Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Owen Temby
McGill University
Abstract The objective of this article is to clarify the significance and usefulness of levels
of analysis, a central IR concept, but one often used unproblematically. I argue that a level
of analysis should be defined as a social structure that is examined for its effects on
another social structure, or on the same social structure. Therefore, levels of analysis are
also relational, meaning that one is defined, in part, in terms of its associated unit of
analysis. Because this definition conceptualizes levels of analysis as methodological tools
rather than ontological postulates, it is consistent with a wide range of positions on the
agent-structure debate. More specifically, I show that the methodological issue of which
levels of analysis a researcher employs is separate from the ontological issue of whether the
theoretical lens is atomistic (reductionist) or holistic at any given level. One implication of
this definition is that researchers need not view their ontological commitments as overly
methodologically constraining. This article also addresses some questions raised by this
conceptualization, among them the possibility of multiple social structures existing at
a single level.
Introduction
Since at least as early as 1961, when J David Singer published his famous article
on the topic, levels of analysis have been a prominent analytical concept in
international relations (IR) discourse. Neorealists, neoclassical realists and
democratic peace theorists all define their theoretical approaches in terms of the
levels of analysis they employ; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1990) use the
concept as their primary means of distinguishing IR theories, and Wendt-inspired
constructivists rely on the distinction between micro- and macro-levels of
structure to provide an account of ideational structural change (Wendt 1999, 2003;
Checkel 2005; Mabee 2007). Despite their common usage, however, there seems
to be little agreement about what levels of analysis actually are, or how they
should be used. It should come as little surprise, then, that some scholars have
insisted that the concept has led to more confusion than it has granted in analytical
precision (Walker 1993; Moravcsik 2003), and that it should be eliminated
altogether (Patomaki 2002).
A previous draft of this article was presented at the 2011 annual conference of the
International Studies Association Northeast in Providence, Rhode Island. I thank Patrick
Thaddius Jackson, Arne Ruckert, Brian Schmidt, Alexander Wendt and the anonymous
reviewers for the many helpful comments on earlier drafts.
q 2013 Centre of International Studies
Owen Temby
2
722
See Onuf (1998) for a discussion of the indispensability of levels in social inquiry.
Onuf also provides an alternative historical overview of levels of analysis in IR to what is
presented in this article and expresses concerns similar to mine about conflating ontology
and methodology when conceptualizing levels.
2
For an overview of constitutive reasoning, see Wendt (1998); for an overview of
critical realism, see Dessler (1999), Patomaki and Wight (2000) or Jackson (2010).
4
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international system levels (and apparently eliminate the individual level) is not
arbitrary, but rather flows logically from the decision to study the international
system and the acknowledgement that states are its constituent elements by
definition. This definition of levels of analysis is consistent with Wendts (1999)
distinction between micro- and macro-levels of structure, and as such does not
replace Waltzs (1959) three levels, but instead compliments them. Singers state
level is not the same as Waltzs as the latters is an independent variable and the
formers is a subset of the international system level which portrays that level
from the standpoint of the stateswhat Wendt (1999) and Buzan et al (1993)
refer to as the interaction (or micro-)level.3
Understanding the distinction between the second image state level and the
interaction level is key here. As stated above, the second image uses properties
of states such as their domestic institutions, production processes and
social identities to explain behaviour. The interaction level, on the other hand,
posits a causal mechanism at the level of the international system, but at the microlevel, which depicts the international system from the states point of view and
explains state behaviour with reference to the relationship between states (Wendt
1999). This level has been conceptualized in recognition of the phenomenon of
emergent properties resulting from the interactions of states in accordance with no
properties other than their desires and the beliefs they have about how to meet
these desires when they take each other into account when making choices. These
types of structures are characteristic of micro-economic theorizing and game
theory where, in the latter case, units may bargain and exhibit common
perceptions about the activity that they are engaging in.
Similarly, Singers (1961, 84 85) only posited causal mechanisms are
state goals, motivation, and purpose in national policy, which are consciously
envisaged and more or less rationally pursued.4 He also discusses actor
perceptions, in terms of whether scholars need to account for them
when modelling their behaviour. This appears to be a clear example of the use of
the interaction level since Singer abstracts away all properties of states except those
relevant to their strategic interaction. To understand or predict state behaviour,
then, he need only specify the content of these properties and position states in
relation to one another in the form of a game-theoretic model.
It appears that Singers international system level, also, is a subset of Waltzs
third image international system level, in this case the one which Wendt refers to
as the systemic (or macro-)level of analysis, which he defines as the level of
multiply realizable outcomes since many different combinations of micro-level
interactions will result in the same macro-level outcome.5 Here the posited causal
3
One might reasonably claim that, in fact, Singer is not talking about two levels of
structure, but about agent and structure, another important dichotomy in structural theory.
I disagree with this on the basis that agent and structure is an ontological problem, and
Singers concern is unambiguously methodological. The question he addresses regards the
best way to study things, not the way things are.
4
Even though these are Singers only causal mechanisms (and thus define his state
level of analysis) I admit that he also treats his state as a dependent variable and, insofar as
he does, employs it as a unit of analysis.
5
Wendts language is confusing here, so I shall clarify. According to Wendt (1999),
every structure has two levels, the micro- and macro-level. The international system, as a
structure, is no different. In the case of this structure, the micro-level is called the
interaction level, and the macro-level is called the systemic level. His failure to more
clearly explicate this point has, arguably, led to a lot of confusion about how these two
levels of the international system contribute to our knowledge of levels of analysis on the
one hand, and agent and structure on the other. See Onuf (1998) for an expression of
uncertainty due to the ambiguity of Buzan et als (1993) conceptualization of the interaction
level.
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Hollis and Smith (1990) distinguish between causal (outsider) explanations and
interpretive (insider) explanations, and argue that holism and individualism are
compatible with both. What is important here is that holism and individualism are
placed on the same causal or interpretive continuum and allowed to be a part of either story,
which enables the difference between holism and individualism to be reduced to simply the
magnitude of their constraining effects.
Although this was a novel insight in the levels of analysis debate, the proposition that
scientific inquiry presupposes ontology dates at least as far back as Friedrich Nietzsche. In
his words, [s]trictly speaking, there is no such thing as science without any
presuppositions; this thought does not bear thinking through since it is paralogical: a
philosophy, a faith, must always be there first of all, so that science can acquire from it a
direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right to exist (1967, 151 152).
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The debate between Wendt and Hollis and Smith continued among other
scholars (Carlsnaes 1994; Smith 1994; Jabri and Chan 1996; Hollis and Smith 1996;
Chan 1998), but did not continue to explicitly address the levels of analysis
problem. This is unfortunate since the initial debate left much unresolved, in
particular the specifics of how the ontological question of what is relates to the
methodological problem of how to study what is. How do we reconcile Hollis and
Smiths point about an ontological problem existing at every level of analysis with
Wendts enriched conception of holism defined in terms of generative and
constitutive effects (rather than simply constraining and causal effects) of
structure? I shall attempt to resolve this matter below.
Levels of analysis reconfigured
The fact that levels of analysis have been used in so many different ways indicates
a demand for language that will give expression to these various related concepts.
To grant us sufficient leverage, a definition of the term should be able to clearly
specify how levels of analysis, micro- and macro-structure and agent and
structure fit together. It should be consistent with how the concept has been used
historically since its inception, but it should also enable scholars with different
ontological and epistemological commitments to converse about the nouns which
constitute IR, even if their views about the ontological status of these nouns differ.
Broadly stated, therefore, I define a level of analysis as a social structure which is
examined for its effects on another social structure, or on the same social
structuresuch as when examining the effects of an anthropomorphized states
regime type on its social identities.8 If we wish to limit these effects to causal
effects, we can define a level of analysis more narrowly, as an antecedent social
structure whose properties are examined to explain the behaviour or properties of
a contingent structure.9 Following Nuri Yurdusevs (1993) and John Gerrings
(2004) example, I call the contingent structure a unit of analysis, thus
differentiating it in definition from a level of analysis. An implication of these
definitions is that levels of analysis are also relational, which means that one is
defined, in part, in terms of its associated unit of analysis. This is because a level of
analysis is not the social structure itself, but a social structure (however it is
understood) as it is employed in analysis. Kenneth Waltzs state level is different
than Paul Wapners (1995) because Waltzs unit of analysis is the state, whereas
Wapners units of analysis are corporations and consumers.
8
I will employ Kyriakos Kontopouloss (1992, 389) definition of a social structure
which, following Anthony Giddenss lead, is rules and resources recursively implicated in
the reproduction of social systems, such as humans or other social kinds. The vital question
regarding individuals is not whether they are social structures, but what the ontological
status of this structure is. Are individuals ontologically privileged entities that mediate
between different impulses and, through an act of will, make choices, or are these structures
reducible to the behaviour of their constituent brain cells, atoms, subatomic particles and so
on? This specific question is outside the scope of this article but, as I explain below, its
answer affects the types of question (causal or constitutive) we are able to ask at the
individual level.
9
For a useful typology of causal effects that can be attributed to levels of analysis, see
Buzan (1995). Buzans text also provides an alternative account of the history of the levels of
analysis concept to the one presented in this article.
Owen Temby
730
10
Holism
Folk psychology
Atomism
Eliminative materialism
(reductionism)
State
International system
Unitary actor
Necessary fiction
the distribution of
States are constrained
However, I contend that this definition does not go far enough in expressing the
meaning of atomism, which, by the word atom, connotes a commitment to reductionism
that extends deeper than the individual, such that the individual itself is ontologically
problematic.
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Owen Temby
parts of the agents to begin with. Therefore, to employ constitutive reasoning with
levels of analysis, both the level and the unit must be conceived of holistically. This
arguably violates prominent understandings of positivism (or empiricism) in IR
and instead presupposes some form of ontological realism.
Conceiving of levels of analysis with constitutive effects is complex, so I will
provide three brief examples: (1) one in which a level of analysis structure
constitutes a different unit of analysis structure, (2) a special case of this in which a
level of analysis structure constitutes a unit of analysis structure which is also its
agents and (3) an example in which the level and unit are the same structure. In
these instances, where both structures are understood holistically, the designation
of which structure represents the level of analysis and which represents the unit is
flexible since each is potentially iteratively examined for its effects on the other
and neither is temporally prior.
First, if our level of analysis is the state, and our unit of analysis is a network of
actors in global civil society (GCS), the two entities cannot coconstitute unless they
are actually ontologically privileged. If our state is just voters, members of interest
groups and the government structure and so on, then the properties of this state
can be understood to some extent cause the behaviour of our holistically
understood network of GCS actors, and vice versa, but the states mutual
constitution with the structure of GCS actors has been ruled out since the states
constitutive social facts (for example, mutual understandings identifying the state
and distinguishing it from other social structures) are nonexistent or instead are
properties of its elements. This is not to say that members of domestic interest
groups and government officials on the one hand, and participants of global civil
society policy networks, on the other hand, cannot be understood to coconstitute
through an iterative process of policy learning. Rather, it means that if they are
analysed as doing so, it involves the use of a level and unit of analysis in which
both structures have been conceptualized holistically.
Second, if our level of analysis is the international system and the unit of
analysis is the state, we are arguably examining a mutually constitutive agentstructure relationship (since states are the international system structures agents
or elements). Analyses of this sort include those that use Finnemore and Sikkinks
(1998) norm life cycle (NLC) approach to explaining how the normative context
among states shapes and is shaped by states and their behaviour. For instance,
Matthew J Hoffmann (2005) used the NLC approach to examine the changing
norms of participation in international efforts to address environmental problems
(in particular, ozone depletion and climate change). He argues that ozone
negotiations were initially characterized by North-only participation, but that,
following the suggestion of a norm entrepreneur, Southern states become
involved in subsequent amendment negotiations. As many Southern states
became involved, this altered the normative context within which Northern states
operated, and which constrained their own behaviour regarding ozone
negotiations. Through the process of acting in accordance with these norms,
Northern (and Southern) states internalized them, so that the norms caused their
identities to accord with them and they considered universal participation
legitimate. As is typical for a constructivist analysis in which state agents and an
ideational superstructure are understood holistically and interact in a mutually
constitutive way, the level of analysis and unit of analysis are fluid and changing
depending on the focus of the analysis.
Third, if our level of analysis is the state, and our unit of analysis is also
the state, their constitutive effects could be thought of as what David Campbell
(1998, 24) calls the performative constitution of identity, the reiterative and
citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names
(Butler 1993, 2). Continuing with the environmental theme above, a state that
perceives a particular environmental problem as damaging to its narrowly
defined self-interests may act to ameliorate the problem and, in doing so,
recursively create an identity consistent with these actions, thus redefining
its interests. Robyn Eckersley (2004, 103) argues that the green identity of
several European nations, as evidenced during the 1997 Kyoto climate change
negotiations, is due in part to the long-term realization by these states that
greenhouse gas abatement measures are economically beneficial. Here, a states
identities and interests are mutually constituted through process.
Holism
Individual
Atomism
State
International system
Macro-individual
Macro-state
Macro-international
(systemic level)
Micro-individual
Micro-state
Micro-international
(interaction level)
Macro-individual
Macro-state
Macro-international
(systemic level)
Micro-individual
Micro-state
Micro-international
(interaction level)
Figure 2. Micro-macro as distinguished from agent and structure and levels of analysis.
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Owen Temby
international level is conceived of atomistically, and Fearon and Wendt (2002) and
Wendt (1999) point out that micro-structures are compatible in principle with
constitutive effects, and in such cases are irreducible wholes.14 While constitutive
effects rule out atomism a priori, the macro-structural methodology of explaining
broad patterns of behaviour without reference to the attributes of particular agents
does no such thing if the structure is defined in terms of the attributes of the agents
to begin with, and if it is only granted the capacity to have causal effects (as with
Waltzs neorealist delineation). Therefore, nothing in the selection of which level
of analysis to employ, macro or micro, connotes a solution to the agent-structure
problem.
As mentioned above, the macro-international level is often referred to as the
systemic level, and the micro-international level as the interaction level. It has
become commonplace to regard theory based on either of these levels to be
systemic IR theory (Keohane 2005). Also, democratic peace theory is compatible
with both the macro-state and micro-state levels. Arguments can use the
micro-state of analysis by imputing causation to the utility functions of domestic
groups, or they can use the macro-level and address how democracy programmes
groups to behave within certain boundaries, irrespective of who they are.
Lastly, the micro- and macro- levels can also be used to study the actions of
individuals. The micro-individual level of analysis involves examining the effects
of interactions of brain cells and other biological elements on a unit of analysis, but
this is separate from the question of whether humans are reducible to these
biological elements. The macro-individual level, on the other hand, involves the
observation of human cognitions that are multiply realizable from combinations
of biological elements but, once again, this is separate from the question of
whether these cognitions are emergent and therefore irreducible, as proponents of
folk psychology maintain and eliminative materialism deny.
Implications for international theory
In the interest of space, I will limit my discussion of the implications of my
definition of levels of analysis for IR theory to Waltzs (1979) famous reductionist/
systemic dichotomy and then suggest a categorization of IR theories in terms of
their utilization of levels of analysis and position on the agent-structure problem.
Waltzs reductionist/systemic dichotomy is, arguably, among the more misleading analytical distinctions currently employed in IR discourse. The reason is
that whether or not a theory is reductionist has nothing to do with whether or not
it is systemic.15 The former is an ontological term relating to a solution to the
14
This points to a contradiction in Wendts work. On the one hand, he makes the
argument just mentioned, that micro-structures can generate properties and have
constitutive effects, and can therefore be holistic. On the other hand, he argues that
micro-level dynamics are rooted in individualism, and macro-level dynamics are rooted in
holism (Wendt 2003). Therefore, in this instance, he arguably commits the common error of
conflating ontology with methodology.
15
Waltz (1979, 18) defines reductionism an approach by which the whole is
understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of its parts. It maintains that
[o]nce the theory that explains the behavior of the parts is fashioned, no further effort
is required (60). Note that Waltzs definition is virtually identical to mine above. This is
Individual
Levels of analysis
State
International system
Classical realism
Neoclassical realism
Liberal
intergovernmentalism
Holism
Atomism
(reductionism)
Constructivism
Classical realism
Institutionalism
Neoclassical realism
Neoclassical realism
Neorealism
Liberal
intergovernmentalism
Liberal
intergovernmentalism
Systemic IR theory
Constructivism
Figure 3. Agent and structure, levels of analysis, and their relationship to theories of IR.
an ontological postulate, one which maintains that structures do not have emergent
properties and are therefore reducible to their parts. Waltz (18) defines systemic IR
theory as a class of theories that conceive of causes operating at the international level.
Again, this is a level of analysis, not an ontological stance regarding the agent-structure
problem.
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Owen Temby
reductionist nor systemic, as it is defined by its use of the state level of analysis, not
its ontology. There are certainly reductionists who theorize about the
phenomenon (Moravcsik 1997), but so do holists (Kahl 1998). Colin Kahl explains
democratic peace with reference to a collective liberal identity among irreducible
state agents. Similarly, while Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001) display no
explicit reductionist or holistic commitments in their effort to construct a theory of
democratic peace, they employ Wendts (1999) holistic argument about the
constitutive (and thus irreducible) effects of the international system, which, when
made more peaceful by democracies that believe they can trust each other, further
contributes to the absence of war. Democratic peace theory, then, as theory which
explains state behaviour with reference to the properties of states (conceived in
holistic or reductionist terms), is reduction neutral.
Several of the other classifications in Figure 3 merit clarification and
explanation. First, classical realist Hans Morgenthau et al (2005) uses the first and
second images to explain state behaviour, while Carr (2001) uses only the second,
and both argue that the structure at the second image does not exist. Second,
neoclassical realists and liberal intergovernmentalists use all three levels while
concurrently maintaining that individuals are the only ontologically privileged
entities (Moravcsik 1997; Schweller 2003). Thus, these approaches arguably
have more in common methodologically than is sometimes acknowledged. Third,
although world systems theory is generally thought to be international systemic, it
also uses the second image insofar as Wallerstein (2004) distinguishes between the
behaviour of weak and strong states. It is holistic at the international level due to
the deep generative effects it grants to the structure of the capitalist world system,
and atomistic at the state level since it accepts that states are reducible to the narrow
interests of capitalists. Fourth, it should come as no surprise that constructivists use
all three of these levels of analysis (and more), whereas institutionalists do not, as
the Fourth (rationalist-constructivist) Debate is as much about methodology as
ontology. Constructivists value breadth in their accounts of social life, and in
pursuance of this end are holists ontologically, methodologically imputing
causation to multiple structures. Rational institutionalists, on the other hand,
bracket the holistic effects of many structures (thereby not necessarily denying their
existence) and often use a limited number of levels of analysis, both for reasons of
parsimony.
Ambiguities
Although this article has thus far attempted to clarify many of the ambiguities
associated with levels of analysis, the definition proposed necessarily raises its
own. In this section I will clarify two of the most obvious: (1) multiple structures
existing at a single level of analysis, and (2) social systems or structures that cut
across levels of analysis. To this end, I provide one example of a theory in which
the concept of system and structure, at first glance, render the use of levels of
analysis questionable. However, as I explain, a relational understanding of levels
as methodological tools grants the researcher a degree of independence from the
ontological problem of specifying what counts as the international, for example.
And the fact that nearly all IR theories examine the effects of the empirical stuff of
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cuts across various levels, this does not preclude employing a state, some
dimension of global civil society, or the structure of the global political system as a
level of analysis. And, although MST does not agree with the ontology of agent
and structure, and does not view the state as an ontologically privileged entity
outside of the discourse that refers to it, the theory has a commitment to
constitutive theorizing, meaning that the ontological question at any given level is
essentially taken for granted in favour of a holistic understanding of social
organization. This is true of the state level of analysis as well since the state is a
proxy for a geographic instantiation of the political systemwhat Luhmann
(2000, 63) in a different context referred to as a program strandwhich is
mutually constituted with other geographical instantiations, as well as with other
systems.
Conclusion
Ultimately, philosophical reflection in IR should serve the purpose of enabling us
to craft accounts of global social life which are coherent and trustworthy. Yet our
subject matter makes this inherently difficult, as a reasonable amount of ambiguity
exists over how to understand IR concepts and the relationships between them. In
this article I suggest that, separate from debating such ontological matters, IR
would benefit from adopting a flexible, yet consistent, understanding of levels of
analysis as methodological tools. More specifically, I have argued for a relational
conception of levels of analysis, as social structures that exist as levels in relation to
a unit of analysis whose behaviour or properties the levels own properties are
examined to explain. As I have shown, this understanding is consistent with the
way in which the concept has been consciously conceptualized in IR discourse,
dating back to Waltzs Man, the state, and war (1959) and extending through the
early 1990s debate between Wendt (1991; 1992) and Hollis and Smith (1990; 1991;
1992). Furthermore, this relational understanding of levels of analysis is consistent
with a range of ontological positions and theories employed in the study of global
social phenomena. This includes theories that explicitly or implicitly address
questions related to agent and structure, as well as at least one theoretical approach
(MST) that rejects such reasoning outright.
That said, existing usage of levels of analysis, and the conceptualization of
their relation to agent and structure, has lacked analytical precision. In a recent
review of the literature on the study of the state, one observer argued that it is
inappropriate to treat the state as a unitary actor (Levi 2002, 53). Her point is that
doing so precludes a priori the examination of domestic politics as an independent
variable on state action. However, as has been shown in this article, this popular
view is based on a conflation of two different issues, one ontological and one
methodological. What the state is need not determine our decision regarding
whether or not to examine domestic actors for their effect on state action or any
other unit of analysis. But since an agent-structure problem exists at every level of
analysis, it is still important to engage the ontological question when making a
methodological choice. This is because, as I have argued, our ontological
postulates determine some of the possibilities open to us when engaging in
scientific inquiry. If we choose to be atomists we cannot engage in constitutive
theorizing because atomism discards the existence of the requisite social facts.
Notes on contributor
Owen Temby (PhD, Carleton University) is a postdoctoral fellow at the
Department of Natural Resource Sciences, McGill University, and a research
associate at the Loyola Sustainable Research Centre, Concordia University. His
current research examines domestic and transnational environmental policy
networks in Canada and the United States. Email: owen.temby@mcgill.ca
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