Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Iya
103 SCRA 972
DOCTRINE:A building is an immovable property irrespective
of where or not said structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner.
FACTS:
Spouses Adriano Valino and Lucia A. Valino own a house of
strong materials. They filed a bond of P 11,000.00 subscribed
by the Associated Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. and as a
counter-guaranty, the spouses Valino executed an alleged
chattel mortgage on the aforementioned house in favor of the
surety company.
The parcel of land on which the house is erected was still
registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation
but was able to obtain the same from them after full payment
of the purchase price. The Valinos acquired another loan from
Isabel Iya for P12,000.00, executing a real estate mortgage
over the house and lot. However, they were unable to pay off
their other loan which caused the foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage. The surety company was awarded the land as the
highest bidder in the auction but later on discovered that the
land was subject to a real estate mortgage. The surety company
then requested that the house and lot be excluded from the
real estate mortgage. Iya, in her answer, said that she had a
real right over the property and that the chattel mortgage on
which the foreclosure was based should be declared null and
void for non-compliance with the form required by law. The
CA ruled that the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage is
limited to the land alone and they awarded the structure to the
surety company saying that the house is a personal property
and may be subject to chattel mortgage.
ISSUE:
Which of the mortgages should have preference?
HELD:
It was held in Lopez vs. Orosa that the building is an
immovable itself, separate and distinct from the land. A
building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or
not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner.
Only personal properties can be the subject of a chattel
mortgage and since the structure in this case is an immovable,
it cannot subject to a chattel mortgage. Therefore the chattel
mortgage and the sale on which it was based should be
declared null and void. Also, while it is true that said document
was registered in the Chattel Mortgage Register of Rizal, this
act produced no effect whatsoever for where the interest
conveyed is in the nature of a real property, the registration of
the document in the registry of chattels is merely a futile act
which would produce no legal effect insofar as the building is
concerned.
Tsai v. CA
G.R. No. 120098
DOCTRINE: Even if the properties are immovable by nature,
nothing detracts the parties from treating them as chattels to
secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.
FACTS:
The RTC held that the lease and sale were irregular as it
involved properties not included in the schedule of the
mortgage contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the (immovable) properties in question can be
entered into a chattel mortgage. -- YES
HELD:
An immovable may be considered a personal property if there
is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of
an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as
ISSUE:
Whether or not the machineries and the equipments are
considered immobilized and thus subject to a realty tax. -- NO
FACTS:
Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting
passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized
lines in the Island of Mindanao, collecting rates approved by
the Public Service Commission.
The petitioner is the owner of the land where it maintains and
operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks; a repair shop;
blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries
which are placed therein, its TPU trucks are made; body
constructed; and same are repaired in a condition to be
serviceable in the TPU land transportation business it
operates.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held a decision for the petition for review
to be set aside and the equipments in question declared not
subject to assessment as real estate for the purposes of the real
estate tax.
The law that governs the determination of the question at issue
is as follows:
Art. 415. The following are immovable property:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Corporation
v.
The Supreme Court held in the negative. The Court said that
the steel towers are personal properties. The Court based their
ruling on the enumeration of immovable properties in Art. 415
of the Civil Code.
First, the steel towers do not come within the objects
mentioned in par. 1, because they do not constitute buildings
or constructions adhered to the soil.Moreover, they are not
construction analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil
because as per description, they are removable and merely
attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which
when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from
place to place.
Second, they can not be included under paragraph 3 since they
are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner; they can
be separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. In
fact, each of these steel towers or supports consists of steel
bars joined together by means of bolts, which can be
disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by
screwing the same.
Lastly, they do not fall under paragraph 5, as they are not
machineries, receptacles, instruments or implements. SC said
that even if they were machineries, receptacles, instruments or
implements, they are not intended for industry or works on the
land. MERALCO is not engaged in an industry or works in the
land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.
HELD:
Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an
immovable or real property. Buildings are always immovable
under the Civil Code. A building treated separately from the
land on which it is stood is immovable property and the mere
fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it
separate and apart from the land on which it stood did not
change its character as immovable property.
Tumalad v. Vicencio
41 SCRA 143
FACTS:
Plaintiff-spouses Magcale secured two loans over a 2-storey
residential building.
FACTS:
On 1 September 1955 defendants executed a chattel mortgage
in favor of plaintiffs over their house located at Quiapo,
Manila, which were being rented from Madrigal & Company,
Inc. The mortgage was registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Manila on 2 September 1955. The mortgage was executed to
guarantee a loan of P4,800.00 received from plaintiffs. It was
also agreed that default in the payment of any of the
amortizations, would cause the remaining unpaid balance to
become immediately due and Payable and the Chattel
Mortgage will be enforceable in accordance with the provisions
of Special Act No. 3135, and for this purpose, the Sheriff of the
City of Manila or any of his deputies is hereby empowered and
authorized to sell all the Mortgagor's property after the
necessary publication in order to settle the financial debts of
P4,800.00, plus 12% yearly interest, and attorney's fees.
When defendants defaulted in paying, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed, and the house was sold at public
auction pursuant to the said contract. As highest bidder,
plaintiffs were issued the corresponding certificate of sale.
Thereafter, plaintiffs commenced Civil Case No. 43073 in the
municipal court of Manila, praying, among other things, that
the house be vacated and its possession surrendered to them,
and for defendants to pay rent of P200.00 monthly from 27
March 1956 up to the time the possession is surrendered.
MTC granted petition.
ruled that the words of the contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by
SERGS became real property by virtue of immobilization.
HELD:
The machineries herein are real properties but are considered
personal by the parties agreement.
The Court will resolve whether the said machines are personal,
not immovable, property which may be a proper subject of a
writ of replevin. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that
writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal
property only. Section 3 thereof reads:
SEC. 3. Order. -- Upon the filing of such affidavit and
approval of the bond, the court shall issue an order and the
corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal
property alleged to be wrongfully detained and requiring the
sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody.
On the other hand, Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates
immovable or real property as follows:
ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
x x x....................................x x x....................................x x x
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works;
x x x....................................x x x....................................x x x
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the
Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built
on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and
principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence,
although each of them was movable or personal property on its
own, all of them have become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the
industry. In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that
the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the
petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of
the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly
stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After
agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped
from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a
party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the
truth of any material fact found therein.
Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio, the Court upheld the intention
of the parties to treat a house as a personal property because it
had been made the subject of a chattel mortgage.
It should be stressed, however, that our holding -- that the
machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the
Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by
the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not
affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery
as personal. In any event, there is no showing that any specific
third party would be adversely affected.
ISSUE:
WON the storage tanks are considered improvements on real
property such that it is subject to real property tax. -- YES
HELD:
Meralco contends that the said oil storage tanks do not fall
within any of the kinds of real property enumerated in article
415 of the Civil Code and, therefore, they cannot be categorized
as realty by nature, by incorporation, by destination nor by
analogy. Stress is laid on the fact that the tanks are not
attached to the land and that they were placed on leased land,
not on the land owned by Meralco.
The issue raised by Meralco has to be resolved in the light of
the provisions of the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No.
470, and the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No.
464 which took effect on June 1, 1974.
Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is
due "on real property, including land, buildings, machinery,
and other improvements" not specifically exempted in section
3 thereof. This provision is reproduced with some modification
in the Real Property Tax Code which provides:
Sec. 38. Incidence of Real Property Tax. They shall be levied,
assessed and collected in all provinces, cities and
municipalities an annual ad valorem tax on real property, such
as land, buildings, machinery and other improvements affixed
or attached to real property not hereinafter specifically
exempted.
The Code contains the following definition in its section 3:
k) Improvements is a valuable addition made to property or
an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere
repairs or replacement of waste, costing labor or capital and
intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it
for new or further purposes.
The SC holds that while the two storage tanks are not
embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered
as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and
rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the
two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence
as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by
Meralco for its operations.
Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty in Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey vs. Atlantic City, 15 Atl. 2nd 271.
For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include
things which should generally be regarded as personal
property. It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as
real property for purposes of taxation which on general
principle might be considered personal property (Standard Oil
Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633).