Professional Documents
Culture Documents
GSIS vs COA
Facts: GSIS granted several benefits to its
employees. The COA subsequently disallowed
some of them. As a result, the employees had
to return the benefits they received to GSIS.
The law provides that retirement benefits are
exempt from attachment, garnishment, levy,
and execution. Section 39 of RA 8291 exempts
benefits
from
judicial
processes,
and
unconditionally exempts benefits from quasijudicial
and
administrative
processes,
including COA disallowances, as well as all
financial obligations of the member. Hence,
retirement benefits cannot be diminished by
COA disallowances.
Issue: Can the COA Disallowances be deducted
from retirement benefits?
Ruling: Yes. The COA disallowances would have
been deducted from their salaries, had they
not retired before such deductions could be
effected. The respondents then had an
obligation to return the amounts received
under the principle of solutioindebiti. The
delivery of benefits to respondents under an
erroneous interpretaton of the law granting
benefits gave rise to an actionable obligation
for them to return the same.
Under Article 2154 of the Civil COde, if
something is received and unduly delivered
through mistake when there is no right to
demand it, the obligation to return the thing
arises. Payment by reason of mistake in the
construction or application of a doubtful or
difficult question of law also comes within the
scope of solutioindebiti.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case 2
Siga-an v. Villanueva (2009)
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint for sum of
money against petitioner. Respondent claimed
that petitioner approached her inside the
Philippine Navy Office (PNO) and offered to
loan her the amount of P540,000.00 of which
the loan agreement was not reduced in
Philippine
Communications
Satellite
Corporation vs. Globe Telecom, Inc., 429 SCRA
153(2004)
GR No. 147324
Additional Information:
Facts:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Case 3
CA decision
Issue
W/ N MKSE has an obligation to respect the
right of subscription of Campos for the IPOs?
Ruling
Art. 1157 enumerates the sources of
obligations: (1) law, (2) contracts, (3) quasicontracts, (4) acts or omissions punished by
law, (5) quasi-delicts. A pleading (complaint or
petition) must assert the root of the obligation
from these five. They must be ultimate facts to
Akongnakalagdasaibabanito
ay
nagpapatunaynatinanggapkokayGinang LYDIA
BORDADOR
ngCalvario,
Meycauayan,
Bulacanangmgahiyas
(jewelries)
[sic]
nanatatalasaibabanitoupangipagbilikosakapak
ananngnasabingGinang.
Angpagbibilhankosanasabingmgahiyas
ay
akingibibigaysanasabingGinang,
saloobng
__________
araw
at
anghindimabili
ay
akingisasaulisakanyasaloob
din
ngnasabingtaningnapanahonsamabutingkalag
ayankatuladngakingtanggapin.
Angbilangkabayaran o pabuyasa akin ay
anomanghalaganaakingmapalabisnamgahalag
angnakatalasaibabanito.
Ako
ay
walangkarapatangmagpautang o kaya ay
magpalakosaibangtaongnasabingmga hiyas.9
x xxx
Based on the express terms and tenor of the
Kasunduan at Katibayan ,Degaos received
and accepted the items under the obligation to
sell them in behalf of the complainants
("angmgahiyas
(jewelries)
nanatatalasaibabanitoupangipagbilikosakapak
ananngnasabingGinang"), and he would be
compensated with the overprice as his
commission ("Angbilangkabayaran o pabuyasa
akin
ay
anomanghalaganaakingmapalabisnamgahalag
angnakatalasaibabanito.").
Plainly,
the
transaction was a consignment under the
obligation to account for the proceeds of sale,
or to return the unsold items. As such, he was
the agent of the complainants in the sale to
others of the items listed in the Kasunduan at
Katibayan.
In contrast, according the first paragraph of
Article 1458 of the Civil Code, one of the
contracting parties in a contract of sale
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of
and to deliver a determinate thing, while the
other party obligates himself to pay therefor a
price certain in money or its equivalent.
Contrary to the contention of Degaos, there
was no sale on credit to him because the
ownership of the items did not pass to him.
II
Degaos claims that his partial payments to
the complainants novated his contract with
them from agency to loan, thereby converting
FACTS:
The plaintiffs were tenants or lessees of
residential and commercial spaces owned by
defendants in Binondo, Manila. On several
conditions defendants informed the plaintiffs
that they are offering to sell the premises and
are giving them priority to acquire the same
(right of first refusal). During negotiations,
Bobby Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6-million
while plaintiffs made a counter of offer of P5million. Plaintiff then asked the defendants to
put their offer in writing to which the
defendants acceded. In reply to defendants
letter, plaintiffs wrote, asking that they specify
the terms and conditions of the offer to sell.
When the plaintiffs did not receive any reply,
they sent another letter with the same
request. Since defendants failed to specify the
terms and conditions of the offer to sell and
because of information received that the
defendants were about to sell the property,
plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint
to compel defendants to sell the property to
them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Contract of Sale is
perfected by the grant of a Right of First
Refusal?
Case 7
RULING:
No. A Right of First Refusal is not a Perfected
Contract of Sale under Art. 1458 or an option
under Par. 2 Art 1479 or an offer under Art.
1319. In a Right of First Refusal, only the
object of the contract is determinate. This
means that no vinculum juris is created
between the seller-offeror and the buyerofferee the exercise of the right, however,
would be dependent not only on the selleroffers intention to enter into a binding
juridical relation with another but also on
terms, including the price, that obviously are
yet to be later firmed up.
Additional Info:
An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to
do or not to do (Art. 1156, Civil Code). The
obligation is perfected upon the concurrence
of
these
essential
elements:
(a) the vinculum juris or juridical tie which is
the efficient cause established by the various
sources of obligations; (b) the object which is
the prestation or conduct, required to
observed; and (c) the subject-persons who,
HELD:
Issue:
_______________________________________________
Case 8
Asia Development Construction v Philippine
Commercial International Bank
Gr No. 153827 April 25, 2006
Facts:
ASIAKONSTRUKT
obtained
credit
accommodations from PCIBANK amounting to
US$4,487,000.00.
These
credit
accommodations are covered by promissory
notes. Prompt and faithful payment of such
was secured by deeds of assignment executed
by ASIAKONSTRUKT in favor of PCIBANK to
secure payment of the principal amount and
interest and bank charges.
However, the promissory notes were not fully
paid despite their having become due and
demandable and despite repeated verbal and
written
demands
were
made
upon
ASIAKONSTRUKT. It failed and refused to pay
its outstanding obligations to PCIBANK.
On February 1999, respondent PCIBANK filed a
complaint for a sum of money with a prayer
Ruling:
NO. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure, as amended, except as to the
amount of damages, when there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law, summary judgment may be allowed.
Summary or accelerated judgment is a
procedural technique aimed at weeding out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of
litigation thereby avoiding the expense and
loss of time involved in a trial.
Under the Rules, summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues
of fact which call for the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if for them
the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the
affidavits, depositions and admissions show
that such issues are not genuine, then
summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules
must ensue as a matter of law. The
determinative factor in a motion for summary
judgment is the presence or absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact.
_______________________________________________
Case 9
ANSAY vs. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, G.R. NO. L13667,
April
29,
1960.
Facts: This was about the employees of the
National Development Company. They asked
for a 20% Christmas Bonus from 1954-1955.
The demanded Christmas Bonus was not given
in the past.
Issue: WON the company has a legal obligation
to give bonuses?
Ruling: No. A bonus is 1) an act of liberality
and the court has no power to command the
company to be liberal and 2) the employees
themselves admit that the company has no
legal obligation to give them bonuses, but the
Case 12
SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA,
plaintiffs vs. JOSE BALCE, defendant
G.R. No. L-14414. 27 April 1960.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facts:
Case 13
METROPOLITAN
BANK
AND
TRUST
COMPANY vs. ANA GRACE ROSALES AND
YO YUK TO
Issue:
Whether defendant can be held subsidiary
liable to pay the indemnity of Ps2, 000.00
which his son was sentenced to pay in the
criminal case filed against him
Ruling:
YES. The particular law that governs this case
is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which
provides: "The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children who
lived in their company." To hold that this
provision does not apply to the instant case
because it only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in
the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother
may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
caused by his or her son, no liability would
attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in
the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this
particular provision of our Civil Code, as may
be gleaned from some recent decisions of this
Court which cover equal or identical cases.
Ruling
JOINT ACCOUNT
x xxx
Notes:
***Application
and
Agreement
Deposit Account reads:
for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case 14
Joseph Saludaga v. FEU and Edilberto De
Jesus, his capacity as the President of
FEU
GR 179337. 2008
FACTS: Saludaga was accidentally shot by
Rosete, a security guard employed by FEU
under the security agency named Galaxy.
Saludaga was brought to the hospital while
Rosete was brought to the hospital. Due to
lack of charges against Rosete, the police
ISSUE:
Who is liable for the damages which the Court
will pronounce?
RULING:
The Court held that FEU is solidarily liable for
the damages incurred by Saludaga. FEU must
pay
for
the
hospital
bills
with
the
corresponding interest declared; temperate
damages; moral damages; attorneys fess and
litigation expenses. De Jesus is not liable since
he is not part the exceptions when an
individual is attached to the liabilities of the
corporation.1
Since Galaxy provided FEU with an unqualified
security guard, they are made liable to the
damages that FEU pays to Saludaga. Imperial,
the president of Galaxy, is solidarily liable
because the Court finds it that he was grossly
negligent with managing the security agency.
Imperial also assured Saludaga that Galaxy
will
shoulder
the
payments
for
his
hospitalization but it was not fulfilled.
ADDITIONAL INFO: DILI NI QUASI-DELICT
NA CASE; MORE ON KINSA DYUD ANG
NAAY TULUBAGON AKA LIABILITY FOR
THE DAMAGES. So, GALAXY AND IMPERIAL
kay liable to FEU (without de Jesus). In turn,
FEU kay liable to Saludaga.
The
moment
that
an
academic
institution
accepts
students
for
enrollment, a contract is established
between them. There is a bilateral
obligation since the school provides the
student with education which he might
find useful later in his life while the
student
follows
the
academic
FACTS:
In the year 1987, the National Power
Corporation (NPC) filed with the MTC Quezon
Cruz vs Tuazon
As requested by the family of TelesforoDeudor,
Cruz
(petitioner)
made
permanent
improvements on the said land having an area
of more or less 20 quinones. In 1952, Tuason&
Co. availed of Cruz services as an
intermediary with the Deudors, to work for the
amicable settlement in a civil case. The said
case involved 50 quiones of land, of which the
20 quiones of formed part of the land. On
1963, a compromise agreement between the
Deudors and Tuason& Co. was entered and
was approved by court. Cruz alleged that
Tuason& Co. promised to convey him the
3,000 sq. meters of land occupied by him
which was part of the 20 quiones of land
within 10 years from the date of signing of the
compromise agreement between the Deudors
and the latter as consideration of his services.
The land was not conveyed to him by Tuason&
Co. Cruz further alleged that Tuason& Co. was
unjustly enriched at his expense since they
enjoyed the benefits of the improvements he
made on the land acquired by the latter.
Ruling:
ART. 2142. Certain lawful voluntary and
unilateral acts give rise to the juridical
relation of quasi-contract to the end that no
one shill be unjustly enriched or benefited
at the expense of another.
1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case 17
SAME CASE, ASUNCION V. CA
Issue:
1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case 18
SORRY, WALA.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case 19
SORRY, WALA.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case 20
PERLA
COMPANIA
DE
SEGUROS,
INC.,
petitioner,vs.
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
MILAGROS
CAYAS
FACTS:
Milagros
Cayas
was
the
registered owner of a Mazda bus
which
was
insured
with
Perla
Compania
de
Seguros,
Inc.
(PCSI).On
December
17,
1978,
the
bus figured in an accident in Naic,
Cavite.19-year
old
Edgardo
Perea,
sued Cayas for damages; while three
others, namely: Rosario del Carmen,
Ricardo
Magsarili
and
Charlie
Antolin, agreed to a settlement of
P4,000.00
each
with
Cayas.At
the
pre-trial,
Cayas
failed
to
appear
and hence, she was declared as in
default.
The
court
rendered
a
decision
in
favor
of
Perea.Consequently,
Cayas
filed
a
complaint for a sum of money as it
was
within
its
contractual
liability
under
the
insurance
policy,and
damages against PCSI in the Court
of
First
Instance
of
Cavite.The
court ordered
PCSI to pay Cayas
P50,000
as
compensation
for
the
injured passengers, P5,000 as moral
damages and P5,000 as attorney's
fees.PCSI appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which, affirmed in toto the
lower
court's
decision.
Its
motion
for
reconsideration
having
been
denied
by
said
appellate
court,
PCSI
filed
the
instant
petition
seeking to limit its liability only to
the
payment
made
by
private
respondent to Perea and only up to
the
amount
of
P12,000.00;
and
denying
liability
for
the
payments
made by to the other 3 injured
passengers.
ISSUE:
WON
PCSI
reimburse Cayas the
by
lower
is
liable
to
amount ordered
court.
RULING:No.The
insurance
policy
involved
explicitly
limits
petitioner's
liability to P12,000 per person and
to P50,000 per accident.In the case
at bar, the insurance policy clearly
and
categorically
placed
petitioner's liability for all damages
arising out of death or bodily injury
sustained by one person as a result
of
any
one
accident
at
P12,000.00.Under
the
law,Section
377 of Presidential Decree No. 612
(which
was
retained
by
P.D.
No.
1460, the Insurance Code of 1978),
the minimum liability is P12,000 per
passenger.
Petitioner's
liability
under
the
insurance
contract
not
being
less
than
P12,000.00,
and
therefore
not
contrary
to
law,
morals, good customs, public order
or
public
policy,
said
stipulation
must be upheld as effective, valid
and
binding
as
between
the
parties.It
being
specifically
required
that
petitioner's
written
consent be first secured before any
payment in settlement of any claim
could be made, private respondent
is
precluded
from
seeking
reimbursement
of
the
payments
made to del Carmen, Magsarili and
Antolin in view of her failure to
comply with the condition contained
in
the
insurance
policy.
Clearly,
the
fundamental
principle
that contracts are respected as the
law between the contracting parties
finds
application
in
the
present
case.
The
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals is hereby modified in that
petitioner shall pay Milagros Cayas
the
amount
of
Twelve
Thousand
Pesos
(P12,000.
00)
plus
legal
interest
from
the
promulgation
of
the decision of the lower court until
it is fully paid and attorney's fees
in the amount of P5,000.00.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case 21
LEUNG BEN VS. P. J. OBRIEN
FACTS: On December 12, 1917, an action was
instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila by P.J. OBrien to recover the sum of
P15,000 alleged to have been lost by Leung
Ben to the defendant in a series of gambling,
banking, and percentage games conducted
during the two or three months prior to the
institution of the suit. The plaintiff asked for an
attachment against the property of the
defendant, on the ground that the latter was
about to depart from the Philippines with
intent
to
defraud
his
creditors.
This
attachment was issued and the sheriff
attached the sum of P15,000 which had been
deposited by the OBrien with the International
Banking Corporation. The provision of law
ISSUE:
Did the lower court correctly dismiss
the complaint on the sole ground that there
was another action pending between the same
parties
for
the
same
cause?
RULING:
No. The present case (civil case No.
9221) stemmed from a criminal case in which
the driver of the defendant was found guilty of
multiple
homicide
through
reckless
imprudence and was ordered to pay an
indemnity of P2,000 for which the defendant
was made subsidiarily liable under article 103
of the Revised Penal Code. While the other
case (civil case No. 8023) was an action for
damages based on culpa aquiliana which
underlies the civil liability predicated on
articles 1902 to 1910 of the old Civil Code.
These two cases involved two different
remedies. As this court aptly said: "Aquasidelict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code, with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that
is entirely apart and independent from a delict
or crime. * * *. A distinction exists between the
civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for cuasi-delictos or culpa extracontractual. The same negligent act causing
damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, or create an action for cuasidelito or culpa extra-contractual under articles
1902-1910
of
the
Civil
Code.
It was a mistake to say that the
present action should be dismissed, because
of the pendency of another action between the
same parties involving the same cause.
Evidently, both cases involved different causes
of action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case 24
SORRY, WALA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case 25
Elcano vs Hill
77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977
Article 1162 Obligations arising from quasi
delicts
FACTS: Reginald Hill, a minor, legally married
but living with his father, Atty. Marvin Hill with
whom he was getting subsistence, killed
AgapitoElcano. After due trial, Reginald was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake." Thus, Spouses Elcano
appealed, filing a civil action against Reginald
and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued
that the civil action is barred by his sons
acquittal in the criminal case; and that his civil
liability as a parent has been extinguished by
the fact that his son is already an emancipated
minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the present civil action for
damages is already barred by the acquittal of
Reginald.
(2) Whether or not Atty. Marvin Hill has a
vicarious liability being the father of a minor
child who committed a delict.
HELD: No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delicts, hence the acquittal is not a
bar to the instant action against him. To find
the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required unlike in
civil cases, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient. The concept of culpa acquiliana
includes acts which are criminal in character or
in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary
or negligent. Also, Art 2177 CC provides that
Responsibility for fault or negligence is
separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
However, plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission.
While it is true that parental authority is
terminated upon emancipation of the child
(ART 327CC), and under Art 397, emancipation
takes place by marriage of the minor, such
emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald
although married, was living with his father
and still dependent from the latter. ART 2180
ISSUE:
Was private respondent entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which
defines
a
quasi-delict
thus:
Is Valenzuela
negligence?
guilty
of
contributory
HELD
1
Case 27
VALENZUELA V CA
FACTS: The case involves an action to recover
damages based on quasi-delict. Valenzuela,
plaintiff, was driving a Mitsubishi Lancer
heading towards Manila. Before reaching A.
Lake St., she noticed something was wrong
with her tires so she stopped at a lighted place
where there were people. After verifying that
her rear right tire was flat, she parked along
the sidewalk, put her emergency lights on,
alighted from the car and opened her trunk for
tools. She was suddenly bumped by another
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Li, defendant hired
by Alexander Commercial Inc., whose impact
threw Valenzuela against the windshield of the
Lis car. Her left leg was severed up to the
middle of her thigh with only some skin and
sucle connected to the rest of her body. She
was
RAILROAD
CO.,
plaintiff-
vs.
LA
COMPAIA
defendant-appellee.
THE ATLANTIC GULF
defendant-appellant.
TRANSATLANTICA,
&
PACIFIC
CO.,
Facts:
The Manila Railroad Company had two
locomotive boilers in the steamship Alicante
which belongs to the CompaiaTransatlantica
de Barcelona (Steamship Company). Because
their
equipment
was
insufficient,
the