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ANYTUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods
and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to
them?
MELESIAS: I do not understand.
SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of
knowledge so small a matter, as just now said? Is it not
one which would task the powers of men perfect in every
way?
ANYTUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in
a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage
both in good and evil? (i.e. In having more pleasure and
more pain.)
HERMOGENES: That is probable.
SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be
the same as knowledge or science?
THEAETETUS: Very true.
POLUS: True.
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And when you call in an adviser, you should
see whether he too is skilful in the accomplishment of
the end which you have in view?
TIMAEUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, and therefore notseeing is not-knowing?
THEODORUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and
prayer is asking of the gods?
PHAEDRUS: I agree.
SOCRATES: Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge
and perception are one, involves a manifest
impossibility?
MELESIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: As, for example, in the case of the sun, I
think that you would be contented with the statement that
the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which
revolve about the earth.
HERMOGENES: True.
SOCRATES: But can you certainly determine by any
other means which of these opinions is true?
NICIAS: Yes, that was what we were saying.
SOCRATES: I think that we were wrong in denying that a
man could think what he knew to be what he did not
know; and that there is a way in which such a deception
is possible.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: His one vote would be worth more than the
vote of all us four?
EUTHYPHRO: To be sure, Socrates.
SOCRATES: What are they? Tell me the names of them,
as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you
asked me.
MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he
was not a man?
ANYTUS: Yes.
PHAEDRUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the
good pleasures and pains?
MELESIAS: To be sure.
TIMAEUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was
saying?
NICIAS: It would seem so.
SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order
of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has
right opinion?
MENO: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false,
names may be true and false?
MENO: Exactly.
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
THEODORUS: I think so.
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not
punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer
says?--or are you of another mind?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these
pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son?
TIMAEUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every
man knows that which he has seen?
EUTHYPHRO: I think that I understand.
SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a
speech?
NICIAS: Precisely.
SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer.
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which
makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not
profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when
they are not rightly used?
CRATYLUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good
to him who possesses them, or does he know that they
will do him harm?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler,
should we not send him to the cobblers?
THEODORUS: In what way?
SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good,
and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?
PHAEDRUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: Did you ever remark that they are also most
cunning matchmakers, and have a thorough knowledge of
what unions are likely to produce a brave brood?
MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: You would argue, as I should, that when one
art is of one kind of knowledge and another of another,
they are different?
HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric,
according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a
part of politics.
THEODORUS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have
been so far right in our idea about knowledge?
TIMAEUS: I quite approve.
SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right
way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right
instrument the natural instrument.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of
the superior?
SOCRATES: Then you see and do not see the same thing
at the same time.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: I mean that every man is his own ruler; but
perhaps you think that there is no necessity for him to
rule himself; he is only required to rule others?
TIMAEUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause
pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And do you mean by conceiving, the same
which I mean?
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But from what line?--tell me exactly; and if
you would rather not reckon, try and show me the line.
ION: True.
SOCRATES: And what will the evil be, whither tending
and what affecting, in the disobedient person?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as
another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?
CLEINIAS: How so?
SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of
persuasion?
ANYTUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right,
or only the first?
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the
ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some
result?
GORGIAS: I think so.
SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises
are not disproven?
POLUS: No.
SOCRATES: And if he is ignorant of the true nature of
any subject, how can he detect the greater or less
degree of likeness in other things to that of which by the
hypothesis he is ignorant?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Nobly! Yes; but wait a little and hear the
explanation, and then you will say so with more reason;
for to think truly is noble and to be deceived is base.
MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful
than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful
and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that
also follow?
MENO: That appears to be true.
SOCRATES: If, then, he remarks on a similarity in our
persons, either by way of praise or blame, there is no
particular reason why we should attend to him.
CALLICLES: Certainly it is.
PHAEDRUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: Then appearing and perceiving coincide in
the case of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for
things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one
such as he perceives them?
POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither
are the good by nature good?
GORGIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then that was the first case of which I
spoke.
POLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Like a good -for-nothing cock, without
having won the victory, we walk away from the argument
and crow.
NICIAS: That appears to be the case.
SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?
THEODORUS: I quite agree.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?
MELESIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But surely he cannot suppose what he
knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not
know to be what he knows?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: But he, who having right opinion about
anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes
it from other things will know that of which before he
had only an opinion.
THEAETETUS: Impossible.
SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer
you would call a dialectician?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a
reply?
CALLICLES: I should.
HERMOGENES: True.
SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what
you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry,
perhaps?
GORGIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: But if he cannot know both without knowing
each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must
know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again
taken wings and departed.
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the
legislator?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them,
this common perception cannot come to you, either
through the one or the other organ?
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And legislation and expediency are all
concerned with the future; and every one will admit that
MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is
such a thing as 'having learned'?
MENO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the
proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of
wood may be used? The carpenter who makes, or the
weaver who is to use them?
CRATYLUS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue
knowledge.
BOY: I do not understand.
SOCRATES: And if this supposed likeness of our faces is
a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether
he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?
NICIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said
duogon and not zugon?
NICIAS: I think not.
PHAEDRUS: Precisely.
SOCRATES: May not 'the wolf,' as the proverb says,
'claim a hearing'?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that
some courage implied knowledge?
ION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is
carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or
for some other reason?
CALLICLES: You are contentious, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And if this supposed likeness of our faces is
a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether
he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of --one
which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the
other is of knowledge?
NICIAS: Precisely.
SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is
happy if he be unpunished?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured
knowledge and not ignorance?
POLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the
approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?
ION: Certainly.
POLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a
man's life if his body is in an evil plight--in that case his
life also is evil: am I not right?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the
virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a
woman was to order a house?
MELESIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present
view?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly,
and yet have no regard for their true interests?
GORGIAS: True.
SOCRATES: We shall soon know; for we have as
hostages the instances which the author of the argument
himself used.
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But would there not arise a prior question
about the nature of the art of which we want to find the
masters?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask
questions?
CALLICLES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil
by reason of the presence of evil?
CALLICLES: Very true.
SOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches
who are not to be envied, but only to pity them.
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others,
punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?
BOY: True.
SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious? Or, is
that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in
part and not all, pious?
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise
dictator, like yourself, should observe the laws of
moderation and probability.
TIMAEUS: That, again, was as you say.
SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make
other men rhetoricians?
EUTHYPHRO: No doubt.
SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally
measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?
HERMOGENES: That is probable.
SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to
say that the round is round any more than straight, or the
straight any more straight than round?
CLEINIAS: No doubt.
SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes,
would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may be
a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is
not.
MENO: Why not?
SOCRATES: Let us assume then, as we now say, that the
syllable is a simple form arising out of the several
combinations of harmonious elements--of letters or of
any other elements.
GORGIAS: Yes, certainly.
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two
or more?
PHAEDRUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches
something which is one and therefore is?
PHAEDRUS: That again is most true.
SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally
answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of
instruments in general.
NICIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts,
as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Often a man remembers that which he has
seen?
GORGIAS: Certainly not.