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SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as

another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?


MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and
light by resorting to a weighing machine?
POLUS: I should say so.
SOCRATES: And have you never heard, simpleton, that I
am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name
was Phaenarete?
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then I must have conceived of some
general or common nature which no more belonged to
you than to another.
GORGIAS: I think so.
SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young?
And do they profess to be teachers? And do they agree
that virtue is taught?
NICIAS: That appears to be the case.

SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in


the same way, by fits?
PHAEDRUS: What of that?
SOCRATES: I mean that you rate them all at the same
value, whereas they are really separated by an interval,
which no geometrical ratio can express.
ION: That is my opinion, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Where, then, is false opinion? For if all
things are either known or unknown, there can be no
opinion which is not comprehended under this
alternative, and so false opinion is excluded.
CRITO: Very good, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most
painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or
both?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has
been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or
both.
ANYTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as


much as of the secondary names, is implied in their being
names.
ION: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods
and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to
them?
LACHES: Yes, certainly.
SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is
cookery?
GORGIAS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child
rejoicing?
THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: And he ought to fear the censure and
welcome the praise of that one only, and not of the
many?
GORGIAS: Clearly not.

SOCRATES: And there are and have been many painters


good and bad?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he
will fancy that he knows the things about which he has
been deceived?
THEODORUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: What! Have you ever been driven to admit
that there was no such thing as a bad man?
NICIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can
you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not
letters?
LACHES: Yes certainly so in my opinion.
SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what
you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry,
perhaps?
CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like


you would call good s, and their opposites evils?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why
anything has a name; is not the principle which imposes
the name the cause?
HERMOGENES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent?
THEODORUS: I suppose not.
SOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?
PHAEDRUS: Yes, that is the way.
SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his
head, or things about him which are numerable?
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be
a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius?
EUTHYPHRO: No doubt.

SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for


it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts?
NICIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only
the brave, rejoice?
GORGIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And would you say this also of like and
unlike, same and other?
TIMAEUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Then it must appear so to each of them?
GORGIAS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar
question about names: will you answer me? Regarding
the name as an instrument, what do we do when we
name?
TIMAEUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And of the many and fair things done by the
gods, which is the chief or principal one?

NICIAS: Very true.


BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then he is benefited?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: And in a word, when he considers anything
for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and
not of the means?
NICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true.
SOCRATES: I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but
I must take time to think whether I equally approve of
your answer.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the
temperate soul is the good soul, the soul which is in the
opposite condition, that is, the foolish and intemperate, is
the bad soul. Very true.
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Am I talking nonsense, then? Think: is not
seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception?

CRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so.


SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes
well and sound at the same time?
BOY: I do not understand.
SOCRATES: But surely he cannot suppose what he
knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not
know to be what he knows?
BOY: Very a sense of deja vue
SOCRATES: Enough appears to have been said by us of a
true and false art of speaking.
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name
Pallas?
GORGIAS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil?
POLUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful


than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful
and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that
also follow?
NICIAS: I agree.
SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was
saying?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I quite agree.
SOCRATES: But how can any one who is ignorant
dispute in a rational manner against him who knows?
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter?
PHAEDRUS: By all means.
SOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition
and rebuke and punishment?
GORGIAS: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to
them because it is loved by them, not loved by them
because it is dear to them.

ANYTUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods
and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to
them?
MELESIAS: I do not understand.
SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of
knowledge so small a matter, as just now said? Is it not
one which would task the powers of men perfect in every
way?
ANYTUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in
a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage
both in good and evil? (i.e. In having more pleasure and
more pain.)
HERMOGENES: That is probable.
SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be
the same as knowledge or science?
THEAETETUS: Very true.
POLUS: True.

SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful


than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful
and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that
also follow?
THEODORUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you
about anything which he pleases, and you will know how
to answer him?
THEODORUS: That is very true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And when you speak of carpentering, you
mean the art of making wooden implements?
MENO: What do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the
likeness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to
the man?
THEODORUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Neither will he be the friend of any one who
is greatly his inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and
will never seriously regard him as a friend.

MENO: Yes, indeed.


SOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Consider again:--Where there is an agent,
must there not also be a patient?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to
be honourable?
POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates?
SOCRATES: But when the point is, how a man may
become best himself, and best govern his family and
state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is
held to be dishonourable?
ION: No.
SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as
health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver,
and having office and honour in the state--those are
what you would call good s?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him


the 'torpedo's shock,' have we done him any harm?
LACHES: Certainly I should.
SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse?
NICIAS: I think not.
SOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the
doing of injustice exceeds the suffering in the
consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the
injured?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved
of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these
names: if names are correctly given, his should have an
opposite meaning.
THEODORUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a
round, for example, is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,'
and I should adopt this mode of speaking, because there
are other figures.

ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And when you call in an adviser, you should
see whether he too is skilful in the accomplishment of
the end which you have in view?
TIMAEUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, and therefore notseeing is not-knowing?
THEODORUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and
prayer is asking of the gods?
PHAEDRUS: I agree.
SOCRATES: Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge
and perception are one, involves a manifest
impossibility?
MELESIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: As, for example, in the case of the sun, I
think that you would be contented with the statement that
the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which
revolve about the earth.

HERMOGENES: True.
SOCRATES: But can you certainly determine by any
other means which of these opinions is true?
NICIAS: Yes, that was what we were saying.
SOCRATES: I think that we were wrong in denying that a
man could think what he knew to be what he did not
know; and that there is a way in which such a deception
is possible.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: His one vote would be worth more than the
vote of all us four?
EUTHYPHRO: To be sure, Socrates.
SOCRATES: What are they? Tell me the names of them,
as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you
asked me.
MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he
was not a man?
ANYTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Any one may see that there is no disgrace in


the mere fact of writing.
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And the right way of giving is to give to
them in return what they want of us. There would be no
meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he
does not want.
MELESIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then the rhetorician ought to make a
regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both
classes, as well of that in which the many err, as of that
in which they do not err?
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if unlike, they are other?
POLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or
intermediate and indifferent?
LACHES: Very true love

SOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of


what is seen?
NICIAS: I do.
SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing
has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all?
CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right.
SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar
definition of the S.
ION: Precisely.
SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for
it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts?
NICIAS: Certainly.
CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you.
SOCRATES: What are they? Tell me the names of them,
as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you
asked me.

PHAEDRUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the
good pleasures and pains?
MELESIAS: To be sure.
TIMAEUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was
saying?
NICIAS: It would seem so.
SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order
of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has
right opinion?
MENO: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false,
names may be true and false?
MENO: Exactly.
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
THEODORUS: I think so.

SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes


justly?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises
are not disproven?
PHAEDRUS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Nobly! Yes; but wait a little and hear the
explanation, and then you will say so with more reason;
for to think truly is noble and to be deceived is base.
CRITO: Clearly so.
SOCRATES: Neither can I by myself, have this sensation,
nor the object by itself, this quality.
TIMAEUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well
as a true?
POLUS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when
goods are present with them?

CRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so.


SOCRATES: Then I will go on to the next point, which
may be put in the form of a question:--Ought a man to
do what he admits to be right, or ought he to betray the
right?
TIMAEUS: That was also said.
SOCRATES: And a foolish man too?
CRATYLUS: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions?
POLUS: True.
SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind?
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally
answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of
instruments in general.
THEODORUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave


them according to his conception of the things which
they signified--did he not?
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil?
PHAEDRUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second
question would be, that there are other painters besides,
who paint many other figures?
LACHES: That is true.
SOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul
likewise has some evil of her own?
GORGIAS: Of course.
SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is
good?
MELESIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And that both are two and each of them
one?

EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not
punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer
says?--or are you of another mind?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these
pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son?
TIMAEUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every
man knows that which he has seen?
EUTHYPHRO: I think that I understand.
SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a
speech?
NICIAS: Precisely.
SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer.

CRITO: Yes, that was what you were saying.


SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about
the way, but had never been and did not know, might be
a good guide also, might he not?
MELESIAS: I do not understand.
SOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct
from that which loves?
ANYTUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and
that those who are punished are less miserable--are you
going to refute this proposition also?
TIMAEUS: I quite approve.
SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to
chastise her?
NICIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then no one can think that which is not,
either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of
something else?
TIMAEUS: I remember.

SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment


which attributes to each that which belongs to them and
is like them?
GORGIAS: In the case supposed:--yes.
SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be
good or he may be bad; it must surely be so if our former
admissions hold good?
CRATYLUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then that was the first case of which I
spoke.
MELESIAS: That is true.
POLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and
yet know both together?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole
are the same, or different?
CLEINIAS: How so?

SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child


rejoicing?
THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly.
SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two
or more?
PHAEDRUS: How do you mean?
SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he
was not a man?
HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them,
this common perception cannot come to you, either
through the one or the other organ?
TIMAEUS: I remember.
SOCRATES: He ought not to speak of the name, but of
the thing which is contemplated under the name.
POLUS: I should.
SOCRATES: Tell me, then, what I was intending to ask
--whether this holds universally? Must the same art

have the same subject of knowledge, and different arts


other subjects of knowledge?
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?
GORGIAS: No.
SOCRATES: Then he is benefited?
HERMOGENES: Of course.
SOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the
rhetoricians are like tyrants, and that they kill and
despoil or exile any one whom they please?
POLUS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Consider again:--Where there is an agent,
must there not also be a patient?
HERMOGENES: Why do you say so?
SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a
thing as memory?
ION: Yes.

SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a


round, for example, is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,'
and I should adopt this mode of speaking, because there
are other figures.
HERMOGENES: Why do you say so?
SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us
them?
THEODORUS: In what respect?
SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in
the same way, by fits?
NICIAS: That is true.
SOCRATES: Once will be enough; and now take
particular care that we do not again unwittingly expose
ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly.
HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so.
SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a
falsehood?
PHAEDRUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: The letters, which are the clements; and the


syllables, which are the combinations;--he reasoned, did
he not, from the letters of the alphabet?
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? For in
giving names men speak.
TIMAEUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance
and quickness of apprehension; whatever things are
learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done
without sense they are hurtful?
ION: That is my opinion, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar
question about names: will you answer me? Regarding
the name as an instrument, what do we do when we
name?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works
of beauty?

THEAETETUS: What are they?


SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every
man knows that which he has seen?
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: Then, my friend, there is such a thing as
right opinion united with definition or explanation, which
does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge.
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good
men? For you were saying just now that the courageous
and the wise are the good --would you not say so?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then that which is dear to the gods,
Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of
God, as you affirm; but they are two different things.
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: Consider again:--Where there is an agent,
must there not also be a patient?

CLEINIAS: What do you mean?


SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what
you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry,
perhaps?
CLEINIAS: How so?
SOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the
house-builder with a view to the building of a house?
HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the
smaller ones, or every part?
LACHES: Certainly I should.
CRATYLUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger
share?
THEAETETUS: I think so.
SOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been
unjust, has no deliverance from injustice?
GORGIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of


discourse?
NICIAS: I agree.
LACHES: True.
SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is
impossible? For if this is your meaning I should answer,
that there have been plenty of liars in all ages.
CLEINIAS: How so?
SOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful
or profitable. Were we not right in admitting this? It must
be so.
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some
other reason?
THEODORUS: I do, and what you say is true.
SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is
supposed to differ from all?
HERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to


disagree with him, when you remember your own
experience in learning to read?
MELESIAS: That is true.
SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced
has to be woven or pierced with something?
GORGIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be
able to analyse them in this way? For I am certain that I
should not.
THEODORUS: Very true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable
and ill-fated?
PHAEDRUS: Certainly.
HERMOGENES: Why, how is that?
SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is
erroneous?
ION: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Then, my friend, there is such a thing as


right opinion united with definition or explanation, which
does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge.
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the race of animals is generated in the
same way?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul? Will
the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or
that in which there is harmony and order?
MELESIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and
absurd?
CRITO: That would not be reasonable, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?
NICIAS: It would seem so.
SOCRATES: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them
what we want?

MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which
makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not
profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when
they are not rightly used?
CRATYLUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good
to him who possesses them, or does he know that they
will do him harm?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler,
should we not send him to the cobblers?
THEODORUS: In what way?
SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good,
and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?
PHAEDRUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: Did you ever remark that they are also most
cunning matchmakers, and have a thorough knowledge of
what unions are likely to produce a brave brood?

MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: You would argue, as I should, that when one
art is of one kind of knowledge and another of another,
they are different?
HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric,
according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a
part of politics.
THEODORUS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have
been so far right in our idea about knowledge?
TIMAEUS: I quite approve.
SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right
way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right
instrument the natural instrument.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of
the superior?

MENO: How can it be otherwise?


SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is
such a thing as 'having learned'?
CRITO: Very good, Socrates.
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Then when we were asked what is
knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge
than what is not knowledge?
GORGIAS: No.
SOCRATES: We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion
of him who says that the syllable can be known and
expressed, but not the letters.
LACHES: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will
recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked
questions?
MELESIAS: That is true.
SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain,
but, perhaps, the evil has more of them?

POLUS: Certainly not.


SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why
anything has a name; is not the principle which imposes
the name the cause?
NICIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Say no more, for there you are right; and so
he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the
nature of the just and unjust already, or he must be
taught by you.
CLEINIAS: How so?
SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he
will fancy that he knows the things about which he has
been deceived?
LACHES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and
pained in a nearly equal degree?
HERMOGENES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is
good, for the honourable is either pleasant or useful?

CALLICLES: Yes, I have.


SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue
knowledge.
CRITO: Yes.
HERMOGENES: Why do you say so?
SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we
proceed with the argument?
LACHES: Not over well.
SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us
them?
CALLICLES: Yes, I have.
SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most--the wise
or the foolish?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called
selanaia.
HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then you see and do not see the same thing
at the same time.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: I mean that every man is his own ruler; but
perhaps you think that there is no necessity for him to
rule himself; he is only required to rule others?
TIMAEUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause
pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And do you mean by conceiving, the same
which I mean?
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But from what line?--tell me exactly; and if
you would rather not reckon, try and show me the line.
ION: True.
SOCRATES: And what will the evil be, whither tending
and what affecting, in the disobedient person?

POLUS: That is evident.


SOCRATES: Then, first of all, I want you to understand
that a man may or may not perceive sensibly that which
he knows.
THEODORUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that
justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a
part of virtue?
PHAEDRUS: What of that?
SOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?--of Zeus
we have spoken.
TIMAEUS: I quite approve.
SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind?
HERMOGENES: I do.
SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we
proceed with the argument?
GORGIAS: Very true.

SOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of


wisdom.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
TIMAEUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: Take care; let us not be cowards and betray
a great and imposing theory.
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something
which is burned?
LACHES: Yes, Socrates, entirely.
SOCRATES: Is there not another kind of word or speech
far better than this, and having far greater power--a son
of the same family, but lawfully begotten?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And his father's name is also according to
nature.
CLEINIAS: How so?

SOCRATES: Nobly! Yes; but wait a little and hear the


explanation, and then you will say so with more reason;
for to think truly is noble and to be deceived is base.
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good
and evil fortune at the same time?
MENO: I quite agree.
SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in
this life, then he must have had and learned it at some
other time?
THEODORUS: I quite agree.
SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you
about anything which he pleases, and you will know how
to answer him?
ION: Certainly, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there
were no teachers of virtue?
THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: And is truth or falsehood to be determined


by duration of time?
PHAEDRUS: How do you mean?
SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music
beautiful for the same reason?
LACHES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every
man knows that which he has seen?
MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And that both are two and each of them
one?
CRITO: Yes, indeed, that is very true.
SOCRATES: And I should speak the truth; for I do not
know how he stands in the matter of education and
justice.
PHAEDRUS: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or
ideal shuttle?

CRITO: Clearly so.


SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a
sound which I understand, and you know that I
understand the meaning of the sound: this is what you
are saying?
PHAEDRUS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the
good were good because good was present with them,
and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods
and pains evils?
POLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that
knowledge and belief differ.
NICIAS: I do.
SOCRATES: Then he who has no knowledge of a
particular art will have no right judgment of the sayings
and doings of that art?
EUTHYPHRO: I should.

SOCRATES: And if this supposed likeness of our faces is


a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether
he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?
CALLICLES: Yes, very.
SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, should not the good
sportsman follow the track, and not be lazy?
LACHES: Quite true.
SOCRATES: If, then, anything happens to become like or
unlike itself or another, when it becomes like we call it
the same--when unlike, other?
THEAETETUS: Quite possible.
SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young?
And do they profess to be teachers? And do they agree
that virtue is taught?
CALLICLES: Yes, certainly, if you like.
SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good
condition of either of them?
HERMOGENES: How do you make that out?

SOCRATES: Having the use of the art, the arithmetician,


if I am not mistaken, has the conceptions of number
under his hand, and can transmit them to another.
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the
worst?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
LACHES: Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?
SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the
consideration of the Gods, and show that they are rightly
named Gods?
PHAEDRUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?
POLUS: True.
SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like
manner is the stadium?
THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or


quickly, that which is struck will be struck violently or
quickly?
TIMAEUS: True.
SOCRATES: And at present we have in view some
knowledge, of which the end is the soul of youth?
THEODORUS: Yes, so he says.
LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates?
CRATYLUS: No, indeed.
SOCRATES: Shall we discuss the rules of writing and
speech as we were proposing?
LACHES: True.
SOCRATES: When we walk we walk for the sake of the
good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, and
when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the
good?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Well, then, suppose that Protagoras or some
one asks whether anything can become greater or more

if not by increasing, how would you answer him,


Theaetetus?
ION: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action?
GORGIAS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good
condition of either of them?
ION: Very true
SOCRATES: good: but I must still ask what is this
attention to the gods which is called piety?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil?
POLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.-Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of
hunger, was pleasant or painful?
CLEINIAS: How so?

SOCRATES: And also that different combinations will


produce results which are not the same, but different?
PHAEDRUS: Exactly.
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and
knowledge are the same, or not the same?
GORGIAS: I think so.
SOCRATES: Then when of two beautiful things one
exceeds in beauty, the measure of the excess is to be
taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in pleasure
or utility or both?
ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a
false opinion?
CRITO: Very true.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Then he who thinks of that which is not,
thinks of nothing?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as
another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?
CLEINIAS: How so?
SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of
persuasion?
ANYTUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right,
or only the first?
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the
ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some
result?
GORGIAS: I think so.
SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises
are not disproven?

POLUS: No.
SOCRATES: And if he is ignorant of the true nature of
any subject, how can he detect the greater or less
degree of likeness in other things to that of which by the
hypothesis he is ignorant?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Nobly! Yes; but wait a little and hear the
explanation, and then you will say so with more reason;
for to think truly is noble and to be deceived is base.
MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful
than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful
and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that
also follow?
MENO: That appears to be true.
SOCRATES: If, then, he remarks on a similarity in our
persons, either by way of praise or blame, there is no
particular reason why we should attend to him.
CALLICLES: Certainly it is.

SOCRATES: But how can any one who is ignorant


dispute in a rational manner against him who knows?
PHAEDRUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the
consideration of the Gods, and show that they are rightly
named Gods?
TIMAEUS: That, again, was as you say.
SOCRATES: But has not that position been relinquished
by us, because involving the absurdity that we should
know and not know the things which we know?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?--of Zeus
we have spoken.
CALLICLES: True.
SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than
knowledge?
MELESIAS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Wise, I may not call them; for that is a great


name which belongs to God --lovers of wisdom or
philosophers is their modest and befitting title.
NICIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.
CLEINIAS: How so?
SOCRATES: And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he
perceives.'
HERMOGENES: Why do you say so?
SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you
would give to the effect of harmony and order in the
soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the
other.
CRITO: Why do you think so?
SOCRATES: But surely life according to your view is an
awful thing; and indeed I think that Euripides may have
been right in saying,
THEODORUS: In what respect?

SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are


evil?
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom?
THEODORUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his
head, or things about him which are numerable?
POLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Once will be enough; and now take
particular care that we do not again unwittingly expose
ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly.
NICIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Say rather that it must be so. Of motion then
there are these two kinds, 'change,' and 'motion in place.'
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the best of the joke is, that he
acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his
own opinion to be false; for he admits that the opinions
of all men are true.

LACHES: Certainly I should.


SOCRATES: Well, but are we to assert that what you
think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why
anything has a name; is not the principle which imposes
the name the cause?
MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which
they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are
evil and yet desire them?
CRATYLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And the best of the joke is, that he
acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his
own opinion to be false; for he admits that the opinions
of all men are true.
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: May not 'the wolf,' as the proverb says,
'claim a hearing'?

PHAEDRUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: Then appearing and perceiving coincide in
the case of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for
things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one
such as he perceives them?
POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither
are the good by nature good?
GORGIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then that was the first case of which I
spoke.
POLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Like a good -for-nothing cock, without
having won the victory, we walk away from the argument
and crow.
NICIAS: That appears to be the case.
SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?
THEODORUS: I quite agree.

SOCRATES: Then in some things we agree, but not in


others?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Suppose, however, that we admit the
principle of which we are speaking to a certain extent.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves,
either with the voice, or tongue, or mouth, the
expression is simply their imitation of that which we
want to express.
HERMOGENES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is
cookery?
NICIAS: That appears to be the case.
SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which
are made by them are by nature good?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:--is he?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?
MELESIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But surely he cannot suppose what he
knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not
know to be what he knows?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: But he, who having right opinion about
anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes
it from other things will know that of which before he
had only an opinion.
THEAETETUS: Impossible.
SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer
you would call a dialectician?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a
reply?
CALLICLES: I should.

HERMOGENES: True.
SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what
you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry,
perhaps?
GORGIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: But if he cannot know both without knowing
each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must
know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again
taken wings and departed.
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the
legislator?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them,
this common perception cannot come to you, either
through the one or the other organ?
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And legislation and expediency are all
concerned with the future; and every one will admit that

states, in passing laws, must often fail of their highest


interests?
THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or
quickly, that which is struck will be struck violently or
quickly?
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and
gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body?
What else but the soul?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is truth or falsehood to be determined
by duration of time?
NICIAS: Precisely.
SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain; you would call a
man courageous who remains at his post, and fights with
the enemy?
PHAEDRUS: Yes, that is the way.

SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that


which the vocal imitator names or imitates?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be
cut with something?
LACHES: That is true.
SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are
they made good by instruction?
EUTHYPHRO: You are quite right.
SOCRATES: Nor when injured injure in return, as the
many imagine; for we must injure no one at all?
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in
your hearing that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was
a wise or good man, as his father was?
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the
temperate soul is the good soul, the soul which is in the

opposite condition, that is, the foolish and intemperate, is


the bad soul. Very true.
CLEINIAS: How so?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But, as you say, cobbler regard the same
things, some as just and others as --about these they
dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among
them.
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to
knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who
has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge?
MENO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And he ought to fear the censure and
welcome the praise of that one only, and not of the
many?
POLUS: True.
SOCRATES: Take care; let us not be cowards and betray
a great and imposing theory.

MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is
such a thing as 'having learned'?
MENO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the
proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of
wood may be used? The carpenter who makes, or the
weaver who is to use them?
CRATYLUS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue
knowledge.
BOY: I do not understand.
SOCRATES: And if this supposed likeness of our faces is
a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether
he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?
NICIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said
duogon and not zugon?
NICIAS: I think not.

PHAEDRUS: Precisely.
SOCRATES: May not 'the wolf,' as the proverb says,
'claim a hearing'?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that
some courage implied knowledge?
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is
carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or
for some other reason?
CALLICLES: You are contentious, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And if this supposed likeness of our faces is
a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether
he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of --one
which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the
other is of knowledge?

NICIAS: Precisely.
SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is
happy if he be unpunished?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured
knowledge and not ignorance?
POLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the
approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?
ION: Certainly.
POLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a
man's life if his body is in an evil plight--in that case his
life also is evil: am I not right?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the
virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a
woman was to order a house?

MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present
view?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly,
and yet have no regard for their true interests?
GORGIAS: True.
SOCRATES: We shall soon know; for we have as
hostages the instances which the author of the argument
himself used.
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But would there not arise a prior question
about the nature of the art of which we want to find the
masters?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask
questions?
CALLICLES: Very true.

SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can


you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not
letters?
GORGIAS: True.
SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and
regularity prevail is good; that in which there is disorder,
evil?
CRATYLUS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Consider again:--Where there is an agent,
must there not also be a patient?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask
whether being punished is suffering or acting?
CALLICLES: Very.
SOCRATES: Wise, I may not call them; for that is a great
name which belongs to God --lovers of wisdom or
philosophers is their modest and befitting title.
EUTHYPHRO: True.

SOCRATES: And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest


and idleness, but preserved for a long time by motion and
exercise?
MELESIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of
good is common to all, and one man is no better than
another in that respect?
GORGIAS: Yes.
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good,
and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?
MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music
beautiful for the same reason?
ION: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who
do their work better and some worse?
ION: Very true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave


them according to his conception of the things which
they signified--did he not?
CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right.
SOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid
rhetorician will never have done injustice at all?
NICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true.
SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which
neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be
incapable of being taught?
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works
of beauty?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is
delivered from vice?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to
us but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with

Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and


not to him who is not?
PHAEDRUS: True.
SOCRATES: Certainly:--any one may know that to be
my meaning.
CRITO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: How then, if I never err, and if my mind
never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I
fail of knowing that which I perceive?
PHAEDRUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And now on the contrary we are saying that
the foolish endurance, which was before held in
dishonour, is courage.
MENO: I should.
SOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in
them except in so far as they are useful or pleasant or
both?
HERMOGENES: How do you make that out?

SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil
by reason of the presence of evil?
CALLICLES: Very true.
SOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches
who are not to be envied, but only to pity them.
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others,
punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?
BOY: True.
SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious? Or, is
that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in
part and not all, pious?
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise
dictator, like yourself, should observe the laws of
moderation and probability.
TIMAEUS: That, again, was as you say.
SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make
other men rhetoricians?

EUTHYPHRO: No doubt.
SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally
measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?
HERMOGENES: That is probable.
SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to
say that the round is round any more than straight, or the
straight any more straight than round?
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes,
would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may be
a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is
not.
MENO: Why not?
SOCRATES: Let us assume then, as we now say, that the
syllable is a simple form arising out of the several
combinations of harmonious elements--of letters or of
any other elements.
GORGIAS: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the


nobility and liberality of your nature make you give many
and diverse things, when I am asking for one simple
thing.
THEODORUS: Most true.
SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or
endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in
happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in
the opposite?
ION: That is my opinion, Socrates.
SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy
because it is loved?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And do you not think that many an one
would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who
depart to him by the strongest of chains?
THEAETETUS: Why so?
SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes
well and sound at the same time?
TIMAEUS: That was also said.

SOCRATES: Then you would say that he who in an


engagement of cavalry endures, having the knowledge of
horsemanship, is not so courageous as he who endures,
having no such knowledge?
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases?
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then,
as we thought, it was taught?
TIMAEUS: That was also said.
SOCRATES: If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he
cannot think that the one of them is the other?
ANYTUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable,
and the punished suffers what is honourable?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: The good are to be regarded, and not the
bad?

BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two
or more?
PHAEDRUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches
something which is one and therefore is?
PHAEDRUS: That again is most true.
SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally
answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of
instruments in general.
NICIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts,
as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Often a man remembers that which he has
seen?
GORGIAS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of


swimming; is that an art of any great pretensions?
TIMAEUS: That was also said.
SOCRATES: Well, then, he will say, according to that
argument, the number eleven, which is only thought, can
never be mistaken for twelve, which is only thought:
How would you answer him?
LACHES: That is most true.
SOCRATES: But how can any one who is ignorant
dispute in a rational manner against him who knows?

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