JURISDICTION

1. Sante vs. Claravall

The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining
jurisdiction applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or
a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the
claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
RULE 1
1. Alonso vs. Villamor
We are confident under these provisions that this court has full power,
apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the
process, pleadings, proceedings, and decision in this case by substituting,
as party plaintiff, the real party in interest. Not only are we confident that we
may do so, but we are convinced that we should do so. Such an
amendment does not constitute, really a change in the identity of the
parties.
No one has been misled by the error in the name of the party plaintiff. If we
should by reason of this error send this back for amendment and new trial,
there would be on the retrial the same complaint, the same answer, the
same defense, the same interests, the same witnesses, and the same
evidence. The name of the plaintiff would constitute the only difference
between the old trial and the new. In our judgment there is not enough in a
name to justify such action.
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or
contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and
delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They do
not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing.
In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character
of the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and
courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.

The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other
purposes than to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its
presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right.
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply
schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps
and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending
party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then,
brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits.
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality,
when it desserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.
There should be no vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be
permitted to challenge a record of a court of these Islands for defect of form
when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced thereby.
2. Negros Merchants Inc. vs. China Banking Corporation
An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore
not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari.
Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an
appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed
in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. Thus, when the trial
court denied respondents motion to dismiss, its next course of action
would have been to file an answer and proceed with the trial of the case.
It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory and that the failure to comply with this requirement cannot be
excused. The certification is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the
party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no
other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and
causes of action. In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the
certification may be signed, for and on behalf of the said corporation, by a
specifically authorized person, including its retained counsel, who has
personal knowledge of the facts required to be established by the
documents.

If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized
to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint
does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and
the plaintiff.
Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that an amended
complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends. Therefore, it is
considered as a initiatory pleading
RULE 2
1. JOSEFINA RUBIO DE LARENA vs. HERMENEGILDO VILLANUEVA
SPLITTING OF CAUSE OF ACTION:
The principle is well established that a party will not be permitted to split a
cause of action and make it the basis of several suits, but that rule applies
only to cases where the cause is in existence at the time the action is
brought.
The rule is well established that when a lease provides for the payment of
the rent in separate instalments, each instalment is an independent cause
of action.
2. Blossom & Co, v, Manila Gas Corporation
As a general rule a contract to do several things at several times in its
nature, so as to authorize successive actions; and a judgment recovered
for a single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a suit
for a subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is
entire, and the breach total, there can be only one action, and plaintiff must
therein recover all his damages.
Inasmuch as there was a total breach of the contract by the defendant's
refusal to deliver, the plaintiff cannot split up his demand and maintain
successive actions, but must either recover all his damages in the first suit
or wait until the contract matured or the time for the delivery of all the goods
had arrived. In other words, there can be but one action for damages for a
total breach of an entire contract to deliver goods, and the fact that they

were to be delivered in installment from time to time does not change the
general rule.
Where there is a complete and total breach of a continuous contract for a
term of years, the recovery of a judgment for damages by reason of the
breach is a bar to another action on the same contract for and on account
of the continuous breach. (Fish vs. Folley, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 54)
The judgment which the plaintiff obtained in the former action founded upon
a breacj of the same contract is a bar to this action.
3. Swagman Hotels vs. Court of Appeals
The curing effect under Section 5 Rule 10 is applicable only if a cause of
action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is
defective for failure to allege the essential facts. It thus follows that a
complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or
remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence
or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. Such an action is
prematurely brought and is therefore, a groundless suit, which should be
dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably by the defendant.
4. ADA V. BAYLON
a. By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action
is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in
one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a
declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of
which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint,
declaration or petition.
A plaintiff
may
under
certain
circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of
action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of
suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with
by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in
controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject
matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The
provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where
possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants.

Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in

the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may
have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is
subject to
the condition, inter alia, that
the
joinder shall
not include special civil actions governed by special rules.
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for
partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the
action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of
Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil
action governed by Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court while an
action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary
rules
of
civil
procedure.
The
variance
in
the
procedure
in
the
special
civil
action
of
partition
and
in
the
ordinary
civil action of
rescission
precludes
their
joinder
in one
complaint or
their being
tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining
what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the
determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular
cause of action.
b. Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of
a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined
cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is no
objection objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu
proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous
adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a
question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed
with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal
thereof. Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of
action and parties involve
an implied admission of the courts jurisdiction. It acknowledges the
power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its
own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to
be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action);
and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said

misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of

misjoinder of parties).
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the
court trying the case has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein
notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has
no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined
cause
of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if
not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court
with respect to the same would be a nullity.
c. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to
bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exist
s side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it
supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the
original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined
with the original
pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a
continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts
which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the
same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original
complaint.
The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the
records new facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to
which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which
further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the
relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even though
they themselves constitute a right of action.
Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions,
occurrences or events which had transpired after the filing of the
pleading
sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts const
itute another cause of action.
Admittedly, in Leobrera v. Court of Appeals, we held that a
supplemental pleading must be based on
matters arising subsequent to the

original pleading related to the claim or defense presented therein, a

nd
founded on the same cause of action. We further stressed therein th
at a supplemental pleading may not be used to try a new cause of action.
However, in Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and
Development Corp., we clarified that, while a matter stated in a
supplemental complaint should have some relation to the cause of action
setforth in the original pleading, the fact that the supplemental pleadi
ng technically states a new cause of action should not be a bar to its
allowance but only a matter that may be considered by the court in the
exercise of its discretion. In such cases, we stressed that a broad
definition of cause of action should be applied
RULE 3
1. Banda v. Ermita
The requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected
are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3)
the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all
concerned.
An element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of
representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate
representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether
the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other
members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so
bears, to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing
on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is
the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For
while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the
plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those
who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would
certainly claim denial of due process.

Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts,
and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege
the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject
matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of
persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to
determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number
appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine
whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the
subject matter of general or common interest.
2. ROGER V. NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO
Civil Procedure; Parties :
The 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit
In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for
the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the coowned
property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other coowners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the
suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
The misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not
a ground for dismissal of action.
3. Bacalso v. Padigos
Indispensable Parties: The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent action of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to absent parties but even as to those present.
The action is for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents,
recovery of possession and ownership, and damages.
Indispensable

parties under Section 7 of Rule 3, Rules of Court provide that Parties-ininterest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As
such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The
general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action
requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and
the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is
precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the
action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
4. Valdez- Tallorin vs. Heirs of Juanito Tarona
The non- joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal.
Section 11, Rule 3 prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint
at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on
its own initiative. Only if plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party,
despite the order of the court, may it dismiss the action.
RULE 5
1. MIGUEL V. MONTANEZ
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay
conciliation
proceedings,
like
the
Kasunduang
Pagaayos in this case, is binding between the contracting parties and, u
pon its perfection, is immediately executory
insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
order and public policy. This is in accord with the broad precept of Article
2037 of the Civil Code, viz: A compromise has upon the parties the effect
and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in
compliance with a judicial compromise.
Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an
amicable settlement has the force andeffect of res judicata even if
not judicially approved. It transcends being a mere contract binding only
upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to

execution in accordance with the Rules.18 Thus, under Section 417

of the Local Government Code, such amicable settlement or arbitration
award may be enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6)
months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such
settlement in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the sixmonth period.
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the Local G
overnment Code and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing
Rules
and
Regulations.
The
Punong
Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine
solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to
give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his
obligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings
are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of
action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has
the force and effect of a final judgment.
It must be emphasized, however, that enforcement by execution of the
amicable settlement, either under the first or the second remedy, is only
applicable if the contracting parties have not repudiated such settlement
within
ten
(10)
days from the date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the Lo
cal
Government
Code.
If
the
amicable
settlement is repudiated by one party, either expressly or impliedly, t
he other party has two options, namely, to enforce the compromise in
accordance with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the case
may be, or to consider it rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
This is in accord with Article 2041 of the Civil Code, which qualifies the
broad application of Article 2037, viz: If one of the parties fails or refuses to
abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
RULE 7
1. Traveno v. Bobongan
A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-

compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective

certification against forum shopping.
As to verification:
o Non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served
thereby.
o Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one
who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct.
As to certification against forum shopping:
oNon-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
substantial compliance or presence of special circumstances or
compelling reasons.
oThe certification against forum shopping must be signed by all
the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did
not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.
oThe certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf.
(WE NOTE THAT: this case deviated from the general rule that
factual questions are not entertained in petitions for review on
certiorari of the appellate courts decisions due to practicality and to
prevent delays.)

RULE 9
1. LEAH PALMA vs. HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ
Certiorari;
A petition for certiorari is proper when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and there in no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy at law.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and
correct, not merely speculative. While Section 1, Rule 65 requires that the
petition for certiorari be verified, this is not an absolute necessity where the
material facts alleged are a matter of record and the questions raised are
mainly of law.
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where
the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It
is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must
be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house
of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.
The RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of private
respondent when the latters counsel entered his appearance on private
respondents behalf, without qualification and without questioning the
propriety of the service of summons, and even filed two Motions for
Extension of Time to File Answer.
The filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and
to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
RULE 10
1. Philippine Ports Authority v. Gothong

The import of Section 3, rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that
the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or
defense
Old Rules of Court:
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. after the case is set for
hearing, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court.
But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was
made with intent to delay the action or that the cause of action or defense
is substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in
this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the
next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only
upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court
upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in
court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause
of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not
retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in
Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may
(now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should
only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in
the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall
serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and
equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a
"just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."
RULE 14
1. E.B. Villarosa vs. Benito

The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept

summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more
clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14.
2. GALURA V. MATH-AGRO
a. In Sandoval II v. HRET, 383 SCRA 770 (2002), the
Court
enumerated
the
requisites
of
a
valid
substituted
service: (1) service of summons within a reasonable time is
impossible; (2) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to
locate the defendant; (3) the person to whom the summons is served
is of sufficient age and discretion; (4) the person to whom the
summons is served resides at the defendants place of residence; and
(5) pertinent facts showing the enumerated circumstances are
stated in the return of service. In Sandoval, the Court held that
statutory restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully
and fully observed.
b. Whenever practicable, the summons must be served on the
defendant in person. Substituted service may be resorted to only
when service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible.
Impossibility of prompt service should appear in the return of
servicethe efforts exerted to find the defendant and the fact that such
efforts failed must be stated in the return of service. In Keister v. Judge
Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977) the Court held: "Service of summons upon
the defendant is the means by which the court
may
acquire jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid
waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null and void. This
process is solely for the benefit of the defendant. Its purpose is not only to
give the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, but also to afford
the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.
The
summons must be
served
to
the defendant
in person. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally
within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made.
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made
to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed.
This
statement
should
be made
in
the
proof
of
service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation
of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service

is in derogation of the common law; it is a method

extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus,
under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully,
and any substituted service other than that authorized by the
statute is considered ineffective. Indeed, the constitutional requirement
of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably
expected to give the desired notice to the party of the claim against him.
3. Citizens Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Melencio-Herrera
In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within the
forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court. In other words, summons by publication cannotconsistently with
the due process clause in the Bill of Rightsconfer upon the court
jurisdiction over said defendants.
Any judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be violative of due
process.
Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal
judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to
determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal
service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential
to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the
constitutional requirement of due process.
It has been held that in actions in personam, service by publication on
resident defendants, who are personally within the state and can be found
therein is not due process of law, and a statute allowing it is
unconstitutional.
The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to
locate properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with
unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, section
1(f), in which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then accordingly
be deemed valid and effective.

(WE NOTE THAT: this case has been superseded by Santos v. PNOC with
respect to summons by publication being strictly prohibited in actions
strictly in personam)
4. PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., vs. PNOC Search Result EXPLORATION
CORPORATION
In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or
the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule
because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was
applicable. Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the
old rule to in rem actions only. This has been changed. The present rule
expressly states that it applies [i]n any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now
applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party. In
case a defendant is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant,
unless the court in its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence
5. Rapid City and Devt. Corp. v. Villa
It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latters
voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in
the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi
and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens: Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant

in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes

exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we
have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and
to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. This, however, is
tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the courts
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule
on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set
forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or
motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for
resolution.
RULE 16
1. Figueroa vs. People
The issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by
laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of
jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual
milieu of Tijam.
2. SOLIVEN V. FASTFORMS
a. In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, we
specified the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2
of the Circular provides: 2. The exclusion of the term "damages of
whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19

(8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies
to
cases
where
the
damages
are
merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action,
or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall
be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. Here, the
main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of money amounting
to
only
P195,155.00.
The
damages
being
claimed
by petitioner are merely the consequences of this main cause of
action. Hence, they are not included in determining the jurisdictional
amount.
b. The
Court
has
constantly
upheld
the
doctrine
that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant's
participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including
the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars
such party from challenging the court's jurisdiction. A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent
and
after
obtaining
or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and
then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
3. HSBC v. Aldecoa& Co.
The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is
that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious.
But when the pendency of such a suit is set up to defeat another, the case
must be the same. There must be the same parties, or at least such as
represent the same interest, there must be the same rights asserted, and
the same relief prayed for. This relief must be founded on the same facts,
and the title or essential basis of the relief sought must be the same. The
identity in these particulars should be such that if the pending case had
already been disposed of, it could be pleaded in bar as a former
adjudication of the same matter between the same parties.

The test of identity of the cases is as follows: A plea of the pendency of a

prior action is not available unless the prior action is of -such a character
that, had a judgment been rendered therein on the merits, such a judgment
would be conclusive between the parties and could be pleaded in bar of the
second action.
The former suit is one to annul the mortgages. The present suit is one for
the foreclosure of the mortgages. It may be conceded that if the final
judgment in the former action is that the mortgages be annulled, such an
adjudication will deny the right of the bank to foreclose the mortgages. But
will a decree holding them valid prevent the bank from foreclosing them?
Most certainly not. In such an event, the judgment would not be a bar to the
prosecution of the present action. The rule is not predicated upon such a
contingency. It is applicable, between the same parties, only when the
judgment to be rendered in the action first instituted will be such that,
regardless of which party is successful, it will amount to res adjudicata
against the second action.
4. SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs. MAGDALENO SlBONGHANOY
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of
the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case, a party may be barred by laches from
invoking this plea for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling
everything done in the case with the active participation of said party
invoking the plea.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards
deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.
RULE 17

1. SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC. v. Magsalin

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized
under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of
the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order
and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. Dismissals of
actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are
with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice[.] As a prejudicial
dismissal, the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is also deemed to be a
judgment on the merits so that the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No.
02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata.
Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and
the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication
on the merits.
As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order
conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid
judgments and final orders. The rule states:
RULE 36
Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof
Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall
be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its
failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its
complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able
to know the particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial
dismissal.
A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaints dismissal
so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima
facie justification for the dismissal. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties

in the dark and is especially prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to
point the assigned error in seeking a review by a higher tribunal.
RULE 19
1. Metropolitan Bank vs. The Presiding Judge
Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter of litigation, in the
success of either of the parties to an action, or against both, may intervene
in such action, and when he has become a party thereto, it is error for the
court to dismiss the action, including the intervention suit on the basis of an
agreement between the original parties to the action. Any settlement made
by the plaintiff and the defendant is necessarily ineffective unless the
intervenor is a party to it.