Case Digest by DONITA

respondent courts Orders under attack.

#1 - [G.R. No. 124320. March 2, 1999]

Petitioners contend that the issue of heirship should first be

HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY vs.

submission that the respondent court should have proceeded with the

determined before trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners

trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same

HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, et.al.

case.

FACTS: Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido

ISSUE: IS THE CONTENTION OF PETITIONER CORRECT?

and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot situated in Bancal,

Carmona, Cavite. Petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of

RULING: NO.

the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay. Subsequently,

petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid

- Petitioners Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper

properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty

recourse. Their proper remedy should have been an appeal. An order of

and Development Corporation (Golden Bay). the discovery of what

dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order, which is subject to

happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for

appeal and not a proper subject of certiorariWhere appeal is available

ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TITLE before

as a remedy, certiorari will not lie.

Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.

- The respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in

Upon learning that Golden Bay sold portions of the parcels of land in

issuing the questioned Order dismissing the Second Amended

question, petitioners filed with the RTC an Amended Complaint to

Complaint of petitioners, as it aptly ratiocinated and ruled:But the

implead new and additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to be

annulled.

But

the

respondent

Complaint.Petitioners

moved

for

court

dismissed

reconsideration

the
of

plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel

Amended
the

Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it - except

Order

the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned

dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion was granted by the

Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal heirs of the

which further allowed the herein petitioners to file a Second Amended

Complaint,

which

they

promptly

did.

The

private

deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of

respondents

the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings

presented a Motion to Dismisson the grounds that the complaint

in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This

failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a

must take precedence over the action for reconveyance. The trial court

right of action, that they have not established their status as

cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason

heirs, that the land being claimed is different from that of the

that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

defendants, and that plaintiffs claim was barred by laches. The

Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil

said Motion to Dismiss was granted. Petitioners interposed a Motion

action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the

for Reconsiderationbut to no avail. The same was denied by the RTC.

enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a

Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief from

wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to

establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively

respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name,

clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special

petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint against respondent for

proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the

annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the

establishment of a status or right.

transfer certificate of title issued in her name. Petitioners alleged that

respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence,
not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she
perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit

[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]

of Adjudication.

# 2 - ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR.,

After trial, the trial court, without resolving the issues defined during

petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.

pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground
that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over

the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario. CA
Affirmed.

FACTS:Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. However, after

few years, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta who gave
birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special

co-petitioner. Meanwhile, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, herein

proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera

respondent. Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of

before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of

Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of their

Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes.

father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed, Portugals

siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a parcel of
land located in Caloocan in his favor. Thus, the Registry of Deeds for

RULING: Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the

Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292

deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in

covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal,

court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This

married to Paz C. Lazo. Paz died. Portugal died intestate. Respondent

must

executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased

take

precedence

over

the

action

for

reconveyance.

The

respondents have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of

Person adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No.

Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property.

34292/T-172 in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled and in its

stead TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by the Registry of Deeds for

The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed

Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila

to prosecute and defend an action in court. A real party in interest is

Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.Later getting wind

the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the

of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by

suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such interest, to be

lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus, making

considered a real interest, must be one which is present and

the latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of

substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,

land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to

contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.

petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial

Settlement of Estate. Later on, Peter and Deborah sold the land

G.R. No. 162956

April 10, 2008

toDionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their corespondents in the case at bar. After the sale, Spouses Fernandez took

# 3 - FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA,

possession of the said area in the subject parcel of land.

and EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., petitioners, vs.PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for

When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject

himself and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter DEBORAH ANN C.

ENRIQUEZ,

and SPS.

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ

land, they discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing

and CATALINA

so. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious,

FERNANDEZ, respondents.

the respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the

aforementioned documents and for damages. The RTC dismissed the

FACTS: The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land

case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually

located in Talisay, Cebu.According to petitioners Faustino Reyes,

seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera

Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and EutiquioDico, Jr., they are the

since they can not demand the partition of the real property without

lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land
with

Anacleto

Cabrera.

Petitioners

executed

an

first being declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an

Extrajudicial

ordinary civil action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding

Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial

specifically instituted for the purpose. CA reversed.

Settlement) involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. The

petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special

Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation

proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera

and Confirmation) over the same property. Thus, TCT were issued

before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the disputed

respectively.

documents?

Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his

RULING: YES.

minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also known

as Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges that

An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the

their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia

enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a

Seguera Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned pro-

wrong. A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which

indiviso share in the subject parcel of land. They further allege that

a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. The

Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters Graciana, who died

Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to

single and without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and

prosecute and defend an action in court. A real party in interest is the

mother of respondent Deborah Ann who succeeded their parents

one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit

rights and took possession of the subject parcel of land. During her

or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such interest, to be considered

records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to

a real interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as

have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been

distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,

instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for

subordinate or consequential interest. A plaintiff is a real party in

there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties

interest when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect,

who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was

while a defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who

not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein

has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the

that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an

plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had

heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the

violated the legal right of the former. The purpose of the rule is to

issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they seek to

protect persons against undue and unnecessary litigation. It likewise

cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in

ensures that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real

the proper forum.

adverse parties in the consideration of a case. Thus, a plaintiffs right

to institute an ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to

Furthermore, it would be superfluous to still subject the estate to

the relief sought.

administration proceedings since a determination of the parties' status

as heirs could be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed because it

In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property

appeared from the records of the case that the only property left by the

was registered sue to recover the said property through the institution

decedent was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have

of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and

already presented evidence to establish their right as heirs of the

partition, or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds

decedent. In the present case, however, nothing in the records of this

or documents related thereto, the SC has consistently ruled that a

case shows that the only property left by the deceased Anacleto

declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the

Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had respondents Peter and

matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a special

Deborah Ann presented any evidence to establish their rights as heirs,

proceeding."

considering especially that it appears that there are other heirs of

Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in this case that had signed one

In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action

for

the

"Declaration

of

Non-Existency,

Nullity

of

Deeds,

of the questioned documents.

and

Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations

therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are
their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned onehalf of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the
documents the respondents sought to annul.
The respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to
substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are,
thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in the

Case Digest by Amiel Pascual

G.R. No. 163604

Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA and contended

May 6, 2005

that declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of

# 4 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE HON.

the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or

COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING

separate appeals requiring a record on appeal reiterating its earlier

argument.

JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA

MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.

The CA denied the Republics Petition for Certiorari. It reasons that

that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a

declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee

The RTC of Ormoc City granted the petition "In the Matter of

spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or

Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P.

protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither

Jomoc petitioned by ApolinariaJomoc on the basis of the Comissioner

does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be

report declaring the absentee spouse presumptively dead. Stated

enforced against any person. The instant petition, being in the

therein is that Clemente left Apolinaria nine years earlier.

nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition

Judge Fortunito L. Madrona cited Art. 41, par. 2 of the Family Code,

to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal.

stating that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage

during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse

Issue: Is a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a

had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must

person in the nature of a special proceeding?

institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive

death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the

Ruling: No. A petition for declaration of presumptive death is a

reappearance of the absent spouse.

summary proceeding under the Family Code and not a special

proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court.

The Republic appealed the RTCs order by filing a Notice of Appeal and
insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Art. 41 of the
FC is not a special proceeding involving multiple appeals where a
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. The petition

Ratio:

for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse is not

included in Rule 109 of the Rules of Court that enumerates the cases

Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored

wherein multiple appeals are allowed. Republic contends that a mere

its grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the

notice of appeal suffices.

absent spouse, provides:

RTC disapproved Republics Notice of Appeal.

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence

of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the

Republics Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been

absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-

Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL

founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of

PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision,

disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances

inter alia:

set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules

of only two years shall be sufficient.

in this Title shall applyin all cases provided for in this Codes requiring

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an

preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary

expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of

presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a

There is no doubt that the petition of ApolinariaJomoc required,

reappearance of the absent spouse.

and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code,

not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal

Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of

for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a

Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioners Notice of

summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal

Appeal, provides:

from the trial courts order sufficed.

Sec. 2.Modes of appeal. -

Also, Republics failure to attach to his petition before the appellate

court a copy of the trial courts order denying its motion for

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases

reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not

decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original

necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a

jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court

technical sense. The CA shouldve directed Republic to comply with the

which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving

rule and not dismissed the petition outright.

a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be

required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple

G.R. No. 157912

or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In

such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like

December 13, 2007

# 5 - ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner, vs.ESTATE OF ALICE O.

manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.

By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

gathered that the petition of ApolinariaJomoc to have her absent

spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire

RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and

to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for

issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims

that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following above-quoted

against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Sheker filed on

Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him

amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of

proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules

certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of

provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall

P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be

be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform;

realties.

capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.4 This means

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker, Victorina Medina, moved

that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may

for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds

be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing

that:

so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the

Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions

(1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of

are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.

the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and

Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum

shopping for

(3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money

complaints

and

initiatory

pleadings, a written

explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of

claim was not filed and served personally.

filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way
obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
as in the present case.

RTC assailed Order and dismissed the money claim without prejudice
based on the grounds above stated by Medina.

On the issue of certification of non-forum shopping:

Shekker then filed fpr a Petition for review on certiorari.

The certification of non-forum shopping is

required only for

complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling

Issue: Must Shekkers contingent money claim against the estate be

that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an

dismissed for his failure to attach to his motion a certification against

initiatory

non-forum shopping?

pleading.

In

the

present

case,

the

whole

probate

proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for

Ratio: No.

allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of

The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate

administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent

court is mandatory.

are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of

the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of

their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred,

To emphasize..

subject to certain exceptions.5

Special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a

motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into

Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.

personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the

personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances

settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent

of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only

since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere

when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other

contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money

modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written

claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a

explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to

certification against non-forum shopping.

begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court

shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case
or the issues involved therein.

On the issue of filing fees:

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati

The trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim against an

assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have

City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the
taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and

estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist

realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money

her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of

claim personally.

separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on
the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates

the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a
reasonable time.

of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to

After all, the trial court had already assumed

residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of

jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate.

administration have been paid.

Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural

the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim

rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal

against the estate.

service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

On the issue of personal service and filing:

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly,

G.R. No. 16680

such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or

other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to

September 13, 1920

# 6- BROADWELL HAGANS, petitioner, vs.ADOLPH WISLIZENUS,

be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the

Judge of First Instance of Cebu, ET AL., respondents.

inefficiency of the postal service.

JOHNSON, J.:

of estate of a deceased person?

Original petition for a writ of certiorari.Facts are admitted by demurrer.

Ruling: No.

Judge Adolph Wislizenus argues that the provision of Act No. 190

Ratio: In proceedings like the present, the judge of the Court of First

permit him to appoint assessors in "special proceedings".

Instance is without authority to appoint assessors.

BroadwellHagans contends that no authority in law exists for the

We find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190, which gives

appointment of assessors in such proceedings.

us an interpretation of the words used in said Act, that there is a

distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding," and that

The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of

when the Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean "special

assessors are the following;

proceeding."

(a) Section 57-62 of Act No. 190--appointment of assessors in the

court of justice of the peace.
(b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190--the only provisions of law

Action

which could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of

Special Proceeding

ordinary suit in a court every other remedy furnished by law

defined as an application or proceeding
of justice

assessors in "special proceedings

formal demand of one's

(c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267applicable to Manila only

to establish the status or right of a

legal rights in a court of

party, or a particular fact.

Usually, in special proceedings, no

justice in the manner
formal pleadings are required, unless
prescribed by the court
the statute expressly so provides. The
or by the law. It is the

(d) section 2477 of Act No. 2711applicable to Manila only

(e) section 2 of Act No. 2369-- appointment of assessors in criminal
cases only

method of applying legal

remedy

remedies

generally granted upon an application

Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in

definite
rules.

writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of

according

to

established

or

in

special

motion.

proceedings

Illustrations

proceedings,

in

of

is

special

contradistinction

to

actions, may be given: Proceedings for

such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . .

."

the appointment of an administrator,

Issue: Is a judge of the CFI, in special proceedings, authorized under

perpetuate testimony; to change the

the

guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to

law

to

appoint

assessors

to

fix

the

amount

due

name

an

of

persons;

application

admission to the bar, etc., etc.

administrator/executor for his services and expenses in the settlement

for

 RTC denied the motion for dismissal of the proceeding.

Therefore, the demurrer is overruled and the prayer of the petition is

CA likewise dismissed the petition.

granted, and it is ordered and decreed that the order of the Judge
Wislezenus appointing the assessors described in the petition be and
the same is annulled and set aside.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proceeding is an ordinary civil action.
Case Digest by CLARISSE
RULING:
No.
Case No. 7 - Vda. De Manalo vs CA

Petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1,
Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222
of the Civil Code (No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest

FACTS:

efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035) for the dismissal of

Troadio Manalo, a resident of Manila died intestate. He was survived by

the petition.

his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his11 children who are all of legal age.
Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the

The Article 222 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear

province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style

from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons

Manalos Machine Shop.

against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff

pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an

Respondents who are 8 of the surviving children filed a petitionwith the

injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.A civil

RTCfor the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio

action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues

Manalo and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as

another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a

administrator.

wrong.

Petitioners filed a motion for outright dismissal of the proceeding

It must be emphasized that the petitioners are not being sued for any

contending that the proceeding is actually an ordinary civil action

cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded. The Petition for

involving members of the same family.

Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of

Estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the

10

petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular

deceased.

fact.The private respondents merely seek to establish the fact of death

CA reversed the RTC ruling.

of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the

heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right

ISSUE:

to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the

decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court.

Whether or not the RTC acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an

Case No. 8

adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a

action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages,

deceased.
Natcher vs CA

RULING:

FACTS:

No.

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered

There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special

owners of a parcel of land.

proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of

justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. The term

Upon the death of Graciana, Graciano together with his 6 children

entered

into

an

extrajudicial

settlement

of

Gracianas

special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to

estate

establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.

adjudicating and and dividing among themselves the real property.

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment

Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,

Graciano sold the 2

nd

of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to

lot of the property by to his wife Patricia.

settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of

property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special

Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his

proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific

first marriage, as heirs.

rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Private respondents filed for annulment of title and reconveyance of the
property before the RTC. They alleged that petitioner Natcher, upon

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate

Gracianos death, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation

of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court

and forgery, acquired the property by making it appear that Graciano

in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.Corollarily, the RTC, acting in

executed a Deed of Sale.

its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication

and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of

RTC ruled in favor petitioner Natcher stating that the property is an

herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as the civil case for reconveyance

advance inheritance of Natcher being a compulsory heir of the

and annulment of title with damages is not the proper vehicle to

11

thresh out said question. Moreover, the RTC was not properly

constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question

Fule

filed

special

appearance

to

question

Venue

and

Jurisdiction of the CFI Quezon City.

of advancement made by the decedent Graciano to petitioner Natcher.

CFI Quezon City issued an order granting Garcias "Urgent

Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the
payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs

Case No. 9

a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings of the CFI

Laguna.

Fule vs CA

FACTS:

Fule instituted a petition to annul the proceedings before CFI

Quezon City.

Virginia G. Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna, at Calamba a

ISSUES:

petition for letters of administration, alleging that Amado G.

Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in

Whether or not the venue is improperly laid out.

the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in

RULING:

Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the

Court.CFI judge granted the motion.

Yes.

Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition raising that the venue was

Section 1, Rule 73 specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the

improperly laid and for lack of jurisdiction.

place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in

CFI laguna deny the opposition of Garcia.

reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:

"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. It

CA annulled the proceedings before CFI Laguna for lack of

could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject

jurisdiction.

matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure

Fule appealed to the SC.

Meanwhile, Garcia filed a petition for letters of administration

dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing;

jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate

before the CFI Quezon City over the same intestate estate of

of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an

Amado G. Garcia.

element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive

of venue.

CFI Quezon City granted the motion and appointed Garcia as

special administratix of the estate.

The term "resides" means the personal, actual or physical habitation of

12

a person, actual residence or place of abode. The term means merely

residence,

that

is,

personal

residence,

not

legal

residence

December 28, 1956 | Concepcion

or

Facts:

domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in

a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and

Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his

also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time

appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres

of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more

Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on November 28, 1952,

than temporary.

resided in Quezon City. Eugenios siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan,

Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are illegitimate children of

The Court rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado

Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in

G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City,

San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed

and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove

upon the ground that venue had been improperly laid.

the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the
death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence

The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenios petition and overruled his siblings

by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that

objection.

his last place of residence was at Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before

Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?

his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated

turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the

Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had

Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the

always been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a

Deed of Donation, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of

house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his

land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of

son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.

titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold

Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer to the

documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at

house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his

Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the

sons residence. It is well settled that domicile is not commonly

venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was

changed by presence in a place merely for one owns health even if

improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.

coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account
of illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy years in

Case Digest by JAZZ

Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.

Case No. 10 - Eusebio vs. Eusebio

In the matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. Eugenio

Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There

Eusebio, petitioner and appellee, vs. Amanda Eusebio, Virginia

is no direct evidence of such intent Andres did not manifest his

Eusebio, Juan Eusebio, et al., oppositors and appellants.

desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify

thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the

13

matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San

MALIG, plaintiffs-appellants,

Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that

vs.

municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at 889 A Espana Ext.,

Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage

MARIA SANTOS BUSH, defendant-appellee.

contract signed by Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to

Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his
residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.

On September 19, 1962 the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that

The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose

direct line of the deceased John T. Bush, having been born of the

they were the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the
common-law relationship of their father with Apolonia Perez from 1923

and freedom of choice, (2) physical presence at the place chosen, (3)

up to August, 1941;

intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied with

the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the

that said John T. Bush and Apolonia Perez, during the conception of

third requisite is absent.

the plaintiffs, were not suffering from any disability to marry each
other; that the defendant, by falsely alleging that she was the legal wife

Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the

of the deceased was able to secure her appointment as administratrix

authority of the CFI of Rizal because they introduced evidence on the

of the estate of the deceased in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the

residence of the decedent, it must be noted that appellants specifically

Court of First Instance of Manila; that she submitted to the court for

made of record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the

approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased

jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the
same.

left a will whereby he bequeathed his estate to three persons, namely:

In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death,

defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural

domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no

children of the deceased; and that they discovered the fraud and

authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the

misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in July, 1962.

Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger; that the

deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.

They prayed that the project of partition be annulled on the ground of

Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is

fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the defendant, who knew

gained. It is not changed by presence in a place for ones own health.

that herein plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of the

decedent;

Case No. 11

The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res

judicata and statute of limitations. The plaintiffs opposed and the

G.R. No. L-22761

defendant filed a reply to the opposition. On January 10, 1963 the

ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS, and JOHN all surnamed

lower court denied the motion, it appearing that the grounds upon

BUSH, represented in this suit by their attorney-in-fact, ROSE BUSH

which said motion is based are not indubitable. In time, the defendant

14

filed her answer specifically denying all the material averments of the

Section 1 of Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may

complaint and invoking laches, res judicata and statute of limitations

be dismissed, and it specifically ordains that a motion to this end be

as affirmative defenses.

filed. In the light of this express requirement we do not believe that the
court had power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the jurisdiction of

presented. The fact that the parties filed memoranda upon the courts

the court, stating that since the action was one to annul a project of

indication or order in which they discussed the proposition that the

partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone

action was unnecessary and was improperly brought outside and

which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of

independently of the case for libel did not supply the deficiency. Rule

the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963

30 of the Rules of Court provides for the cases in which an action may
be dismissed, and the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any

TRIAL COURT: granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, not

other, under the familiar maxims, inclusio unius est exclusivo ulterius.

on the ground relied upon by the defendant but because the action

The only instance in which, according to said Rules, the court may

had prescribed.

dismiss upon the courts own motion an action is, when the plaintiff
fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an

The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence, this

unreasonable length of time or to comply with the Rules or any order

appeal.

of the court.

ISSUE: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not alleged

Although a motion to dismiss had been presented defendant the

in the motion to dismiss?

resolution of the court granting the same was based upon a ground
not alleged in said motion. But assuming that the lower court could

It must be remembered that the first motion to dismiss, alleging lack of

properly consider the question of prescription anew, the same still did

cause of action, res judicata and statute of limitations, was denied

not appear to be indubitable on the face of the allegations in the

because those grounds did not appear to the court to be indubitable.

complaint.

The second motion reiterated none of those grounds and raised only
the question of jurisdiction.

The defendant cites Article 137 of the Civil Code, which provides that
an action for acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced

In dismissing the complaint upon a ground not relied upon, the lower

only during the lifetime of the putative parents, except in two instances

court in effect did so motu proprio, without offering the plaintiffs a

not obtaining in this case, and that the present action was commenced

chance to argue the point. In fact the court did not even state in its

after the death of the putative father of the plaintiffs. The said

order why in its opinion the action had prescribed, and why in effect,

provision is not of indubitable application, since the plaintiffs do not

without any evidence or new arguments on the question, it reversed its

seek acknowledgment but allege as a matter of fact that they are the

previous ruling that the ground of prescription was not indubitable.

acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of
the late John T. Bush. Whether or not this allegation is true will, of

In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, et al., 88 Phil. 94, it

course, depend upon the evidence to be presented at the trial.

was held:

15

Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the

defendant, this Court believes that the plaintiffs cause should not be
The defendant insists in this instance on the jurisdictional ground

foreclosed without a hearing on the merits.

posed in her motion to dismiss, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules
of Court formerly in force (now Rule 73, Section 1), which says:

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside and the case
remanded for further proceedings. Costs against the defendant-

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent

appellee in this instance.

is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a

citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
Case No. 12

province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an

inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any

TOMAS JIMENEZ vs IAC

province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of

the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to

FACTS:

the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court,

so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the

Lino Jimenez married consolacion Ungson with whom he begot 4

location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,

children, namely; Alberto, Leonardo, Jr., Alejandra Angeles. During

except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record

such marriage, Lino acquired 5 parcels of land in Pangasinan. When

It will be noted that the foregoing rule fixes jurisdiction for purposes of

Caolboy with whom he begot the 7 petitioners herein. After Lino and

the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased

Genoveva's death, Virginia(2nd Marriage) filed a petition before CFI

person, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,

praying to be appointed as administratix of the properties of the

or of the location of his estate.The matter really concerns venue, as

deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva upon which Leonardo Jimenez,

the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different

jr. filed a motion for exclusion of his father's name and those of his

courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule

uncle and aunts contending that they have already received their

specifies that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the

inheritance consisting of 5 parcels of land. However, the petition of

estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all

Virginia wherein she included the said 5 parcels of land in the

other courts.

inventory of the estate of Sps. Lino & Genoveva.

In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the

Consequently, Leonardo moved for the exclusion of those properties

partition already made and approved by the probate court, and to

from the inventory contending that such parcels of land were already

reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but

adjudicated to his father and to his uncle and aunts. The probate

for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance

court ordered the exclusion of 5 parcels of land and denied the motion

of which, through fraud, they have been deprived.

for recon. filed by Virginia. The latter went to CA on a petition for

Consolacion died, lino contracted a second marriage with Genoveva

16

certiarari and prohobition seeking the annulkment of the orders of the

pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive and could

probate court, of which the CA dismissed.

still be attaced in a separate proceeding.

Subsequently, the petitioners filed an amended complaint before the

Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in their motion

RTC to recover possession/ownership of the 5 parcels of land as part

to dismiss do not appear to be indubitable. Res judicata has been

of the estate of Lino and Genoveva. Private respondents moved for the

shown to be unavailable and the other grounds of prescription and

dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action was barred

laches by private respondents are seriously disputed.

by prior judgment and prescription and laches. Thereafter, the Trial

Court dissmied the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
ISSUE:

Case Digest by DATS

W/N in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court

#13

has jurisdiction to decide on questions of ownership

vs.

Fact:

RULING:

Respondent Romeo Jaring1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond

Petitioners' action was appropriately filed because as a general rule, a

in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five

probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. The

years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased

Patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the

the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses

principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion

Placido and PuritaAlipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios

or exlusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a

Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in

separate action. It has been held that in a special proceeding for the

two installments ofP300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with the second

probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter

probate

court

cannot

resolve

with

finality.

installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees

This

signed the contract.

pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to intestate

proceedings as in the case at bar.

The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance

Res judicata, does not exist because of the difference in the causes of

of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply

action. The other action was for the settlement of the intestate estate of

with their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent

Lino and Genoveva while the other one was an action for recovery of

sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said

possession and ownership of the 5 parcels of land. Moreover, while the

CFI

had

ALIPIO, petitioner,

Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING,respondents.

ownership of the 5 parcels of land is barred by res judicata

the

PURITA

COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his

W/N the petitioners' present action for the recovery of possession and

which

jurisdiction,

the

same

was

merely

limited.

amount before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan,

Any

17

Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease

testate. Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by

contract should the defendants fail to pay the balance.Petitioner moved

lumping his claim against the Alipios with those against the Manuels

to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placidoalipio, had

considering that, aside from petitioners lack of authority to represent

passed away. Hence, the case should be filed in the probate court.

their conjugal estate, the inventory of the Alipios conjugal property is

necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless
to say, such power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction
over the settlement of the decedents estate and not to any other court.

Issue:
#14
Can the creditor sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary

IN

DECEASED

proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the

THE

MATTER

ISMAEL

OF

REYES,

THE

INTESTATE

THE

HEIRS

OF

ESTATE

OF

OSCAR

R.

REYES, petitioners,

conjugal partnership?

vs.
CESAR R. REYES, respondent.
Fact:

Held:

Spouses Ismael Reyes and FelisaRevita Reyes are the registered owners

No, It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of

of parcels of land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City

conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the

covered by TCT. The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar,

husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and

Araceli, Herminia,

it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus,

Aurora,

Emmanuel,

Cesar and

Rodrigo,

all

surnamed Reyes.

when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation

entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as

On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death,

representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent

Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of

debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between

his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land

them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary to be true, the

located in TandangSora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax

nature of the obligation involved in this case, is not solidary but rather

liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no

merely joint, making imperial still inapplicable to this case.

payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property
covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied sold and eventually forfeited by the

It is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit

Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government.

against petitioner.Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the

Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioners

Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the

husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either

BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property covered by

for the issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of

TCT No. 4983 upon payment of the reduced tax liability in the amount

will, depending on whether petitioners husband died intestate or

of about P18,000.

18

On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar

deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action

Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the

to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as

considering that the subject properties are still titled under the torrens

administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate

system in the names of spouses Ismael and FelisaRevita Reyes which

included 50% of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and

under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been

3598. Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the

set aside in the manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the

ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the

provisional character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the

deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and

inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the

or purchase.

Probate Court.

The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in

#15

favor of Cesar Reyes where the latter was ordered to submit a true and

vs.

complete inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of the

ROGELIO BAGAYAS, FELICIDAD BAGAYAS, ROSALINA BAGAYAS,

deceased and the special powers of attorney executed by the other

HILARIA

BAGAYAS, Petitioner,

MICHAEL BAGAYAS, and MARIEL BAGAYAS, Respondents.

heirs who reside in the USA and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot

conforming to his appointment as administrator. Cesar Reyes filed an
inventory of real and personal properties of the deceased which
included the Arayat properties with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters.

Facts:

Issue:

Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of sale and partition before

the RTC, claiming that Rogelio, Felicidad, Rosalina, Michael, and

Can the probate court determine ownership over the property?

Mariel, all surnamed Bagayas (respondents) intended to exclude her

from inheriting from the estate of her legally adoptive parents,

Held:

MaximinoBagayas (Maximino) and Eligia Clemente (Eligia), by falsifying

a deed of absolute sale (deed of absolute sale) purportedly executed by

No, the question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which

the deceased spouses (Maximino and Eligia) transferring two parcels of

the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of

land (subject lands) registered in their names to their biological

determining whether a certain property should or should not be

children, respondent Rogelio and Orlando Bagayas(Orlando). Said

included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may

deed, which was supposedly executed on October 7, 1974, bore the

pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not

signature of Eligia who could not have affixed her signature thereon as

conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to

she had long been.

resolve title.

Respondents likewise testified in their defense denying any knowledge

We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the

of the alleged adoption of petitioner by Maximino and Eligia, and

provisional inclusion of the subject properties to the estate of the

pointing

19

out

that

petitioner

had

not

even

lived

with

the

family. Furthermore, Rogelio claimed that after their parents had died,

adoption, as well as the forgery of Eligias signature on the questioned

he and Orlando executed a document denominated as Deed of Extra

deed, no partition was decreed, as the action was, in fact, dismissed.

judicial Succession (deed of extra judicial succession) over the subject

Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the legally adopted

lands toeffect the transfer of titles thereof to their names. Before the

child of Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a declaration of

deed of extra judicial succession could be registered, however, a deed

heirship and co-ownership upon which petitioner may institute an

of absolute sale transferring the subject lands to them was discovered

action for the amendment of the certificates of title covering the

from the old files of Maximino, which they used by reason of

subject land. More importantly, the Court has consistently ruled that

convenience to acquire title to the said lands.

the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary

civil action, for matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship

In dismissing Civil Case No. 04-42, the RTC declared that petitioner

must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the

could not ask for the partition of the subject lands, even though she is

purpose of determining such rights. Therefore, the remedy then of

an adopted child, because she was not able to prove any of the

petitioner is to institute intestate proceedings for the settlement of the

instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale purportedly

estate of the deceased spouse Maximino and Eligia.

executed by Maximino and Eligia. This conclusion came about as a

consequence of the RTCs finding that, since the subject lands

Case Digest by DREW

belonged exclusively to Maximino, there was no need to secure the

# 16 - URIARTE V. CFI

consent of his wife who was long dead before the sale took place. For
this reason, the forgery of Eligias signature on the questioned deed
was held to be inconsequential. However, on reconsideration, the RTC

Short summary: alleged natural child of the deceased filed petition for

declared that it committed a mistake in holding the subject lands as

settlement of INTESTATE estate of Don Juan Uriarte y Goite in Negros

exclusive properties of Maximino since there was already an

Occidental Court. PNB was even appointed as special administrator,

admission by the defendants during the pre-trial conference that the

but PNB failed to qualified. MTD filed by nephew of Don Juan, alleging

subject properties are the conjugal properties of the spouses

that while he was in Spain, the deceased made a will AND that

MaximinoBagayas

RTC

petitioner had doubtful interest (proceeding for his recognition as a

sustained its dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42 on the ground that it

natural child not yet done). Pending this, the nephews instituted a

constituted a collateral attack upon the title of Rogelio and Orlando.

petition for probate of the will of Don Juan in Manila. Alleged natural

and

Eligia

Clemente. Nonetheless,

the

son opposed, contending that Negros courts already had exclusive

Issue:

jurisdiction of the case.But Negros court dismissed the special

proceeding, and the Manila court proceeded to probate the will.

Is the ordinary court vested with power to determined heirship of an

Petitioner contested it. Court held that since the decedent was a non-

adopted child?

resident, both Manila and Negros courts may be proper venues for the
proceedings. But since probate proceedings enjoy priority over

Held:

intestate proceedings, action by Manila court proper. Even if the venue

was improper, petitioner considered to have waived the defect by

No. While the RTC may have made a definitive ruling on petitioners

laches. Lastly, the court held that if ever recognized as the natural

20

child of the decedent, he could opt to intervene in the probate

Issue:

proceedings, or to have it opened if already finished.

INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT?

Facts:

Ruling: NO.

Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in Manila

W/N

NEGROS

COURT

ERRED

IN

DISMISSING

THE

Decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country (Spain) during the time

and Negros
The alleged natural son of Don Juan, VICENTE URIARTE, filed petition

of his death, so the courts in the province s where he left property may
take cognizance of settlement of his estate

for settlement of INTESTATE ESTATE of Don Juan before the Negros

Occidental court. Note that during that time, the proceedings for

Here, decedent left properties both in Manila and in Negros

compulsory acknowledgment as the natural son of Don Juan was still

pending
PNB also was appointed as special administrator of the estate, but PNB

Even if Negros court first took cognizance of the case, still has to give

failed to qualify
OPPOSITION TO PETITION by HIGINIO URIARTE (nephew of Don Juan):
Don Juan left a will, executed in Spain, duly authenticated - submitted

distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance

way to Manila court special proceeding intended to effect the

with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a
"probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate.

before Negros court

ViCENTE's capacity and interest are questionable
JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA (di ko alam how related) commenced
SPECPRO for PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF DON JUAN before Manila

BUT testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a

courts + MTD in Negros Courts

Since there's a will, no need for intestate proceedings before Negros

deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for

the same purpose.

Courts
Vicente had no legal personality to sue
OPPOSED by VICENTE: Negros Courts first took cognizance, it had

So even pending Intestate proceedings, if it is found it hat the

acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same

decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the
latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that
stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter
being required to render final account and turn over the estate in

NEGROS COURT: DISMISS proceedings before it

VICENTE filed OMNIBUS MOTION in Manila Court for leave to intervene

his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.

+ dismissal of petition for probate + annulment of proceedings

If will rejected or disproved, proceedings shall continue as intestacy

DENIED
Manila court admitted to probate the last will

VICENTE already waived procedural defect of VENUE IMPROPERLY

LAID

21

Facts:
He knew that there was a will when a MTD was filed in Negros court,

Petitioner Rebong applied for a petition to cancel the annotation on

so he should have filed a MTD in Manila court earlier: Manila court

the certificate of title of a land which he inherited from his parents.

already
The annotation was pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74 of the
*appointed an administrator

Rules of Court (on settlement of estate) to the effect that the property
is still subject to any claim by creditors and other heirs of his deceased

*admitted the will to probate more than 5 months earlier

parents within 2 years from settlement of estate.

Court would not annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even

Petitioner based her petition for cancellation on section 112 of Act no.

if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be

496.

to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar

jurisdiction

HOWEVER, Respondent Judge denied her petition. She now claims

that Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.

As to interest of Vicente in the case

Two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status
and interest in the estate of the deceased parent:

Issue/Held:

(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and

Whether the petition to cancel annotation should be allowed.

(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.

NO
Ratio:

#17 - Rebong vs. Ibanez

The annotation could NOT be cancelled because the registered

interests have not yet terminated and ceased.
The two year period required by Rule 74 has not yet lapsed when the

Subject:

petition for cancellation was filed.

Liability of Heirs and Distributees

Neither section 4, Rule 74 nor Act 496 authorizes the substitution of

a bond for a lien or registered interest, whether vested, expedient,
inchoate or contingent, which have not yet terminated or ceased.

22

#18 - Hernandez v. Andal

Rule 74 Sec. 1 provides that when there are no outstanding debts the

Facts:

it is contended that a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot

heirs may divide the estate by means of a public instrument. Although

be validated by any acts short of the execution of a public

Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez are sisters who inherited

document, there are no indications in the phraseology of the rule

from their father a parcel of land. They partitioned the land verbally.

to justify an affirmative answer. Where the law intends a writing

or other formality to be the essential requisite to the validity of

Afterwards Maria and Aquilina sold their share to Zacarias Andal.

the transaction it says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Sec. 1

Cresencia tried to repurchase the land sold at P150 but Andal did not

Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the

agree. In her supplemental complaint she alleged that she offered to

repurchase it for P860 but Andal asked for an extension but later on

required public instrument is to be constitutive of a contract of

sold the land back to Maria and Aquilina for P970.

partition.

During trial, counsel for plaintiff contended that the best evidence was
the document of partition. The trial court ruled that under Rules 74
and 123 of the Rules of Court and Art. 1248 of the CC, parol evidence

Likewise, the Rules of Court promulgated by the Judicial department

of partition is inadmissible hence the resale of Andal to the

deals with matters of procedure exclusively. For the Court to prescribe

Hernandezes was null and void. Hence this appeal.

what is to be a binding agreement between co-heirs in the settlement

of their private affairs which in no way affect the rights of 3rd parties
would be to transcend its rule-making power.

Issue:
Case Digest by ROVER

W/N a contract of partition can be proved by parol evidence

G.R. No. 147468

Held: YES

April 9, 2003

#19 - SPOUSES EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO & JOSEFINA

CHAVEZ DOMINGO, petitioners,

There are 2 conflicting views as to whether an agreement of partition

should be in writing under the statute of frauds. Partition is excluded

Vs.

from the operation of the statute of frauds for the reason that partition
is not a conveyance but simply a separation and designation of that

LILIA MONTINOLA ROCES, CESAR ROBERTO M. ROCES, ANA

part of the lands which belongs to each tenant in common.

23

provisions of section 4, rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

INES MAGDALENA ROCES TOLENTINO, LUIS MIGUEL M. ROCES,

JOSE ANTONIO M. ROCES and MARIA VIDA PRESENTACION
ROCES, respondents.

When respondents learned of the sale of the property to petitioners,

FACTS:

Regional Trial Court of Pasig.They argued that the affidavit of self-

The spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces were the owners of two contiguous

Roces spouses and it was not true that Lilia Roces was dead.

they filed a complaint against Montinola and petitioners with the

adjudication was fraudulent because Montinola was not an heir of the

parcels of land, On November 1962, the GSIS caused the annotation of

Petitioners in their answer alleged that they are buyers in good faith

an affidavit of adverse claim on the titles alleging that the spouses

and that the actions of the respondents was barred by estoppel and

have mortgaged the same to it.

laches.

GSIS wrote a letter to Cesar Roces demanding the surrender of the

Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. CA reversed

owner's duplicates of titles, Spouses Roces failed to comply, GSIS filed

the decision and ordered Montinola to pay the Petitioners, the title was

a petition with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,praying that

reinstated back to the respondents and that all other claims made by

the owner's duplicates in Roces' possession be declared null and void

the Petitioners were dismissed.

and that the Register of Deeds of Pasig be directed to issue new

owner's duplicates to GSIS. CFI of Rizal granted the petition.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied hence

this petition.

Cesar died intestate on January 1980, survived by his widow along

with all the respondents in this case.
On July 1992, Montinola a nephew of Lila Rocesexecuted an affidavit

ISSUE:

of self-adjudication over the said parcels of land. That the properties

were acquired during the existence of their marriage; that the spouses

1. Whether the Petitioners in holding the annotation in the title regarding

left no heirs except the brother of Lilia Roces, who was his father; that

SEC. 4, RULE 74 is an encumbrance which disqualifies them from

neither of the spouses left any will nor any debts; and that he was the

being innocent purchasers for value

2. Whether the Respondents was barred by Estoppel and Laches

sole heir of the Roces spouses.

Montinola filed a petition against GSIS with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig,During

the

trial,

GSIS failed to produce

HELD:

any document

evidencing the alleged real estate mortgage by Roces of the properties.

1. The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any

Hence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Montinola. GSIS

person, as long as the deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights

did not appeal the judgment thus became final and executory.

within two years from the date of the settlement and distribution of
estate. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the effects of this provision

Montinola sold the parcels of land to Spouses Domingo, subject to the

are not limited to the heirs or original distributees of the estate

24

properties, but shall affect any transferee of the properties.

Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and

In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in

cannot now avoid the consequences brought about by the application

vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property. Thereafter on

of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

2. Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and

December 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of Donation Inter

cannot now avoid the consequences brought about by the application

children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen,

1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication"

Vivos covering the house and lot abovementioned to three of this

of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

Delay is an indispensable requisite for a finding of estoppel by laches,

both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other children,

petitioners herein.TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572

but to be barred from bringing suit on grounds of estoppel and laches,

was issued in private respondents' name.

the delay must be lengthy and unreasonable.No unreasonable delay

can be attributed to respondents in this case.

From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of

the land. However, when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT

DECISION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition

No. 47572, they immediately demanded that since they are also

for review is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of

children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective

Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 62473 are AFFIRMED in toto.

shares over the land in question. Private respondents ignored

petitioners demands.

G.R. No. 125715

Petitioners joined by Rafael Marquez Jr. filed a complaint on May 1991

December 29, 1998

for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" before the trial

courtalleging that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of

#20 - RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F.

Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent since the private respondents

MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, and

took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him

RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioners,

execute the said documents.

Vs.

Private respondents argued that petitioners action was already barred

by the statute of limitations that the same shouldve been filed within

COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F.

4 years.

MARQUEZ, respondents.

Trial Court rendered its decision in favor of the Petitioners. Stating

FACTS:

that: Prescription cannot set in because an action to set aside a

document which is void ab initio does not prescribe.Both the "Affidavit

During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad

of Adjudication" and the "Donation Inter Vivos" did not produce any

Marquez begot twelve children, sometime in 1945, the spouses

legal effect and did not confer any right whatsoever.

acquired a parcel of land, wherein they constructed their conjugal

Private respondents appealed to the CA and decision of the RTC was

home.

25

reversed stating that: In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in

trust under Article 1456 was established.Constructive trusts are

Gerona v. de Guzman, 11 SCRA 143, 157, the action therefor may be

created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise

filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.Such

contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of

discovery is deemed to have taken place in the case at bar on June 16,

confidence, obtains or holds the legal, right to property which he ought

1982, when the affidavit of self-adjudication was filed with the Register

not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.

of Deeds and new certificate of titlewas issued in the name of Rafael

Marquez, Sr.Considering that the period from June 16, 1982, when

In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an

TCT No. 33350 was issued in the name of Rafael Marquez Sr., to May

implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance

31, 1991, when appellees' complaint was filed in court, is eight (8)

of the Torrens title over the property.For the purpose of this case, the

years, eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days, appellants' action to

prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued,

annul the deed of self-adjudication is definitely barred by the statute of

which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for

limitation.

reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years

later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.

Petitioners filed a motion of reconsideration but proved unavailing.

Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land was conjugal property of

Hence this petition.

the spouses Rafael, Sr. and Felicidad, ownership of the same is to be

ISSUE:

equally divided between both of them.

Whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed?

Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife's

share, validly donate this portion to the respondents? Obviously, he

HELD:

cannot, as expressly provided in Art. 736 of the Civil Code.

It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus,

Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him.

succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil Code. Under

Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children,

DECISION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the

petitioners and private respondent therein, and her spouse, Rafael

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41214 is REVERSED and SET

Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate

ASIDE. Except as to the award of attorney's fees which is hereby

the entire property by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming

DELETED, the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 60887 is

that he is the sole surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F.

REINSTATED. No costs.

Marquez.
G.R. No. L-23638

October 12, 1967

As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another,

misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of

#21 - DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES,

his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to

petitioners,

secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive

26

executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and

Vs.

revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication

of the properties is opportunely presented."

---------------------------------------G.R. No. L-23662

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or

new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be

October 12, 1967

considered and resolved; on July 1959, the Court overruled the claim
MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA

that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but

REYES, petitioners,

"reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied
revocation at the opportune time."

Vs.

On January 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz

as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the

ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.

FACTS:

On February 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue

whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale in favor of the

On January 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted

testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the

to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the

execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter under Article

purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October

957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the

22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner

trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late

as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for

Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of

hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and

sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of

Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and

Appeals.

Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the

decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for

The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting

the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel

the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that

by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of

the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied

conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in

revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there

favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were

had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944

finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on

deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee

August 3, 1954.

herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.

After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance,

ISSUE:

by decision of June 1958, found that the will was genuine and properly

27

1. Whether the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to

sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel.

probate had become final for lack of appeal;

2. Whether the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959,

Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still

appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court

overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise

of Appeals correctly so ruled.

become final;
3. Whether the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly

3. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change

revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the

or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her

proponent on 1943 and 1944.

1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the

subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the

HELD:

legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of

Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances"no consideration

1. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is

whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the

untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and

transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying

definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and

the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in

the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament,

advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an

irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or

alteration or departure therefrom.

otherwise.

Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that

As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so

in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil

recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109. The rule

Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.

expressly enumerates six different instances when appeal may be

Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the

taken in special proceedings.

conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the

There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below

legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision

was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive.

decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of

Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor

sale were also thatit was the moral influence, originating from their

review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal

confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution of

belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.

2. As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs.

the 1943 and 1944 conveyances.

Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are

DECISION: In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed

requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the

decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against

testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a

appellants Reyes and Fernandez. So ordered.

consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition

within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of
a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment
prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non

Case Digest by SALLY

28

# 22- Rodelas vs. Aranza

HELD:
No. L-58509. December 7, 1982.*

Yes, pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic

wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution
has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If
uncontested, at least one identifying witness is required and, if no

# 22 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL

OF

RICARDO

B.

BONILLA,

deceased,

MARCELA

witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least

RODELAS,

three identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic

petitioner-appellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET. AL., oppositors-

will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will

appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.

cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the

handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a

FACTS:

comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and

the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the

Appellant Marcela Rodelas filed a petition with the Court of First

holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with

Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B.

the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gan vs. Yap, 104

Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The

Phil. 509, the Court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost

petition was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla,

or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of

Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla

witnesses who have seen and/or read such will The will itself must be

on the ground that lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be

presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the

proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. The lower court

document itself as material proof of authenticity. But, in Footnote 8 of

rendered a decision in favor of the oppositors-appellees. Hence, this

said decision, it says that Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic

appeal.

or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other

similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the

ISSUE:

deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court.

Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed

Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found will be

holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the

probated by means of a photostatic copy.

handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979,

denying appellants motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of
the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the

29

and

will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

hospitalization.

Rodolfo

submitted

documentary

evidence

previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax

returns, voters affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real
estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all
# 23 - JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City,

Pampanga.

G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002

Private respondentPerico countered that their deceased parents
#23 - RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

actually resided in Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their

PERICO V. JAO, respondents.

deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death

certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout
Gandia Street, Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry

FACTS:

appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed

his own signature on the said document.

Petitioner (RodolfoJao) and private respondent (PericoJao) were the

only sons of the spouses Ignacio JaoTayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died
intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate,

The Trial Court ruled in favor of Perico. The CA affirmed in toto the

cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.

trials court decision. Hence, this petition.

Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration

ISSUE:

before the RTC of Quezon City, over the estate of his parents. Pending
the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be

Where should the settlement proceedings be hadin Pampanga, where

appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother,

the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City,

Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More

where they actually stayed before their demise?

particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without

HELD:

rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to

their deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables
therein.

Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of

Where estate of deceased persons be settled.If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen

improper venue.He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in

or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,

Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths.

and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in

The decedents actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where

which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a

his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his

foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he

parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfos residence

had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the

in Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment

30

estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all

domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to

other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends

make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is

on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his

required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an

appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of

The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents

jurisdiction appears on the record.

residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary

evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or

by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required

letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the

by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In

province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.

Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, we held:

The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents

xxxxxxxxx the term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence

residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary

as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. This term resides,

evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented

like the terms residing and residence, is elastic and should be

by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required

interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in

by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In

which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules

Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, we held: x xxxxxxxx the term resides

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature

connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal

residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the

residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing

statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as meaning

and residence, is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the

residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a

object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the

distinction between the terms residence and domicile but as

application of venue statutes and rulesSection 1, Rule 73 of the

generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,

Revised Rules of Court is of such natureresidence rather than

and convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other

domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word

words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,

domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile

meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,

in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the

actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a

terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes

place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means

fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same

merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or

meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be

domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant

viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,

in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place

actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of

and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of

abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.

time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be

In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,

more than temporary.

personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply

Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have

requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while

31

one and the same meaning.At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting

herein,

namely,

Manuel

Cuenco,

Lourdes

Cuenco,

Concepcion

straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions

CuencoManguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and

and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals and

Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.

Bejer v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As

Respondent

Lourdes

Cuenco

filed

Petition

for

Letters

of

thus defined, residence, in the context of venue provisions, means

Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu, alleging among

nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode,

other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila; that he was

provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. All told,

a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and

the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for

personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the

the settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly laid in

Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April

the Quezon City court.

1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested
persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA,
a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and

the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is

In the meantime, petitioner Rosa CayetanoCuenco filed a petition with

AFFIRMED.

the CFI of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceaseds last will
and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor,
as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and
testament.

#24 - Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court,

petitioner Rosa filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to

No. L-24742. October 26, 1973.

#

24

ROSA

CAYETANO

Dismiss, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of

CUENCO,

petitioners,

vs.

Special Administrator. Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance

THE

its resolution on petitioners motion to dismiss until after the CFI

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL

CUENCO,

LOURDES

CUENCO,

CONCEPCION

Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probateproceedings.

CUENCO

MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES.

Respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion

and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.

to Dismiss,on the groundof lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue,

FACTS:

the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon

Sen. Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his

prohibition to CFI Quezon.

considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over

appeal, CA ruled in favor of respondents and issued a writ of

widow, the herein petitioner, and their 2minor sons, all residing in

ISSUE(s):

Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents

32

1. WoN CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the

2. WoN CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of

exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far

discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction

as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the

over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebus order

location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,

expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over

except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the

intestate proceedings

want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location
of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter

HELD:

but merely of venue.

The Court finds that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court

writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with

with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires

the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders

exclusive jurisdiction.

and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceaseds last

will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix

A fair reading of the Rulesince it deals with venue and comity

thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testators express wish.

between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdictionindicates that

the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take

The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all

cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise

Courts of First Instance over all matters of probate, both of testate

jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

and intestate estates. On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules
of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate

indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts

of the decedents last will has been presented in another court where

which otherwise may properly assume; jurisdiction from doing so, the

the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his

Rule specifies that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of

surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of

the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all

the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate

other courts. The cited Rule provides:

may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition

and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the

Section 1 1.Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is

second court which has before it the petition for probate of the

an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a

decedents alleged last will.

citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration

granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the

The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court

Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an

did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in

inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the

declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead

33

deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed

as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedents last will,

decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for

since the record before it (the petitioners opposition and motion to

certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed

dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition

by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is

that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that

ordered dismissed. No costs.

respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings

Case Digest by YUMMY

the Cebu courts order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate

proceedings before the Quezon City court/thus leaving the latter free

# 25 - BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,

(pursuant to the Cebu courts order of deference) to exercise

jurisdiction and admit the decedents will to probate.

vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA, respondent.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to
FACTS:

have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in

admitting the decedents will to probate and appointing petitioner as
executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light

In January 1945, TeodoroTolete died intestate. He left 4 lands in San

of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay

Manuel, Pangasinan. Heirs left were his widow, Leoncia de Leon and

down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.

several nephews and nieces. On July 1946, without any judicial

proceeding, Leoncia executed an affidavit stating that she is the only

Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Courts exercise of its

supervisory authority over all inferior courts,

22

heir of the decedent to inherit the said properties. Such affidavit was

it may properly

registered with the ROD of Pangasinan. On the same day, Leoncia also

determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly

executed a deed of sale in favor of Benny Sampilo for 10k which was

assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the

also registered in said ROD.

interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon

City courts exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the
decedent and its admission to probate of his last will and testament

On March, 1950, FelisaSinopera instituted proceedings for the

and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in

administration of the estate of the late Teodoro. Meanwhile, on June

pursuance of the decedents express will and all its orders and actions

17, 1950, Sampilo, in turn, sold the lands to HonoratoSalacup for 50k.

taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized

The sale was also registered in the ROD.

rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat
and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to
revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find
that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City

On June 20, 1950, Sinopera, then as appointed administratrix,

court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of

brought this present action against Sampilo and Salacup on the

record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.

ground that Leoncia had no right to execute the affidavit. Notice of

34

lispendens was recorded on the certificates on June 26, 1950.

The laws governing such case are Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74 (codal
please; saving space).

CFI: in favor of Sinopera; the affidavit was declared null and void;
declared Sinopera owner of of the 4 lands; declared that the

By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" it indicates the

usufructuary rights of Leoncia to said properties are terminated.

persons to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement.

On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made
expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who
did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof.

CA: modified the judgment; the deeds of sale were void only insofar as
the properties conveyed exceed the portion that corresponds to
Leoncia; Salacup was ordered to deliver to Sinopera of the lands in

There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge

the complaint for disposition but reserved his right to secure that part

of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them, the law

which belonged to Leoncia and his right to bring an action against

is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their

Leoncia and Sampilo for damages.

lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they

may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and
both the distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights

Sampilo and Salacup appealed to the SC alleging that the action has

or interest.

already prescribed since it should have been commenced within 2

years and but was only filed 4 years after the registration of the
affidavit.

But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no
notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no
direct or express provision that they also be required to assert their

ISSUE: WON Sinopera's right of action to recover her and her co-heirs'

claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the

participation to the lands in question prescribed at the time the action

settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had no

to recover was filed.

knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect,

would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law.

SC RULING: Nope. Not yet. CA decision was affirmed in toto.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial

settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any
reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution

35

would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of

# 26 - IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF

the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as

DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES,

no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.

petitioners,
vs.

The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs

CESAR R. REYES, respondent.

from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two

years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only:

FACTS: Spouses Ismael Reyes and FelisaRevita Reyes are the owners
of lands in Cubao, QC. They have 7 children. On April 1973, Ismael

(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the

Reyes died intestate.

extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of

Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.

Prior to his death, Ismael was notified by the BIR of an income tax
deficiency arising from his sale of a land in TandangSora, QC. For
failure to pay, the tax increased to about 172k+ and since his heirs
also did not pay such tax, one of the lands in Cubao was levied, sold

The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all

and forfeited in favor of the Government.

the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement.

In 1976, Oscar Reyes, son of Ismael, availed of the BIRs tax amnesty

Moreover, the action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the

and was able to redeem the property. Also in May, 1982, a notice was

deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition

sent to Felisa from the Office of the City Treasurer of QC informing her

that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except

that the Cubao properties will be auctioned for her failure to pay the

herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a

real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981. Oscar again settled the

period of four years, does not appear to have lapsed when the action

accounts through an amnesty compromise agreement with the City

was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in March, 1950

Treasurer.

and these proceedings must have been instituted soon after the
discovery of fraud.

In May, 1989, Cesar, brother, filed a petition for issuance of letters of

36

administration with the RTC of QC praying for his appointment as

administrator of their fathers estate which includes of the Cubao
properties. Oscar opposed on the ground that he had acquired the

The subject properties are still titled under the Torrens system in the

properties by redemption and/or purchase.

names of spouses Ismael and FelisaRevita Reyes which under the law
is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the provisional
character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as

RTC: in favor of Cesar; properties were provisionally included in the

stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.

estate. Oscar appealed but while pending, he died and was substituted
by his heirs.
Settled is the rule that the RTC acting as a probate court exercises but
limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and
CA: affirmed, MR denied, hence, present action.

determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person

adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties
having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to
the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or

ISSUE: WON the Cubao properties can be included in the estate. WON

the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.

the trial court should not determine question on ownership.

The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application

SC RULING: Yes.

of the exception to the rule. It bears stress that the purpose why the
probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on ownership was
for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties
should be included in the inventory which is within the probate courts

The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having

competence.

to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of

deceased

persons,

and

the

appointment

and

removal

of

administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of

ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court

There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of

cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining

ownership for its final resolution.

whether a certain property should or should not be included in the

inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and
In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that

is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

37

its determination of the ownership was merely provisional and

ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction.

suggested that either the administrator or the widow Felisa Reyes may
commence the proper action in the Regional Trial Court.
SC RULING: Yes. The case was to be returned to the probate court for
the

The question of ownership of a property alleged to be part of the estate

liquidation

of

the

conjugal

partnership

of

Teodoro

and

LucreciaReselva prior to the settlement of the estate of Teodoro.

must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its

general jurisdiction.

The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge of

proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
# 27 - MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner,

determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which

are claimed to belong to outside parties. Stated otherwise, "claims for

vs.

COURT

OF

APPEALS

and

MENANDRO

A.

RESELVA,

title to, or right of possession of, personal or real property, made by the
heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by

respondents.

third persons, cannot be entertained by the probate court."

FACTS: MenandroReselva, Milagros Cortes, and FloranteReselva are
brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T.
Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989 and

In the present case, however, Menandro, who refused to vacate the

May 13, 1987, respectively. The parents owned a house and lot (more

house and lot cannot be considered an "outside party" for he is one of

or less 100 sq. m.) in Tondo, Manila.

the three compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very much

involved in the settlement of Teodoro's estate.

The father executed a holographic will which was probated in July,

1991 with Milagros as the executrix. Thereafter, she filed a motion

By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are

before respondent probate court praying that Menandro, the occupant

all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the

of the house and lot, be ordered to vacate the property and turn over
the possession to her. This was granted.

probate court the question of title to property." Here, the probate court

CA reversed such decision for having been issued beyond the RTCs

opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate

is competent to decide the question of ownership. More so, when the

action would be most expensive and inexpedient.

limited jurisdiction as a probate court. Hence, appeal by Milagros.

38

In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA

with that of, the decedent since the former's theory merely advances

VENTURA, executrix- appellant, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA

co-ownership with the latter. In the same way, when the controversy is

CARDONA,

whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or

heirs-appellants,

vs.

exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within the

GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO,

jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the

MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ,

conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent

oppositors-appellees.

which is to be distributed among the heirs.

FACTS:

More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section
2 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the

deceased Gregorio Ventura while Miguel Ventura and Juana
Cardona are his son and saving spouse who are also the brother
and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other hand, appellees

RULE 73

Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate

children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano (Record
on Appeal, p. 122) but the paternity of appellees was denied by

SEC. 2.Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the

the deceased in his will (Record on Appeal, p. 4).

marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the

community

property

shall

be

inventoried,

administered,

and

On December 14,1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the

liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate

probate of his will which did not include the appellees and the petition

proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the

was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 812 (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-

conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate

3). In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an

proceedings of either."

illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the testator to be the

executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate (Record on
Appeal, p. 7).

Case digest by June

On January 25, 1961, Maria Ventura filed a motion to hold in

abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration or to have

Case No. 28

their approval without the opposition of the spouses Mercedes Ventura

and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria Ventura and ExequielVictorio on the

G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988

ground that the question of the paternity of Mercedes Ventura and

39

Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination before the

the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of

Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the adulterous

interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

children of testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to

oppose the approval of the counts of administration (Record on

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme

Appeals, pp. 33-36).

Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of

Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore,

Hence, this appeal.

as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference

over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and

Gregoria and Mercedes Ventura claimed that they are the legitimate

Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in

children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who

Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed

died in 1943, and asked that one-half of the properties described in

administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or

the complaint be declared as the share of their mother in the conjugal

Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona

partnership, with them as the only forced heirs of their mother Paulina

and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in

(Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 53-68).

order to represent both interests.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally

Case No. 29

justified.

G.R. No. L-7019

May 31, 1955

In the matter of the intestate estate of the deceased

HELD:

RosaliaSaquitan. EULOGIO S. EUSEBIO, administrator-appellee,

vs.

The Supreme Court held that the removal of Maria Ventura as

DOMINGO VALMORES,oppositor-appellant deceased.

executrix is legally justified. In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of

JACINTA SISCAR, widow of deceased,oppositor-appellant.

the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin
are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura.

FACTS:

The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled
under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property (Cooper vs.

On July 31, 1952, the above-entitled proceedings were instituted in the

Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341). It is generally said that "the

Court of First Instance of Rizal, upon petition of Francisco

nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is

Valmores, who claims to be the adopted son of the spouses

preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class

40

Domingo Valmores and RosaliaSaquitan. The petition alleges that

have happened: Domingo Valmores died on May 13, 1954. (According

RosaliaSaquitan died in Pasig, Rizal on October 1, 1950, without

to the certificate of death, he was 85 years old at the time of his death.

leaving any decendant or ascendant; that the nearest relatives of said

It appears that the said oppositor was married for the second time to

decedent are the husband, Domingo Valmores, and the petitioner

Jacinta Siscar on January 6, 1952). Upon being notified of the death of

Francisco Valmores; and that the surviving spouse Domingo Valmores

Domingo Valmores, this Court ordered the widow substituted for the

is more than 80 years of age and physically unfit to discharge the

deceased appellant.

duties of administrator, so the petitioner recommends the

ISSUES:

appointment of EulogioEusebio as administrator. On the same day

of the presentation of the petition, the Clerk of court issued a notice

1. Whether the petitioner can be designated as the administrator of

setting a date (August 29, 1952) for the hearing of the petition and

the estate of the deceased.

ordering the publication of the notice in the newspaper "La Opinion."

On the day set for the hearing, no one appeared except counsel for the

2. Whether the notice to the persons having an interest in the

petitioner Francisco Valmores. Francisco Valmores himself did not

properties of the deceased can be dispense with.

appear. Counsel for the petitioner proved the publication of the notice
of hearing and, afterwards, presented his witness, one by the name

HELD:

of RaymundoDelmindo, who declared that he is the brother of

Francisco Valmores that his brother had been adopted by the

The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove

spouses Domingo Valmores and RosaliaSaquitan, that RosaliaSaquitan

that the petitioner was legally adopted; hence, he did not have any

did not leave any will, that her nearest relative is her surviving

interest in the properties of the deceased RosaliaSaquitan.

husband who is 80 years of age and incapable of administering the

estate. Thereafter the following proceedings for the settlement of the

A study of the records also discloses fatal irregularities in the notice

estate took place in rapid succession.

required to be given. Thus nowhere does it appear from the record that
Domingo Valmores was ever personally notified of the filing of the

On March 23, 1953 the surviving spouse Domingo Valmores presented

petition or of the time and place for hearing the same. His first

an opposition dated March 20, 1953, impugning the appointment of

opposition shows that he was not aware of the hearing at all. He was

EulogioEusebio as administrator on the ground that he is a stranger to

notified of the proceedings for the first time when the inventory was

the family and to himself, and praying that he be appointed

sent him on November 29, 1952. Section 3 of Rule 80 of the Rules of

administrator of the properties of the deceased, and that the case be

Court provides:

set for hearing so that he can present his evidence. On April 4, 1953
he presented an amended opposition, alleging that RosaliaSaquitan

When a petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having

had died more than two years before, that he had been administering

jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the

the properties of her deceased wife, that he is now the owner and

petition, and shall causenotice thereof to be given to the known heirs

possessor of the properties in question, which was valued at P45,914.

and creditors of the decedent and to any other persons believed to have

Since the pendency of the case before this Court, the following events

an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of

41

Rule 77. (Emphasis supplied.)

deceased to appear and contest in due time the right of the petitioner
or the appointment of the person recommended as administrator.

The known heir in this case was Domingo Valmores and notice should
have been given him in accordance with Section 3 and 4 of Rule 77.
Section 4 of Rule 77 specially provides:
The Court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place
fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the known heirs, legatees
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their place of
residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage prepaid at

Case No. 30

least twenty days before the hearing, if such places of residence be

known.

G.R. No. L-23372

. . ..Personal service of copied of the notice at least ten days before the

IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE PIO DURAN. CIPRIANO

day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

DURAN

and

June 14, 1967

MIGUEL

DURAN,

petitioners-appellants,

vs.

Section 5 of the same rule also requires:

JOSEFINA B. DURAN, movant-oppositor and appellee.

At the hearing compliance with the provisions of the last two preceding

FACTS:

sections must be shown before the introduction of testimony in

support of the will. All such testimony shall be taken under oath and

Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961 in

reduced to writing.

GuinobatanAlbay. Among his alleged heirs are Josefina Duran, as

surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces.

The records of the hearing do not show that the notices as above
required had been given to Domingo Valmores or MaximoSaquitan.

Subsequent to his death, on June 2, 1962, Cipriano Duran, one of the

surviving brothers, executed a public instrument assigning and

We, therefore, find that the error imputed to the trial court in

renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of

oppositor-appellant's brief that the court has failed to comply with the

Josefina Duran, for the consideration of P2,500.00.

provisions of Section 3 and 5 of Rule 80 had not been complied with,

was actually committed. The requirement as to notice is essential to

A year later, on June 8, 1963, Cipriano Duran filed in the Court of

the validity of the proceedings in order that no person may be deprived

First Instance of Albay a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio

of his right or property without due process of law. The absence of

Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. An

notice to heirs becomes the more apparent in the case at bar, where

ex parte motion to be appointed special administrator was also filed by

evidently a stranger has been able to railroad the proceedings in court

him.

without opportunity of the person most interested in the estate of the

42

Against said petition, Josefina Duran filed on August 9, 1963 an

(Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196). Should it be contended that said

opposition, praying for its dismissal upon the ground that the

partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the

petitioner is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the

remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that

deed of transfer and renunciation the estate, in view of afore-stated,

purpose. And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a

she asked to be appointed administratrix.

settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or

rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he is

Acting on said motions, on June 3, 1964, the Court of First Instance

left without that "interest" in the estate required to petite for settlement

issued an order dismissing the petition of Cipriano for his lack of

proceedings.

interest in the estate. Said lack of interest was premised on the deed of
transfer executed by Cipriano, regarding which the court declared itself
without power to examine in said proceedings, collaterally, the alleged
ISSUE:

fraud, inadequacy of price and lesion that would render it rescissible

or voidable. And with the petition's dismissal, Miguel's petition to be

Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally

joined as co-petitioner was deemed without leg to stand on.

justified.
The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and
settlement of an estate must be filed by an "interested person" (See. 2,
Rule 79). Appellants contend that the deed of assignment executed by
HELD:

Cipriano did not operate to render him a person without interest in the
estate.

The Supreme Court held that the removal of Maria Ventura as

ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner is a person-in-interest in the estate of

executrix is legally justified. In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of

the decedent.

the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin
are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura.

HELD:

The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled
under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property (Cooper vs.

In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no

Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341). It is generally said that "the

settlement proceedings was pending. The properties subject matter of

nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is

the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court.

preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class

Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between

the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of

the assignor and assignee, the same does not need court approval to

interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is valid as

between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme

extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for

Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of

purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only

Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore,

43

as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference

Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for

over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and

the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award

Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in

the two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents.

Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed

administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or

Respondents

Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona

administrators of the estate, and to serve as such without posting a

and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in

bond.

order to represent both interests.

prayed

that

they

be

appointed

as

special

joint

The RTC Court appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint

administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses, and required
them to post a bond.
Respondents asserted their priority in right to be appointed as
administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima, whereas

Case Digest by Terelyn

Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law of the decedents and not even a

Case No. 34

legal heir by right of representation from her late husband Leonardo.

OCAMPO V. OCAMPO

ISSUE:

FACTS:

Whether or not the appointment of special administrators be governed

by the rules regarding the selection of regular administrators.

Petitioners are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo
who

died

on

January

23,

2004. Leonardo

and

his

HELD:

siblings,

respondents Renato and ErlindaOcampo are the legitimate children

A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its

and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died
intestate.

supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the

On June 24, 2004, the petitioners initiated a petition for intestate

settlement.When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or

proceedings of the estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado

representative of the parties suggesting the appointment.The principal

Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo. It alleged that, upon the death of

object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve

Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly

the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to

controlled,

administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section

entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy

managed,

and

administered

the

estate

of

their

2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.

parent. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession,

control and management of the properties to the exclusion of

While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to

petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of

44

their

deceased

administrators,

parents

in

this

not

is

their
a

appointment

mandatory

as

joint

requirement

special
for

administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D.

the

Lim be appointed as the special administrator.

appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of

special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the

Petitioners

selection or removal of regular administrators.The probate court may

administration of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate

appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than

heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are

those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to

purportedly Gerardos illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the

first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the

doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more

application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as

preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the

would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not

decedents estate. They also claim that they are more competent than

obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and

private respondents or their attorney-in-fact to administer Gerardos

is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by

estate. Petitioners claim to have lived for a long time and continue to

higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or removalof special

reside on Gerardos estate, while respondents are not even in

administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be

the Philippines, having long established residence abroad.

assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

contendthat

they

should

be

given

priority

in

the

ISSUE:

Court.

Whether or not the order of preference in the appointment of a regular

administrator apply to the selection of a special administrator.
Case No. 35

HELD:

TAN VS. GEDORIO

The Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the

FACTS:

appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the Rules of

Gerardo Tan died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. Private

preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next

Court does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. The

of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of

respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed

with

the

RTC

petition

for

the

issuance

of

letters

a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in

of

the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

administration. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo

Tan, filed an opposition to the petition.

Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate

their claim that their co-petitioner Vilma would have been the more

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special

competent and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix of

administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take

Gerardos estate.

possession and charge of Gerardos estate until the Petition can be

resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular

45

The Court find it immaterial the fact that private respondents reside

suspended upon the death of Carlos Gurrea, and praying that the

abroad, for the same cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact,

Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the

Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as

final determination of the case.

special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the

country and can, thus, personally administer Gerardos estate.

ISSUE:

The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator

Whether or not the estate of the deceased should still be made liable

is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person

for the support due to Mrs. Gurrea?

fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.

HELD:
Case No. 36
Due to the absence of proof as regards the status, nature or character
of the property now under the custody of the Special Administrator.

PIJUAN VS.VDA. DE GURREA

Precisely, however, on account of such lack of proof thereon, we are

bound by lawto assume that the estate of the deceased consists of

FACTS:

property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of which

In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz and Carlos Gurrea were married in

belongs presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea,aside from such part of the

Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her

share of the deceased in said partnership as may belong to her as one

and came, with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived

of the compulsory heirs,if his alleged will were not allowed to probate,

maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two children. Having

or, even if probated, if the provision therein disinheriting her were

been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was

nullified.

residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the

It is next urged by Mrs. Gurrea, as widow of the deceased, she claims a

Philippines in June 1960.

right of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of

Carlos Gurrea died on leaving a document purporting to be his last will

Court. In the language of this provision, said preference exists "if no

andtestament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof

executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are

and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Soon thereafter,

incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies

Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings with the CFI, for the probate of

intestate." None of these conditions obtains. The deceased Gurrea has

said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed

left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending

special administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the

probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again,

probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son and an

said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executorthereof, and it is not

illegitimate daughter

claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only

not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying

On July 16, 1962, Mrs. Gurrea filed a motion alleging that the

for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special

aforementioned alimony,pendente lite, of P1,000 a month, had been

administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to

46

note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of

the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a
regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special

HELD: Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, petitioners

administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the

lawful acts before the revocation of her letters of administration or

discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.

before her removal shall have the same validity as if there was no such
revocation or removal. It is elementary that the effect of revocation of

Case Digesd by OSHIN

letters testamentary or of administration is to terminate the authority

of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor or
administrator, done in good faith prior to the revocation of the letters,
will be protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights

#40 - Vda. De Bacling vs. Laguna

acquired under a previous grant of administration.

# 41 - Ruiz vs. CA (1996)

FACTS: Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a

residential land where petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon
Bacaling, constructed a residential house.

Unable to pay the lease

FACTS: Hilario Ruiz left a holographic will wherein he named as his

rental, an action for ejectment was filed by private respondent against

heirs his only son, his adoptive daughter and his grandchildren from

petitioner in her capacity as judicial adminstratrix of the estate of Dr.

his only son. His only son was also named executor of the will. Upon

Bacaling. The petitioner entered into a compromise agreement on July

his death, the only son did not petition for the probate of said will, and

29, 1964 with private respondent Laguda. For failure to satisfy the

even opposed the probate of the will. The probate court ordered that

conditions of the settlement, Laguda moved for execution. Petitioner

support be given to the grandchildren, and that the titles to the two

moved for reconsideration to which Laguda filed an opposition alleging

apartments being rented out be released to the heirs.

that as judicial administratrix as of July 29, 1964, she was legally

authorized to enter into the amicable settlement which was the basis
of the decision dated July 30, 1964, of the City Court of Iloilo sought
to be executed and, therefore, her act was binding upon the present

HELD: As to the support to be given, the rules of court provides that

judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who replaced petitioner

ONLY CHILDREN of the deceased (as well as the surviving spouse) are

upon her discharge as such on November 28, 1964.

entitled to support, not the grandchildren. As to the release of the

titles, court held that it was too early to release the titles yet as the
estate has not yet been inventoried and appraised, the charges upon

ISSUE:

the estate has not yet been paid, and there is still an issue as to the
Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial

intrinsic validity of the will which the court should proceed to

administratrix prior to her discharge or removal are valid and binding

determine first. Finally, court held that the right of an executor or

upon her successor.

administrator to the possession and management of the real and

47

personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only

were necessary for the preservation and use of the family residence. As

be exercised so long as it is necessary of the payment of the debts and

a result of those expenses, the co-owners, including the three

expenses of administration.

oppositors, would be able to use the family home in comfort,

convenience and security. We hold that the probate court did not err in
approving the use of the income of the estate to defray those expenses.

# 42 - De Guzman vs. De Guzman-Carillo

Case Digest by ARNEL

FACTS: This case is about the propriety of allowing as administration

G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990

expenses certain disbursements made by the administrator of the

testate estate of the late Felix J. de Guzman of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

# 43 -BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner,

One of the properties left by the decedent was a residential house

vs.

located in the poblacion which was adjudicated to his eight children,

HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch

each one being given a 1/8 proindiviso share in the project of partition.

143, Makati, Metro Manila and TERESA F. OLBES, respondents.

The

administrator

submitted

four

accounting

reports

for

his

disbursements which were objected by the three heirs.

HELD: An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses

FACTS:

in the care, management, and settlement of the estate. He is entitled to

possess and manage the decedents real and personal estate as long as

Special Proceedings No. 021 is an intestate proceeding involving the

it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of

estate of the deceased Doa Ramona Gonzales Vda. deFavis. Doa

administration. He is accountable for the whole decedents estate

Ramona is survived by her four (4) children who are her only heirs,

which has come into his possession, with all the interest, profit, and

namely, AsterioFavis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia

income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such estate as is

Favis-Gomez.

sold by him, at the price at which it was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1
and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court).

The court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and private

respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate.

It should be noted that the family residence was partitioned proindiviso among the decedents eight children. Each one of them was

While petitioner Beatriz was in the United States accompanying her

given a one-eight share in conformity with the testators will. Five of

ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in that country

the eight co-owners consented to the use of the funds of the estate for

Teresafiled a motion to remove Beatriz as co-administratrix, on the

repair and improvement of the family home. It is obvious that the

ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and

expenses in question were incurred to preserve the family home and to

had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the

maintain the familys social standing in the community. Obviously,

estate and the heirs.

those expenses redounded to the benefit of all the co-owners. They

48

 In an Order, respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a

granted to Beatriz and retainedTeresa as the administratrix of the

deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the

estate of the late Ramona Gonzales.

interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. The

underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap
the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate,
or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence

ISSUE:

or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential

motive to administer the estate correctly.

Whether or not the removal of Beatriz as co-administratix of the estate is

valid.

Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their

trust as entitle them to protection from removal without just
cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the
legal and specific causes authorizing the court to remove an

RULING:

administrator.

No. Removal of Beatriz as co-administratix of the estate is not among the

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in

ground for removal of administrator.

the removal of an administrator, it however must have some fact legally

before it in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an

The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named

act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable

executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to

to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it

give bond, or a person dies intestate, the court must appoint an

deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the

administrator of the estate of the deceased who shall act as

administrator. In making such a determination, the court must

representative not only of the court appointing him but also of the

exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.

heirs and the creditors of the estate. In the exercise of its discretion,
the probate court may appoint one, two or more co-administrators to

In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the

have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have

petitioner as co-administratrix on any of the causes specified in

different interests represented.

respondent's motion for relief of the petitioner. The court based the
removal of the petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the
estate,

conflicts

petitioner

and

and

misunderstandings

respondent

Teresa

Olbes

have
which

existed

between

allegedly

have

prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance that petitioner had
been absent from the country.

49

Case No 44

Instance of Davao against respondents, Carlos V. Matute and Matias

S. Matute, as defendants, in their capacities as co-administrators

G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983

of the estate of AmadeoMatuteOlave, for the collection of an

alleged indebtedness of P19,952.11. Defendants Carlos V. Matute and

ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE, as represented by JOSE S.

Matias S. Matute in said Civil Case No. 4623, filed an answer denying

MATUTE, Judicial Co-Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, Court

of

First

Instance

of

their lack of knowledge and questioning the legality of the claim of

Manila, petitioner,

SAMCO.

vs.
HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, Presiding Judge of Branch III,

An Amicable Settlementwas submitted to Court of First Instance of

Court of First Instance of Davao, Davao City; SOUTHWEST

Davao, whereby the property of the estate covered by OCT No. 0-27 of

AGRICULTURAL

as

Davao was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim.

(SAMCO); CARLOS V. MATUTE, as another Administrator of the

The said Amicable Settlement signed by the herein respondents was

Estate of AmadeoMatuteOlave, Sp. Proc. No. 25876 CFI, Manila;

not submitted to and approved by the then Court of First Instance

and MATIAS S. MATUTE, as former Co-Administrator of the Estate

of Manila, Branch IV, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, nor notice thereof

of

made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings.

MARKETING

AmadeoMatuteOlave,

CORPORATION

Sp.

Proc.

No.

also

known

25876,

CFI,

Despite the utter lack of approval of the probate court in Manila, the

Manila, respondents.

CFI Davao approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the same
the enforceability of a court decision.
FACTS:
ISSUE:

The petition alleged that the estate of AmadeoMatuteOlave is the

owner in fee simple of a parcel of land containing an area of 293,578

Whether or not the Amicable Settlement approved by the CFI Davao, not

square meters, situated province of Davao.

the probate court, is valid.

The Court of First Instance of Manila, as the probate court, issued

an order directing the co-administrators, Carlos V. Matute and Matias
S. Matute, to secure the probate court's approval before entering into
any transaction involving the seventeen (17) titles of the estate, of
which the property described in OCT No. 0-27 is one of them.

RULING:

Private respondent Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation

No. The Amicable Settlement not approved by the Probate Court is

(SAMCO) filed Civil Case No. 4623 with the respondent Court of First

50

invalid.

of the probate court of Manila, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, which has the
exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of AmadeoMatuteOlave. It was a

Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action

mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course

upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest

thereon

shall

be

commenced

against

the

executor

to Civil Case No. 4623, much less issue the questioned Order, dated

or

November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable Settlement.

administrator; ..." The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one

arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the
administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila

Case No. 45

(Sp. Proc. No. 25876) for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
AmadeoMatuteOlave; and the claim must be filed within the period

G.R. No. L-18936

prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever."

(Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court).

May 23, 1967

INTESTATE ESTATE OF ENCARNACION ELCHICO Vda. de

The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the

FERNANDO, deceased.

estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased

NATIVIDAD E. IGNACIO and LEONOR E.

persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to

ALMAZAN, administratrices-appellants,

examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which

vs.

should be allowed.

PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC., claimant appellee.

The primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to

apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the
FACTS:

claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its
payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the
administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire

August 29, 1951. Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. (Pambusco) lodged its

estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor

complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against two (2)

shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata

defendants

in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased.

Fernando for collection of P105,000.00 upon a contractual obligation.

Valentin

Fernando

and

EncarnacionElchicoVda.

de

It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in

January 23, 1955. EncarnacionElchicoVda. de Fernando died. By this

filing Civil Case No. 4623 in the then Court of First Instance of

time, Pambusco in the foregoing civil case had already presented its

Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which

evidence and submitted its case.

eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than twentynine (29) hectares of land belonging to the estate of the deceased

March 23, 1955. Intestate proceedings were filed. Notice to the estate's

AmadeoMatuteOlave in payment of its claim, without prior authority

creditors was given for them to file their claims within six (6) months

51

from this date, the first publication of the notice.

money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before

final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed

December 11, 1958. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance

to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.

of Manila rendered judgment in the civil case, ordering the

defendants to pay the Pambusco the sum of P93,000.00 together

The Philosophy behind the rule which provides for the dismissal of

with the costs of these proceedings.

the civil case is that, upon the death of defendant, all money claims
should be filed in the testate or interstate proceedings "to avoid

February 25, 1959.In Special Proceeding 25256, Intestate Estate of

EncarnacionElchicoVda.

Fernando,

Pambusco

registered

useless duplicity of procedure."7 Obviously, the legal precept just

its

quoted is procedural in nature. It outlines the method by which an

contingent claim in these special proceedings for whatever money

action for recovery of money, debt or interest may continue, upon the

judgment may be rendered in his favor in the civil suit.

terms therein prescribed. Whether the original suit for the recovery of
money as here proceeds to its conclusion, or is dismissed and the

January 25, 1961. The judgment in the civil case having reached

claim covered thereby filed with the probate court, one thing is certain:

finality, the probate court issued an order which allowed said amount
of

P46,500.00

to

be

paid

by

the

heirs

and/or

the

no substantial rights of the parties are prejudiced.

joint

administratrices, but no payment thereof shall be made until after the

However, at the time of the death of defendant EncarnacionElchicoVda.

administratrices shall have informed the Court in writing as to the

de Fernando, plaintiff Pambusco had already closed its evidence and

existence of other unsettled money claims against the estate and of the

submitted

sufficiency of the assets available for payment of all the debts.

its

case.

Her

administrator

substituted.

By

this

substitution, the estate had notice of the claim. The estate was
thus represented. The administrator of the estatetook active steps
to protect the interests of the estate. He went to trial. Defeated in

ISSUE:

the Court of First Instance, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. He

Whether or not Pambusos claim for payment of indebtness properly

has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say that said

admitted by Probate Court.

judgment reached after a full dress trial on the merits will

even elevated that civil case to this Court. Now that the judgment

now go for naught. The estate has thus waived its right to have
Pambusco's claim re-litigated in the estate proceedings. For, though
presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is generally understood

RULING:

that it may be waived by the estate's representative.And, waiver is to

be

Yes. It was properly admitted by the probate court.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides:

determined

from

the

administrator's

"acts

and

conduct."Certainly, the administrator's failure to plead the statute of

nonclaims, his active participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim,

SEC. 21. Where

in the civil suit, amount to such waiver.

claim does not survive. When the action is for recovery of

52

reconvened to consider his claims, plaintiff states that his failure to

present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it
Case Digest by KIM

was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his

will, expressly recognized them and directed that they should be paid.

V. CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE (RULES 86 & 88)

The inference is that had plaintiff's claims not been mentioned in the
will he would have presented to the committee as a matter of course;

G.R. No. L-8235

March 19, 1914

that plaintiff was held to believe by this express mention of his claims
in the will that it would be unnecessary to present them to the

# 46 - ISIDRO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant,

committee; and that he did not become aware of the necessity of

vs.

presenting them to the committee until after the committee had made

LEANDRA MANARANG, administratrix, defendant-appellee.

its final report.

*statute of non-claims

ISSUE: When and under what circumstances may the committee be

recalled to consider belated claims?
HELD:

FACTS:

Section 689 (civil procedure) provides:

Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of

That court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the case

certain real and personal property which, by his last will and

require for the creditors to present their claims the committee for

testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children. The fourth

examination and allowance; but not, in the first instance, more than

clause of this will reads as follows: I also declare that I have contracted

twelve months, or less than six months; and the time allowed shall be

the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be

stated in the commission. The court may extend the time as

religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time

circumstances require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed

agreed upon with my creditors.

eighteen months.

Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of

It is strictly confined, in its application, to claims against the estate of

the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and

deceased persons, and has been almost universally adopted as part of

various other described as falling due at different dates (the dates are

the probate law of the United States. It is commonly termed the

not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated
and a committee was regularly appointed to hear and determine such

statute of nonclaims, and its purpose is to settle the affairs of the

claims against the estate as might be presented. This committee

estate with dispatch, so that residue may be delivered to the persons

submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908.

entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond

in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of limitations,

In his petition of July 14, 1909, asking that the committee be

have not yet prescribed.

53

The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims

extension of this time under section 690 rested in the discretion of the

must be presented is to insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a

court. (Estate of De Dios, supra.) In other words, the court could

deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate in

extend this time and recall the committee for a consideration of the

the hands of the persons entitled to receive it. (Estate of De Dios, 24

plaintiff's claims against the estate of justice required it, at any time

Phil. Rep., 573.)

within the six months after January 23, 1908, or until July 23, 1908.
Plaintiff's petition was not presented until July 14, 1909. The bar of

Due possibly to the comparative shortness of the period of limitation

the statute of nonclaims is conclusive under these circumstances as

applying to such claims as compared with the ordinary statute of

the bar of the ordinary statute of limitations would be.

limitations, the statute of nonclaims has not the finality of the

ordinary statute of limitations. It may be safely said that a saving
provision, more or less liberal, is annexed to the statute of nonclaims
in every jurisdiction where is found. In this country its saving clause is
found in section 690, which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 88602

On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if

made within six months after the time previously limited, or, if a

April 6, 1990

# 47 - TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the

committee fails to give the notice required by this chapter, and such

Estate of the Deceased ALFREDO E. JACOB,petitioner,

application is made before the final settlement of the estate, the court

vs.

may, for cause shown, and on such terms as are equitable, renew the

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BICOL SAVINGS & LOAN

commission and allow further time, not exceeding one month, for the

ASSOCIATION, JORGE CENTENERA, AND LORENZO C.

committee to examine such claim, in which case it shall personally

ROSALES, respondents.

notify the parties of the time and place of hearing, and as soon as may
be make the return of their doings to the court.

FACTS:

If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient

Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob was the registered owner of a parcel of land in

cause for reconvening it for further consideration of claims which may

Naga City. Sometime in 1972 Jorge Centenera was appointed as

not have been presented before its final report was submitted to the

administrator of Hacienda Jacob until January 1, 1978 when the

court. But, this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee

Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by Dr. Jacob was

did give the notice required by law. Where the proper notice has been

revoked by the latter. Because of the problem of paying realty taxes,

given the right to have the committee recalled for the consideration of a

internal revenue taxes and unpaid wages of farm laborers of the

belated claim appears to rest first upon the condition that it is

hacienda, Dr. Jacob asked Centenera to negotiate for a loan. For this

presented within six months after the time previously limited for the

purpose, a special power of attorney was executed and acknowledged

presentation of claims. In the present case the time previously limited

by Dr. Jacob before notary public Lorenzo Rosales.

was six months from July 23, 1907. This allowed the plaintiff until
January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An

Consequently, Centenera secured a loan in the amount of P18,000.00

54

from the Bicol Savings & Loan Association sometime in September

against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security,

1972. Centenera signed and executed the real estate mortgage and

may abandon the security and prosecute claim in the manner provided

promissory note as attorney-in-fact of Dr. Jacob. When the loan fell

in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the

due in 1975 Centenera failed to pay the same but was able to arrange

estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security,

a restructuring of the loan using the same special power of attorney

by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party

and property as security. Again, Centenera failed to pay the loan when

defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of

it fell due and so he arranged for another restructuring of the loan

the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or

with the bank on November 23, 1976. Centenera again failed to pay

other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his

the loan upon the maturity date forcing the bank to send a demand

deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section;

letter. A copy of the demand letter was sent to Dr. Jacob but no reply

or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose

or denial was received by the bank. Thus, the bank foreclosed the real

the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations,

estate mortgage and the corresponding provisional sale of the

and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall

mortgaged property to the respondent bank was effected.

receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate;

but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or

Petitioner Tomasa Vda. De Jacob contends that the extrajudicial

administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by

foreclosure proceedings and the sale of the property mortgaged under

paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the direction of

the amended real estate mortgage after the mortgagor died are null

the court, if the court shall adjudge it to be for the best interest of the

and void. It is pointed out that Dr. Jacob died on March 9, 1979 and

estate that such redemption shall be made

that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were effected after his

death, that is, the public auction sale was made on May 11, 1979.

From the foregoing provision of the Rules it is clearly recognized that a

Petitioner argues that such extrajudicial foreclosure can only be

mortgagee has three remedies that may be alternately availed of in

prosecuted during the lifetime of Dr. Jacob for the reason that such

case the mortgagor dies, to wit:

kind of foreclosure under Act No. 3135, as amended, is authorized only

because of the special power of attorney inserted in the mortgage deed;

(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of

and that said special power of attorney cannot extend beyond the

the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;

lifetime of the supposed mortgagor.

(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an

ordinary claim; and;

ISSUE: whether or not an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage may

proceed even after the death of the mortgagor.

(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose

the same at anytime, before it is barred by prescription, without the

HELD: YES.

right to file a claim for any deficiency.

Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
From the foregoing it is clear that the mortgagee does not lose its light
to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage even after the death of the

Sec. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. A creditor holding a claim

55

mortgagor as a third alternative under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules

Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special

of Court.

Administrator of the estate of her late mother.

The power to foreclose a mortgage is not an ordinary agency that

contemplated exclusively the representation of the principal by the
agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for

The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as

the latter's own protection. That power survives the death of the

Special Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the

mortgagor.

appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration of

the estate. The significant highlights of his administration are listed
below:

# 48 - ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES, Petitioner,

- versus -

LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSO, et.al

G.R. No. 159130

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

August 22, 2008

5.

On January 8, 2002, Atty. Briones submitted the Special

Administrators Final Report for the approval of the court. He prayed

* claim of executor against the estate

that he be paid a commission of P97,850,191.26 representing eight

Facts:

percent (8%) of the value of the estate under his administration.

Respondent Ruby J. Henson filed on February 23, 1999 a petition for

6.

The respondents opposed the approval of the final report and

prayed that they be granted an opportunity to examine the documents,

the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J. Henson, with the

vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement of income and

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

disbursements. They likewise asked the trial court to deny the Atty.
Briones claim for commission and that he be ordered to refund the
sum of P134,126.33 to the estate.

Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceaseds daughters and also a

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

respondent in this petition, opposed Rubys petition. She alleged that

Ruby understated the value of their late mothers estate and acted with
unconscionable bad faith in the management thereof. Lilia prayed that
her mother's holographic will be disallowed and that she be appointed

HELD:

as the Intestate Administratrix.

56

From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrators

(c) allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against

commission is no less a claim against the estate than a claim that

the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on

third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this

behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

when it provides for Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an

Estate. Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a
claim against the estate is appealable as in ordinary cases.Hence, by

(d) settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or

the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the

guardian;

Special Administrators commission effectively, a claim by the

special administrator against the estate is the lower courts last
word on the matter and one that is appealable.

(e) constitutes, in the proceedings relating to the settlement of

the estate of a deceased person x x x a final determination in
the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that

Under these terms and taking into account the previous discussion of

no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special

the nature of the various parts of the Order of April 3, 2002, the lower

administrator.

courts determination of the special administrators commission is

clearly appealable while the auditors appointment is not. The latter,
under the express terms of the above provision, can be the subject of
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Where multi-appeals are allowed, we see no reason why a separate

petition for certiorari cannot be allowed on an interlocutory aspect of the
case that is separate and distinct as an issue from the aspect of the
case that has been adjudged with finality by the lower court. To

The petitioner is the special administrator in a settlement of estate, a

reiterate, the matter appealed matter was the special administrators

special proceeding governed by Rule 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of

commission, a charge that is effectively a claim against the estate

Court. Section 1, Rule 109 in part states:

under administration, while the matter covered by the petition

for certiorari was the appointment of an auditor who would pass upon

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be

the special administrators final account. By their respective natures,

taken. An interested person may appeal in special proceedings

these matters can exist independently of one another and can proceed

from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First

separately as envisioned by the Rules under Rule 109.

Instance or a Juvenile Domestic Relations Court, where such

order or judgment:

Case Digest by ICE

xxxxxxxxx
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE (RULES 86 &88)

57

#49 - ROMUALDEZ V. TIGLAO

24

JULY

ISSUE/S:

1981

GR NO. L-51151

Whether or not the action for revival was proper instead of presenting
the claim in the Special Proceeding in the settlement of Felisas estate

FACTS:
HELD:

Sometime in March 1960 Paz Romualdez and others sued Antonio

Tiglao and his sureties which includes FelisaTiglao for the payment of

The action for revival was proper.

unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota.

The appellant argues that the present action is one for the recovery
of a sum of money so that it is barred by Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the
The CFI of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of Romualdez adjudging

Rules of Court and that the remedy of Romualdez and others is to

Tiglao and others liable for the unpaid rentals, damages, attorneys

present their claim in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First

fees plus costs.

Instance of Rizal.

A writ of attachment has been issued, however, the judgment was not

The SC held that the original judgment, which was rendered on May

satisfied.

31, 1960, has become stale because of its non-execution after the
lapse of five years (Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).

Romualdez sought for the revival of the judgment sometime in 1970

and during that time Felisa was already dead. Felisas estate was

Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of FelisaTiglao

represented by the Special AdministratrixManingningTiglao-Naguiat.

unless it is first revived by action.

Maningning filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that under Sec. 1 of

This is precisely why Romualdez and others have instituted the second

Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, "No action upon a claim for the
recovery

of

money

or

debt

or

interest

thereon

shall

suit whose object is not to make the Estate of FelisaTiglao pay the

be

sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep

commenced against the executor or administrator.

alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be

presented as claims against the estate in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of

The lower court nevertheless granted the revival.

the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

Hence, an appeal by the estate of Felisa.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment insofar as the Estate

of FelisaTiglao is concerned, its appeal is hereby DISMISSED with

58

costs against the appellant.

Alfonso also filed a Petition for Letters of Administration, as well as
filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR

Settlement of Estate.

(RULES 87 & 89)

Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not

the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.
Orfinada,

#50 - RIOFERIO V. CA

13 JANUARY 2004

Jr.

in

view

of

the

pendency

of

the

administration

proceedings.

GR NO. 129008

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the
estate pending the appointment of an administrator.

FACTS:
AfonsoOrfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and
real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan and Kalookan City. He

HELD:

also left a widow, the respondent Esperanza Orfinada, whom he had

seven children who were also respondents in this case.

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without

doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the
decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New

The decedent also left his paramour and their children, they are

Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the

petitioner Teodora Rioferio and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and

moment of the death of the decedent."

Rowena.

The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the

On Nov. 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate

property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the

children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner Teodora and her

inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another

children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased

or others by his will or by operation of law.

Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the

decedent located in Dagupan City.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the

59

heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been
appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of
advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation namely

The money (rentals) allegedly due is not property in the hands of the

Sec. 3, Rule 3 and Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.

administrator, it is not thus within the effective control of the probate

court. Neither does it come within the concept of money of the
deceased concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away, which would
confer upon the court incidental prerogative to reach out its arms to

ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR

get it back and, if necessary to cite the possessor thereof in contempt.

(RULES 87 & 89)

ISSUE/S:
#51 - DELA CRUZ V. CAMON

30 APRIL 1966

Whether or not the administrator can demand by mere motion.

GR NO. L-21034

HELD:
FACTS:

NO. When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party

The estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was owner of

jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the

against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the courts

administrator, but by an independent action against the third

2/4 share pro-indiviso of Hacienda Rosario in Negros Occidental.

person.
That whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon since long
before the present intestate proceedings were commenced.
Camon is a third person, hence, the administrator may not pull him
against his will, by motion, into the administration proceedings. We are
Sometime in Oct. 1962, the administrator of the estate (Dela Cruz)

fortified in our view that even matters affecting property under judicial

moved to the court for an order to direct Emilio Camon to pay the

administration may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the

estates 2/4 share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario. Emilio Camon

course of intestate proceedings, if the interests of third persons are

challenged the probate courts jurisdiction over his person. The court

prejudiced.

ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made by mere

motion by the administrator but by independent action. The
administrator appealed.

Case Digest by RAYMOND

60

Alejandro oppose the said petition claiming that the testate proceeding

#55 - Guilas vs judge CFI-Pampanga

had already been closed and terminated and that he ceased as a

Facts:

consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased; and that

Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of

on 1936 Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as

the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate, when

her sole heir and executor

she could have filed a petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60)
days from December 15, 1960

In the year 1953 Juanita Lopez,was declared legally adopted daughter

and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro .After adopting

In her reply Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution

legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doa Jacinta did

of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the order of the court

not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as

declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings, determines the

one of her heirs.

termination of the probate proceedings

jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment

In the Testate Proceedings the will was admitted to probate the

of all the taxes, and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs

surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed

entitled to receive the same"); that the executor Alejandro is estopped

executor

from opposing her petition because he was the one who prepared, filed
and secured court approval of, the aforesaid project of partition, which

in a project of partition executed by both Alejandro and Juanita, the

right of Juanita to inherit from Jacinta was recognized

she seeks to be implemented; that she is not guilty of laches, because

and 2 lots

when she filed on July 20, 1964, her petition for he delivery of her

where given to Juanita.

share allocated to her under the project of partition, less than 3 years
had elapsed from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of

the lower court approved the said project of partition and directed that

partition was approved, which is within the 5-year period for the

the records of the case be sent to the archives, upon payment of the

execution of judgment by motion.

estate and inheritance taxes

Issue:

on April 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate

ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partitionon the

won

ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray further that

juanitas contention is correct in stating that the actual delivery

and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the

Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all

order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings,

the crops and to deliver immediately to Juanita lots in the project

determines the termination of the probate proceedings

partition.
While in the

the probate court loses

Held:

Testate Proceedings No. 1426, Juanita filed a petition

dated July 20, 1964 praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration

to her the actual possession of said 2 lots as well as the lessees of the

only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate

said two lots.

61

delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the

THE

approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate

JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.

the probate proceeding

HONORABLE

COURT

OF

APPEALS

and

CONCORDIA

Facts :

as long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and

Case involves the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. died a bachelor,

terminated

without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or

nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,

because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not

petitioner CeledoniaSolivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother,

prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided

SalustiaSolivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-

the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83

Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

Phil., 137)

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his

Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded,

aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a

which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and

foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving

recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or

students obtain a college education.Celedonia told Concordia about

any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the

Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after

aforecited doctrines.

his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the

In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her

plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to

share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from

Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she

August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approve

filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, stating that

and within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when the original project of
partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots

Petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately

allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. And

preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the

in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of

deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the

1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated December 15,

late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to

1960 of the probate court closing and terminating the probate case did

the filing of the petition they (petitioner CeledoniaSolivio and movant

not legally terminate the testate proceedings, for her share under the

Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a

project of partition has not been delivered to her.

foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their
filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house
which are not far away for (sic) each other.

#56

CELEDONIA

SOLIVIO, petitioner,

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the

vs.

proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in

62

good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977
Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an

ISSUE: 1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to

amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be

entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia

issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that

Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the

after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting,

probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch

the estate be adjudicated to her.

23 of the same court;

The court declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold

HELD:

properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the
deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE

SC finds merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial

JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the

Court,

Securities and Exchange Commission.

Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate

Branch

26,

lacked

jurisdiction

to

entertain

Concordia

of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No.
Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of

2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of

the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr.,

the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and

because she too was an heir of the deceased. her motion was denied

approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing

by the court for tardinessInstead of appealing the denial, Concordia

the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings`

filed with the rtc of Iloilo for partition, recovery of possession,

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring

ownership and damages.

Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did
trial court rendered it judgement in favor of Concordia Javellana-

not toll the end of the proceedings .In view of the pendency of the

Villanueva.the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment

probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now

pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and

RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring

accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those

Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia)

orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had

declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the

already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the

deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy

'SalustiaSolivioVda. deJavellana Foundation." The trial court denied

when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the

her motions for reconsideration.

Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of

that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for

Celedonia appealed to the ca and rendered judgment affirming the

the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate

decision of the trial court.

action was improperly

filed for it is the probate

court

that

has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the

estate.

63

in the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and

continued living together as husband and wife, his father supporting

conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not

them and introducing him to the public as his natural child; that even

interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.

the family of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the
year 1944, his father and mother separated, and subsequently, his

The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No.

father married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result

13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly

of the marriage, two (2) children were born herein petitioners Lourdes

Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia

Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.

Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr.,

ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix,

his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad del

Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were

Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then

improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he

Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate proceedings for the

estate of his deceased father, docketed therein as Special Proceedings

within the exclusive competence of the probate court.x

No.

9092;

that

in

the

said

intestate

proceedings,

petitioners

deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs and for this reason they
succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated
and partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate proceedings

# 57 - G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989

were terminated on November 9, 1953;

NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual

having no knowledge of the intestate proceedings and came to know

capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors ANTONIO

ALBERTO,

JR.

and

LOURDES

about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the

ALBERTO, petitioners,

petitioners who refused to give him his share. Accordingly, he prays

vs.

that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as the natural child

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J. ALBERTO, JR.,

assisted

by

his

mother

as

his

natural

guardian,

of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over to him

ANDREA

JONGCO, respondents.

petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the cause
of action is barred by prior judgment; and (2) that the cause of action
is also barred by the statute of limitation. The trial court issued an
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. But after the respondent filed an

Facts:

answer

to the complaint

the Court orders the dismissal of the

complaint . Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision,

in 1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea

appealed to respondent Court, respondent Court reversed the decision

Jongco, lived together as husband and wife and as a result of which,

of the trial court.

he was born on September 10, 1942; that during the time that his
alleged father and mother lived together as husband and wife and up

MR was filed and was denied thus this instant petition.

to the time of his birth, both were single and had no legal impediment
to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and mother

64

ISSUE: won THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of

HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION

which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court

WAS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.

or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed

and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of .

HELD:
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
estate of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No.

Case digest by Kim and Butsi

9092) had already been terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order

of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the

# 58 -Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu

persons entitled thereto and that in said proceedings the court also
declared who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the instant

Facts:BibianoBarretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their

case which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as

lifetime, they acquired vast estate (real property inManila, Pampanga

an acknowledged natural child of the deceased in order to establish his

and Bulacan). When Bibiano died (Feb. 18, 1936), he left his share in a

rights to the inheritance is already barred by prior judgment

will to SaludBarretto(mother of the minors) and Lucia Milagros

(Petitioners' Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent's insistence that he

Barretto; and a small portion as legacies to his sisters Rosa Barretto

had no knowledge or notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged

andFelisaBarretto and his nephew and nieces.

natural father

fishpond

was

reserved

for

Maria

(the

The usufruct of a

widow).

Asappointed

administratrix, Maria prepared a project of partition, signed by her in

Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit.

her own behalf and as guardian ofthe minor Milagros. It was approved,
and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered. Salud took

This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and

immediatepossession of her share and secured the cancellation of

settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are

OCTs and issuance of new titles in her name.

binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the

Upon Marias death

(Mar. 5, 1948), it was discovered that she executed two wills: in the

subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally

first, she instituted Saludand Milagros as her heirs; in the second, she

bound. The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested,

revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagrosalone.

through the publication of the notice prescribed ... and any order that

The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first

may be entered therein is binding against all of them .It was ruled

will presented by Tirso Reyes (asguardian of the children of

further that a final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased

SaludBarretto), the TC held that Salud was not the daughter of the

person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees; and

decedent Maria byher husband Bibiano. The SC affirmed the same.

that the only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding

TC: The project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the

may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of

settlement of the estate of Bibiano is nulland void ab initio (not merely

circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence

voidable) because the distributee (Salud), predecessor of Tirsoet. al.,

not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure

wasnot a daughter of the Sps. Bibiano and Maria. The nullity of the

relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the

project of partition was decreed on thebasis of Art. 1081 (OCC) (A

65

partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being

impinged on thelegitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason

so, hasbeen included, shall be null and void). As Milagros was the only

cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano. Nor does the factthat

true heir of Bibiano, she was entitled torecover from Salud and her

Milagros was allotted in her fathers will a share smaller than her

successors all the properties received by her from Bibianos estate, in

legitime invalidate the institution of Saludas heir, since there was no

view ofArt. 1456 (NCC) which states that property acquired by mistake

preterition or total omission of a forced heir here.The view that the

or fraud is held by its acquirer in impliedtrust for the real

partition in question is void for being a compromise on the civil status

owner.Having lost the fight for a share in the estate of Maria as her

of Salud, in violationof Art. 1814 (OCC) is erroneous. A compromise

legitimate heir, Tirso now falls back upon the remnantof the estate of

presupposes

Bibiano (the fishpond), which was given in usufruct to Maria. Hence,

concessions of the parties; and the condition of Salud as daughter of

this action for the recovery ofthe one-half portion thereof. This

the testator Bibiano, while untrue, was atno time disputed during the

action afforded Milagros an opportunity to set up her right of

settlement of the estate of testator. There can be no compromise over

ownership; notonly of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other

issues not indispute. While a compromise over civil status is

properties willed and delivered to Salud, for being aspurious heir, and

prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the partiesover the

not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano, thereby directly

share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.At any rate,

attacking the validity, not onlyof the project of partition, but of the

independently of the project of partition (a mere proposal for

decision of the court based thereon as well.

distribution of estate), it is the courtalone that makes the distribution

the

settlement

of

controversy

through

mutual

of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts
Issues/Held:

to whicheach is entitled. It is that judicial decree of distribution, once

final, that vests title in the distributees. Where acourt has validly

(1) W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in

issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has become

question is void ab initio and Salud did notacquire valid title to it. No.

final, the validity orinvalidity of the project of partition becomes

irrelevant.

(2) W/N Milagros action is barred by the statute of limitations. YES.

Ratio (1) Art. 1081 (OCC) is misapplied!

Salud admittedly

(2) Milagros contends that as Maria could not have ignored that Salud

had

was not her child, the act of Maria inagreeing to the partition and

been instituted heir in Bibianos last will andtestament together with

distribution was a fraud on her rights and entitles her to belief. This

Milagros. Hence, the partition had between them could not be one

contention isunfounded.First, there is no evidence that when Bibianos

such had with a partywho was believed to be an heir without really

estate was judicially settled and distributed, Salud knew that shewas

being one, and was not null and void under Art. 1081. The legalprecept

not Bibianos child. Thus, if fraud was committed, it was Maria who

of Art. 1081 does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs

was solely responsible; and neitherSalud nor her minor children can

(without distinction betweenforced, voluntary or intestate ones), and

be held liable therefor.Second, granting there was such fraud, relief

the fact that Salud did not happen to be a daughter of the testator

therefor can be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and

doesnot preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his

therecord shows that this period had elapsed a long time ago. At the

testament; for Bibiano was at liberty to assign thefree portion of his

time of distribution, Milagros was only 16. She became of age 5 years

estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud

later (1944). On that year, hercause of action accrued to contest on the

66

ground of fraud the court decree distributing her fathers estateand

their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she

the 4-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948.

married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. On 16 April 1972

Conceding that Milagros only becameaware of the true facts in 1946,

Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong

her action still became extinct in 1950. Her action was barred in

filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

Aug.1956, when she filed her counterclaim in this case contesting the

issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of

decree of distribution of Bibianos estate. There is no evidence of an

Arturo

alleged verbal promise by Tirso to reconvey the properties received by

BlandinaDandan (also referred to as BlandinaPadlan), claiming to be

Salud,which allegedly induced Milagros to delay the filing of the action.

the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,

Granting that there was such promise, itwould not bind Tirsos wards,

Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the

who are the real parties-in-interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by

children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed

aguardian, being an act of disposition, and not of administration,

appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in

cannot bind his wards, being null and voidas to them unless duly

favor of

authorized by the proper court

Cabasal was later replaced by HiginoCastillon. On 30 April 1973 the

in

favor

of

the

Philippine

Trust

City for

Company. Respondent

for the

the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.

oppositors

(Blandina

and

Padlanchildren)

submitted

certified

Dispositive: CFI decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as it

photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment

orders Tirso to reconvey to Milagros theproperties enumerated in said

of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,

decision. The same is AFFIRMED, insofar as it denies any right of

claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,

Milagros toaccounting. The action for partition of the fishpond must be

intervened. On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate

GIVEN DUE COURSE.

declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate.

Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was

No. 59 - G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998FE

D.

decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules

QUITA,

of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court

petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, *

as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the

respondents.

distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the

Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with
children.

Somewhere

along

the

way

their

relationship

soured.

Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,

ISSUE: Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further

U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing

proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no

dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from

legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of

each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July

the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to

1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks

who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the

thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but

decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition

67

based on establish facts and admissions of the parties. We cannot

lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely

sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is

applying

clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are

respondent's

lawful heirs of the

shares to

which

deceased

each

person

person or
is

as

to

the

the distributive

entitled under the

the

ruling

in

Tenchavez

v.

Escao.Then

in

private

motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's

decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in

law, the

the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may

controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,

provided they are valid according to their national law. . We deduce
that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of
their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to

Ruling: We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the

determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce.

right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo
# 60 - Emilio Pacioles v. MiguelaChuatoco-Ching

Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But

controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of
Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to
appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the

Facts:

motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate,

simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth

1. Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by herhusband

of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after

(petitioner) and two minor children.

which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of

heirswould be deemed submitted for resolution. We note that in her

2. Emilio filed a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelitas estate.

comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among

others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit

3. Miguelitas mother filed an opposition to the petition for issuance of

from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the

letters of administration. That the bulk of the estate is composed of

U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above

paraphernal properties. She wishedto be appointed. She also said that

quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a

she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half

Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the

of her inherited properties to the deceased on condition that they

divorce that they obtained.12 Reading between the lines, the

would undertake a business endeavor as partners.

implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the

time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial

4. The mother asked that one Emmanuel be appointed.

court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of

a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid

5. Court appointed Emilio and Emmanuel as joint-administrator.

of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of

the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the

6.

68

No

claims

were

filed.

Thereafter,

Emilio

filed

an

inventory.Emmanuel failed to file one.

not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court

may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional,

7. Court declared Emilio and his children as the only compulsoryheirs

not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action

of the deceased

to resolve title

8. Emilio then petitioned the court for the payment of estate tax

2. Reliance to Pastor v. CA

andthe partition and distribution of the estate.

a. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in
9. RTC denied the petition as to the partition and distribution. CA

sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing

affirmed.

on respondents claim. Such reliance is misplaced.

Issue: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass

b. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose

upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of

of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon

the decedents estate?

questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a

property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case

Held:

show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.

1. General Rule:

i. First, the inventory was not disputed.

a. jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate

Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the

court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the

exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to

estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to

be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory,

the determination of questions of ownership thatarise during the

taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate

proceedings.

properties.

i. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special

ii. Second, Emmanuel (respondents son) did not file an inventory

and limited jurisdiction.

1. He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those
b. A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an

properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he

intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of

did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with

ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property

petitioners inventory.

should be included in the inventoryi. Pastor v. CA

2. Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
1. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extrataneous matter

jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-

which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the

off stance on the matter. It is well- settled in this jurisdiction,

purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should

sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a

69

question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the

account of the plaintiff the sum of P5098, with legal interest and costs,

estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be

the plaintiff to secure damages in the amount of P10,000 more or less,

his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the

and the defendant to be absolved totally from the amended complaint.

deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,

As it is conceded that the plaintiff has already received the sum

such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or

represented by the United States treasury, warrant, which is in

probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction

question, the appeal will thus determine the amount, if any, which

to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court

should be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant.

in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.

The parties to the case are PaulinoGullas and the Philippine National
a. Jurisprudence states that:

Bank. The first named is a member of the Philippine Bar, resident in

the City of Cebu. The second named is a banking corporation with a

i. probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or

branch in the same city. Attorney Gullas has had a current account

intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to

with the bank.

be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside

parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to

It appears from the record that on August 2, 1933, the Treasurer of the

determine whether they should or should not be included in the

United States for the United States Veterans Bureau issued a Warrant

inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator.

in

If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties,

SabectoriaBacos. PaulinoGullas and Pedro Lopez signed as endorsers

the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an

of this check. Thereupon it was cashed by the Philippine National

ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of

Bank. Subsequently the treasury warrant was dishonored by the

title because the probate court cannot do so.

Insular Treasurer.

3. Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court

At that time the outstanding balance of Attorney Gullas on the books

of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum

of the bank was P509. Against this balance he had issued certain

for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties

cheeks which could not be paid when the money was sequestered by

ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate

the On August 20, 1933, Attorney Gullas left his residence for Manila.

the

amount

of

$361,

payable

to

the

order

of

Francisco

The bank on learning of the dishonor of the treasury warrant sent

notices by mail to Mr. Gullas which could not be delivered to him at
#

61

PAULINOGULLAS,

that time because he was in Manila. In the bank's letter of August 21,

vs.

1933, addressed to Messrs. PaulinoGulla and Pedro Lopez, they were

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

informed that the United States Treasury warrant No. 20175 in the
name of Francisco SabectoriaBacos for $361 or P722, the payment for

Both parties to this case appealed from a judgment of the Court of

which had been received has been returned by our Manila office with

First Instance of Cebu, which sentenced the defendant to return to the

the notation that the payment of his check has been stopped by the

70

Insular Treasurer. "In view of this therefore we have applied the

indorser and that the right of action against him does not accrue until

outstanding balances of your current accounts with us to the part

the notice is given. (Asia Banking Corporation vs. Javier [1923] 44

payment of the foregoing check", namely, Mr. PaulinoGullas P509. On

Phil., 777; 5 Uniform Laws Annotated.)

the return of Attorney Gullas to Cebu on August 31, 1933, notice of

dishonor was received and the unpaid balance of the United States

As a general rule, a bank has a right of set off of the deposits in its

Treasury warrant was immediately paid by him.

hands for the payment of any indebtedness to it on the part of a

depositor. In Louisiana, however, a civil law jurisdiction, the rule is

As a consequence of these happenings, two occurrences transpired

denied, and it is held that a bank has no right, without an order from

which inconvenienced Attorney Gullas. In the first place, as above

or special assent of the depositor to retain out of his deposit an

indicated, checks including one for his insurance were not paid

amount sufficient to meet his indebtedness. The basis of the Louisiana

because of the lack of funds standing to his credit in the bank. In the

doctrine is the theory of confidential contracts arising from irregular

second place, periodicals in the vicinity gave prominence to the news

deposits, e. g., the deposit of money with a banker. With freedom of

to the great mortification of Gullas.lawphil.net

selection and after full preference to the minority rule as more in

harmony with modern banking practice.

A variety of incidental questions have been suggested on the record

which it can be taken for granted as having been adversely disposed of

Starting, therefore, from the premise that the Philippine National Bank

in this opinion. The main issues are two, namely, (1) as to the right of

had with respect to the deposit of Gullas a right of set off, we next

Philippine National Bank, and to apply a deposit to the debt of

consider if that remedy was enforced properly. The fact we believe is

depositor to the bank and (2) as to the amount damages, if any, which

undeniable that prior to the mailing of notice of dishonor, and without

should be awarded Gullas.

waiting for any action by Gullas, the bank made use of the money
standing in his account to make good for the treasury warrant. At this

The Civil Code contains provisions regarding compensation (set off)

point recall that Gullas was merely an indorser and had issued in good

and deposit. (Articles 1195 et seq., 1758 et seq. The portions of

faith.

Philippine law provide that compensation shall take place when two
persons are reciprocally creditor and debtor of each other (Civil Code,

As to a depositor who has funds sufficient to meet payment of a check

article 1195). In his connection, it has been held that the relation

drawn by him in favor of a third party, it has been held that he has a

existing between a depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor

right of action against the bank for its refusal to pay such a check in
the absence of notice to him that the bank has applied the funds so

The Negotiable Instruments Law contains provisions establishing the

deposited in extinguishment of past due claims held against him.

liability of a general indorser and giving the procedure for a notice of

(Callahan vs. Bank of Anderson [1904], 2 Ann. Cas., 203.) The decision

dishonor. The general indorser of negotiable instrument engages that if

cited represents the minority doctrine, for on principle it would seem

he be dishonored and the, necessary proceedings of dishonor be duly

that notice is not necessary to a maker because the right is based on

taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder. (Negotiable

the doctrine that the relationship is that of creditor and debtor.

Instruments Law, sec. 66.) In this connection, it has been held a long

However this may be, as to an indorser the situation is different, and

line of authorities that notice of dishonor is in order to charge all

notice should actually have been given him in order that he might

71

protect his interests.

FACTS: The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a

petition claiming the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of

We accordingly are of the opinion that the action of the bank was

Escheat. Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the exclusive owner of the

prejudicial to Gullas. But to follow up that statement with others

said hacienda, assailed the petition upon the grounds that the petition

proving exact damages is not so easy. For instance, for alleged libelous

does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy

articles the bank would not be primarily liable. The same remark could

prayed for. Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under

be made relative to the loss of business which Gullas claims but which

a contract legally entered with Coelegio de San Jose, also intervened in

could not be traced definitely to this occurrence. Also Gullas having

the case. Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to the

eventually been reimbursed lost little through the actual levy by the

appearance and intervention of CdSJ and Carlos Young but such

bank on his funds. On the other hand, it was not agreeable for one to

objection was overruled. Furthermore the lower court dismissed the

draw checks in all good faith, then, leave for Manila, and on return find

petition filed for by Municipal Council of San Pedro.

that those checks had not been cashed because of the action taken by
the bank. That caused a disturbance in Gullas' finances, especially
with reference to his insurance, which was injurious to him. All facts

ISSUE: W/N the petition for escheats should be dismissed?

and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that Gullas

should be awarded nominal damages because of the premature action
of the bank against which Gullas had no means of protection, and
have finally determined that the amount should be P250.

RULING: YES. According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure

Agreeable to the foregoing, the errors assigned by the parties will in

(now Sec 1 of Rule 91), the essential facts which should be alleged in

the main be overruled, with the result that the judgment of the trial

the petition, which are jurisdictional because they confer jurisdiction

court will be modified by sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff

upon the CFI are:

the sum of P250, and the costs of both instances.

1. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will,
2. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner
RULE 91

thereof,
3. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the
property, and

No. 62 - MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA V.

4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where

COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE

deceased has his last residence or in case he should have no residence

in the country, the municipality where the property is situated.

72

The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, temporal property of the Father of
Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of Rule 91) provides that after the publications

the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by the order of the King of

and trial, if the court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of

Spain. From the moment it was confiscated, it became the property of

real and personal property situated in the country and has not left any

the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact, it is evident that

heir or other person entitled there to, it may order, after payment of

the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them, if

debts and other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall

the court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and

adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the

personal property situated in the country and has not left any heir or

deceased had his last residence and the real property to the

other person entitled there to, it may order, after payment of debts and

municipality/ies where they are situated.

other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall adjudicate
the personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his

Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a

last residence and the real property to the municipality/ies where they

deceased person become the property of the State upon his death

are situated.

without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action but a
special proceeding. The proceeding should be commenced by a petition

Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a

and not by a complaint.

deceased person become the property of the State upon his death
without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action but a

In a special proceeding for Escheat under section 750to 752 (now

special proceeding. The proceeding should be commenced by a petition

sec 1 to 3 of Rule 91), the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive

and not by a complaint.

interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or Interest

in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and

In a special proceeding for Escheat under section 750to 752 (now

necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.

sec 1 to 3 of Rule 91), the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive
interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or Interest

When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the

in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and

petitioner to the remedy prayed for and even admitting them

necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.

hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the court to

proceed to the Inquisition provided by law, an interested party should

When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the

not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is

petitioner to the remedy prayed for and even admitting them

untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is

hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the court to

entertained

proceed to the Inquisition provided by law, an interested party should

upon

this

ground

the

petition

may

be dismissed

unconditionally.

not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is

untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is

In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to

entertained

intervene as an alleged exclusive owner and a lessee of the property

upon this

unconditionally.

respectively.

73

ground

the

petition

may

be

dismissed

In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to

the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact, it is evident that

intervene as an alleged exclusive owner and a lessee of the property

the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them,

respectively.

because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased

person who has not left any person which may legally claim it (2nd

The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the

requirement lacking).

Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, temporal property of the Father of

the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by the order of the King of
Spain. From the moment it was confiscated, it became the property of

74