Economic and Political Weekly

LETTERS
Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been Indias premier journal for
comment on current affairs
and research in the social sciences.
It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949-1965),
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
As editor for thirty-five years (1969-2004)
Krishna Raj
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys.
editor
Paranjoy Guha Thakurta

EXECUTIVE Editor
aniket Alam
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Editor: Paranjoy Guha Thakurta.
Evergreen Revolution
his is with reference to the article

Agriculture Is Injurious to Health
by Atul Deulgaonkar and Anjali Joshi
(EPW, 7 May 2016). If we do not have
appropriate technology, natural resources
are of no value. Indian agriculture is
immensely technology deficit and average
yields are below the best in the world.
Egypt has the highest average yield of
paddy with 100 q/ha whereas Indias
average yield is 31.95 q/ha. In Israel, maize
yields are 251.8 q/ha against Indias
20.02 q/ha. Several modern technologies
are available to push the yield frontiers,
utilise inputs more efficiently and diversify
to more sustainable and higher value cropping patterns. The excessive use of chemical fertilisers has turned verdant lands
poisonous and indiscriminate use of pesticides has played havoc with the environment and human health. Nano technology
can be used in agriculture in promoting
soil fertility and balanced crop nutrition
and effective weed control. The nanosized silver particles can be used commercially as antimicrobial agents in a
relatively safer way than, say, fungicides.
An array of resource conservation technologies, including zero and reduced tillage,
green manuring, crop rotations, etc, is
now available.
The system of rice intensification has
emerged as an alternative to conventional rice growing methods since it uses
less water for considerably higher yields.
Plant scientists are now using genetically
modified organism technologies to create
drought-tolerant and pest-resistant plant
varieties. Precision farming involving
efficient use of scarce resources is
already widespread in high-income
countries. India is strong in the area of
remotesensing technologies which can
be used extensively for assessing natural
resources, land degradation, water resources as well as to predict crop yields,
among other things.
The Green Revolution that we accomplished in the 1960s and 1970s can be converted into an evergreen revolution
only if there is a paradigm shift in our
research and development in agriculture.
A P J Abdul Kalam, the former President
of India, aptly said that modern technologies integrated with agriculture and
agro-food industry will revolutionise this
sector and produce large-scale employment and thereby wealth. It is time we
put this into practice.
Jaydev Jana
Kolkata
Information on Polio Cases
he National Polio Surveillance Project

(NPSP) is currently the only agency
or organisation which collects information regarding any child up to the age
of 15 years who develops paralysis, is
labelled as acute flaccid paralysis (AFP)
case and is investigated to establish the
cause of paralysis. Each case entails a
physical examination; two samples of
faecal matter are collected within two
weeks of onset of paralysis and sent to
the reference laboratories for isolation
of wild polio virus. A follow-up is done
after 60 days of onset of the disease.
Then the index case is labelled as either
non-polio and discarded or categorised.
The number of vaccine associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) cases has never
been disclosed in AFP Alert, a monthly
newsletter of the NPSP or the weekly
report on its website.
The last polio case by wild poliovirus
labelled as a confirmed polio case was reported on 13 January 2011. In March 2014
India was declared a polio-free country. In
the 1 March 2014 report, Table 1 showed
that in 2013 there were 54,846 AFP cases,
no confirmed polio case, five vaccinederived polioviruses (VDPV) cases, 17
polio compatible cases, 52,993 had been
discarded as non-polio, and 1,831 were
still pending, that is, under investigation.
Later the number of polio compatible
cases rose to 23. Since then the NPSP has
stopped publishing the weekly report on
its website www.npspindia.org/.
On 10 February 2016 I had sought
information under the right to information (RTI) regarding the number of
VAPP, polio compatible and VDPV cases
which had occurred in India from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2015. The
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
Immunisation Division, Government of
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
Economic & Political Weekly
LETTERS
India No Z33013/02/2016-Imm/dated
8 March 2016 stated:
(1) Please refer to your RTI application
dated 10 February 2016 seeking information under the RTI Act 2005. In this
regard, it is informed that no data on
polio compatible case/cases with VAPPs is
maintained by this ministry. The data on
polio compatible case/cases with VAPPs
is maintained by WHO and uploaded on
its website from time to time.
(2) In case you are not satisfied with the
reply an appeal can be made to the
Director (RCH), Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare, who is the appellate
authority in this matter.
On 18 March 2016, I had sent a memorandum to the appellate authority where
I had pointed out: Surprisingly Ministry
of Health & Family Welfare is not aware
of the fact that NPSP has stopped displaying figures regarding polio cases
since India had been declared polio free.
NPSP has never posted number of VAPP
cases on its website. Moreover it has now
removed the information regarding past
polio incidence. Still the Ministry has
advised the author to check WHO Website.
The response from the appellate authority on 8 April 2016 stated, Having
considered the appeal of the appellant
and the record available, I am of the considered view that the requisite information in respect of Immunisation Division
as available and admissible under the
RTI Act 2005 has already been provided
to the appellant by the CPIO (Central
Public Information Officer). In the light
of above, the appeal of the appellant
under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act 2005
wrt Immunisation stand disposed of.
The appellate authority had stated further: If the appellant is not satisfied
with this order, he may appeal to the
Central Information Commission......
I was fully satisfied that the Ministry
of Health and Family Welfare is not
hiding any information, as it has admitted
that it has no information regarding
polio cases caused by oral polio vaccine
though this information was available to
the public on the WHO/NPSP website.
The ministry is also not aware of the fact
that the NPSP has not only stopped posting AFP data since India has been
declared polio-free, but also removed
EPW
may 28, 2016
the past data from its website. Thus, I

found no reason to approach the Central
Information Commission.
Yash Paul
Jaipur
Science on Television
seudoscience is embraced, it might be

argued, in exact proportion as real
science is misunderstood. If you have
never heard of science (to say nothing of
how it works), you can hardly be aware
that you are embracing pseudoscience.
How satisfying it would be, as in folklore
and childrens stories, to fulfil our hearts
desire just by wishing. How seductive this
notion is, especially when compared with
the hard work and good luck usually required to achieve our hopes. The enchanted
fish or the genie from the lamp will grant
us three wishesanything we want except
for more wishes. Who has not pondered
just to be on the safe side, just in case we
ever come upon and accidentally rub an
old, squat brass oil lampwhat to ask for?
Pseudoscience speaks to powerful
emotional needs that science often leave
unfulfilled. It caters to fantasies about
personal powers we lack and long for. In
some of its manifestations, it offers satisfaction of spiritual hungers, cures for disease, promises that death is not the end.
It is easier to contrive than science, because
distracting confrontations with reality
where we cannot control the outcome
of the comparisonsare more readily
avoided. The standards of argument,
what passes for evidence, are much more
relaxed. In part for these same reasons,
it is much easier to present pseudoscience
to the general public than science. This
explains why witchcraft, black magic,
superstition among a host of other pseudoscience channels thrive on Indian
television at its prime-time.
Late last year, the Broadcasting Content
Complaints Council (BCCC) sent an advisory to ZEE, Colours, Sun TV and MAA
TV advising them to exercise caution
while putting out programmes on occult,

superstitions, black magic, exorcism,
witchcraft, especially in the portrayal of
women in a negative manner on air.
Multiple television shows depict victims
of witch-hunting as old or widowed
women, or portray churels as antagonists
who cause mysterious accidents. The BCCC
cited multiple states that witnessed a
rise in killings as a result of various
social evils, most particularly witchcraft,
practised by people inspired by superstitions, as the reason for the restrictive
viewing advisory.
What we almost never findin public
libraries or prime-time television programmesis the evidence from seafloor
spreading or plate tectonics, and from
mapping the ocean floor which shows
quite unmistakably that there could
have been no continent between Europe
and America on anything like the timescale proposed (Carl Sagans The Demon
Haunted World: Science as a Candle in
the Dark). Spurious accounts that snare
the gullible are readily available.
The consequences of scientific illiteracy
are far more dangerous in our time than
in any time that has come before. It is
perilous and foolhardy for the average
citizen to remain ignorant about global
warming, say, or, ozone depletion, air
pollution, acid rain, exponential population growth, etc. It is enormously easier
to present, in an appealing way, the wisdom distilled from centuries of patient
and collective interrogation of Nature
than to detail the messy distillation apparatus. The method of science, as stodgy
and grumpy as it may seem, is far more
important than the findings of science.
And it is worse for prime-time television
to continue getting in the way, providing
easy answers, dodging sceptical scrutiny,
casually pressing our awe buttons and
cheapening the experience, making us
routine and comfortable practitioners as
well as victims of credulity.
Arjun Joshi
Ahmedabad
Web Exclusives
The following article has been published in the past week in the Web Exclusives section of the EPW website.
The Pandit QuestionsVinayak Razdan, Michael Thomas
Articles posted before 21 May 2016 remain available in the Web Exclusives section.
vol lI no 22
LETTERS
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320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013, India
Email: edit@epw.in, epw.mumbai@gmail.com
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
may 28, 2016
Can the Congress Recover?

Its dismal state is reason for despondency, as India needs a strong opposition.
s the Indian National Congress, which has ruled the country

for all but roughly 14 years since August 1947, in a state of
terminal decline? The staunchest supporter of the Congress
will surely acknowledge that the party is today weaker than it
has ever beenarguably ever since it was established in
December 1885. This question, raised many times in the past,
acquires relevance in the wake of the partys electoral defeat in
Assam and Kerala. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) would like
us to believe that we are moving inexorably towards a Congressmukt Bharat. But there could be a difference between perception and reality.
The Congress, which used to boast that it was not just the worlds
largest political party (bigger than the Chinese Communist Party)
but had a presence in each and every one of the more than six
lakh villages in the country, has fallen and risen on a number of
occasions. But each time it bounced back, it has found it difficult
to return to its earlier peak. Each new trough has touched a nadir,
the last being the 2014 Lok Sabha elections when the partys
share of the total vote crashed below the 20% mark for the first
time and the number of MPs (Members of Parliament) owing
allegiance to it in the Lok Sabha plummeted to just 44. So can
the Congress descend to even lower depths after the 17th general elections scheduled to take place in AprilMay 2019? Much
depends on the performance of the Narendra Modi government
over the coming three years. Still, the party led by Sonia Gandhi
currently seems to be at a complete loss as to what strategies it
should adopt to rejuvenate itself. It is helplessly hoping the BJP
government will self-destruct. And the not-so-young vice president of the partyRahul Gandhi turns 46 on 19 Juneremains
as diffident as he has always been to lead the Congress in the
way a dynamic leader of the biggest opposition party should.
Two decades after independence and the fourth general elections in 1967, the Congress lost power for the first time in nine
states across the country (Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar,
Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa, Madras and Kerala). A
popular adage of the time used to be that a person could travel
from East Pakistan to West Pakistan without crossing a single
Congress-ruled territory. Indira Gandhi split the party twice,
marginalised the so-called conservative sections, became the
proverbial high command and rode the crest of a victorious
wave after the birth of Bangladesh in 1971. Many argue that her
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
weakness for her younger son Sanjay and the fall of her authoritarian Emergency regime in March 1977 marked the beginning
of the end of the Congress. Yet, she was back in power less than
three years later. After her assassination in October 1984, her
older son Rajiv led the party to its biggest-ever victory with a
vote share of 48% and with the number of Congress MPs in the
Lok Sabha touching the three-fourths mark. Never had his
mother or his grandfather Jawaharlal Nehru enjoyed such popular support. Five years later, the Congress was out of power.
For nearly six years after Rajiv Gandhis assassination in May
1991, his widow Sonia remained out of active politics. She
shunned power in May 2004 when the Congress formed the
central government after a gap of eight years. Yet, for a decade
thereafter, she not only headed the party but was the most influential person in the country. Technically, in the five and half
decades the Congress has been in power, a member of the
GandhiNehru family has led the union government in New
Delhi for all but six years (that is, the periods when Lal Bahadur
Shastri and P V Narasimha Rao served as prime ministers). So,
how far has the stranglehold of the dynasty contributed to the
decline of the Congress? This is not an easy question to answer.
What can be asserted without fear of contradiction is that the
Congress system of government, as described by political
scientist Rajni Kothari, has shown distinct signs of decay for
quite a few decades now. The strength of the Congress was that
it was a coalition within a party and could justifiably claim to
represent all sections of what is the worlds most diverse nation
state. This began to break down after 1984, when the attack on
the Golden Temple and the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi later that
year alienated many Sikhs. Muslims were disillusioned with the
partys secular credentials after the demolition of the Babri
Masjid in December 1992. And from the mid-1990s, large sections
of Adivasis, Dalits and intermediate castes began switching
their allegiance towards parties like the BJP, the Bahujan Samaj
Party and the Samajwadi Party. Its perceived left-liberal and
pro-poor image was dented following the advent of economic
liberalisation in 1991. The great banyan tree that included in its
shaded canopy diverse shades of ideological opinion was
becoming a shadow of its former self.
Between 1996 and 2004, even as the country went through a
phase of coalition politics and the power of regional political
7
EDITORIALS
forces grew, the Congress continued to delude itself into believing it was the natural party of governance. As corruption and
venality ate into its vitals, party functionaries failed to read the
writing on the wall. There is little indication from the party
leadership that it comprehends what has happened. Will the
Congress eventually get its act together and under whose leadership? These are open questions. What is clear is that it is incapable at present of leading an anti-BJP alliance. Indian democracy needs a strong opposition more than ever before. And the
dismal state of the Congress is cause for much despondency.
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
EDITORIALS
Spectre of Debt
Public banks must develop mechanisms for better governance and improved lending strategies.
inancial liberalisation has done two things to the lending

strategies of public sector banks (PSBs). One, it increased
the share of retail credit assets in total assets such as credit
card advances, housing and personal loans; in short, it financed
borrowed consumption expenditure. The other, financing infrastructure through government-enforced pressure on public banks.
The reason for the latter was twofold: an inadequate corporate
bond market and the unwillingness of private players to deploy
their own capital for long-term financing of infrastructural projects; and the governments reluctance to invest in infrastructure
given its fiscal commitments. The result was reliance on public
private partnerships for financing infrastructure projects.
The boom of 200408 was largely driven by private investments
in infrastructure that led to an acceleration in Indias gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rate. The burden of financing these
projects fell on the PSBs. These banks are now facing the downside of loan exposures, with alarming ratios of non-performing
assets (NPAs) as a proportion of total advances.
Recent estimates by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) show that
stressed assets, that is, gross NPAs, restructured standard assets,
and written-off accounts for the banking system as a whole,
which stood at 9.8% at the end of March 2012, moved up to 14.5%
by the end of December 2015. During the same period, the
stressed assets of the PSBs increased from 11% to 17.7% of total
advances. To put the figure in perspective, this adds up to almost
the sacrosanct fiscal deficit target of the government. There is strong
likelihood that the proportion of NPAs in stressed assets will rise
in the near future if the already restructured loans of the PSBs
become NPAs, given the overall macroeconomic situation of the
country and a year and half of falling exports. This severely impairs the profits of banks; many state-owned banks have recorded
lossesat the quarter ended March 2016, the Punjab National
Bank noted a record loss of `5,367 crore. The cumulative losses of
20 PSBs stood at `14,283 in the fourth quarter of 201516 against
a profit of `3,918 in the same quarter of the previous year.
The Financial Stability Report of the RBI points to a high
share of infrastructure-related debt in the stressed assets of
PSBs. Mining, iron and steel, infrastructure and aviation in total
advances of the PSBs stood at 25.1% in December 2014; the proportion should have increased since. Their share in the stressed
assets held by the PSBs was a much higher 45.5%, of which
30.9% was accounted for by infrastructure alone, with power
generation accounting for 17.3%. An internal report by Credit
Suisse Bank titled House of Debt first released in 2012 highlighted
8
the borrowing spree of 10 leading Indian companies, many of

them infrastructure firms. In more recent versions, the report
showed how these companies were overleveraged with rising
debtequity ratios. This raised concerns for the government. Bad
governance, cost overruns, stalled projects, and pricing constraints
have affected the viability of many of the companies involved.
Studies have pointed out that there are a few bad apples in the
basket; the corporate sector as a whole is not overleveraged. In
fact, it is these aforementioned four sectors, along with textiles,
that account for more than half of the stressed assets of banks.
A related issue, which drew much attention in the media, was
instances of wilful defaults. Even as the RBI was chary at first
naming wilful defaulters, and has now agreed to disclose the
big names, media portals have listed the top 10 wilful defaulters, including the now infamous king of good times, Vijay
Mallya. The top-10 list kept changing with each new set of information that came out. Estimates of wilful defaults range from
`56,000 crore to `5,00,000 crore, but no official estimates have
been released by the RBI.
The RBIs push for banks to clean up their balance sheets to
meet the Basel III capital adequacy norms has also increased the
visibility of NPAs. The RBI made banks undergo asset quality
reviews to clean up their books of account as a result of which it
found that almost half of the lenders stressed assets had not
been reported. Earlier, restructuring by extension of maturity,
conversion of debt to equity or a cut in interest rates permitted
stressed assets to be recorded as standard restructured assets, but
the RBIs tightening of norms for classification of assets as nonperforming has brought into focus the magnitude of the problem.
With inadequate budgetary allocations made for recapitalisation,
the governments position on raising capital through equity
sales for banks would in effect mean privatisation of the public
banking system. The gains of public banking, as global experience
has made clear, are too precious to be caught in the narrative of
inevitable privatisation. Private banking brings with it problematic
incentive structures, as the sub-prime crisis in the United States
has shown, and even in India, it is still depositors and the general
public who end up bearing the risks. Indias PSBs, which are relatively risk-averse, have so far been able to insulate the countrys
financial systems from global financial shocks. Even as financial
liberalisation has forced banks to fuel the credit- and infrastructureled growth of the last decade, it is imperative that they develop
better governance practices and improve their lending strategies.
It is also imperative that corporates pay their dues.
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
EDITORIALS
Killing Them Silently

Compensating workers dying of silicosis is an important legal breakthrough.
he 4 May direction by the Supreme Court in an ongoing

case on occupational health hazards and compensation
to affected persons is significant in many respects. The
Court has directed the Gujarat government to immediately pay
an amount of `3 lakh each to the next of kin of 238 workers
who died after contracting silicosis. It has also asked the Madhya
Pradesh (MP) government to compensate 304 workers who are
afflicted with the disease and unable to work.
Silicosis is a deadly occupational disease, a silent killer. Exposure to fine silica dust in mining, construction, stone crushing,
gem cutting and other such industries impairs lung function,
leaving people vulnerable to diseases like tuberculosis (TB). As a
result, it is difficult to establish causality between early onset of
silicosis and death due to TB. Most of the people employed in
such industries are already very poor and undernourished and
work without any protective gear. Although silicosis is recognised as an occupational disease in India and listed as a notified
disease under the Mines Act, 1952 and the Factories Act, 1948,
rarely have workers succeeded in proving that illness or death
was caused by exposure to silica dust.
The Supreme Courts direction is noteworthy not just for ordering
compensation and rehabilitation but also for exposing the indifference of authorities to act even when ordered to do so. In this
case, the workers who died were poor Adivasis who had migrated
from Alirajpur and Jhabua districts in MP to work in the quartz
and stone-crushing industries in Godhra and Balasinor in
neighbouring Gujarat. When they returned to MP, 238 died from
silicosis and TB and 304 continue to suffer. In 2006, the Peoples
Rights and Social Research Centre moved the Supreme Court
on behalf of these workers. It had also appealed to the NHRC
(National Human Rights Commission) to look into the issue.
After a fairly extensive investigation, the NHRC presented a
special report on silicosis to Parliament. It emphasised that
death and injury resulting from silicosis was both a health and a
human rights issue. It also noted that under Employees State
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
Insurance Act (ESIA) and Workmens Compensation Act, silicosis

is accepted as an injury for which workers can seek compensation.
The NHRC made several specific and important recommendations such as making a half-yearly occupational health survey
mandatory, a medical examination of workers exposed to silica
dust and implementation of dust control methods developed by
the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH). It also suggested a separate silicosis board in each state (Odisha already
has one) and recommended that silicosis control be integrated into
the Revised National Tuberculosis Control Programme (RNTCP).
On all counts, silicosis and its impact on workers is a serious
problem that must be addressed. But the response of the two
state governments in this particular case is symptomatic of the
callousness that governments and industry display towards
workers health and rights. The Gujarat government argued that as
these were casual workers, they were not entitled to compensation under ESIA. It also claimed that as they were from MP, it
was not responsible for them. The apex court has rightly dismissed these excuses and asked the Gujarat government to pay
the compensation within a stipulated time frame.
Whether this order will set a precedent depends on much else
that must change. The case has exposed the indifference of the
institutions that ought to respond to workers facing occupational
hazards. The Gujarat government, for instance, chose to hide behind legalese rather than accepting the NHRCs order. Even the
Central Pollution Control Board, tasked to monitor hazardous industries, had to be compelled to attend the apex courts proceedings
after being threatened with bailable arrest warrants against its
officials. It is this apathy that is as responsible for the death of
workers as the silica dust. Also, given the current dominant sensibility, when any regulation or measure that ensures safety for
workers is viewed as a hurdle in the path of speedy economic
development, and the ease of doing business, the chances of
this case, or the courts direction, making a long-term difference
are fairly slim.
EDITORIALS
First Published in 1966
To mark 50 years of EPW, each week in 2016 will

present an extract from our archives.
Vol XXIII, No 22
may 28, 1988
SOUTH ASIA
Exporting Freedom Fighters

The practice of harbouring secessionist terrorists
of neighbouring countries is becoming a leverage
in the hands of the states in their bilateral relations in the sub-continent. Pakistan sheltering
Khalistani terrorists and the Afghan Mujahideens,
India protecting the Chakma tribal rebels of
Bangladesh and the Sri Lankan Tamil militants,
Bangladesh harbouring till recently the Mizo
secessionists, and even now the Tripura National
EPW
may 28, 2016
Volunteers, Nepal becoming a haven for the

Gorkha National Liberation Front, are all instances of direct or indirect encouragement of
terror by these states as a means of political action
abroad, to further their respective interests.
... But such a policy of encouraging terrorism
or exporting freedom fighters abroad as a means
of political leverage, could boomerang and turn
against the government itself. As we have seen,
hardly any of these states in the sub-continent is
free from internal discontent and secessionist
strifes. Pakistan has its share in the form of the
Baluchi guerilla movement and the rising Sindhi
nationalism. By harbouring all these years the Tamil guerillas, India had been doing exactly what
it is now blaming Pakistan for. The Khalistani terrorists had taken a leaf out of the LTTE book.
... While the seedbed of the Khalistani movement lies within Indianourished by the socioeconomic fallout of the Green Revolution, the
vol lI no 22
selfish politicking of the Akali Dal and Congress(l)

factionsPakistani encouragement does indeed
help the movement. The recent three-day talks
between the home secretaries of India and Pakistan
in Delhi were primarily held at Indias initiative.
While the Indian press had quite predictably publicised the Indian point of viewevidence of training camps in Pakistan, flow of arms from Pakistan,
protection given to the Khalistani intruders by the
Pakistan Rangers, etcit left out what the Pakistani officials had to say. The latter were reported
to have given their Indian counterparts a detailed
report about Indian interferenceproviding shelter to Sindhi and Baluchi dissidents in India, encouraging of smuggling across the borders, etc.
Since neither Pakistan nor India can claim to have
clean hands in this mater [sic], is it not better that they
stop raising a hue and cry about foreign hands and
start looking within to make serious attempts to solve
their internal problems of uneven development?
STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
Nuclear Retaliation Options

Debates on Nuclear Doctrine
Ali Ahmed
The debate on nuclear retaliation

options has been hijacked
by realists, with even the
liberal security perspective
marginalised. Engagement with
the issue by nuclear abolitionists
is called for, lest the impression of
a consensus develops around the
realist offering of unacceptable
damage that promises
nothing but genocide, a global
environmental disaster and
national suicide in its wake.
he last thrust for the revision of

Indias nuclear doctrine was in
the run-up to the national elections of 2014, when the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) manifesto stated that the
party intended to [s]tudy in detail
Indias nuclear doctrine, and revise and
update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times (BJP 2014: 39).
The latest impulse towards reviewing
the nuclear doctrine was in April at a
seminar of the Indian Pugwash Society
(2016), incongruously organised at the
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi (Indian Pugwash Society
2016).
In discussions on Indias nuclear doctrine, there is a consensus on the need
for periodic review. While on this count
most agree that a review of the current
doctrine adopted in January 2003 by the
Cabinet Committee on Security (Prime
Ministers Office 2003) is long overdue,
disagreement is over two issues. First,
whether the no first use (NFU) posture
should be retained, and second, if NFU
stays, what is the best manner of retaliation, not only to deter, but also to follow
through in case deterrence fails to work.
While agreeing on the need for review
and for continuing with retaliation only
doctrine of the National Security Advisory Board (Ministry of External Affairs
1999), this article questions the nuclear
retaliation options under discussion.
Higher-order Retaliation
Ali Ahmed (aliahd66@gmail.com) blogs on

national security issues at www.ali-writings.
blogspot.in.
10
Nuclear retaliation options can be classified according to the levels of retaliation

envisaged: higher-order and lower-order
retaliatory options. Higher-order options,
in turn, are pitched at two levels: massive and unacceptable damage. The
term massive figures in the 2003 doctrine (Prime Ministers Office 2003). Its
progeny, the 1999 draft nuclear doctrine
favoured punitive retaliation, presumably with lesser warhead weight and

numbers, to inflict damage unacceptable to the enemy (Ministry of External
Affairs 1999).
Higher-order nuclear retaliation votaries rely on arguments from the early
nuclear era in South Asia. Then, India
had only a few bombs in the basement and
rudimentary delivery capability. Deterrence was understandably based on
dropping these on cities. India was constrained to go in for countervalue targeting, colloquially called unacceptable
damage. This phrase has since become
a mantra, though much water has flown
down both the Ganga and the Indus.
Today, India has moved from a defensive conventional military doctrine based
on counteroffensives by strike corps, to
an offensive doctrine envisaging proactive offensive operations by both, borderguarding pivot corps and offensive
strike corps. Indias conventional war
doctrinenot explicitly one for limited
war (Ahmed 2014: 71)has the potential to nudge Pakistans nuclear redlines.
In effect, India is to kick off the conventional war in double quick time, even as
Pakistan promises to reach early for the
nuclear button.
Under the current nuclear doctrine,
this would trigger massive retaliation.
Its expansive interpretation involves both
countervalue and counterforce targeting, while a more moderate interpretation restricts itself to only countervalue
targeting (Nagal 2015). Pakistans nuclear
warheads, now numbering in the lower
three digits, confer on it a second-strike
capability or ability to strike back even
in the case of a higher-order attack on it.
With both states having second-strike
capability in terms of number of warheads that would survive a higher-order
strike, India and Pakistan are now at a
stage of mutual assured destruction
(MAD) (Kidwai and Lavoy 2015: 4).
Taken together, the tonnage involved in
the retaliatory exchanges would result in
an environmental disaster on a global
scale. Clearly, massive is unthinkable,
and a review to excise it from the nuclear
doctrine is indeed overdue.
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
The favoured option to replace the

guiding formulationmassiveis unacceptable damage or retaliation with
sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict
destruction and punishment that the
aggressor will find unacceptable (Ministry of External Affairs 1999). While the
phrase already figures in the doctrine
(Prime Ministers Office 2003), its votaries wish it to have pride of place through
a review. To votaries of unacceptable
damage, when less is enough, going
massive can only make rubble bounce.
However, Pakistan has put the cat
among the pigeons by acquiring tactical
nuclear weapons (TNW) as part of its
full spectrum deterrence (Dalton and
Krepon 2015: 3). Indias conventional
offensive could trigger Pakistani nuclear
first use in the form of TNW (Kidwai and
Lavoy 2015: 89). Indian retaliation to
inflict unacceptable damage not only
would be disproportionate, but would
open India to receiving unacceptable
damage in return. This would have an
impact on the credibility of unacceptable damage to deter. Believing its
nuclear numbers have checkmated
higher-order retaliation, Pakistan may
up the ante in the face of Indian conventional attack at a lower-order level with
TNW. Therefore, unacceptable damage
is no advance.
There are two other disadvantages.
First, both higher-order optionsmassive and unacceptable damagepressure a first-strike attempt on Pakistans
part. First strike is an attempt to disarm
an enemys nuclear retaliatory capability. Pakistan apprehending higher-order
retaliation from India could well go first,
not with TNW, but with higher-order
nuclear first use, intended to set back
Indias retaliatory capability. Second,
NFU is further threatened with abandonment. Higher-order options are predicated on a belief that India can survive
nuclear war, while Pakistan cannot.
This induces a belief that it might be
prudent to get a grievous nuclear blow in
first. Doing so would set back a Pakistani
counter-strike, which would be further
degraded by Indias missile shield, enabling India to survive. Such thinking
contributes to the arguments against
NFU and to technological thrusts that
EPW
may 28, 2016
make this possible: ballistic missile

defences, surveillance, accuracy, and
multiple warheads.
The assumption that India can survive
needs debunking. Along with the environmental and economic consequences,
the likely sociopolitical effects also have
to be factored in. To illustrate with a scenario, a nuclear war could see its largest
minority, its Muslims, further beleaguered.
The magnitude of the Gujarat pogrom of
February 2002 was aggravated by the
context of the then ongoing crisis in the
wake of the 13 December 2001 terror
attack on Parliament. A decade and half
down the road, Indias minority is in
more dire straits. Under the circumstances, should Pakistan use nuclear
weapons, the minority would end up a
readily available scapegoat. In effect,
the fallout of nuclear war would be in
the reinforcing of the right wing in policy, of authoritarianism in governance
and of militarisation of society. Manifestly, even if Pakistan is finished, India
as we know it would be too. Hence,
higher-order options are just as suicidal
as they are genocidal.
Lower-order Retaliation
This brings to fore the lower-order retaliation options. Higher-order nuclear first
use is ruled out by the onset of MAD. For
Pakistan, its graduated deterrence posture
serves to extend the nuclear deterrence
cover to the conventional level by signalling crossing of thresholds by Indias conventional operations. The most likely
nuclear first use scenario is of Pakistani
TNW against Indias conventional forces.
This can be at two levels: one, targeting
Indian offensive forces, and the second,
as nuclear messaging. The first requires
many warheads and would cause considerable collateral damage. The second may
be for catalysing international intervention by signalling onset of nuclear war.
The latter is the more likely manner of
nuclear first use by Pakistan.
Lower-order nuclear first use in this
manner can best be answered by lowerorder retaliation. This option abjures
higher-order retaliation and is escalationcontrol friendly since it incentivises restraint by Pakistan. In-conflict deterrence
does not suffer since higher exchanges
vol lI no 22
remain a threat-in-being. Critics, however, could argue that it risks inducing a

belief that Pakistan could get away
lightly for the temerity of violating the
seven-decade long nuclear taboo. However, the converse is equally true: since
it provides a credible answer to Pakistans TNW, it strengthens deterrence.
The second criticism is of the potential arms race impacting the minimum
in Indias doctrine of credible minimum
nuclear deterrence (Ministry of External Affairs 1999) and knock-on nightmares for operationalisation and civil
military relations. As has been seen,
Pakistans use of TNW would most likely
be for nuclear messaging, rather than in
a massed mode to stop Indias conventional forces. Since three out of five of
Indias nuclear tests 18 years ago at
Pokhran II were of the sub-kiloton variety, India likely has the nuclear ordnance. Therefore, a lower-order response
does not imply acquiring TNW in large
numbers, but employing existing capability in selective, non-escalatory targeting. This could induce a possible reversion to strategic sanity, and at the least
possible cost in terms of nuclear damage
sustained and inflicted.
However, lower-order options assume
escalation control. The charged atmosphere of a war gone nuclear can be
expected to put paid to political rationality and strategic thinking. Escalation
control, therefore, requires prior arrangements with doctrinal exchanges between the two sides as a first step. Escalation control mechanisms can even be
tacit and reliant on foreign powers
trusted by both sides. However, in a circumstance as currently obtains, with
the two not even talking to each other,
creating such mechanisms can be ruled
out. The paradox is that where trust
levels enable such mechanisms, these
mechanisms would not be required in
first place.
Caveat to Proportionate
Retaliation
In case India has to persist with its nuclear
doctrine of higher-order retaliation, it
has to wind down the offensive content
of its conventional doctrine. With no
reflexive Indian conventional offensives,
11
STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
there would be no crossing of redlines.

There would be no need for punitive
retaliation that can only draw like punishment on India in turn. However, India
wishes to keep its conventional advantage honed, to tamp down on Pakistans
propensity for proxy war. India cannot
have its cake and eat it too. It requires
the tempering of its nuclear doctrine.
Proportionate retaliation fits the bill. It
deters higher-order nuclear first use, and
to lower-order first use, enables lower
retaliation.
However, proportionate retaliation
needs a caveat. As has been seen, lowerorder nuclear first use by Pakistan would
be less to halt Indias armoured thrusts,
and more for nuclear messaging to warn
off India and bring international conflict termination pressures. Proportionate
retaliation in a lower-order mode to this
most likely scenario may not be the best
response. It would imply shooting back,
with attendant escalation risks. The
more appropriate response to this most
likely manner of Pakistani nuclear first
use is nuclear non-retaliation. This is the
caveat to proportionate retaliation.
Nuclear non-retaliation appears to be
an oxymoron, when deterrence is taken
as obtaining from credibility, predicated
on capability and intent. However, nuclear
non-retaliation is compatible with the
concept of existential deterrence, which
posits that the very possession of nuclear
weapons deters. There is no compelling
need for displaying a resolve and will,
and building a variegated nuclear arsenal. It is in line with the two pillars of
the nuclear doctrine that commands a
consensus, NFU and minimum deterrence. Absence of nuclear retaliation
from India in such a case would be deescalatory, reducing the premium on
escalation control.
By abjuring nuclear weapons, India
can capture the political and moral high
ground. It would put Pakistans leadership in the dock. It can continue applying its conventional military advantage,
since international pressures would be
on Pakistan. The military exercises this
yearShatrujeet and Chakravayuh-II
testify that Indias military is well practised, even though the separate press
releases on the exercises carefully omit
12
mention of any nuclear backdrop (Ministry of Defence 2016a, 2016b).

The effect of the caveatnuclear nonretaliationis that the bets are off in case
Pakistan persists or escalates. Deterrence is not absent since any nuclear
action enhances the probability of escalation. Pakistan cannot persist with strikes
since the caveat only covers nuclear first
use and not subsequent strikes, deterred
by proportionate retaliation.
The Best Option of All
The aim in a war gone nuclear should be
to heed K Sundarji, who had it that
nuclear exchanges must be terminated
at the lowest threshold of nuclear use
(Sundarji 2003: 14653). He further
went on to say that this must be done for
the conflict itself, if necessary by unilateral politically feasible concessions.
Instead of his sage arguments voiced in
the discussion, the debate is confined to
realists arguing over which of the two
higher-order options is better: massive or
unacceptable damage. In a MAD situation,
both being insane, proportionate retaliation enabling lower-order retaliation is
a contribution from the liberal perspective. This enables Sundarjis stricture that
a nuclear war be brought to its end straight
at its very outset. The caveat of initial
non-retaliation is one such measure.
Voices other than those of realists
need to be heard in the debates on
nuclear doctrine. The realists underemphasise the equalising effect of nuclear
weapons. Strategists of the liberal perspective are wishful in believing that
escalation control is possible. The antinuclear community is missing in action
in the debate. Here, non-retaliation is
taken as a caveat. An abolitionists contribution to the debate could well be that
non-retaliation is the best option across
the board; indeed, to even higher-order
nuclear first use. This is strategically sustainable, even if it is deterrence heresy. It
can yet carry the day since nuclear
employment strategyto be used
when the balloon goes upis distinct
from nuclear deterrence doctrine, to
keep the balloon tethered in peacetime.
Nuclear abolitionists avoiding the nuclear
deterrence debate is well founded in
the fear that the deterrence discussion
legitimises nuclear weapons and that

deterrence is a false god to nuclear abolitionists. However, such avoidance is not
without a price. Thinking about the least
damaging way nuclear weapons can be
employed may prevent worse outcomes,
inevitable when their use is hijacked by
nuclear hawks.
References
Ahmed, Ali (2014): Indias Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting
War in South Asia, New Delhi: Routledge.
BJP (2014): Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat: Election
Manifesto 2014, Bharatiya Janata Party,
26 March, New Delhi, viewed on 1 May 2016,
http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_
manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf.
Dalton, Toby and Michael Krepon (2015): A Normal
Nuclear Pakistan, Stimson Center and Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, viewed on 4 May 2016, http://carnegieendow ment.org/files/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf.
Indian Pugwash Society (2016): Panel Discussion
Report on Future of Indias Nuclear Doctrine,
25 April, New Delhi, viewed on 5 May 2016,
http://pugwashindia.org/pdf/Report-Finalpanel.pdf.
Kidwai, Khalid and Peter Lavoy (2015): A Conversation with Gen Khalid Kidwai, transcript,
Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015, 23 March, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, viewed on 15 April 2016,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/03230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf.
Ministry of Defence (2016a): Chief of Army Staff
Reviews Exercise Shatrujeet, press release,
Press Information Bureau, 22 April, New Delhi,
viewed on 5 May 2016, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/ PrintRelease.aspx?relid=139079.
(2016b): Exercise Chakravyuh-II, press release,
Press Information Bureau, 6 May, New Delhi,
viewed on 7 May 2016, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=145047.
Ministry of External Affairs (1999): Draft Report
of National Security Advisory Board on Indian
Nuclear Doctrine, 17 August, New Delhi,
viewed on 3 May 2016, http://mea.gov.in/infocus-article.htm?18916/ Draft+Report+of+N
ational+Security+Advisory+Board+on+India
n+Nuclear+Doctrine.
Nagal, Balraj (2015): Indias Nuclear Strategy to
Deter: Massive Retaliation to Cause Unacceptable Damage, Centre for Land Warfare Studies
Journal, Winter 2015, pp 120, viewed on 20
April 2016, http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/440323975_balrajnagal.pdf.
Prime Ministers Office (2003): Cabinet Committee
on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing
Indias Nuclear Doctrine, press release, Press
Information Bureau, 4 January, New Delhi,
viewed on 23 April 2016, http://pib.nic.in/
archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/
r040120033.html.
Sundarji, K (2003): Vision 2100: A Strategy for
the Twenty-First Century, New Delhi: Konark
Publishers.
may 28, 2016
available at
Gyan Deep
Near Firayalal, H. B. Road
Ranchi 834 001, Jharkhand
Ph: 0651-2205640
vol lI no 22
EPW
COMMENTARY
Muslim Womens Rights

and Media Coverage
Flavia Agnes
Despite the large number of

positive court judgments in favour
of Muslim women in India, the
media prefers to endorse the view
that once the husband pronounces
talaq, the wife is stripped of all
her rights. Similarly, articles by
experts, while focusing on the
need to declare instantaneous
triple talaq invalid, pay little
attention to the rights laboriously
secured from the trial courts, the
high courts and even the Supreme
Court, by many Muslim women.
This article was earlier posted on the Web

Exclusives section of the EPW website.
Flavia Agnes ( flaviaagnes@gmail.com) is a
womens rights lawyer and director of Majlis,
which runs a rape victim support programme
in Mumbai.
EPW
may 28, 2016
hayara Bano faced severe domestic

violence for nearly 15 years (she is
35 years old) that, apart from
physical assaults, included demands for
dowry, prevention from meeting her
family, and forced-multiple abortions
leading to health problems and depression. After she was sent back to her parents home by her husband, he sent her a
talaqnama by post.
Why did Shayara Bano accept this
torture for 15 years? Why did she not
secure her rights while she was living in
her husbands home or soon thereafter, by
approaching a trial court in her vicinity
and availing of the remedies which are
open to her under a secular statute, the
Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 whereby she could
obtain reliefs such as maintenance, child
custody/access and protection from
future violence?
Two choices were open to her even
after she received the talaqnama. She could
have approached the court and pleaded
that the arbitrary triple talaq was invalid
by relying upon the landmark ruling,
Shamim Ara v State of UP (2002)1 and
claimed the reliefs she would be entitled
to, as a wife. Alternatively, if she wished
to accept the talaqnama and bring to an
end the oppressive marriage, she could
have filed proceedings under the Muslim
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce)
Act, 1986 (Muslim Womens Act), accepted the divorce and claimed a lump
sum settlement.
This is what thousands of Muslim
women routinely dofile proceedings
in magistrate courts for enforcement of
their rights under various legal provisions such as the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the
Muslim Womens Act or maintenance
under Section 125, CrPC (the Code of
Criminal Procedure).
vol lI no 22
But for Shayara Bano, this was not to be,

as the legal strategy crafted by her lawyer,
whom she had approached to transfer a
case filed by her husband, Rizwan Ahmed
in the Allahabad Family Court to her home
town was a high profile but cumbersome
one. It is a public interest litigation (PIL)
in the Supreme Court challenging triple
talaq on the grounds that it violates the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution, to a Muslim woman.
Contextualising the PIL
It is interesting to examine the context
under which a little-known lawyer
practising in the Supreme Court, Balaji
Srinivasan, who has no claims to be an
expert on Muslim family law struck
upon this strategy.
In October 2015, while examining the
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act,
Justices Anil R Dave and Adarsh K Goel
of the Supreme Court gave a renewed
call for enacting a uniform civil code (UCC)
in the context of discriminatory Muslim
personal laws, on the grounds that they
violate the fundamental rights of Muslim
women by permitting triple talaq and
polygamy and sought responses from
the Attorney General and the National
Legal Services Authority of India on
whether gender discrimination suffered
by Muslim women should be considered
a violation of fundamental rights.
When the lawyer realised that Shayara
Banos husband had sent her a talaqnama,
it dawned on him that he would receive
instant fame and make history, if he used
her case for filing a PIL taking recourse
to the very same formulation that the
Supreme Court had used during the earlier casetriple talaq is a violation of
the fundamental rights of Muslim women.
The astute lawyer sought only a limited
remedy of abolishing instantaneous triple talaq and not triple talaq itself,
which is permitted by the Quran if the
three utterances are spread over 90
days. According to him, the PILs filed by
non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
in the past were dismissed as they were not
filed by an affected party and because
they pleaded for the enactment of a UCC.
The case filed by him would be tagged
13
COMMENTARY
on to the earlier reference to the chief

justice to constitute a special bench to
examine the core issue of framing a UCC.
Legal Precedents
Anyone familiar with the developments
within the Muslim Personal Law would
know about the plethora of case laws piled
up over a decade and a half, declaring instant triple talaq invalid. Hence, the verdict
in this case would not be a legal precedent.
In 2002, in a landmark ruling in Shamim
Ara v State of UP the Supreme Court invalidated arbitrary triple talaq and held that a
mere plea of talaq in reply to the proceedings filed by the wife for maintenance
cannot be treated as a pronouncement of
talaq and the liability of the husband to
pay maintenance to his wife does not come
to an end through such communication.
In order to be valid, talaq has to be pronounced as per the quaranic injunction.
The term pronounce was explained as
to proclaim, to utter formally, to declare, to articulate. While setting aside
the judgments of the two lower courts,
the family court and the Allahabad High
Court, the Supreme Court commented,
None of the ancient holy books or scriptures
mention such form of divorce. No such text
has been brought to our notice which provides that a recital in any document, incorporating a statement by the husband that he
has divorced his wife could be an effective
divorce on the date on which the wife learns
of such a statement contained in an affidavit
or pleading served on her.
Unfortunately, this landmark ruling did

not receive wide media attention and
was not discussed in public forums.
However, it became the basis for several
later rulings by various high courts which
have held that in order to be valid, talaq
has to meet the quaranic injunctions.
In 2002, in the Dagdu Pathan v Rahimbi
Pathan case,2 the full bench of the
Bombay High Court held that a Muslim
husband cannot repudiate the marriage
at will. The court relied upon the following words of the Quran,
To divorce the wife without reason, only to
harm her or to avenge her for resisting the
husbands unlawful demands and to divorce
her in violation of the procedure prescribed
by the Shariat is haram.
The court ruled that all the stages like

conveying the reasons for divorce,
14
appointment of arbitrators, conciliation

proceedings between the parties are required to be proved when the wife disputes the fact of talaq before a competent court. A mere statement in writing
or oral disposition before the court regarding talaq in the past is not sufficient
to prove the fact of divorce.
In 2004, in Najmunbee v Sk Sikander
Sk Rehman,3 the Bombay High Court
reiterated this position and held that a
Muslim husband cannot repudiate his
marriage at will. He has to prove supporting reasons for his decision and it
cannot be based on a mere whim. Muslim
law mandates pre-divorce reconciliation
between parties through the intervention of arbitrators.
In Dilshad Begaum Ahmadkhan Pathan v Ahmadkhan Hanifkhan Pathan
(2007),4 the sessions judge had accepted
the contention of the husband that he
had pronounced talaq in the presence of
witnesses in a masjid. Hence, the order
of maintenance of `400 awarded to the
wife by the trial court was quashed. But
on appeal, the Bombay High Court held
that though the husband had proven that
he had pronounced talaq it was not valid
and legal as the additional requirements
had not been proved like the reasons for
divorce, the appointment of arbitrators
and conciliation proceedings to bring
about reconciliation. The failure of such
proceedings or situation where it was
impossible for the marriage to continue
had not been proved. A compromise was
arrived at. It recorded in a document that
the husband had agreed to transfer onethird of his land to his wife if he failed to
cohabit with her or pay maintenance to
her. The court held that this document
was not acted upon by the husband and
he did not fulfil the additional requirements. Hence, the talaq pronounced by
the husband was held to be invalid.
In 2007, in Riaz Fatima v Mohd Sharif,5
the husband had pleaded that since he had
divorced his wife she was not entitled to
maintenance. He produced the photocopy
of a fatwa obtained by him regarding the
validity of the talaq. He also disputed the
paternity of their minor child. Rejecting
the husbands contention, the magistrate
court had awarded maintenance to the
wife and child. But the sessions court
overruled this decision and set aside the

order of maintenance. In appeal the Delhi
High Court laid down clear guidelines
regarding the process of proving talaq:
(1) Divorce must be for a reasonable cause
that is mandatory of the Holy Quran.
Therefore, when a dispute arises, the
husband has to give evidence showing
the cause which has compelled him to
divorce his wife.
(2) He has to prove that there was proclamation of talaq thrice in the presence
of witnesses or in a letter. Till then the
talaq is not valid.
(3) The husband would also have to prove
that an attempt had been made for settlement/conciliation prior to the divorce.
(4) There has to be proof of payment of
meher (dowry) and observance of iddat
(the period of waiting by a woman after
divorce or the spouses death before she
can marry again).
The court held that in the present case
there was insufficient evidence to prove
that the husband had pronounced talaq
on his wife. A mere statement before the
court by the husband, stating that he
divorced his wife on a particular day,
would not suffice. All the prerequisites
have to be fulfilled before a Muslim husband can divorce his wife.
In a recent ruling, the Bombay High
Court in the Shakil Ahmad Shaikh v
Vahida Shakil Shaikh (2016)6 reaffirmed
that the plea taken by the husband that
he had given talaq to his wife at an earlier
date does not amount to the dissolution of
marriage, unless the talaq is duly proved
and it is further proved that it was given
by following the conditions precedent,
namely, arbitration/reconciliation and
valid reasons. The mere existence of a document like a talaqnama is by no means
sufficient to render a talaq valid. It is not
sufficient that the prescribed expression
has been pronounced thrice, but the
stages it is preceded by are required to
be pleaded and proved before the court.
In these cases, the wife had approached
a civil court for maintenance and the
husband had pleaded that since he had
divorced his wife, he was not liable to
maintain her. This is due to a misconception which prevails even among legal
scholars and Muslim womens groups that
a Muslim husband is not liable to pay
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
COMMENTARY
maintenance to his deserted wife, if the

husband pleads that he has pronounced
talaq or has sent her a talaqnama.
The authoritative Constitution Bench
ruling in the Danial Latifi case,7 while
upholding the constitutional validity of
the Muslim Womens Act enacted after
the controversial Shah Bano ruling8 has
clearly stipulated that a Muslim womans
right to post-divorce maintenance is not
extinguished after the iddat period and
the provision for maintenance must be
made for her entire life. Even this ruling
has not been widely publicised.
Hence the view that a plea of divorce
made in a written statement or a
talaqnama sent by post will deprive a
Muslim woman of her right to post divorce
maintenance is erroneous but continues
to be adopted by ill-informed lawyers.
Hence even after the receipt of the
talaqnama, Shayara Bano could have initiated proceedings to enforce her rights
under the Muslim Womens Act or under
the Domestic Violence Act in a local
magistrate court.
Instant Media Hype
Rather unfortunately, despite the plethora
of judgments cited here, instead of highlighting the positive judgments in favour of
Muslim women, the media has preferred
to endorse the view that once the husband
pronounces talaq, the wife is stripped of
all her rights. Due to this misconception,
Shayara Bano received wide media publicity as the first Muslim woman to challenge
the constitutional validity of instantaneous triple talaq and it has been projected
that finally Muslim women will get some
respite from their oppressive personal
laws. Overnight Shayara Bano was transformed into a star, as the news of the PIL
spread like wildfire, just as Shah Bano who
fought for her right of maintenance under
the provisions of Section 125 of the CrPC
was rendered a household name three
decades ago. Parallels are drawn between
these two women whose struggles are
projected as iconic because the media
has taken a fancy to these cases and has
projected them as heroic struggles.
It is wrongly projected that Muslim
women in India are devoid of rights and
the only recourse open to them is to
challenge their personal laws in the
EPW
may 28, 2016
Supreme Court. It seems as though

domestic violence and desertion are
unique problems faced by Muslim women,
a misfortune that has befallen them due
to an archaic and oppressive legal regime
which needs to be reformed through the
intervention of the apex court in a topdown manner, in order to secure for
them the dignity enshrined in the Constitution. It seems that by declaring instantaneous triple talaq invalid, the violence suffered by Shayara Bano over the
last 15 years will be vindicated and justice will be meted to her and all other
women who are similarly situated.
In the prevailing media frenzy, there
is no space to raise simple questions
about the options available to her under
various other common statutes such as
the Domestic Violence Act, for, after all,
she is a Muslim woman and the domestic
violence she suffered cannot be placed
under a general category. It must be
given a special Islamic hue for the
violence to be taken seriously by the
media. The violence she endured itself is
not important; it is her Muslim-ness and
the projection that she is the victim of
archaic and oppressive personal laws
which alone can give her that special
status and set her apart from all other
victims of domestic violence. Without
such framing, the violence she suffered
would command no special status, and
may easily be dismissed as the routine
violence suffered by women in India.
Legal Developments Ignored
Several articles written by experts, while
focusing on the need to declare instantaneous triple talaq invalid, have paid
scant attention to the volume of case law
on this issue and the achievements of
scores of Muslim women for well over a
decade which laboriously secured their
rights from the trial courts, the high
courts and even the Supreme Court.
Islamic scholars like Zeenat Shaukat
Ali have referred to the pristine Islamic
law to hold that the practice of arbitrary
instantaneous triple talaq is not known
to Muslim law and a declaration by the
Supreme Court to outlaw this practice is
long overdue. However, these scholars do
not make any reference to court rulings
which have upheld the rights of Muslim
vol lI no 22
women over several decades and have

declared such practice un-Islamic.
Islamic scholar and a former member
of the Planning Commission Syeda S
Hameed, who enjoys the unique reputation of presiding as a qazin over a Muslim marriage which according to her is a
paradigm shift unheard of in India within
the Islamic cultural traditions, in a recent
article (This Reform Must Begin Within,
Hindu, 27 April 2016) has expressed her
concern that the proceedings in the
Supreme Court may only serve to polarise
public opinion. It will pit Muslim clerics
against secular groups pressing for state
intervention and provide the masala to
the electronic and social media. Stereotypical images of Muslim women and
men will be flashed as the backdrop to
sharply divided panels who will engage
in mutual acrimony. Whichever side
wins, the impact of internal democratisation and reform on Muslim women
who seek to negotiate their rights within
the faith would receive a setback. It will
also provide a boost to the anti-Muslim
propaganda of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and other Hindu rightwing outfits and may even fuel communal
violence in the country which, in her
opinion, is best avoided as it may result
in loss of innocent lives of people at the
margins from both communities.
On the other hand, the intervention by
the All India Muslim Personal Law Board
(AIMPLB) to plead that the Supreme Court
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate over
Muslim Personal Law since it is inextricably interwoven with the religion of Islam,
which is based on quaranic injunctions
and is not a law enacted by Parliament,
only serves to render the proceedings
contentious and add to the controversy.
Their claim is pure illogic since the board
had intervened in many important rulings such as the Shah Bano and Danial
Latifi (cited above) ones. It was also instrumental in pressuring the government to
enact the Muslim Womens Act in 1986
and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages
Act, during the pre-independence period.
Instead of opposing the authority of the
Supreme Court it would be more prudent
for the Board to assure the Supreme Court
that the internal processes of declaring
arbitrary talaq invalid are in progress
15
COMMENTARY
and proceedings in the Supreme Court

may hinder the process of democratisation, not as a strategy to stall the
proceedings, but with the genuine concern for the welfare of the community.
Conclusions
If the Supreme Court declares instantaneous triple talaq invalid and lays down
guidelines for the three utterances to be
spread over 90 days, while Shayara
Banos name will be etched in gold in the
annals of Muslim personal law reform,
in practical terms, what would its impact
be upon her personal life? The litigation
is bound to isolate her family that
belongs to a conservative social mileu
while the legal case will be referred to
16
the trial court to determine her claims

through another round of litigation!
In a recent interview to the media,
Shayara Bano is reported to have replied
to the questionis there more communal
intolerance today than before? No, I dont
think the situation is like that. There is no
communal intolerance between Hindus
and Muslims. To another question, about
the Bharat Mata ki jai slogan controversy her response was, I feel all Muslims
should say Bharat Maa ki jai; there is
nothing wrong with us raising this slogan.
While Shayara, a victim of domestic violence, cannot be criticised for her answers,
the questions reflect the insidiousness of
the media and are an indicator of how
she may be manipulated with the motive
of pitting her against her community

within a politically volatile situation. As
the case drags on in court, such comments will serve to alienate her from her
community within the now familiar formulation gender versus community and
may eventually lead to her retracting her
claim just the way Shah Bano was compelled to do three decades ago.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
may 28, 2016
2002 (7), SCC 518.

II (2002), DMC 315 Bom FB.
I (2004), DMC 211 Bom.
II (2007), DMC 738 Bom.
I (2007), DMC 26 Del.
MANU/MH/0501/2016, Bombay High Court
dated 20 January 2016.
Danial Latifi v Union of India, (2001), 7 SCC 740.
Mohd Ahmad Khan v Shah Bano Begum, AIR
1985 SC 945.
vol lI no 22
EPW
COMMENTARY
Remembering May 1974

The Historic Railway Workers Strike
V Krishna Ananth
In May 1974, railway workers

went on a strike in what was
perhaps the most intense working
class action in independent India.
In whatin retrospectseems
like a dress rehearsal for the
Emergency, the government
clamped down in a draconian
manner. Curiously, however,
many political forces and
personalities who were to play a
major role in the anti-Emergency
movement distanced themselves
from the strike.
he railway workers general strike

in May 1974 was perhaps the most
intense assertion of working class
action in independent India. In terms of
its geographical spread or the number
of participants or its impact on the
national political scene, the strike was
indeed unprecedented in both pre- and
post-independent India.
It is now 42 years since the strike shook
the nation. Yet, the event can only be
reconstructed on the basis of records left
with a few participants in the strike, media
reports that are far and few and oral tradition. In other words, the official records
that have helped reconstruct labour history in India during the struggle for independence are yet to be thrown open in this
case. This, then, is only an attempt to narrate the strike in a manner of storytelling
and unveil in the process the potential
that exists for a larger study as and when
the official records are made available.
Co-opting Unions
V Krishna Ananth (krishnananth@gmail.com)

teaches history at Sikkim University, Gangtok.
16
With over 17 lakh permanent workers and

at least three lakh casual workers, the
Indian Railways was the largest employer
in India. And unlike in the case of workers

in the public sector undertakings (PSUs),
where a system of periodical wage
revision based on bipartite negotiations
existed, the wages of those employed in
the railways were determined by pay
commissions appointed by the government from time to time. There was no
space in this arrangement for bipartite
negotiations.
This was because the railways were
nationalised before independence and
were hence considered a government arm.
This was unlike the PSUs that came into
existence after independence and were
managed as companies or corporations,
and wages and other terms of employment there were determined by way of
periodic agreements between the individual managements and the workers.
As a consequence, despite being in the
same category of workers who were
engaged in manufacturing goods and
services, the railway workers were treated
like employees in government departments. Similarly, the railway administration had institutionalised the trade union
set-up in the railways.
Apart from the All India Railwaymens
Federation (AIRF), a conglomerate of
unions across the zonal railways that
were born in the course of several struggles against the Railway Companies (as
they existed before independence) and
also the British rule, the Railway Board
also accorded recognition to the National
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
COMMENTARY
Federation of Indian Railwaymen (NFIR),

an affiliate of the Indian National Trade
Union Congress (INTUC). The INTUC, it
may be mentioned here, was founded in
1948 and from its inception this central
trade union as well as its affiliates functioned more as apologists of the Congress Party and its government rather
than being a trade union in any sense of
the term.
The AIRF, for all practical purposes
remained the representative union of
the railway workers. This too had begun
to change in the couple of decades after
independence, and years of being a
recognised federation meant that the
AIRF too had become a means for patronage by the railway administration. Its
leadership was increasingly losing its
fighting edge. The central leaders of
both the AIRF and the NFIR were provided
with facilities such as free rail travel,
invites for talks and their offices were
located in free space provided by the
administration within the railway premises. All these were also extended to the
leaders of the affiliates of these two
federations at all levelszonal, divisional
and the branches. In other words, the
AIRF had been co-opted into the system
and there was hardly any difference
between this federation, with a long
and glorious history of militant trade
unionism, and the NFIR. The AIRF, however, pretended to be militant unlike
the NFIR.
Category Unions
It was in this context that sections of
railway employees such as the engine
drivers, the firemen (a category that
existed in the days of the steam locomotive), the guards, the station masters and
those in the signal and telecommunication
department began setting up unions of
their own. These were sections that were
drawn from among the middle classes
and in many ways compared themselves
with the workers in the PSUs. They also
belonged to categories that were directly
involved in running the trains.
One of the issues that began to bother
them was the long and irregular working
hours. The engine drivers, the firemen
and the guards, for instance, worked a
lot more than the eight hours that was
EPW
may 28, 2016
stipulated for factory workers. And the

demand for regulation of working hours
was put forward by the All India Loco
Running Staff Association (AILRSA), which
came into existence in the mid-1960s.
The leadership of both the AIRF and the
NFIR was insensitive to this.
There was a series of strikes across the
zonal railways since 1965, and through
these the AILRSA matured into an all
India organisation and also emerged as
the militant face of the railway trade
union movement. This also encouraged
other categories in the operations department to set up similar unions and
carve out a space, independent of the
federations. The Railway Board, however,
refused to recognise these unions and
the AIRF as well as the NFIR would not let
the board recognise or even talk with
these category unions, as they were
called. The AILRSA, meanwhile, was gathering strength and by 1972, after several
strikes across the railways, the association could get the railway administration to reduce the working hours from 14
to 12 hours at a stretch.
Then there was a nationwide strike
led by the AILRSA beginning 26 May 1973
and despite large-scale arrests and detention of the leaders under the Defence of
India Rules (DIR) and other such provisions, as many as 42,000 drivers across
the country participated in the strike. The
total number of drivers at that time was
70,000. This forced the Railway Minister,
L N Mishra, to invite the AILRSA leaders
for talks.
The issues remained unresolved and
the engine drivers and firemen went on
strike, once again, from 2 August 1973.
The immediate provocation this time
was an order effecting a break in service
for all those who were detained during
the May 1973 strike. The strike was total
and after repressive measures failed
(some 400 leaders of the AILRSA were
arrested and sent to jail) Mishra invited
the leaders for talks again on 10 August
1973. The talks, interestingly, were held
even while the strike was on and it was
called off only after the government
agreed to withdraw all the cases against
the strikers and agreed not to take disciplinary action against the strikers; and
most importantly after Mishra agreed to
vol lI no 22
the introduction of a 10-hour working

day. The AILRSA leaders refused to
concede any role to the AIRF and the
NFIR in the course of this negotiation
and this they did by going against the
Railway Boards insistence.
Crisis in Economy
The picture will be complete if seen in the
larger context of the crisis in the economy
during 1972 and 1974. Insofar as the railway workers were concerned, the resentment grew further after the government
thrust the recommendations of the Third
Pay Commission. The recommendations
were for a meagre increase in wages at a
time when prices were rising fast. The
minimum wages were raised from `170
per month to `196 per month.
The prices of essential commodities had
risen by 23% in 1973. The overall crisis in
the economy, marked by shortage of grains
and domestic fuel, charges of corruption
against members of the ruling establishment and the rising tide of militancy in
the trade union movement laid the basis
for a strike. And then, the government
decided to impound an instalment of
dearness allowance. These were bad
enough reasons and a meagre rise in
wages, awarded by the Third Pay Commission, turned out to be the immediate
provocation for a strike in the railways.
The railway worker, by and large, was
comparing himself with those in the
PSUs; the minimum wage in the steel
industry at that time was `297 per month,
while in the public sector BHEL, it was `294
a month and in the Hindustan Machine
Tools, it was `350 per month. The PSU
workers could engage in periodic wage
negotiations while the railway worker
was condemned to wait and take whatever the pay commission recommended!
Meanwhile, caught in a bind because
the category unions were gaining strength,
the AIRF decided to go for course correction. In October 1973, at its convention in
Secunderabad, George Fernandes replaced
Peter Alwares as its president. Fernandes,
a stormy petrel trade unionist in and
around Bombay and chairman of the
Socialist Party, was brought into the
AIRF by sections that were desperate to
reinvent the federation as a fighting organisation. That had become necessary
17
COMMENTARY
in the context of the emergence of category

unions and the consequent erosion of the
AIRFs base among the railway workers.
The Secunderabad convention also voted
in favour of a national general strike in
the railways.
Fernandes Steps In
According to Fernandes, the decision to
strike was forced on him by detractors
from his own party as well as sections in
the AIRF that were affiliated with the
Communist Party of India (CPI), with an
intention to paint him as another effete
leader. Despite his opposition to a strike,
in the convention itself, the delegates
voted in favour of a general strike. This,
in a sense, reflected the extent of discontent among the workers, who constituted
the ranks of the federation. Fernandes
says he decided to make the best out of a
bad bargain and went about addressing
workers across the railway zones. He
also broke ranks with the others in the
AIRF leadership by insisting that the
AIRF prepare for the strike in association
with the category unions.
The other important leaders of the
AIRF, including the general secretary,
Priya Gautam, also a member of the
unified Socialist Party but belonging to
the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) tradition,
was opposed to any such joint action
with the category unions in general and
the AILRSA in particular. Fernandes had
his way and on 27 February 1974, a convention of over 100 railwaymens unions,
including the AILRSA, gave concrete
shape to the idea of a general strike and
a National Coordination Committee of
Railwaymens Struggle (NCCRS) was
formed.
A memorandum with demands including wage increase, statutory bonus for
railway workers as it was given to workers in the PSUs, regularising the services
of over three lakh casual workers was
sent to the Railway Board. The board,
however, ignored the memorandum.
On 15 April 1974, the NCCRS representatives were called for a meeting with
the Railway Board officials and were
told that their demands were unacceptable. The NCCRS met the same day and
decided to serve notice for a general
strike beginning 8 May 1974. The meeting
18
decided to serve the strike notice on 23

April 1974 to the administration at all
levels including the various zones and
divisions across the country. A 13-member
Action Committee with Fernandes as
Chairman and representatives from the
AIRF, the AILRSA, the AIREC, CITU, AITUC
and BMS was formed at the NCCRS convention itself.
The NCCRS, in many ways, reflected
the unity that was emerging among the
unions at that time and also the arrival of
Fernandes as the leader. It took a while
before the union leaders were called for
negotiations. To be precise, talks began
only on 27 April 1974 and the government
side was represented by the Deputy
Minister for Railways, Mohammed Shafi
Qureshi, a Congress Member of Parliament
from Anantnag in Jammu and Kashmir.
While Railway Minister, Mishra refused to
be part of the negotiating team, Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi set out on a visit
to Iran on 28 April 1974.
The government side promised nothing other than recommending that 300
foodgrain shops be set up in the railway
colonies. The talks, however, kept dragging. They decided to meet again on
2 May after their return from Lucknow
where Fernandes, along with many other
leaders of the 13-member Action Committee, was to address a May Day
gathering of railway workers.
While they did address the Lucknow
rally, the talks did not take place on 2 May.
Fernandes was picked up at Lucknow,
late in the night on 1 May 1974, put on a
Border Security Force plane, flown down
to Delhi and then driven into the Tihar
jail early in the morning on 2 May 1974.
Other members of the Action Committee
too were sent to jail.
dominated the NCCRS, the strike committee decided to begin the strike from
2 May 1974 rather than wait until 8 May.
And workers in the workshops across
the country stopped work on 2 May
itself. A general strike was called in
Mumbai (Bombay as it was called then)
and the city came to a standstill. Bombay,
then, was Fernandess home and he controlled the transport, hotel and municipal
unions in the city. Railway workers in
the marshalling yards of Moghulsarai
and Delhi stopped work and marched in
a procession after news of Fernandess
arrest spread.
In a couple of days after 2 May 1974,
train services came to a halt across
the country. All the major workshops
Jamalpur, Chittaranjan, Varanasi, Perambur, Kharagpur, Golden Rockwere
closed down. A united strike, by over 17
lakh workers in the railways, was something that the government could not
have ignored. Addressing a public meeting at Madras on 29 March 1974 (even
before the strike notice was served and
after the NCCRS was formed), Fernandes
is reported to have said:
Realise the strength which you possess.
Seven days strike of the Indian Railways,
every thermal station in the country would
close down. A 10 days strike of the Indian
Railways, every steel mill in India would close
down and industries in the country would
come to a halt for the next twelve months. If
once the steel mill furnace is switched off, it
takes nine months to re-fire. A fifteen days
strike in the Indian Railways, the country
will starve.
The government too knew this. Indira

Gandhi had decided against giving in to
the railwaymens demands. The official
thinking was that agreeing to the demands would cost an additional `450
crore for the government and also
Trains Come to a Halt

News of the arrest spread immediately
and railway workers went on a strike in
many parts on 2 May. The gates at the
Victoria Terminus and Central station in
Bombay were bolted and locked by the
workers. Suburban trains came to a halt.
Railway workers joined by their family
members sat on railway tracks and stopped
trains in Patna, Gaya and Ferozepur.
In the Southern Railway, where the
AILRSA had been most militant and
may 28, 2016
Attention ContributorsI
The EPW has been sending reprints of articles
to authors. We are now discontinuing the
practice. We will consider sending a limited
number of reprints to authors located in India
when they make specific requests to us.
We will, of course, continue to send a copy of
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vol lI no 22
EPW
COMMENTARY
trigger similar demands and strike threats

from other industries. The railway administration ordered cancellation of as
many as 98 mail and express trains from
25 April 1974 itself. And zonal railway
administrations were given powers to
order further cancellations.
The idea was to restrict the movement
of passenger trains and use the locomotives to haul goods trains and build buffer
stocks of coal and other requirements to
the industries. This was how the administration sought to reduce the impact of
the strike and these measures were initiated even before the negotiations began.
The thermal generation units were kept
going and steel plants could be kept running despite the disruption of train
movements due to the strike.
Jail, Eviction and Violence
This was not enough to break the strike.
In the three weeks between 2 May and
27 May 1974, when the strike was formally
called off, as many as 50,000 railway
workers were arrested. Of those, 10,000
were put in jail by the evening of 2 May
1974 itself. And most of those arrested were
detained under the DIR and Maintenance
of Internal Security Act, both of which
were in vogue thanks to the Emergency
declared at the time of the IndoPak war in
December 1971 and was not withdrawn.
At least 30,000 families were evicted
from the railway quarters all over the
country. The threat of eviction from the
quarters was one of the means used by the
administration to force striking workers
return to work. The railway colonies in
Moghulsarai, Jamalpur, Jhansi and in
many other important railway towns
were turned into hunting grounds for
the police and paramilitary forces.
The government had decided to crush
the strike and pulled all stops. It was
determined to treat the strike as a battle
rather than an industrial dispute.
Even after the strike was called off
unconditionally, the railway administration ordered the dismissal of as many as
50,000 workers, all of them being active
leaders of the strike.
At least 10 lakh workers who persisted
with the strike until it was called off on
27 May 1974 (rather than apologising for
their action) were taken back to work as
EPW
may 28, 2016
fresh recruits; all their past service was

not to be accounted for and they lost
benefits such as pension, provident fund
and accumulated leave. Even workers with
service of over 25 years were treated as
fresh recruits!
Both these decisions were reversed.
But not before Indira Gandhis Congress
was voted out in the March 1977 general
elections and Madhu Dandavate, a close
associate of George Fernandes in the
Socialist movement, became the Railway
Minister and ordered reinstatement of all
the worker leaders who were dismissed
for their role in the strike and restored
the services of the 10 lakh workers and
also annulled the earlier decision to
treat many others as fresh recruits.
The railway workers may not have
achieved anything in terms of their
demands through the general strike of
1974. And in a way, the repressive measures that were resorted to by the government destroyed the union movement.
The leaders, including Fernandes, were
released from jail on 28 May 1974.
Fernandes, in the very first press conference after the strike, made it clear that
he would not want the railwaymens
struggle end an orphan. He said this after quoting John F Kennedys observation after the Bay of Pigs disaster that,
Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is
an orphan. There is no disputing the
fact that the repression let loose against
the striking workers was unprecedented
and it was a dress rehearsal for what
would happen during the 19 months of
emergency.
Supporters and Betrayers
Having said this, it is also important to
discuss the attitude of the opposition
parties to the strike. The CPI, despite its
own trade union wingthe AITUC
being a part of the AIRF and other
unions that led the strike indulged in
double speak. The Kerala government,
headed by C Achutha Menon, went about
arresting and detaining strike leaders.
S A Dange, one of the partys important
leaders, was even guilty of asking the
workers to return to work midway
through the strike. His argument was
that the workers had proved a point and
that was enough.
vol lI no 22
The Socialist Party, of which Fernandes

was the chairman, remained factionridden. Priya Gautam, who was the
general secretary of the AIRF, did not
cover himself with glory either before
the strike or through it. The CPI(M) was
perhaps the only political party whose
cadre and associates in the union movement involved themselves completely in
the strike.
The NCCRS, in many divisions, was
controlled by the party and its cadre
led the strike from the front. It is important to mention, in this context, an
incident in Madurai (in Tamil Nadu).
Ramasamy, a mill worker and an activist
of the CITU, was crushed under the
wheels of a train which the unionists
and strike supporters had decided to
stop from rolling. This was part of the
solidarity action by the trade unions
outside the railways. Meanwhile, efforts
to mobilise the Posts and Telegraph
workers on a solidarity strike did not
materialise.
As for the Lok Dal, the Jan Sangh and
the Congress (O), its leaders were, by
and large, unconcerned about the strike.
Apart from making some noise in Parliament and outside, the political leaders
did nothing to sustain or to mobilise
solidarity actions even in places where
they were strong.
There were hardly any protests by
college students even though in Gujarat
they had succeeded in getting the state
assembly dissolved in March 1974, a
couple of months before the strike. A
student movement in Bihar was gaining
strength but there is no evidence of its
leaders expressing solidarity with the
railway workers struggle.
There is hardly any evidence of
Morarji Desai, who had gone on a fast
unto death in Gujarat in support of the
students and their demand for dissolution of the assembly, raising his voice in
support of the railway strike. This is true
of Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) too. JP,
incidentally was a president of the AIRF
in 1948 and also of many trade unions at
that time. But then, despite his splendid
silence in the context of the strike, we
find him emerging as the rallying point
of the anti-Indira forces a few months
after it.
19
2016 STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
Victory for Identity Politics,

Not Hindutva in Assam
Udayon Misra
During the recently concluded

Assam assembly elections,
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sanghs role was exaggerated
to strengthen the impression
that the Assamese have finally
succumbed to the ideology
of Hindu nationalism. This
is not borne out either by the
background of most of the
successful Bharatiya Janata Party
candidates or the overall voting
pattern in the state.
Udayon Misra (udayon.misra@gmail.com) is a

former National Fellow of the Indian Institute
of Advanced Study, Shimla.
20
efying all demographic equations,

the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
alliance has swept the polls in
Assam, winning 86 of the 126 seats in
the state assembly. The Congress, which
ruled the state for three terms, has
been reduced to just 24 seats. This was
certainly not the result of a Modi wave.
Rather, it was the result of the BJPs success in garnering the support of regional forces like the Asom Gana Parishad
(AGP), the Bodoland Peoples Front (BPF)
and the Rabha, Tiwa and other plains
tribal organisations.
There was no Hindutva agenda as
such in these elections and the emphasis
was clearly on preserving the identity
and culture of the indigenous people of
the state in the face of swift demographic change triggered by infiltration from
neighbouring Bangladesh. Alarm bells
had started ringing amongst the indigenous groups the moment the religious
break-up of the 2011 Census was released
by the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) government after it had been kept
under wraps by the previous dispensation. Once the figures were released, it
became evident that the rise in the Muslim
population in the state, which now stands
at 34.2%, was the highest in the country,
surpassing even a state like Jammu and
Kashmir. Different ethnic organisations
voiced their apprehensions at the possibility of being totally marginalised in
the states politics and political parties
like the AGP, which had lost much of its
credibility but still had a substantial base
in rural areas, made the issue of threat
to identity a major one. Reading the
writing on the wall, the BJP went out of
its way to build up an electoral alliance
with regional forces. This proved to be a
master stroke, especially as the Congress
developed cold feet in arriving at an
understanding with the All India United
Democratic Front (AIUDF) for fear of

antagonising its Hindu vote base.
The understanding with the AGP
brought in rich dividends to the BJP.
Those who wrote off the AGP as a political
force because of its miserable performance
in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls, and in the
2011 assembly elections where it managed
to secure just nine seats, failed to take
into account the strong sentiments in
favour of a regional force. This surfaced
during the recent elections. In the last
Lok Sabha polls, the AGP drew a blank
but the number of votes it got in the state
exceeded five lakh. Moreover, the regional
party still had its organisational structure
more or less intact in different parts of the
state despite its reduced presence in the
states legislature. Once it arrived at an
understanding with the BJP, things
started looking up. For the Congress, the
resultant consolidation of votes against it
proved too great a challenge as it had always made electoral gains because of a
divided opposition. This accounts for the
14 seats won by the AGP and the victories
of several of its stalwarts who had been
virtually written off in the states politics.
A Secular Flavour
The AGP gave the BJP a much-needed
secular flavour from which it benefited.
Moreover, several AGP leaders had already
joined the BJP. This made the equations
between the AGP and the BJP much easier.
For instance, although several former AGP
leaders fought the polls as BJP candidates,
the electorate continued to see them as
strong supporters of regional sentiments.
In fact, most of the states BJP leadership
is made up of former All Assam Students
Union (AASU) and AGP activists, including
the chief ministerial candidate Sarbananda
Sonowal who is a former AASU President
and an AGP leader. The BJPs decision to
project Sonowal as its chief ministerial
candidate paid off because of his wide
acceptability to different sections of the
people of the state. A plains tribal belonging to the small SonowalKachari community of upper Assam, Sonowal has
emerged as a major voice of the indigenous
people. His success in getting the Illegal
Migrants (Determination by Tribunals)
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
Act of 1983, which had made the detection

of foreign nationals virtually impossible,
scrapped by the Supreme Court in 2005,
made him a hero amongst the Assamese
people who called him jatiya nayak
(national hero). Sonowal represented
the AGP in the Lok Sabha from 2004 to
2009. Even when he moved from the AGP
to the BJP in 2011, he was always seen as
someone who represented regional
interests. It was precisely because of
Sonowal that so many of his former colleagues in the AGP joined the BJP.
Although initially reluctant to induct
the Congress dissident Himanta Biswa
Sarma into the BJP, Sonowal soon realised
the latters worth. Together they worked
out a successful strategy to defeat the
Congress that had already been considerably weakened by internal dissension
and family politics. Moreover, the last
term of Tarun Gogois 15-year rule was
marked by widespread corruption and
administrative incompetence compounded with arrogance and an increasing disconnect with the masses. With Himanta
Biswa Sarma in charge of the election
campaign, the BJP made full use of antiincumbency feelings and pushed forth
the agenda of development and identity,
appealing to people to vote for the protection of their maati, bheti and jati
(land, hearth and nationality).
This had a strong appeal amongst the
indigenous Assamese and all the ethnic
groups. Though the question of development continued to be a major issue in the
elections, it was clearly the preservation
of the land and the identity of the indigenous people that found greater resonance during the campaign. That is why
the elections were often referred to as
the last battle of Saraighat1 for the Assamese people and memories of the antiforeigner agitation of the 1980s were revived. Following the election results, several regional newspapers commented
that the spirit of the 1980s was back, with
the issues of identity, land and language
once again back in focus.
In recent years, the debate over
Assamese identity has been acquiring
new dimensions and there were signs
that different ethnic organisations were
coming together. More than 25 ethnic organisations gathered under the leadership
EPW
may 28, 2016
of the AASU to demand constitutional

safeguards as had been promised by the
Assam Accord of 1985. There was much
debate about the definition of Assamese
in Clause 6 of the Assam Accord. The
Asam Sahitya Sabha was asked to come
out with a formula but it failed. On this
issue, the then speaker of the Assam assembly, senior Congressman Pranab Gogoi,
came out with a suggestion that all those
who figure in the 1951 electoral rolls and
anyone who spoke Assamese and any of
the tribal languages as well as Bengali
in the Barak Valley should be seen as
Assamese. While the AASU and the tribal
organisations supported this move, the
Congress and the AIUDF strongly opposed
it. The Congress, which claimed in its
election rallies that it represented regional interests better than its opponents, did not realise that its dilly-dallying over the definition of Assamese
would prove costly. The election results
have shown that the fear about eventually being reduced to a minority in their
homeland was shared by the broader Assamese society as well as by the different ethnic groups in the state. This also
explains the victory of the BJP candidates in the hills of Karbi Anglong and in
all constituencies where there is a sizeable
plains tribal population, especially in
upper Assam.
The massive erosion of support for the
Congress amongst the tea garden community in upper Assam was another major
factor in the BJPs electoral sweep. Years
of neglect, rising unemployment and
pitiable health and education indices
contributed to the alienation of tribal
workers in tea gardens from the Congress.
The BJP took advantage of this in 1985
and the result was evident in the 2014
Lok Sabha elections when BJP candidates scored victories in constituencies
like Dibrugarh and Jorhat where a large
section of the voters are tea garden
labourers. The BJP continued its consolidation in tea garden sector that finally
gave it an advantage in all the 35 assembly
constituencies where tea garden labour
votes are the determining factor.
Master Move
Apart from its understanding with the
AGP, the BJP leadership made another
vol lI no 22
master move in bringing within the fold

of the BJP alliance the Tiwa and Rabha
organisations. This gave the party a tribalfriendly face and helped its fortunes not
only in Tiwa and Rabha areas but also in
the hill constituencies of Karbi Anglong
and Dima Hasao. Here it virtually replaced the Congress that had held power
for decades. Thus, while the AGP partly
neutralised the BJPs communal image,
its understanding with the plains tribal
organisations and the BPF, in particular,
gave the alliance an edge. Not only did
the BPF bring in 12 seats from the Bodo
Tribal Autonomous District (BTAD) area
but it also helped secure support from
Bodo voters spread all over the state,
especially in Mangoldoi, Sonitpur and
Lakhimpur districts.
Despite this, it is significant that the
Congress, which suffered heavy losses
throughout the state, retained its hold
over several Muslim majority constituencies in the three lower Assam districts
of Goalpara (57.52% Muslims), Barpeta
(70.74% Muslims), and Dhubri (79.6%
Muslims) and also wrested several seats
from the AIUDF. In Barpeta district, the
Congress secured four out of the eight
constituencies, having taken the Baghpat
and Jania seats from the AIUDF by large
margins, while retaining the Sarukhetri
and Chenga seats. As a result, the Congress
virtually neutralised the AIUDF which
could hold on to just the Bhabanipur
seat. In Goalpara district too the Congress registered wins in two out of the
districts four seats. It took the West
Goalpara constituency from the AIUDF
while winning the East Goalpara seat
by defeating the BJP candidate by a
margin of over 5,000 votes. The AIUDF
succeeded in holding on to only the
Jaleswar seat and that too by a small
margin. Thus, in both Barpeta and
Goalpara districts, the Congress succeeded in marginalising the AIUDF.
Only in Dhubri district did the AIUDF
register some gains, having secured
three out of the districts seven seats.
The Congress and the BJP alliance won
two seats each.
However, the Congress partys most
impressive win was in South Salmara,
considered the bastion of the AIUDF.
Here, the AIUDF leader Badruddin Ajmal
21
was defeated by his Congress rival Wajid

Ali Choudhury by over 16,000 votes.
What is interesting is that in Darrang
district (64.34% Muslims), the Congress
defeated the AIUDF in the predominantly Muslim constituency of Dalgaon, but
lost all the other three seats to the BJP
combine. Immigrant Muslim votes were
divided between the Congress and the
AIUDF in most of the constituencies of
lower Assam, with the former registering wins against the latter. It is evident
from this voting pattern that a large
section of the immigrant Muslim voters
shifted their preference from the AIUDF
to the Congress, thereby rejecting the
formers attempt at polarisation along
religious lines.
That the AIUDFs attempt at such polarisation did not succeed can also be
seen in the voting pattern amongst Muslims in constituencies where they are
either a majority or form a substantial
section of the electorate. In as many as
36 of such constituencies, the BJP combine got some 16.6% votes, a substantial
increase from the 8.3% that it had
secured in the 2011 elections. On the
other hand, the vote share of the AIUDF
in these constituencies came down from
29.7% in 2011 to 27%. The vote share of
the Congress in the minority-dominated
constituencies also went down from
35% in 2011 to 32%. These are significant figures because they point to the
fact that the BJP combine has succeeded
in garnering a substantial number of Muslim votes without which victory would
not have been possible in the four lower
Assam districts of Goalpara, Barpeta,
Dhubri and Darrang where it secured a
total of nine seats against the AIUDFs
four. Moreover, without substantial support from Muslim voters, the BJP combine would not have been able to secure
all the three seats in Nalbari district.
It is clear that the BJP combine has
made major inroads into the Muslimmajority constituencies of lower and
middle Assam, while at the same time
making a clean sweep of all the eight
seats in Sonitpur district, which has a
large Muslim population. Hence the
claim that the BJP combine has won the
support of the states indigenous Muslims,
especially after its success in constituencies
22
like Barkhetri and Patacharkuchi of

the Nalbari district where indigenous
Assamese Muslims voted in large numbers for it.
Winning the Muslim Vote
The BJP combines win in Muslim-majority constituencies of the state has come
as a surprise to many analysts and seems
to have disproved the notion that
Muslims vote in a polarised manner. In
the Muslim-majority districts of Dhubri,
Barpeta, Darrang, Goalpara, Nagaon,
Mogaigaon, Hailakandi, Karimganj and
Bongaigaon, the BJP combine did much
better than expected, with a tally of 22
seats. According to a report published in
the Hindu,2 in the 49 Muslim-majority
constituencies spread over the nine districts of the state, the BJP by itself won
as many as 15 seats, while its allies the
AGP and the BPF secured five and two
seats each respectively. The Congress
won 14 and the AIUDF 12.
This success of the BJP combine cannot be attributed merely to division of
votes between the Congress and the
AIUDF, though that certainly is a major
factor. According to the Hindu report,
while the BJP combine did not do well in
constituencies where Muslims constituted over 60% of the voters, in constituencies where Muslim voters ranged from
30%50%, it did much better. In the
three constituencies of Hailakandi district in the Barak Valley, all the seats
were won by the AIUDF. But in Bongaigaon, it was the AGP, which claimed
two out of the four seats, while the BPF
got one. This shows that apart from a
major consolidation of Assamese, Bodo
and Bengali Hindu votes, a substantial
number of Muslims have also voted in
favour of the BJP combine.
The same may be said about Nagaon
district where seven out of the 11 seats
were won by the BJP combine. Between
the Congress and the AIDUF, they secured
four seats. The division of Muslim votes
alone could not have led to such results
in Nagaon district. In Darrang district,
with its 64% Muslim population, the
BJP and the BPF together got three
of the four seats, with the Congress
securing only one. Here too the consolidation of Assamese and Bodo votes
helped the BJP combine but the combines win cannot be attributed only to
division of Muslim votes, although the
AIUDF acted primarily as a spoiler for
the Congress.
Though it was expected that the BJP
combine would do well in the upper
Assam districts, the complete decimation of the Congress in Dibrugarh and
Tinsukia, which with a substantial number of tea garden workers have long
been its bastion, was a bit of a surprise.
In Dibrugarh, the BJP combine secured
all the seven seats (BJP six, AGP one). Of
the five seats in Tinsukia district in upper Assam, as many as four went to the
BJP, while the Congress secured one.
The lone seat which went to the AIUDF in
upper Assam was from Naoboisa in
Lakhimpur district. In Sivasagar district, one seat each was won by the Congress, the BJP and the AGP. The former
speaker of the Assam assembly and Congress leader Pranab Gogoi barely managed to retain his seat by a few hundred
votes and that too because he has the
image of an Assamese nationalist. That
the BJP combine could register major
gains in Lakhimpur and Dhemaji districts
points to the support it has received from
the plains tribal population in these
districts. Similarly, in the Jagiroad and
Morigaon constituencies in middle Assam,
the inclusion of the Tiwa organisations
in the BJP combine brought it substantial dividends.
Role of RSS and VHP
The role of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) and Hindutva bodies like
the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) in the
Assam elections have been commented
upon in several circles. While it is true
that RSS activities in Assam, particularly in the Brahmaputra Valley, began in
the 1940s, it is also a fact that the RSS
was never a major factor in the society
and politics of the state where identity
politics centred on immigration, land
and language has overshadowed all other
considerations. Added to this is the highly
syncretic and plural nature of Assamese
society that has made it difficult for
organisations like the RSS to push forward the agenda of religious polarisation
as it has done in the Hindi heartland.
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
From the beginning, RSS activities were

patronised by the Marwari business lobby
and the organisation did not have many
local leaders. In the popular imagination, the RSS in Assam was linked with
Hindi-speaking Hindus and seldom perceived as an organisation with a local
base. This explains the near absence of
support for the Ram Janmabhoomi
movement in Assam. Similarly, issues
like a ban on cow slaughter and vegetarianism have never touched a chord
amongst the Assamese people who prefer to identify themselves with their hill
neighbours in matters of food and culture. A small core of Assamese highcaste Hindus were attracted to the RSS
VHP ideology but their influence in the
sociopolitical life of a composite Assamese people has been minimal. All this
notwithstanding, the RSSVHP combine
has time and again tried to appropriate
Assamese religio-cultural icons like Srimanta Sankardeva and war heroes like
Lachit Barphukan in order to advance its
Hindutva programme. But given the
highly inclusive nature of Sankardevas
school of Vaishnavism, it is unlikely that
the RSS agenda of religious polarisation
will work. Even when it comes to appropriating heroes like Lachit Barphukan,
the average Assamese knows that the
Ahoms did not distinguish between
Hindus and Muslims when it came to
defending the cause of the nation. In
fact, Ahom kings did not hesitate to
appoint Muslims in important official
and army posts. Although some heads or
satradhikars of the Vaishnava satras or
monasteries have long been associated
with the RSS, it would be simplistic to
conclude that RSS influence has percolated to the common people associated
with such satras.
During the 197985 movement on the
foreign nationals issue, RSS functionaries tried to infiltrate the AASU and the
All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad front
but with little success. Despite many aberrations and the rise in anti-Muslim
feelings during certain phases of the
movement, the AASU leadership of that
time succeeded in steering the organisation along largely secular lines. Even
on the foreign nationals issue, the AASU
has consistently maintained that any
EPW
may 28, 2016
post-1971 migrant, be he a Muslim or a

Hindu, must be detected and deported.
The Modi governments decision to regularise the stay in the country (Assam
included) of post-1971 Hindu refugees
was met with stiff opposition by the
AASU and other ethnic student bodies. It
is, however, a separate matter that neither the BJP nor the AGP made the issue
of the Bengali Hindu refugees a major
one in the elections, perhaps keeping in
mind the large voter base of Bengali
Hindus in the state.3
Role of RSS Exaggerated
Finally, it is significant that amongst the
BJP candidates during this election,
there seems to be no one with a solid RSS
background, even though RSS activists
have been working in the state for several decades.4 BJP leaders have credited
the RSS with preparing the ground for
the electoral victory. Union Minister of
State for Home Kiren Rijiju praised the
dedication of some 25,000 RSS volunteers who worked day and night to
secure the BJP victory, especially in the
tea garden areas. Even if this is true, the
question remains as to whether the RSS
would be able to translate these electoral gains into ideological success. Given
the complexity of social formations in
the state, this appears highly unlikely.
Role of the RSS has been exaggerated
to strengthen the impression that the
Assamese have finally succumbed to the
ideology of Hindu nationalism. This is
certainly not borne out by the background of most of the successful BJP
candidates as well as the overall voting
pattern of the state. The Congress, on its
part, has credited the RSS with winning
the elections merely to deflect attention
from the fact that people voted against
the Tarun Gogoi government because of
widespread corruption and blatant encouragement of family dominated politics.
Working out successful election strategies is one thing, but to impose a narrow
ideology of Hindutva on an inclusive
and plural society is quite another task.
Despite this, we cannot rule out the
fact that with the BJP wielding power in
a state where both the AGP and the BPF
are relatively minor partners, the RSS and
its fringe elements could get additional
vol lI no 22
leverage to push forward their agenda.

As it is, there are signs that the RSSVHP
section within the BJP is trying to pass
off the verdict of the Assam elections
as a victory of the forces of Hindutva,
even though during the entire election
campaign the central BJP leadership
skilfully avoided highlighting the Hindutva agenda plank of religious polarisation and encouraged the Assam BJP
leadership to focus almost entirely on
regional issues. Attempts by the RSS to
saffronise Assam politics are bound to
be resisted by the BJPs partners in government, the AGP and the BPF. Moreover,
as long as Assamese nationalist organisations like the AASU and the Asam Sahitya Sabha stick to their secular credentials, the going will be tough for the RSS.
We must watch how within the state BJP,
the large number of leaders drawn from
the AGP, the Congress and the AASU will
react to RSS attempts to influence government policies and programmes. It will
be simplistic to conclude at this stage
that the overwhelmingly Hindu content
of the coming BJP government will automatically strengthen the RSS and other
fringe right-wing groups. The innate secular strength of Assamese society will
hopefully prevent such a rightist slide.
Nonetheless, the presence of Hindu spiritual leaders at the swearing-in ceremony
of the new government is bound to send
a wrong signal to all those who voted for
a change in government, not because of
religious reasons but because they hoped
that the new government would seriously
address the major issues confronting the
people of Assam.
Notes
1
2
3
It was at Saraighat near Guwahati that the

Assamese led by the Ahom General Lachit
Borphukan finally defeated the Mughals in a
crucial river battle on the Brahmaputra in 1671.
How BJP Escaped the Tripwire in Assam, the
Hindu, 21 May 2016.
According to conservative estimates, the total
Bengali Hindu population in the state is some
40 lakh.
Malini Bhattacharjee, Tracing the Emergence
and Consolidation of Hindutva in Assam, Economic & Political Weekly, 16 April 2016. The
first time an RSS functionary became a minister in Assam was in 1978, when Lakheswar Gohain became the revenue minister in the Janata Party government led by Golap Borbora. Gohain had fought the 1978 assembly polls as a
Janata Party candidate from the Kampur constituency of Nagaon district.
23
Nothing Succeeds Like Success

in West Bengal
Rajat Roy
The outcome of the West Bengal

assembly elections raises
important questions. For one, it
questions the narrative of rural
appeasement by populist schemes
undertaken by the incumbent
government versus discontent in
urban areas. The success of the
welfare schemes, in any case, is
put in check by extortion, lumpen
practices, corruption as well
as discrimination in favour of
Trinamool Congress supporters.
The hurriedly put together
alliance between the Left Front
and Congress could offer no
viable alternative to the
ruling regime.
he outcome of the West Bengal

assembly elections has thrown up
more questions than provided
answers. After the election results were
known, a lot was talked about the welfare
measures initiated by the All India Trinamool Congress (TMC) government in the
last five years that propelled Chief Minister
Mamata Banerjee and the TMC to resounding electoral success. These welfare
schemes included food rations at a subsidised rates for a large section of the people,
the Kanyashree scheme of cash transfers for
girl students, cycles for students of classes
nine and ten in rural areas, and potable
water in villages under the Sajaldhara
scheme. Better roads and improved supply of electricity too were considered
feathers in the cap of the ruling TMC government. There is no denying that these
programmes, however faulty in their implementation, created certain goodwill for
the ruling party among the rural poor.
Untrue UrbanRural Divide
Rajat Roy (royrajat@yahoo.com) is a senior

journalist and political commentator.
24
Of the total 294 assembly seats in Bengal,

only 32 seats fall under the urban category,
another 110 seats fall under the semi-urban
category, while the rest of the 152 seats are
in rural Bengal. Thus, control over rural
votes provides clues to electoral success in
the state. During the Left Fronts rule, measures like land distribution among the rural
landless and initiatives to empower the
poor by introducing an effective panchayat
system were considered to be among the
reasons that helped create a solid vote bank
for the left. It may be surmised that taking a
cue from the Left Front, Banerjee tried to
create a rural vote bank for her party by
initiating various welfare schemes.
From this premise, it is tempting to jump
to the conclusion that the welfare schemes
did tilt the balance in favour of the ruling
party. Once that is accepted, it is a step forward to change the narrative to one of an
urbanrural divide. The urban middle class
and intellectuals are apparently going
against a party that has already snatched

away power from their hands. The hegemony that had been established over the
years in social and political spaces by the
so-called bhadralok today lies in tatters.
Instead, a new process of social engineering is in motion where the poor benefit
from welfare schemes. The fierce attacks
launched by a large section of the media
against the ruling party during the election
campaign are only an expression of urban
anger because of loss of political influence
and powerso runs the dominant narrative. The reality is more nuanced.
The results show that of the 32 urban
seats, the Left FrontCongress alliance
could win only four seats, that is, Siliguri,
Durgapur East, Durgapur West and
Raniganj. The 20 other seats that the
alliance won came under the category of
semi-urban seats and the remaining 52
seats were from rural areas.
The district-wise results also show that
out of the total 11 constituencies in Kolkata,
the Left FrontCongress alliance drew a
blank. In Howrah district, out of 16 seats,
the alliance got only one seat. In North and
South 24 Parganas, where a good number
of seats are urban, the Left FrontCongress
combine fared poorly. Only Dum Dum
(North), Kamarhati and Jadavpur came
its way, while the alliance won another six
seats in rural areas. In Hooghly district
which has a number of urban seats, the
alliance did not get a single seat from an
urban area. Thus, the urbanrural divide
theory to explain the electoral outcome
hardly holds ground.
Extortion as Parallel Economy
In Bengal, the absence of growth in manufacturing industry has resulted in loss of
jobs. Contrary to the chief ministers
claim of having created 70 lakh jobs in the
last five years, the state government has
not been able to substantiate its claim
with hard facts and figures. The absence
of growth of employment opportunities
has given rise to extortion as an alternative source of income for the unemployed.
While a section of skilled, semi-skilled
and unskilled workers has been migrating in great numbers to distant states, another section of the unemployed youth in
the West Bengal has been occupied in the
lucrative occupation of extortion.
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
In the real estate sector, businesses

have come up in the form of syndicates
that offer services like purchase of land,
supply of building materials and engagement of labourers to builders and property
developers. According to the chairman of
Bidhannagar Corporation, in Rajarhat
New Town alone, there are around 20,000
people involved in the syndicate business. There is ample evidence that these
syndicates get much-needed protection
from the political establishment and are
insulated from interference from lawenforcing agencies. The individuals who
form these syndicates extort money from
petty shopkeepers, owners of small and
medium industrial units and others.
The village poor are also not spared. In
this context, the experience of the people
getting employment under the Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in the state is telling. Unskilled workers who, under this
scheme, get paid sixeight months late,
find extortionists waiting right outside the
bank to take a hefty cut from their earnings. The fate of poor daily wage earners is
similar, as they are compelled to shell out a
portion of their earnings to goons owing
allegiance to the ruling party. If welfare
schemes are generally perceived to be propoor yielding political dividends to the
ruling party, the business of extortion
should at least partially offset their
impact. But this does not seem to have
happened to a significant extent.
During the rule of the Left Front, it was
often seen that the narrow sectarian approach of the then ruling party, the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M),
created a divide in rural Bengal by denying benefits of the welfare schemes to
political opponents of the CPI-M. That this
pernicious tradition continues in Bengal
was evident in the case of distribution of
new digital ration cards and also when
funds were released through panchayats
for various rural development projects.
The hiring of civic volunteers presented
another example of widespread nepotism
in the state. The Calcutta High Court
recently declared that the appointment
process of civic police volunteers in West
Bengal was a sham with systematic
malice and ordered the state government
to cancel all such appointments by the end
EPW
may 28, 2016
of 2016. The government had created the

civic volunteer force in 2013 and recruited
around 1.3 lakh young people tasked
with assisting the police in managing
traffic besides doing manual work in
police stations. The high court observed
that the process adopted by the government during the recruitment of civic police volunteers was not only illegal, it
seems to be a scam. It added that the
government had adopted a pick-andchoose policy (Telegraph 2016).
A new social divide within the rural
poor has been successfully created by the
ruling establishment. In 70 assembly seats,
the margin of victory was less than 5,000
votes. Most of these are in the rural areas.
Of these, 17 went to the CongressLeft
Front combine, two to the BJP and the rest
to the ruling TMC. Had there been a serious effort on the part of the state government to ensure all-round development
through various welfare schemes that are
not discriminatory, the margin of victory
for the ruling party in these 52 seats
would perhaps have been much higher.
Is Corruption a Non-issue?
Arguments are being offered that the rural
poor in West Bengal ignore the issue of
corruption and give greater weightage to
the direct benefits they receive from welfare schemes in determining voting behaviour. If such a proposition is accepted,
the question arises as to how extortion
and bullying exercises its influence on
voters when they exercise their franchise.
Five of the TMC candidates who were
sought to be implicated in the Narada sting
operation (for allegedly accepting bribes)
won in the elections this time. Of them,
four contested from urban constituencies,
where the electorate is relatively more
exposed to the media which had extensively highlighted the Narada scam.
Their margin of victory in these assembly
constituencies was much lower in comparison to the results in the 2011 assembly
elections; in some cases, the margin
halved. So the question remains: was
corruption a non-issue altogether?
Perception plays a crucial role in influencing decisions. The biggest capital of
the ruling TMC has been and remains the
public perception of the image of Mamata
Banerjee. She is perceived as untainted
vol lI no 22
and pro-poor. She leads the life of an

ordinary citizen and her personal integrity is considered unquestionable.
The assembly election was preceded by
two incidentsthe release of Narada videotapes and the collapse of Vivekananda
flyover in central Kolkata. The incidents
raised serious doubts about the TMC supremos honesty. In trains plying between Santiniketan and Burdwan, bauls (folk singers) regularly sing songs and get some
alms. A baul was recently heard singing a
song whose lyrics were widely circulated:
Didir paye hawai choti, bhaiera sob kotipati
(Mamatas slippers denote honesty, but her
brothers are minting money). The singer
sang his song without restraint and without fear of confrontation from supporters
of Banerjee. This happens only when there
is an endorsement of the views expressed.
No Viable Alternative
There were indeed reasons for popular discontentment against the ruling party, but
the hurriedly patched-up alliance that took
shape only a month before the elections
could not present itself as a viable alternative to the incumbent regime. The organisational weakness of the left was also an
important factor. Despite these shortcomings, the CongressLeft Front combine
got 38.2% of votes, 1% less than what they
had obtained in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. The Bharatiya Janata Partys (BJP)
vote share came down from 17% to 10.2%.
In 2014, the BJPs vote share in West
Bengal was bolstered not only by the Modi
wave, but also by the 2.5%3% Gorkha
votes the party won in Darjeeling. This
year, the BJPs vote share has depleted by
around 4%4.5% in this hilly district. The
TMCs overall vote share in the state rose
from 39.9% in 2014 to 44.9% in 2016. If
post-poll social media posts by the Akhil
Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) and
the Hindu Sanhati Manch congratulating
Mamata Banerjee for her spectacular
victory are anything to go by, then the
possibility of tactical voting by a section of
the supporters of the BJP and the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) to defeat
candidates of the CongressLeft Front
alliance cannot be ruled out.
Keeping an eye on 2019 general elections, the BJP would be looking for possible
supporters or partners (direct or indirect,
25
overt or covert) in areas where it is weak,

including West Bengal. In the recent past,
Banerjee and her colleagues have consistently not raised issues with which the BJP
has been attacked by its political opponents, such as the issue of intolerance to
free expression. When supporters of the
BJP demonstrated in front of the Jadavpur University campus, threatened
the vice chancellor and sought to intimidate a section of the students alike, the
state government and TMC supporters
were conspicuously silent. After her resounding victory, the chief minister made
it amply clear that the BJP is not a pariah
as far as her party is concerned.
What Next?
With this massive mandate in her favour,
Mamata Banerjee would like to spread
her wings. She has been nursing ambitions of playing a larger role in national
politics. By inviting Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina, the King of Bhutan, and the chief ministers of Uttar
Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi and Tamil Nadu,
she has made her intentions clear.
26
The chief minister is evidently hopeful

that she and her party would play an
important role in government formation
after the 2019 general elections. In the
international arena, she wants due recognition to be given to her as a key player in Indias Look East policy. What role
she will play in shaping the Teesta River
water sharing treaty between India and
Bangladesh, remains to be seen. She had,
in September 2011, objected to the terms
of the treaty and refused to accompany
the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
to Dhaka. As a wily politician, Banerjee
will bargain hard with New Delhi to get
something tangible (perhaps a relief in
the states debt burden) before she agrees
to any new deal on sharing the Teesta
waters. While it is difficult to predict her
future course of action, it is almost certain that she will continue to implement
welfare schemes with fresh vigour.
have been much worse for both. Unlike in

West Bengal where the Congress emerged
stronger and bigger than the Left, at the
national level, the Congress got a drubbing in Kerala and Assam. Its alliance
with the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
(DMK) in Tamil Nadu failed to defeat J
Jayalalithaas All India Anna Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). There is
a pressing need for the Congress to form
alliances with regional partners.
The successful experiment in Bihar
could not be repeated in Bengal. But the
urge to form a front against the BJP will
draw the Congress closer to the left. The
leaders of the left and the Congress in
Bengal have already reaffirmed their
faith in the alliance. The panchayat elections in the state are due in 2018. It is to
be seen whether the alliance would become active again only at the time of election or remain alive on the ground intermittently during the coming two years.
Whither Alliance?
As details of the poll results became available, the home truth became amply clear
to the CongressLeft Front combine. Had
there been no alliance, the result would
References
Telegraph (2016): Stay on Civic Police Hiring,
29 April, viewed on 23 May 2016, http://www.
telegraphindia.com/1160429/jsp/bengal/story_82858.jsp#.V0RWmpF97IV.
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
Democratic Process
Not Yet Lost in Tamil Nadu
V Krishna Ananth
The AIADMK is certainly not as

invincible as it appears after the
elections in Tamil Nadu. It is
possible for the DMK to consolidate
and register substantial gains in
elections to rural and urban local
bodies due in October this year.
As for the left, it will be the first
time that neither the CPI nor the
CPI(M) will be represented in the
state assembly.
V Krishna Ananth (krishnananth@gmail.com)

teaches history at Sikkim University, Gangtok.
26
here was little doubt over J Jayalalithaas All India Anna Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)
returning to power in Tamil Nadu. Analysts as well as a section of those who
lost the elections have blamed it on the
people of Tamil Nadu falling for freebies
on which a lot has been said and argued
either way. A debate is possible on
whether such welfare schemes as free
rations of staple grains and an expanded
public distribution system to ensure prevention of hunger deaths should at all be
equated with promises of subsidies for
two-wheelers and laptops and thus condemned as populism. However, the fact
is that such practices seem to have come
to stay and it will take concerted efforts
to distinguish welfare measures (to be

retained as a matter of conviction) from
acts of corrupt electoral practices.
However, it is certainly not anyones
case that the people, in general, are
amoral and are given to trade their democratic right to vote with money and material goods. The fact is that the Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) too had
tried this in 2011 and lost the elections
then, and the AIADMK too could not sweep
the polls this time despite the massive
amount of cash that reached the voters
on its behalf. There is evidence that the
democratic process is not yet lost.
There was, however, an element of
surprise when the DMK emerged with as
many as 89 seats in the 234 strong state
assembly1 helping its ally, the Congress,
win eight seats alongside. The DMK managed to make a comeback in the state
after its disastrous performance in 2011
(winning only 23 seats) when it was denied the status of being the opposition
party in the assembly. That privilege
went to Vijayakanth, whose Desiya
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK)

won 29 seats as a pre-poll ally of
the AIADMK and was left without the
option of joining the government after
Jayalalithaa made that clear moments
after the results gave her a landslide. The
DMK showed no signs of recovery in
2014, drawing a blank in the Lok Sabha
polls and the AIADMK seemed invincible.
An analysis by political observers, in
the first flush after the results came,
concluded that the DMK could have
beaten its rival if only the party had
been more astute and forged a rainbow
coalition, including Vijayakanths DMDK
and S Ramadosss Pattali Makkal Katchi
(PMK). In other words, Karunanidhi
would have achieved the AIADMKs
defeat by conceding the chief ministers
job to either Anbumani Ramadoss (son
of S Ramadoss) or to Vijayakanth. This
was not what the DMK patriarch would
have done.
Meanwhile, it is now clear that
Vijayakanth, who arrived on the poll
scene in 2006 with a bang and sustained
his hold in the 2009 general elections,
who managed to bargain for a chunk of
seats from the AIADMK in 2011 and who
went along with the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) in 2014 (recall the special
mention Narendra Modi had made of
him while addressing his allies after
the May 2014 victory), has been dumped
by the people. It is unlikely that this
star-turned-politico will muster the
strength to hold on. He does not have
it in him to tide over the rough and
tumble of politics. The same may not
be true of Ramadoss and the PMK. The
party may live to fight another day and
manage to strike deals with either the
BJP or the AIADMK for 2019; but that will
be possible only if the elder Ramadoss
decides to love his son a little less and
stop dreaming of the chief ministers
chair for him.
Karunanidhi had lost the plot and it
showed in the way in which his efforts to
make a rainbow coalition against the
AIADMK were spurned by a cross section
of parties, among them, the PMK, the
DMDK and the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal
Katchi (VCK), even as the Congress that
had walked out of the alliance in 2014
quietly clinched a sweet deal. This was
EPW
may 28, 2016
so because the party, whose fortunes

have been on the decline (it lost power
in the state in 1967 but managed to remain afloat, riding piggyback on either
the DMK or the AIADMK since 1977),
could thus ensure representation in the
state assembly this time.2 To be fair,
Karunanidhi had never held any grudge
against any party (barring the AIADMK
ever since M G Ramachandran set it up
in 1972 and wrested power in 1977 and
against Jayalalithaa since MGRs death
in 1988) and least of all against the
Congress.3
In other words, the DMK patriarch
should certainly be credited with the
skills to read the writing on the wall
and he seems to have done so this time
around too. He certainly knew that
the Congress, even after the exit of
G K Vasan and several factions, including
the one that P Chidambaram seemed to
build for his son, was worth being taken
on as an ally. And this indeed is what
led the party to snatch a respectable
performance from what appeared to be
the end of the road for the Congress,
particularly after its bad show in 2011
and its disastrous performance in the
2014 general elections.
But then, after a closer look at the poll
results, particularly the AIADMKs sweep
in the Kongu region (Coimbatore, Tiruppur and Erode Districts) in Western
Tamil Nadu, it is possible to argue that
the DMK could have won more than the
number of seats it won and could have
even formed the government if it had
managed to get the Kongunadu Makkal
Desiya Katchi (KMDK), a sub-regional
outfit of the upwardly mobile Gounder
community (both in the social and economic sense), into its fold. A look at the
votes polled in this region clearly show
that this sub-regional outfit polled more
votes than the margin by which the
DMK/Congress candidates lost to the
AIADMK in at least a dozen constituencies across Coimbatore, Tiruppur and
Erode Districts. Moreover, unlike the DMDK
and the PMK, who demanded the chief
ministers job for its leader, the KMDK
could have been roped in with an offer
of a couple of assembly seats to contest
and a commitment to decriminalise
toddy tapping!
vol lI no 22
The AIADMK, even after having retained power (defying the pattern since the
death of MGR and losing power to the
DMK after being in power), is certainly
not as invincible as it appears. And it is
possible for the DMK to consolidate and
register some substantial gains in the
elections to the rural and urban local
bodies due in October this year. For
this, the DMK needs to anoint M K Stalin
as Karunanidhis heir and ensure an
amicable settlement among the siblings,
reduce the role of the Maran brothers in
the party, and scout for localised and
sub-regional outfits such as the KMDK.
Dalit Assertion
While this could bring good news to the
DMK, it certainly will spell disaster for
the sociopolitical discourse of the state.
A region that was home to social transformation, where brahmanical Hindutva
had been challenged successfully many
decades ago, and which was marked by
a measure of success that the non-Brahmin movement had achieved in the electoral as well as in the social sense when
the Congress Party was voted out decisively, is today in the grip of casteist violence against the Dalits. There were instances of casteist violence in Tamil
Nadu even before the DMK came to power
in the state in 1967. The massacre of 44
agricultural workers, all Dalits, in
Keezhavenmani on 26 December 1968
happened within months after the DMK
wrested power in the state. The blot of
having failed to apprehend and punish
the perpetrators of the ghastly crime
remains on the administration which
was then headed by C N Annadurai.
While there appeared a lull in the
years after that, there was organised
violence against Dalits in Kodiangulam,
where a 600 strong police force descended
on this all-Dalit settlement and ravaged
their homes on 31 August 1995. Since
then, there has been a pattern: Dalit assertion being dealt with violent attacks on the community and its members by armed gangs of the intermediate community and the police either
participating in such crimes (as in Kodiangulam) or remaining bystanders when
Murugesan and five of his associates
were hacked to death in Melavalavu on
27
29 June 1997. Murugesan and his associates were killed only because they
dared to defy the norms set by the
non-brahmin caste Hindus, which said
that they shall not contest elections to the
panchayats even if it was a right guaranteed to them by the Constitution!
If Kodiangulam was orchestrated when
J Jayalalithaas AIADMK ruled Tamil
Nadu, the Melavalavu killings were acted
out after the DMK had wrested power in
the state. While it may not be possible to
establish a nexus between the leaders of
these two parties and the trend as it began
in Kodiangulam and persisted across the
state, since then there has indeed been a
pattern to this kind of violence. The
thrust of the Justice Gomathinayagam
Committee report (it was set up by the
AIADMK government post Kodiangulam)
tabled in the state assembly many years
later (in December 1999 when the DMK
was in power) did convey a message. It
was that the police cannot be blamed for
using force, particularly in instances
where the Dalits were at the receiving end.
The brutal attack that took place on
the banks of the Tamaraparni River (in
Tirunelveli) on a procession led by Dalit
leader K Krishnasamy seeking early settlement of wage-related disputes of
workers in a tea garden17 of the participants were chased by armed policemen into the river and got drownedon
23 July 1999 did convey the same message loud and clear. This indeed is not
what the Dravida Iyakkam4 promised in
its early years.
In other words, the DMK patriarch will
have to intervene with all his authority
within the party to ensure the completion of the unfinished agenda of effecting a social transformation by internalising the class aspect into the caste-based
agenda that it had taken up in the nonBrahmin movement it had inherited
from the Dravida Kazhagam in 1949. To
opt for this calls for political courage
and in a sense reinventing the DMKs first
principle: to forge a lasting arrangement
with parties such as the Puthiya Tamilagham (incidentally a DMK ally now) and
the VCK, now with the Third Front. The
DMK, founded as it was on the altar of
the campaign for social transformation,
will find this easier said than done.
28
This, after all, was the challenge before the left parties in Tamil Nadu. The
Communist Party of India (CPI) until
1964 and both the CPI and the CPI(M)
since the split that year, claimed to persist with this agenda. The communist
movement, indeed, had played a decisive
role since its inception in the 1920s by
democratising the national movement
by involving the industrial workers and
the peasantry as well as the landless
masses in the campaign. This, in fact,
had also rendered the Justice Partys
campaign weak and rudderless.5 It is
another story that the left, after years of
debates, mostly of a theological nature,
ended up losing its hold in the political
discourse of the state. Even if the two
parties managed representation in the
state assembly all these years, it turns
out that this was done only by riding
piggyback on either the DMK or the
AIADMK. This will be the first time ever,
in the long history of electoral democracy,
that neither the CPI nor the CPI(M) will
be represented in the state assembly.
That this happened even as the left parties won a majority in neighbouring Kerala is something that must concern the
leaders of the left.
Notes
1
Polling was held only in 232 constituencies at

the time of writing.
It may be stressed here that M Karunanidhi as

chief minister was dismissed from power invoking Article 356 (rather abusing the constitutional
provision) twice in the past, first on 31 January
1976, when Indira Gandhis Congress-led government dismissed the state government (one of the
two non-Congress governments then and whose
opposition to the Emergency was an irritant to
the regime), and once again on 30 January 1991,
when Rajiv Gandhi ensured the union cabinet,
then headed by Chandrashekhar (and depending
on the Congress for survival) recommended dismissal of the state government on charges that
the state, under Karunanidhi, had turned into a
haven for the LTTE. Similarly, the Congress, under Sitaram Kesri pulled down the I K Gujral-led
United Front Government in New Delhi in 1998
specifically objecting to the DMKs presence.
Notwithstanding the dismissal of Karunanidhis government in January 1976 and a violent demonstration his cadre held on Indiras
arrival at Madurai subsequently (when she
suffered a minor injury) Karunanidhi struck
an alliance with her party in 1980, tried hard
for such an alliance again in 1984 (until the
AIADMK managed it), supped with Congressmen in the state such as G K Moopanar and
P Chidambaram who floated the Tamil Maanila
Congress in 1996, and then returned to the
Congress-led UPA months before the May 2004
elections (after remaining in the BJP-led NDA
between 1999 and November 2003).
The choice of this phrase (Dravida Iyakkam) is
conscious and I owe this usage to N Ram. See
Dravida Movement in Its Pre-independence
Phases, Economic & Political Weekly, Annual
Number, February 1979, Vol XIV, Nos 7 and 8,
pp 377402. The article explains the complex of
historical forces in the latter half of the 19th
century that influenced the making of the Dravidian movement of which the DMK as much as
the AIADMK are legatees. It also deals with the
various stages of negotiations within the movement and its evolution from the Justice Party
(with a pronounced and unabashed pro-British
agenda) into the DMK in 1949 and the critical
intervention by C N Annadurai in its making
into a platform committed to democratic politics alongside social reforms.
See N Ram, op cit, for a full discussion on this.

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may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
Left Front Victory in Kerala

A Verdict for Social Re-engineering
K M Seethi
Political conditions under the

Congress-led United Democratic
Front in Kerala provided
considerable opportunities for
both the Left Democratic Front and
the National Democratic Alliance
to muster peoples support on a
number of issues ranging from
rampant corruption to social
conditions of women and
marginalised communities. While
the LDF effectively reaped the
windfall of several graft cases in
which many ministers as well as
the personal staff of the chief
ministers office were directly or
indirectly involved, the Bharatiya
Janata Party-led NDA has steadily
succeeded in making inroads into
the support base of both the
fronts, as well as among new
voters, though the party won just
one seat.
K M Seethi (kmseethimgu@gmail.com) is the

Director of School of International Relations and
Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam.
EPW
may 28, 2016
he landslide victory of the Communist Party of India (Marxist)

(CPI(M))-led Left Democratic Front
(LDF) in the assembly elections held in
Kerala on 16 May 2016 is a clear indication
that the much-touted appealcontinuity
for developmentof the Congress-led
United Democratic Front (UDF) government has been turned down by the people of the state in the wake of a series of
corruption charges against the ruling
dispensation. The Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) campaign, with the slogan Kerala lost its way and the BJP is to show the
way also did not seem to have made
any significant impact on the electorate.
However, the NDA could make a claim
that it has eventually succeeded in opening its political account in the state assembly with the lone seat it won from
one of the constituencies in the states
capital, Thiruvananthapuram.
Overall Election Scenario
Many would believe that the LDF victory
has been made easier with the antiincumbency wave reaching new heights
in the past few months on a variety of issues. In a spectacular performance, the
LDF secured 91 seats in the 140 member
assembly, reducing the UDF strength to a
meagre 47 (Table 1). More importantly,
the anti-incumbency wave took a heavy
toll with four cabinet ministers (the controversial Minister for Excise K Babu, the
Minister for Labour Shibu Baby John, the
Minister for Agriculture K P Mohanan
and the Minister for Welfare of Scheduled
Tribes P K Jayalakshmi), the speaker
N Sakthan, the deputy speaker Palode
Ravi and the chief whip Thomas Unniyadan losing their seats, besides
reducing the margin of the votes secured
by Oommen Chandy (chief minister),
K M Mani (the controversial finance minister who had to quit after the scandal
relating to opening bars) and several
vol lI no 22
others. The seats won by the Congress

have also been reduced to an all-time
lowfrom 38 to 22. The Indian Union
Muslim Leagues (IUML) tally has come
down from 20 to 18, while that of the
Kerala Congress (Mani) (KC(M)) from
nine to six.
Curiously, three parties in the state
the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP),
the Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)), both
belonging to the UDF, and the Kerala
Congress (Democratic), belonging to
the LDFhave been wiped out without
winning even a single seat. It may be
noted that the RSP and JD(U) were LDF
partners, but quit the front in the 2011
election. The attempts to bring them
back to the LDF fizzled out due to the
personalised political bargains; the
price of remaining in the UDF seemed to
be too heavy for the two parties.
The CPI(M), in a remarkable performance, increased its strength from 45 to
58 and the CPIs seats also saw an increase
from 13 to 19. The JD(S) secured three
seats, while the Congress(S), CMP and
Kerala Congress(B), RSP(L) got one seat
each (see Table 1). Among the many
independent candidates fielded by the
LDF, five won. An interesting aspect of
the 2016 election was that all fronts
fielded film stars with the intention of
capturing votes and the LDF succeeded
in getting two of them elected. Similarly,
Table 1: Seats Shared by Various Parties in
Assembly Election Results, 2016
Total
CPI(M)
Congress
CPI
IUML
KC(M)
JD(S)
NCP
CMP
KC(B)
RSP(L)
KC(J)
BJP
Congress(S)
Independent
140
LDF
UDF
NDA
Others
91
58
47
22
19
18
6
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
CPI: Communist Party of India; JD(S): Janata Dal (Secular);

NCP: Nationalist Congress Party; CMP: Communist Marxist
Party; KC(B): Kerala Congress (Balakrishna Pillai); RSP(L):
Revolutionary Socialist Party (Leninist); KC(J): Kerala
Congress (Joseph).
Source: Kerala, Chief Electoral Officer (2016): Legislative
Assembly Election Kerala 2016, available at http://www.
ceo.kerala. gov.in/.
29
P C George, the former government

chief whip who failed to secure support
from either front and contested as an
independent, registered an impressive
victory from his hometown in a quadrangular fight.
The LDF effectively reaped a windfall
because of the several graft cases in
which many UDF ministers as well as the
personal staff of the former chief ministers office were directly or indirectly involved. The Left Front thus swept the
districts of Kollam (11/11), Thrissur (12/13),
Alappuzha (8/9), Pathanamthitta (4/5),
Palakkad (9/12), Kozhikode (11/13), Kannur (8/11) and Wayanad (2/3). The districts where the UDF could make its presence felt are Malappuram (12/16), Kottayam (6/9) and Ernakulam (9/14) (Table 2).
Malappuram is the stronghold of IUML, a
partner of the UDF, which secured the
maximum number of seats but with reduced margins in most constituencies,
compared to its performance in 2011.
Interestingly, the other minor parties
which sought to cash in on the Muslim
vote bank (such as the Welfare Party,
Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI)
and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP))
failed to secure even a modicum of support from the people. This might give
an indication that minority votes, especially those of the Muslims (who constitute more than 26% of the states
population), went in favour of secular
alter natives in the wake of a fear that
the Sangh Parivar was gaining ground
in the anti-incumbency wave against
the UDF.
BJP-led NDA Success
The BJP-led NDA succeeded in demolishing a myth that it would never be able to
secure a seat in the state assembly
against the backdrop of the bipolar
coalition politics which has been a distinctive feature of politics in Kerala since
1967. The victory of the BJP candidate
from the Nemom constituency, O Rajagopal, a former union minister in the government led by Atal Behari Vajpayee, is
being celebrated as the first, yet the best
lotus in the state, where most political
parties as well as both fronts displayed
a strong aversion to the BJPs brand of
politics. However, against all odds, the
30
the state through concerted strategies

entailing castecommunal equations.
BJPs attempts to mobilise an intermediate caste like the Ezhavas (who constitute
nearly 24% of the population) through its
front organisation, Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana (SNDP), and its newly
formed Bharat Dharma Jana Sena (BDJS),
Table 2: District-wise Performance of Kerala
as well as other upper castes (such as
Elections 2016
Nairs (14%) and Namboothiris (1%)),
No District
Total LDF UDF NDA Others
lower castes (such as a faction of the
Seats
1 Kasaragod
5 3 2 Pulayar Mahasabha) and tribes (like
2 Kannur
11 8 3 C K Janus newly formed Janadhipathya
3 Wayanad
3 2 1 Rashtriya Sabha (JRS)) seemed to have
4 Kozhikode
13 11 2 earned it dividends. The NDAs frenzied
5 Malappuram
16 4 12 campaign
in the presence of Prime Min6 Palakkad
12 9 3 ister
Narendra
Modi, BJP President Amit
7 Thrissur
13 12 1 Shah
and
several
union ministers pro8 Ernakulam
14 5 9 vided
a
political
boost
to the NDA.
9 Idukki
5 3 2
Though
the
BDJS
fi
elded
candidates in
10 Kottayam
9 2 6 1
11 Alappuzha
9 8 1 as many as 36 constituencies, none of
12 Pathanamthitta
5 4 1 them emerged victorious, and in all places,
13 Kollam
11 11
- the votes secured under the banner of
14 Thiruvananthapuram 14 9 4 1
the NDA were abysmally low. The UDF,
Source: Kerala, Chief Electoral Officer (2016): Legislative
on the other hand, was expecting that
Assembly Election Kerala 2016, available at http://www.
ceo.kerala.gov.in/.
the Ezhava community, whose members
The BJP has slowly succeeded in mak- constituted the support base of the left
ing inroads into the support base of parties, would switch their loyalty from
both fronts, besides that of the new vot- LDF to NDA through BDJS, and that the
ers, though the actual pay-off in terms split in the vote bank would eventually
of seats in the assembly is just one. It help the Congress-led front. It was exwas interesting that the BJP-led alliance pected that the upper-caste votes would
offered a tough triangular fight in many be split, undermining the support base
constituencies, and unlike in previous of the left. The results, however, indielections, it came second in as many cated a diametrically opposite scenario.
as seven constituencies, pushing both In fact, the support base of the UDF
fronts to the third position. Even in eroded considerably, with a good numMalampuzha, where the veteran CPI(M) ber of votes moving to the NDA as well
leader V S Achuthanandan won the seat, as to the LDF, underscoring the fact that
the electorate in Kerala actually ashis nearest rival was an NDA candidate.
Similarly, the NDA candidate in Man- sessed the performance of the UDF govjeswaram (Kasaragod District) lost the ernment while voting, instead of stickelection by just 89 votes. This indicated ing to particular caste/communal interthat the BJP has been gaining ground in ests and equations.
There are other interestTable 3: Voting Share of Parties in Kerala Elections 2016
(%) ing dimensions in the elecLDF
UDF
NDA
Others
tion statistics. There has
CPI(M)
26.5 Congress 23.7 BJP 10.5 SDPI
0.6
been an increase of more
CPI
8.1 IUML
7.4 BDJS 3.9 CMP
0.6
than three million voters in
JD(S)
1.4 KC(M)
4
Welfare Party 0.3
NCP
1.2 JD(U)
1.5
PDP
0.2 this election. The voter
KC(B)
0.4 RSP
1.1
BSP
0.2 turnout also showed a sigCongress(S) 0.3 KC(J)
0.4
AIADMK
0.2 nificant jump from 75.12%
Independents
Independents 5.3 in 2011 to 77.35% in 2016.
The highest turnout of
SDPI: Social Democratic Party of India; AIADMK: All India Anna Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam.
81.89% among the 14 disSource: Kerala, Chief Electoral Officer (2016): Legislative Assembly Election
tricts was reported from
Kerala 2016, available at http://www. ceo.kerala.gov.in/.
NDA secured nearly three million votes

(15.03%) in the 2016 elections which is a
significant rise from the 2011 tally of
6.03% (Table 3). The BJP leadership
claimed that two million new voters
who supported the party in the 2016
elections remained with it and helped it
increase its vote share by 9%.
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
Kozhikode. Kannur emerged second with

80.63%. The lowest turnout of 71.66%
was in Pathanamthitta District. The candidates of the LDF registered victories in
25 of the 38 constituencies where the
polling rate was above 80%. The UDF
could win only in 13 constituencies where
the voter turnout was as high as 80%. In
spite of the increase in voter turnout,
there was a decline in the vote shares of
parties in both the LDF and UDF. The decline of the vote share of the UDF was
from 45.83% (2011) to 38.86% (2016)
with the number of seats declining from 72
to 47. The vote share of the Congress came
down from 26.4% (2011) to 23.6% (2016).
On the other hand, the LDF vote share actually declined from 44.94% (2011) to
43.31% (2016), while the number of seats
increased from 68 to 91. The CPI(M)s vote
share also declined from 28.18% (2011) to
26.5% (2016) despite securing an additional 13 seats (from 45 in 2011 to 58 in
2016). The decline of CPIs vote share was,
however, marginal from 8.2% (2011) to
8.1% (2016). While both fronts showed a
significant reduction in their vote share,
there has been a considerable increase
in the vote share of the BJP and its allies.
The BJP-led NDA registered a significant
growth in the vote share from 6.03% in
the 2011 elections to 15.02% in 2016, an
increase of nearly 9%. The break-up of the
vote share (2016) of the major constituents
of NDA is: BJP 10.5%, BDJS 3.9%.
Conclusions
Though there has been an upswing in
the vote share of the NDA, this has not
been translated into assembly seats, given the fronts constraints in breaking the
duopoly of the two prominent fronts in
the state. However, the NDA alliance has
been able to make considerable advances
in the local body elections held in 2015
when it succeeded in capturing 15.63%
of the total votes, thereby emerging as a
critical factor in many panchayats and
municipalities in the state.
It was in such a situation that the BJP
sought to make further advances in the
2016 assembly elections by deploying
strategies of reappropriating caste and
communal forces to present an impressive performance. The political conditions under the Congress dispensation
EPW
may 28, 2016
provided considerable opportunities for

both the LDF and NDA to muster peoples
support on a variety of issues ranging
from rampant corruption to social
conditions of women and marginalised
communities. The UDF government
made tall claims relating to the launch
of projects such as the Kochi metro rail,
the Vizhinjam port, the Kochi smart
city, the Kannur international airport,
besides having undertaken the chief
ministers Jana Samparka Paripadi.
But the corruption scandals pertaining to bars offering alchohol in hotels,
the solar panel deal, the illegal allotment of lands, including the order
issued a few days before the election
declaring the reclamation of 378 acres
of the Methran Kayal backwaters wetland at Kumarakom village in Kottayam
District and 47 acres of paddy fields at
Kadamakuddy in Kochi, all contributed
to the debacle of the Congress-led UDF.
The left parties knew that the UDF was a
ramshackle dispensation and that its
collapse was imminent. The election
campaigns which spanned over two
months thus witnessed intense political
debates on a wide range of issues, including the inability of the police to nab the
killer of Jisha, a Dalit law student who
was brutally murdered. Both the LDF and
NDA capitalised on the issue putting the
government on the defensive.
The LDF carried out a statewide campaign projecting its seculardemocratic
alternative to the Sangh Parivars politics of communal mobilisation. It also
succeeded in highlighting how the
Modi governments neo-liberal policy
regime was increasing inequality. The
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) issue,
the nationalism debate, the killing of
writers and intellectuals across states in
India, and the beef controversy, were all
subjects that came up in the election
campaigns in the state. The CPI chose a
JNU scholar, Muhammed Muhsin, to

contest from Pattambi constituency and
he is the youngest member of the state
assembly. Kanhaiya Kumar, the president of the JNU Students Union, came to
Kerala and campaigned for Muhsin in
Pattambi. The fact that another JNU
student leader Roji M John also won from
the Angamaly constituency on a Congress
ticket showed that the debates on JNU
had a political resonance in the state.
The new LDF government led by the
CPI(M) has several challenges before it.
The most crucial ones are related to the
pending corruption cases, including the
solar panel scam and liquor policy,
besides issues relating to the continuance
of the Kochi metro rail project, the
Vizhinjam port, the Kochi smart city
project, etc. The policies in the field of
education, health, industry, agriculture,
and the welfare of Dalits and Adivasis
need to be revisited to ensure transparency, accountability and equity.
Kerala is reported to be on the top of
the list of states with the highest unemployment rate. Paradoxically, Kerala is
also the most sought-after destination
for employment for a large number of
migrant labourers (numbering nearly
four million) from states like West Bengal, Assam, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh.
At the same time, Kerala is expecting
many migrants (whose number is as high
as 2.5 million) from the Gulf countries to
return in the wake of huge fall in oil
prices. The Kerala State Planning Board
has already sounded an alarm that the
return migration would have a serious
impact on remittance economy of Kerala.
The LDF government has already come
out with a bunch of promises. The success of the new dispensation, however, depends on its capacity to handle these issues and challenges in a time-bound
manner without losing control over the
social security matrix of the state.
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vol lI no 22
31
Elucidating Gandhis Thinking

Felix Padel
t a time when it has become fashionable to debunk Gandhi, and

emphasise his flaws, it is refreshing
to read a book whose main thesis is that
Gandhi maintained a consistent political
theory, whose essence was opposing the
Cartesian dualism between self and the
other, and the addiction to violence at the
core of modern civilisation. This book
makes a major contribution to political
science and other social sciences, as well as
philosophy (the authors own discipline).
Although many Indian thinkers have
challenged the hegemony of Western
theoretical constructs, few have done so
as powerfully as Gandhi. Yet his critique
remains veiled by a number of polarising
controversies surrounding particular issues
as well as by the sheer volume of what
Gandhi wrote and said. The strength of
this book is that it elucidates the clarity
of thought and consistent arguments
that formed the essence of his philosophy and activism. In so doing, it makes a
major contribution that could help make
Gandhis thinking relevant and accessible to many debates today, bypassing
stale debates that dismiss his relevance
through negative stereotyping.
The book elucidates Gandhis core concepts through numerous quotations, and a
systematic survey of key issues, together
with his relationship to seminal political
thinkers, including Thomas Hobbes, David
Hume, Karl Marx, Rabindranath Tagore
and B R Ambedkar, among many others.
Political Theory
Non-violence emerges as a primary tenet
of Gandhis thought, as a law of human
existence and theory of power, in opposition to a fundamental presupposition
of modern political theorythat competition, conflict and violence comprise the
law of nature (p 23) and of human
nature in particular, as expressed most
potently by Hobbes. Ahimsa is elucidated as Gandhis primary political method.
32
book reviewS
Gandhi in Political Theory: Truth, Law and
Experiment by Anuradha Veeravalli, Ashgate (Farnham,
Surrey (United Kingdom) and Burlington, Vermont (United
States), 2014; pp 154, `7,664.17.
On many issues, Gandhis thinking

emerges as surprisingly close to that of
Karl Marx, for whom capitalist society
is a historical mode of complete alienation from the essence of man, or of man
from himself (p 27). The fundamental
difference is in the approach to violence.
To Marx, violence is an unavoidable part
of revolution, and can have a liberating
aspect, while to Gandhi, the power of
loving ones enemies releases a far greater
transformative force than hating and
killing them. In his words, The body
might be destroyed, the spirit will proclaim its freedom; this to me is not a
theory; it is a fact of experience (p 28).
With Ambedkar, whose followers tend to
see Gandhis approach as patronising and
casteist, the difference emerges primarily
as one of strategyGandhi hating untouchability as much as Ambedkar, and
trying to end it, but from the other side,
by attempting to reform Hinduism and
inculcate respect for traditional caste occupations, such as cleaning streets and
disposing of dead bodies. Why should
not people who perform these jobs be
respected and remunerated equally, or
more highly, than high status but essentially parasitic jobs that make money out
of peoples misery, such as lawyer or
doctor? It often seems self-destructive
for the Dalit cause that the Ambedkar
Gandhi argument has been kept raw, instead of finding common cause in trying
to end untouchability once and for all.
Another vital concept in Gandhis political theory is self-rule, deemed necessary
as a counterpart to political freedom.
Self-rule has an individual as well as a
collective aspect, which is essentially
sovereignty of the people. Swaraj is basically a theory of substantive sovereignty

of the masses of the nation and of the
individual as opposed to the state as
sovereign (p 50).
On the nation state, Gandhi, of course,
had an uncanny ability to appeal to the
idea of India; yet the thrust of his political
thought was towards transcending the
nation state and government control. In
his words again, Self goverment means
continuous effort to be independent of
any government control (p 55).
It is popular these days to hear people
blaming Gandhi for Indias partition,
when no one, perhaps, tried harder to
prevent it. As independence approached,
Gandhis concern was to stop the violence. More than that, his larger aim
was to end the whole system of exploitation that British rule had systematised:
what he saw as more important than
technical independence was independence from the epistemological, metaphysical and political underpinnings of
modern civilisation rather than from
British rule (p 79).
His opposition to the proposal to
vivisect India, and support for Badshah
KhanFrontier Gandhiwhose Khudai
Khidmatgars tried vainly to oppose
Pakistans emergence from India, in
their Pashtun movement in the North
West Frontier Province, emerges eloquently in these pages.
Experiments in Brahmacharya
As the violence around partition escalated,
why did Gandhi choose to spend time in
Noakhali in East Bengal, and why did he
choose that time and place to indulge in
his much-criticised experiments in selfcontrol around celibacy?
The sense of moral outrage Gandhis celibacy experiments created cut across boundaries of modernists and traditionalists, scientists and politicians His unorthodox use of
brahmacharyashocked and embarrassed the
orthodox Hindu and the liberal educated Indian equally (p 129).
This is very true. From the point of

view of sexual emancipation, knowing
the history of how sexuality has been
repressed as well as commercialised, it
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
BOOK REVIEW
often seems hard to identify with Gandhis

advocacy of celibacy and seeming denigration of the joys of sex.
In this book, for the first time, Veeravalli
brings to light the theoretical basis for
understanding Gandhis experiments in
brahmacharya as experiments in achieving non-violence through personal refinement, transforming the macrocosm
by working on the microcosm, rather
than as an expression of renunciation or
rejection of sexuality. This distinction is
vital to understand, since such a wide
spectrum of people have reacted against
Gandhi based on a misunderstanding
of why and how he performed these
experiments.
Veeravallis approach to this subject
involves focusing on the story of Manu,
the 17-year old girl, a grand-niece of
Gandhi, who participated willingly in
his celibacy experiments at Noakhali by
sleeping naked next to him. Though
sketchy, the biographical details of
Manus life presented here, partly through
quotations from her diary (finally published in Gujarati in 2013), show her consciousness of her role in the experiments, and how this developed her own
sense of calling, which inspired her own

work for the rest of her life. This consciousness she expressed in a muted
form in her book on Gandhi, BapuMy
Mother (1949), where she maintained a
silence on the brahmacharya experiments out of respect for associates of
Gandhi who advised this, and also in her
educational and womens work in later
life at Mahuva on the Saurashtra coast.
Perhaps we have to understand that
human sexuality is a mystery that offers
ecstatic pleasures, but is misused in
the most terrible ways every day, most
obviously by men who force themselves
onto women and children. Gandhi and
the Dalai Lama represent one end of
the spectrum on how to relate to ones
sexuality, offering liberation through
forms of renunciation. Thousands of
women who have suffered sexual abuse
renounce sex from the other side. Maybe we should not understand this conscious abstinence from sex as a total
contradiction of sexual liberation, but
as a necessary counterpart to it, highlighting the addiction and enslavement
to sex that certainly grips a lot of men in
present times.
Another area where Gandhi has continued to be controversial is in his

radical questioning of industrialisation.
When Charlie Chaplin met Gandhi in
London in 1931, this was the question
he asked Gandhi, whom he admired in
other ways: why oppose industrialisation when it so obviously represents
the advancement of mankind? Here
Gandhis perception comes close to that
of Marx.
In contrast to many followers of Marx,
who have orthodoxised Marx into a belief
that industrialisation and capitalism represent necessary stages of human development, Gandhi, like Marx, emphasises the
totally dehumanising aspects of factory
work, which alienates human beings from
their labour and fruits of labour. We
know now that the solution to this alienation does not lie simply in the state taking over private enterprise: factories in
Stalins Soviet Union, Maos China, or
Communist Party of India (Marxist)ruled Kerala and West Bengal appear as
dehumanising as any. Trade union movements and movements of workers to
have more control over industrial work,
and proper remuneration, are vital, and
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vol lI no 22
33
BOOK REVIEW
Gandhi supported such movements

among textile workers.
But ultimately, where is industrialisation
headed? As Indian negotiators at the
Paris climate change summit push for the
right to develop India economically along
the same basic trajectory along which
Western countries developed, they do this
in the name of ending poverty. However,
anyone who follows grassroots movements in India closely knows very well
that industrialisation through metal factories, big dams and power stations, far
from ending poverty, is making it worse
for millions. It is being imposed by force,
with hideous injustice, by takeovers of
34
land and resources that are being resisted

every step of the way by movements of
women and men who still follow Gandhis
models of resistance.
Conclusions
Gandhis belief was that India can show
the world a radically different model of
development, based on pluralism, selfrestraint and non-violence. Within months
of independence, he saw the chances for
this alternative collapsing, and wished
to diea wish too soon fulfilled. Yet his
vision of what India has been and can
be is still immensely inspiring. To follow that inspiration though, and temper
it with inspiration from so many other

strands, one needs to understand Gandhis political thought beyond its seeming contradictions.
This book offers a way into this that
could bring the essence of his thinking
back into circulation. To millions of people
around a world exploding in everescalating violent conflicts, Gandhi offers an alternative that needs exploring
more deeply, linking the personal and
political, the spiritual and material.
Felix Padel (felishmr@gmail.com) is a social
anthropologist and author of Sacrificing
People: Invasions of a Tribal Landscape.
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
BOOK REVIEW
Beyond Workers and Peasants

Vamsi Vakulabharanam
avid Goodman, in this wellresearched book, provides the

material to answer three interrelated questions (although he does not
explicitly formulate them in this manner):
first, why do most (but not all) Chinese
social scientists avoid using class as an
analytical category even though it is not
hard to see the emergence of a hierarchical
class-based society in China, post-1978
reforms? Second, how does a communist state still hold on to some notion of a
non-class society in the wake of rising
class-based inequalities? Third, what is
the Chinese class structure in the present
(accompanied by low social mobility and
high intergenerational transmission of
wealth, privilege and advantage), and how
does this help in understanding socioeconomic change?
Class as a Category
The answer to the first question that one

can glean from the book is complex. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) accepted
Maos class analyses during the prerevolution phase between 1930s and 1949.
Maos radical idea that the peasantry
(along with the landless agricultural
workers) can act as a revolutionary class in
the post-1930s China in the fight against
landlords and the state was deployed to
34
Class in Contemporary China by David S G

Goodman; New York: Wiley, 2014; pp xvii+233, 15.99.
revise the fundamental strategy of the

communist party. This was done after
the near annihilation the communist
party faced from Chiang Kai-sheks government with an urban-centric strategy
that focused mainly on mobilising the
minuscule urban proletariat at that time.
Although Mao never openly questioned
the ontological primacy of proletariat in a
communist revolution, he believed that the
peasant question was the primary contradiction in the Chinese context. After fighting the Japanese to a stalemate (before the
Japanese finally left China due in part to
the United States (US) and Soviet victories
over them), and defeating the Kuomintang,
Maos communist party established a communist-led government of four classes
workers, peasants, petti-bourgeoisie, and
bourgeoisie. After 1949, the new communist-led state implemented revolutionary
measures like land reforms, subsequent
collectivisation of farms, and nationalised private firms while also establishing
new state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
By 1956, it seemed that China had
attained something akin to a class-less
society that was led by CCP and the
peoples government. Mao, in fact,
launched the Hundred Flowers Movement in 1956, when the CCP felt comfortable about the expression of diverse
opinions from intellectuals about the
new communist regime. This campaign
quickly became a repressive movement
(Anti-Rightist Campaign) as several individuals who had spoken up were denounced for their bourgeois liberalism
imprisoned, censured or excluded.
For the next 20 years or so, Mao was
constantly engaged in identifying and
fighting what he saw as anti-communist
elements within the party and outside
(what he termed as the continuous revolution). Right after the revolution in 1949,
Chinese state resorted to a particular
official deployment of class as a category.
Every individual was assigned a class
descriptor (from 62 such descriptors)
and two class labels: class origin (based
on what the individual was doing in the
period, 194649) and class background
(the class that the father of the individual belonged to, when he/she was born).
The class descriptor and labels determined almost every aspect of the individuals life in post-revolution China such
as career, education, and even marriage
options. People who fought for the revolution, or people from working class or
peasant background were highly favoured
over the others. The others were openly
or tacitly viewed as class enemies. The
initial assumption of CCP was that this
whole arrangement would gradually
lose its salience. During the Anti-Rightist
Campaign of 1957, the class descriptors
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
BOOK REVIEW
were even added to the work records of

individuals. During the Cultural Revolution, in the 1970s, these categories were
extensively used to denote class enemies
and friends. These descriptors and labels
persisted until the end of Mao era.
Given the repression and upheavals
political, social and economicassociated
with the term class, there is a general
sense that class as a category is far too
potent and can potentially lead to gross
abuse in the Chinese context. While this
explanation does not exhaust all the reasons for the Chinese social scientists
reticence to use class categories, it is one
of the most compelling ones. Indeed, it
is also most certainly true that several
Chinese social scientists would want
China to move to a full-fledged Western
style capitalist democracy.
Changing Societies
The book also provides material to
answer the second question. Chinese
partystatea short form for CCP and
the state that are virtually indistinguishable from each other since the revolutionused two occupational classes
and a stratum to broadly identify the
Chinese society in the pre-1978 period.
Workers and peasants were the two
classes and the stratum consisted of professionals, teachers, managers of firms
and so forth. The stratum was always
suspect in terms of its potential aspirations for bourgeois status and values.
In the post-reform period, various
reforms were introduced under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping that would usher
in growth of productive forces, unleash
market forces, and introduce inequalities in society. As the society became more
complex with the emergence of multiple
classes (including an entrepreneurial
class, a professional class in the private
and public sector, and a complex working class that had multiple constituents),
the partystate has resorted to multiple
ways to deal with this complexity.
In the initial period after reforms,
almost as a reflex to the Cultural Revolution, intellectuals were clubbed with
workers, which meant China had only
two classes, workers and peasants.
Political consciousness merely arose out
of ones class belonging. This simple and
EPW
may 28, 2016
static view of CCP came into a state of

conflict with the societal complexity.
The response from the partystate by
1990s was to separate political consciousness from class by occupation. Regardless of occupational class position,
people could possess socialist political
consciousness. Those members of the
partystate who had acquired wealth
and privilege could still possess socialist
consciousness and the private capitalist
class that emerged in response to market
reforms was welcomed into the party
after 2000.
However, the broader impetus of the
party after 2002 has been to push a
harmonious society ideology that privileges a middle class (a non-Marxian
class conception), advocating controlled
growth of the upper classes and reducing the number of people belonging to
lower classes. A model Chinese person,
who aspires for economic and cultural
advancement, and is content with the
enlightened leadership of the partystate
elite, has replaced the Socialist Man of
the Maoist period in the CCP ideology, to
hold on to the idea of a socialist classless
society in the wake of rising inequalities
and the emergence of a complex class
based society.
New Class Structures
David Goodman provides an answer to
the third question: what kind of a class
structure did the market-oriented reforms
of 1978 create? The literature around
class in China is dominated mainly by the
work of sociologists from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). These
CASS sociologists (and official accounts
of class by occupation categories), have
tended to use a tripartite framework
that draws on traditions of Western sociology (thinkers like Anthony Giddens,
Erik Olin Wright and John Goldthorpe)
much more than Marx, to highlight three
sources of class powerproperty, qualifications and labour.
Those who possess property (means
of production) are the dominant class,
those with educational or organisational
qualifications are the intermediate/
middle/professional class, and those
who own mainly physical labour are the
subordinate class. While each of these
vol lI no 22
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35
BOOK REVIEW
may have further subdivisions, this is

the class schema that David Goodman
finds persuasive in his analysis of Chinese
class structure.
The dominant/ruling (coterminous)
class has two componentsa political
elite and an economic elite. The political
elite comprises members of the party
state. While before 1978, the partystate
drew heavily from those who were active in the revolutionary ferment between 1930 and 1949, post-1978, there
have been some important changes.
First, recruitment to the partystate
has been based not only on political loyalty but also educational qualifications.
This has come about primarily because
of the nature of competence that is needed
in implementing the changes due to
reforms. This has also resulted in the
recruitment of much younger people
into the cadres. Second, there has been
tremendous decentralisation (70% of the
government expenditure is the responsibility of the local government). However,
there is significant intergenerational
transmission of privilege, with a large
number of children of the CCP officials
GYAN BOOKS
occupying important positions in the

partystate or in the SOEs.
Formation of Capitalist Class
The economic elite consists of different
players: entrepreneurs in private and
foreign-owned firms, managers in SOEs
and in the private sector, and a significant number of party cadres. Some
routes to the formation of the capitalist
class can be identified here.
First, the earliest capitalists in China
came from Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) that came up in rural areas
from the early 1980s onwards. The TVEs
were meant to be collectively owned by
village communities (South and East of
China) or by the local government (Sunan
model). While the 1990s privatisation
story of TVEs is quite complex, a brief outline can be provided here. Some TVEs
found it hard to be profitable in the wake
of business cycles and increased competition, so underwent privatisation. Managers and workers of TVEs were eyeing
the more lucrative urban incomes. Some
TVEs were so profitable that they were
taken over by private capital. In some
Sociology of Sanitation
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cases, private capitalists set up TVEs

(Wenzhou model) as front organisations
in order to obtain cheaper credit or land
or easier permissions, but in reality pursued profit-oriented activity.
Second, lots of private enterprises
were created in urban spaces, especially
after 1992. This created a second class of
entrepreneurs.
Third, when SOEs were significantly
reformed in the mid-1990s, SOEs began
to either subcontract work to private firms
(hybrid privatepublic activity) or to collective enterprises. This also created a
spurt in the entrepreneurial class. On the
whole, the author cites estimates that show
that about 60% of the gross domestic
product of China today comes from the
private sector (that is, excluding public
and foreign-owned sectors). Although
SOEs still control the strategic industries
and are at least equally favoured by the
partystate as the private sector, a substantial volume of economic activity is
performed by private sector enterprises.
The economic and political elites are
not coterminous and their relationship is
characterised by tremendous complexity,
The book is based on a

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significant issues of
environmental sanitation,
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Founder, Sulabh International,

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The book is based on issue of

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so because the interventions
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dimensions.
Former Prof., Sociology

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The works emphasises that
the idea of sanitation is a
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Intricacies of sanitation
urgently need to be tapped in
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book presents the issues of
sanitation. Good sanitation is
a 'way of life' and an effective
tool for progress.
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ISBN no.: 9789351281139 Pages: 321 Price: Rs 900
Sanitation in India
Sanitation in India with Focus on

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A Historico-Sociological Survey
Dr (Prof.) Mohammad Akram
The book delineates the
conceptual and theoretical
formulations necessary for
the study of sanitation. It
develops some postulates
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uses data provided by various
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Sociology of Sanitation.
Associate Prof. &

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36
Dr (Prof.) Richard Pais

The book, Sociology of
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Sanitation is now increasingly
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our country. The book deals
with why it is appropriate,
rather, necessary for the issue
of Sanitation to be duly
considered as a field of
historico-sociological studies
in the Indian academia. The
traditions and practices of
sanitation should belong to
our cultural sphere.
Former HoD, Sociology

Patna University
Dr (Prof.) Leela Visaria

This book dwells on the
availability of toilets and the
disposal of human excreta by
building toilets in the context
of equity. It discusses the
availability of toilet facility at
the household level in India
by examining the available
information on households
having toilets over time and
variations across regions.
Former Director, GIDR
Gyan Avenue, 12, Pragati Market, Ashok Vihar, Phase-2, Delhi-110052. Ph.: 011-47034999, 9811692060
Showroom: 5, Ansari Road Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002, PH.: 011-43029145
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
BOOK REVIEW
regional and otherwise. In general, it

appears to be the case that a significant
part of the economic elite has a close
connection with the partystate (in terms
of either having worked directly for it at
some point or having their fathers/
relatives in the partystate apparatus). A
significant chunk of the economic elite
also seems to have arisen out of the descendants of the pre-1949 economic elite.
The political elite, especially at the
provincial levels, seems to be closely
allied with economic growth agenda for
its own advancement, so they maintain
close connections with the economic elite
through various associations and so forth.
At the apex levels, while there are clear
connections between the two elites, these
are not as closely intermeshed as they are
at the local levels. David Goodman gives
an estimate of about 3% of the total population to be in the dominant class.
Identifying the Middle Class
There is a lot of attention on the part of
the partystate to middle class. While
considerable complexity and variation
exists in the identification of the middle
class among various studies, there seem
to be two primary functions of this class in
the current Chinese context. First, the existence and discourse around the middle
class masks the existence and influence
of the dominant class. Second, there is an
aspirational aspect: a large part of the
Chinese population aspires to be in middle
class. Being middle class means to possess
a quality that David Goodman identifies
as suzhi, which combines university education, homeownership in urban spaces
and a certain cultural aspiration.
While the ideology of the Chinese state
would want a vast majority of the Chinese population to be accommodated in
the middle class, according to careful estimates, about 10%12% of the Chinese
population (primarily educated professionals but also managers at lower
rungs, owners of small enterprises and
so forth) is slotted in this class. A vast
majority, roughly 85% of the Chinese
population, therefore, falls in the residual
category of labouring subordinate class.
This class comprises peasants, urban
workers in the public and private sectors, a
vast population of migrant workers (250
EPW
may 28, 2016
million and above), small-scale self-employed workers and a whole lot of unemployed workers.
Most Chinese peasant families have at
least one migrant adult working in a distant place. While there is considerable
regional variation, peasants are the poorest within the subordinate class. Above
them are the migrant workers. Given the
hierarchical household registration system
(a system that was originally introduced in
1955, also known as hukou) rural workers who migrate to urban areas cannot
get the local hukou. Having the local hukou means getting access to education,
healthcare, pension benefits and other
state-provided welfare provisions. About
250 million migrant workers do not have
local hukou (urban) at destination, so
they are at the mercy of the market.
However, given the huge ruralurban
disparities (urban incomes are roughly
thrice the rural incomes) and regional
disparities (between coastal/eastern and
southern, and inland provinces), there
has been significant migration from inland rural areas to coastal urban areas.
Among the urban workers, until early
1990s, there was a higher status attached to workers in SOEs. They had better
wages and better access to welfare.
However, between 1995 and 2002,
Chinese SOEs were reformed significantly,
and over 50 million workers were retrenched during that period. Apart from
lowering the status of SOE workers, this
has also created a vast army of the unemployed among the Chinese working
class. Those who are still working for SOEs
have much less security compared to the
pre-1990s period, although they are better off compared to migrant workers and
workers in the private sector companies.
The key feature of the subordinate class
is that it is riven with multiple divisions
and does not possess a unified working
class kind of a consciousness.
Implications for Change
How does this tripartite schema help us
understand change in Chinese society?
David Goodmans conclusion is that
there is very little social mobility across
classes, and there is a significant intergenerational transmission of privilege.
So, these classes almost exist as strata.
vol lI no 22
Given this structure of stratification,

what are the implications for change?
The authors account of the Chinese
economy and the society is that while
China should still be characterised as a
socialist mixed economy, it is certainly
part of the overall neo-liberal configuration. Given the existence of a strong party
state, and a privileged state-owned sector (even if the workers in this sector no
longer have a high status), the author
does not foresee a quick transition to a
full-fledged capitalism or democracy.
The dominant and middle classes are
strongly embedded in the partystate
structure, while the subordinate class is
not unified. While the number of protests by peasants and workers is quite
significant, there is no unified framework
or organisation that drives these protests. The protests are also not always
about economic inequality but are also
about procedural injustices or political
corruption. They are not necessarily
directed against the prevalent economic
system as such. So, the author concludes
that China will continue to be unequal
and stratified as a socialist mixed economy.
On the whole, my assessment of the
book is that it is a must-read for social
scientists, who are interested in China
and its evolution, and activists in various political parties and non-governmental organisations, who take interest
in China. The use of class as an analytical category is too Weberian.
A different Marxian conception will
bring out three aspects much more directly: (i) a focus on labour and its exploitation during the reform period, (ii) formation of capital and its continued accumulation, and (iii) processes of primitive
accumulation or accumulation by dispossession of peasants and the urban
workers. These three processes are central to the phenomenal and unprecedented Chinese growth between 1978
and now. This would also bring out a different characterisation of Chinese society and attendant political imagination.
As it stands, however, the class analysis
in this book is quite useful, insightful
and is definitely worth engaging with.
Vamsi Vakulabharanam (vamsi.vakul@gmail.
com) teaches Economics at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, the US.
37
PERSPECTIVES
employment generated in 201415 was

very small in some states, for example,
all rural households in Uttar Pradesh
and Maharashtra, on an average got
work for only about five days in the entire financial year (Table 1, p 39).
The MGNREGA Crisis

Insights from Jharkhand
Ankita Aggarwal
A decade after coming into force,

the Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee
Act is suffering from a decline
in employment, budget caps,
delays in wage payments and
rampant violations of workers
entitlements. An examination of
the case of Jharkhand points to
reasons for this crisis, including
the absence of a strong grievance
redressal system, weak financial
institutions, acute shortage of
functionaries and indiscriminate
use of technology. However,
some initiatives taken by the
state government and civil
society in the recent past open up
new possibilities for improving
the programme.
he Mahatma Gandhi National

Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (MGNREGA) has been in a
crisis for a few years now. Rural workers
are finding it increasingly hard to get
work and payment on time. Most
of them are also denied their other
entitlements under the act such as
worksite facilities, unemployment allowance (when work is not given on time),
and compensation in case wages are
paid with delays.
This article discusses the nature and
scale of the MGNREGA crisis in the country and goes on to examine the reasons
for the crisis in Jharkhand, in the hope
that this will help shed light on the situation in other parts of the country. Lastly,
it discusses some of the promising initiatives that have been taken recently to
improve MGNREGA in Jharkhand.
This article draws on official data
from the MGNREGA website, existing
literature on the programme in Jharkhand, discussions with activists working
in the state, and several years of work on
MGNREGA in Jharkhand in association
with local help centres for rural workers,
civil society organisations and the state
government.
Nature and Scale of the Crisis
The author would like to thank Jean Drze

and Siraj Dutta for their comments and
suggestions.
Ankita Aggarwal (aggarwal.ankita87@gmail.
com) is with the National Institute of Rural
Development, Hyderabad.
38
Employment Crash: Over the past five

years, there has been a major crash
in the scale of MGNREGA employment.
In 201415, 155 crore person-days of
MGNREGA work were generated across
the country, just about half the quantum
of employment generated in 200910. In
Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, employment has fallen by more than half in
the last two years alone. The reduction
in Bihars employment has been as large
as 60% between 201415 and 201213.
Even in absolute terms, the scale of
Budget Caps: The central government

funds the wages to be paid to unskilled
MGNREGA workers and 75% of the material costs; the rest is paid by the state
government. Every year, a certain allocation is made for MGNREGA in the union
budget, but if required the central government gives funds over and above this
allocation, as the programme is meant
to be demand-driven.
However, in 201415 the central government treated the initial allocation
of `34,000 crore as a cap on MGNREGA
expenditure. As a result, when funds
dried up towards the end of that financial year, workers were denied work
without any compensation in the form
of unemployment allowance. Apart
from the budget caps, delays in transfer
of funds from the Ministry of Rural
Development also hampered the ability
of states to provide timely work to
all workers demanding employment.
In 201516, the budget caps were removed, but delays and uncertainties
in the flow of funds continued to affect
MGNREGA.
Delays in Wage Payments: As per official data, 70% of MGNREGA wages were
paid with delays (more than 15 days
after the completion of a weeks work) in
201415; 64% of the delayed payments
were made more than a month late. In
Punjab and West Bengal, the proportion
of delayed payments was higher than
90%.1
Shrinking Rights: Since MGNREGA was
enacted 10 years ago, several entitlements of workers have been curtailed.
To illustrate:
(i) MGNREGA is no longer linked to the
Minimum Wages Act. The MGNREGA
wage is now fixed at the discretion of the
central government (Drze 2015). As a
result, in several states, MGNREGA wage
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
PERSPECTIVES
Table 1: Statewise Status of MGNREGA in 201415
State
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Chhattisgarh
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Mizoram
Nagaland
Odisha
Punjab
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Tamil Nadu
Telangana
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
Uttarakhand
West Bengal
India
Average Number of Days of

MGNREGA Work Provided Per
Employed
Rural
Household
Household
47
14
22
34
32
35
28
42
36
41
40
43
42
53
22
48
22
22
36
22
46
43
47
43
88
34
32
33
40
Proportion (%) of Persondays

Accounted for
Women
Scheduled
Scheduled
Castes
Tribes
11
10
4
2
13
3
2
15
8
10
5
14
11
5
26
39
41
33
7
2
18
26
28
13
83
5
10
12
9
59
30
28
37
50
43
42
61
25
32
47
92
43
43
38
43
40
31
34
57
68
48
85
61
49
25
51
41
55
23
0
6
28
11
7
44
27
5
14
16
17
16
10
3
1
0
1
16
77
20
4
29
24
17
35
18
32
22
12
90
15
2
32
40
0
8
20
36
8
4
29
19
52
94
100
95
42
0
26
36
1
19
44
1
3
8
17
Notified Wage Proportion (%)

Rate (`)
of Wages Paid
with Delays
169
155
167
158
157
167
236
193
157
158
191
212
157
168
175
153
170
155
164
200
163
155
167
169
155
156
156
169
170
59
52
67
75
71
54
82
77
80
31
88
82
82
72
11
88
2
70
79
93
59
56
71
71
30
79
46
92
70
Source: Authors calculations using official data from nrega.nic.in and Census of India 2011.
is lower than the states minimum agricultural wage. In Punjab, for example,
the MGNREGA wage in 201415 was `66
below the states minimum agricultural
wage.
(ii) At the time of enactment, MGNREGA
entitled workers to claim compensation
of up to `3,000 in case of delays in wage
payments, as per the Payment of Wages
Act. But the revised schedules of the act
now entitle workers to a compensation
amount of only 0.05% of the pending
wages per day of delay.
(iii) The initial MGNREGA guidelines
required the implementation of the programme act to be consistent with the
Persons with Disabilities Act, which
mandates spending 3% of the funds for
the benefit of persons with disabilities.
This requirement was subsequently
done away with.
Violations of Entitlements: Workers
are not only facing dilutions, but their
MGNREGA entitlements are also violated.
EPW
may 28, 2016
Most workers who are denied work are

also unable to secure the unemployment
allowance.2 Instances of payment of the
severely reduced compensation amount
in case of wage delays are also few and
far between. Worksite facilities (drinking water, first-aid kit, shade for rest,
crche for children below six years of
age and notice board) have become a
rare sight and grievance redressal remains a distant dream.
The Case of Jharkhand
The crisis in the employment guarantee
programme has affected Jharkhand as
well, a state which has amongst the highest levels of poverty in the country and
tremendous potential for MGNREGA
works. Between 201213 and 201415,
there has been a 20% fall in MGNREGA
employment in Jharkhand. The unavailability of adequate work and delays in
wage payments have caused immense
economic hardships in rural areas. Many
workers have been forced to migrate to
vol lI no 22
other parts of the country, some have had

to go as far as Kerala (Aggarwal 2015).
Disruptions in Funds: Like the rest of
the country, Jharkhand suffered from
the budget caps imposed by the central
government in 201415. The same year,
the state also faced long delays in receiving funds from the Ministry of Rural
Development. However, the blame for
this situation lay partly with the state, as
it did not complete the process of collecting MGNREGA audit reports from all the
districts and forwarding them to the
centre on time; a prerequisite for the release of funds from the ministry.
Due to the budget caps and delays in
receiving funds from the ministry in
201415, Jharkhand was left with very
little money from October 2014 to the
rest of the financial year to provide
employment and ensure timely payment
of wages. Given the uncertainty about
receiving additional funds in the rest of
the financial year, local officials became
reluctant to open works; they preferred
violating workers right to work than
dealing with the hassles of delays in
wage payments. Further, the ministry
exempted the states from paying compensation to workers who did not receive their wages on time due to shortage of funds.
Lack of Accountability: Even when funds
are available, workers are often unable to
get work because of delays in sanctioning
schemes, starting schemes or allotting
work to workers. Such situations arise because of a general lack of accountability of
local officials and MGNREGA functionaries,
creating an atmosphere of impunity, which
results in rampant violations of workers
entitlements.
Failure of the state government to impose penalties on the erring officials and
functionaries has also contributed to
large-scale delays in wage payments.
Timely payment of wages requires several operations to take place on time
generation of muster roll, filling of the
muster roll, entry of the filled muster
roll, measurement of work, generation
of wage list, generation of Fund Transfer
Order (FTO) and signing of the FTO.
As all these operations take place
39
PERSPECTIVES
sequentially, delay at any step stalls all

the subsequent steps as well. In order to
avoid these delays, the central and state
governments have repeatedly prescribed
clear timelines within which these operations are to be completed and have also
identified the functionaries responsible
for them. However, most officials and
functionaries are either unaware of
these timelines or flout them knowingly
as the errant persons are almost never
held accountable.
In April 2015, the Government of
Jharkhand finally notified rules for payment of compensation in case of delayed
payments, and in November 2015 it notified rules for payment of unemployment
allowance in case of delays in giving
work to workers. However, these rules
are yet to be activated.
Shortage of Staff: MGNREGA functionaries, that is, gram rozgar sevaks, block
programme officers, computer assistants, engineers and accountants form
the backbone of the programmes implementation in rural areas. Despite the
crucial role of these functionaries in
ensuring timely work and wages to
workers, 25% of the posts were vacant in
December 2015.3
The staff shortage increases the work
load on the existing functionaries without any additional pay and causes delays
in the implementation of the programme.
Even the pool of functionaries that does
exist is fairly unmotivated, given the paltry salaries for most of them, lack of
financial incentives to improve performance and virtually no public appreciation for those who do their work well.4 In
the absence of regular trainings for the
functionaries, they are usually left on
their own to grapple with the periodic
changes that are introduced in the
implementation of the programme.
Continued Corruption: Despite the introduction of many transparency and
accountability provisions, corruption continues to affect MGNREGA in Jharkhand.
The Public Evaluation of Entitlement
Programmes (PEEP) survey conducted
in MayJune 2013 compared the gap
bet ween the self-reported number of
MGNREGA work (in 201213) among
40
sample households with the official records for the same households. On an
average, the scale of work as per the
official records was just 7% higher than
what was reported by the household.
But in the case of Jharkhand, the official
figures were more than twice as high,
suggesting widespread siphoning off of
funds for labour payments through inflated muster rolls.
Siphoning off usually takes place
through collusion of several persons, typically involving middlemen, MGNREGA
functionaries, elected representatives,
local officials and postmasters (in case
of wage payments through post offices).
For example, in July 2014 a case of corruption was unearthed in a road construction work in Murhu block of Khunti
District, in which muster rolls were extensively fudged by adding fake names
and inflating entries for the workers
who had actually worked. Based on
these fudged muster rolls, wages were
credited into workers post office accounts and then withdrawn by the local
middlemen and mate in connivance
with the postmaster. Meanwhile, the
workers received only token amounts in
cash. The gram rozgar sevak participated in the scam by signing the fudged
muster rolls and the juniour engineer
manufactured an inflated measurement
book. Block-level officials and elected
representatives may also be responsible,
as the work was implemented by the
panchayat samiti.
Another example of corruption was

uncovered a year later in Palamu District, in which large-scale fake demand
for work was made by MGNREGA functionaries on behalf of workers and the
work was carried out by machines,
which are banned in the programme. As
wages were paid after fingerprint authentication of workers in whose names
the payments were made, they too were
made party to the scam being paid token
amounts for coming to the bank branch
and verifying their identity.
Corruption is also rampant in procurement of material for MGNREGA
works. Material is to be procured only
from registered vendors, but it is usually
supplied by unregistered suppliers. These
unregistered suppliers pay a commission
to the registered vendors for providing
them with a bill from their establishment which is then submitted to the
administration for reimbursement. As a
part of the material payment is used for
paying commission to the registered
vendor, the material which is actually
supplied is less than the amount for
which the bill is made. The resultant
shortage of materials either leads to the
asset remaining incomplete or getting
constructed poorly. In case of individual
works, often the beneficiary puts money
from her own pocket to provide the
additional material that is required to
complete the asset. Sometimes the work
estimates are prepared with inflated
allocations for materials, to ensure
EPW E-books
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may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
PERSPECTIVES
completion of assets even after factoring

in the commissions paid from the allocation for material procurement.
Flaws of Financial Institutions: In
2007, the system of MGNREGA wage payments shifted from cash to post offices
and banks. However, this change has
not been accompanied by an adequate
expansion and strengthening of these
financial institutions. As a result, workers have been facing hassles such as long
distances to the nearest bank branch,
foot-dragging by bank employees in
opening their accounts, siphoning off
wages from post office accounts, etc.
Given the extensive network of post
offices than bank branches in Jharkhands rural areas, 70% of MGNREGA
workers accounts are still in post offices.
However, due to the weak norms of accountability exercised by the postal department, it is not difficult for middlemen, mates and others to siphon off wages
from workers post office accounts by colluding with the local post master. Also,
delays in wage payments through post
offices are substantial, as FTOs for post
office payments have to be processed at
several stages before the amount is credited in the workers account. Noncomputerisation of the lowest level of
post offices (branch post office) adds to
the delays, as money and pay orders have
to be transferred manually from the next
higher level (sub-post office). As branch
post offices are not allowed to keep large
sums of money due to concerns of theft,
they are often unable to pay workers
because of unavailability of cash.
Delays in processing wage payments
and risks of siphoning off are lower in
the banking system. But banks have
their own problems. Despite the central
governments much touted Pradhan
Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana for financial inclusion, opening bank accounts in rural
Jharkhand is still a harrowing experience for MGNREGA workers. Due to the
limited number of bank branches in rural areas, workers often have to make
long trips at their own expense to access
the banks. The bank branches are usually crowded and suffer from shortages of
bank staff and MGNREGA workers often
have to wait for a long time to withdraw
EPW
may 28, 2016
their wages. Work comes to a virtual

standstill in the absence of electricity or
internet at the bank branches, forcing
workers to make another trip to open
their account or withdraw their wages.
Often, bank branches simply refuse to
open workers accounts or delegate this
task to the common service points or
pragya kendras set up in some block
headquarters and gram panchayats to
provide financial and other services to
the rural population. For example, after
waiting for about three months for the
local Bank of India branch to open their
bank accounts, about 600 workers of Satgawan block of Koderma complained to
the deputy commissioner in March 2015
about their inability to work in MGNREGA
for want of a bank account. It was only
after receiving a threat of disciplinary action from the district official that the bank
opened accounts of these workers.
To reduce the hassles of long distance
and queuing to withdraw wages from
bank branches in rural areas, many banks
employ business correspondents to
bring banking services to peoples doorstep. Users of the services provided by
business correspondents authenticate their
identity through biometrics or smart cards.
In Jharkhand, however, the experience
of payments through business correspondents has been riddled with difficulties. Internet signal required for biometric
authentication is often not available in rural
areas away from the block headquarters.
A sizeable proportion of workers are unable to verify their identity using biometrics either because of weathered fingerprints or due to improper capturing of
their fingerprints at the time of enrolment
in the biometric system. Such workers have
to go to the local bank branch to withdraw their wages. To reduce their work
load, many bank branches entertain only
those with a written confirmation from
the business correspondent about their
inability to withdraw wages using biometrics. This eliminates the option of directly
withdrawing wages from the bank branch
in case the business correspondent is dishonest or does not visit the village frequently enough.5
Weak Grievance Redressal: Jharkhands
grievance redress system for MGNREGA
vol lI no 22
is extremely weak. Most workers are unaware of their right to complain. Those
who do manage to take their grievance
to a government official or functionary
are often turned away. The small proportion of complaints that do get registered are seldom acted upon and the
wrongdoers are rarely penalised.
As per the records of the rural development department, the state-level helpline received only 425 complaints from
May 2010 to June 2015. Perusal of the
last 50 complaints received during this
period revealed that no systematic followup was done to ensure action on the
reported grievances. Despite repeated
instructions from the state on setting up
district-level helplines, only 11 districts
had complied till July 2015.
As per MGNREGA rules, up to two
ombudspersons can be appointed for
every district. But in July 2015, only five
ombudspersons were working in the entire state, each in charge of twothree districts. Even among these few ombudspersons, only about half were active. The
state has been unable to appoint more
ombudspersons or renew the term of
some of the existing ombudspersons as
the central government is yet to nominate its representatives for the selection
committee.
Most of the routine social audits which
take place in the state are cosmetic exercises, as they are conducted by the same
functionaries and officials who are responsible for implementing the programme, with little participation of the
gram sabha.
Overdependence on Technology: Over
the past few years, there has been a
steady increase in the use of technology
in MGNREGA. Some well-designed technological innovations, such as the Management Information System (MIS), have
greatly helped in increasing accountability and transparency in the implementation of the programme. However,
several parts of Jharkhand are suffering
because of blanket introduction of technology without adequate preparation.
The system of electronic payment of
MGNREGA wages was introduced in
Jharkhand a few years ago. This system
requires all payment-related processes
41
PERSPECTIVES
generation of muster rolls, wage lists

and pay ordersto take place online at
the block or gram panchayat offices.
However, as many of these offices have
severe deficits of computer equipment,
electricity supply and internet connectivity, delays in these processes are rampant.
The electronic payment system also
requires workers bank/post office account numbers to be recorded correctly
in the MIS. Mistake of even one digit
precludes payment. If the mistake in
recording a workers account number is
identified before she is allotted work, it
has to be rectified by the local administration at the district level. However, if
the mistake is not corrected in time, the
FTO transaction for the workers wage
payment gets rejected. At the time of
scrutiny of the rejected FTOs, the incorrect bank/post office account numbers
are rectified by a block-level functionary
and new FTOs are generated for wage
payment. If the revised bank account
number is also incorrect, the block administration loses the authority to rectify
the mistake a second time and has to
request the state MIS officer to enter the
correct bank/post office account number. These correction measures often
take months as they are rarely a priority
on the MGNREGA functionaries task lists.
Linkage with Aadhaar: MGNREGA workers in Jharkhand are being zealously
linked with Aadhaar, for the stated purposes of weeding out ghost workers
and enabling biometric-based payments
to ensure that wages go in the right
hands. Although there is merit in pursuing both these objectives, the manner
in which Aadhaar is being linked with
MGNREGA grievously violates workers
entitlements.
Despite Supreme Court orders prohibiting government authorities from denying public services to people for want of
Aadhaar, workers without a UID (Unique
Identification) number are routinely
denied work. One reason for this is
that allotting work to workers without
Aadhaar has been made a complex process in the MGNREGA MIS since April
2015.6 The other reason is intense pressure from the ministry to increase the
rates of Aadhaar linkage of MGNREGA
42
workers. This demand has forced MGNREGA functionaries to spend a significant part of their working hours collecting workers Aadhaar numbers and entering them in the MIS. To meet the targets of Aadhaar linkage, many functionaries have even cancelled the job cards of
workers without Aadhaar.
Efforts towards Improvement
Although the functioning of MGNREGA in
Jharkhand leaves much to be desired,
there has been significant progress since
2006, when a survey of Manika block of
Latehar and Manatu block of Palamau revealed that implementation of the act was
mainly restricted to distribution of job
cards. Workers as well as government officials had poor understanding of the act.
Absence of gram panchayats were also a
major hurdle in the implementation of the
act. The lucky few who got some employment were paid with long delays and received less than the statutory minimum
wage (Bhatia and Drze 2006).
Today, Manika is a very different place,
(Manatu less so). Most rural households
in need of MGNREGA work have a job
card and a large number of workers are
able to get employment in their gram
panchayat. Most people are aware of the
basic provisions of the act and have
learnt to demand work, instead of waiting for schemes to open. These changes
have been brought about to a large extent
by the efforts of the MGNREGA Sahayata
Kendra, operational in the block premises since 2010. The sahayata kendra is operated by local volunteers who help
workers organise and access their entitlements. The kendra helps workers in
tasks such as applying for a job card, demanding work, opening a bank account,
tracking the payment of their wages and
filing complaints. It has also been fighting corruption in the programme by conducting social audits, public hearings and
joint enquiries with the administration.
Several noteworthy initiatives in improving MGNREGA have been taken by
the joint effort of the Jharkhand government and the states civil society. The
first in a series of such initiatives taken
recently was the Kaam Mango Abhiyan
carried out in early 2014 to help workers with large-scale demand for work.
However, the results of this campaign

were limited; a large proportion of workers who applied for work did not get any
work or unemployment allowance.
The second positive initiative was
conducting social audits in 50 gram panchayats of the state with involvement of
local activists working on MGNREGA. Although the audit teams brought to light
many irregularities, disciplinary and
remedial action were taken in only a few
cases. Also, the state has been unable to
carry out similar social audits in other
gram panchayats as it is yet to put in
place an independent social audit unit.
The most recent effort worth mentioning is Yojana Banao Abhiyan, a statewide campaign, conducted in January
February 2016 to plan MGNREGA works
for 201617 (along with works to be taken
up with funds devolved to gram panchayats as per the recommendations of
the 14th Finance Commission). The campaign mobilised lakhs of people to plan
works for their village to meet needs of
basic infrastructure and augment livelihoods through better management of
natural resources. Over 10 lakh MGNREGA
schemes have been planned in this
campaign across Jharkhand.
Jharkhand has also made good use of
the financial support provided by the
ministry to put in place cluster facilitation teams in 76 blocks of the state for
about three years (July 2014 to March
2017). These teams comprising of people
with expertise in Integrated Natural Resource Management, civil engineering
and mobilisation have been helping with
the planning, estimates, laying out and
measurement of MGNREGA works. Members of self-help groups are playing an
active role in this project by making
workers aware of their entitlements,
helping them apply for a job card, work
and bank account and supervising worksites as mates. The outcomes have been
quite encouraging in some of the blocks
where this project is being implemented:
the scale of work has more than doubled
compared to the previous year, some
households have received a hundred
days of work, many useful assets have
been created and participation of women
in the employment guarantee programme has increased considerably.
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
PERSPECTIVES
Finally, it is also important to mention

the findings of a recent study of 926
MGNREGA wells across six districts of the
state. The study found that 70% of the
sanctioned wells were complete (with or
without a parapet); 95% of the completed
wells were being used, and the estimated
rate of return on MGNREGA expenditure
for all wells (complete or incomplete)
was a respectable 6% in real terms
(Bhaskar and Yadav 2015).7
Concluding Remarks
A decade after the implementation of
MGNREGA, the programme is in need of
serious attention; workers entitlements
are being curtailed, work is being denied routinely without any compensation and long delays in wage payments
are forcing rural households to seek exploitative sources of employment. The
responsibility for this situation stretches
from the political leadership to the local
officials and functionaries.
Jharkhand can certainly improve the
delivery of the act by building on its positive initiatives. It also needs to urgently
establish an independent social audit
unit and draft rules for transparency and
grievance redressal, activate its rules for
payment of unemployment allowance and
compensation for delayed payment. It
needs to take action on complaints,
impose fines on officials and functionaries

violating the act, fill the large vacancies of
MGNREGA functionaries and strengthen
the monitoring of the programme.
A measure which has not been tried in
the state but has immense potential of
reviving the programme is supplementing the somewhat modest salaries of
MGNREGA functionaries with bonuses
which are linked to their performance,
on the scale of employment generated,
proportion of assets completed and rate
of timely payment of wages. Taking
these much required measures will need
strong political will and sustained pressure from the people.
Notes
1
2
See Singh (2015) for a brief account of delays

in wage payments in Adilabad District of
Telangana.
As per the Management Information System
(MIS), workers across the country were due
`534 crore as unemployment allowance from
201213 to 201415. The payable unemployment allowance has to be approved by programme officers (the district-level nodal
MGNREGA functionary). However, this entire
amount was rejected by the respective programme officers for one reason or another.
The vacancy rates were 16% for gram rozgar sevak (to be appointed one per gram panchayat),
39% for block programme officer (to be appointed two per block), 45% for computer assistants
(to be appointed one per block), 50% for assistant engineer (to be appointed one per block),
45% for junior engineer (one to be appointed for
every five gram panchayats) and 38% for account assistant (to be appointed one per block).
For example, the monthly salary of `15,300 of
Jharkhands block programme officer is amongst

the lowest remuneration for these functionaries
in the country. Functionaries in equivalent posts
in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal are paid as much
as `30,000`35,000 a month.
For more on experience of business correspondents in Jharkhand, see Bhatti (2012) and
Yadav (2012).
Workers without Aadhaar who demand work
have to seek exemption from the requirement
of this identity number via the MGNREGA MIS.
They are allotted work only after their request
is approved by the district administration.
An earlier study of 11 completed MGNREGA
wells in Ratu block of Ranchi District also
found the irrigation from the wells to substantially increase the income from agriculture in
the command area (Aggarwal et al 2012).
References
Aggarwal, Ankita, Aashish Gupta and Ankit Kumar
(2012): Evaluation of MGNREGA Wells in
Jharkhand, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 47,
No 35, pp 2427.
Aggarwal, Ankita (2015): The Slow Destruction of
MGNREGA: Evidence from Jharkhand, India
Together, 16 March.
Bhaskar, Anjor and Pankaj Yadav (2015): Alls Well
That Ends in a Well: An Economic Evaluation
of MGMGNREGA Wells in Jharkhand, Institute for Human Development.
Bhatia, Bela and Jean Drze (2006): Employment
Guarantee in Jharkhand: Ground Realities,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 41, No 29,
pp 31983202.
Bhatti, Bharat (2012): Aadhaar-Enabled Payments
for NREGA Workers, Economic & Political
Weekly, Vol 47, No 49, pp 1619.
Drze, Jean (2015): Indias Rural Jobs Programme:
A Dismal Appraisal, Huffington Post, 4 May.
Singh, S Harpal (2015): Fall in Allocations,
Hindu, 31 May.
Yadav, Anumeha (2012): To Pass Biometric Identification, Apply Vaseline or Boroplus on Fingers
Overnight, Hindu, 15 December.
Review of Urban Affairs

April 23, 2016
Greenfield Development as Tabula Rasa:
Rescaling, Speculation and Governance on Indias Urban Frontier
Scaling Up, Scaling Down: State Rescaling along the DelhiMumbai Industrial Corridor
Dholera: The Emperors New City
Loraine Kennedy, Ashima Sood

Shriya Anand, Neha Sami
Preeti Sampat
Making of Amaravati: A Landscape of Speculation and Intimidation
C Ramachandraiah
Reading into the Politics of Land: Real Estate Markets in the South-west Peri-urban Area of Chennai
Bhuvaneswari Raman
The Politics of Urban Mega-projects in India: Income Employment Linkages in Chennais IT Corridor
M Vijayabaskar, M Suresh Babu
Making Sense of Place in Rajarhat New Town: The Village in the Urban and the Urban in the Village
Ratoola Kundu
New Regimes of Private Governance: The Case of Electronics City in Peri-urban Bengaluru
Mathew Idiculla
For copies write to: Circulation Manager,

Economic and Political Weekly,
320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013.
email: circulation@epw.in
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
43
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Off-grid Energy Development in India

An Approach towards Sustainability
Arabinda Mishra, Gopal K Sarangi, Shivani Wadehra
A critical evaluation of existing approaches to the

off-grid development in India suggests that successful
decentralised interventions are contingent upon the
combined influence of three key determinants, that is,
strength of policy support, community participation,
and productive linkages. Technology, source of finance
and plant size are other key determinants. Contrary to
the established wisdom on role of communities, it is
suggested that, in practice, the reality of capacity
constraints among communities, local-level conflicts
and elite capture subvert community participation.
The authors acknowledge the financial support received through the

EPSRC/DfiD research grant from the RCUK Energy Programme. The
views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the institutions they are affiliated to or the
funding agencies. Special thanks to Subhes Bhattacharyya for his
helpful comments.
Arabinda Mishra (Arabinda.Mishra@icimod.org) is with the International
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Kathmandu, Nepal;
Gopal K Sarangi (gopalkrishna.sarangi@gmail.com) teaches at the
Department of Policy Studies, The Energy and Resource Institute,
New Delhi; and Shivani Wadehra (shivani.wadehra@teri.res.in) is
pursuing her PhD from TERI University, New Delhi.
EPW
MAY 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
nergy is considered as a primary and critical input for

sustainable human development. Current energy access1 statistics reveal that about 1.3 billion people (that
is, 22% of the global population) do not have access to any
form of modern energy services, of which 493 million (about
37.4% of 1.3 billion people) live in South Asia (IEA 2011). The
International Energy Agency (IEA) projections also warn us
that if current trends persist, more people are likely to slip into
the energy poverty trap in 2030 than now (IEA 2009). Access
to energy has also been strongly linked to achieving Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and has become an important policy goal for developing economies of the world.
The conventional approach to addressing the energy access
challenge primarily rests on expanding the grid and creating
new sets of distribution network infrastructure. However, the
grid extension solution does not always fix the problem and is
often neither financially viable nor environmentally benign
(Rogers et al 2006; Lhendup 2008). Given the limitations of
centralised grid extension approaches, off-grid solutions based
on small-scale decentralised renewable energy systems are increasingly emerging as preferred alternatives in many parts of
the world. These interventions are also resource-efficient and
less capital intensive.
However, for project developers of decentralised energy systems, some inherent constraints are likely to arise because of
high upfront costs, thin rural markets,2 difficulty in arranging institutional finance and ambiguous government policies.
More specifically on the policy front, the existing responses are
limited to pilot scale implementation models and do not have a
clear framework to mainstream decentralised systems in the
national planning process (Hiremath et al 2009). A greater
challenge to promote and accelerate the off-grid process in
developing economies is linked to inadequate capacities at the
community or village level to effectively operate and maintain
the infrastructure. Studies point that capacity-building efforts
are central to wider replication of these systems (Clemens et al
2010; World Bank 2011).
Nevertheless, there has been a renewed interest in many
countries in the decentralised regime of power production
through small-scale facilities. Microgeneration technologies
have become attractive in developed countries because of their
potential to become future energy technologies3 (IEA 2002;
Pehnt et al 2006; Sauter and Watson 2007). Developing countries are increasingly looking forward to such technologies not
just as an isolated form of energy provision, but in the overall
105
SPECIAL ARTICLE
context of community life and as an integral component of other

rural improvement efforts (Kaygusuz 2011). Recent improvements in the legal and regulatory conditions and the creation
of fertile policy space offer new directions to off-grid energy
development in developed and developing countries alike.
This review of literature on off-grid energy systems reveals
that there is a dearth of studies using integrated frameworks
of analysis. Most studies either focus on technoeconomic
assessments or present policy narratives without adequate
attention to local contexts and key determinants shaping the
development trajectory of these projects. This paper attempts
an integrated evaluation of factors that are expected to determine the business case for off-grid projects. The geographical
focus is on India and the data for our analysis come from the
documented experiences of a large number of off-grid projects, field visits and interactions (both telephonic and direct)
and participatory stakeholder consultations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the
current state of off-grid energy systems in India. Section 2
traces the genesis and major policy drivers shaping off-grid
energy development in India. Section 3 reviews literature to
critically examine three key sustainability dimensions of off-grid
electricity projects: policy support, rural energy markets and
community participation. An empirical exercise is presented
in Section 4 to identify key determinants of project sustainability in India. In Section 5, we draw lessons from the earlier
discussion to propose an approach to frame a business model
for decentralised/off-grid energy interventions in the country.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
1 The Indian Context
The Twelfth Five Year Plan (201217) Approach Paper of the

Government of India (GoI) highlights the energy access concerns, especially for poor habitations and suggests looking beyond the conventional approaches to address the problem
(Planning Commission 2011). Latest available figures reveal
there are about 11,000 unelectrified remote villages and hamlets in various parts of the country. The Census 2011 figures
reveal that the use of kerosene continues to be the primary
source of lighting energy for 43% of rural India. More importantly, it shows the presence of large variation in energy access
levels among the states in India. The electricity use for lighting
statistics of the Census 2011 indicates that while the use of
electricity in rural areas is the highest in Himachal Pradesh
(96.6% of the households) and Punjab (95.5% of the households), it is the lowest in Bihar (10.4% of the households).
Both at the national and state levels, there are a number of
government policies and programmes to promote off-grid
electricity solutions as a means to address the energy access
challenge. The most important piece of legislation in this
regard is the 2003 Electricity Act of the GoI with specific provisions relating to rural electrification through off-grid modes.4
Further, the Integrated Energy Policy (IEP), 2006 of the GoI
reiterates that traditional biomass will be the primary fuel for
rural areas of the country for a long time to come thereby indicating the need to focus on decentralised energy options. The
106
Report of the Gokak Committee on Distributed Generation

asserts that decentralised renewable energy systems should
be used even in areas where grid connectivity is effective in
management of rural power distribution (Gokak Committee
2003). Apart from macro-level policy statements, a set of
specific programmes5 is also under operation to mainstream
off-grid energy systems in the country. The most recent initiative in this direction is the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar
Mission (JNNSM) with its 2022 target to produce 2,000 MW of
off-grid power.
A number of off-grid technologies have been developed,
tried and inducted in India over the years. The sectoral applications of decentralised energy technologies consist of agricultural, domestic, industrial, and commercial use in both rural
and urban areas. Multiple technologies such as combustion
and gasification of biomass, micro-hydro, solar photovoltaic,
aerogenerators, waste to energy biofuel gasification plants are
used at different scales and sizes. However, biomass gasification,
micro-hydro and wind have been the dominant ones in the
country (Hiremath et al 2009).
Figure 1: Cumulative Deployment of Off-grid Energy in India
Figure 1a
200
Biomass Gasifier
Waste to energy
SPV power plant
150
Aero gen/hybrid system
100
50
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Source: Energy Statistics (various volumes), MoSPI, GOI.
Figure 1b
(%)
80
Biomass Gasifier
Waste to energy
SPV power plant
Aero gen/hybrid system
60
40
20
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Source: As in Figure 1a.
Figures 1a and 1b present an interesting picture of the cumulative off-grid energy deployment in India in recent times. As
of 31 January 2013, 826 MW of various off-grid systems has
been installed in the country (MNRE 2013). The cumulative
off-grid energy statistics reveals two important developments.
First, although biomass gasifier-based systems had an early
start in terms of large-scale deployment, their contribution
to off-grid installed capacity in the country appear to have
plateaued in recent years and in relative terms, are in fact,
decelerating. The question then is what explains this phenomenon. Despite maturity of biomass-based technologies and
policy level thrusts, why have off-grid energy systems based on
MAY 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
200809
800
200910
201011
Rajasthan
Punjab
Others
Odisha
Mizoram
Lakshadweep
Karnataka
Jammu and Kashmir
Haryana
Gujarat
Delhi
Chhattisgarh
Andhra Pradesh
Andaman and Nicobar
400
Source: As in Figure 1a.
such technologies fallen behind? There has been a sudden spurt

in the solar-based systems in recent years, which is obviously
linked to the recent policy thrust on solar energy development.
The second interesting development is the large variation in
the performance of states in setting up solar-based off-grid
plants, which possibly reflects varying levels of commitments
at the subnational level in promoting renewable energy in general (Figure 2). Interestingly, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Haryana, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal,
have not only outranked other states in setting up small utility
scale solar-based off-grid power plants, but have also experienced
substantial growth in solar-based off-grid energy systems.
2 Off-grid Energy Development: Genesis
The early idea to promote and develop renewable energy

in India, besides hydro energy, was mooted in the wake of
global oil shocks in the late 1970s. The constitution of a
Commission for Additional Sources of Energy (CASE) in 1981
was a pioneering effort by the GoI to create a dedicated institution for the development of renewable energy in the country.
CASE first became the Department of Non-conventional Energy
Sources (DNES), then an independent ministry, the Ministry
of Non-conventional Energy Sources (MNES), in 1992, and
it was rechristened as the Ministry of New and Renewable
Energy (MNRE) in 2006. Despite the Ministry of Power (MoP)
spearheading rural electrification efforts in the country, the
MNRE has been tasked from time to time to address electrification concerns in remote and far-flung villages of the country
(Bhattacharyya 2006).
Among the earliest attempts in the field of off-grid/decentralised energy in India are programmes like the National
Biogas Development Programme (NBDP) and the National Solar
Cooker Promotion Programme which were launched in the
beginning of the 1980s with the intent to address rural cooking
energy needs in the country. During the same period several
state governments established nodal agencies6 to enhance the
development and deployment of renewable energy in the country.
In the field of renewable energy-based micro-grids/mini-grids,
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West Bengal
1,200
Uttarakhand
1,600
the biomass gasifier plants set up in Gosaba

islands of Sundarbans (West Bengal) during
the latter half of the 1990s mark successful
off-grid intervention on a fairly larger scale.
Before the enactment of the Electricity Act
2003, rural electrification was carried out in a
limited fashion and mostly bundled with other rural development programmes (Siddiqui and
Upadhyay 2011). The first effort was undertaken during Fifth Five Year Plan (197479) under
the banner of the Minimum Needs Programme
(MNP) in which central financial assistance was
made available for electrification of remote rural villages. This was followed by the Rural Electricity Supply Technology (REST) Mission, 2002
with an objective of Power for All by 2012.
Around this time, the Gokak Committee (2003)
set up by the government recognised the
potential role of decentralised energy options in addressing
Indias rural electrification challenges. The efforts to mainstream
renewable energy-based off-grid energy systems culminated
with Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Viduytikaran Yojana (RGGVY) in
2004 with its special focus on Decentralised Distributed Generation (DDG) schemes. The major central government programmes promoting off-grids in India and with specific targets to
electrify remote villages of the country are the Remote Village
Electrification (RVE) programme and the Village Energy Security Projects (VESP) programme of MNRE, and DDG schemes of
MoP. While the RVE programme seeks to meet only the lighting
requirements of far-flung remote villages, the VESP projects are
designed to provide for the total energy needs of rural communities. The DDG schemes intend to provide electricity to
those villages where population is more than one hundred
(MoP 2009).
The enactment of the Electricity Act 2003 has opened up
new vistas for off-grid energy development in India by scrapping the licensing requirement for electricity generation and
distribution in rural areas. This has been the prime motivating
element for private sector to foray into off-grid energy development. The 2006 Rural Electrification Policy (REP) had provisions for off-grid energy development in India. More recently,
under Indias National Action Plan on Climate Change, JNNSM
has emerged as a major policy driver for the development and
deployment of off-grid solar energy applications.
The generic organisational framework for all the public
sector programmes is illustrated in Figure 3 (p 108). In majority of
cases the financial assistance in the form of subsidies comes
from the central level: MNRE/MoP. The State Renewable Energy
Development Agencies (SREDAs) act either as project implementers or as project monitoring agencies; often, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) or state forest departments have taken
up this role. Technical support comes from the associated technology partners. In majority of cases, a village energy committee
(VEC) is formed to look after the operations and maintenance
(O&M) of the project. The DDG schemes operate with a slightly
different organisational arrangement. In case of DDGs, the Rural
Uttar Pradesh
2,000
Tamil Nadu
Figure 2: Statewise Distribution of Off-grid Solar Power Plants
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Electrification Corporation (REC) acts as the nodal agency (NA)

and a three-tier monitoring mechanism ensures quality checks.
Figure 3: Simplified Organisational Framework of Major Publicly
Supported Off-grid/Decentralised Programmes
MNRE/MOP
REC (nodal agency)
Consultant
Project Implementing/
monitoring agency
Technical
support
VEC
Village project
Source: Authors construct.
The need for an integrated approach to formulating off-grid

energy programmes is recognised at the policy level in India.
This realisation seems to have evolved over time and the experiential learning gained from the implementation of a particular off-grid energy programme has fed into the formulation of
the succeeding programme. For instance, RVE, which is one of
the earliest programmes in the field of off-grid energy development in India, recognises the role of local institutions and
emphasises on the vertical coordination among institutions at
different scales. The approach to integration has been taken
up to the next level in the succeeding programme, VESP, which,
inter alia, stresses on local level community participation and
recognises the need for firming up institutional arrangements
at this level. Thrust is also placed to capture inter-regional
variations with regard to resource availability, energy requirements, and social cohesion among local communities. The programme went a step ahead in focusing on the need for enhancing productive activities through microenterprise developments in project localities. Even more progressive is the DDG
scheme of MoP which explicitly recognises carbon credits from
off-grid energy systems as potential inducement for private
investors to foray into the rural energy business.
However, despite the recent emphasis on supportive policy
environment, multiple challenges continue to obstruct upscaling and replication of decentralised energy systems as a
means to off-grid electricity access. Despite policy-level attempts to coalesce factors in a holistic fashion in the ambit of
programme designing and implementation, some missing
links remain and there is an incomplete understanding of the
sustainability dimensions of decentralised/off-grid energy
interventions in rural India. The next section highlights the
key anomalies and gaps in the existing approaches.
3 Sustainability Challenges
It has been argued that rural applications of renewable energy

systems face multiple sustainability challenges related to technology, economics and community participation and that
there is a dearth of literature explaining what exactly matters
for sustainability of off-grid projects (Hong and Abe 2011).
108
Sustainability of project interventions has been linked to

social acceptance (Sauter and Watson 2007; Wolsink 2012)
and locally-based decision-making processes (Burton and
Hubacek 2007). A recent World Bank study (2011) on VESP projects in India indicates that many of the identified problems
are due to poor knowledge about local institutional contexts.
Cust et al (2007) are convinced that even economically viable
projects fail simply because the importance of organisational
structure and institutional arrangements of those projects are
not adequately appreciated and suggest aligning economic
incentives with the institutional arrangements.
In order to gain further insights on the operationalisation
aspects of off-grid/decentralised energy development in
India, we examine three key ingredients: policy support,
rural energy markets and community participation. The
emphasis here is to identify gaps and inherent contradictions
hindering the sustainability of off-grid/decentralised energy
interventions in India.
3.1 Addressing Policy Inadequacy
A critical evaluation of the policy statements suggests that the

problems besetting the development and promotion of decentralised/off-grid energy in India may largely be due to a lack of
policy focus and certain ambiguities in the existing policy
framework. First, the review of policy documents and legislative
pronouncements in India reveals a diluted and mixed articulation of what is meant by either a decentralised or an off-grid
energy system. Accordingly, a varied and loose interpretation
seems to have been adopted, mostly drawing from experiences
and industry practices.7 Second, policies are often found to be
ambiguous on choice of technology and there is evidence from
the field to suggest inappropriate technology selection.8 Third,
financial arrangements for promotion of decentralised energy
systems have been found to be not based on any valid logic,
such as the emphasis on capital component of a project with
scant attention to operation and maintenance costs.
Often, juxtaposing a policy or programme with the existing
legal and political institutions has led to confusion. For instance,
as per the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, panchayats9
are responsible for providing drinking water and street lights
in the villages. In the case of off-grid energy-based village
electrification, panchayats are hardly found to pay for the service
offered by the decentralised energy facilities (World Bank
2011). This raises debates regarding the provisioning of basic
village level services through off-grid energy systems and the
role and contribution of village level constitutional entities.
Organisationally also, there seem to be a lack of coordination between MoP and MNRE in implementing two key off-grid
rural electrification programmes, DDG and RVE. As per the
design principles of these two programmes, the REC is supposed
to maintain the liaison in order to avoid any kind of implementation hurdles. The current arrangements do not reveal any
such coordination (Siddiqui and Upadhaya 2011).
A comparison of Indias off-grid energy programmes reveals
some key differences in their operational features. On the
finance front, for instance, all programmes except for JNNSM
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have a capital subsidy component, which is 90% the total project cost. Under JNNSM scheme, MNRE provides 30% of the
benchmark costs as capital subsidy and 50% of the benchmark
costs (`150/Wp) can be financed by a loan at 5% interest per
annum. The user has to make a down payment of 20% of the
benchmark cost. Differences can also be observed in matters
of technology preferences, energy applications and recognition of carbon financing benefits. On technology front, while
solar has been the preferred technology in RVE and JNNSM,
VESP emphasises biomass-based technology. DDG is neutral in
technology selection matters. Similarly, a comparison on the
basis of energy applications reveals that the design principles
of all the programmes except VESP target lighting needs. VESP
intends to provide the total energy needs of the users. Finally,
there are also differences in carbon benefit recognition from
projects. Except DDG of MoP, no other programme explicitly
mentions the benefits of carbon financing schemes. Multiple
approaches to off-grid programme design are contributing to
confusion among project developers and state-level agencies.
Policies and regulation at the state-level are mostly designed
to propel grid-interactive renewable energy with very little focus
on decentralised or off-grid renewable energy systems. As is the
case at the level of central ministries, the policy documents at
the state level provide no clarity on what constitutes off-grid
renewable based energy systems. Some of the central regulatory
guidelines seem to have not been considered in true spirit by the
states (safety and security standard specifications of the Electricity Act, 2003 have been grossly unheeded by state agencies).
Expectedly, political compulsions have often driven policies (for
example, subsidies on kerosene) against the stated goals of the
government. From the above, it appears that there is a critical
need to strengthen policy and institutional arrangements at all
levels of energy governance to capture the associated dynamism
of the sectors growth and development. In a dynamic context,
where technology leapfrogs and liberalisation process fast alters
the operational dynamics of the sector, the need of the hour is to
create more accommodative policy space to support new innovations and to move in a sustainable development trajectory. It
is also felt that there is a need to bridge the regulatory gaps by
bringing in place a more comprehensive regulatory screening
mechanism,10 streamlining administrative processes11 and getting
rid of market barriers. A well-crafted regulatory system could
facilitate the growth of market, rather than hindering it. The
current debate in India to introduce a system of regulation for
off-grid development is primarily intended to unleash the private sectors potential by adequately incentivising it as well as to
control rent-seeking behaviour of private players (ABPS 2011).
3.2 Promoting Off-grid Entrepreneurship
Certain economic and strategic factors have created a possible

niche for business communities to foray into rural energy
markets in India. Private efficiencies and entrepreneurships
are believed to have the potential to upscale the rural energy
business through decentralised energy interventions. A rural
energy entrepreneurship is often distinguished from the
standard entrepreneurship as it often starts as a social enterprise.
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At the international level, REDCO (the Rural Energy Delivery

Companies) Alliance and Energy Access Foundation (EAF) has
been pivotal in catalysing the rapid growth of rural energy
business in many countries.
There exist enormous opportunities for small- and mediumscale investors to engage themselves in decentralised clean
energy business in emerging economies like India. Bairiganjan
et al (2010), for instance, estimate the business potential of
such services at around `94 billion per year. This unlocking of
rural energy markets has been made possible due to the
changes in the legal and regulatory landscape governing the
decentralised sector, which has created the required legal and
regulatory space for private entrepreneurs. The enactment
of the Electricity Act 2003 and consequent withdrawal of
the licensing requirements for generation and distribution of
electricity for rural areas has been the key legal enabler driving
the private enterprise in the sector.
A significant part of rural energy entrepreneurial activity is
happening with large-scale dissemination and installation of
solar home systems (SHSs). The Solar Electric Light Company
(SELCO) in India has been the forerunner in making a successful social enterprise model through its SHS intervention. By
leveraging the model of microfinancing and rural banking
through innovative financial modalities, SELCO has been able to
install more than 1,15,000 SHSs in different parts of the country.
Other noteworthy examples are the successes achieved by the
Husk Power Systems (HPS), Mera Gao Power, and Saran
enewables operating in remote rural parts of Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh. HPS have been providing electricity in more than 300
remote villages in Bihar.
However, it appears that the policymakers and planners
have not able to adequately appreciate the role and potential of
private business in rural energy services. High transaction
costs of accessing government support12 have been a key inhibiting factor for private entrepreneurs, and to address this,
the information exchange between government and private
players needs to be enhanced. Non-uniformity of state policies and provisions on certain key strategic matters are also
limiting the growth and development of off-grid energy
systems in the country.
3.3 Building Community Capabilities
Community participation is unequivocally considered crucial

for effective deployment of off-grid energy projects. The dominant decentralised energy models prevalent in India revolve
around the premise of strong community involvement in project
management. Considering the rich diversity of the country,
needs and capabilities of communities would differ significantly across regions. Project implementation and operation
modalities, when critically linked to community-level engagement, need to be contextualised at the local scale and take
explicit account of the diverse sources of heterogeneity within
and among communities. Community-level heterogeneity has
significant implications for engineered processes towards
achieving community ownership of projects. The capacitybuilding component of existing off-grid energy programmes
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need a deeper and more participatory approach to community

mobilisation than is often observed in practice.
4 Insights from an Empirical Exercise
This section focuses on project level evaluation to identify key

factors responsible for project viability on a sustained basis in
the country. Based on secondary sources,13 the evaluation
covers 80 cases of off-grid/decentralised project interventions representing a diverse set of technologies (such as
biomass, solar, micro-hydro, small wind and hybrid systems)
and located across multiple Indian states. Going by the discussion presented in earlier sections of this paper, long-term
operational viability of off-grid projects in the Indian context
is linked, among other things, to strength of policy support,
community participation, linkages with income-generating
opportunities, technological appropriateness, and finance.
Accordingly, Table 1 presents a profile of the database in
terms of the percentage distribution of projects along these
key dimensions.
Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Project Cases across Different Categories
Variables
Categories
Technology14
Micro-hydro
Biomass
Solar
Funding source
Grant
Equity and grant mix
Private equity
Community participation Community owned
and managed
Others
Productive linkages
Exist
Do not exist
Supply duration
Less than six hours15
Six hours and more
Project commissioning year Before 2003
2003 and after
Tariff structure
Flat tariff
Metered tariff
High
Policy strength16
Low
Total Cases (%)
Cases Operational/
Partially
Operational (%)
20
60
20
39
52
9
100
67
94
61
88
100
26
74
56
44
29
71
15
85
88
12
33
67
71
100
89
71
74
81
83
78
76
100
81
78
Source: Authors estimation based on secondary data.
As is evident from Table 1, the majority (60%) of the project

cases in our database are based on biomass gasification
technology and have come up following the 2003 Electricity Act.
It is not shown in the table but mid-sized plants, ranging
between 11 kW and 50 kW, constitute more than 50% of the
cases. We know that the off-grid landscape in India has variety
in terms of project implementing entities (for example, VECs,
NGOs, state nodal agencies and in some cases private business
entities), but the majority of cases in our database have either
VEC or NGO as the implementing agency. Less than a third of
the cases have full community participation in terms of both
ownership and management, whereas in the others category,
around 10% of cases are implemented by private entities.
Financing in half of the cases in the database is a mix of grant
and private equity and in 56% of the projects there is clearly a
110
productive application of energy leading to the creation of

income-generating opportunities. The pricing problem is
reflected in the fact that an overwhelming majority (88%) of
the projects is restricted to charging flat rate tariffs; it is encouraging to observe that in close to three-fourths (71%) of
the cases off-grid systems are able to meet/exceed the supply
norm of six hours.
A key challenge in preparing the database for analytical
work was to identify each projects current operational status.
This was an intensive exercise and we have largely relied
on expert information to categorise projects as operational,
partially operational and non-operational. The database has
78% of cases under the operational and partially operational
category, which allows us to take the analysis to the next level
of identifying key determinants.
The distribution of operational and partially operational
projects across different categories is largely according to
expectation with one exception. The deviation is with reference to community participation: while admittedly only a
fourth of our case studies are characterised by community
ownership and management, not all of these seem to have
fared well in terms of project sustainability. In contrast,
the remaining three-fourths of our case studies have no
community participation, but they show a 100% result on
the sustainability indicator. Among the other variables,
expectedly, high policy support and the existence of productive linkages are linked to relatively higher percentage of
operational cases.
The database gives a reason to link more definitively a projects source of funding with the projects long-term viability.
Government grants have clearly not been fortuitous in the majority of cases. The reason may be found in the soft-budget
syndrome identified in public finance literature. With guaranteed funding and lax monitoring, government funded projects
are said to operate under soft budget constraint conditions,
which inevitably leads to a weak budgetary discipline by
project developers and implementers. Moreover, a majority of
public-funded projects grossly fail on aftersales service and
have serious maintenance issues.
Coming to the next level of analysis, we start off by looking
at the correlation among the variables to get a sense of how
they are related to each other. Polychoric correlations have
been used as the data is categorical and not numeric. We then
run a principal component analysis (PCA) to remove the correlations from the data and use the scores generated from the
first three components in an ordered logistic regression to see
which variables turn out to be significant in determining the
sustainability of a project. Polychoric PCA assumes that there is
a latent continuous variable underlying every ordinal variable
and calculates variancecovariance accordingly (Njong and
Ningaye 2008).
For the PCA and subsequent regression, variables have been
coded in the following manner (Table 2, p 111).
The correlations matrix (Appendix B, p 114) shows a strong
negative relationship between productive linkages and community participation and a moderate negative relationship
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Table 2: Coding of Variables
Policy strength
Technology
0 to 5 in increasing order
Solar = 0
Biomass = 1
Micro hydro = 2
Pure grant = 0
Equity and grant = 1
Private equity = 2
Others = 0
Community-owned and -managed = 1
Not operational= 0
Partially operational= 1
Operational= 2
No =0
Yes= 1
Funding source type
Community participation
Status of the project
Productive linkages
Source: As in Table 1.
between productive linkages and policy support. There is also

a strong negative relationship between funding source and
community participation and a moderate positive correlation
between community participation and technology.
In order to remove the correlations from the data, principal
component analysis was used. The first three components explain
68.37% of the variance in the data (Appendix C, p 114). Table 3
gives the eigenvectors for the first three principal components.
Table 3: Eigenvectors
Policy strength
Plant size (in households/kW)
technology
Funding source
Productive linkages
e1
e2
e3
0.481103
-0.01226
-0.14028
-0.09908
0.558933
-0.65306
0.092792
0.518345
-0.62373
0.565797
-0.11612
0.007389
-0.43274
0.713965
0.216167
-0.25585
0.435563
0.032967
As is visible from Table 3, policy strength, community participation and productive linkages are the major contributors
to the first component, technology and funding source are the
major contributors to the second component and plant size (in
households/kW) to the third component. Scores on the first
three components17 (Index 1, Index 2 and Index 3) are then
used as independent variables in an ordered logistic regression with the current operational status of the project as the
dependent variable.
Table 4: Results of Regression Analysis
Ordered Logistic Number of obs = 80
Regression
LR chi2(3) = 18.57
Prob > chi2 = 0.0003
Pseudo R2 = 0.1381
Coef
Index 1
Index 2
Index 3
Std Err
-0.9841743*
0.6819092*
-0.5483716**
P>z
[95% Conf Interval]
0.316992 -3.1 0.002 -1.60547 -0.36288

0.284885 2.39 0.017 0.123545 1.240273
0.323862 -1.69 0.09 -1.18313 0.086385
*Significant at 5% level; **significant at 10% level.

The likelihood ratio of 18.57 with a p value of 0.0003 as presented in Table 4 shows that the model as a whole is statistically significant as compared to the null model with no predictors. Index 1 and Index 3 are negatively related, while Index 2 is
positively related to the operational status of the project.
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Combining the signs from the regression model and the

loadings from Table 3 containing eigenvectors, we interpret the
findings from the regression in the following manner
Index 1 being negatively related to the dependent variable implies that even though the policy strength and community participation are important, increasing the productive linkages of
the project have a greater bearing to increasing the sustenance
of a project. Index 2 having a positive sign is an indicative that a
shift towards solar and shifting towards equity from grant
increases the sustainability of the project. Index 3 having a negative sign also implies that smaller the plant size (in households/kW) the more are the chances of project sustenance.
In order to supplement our efforts done through the quantitative analysis, we carried out primary surveys of select projects to better understand and cross validate the findings of
quantitative analysis. We applied a case study based research
design following Yin (2009). The unit of analysis for our survey
was individual off-grid energy projects deployed in India. The
phenomenon studied through case studies are drawn from the
findings of the quantitative analysis carried out above. We also
looked at other analytical techniques such as pattern matching, explanation building drawing from our findings from the
quantitative analysis. In order to get correct responses on the
phenomenon studied, we relied on several case study tactics
suggested by Yin (2009) such as the use of multiple sources of
evidence, testing pattern matching, explanation building,
applied logic models. Various sources of evidence techniques
such as documentation, interviews, both in-depth and focused
for select informants, direct observations, and participant
observations are used for collecting relevant information.
Several site visits which happened under the broader framework of the OASYS18 project gave the authors an opportunity to
match the insights gained from the above econometric analysis
with first-hand field observations and consultations with local
stakeholders. Appendix D (p 114) gives relevant details of the
sites visited. It was clear from the local consultations that people
prioritise livelihood opportunities over other energy needs.
More specifically, energy requirements for irrigation purposes
are given high preference over lighting needs. Even in projects
run by private initiatives such as husk power systems operating in UP and Bihar, there are efforts to create additional
sources of income through the project intervention.
In each of the sites visited, project developers gave a strong
emphasis to the role of supportive policy in determining the
success of a project. The consensus is that macroeconomic
policy enunciation must be strengthened with local mechanisms
for continuous monitoring and accountability frameworks,
specifically for government-owned and -operated projects.
Regarding community participation in project activities, the
site visits brought out the reality of capacity constraints among
communities, local level conflicts, and elite capture. An
example is that of Radhapura where local caste-based conflicts
have inhibited community participation and led to partial
functioning of the project. The success of private initiatives
like HPS in Bihar suggests that there are viable alternatives to
community participation in off-grid project design.
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
5 Business Models for Off-grid Energy Systems
The above analysis makes it clear that successful off-grid interventions are based on much more than techno-economic
assessment. A meaningful business model would need to factor
in the whole set of constituent elements such as choice of
technology, scale of the project, type of policy support, role of
community, income linkages and funding sources. The integration, moreover, would need to feature in a dynamic framework that is able to account for multiple interacting drivers at
different scales of the social, economic and institutional context in which the intervention is planned.
It is proposed here that the business case for an off-grid
intervention should start by looking at the local context. A
useful approach may be to distinguish between the set of
determinants that are generally context dependent and those
which are context neutral. Choice of technology, social acceptance and ownership, and economic linkages are essentially
context-specific outcomes in the project cycle of an off-grid intervention. At a more macro level and as exogenous influences,
we have policy support and institutional financing.
Considering technology choice to be partially neutral and to
some extent driven by external determinants, the choice of
intervention would primarily be determined by two crucial
locally embedded elements, that is, strength and ability of local community structures and economic linkages. In terms of
a conceptual framework, community structures can have two
extreme forms: one deeply cohesive, well-organised and having
genuine interests to participate in the project operation and
management, and the other largely disorganised, fractured,
sabotage-prone and passive to the project matters. Economic
linkages can have similar characterisation with two extreme
types: one with easy market access, vibrant local economy,
and the other remote and opportunity constrained. Figure 5,
with its four quadrants, not only captures the combinations of
these extreme varieties of the two context dependent determinants, but also allows us to contextualise in terms of intermediate combinations with varying degrees of heterogeneity.
Figure 4: A Graphical Exposition of Possible Combinations of Community
Structures and Economic Linkages
Economic linkages
Poor community
structures and
strong economic
linkages
Vibrant community
structures and
poor economic
linkages
Poor community
structures and
poor economic
linkages
Vibrant community
structures and
strong economic
linkages
Community
strength
Source: As in Figure 3.
112
Such contextualisation, in turn, establishes the need for a nonuniform and context-relevant approach to decision-making in
off-grid energy interventions.
Given the framework of Figure 4, one can possibly map the
various contextual reference points to a continuum of off-grid
energy services ranging from one extreme of that of a merit
good to the other extreme of fully marketable services. Once the
nature of services is identified, the next step would be to apply
the schematic presented in Figure 5. It presents a multi-stage
Figure 5: Multistage Decision Process for Sustainable Off-grid Projects
Participatory needs assessment
exercise
Needs assessment
Scenario
construction,
that is, most
plausible to
surprise
Scenario construction
Resource
availability
Local
supply
chain
Scale of
intervention
MCDM
Technology
mapping
Others
Policy
strength
Community
strength
Weighing
technology options
Transition financing
Techno-economic assessment
Financial gradient approach
Source: As in Figure 3.
decision process for sustainable off-grid energy projects. It

consists of five essential stages, and importantly, decisions
arrived at each stage are fed into the next stage in the process.
The choice of the scale of project intervention comes first
which can be facilitated through a baseline assessment of the
specific context for its energy needs and productive potential
(step 1); the dynamic character of the context may be introduced
through the technique of scenario building and future scenarios
may range from the most plausible to a surprise (step 2).
Step 3 in the decision process is the evaluation of appropriate
technology, which would require the application of the multiple
criteria technique (MCDM).19 The criteria would include resource
availability, local supply chain, community capabilities, policy
strength, scale of the intervention, and other supporting factors.
An appropriate multi-criteria decision tool considering the above
identified factors can decide on the appropriateness and relevance of technology type/s with respect to the context and scale.
Following the multi-criteria analysis, alternative technology
types can be made subject to cost effectiveness analysis to arrive at a final decision on technology selection (step 4).
The final stage of decision-making (step 5) involves issues
related to finance and the choice of an appropriate financing
mechanism. Here, we would need to refer back to the mapping
done in stage one, in which the context defines the nature of
MAY 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
off-grid energy services to be provided. It is hypothesised that

the choice of finance would be determined by the characterisation of the off-grid energy service. If the context defines the
services to be fully marketable, one would expect private
investment to be forthcoming given the appropriate policy
support. In contrast, if the context is such that the off-grid
energy services are best viewed as a merit good, it would be
justified to expect public investment in the project. In between
these two extremes, off-grid energy services would require a
mixed form of financing which may be linked to varying gradients of transition depending on the dynamism of the context.
6 Conclusions
Despite efforts at all levelsgovernment, donor agencies, and

private playersmultiple challenges continue to obstruct upscaling and replication of decentralised energy systems as
means to off-grid electricity access. The problem seems to lie
in overemphasising the techno-economic angle of development
of these systems without adequate attention to other critical
Notes
1 Access to modern energy services is defined by
the IEA as household access to electricity and
clean cooking facilities (that is, clean cooking
fuels and stoves, advance biomass cook stoves
and biogas systems).
2 The concept of market thinness indicates a situation where in general the number of buying
and selling offers is small.
3 For instance, the United Kingdom Department for
Trade and Industry envisages meeting 40%
50% of energy needs from micro-generation
energy technologies (Burton and Hubacek
2007).
4 The primary motivation behind the Electricity
Act 2003 was to reform the debt-ridden publiclyrun electricity sector through a variety of
measures such as de-licensing the generation
segment, corporatisation, privatisation and
competition and creating an independent entity
of regulation for the sector.
5 For example, Remote Village Electrification
(RVE) Programme, Village Energy Security
Project (VESP) Programme of Ministry of New
and Renewable Energy (MNRE) and Decentralised Distributed Generation (DDG) Programme of Ministry of Power (MoP), Government of India.
6 For instance, see statewise constitution of new
and renewable energy development agencies
Gujarat Energy Development Agency (1979),
Uttar Pradesh New and Renewable Energy
Development (1983), The Odisha Renewable
Energy Development Agency (1984), Maharashtra
Energy Development Agency (1985), Tamil
Nadu Energy Development Agency (1985),
Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission
(1985), New and Renewable Energy Development Corporation of Andhra Pradesh (1986)
and Agency for Non-conventional Energy and
Rural Technology in Kerala (1986).
7 Even the current literature on the topic does not
offer a consistent definition and several terms,
for example, decentralised energy, distributed
energy, off-grid systems and stand-alone systems are used interchangeably to connote
on-site production of energy at a small scale.
An oft cited definition is that of IEA, which
defines distributed generation as a generating
plant serving a customer on-site or providing
support to a distribution network and connected
to the grid at distribution level voltages.
EPW
MAY 28, 2016
determinants. Of late, though policies and programmes have

started increasingly recognising the complexity and multidimensionality of challenges in mainstreaming renewable
energy-based decentralised interventions, they are falling
short of addressing core sustainability concerns. The present
analysis reveals that operational viability of off-grid projects
in the Indian context is largely determined by policy support,
social acceptance in the form of community participation,
linkages with income-generating opportunities and technological appropriateness. The key pointers of our analysis are
that: (a) macroeconomic policy instruments must be aligned
with local accountability mechanisms, specifically for government-owned and -operated projects; (b) at the project level,
key choices related to technology selection and scale of intervention need to emerge from an understanding of the context;
(c) the context itself is a variable depending on community
structure and local economy; and (d) financing of a project
may be linked to the nature of energy services defined by
the context.
8 Siddiqui and Upadhaya (2011) find despite having abundance biomass availability, villages
are electrified through solar powered systems.
9 Village panchayats are local self-governments
at the village level.
10 The current regulatory regime is focused almost
exclusively on the technical aspects in evaluating
off-grid projects. For instance, the MNRE from
time to time spells out various technical standards and protocols for off-grid/decentralised
project developers and manufacturers as eligibility criteria for availing the subsidies. Longterm sustainability of the project would require
regulators to look at other aspects such as financial viability, social acceptance, etc.
11 Given that multiple agencies with varying
mandates are involved in off-grid development
in India, standardised rules and procedures to
define centre-state engagement is expected to
contribute to greater transparency and ultimately help in empowering state agencies responsible for off-grid project development. A
key area where there is a need for streamlining
administrative processes is the mechanism by
which state renewable energy development
agencies access central funds through the MNRE
and MoP programmes. Similarly, at the state
level, project developers often complain of a
general lack of clarity on the issue of incentives.
12 This is primarily the costs and time required
to access public financial supports provided
either in the form of grants or subsidies or any
other mode.
13 The data collection activity for this paper includes an initial scoping exercise of documented
case profiles of off-grid energy interventions in
India, a series of expert interviews, and consultations. In order to gain further insights at a
collective level, a participatory workshop was
conducted and preliminary findings of this study
were presented and discussed with different
stakeholder representatives in the workshop.
14 The importance of various off-grid technologies
is based on the findings of a paper by Kishore
and Dattakiran (2012), where various off-grid
technologies are ranked on the basis of their
appropriateness through a multi-criteria analysis.
15 Taken from the norm set by the Rajiv Gandhi
Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana.
16 In order to measure the strength of policy
support, states have been categorised into two
vol lI no 22
groups on the basis of presence or absence

of key policy elementssuch as presence or
absence of institutional linkages, provision of
fiscal incentives like electricity duty exemption, tax exemption, refund of stamp duty and
registration charges, etcfor off-grid/decentralised energy sector within the existing state
renewable energy policies. States where the
elements exist are coded as 1 and 0 otherwise; finally a simple aggregative index has
been generated and normalised (Appendix A).
States having a score of 0.6 and above are
identified as having high policy strength,
whereas low policy strength is associated
with a score less than 0.6.
17 Scoring matrix could be provided on request.
18 OASYS which stands for Off-grid Access System
in South Asia is an EPSRC/DfID funded collaborative research project on Decentralized
off-grid electricity generation in developing
countries: business models for off-grid electricity supply.
19 Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) is a
technique that deals with decision problems
where there exist multiple criteria to choose.
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Support Community Level Off-Grid Projects,
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and S Singh (2010): Power to People: Investing
in Clean Energy for the Base of the Pyramid in
India, World Resource Institute (WRI)Centre for Development Finance (IFMR) Research
Report,
http://www.wri.org/sites/default/
files/pdf/power_to_the_people.pdf, viewed on
11 April 2016.
Bhattacharyya, S C (2006): Energy Access Problem of the Poor in India: Is Rural Electrification
a Remedy?, Energy Policy, 34(18): 3387397.
Burton J and Klaus Hubacek (2007): Is Small
Beautiful? A Multi-criteria Assessment of Small
Scale Energy Technology Applications in Local
Governments, Energy Policy, 35(12):6402412.
Clemens, E, K Raijal and M Takada (2010): Capacity Development for Scaling Up Decentralised Energy Access Programmes: Lesson from Nepal on Its
113
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Role, Costs and Financing, Practical Action
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UNDP-Capacity-Development-Energy-AccessFull-Report.pdf.
Cust, J, A Singh and K Neuhoff (2007): Rural Electrification in India: Economic and Institutional Aspects of Renewables, available on: http://www.
undp.ro/download/capacity_dev_energy_access
%20full%202010.pdf, viewed on 11 April 2016.
Gokak Committee (2003): Report of the Gokak
Committee on Distributed Generation, Ministry
of Power, Government of India, available at:
http://58.68.105.147/RRCD/oDoc/33_gokak.pdf.
Hiremath, R B, B Kumar, P Balachandra,
N H Ravindranath and B N Raghunandan (2009):
Decentralised Renewable Energy: Scope, Relevance and Applications in the Indian Context,
Energy Sustainable Development, 13(1): 410.
Hong, G W and N Abe (2011): Sustainability
Assessment of Renewable Energy Projects for
Off-grid Rural Electrification: The Pangan
An Island Case in the Philippines, Renewable
and Sustainable Energy Review, 16(1): 5464.
IEA (2002): Distributed Generation in Liberalized
Electricity Markets, Paris: International Energy
Agency.
(2009): Energy Poverty? How to Make Modern
Energy Access Universal, Paris: International
Energy Agency.
(2011): World Energy Outlook 2011, Paris: International Energy Agency.

Kaygusuz, K (2011): Energy Services and Energy
Poverty for Sustainable Rural Development,
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review,
15(2): 93647.
Kishore, V V N and J Dattakiran (2012): The Quest
for Sustainable Technology Options for Decentralised Electrification Using Multi-criteria
Decision Aid, OASYS Working Paper 11.
Lhendup, T (2008): Rural Electrification in Bhutan
and a Methodology for Evaluation of Distributed
Generation System as an Alternative Option for
Rural Electrification, Energy for Sustainable
Development, 12(3): 1324.
MNRE (2013): Annual Report 2012-13, Ministry of
New and Renewable Energy, Government of
India, available in http://mnre.gov.in/filemanager/tenders/annual-report-2012-13.pdf.
MoP (2009): Guidelines for Village Electrification
through Decentralised Distributed Generation
(DDG) under Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutkaran Yojana, Ministry of Power, Government
of India.
Njong, A M and P Ningaye (2008): Characterizing
Weights in the Measurement of Multidimensional Poverty: An Application of Data-driven
Approaches to Cameroonian Data, Oxford
Poverty & Human Development Initiative,
Working Paper 21, available at: http://www.
ophi.org.uk/working-paper-number-21/.
Pehnt, M, M Cames, C Fischer, B Praterious,
L Schneider, K Schumacher and J P Vob (2006):

Micro-generation: Towards Decentralised Energy
Systems, Heidelberg: Springer Publishers.
Planning Commission (2011): Twelfth Five-Year
Plan (2012-17) Approach Paper, New Delhi:
Planning Commission, Government of India.
Rogers, J, R Hansen, S Graham, P Covell, H Hande,
S Kaufman, C Rufin and L Frantzis (2006):
Innovation in Rural Energy Delivery: Accelerating Rural Access through SMES, Navigant
Consultation, viewed on 7 May 2011 (http://
www.soluzusa.com/documents/NCI-Soluz_
Innovation_in_Rural_Energy_Delivery.pdf).
Sauter, R and J Watson (2007): Strategies for the
Deployment of Micro-generation: Implications
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2770779.
Siddiqui, S and S Upadhyay (2011): Need for Integrated Policy and Institutional Framework for
the Implementation of Jawaharlal Nehru
National Solar Mission in Rural Areas, New
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Development: Lessons for Decentralised Energy
Delivery, New Delhi: World Bank.
Yin, R K (2009): Case Study Research: Design and
Methods, California: Sage Publication.
Appendix A: Scoring States on the Basis of Policy Variables

State
Resource-specific
Policy (Presence = 1 ;
Absence = 0)
Institutional Linkages
(Presence = 1 ;
Absence = 0)
Electricity Duty Exemption

(Exempted =1, Not Eexempted = 0)
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Rajasthan
Fiscal and Financial Incentives

Tax Exemption (Exempted =1,
Refund of Stamp Duty and
Not Exempted = 0)
Registration Charges (Yes = 1, No=0)
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0.8
0.4
1
0.4
0.8
0.2
0.4
0.6
1
0.6
Appendix C: Variance Explained
Appendix B: Correlations Matrix

Strength
of Policy
Strength of policy
Plant size (in hh per kw)
Technology
Funding type
Productive linkages
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
Normalized
Aggregated Score
1
-0.05393
-0.11288
0.024022
0.199914
-0.39073
Plant Size
(in hh per kw)
1
-0.17671
0.125966
0.083664
0.065594
Technology
1
-0.16477
0.062085
0.168423
Funding
Source
Community
Participation
1
-0.10029
0.085045
Productive
Linkages
1
-0.53025
Eigenvalues
Proportion
Explained
Cum Explained
1
2
3
4
5
6
1.791986
1.322679
0.988112
0.83125
0.697297
0.368676
0.298664
0.220446
0.164685
0.138542
0.116216
0.061446
0.298664
0.519111
0.683796
0.822338
0.938554
1
Appendix D: Operational Details of the Projects Visited

Project Location
Commissioning
Year
No of HHs
Served
Technology
Used
Tamkuha, West Champaran,

Bihar
Amthagouda, Kalahandi,
Odisha
Karlapet, Kalahandi, Odisha
Kandhal, Cuttack, Odisha
2007
400
2006
60
Biomass gasificati
on system
Micro-hydro
2006
2009
112
143
Rampura, Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh
2009
69
Radhapur, Shivpuri,
Madhya Pradesh
2008
60
114
Size of the Plant

(kW)
Micro-hydro
Biomass gasification
system
SPV
Biomass gasification
system
Policy
Strength
Funding
Source
Income
Linkages
Ownership and
Management
Status of the
Project
33
Low
Private
Exists
Private
Operational
20
Low
Non-govt
Do not exist
25
10
Low
Low
Non-govt
Exists
Government Exists
8.7
Low
Non-govt
10
High
Government Do not exist
Community Partially
operational
Community Operational
Community Partially
operational
Community Partially
operational
Community Partially
operational
MAY 28, 2016
Do not exist
vol lI no 22
EPW
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Trade Liberalisation and Income Convergence

Evidence from Developing Countries
Garima Siwach
This paper analyses the effect of liberalisation on per

capita income convergence between countries. The
1980s and 1990s saw many developing countries open
up their economies. Some of these economies
continued to lag behind; however, most of them saw
rapid growth post liberalisation. To identify the effect
of trade on convergence rates, a single difference
approach is followed, comparing convergence patterns
pre- and post-liberalisation. The convergence measure is
estimated between a set of developing countries and
their most active trading partners. The results do not
reflect any significant change in the rates of convergence
for the developing countries pre- and post-liberalisation.
ross-country income convergence has been an active

topic of interest in macroeconomics, finding its way
from the neoclassical theory, to endogenous growth
models. The study of growth and convergence has a significant
impact on the long-term growth policies of an economy; it has
strong implications for poverty and economic inequality, the
central issues that developing countries are seeking to address.
A strong factor in convergence theory is the flow of technology
from richer to poorer countries. Technology flow could take
various forms; the central idea being that given the initial state
of endowments, poor countries are expected to grow faster
than richer countries. This argument would make a strong
case for a direct positive relationship between free trade and
income convergence. It would be interesting to study this relationship in emerging economies, as a measure to understand
the empirics of the catch-up effect. This paper examines
developing countries that started out relatively poor, and undertook trade liberalisation in the late 1980s or early 1990s.
First difference study is conducted to check the effect of liberalisation policies on convergence rates, and check the rate of
per capita income dispersion (convergence or divergence), preand post-liberalisation.
Convergence Theory and Trade
Garima Siwach (gsiwach@albany.edu) is a doctoral student of

Economics at the University at Albany, State University of New York.
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
Slaughter (2001) considers a countrys per capita income from

two factors of production: labour and capital.
GDP (w. L) (r. K)
K
pcgdp =
=
+
= w + r
L
L
L
L
To study the impact of trade on per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) convergence, it is important to look at how trade
impacts each of the above variables. Starting out with the neoclassical growth model, the Solow model has clear implications
on growth for the rich and poor countries. The theory states
that when a country starts out with lower levels of initial capital,
it is easier for that country to grow faster, accruing to diminishing returns to capital. Since returns to investment are high,
coming from high marginal productivity of the worker, richer
countries will invest in poorer countries, thus leading to an
increase in capital generation. In this sense, the poor countries
catch-up on growth with the rich countries. With free trade,
Solows theory should gain a strong support, because lower
barriers to trade encourage flow of investment.
In contrast to the neoclassical growth model, Romer (1986)
stated that rich countries may always grow faster than poor
countries because of factors that are endogenous to the country,
115
SPECIAL ARTICLE
like economic policy measures and investment in human capital.

Lucas (1990), in addition, lists out at least three significant
factors that affect per capita income growth: differences in
human capital, external benefits of human capital, and capital
market imperfections. He uses a small approach to study this
by comparing the rate of returns for the United States (US) and
India in 1988. Borrowed from Lucas (1990) is the following
evidence:
Assume a CobbDouglas constant returns to scale technology:
y = Ax
The marginal product of capital is: = ; capital per
worker is: =
Lucas (1990) uses estimation from Summers and Heston

(1988), which states that in 1988, production per person in the
US was 15 times what it was in India. Using the above model,
marginal product of capital (MPK) in India should have been 58
times the MPK in US. But this model ignores human capital.
Lucas presents a model incorporating h, that is, human capital
per worker:
y = Ax h
Here, the marginal product of capital is: =
He then goes on to estimate to calculate the total external

effect of human capital given by h. Taking this into account,
he finds the ratio of rate of return between India and the US to
be 1.04, rather than 58.
Trade liberalisation affects factor prices. The factor price
equalisation (FPE) theory states that given certain assumptions, free trade equalises factor prices between trading countries. However, this process itself depends on other factors like
tastes, technology and geography, and so there is no general
support for the theory. An implication of FPE is that given free
trade, countries avoid diminishing marginal returns. Ventura
(1997) states that as long as country j is small relative to the
rest of the world, capital stock in country j is always strictly
lower, the return to capital will be independent of capital stock
in country j.
In general, the effect of trade is ambiguous. The empirical
results are contrary. The East Asian economies, now called a
growth miracle, have well come to the fore of development in
Asia. Yet many other countries that opened their trade policies,
like India or countries in sub-Saharan Africa, remain among
low income countries.
Review of Empirical Literature
Two recent empirical studies that have sought to address this

question are those of Ben-David (1996) and Matthew Slaughter
(2001). Ben-David studies the relationship between trade magnitude and income convergence. He does this by first forming
major trade groups for the 25 richest countries in 1960. After
calculating the average per capita income for each group, he
runs a time series regression on the difference between country is and country is trade groups per capita income in time t
and t-1. His results find significant convergence between
trading partners.
116
Slaughter proposes a difference-in-differences estimation of

convergence, where he compares the performance of a treatment group, pre- and post-liberalisation, to the performance of
a control group. He defines a treatment group as a group of
countries that implemented sizeable trade liberalisation
implemented equally by all participants. He takes four treatment groups in his study (European Economic Community
(EEC), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), EECEFTA and
Kennedy Round). The control group is taken as countries similar
to the treatment group but not included in the trading group.
To estimate the per capita dispersion, he uses the standard
deviation of per capita income among a group of countries. He
computes this through a difference-in-differences specification.
His results show insignificant convergence and, in some cases,
divergence in per capita incomes post-liberalisation.
In the following sections, we build on the aforementioned
studies, by identifying the impact of liberalisation on convergence for the emerging market economies.
Data Sources and Methodology
The present study focuses primarily on developing countries,

which started out with some of the lowest per capita incomes
in the world. It would be interesting to focus attention on these
countries because the implications of the catch-up effect are
strongest here. Nineteen such countries are identified, following Sachs and Warners criteria for an open economy.
Sachs and Warner (1995) classified countries as open or
closed based on the following conditions: (i) non-tariff barriers
covering 40% or more of trade; (ii) average tariff rates of 40%
or more; (iii) black market exchange rate that is depreciated by
20% or more relative to the official exchange rate, on an average,
during the 1970s or 1980s; (iv) socialist economic system; and
(v) state monopoly on major exports.
They defined an open economy as one where none of the
above conditions applied. For accuracy in results, the countries
that practised temporary liberalisation before 1988, or those for
which data was unavailable (mainly the former Soviet Union),
were eliminated. The list of the 19 countries along with the
years of liberalisation is given in Appendix A (p 120). In rest of
the paper, these countries are called treatment countries.
Following Ben-Davids approach, we form two separate
trading groups for import and export partners, pre- and postliberalisation for each of the treatment countries. We restrict
the size of the trading groups to 12, defining most actively
engaged in trade with as importing or exporting higher
than 3% of the treatment countrys total imports or exports.
The list of each of the countries and their groups are given
in Appendix A. The International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Direction of Trade Statistics is the data source for each
trading country.
The regression approach used in this paper is the first
difference approach. This estimates the difference in convergence rate before and after liberalisation. Slaughter (2001) takes
a difference-in-differences method, which is clearly a more
sophisticated method. However, the problem with using that
approach is the difficulty in choosing a control group. It is
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
difficult to come up with a group of a large enough size that

did not practise trade liberalisation during any of the years
of study. To eliminate this bias, we check the significance in
difference between convergence rates in two different periods
for the treatment countries. Moreover, since the treatment
countries chosen are not close together by geography or history,
we assume it safe to ignore a control group.
The measure of income dispersion is calculated using the
rate of change of difference in the treatment countrys per
capita income and the average per capita income of its trading
group over time. All data on per capita income are constant at
2005 prices in international dollars and are taken from Penn
World Tables by Summers and Heston (1988). Following
Ben-David (1996):
(y, ybar ) = (y, ybar ) + ,
...(1)
Here, yi,t represents the log of per capita income of treatment country i in year t, and ybart is the average of logs of per
capita income of the trading group in year t. Then gives the
measure of dispersion; > 1 indicates divergence while < 1
indicates convergence.
Taking one term for difference in income logs:
z, = z, + ,
...(2)
We regress the change in income dispersion in year t on income dispersion in the last year. From equations (1) and (2)
above then, > 0 indicates divergence and < 0 indicates convergence.
Since difference regression is used, we require the difference in the convergence rate pre- and post-liberalisation. For
this analysis, we estimate:
z,, = z,, + z,, (d ) + ,,
...(3)
Dummy variable de assigns a value of 0 to the pre-liberalisation

era and 1 to the post-liberalisation era. Convergence rate
before trade liberalisation is given by 1, and convergence rate
after trade liberalisation is given by 1 + 2. The single difference, given by 2 is the indicator of interest. This parameter is
estimated for each of the 19 countries.
Results of the Study
Results of equation 3 are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1

shows the results for convergence with imports groups and
lists the treatment country, years studied for each country,
estimated parameter 1, the calculated parameter 1 + 2, estimated parameter 2, and the standard deviation of 2. Table 2
lists the same information for exports groups. The parameters
derived are ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, measured
for significance at 95% level.
The results in Table 1 indicate that there was no significant
< 0
change in convergence rates pre- and post-liberalisation.
implies that per capita incomes were converging before trade
liberalisation. This holds for all countries except India and
+
< 0 implies that per capita incomes were conGuyana.
verging after liberalisation. This is true for all countries except
Guyana, Mali, Colombia and India. Rate of divergence increased
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
for India after liberalisation, while it saw an insignificant

indicates that
decrease in case of Guyana. A negative
convergence rate was higher in the post-liberalisation period.
This does not hold for eight countries: Mexico, Mali, Philippines, Paraguay, Benin, Uruguay, Colombia and India. The
, higher the difference in dishigher the absolute value of
persion rates in the two periods. Out of 19 countries, the difference is significant only for two countries (the Philippines
and Uganda). For the Philippines, the convergence rate was
significantly lower post-liberalisation, and for Uganda it was
significantly higher.
To conclude, out of 19 countries, the import groups study
suggests that only for one country, the convergence rate was
significantly higher post-liberalisation. For some countries,
divergence in per capita incomes is noted post-liberalisation.
Table 1: Results for Imports Groups
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Treatment Country
Years of Study
Guinea
Mexico
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Mali
Philippines
Uganda
Paraguay
Tunisia
Turkey
Benin
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Nepal
India
Kenya
Zambia
19712000
19712000
19722001
19732002
19732002
19732002
19732002
19742003
19742003
19742003
19752004
19752004
19762005
19762005
19762005
19762005
19772006
19782007
19782007
-0.553
-0.255
-0.222
0.161
-0.005
-0.218
-0.171
-0.093
-0.056
-0.356
-0.123
-0.126
-0.263
-0.599
-0.024
-0.390
0.133
-0.478
-0.550
-0.580
-0.198
-0.223
0.078
0.013
-0.177
-0.215
-0.052
-0.067
-0.364
-0.110
0.039
-0.298
-0.761
0.015
-0.536
0.186
-0.557
-0.961
-0.027
0.057
-0.001
-0.084
0.018
0.041*
-0.044*
0.041
-0.011
-0.009
0.013
0.164
-0.035
-0.161
0.039
-0.146
0.052
-0.080
-0.411
SD of
0.016
0.043
0.037
0.049
0.163
0.017
0.020
0.022
0.007
0.017
0.018
0.671
0.121
0.100
0.137
0.155
0.064
0.063
0.274
* Significant at 95% level.
Table 2: Results for Exports Groups

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Treatment Country
Years of Study
Guinea
Mexico
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Mali
Philippines
Uganda
Paraguay
Tunisia
Turkey
Benin
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Nepal
India
Kenya
Zambia
19712000
19712000
19722001
19732002
19732002
19732002
19732002
19742003
19742003
19742003
19752004
19752004
19762005
19762005
19762005
19762005
19772006
19782007
19782007
-0.032
0.000
-0.289
-0.118
-0.818
-0.166
-0.512
-0.161
0.687
-0.667
-0.502
-0.114
-0.277
-0.437
-0.099
-0.709
-0.184
-0.438
-0.650
-0.032
-0.018
-0.410
-0.121
-0.689
-0.132
-0.535
-0.159
0.474
-0.548
-1.417
-0.093
-0.289
-0.620
-0.152
-0.798
-0.197
-0.544
-0.784
-0.001
-0.018
-0.121
-0.003
0.129
0.035
-0.022
0.002
-0.213
0.119
-0.914
0.021
-0.012
-0.184
-0.052
-0.089
-0.014
-0.106
-0.135
SD of
0.007
0.071
0.149
0.015
0.049*
0.020
0.015
0.058
0.110
0.057*
0.774
0.040
0.097
0.156
0.854
0.061
0.008
0.090
0.064*
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
Table 2 lists the results on the exports groups. The coefficients

are interpreted as before. Here we see that all 19 countries
except Tunisia were converging before and after liberalisation. Tunisias rate of divergence, however, decreased after
liberalisation. Countries that were converging less after trade
liberalisation were Mali, Philippines, Paraguay, Turkey and
Uruguay. Yet only for three countries, the convergence rate
was significantly different after liberalisation, namely, Mali,
Turkey and Zambia. For Mali, the post-liberalisation convergence rate was significantly lower than the convergence rate
pre-liberalisation. To conclude, it can be said that for only two
out of 19 countries, convergence was significantly higher after
trade liberalisation.
Both imports and exports groups indicate that trade liberalisation did not foster per capita income convergence for the
developing countries between the 1970s and 2000s.
Large Country Bias
It is important to note that the composition of trade groups

changed between two periods of our study, that is, before and
after trade liberalisation. However, one country that dominated the imports and exports groups for almost all countries
is the US. During the whole period of our study, between the
1970s and the 2000s, the US appeared as a major importer/
exporter for most countries, and it continues to be among
the highest income countries, with rapidly rising per capita
income as an outcome of stabilised population growth and
increase in technological investments. One may then ask if
the results are possibly biased by the presence of this one
large country.
Ben-David also accounts for this in his study by excluding
the US and then estimating the results. The same is estimated
here and the results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Two countries namely, Guinea-Bissau and Nepal, are excluded
in Table 3 and 4 as the US was not a major exporter for these
countries in either of the two periods. As evident from Table 3,
the results do not change much after eliminating the US. In
Table 3: Results for Imports Groups after Eliminating the US
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Treatment Country
Years of Study
Guinea
Mexico
Guyana
Mali
Philippines
Uganda
Paraguay
Tunisia
Turkey
Benin
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
India
Kenya
Zambia
19712000
19712000
19732002
19732002
19732002
19732002
19742003
19742003
19742003
19752004
19752004
19762005
19762005
19762005
19772006
19782007
19782007
118
-0.603
-0.248
0.193
0.007
-0.251
-0.171
-0.091
-0.032
-0.312
0.054
-0.088
-0.244
-0.404
-0.004
0.127
-0.488
-0.555
-0.650
-0.187
0.085
0.026
-0.206
-0.274
-0.041
-0.043
-0.326
0.036
-0.072
-0.006
-0.524
0.072
0.188
-0.595
-0.912
-0.046
0.061
-0.107
0.019
0.045*
-0.104
0.049
-0.011
-0.014
-0.018
0.016
0.238
-0.120
0.075
0.061
-0.108
-0.356
SD of
0.024
0.051
0.062
0.13
0.020
0.061
0.035
0.006
0.021
0.040
1.045
0.353
0.089
0.218
0.083
0.083
0.231
this case, there are four countries that show divergence before
liberalisation: Guyana, Mali, Benin and India. Post-liberalisation,
Colombia is added to this list. The Philippines shows a significantly lower convergence rate post-liberalisation. Therefore,
eliminating the US from our imports groups does not change
the earlier conclusion.
As can be seen in Table 4, the result stands robust when applied to the exports groups as well. As before, the countries
that did not export to the US have been excluded. Also eliminated is Mexico, since post-liberalisation, the US is the only
country in Mexicos exports group. Turkey is the only country
that experienced per capita income divergence before liberalisation. For four out of the 13 countries, convergence slowed
down after liberalisation. As before, the results change somewhat after we eliminate the US, but not quite. There were only
two countries, Uganda and India, where convergence increased
significantly after liberalisation. To generalise then, one may
say that our earlier results do not change significantly after
removal of the US from the dataset.
Table 4: Results for Exports Groups after Eliminating the US
Treatment Country
Years of Study
SD of
1 Guinea
19712000
-0.008
-0.012
-0.004
2 Guyana
10732002
-0.213
-0.310
-0.097
0.009
0.186
3 Philippines
19732002
-0.157
-0.119
0.038
0.022
4 Uganda
19732002
-0.018
-0.058
-0.040*
0.011
5 Paraguay
19742003
-0.161
-0.152
0.009
0.042
6 Turkey
19742003
0.043
-0.002
-0.045
0.130
7 Uruguay
19752004
-0.124
-0.093
0.031
0.054
8 Argentina
19762005
-0.247
-0.237
0.009
0.183
9 Brazil
19762005
-0.345
-0.567
-0.222
0.242
10 Colombia
19762005
-0.063
-0.572
-0.509
2.400
11 Nepal
19762005
-0.813
-1.075
-0.262
0.220
12 India
19772006
-0.344
-0.364
-0.020*
0.009
13 Kenya
19782007
-0.417
-0.653
-0.237
0.219
Concluding Remarks
The above results conform to Ben-Davids and Matthew

Slaughters results. Ben-Davids study suggested that the rate
of convergence is significantly higher over time with major
trading partners. Slaughter showed that while convergence
seems to exist, trade liberalisation policies, through the formation of Free Trade Agreements, do not play a significant role.
This study conforms to the existing literature. We see that for
most countries, convergence holds with their trading partners,
which implies that the per capita income gaps are falling.
But there is no significant change in convergence that can be
attributed to trade liberalisation. Through a first difference
analysis that estimates convergence rates between trade
groups before and after liberalisation, we find no significant
change in convergence for developing countries towards their
major partners of trade. The results are robust when large
country biases are taken care of as well.
One might then question the role of economic policies that
reduce trade barriers. One point to note is that the trade groups
also change with time. It can be possible, although cannot be
generalised from evidence, that with free trade, new trading
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
SPECIAL ARTICLE
partners mostly comprise of richer countries, thus raising the

income differences initially with change in trade groups.
However, the more important thing to note is that liberalisation is hardly ever an instant process. It is most often gradual,
with policies shifting towards freer trade over a number of
years. Since I have used the criteria given by Sachs and Warner,
one may question if there were capital account liberalisation
alongside the tariff reductions and other criteria that Sachs
and Warner laid out. Since most of the capital flow takes place
in the form of foreign direct investments (FDI), which governs
a significant change from liberalisation, it could be possible
that FDI itself takes time to flow, and does not start immediately with trade reforms. This reasoning could also work in
the other direction. As Slaughter (2001) points out, if liberalisation is anticipated widely, firms cross-country investment
behaviour may comply with liberalisation before the barriers
are actually brought down. One might then want to increase
References
Ben-David, D (1996): Trade and Convergence
among Countries, Journal of International
Economics, Vol 40, pp 27998.
Lucas, R E (1990): Why Doesnt Capital Flow from
Rich to Poor Countries, The American Economic
Review, Vol 80, No 2, pp 9296.
Romer, P M (1986): Increasing Returns and LongRun Growth, Journal of Political Economy,
Vol 94, No 5, pp 100237.
the time span in both periods to understand the gradual

effect of trade.
Another important consideration in growth models is population growth. Population in developing countries may take
much longer to stabilise relative to GDP. Moreover, changing
the design of human capital does not occur with a mere
change in policy. Free trade does lead to increased knowledge
dissemination, but this process needs to be accompanied by
endogenous factors. As stated by endogenous growth theories, infrastructure and institutional settings play an important role in addition to knowledge dissemination. As a result,
labour productivity might not be increasing at a pace fast
enough, as proposed by the theory of convergence. It would
be safe to say, based on previous studies, that liberalisation
fosters per capita income convergence in those countries that
started out with higher levels of literacy, hence justifying the
need to factor human capital.
Sachs, J and A Warner (1995): Economic Reform

and the Process of Global Integration, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 1995, No 1,
pp 1118.
Slaughter, M J (2001): Trade liberalization
and Per Capita Income Convergence: A
Difference-in-Differences Analysis, Journal
of International Economics, Vol 55, No 1,
pp 20328.
Solow, R M (1956): A Contribution to the Theory of
Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 70, No 1, pp 6594.

Summers, R and A Heston (1988): A New Set of
International Comparisons of Real Product and
Price Levels: Estimates for 130 Countries, 1950
1985, Review of Income and Wealth, Vol 34,
Issue 1, pp 125.
Ventura, J (1997): Growth and Interdependence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII,
pp 5784.
New in EPWRF India Time Series
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EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
Appendix A
Country
Import Group
Pre-liberalisation
Guinea
France, US, Brazil, Belgium, Germany, Italy, UK, Canada, Spain
Mexico
US, Japan, Germany
Guinea-Bissau Portugal, Thailand, Italy, Spain, Senegal, Netherlands, France,
Sweden, Germany, Pakistan
Guyana
US, Netherlands, UK, Japan, Trinidad and Tobago, Indonesia
Mali
Philippines
Uganda
Paraguay
Tunisia
Turkey
Benin
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Nepal
India
Kenya
Zambia
France, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Netherlands, US, Belgium,

Japan, Italy
US, Japan, Kuwait, Hong Kong, Germany, Singapore, Malaysia,
Saudi Arabia, Australia, China
Kenya, UK, Italy, Germany, Japan, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, US, India
Brazil, Argentina, US, Algeria, Japan, UK, Germany
France, Italy, Germany, US, Belgium, Spain
Germany, US, Iraq, Italy, France, UK, Iran, Japan, Belgium
France, Thailand, US, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Netherlands, UK,
Spain, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Japan
Brazil, Argentina, US, Germany, Mexico, France
US, Brazil, Germany, Bolivia, Italy, France, Japan
US, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Iran, Iraq, Italy
US, Japan, Germany, Venezuela, Switzerland, France,
Brazil, Mexico
Japan, Singapore, India, China, Thailand, France, New Zealand,
Hong Kong, Germany, Korea
US, Germany, Belgium, Japan, UK, Saudi Arabia, UAE
UAE, UK, Japan, US, Germany, France, Malaysia
South Africa, UK, Egypt, US, Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia, Japan,
Germany
Post-liberalisation
Guinea
France, Cote d' Ivoire, Belgium, US, Japan, China, Germany, Italy
Mexico
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Mali
US, Japan, Germany

Portugal, Senegal, India, China, Thailand, Netherlands, Belgium
US, Trinidad and Tobago, Netherlands, Italy, UK, Cuba
Cote d'Ivoire, France, Senegal, Germany
Philippines
US, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, China
Uganda
Kenya, Japan, South Africa, India, UK, UAE,

Central African Republic, US
Brazil, Argentina, China, US, Switzerland, Bahamas
France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Libya
Germany, Italy, Russia, France, UK, US, Switzerland, China
France, China, Ghana, Cote D'Ivoire, Thailand, UK, Togo,
Belgium, Netherlands
Argentina, Brazil, Russia, US, China, Nigeria, Iran
Paraguay
Tunisia
Turkey
Benin
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Nepal
India
Kenya
Zambia
120
Brazil, US, China, Germany

US, Germany, China, Japan, Algeria, France, Nigeria, Korea, Italy
US, Mexico, China, Brazil, Venezuela, Germany, Japan
India, China, Singapore, Indonesia
China, US, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, UAE, Germany,
Australia, Iran
UAE, India, China, US, Japan, South Africa, UK, Germany,
Indonesia
South Africa, UAE, China, India, UK, Congo
Export Group
Pre-liberalisation
Years
US, Germany, Spain, Ireland, France, Italy, Cameroon

US, Japan, Spain, France, UK
Portugal, France, Turkey, Belgium, Pakistan, Japan,
Spain, UK
UK, US, Germany, Japan, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada,
Venezuela, France
Cote dIvoire, Senegal, Switzerland, Belgium
197185
197185
US, Japan, Netherlands, Germany, China, UK, Singapore
197387
US, UK, France, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Italy

Brazil, Netherlands, Switzerland, Argentina, Chile, Belgium,
Bermuda, Germany, US, Panama
France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Spain, India
Germany, Iraq, Italy, US, UK, Iran, France, Saudi Arabia
Portugal, China, Thailand, Nigeria, Italy, Cote DIvoire,
Turkey
Brazil, US, Germany, Argentina, China, UK, Iran, Italy,
Netherlands
US, Brazil, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Iran, Chile, Japan
US, Netherlands, UK, Japan, Germany, Italy, Belgium
US, Germany, Venezuela, Netherlands, Panama, Japan
197387
197488
197286
197387
197387
197488
197488
197589
197589
197690
197690
197690
197690
Germany, US, India, Switzerland, UK

US, Japan, Germany, UK, UAE, Belgium, China, Italy
UAE, UK, Pakistan, Uganda, Germany, Switzerland,
Netherlands, Tanzania, Egypt
Japan, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, France, Belgium,
Thailand, Italy, Kenya, Zimbabwe
India, Spain, Russia, Germany, US, Ireland, France, Ukraine,
Canada
US
Thailand, Uruguay, India
Canada, US, UK, Portugal, Jamaica, Belgium
Thailand, India, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Mauritius,
France, Czech Republic, Belgium, UK
US, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, China, Hong Kong,
Germany, Malaysia, Korea, Thailand
Switzerland, Kenya, Netherlands, South Africa, UK,
Belgium, Spain
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Switzerland
France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Libya, Belgium, UK
Germany, US, UK, Italy, France, Spain, Netherlands
China, India, Nigeria, Niger, Thailand, Indonesia, Togo
197791
197892
197892
19862000
19862000
19872001
19882002
19882002
19882002
19882002
19892003
19892003
19892003
19902004
US, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, Mexico, China, Canada,

Spain, UK, Italy
Brazil, US, Chile, China, Spain, Netherlands
US, China, Netherlands, Germany, Mexico, Chile
US, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru
India, US, Germany
US, UAE, China, Singapore, UK, Hong Kong, Germany
19902004
Uganda, UK, Tanzania, Netherlands, US, Pakistan, Sudan,

Egypt, UAE, Somalia, Congo
Switzerland, South Africa, Thailand, Congo, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, China
19932007
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EPW
19912005
19912005
19912005
19912005
19922006
19932007
SPECIAL ARTICLE
On Incidence of Diarrhoea among Children in India

Can the Gordian Knot of Complementarities Be Cut?
Arijita Dutta, Gitanjali Hajra, Shyama V Ramani
Drinking water, sanitation and hygiene behaviour,

referred to as the WASH variables by the United Nations
Childrens Emergency Fund, are acknowledged as the
three main determinants of diarrhoeal diseases. But the
impact of their complementarities on disease incidence
remains understudied. This study uses state and
household level data to examine the determinants of
child diarrhoeal incidence. It introduces indicators of
WASH quality and combined presence, both at the
household and state levels. It combines them in a novel
analysis to understand their roles. In the Indian states,
with the worst WASH infrastructure, these variables are
strategic substitutes, but as WASH infrastructure
improves, they become strategic complements. Thus,
resource allocation to lower diarrhoea incidence must
take into account the complementary rather than
individual presence of these focal variables. Further, the
quality of WASH also matters. The Swachh Bharat
Abhiyan, targeting universal sanitation coverage, is
unlikely to be effective unless it breaks the Gordian knot
of complementarities and WASH quality holding up the
burden of childhood diarrhoea.
Shyama V Ramani gratefully acknowledges support from the EU FP7

project MNEmerge, Grant Agreement No 612889 and FINISH Society
(India).
Arijita Dutta (dutta.arijita@gmail.com) and Gitanjali Hajra (gitu.
hajra@gmail.com) are with the Department of Economics, University
of Calcutta, Kolkata, and Shyama V Ramani (ramani@merit.unu.edu) is
with the United Nations University-Merit, Maastricht, Netherlands.
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
iarrhoeal disease is one of the most significant and leading causes of child mortality and morbidity in low income countries of the world (UNDP 2014). According to
the World Health Organizations (WHO) estimates, every year,
diarrhoea is responsible for approximately eight lakh deaths of
children under the age of five, mostly in developing countries
(WHO 2007). About 88% of this incidence is related to unsafe
water supply, inadequate sanitation and/or hygiene behaviour
(WHO 2004). Many developing countries have been investing
in sanitation, water and education infrastructure to lower
diarrhoea incidence, especially over the last two decades. But
they have not been very successful as the disease still claims
2,195 children every day, even more than HIV, malaria and
measles combined (Liu et al 2012). The loss and/or debilitation
of children are of concern not only from the point of welfare,
but also for economic growth and inclusive development.
This article provides some insight on the policy initiatives to
slash diarrhoea incidence by examining the role of public health
infrastructure and its interrelationships with the hygiene
behaviour of households. It starts from the premise that an
inadequate understanding of the interrelationships between
complementary determinants of diarrhoea is leading to suboptimal policy design and implementation, which, in turn,
gives rise to heterogeneous outcomes in terms of diarrhoea
control. India is the focus of our study.
It is well known that diarrhoea incidence can be brought
down by isolating human excreta from living spaces or blocking the infection route through hygienic practices (JICA 2012).
Excreta-related pathogens reach human hosts via vectors that
use or involve faeces as a medium. For instance, from faeces,
the pathogens are transferred to humans either through
non-hygienic behaviour or through intermediaries like flies,
plants, fish, molluscs, other animals, soil and water. Hygiene
behaviour such as the use of toilets, regular washing of hands,
maintaining clean living spaces, workspaces and kitchens,
using footwear, practising hygienic disposal of stools minimise pathogen transmission. Of course, hygiene behaviour
is facilitated if households have access to toilets and noncontaminated water. In short, drinking water, sanitation and
hygiene behaviour referred to as the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) variables by the United Nations Childrens Emergency Fund (UNICEF) are widely acknowledged as being the
three main determinants of diarrhoeal diseases, but the impact of their complementarity on disease incidence remains
understudied.
121
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Indeed, the central role of access to water and sanitation for

sustainable development is now even more confirmed with the
formal adoption of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) in September 2015 by the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly. Among these, Goal 6 is to ensure availability and
sustainable management of water and sanitation for all by
2030. This presents a great challenge for India, because according to WHO/UNICEF (2014), India was in the group of only 45
countries where sanitation coverage was less than 50% and
home to the largest population lacking sanitation. Thus, over
the last decade, sanitation coverage has captured increasing
policy attention and is now exemplified in the national programme called the Swachh Bharat Mission, whose central
objective is to eliminate open defecation in India through installation of toilets and triggering of behavioural change.
Sanitation: Impact on Diarrhoea and the Indian Reality
Determinants of Diarrhoea: From a comprehensive survey of

the medical and economic literature with respect to low- and
middle-income countries, Ramani et al (2012) classify the
main correlates of diarrhoeal diseases into five categories:
(i) physical environment of the locality (for example, weather,
water table, drainage, etc); (ii) level of socio-economic development of the region; (iii) knowledge, resource and asset portfolio of household (level of education of the mother, access to
water and sanitation); (iv) behavioural routines of the household (childcare practices and practice of open defecation); and
(v) individual host characteristics (age, gender). However,
within both the medical and economics literature, studies take
determinants as stand alones and examine the impact of each
separately on the probability of diarrhoeal incidenceeven
though most recognise the existence of complementarity
between various factors.
Taken together, a cross-country analysis by Gnther and
Gunther (2010) using 172 Demography and Health Survey data
sets from 70 countries finds that water and sanitation infrastructure lowers the odds of children suffering from diarrhoea
by 7%17%. This result has been reconfirmed in the context of
Nepal by Pokhrel and Viraraghavan (2004), Zimbabwe by
Root (2001), Egypt by Roushdy et al (2012), East Africa by
Tumwine et al (2002), Senegal by Bampoky (2013), India by
Kumar and Vollmer (2013) and generally of developing countries by Waddington et al (2009), respectively.
In addition to sanitation and water, scholars also confirm
that knowledge and practice of hygiene behaviour are important determinants of diarrhoea incidence. Khanna (2008) finds
that disease-specific awareness among mothers is likely to
reduce the incidence of child diarrhoea in India. Fan and
Mahal (2011) find that effects of improved water supply or
improved toilets on different diarrhoeal outcomes are not consistent in rural India, though regular handwashing has far
stronger impacts.
Many works also consider sanitation and water supply separately. Panda (1997) shows that households with toilet facilities
are two-fifths as likely as households which have no such
122
facility to have experienced episodes of diarrhoea. Households

that utilise public tube wells or bore wells as sources for
drinking water are three-fifths as likely to have experienced
an episode of childhood diarrhoea compared to those that utilise unsafe drinking water. Similarly, Borooah (2004) demonstrates that while inadequate toilet facilities increase the likelihood of diarrhoea by 5% and safe water supply reduces the incidence of diarrhoea by 5%, Jalan and Ravallian (2003) find
that the prevalence and duration of diarrhoea among children
under five in rural India is significantly lower on average for
families with piped water than for observationally identical
households without it. Such results are also echoed by Quinn
(2009), with respect to Ghana.
Some of the papers also try to identify the type of water
source and sanitation facility that best improves health status. In the Ugandan case, Kasirye (2010) finds that only piped
water within the household and access to private covered pit
latrines significantly lessen diarrhoea prevalence. Another
study by Fuentes et al (2006) also highlights that the health
benefits are higher for households that have access to flush
toilet rather than pit latrine.
Though these studies identify the nature of the impact of
sanitation and drinking water separately within a country or
across countries, they hint that sanitation alone is not the only
one determining factor for child diarrhoea. Indeed, the two
surveys on determinants of diarrhoeal diseases (Ramani et al
2012) and the impact of sanitation interventions (Loevinsohn
et al 2013 along with Khanna 2008) point out that the risk factors are not only individually correlated with the occurrence of
diarrhoea, but they often jointly determine the final impact on
disease incidence. Similarly, through a meta-analysis of worldwide interventions, Fewtrell et al (2005) highlight that combined water, sanitation, and hygiene programmes will not
reduce diarrhoea, if the intervention is piecemeal and/or the
water quality is neglected. Huda et al (2012) find that a combined intervention in Bangladesh (SHEWA-B) did not sufficiently improve hygiene behaviours, and hence, diarrhoea was not
lowered.
These studies drive home the point that interactions between the determining factors, that is, the impact of complementarity, are as important to measure, as the impact of each
individual factor taken by itself. Complementarity can be
viewed as a particular form of externality in which the taking
of an action by an agent increases the marginal benefits of another action(s) for the same or different agent(s) (Ray 2000).
When complementarities are not taken into account in an intervention, it often leads to a coordination failure (RosensteinRodan 1943), lowering impact below than that targeted.
State Efforts to Increase Sanitation Coverage in India:
Policy interventions to achieve sanitation coverage in low- and
medium-income countries tend to be a mix of two types of
programmes (Ramani and SadreGhazi 2014). Under the first
type, a top-down, state-funded initiative provides sanitation
infrastructure as a merit good to households, on the assumption
that availability will lead to usage. Under the second type,
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sanitation coverage is increased through a slower, bottom-up,

demand-driven approach, whereby households are persuaded
or accompanied by intermediary organisations to invest in or
use sanitation infrastructure. Studies show that the top-down
approach is challenging, when there is a weak knowledge base
and/or a significant socio-economic or ethnic diversity as public
good provision programmes tend to take a checklist one size
fits all approach, without adjustment of the programme to ensure
the right fit for a context (Rheinlander et al 2011). Bangladesh
is a case study of success of the second type of intervention, where
the support of microfinance institutions has facilitated investment in toilets and the participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in creating awareness on the benefits of hygiene behaviour has increased the use of latrines (Hadi 2000).
In India, the central governments investment in sanitation
infrastructure was initiated under the Central Rural Sanitation Programme (CRSP) of the Ministry of Rural Development
in 1986. Following the first type with supply-driven approach,
free or highly subsidised toilets were provided to households
assuming that increased coverage would automatically reduce
open defecation. However, despite an investment of more than
`6 billion and the construction of over nine million latrines in
rural areas, the Census of 2001 found that only 22% of rural
households in India had access to a toilet (GOI 2008). The programme failed to motivate and sustain high levels of sanitation coverage, because of poor implementation coupled with
indifference from targeted beneficiaries, who perceived no
need to use toilets (UNDESA 2003; GOI 2008).
Consequently, the Indian government adopted the second
type of demand-focused intervention. It went from being a
supplier of free toilets, to becoming a financier for public
private partnerships involving NGOs, microfinance companies
and other social enterprises who interacted closely with the
targeted beneficiaries to provide accompaniment and education for sanitation literacy and use (Ramani and SadreGhazi
2014). The Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) launched in April
1999, emphasised that information, education and communication (IEC) should precede sanitation construction to ensure
sustained demand and behavioural change.
Despite these efforts, India is still far from having complete
sanitation coverage status. According to the 2011 Census data
collected by the Government of India, of the 247 million households in India, only 47% have their own toilet facilities and out
of the remaining 53%, only 3% have access to public toilets.
This leaves about half of the households with no option, but to
defecate in the open. Moreover, only 3% was from the poorest
20% households of the target beneficiaries of TSC, indicating
that the poorest segment hardly benefited from the programme (JMP WHO/UNICEF 2012). It is likely that the bottom
20% of the poor did not have means to invest first in toiletbuilding through own funds or loans and be reimbursed under
the TSC programme in the post-construction period. The bottom 20% may indeed require free provision of toilets or community toilets to shift from open defecation.
Translating this into deadweight losses for the economy, a
World Bank study (2011) estimates that, the total economic
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
cost of inadequate sanitation in India amounts to a loss of

`2,180 ($48) per person. Thus, the Indian government is continuing full steam with its national programme to bring about
complete sanitation coverage, but diarrhoeal disease has not
been lowered significantly yet. In terms of international ranking, India still has the highest burden of child mortality and
morbidity related to diarrhoea in South Asia (WHO 2014) and
the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) loss due to this disease
is still significant. This paradoxical situation clearly proves
that increasing the sanitation infrastructure is not a guarantee
for lowering diarrhoeal morbidity and calls for a deeper analysis.
Conceptual Framework and Estimation
of Empirical Model
From the findings of the literature survey, we start with the

premise that the incidence of child diarrhoea is a function of
household level characteristics, hygiene behaviour, host characteristics and the complementary presence of water, sanitation and hygiene behaviour within the household and in the
locality in which the household is located. Let the probability
of incidence of diarrhoea in a child be given by p. Further, let
the socio-economic development of the region as given by the
nature of the joint presence of water, sanitation and observation of hygiene behaviour be given by r. Let the vector of
household characteristics, including water and sanitation, be
Hc and similarly let Hb give the vector of hygiene behaviour.
Finally, let Ho refer to the host (that is, potential patient) characteristics. Then all these variables jointly determine the probability of diarrhoea incidence as in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
Socio-economic development of region: r
Complementary presence of focal variables
Household characteristics Hc:
Hygiene behaviour Hb:
Probability
of diarrhoea
incidence
in child p
Host characteristics Ho:
Source: Authors understanding.
Data: To estimate the model presented in Figure 1, we used the

National Family Health Survey (NFHS) of India, which provides information at the state and household level on health
status indicators. It is compiled from a very large scale, multistate and multi-round survey that aims to provide information
related to healthcare utilisation and health status of a representative sample of Indian households. The latest version
available (NFHS-3) pertains to the period 200506 and is
based on a sample of 1,09,041 households nationwide. It is the
last round of the cross-sectional database available in the public
domain. The data set was constructed through interviews
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requested from women aged 1549 and men aged 1554 in the
sampled households. From the survey, the Children Data Set
(IAKR52DT) incorporating both household information and
information on illness for all children less than five years of
age was used for this paper. In the survey, the incidence of
diarrhoea, the focus of our study, was noted by its presence or
absence in a child below five years in the two weeks preceding
the interview.
Some limitations of the database must also be pointed out.
While it is well known that the local environment matters for
health, the NFHS sample frame is robust only up to state level,
while estimates at districts or substate levels often provide
biased values, and hence, the latter could not be considered. In
terms of public health infrastructure and hygiene behaviour
the only variables available are the ones used in our analysis.
Variables Construction and Estimation Methodology: First,
we distinguished between two types of explanatory variables
in household characteristics and hygiene behaviour: focal
and control. The focal variables were the three main determinants of diarrhoea incidence, that is, the WASH variables,
which have been noted in the literature as being highly complementary: existence of toilet facilities within the house
premises, source of drinking water and hygiene behaviour of
household. The rest were the control variables.
Second, for each focal variable, we not only considered the
quantity, but also the quality. For each, we identified a high
and a low quality. For instance, with respect to toilet facilities of household, a flush toilet represents a high quality, and
a pit toilet a low quality. Open defecation is automatically
listed in low quality. Second, two possibilities exist for the
households source of drinking water facility: piped water
and bottled water signifying high quality and surface water
or well indicating low quality. Third, with respect to hygiene,
data on the manner of disposing childrens stool is available. The more hygienic one consists of disposing childrens
stool in a toilet or burying them underground and the less
hygienic one is when they are thrown away, put into the garbage or left open. This quality characterisation was formulated through discussions with experts in the sanitation and
healthcare fields.
Third, in order to test the impact of complementarity between the three focal determinants, we constructed a complementarity index between access to toilet, drinking water and
disposal of stool as independent variables comprising the
WASH index. Complementarity referred to the combined quality
of presence of the three major determinants. The presence of
best quality was given by 1 and absence of best quality by 0 for
each variable. Thus, a complementarity index, given by the
sum of the qualities of access to toilet, drinking water and disposal of stool can range between 0 and 3. It assumes the highest or best value 3, when all three variables, namely, access to
water, access to sanitation and hygiene practice (disposal of
childs stool) assume the best possible categories (that is, the
household had flush toilet, used piped or bottled water and
childrens stools were flushed down the toilet or buried). It
124
assumes intermediate values 1 or 2, when at least one of the

three variables is the best possible, but this co-occurs with another one of lower quality in the household. For instance, the
household may have access to pipe or bottled water, but it may
not have a toilet or the other way round. Finally, complementarity is the lowest or worst at 0, when none of the three variables is of the best possible quality.
Fourth, we identified the different modalities of the remaining control variables. The household asset portfolio was given
by the Household Wealth Index (1 = poor, 2 = middle class,
3 = wealthy). The wealth index was constructed from NFHS
household-level data, using principal components analysis
(PCA) of household ownership of several items. It is acknowledged that the social identity, location of household and level
of education of the adult members also influence household
behaviour. Thus, the religion of the household, either Hindu
or non-Hindu and place of residence of the household, either
rural or urban were noted. The educational level of the childs
mother was taken as the indicator of the knowledge base of
the household with respect to health, being either no education, or up to primary school or above primary school level.
Another household behaviour considered was nutrition practices. With respect to child nutrition, a continuous variable
indicating duration of breastfeeding among children below
five years was formulated.
Among the individual child level characteristics, vulnerability of a child to disease in developing countries is highly influenced by gender, whereby female children are given less
care than male ones. The childs birth order number is crucial too, as the mother becomes more tired and less capable of
childcare, while assuming household chores as the number of
the pre-existing children increase.
Taking HCf and HBf as the household characteristics and hygiene behaviour, respectively with respect to the focal WASH
variables; and HCc and HBc as the household characteristics and
hygiene behaviour, respectively with respect to the control variables, the complementarity index C is computed as in Table 1.
As can be noted, our coding for the complementarity index
takes into account both the quality and the complementary
presence of the WASH variables. Further, assuming that the
control variables, the focal variables and the complementary
Table 1: Focal and Control Variables Considered as Possible Determinants of
Child Diarrhoea Incidence
Household Characteristics
with Respect to Focal
Variables: HCf
Focal
Flush toilet (a1=1)
Variables Piped water or bottled
High Quality water (b1=1)
Focal
Pit latrine (a2=0)
Variables surface water or
Low Quality well water (b2=0)
Household characteristics
with respect to control
variables: HCc
Household wealth index
Control
Religion of Household
Variables
Place of Residence
Mothers Educational Level
Hygiene Behaviour
Complewith Respect to
mentarity
Focal Variables: HBf
Index: C
Disposing child stool
in toilet or burying
C= (a1 or a2) +
it (c1=1)
(b1 or b2) +
Throwing childs
(c1 or c2)
stool into garbage
with 0 c 3
or in open (c2=0)
Hygiene behaviour
Host
with respect to
characteristics:
control variables: HBc
HO
Duration of
Breastfeeding
Gender
Birth Order
Source: : Authors understanding.
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index occur independently of one another at the household

level within the region r, we estimated the following two models.
...(1)
p = fr (HCf , HCc , HBf , HBc , Ho)
p = fr (HCc , HBc , Ho, C)
...(2)
The first model examines the impact of all the drivers of
diarrhoea incidence individually without taking into account
complementarity. The second model focuses on the role of the
control variables and the complementary presence of the
WASH variables. Now, it could be argued that hygienic disposal
of stools is facilitated by presence of a toilet, and therefore, the
three variables need not be independent. But, this is not so, for
a childs stool can also be buried, and therefore, the absence of
a toilet does not necessarily force the household to adopt
unhygienic behaviour.
The indicator for regional socio-economic development, r,
was derived using cluster analysis. Since each of the households belongs to a particular state, in the first stage, a hierarchical cluster analysis with nearest neighbour method was
used to obtain a typology of Indian states according to their
level of development vis--vis the WASH variables. Then for
each cluster, logistic regression analysis was used to estimate
Equations (1) and (2) assuming that the explanatory variables
are independent. All the statistical analysis was done using the
statistical software SPSS 15 and Stata 12.
Results and Analysis
Results of Cluster Analysis: Let us refer to WASH as the joint

presence of water, sanitation and observance of hygiene behaviour and use this term to understand the nature of the four
groups identified by cluster analysis as given in Table 2.
Cluster 1 comprises the Indian states commonly acknowledged to be the most vulnerable and backward with respect
to general socio-economic development. Unsurprisingly, they
are the worst in terms of WASH infrastructure, having about
62% of households in the lowest complementary type with all
the three focal variables in their worst possible form. Cluster 2
consists of states with middle-level infrastructure, while Cluster 3 contains states with relatively better WASH infrastructure.
Table 2: Typology of Indian States according to the Quality and Complementary
Presence of Water and Sanitation Infrastructure and Hygiene Practice
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4
Chhattisgarh (1,592)
Odisha (1,781)
Rajasthan (2,023)
Uttarakhand (1228) Delhi (1,251)

Meghalaya (1,093)
Gujarat (1,571)
Mizoram (848) Nagaland (2,108)
Haryana (1,255)
Sikkim (653)
Arunachal Pradesh
(870)
Madhya Pradesh (3,016) Maharashtra (3,038) Kerala (1,017) Assam (1,532)
Uttar Pradesh (7,051) Himachal Pradesh
Tripura (639)
(995)
Bihar (2,320)
Jammu and Kashmir
Goa (988)
(1,225)
Jharkhand (1,658)
West Bengal (2,368)

Tamil Nadu (1,735)
Karnataka (2,189)
Punjab (1,307)
The total household sample size in each state is given within brackets.
Source: Analysis of NFHS-3 unit level data.
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may 28, 2016
Table 3: Presence of Different Categories of Quality of Complementarity

across Different Clusters
Households in Each Cluster (%)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Complementarity (best)
Complementarity (intermediate)
Complementarity (intermediate but with
good quality sanitation)
Complementarity (worst)
Prevalence of diarrhoea among children
under age five years
6.64
31.28
25.17
47.42
36.39
57.81
14.99
59.4
22.16 25.44
62.08 27.41
47.58
5.8
39.07
25.61
10.25
8.26
9.09
9.08
have low quality) drops. What is more interesting is that within the second intermediate category, as the level of WASH improves, the mix of good sanitation quality with either or both
bad quality of drinking water and hygiene practices, increases.
In Cluster 3, the supposedly best cluster in terms of WASH, the
share of households with good sanitation, but with bad quality
of other complementary variables constitutes more that 80%
of the intermediate category. It is also noteworthy that prevalence of diarrhoea has a clear association with WASH infrastructure at the macro level.
Turning now to the sample characteristics of households
within each of the four clusters as shown in Table 4 (p 126), we
gain more insight. If a household is in Clusters 1, 2 or 4, then it
is likely to practise open defecation, not have a toilet, drink
water from a well or pumped water, throw away childs stool
in an unhygienic manner and live in a rural area. Mothers are
likely to have less than primary education (that is, up to fifth
class) and breastfeed on average for only 10 days after birth as
they are forced to go to work. Households are more likely to be
Hindu than non-Hindu in any cluster. However, the ratio of the
Hindus is the highest in Cluster 1 and the lowest in Cluster 4. In
the latter, the share of Christians within the non-Hindu category dominates. Shares of households with poor wealth index
(calculated by the NFHS itself considering the asset positions of
the households) decrease across the Clusters 1 to 3. Average
birth order of the child surveyed is three in Cluster 1, while it is
two in Clusters 2 and 3. Since the NFHS registers the detailed
birth history of the children born within five years preceding
survey, the birth order of the child represents the fertility
behaviour of the mother. Thus children with higher orders are
supposed to lack proper childcare.
Manipur (1,912)
Andhra Pradesh (2,292)
Cluster 4 is made up of the small states and centrally managed

union territories.
Table 3 gives the details of the quality of the complementary
presence of WASH across clusters. As one moves up the ladder
from Cluster 1 to Cluster 3, the share of all the three good quality focal variables increases from 6.64% to 36.39%. Similarly,
the corresponding shares of intermediate categories increase
too, while that of worst category (where all focal variables
vol lI no 22
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis: In order to understand the effects of the different risk factors on childhood
diarrhoea, separate logistic regressions were estimated at
individual child level in each cluster, with household characteristics, hygiene behaviour and host characteristics in control
125
SPECIAL ARTICLE
(recall Equations 1 and 2). The probability of Chi square

statistics showed a good fit in all clusters except Cluster 4. Other
combinations also did not yield good results indicating that
Table 4: Features of Households in the Different Clusters
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Total sample size

15,728 16,658
Sanitation facilities
Flush, etc
29.18 50.84
Pit toilets
3.16
2.52
No toilet and open
67.66 46.64
Drinking water
Tap, bottle
19.74
59.99
Surface, well, etc
80.26 40.01
Child stool disposal
In toilet
15.9
33.88
Throwaway
84.1
66.12
Duration of breastfeeding
Average months
0.36
0.32
Place of residence
Rural
67.69 56.45
Urban
32.31 43.55
Mothers education level
Less than primary
71.74
53.15
Above primary
28.26 46.85
Household wealth index
Poor
53.08 28.18
Middle
16.41 18.86
Rich
30.51 52.96
Religion
Hindu
81.32 75.78
Non-Hindu
18.68 24.22
Average childbirth order of child surveyed
3
2
Sex of child
Male
51.96
53.15
Female
48.04 46.85
(% of Total)
Cluster 3 Cluster 4
3,138
6,439
84.03 54.23
7.78
23.33
8.19 22.44
58.89 41.68
41.11 58.32
65.30 34.32
34.7 65.68
1.68
0.89
43.05 63.18
56.95 36.82
33.01 46.23
66.99 53.77
Table 5: Odd Ratios of the Different Determinants of Diarrhoea Incidence

Variables
7.65 30.61
18.04 25.35
74.31 44.04
52.42
47.58
2
40.47
59.53
3
51.63
48.37
50.32
49.68
the drivers of diarrhoeal disease are likely to be much more

context-specific in each state in Cluster 4, thereby meriting a
separate study in itself. Hence, in what follows results on Cluster 4 are not discussed.
Table 5 contains the first regression results for each cluster
and the full dataset (that is, the estimation of Equation 1). It
shows whether the likelihood of child diarrhoea increases or
decreases when the variable in question changes. The table reports the odd ratios and standard errors are clustered around
states. The relatively low pseudo R2 for regression results leads
us to consider these as associative relationships, making room
for many unobserved variables for causal analysis.
Some expected results are confirmed by Table 5. For instance, duration of breastfeeding has a highly negative and
significant coefficient in all clusters, showing that the likelihood of diarrhoea decreases as the duration of breastfeeding
increases. Religion of households is statistically significant in
Cluster 1, implying that in the most backward states, the
non-Hindus are more likely to get diarrhoea as compared to
the Hindus.
Other results call for more reflections as counter-intuitive
findings are revealed on the impact of the WASH and non-WASH
variables. For instance, the use of pit toilet and open defecation (relative to flush toilet) is significantly associated with
126
child diarrhoea only in Cluster 1, whereas in the other three

clusters as well as in the pooled data with all states, they are
insignificant. Drinking water and hygiene behaviour of the
households are both insignificant predictors of child diarrhoea
in all clusters, thus, indicating a poor association with diarrhoea behaviour.
With respect to the impact of the other control variables,
children of urban residents are more likely (coefficient is positively significant) to have diarrhoea in Cluster 1 as compared
to rural ones. Furthermore, children of the rich households
have significantly lower chances of getting diarrhoea only in
Cluster 3, the region with the maximum urban population.
Contradicting popular beliefs, mothers education does not
have any significant impact in any cluster, a female child is not
more likely to suffer from diarrhoea episodes as compared to a
male and birth order of child does not matter.
Next, we turn to the impact of complementarity of WASH
variables (that is, the estimation of Equation 2). Instead of considering WASH components separately, we examine the impact
of their complementary presence and our results are shown in
Cluster 1
Odd Ratios
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4
Total
Sanitation (improved toilet in

reference)
0.237
0.043
0.057
0.137 0.138
Pit toilet and open
(0.000)*** (0.698)
(0.774) (0.586) (0.120)
(unimproved or no sanitation)
Drinking water
(improved reference)
-0.151
-0.077
0.353
0.075 0.046
surface drinking water and well (0.202)
(0.602)
(0.198) (0.715) (0.612)
Disposal of childs stool
(Hygienic reference)
0.108
0.152
0.174
0.083 0.096
non-hygienic
(0.34)
(0.263)
(0.274) (0.607) (0.197)
-0.021
-0.022
-0.013 -0.002 -0.017
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.613) (0.000)***
Place of residence:
0.173
-0.141
0.076
0.258 0.053
(rural reference) urban
(0.024)** (0.454)
(0.737) (0.016)** (0.497)
Mothers education: (below
0.107
0.139
0.111
0.037 0.097
primary reference) above primary (0.150)
(0.184)
(0.575) (0.794) (0.066)*
Wealth index
0.135
0.017
-0.316 0.005 0.061
(low reference) medium
(0.060)*
(0.846) (0.319) (0.979) (0.375)
Wealth index: rich
0.014
-0.037
-0.455 0.020 0.008
(0.896)
(0.777) (0.003)*** (0.944) (0.927)
Religion of household: (Hindu 0.321
-0.056
0.115 -0.068 0.064
Reference) Muslim and others (0.000)*** (0.557) (0.497) (0.704) (0.437)
Birth order no
0.007
0.004
0.065 0.016 0.020
(0.456)
(0.828) (0.175) (0.706) (0.071*)
Childs sex: (male reference)
-0.128
-0.184
-0.204 -0.046 -0.145
female
(0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.038)** (0.689) (0.000)***
Pseudo R2
0.13
0.10
0.15
0.024 0.064
F statistics
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.639 0.000***
Diarrhoea=1 if child had diarrhoea in last two weeks and 0 otherwise. P-values of Z-Statistic
are in parenthesis. *** denotes significance at 99% confidence level, **at 95% level, and *
at 90% level. Standard errors are clustered around states.
Table 6 (p 127). According to this, complementarity matters in

containing diarrhoeal diseases in Cluster 3 but not in Clusters 1
or 2. It is interesting to find that when clubbed together, the
pooled data reveals a strong association of complementarity
variables with incidence of child diarrhoea, with both the two
categories (complementarities 2 and 3 vis--vis 1) emerging
significant in regression. All control variables have the same
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
SPECIAL ARTICLE
kind of impact on diarrhoea incidence as before in the four

clusters. Though drinking water and hygiene behaviour is not
separately associated with diarrhoea in any of the clusters (as
shown in Table 5), their joint presence in WASH variable becomes significant in Cluster 3.
Figure 2: Evolution of Complementarity between WASH Components

as a Function of the State of the Regional WASH Infrastructure
H or
observance
of hygiene
behaviour
High WASH
infrastructure
coverage
Discussion of Results
Our central proposition that complementarity of WASH at both

the household and regional level matters for diarrhoea incidence is partially confirmed. Indeed, it is this partial validation that signals the alarm that the one size fits all approach
will lead to sub-optimal resource allocation and impact. Our
empirical analysis suggests that wherever WASH infrastructure
is minimal, the three main determinants of diarrhoeal diseases
are strategic substitutes. It is striking that in Cluster 1, while
access to improved toilet is strongly associated with less diarrhoea containment significantly, complementarities do not
matter (Tables 5 and 6). One explanation for why the sanitation variable is significant separately only in Cluster 1 may be
because in backward states the percentage of those having
better quality sanitation facilities is the least (29%). Thus,
Intermediate
WASH
infrastructure
Minimal WASH
infrastructure
WASH or water and

sanitation infrastructure
Source: Authors understanding.
diarrhoea. In Cluster 3, according to Tables 5 and 6the WASH

variables have a greater joint impact than as individual determinants. Both quality of drinking water
Table 6: Relative Importance of the Different Determinants of Diarrhoea Incidence Given Joint
Presence of Public Health Infrastructure and Hygiene Behaviour (Logistic regressions results)
and hygiene behaviour, which individualVariables
Odd Ratios
ly were insignificant, create an externaliCluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4
Total
ty in the complementarity variable, which
Complementarity 2 (complementary 3 ref)
0.015
0.177
0.178
0.345
0.193
(0.930)
(0.296)
(0.127) (0.000)*** (0.026)**
in turn, creates a higher marginal impact
Complementarity 1 (complementary 3 ref)
0.119
0.178
0.655
0.356
0.284
in decreasing child diarrhoea (0.056),
(0.513)
(0.518) (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.037)**
compared to 0.023 for sanitation in Cluster
-0.021
-0.022
-0.013
-0.002
-0.017
1. Essentially, this means that in Cluster 3,
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.008)***
(0.628) (0.000)***
if there is investment in both components
Place of residence: urban ref: rural
0.18
-0.118
-0.021
0.246
0.044
(0.007)**
(0.511)
(0.922) (0.035)**
(0.563)
of public health infrastructure and awareMother's education:above primary reference
0.086
0.138
0.139
0.038
0.092
ness on hygiene behaviour, then there
above primary
(0.216)
(0.206)
(0.439)
(0.769)
(0.094)
will be around 56 less cases of diarrhoea
Wealth index: medium (low reference)
0.135
0.023
-0.277
-0.032
0.05
per 1,000 children. The insignificant as(0.052)**
(0.799)
(0.395)
(0.874)
(0.449)
sociation of either of the WASH variables
Wealth index: rich (low reference)
-0.057
-0.044
-0.421
-0.021
-0.027
(0.534)
(0.701) (0.000)***
(0.938)
(0.714)
separately, or jointly in Cluster 2, identiReligion of household: Muslim and others
0.295
-0.065
0.127
-0.071
0.055
fies a difficult zone of intervention when a
(0.000)***
(0.481)
(0.445)
(0.497)
(0.505)
region is at a middle rung of the WASH
Birth order no
0.007
0.004
0.059
0.016
0.019
development ladder.
(0.511)
(0.816)
(0.243)
(0.709) (0.080)*
The above arguments are summarised
Child's sex: female
-0.126
-0.184
-0.203
-0.050
-0.145
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
(0.127)
(0.665) (0.000)***
in Figure 2. Our results suggest that mothPseudo R2
0.12
0.1
0.14
0.03
0.065
ers education need not be a significant
F statistics
0.000*** 0.000***
0.000***
0.315 0.000***
determinant of child diarrhoeal incidencDiarrhoea=1 if child had diarrhoea in past 14 days and 0 otherwise. P-values of Z-Statistic are in parenthesis. *** denotes
es, contradicting our general belief that
significance at 99% confidence level, **at 95% level, and * at 90% level. Standard errors are clustered around states.
improvement in mothers education crewithin Cluster 1, even if there is investment only in improving ates better awareness about childcare practices, which transaccess to flush toilets, it will have a significant impact on diar- lates itself into reduced morbidity among children. However,
rhoeal morbidity unlike in other clusters. Any infrastructural this could be because the quality of mothers education also
improvement will also promote inclusive development as find- matters, and thus, this result seriously questions the quality of
ings reveal that the non-Hindus will be particularly benefited education received across the clusters, an issue which has
been succinctly represented by the Annual Status of Education
also in this cluster.
However, as WASH infrastructure improves and reaches a Report (2014). Indeed, the studies which found mothers
minimum threshold level in each of the three factors, the education level to be a good determinant of child diarrhoea
WASH variables become strategic complements such that the like Khanna (2008) have considered awareness of the mothers
joint presence of sanitation infrastructure, drinking water about healthcare practices, rather than just the formal
availability and hygiene behaviour is required to contain education level.
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
127
SPECIAL ARTICLE
The higher incidence of child diarrhoea in urban areas in

Cluster 1 too calls for some discussions. Though WHO/UNICEF,
2014 report posits far higher levels of improved sanitation in
urban areas (80% globally in 2012) than in rural areas (47%),
the hazards and squalor associated with unimproved sanitation are particularly acute in urban areas, where residential
densities are high (Mcgranahan 2015). Cluster 1, a typically
more rural and backward region of the country, has fewer, but
more densely populated towns and cities, lacking proper sanitation and drinking water facilities. The urban population in
this region is hence exposed to serious complementary risks of
suffering from diarrhoea, primarily due to the high population
density and insufficient WASH coverage.
Our results are important in the Indian context, because access
to sanitation, water and hygiene behaviour do not have a homogeneous complementary presence in all Indian states. Indeed,
it is the reverse. States like Mizoram and Kerala (in Cluster 3)
which occupied first and second positions in terms of access to
sanitation among 25 states in 2011 are 18th and 25th, respectively
in terms of access to improved drinking water. Uttar Pradesh (in
Cluster 2), which enjoys third position in terms of access to drinking water, ranks 19th vis--vis access to sanitation.1 Our results
point out that one magic bullet of policy intervention in improving access to sanitation will not give homogeneous results
across the regions, and diversity in policy dynamics is crucial.
In terms of policy recommendations, our results suggest
that in Cluster 1, that is, in states having poor health context,
any individual investment in sanitation, availability of water,
quality of water or hygiene education will reduce diarrhoea
incidence and improve health status. In Clusters 2 and 3, there
must be an investment in improving hygiene behaviour, but
while ensuring that the complementary presence of access to
sanitation, water quantity and water quality are not lowered.
Raising the general awareness level of the masses should be
targeted through adult education. Indeed, best returns to public investment will be generated only through a joint focus on
access to sanitation, water availability, water quality and
hygiene behaviour. Investment on one without the other will
not reduce diarrhoea incidence as much. As discussed earlier,
Table 3 points out that 83.97% of households in Cluster 3 have
improved sanitation facilities, but out of them, more than half of
the households actually lose the advantage due to coexisting
bad quality of drinking water and/or bad hygiene behaviour.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to explore why the incidence of

diarrhoea among young children below five years has not been
lowered in India, despite the substantial investments of the
Indian government and international agencies in improving
sanitation coverage. In particular, it examines the impact of
the complementary presence or absence of WASH, that is, water,
access to sanitation and hygiene behaviour on the health outcome of a region in terms of child diarrhoea. A conceptual
framework was formulated and tested with household level
and state level data for this purpose. Its findings serve to explain
the variations in the results noted in the literature and suggest
128
some noteworthy points for policy design for developing countries at large.
It seems worthwhile to view public health as the output of a
production function into which many inputs enter. The role of
complementarity among inputs in a production function at the
firm, sectoral and national level has been explored very well in
economics in the context of agriculture, manufacturing and services, but less so in public health outcomes. If we consider public
health similarly, planners will need to identify which inputs are
substitutable for one another and which are complementary.
Identification of focal variables whose complementarity matters
significantly for the problem concerned is crucial. For instance, our
analysis suggests that in the case of diarrhoea, the crucial variables
are the quality and quantity of WASH and its general recommendations for policy design can now be summarised as follows.
First, when WASH infrastructure is least developed, each
WASH component can be treated as a substitute of the other. In
this case, investment in any of the focal variables will improve
health status. However, as WASH infrastructure improves in
coverage and quality, the WASH components become strategic
complements, and thereafter, uncoordinated or uni-focused
programmes will not have much impact. Only a three-pronged
strategy targeting all focal variables will maximise returns.
Second, in every WASH variable, it is not only the quantity
that matters, but also the quality. This means that technology
design of toilets and their fit to environment, quality of water
and quality of education that drives hygiene behaviour matter
as much or more than simply installing toilets, providing water
and running schools.
Third, national and international sanitation drives are unlikely to be effective unless they break the Gordian knot of
WASH complementarities holding up the burden of childhood
diarrhoea. While any public health programme aiming at increasing just toilet facilities or piped water or hygiene would
be easier to implement, it may not achieve the desired results
due to their complementary role in diarrhoea incidence. Sanitation drives have to be holistic and promote access to water
and hygiene behaviour as well, because disparities at the
household level can lower health gains. A household can have
improved sanitation, but unimproved drinking water. Gain in
one infrastructure may be lost or offset by the lack of another.
Besides, not just the water and sanitation infrastructure, but
the household-based hygiene behaviour also plays a big role in
diarrhoea. Even if a household has an improved toilet within
its premises, if its knowledge base is poor, its members may
not use water and soap to clean their hands after defecation or
they may throw a childs stool anywhere. This way, the gain of
improved sanitation is again lost.
This leads us to conclude that a magic bullet for diarrhoea
reduction, if indeed, it can be created, has to be necessarily
multidimensional, taking into account the quality and synergetic effects of its main drivers. Therefore, the Swachh Bharat
Abhiyan, targeting universal sanitation coverage is unlikely to
be effective, unless it breaks the Gordian knot of WASH complementarities and WASH quality holding up the burden of
childhood diarrhoea.
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Note
1 Census of India (2011), Ministry of Home Aff
airs, Government of India, available at: http://
www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-common/cen
sus_2011.html.
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129
CURRENT STATISTICS
Wholesale Price Index
Foreign TradeMerchandise
The year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation rate based on WPI turned positive to 0.3%
(after 17 months) in April 2016 against -2.4% in April 2015. The index for primary
articles rose by 2.3% in April 2016 compared to 0.5% a year ago, while the rise in
the index for food articles slowed down to 4.2% compared to 5.9% in April 2015.
The index for fuel and power continued to decline for the 18th month in a row,
however, at a decelerated rate of -4.8% in April 2016 compared to -13%, a year
ago. The index for manufactured products increased by 0.7% in April 2016
against -0.5% in April 2015.
The merchandise trade deficit narrowed to a five-year low to $4.8 billion in

April 2016 from $11 billion, a year ago. Exports contracted for the 17th month
in a row by (-)6.7% billion to $20.6 billion in April 2016 from 22.1 billion in
April 2015. Imports fell sharply by (-)23.1% billion to $25.4 billion in April 2016
from 33.0 billion, in the same month last year. Oil imports declined by (-)24%
billion to $5.7 billion and the non-oil imports by (-)23% billion to 19.8 billion
in April 2016, compared to $7.4 billion and $25.6 billion, respectively, a
year ago.
Consumer Price Index
Index of Industrial Production
The CPI inflation rate rose to 5.4% in April 2016 compared to 4.9%, a year ago,
as the food price index increased by 6.3% compared to 5.1% in April 2015. The
CPI-rural and CPI-urban inflation rate increased to 6.1% and 4.7%, respectively,
in April 2016 from 5.3% and 4.4%, respectively, in the corresponding month
last year. As per Labour Bureau data, the CPI inflation rate for agricultural
labourers increased to 5.3% in April 2016 from 4.4%, a year ago, while inflation
for industrial workers decreased to 5.5% in March 2016 compared to 6.3% in
March 2015.
The y-o-y growth rate of IIP slowed down to 0.1% in March 2016 from 2.5%, a year ago,
with growth in manufacturing segment declining to -1.2% from 2.7%. Growth rate
of the mining segment was -0.1% in March 2016 compared to 1.2% in March 2015,
and electricity generation at 11.3% against 2.2%. As per use-based classification,
the capital goods segment declined substantially by (-)15.4% in March 2016
compared to the growth of 9.1% registered in March 2015. The growth rate of
consumer durable goods was 8.7% in March 2016 compared to -4.6% in March
2015, while that of consumer non-durables fell to -4.4% from 1.9%, a year ago.
Movement of WPI Inflation JanuaryApril
Merchandise Trade April 2016
Year-on-Year in %
0.500
0.3%
-0.375
2016
Exports
Imports
Trade Deficit
April 2016
($ bn)
Over Month
(%)
20.6
25.4
4.8
-9.5
-8.5
-4.5
Over Year
(%)
(AprilMarch)
(201516 over 201415) (%)
-6.7
-23.1
-55.9
-15.9
-15.3
-14.0
Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
-1.250
Components of Trade April 2015 and April 2016

2015
-2.125
-3.000
-2.4%
January
February
March*
$26 billion
Non-oil Imports
$22 billion
Exports
28
$21 billion $20 billion
April*
$7 billion
Oil Imports
$6 billion
* Data (2016) is provisional.
Trends in WPI and Its Components April 2016* (%)

Weights
Over Month
Over Year
100
20.1
14.3
14.9
65.0
1.4
2.1
2.0
1.7
0.8
0.3
2.3
4.2
-4.8
0.7
All commodities
Primary articles
Food articles
Fuel and power
Manufactured products
Financial Year (Averages)

201314 201415 201516
6.0
9.9
12.9
10.3
3.0
2.0
3.0
6.1
-0.9
2.4
-2.5
0.2
3.4
-11.7
-1.1
$5 billion
-12
$11 billion
Trade Deficit
2015
2016
APRIL
APRIL
Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.
Movement of IIP Growth AprilMarch
* Data is provisional; Base: 200405=100; Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Year-on-Year in %
Movement of CPI Inflation January 2015April 2016
12
Year-on-Year in %
8
Consumer Food
5
CPI
6.3%
5.4%
4.3%
2.5%
0.1%
201415
-4
201516
April
September
March*
* March 2016 are quick estimates; Base: 200405=100.
Miscellaneous
Industrial Growth: Sector-wise March 2016* (%)

0
Jan
2015
Jan
2016
Over
Month
100
14.2
75.5
10.3
7.4
9.3
7.0
7.9
0.1
-0.1
-1.2
11.3
2.8
1.5
2.3
8.4
2.4
2.2
2.0
5.6
45.7
8.8
15.7
29.8
8.5
21.3
8.4
21.6
7.1
1.2
3.4
-0.2
4.0
-15.4
3.7
0.4
8.7
-4.4
7.0
6.4
1.7
-3.4
-12.6
2.8
3.6
-2.9
2.4
3.0
11.1
-1.7
General index
Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity
* Data is provisional.
Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Base: 2012=100.
CPI: Rural and Urban April 2016* (%)

Latest
Month Index
Over
Month
Over
Year
Rural (2012=100)
128.9
0.7
6.1
6.2
5.6
Urban (2012=100)
125.3
1.2
4.7
5.7
4.1
Financial Year (Avgs)

201415 201516
CPI: Occupation-wise
Industrial workers (2001=100) #
268
0.4
5.5
6.3
5.6
Agricultural labourers (198687=100)
848
0.6
5.3
6.6
4.4
* Provisional. # March 2016. Source: CSO (rural and urban), Labour Bureau (IW and AL).
Weights
A*
Over Year
Financial Year (Avgs)

201415
201516
Industrial Growth: Use-based

Basic goods
Capital goods
Intermediate goods
Consumer goods
Consumer durables
Consumer non-durables
* March 2016 are quick estimates; Base: 200405=100; Source: Central Statistics Office.
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.
EPW
MAY 28, 2016
vol LI no 22
131
CURRENT STATISTICS
Indias Quarterly Estimates of Final Expenditures on GDP

201415
` crore | at 201112 Prices
Private final consumption expenditure

Government final consumption expenditure
Gross fixed capital formation
Change in stocks
Valuables
Net trade (Exportimport)
Exports
Less imports
Discrepancies
Gross domestic product (GDP)
Q1
Q2
1406817
294338
832420
48976
42871
-40831
620869
661700
-49687
2534903
(8.2)
(9.0)
(8.3)
(23.0)
(16.3)
1422029
322557
828754
48434
38194
-55355
625875
681230
-36835
2567778
(11.6)
(-0.6)
(7.5)
Q3
(9.2)
(15.4)
(2.2)
(20.6)
(0.3)
(1.1)
(4.6)
(8.3)
1495823
261886
843733
45077
37174
-45813
636468
682281
21305
2659185
Q4
(1.5)
(33.2)
(3.7)
(16.0)
(10.8)
1539614
223826
903344
52520
55036
-13989
625190
639179
29933
2790285
(2.0)
(5.7)
(6.6)
201516
Q2
Q1
(6.6)
(-3.3)
(5.4)
(21.6)
(32.2)
1496865
297285
875840
50641
47906
-43945
584770
628715
1870
2726461
(-6.3)
(-6.1)
(6.7)
(6.4)
(1.0)
(13.8)
(20.7)
(15.4)
1501895
336578
891606
50894
47703
-58970
598797
657767
-3536
2766170
(-2.0)
(-0.4)
(7.6)
Q3
(5.6)
(4.3)
(14.7)
(26.4)
(28.9)
1591508
274071
867229
48907
47749
-31889
576676
608565
54763
2852339
(-4.7)
(-4.8)
(7.8)
(6.4)
(4.7)
(9.8)
(30.5)
(32.6)
(-5.1)
(-6.1)
(6.9)
Indias Overall Balance of Payments (Net): Quarterly

201415 ($ mn)
Q4
Q3
Current account
Merchandise
Invisibles
Services
of which: Software services
Transfers
of which: Private
Income
Capital account
of which: Foreign investment
Overall balance
-7721
-38635
30913
19982
17844
16428
16521
-5497
22864
13194
13182
Q1
-645
-31560
30916
20116
18625
16425
16600
-5625
30023
22993
30149
201516 ($ mn)
Q2
-6147
-34181
28035
17750
17556
16153
16267
-5868
18595
10308
11430
-8748
-37425
28677
17897
18029
16263
16421
-5483
8576
3198
-856
201415 (` bn)
Q3
Q3
Q4
-7081
-34004
26923
18083
18418
15250
15305
-6409
10536
10576
4056
-478 [-1.5]
-2393
1915
1238
1105
1017
1023
-340
1416 [4.5]
817
816 [2.6]
201516 (` bn)
Q2
Q1
-40 [-0.1]
-1964
1924
1252
1159
1022
1033
-350
1869 [5.6]
1431
1876 [5.7]
-390 [-1.2]
-2,170
1,779
1,127
1,114
1,025
1,033
-372
1,180 [3.7]
640
725 [2.3]
Q3
-568 [-1.7]
-2432
1863
1163
1171
1057
1067
-356
557 [1.7]
427
-56 [-0.2]
-467 [-1.3]
-2242
1775
1192
1214
1005
1009
-423
695 [2.0]
711
267 [0.8]
Figures in square brackets are percentage to GDP.
Foreign Exchange Reserves

Excluding gold but including revaluation effects
` crore
$ mn
Variation
13 May
2016
2248660
338550
15 May
2015
31 Mar
2016
2115280
333215
2229020
337605
Over
Month
Financial Year So Far

201516
201617
Over
Year
16100
864
161980
7858
104880
11906
Monetary Aggregates
` crore
Money supply (M3) as on 29 April

Components
Currency with public
Demand deposits
Time deposits
Other deposits with RBI
Sources
Net bank credit to government
Bank credit to commercial sector
Net foreign exchange assets
Banking sectors net non-monetary liabilities
Reserve money as on 13 May 2016
Components
Currency in circulation
Bankers deposits with RBI
Other deposits with RBI
Sources
Net RBI credit to government
of which: Centre
RBI credit to banks & commercial sector
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI
Govts currency liabilities to the public
Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI
Outstanding
2016
Over Month
Over Year
11907190
-92580 (-0.8)
1650040
1012300
9231530
13310
53930
-170730
25980
-1770
(3.4)
(-14.4)
(0.3)
(-11.7)
219150
86280
775120
1280
3497530
7794710
2516010
1922960
2181260
301200
-283800
28070
138050
33770
(9.4)
(-3.5)
(1.1)
(7.7)
(1.6)
341690
647400
167240
76850
262970
201516
1081840 (10.0)
Aggregate deposits
Demand
Time
Cash in hand
Balance with RBI
Investments
of which: Government securities
Bank credit
of which: Non-food credit
Capital Markets
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 197879=100)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 198384=100)
S&P BSE-200 (198990=100)
CNX Nifty (Base: 3 Nov 1995=1000)
Net FII Investment in equities ($ Million)*
Financial Year
201415
201314
(3.3)
(1.5)
(2.1)
(-13.9)
104760
58760
965330
-1270
(9.2)
(7.8)
(14.9)
(-39.2)
140360
79650
800140
12620
(11.3)
(9.8)
(10.7)
(640.6)
211910
105390
786010
860
(15.3)
(11.8)
(9.5)
(5.9)
(10.8)
(9.1)
(7.1)
(4.2)
(13.7)
148440
104670
98120
76170
-10160
(4.9)
(1.5)
(4.4)
(4.3)
(-0.5)
256500
-27210
25300
1750
520
(7.9)
(-0.3)
(1.0)
(0.1)
(0.0)
335850
777430
287280
275010
217860
(12.4)
(13.7)
(17.6)
(16.8)
(14.4)
-37470
597350
326710
-144130
195700
(-1.2)
(9.3)
(17.0)
(-7.5)
(11.3)
233630
779280
240060
151270
252290
(7.8)
(11.1)
(10.7)
(8.5)
(13.1)
195570
194280
-12770
165120
2360
87310
55130
57290
-82110
110740
120
94050
(46.6)
(46.4)
(-10.6)
(7.4)
(12.1)
(9.9)
(15.1)
(15.9)
(-40.5)
(5.2)
(0.6)
(12.0)
1127560 (13.4)
86050 (5.2)
-83270 (-16.6)
-2250 (-14.6)
190230
188050
-196920
19670
0
12460
1032790 (10.9)
201516
51950
15280
187760
-2140
-12120
-12190
42210
16100
0
12420
110090 (9.2)
109020 (34.0)
-1280 (-39.5)
(44.8)
(44.3)
(-64.7)
(0.8)
(0.0)
(1.3)
108120
107150
14070
244460
2000
150810
147240 (11.3)
35860 (8.3)
12640 (644.9)
(18.3)
(18.1)
(32.4)
(15.7)
(13.0)
(21.8)
-334180
-336600
145020
324760
2090
-58050
(-47.8)
(-48.2)
(0.0)
(18.0)
(12.1)
(-6.9)
1104170 (10.5)
215150 (14.9)
36260 (7.8)
850 (5.8)
60470
63520
102040
256190
2480
168900
(16.6)
(17.6)
(0.0)
(12.0)
(12.8)
(21.5)
Variation
Over Month

201617
Over Year
201516
(-9.1)
(-8.0)
(-6.9)
(-8.0)
(-0.8)
201516
218620
16297
(3.2)
(3.9)
(2.4)
(-17.5)
615220
612620
107620
2403140
21910
966630
20 May
2016
201415
322660
40486
44710
34390
198650
-2560
76520 (5.3)
-81880 (-17.6)
-4810 (-32.9)
25302
7870
3283
7750
167643
251570
16769
(15.3)
(9.3)
(9.2)
(10.6)
224680 (14.7)
34870 (9.1)
3410 (34.8)
9577250
913120
8664140
62300
398270
2705350
2703870
7260620
7156550
82800
-485
252850 (2.2)
32100 (1.9)
2360 (0.6)
-690 (-5.0)
Outstanding
2016
108086
-14361
Financial Year
201314
275180 (2.6)
Scheduled Commercial Banks Indicators ( ` crore)

(As on 29 April 2016)
201213
Variation
201617
1749510
418550
13200
(-1.9)
(-2.0)
(64.5)
(0.7)
(0.0)
(1.3)
19640
779
201112
-143570
-170120
26550
2470
-76340
110020
109980
-269370
-272240
(-1.5)
(-15.7)
(0.3)
(4.1)
(-16.1)
(4.2)
(4.2)
(-3.6)
(-3.7)
Month
Ago
25844
8026
3347
7915
166981
816690
87130
729550
7620
-390
131630
132010
609480
609500
(9.3)
(10.5)
(9.2)
(13.9)
(-0.1)
(5.1)
(5.1)
(9.2)
(9.3)
Year
Ago
27837
8554
3526
8423
169058
(14.2)
(15.9)
(19.4)
(15.8)
(9.9)
227280
31950
195330
1330
25580
81900
82110
114710
105050
(2.7)
(4.0)
(2.5)
(2.5)
(6.9)
(3.3)
(3.3)
(1.8)
(1.6)
198600
14680
183920
4420
10830
65460
65470
-17040
-15850
(2.1)
(1.6)
(2.2)
(7.6)
(2.8)
(2.5)
(2.5)
(-0.2)
(-0.2)

Trough
Peak
201516
Trough
Peak
24674
7656
3193
7546
-
22952
7051
2938
6971
-
26064
8100
3371
7980
-
Financial Year
201415
201314
955110
51620
903480
5380
34080
206720
207540
733640
731610
(14.1)
(7.8)
(14.8)
(13.3)
(12.1)
(10.3)
(10.4)
(13.9)
(14.2)
827720
80120
747620
7480
56740
279000
278560
542330
546350
End of Financial Year

201415
201314
29044
8980
3691
8834
-
22386
6707
2681
6704
149745
(10.7)
(11.2)
(10.7)
(16.3)
(17.9)
(12.6)
(12.6)
(9.0)
(9.3)
(18.8)
(18.1)
(17.2)
(18.0)
(9.9)
27957
8607
3538
8491
168116
(24.9)
(28.3)
(31.9)
(26.7)
(12.3)
201516
845370
104400
740960
4530
14360
148070
148650
741230
730400
(9.9)
(13.1)
(9.6)
(8.5)
(3.8)
(5.9)
(6.0)
(11.3)
(11.3)
201516
25342
7835
3259
7738
166107
(-9.4)
(-9.0)
(-7.9)
(-8.9)
(-1.2)
* = Cumulative total since November 1992 until period end | Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year | (-) = not relevant | - = not available | NS = new series | PE = provisional estimates
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.
132
MAY 28, 2016
vol LI no 22
EPW
POSTSCRIPT
SOCIETY
Feminist by Choice?
As examples from the entertainment industry show, the post-feminist woman who claims to be guided by
the freedom to choose is under the illusion of free will.
Carol DSouza
hile interviewing Sunny Leone, a Bollywood actor

great applause and congratulatory posts on social media,
known for her role in adult films, Bhupendra
with many commentators defending her right to choose to
Chaubey, the host of The Hot Seat, an interviewlook any way she wantsgirl power all the way. Never mind
based show on the CNN-IBN television channel, asked questhat the choices of these women in the entertainment industions alrightbut he asked all the wrong questions. It was
try align perfectly with the existing order.
tough to miss the outrage Chaubeys interview of 15 January
As Rosalind Gill, a scholar, says in her 2008 paper
generated on social media outlets. Leone was on the show to
Postfeminist Media Culture: Elements of Sensibility, what this
promote her upcoming film, Mastizaade, an adult comedy,
post-feminism or choice feminism refuses to acknowledge
which was released at the end of January.
is that choices are not made in a political or social vacuum.
The freedom in the freedom to choose is an engineered
Chaubey seemed so obsessed with Leones past of being an
illusion kept in place by the dominant forces of society in the
adult film star that he never mentioned her upcoming filmthe
interest of sustaining the existing power structure. Also
main reason for her being on the showuntil quarter of the way
notable, as Gill points out, is the similarity between the postinto the interview. Once the footage of the interview was out,
feminist woman and the neo-liberal consumer look. That is,
netizens rallied on Leones side, damning Chaubey not only
the post-feminist woman who says, Never mind society
for his bad manners of tastelessly hounding a guest but for the
which expects me to wear high heels and be dejudgmental and misogynist nature of his questions.
The freedom
void of body hair...I want to wear high heels and
But what if Chaubey had asked different quesin the freedom
be devoid of body hair, because thats what I
tions? Suppose he had asked Leone what she
to choose is an
thinks of the porn industry and its reduction of
engineered illusion want. She is the self-same neo-liberal consumer
on whose faithful buying behaviour the entire
women to the sum of certain body parts and
kept in place by
fashion and cosmetic industries are hinged upon.
activities? What if he had asked her opinion of
the dominant
Is it a coincidence that the patriarchal and
Bollywoods obsession with objectifying exhibitioforces of society
capitalist interests are so much in sync with the
nism? And, finally, what if he had asked the actor
in the interest of
choices of most women, especially in the enterhow comfortable she is being a contributing factor
sustaining the
tainment industry?
toor at least a willing participant inthese
existing power
True, there is a danger in being blindly ideopractices? It would be a safe bet to say there would
structure
logical. After all, we have to live and function in a
have been an outrage as similar and as widesociety amidst various personal and familial pressures that
spread as the initial one.
are as varied and real as the individuals themselves. Having
It has become politically incorrect to ask difficult questions,
said this, normalising and legitimising every choice a woman
especially to women, about their choices. Today, more or less
makes and glorifying it in the name of her freedom to choose
all the choices women make are portrayed as feminist or
robs us of an opportunity to critically think through, politicise
liberating by the sheer virtue of being made by women.
and try to bring about a less agenda-driven society. The illuLinda Hirshman, a lawyer and scholar, in her essay titled
sion of free will is the cornerstone of hegemony. The status
Homeward Bound in The American Prospect (2005), introquo can only be changed by acknowledging this stark fact.
duced the term choice feminism to describe this
phenomenon. She wrote: A woman could work, stay home,
Carol DSouza (dsouzacarol93@gmail.com), who is based in Bengaluru, Karnataka, is a
have 10 children or one, marry or stay single. It all counted as
Content Analyst at Ugam, a managed analytics firm.
feminist as long as she chose it.
In the same vein, women in the entertainment industry
choose to flaunt their bodies because it is what they
want; they choose to look a certain way because it is their
available at
wish. Consider two other Bollwood stars. Kareena Kapoor
Delhi Magazine Distributors Pvt Ltd
Khan, when asked about her penchant for doing item songs
110, Bangla Sahib Marg
in movies, said, I enjoy doing item songs. I think they are
New Delhi 110 001
about looking and feeling great, being in great shape.
Ph: 41561062/63
Parineeti Chopra unveiled her toned physique recently to
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
133
POSTSCRIPT
FILMS
A Summer with Leela
Though armed with a powerful thread of a story and

an able line of actors, the director fails to delivernot
because dark, shoved-under-the-carpet realities are discussed but because the film fails to touch a chord with
Though it lacks conviction or a reasonable
the viewer.
raison dtre and disappoints overall, the recent
Leela can be read in many ways. A feminist could feel anger
Malayalam film, Leela, may well have been saved
at the most submissive and silent portrayal of the victim, who
by sustaining the appetite for the new.
happens to be the main female character, Leela, or at the way
the sex workers are dealt with by the protagonist, who himself
P S Nirmala
is an impotent man with bizarre sexual fantasies. Yet, as
t is refreshing to see that Malayalam cinema has started
grandmothers would remind us, there can be no question
exploring untrodden paths, posing uncomfortable quesabout the importance of the story. What matters, though, is
tions though providing no answers, and plucking out
how the story is delivered. Ranjith has tried some old tricks
of his, in this film tootalking statues and flying angels
unusual characters and happenings from the mundane.
giving advice or witnessing situations. The effect may be
Long gone are the days when abject poverty, unemployment
surreal, but the end result is tepid.
of the youth, and crimesboth harmful and harmless
A fatalist can read the film as the karmaphala
caught the fancy of the average Malayalam
A film is essentially
(fate
or destiny resulting from ones previous acfilm-maker. There is a definite turn in the path,
the reinvention
tions)
of the girl who is raped by her father, and
very sharp, even for films that hit the box office
of any story and
later
gets
killed under the feet of a tusker. But
only with the benevolent presence of superstars.
the weaknesses
what
is
important
is that we do not feel the agony
Contemporary themes of more freedom for
or strengths of
or
the
bitterness
of
the situation. We do not feel
thought, freedom-loving women, and the mockthe story need not
anything.
At
the
end
of the day, we may rememing of the young generation who question the
affect the film.
ber
the
eyes
of
the
girl,
which are like those of a
unwritten codes of society are like a welcome
The director alone
dead
fi
sh,
but
they
will
not
haunt us.
gush of fresh air, right in the middle of the
is accountable
The
main
character,
Kuttiappan,
with all
scorching summer.
if the film is not
his
crazy
whims
and
fantasies,
appears
to be a
However, in this context, Leela, a film released
convincing enough
man with no conviction. He takes out a procesin April by the veteran director Ranjith (who has
sion of aged and retired sex workers of the village and
to his credit nearly 60 films made over two decades, many
honours them with money and shawls, but rightly gets reof them hits), based on a story written by R Unni, generally
buffed by one of them. At this juncture, Kuttiappan gets
disappoints. This was a film for which film viewers of
confused. It is obvious that the fellow lacks any convicKerala had high expectations, so the audience disappointtionhe displays on the wall of his room photos of Marxist
ment was multiplied.
NE
EPWRF India Time Series

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(State-wise Data)
The Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation (EPWRF) has added state-wise data to the existing Banking Statistics
module of its online India Time Series (ITS) database.
State-wise and region-wise (north, north-east, east, central, west and south) time series data are provided for deposits, credit
(sanction and utilisation), credit-deposit (CD) ratio, and number of bank offices and employees.
Data on bank credit are given for a wide range of sectors and sub-sectors (occupation) such as agriculture, industry, transport
operators, professional services, personal loans (housing, vehicle, education, etc), trade and finance. These state-wise data are
also presented by bank group and by population group (rural, semi-urban, urban and metropolitan).
The data series are available from December 1972; half-yearly basis till June 1989 and annual basis thereafter. These data have
been sourced from the Reserve Bank of Indias publication, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in India.
Including the Banking Statistics module, the EPWRF ITS has 16 modules covering a range of macroeconomic and financial data
on the Indian economy. For more details, visit www.epwrfits.in or e-mail to: its@epwrf.in
134
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
POSTSCRIPT
FILMS | TRAVEL
leader E M S Namboodiripad alongside Marilyn Monroe

and Bruce Lee.
At the same time, Leelashe never names herself in the
film; the name is something gifted by Kuttiappanutters no
word throughout her ordeals; she opens her mouth only
for a call and then a screamthe call, when she is being
raped; the scream, when she is crushed by the tusker. And
the only time there appears a glitter in her eyes is when
Kuttiappan appreciates the meal she cooked. How gratifying for the whole of womankind that a man appreciates
their culinary skills! Any feminist who thinks this girl
deserves to be crushed under the feet of an elephant surely
cannot be blamed.
A film is essentially the reinvention of any story and the
weaknesses or strengths of the story need not affect the film.
The director alone is accountable if the film is not convincing
enough. It is not necessary for the film to carry a message,
but, in this particluar case, Leela does not know where it
stands, nor does it have a raison detre.
In this context, one could not help but be reminded of one
of the better films at the International Film Festival Kerala
2015Desde Alla, a Venezuelan venture by Lorenzo Vigas,
a story of a 50-year-old man, apparently a homosexual,
falling for a 17-year-old boy, and later handing him over to
the police, when his own (fabricated) moral codes were broken by the boy, in a way that only a youngster can do, lightly
and playfully. For the viewer, the film was like a sharp slap
on the face. In contrast, the message of Leela is grossand
dont pity the viewer for forgetting it as soon as she leaves
the cinema hall. Even the birds-eye view shots of the plantations of Wayanad could not save the film. We have seen
better shots of the majestic hills of Munnar in Ram Gopal
Varmas Nishabd.
Perhaps the only saving grace of Leela is that it may well be
a step forward for Malayalam cinema in the sense that it
sustains the appetite for the new, which is a good sign, indeed.
P S Nirmala (psnirmala555@gmail.com) is a freelance journalist, presently engaged in
film studies.
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
135
POSTSCRIPT
FILMS | TRAVEL
Set Free
The quaint little hamlet of Dagshai, in the foothills of
the Himalayas, boasts of Indias only other cellular
jail, built during the British colonial era.
Chitvan Singh Dhillon
estled among emerald green deodar forests and

pine knolls lies Dagshai, a quaint little garrison
town in the foothills of the Himalayas, located
atop a high hillock, which stands sphinx-like astride the
KalkaSimla highway at a point close to the industrial town
EPW
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
of Solan. The little hamlet was established nearly a century

and a half ago, in 1847, by the East India Company by securing, free of cost, five villages from the erstwhile Maharaja
of Patiala, namely, Dabbi, Badhtiala, Chunawad, Jawag
and Dagshai. The cantonment was named after the lastmentioned village, as it was the largest in size and
apparently, strategically located. Legend has it that the
name Dagshai was derived from Daag-e-Shahi. During Mughal
times, a Daag-e-Shahior a royal markwas stamped on
the foreheads of criminals who were then sent packing to
the then Dagshai village.
Apart from the geo-economic significance of this little
hamlet, the British were enamoured by its beauty and pristine environment, overlooking a valley. It was built as a sanatorium for patients of tuberculosis, who would benefit from
the fresh, clean, pine-scented air.
Dagshai has another dubious attraction. The Andaman
Islands may boast the most notorious cellular jail in
India but there is a second lesser-known cellular jail in the
countrythe Dagshai cellular jail, 60 km from Chandigarh,
which has now been spruced up and converted into
a museum.
The Dagshai jail was constructed
The Andaman
in
1849 at a cost of `72,873. It has
Islands may boast
54
maximum security cells, eight
the most notorious
by
12
feet in area, with 20-feet-high
cellular jail in India
ceilings and well-barricaded winbut there is a second
dows and doors. Of the 54 cells,
lesser-known
16 were meant for solitary confinecellular jail in the
ment. These cells had absolutely
countrythe
no ventilation and little access to
Dagshai cellular
natural sunlight. They were meant
jail...
for prisoners guilty of treacheries
against the British Raj, and they were subjected to harsh
punishment in those cells.
One particular cell was kept aside for those who were
to be meted out unusually ruthless castigation for daring
the British Empire. In 1857, the Gorkha soldiers of the
Nasiri Regiment, who had vociferously revolted against
the British during the mutiny of 1857, were caged in the
Dagshai jail.
In 1914, a prosperous Sikh, Baba Gurdit Singh from the
island of Singapore, chartered a Japanese ship, Komagata
Maru, to ferry 350 Sikhs to Canada. They were all ex-army
men seeking resettlement in British-ruled Canada. They
were denied disembarkation. The ship had to return to
Calcutta where 20 identified masterminds were detained
on arrival and were sent to the Dagshai jail. Four of
them were hanged. It is believed that Mahatma Gandhi
also spent a night in the jail in solidarity with the Irish
Catholic soldiers.
Apart from the jail, there are around 20 luxurious British-era
villas spread around the cantonment. One of the most iconic
properties, on the Charring Cross, is called Petlands,
135
POSTSCRIPT
TRAVEL | POEM
owned by Sardarni Gurbachan Kaur. This property has an

interesting history. When the partition of India took place,
the aristocratic Mann family, erstwhile chiefs of Punjab,
were spending the summer of 1947 at the luxurious Savoy
Hotel in Mussoorie. Caught unawares on the wrong side of
the newly drawn Radcliffe line, they found themselves in
what is now called India. All they owned had been left on the
other side of the border. The only property they owned in
India was in Dagshai.
Born into an aristocratic family, Gurbachan Kaur was
the only child of the legendary Bishan Singh Singhpuria,
a philanthropist, human rights activist and educationist.
Petlands was just one of the luxury properties she had
inherited from her father. It had been bought from
Mrs Cocks, a lady of Afro-American origin, who sold it off
for `20,000 in the 1920s before she set off for Australia
where her son lived.
Wandering through Dagshai, I notice very old churches
with wooden crosses, weathervanes and assorted signs to
a bygone era. Theres also a graveyard with tombstones
that date back to the early 1800s. The aura is spooky. I
scurry along.
As I sit down for my last cup of tea at Dagshai, I cant help
but feel pangs of nostalgia and melancholy. Dagshai is a
cosy little hamlet, home away from home, where time
stands still, amidst the winding roads, with hairpin curves
that magically fold back into the clouds through tunnels of
treespine, oak and cedar. For all nature lovers, this little
town beckons!
Chitvan Singh Dhillon (filmbuff100@gmail.com) is a Chandigarh-based freelance
journalist.
LAST LINES
136
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
EPW
POSTSCRIPT
TRAVEL | POEM
This Is Not a Love Poem

Harnidh Kaur
I could never tell when poets wrote

about lovers, or when it was about
nationsthey were one and the same,
heartbroken dirges unspooled from
the centre of chests, till the yarn,
stained red with blood and revolution,
tied the ideas of patriotism into place,
nestling it between the political and the personal.
This is not a love poem, and this is not
a mournful lament, this is not anger, and
this is not passionI leave those to the
ones who seem to know how I should love
my country better than I ever willthis is
a mere query into the heart of the matter.
Will I ever be allowed to speak without
a predictated, preexisting, predestined script?
Will my hands ever look like hands, and not
cogs and keys, fitted into giant machinery,
and will my eyes ever be simply eyes, not
curators and cataloguers of unrelenting
thrusts on those I call my own, marked away as
incidental costs, just another in the states
budget of predetermined lives that can be
expended each year, in search of greatness?
Will the poetry Ive written to my lovers ever
echo in the words I spew trying to make sense
of what a country means to me? Will I ever find
myself confused between the love Ive given,
and the love I feel? A watan is not just a country,
its a homeland, bound to its people with
shared memories and histories, so will my
country, nation, and watan ever be one?
Harnidh Kaur (harnidh95@gmail.com) is currently pursuing her Masters in Public

Policy from St Xaviers College, Mumbai. Her first book, The Inability of Words, is
slated for a 2016 release.
136
may 28, 2016
vol lI no 22
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How Kerala is Destroying its Wetlands

Chitra K P (chithukp@gmail.com) teaches at the Department of Social Work, Sree Sankaracharya
University of Sanskrit, Kaladi, Ernakulam, Kerala.
The amendment to the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act 2008 is one in a series
of environmentally detrimental decisions that the Kerala government has taken. The state urgently
needs to factor in ecological rationale in decision-making and conserve paddy fields and weltlands
for the long term health of the state.
Reckless reclamation or conversion of paddy fields and wetlands has become a regular activity in
Kerala. Over the last few decades Kerala has lost hectares of wetlands and paddy fields legally in
the name of industry, infrastructure development and housing. Illegally, land has been lost to
benami (property registered in the name of a person other than one who has financed it)
transactions in the burgeoning land market. The consequent impact on water security, food
security and ecological balance of the region is being neglected by the state-market nexus in the
quest for unbridled economic growth and development. Market forces often manipulate and modify
existent legal framework for conservation initiatives to normalise conversion and reclamation of
wetlands and paddy fields. The effort here is to delineate the sabotage attempts on the wetland
conservation laws of the state.
The Kerala Finance (No 2) Act 2015 was passed by the Kerala Legislative Assembly to give effect
to certain financial proposals of the Government of Kerala for the Financial Year 20152016 on 29
July 2015. The said act amends the Kerala Conservation of Paddy land and Wetland Act 2008 (28 of
2008) (KCPWA).
The original act was passed with the objective of restricting reclamation or conversion of paddy
fields and wetlands and to conserve them to promote agriculture sector and ecological security. But
the amendment to the act gives power to the district collector to regularise the unauthorised
conversion or reclamation of paddy land made before the commencement of the 2008 Act (12
August 2008) by recovering a fee from the concerned person. The amendment is valid over any
provisions contained in the 2008 act, any other act, rules or orders, judgment, decree or order of
any court, tribunal or other authority of the state. The revision is made through the Finance Act in
the name of revenue generation for the state to validate and legalise reclamation of paddy
fields/wetlands, violating the conservation objective.
Discrepancies in Amendment
The Kerala Conservation of Paddy land and Wetland (Regularisation of Unauthorised reclamation)
rules 2015 based on the new act defines paddy field as those recorded as wetland in the Basic Tax
Register and which have been reclaimed before 2008. This is against the definition accorded to
paddy fields in the 2008 act and literally acts against the idea of conservation. As per the rules
anyone who is engaged in unauthorised reclamation prior to 12 August 2008 can submit an
application with a nominal fee of Rs 500 (along with land ownership documents, documentary
evidence by any concerned authority and photographs signed by the applicant stating that the land
has been reclaimed without authorisation prior to the prescribed date) to the collector for the
regularisation of such reclamation. The rules also state that the verification of the application
would be done based on the status of draft/data bank details on 12 August 2008. This is
problematic since the consolidation of even a draft data bank was done only in 2012.
The new amendment justifies the reclamation of lakhs of acres of paddy fields/wetlands in Kerala
before the formulation of the Wetland Conservation Act in 2008. The Conservation Act has not been
enforced properly either. In the absence of a proper data bank of wetlands and paddy fields in the
state, there is a high probability that the wetlands and paddy fields reclaimed after 2008 also will
get legalised.
Further the fee for regularisation is set at the rate of 25% of the fair value of the land per acre[i].
The market value of wetland itself is very low in comparison to drylands, since the ecological value
of paddy fields and wetlands is not considered in market based valuation. Also the requirement of
land filling and leveling lowers the land price in the case of wetlands. Since the fair value of the
wetland itself is low, 25% of that amount per acre would be negligible and is incomparable with the
high profit generated by the reclaimed wetland (now dryland).
Institutional failure of the revenue department in the formulation of an authentic databank of paddy
fields and wetlands is being capitalised here to serve private interests. Thus the motive of the new
amendment needs critical analysis in terms of the intent, the provisions set and the transparency of
procedures. In the present state the new amendment will only serve to meet the interest of benami
land holders and those engaged in real estate ventures resulting in largescale misuse and
corruption.
Sabotaging Conservation Laws
The states attempt to sabotage the conservation of paddy fields and other wetlands is not new in
Kerala polity. In 1997 the agriculture department issued a directive[ii] to all the district collectors
not to sanction any application under the Kerala Land Utilisation (KLU) order [iii] for conversion of
paddy land for other uses, except with the prior approval of the concerned government body.
Considering the delay in the processing of applications as well as upholding the
inappropriateness of governmental intervention in the quasi-judicial functions of the district
collectors under the KLU statute through an administrative measure, the directive was withdrawn
in 2002 through another order[iv] by the agriculture department. This gave back the decisionmaking power to the collectors regarding the applications for conversions, with a loose mention
that large scale reclamation of wetlands and paddy fields should be discouraged.
The withdrawal of the agriculture department in decision-making on land use should be read
together with the introduction of the Land Use Bill and Kerala Industrial (Prohibition of Obstructive
Practices) Bill in 2002 which opened up more space for the conversion of agricultural land. In 2012
these two bills were reintroduced by the Committee for Policy Initiatives and Legal Changes,
formed with the intention of formulating policy modifications in the context of Emerging Kerala, a
summit organised to project the state as an investment destination. Both the bills attempted to
sabotage the protective measures for paddy and other agricultural crops.
The guidelines mentioned in the Land Use Bill spoke only about the preservation of double crop
paddy fields and remained silent about single crop paddy fields and other agricultural lands. This
was in contradiction to the KCPWA 2008 which specified that even single crop paddy lands or
cultivable fallow lands should be protected against reclamation. Unlike the land utilisation order
which focused on the preservation of agricultural lands as such for food security reasons the new
Land Use Bill sought guidelines for the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural or
tourism purposes. Further the punitive measures offered were not at all stringent enough to thwart
changes in land use for non-agrarian purposes.
The Kerala Industrial (Prohibition of Obstructive Practices) Bill 2002 sought to outlaw any
obstructive practices against an industry initiated after getting the clearance of the government
and other concerned agencies. Any kind of protest either in the name of local employment
reservation or environmental issues or rehabilitation issues could be prohibited from the time of
land acquisition itself according to the bill. Any form of labour strike could also be termed illegal as
per the bill.
The attempt was to deny the democratic right to dissent, a right of the concerned communities
while initiating an industry. The bill set conditions which defined any form of action by civil society
or political organisations against an industrial project as a criminal offence. The extent of
punishment for obstructing an industry was set higher than that of causing land use change in
contravention of the guidelines under the Land Use Bill. Further the offences in relation to this
were considered as cognisable. Such attempts should be seen in the light of sprouting of protest
movements across Kerala and India posing relevant questions on human rights, social and
ecological justice against different industrial as well as infrastructural development ventures.
A government order from the revenue department in November 2011 gave paddy field conversion
rights for contributors of paddy land for development projects that is 50% of the owned land could
be legally converted if land contribution is done for the projects. The order came in the context of
the proposed Kottayam Corridor Project and Kodimatha Mobility Hub Society (a 125 acre real
estate project with plans of exhibition centre, convention centre, cricket stadium and tourism
facilities, landscaped walkways, cycling tracks and water sport activities) in Kottayam district of
Kerala. Giving land filling rights to contributing land owners cannot be claimed a legal provision
but is only an administrative strategy for land pooling to the benefit of real estate groups.
The action was justified by the state by arguing that the paddy field notified for the hub is
uncultivated land which again contravened the provisions of the 2008 act which said only
uncultivable wetland could be reclaimed if needed. Also the issue reflects the erratic development
ideology of the state which decides to convert ecologically sensitive paddy fields for cricket
stadiums, exhibition centres, water sport activities etc. Paddy fields are written off as uncultivable
and infertile in the manipulated reports to serve private interests and for profiteering in the name
of development. Even after the amendment to the act in 2015 another attempt was made by the
Revenue department to permit private entrepreneurs to fill upto 10 acres of paddy field for
industrial purposes through an amendment of the conservation Act, but had to back out due to
protest from various quarters.
The agriculture department has no say in land utilisation and the revenue department is considered
to be the custodian of all the government land, inclusive of agricultural land. But in many
instances the industrial department and finance department exhibit overriding powers in land
utilisation. This is evident from the revenue department order [v] in 2012 which mandated that all
government orders sanctioning land acquisition for various projects shall be issued only by the
revenue department. The order mentioned that the revenue department is unable to maintain data
on the land being acquired by different departments/agencies for various purposes and has lost
control over the land acquisition procedures. The role of various powerful stakeholders, especially
the industrial department in facilitating unbridled land acquisition, adversely affects the
conservation of wetlands and paddy fields. Even the State Act in Kerala which aims at the
conservation of paddy fields and wetlands states they can be acquired if it is for a public purpose.
No Ecological Rationale in Decision-making

The present development scenario demands agricultural land for industrial and infrastructural
development and other real estate transactions. The social and ecological rationales of land use are
suitably erased into oblivion in the current mode of apolitical decision-making where economic
factors become the sole factor in these matters.
Even a long term economic rationale in terms of the ecological role of wetlands and paddy fields is
subverted here. The new amendment act characterises purposeful flexibility and weakening of
existing state policies in matters regarding protection of common property resources which ensure
food, water and other ecological securities. The contradictory positions exhibited by the existing
state policies on agriculture protection, wetland conservation, industrial development contribute to
the absence of a rational decision on paddy fields and wetlands in social, economic and ecological
terms. The contradictory administrative functions of the revenue department also determine the
deterioration of productive land use in the state. The same department which is currently vested
with the power of decision-making on the conversion of wetlands is also vested with the power to
acquire lands for development projects.
Also it is seen that finance and industry departments override the powers of the revenue
department in determining land use. The agriculture department, which in actuality should be the
most significant stakeholder in evolving policies on agricultural land use, remains a silent spectator
of the processes and practices that emerge.
Way Forward
It is high time to think about the water security, food security and ecological security of the state to
avoid an environmental and social catastrophe. The state should immediately revoke the new act
and initiate an action plan for the conservation of the remaining paddy fields and wetlands of the
state, considering the ecological and social function of the resources. The databank of paddy fields
and wetlands need to be updated and errors rectified both manually and with technological support
using satellite imageries. The state should take proactive action in reasonable allocation of funds
and encourage cultivation of cultivable fallow lands to ensure conservation. A regular monitoring
mechanism for the conservation of paddy fields and wetlands should be initiated.
Overarching powers of the various administrative departments and the collector in converting and
reclaiming land should be revoked. The local self-government should make use of the constitutional
powers and take a significant role in the conservation of paddy fields and wetlands. The loopholes
in the existing laws which facilitate accumulation and conversion of wetlands and paddy fields
should be identified and addressed. A strong political debate should be initiated for a proactive
intervention on land use and conservation policies of the state.
Notes
[i] One are is equivalent to 2.47 cents
[ii] Government letter No 47165/NCA-3/97/AD by Agriculture Department dated 17th December
1997
[iii] The Kerala Land Utilisation (KLU) Order was formulated in 1958 and later on amended with
enlarged powers in 1967 under the Essential Commodities Act 1955 as a response to address the
acute food security in the state. The Order aimed to protect agriculture especially paddy, through
stringent measures to prohibit non-agricultural use or alternate agricultural use of land. As per the
Order even fallow land could be taken over for cultivation by the government.
[iv]GO(Rt) No157/2002/AD by Agriculture Department dated 2nd February 2002
[v] GO(Ms) No 182/2012/RD, Revenue (B) Department, dated 3rd May 2012
Tags:
Kerala
Paddy
Paddy field
Land
Kerala Legislative Assembly
Kerala Conservation of Paddy land and Wetland Act
Wetland Conservation Act
The She in Science

Aashima Dogra and Nandita Jayaraj (labhopping@gmail.com) are independent science journalists
and run The Life of Science project.
Who and where are the women doing science in India? Two science writers set out on a journey to
collect stories that counter the popular narrative of science being the domain of old bearded men.
Conception of The Life of Science

What gave birth to The Life of Science (TLoS)? It was while working together at a science magazine
for children that plans for the project began. The initial idea was to build a digital resource for
students and the general public to have an idea of what a life in science and technology research
entails. Popular media accounts are often misleading as they fail to capture the complex terrain
that a life in science entails, both professionally and personally. Digital resources of institutions are
not helpful either as they are, more often than not, poorly curated for the general public.
What does an archaeologist do? Why do seismologists bother studying earthquakes that have
passed? What does it mean to study the neurobiology of a specific emotion? By answering some of
these questions for people, we hope to help open new worlds of opportunity and give people the
required knowledge to be able to decide if a career in research is possible for them, and if yes,
what kind.
We decided that the best way to do this would be to go on the ground and see for ourselves. As
former scientists-in-training ourselves, this would mean catching glimpses of the life we left behind
not because we were not passionate enough, but because we realised that our strengths lay in
communicating rather than doing research.
Focus on Women
For the past 25 years, 2530% of PhD students in India have been female (Godbole and
Ramaswamy 2015). However, this does not translate to women actually pursuing research or
holding faculty positions. As of April 1998 only 9% of the total scientists engaged in research and
development in science and technology institutes of Delhi were female (Society for Environment
and Development 1998). Similarly puzzling statistics persist in recent yearsfor example women
pursuing a physics degree in India comprised 32% of the undergraduateshigher than the United
Kingdom as well as the United States 20%, but the proportions drop to 20% and further to 11% in
the graduate and professional level respectively (Kurup et al 2010).
The same report makes several fascinating observations regarding the familial situations of these
women, working hours, factors like career breaks, and reasons for dropping out. Since its
conception in 1957, out of around 500 recipients of the Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar Prize for Science
and Technology, only 16 have been women. Even here there is an imbalance in the disciplines that
they have been awarded inMathematics: 2; Physics: 0; Engineering: 2; Chemistry: 3; Earth
Science: 1; Biology + Medical: 8.
The questions are many, and it is this reality that we were keen to explore when we decided to
focus on women in our project.
Way of Working
The two of us carrying out this research have two different approaches of finding subjects. One of
us finds word of mouth most reliable and the other benefits from the spontaneity of simply walking
into institutions without an appointment. Except with high security establishments, we have found
that most of our scientific centres are quite open and welcoming.
We now find ourselves talking to women who would otherwise have stayed invisible as they work in
smaller towns in non-premier institutions, but nevertheless are a crucial component in the world of
Indian science as they train hundreds of students and conduct significant research themselves.
Many times, our personal and social networks fail to give us the required connections in a
particular town or university. We then turn to the internet but even this often does not work as
Indian science is not well documented in the media. Renowned institutions like the National Centre
for Biological Sciences, Indian Institute of Sciences in Bengaluru and Rajiv Gandhi Centre for
Biotechnology in Thiruvananthapuram have websites that have proved to be quite user-friendly, but
this is not always the case. The websites of the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) are
unhelpfully heterogeneousIIT Bombays is pretty good, while IIT Madras is still a counter-intuitive
mess, at least for outsiders like us who want to scope out good research. Even the website of the
Banaras Hindu University, Indias flagship university, has very limited information of the research
that is happening in the laboratories there. At the other end, we have been surprised to find local
colleges like the Union Christian College in Aluva, Kerala, having informative websites. These are
the notable cases but overall, websites of most scientific institutions continue to be bare, out-ofdate and uninformative.
Emerging Trends
At the time of writing this article, TLoS is 13 interviews old (we publish one a week), and has
documented the personal and professional experiences of 15 women working in science. There are
six to seven more in production for the coming month. There are early days but there do already
seem to be some characteristics that these women, despite varying widely in age, field of study,
stage of career and background, have in common.
Family Support
Almost all of the 17 or so women interviewed so far emphasised the role of family support in their
success. Most of them boast of the unconditional support of either their mother or father through
their journey as a scientist. This support also comes in the form of childcare among the mothers in
the groupmany had parents or in-laws who live in the same city or the same household.
Wife-Husband Scientist Team
All of the researchers are above 30 years of age. 11 out of 15 interviewed so far are married; most
are mothers. Among the 10 who run their own labs, have spouses who are also doing scientific
research. Four of the five spouses work in the same field as their wives. Each of these three
women, though studying vastly varied subjects (geophysics, pharmaceutical biotechnology and
microbiology) and hailing from different corners of India (Ajmer, Bengaluru and Mumbai),
emphasised how much working as a team and having a spouse who understands and shares the
pressures has helped them advance their careers and manage their families better than they could
have otherwise.
The stories of husband-wife scientists team seem to suggest that if the husband is an academic,
their partners are more likely to continue their academic life. In one case, the husband was in the
room while the interview took place as they share the responsibility of handling the department.
Raising Children
A number of our subjects who have children admitted that some of their career choices have been
dictated by what made sense with regard to bringing up their children. Radhika decided to return
to India from a successful run in a reputed Australian laboratory so that she could give back to her
parents who she had highly depended on for childcare support. Another subject Ramadevi, came
back from the US following concerns about the countrys influences on her teenage daughter.
Importantly, none of these choices were made rashly; they all followed years of deliberation and
preparation to ensure a smooth transition into Indian academics.
Backgrounds
Most of our subjects so far have been privileged to come from backgrounds where academics is
considered a priority for daughters as much as men. Though primarily urban, a handful, like junior
Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) scientist Kriti Faujdar we met at Hassan, Karnataka,
were brought up in small towns, in this case, a village in Bihar. However, Kriti counts herself lucky
to have a father who has always placed a high priority on his three daughters education despite
societal disapproval.
Challenges
Even with our small dataset, stories of challenging scenarios have emerged. Though many of our
subjects insist that they have been treated with equal respect and given equal opportunities, a few
have had unpleasant experiencesone biochemist recounted a horrible episode where she was
accused of having a questionable relationship with her superior.
A scientist from a government research institution later changed her mind about her views on
working under male bosses (she had said that any awkwardness with women in the workplace
could stem from the lack of women they had to interact with while studying), indicating that there
exists a fear of speaking ones mind especially about sensitive topics like sexism.
Several researchers, especially from smaller institutions with greater funding crunches, have had a
hard time jumping through bureaucratic hurdles in the path to setting up a functional laboratory. A
microbiologist from Ajmer, for example, informed us that no faculty recruitments had taken place in
the past 10 years and there is hardly any facilitation for the existing researchers to do collaborative
research or file for patents. Another biotechnologist in Varanasi had to literally build up her
laboratory from an empty room, right from the electrical wiring to experimental equipment.
Researchers who engage in a lot of field studies and travel have offered multiple perspectives. A
fisheries scientist in Kerala said that being female earns her more respect and people seem more
enthusiastic to help, whereas an ecologist, also from Kerala, felt that the risk is undeniably more for
women and often accepting help from strangers involves blind faith.
Interestingly, all of these women continue to research and publish work irrespective of social
background, quality of their institutes, and bureaucratic battles. This seems to suggest that
scientific research in India is a little more democratic than that in the social sciences where
research is skewed towards the well-known central universities and research institutions even after
successive reforms instituted by the Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR) (DFID
SARH 2011).
At the start of their career, most of these women have been told by close or distant relatives to
concentrate on their personal life rather than their chosen academic path. Get married and then
do whatever you want, seems to be a universal statement.
One of these scientists opened up about sexual harassment faced at the workplace but requested
this information to not be included. One of them was wrongly accused of having an affair with
someone in the higher management, as if it was the only way to explain her efficiency in the
bureaucratic process.
Comments on Equality
Towards the end of the interview, we always ask our subjects to share some pointers towards more
gender equality in science. Most of them agree that family pressure and responsibilities are the
prime challenges. Many of them remind us that a woman can be successful in science if she has
optimum work-life balance, unlike most other women in our country who havent. There are several
changes that could be institutedday-care spaces close to the workplace, at least one women in
higher management positions or simply listening to women colleagues when they have an opinion.
There has even been a case (in a yet to be published interview) of a scientist insisting to us that its
simply not possible to have it alla woman has to make a choice between family and career.
Aspirations
TLoS project aims to reach as many cities and towns as possible to unearth as many different
stories and profiles of people who work in scientific labs. We want to be accessible to varied
audiences and we intend to do this by eventually translating our content into regional languages
and making use of regional media to disseminate it.
These stories will travel, as all stories inevitably do. It will be nice to see them in popular
newspapersmajor and regional, rather than just as Facebook posts. These stories are relevant in
local newspapers that are read where these scientists live and work.
The project strives to develop into an honest and reliable resource both for young science
enthusiasts to understand what rewards and challenges a life in research will likely entail as well as
for the general public to eliminate the shroud of mystery around scientific work so that they can
appreciate the role scientists play in the community.
References
[All URLs accessed on 31 May 2016]
DFID South Asia Research Hub (2011): Social Science Research in IndiaA Mapping Report,
September, http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/mis_spc/60911-MappingReport_social_science.pdf.
Godbole, Rohini M and Ramakrishna Ramaswamy (2015): Women Scientists in India, Report for
the Indian Academy of Sciences,
http://www.ias.ac.in/public/Resources/Initiatives/Women_in_Science/AASSA_India.pdf.
Kurup, Anitha et al (2014): Trained Scientific Women Power: How Much are we Losing and Why?,
IAS-NIAS Research Report, April, Bengaluru: Indian Academy of Sciences and National Institute of
Advanced Studies, http://eprints.nias.res.in/142/1/IAS-NIAS-Report.pdf.
Society for Environment and Development (1998): Status of Women Scientists in S&T/R&D
Institutions in India, New Delhi: National Commission for Women,
http://ncw.nic.in/pdfreports/WOMEN_SCIENTISTS.pdf. The Life of Science
Tags:
Science
Technology
Scientific Institution
Indian Institute of Science
Women
Gender

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