France Suppressed Reports of Gruesome Torture

at Bataclan Massacre

N 3922
______
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
CONSTITUTION of 4 October 1958
Fourteenth LEGISLATURE
Saved to the Chair of Assembly national July 5, 2016
REPORT
FACT
On behalf of the COMMISSION of inquiry (1)
relative to the implemented means Artwork by the State to fight
against terrorism since January 7, 2015
Mr. Georges FENECH
President
MR. SBASTIEN PIETRASANTA

Rapporteur
Members

VOLUME 2:
RECORDS OF THE HEARINGS
(1) the composition of this commission of inquiry figure on the reverse side of this page.
The commission of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism is composed of:
Mr. Georges Fenech, Chairman; Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur; Mr Jacques Cresta, Meyer
Habib, Guillaume Larriv, Ms. Anne-Yvonne Le Dain, vice-presidents; Mr. Christophe Cavard,
Ms. Franoise Dumas, Mr. Olivier Falorni, Serge Grouard, Secretaries; Mr Pierre Aylagas,
David Comet, Jean-Jacques Cottel, Marc Dolez, Ms. Marianne Dubois, Mr. Philippe Goujon,
Henri Guaino, Franois Lamy, Jean-Luc Laurent, Michel Lefait, Pierre Lellouche, Ms. Lucette
Lousteau, Messrs. Olivier Marleix, Jean-Ren Marsac, Alain Marsaud, Pascal Popelin, Ms.
Maina Sage, Julie Sommaruga, Mr. Patrice Verchre, Jean-Michel Vel.
RECORDS OF THE HEARINGS

Round table, open to the press, victims and relatives of victims of the attacks of November 13,
2015: Association November 13: brotherhood and truth : Mr. Georges Salines, president, Mr.
Mohammed Zenak, Treasurer, Ms. Sophie Dias, Member of the association, Ms. Aurlia Gilbert,
Member of the association; Association Life for Paris - 13 November 2015 : Mrs Caroline
Langlade, Vice-President, Mrs. Lydia Berkennou, Member of the association, Mr. Alexis
Lebrun, Member of the association; Mr. Grgory Reibenberg, leader of the restaurant La Belle
quipe (Monday, February 15, 2016) 9
Hearing, open to the press, Ms. Franoise Rudetzki, founder of SOS attacks (Monday, February
15, 2016) 28
Round table, open to the press, lawyers of victims of terrorist attacks: Me Patrick Klugman,
lawyer at the bar of Paris, accompanied by Mr. Samuel Sandler, father and grandfather of victims
of Mohamed Merah; Me Samia Maktouf, counsel to the bars of Paris and Tunis, accompanied by
Mr. Omar Dmougui, victim of the attacks of November 13, 2015; Me Olivier Morice, lawyer at
the bar of Paris, accompanied by Mr. Ren Guyomard and Ms. Emmanuelle Guyomard, father
and sister of a victim of the bombing of the Bataclan (Wednesday, February 17, 2016) 46
Round table, open to the press, associations of victims of terrorism: French victims of terrorism
(AVFT) Association : Mr Guillaume Denoix de Saint - Marc, Director-general, Mr Stphane
Lacombe, Deputy Director, Ms. Aline the lease-Kremer, responsible for communication and
management; National Federation of victims of attacks and collective accidents (FENVAC) : Mr.
Olivier Dargouge, Vice-Chairman, Ms. Marie-Claude Desjeux, Vice-President, Mr. Stphane
Gicquel, Secretary general; National Institute for assistance to victims and mediation (INAVEM)

: Ms. Michele Kerckhove, Chairperson, Mrs Sabrina Bellucci, Director General (Wednesday,
February 17, 2016) 63
Hearing, open to the press, by Mr. Daniel Pszenny, journalist to the World, victim of the attacks
of November 13, 2015 (Wednesday, February 17, 2016) 77
Round table, open to the press, devoted to hospital for victims of the attacks of the year 2015
support: Mr. general physician armies Jean-Marc Debonne, head of the health service of the
armies (SSA), Mr. doctor general inspector Dominique Vallet, Deputy "provides care and
expertise," Mr. physician in Chief Jean-Christophe Bel; Mr. Martin Hirsch, CEO of the
Assistance publique-Hpitaux Paris (AP - HP), Dr. Christophe Leroy, head of the "management
of health crises" in the AP - HP (Monday, February 29, 2016) 82
Hearing, open to the press, Mr. Patrice Paoli, Director of the interdepartmental cell of victims
(Monday, March 7, 2016) 109
Hearing, open to the press, of Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior (Monday, March
7, 2016) 120
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue, the RAID (Research Assistance
Intervention Dissuasion) leader, and Mr. ric Heip, his Deputy (Wednesday, March 9, 2016) 152
Hearing, behind closed doors, general Denis Favier, Director-general of the national
gendarmerie, colonel Hubert Bonneau, the intervention of the gendarmerie nationale (GIGN)
group, and the colonel Armando de Oliveira, Commander region Picardie gendarmerie and the
grouping of departmental gendarmerie of the sum (Wednesday, March 9, 2016) 174
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Philippe Chadrys, Deputy Director responsible for counterterrorism in the headquarters of the judicial police (DCPJ), Mr. Franck Douchy, Director
regional judicial police in Versailles, and Mr. Frdric Doidy, head of the central Office for
combating organized crime (OCLCO) and head of research and intervention brigades national
(bis) (Wednesday, March 9, 2016) 191
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Christophe Molmy, Chief of the research and intervention
(bis) of the prefecture of police of Paris, and Mr Marc Thoraval, head of the criminal brigade of
the Regional Directorate of the judicial police (DRPJ) of Paris (Thursday, 10 March, 2016) 212
Hearing in camera, Mr. Patrick Pelloux, doctor emergency doctor (Monday, March 14, 2016)
236
Hearing, behind closed doors, soldiers mobilized under operation Sentinel November 13, 2015:
Lieutenant-Colonel d. D., Chief of the tactical staff of Paris, master P - M. A., Commander unit,
Chief Sergeant G. A., head of the deployed section rue Charonne and Marchal des logis R. D.,
leader of the Group spoke at the Bataclan (Monday, March 14, 2016) 246

Hearing, behind closed doors, police intervened during the attacks of 7, 8 and 9 January 2015:
Mr. B. B., police Commissioner, Mr. M. J., Commander of police, Mr. J-S. B., leader-board tray
11 (Monday, March 14, 2016) 258
Hearing, behind closed doors, police intervened during the attacks of November 13, 2015: Mr. B.
B., police Commissioner, Mrs C. P., Commissioner of police, Mr G. P., Commissioner of police,
Mr. G. B., police captain, Mr. Z. I., Commissioner of police, Mr D. K., Divisional
Commissioner, Mr. S. Q., Divisional Commissioner, M. J. M., Commissioner of police, Mr. F.
C. , Divisional Commissioner, Ms. V. G., Divisional Commissioner, M. T. D., Superintendent of
police (Monday, March 14, 2016) 273
Round table, open to the press, devoted to support for the victims of the attacks by the year 2015
by the brigade of firefighters of Paris (BSPP) and medical assistance service urgent (UAS):
general Philippe Boutinaud, commanding the BSPP, Professor Jean-Pierre Tourtier, Chief
Medical Officer of the BSPP, surgeon Michel Bignand, colonel Jean-Claude Gallet, Deputy to
the commanding general of the BSPP, colonel Grard Boutolleau Head of the 2e groupemement
fire and rescue and commanding officer of relief at the Bataclan, Professor Pierre Carli, medical
director of SAMU de Paris, head of Department at the Department of anaesthesia and
resuscitation of the hospital Necker-Enfants-Malades, Professor Frdric Adnet, Director of
SAMU 93, head of the Center home-emergencies-imagery of the hospital Avicenne, Dr Franois
Braun, president of the SAMU emergency of France, head of emergency medicine, Dr. Yves
Lambert, head of the pole of the urgency, Director of SAMU 78, Dr. Valerie Charlotte Chollet Xemard Hospital practitioner of UAS 94 at hospital Henri-Mondor (Wednesday, March 16,
2016) 289
Hearing, open to the press, Mr. Jean Benet, Director of transport and the protection of the public
from the prefecture of police of Paris, and of Professor Bertrand Ludes, Director of the medicolegal Institute of Paris (Wednesday, March 16, 2016) 318
Round table, open to the press, dedicated to safety at the Stade de France on November 13, 2015:
for the Consortium Stade de France : Mr. Christophe Bionne, Director of safety and security,
Mr. Jean-Philippe Dos Santos, Deputy Director of security, Ms. Florence Gaillot, Executive
Assistant, in charge of the seizure of the handrail of the event, Mr. Pascal Begain responsible for
fire safety, Mr. Damien Chemla, preventionist, responsible for the technical and human means
Ms. Suzanne Delourme, responsible for safety; for the French Football Federation : Mr.
Victoriano Melero, Director of cabinet of the president and Deputy Director-general, Ms. Ccile
Grandsimon, responsible for regulation and management of the security of the meetings, Mr.
Didier Pinteaux, responsible for safety and security; for private security companies : Mr. JeanMarc Peninou (Stand up), Mr. Mustapha Abba Sany (Gest not sport), Mr. Bastien Rousseau
(SGPS), Mr. Fabrice Laborie (ACA), Mr Olivier Bruel (Als Event's), Mr Olivier Ploix (ISMA),
Mr. Christian Glaz (MCS), Mr. Ludovic Foret (JM safety), Mr. Olivier Roussel (Europa Secure
Dog), Mr. Bruno Lafond and Mr. Franck Chaboud (hand safety) (Wednesday, 16 March, 2016)
326
Hearing in camera, the Divisional Commissioner X and brigadier Z, his driver (Thursday, March
17, 2016) 339

Hearing in camera, the night of the Val-de-Marne bin officials intervened on November 13,
2015: Mr. T.P., corporal, M. L. S., corporal, Mr. O. B., brigadier, Mr. N. B., peacekeeper, M. A.
D., keeper of the peace, and Mr P. T., peacekeeper (Monday, March 21, 2016) 355
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone, Director general of the national police,
and Mr. Marc Baudet, Advisor strategy and prospective (Monday, March 21, 2016) 369
Hearing, behind closed doors, general Denis Favier, Director general of the national gendarmerie
and colonel Samuel Dubuis, Member of his cabinet (Monday, March 21, 2016) 386
Hearing, behind closed doors, of general Bruno Ray, military Governor of Paris, and colonel
Marc Boileau, Chief of staff (Monday, March 21, 2016) 402
Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Michel Cadot, Paris police prefect, Mr. Christian Sainte, Director of the
police judiciaire in Paris, Mr. Jacques Mric, Director of the safety of nearby the Paris
metropolitan area, and general Philippe Boutinaud, Commander of the fire brigade of Paris
(BSPP) (Wednesday, 23 March 2016) 417
Round table, open to the press, of the national police unions: Ms. Cline Berthon, General
Secretary of the Union of the Commissioners of the national police (SCPN), Mr. Jean-Luc
Taltavull, under-Secretary-General; Mr. Thierry Clair, delegate pole province of UNSA Police
(Wednesday, March 23, 2016) 443
Round table, open to the press, trade unions of judges: Mr Olivier Janson, Deputy Secretary
general of the Union of magistrates, Mr. Benjamin Blanchet, Charg de mission; Ms. Clarisse
Taron, President of the Union of magistrates, Mrs Laurence Blisson, General Secretary; Ms.
Batrice Brugre, Secretary General of FO-magistrates, Mr. Jean de Maillard, associate member
(Wednesday, March 23, 2016) 457
Hearing, to camera, of Mr. Franois Molins, Prosecutor of the tribunal de grande instance (TGI)
of Paris Republic, Ms. Vronique Degermann, vice-Attorney of the Republic nearly said TGI
(Wednesday, 30 March 2016) 472 Attorney of the Republic Assistant near the same TGI, Ms.
Camille Hennetier
Hearing in camera, Ms. Laurence Le Vert, first Vice President of the instruction to the antiterrorism pole TGI de Paris, and Mr. David Bnichou, Vice President of education at the antiterrorism pole of the same git (Wednesday, 30 March 2016) 486
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Denis Couh, first Assistant Vice President of the regional
court in Paris, Mr. Laurent Raviot, Vice President of the same court, presidents of the 16e
correctional Chamber, and Mr. Rgis de Jorna, president of the Court of appeal of Paris
(Wednesday, 30 March 2016) 497
Hearing, huis clos, Ms. Isabelle Gorce, Director of prison administration, and Mrs Fabienne
Viton, head of the bureau of intelligence prison (Monday, April 4, 2016) 509

Hearing in camera, Mr. Marc Trvidic, Senior Vice President of the TGI de Lille (Wednesday,
April 6, 2016) 528
Hearing in camera, Mr. Vincent the Ganguly, vice-president in charge of the enforcement of
sentences in the TGI de Paris (Wednesday, April 6, 2016) 542
Round table, open to the press, trade unions from the press: Mr. Jean Viansson - Ponte, president
of the Union of the regional daily press (SPQR), Ms. Haude D'Harcourt, Councillor responsible
for relations with the public authorities, and Mr Jacques Lallain, Secretary general of the drafting
of the Parisien . Mr. Denis Bouchez, Director of the Union of the national daily press (SPQN);
Mr. Jean-Christophe Boulanger, president of the Union of the independent press of information
online (SPIIL) (Monday, 25 April, 2016) 553
Round table, open to the press, representatives of audiovisual media: Group TF1 : Mr. Antoine
Gulaud, Editorial Director of TF1, Mr. Nicolas Charbonneau, CEO of LCI, Mr. Philippe
Moncorps, legal information Director, Mrs. Nathalie Lasnon, Director of regulatory affairs and
competition; Group France Tlvisions : Mr. Michel Field, Executive Director responsible for
information, Mr. Alexandre Kara, Editorial Director, Ms. Audrey Goutard, Assistant to the head
of service investigations and reports; BFM TV : Mr Herv Broud, Ms Ccile Ollivier, reporter,
Director of information policy; Itele : Mr. Guillaume Zeller, managing editor, Mr. Alexandre Ifi,
Deputy Director of the writing; Group Radio France : Mr. Olivier Zegna Rata, Director of Radio
France international and institutional relations; Mr. Grgory Philipps, Deputy Director of the
drafting of France Info, Ms. Anglique Bouin, Deputy Director of the drafting of France Inter .
RMC : Mr. Herv Broud, Director of information (Monday, April 25, 2016) 565
Hearing, open to the press, Mr. Guillaume Blanchot, Director-general of the Higher Council of
l'audiovisuel (audiovisual regulatory body-CSA) and Mr. Thomas Dautieu, Assistant to the
Director of programs (Wednesday, April 27, 2016) 586
Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Jrme Bonnafont, Director of North Africa and the Middle East to the
central administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international development, Mr.
Didier Chabert, Deputy Director of the Middle East, Mr. Philippe Errera, Director-general of
international relations and strategy of the Ministry of defence, and Mr. Fouad El Khatib, head of
the Africa Department of the North and Middle East (Wednesday, April 27, 2016). 597
Hearing, behind closed doors, of colonel Bruno Arviset, Secretary general of the Council of the
military of the gendarmerie nationale of Philippe squadron leader function - Alexandre Akhigbe,
Chief of Squadron Y, major Emmanuel Franchet, Chief Warrant Officer Frdric Guaignier,
warrant officer Raoul Burdet of warrant officer Vincent Delaval, warrant officer Sbastien
Perrier and Constable Annak Kernes (Monday, May 9, 2016) 612
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Jean-Jacques Colombi, Chief of the division of international
relations at the Central Directorate of the judicial police (DCPJ), and Mr. Alexandre Pichon, his
Deputy (Monday, May 9, 2016) 628

Hearing, behind closed doors, the general Pierre de Villiers, Chief of staff of the armed forces
(Monday, May 9, 2016). 643
Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Grgoire Dor, Deputy Head of the unit for coordination of the forces of
intervention (UCOFI) (Wednesday, May 11, 2016) 666
Round table, open to the press, of specialists on the Middle East: Mr. Pierre-Jean Luizard,
historian, Director of research at the national Centre for scientific research (CNRS); M. Bligh
Nabli, Director of research at the Institute of international relations and strategic (IRIS); Mr.
Wassim Nasr, France 24 journalist; Mr. Pierre Razoux, Director of research at the Institute of
strategic research of the military school (IRSEM) 680 (Wednesday, May 11, 2016)
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. David Skuli, head of the police aux frontires (PAF), Mr.
Fernand Gontier, Deputy central Director, and Mr. Bernard Siffert, Deputy Director of
international, cross-border business and security (Thursday, may 12, 2016) 698
Hearing, behind closed doors, Ms. Hlne Crocquevieille, Director General of customs and
Excise, Mr Jean-Paul Balzamo, Deputy Director of legal and litigation, business controls and the
fight against fraud, and Mr. Jean-Paul Garcia, Director national intelligence and customs
investigations (Thursday, may 12, 2016) 714
Hearing in camera, Mr. Didier Le Bret, national coordinator of intelligence (RSS) (Wednesday,
may 18, 2016) 727
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Francis Delon, Chairman of the National Committee of
control of the techniques of intelligence (CNCTR), accompanied by Mr. Marc Antoine, Advisor
to the president (Wednesday, may 18, 2016) 746
Round table, open to the press, intelligence specialists: M. Jean-Franois Clair, former Deputy
Director of the direction de surveillance du territoire (DST); Mr. Philippe Hayez, head of the
speciality "information" of the school of International Affairs of the Institute of political studies
in Paris; Mr. Franois Heisbourg, special adviser to the president of the Foundation for strategic
research; Mr. Sbastien-Yves Laurent, Professor at the Faculty of law and political science at the
University of Bordeaux; Mr. Damien Martinez, Secretary general of the Centre for analysis of
terrorism (CAT) (Thursday, May 19, 2016) 759
Hearing in camera, Mr. Jrme Lonnet, head of the central Department of territorial intelligence
(LSVCCS) (Thursday, May 19, 2016) 771
Hearing, behind closed doors, of general Pierre Sauvegrain, Assistant Director of operational
anticipation of the national gendarmerie (SDAO), and Mr. Olivier Mtivet, his Deputy (Monday,
May 23, 2016). 783
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Olivier de Mazieres, responsible for the operational staff of
prevention of terrorism (EMOPT) (Monday, May 23, 2016) 798

Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Patrick Calvar, Director-general of the internal security (CSB),
accompanied by Ms. Marie Deniau, head of cabinet (Tuesday, May 24, 2016). 813
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Louis Gautier, Secretary general of defence and national
security (SGDSN) (Wednesday, may 25, 2016). 839
Hearing in camera, Mr. Bernard Bajolet, Director general of external security (DGSE)
(Wednesday, 25 may 2016) 856
Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Ren Bailly, Director of intelligence at the prefecture of police of Paris
(DRPP) (Thursday, 26 May 2016) 871
Hearing, behind closed doors, of general Christophe Gomart, Director of military intelligence
(DRM), Ms. Lorraine Tournyol du Clos, Assistant to the Director, responsible for strategy, and
colonel Rnald Patigny, military assistant (Thursday, May 26, 2016) 889
Hearing, open to the press, Mr. Jean-Jacques Urvoas, keeper of the seals, Minister of Justice
(Wednesday 1er June 2016) 902
Hearing, open to the press, Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian, Defence Minister (Wednesday 1er June
2016) 920
Hearing, open to the press, of Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior (Thursday, June
2, 2016) 938
Hearing, open to the press of Ms Juliette Madel, Secretary of State responsible for assistance to
victims (Thursday, 16 June, 2016) 969
Round table, open to the press, victims and relatives of victims of the attacks of November 13,
2015: Association November 13: brotherhood and truth : Mr. Georges Salines, president, Mr.
Mohammed Zenak, Treasurer, Ms. Sophie Dias, Member of the association, Ms. Aurlia Gilbert,
Member of the association; Association Life for Paris - 13 November 2015 : Mrs Caroline
Langlade, Vice-President, Mrs. Lydia Berkennou, Member of the association, Mr. Alexis Lebrun,
Member of the association; Mr. Grgory Reibenberg, leader of the restaurant " the beautiful team
Report of the round table, open to the press, Monday, February 15, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the invitation
of the commission of inquiry into the means OEimplemented by the State to combat terrorism since
January 7, 2015.
This commission of inquiry was constituted on February 9; It has 30 members from all political parties
represented in Parliament. The rapporteur Sbastien Pietrasanta and myself are assisted by four vicepresidents and four secretaries. Unless prevented, we will meet Monday and Wednesday afternoon and
Thursday morning.
We are neither prosecutors nor judges, we didn't accuse nor do consider; We are Commissioners of
inquiry, whose objective is to establish the truth and to make proposals to ensure that the Government
takes the steps needed to remedy what does not go.

I said to the press that in accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the order on November 17, 1958
and in the interests of transparency, the rule is that the advertising of our work. The written press is
therefore authorized to attend the hearings. Audiovisual transmission will be ensured by the inner channel
of the Assembly and broadcast live on its website, videos remain available for a few months.
However exceptions to the rule of publicity will be applied when it comes to preserve trade secrets secrecy, secret training - certain personalities that we will have to audition. Similarly, the hearings may be
held behind closed doors at the request of the interviewees even if they are not subject to secrecy. In this
case, an account, total or partial, will be published retrospectively.
Today and Wednesday sessions will be exclusively devoted to the hearing of victims of the attacks on 13
November 2015, their associations and their lawyers. On 29 February, a session will be devoted to the
attacks in the month of January 2015.
If we decided to start by victims, it is above all to demonstrate them our solidarity but also to hear what
they have to say, both in regard to the manner in which they were supported on the difficulties they had to
face.
Ladies and gentlemen, your freedom of speech is total to share your feeling about the means available to
the State response to events which we know that they are likely to recur.
Friday, November 13, 2015, the jihadi attacks in Paris have been 130 deaths and hundreds of injuries. In
total, these are 4,000 people which are considered as direct or indirect by the Fund of guarantee of
victims of acts of terrorism and other offences victims (ITMF).
The association "13 November: brotherhood and truth" was incorporated on January 9, 2016 by victims
and relatives of victims of all the affected sites. It is intended to allow victims and their relatives to meet.
She wants to also accompany them in the defence of their rights and act to the manifestation of the truth.
It is represented here by its president, Mr. Georges Salines, 58 years, whose daughter was killed at the
Bataclan. Mr. Mohammed Zenak, 58 years, Treasurer of the association; Ms. Sophie Dias, 34, who lost
his father at the Stade de France; Ms. Aurlia Gilbert, age 43.
The association " Life for Paris is represented by its Vice President, Ms. Caroline Langlade, 29 years,
rescued from the Bataclan . Ms. Lydia Berkennou, 27 years old, rescued from the Bataclan ; Mr. Alexis
Lebrun, survivor of the Bataclan.
We welcome also Mr. Grgory Reibenberg, owner of the restaurant La Belle quipe, 46 years, survivor of
the shooting of his restaurant, in which he lost the mother of his daughter.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. The work of our Committee of inquiry will adhere to a double
requirement, the truth and the effectiveness. The truth, we owe to you, and the French victims. We
investigate to find out the truth of the facts, without bias, in respect for our judicial institutions.
The effectiveness we intend to OEuseful for our country work, and I will personally ensure that the report
contains very concrete proposals.
If we wanted to start our work by the hearing of victims, it is to express our solidarity and to show that we
are working for them, for you who are there. We expect that you should freely express with the aim of
helping to provide answers to the legitimate questions you ask yourself.
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, before I give you the floor, in accordance with
article 6 of the commissions of Inquiry Ordinance of November 17, 1958, I must ask you to swear to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Mr. Georges Salines, Mr. Mohammed Zenak, Ms. Sophie Dias, Ms. Aurlia Gilbert, Ms. Caroline
Langlade, Mrs. Lydia Berkennou, Mr. Alexis Lebrun and Mr. Grgory Reibenberg oath.
M. Georges Salines, president of the association "13 November: brotherhood and truth". One of
the objects of our association is to act for the manifestation of the truth, which joined the objectives of
your commission to shed light on the way in which our country faces terrorism. We therefore hope that
our testimonials will help you.
We have among our members by direct witnesses of what has past on 13 November, which may testify to
what they have seen on the site attacks both in terms of security as regards the intervention of the forces
of order or assistance given to the wounded and victims.
For people in my situation, relatives of victims, they also have things to say, so far as the means to fight
against terrorism you seem duty also include ways to mitigate the most painful: there are indeed things to
improve in information devices of people seeking missing persons, in the process of identifying the dead
and how are announced news especially when they are bad, the relatives of the victims. Similarly, we can
testify that progress remains to be done in the Organization of assistance financial, legal or health devices activated downstream of the attacks. Indeed, if our country has on the subject of quite
remarkable tools that many may envy us, everything is far away despite everything to be perfect,
particularly in terms of coordination and unity of doctrine.
It is difficult, when it suffered from psychological trauma, to find the good interlocutor in a french
psychiatric system, very fragmented by quarrels of school and composed of more or less competent
professionals in the field of the psychotrauma. Similarly, all lawyers are not specialists in terrorism cases.
With respect to administrative procedures, their complexity sometimes leads to aberrations - some of the
victims of the Bataclan or always terraces are not, for example, on the list of people to compensate - who
are harassed difficult to tolerate for victims in a State of psychological fragility. The appointment of a
Secretary of State responsible for assistance to victims in the Government be enough to solve these
problems of coordination? The answer depends in part on the administration on which it can rely to
provide appropriate solutions.
Act for the manifestation of the truth, but also challenge you to get the answers to the thousand questions
we ask. You investigate the means OEimplemented by the State to combat terrorism since January 7,
2015, but what has passed November 13 must not to immediately lead us to draw up a first admission of
failure? Could these attacks be avoided? That is how mobilized the police means and intelligence forces
to monitor terrorist apprentices and the jihadists dies? Should we not wonder about the massive
deployment of the security forces on the territory? Many soldiers patrol Paris dress leopard, which is no
doubt very suitable for camouflage in the jungle but what might appear questionable effectiveness if, in
addition, show and gathering places are inadequately protected.
In our opinion, the means to fight against terrorism can be summarized police and security, means
excluding prevention. Personally, I am concerned to hear at the highest level of the State that explain
jihadism, it already excuse him. I'm the last one who would think to forgive the people who killed my
daughter or those who have manipulated, but it seems to me absolutely essential, if we want to fight, to
explain the mechanisms that lead young French to take up arms against young people of their age.
We welcome here the Ant work done by Mrs. Latifa Ibn Ziaten, that I met, or by Dounia Bouzar, working
with youth at risk of being recruited by radical Islamist movements of sectarian type. Unfortunately, in the
current state means mobilised, their task akin especially you want to empty the sea with a small spoon,
and if we want to be effective, it will likely change the scale.
To in arriving here, our company must be thoroughly sick and we must ask ourselves what the means of
the cure, which is by no means a way to overturn the conviction. The France is not more guilty of what is

happened on 13 November that the United States are London bombings of 2005 and the September 11
attacks. The culprits remain the culprits and nothing will justify the heinous crimes they have committed.
Other parliamentary committees of inquiry have already dealt with terrorism, including that chaired by Mr.
ric Ciotti on monitoring of sectors and individuals jihadists. What were the recommendations of these
commissions? Have they been implemented OEwork?
The President Georges Fenech. I should mention at this point that our investigative commission
deliberately chose to concentrate its work on the means OEwork to fight terrorism and not on the
phenomena of radicalisation, which have already been the subject of several commissions of inquiry.
I would also like you to clarify what your room for manoeuvre OEwork at the judicial level, since your
association is newly created.
M. Georges Salines. To the extent where our association does not have five years of existence, it may,
pursuant to section 2-5 of the code of criminal procedure, be civil, which is for the less paradoxical,
insofar as we are the direct victims of acts that are the subject of a judicial procedure.
A few days before leaving the Government, Christiane Taubira told me being favourable to the alignment
of our system on that of the victims of disasters, for which is provided for a derogation that allows
associations, subject to approval of the Ministry of justice, to build parties civil. I submitted the same
request to Mr. Jean-Jacques Urvoas, which we expect is committed to turn on this point.
The President Georges Fenech. The Law Committee focuses Wednesday on a bill for reform of the
criminal procedure which could be an opportunity to change the law on this issue.
You're also complained about not having had access to autopsy reports and do not have been received
by the judges.
M. Georges Salines. Most of the bereaved families want to know what happened to the person they
have lost. This is possible through a lawyer, which means to take a lawyer and pay. Among others is the
reason why we ask that Attorney's fees are supported by the ITMF. However, to my knowledge, the
medical reports were not yet paid to the folder. We want more generally be kept informed of the progress
of the investigation procedure and ask judges, particularly judge Teissier, unite as soon as possible for
this purpose all of the civil parties.
Mr Franois Lamy. Do you have an official channel of access to information within the services of the
State?
Do you think the new Secretary of State assistance to victims can perform this function?
M. Georges Salines. We have no source of regular information. Benefit from a return of experience, to
which we would take part, is part of our demands. The only action to which we were associated - and yet
was it at our request-is a day of reflection organized by the Ministry of health, during which we were able
to give our views on the lack of support at the scene of the attacks of those who were not injured and
which, most often, was sent home while they had lost their clothes their phone, their money or their
papers.
I also insisted on the atrocious lack of operative information of people looking for missing persons: a
phone number which proved unreachable for hours, multiple phone platforms corresponding to different
hospitals and the medico-legal Institute, and ultimately failures beyond the imaginable, with regard to the
announcement of the death.

For the rest we have no regular or ad hoc information. Suggest to the new Secretary of State to fulfil this
role can in fact be a good idea...
Mr. Serge Grouard. You insist on the terrible situation in which the relatives of victims seeking news of
their loved ones during the night attacks have found, but you keep saying the same thing for days that
followed? Have you had, or not, the feeling that the devices were organizing?
M. Georges Salines. In the night from 13 to 14 November, operative information of victims and those
involved proved deficient, probably because it had not been correctly dimensioned and that one had
hardly anticipated that an attack could cause as many victims. However, it was foreseeable with regard to
what has happened in other capitals and to the extent where Paris knew threatened. In addition, all the
tools were not set up. Notably, there is no common information system across the Paris area health care
facilities. It is therefore to the relatives of the victims to contact them one after the other, because no
device research assistance was provided.
The days that followed, I dresserai a less black picture of the situation, for some devices exist, including
associations of the victims gathered within the national Institute of victim assistance and mediation
(INAVEM). This is true in any case in Paris, because it seems that things are more difficult in the
province.
An association as Paris aid to victims is a good entrance gate but does not remove all of the barriers.
Support 100% by social security depends on the inscription on the list of victims; However, in some
cases, it is suggested you to appear on this list you constitute part civil, while it's two steps without report
and be civil is not mandatory. Furthermore, this support runs from November 13, but from the date of
application for support, which is still an aberration.
M. Mohammed Zenak, Treasurer of the association "13 November: truth and brotherhood '. I am
the father of Sonia, 22 years, injured in the Counter Voltaire. We are fortunate that she has always been
aware and that it therefore could warn us that she was alive. At three o'clock in the morning, she was able
to tell us that she was directed to the Pitie-Salpetriere, where it was supported, as all the wounded under
a number. In this regard, if one can accept that there has been, this first night, a number of fraudulent,
that say that the next day and the day after, some injured, those in a coma, had yet to name?
I would like to insist on the lack of follow-up after hospitalization. Operated on five occasions, my
daughter has left the hospital after three weeks, nothing has been provided for its release, neither
medically or psychologically, and it was very complicated to find a psychological support cell who agrees
to move home to help her, knowing that she was in a State of psychological fragility that prevented him
out.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. I cannot but pay tribute to the courage and resilience you have all demonstrated
here to overcome your suffering. It seems to me that group together you into associations is a way of you
rebuild by exceeding the addition of your solitudes face an unforeseeable traumatic event, which required
public services had not anticipated the magnitude, which probably explains the shortcomings which you
all have been witnesses or victims.
Do you need, to remedy these shortcomings, install within each Department a person and a contact
person cell? Do you think it is preferable and more effective to organize these information at the territorial
level relays? Should we imagine a form of one-stop?
M. Mohammed Zenak. Some of our members in the Province are complaining of not having access to
the information; will it have more with a single window? Is a single window also possible when are
involved also different services the firemen, police, army, health services?

M. Georges Salines. You explain the unpreparedness of the services by the unprecedented magnitude
of events and the number of victims. No doubt but, without redoing the story retrospectively, attacks like
these have already occurred - I think in particular to the bombings in Bombay, which simultaneously hit
several points of the city. Therefore, I cannot help thinking that one has prepared the war of 14-18 in
1939.
Concerning the interlocutors which can turn victims to seek help and solve their difficulties, found in the
some one hundred and fifty associations providing assistance to victims, and notably in Paris, in Paris aid
to victims. These associations actually manage a public service: is this relevant? I am not prononcerais
but the question deserves to be asked.
Then remains the problem of the interlocutor to which can turn these associations. It is indeed very
complicated, when volunteer in an association to manage the multiplicity of stakeholders involved. I for
my part have a job otherwise, and have no intention of becoming a professional victim; It is likely that
having a unique referent would simplify me the task.
Ms. Sophie Dias, Member of the association "13 November: brotherhood and truth". I am the
daughter of Manuel Dias, car driver, killed, aged 63, front door D du Stade de France.
The implementation of a single window seems to me indeed indispensable, especially for people living in
the Province, which is the case of MOM. It actually took me beg an appointment with the local victims
association, which was overwhelmed. We have had no priority treatment and the psychologist who
received us explained to us not being able to do much for us, which shows how the resources of these
associations are limited.
In the unpredictable magnitude of the attacks, I would like to be reassured on the protection of our
stadiums, with the approach of the sporting events that our country prepares to host. The many victims of
the Bataclan probably diverted attention from the only victim there was at the Stade de France, but this
victim was my father.
Regards the toll-free number to contact for information on missing persons, I point out that it was
inaccessible from abroad. The people that my mother has been online have stopped him repeat that the
fact that it has no news was rather good sign...
We have had contact by ourselves all hospitals near the stade de France, in vain, because dad wasn't on
any of the lists. Is that passing through the Consulate of the Portugal - since dad was Portuguese - that I
have had confirmation of his death, Saturday to fourteen hours, the Quai d'Orsay having waited 48 hours
to contact me. This is unacceptable and this is serious. We cannot consider that such errors occur, and it
seems not so complicated to digitally manage a list of hundreds of names, without yielding to the fatalism
of those who think that, if attacks had heavily hit the stage it would still, today, to count our dead...
With regard to the autopsy report, we have still had no access, any more than we do not have information
that could help us make our mourning. It is essential that the victims could turn to someone who listens
and information. It is one of the goals of our association.
M. Grgory Reibenberg, owner of the restaurant La Belle Equipe. I lost on the evening of November
13, the mother of my daughter and twelve relatives including some working with me. I am surprised that
should set up a commission of inquiry to arrive at the conclusion that victims should be able to find in front
of them to relevant stakeholders, but this is due probably to the archaic of our administrative system.
For the rest, I have a point of view that differs from that of Sophie Dias and do not think that it should
install soldiers in each stage. Since 13 November, I try to escape from the ambient speech on fear turning
more television.

That evening, I been dealing with police officers who have asked me eight times my papers without
offering me a glass of water, I waited forty minutes the firemen, but we are in Tel Aviv or in Beirut, and I
have no desire that we invest all our money and all our energy to specialize in this kind of trauma. All
these deaths, these wounded, these indirect victims, these living dead because of seven individuals, is
not supposed to reproduce every day. And I hope that it will be very rare. Resilience, it's personal.
Although it can be helped, only you can do something for you. I to the truth to say that people from Paris
aid to the victims that I contacted late December proved perfectly considerate, available and relevant.
It will never prevent a murderer to be an assassin, and can deploy all police officers and all the military
you want, this will change nothing. It is very easy to kill, and what should worry us is the number of
individuals released into the wild that can pass to the Act tomorrow. It was against this that we must fight.
Yet what has been done since January 7, apart from putting on the table the idea of deprivation of
nationality, symbolic measure in my opinion completely useless? Is he serious, when you have a motor
problem to worry about the color of the seats? I don't understand.
The President Georges Fenech. Our Committee of inquiry has other ambitions than to resolve the
administrative issues related to support for the victims. But improve the Organization of our services is
nevertheless necessary and this is part of the issues that we must address.
Ms. Aurlia Gilbert, Member of the association "13 November: brotherhood and truth". I am
survivor of the Bataclan, where I am remained hidden for more than two hours before being released by
the brigade of research and intervention (BRI) teams just before the onslaught of ten midnight, while the
hostage-takers were still in places. As much, it took me through this horrible pit where, two hours ago, we
were gathered to attend a rock concert.
Our association is designed to help all persons concerned - close to victims and survivors of all sites - find
their way to a multiplicity of interlocutors, knowing that all are not in a social, psychological or physical
situation enabling them to have access to the right information and appropriate medical and psychological
support.
For my part, I am proof that things may well happen: I figure on the lists, I went to the military school at
the right time, I was taken care of properly and contacted by the ITMF. But things are not as simple for
everyone.
We receive including even the Association of the trying, i.e. people who developed a complex of survivor
and the fact to be unharmed led to think that everything was fine and that they were not legitimate to ask
for help. Or disorders may appear with delay, and this is the reason why we call the continuation of
emergency cells. We must also consider the case of foreigners who do not have access to the same
features in their country of residence and do not necessarily know that they have the right using the
guarantee fund.
It is therefore to help all these people, those who are injured for life and can not regain a normal life, that I
engaged in the association, knowing that helping others is also part of the reconstruction process
survivors.
A note finally on the way which you have evaded a little quickly, Mr President, the work of the commission
of inquiry on the jihadist networks. I read his report, which included a number of recommendations
concerning the implementation of the PNR - Passenger Name Record or collaboration between
intelligence services and police services. Knowing which of these proposals have been implemented
since the month of June and what is the State of the places that can make today are issues on which we
can move as quickly.
The President Georges Fenech. Your request is legitimate, and our Committee of inquiry is also created
to get the answers to these questions and determine to what extent the devices have changed compared

to the findings of the previous commission of inquiry, to which the rapporteur and myself were involved.
Where are the European discussions on the NRP? What has changed the new legislation on intelligence?
Policy makers that we auditionnerons have a duty to enlighten us on these issues.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Ms. Gilbert, your remarks do mean you feel politicians unable to transform the
system? It is true that nothing of what was recommended by the commission on jihadist networks has
been implemented OEwork and that for five years that we speak, the NRP, that file that identify data on
travellers on European airspace is blocked on the grounds that it would constitute an infringement of
individual freedoms - what is not totally inaccurate. As a citizen, how do you explain it and how do you
judge the action of the policies that we are?
Ms. Aurelia Gilbert. It is not for us to judge the action of policies, and it is also too early to do so. We are
attentive to the protection of individual freedoms, and any difficulty, as it was already pointed in the report
of the commission on the jihadist networks, will be to find the right balance between the means given to
police and intelligence services to prevent the terrorist attacks and the preservation of individual liberties.
Very upstream, we must be concerned about prevention, to prevent these young French, I looked in the
eye and wanted to kill me, kill other French. We ask when we lost them. These are murderers, but they
remain human beings humans, who have grown up and been educated in our society. The threat facing
us comes more today the GIA but children in the Republic.
M. Georges Salines. It is even more difficult to judge the action of the policies that we have various
opinions, including on the forfeiture of nationality. Being victims does not make us experts.
Personally however, I can testify that a number of bi-national born in France of Muslim parents have seen
in the current hubbub a message that their extended summer that they were not quite French like the
others - certainly wrongly. However, number of these binational belong to victims of the November 13,
and the universal disapproval of the attacks should have the opportunity to much stronger than January 7,
where were opposed those who were Charlie and those who were not relink between the French from
different sources. Or how has built political debate leaves a sense of disorder and cacophony that came
to disrupt the solemnity of the moment. We may all regret.
Ms. Caroline Langlade, Vice-President of the association Life for Paris - 13 November 2015 '.
Three months ago, we suffered terrorism, barbarism and blind violence. Once the stunning status is
passed, it took we meet and act. We are then Federated around the call by Maureen Roussel on
Facebook and created the association Life for Paris, which includes injuries, relatives of missing persons,
psychological victims and caregivers. This appeal, given two million times, allowed the grouping of more
than a half thousand people directly involved which, beyond the social network, are structured since 13
January last for long-term action. Indeed, the support and the accompaniment of the victims require a
long-term effort. Beyond direct aid to daily, support between victims and the desire to commemorate the
missing, our voice, representative and based on our experience, should contribute to improving the
Organization and support of victims in case of occurrence of a comparable event.
In France, when one is victim of an accident or an attack, there are a number of moral and physical
support devices, which we welcome. Unfortunately, on 13 November 2015, these were not enough to
cope with the huge number of victims of these acts of war. In addition, the support of victims proved to be
particularly Kafkaesque. Their experience, members of the association Life for Paris found some
shortcomings.
Support for those not injured physically was unanimously considered very insufficient, some individuals
who have returned home without being seen or heard and without advice to implement support. Others
have had to identify themselves repeatedly without ever be contacted thereafter. That evening, no device
of psychological support could be offered massively. Civil protection officials have been forced to listen to

victims, which has probably traumatized more people. The vast majority of the people taken in crisis were
released between four and six o'clock in the morning without instructions on the steps to be taken.
Respect for victims also involves the protection of dissemination of their image in the media. Several
members of our association and complained that their face has not been blurred on television, which has
added to their trauma.
Many injured were treated after a long wait in some sites. Examinations performed by caregivers in the
emergency could give rise to harmful errors; Thus a person received a ball that has not been seen during
the first review.
Support for deceased persons proved to be very bad for the families. Indeed, the Institute of forensic
medicine being overwhelmed, families remained without information for three days. Why not imagine
deploying a mechanism of recognition by fingerprinting to the scanner?
The administration has been heavy, litigious and sometimes did not evidence any empathy for the victims
or their families. Should therefore replace the human being to the c OEheart of support devices.
We wish to commend the extraordinary work accomplished this day there by police forces, firefighters,
healthcare personnel of hospitals, associations of victims, who knew how to listen, assist and support
victims beyond their own fear and their own framework, showing a huge empathy to best meet the needs
of each. It would be urgent to consider and treat the trauma among caregivers.
When attacked, it loses its bearings, and any administratve step appears insurmountable. One is unable
to support, so there need support, help and simplicity. Support only constitute a right? Should it not be a
legal obligation, so that person starts only its process of reconstruction? Why departmental cells do not
seek to simplify the steps by proposing a course of support eased a SEO common to all antennas for the
recognition of the status of victim-based? Is this really the victims or their families to do the work of the
State in the completion of these procedures? What is the associations of victims and the victims to
overcome the lack of information, organization and monitoring of the support of the people?
Individuals not receiving no support since November 13 daily join our association. They have no
information and admit discouraged before the considerable number of steps to perform. The foreign
members of our association are abandoned by the lack of coordination of french among them services
and our administration with that of their country. No one told them that they had the same rights as
citizens french victims of terrorism.
Communicate as soon as the same day seems imperative, because number of individuals have cut off
the media after the attacks and have not received any information. Similarly, it should be to support
victims early on, so that they are not running out. Thus, the invitation to the consultation of psychological
counselling at the Htel-Dieu should have been given from the earliest days, while this Protocol has been
set up at the end of three or four weeks. Victims who have already lodged a complaint were therefore
forced to repeat their testimony.
On November 13, the France was not able to protect its citizens and has failed in its obligations. Can we
expect a day to protect them after a tragedy? Can we, as an association and users of these public
structures, have the hope to be heard and consulted on the development of support for the victims? We
have rights, but we know also have a duty towards the next potential victims. Our association works hand
in hand with other victim assistance organizations in order to remedy the lack of information on the
mechanisms and support of French, foreign victims and the families of deceased persons.

M. Alexis Lebrun, Member of the association "Life for Paris - 13 November 2015 '. I was in the pit of
the Bataclan on 13 November, where I waited for death during an hour and a half before the miraculous
intervention of the Commissioner come save me and allow me to speak to you today.
On 18 September 2015, the newspaper Le Figaro revealed via BFM TV information, that a french jihadist
of return of Syria to commit an attack in a concert hall was arrested mid-August 2015 by the Directorate
General of internal security (CSB). In the aftermath of the attacks of November 13, Marc Trvidic, former
anti-terrorism judge, stated that he had auditioned this alleged terrorist who would have mentioned the
idea of an attack in a concert hall. At the end of the month of August 2015, Mr. Trvidic is asked to leave
his duties despite this threat. Was this movement appropriate?
This same September 18, a journalist of RFI jihadism, Dr. David Thomson, referred to the arrest of this
man and a propaganda poster Jihad to detonate grenades in concert halls.
January 7, 2016, the daily Le Monde published a survey on the route of this man; He explains have
received, on the part of one of the coordinators of the attacks of November 13, the mission to commit an
attack in France at a rock concert. The man arrested had told investigators that this was going to happen
very soon. The procedure described in these hearings corresponds exactly to that used by the
perpetrators of the attacks of November 13, 2015. What measures have been taken in the meantime to
ensure the safety of concert halls? Three months after this arrest and two months after these revelations,
the threat is implemented at the Bataclan, in Parisian terraces and at the Stade de France. November 13,
2015, the Bataclan was complete and hosted more than 1,500 people, but no security measures has
been deployed for this concert: there was no police or military presence in the room and no excavation
has been carried out. With regard to the serious threat, proven, repeated and known to the intelligence
services, how is it possible that one of the largest venues of Paris has not enjoyed the same protection
measures than those deployed around some places sensitive after the attacks of January 2015? How
plan Vigipirate, then at its highest level, could not be to mobilize some men front rooms hosting hundreds
or thousands of people? Who decided the places to be protected within the framework of Vigipirate? How
were deployed forces of the Vigipirate plan November 13, 2015? Why are some places protected 24
hours a day even when they are empty, while others are abandoned when they are filled with? We
underestimated this threat? We know the result: 130 people have been killed on 13 November 2015 and
thousands of others were injured physically or psychologically. Despite the maintenance plan Vigipirate to
its highest level and setting up of the State of emergency, we find that the places receiving public do not
seem to benefit today enhanced protection. In these circumstances can consider that all appropriate
decisions and actions have been implemented OEwork in 2015?
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, Mr Lebrun for raising clear and legitimate questions that
our Committee of inquiry will pose to the interviewees. We need answers, the security we make.
M. Gregory Reibenberg. I appear clearly, despite the blurring of my face in a television show, broadcast
two days after the events. Indeed, the cameraman of a string was embedded in a fire brigade that took
place at the beautiful team. I am shocked that such a moment could be put on the air: I had blood on my
clothes and I was wearing the mother of my daughter who was not yet dead! I hope that my daughter will
never see these images. How could a person accept to broadcast, even though the Government had
requested the largest media selected?
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Reibenberg, in our country, the citizens have protections on the use
of their image. I understand your emotion and we will discuss with the Rapporteur of the opportunity to
hear journalists and a representative of the Conseil suprieur de l'audiovisuel (audiovisual regulatory
body-CSA).
Audiovisual channels have acknowledged their wrongs in the media treatment of the attacks of January
2015 during which they could endanger the lives of the people taken hostage in the store Hypercacher.
Our Committee of inquiry will take up this subject.

M. Gregory Reibenberg. These images exist, and I do not wish that my daughter falls on a day on it.
Ms. Caroline Langlade. When one types " Bataclan " in the Google engine, the photograph of the Interior
of the Hall the evening of drama appears first. The members of our association regularly seize Google so
this image disappears, but it is difficult to remove it since it has already been taken and relayed on
numerous occasions.
Ms. Lydia Berkennou, Member of the association "Life for Paris - 13 November 2015 '. I was present
at the Bataclan on the evening of November 13, 2015. The police have done a remarkable job, even if we
might deplore the response time for the assault and evacuate the room. I would like to congratulate relief,
which have shown their capacity to support the victims. Unfortunately, some rescuers had not received
adequate training, and some errors could cause more deaths. My friend, evacuated the room at midnight
and a half, was first placed in the middle of the minor injuries as a first aider thought that it was only a
scratch. At three o'clock in the morning, by the dint of complaining of pain, she was transported to the
field hospital where a doctor found that a bullet was lodged in her lung. The lack of coordination among
stakeholders resulted in the dissemination of contradictory and destabilizing instructions for victims.
Should implement a protocol of procedures to follow for each actor. It should also reduce the possible
time of intervention, in order to save more lives.
Training and training for regular situational exercises appear necessary. There is also place to improve
communication between the various devices deployed, in order to focus all of the victims, including
psychological injuries. Do not ask them to return home because it can do nothing for their case. Should
be home and support sites to save time. The State must develop a single document setting out all of the
steps to perform after an attack and spread it on a large scale.
Administrative barriers are too many, while the victims are in shock. I am pleased that a secretariat of
State aid to the victims has been established. I hope that this commission of inquiry will answer the
questions that ask ourselves us: safety is our priority, it should not know fault and treated seriously.
Polling is more on the assumption of an attack, but on the time and place where it will take place.
Organization and communication are essential for the success of interventions. Discussions on the
supported of victims will allow, relying on the experience of the subjects, to improve. In the event of new
attacks, our compatriots may this time count on an excellent service. Your Committee's discussions must
lead to the simplification of administrative procedures and the facilitation of access to long-term care. Too
many obstacles slow down or even we discourage today, which is unacceptable after such drama. Let us
not forget that we are beings humans: we do not have to adapt to society, it is to do and help us.
The rapporteur. You have pointed to the need to improve information devices of people looking for
missing persons. Mr Salines, I consulted your Twitter account where I found your distress in the process
of looking for your daughter. Do you have concrete proposals to fix the existing system?
You were numerous to consider that the process of identification of the victims was too long. There also,
your experience led you to consider development tracks?
Mr Salines, you said that those responsible for the death of loved ones were not trained for this task. That
should change?
Three or four of you were at the Bataclan on the evening of the tragedy: how have you perceived the
intervention of the police forces?
M. Georges Salines. It should firstly to establish a system of unique information identifying the wounded
and the dead and searchable by people looking for missing persons. Many families had to circumnavigate
emergency services in the hope of finding one of their close; There refers to people who live with terrible
hours and who come to hope that their child is in a coma.

Mr President, reading the tweets with the hashtag Search Paris November 14 was the saddest activity
that is.
It is not enough to OEimplemented a unique searchable database by phone - which nevertheless
constitutes a step forward - because human accompaniment is essential in these times. We have to rely
on the mechanism set up at the military school, and foreign countries have planned sending social
workers or psychologists at the home of people looking for one missing in order to accompany them in
this event.
This information system must help to identify the victims. Mr. Mohammed Zenak told us of the difficulties
he had encountered for the identification of his daughter, and the public hospitals of Paris (APHP)
assistance platform could not include information on wanted persons outside their name, their name and
their date of birth. Need to improve this system, including by incorporating the Forensic Medicine Institute,
to initiate more specific research about the unidentified wounded.
While I was at the Hpital Europen Georges-Pompidou, one of my friends is managed to reach an agent
to the interministerial crisis cell which announced it the death of my daughter. The cell broadcast a tweet
indicating a number to obtain news from Lola. Many people have called this number, so messages of
condolence were posted on social networks; Fortunately, I did not got knowledge. It was a major mistake
to entrust this task to someone, in this case, Mr. Stphane Gicquel Secretary-General of the National
Federation of victims of collective accidents (FENVAC), which was not the best position to carry it out, as
he also acknowledged. Once at home, I called this number and Mr. Gicquel, who told me the death of my
daughter. I asked what an official confirmed the news, a member of the cabinet of the Minister of Justice,
has done with great humanity and competence. Five minutes later, the cell for the identification of the
Forensic Medicine Institute made us completed a questionnaire on the size, the color of hair and the
distinguishing features of our daughter, while identification was already accomplished since people came
to prevent his death by phone. Finally, the judicial police (PJ) also joined us for hear us of the death of our
daughter. It is of a failure, because it should not hear such news by phone and in these conditions. And
yet, I consider myself fortunate, because families have waited three days and some saw the body of a
child that was not theirs. This leaves considerable progress margins to accomplish.
Ms. Caroline Langlade. A member of our association insists on the need to improve the human contact;
Indeed, someone asked him to identify the B8768 number, which was his brother. It is important that
these people are not in contact with professionals making too little empathize.
Ms. Sophie Dias. Human solidarity is important in these times and we have not met at the Forensic
Institute. We had to deal with the posting of people who explained to us that if one could not see the face
of my father, there would present us a foot or a hand. We had to kindly insist that identification occurs
from the Passport, and the sole concern of these people was that we pick the body quickly, while that of
suicide bombers is still. Is totally the situation, and should be that the IML staff is much more human, as it
has been treated in a shameful manner.
The President Georges Fenech. The Consulate of Portugal in Paris was informed by the quai d'Orsay of
death of your father one day before you?
Ms. Sophie Dias. Yes. The Consulate contacted me Saturday about 2 p.m., but the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs is called me on Sunday night.
The President Georges Fenech. Were you you manifested from the Quai d'Orsay?
Ms. Sophie Dias. No, because I did not know what steps perform. I especially contacted hospitals in
Paris, but it is necessary to contact them one by one because no centralization of information is ensured.
The name of my father not appearing on the lists of the PJ or on hospitals, I was rather reassured while
he was already at the Forensic Institute.

Ms. Caroline Langlade. Members of Life for Paris work at the Forensic Medicine Institute and are
shocked because nothing they has been offered in terms of psychological support. Any business requires
to face as many horrors, and it is important to put in place a professional accompaniment for all those
who have had to speak this evening.
M. Alexis Lebrun. Personally, I cannot emit negative remarks about police intervention, since she is the
one that allows me to speak to you today. I came out of the Bataclan by the gap to 23: 30 hours, at a time
where the assault had not yet been given. I managed to emerge miraculously through the initiative of a
Commissioner of police, who, on his own, entered the Bataclan with his driver and killed the present
terrorist on the scene. This man changed the course of the evening, for its heroic intervention saved
many these people around me on the ground floor of the Bataclan.
The police force has accomplished a feat in successfully completing the evacuation of all the hostages
held by the terrorists and who are uninjured. All forces of intervention by other countries would not
necessarily capable of performing such an operation.
The President Georges Fenech. You say be stayed an hour and a half into the pit: you had to ask about
the intervention of the police, not time?
Mr. Alexis Lebrun. During this hour and a half, I was hidden under people and was therefore unaware of
what was happening, but even if time seems extremely long, the shots stopped after half an hour and I
waited in silence. When intervention forces entered on the ground floor, we do not got up because we
were unaware whether police or terrorists. The Commissioner's speech occurred after twenty to thirty
minutes: this seems long when expected death, but the operation has not failed since I'm here today.
Obviously, everyone has not had this chance.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Mr Lebrun, the terrorists fired for half an hour, and then nothing happened: the
Commissioner of police intervened at the end of that time or during it?
Mr. Alexis Lebrun. He intervened on its own when first entering the room.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Very early, so is not it?
Mr. Alexis Lebrun. He was the first to enter and fired at the terrorist on the scene. The other two
attackers took him to target from the floor, and he had to withdraw with his driver as he was not at all
equipped to deal the arming of the two terrorists. The intervention of the police forces took over later.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. How much time passed between the end of the exchange of fire between terrorists
and the Commissioner and the arrival of the assault to the police forces?
Ms. Caroline Langlade. The final assault of the brigade of research and intervention (bis) was given after
a little more than three hours.
The President Georges Fenech. I ask of Mr. Alain Marsaud: how much time is it passed between the
withdrawal of the Commissioner and the intervention of the police forces?
Ms. Caroline Langlade. About two and a half hours.
M. Georges Salines. I am a doctor and I read an article entitled return of experience from the attacks of
November 13, 2015 and published in the annals of emergency medicine by the medical service of the
research, Assistance, Intervention, deterrence (RAID) service. This article provides the following
chronology: the attack begins at 21 hours 49, Commissioner intervenes, 22 hours 10 and leads to an

explosion of the belt of one of the terrorists and the withdrawal of his two accomplices in the floors of the
Bataclan, and columns of the bis and the RAID storm from 22 hours 35.
The rapporteur. The commission audition members of intervention forces and the Commissioner of
police in order to know the precise course of events.
The President Georges Fenech. The commission also intends to go at the Bataclan.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. This is necessary, because Ms. Langlade evokes a wait of three hours, while Mr.
Salines recounts an article referring to a twenty-five minute delay between the withdrawal of the
Commissioner and the arrival of the security forces!
Ms. Caroline Langlade. I sent a message on Facebook to prevent my relatives at the time where we
were evacuated from the Bataclan, i.e. between midnight forty-five and fifty midnight. The bis came then
to give the final assault. I was in the dressing room that overlooks the passage Amelot and before which
the two terrorists exploded following the exchange of fire with the bis. We were forty in this room of nine
square meters where we waited for three hours. I communicated several times with the police to provide
them with all the elements which I knew - presence of many terrorists, number of people present in the
room, exchanged comments between the terrorists - and for information. Indeed, when expected three
hours in a room without being able to act on his own fate, it is in a terrible situation.
The network being saturated, I called my mother in Nancy that she contacted the city police to transmit
information to the police of Paris. I called the police and got to speak to an agent after fifteen minutes of
waiting. My interlocutor, a very human brigadier, took the time to talk to me and told me that the police
forces would soon intervene. We were locked into the lodge for half an hour and in which one of the
terrorists trying to penetrate. I have provided information to the police by whispering - I had already done
switch off the lamp and close the windows so that the terrorist may not see and does not draw not in the
gap of the door which formed after each Jolt he gave in the door - and begged him to not hang up while
he wished to respond to other calls to maintain this attachment with the outside. It reassured me for five
minutes, which allowed me to soothe my turn people who were with me in the lodge telling them that the
police were arriving.
An hour later, I reminded the police in whispers as the terrorist was still behind the door, and my caller
asked me to speak louder. I explained my situation, to which the police replied that I bloquais the line for
an actual emergency. I do not see what there may be of more urgent than forty people at risk of imminent
death. I spoke a little louder and everyone asked me to keep my mouth shut because I was putting
everyone's life in danger. The police is upset and hung up on me nose in saying "too bad for you! The
idea is not to point the finger of the institutions, but we must take into account the fact that people more or
less well manage the emergency. In the lodge, some people have failed to carry out individual actions
which have claimed the lives of everyone, but one cannot be judged because nobody, including among
professionals, cannot know his behavior in such circumstances before have experienced them. We
should nevertheless to identify those who can cope with such events, so that failures of tonight there
would not recur.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Why is the terrorist not entered in the lodge that he knows that several people had
there are refuge?
Ms. Caroline Langlade. He attempted to enter our room, including claiming to belong to the Group of
intervention of the gendarmerie nationale (GIGN); I initiated a vote Freehand to not open the door, and
the majority of my companions followed me. The door was closed, because when we invested this Lodge,
boys have put the couch and the refrigerator front door to prevent opening. With every stroke given by the
terrorist, we wanted all the sofa and the fridge so the door remained closed. An extraordinary solidarity
has arisen this evening there, and we have vocation to continue because if we saw the worst of human
beings, we have also seen the best.

The rapporteur. When the police arrived, did you vote again to open them? Did you know right away that
it was the police?
Ms. Caroline Langlade. I had spoken to a senior official of the bis to which I had passed on information,
but I've never kept aware of the terms of the intervention of the police forces. The best friend of one of
this people in the lodge gave his phone to the Commissioner of the bis, which allowed to establish a
communication with the outside world and to address the issue of opening the door. In fact, we have
discussed for fifteen minutes with the bis because we refuse to open it; We asked a password to be able
to identify officers of the bis, but to the chaos that had taken hold of the lodge, one of our companions
took a reckless risk by opening the window to ask screaming if we could get out. He could being shot, and
the entry of the bis in the lodge was the only time where I thought die.
This has always been for us to search information, so that we, surviving victims, have more desire to do
so and are exhausted every day having to beg for information. We shouldn't have to fight for information,
it should come to us!
Ms. Lydia Berkennou. Terrorists have penetrated at 21 hours 47 - and not 21 hours 49 - in the Bataclan.
Commissioner shot the terrorist who was on the scene at 22: 15 pm, and the final assault was given to
eighteen midnight.
M. Georges Salines. This timeline is perfectly compatible with the evidence provided by article that I
cited, as the final assault was not given to 22 hours 35, this time corresponding to the time where the
RAID entered the Bataclan. The security forces conducted the evacuation of all people alive in the pit.
Ms. Lydia Berkennou. My girlfriend is out of the pit to midnight and a half.
M. Georges Salines. The intervention of doctors and police officers has been remarkable since people
alive at the time of the intervention are outputs unscathed, with one exception. The article says that "due
to the incompressible time between the occurrence of the attack and the arrival of the doctors of
intervention, there were more alive patient requiring immediate and heavy medical support".
The rapporteur. Between the time when the Commissioner and the final assault of the bis, there were
the shots inside the Bataclan ?
Ms. Caroline Langlade. Yes, but I don't know if they have been victims.
Mr. Alexis Lebrun. As Ms. Langlade, I do not know if these shots were made by victims. I guess that
terrorists targeted the police from the windows of a room upstairs, this version being confirmed by some
accounts.
It seems to me that police forces did not have the plan of the room in their speech. This is all the more
surprising that the intensity of the threat was high. In the light of the context, the police should have very
detailed plans of the places open to the public in Paris and the rest of the country. No doubt, this lack of
information was a further difficulty for intervention forces.
Mr. Serge Grouard. All your remarks confirm that the onslaught of the bis not took place before midnight;
more than two hours - between 21 hours 47 or 21 hours 49 and 0 hour 18 or 0 hour 45 - elapse so
between the beginning of terrorist action and the intervention of the security forces.
Ms. Aurelia Gilbert. The bis was present on the scene well before the onslaught of 0 hours 18 and
proceeded to the evacuation of several people, including myself. The neutralization of the perpetrators
was, well occurred from 0 hour 18.

The President Georges Fenech. At a next meeting, we will establish the precise chronology of events at
the Bataclan.
Mr. Serge Grouard. The Commissioner was at the Bataclan or came from outside? If I understand
correctly, the bis has intervened before the assault after midnight: is that correct?
Ms. Caroline Langlade. The Commissioner of the crime (BAC) brigade stood near the Bataclan shortly
after the outbreak of the terrorist attack and, with one of his colleagues, decided to intervene. They are
placed in the entry, and Commissioner shot the terrorist remained on the scene. Entrance doors are
glass, the Commissioner was exposed, but he managed to touch the terrorist exploded.
The bis first performed the evacuation of the victims located in the pit, and then responded to a request
for negotiation of the terrorists. Finally, the security forces are deployed to neutralize terrorists and secure
the room.
Mr Franois Lamy. It would be useful that it distributes the chronology of events and focus on the real
issues raised by Mr. Alexis Lebrun.
The President Georges Fenech. Altogether, Mr Lamy.
The rapporteur. How long the police were set to arrive in cafes and restaurants affected by the attacks?
M. Gregory Reibenberg. The first firefighter arrived at the Belle team twenty minutes after the shots, the
neighbor he had counted thirty-five minutes. It was the last contested terrace, where the time important
before the arrival of relief, but the bar is still located at a crossroads and near a Firehouse. Wait so long is
still worrying about the means granted to relief in Paris. They have transformed the Caf next door in
hospital; some firefighters were not prepared to see such a scene, and I had to support them. He was
frightened kids who could not reassure us. Emergency medical service (EMS) arrived at the end of thirtyfive to forty minutes with medical equipment, firefighters had nothing other than their hands and their
goodwill because they didn't even have oxygen.
Ms. Aurelia Gilbert. Imagine for a moment that such attacks occur in the province! Health and relief staff
fear this scenario, as hospitals and emergency services would be overwhelmed, causing deaths.
The President Georges Fenech. As an elected official, I am a member of a departmental service of fire
and rescue (SDIS) leading a reflection on the modalities of intervention in the event of mass attack. There
is much to be done, but these threats are taken into account.
M. Mohammed Zenak. My daughter saw the terrorist who attacked the Counter Voltaire, located near the
beautiful team. He was smiling, and after asking a coffee, he blew himself up. Police and firefighters
quickly arrived on the scene. She told the police that it was a terrorist act, but they denied. The terrorist
was still alive because it has fortunately failed to raise all of his explosives. Including that the attack was
of a terrorist nature, the police conducted the evacuation of clients in quiet.
My daughter several times asked me this question: "how we arrived here? The terrorists were identified
and banned from European territory: how could they go to Paris to conduct an attack of this magnitude?
The President Georges Fenech. Our Committee of inquiry will focus on those issues which are in the
cOEheart of its mission. We will particularly try to identify what could malfunction in intelligence. Your
query is legitimate, Mr Zenak, but it is too early to answer.
Thank you for the dignity and the quality of your interventions, enabling us to focus our work on the most
important subjects.

Hearing, open to the press, Ms. Franoise Rudetzki, founder

SOS attacks
Record of the hearing, which was open to the press, Monday, February 15, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We are very pleased to welcome Ms. Francoise Rudetski, we all
remember, was seriously injured in 1983 in an attack in Paris.
Madam, facing the failure of the public authorities and the absence of consideration for victims, you have
founded in 1986 the association SOS attacks, you poeple until 1998 before becoming associate general.
At the same time, you have actively supported the creation of the guarantee fund of the victims of
terrorism. You are also a member of the economic, social and environmental Council you represent to the
national consultative Commission on human rights.
Thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of the Commission of inquiry into the means
OEimplemented by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015. We indeed wanted to start our
work by the testimonies of victims, associations and the lawyers of the victims, who are entitled to the
attention of national representation. Your experience, in the particular context that we live, and after the
attacks in 2015, will be particularly valuable to us.
This hearing, Madam, is open to the press. It subject to a retransmission live on the website of the
National Assembly, and his recording will also be available for a few months on the video portal of the
National Assembly. I would also point out that our Committee may decide to include in its report any
portion of the record which will be made of your hearing. We also decided that the hearings would be
open to the press, in the interests of transparency - except, of course, hearings of professional secrecy.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the commissions of Inquiry Ordinance of November 17,
1958, I ask you, Madam, to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Ms. Franoise Rudetzki oath.
Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. Thank you, Mr Chairman, Mr President, thank you to the members of this
commission to do me the honour to hear me in your hearings.
I will begin by the history of the creation of the association SOS attacks. It initially struggled to deal with
the most pressing. Through my own experience and my lawyer training, I soon discovered in fact that the
victims of terrorism were abandoned. In 1985, the term "terrorism" did not exist in french law. However
not known as it does not recognize it and it does not take it into account. Thus, these victims were not
recognized, they were not even identified as such and were drowned in the mass of victims of criminal
offences.
I used the media to track down victims of attacks, of which the first, after the war of Algeria, is that
occurred September 15, 1974, in the Drugstore Saint-Germain, a Sunday in Paris, and which has been
claimed by Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, said Carlos. I thus found a score of still-living victims. We then
founded SOS attacks, with my husband, who was present at the scene on December 23, 1983, and a
friend who had suffered abroad, of violence that could be described as terrorism.
This adventure of SOS attacks resulted in the adoption, after a fairly short period of time, of eight laws
that have helped to advance the right of all victims in France. The urgency was to take charge, where the
creation of the guarantee fund of the victims of terrorism.
Two solutions were possible: the first, presented by the National Assembly, passed through
compensation of insurance; the second who had the favor of the Senate, by a compensation from the

State. The Prime Minister of the time, Jacques Chirac, had explained to me that the State would
indemnify neither quickly nor well. At the time, I was already worried that someday, the State's finances
are in a condition such that victims may suffer. Where the idea of this contribution of national solidarity,
we pay all through our insurance of property - casualty home, motorcycle, boat, home, business. There
are now 80 million of contracts of insurance of goods in France.
I pass on the history of this contribution which has varied over time. The last increase, after ten years of
immobility, dated 1 November last, thirteen days before the November attacks. It's been two years that I
was asking a net increase in the contribution, because a report commissioned by the Ministry of finance
showed that we were trying to dip into our reserves. In addition, fearing an attack of major proportions, I
wanted that the guarantee fund is ready for immediate disbursement to come very quickly to help the
victims. It took the attacks of January and the unanimity of the Board of Directors of the guarantee fund
so that we get an additional euro. Thus, the contribution which is paid on each of our property insurance
contracts today is 4.30 euros.
Act of 9 September 1986, which was adopted prior to the attacks of the rue de Rennes, is unique in the
world: it provides for full compensation of all damages. It is also a remarkable simplicity - may we always
have in France of laws as simple and easy application.
So, we have the best act in the world. We also have the best funding, insofar as this contribution proves
that each of us participates in the solidarity effort which is due at the end of the chain of acts of terrorism,
to the victims. Despite the financial difficulties of a number of countries including the France, we could be
in an idyllic location. Unfortunately, one must distinguish the practice law.
I will therefore mention some malfunctions existing compensation for victims. This compensation is part of
the fight against terrorism. This is our way of proving that we are in solidarity with the victims, that we are
not giving our values, is to recognize that we can all be from one day to the next day, victims of an act of
terrorism. It is important to show that in France, the civilian population has the largest solidarity. This is
the best answer - with the judicial arsenal, intelligence and European cooperation - that we can bring to
this threat. The France is not at war: on waging the war against it.
End of 2014, the guarantee fund had instructed 4 200 records of victims of terrorist acts, which have been
supported from January 1, 1985, because of the retroactivity of the law. After January 2015, a little more
than 200 files were opened as a result of the 17 deaths and injuries, including the relatives of the
deceased and those that today is called the involved.
From 1986-1987, we considered, association SOS attacks, that terrorism was a new form of war, a war in
peacetime affecting civilian populations, and we wanted to do recognize symbolically. It took four years of
fighting that the Act of 23 January 1990 will be adopted, with the personal involvement of Franois
Mitterrand. Beyond the symbol, this Act - also retroactive to January 1, 1982, to encompass a range of
attributed attacks or direct Action, either to the Group Carlos or activists Basques or Corsicans complements, to the guarantee fund of the victims of terrorism, socially.
This law establishes a free care for life book, which allows reimbursement and support all of the care,
much better than the recent law adopted on 3 January. It supports many facilities that do not appear in
the nomenclature of social security - planning, equipment, access to military hospitals. Finally, it gives the
status of ward of the Nation for children, either because they are orphaned, either because they were
themselves injured, or because they have a parent seriously injured following an attack. Can make the
request until the majority, which is aged 21 to the Ministry of defence. This ward of the Nation status is
granted to life; the national Office of veterans and victims of war, the ONAC may pay social aid for costs
relating to education, leisure, travel, computer equipment or development of apartments.
Finally, victims may benefit from the provisions of a third law, relating to accidents at work and of course,
in the context of the common law of work accidents.

These laws are useful and complement each other even if this sometimes poses problems of articulation.
I have long fought to make the guarantee fund, for the victims, a single window where they could submit
their file, then disseminated among agencies. In 1995, following the attacks in the Paris metro, I have
heard by Alain Jupp, and these provisions have been implemented. Today, I am told that this unique
procedure has fallen into disuse. I appeal to your commission: we cannot imagine that going towards
more complexity, more steps to making 20 years ago! But as this is not to include in the Act, I will also
speak to the highest authorities of the State, which are perfectly aware of this situation, to engrave in
marble, thanks to a decree, this possibility.
You should know that the Board of Directors of the guarantee fund is composed: a President, who is
currently Mr. Delmas-Goyon, Member of the Court of cassation; four representatives of the Finance
Ministers, Social Affairs, justice and Interior. a representative of the world of insurance; and three persons
OEwork and interest for victims.
I sit in the CA from the very beginning in 1986, which makes that I pass to the "memory" of the Fund. The
other two members are changing pretty regularly: there is a seat for the INAVEM and a seat for the
national Council of the bars - which has recently designated a Marseille lawyer specializing in personal
injury.
After the official words that we have heard, and including the President of the Republic who said that after
burying the dead, we were going to repair the living, I thought I could rely on the four representatives of
the Ministers to repair the living, improving compensation practices, and at least find those of twenty
years ago. But I can say here: I do not have the support that I expected. I hope that the work of your
Committee will help me get such support. Perhaps the appointment of a new Secretary of State for the
victims, Ms Juliette Madel, will help. In any case, I intend to solicit an appointment with Mr. Urvoas, your
former president of the law commission which, I believe, will be attentive to my requests.
Among the faults that I can point, there is misuse of computer software. Need to know: lists of victims
which are established by the public prosecutor, the SAMU, hospitals and various services of the State, do
not work with the same software. We lose so much info and our list is completely disparate. We must
convince the State to use the same software to enable each organization to add to the list of possible
elements to use to manage victims and to ensure their traceability. It must be in effect as soon as
possible give information to families who are looking for parents who died or injured. It is also regrettable
that the media and social networks have made faster information than the public authorities themselves.
I denounce other dysfunction, order medical it. In 1986-1987 and in 1997, I did conduct two
epidemiological surveys on the State of health of the victims of terrorism, with the help of INSERM and an
international Committee, which had led to the publication by the Directorate-General of health, a guide
practice to use health professionals collective accidents, attacks and natural disasters. This guide
includes, among others, a number of information on the drafting of very important medical certificates for
traceability of care and on the repair and compensation, with a few caveats warning about invisible
injuries - ENT and pulmonary.
All the victims who are close to an explosion, whether it's an accident due to gas, or of an attack, as in the
subway or at the Bataclan, indeed suffer hearing from tinnitus. If they are treated within three days
following the explosion, by a cortisone treatment, they can be cured in 80% approximately. It is all the
more important to respond quickly to these disorders are very costly to society: they can completely
"dsociabiliser" victims, cause behavioural or psychological disorders serious and prevent a professional
activity. However, on January 20 day held at the Ministry of health as part of operation Retex, all health
professionals expressed their regret to have completely forgotten these problems in the ears. Similarly,
one can miss pathologies lung, for example to the emanation of plastic seats burned in the subway.

Furthermore, medical reports did not go always very well. Nobody disputes today, these injuries, whether
physical or psychological, akin to injuries of war, that the military know perfectly treat - shots with the
Kalashnikov, serious psychological belts of explosives, disorders damage. On the other hand, the experts
of the guarantee fund are not trained to this trauma.
I therefore alerted the Board of Trustees of the Fund on this point in him asking to expand its panel of
experts: they are only five or six while we will have to treat 3 000 compensation records, and above all,
they do not have the necessary training that could provide them with military doctors.
I got that three organizations - social security, Veterans Affairs, Department of defence - and the
guarantee fund are organizing a unique expertise where, in each specialty, the victim would be seen only
once, the three reports being sent to each of them. There again, the practice had been a little lost. But
Ms. Touraine has listed it in the Act - that of 3 January 2016. I am therefore a little reassured.
Dysfunction also with regard to the scars made by the hostages. The hostages have specific problems
that are not the same as those of the victims of the RER, or those who were at the Bataclan. New
positions of prejudice have been created, in the context of collective disaster, by the ordinary courts. I am
talking about the harm of anguish and injury of anxiety - expectation of death, fear of death, fear of those
who do not know if their loved ones are alive or injured. However these new positions of harm are not
recognized by the guarantee fund.
I however got a step forward: taking into account the duration of the detention. As victims of attacks
which, since 1986, have benefited from a special psychological support, the hostages are seen recognize
a specific prejudice to detention, relatives being also assisted during the term thereof. But then again, on
bute on the recognition of the disorder: experts tend to minimize what are three years in prison, in
conditions which were widely referred to by the press and on which I will not return.
The "forgotten" attacks on 13 November are another example of dysfunction. It's specifically for victims of
the Stade de France. There was talk of a death, but thirty persons were present, of which eight were
seriously injured. They were forgotten for several weeks. With the help of journalists and the population
which was mobilized military, we found the trace of these poor victims, Roma or the SDF, which had not
been recorded immediately.
There are also people who were in the building squatted Saint-Denis and which are in my opinion, to the
victims of terrorism. There again, it is a somewhat disadvantaged population. At the time of the assault of
the police, there were physical and psychological injuries. I was told that they did not fall into the category
of victims of terrorism may be indemnified by the guarantee fund, but that, as victims of the intervention of
the police, they would fall under any compensation from the Ministry of justice. The same question arose
in 2012, with the case of Merah, during the assault by the police.
The rules are then those of pre-1986: compensation are not integral, as provided for in the law of
September 9, but lump sum so paid from the budget of the State, according to the public accounting
rules. Three months later, they are thus the only victims who have not received, for example, provisions
that are in need, they must relocate and treated and that they cannot do so, not having received any aid.
In addition, a victim of the Bataclan, which got away unscathed and which has witnessed the difficulties of
identification of deceased and injured persons, asked me to make you a suggestion: there is a DNA file
for offenders, could not have such a file to ensure the traceability of the victims, and allow to find them in
hospitals or elsewhere? The victims would be better supported, what would their reconstruction.
Me are also put together the problems with images taken by the media - images of victims in blood, in the
newspapers and on television.

I had been consulted by Mrs Guigou, as part of its law in 2002 on the worsening of the fines incurred by
the media that published indecent images. I remember the Erignac case and the prefect in a puddle of
blood, but this woman victim from 1995 to the relieved dress, who had tried to take action in the context of
the right to the image. At the time, all the victims who had filed a lawsuit in this framework had lost it since
the primacy given to the right to information. I had pointed out to Mrs Guigou that intention was good but
that it would be important to the media to pay fines as most pictures are bloody and indecent, more sales
are increasing. The media are not the only ones questioning: at the end of the chain, there are those who
buy magazines. I had rather suggested the adoption of a Charter or of a code of ethics, a bit like what has
made the BBC in England. But everything has collapsed with portable devices: thus in London, July 7,
2005, despite respect for the media, images taken by passengers have been circulating in the minutes
that followed explosions in the subway; they were either sold or put on the internet.
I don't have the answer to this problem. All I know is that these images make harm to the victims, as they
systematically emerged at the anniversaries of the attacks. Even if they were able to rebuild, they meet
again in the State where they were then.
I would like to make another suggestion which is, however, of the Act. You have just received the
November 13 Association: brotherhood and truth. This association has a very strong legitimacy. I can tell
you while I met many victims and major injuries. Indeed, every day or every two days, I go hospital civilmilitary - at the National Institution of invalids and Percy - to train, at the request of the military authorities,
staff and social workers - on the articulation of the various laws and their respective advantages.
Unfortunately, the 13 November Association cannot yet be civil. Indeed, article 2-9 of the code of criminal
procedure allows associations that deal with the victims of terrorism to constitute civil party that after five
years of existence. However, because of the legitimacy of this association, it seems inconceivable that it
cannot sue. Could you work on the amendment of article 2-9, still subject to approval by the Ministry of
justice or the Interior? It should indeed avoid commercial or associations of lawyers associations are
created to do business or solicit clients. Should exercise caution and check the legitimacy of associations
- a fortiori when they apply for grants.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, Mrs Rudetzki of retraced the history of the fight that you
have led to the recognition of the victims of terrorism, and of their rights.
You have also raised issues that have been raised before us earlier by the various associations of
victims: the single window that has fallen into disuse, the misuse of the software, the difficulties of
identification; expertise - M. Salines alluded to the insufficient competence and training of experts; the
question of images; Finally, the legal capacity of the associations.
On this last point, we see how, in the context of the reform of criminal procedure that is soon scheduled
for consideration at the meeting, align the provisions of article 2-9 of the code of criminal procedure with
those of article 2-15 relating to associations dealing with victims of disasters. This would allow Association
November 13 to litigate and facilitate the action of its members.
Finally, I understand well how could be created the DNA file to which you alluded.
Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. The idea did not come from me, I am contented to transmit it to you. But I will
leave you note addressed to me, and which refers to the experience of several people who found
themselves at the Bataclan on the evening of November 13. Probably should be that we all have our DNA
in a chip, in our map Vitale? I did not have time to think precisely. Everything that I know, it is that
information has been lost, that victims were sometimes misdirected, in hospitals not always adapted to
their wounds, and that families have struggled to find their loved ones. Therefore, dig a little question.

The President Georges Fenech. You have regretted that the status of victims of terrorism has been
acknowledged, "collateral" Saint-Denis victims, nor to those you qualify "forgotten". Is it the discretion of
the guarantee fund? Who is at the origin of this classification?
Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. The guarantee fund is bound by the list of the Procuracy, which shall be
authentic. Once the public prosecutor forwards the list, the guarantee fund is able to send, within fifteen
days or three weeks, a provision which is modulated depending on the severity of the lesions. One
distinguishes only between the hospitalized victims who undergo interventions, and those called today the
"involved". After, it refines the duration of hospitalization.
The Fund also pays a provision to the relatives of the deceased. Admittedly, since 1995, its management
of support for the families of deceased persons is quite remarkable. In this case, the list of the 130 dead
was not the subject of dispute, and passed pretty quickly. Funeral expenses have then been supported
without requiring advance the money. A few families have done so if that information was not always well
circulated. Indeed, is often alleged to the guarantee fund its lack of transparency, which is probably
justified. However, in most cases, funeral services were aware. Families went in the service they wanted
to and choose a mode of funeral. The company then established a quote and sent it to the guarantee
fund, which directly address the Bills, the funeral taking place in France or abroad, with the support and
the relocation of families to attend the funeral. The Fund will even pay the flowers on the convoy. The
system works so well.
We had the list of 130 people died and 350 hospitalized injuries, and virtually all the victims of the
Bataclan since there was the box office list. This accounted for 1,500 people, less the 90 dead.
If the identification of victims of the Bataclan has not been the subject of too much difficulty, it has been
differently however for the victims who were in the terraces of cafes. Some were transported in hospitals,
but others, indeed, had fled the scene. They there had also been encouraged by the police and security
forces - UAS and other - because had to quickly evacuate the site: no one knew if another team of
terrorists was not going to occur, and should not interfere with relief. In any case these victims were not
on the first lists of the Parquet.
I immediately asked the guarantee fund to list the methods of proof that they could use to enter it. To be
saved, they had to file a complaint and to be heard by the police interest. On the other hand, sometimes
were unnecessarily complaint to victims who were already on the lists of the Parquet. This made that
overloading jobs in time to families of dead or wounded.
They could also seek the testimony of servers in cafes - but these were often closed after the attacks.
They could rely on the testimony of people who were with them tonight. But some were sometimes rising
only in these cafes. Certificates medical, written either by family physicians, different hospitals was used.
Today, the list of victims fund-supported is 1 200 open folder. But it is expected to manage 3 000.
The President Georges Fenech. I understand that a person, victim of the shooting not a terrorist, but an
intervention force, would not guarantee fund report.
Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. It is not us who in decided so. This comes from the Prosecutor's Office.
Soon after on 13 November, I asked the Chairman to convene the Board of Directors, because it is there
St
that laid down the General rules of our compensation policy. But there we had to wait until 1 February while the Act imposes on us a meeting once per quarter. Thus, the first thirty years of existence of the
Fund, we stayed four months without meeting the CA, which I deplore.

er

Whatever it is, 1 February, we met and I mentioned the point that you just lift. I asked why there were
excluded, in particular victims of Saint-Denis. The representative of the Minister of justice replied that it
was not the victims of terrorism and that it would be up to his Ministry's support. I put the matter to the
vote, but I have not unfortunately been followed. We must stick to the position that I deeply regret.
The President Georges Fenech. The commission of inquiry undertake a reflection on this issue.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. Madam, compensation criteria are suitable? How would you like that they evolve?
In addition, you mentioned quite positively the establishment of the secretariat of State of the victims.
Concretely, what are you?
And once again, thank you for everything you do.
Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. In modes of injury, there are the Divekarnomenclature, which bears the name
of a member of the Court of cassation now deceased. It had set up a commission, in which I participated,
to a State of play of the different positions of prejudice to compensation. It had traced the evolution of the
case law - for example, accident road or assault - with the decisions of the courts of appeal, and taken
over the work of the doctrine.
In cases of terrorism, the Act speaks of full compensation for all damages. This involves taking account of
the degree of disability, whether physical or psychological. There are also positions of harm so-called
"personal", i.e.: the suffering on the basis of the abuse suffered by the hostages, the number of surgeries,
burns that are very painful, neurological pain also very painful. the loss of amenity, which is that one can
no longer exercise a hobby or a sport; sexual prejudice; the disfigurement that we prove with pictures;
and finally a post that poses difficulties for evaluation, although it is very easy access, economic loss,
about which the guarantee fund is particularly fearsome.
It is true only in respect of economic loss, considerable sums can be at stake: disappearance of a
business leader, who supports the need for his entire family. loss of one or two salaries; children to raise,
etc. Each situation is examined in concreto. It cannot enact rules or establish a scale, which nobody else
would want. Need to make an assessment with tax services, from tax returns, wage sheets. But for the
liberal professions, craftsmen, it is more complicated; and for the people to unemployment even further.
And how, for women in the home? The situations are all different. The assessment will also vary the
composition of the family - and today, there are many blended families, with children of different beds.
Certainly, these are complicated calculations, but the Fund must have of more human resources for faster
processing records - especially as it has no financial problem for hire. I mention just one example, you'll
find very shocking. To date, nearly four years after the attack of March 19, 2012, before the Jewish school
of Toulouse where she lost her husband and two of her children, Ms. Sandler has touched that some
supplies and some posts of prejudice but nothing in respect of its economic harm. There are battles of
evaluation, in which I will not go. In any event this is not eligible four years after the fact: this woman
needs money to raise her third child, who was eighteen months old at the time. She needs to know how
much it can have, where live and how to manage his life.
If the theory is very good, there is therefore in practice certain malfunctions that can not accept. I expect
the same problems for victims of Charlie, more even than for theHypercacher. Indeed, compensation will
involve copyright that could touch the different designers. We went for a long battle assessment, insofar
as the victims were self-employed. I think particularly in the evaluation of economic loss of Mrs Maryse
Wolinski, Georges Wolinski's wife.
The President Georges Fenech. You did not mention the pain and suffering ?

Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. In french, these are "endured suffering, which are evaluated on a scale of 1 to
7. In this connection, I note that such a scale is not suitable for three-year detention of a hostage,
because the situation is exceptional. It will be similarly in some positions of prejudice when it comes to
compensate victims of the Bataclan.
This brings me to convey to you a very important decision that has been made by the Court of Thononles-Bains in a case linked to a serious accident at the crossing of Allinges, where several students had
lost their lives. On the occasion of this case, president Deparis created and made by the Correctional
Court accept two positions of harm that the doctrine had a poorly developed, namely the harm of anguish
- some children have seen happen death - and the detriment of anxiety - parents have waited hours to
know the fate of their children.
When we imagine the three hours have passed most of the victims inside the Bataclanwith 90 dead,
some victims have been protected by the body of the deceased... I'll have it innovates. Fortunately, it has
no specific rules for this full compensation. We, on the basis of exceptional situations, exceptional
respond to such damages. The experts will help us to highlight these special effects, we will strive then to
the Board of Directors, to translate into currency.
Ms. Marianne Dubois. Thank you, Madam, for being with us tonight.
In my constituency, a family was bereaved and another was very touched at the time of the attack which
took place at the Bardo Museum. Yet they have the impression of not being recognized as victims
because this has not happened in France. Thus, the President of the Republic on several occasions met
victims of bombings that took place in France, but not in Tunisia.
I would like to ask you about the recognition of the emotional harm. How can we assess the loss of a
father, a mother, of a loved one?
Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. I am no victim: I especially organized for disabled persons a briefing for the
victims of the attacks of the Bardo, so that they become aware of their rights, and I defend their records to
the guarantee fund.
Of course, you need lawyers, who are not always the rights of victims, shall inform. This is what have
been a number of them speaking to me. I lead in fact any work to the bar to transmit my knowledge on
a voluntary basis, I would like to clarify. I tell them the laws that exist. These legal professionals familiar
with the legislation on occupational accidents, but not the operation of the Fund and the status of civilian
casualties of war.
I am also at the disposal of these victims, who were all my contact information. They know they can reach
me. I don't ever put more than half a day to remind. I get about 150 emails per day, apart from telephone
calls. So, for me, they are not forgotten. Now, I cannot answer instead of the President, which I would not
like the agenda. Their lawyer did an application in due form? At last, this was not the case. But I will say
no more.
Whether that is worth a human life, the question is vast. Americans assess life in millions of dollars. The
Germans, for their part, believe that life is priceless, to the point that the recognition of this hurt feelings or
affection, as they say now in France, was, prior to the changeover to the euro, a DM. This was offset by
other prejudice, particularly economic positions, to help families to live and relive.
The France adopted an intermediate position - from the Badinter Act, which provides for a right to
compensation for road accident victims. Over the years between 1985 year where I started my battle, and
today, the amounts have evolved: they went from 20,000 euros to approximately 45,000 euros for the
loss of a companion, of a wife or child. I note also that the loss of a child is less well "paid" than as a
companion or a wife. I find it curious, insofar as a child does not replace while the surviving spouse can

rebuild his life. It's what emerges from the case law. However, that is worth the life of a child? If I lost my
daughter, I couldn't give you a number...
I happen to ask families who dispute the guarantee how much Fund proposal they assess the loss of their
loved and below how much money they are going to decide to go to the courts they never do. I ask you
the same question: how much would you rate life? For my part, I am not able to respond. But I'm fighting
like a Tigress for the assessment of physical, psychological and economic harms, and everything that
goes with: rehabilitation of housing, cars, reintegration and training professional who are also supported
by the guarantee fund.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Madam, I would like to welcome my turn your fight.
You mentioned the procedure to the public prosecutor, allowing to develop the list of items and those who
will be regarded as victims. This list is then forwarded to the guarantee fund, and opens right to
compensation and support. Given the large number of victims of the attacks of last November, what is the
timeframe of the Parquet? Some victims are waiting - it can be included in this list for support? Is the
Prosecutor's Office equipped to handle such a situation, different from those that were formerly known?
Furthermore, I noticed that in almost thirty years, the guarantee fund had processed 4 200 files, and that
you were expecting to receive 3 000 other. The guarantee fund has sufficient means to support these
victims?
Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. First, this list of prosecutors was established quite quickly, in the days that
followed the attacks. Such was the case of the 130 deaths, thanks to the remarkable work of identification
of the Forensic Medicine Institute - apart from a problem of inversion.
In passing, I would like to welcome our health services. The evening of November 14, we had a list of 128
people died. The balance finally stood at 130, thanks to the quality of care, surgery and of French
medicine that, despite financial difficulties, has been able to save many lives, including that of a number
impressive young people, who were seriously injured.
Hospitals have also sent lists the Parquet, but it took a little late because of software problems that I
mentioned previously. If we want to be able to face other large-scale attacks, it is urgent to develop a
software common to all stakeholders. This will provide, on a same listing of all information: profile of each
victim, structure and social situation of each family... We know, for example, if children are left alone at
home.
You should also know that it supports, in France - and this is very positive - all victims, regardless of their
nationality or their situation with regard to the legality of their stay in our country. I had made this request
early 1986 when I began to negotiate the law of September 9, 1986: to the guarantee fund, we do not
have to wonder about the legality of the presence of a person in our territory. The country of human
rights, we have all the security, because they are human beings human.
Similarly, we support any French victim of attacks abroad: whether at the Museum of Bardo, Sousse, in
Cairo, in New York, in London, in Madrid, in Israel, everywhere in the world where there are families,
victims who have French nationality or which are binational. After we be filled, we support the bi-national,
in addition to what can be done by the legislation of their country of origin. We know although many
countries, and I think for the attack in Ouagadougou, provided nothing for the victims. But if the latter
have links with the France, they are supported.
Once the list of prosecutors, several weeks elapse. As I have indicated, victims may also have to provide
evidence that I listed above, and the Fund examines. This may take two or three weeks, but not months.
If, in the light of the elements, the Fund accepts the victim on this new list, it can immediately pay him an
allowance.

If the evidence are considered to be insufficient, the application may be rejected. I have asked that any
discharge is submitted to the Board of Trustees of the Fund, which will examine the validity. Certainly, we
do not manage the files, but I would like to know the motivations in the case of refusal. And if a person is
not accepted on the lists, it can still appeal to the Court of high instance of Crteil, which is the Court
responsible for the guarantee - domiciled at Vincennes - Fund order to be awarded the quality of victim.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. Thank you for your presentation that traces the positive developments in the
recognition of terrorism to the creation of the guarantee fund, but which also shows that it remains the
way to go.
You insist particularly on the single list as element triggering for the guarantee fund for compensation
which will be awarded to the victims or their families. Associations that were interviewed have pointed
early on the diversity of the lists and the difficulty of access to information. Where these questions.
Based on your experience, do you not think that it would be good to have a single list at the beginning of
the procedure, in order to inform and then open rights to the guarantee fund? Should not a single
authority focus the preparation of this list from a same software? How, specifically, to go to this unique
procedure and, possibly, to a single authority? Should this pick up the Bill, other measures, or simply
internal arrangements to the guarantee fund?
Mrs Franoise Dumas. Thank you, Madam, for the clarity of your remarks. You unfortunately have an
acute knowledge of the needs of victims and their relatives as well as different malfunctions. How do you
explain the decline of the single window procedure? Is this due to the fact that several ministries are
involved? The complexity of the devices? Do you have concrete proposals to make on the subject?
Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. On the single list, current practice, that passes through a control of the
Prosecutor's Office, seems to be the best. The Parquet is indisputable, undisputed authority, and it is to
him to gather all information that it receives hospitals, emergency services, services of police who were
able to collect evidence, and all those who have been in contact with the victims and were able to pick up
their identity. Yet once, the problem comes from the difference of software, resulting in a loss of data. Mr.
Franois Molins, will explain in detail the difficulties encountered by the Prosecutor's office to collect the
identification of all the victims.
So far, 1,200 have been opened to the guarantee fund from all the items that it has. In my view, the
guarantee fund does not have the legitimacy to take the single list: should the receive and initiate the
procedure.
Are all those who have not been identified. The Act provides that any person who deems himself victim
may directly enter the guarantee fund. It can also be civil and bring evidence to prove that she was well
on the premises. I repeat, I wish that the Governing Council is aware of the records released by the
guarantee fund, left to the refusal to be validated and that the person should go before the High Court of
Crteil.
I do not believe that, in this area, the intervention of a law is necessary. But it is you who are
professionals in the development of laws... A decree could perhaps be sufficient to complete the Act of 9
September 1986. In any case, apart from this problem of software and management of a large number of
victims, prosecutors seems to be the most legitimate authority to develop this list.
How to explain the decline in the achievements of 1995? By the fact that stakeholders are changing over
time. I told you, I'm "memory" of the Fund, a "survivor" of 1986; no other than me member was present at
the time. Thus, the president was appointed a year ago. Ministers are represented by different instances.
For example, the Minister of justice is represented by the head of the office of the victims. However this
service is dormant, and I weigh my words! Office managers do not stay. The latest had resigned shortly
before the 13 November. She ended up staying until January 30, 2016, and was therefore not even

St

present to CA from 1 February. At present, there is no Chief Office of victims. Yet it is the c OEur, at the
Ministry of justice, the organization that manages the rights of the victims! This Department is abandoned
for years - it started not with Mrs Taubira. To the extent that Mr. Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior, had
created a Delegation to the rights of victims within the Ministry of the Interior, precisely to help to the
victims of terrorism. This shows, and I'm sorry, the lack of interest of the State towards the victims.
Ms. Nicole Guedj, Secretary of State for the rights of victims with Mr. Perben, made things interesting and
concrete. Then the Secretary of State has disappeared. Today, he reappeared, with the difference that
the new Secretary of State dependent on the Prime Minister. Will it have at its disposal in addition to a
firm, an administrative structure that will work? I base all my hopes in this creation. Indeed, the Board of
Directors, representatives of the four Ministers voted always in the same direction to enable governmental
solidarity to practice. Still need that they have defined a common position during an inter-ministerial
meeting. If they reflected the voice of the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic who asked that
it repairs the living, we would be five out of nine to advance the rights of victims and prevent the loss you
have mentioned.
Because of mobility in the public service, officials who sit on the Board of Directors are continually
replaced - sometimes even before two or three years. It is in the direction of the guarantee fund:
Executive Director, Mr Franois Werner, and the Director, Mrs. Nathalie Faussat, are there than in recent
years. The 1995 phase is lost in the mists of time. And in 1986, records were not computerized. Where a
certain loss of knowledge, is observed in all French administrations.
I can resume, in this regard, the example of the guide that we had published in 2003, and which I
mentioned the existence with Mrs. Touraine's office, just before Christmas. This booklet contains many
interesting things about the support of victims. This leads me to make a small comeback in the past.
Eighteen months ago, held a meeting on medical and psychological emergencies cells. -CUMP - that
were created in 1995 by Mr. Xavier Emmanuelli, then Secretary of State for emergency humanitarian
action.
Mr. Xavier Emmanuelli, whom I had met in June 1995, and to which I had presented the results of the
epidemiological study on the State of health of the victims of the attacks of 1986, intended to create a
new device and I had offered to discuss in next September. The RER B station Saint-Michel bombing
occurred on July 25, 1986. Mr. Emmanuelli had its CUMP project in mind. He brought the President of the
Republic in hospitals, meet the people who had fled the subway and horror, who was told to leave and
who wandered, dazed, in Paris. These people had sometimes walked the streets for several days and
had been collected by bystanders, police officers or doctors. It is there that are born CUMP that support
at the scene of the attacks or accidents involved victims - I speak not of those that need to save life and
which are immediately sent to hospitals. These cells are animated by volunteers who come from
hospitals: psychiatrists, psychologists or even the psychiatric nurses. They are involved in the emergency,
then re-enter their original service.
Eighteen months ago, so we celebrated the twentieth anniversary of these emergency cells. On this
occasion, I had pointed out to the representative of the Directorate-General of health that while it might be
the victim of a major magnitude attack, our small guide was no longer updated. I was told we were going
back into construction. I have never heard in speak. While this issue is on the site of the Ministry of
health, no one in the office of Ms. Touraine had remembrance. Yet once, there is in France a loss of
knowledge that seems quite worrying, especially in extreme situations.
With regard to the finances of the Fund for the year 2016, barring major events, thanks to this additional
St
euro bringing the contribution of national solidarity to 4.30 euros since January 1 , we have the
necessary cash. If other attacks were to occur, it would be something else. However, the amount of the
contribution is fixed by a simple arrested, taken every year in the month of October by the Ministry, to be
taken into account by insurance companies the following year.

After the disaster of the DC10, in 1989, which had been 170 deaths, had been afraid of running out of
cash and having to dip into our reserves. The Ministry of Finance of the time had, during the year,
er
increased to a franc, the contribution to enable us to cope with this disaster. 1 February 2016, I therefore
asked the guarantee fund of this order - which is also in the archives of the Ministry of finance - to prove,
if necessary, it is possible to increase the contribution during the year.
Finally, ladies and gentlemen, in 2008, unanimously, you put the responsibility of the guarantee fund the
compensation for owners cars and motorcycles burned on 14 July and 31 December - with 40% of abuse.
What it concerns the Fund of guarantee of victims of acts of terrorism and other criminal offences? This is
unacceptable! Of course, this does not represent huge sums, but it's symbolic: this compensation should
be the automobile guarantee fund. Why should the national solidarity work while there are people who are
neither car nor motorcycle?
As of 2008, while I had been received here by the president of the law commission, Mr. Warsmann, as
well as in the Senate, I expressed my opposition to such misuse. But it was in vain. Since I picked up my
Pilgrim's staff and I am struggling to return there on this provision. Each time, explains me that there is no
necessary legislative vehicle, cannot make budget rider, etc.
th

Last November, Mrs Taubira introduced his Bill on justice of the XXI century: I thought that this text a
little Tote could be good support. A Senator who asked me if I had an amendment to propose, I
suggested the deletion of this unfair burden and the transfer of appropriate compensation to the motor
vehicle Fund. She filed the amendment at first reading in the Senate. But the Parliamentary Secretary or
administrator having forgotten article 40 of the Constitution, this amendment is not even passed under
discussion. I have therefore seized Mr. Bruno Le Roux, the Chairman of the Socialist Group, and
prepared it another amendment in preparation for the next reading. But after the events of November 13,
the agenda of the work of the Parliament may be changed. In any case, it seems to me be good financial
administration to unload the guarantee fund of this unfair burden.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you give us the amount of the resources of the Fund?
Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. In addition to the national solidarity contribution, which is 4.30 euros for each of
the 80 million of insurance contracts, we have placed a lot of money.
On January 29, we open 1 137 compensation records, and paid 17 million euros of provisions. And
according to my records, we have a book value of 1, 331 billion euros in cash.
In fact, the "terrorism and offences" Fund is managed by the guarantee fund automobile, which is
Vincennes, and employs 120 people. A financial department manages both the automobile guarantee
fund and the Fund "terrorism and crimes. We pay to the motor vehicle fund a percentage of fee prorated
to the time spent by the unit in charge of the victims of terrorism - the guarantee fund will give you the
figures. Thus, we do not have need to have a local, which limits the costs. I think it is good administration.
Therefore, we don't have a money problem. We even what hire, including editors with bac + 5 in law,
subject to provide additional training, due to the specificity of our rules.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you give us your feeling about the attacks in the month of
January, and the object of our mission? I really enjoyed your comments when you said that the
compensation was part of counter-terrorism and that it was proof of our solidarity against terrorism. Do
you have comments to make on the question of resources and prevention?
Ms. Francoise Rudetzki. Much of radicalisation and the "de-radicalization". But I admit not very well
know how to 'dradicaliser '.

This is not going to bring the word of victims to those who are in prison can make them brainwashed
upside. Moreover, making the mental manipulation would run counter to our values. We must therefore
find other routes.
I heard the former Prime Minister, Mr. Alain Jupp, a prison policy. This might be a good way to get
information. Affairs Merah, Beghal, Chung or Kaye, always bring us to the prison. We know that
somehow, Djamel Beghal formed the brothers Kaye and Coulibaly. Perhaps this is a mistake of putting in
the same prison.
We talk about reunification, an internment camp - I do not like this type of device - for data subjects to the
file S. But it seems to me difficult if they are not passed to the Act. In any event it may not act on the
brains of those who are already in jail...
On the other hand, we can act at the level of national education. Admittedly, I'm not a specialist, but our
democratic values, our values of secularism, must be transmitted from the earliest age. Our mistake was
to consider that radicalisation or failure to Republican values were related to the problem of the suburbs.
Today, everyone agrees that it was wrong. Of course has been done in the suburbs, and that it has put a
lot of money, but the result is not the height. Despite the progress, - as a student, I worked on urban
renewal-, the problem of urbanism is not set.
In any case, and noted also in Belgium, except perhaps Merah, all those involved are not necessarily to
be radicalised in the suburbs. The phenomenon is found in all environments. I recall that 220 French are
parties in Syria and that their families had not seen coming.
To have contacts with the Muslim authorities, imam Chalghoumi, with Mr Boubakeur, Rector of the Paris
Mosque, I think that one of the solutions cannot come from the Muslim community. Must be the
household within mosques where the Salafist preaching are pronounced every week.
Should we stop those who preach against our values, which call for violence? This is a matter of the
Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of religious affairs. But also of the Muslim world. Seen well, and some say,
they are primarily french, Republican, Democrat, then Muslim. It should not return to the system of
communitarianism: what would be the worst of things. It would be the loss of our values, and secularism.
Intellectuals, social workers attending the Muslim community should perhaps also provide the means to
detect radicalisation, that may not always be families, sometimes divided, sometimes blended. Must be
given to all people who are involved with these French who practise or not, the Muslim religion but have
ties with Muslims the means to detect, to be tuned in the associative. They constitute a kind of vigilance
team which would lead to additional work from that of the penitentiary police.
You must use the same modes of communication that the jihadists, leading huge campaigns, with videos.
Should almost be clubbing: all TV channels, radio stations, social networks should be used today to fight
the battle.
There's also the problem of the training of imams and its financing. Who says that an imam is imam? It is
a broad debate and this falls under the Ministry of the Interior.
In any case, there is awareness of the civil society. January 11 beautifully testified even if after the breath
fell back a little. This exceptional mobilisation day will mark the history of the country, and also that of the
world. It must take into account also the circles of reflection: the Institut Montaigne, Diderot, the
Freemasons, the associations working on resilience - because I have not spoken, but it should not hold a
victim in its victim status, should help it on the path of resilience.

There in some french, "the hommistes rights" intellectuals that I frequent to the CNCDH (Commission
nationale consultative human rights), a confusion between terrorism and resistance. This is not at all the
same thing. When the french resistance fighters were conducting actions during World War II against the
Germans, it was very specific targets. The Germans, on the other hand, taking hostages or killed civilians.
Let us not confuse! Direct action which was bombs and caused serious collateral damage, it was not
acceptable in a country where we have the right to vote, to advocate, to express themselves. Similarly, he
was not eligible to offer hospitality to the Red swelled to give political asylum to alleged Italian refugees,
sought by Italian justice for crimes committed in Italy. The Battisti case is inadmissible: it released him
and he fled. Need to reset it to Italian justice. The Italy is part of Europe.
This brings me to my fight for judicial Europe. For me, the only boundaries that exist today are judicial
boundaries. Take the example of Carlos, who was arrested by the french and brought back services in
France in 1994. He was sentenced for the 1982-83 attacks: the TGV, the Capitol, the gare saint-Charles,
rue Marbeuf - for him also, the victims were collateral damage. Weinrich, who was his right arm, was
arrested, meanwhile, in Germany and could never organize confrontational between the two - the
Germans felt that moving in a plane of one or the other would have been too dangerous - then yet they
had participated in the same actions. There were two legal proceedings, one in Berlin and one in Paris,
because neither the Germans nor the French do extradite their own nationals.
Therefore Europe judicial dysfunction completely. In 1996 I organised a Conference in the Senate,
following the Geneva appeal by anti-terrorist judges. But it took until the events of 2001 so that the
European arrest warrant is created. There is no common list of offences, which could work with an
automatic extradition. It does not extradite between Paris and Lyon: why extradition proceedings between
Brussels and Paris? It should no longer be any legal boundaries. It then closed completely each country,
and they say goodbye to Europe. It is another debate.
If we stay in this Europe that in my opinion it must save, need to build judicial Europe, and to create a
European public prosecutor so that, if a State fails to continue, if there are problems of cooperation
between the different justices, it could have a supreme authority, in Europe, allowing prosecution, stop
and fight with our weapons against terrorism. I always say, the weapons of democracy, it is the law.
This is my project. It is perhaps a little crazy, but I really wish works to the creation of this European
judicial area, to start within a small nucleus: Brussels, of course; the Spain which also has been affected
by the attacks.
The President Georges Fenech. Mrs Rudetzki, on behalf of all my colleagues in the Committee of
inquiry, I welcome the fight that you are doing for so many years, still the same flame with the same
dynamism. We thank you for your important contribution, which will nourish our work. It is with great
respect that we have received.
Round table, open to the press, lawyers of victims of terrorist attacks: Me Patrick Klugman, lawyer
at the bar of Paris, accompanied by Mr. Samuel Sandler, father and grandfather of victims of
Mohamed Merah; Me Samia Maktouf, counsel to the bars of Paris and Tunis, accompanied by Mr.
Omar Dmougui, victim of the attacks of November 13, 2015; Me Olivier Morice, lawyer at the bar of
Paris, accompanied by Mr. Ren Guyomard and Ms. Emmanuelle Guyomard, father and s ur of a
victim of the bombing of the Bataclan
Report of the round table, open to the press, Wednesday, February 17, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the request
for hearing of our Committee of inquiry. As I indicated at the first meeting of our Committee, we wanted to
start with victims who are entitled to the attention of national representation. We continue our series of
hearings with several lawyers, accompanied by victims or relatives of victims.

Me Samia Maktouf, lawyer at the bar of Paris and Tunis, was accompanied by Mr. Omar Dmougui, victim
of the attacks of November 13, 2015, conscious faction at the Stade de France on November 13. Mr
Dmougui, you have, in this capacity, successful to prevent one of the suicide bombers to penetrate inside
the stadium. You have now a deep trauma. We will hear first.
Me Olivier Morice, lawyer at the bar of Paris, is accompanied by Mr. Ren Guyomard and Ms.
Emmanuelle Guyomard, father and sOEheart of a victim of the Bataclan, Mr. Pierre - Yves Guyomard,
who was forty-three years.
Me Patrick Klugman, lawyer at the bar of Paris, is accompanied by Mr. Samuel Sandler, father and
grandfather of victims of Mohamed Merah. Mr Sandler, even if, initially, your hearing may be outside the
scope of our investigations, your experience, as well as your lawyer, is useful for the commission put into
perspective the treatment of victims by 2015 with what has been done previously.
I recall that this roundtable is open to the press and that it subject to a live broadcast on the internet site
of the National Assembly. Registration will be available for a few months on the video portal of the
Assembly. The commission may decide to include in its report any part of the report that will be made of
the hearing. We decided, in a general way, our hearings would be open to the press, because we need to
conduct this investigation in a transparent manner.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the commissions of Inquiry Ordinance of November 17,
1958, I will ask each and others to take the oath to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.
Me Patrick Klugman, Me Samia Maktouf, Mr. Omar Dmougui, Mr. Samuel Sandler, Mr. Olivier Morice, Mr.
Ren Guyomard and Ms. Emmanuelle Guyomard successively take oath.
M. Omar Dmougui, victim of the attacks of November 13, 2015. Hello everyone and thank you for
asking me.
My name is Omar Dmougui. I was born September 7, 1983 in Guelmim in the Morocco. I am in France
since January 18, 2003, for thirteen years. I am the father of a little French girl, Laurence Dmougui. I work
at the Stade de France where I am conscious to the door G.
On 13 November, I have come to the Stade de France to do my job. It was one day like any other. I
picked up my badge. I was very happy, because the France played against the Germany. There's all the
colors of the France. There were also Germans. It was good.
I'm doing the rounds between the G and H door. Before me, there is a young, up to twenty-three, twentyfour years, who is dressed in civilian clothes. I look and he looks at me in the eyes. I thought it was an
undercover police officer.
I have people enter the stadium. There were men, women, couples, young people, elderly people. Before
the doors closed, there were laggards; I made them enter. Then, there was a first explosion, to my right. I
saw nothing, except a truck, next to the Caf, which has moved due to the power of the explosion. After
that, I went out to evacuate the world. A police officer facing the place where took place the first
explosion. I heard the police say it was an attack. After, I evacuated everyone to parallel boulevard. There
were young people, some very young women. I said: ' stay away, back, please, step back, step back! I
saw the young man who set me in the eyes. He raises his belt. There is an explosion and I fall down
because of the breath. There, I saw a gentleman type European, aged fifty-two-year-old who told me: '
help me, please! I can't do anything, because I can't move my legs. I was in the Middle, next to the
suicide bomber and the gentleman who is injured and who will lose life five minutes later.

Then, relief evacuated me and close to everything that I do not want to describe to you. A doctor said: 'no,
its place is not here. They brought back me to the McDonald's where they gave me first aid. After, I was
evacuated to the hospital.
The President Georges Fenech. You have prevented this young man you have raised from entering the
stadium?
M. Omar Dmougui. Yes.
The President Georges Fenech. How?
M. Omar Dmougui. All police officers have gone to the place where the first explosion occurred. It was
chaos, the G door was open, and the suicide bomber wanted to enter the stadium.
The President Georges Fenech. It is at this time you are interposed.
M. Omar Dmougui. Yes.
The President Georges Fenech. How?
M. Omar Dmougui. I told him: ' where are you going? '' Push yourself, Mr! . He looked at me in the
eyes, took two steps back and detonated his belt. There was a Dad of fifty-two years, European-style,
behind him, who asked me for help. But he died. This man, I see it all the time; When I sleep and even
here I see before me.
The President Georges Fenech. We understand that you're always extremely traumatized by what you
have experienced. Thanks to your extremely courageous intervention, you have prevented that from
happening something more serious still.
Our Committee would like to know what you think of security around the stadium. According to you, were
they sufficient tonight?
M. Omar Dmougui. For me, these are the guards who did the work, amazing work. They are the ones
who rescued France with all its colours, its cultures, all its religions.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you want to add something?
M. Omar Dmougui. My residence permit expires February 29, 2016. I am the father of a french child and
I do not know what will happen.
I was the victim of an attack. I do not understand why I have not been well taken in charge. These are my
lawyer and psychiatrist who treated me, Dr. Mezouane Belkacem, who helped me to be transferred to the
military hospital of Percy.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Thank you for this testimony.
It questions the fact that these individuals had no ticket. Your experience meaningfully inform us on this
point. Do you feel that the first explosion was intended to make diversion so the suicide bomber who was
in front of you can take advantage of the panic to enter the stadium? Do you think it is and things had
been arranged, and that, suddenly, your intervention has prevented a much larger massacre?

What do you think of the support by relief, both on the evening of November 13 and the following days,
including psychological and psychiatric support?
M. Omar Dmougui. Could you ask one question at a time, please?
The rapporteur. As the bomber had no ticket to enter the stadium, do you think that the first explosion
was intended to allow him to enter the stadium to do more damage?
M. Omar Dmougui. Yes, it was a strategy. All police officers went to the site of the first explosion, to the
cafe. Suddenly, I found myself alone. And him, he sought to enter the stadium; I stopped it, I stopped the
carnage.
The rapporteur. After the first explosion, have you had particular to stay on-site instructions or well each
managed it the situation in its own way?
M. Omar Dmougui. I did not have instructions. My only logs, it was to control tickets. End point.
The rapporteur. What did you think of the accompaniment of the relief on the evening of November 13
and the following days?
M. Omar Dmougui. The evening of November 13, relief have put a lot of time to arrive. This pissed me
off. Caregivers were not well trained for the attacks.
The President Georges Fenech. According to you, how long brought relief to arrive?
M. Omar Dmougui. Twenty or thirty minutes. For me, it was long.
M. Olivier Falorni. Sir, I want to thank you for your presence and salute your courage.
How much were you this access door? How much time has elapsed between the initial explosion and
attempting to enter the stadium of the person that you stopped? You mentioned a displacement of the
police to the scene of the first explosion; at that time, were you alone or with colleagues?
M. Omar Dmougui. Could you ask one question at a time?
M. Olivier Falorni. How much were you at the entrance of the access door before the attacks?
M. Omar Dmougui. We were four.
M. Olivier Falorni. When the first explosion occurred, were you still four or you are you found only?
M. Omar Dmougui. Everyone is saved. Behind me, the employees of the company Stand'Up, who
looked after the excavations, are gone. I found myself alone.
Olivier Falorni. How much time has elapsed between the initial explosion and the attempt to enter the
terrorist?
M. Omar Dmougui. Fifteen to sixteen minutes.
Olivier Falorni. If you had been there, to other sas, you could have prevented the terrorist to enter
directly into a forum ?

M. Omar Dmougui. I don't think so. Women and men employed by the company Stand'Up to the Patdowns are all saved after the first explosion. I shot the head: there was nobody. Those who were there
can tell you that there was nobody.
Olivier Falorni. When you have pushed the terrorist, you indicated that it was blew up. It was voluntary
on his part because he was unable to enter the stadium. Immediately, he took a few steps backwards and
raised his belt.
M. Omar Dmougui. Altogether.
Mr. Meyer Habib. You spoke of this fifty-two gentleman who has agonized before you. This attack would
have been much more deadly.
The police was present at the entrance of the stadium before the attacks? The excavation took place after
your dam, is not it?
M. Omar Dmougui. The police was not far away.
Mr. Meyer Habib. You have exchanged glances with the person who has proved to be a terrorist, and
that you had taken, as a first step, a policeman.
M. Omar Dmougui. Yes.
Mr. Meyer Habib. This means that this person has remained for a long time before you.
M. Omar Dmougui. It was back and forth.
Mr. Meyer Habib. I imagine that in the beginning, many people entered the stadium. If the man had been
able to enter with all this mass, there would have been true carnage. You therefore saw before the start of
the match.
M. Omar Dmougui. Yes.
Mr. Meyer Habib. And you thought that it was a police officer.
M. Omar Dmougui. Yes. It was two hours that I saw, that I had his eyes.
Mr. Meyer Habib. He was dressed normally?
M. Omar Dmougui. He wore a black jacket and jeans. And he had a small ponytail.
Mr. Meyer Habib. You stopped it with your hands.
M. Omar Dmougui. Not, by far, because behind him there were many people.
Mr. Meyer Habib. People who watched television heard an explosion. Those who were inside the
stadium, was told that there was an attack?
M. Omar Dmougui. Yes.
Mr. Meyer Habib. How has it happened?

M. Omar Dmougui. While I did evacuate the world by parallel boulevard, it came. I told him: "back, back!
And he unleashed his belt.
Mr. Meyer Habib. You have been injured. How did the immediate support? A few months after the
bombing, how do you feel, as a victim, this support?
M. Omar Dmougui. The first day, the rescue took me to the hospital. After that, I was told that I could go;
I had a certificate to be able to come back in seven days if I was not well. Since that day, I do not sleep.
Every night, I was going to the emergency room. The Htel-Dieu Professor gave me a list of psychiatrists
to make me follow. And it is the psychiatrist who asked my hospitalization.
Mr. Meyer Habib. In a psychiatric hospital?
M. Omar Dmougui. Yes, a civilian hospital in Crosne. As I am too stressed, I tightened the teeth and I
bleed. The dentist prescribed me a gutter to the evening.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Dmougui, thank you for your testimony which was eagerly awaited.
Me Samia Maktouf, lawyer at the bar of Paris and Tunis. It is very difficult to speak after the testimony
very touching by Mr Dmougui, which reminds us the situation of the victims.
I rise today to your Committee as a civil party lawyer of individual cases that the France has known since
2012: l'affaire Merah, Charlie Hebdo, theHypercacherattacks, the Bataclan and the Stade de France.
Many of my clients, victims, think that it is a commission in addition. But I will not give to the skepticism. I
am the work of your Committee, I heard shocking testimonies of victims, and I am convinced that it is very
important to talk. Your report will help understand, but also to prevent other attacks. It does not remain a
dead letter and will go not just to grow the archives of the National Assembly.
I followed with great interest the hearings you made last Monday, and I would like to support the victims.
These victims do not understand that we can today say that their support is total and complete. This is not
the case.
Be aware that Omar Dmougui and several other victims are not considered civilian war victims. The text
of 2015, which has still not entered into force, does assimilation for the settlement of a pension. Victims
want to be recognized as such even if they are not personal injury. Omar Dmougui has no injuries on his
body, but he suffers from deep psychiatric injury. It must also be considered a civil war victim.
The victims expect more than hospitalization and psychiatric and psychological support. We owe them a
response. This is part of their therapy.
Their support also passes by the accompaniment by the associations of victims, who do extraordinary
work, and by the right professionals. Today, more than 500 victims have no lawyer. This is why I took
upon myself to address our agenda - and I am sure that my colleagues have done the same thing. It
challenged the bars of the France. It is not acceptable that families, parents, moms must write to the
judge to ask him how to take a lawyer. Is it necessary to add this trauma to their pain? The France knows
attacks from 2012; needed it is structured, law professionals make Act of civic responsibility in organizing
themselves to take care of our citizens that these atrocities were made sick.
It comes to mind, in the presence of Mr. Samuel Sandler, whose son and two grandsons were killed, the
formula of Alain Badiou that qualifies these acts of mass murders. In 2012, in case Merah, victims were
targeted: soldiers, three children and a Rabbi who were killed because they were Jewish. Today, to
borrow an expression from Gilles Kepel, it is passed to a terrorism of third-generation, or even fourth-

generation because we have all become targets. From 2012, the terrorists never cease to take the lead
on us, on our police services, on our intelligence services. They have an extraordinary ability to hide,
there's more signs to recognize. The terrorist, today is more qamis, leaves more grow a beard; it
intersects perhaps in the metro - we know that Abaaoud took-, maybe it's a neighbor of bearing, someone
with whom we share a professional space. Terrorists are sown in our society like a gangrene.
The President Georges Fenech. You have entered a number of records from 2012. Since then, and
particularly since the month of January 2015, do you feel that there was an evolution in the fight against
terrorism means?
Me Samia Maktouf. The answer is clearly no, because we could not avoid and stop further attacks.
Data subjects "S" are supposed to be followed but are not judicial - it would take a law course to explain
why. We certainly try to cope, but piecemeal; sorry to say, it's DIY. Need reminding that Fabien Clain,
who is none other than the mentor of Mohamed Merah and the voice of the attacks of November 13, sent
two people to Sid Ahmed Ghlam? It is in the Belgian industry, it is everywhere; It is the thread of all
terrorist cases which we have known to date. He is on the run. He appeared in the first case, the
statement was sloppy. She did not stop terrorists in power then only one OEit novice could have
concluded the review of their situation that they would inevitably spend an armed action. Those involved
in the attacks of November 13 are the same protagonists that case Merah - Sabri Essid, Corel, Fabien
Clain, Dru, the list is too long to mention them all. I want proof that after the case Artigat 1, there is now a
case Artigat 2
You said, Mr president, we are not here to point the responsibility of each and the other but to try and find
out what has not worked, and to try to prevent.
The President Georges Fenech. You say that the statement has been sloppy. It is a heavy accusation.
Why do you say that?
Me Samia Maktouf. Because she was unable to neutralize terrorists identified poised to commit terrorist
acts and to kill french citizens.
Artigat is the genesis of terrorism; that is the thinking head of terrorism in France, which is still active. With
my colleagues, we have asked that case Artigat 1 be paid record Merah, what has been done. We were
able to assess the damage. To date, the protagonists of the Merah case are the same as in all the other
cases laid down or aborted. What is serious is that there has been many actions.
Finally, I want to share the lack of means of the anti-terrorism centre. Today, it has not sufficiently loaded
magistrates expert terrorist instructions. Lack of Arabic-speaking experts. In the case of Merah, for
example, the magistrate believed that Abdelkader Merah had changed his signature at a hearing; in fact,
he wrote in the Arabic language. And what he wrote is extremely serious: on eighteen pages of minutes,
he asked the judge to convert to islam, said not to recognize the justice of men and not to recognize that
the righteousness of God. He cites even some Suras of the Koran. These elements have not been
translated. I had to ask a sworn translation because, with my colleagues, we needed to demonstrate the
growing indoctrination of Abdelkader Merah.
Me Olivier Morice, lawyer at the bar of Paris. Our lawyers approach is resolutely independent. We are
independent at any time, regardless of the political power in place. We have denounced malfunctions in
case Merah; We condemn today a number of failures, with a clear purpose: help national representation
to ensure that the fight against terrorism is much more efficient. I will have to make concrete proposals.
If I say so beforehand, is to tell you that, as an auxiliary of justice, my colleagues and I are surprised that
national representation has devoted so little space and had so little regard for the judiciary in the context

of the various laws that have been passed or are under consideration. The judicial authority is, totally
incomprehensible way in a democracy, the great absent. We have the feeling that, for reasons more or
less clear, there is a lack of will to give the judiciary the role that is his. It is so true that the first president
of the Supreme Court and the Attorney general at the Court of cassation have alerted the Executive on
this point in January.
There were serious failures, but do not yield to the approximation or launch too fast convictions. Say, for
example, that the investigating judges who had supported the attack of the Bataclan project have botched
the judicial inquiry or that they have not tried to arrest those who were able to project such an attack,
would be wrong. These are experienced and courageous investigative judges, but they clashed with the
total lack of judicial cooperation of Egyptian authorities which prevented them to deepen their work.
We must nevertheless be lucid. We knew from 2009 that an attack at the Bataclan project envisaged
sufficiently accurately - a preliminary inquiry and a judicial investigation had been opened, two judges
training are responsible for the folder. Gold Bataclan owners have never been warned of this judicial
information. I recall that, in the case of events on 13 November, 2,000 victim notification were addressed.
No specific action was taken on the Bataclan concert hall while it was known through several hearings
made, either by the secret services, in the context of current information, than before the been a room or
show rooms would be referred. And the interviewees have even said that a bombing would take place
very soon.
And that has happened? The new owners of the establishment have not been warned, and, as you know,
no special security measures taken at the entrance to the Auditorium, the people present at the entrance
checking only tickets. In addition, and it is surreal - we have no answer today to that question-, plans of
the venues most concerned by a potential risk of attack don't have even not been transmitted to the
authorities to intervene. The Brigade research and intervention (bis) which occurred - and not the RAID,
as I could hear him sometimes - had not, indeed, the plan of the settlement while found in the mobile
phone of a terrorist.
It is obvious that all those who OEwork in the fight against terrorism are everything to try to make
improvements. Unfortunately, the reception of victims and auxiliaries of justice lawyers can say that things
have not greatly improved since the Merah case that has been marked by dysfunctions - the failure of
legalization of information in a number of files, for example. What is a lack of litigiousness? The fact it has
not brought in a timely manner to the attention of the judicial authority of the information whose
exploitation is likely to allow, prevent terrorist acts, either to catch offenders. We are convinced that need
to change a number of reflexes and texts. Also, I brought with me to bills as suggestions. I should
mention that this reflection was conducted with Professor Didier Rebut, specialist in criminal law and
criminal procedure.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you be more specific on the lack of litigiousness?
Me Olivier Morice. Perhaps you know that article 40 of the code of criminal procedure is no sanction
against the administrative authorities which will reveal not the offences which they may have had
knowledge. We propose that be added, in the code of Homeland Security, a provision for a sanction in
case of non-transmission to the authority judicial knowledge of offences or crimes-related information and
to assist prosecution of acts of terrorism. Today, any person in any service she works, which is in
possession of such information and that delays their transmission to the judicial authority, is not
sanctioned. Be aware that following the attacks committed by Mohamed Merah, services of the Central
Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI) rushed at the Attorney of the Republic of Paris to bring to the
attention of the judicial authority 20 procedures to determine whether it was necessary to judicialize them.
In this long for ongoing judicial information, the investigating judges work, logically, in the form of letters
rogatory, which are often very. For the sometimes incomprehensible reasons, carried out investigations
are worn to the knowledge of the parties that two, three or four years later, which has implications for the

management of judicial information, because judges are not always informed of the results. In Mohamed
Merah, which lasts several years responsible investigators of letters rogatory sent, just prior to the closing
of the information, a considerable number of depositions to the examining magistrate who claimed them
for several years. Minutes that had been established, for example as early as 2013, provided that in 2015,
without any sanction.
We thought about a solution enabling to meet equitably and the rights of civil parties and persons likely to
be prosecuted. If defect or the transmittal timeliness of insufficiently motivated the letters rogatory to the
judicial authority were sanctioned by the regime of invalidity, I can assure you that the rise of the
information would be much more effective.
The President Georges Fenech. You are affirmative on the fact that, several years before the bombing
of the Bataclan, appeared on a record denunciation of terrorism specifically aimed the Bataclan.
Me Olivier Morice. Of course!
The President Georges Fenech. Was it not simply aim for an establishment open to the public or a
concert hall? I ask you to be as precise as possible.
Me Olivier Morice. I am accurate. And I'll even violate the confidentiality of the investigation or the
privilege...
The President Georges Fenech. We do ask you not.
Me Olivier Morice. I'm going to rape because that, pursuant to the decisions recently made by the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of the human rights which also condemned the France - I am in law,
solicitor, to reveal to the public, and in particular to the national major dysfunctions representation in a
number of information. And affirm that the Bataclan Concert Hall was covered by a project of attack
because its owner belonged to the Jewish community. That said, it can not throw anathema as well on a
judicial investigation. Objectivity command recognize that the magistrates, whose quality is not in
question, tried at that time to identify the responsibilities, but they were unable to do so because of a lack
of cooperation of the Egyptian authorities. It is so true that, in the project of the Bataclanattack file,
concerning Mr. Ben Abbes, the two brothers Clain, which I do not need to explain who they are, were
heard. I have with me a diagram, that we hold at the disposal of national representation, showing all links
between a number of people, we were able to explain through what we asked, beginning in October
2014, to a magistrate, under the management of the attack in Cairo.
Each in its place must be aware of its limits but also its responsibilities. Under the State of emergency
and the law, national representation gave quite exorbitant powers to the Executive branch. It is necessary
to counterbalance, otherwise we are no longer in a democracy. If the judicial authority is not set to its true
place, let's right into the wall. Be aware that all Chief Justices of Court of appeal of France came forward
to say that the manner in which things were being considered was totally offset from the mission of the
judiciary!
The President Georges Fenech. According to you, that is what constituted an obstacle with the Egyptian
authorities for more information?
Me Olivier Morice. Number of requests for international criminal assistance were made. But the Egyptian
authorities have demonstrated a lack of cooperation, which also still exists.
Mr. Meyer Habib. There has been a change of power in Egypt.

Me Olivier Morice. This changed nothing. The obstacles are such as the magistrates do not. This is not
to betray the confidence to say that these magistrates, who are working hard to combat terrorism, live
very difficult to find in other cases the same people that they have failed to stop at certain times. You
think, well, that, if ever they had been able to do so, they would have done.
The text that we are at the disposal of the national representation especially very legal because it was
developed by a Professor of law.
Me Patrick Klugman, lawyer at the bar of Paris. I wanted to come today before you with Mr. Samuel
Sandler because, although it is not the subject of your inquiry, you have understood not concerted fellow
Samia Maktouf and Olivier Morice case Merah was matrix acts of terrorism which targeted our country.
The roots of this matrix went back also to the case of Artigat, cited by Me Maktouf, the first to lead a court
dies of Arige, say Southwest. Are already present all the protagonists found directly to theOEwork in the
attacks of 12, 15 and 19 March 2012 in Toulouse and Montauban, and in the preparation, perpetration or
claim of the attacks of November 13 in Paris. Everything brings back us to the case of Merah.
While we sometimes respond in very split sequences, separated, the jihadists, they have the meaning of
the message, long time: Fabien Clain, which claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Bataclan, is
organically linked to Mohamed Merah; his brother-in-law, Sabri Essid, appeared in videos broadcast in
France, attending a decapitation by a child who appears to be his son. Obviously, something has not
been understood.
Understanding these different cases is, for the moment, impossible, even though even the investigators
seized various records are the same - these are a few magistrates of the Saint-loi gallery that some of
you are familiar. In one case, that wants the magistrate, this is the resolution, i.e. bring to any one
jurisdiction or authors, otherwise, one or more accomplices. It is the case of the Merah, which is now in
regulation. The examining magistrate does not have the duty of all lessons of this case indices or other
affairs that are followed by intelligence. Where is the command centre? Where is the center of analysis?
Is this only the case of the intelligence services or can it be elsewhere, at the level of the Prosecutor's
office? If there is already a direction of terrorism, it is not, in my opinion, perfect. At any time, Affairs have
was interconnected, in their weakness or their failure to act. It is particularly glaring aprs l'affaire Merah.
Governments have devoted considerable attention to the victims support devices, at all levels. This has
been especially true during the attacks of last January. Of course, the scale of the attacks of November
13 has created an unprecedented situation and blew all these devices, and we end up with people who
are bewildered. It is unacceptable that victims of terrorism compensation fund, in certainly normal order to
protect his money, "sends on roses" people seeking support, care, monitoring.
Civilian victim of war status is not appropriate, said Me Samia Maktouf. Devices exist but lacks a status
for these people who have been victims of crimes which have affected the nation in what she has deeper.
Many problems have dotted about the treatment of the information, especially when the hostage of
theHypercacher. I would like to acknowledge here the reaction of BFM TV, which has shown great
intelligence by accepting the agreement that allowed the outcome of the drama. The scenes which we
face are very often subject to immediate media treatment; journalists have no legal framework allowing
them to know what broadcast, which stops the duty to provide information and begins the protection of
people, at what point it has put at risk of others. The national representation must focus on this issue,
because there is a clear intention of manipulation on the part of the jihadists. Remember that Mohamed
Merah has attacked his victims with a GoPro and sought to transmit his videos, and that, during the taking
of hostages of theHypercacher terrorists have never ceased to join media. Everyone, including the media,
have clarified legal framework.
Finally, it is important to know what is Salafism. But to understand the phenomenon, still need to be able
to apprehend him. In this regard, I support the dissemination of the Salafistsfilm, which has nothing to do

with OEwork of propaganda - I would point out that the material I have a conflict of interest. I am appalled
to see that, one year after the attack in Charlie Hebdo, censorship is aOEwork that aims to show the
public the reality of Salafism and these criminals.
M. Christophe Cavard. Following the case Merah, I chaired, in 2013, the commission of inquiry on the
functioning of the french intelligence services in the follow-up and monitoring of the armed radical
movements. I was also member of the commission of inquiry on the monitoring of sectors and individuals
jihadists, whose ric Ciotti was president and Patrick Mennucci, the rapporteur. The testimony of the
victims, as it allows to recognize as such, gives strength and its reality to the shock of the attacks that we
have experienced. I thanked the Chairman and the rapporteur of the present Committee of inquiry for
allowing it, because the weeks passing and taken in parliamentary work, there is a tendency to forget
what has happened.
Many things have been said during the two previous commissions of inquiry, I would like to confront the
questions reported speakers on developments since the case Merah. At the time, the lack of cooperation
between the intelligence services had been pointed. To listen to you, few things have changed in this
area, however this is not what emerges from our discussions with the services. Me Morice comes to talk
about the link between intelligence and justice, and the legalization of the folders. It is a difficulty which
justified act on intelligence, which I have voted in favour. The collection of information through certain
techniques raised questions of legality and did not allow the judge to include the information thus
obtained in the procedure. The problem is that the laws are not always effective immediately.
Is currently under discussion in the National Assembly Bill strengthening the fight against organized
crime, which would give the administrative power - prefect, parquet, Ministry of the Interior - the capacity
of preventive administrative decisions in the absence of evidence. However, in judicial logic, it cannot
take sanctions if there is no evidence. However, this administrative power is given in framed manner, and
the fundamental text remains: it is impossible to deprive anyone of liberty simply on the basis of the
prevention of an act. This is to allow time for the prosecution to establish.
You will laws that we voted and the text that is being examined in the right direction?
Me Olivier Morice. Surely there were improvements in cooperation between intelligence services,
otherwise it would be really pitiful. But such cooperation is still inadequate. The apprehension of the
information on the ground, inter alia, been neglected since the restructuring occurred at the level of the
General Directorate of internal security (CSB). Certainly, a reform has enabled that techniques for the
collection of information fall within the nails of the legislation. However, this has not improved the
legalization. In this regard, your responsibility is heavy, because you you still enormously pass of the
judicial authority. Maybe find me you aggressive, and I beg you to forgive me.
Why have overshadowed the role of the judicial authority in the text relating to the fight against organized
crime? It should be unthinkable for lawyers - and among you, there are magistrates. It is even more
inconceivable in a democracy such as ours, which is the country of human rights. This is not only a
question of balance in the separation of powers; specifically, there is a deficit of reflexes, including the
administrative authority which you increase power. As an officer of the Court, I find that the powers of the
prefects are exorbitant. You are gone from the judicial authority, and I still do not know why. This has
implications in the fight against terrorism.
The President Georges Fenech. Master Morice, we don't feel any aggression towards us. You have
complete freedom of speech and criticism.
Me Patrick Klugman. Between the law society and parliamentary representation, there is apparently
interesting crosses. But each has its place.

In the folder Merah, leakage of Souad Merah abroad had been poorly felt; the change of legislative
framework would today continue or prevent such an act. We have the honesty to say that a number of
things have changed since the Merah case, even if we sometimes have the feeling of a martyr procedure.
Today, for example, the criminality can aim a single terrorist organization. The legal framework has
changed, and it is happy. So is there a centre cockpit and intelligence? I do not think so.
Finally, I believe that the administrative authority should have a role, but that the judicial authority, in its
place, must be able to understand terrorism.
Me Samia Maktouf. If there was a slight improvement on mutual assistance between the internal
services in France, there is unfortunately no cooperation between the intelligence services. That is what
decided the MOM of our young colleague to bring a complaint before the European Court: If the Belgium,
which did not see fit to do so, had passed the information it had concerning Abaaoud and the industry of
Verviers in January 2015, this could certainly avoid the death of innocent people.
The President Georges Fenech. We go in Belgium to answer these questions.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Going back in time, you do the articulation between the different cases, speaking of
intelligence between them. The fact that we find the same actors each time does mean, for you, that there
case to a logic of limited network of small group? It is important to identify the threat. So much is said on
this point, sometimes very different, it is difficult to get a precise idea. You lift tracks that I find very
interesting.
Master Klugman, can you clarify what you mean by "command and analysis centre"?
Mr Franois Lamy. Master Morice, you mentioned the problems associated with article 40 of the code of
criminal procedure - a point that we can also share for issues other than that of terrorism. You also made
State of delays in transmission, by the police, from minutes to anti-terrorist magistrates as well as the
open judicial inquiry concerning the possibility of an attack at the Bataclan. What link do you see between
these three elements? Do you think there would have been other brakes than the Egyptian authorities?
Have you more precise information, for example on notices that have not been transmitted by the police?
The case, which came out in the press, is serious enough that there are very specific information.
What, according to you, of powers to the judicial institution could have prevented the attacks of November
13 in any case allow to inform police services?
Finally, could you send us a copy of the schema that you mentioned earlier? This morning, the
newspaper Liberation published an also, but fairly brief.
Me Patrick Klugman. We all share the same concern. What we have to do here, rather than looking for
faults, is a work of construction from many doubts.
Nothing in the judicial work that has been done in the various cases we've had to know, lets say that we
are facing an industry. On the other hand, it is clear that it is a political project under which some
personalities emerge and means are structured. One of the identified sectors is that of Southwest that
appeared before the Merah case, and that, outside of french territory, continued to carry the same
message, to claim or assisting the commission of other acts - as was the case in the November 13
bombing. This is what one can say so for the time being. Suggests that a single die with one command
centre would be to miss the point.
What is unbearable is to see people we know closely or from afar were not challenged, nor prevented to
act or to leave the territory while their name was mentioned for several years.

The President Georges Fenech. Which?

Me Patrick Klugman. Fabien Clain and Sabri Essid, among others. These are known, identified
personalities and that gave us the impression, from the beginning, that there has never been a lone wolf.
There, around Mohamed Merah, a clan that was known on the judicial level, before that he not commit
attacks. But no consequence in were made.
Me Samia Maktouf. Not only these individuals were known, but all the lawyers here have exercised their
right of application of Act, specifically asking that they be interviewed and prevented from leaving the
territory. Gold Schwarz Merah, Sabri Essid and Fabien Clain are gone. My application date of 2012. I
have also asked that Olivier Corel to be auditioned. Nothing has been done. Of course, we have full
confidence in the work of the judges of these folders. We are not here to incriminate or hover
responsibilities...
The President Georges Fenech. You are doing.
Me Samia Maktouf. You ask us to mention malfunctions. Here's! However, we have full confidence in the
work of judges.
The President Georges Fenech. You report a malfunction at this level there while maintaining your
complete confidence in the work of judges. It is to your credit. You have the right to point any responsible
finger you want.
Mr Franois Lamy. You also have the right to send us documents, because it is the c OEheart of our
Committee of inquiry. You cannot launch accusations in the air without provide us with specific, concrete
documents.
Me Patrick Klugman. The reasons for which the magistrates do not give suite are understandable: their
connection to them, is to complete their information on acts of Toulouse and Montauban. I understand
that a magistrate refuses to extend its referral to not be engluer into a process without end. The problem
is that there is no one else where this could be done. It lacks the proper procedures to judicialize even
outside specific information aimed a specific Act. I do not put into question the work of the magistrates.
Their action is understandable and it is not subject to bail or reproach.
M. Olivier Falorni. Master Morice, you said that the Bataclan was a target determined very precisely.
Since you were family Vannier, after the bombing of Cairo lawyer, can you confirm that Mr. Farouk Ben
Abbes, who had been suspected of fomenting an attack on the Bataclan, had links with Fabien Clain? Is it
true, October 13, 2014, you did a request for Act anti-terrorism pole to have information about the Farouk
Ben Abbes folder and this project of attack against the Bataclan ?
The judicial inquiry, which was launched in 2010, has been classified, I believe, in 2012. Who was
informed? Why nobody was visibly aware of the serious threats which weighed on the Bataclan, which
also was identified as an establishment run by a Jew which occurred in evenings for the benefit of the
IDF, making it an even more sensitive threat?
Me Olivier Morice. Before answering your questions, I would remind you that sits next to me Mr.
Guyomard. I'm embarrassed to have taken as long the floor and could not yet speak.
The President Georges Fenech. I shall give him the floor just now.
Me Olivier Morice. Lawyers have a habit of not only making friends, and what I'll tell you won't perhaps
pleasure to investigators or prosecutors.

In the project to attack the Bataclan, Farouk Ben Abbes had not only been heard but challenged. The
Clain, too, were heard. That let me not explain, this is no victim notification was sent to the owner of the
Bataclan. I have no answer on this point. When I asked the question to the investigating judges who,
incidentally, are not always the same to follow a folder, they replied that, given the terrorist threat which
weighed particularly on the theatres, the Prosecutor of the Republic could warn, at least, of threats on this
room. At least that our information is wrong on this point, neither the old nor the new owner is said have
been warned.
In the folder of the attack in Cairo, in which Ccile Vannier was murdered, in 2009, in absolutely abject
conditions, the information collected were transmitted to french services. They were then led to the
opening of a judicial investigation in France. A faster prosecution have to avoid certain attacks? What I do
not know but that I'd have to know, Mr Lamy, it is contained in the french secret service briefing notes. I
know that, during previous commissions of inquiry, claims could be made. In France, our declassification
system is outdated compared to other democracies: it is an administrative authority that declassifies or is
the judicial authority which organizes the declassification.
In the days that followed the attacks of November 13, a number of information submitted to the judicial
authority for the purpose of prosecution, exactly as happened in the case of Merah. As soon as the
attacks took place, are brought to the attention of the judicial authority of the information. This is why I
suggest, with Professor Didier Rebut, to amend article 40 of the code of criminal procedure and punish
failure to transmit to the judicial authority.
The President Georges Fenech. Madam, lawyers, thank you for your extremely accurate answers. We
expect your share any document that could be useful to our Committee of inquiry.
Me Olivier Morice. I will transmit the proposals for legislative changes that we have prepared.
The President Georges Fenech. I now give the floor to Mr. Ren Guyomard, father of Mr. Pierre-Yves
Guyomard, died in the attack of the Bataclan at the age of forty-three.
Mr. Ren Guyomard. My son was married and his wife also died, the same evening at the Bataclan.
When I talk to Me Morice, he speaks of anger - anger, Yes, I can not tell you anything; the word is even
too low. When you discover in the press that the Bataclan was the subject of threats in recent years,
cannot help but say that if they had been transmitted to the right, taken seriously, my son and my
daughter-in-law would perhaps still be alive.
Your commission of inquiry focuses on the means OEimplemented by the State to combat terrorism since
January 7, 2015. For me, the means implemented inOEwork from January 7 to November 13, this is
zero! Since my son has not been protected, it is zero! Since 13 November, I do not know. Someone
among you could maybe tell me what specific measures have been taken to that of other fathers do not
know my situation. I am not at all optimistic, and I am afraid I have to tell you that there will be other
Bataclan.
Ladies and gentlemen, nothing has been done to protect the Bataclan while we had the information that
one had the means. Why things change today? The risk was precise, targeted: it was not any Bistro, but
the Bataclan, address specific. We knew the reasons. Nothing has been done: the plans of the room were
not communicated to police forces, Bataclan owners have not warned of the risk. They now talk to me of
foreign policy, the reluctance of the Egyptians. But this has nothing to do. I me sheet detail! It was known
that a threat weighed on the Bataclan, and nothing has been done.
As if by miracle, in the weeks that followed, very energetic decisions have been taken: we launched 700,
800 searches, found a Kalashnikov, rocket launchers, weapons of any kind. But we have been able to do

these searches, it is because we were addresses and names, it is because people were registered S, Y
or Z. Why have these searches not made at least after the attack in Charlie Hebdo ? Why are we
suddenly after 13 November? Because you have to show people that it stirs! But this does not make my
son or my daughter-in-law that we loved. They are dead.
And then, once the drama is passed, there are the following. This later, I only wish none of you know. It's
a nightmare: do not know, for hours, days, if your children are "on the list"; worse, when they are not, they
phone number in number, the end of the wire was incompetent people or not at all informed, some even
hang up. No one can imagine such unpreparedness, such improvisation, such contempt for the people
that we are in such situations. At least on this aspect of things, what did you do, what decisions have
been taken?
Do not illusion, tomorrow there will be an another Bataclan and maybe worse! If ever that happens in a
provincial town that does not Institute forensic Paris, supposedly the most efficient, it will be terrible.
I wanted to just tell you that there's anger. When we talk about oblivion, it is as if there was not talk me. I
hope that what I say will be used to something, but I am not much illusion. Thank you for listening to me.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Guyomard, be sure that all parliamentarians present here are
affected by the words of a father who seeks justice and cares that others do not know the fate of her
children. It is the objective of this commission of inquiry. Today we can bring you no response; We hope
give you at the end of our work. We are here for this, we are here for you, to all those who have lived
these tragedies.
I hope that Mr. Samuel Sandler can speak also.
M. Samuel Sandler. I was very touched by the testimony I have heard since I'm kinda in the same case.
My name is Samuel Sandler. My son was killed in Toulouse, as well as my two grandsons. I take this
opportunity to say that I suffer to see with what approximation the press reported the death of a teacher
and three students. When one is outside the school, which is waiting for a shuttle and that are being
taken by the hand a child of three years and another five years, it can be a high school students. It is a
father that is targeted. And the assassin well saw that he had his two children beside him.
You will have noticed that I should never decision the name of the assassin. Do not see the superstition.
If I find his name and his name, would give him a certain spark of humanity, that I refuse to do. This is
why I always talk about "the assassin of my children" - lawyers responded very well to the aspect of the
Lone Wolf.
Each attack clears the previous. However, the pain is still there.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you have something to say about the time that has passed since
the attacks of Toulouse and Montauban, until November 13? Do you feel that our country has learnt the
consequences of these events?
M. Samuel Sandler. I remember especially the manifestation of January 11, which gave the impression
that, as for the war of 14-18, it was 'the ders der. But whenever you asked me, I answered that no, it
would not 'the ders der.
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much.
Round table, open to the press, associations of victims of terrorism: French victims of terrorism
(AVFT) Association : Mr Guillaume Denoix de Saint - Marc, Director-general, Mr Stphane
Lacombe, Deputy Director, Ms. Aline the lease-Kremer, responsible for communication and

management; National Federation of victims of attacks and collective accidents (FENVAC) : Mr.
Olivier Dargouge, Vice-Chairman, Ms. Marie-Claude Desjeux, Vice-President, Mr. Stphane
Gicquel, Secretary general; National Institute for assistance to victims and mediation (INAVEM) :
Ms. Michele Kerckhove, Chairperson, Mrs Sabrina Bellucci, Director General
Report of the round table, open to the press, Wednesday, February 17, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We welcome, for a second round table, representatives of three
associations of victims of terrorist attacks, whom we thank for responding to the request of our Committee
of inquiry. We wanted to start by victims, who are entitled to the attention of national representation.
The French Association of victims of terrorism (AFVT) was established in February 2009 to help victims of
attacks in all of their efforts, whether judicial, administrative or health. It provides psychological assistance
to victims, as well as legal and administrative support.
She is represented by its founder, Mr Guillaume Denoix de Saint Marc, who is the Director general, and
himself son of a victim of terrorism, in this case the bombing of UTA flight from Brazzaville to Paris via
N'Djamena in 1989. Are also present Mr Stphane Lacombe, Deputy Director, and Ms. Aline the leaseKremer, head of communication and management.
The National Federation of victims of attacks and collective accidents (FENVAC) was created in April
1994 by eight associations of victims of disasters between 1982 and 1993. It has thus not only vocation
support to victims of attacks and their relatives. It operates also in the more general framework of
disasters. She became expert to speak of the victims and their families and to improve the public devices
at home, help and support.
She is represented by Mr. Olivier Dargouge, Vice President, Ms. Marie-Claude Desjeux, Vice-President,
and Mr. Stphane Gicquel, Secretary general.
L'Institut national victim assistance and mediation (INAVEM), created in 1986, is to animate, coordinate
and promote the network of assistance to victims, as well as to initiate partnerships and agreements to
facilitate the access of victims to the local associations. The INAVEM brings together 150 associations.
He is represented by Mrs Michle de Kerckhove, Chairperson, and Ms. Sabrina Bellucci, Director
General.
We decided that our hearings would be open to the press, because we conduct this investigation in a
transparent manner.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the commissions of Inquiry Ordinance of November 17,
1958, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr Guillaume Denoix of Saint Marc, Mr. Stphane Lacombe, Ms. Aline the lease-Kremer, M. Olivier
Dargouge, Ms. Marie-Claude Desjeux, Mr. Stphane Gicquel, Ms. Michle de Kerckhove and Ms. Sabrina
Bellucci take oath.
Mr. Guillaume Denoix de Saint Marc, Director general of AVFT. The AFVT operates in two areas. I will
speak first on the question of support for the victims and let Stphane Lacombe develop the second
component, which concerns preventive measures we pursue, with, among others, the voices of the
victims.
Mr. Mohamed Sifaoui, consultant, could not come, for reasons of health. It might intervene on the issue of
prevention, on which he has much more to say.

The very important evidence your commission of Inquiry heard Monday last and just now perfectly reflect
those reaching us since the attacks. We have hardly talked about, because it seemed to us important to
not to reveal the weakness of our device, which actually suffers from many problems. It is necessary to
restructure it, by improving the collaboration between the State and civil society and by incorporating all
the associations that can assist.
Although we have been excluded from operative support for more than a year, the victims have
spontaneously approached us. They know that our association exists, but do not understand what
distinguishes such or such other structure, how it is different or complementary. They are struggling to
have an overview of the device, whether that collaborates with who and what is the role of each. We
have, from this point of view, a huge job to do, because the situation is really cacophonous.
I would like to mention an event that caused many traumas: by awarding the Legion of honor to some
victims, Pandora's box was opened. It will be very difficult to deny that the 130 victims of November 13 as
they also make Knights. Victims of other attacks, prior or subsequent to the month of January, felt this
gesture as extreme violence and wondered: "why not us? '' No doubt we wanted, in a burst of generosity,
hastily respond, but it has created a precedent that will be very difficult to manage. This is one example,
among others, everything should be done to the recognition of the victims of terrorism.
Mr. Stphane Lacombe, Director Deputy of the AFVT. At the time where the public authorities seem to
prepare opinion for future large-scale attacks, we must consider the strategy put in place by the State to
prevent radicalisation. I insist on the need to articulate a partnership between public authorities and civil
society through different actors, including our association, to fight against the ideology that feeds
terrorism. We assume that terrorism is not the result of a spontaneous generation. Within this framework,
we work with many stakeholders, including the European Union, on the voice of the victims, as the
content and promotion of positive citizenship vector. The voices of the victims can be a very nice tool of
prevention since the victims are themselves in the context of reconstruction and they feel the force to
make the promotion of the values that unite us all.
The theme of radicalization if very media, although some effects of communication can hide the real
issues, against which there may be exclusive approach. On the contrary, it is a multidisciplinary approach
that must prevail. We therefore conduct our actions of prevention in collaboration with the association "11
January", founded and chaired by Mohamed Sifaoui, and the association Entr' others ', which brings
together a group of psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, field practitioners, following profiles jihadists a decade.
It seems important to ingenuously the debate around these issues, by naming our ideological enemy,
Islamism, which feeds the ideological body of the terrorists and that is one of the conditions of the
transition to the Act.
When we organize meetings with citizens, in prisons or elsewhere, as part of our awareness modules, we
note with concern that agents of the State have doubts on their missions and ideological weaknesses:
this may create gaps that never fail to exploit extremists or those who relay their speech.
In a press release on January 5, we stopped the State on its strategy in the material, which seems not
very clear to us. Actors of civil society, we want to be associated with the resources that we offer in this
development work in the long term, which goes far beyond the issues of political communication.
Ms. Aline the lease-Kremer, head of communication and management of the AFVT. Things began to
change from 2012, but he'll have to address seriously and more coercive way of the question of the
dissemination of hateful content on the internet. It is very surprising that in full State of emergency, some
sites - the list would be long - have not been closed. Families and relatives of victims, including myself, do
not understand this situation and wonder. Certainly, there is awareness, particularly on the part of social
networks - I believe that Twitter has finally decided to close certain accounts-, but it happens still

astonishing things, since one can broadcast on the internet of violent content, clearly outlaws, and stir up
hatred, at a time where everyone is working to rebuild a "living together".
M. Stphane Gicquel, Secretary general of the National Federation of victims of attacks and
collective accidents (FENVAC). Thank you for your invitation: it is an honour to speak before you.
The FENVAC is an association of victims: all its members, all members of its Board of Directors, are
victims. It mission is to defend the rights of victims and to accompany them in the long term.
We intervene within the framework of an agreement signed with the Ministry of justice. Therefore, we
have part of the interdepartmental cell (CIAV) victims, of which much was discussed last Monday. This
strong commitment of our association in the victim assistance and crisis management in the early hours
following an attack or a disaster is explained by our desire to make the resistance, to fight against
terrorism.
We sit on the Board of Directors of the guarantee for compensation of the victims fund, and we were
recently named to the Board of Directors of the national war veterans and victims of war. Finally, our
association is part civil in 30 procedures regarding issues related to terrorism. We understand the need
for truth and justice, the need to decrypt and understand, expressed inter alia the association November
13, 2015: brotherhood and truth ", which we accompanied the creation and we support the call for reform
of article 2-9 of the code of criminal procedure to enable all the associations of victims of an attack to sue
civil. It is very important in the complex process of repair, that victims do not suffer the aftermath of the
attacks, but they are actresses.
Before addressing the issues concerning the fight against terrorism, I would like to victim assistance
devices. Various criticism and misunderstanding expressed last Monday. From the point of view of the
FENVAC, the recent interdepartmental instruction on support for the victims of terrorism is despite any
progress. In saying this, I am not in opposition with victims who expressed themselves Monday and which
may have the overview available to our federation. But these improvements do not imply that the system
is perfect.
Feedback is underway. We were present during three weeks in eight hours at midnight, within the
interdepartmental cell of the Quai d'Orsay, and for fifteen days, we have assured the daily presence of
three members within the Center for families of the military school. With regard to the list of victims and
the time limit to notify their families, we were leaving a white page. We had the name of the deceased, but
we must wonder about the time that took their identification. Why it did not appeal to the Institute for
criminal research of the national gendarmerie (IRCGN), which has actual competence identification and
support of families, pending the identification? This Institute is indeed to identify victims of major
disasters, like the Puisseguin accident or crash of the Germanwings.
On the other hand, the interdepartmental cell lost time. While we were mobilized on Friday evening at the
Quai d'Orsay, first calls not have been switched that on Saturday, to seventeen or eighteen hours. One
may wonder why. It is the prefecture of police to answer this question. It was me who had to announce
the death of her daughter in Mr. Salines phone. It was deeply struck. We we are explained, but you
should know that the announcement of the deaths occurred in the biggest mess. On Saturday, at
eighteen hours, we received the first calls and we find the following alternative: either we imprint by
asking our interlocutors to attend military school the next day, we announced the death to the phone. It
was the choice of the Devil: it must be taken into account in the feedback.
With regard to victim assistance device, need more State. These victims are indeed very special: through
them, this is our State, our democratic system, our values which have been targeted. Therefore, a direct,
strong, durable, the State response. The victims do not understand why they were not received by an
authority, whether the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister. Myself, I wonder when I compare it
with what is done in previous disasters. Thus, in the case of the crash of Air Algeria, in 2013, families

collected 48 hours after at the Quai d'Orsay, in the presence of five or six Ministers, the Prime Minister
and the President of the Republic, which was again awarded the families in September. The same
readability question about certain gestures that are not systematic: Mr. Denoix de Saint Marc talked with
reason the award of the Legion of honour.
January 23, we held a briefing at the House of the bar, with 300 victims. It was an associative approach.
Victims have told us that this meeting was a good thing, but they wondered why it was not the State
which had organized it.
It must also be "better State", i.e. a better State intervention. The great progress of the ministerial
statement is to organize the interministerialite. Representatives of departments no longer work side-byside, but together, in the interdepartmental cell. However, there remain mysteries to clear up, even in the
eyes of the community representatives who were part of the device.
Why has the Assistance publique-Hpitaux Paris (AP - HP) taken so long to transmit the list of hospital
patient? We were off again to a blank page. The Tuesday or Wednesday following the attacks, we had
the coordinates of 1.5% of people hospitalized. Thanks to vigorous action of the cabinet of the Ministry of
health, we have passed in 48 hours, 1.5 to 3%. This lack of collaboration, these institutional blockages
are unacceptable and incomprehensible. Need, ladies and gentlemen, that you are the relay to get things
done.
I come to the incongruities. Each victim receives a folder to be a military or war widow's pension
application. These are probably the first items that receive the victims, the pension services to the
Department of defence being extremely diligent to send these documents. These are theoretical rights:
nobody will not receive military or war widow's pension, pension because the system of compensation for
victims is actually provided by the guarantee fund. However, imagine what can feel a person who
receives such documents, especially when she was twenty-five or thirty-five years old...
We were told, on the other hand, that the Parliament had passed a measure ensuring the free care. But
the system is so complex that ourselves, associative actors, have several days to understand that it was
not free, but care reimbursed at 100% of the rate of social security. The daughter of M. Zenak - that you
auditioned Monday - has been affected to theOEit and must change of glasses every two months. With
these "free" care, be not reimbursed only 35 or 40 euros on 250 or 300 euros it costs every time the pair
of glasses. This may seem a detail, but it is a good illustration of what expressed the families and victims.
"Best of State", it is also ensure equity among all the victims. The attacks of January 7 and November 13
are in everyone's memories, but remember not all French who have been hit abroad, for example in
Tunis, the Bardo Museum, or In Amenas - Ms. Desjeux may talk about. The action of the State must be
the same for the stricken foreign victims.
With regard to the courses of action to combat terrorism, I don't bring nothing again compared to what
has already been said various reports, including that of the commission of inquiry on the monitoring of
sectors and individuals jihadists, chaired by M. Ciotti, and one by Mr Pitrasanta on radicalisation.
Everything is there: the lack of means of justice, lack of judicial cooperation, the boundaries that exist for
the judges but not to terrorists, the disconnection of intelligence with the judiciary, unable to carry out
investigations on the financing of terrorist networks, the problem of coordination of services, the need to
detect radicalisation and weak signals the encryption of data and the inability to blow, the question of
social networks.
I will however post two new tracks: on the one hand, we must cultivate citizen resistance to terrorism and
think about the responsibility of undertakings which send the French work on sensitive sites abroad.
All these findings have been prepared in previous reports, because the questions and doubts of victims
previously occurred in January 7, 2015. These issues were already topical when we experienced the

wave of attacks by 2012. Your commission awakens a new hope, and need you insure you the
effectiveness and the follow-up to the recommendations that you can be persuaded to make. We need a
serious action plan, a real cockpit, maybe organize a new tracking system, with a citizen panel that our
associations could be part. It cannot be, at the highest level of the State, announce that we are at war and
that other attacks will take place, without that undertakes a debate on the fight against terrorism, so each
is truly responsive and aware of the trade-offs to be made between civil liberties and security.
Today, this area of debate is completely absorbed by the question of forfeiture of nationality. I will not
comment on the usefulness or the legitimacy of this measure, but the debate on the fight against
terrorism must not be summed up in the controversy over the deprivation of nationality. It is important for
our collective security, the debate is taking place, because it is countless interviews with the victims that
they want to attack the State, which they consider that it has a responsibility for what happened. This
betrays the lack of pedagogy and information to the victims, to accountability in a transparent manner.
The President Georges Fenech. What do you mean by "cultivating civic resistance?
M. Stphane Gicquel. Every citizen must make evidence of resilience, i.e. the ability to resist a threat
and its security actor. The poster campaign of the Government on the right moves to have goes in this
direction. We have a true safety culture. That means "being at war?
Ms. Marie-Claude Desjeux, Vice-President of the FENVAC. It is for me a greater honor to be here that
I've joined the FENVAC only recently. My family and I have been victims, three years ago, the taking of
hostages of In Amenas, Algeria, during which my brother Yann was killed.
I drew your attention to the fact that the events of January and November 2015 contributed to overall
awareness in France, but many families French are victims of terrorism abroad and do not receive the
support enjoyed by those who are victims in France. During reflections on solutions, I implore you to
remember those families who have lost one of them abroad, which are very often abandoned and have
no means to regroup.
The President Georges Fenech. We take note of what you have just said on the French victims of
terrorism abroad.
Ms. Marie-Claude Desjeux. We are aware that relations between countries are often very complicated,
particularly between the France and the Algeria, but should carry out substantive work on relations
between countries in the specific context of the attacks.
Ms. Michle Kerckhove, President of the national Institute of victim assistance and mediation
(INAVEM). Founded and moderated by professionals, psychologists and lawyers, present on all french
territory, the INAVEM differs from other associations in that it includes not victims, but that she comes to
help. It gathers 150 associations and 1 200 professionals empowered to intervene as soon as they are
mandated by the Prosecutor of the Republic, the prefect or the judicial authorities, as a result of a serious
accident or a terrorist act.
The President Georges Fenech. What is your Ministry?
Ms. Michle de Kerckhove. For the moment, it is the Ministry of justice.
The President Georges Fenech. Are you going to work with the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister,
responsible for assistance to victims?
Ms. Michle de Kerckhove. We will begin to do so, but it seems to me that justice and the secretariat of
State for assistance to victims - which is not the secretariat of State in charge of the victims - have

somewhat different roles. As said earlier Mr. Gicquel, the interministerialite is necessary, because all
departments may be affected when there is a serious collective accident, a serial risk or an attack. It is
necessary to coordinate the actions of all these departments, and justice was probably not the authority
sufficient to do this, be it at the level of health, transport or inside. This Secretary of State being placed
under the authority of the Prime Minister, may allow it to more easily coordinate the action of government
departments.
Our presence on the ground and our reactivity are our particularity. As soon as something is happening in
a Department - there were a lot of attacks in Paris, but there has been elsewhere, as in Toulouse-, we
intervene and mobilize stakeholders so that they are doing as quickly as possible to the side of the
victims.
Since the month of January, we OEwork in the Chancery, with the FENVAC, to the creation of the device
that gave birth to the interdepartmental victim cell. This cell, which was developed in OEfor the first time,
is can certainly be improved in many ways, but it is a first step that will allow us to be more operational,
more reactive, and respond much better to the demands of victims.
Was discussed earlier for the victims of terrorism abroad. The INAVEM is a member of a European
network. As soon as we had the nationality of the European victims, we got in relationship with our
European counterparts that they support also.
The french model of assistance to victims is envied abroad, and we strive to export it. A European
directive of October 2012 on assistance to victims is inspired and visitors from around the world regularly
come to study our model: the links that we make so allow us to create networks facilitating support for
victims.
Of course, we participate in the device of emergency aid to victims in France, but we intervene in the
vicinity and especially in the long term, with professionals who are present as long as victims in need.
Ms. Sabrina Bellucci, Director General of the INAVEM. Assistance to victims is a profession, we have
chosen, and that persists there for thirty years. As professionals, we are listening to the victims and their
needs. Our daily concern is to tailor our support to what they tell us. Any process can be sustained if
victims ask us.
The INAVEM mediates devices concerning acts of terrorism since 1985. The first Conference he
organized was held in 1987. Since then, we develop accompanying and monitoring devices.
In November, 92 mobilized associations have sent more than 988 mail and received 733 calls on our
phone platform. The 1,800 people supported have all said us the same thing: they were looking for
listening, readability, traceability, they needed referents of facilitators. Mr. Gicquel and others, including
the AFVT, are calling for more and better State: the State's responsibility is to coordinate and to identify
the actors involved with victims, about who does what and when, and if the action taken is effective.
There is nothing worse, when one is in full chaos, only to add to the mess. When it meets the chaos by
chaos, the efforts for victims is neither readable nor effective.
Even though I am an associative actor from civil society, I share with the State the responsibility to carry
out this reflection, which, beyond the ministerial statement and the secretariat of State perimeter seems
to relate to both victims of terrorism and those accidents collective-, must focus on the management of
existing devices. Because, if the good features of common law we have can be improved, they have
before any need to be controlled.
We owe to the victims the readability and especially the traceability of our actions. They said, for
example, did not have knowledge of the issue of the interdepartmental to the victims cell phone, while it's

a first listen number that must be issued immediately after the attack. It is scandalous. It is still not difficult
to find simple but effective, devices such as 'kidnap warning', set up by Nicole Guedj, which allows you to
constrain the set channels TV, media, carriers and the motorway, to serve ads. It would suffice to draw
such actions to inform victims of the terrorism of the devices that are available to them.
The President Georges Fenech. Sbastien Pietrasanta, Philippe Goujon and I have supported this
morning an amendment to the Bill strengthening the fight against organized crime, terrorism and their
financing, and improving efficiency and guarantees of criminal procedure, which aimed to remove the
condition of the five years provided for in the code of criminal procedure to allow a federation of
associations of victims of terrorism to be a civil party. Amendment was ultimately withdrawn to be
rewritten, but the rapporteur Pascal Popelin is committed to return in meeting within fifteen days and I
understand that the keeper of the seals is particularly attentive to the issue. This provision will help many
associations and victims.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. It was a first concrete proposal from the first hearings of our
Committee of inquiry.
Mr Gicquel, what has been your role during the hours that followed the attacks of November 13? How
have you been mobilized? Have what difficulties you encountered?
You said that we were leaving a white page, but that we had made progress. With regard to the events of
November 13, what are the tracks that are available to us to improve support for victims?
I would also like that you spend a few moments in the management of the crisis of November 13 and the
role that was yours, and that you make some concrete proposals.
The following questions are aimed rather at AFVT, I had the opportunity to meet on the occasion of my
report on the de-radicalization. One year after your first speeches - in Osny prison, including - radicalized
detainees, do you consider that the first experience of de-radicalization was conclusive? You intervene,
after responding to a call for tenders of the Ministry of justice, with a program of six weeks in prison. Is it
not a bit short to be effective, even if a follow-up is planned? The Government is implementing a ten
month program in de-radicalization centres, out of prison.
Finally, even if the prison issue is not in the cOEheart of our thinking, our Committee of inquiry must take
an interest and I would like to know your feelings about the creation, in some prisons, quarters for
radicalized people.
M. Stphane Gicquel. Interdepartmental instruction creating the interdepartmental cell of the victims was
signed November 12 and had to be applied as early as 13 to the evening. As the INAVEM, the FENVAC
intervenes in this cell, composed of representatives of various ministries. For our part, we do not interfere
directly, but at the request of the Ministry of justice and in the context of our conventionnements. We have
mobilised very quickly, as early as Friday evening, and we were operational as early as Saturday
morning.
The rapporteur. You are you "autosaisis" from 13 to the evening or have you been called?
M. Stphane Gicquel. Personally, I was called by the crisis center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which manages this device, which can ask question. I do not say this to challenge these professionals,
who are the best to handle the crisis. However, if we make the object of real threats, need specific device
and a room? We were confronted, during the management of this crisis, to practical problems. For
example, we had no input software. We were working on Excel files which quickly took considerable
dimensions and were completely unreadable. At one point, the mail boxes ceased to operate. We called

the families asking them to send documents by mail, but we we then realise that the mail box does not
work. It was necessary to remind families to give a different email address.
We know very well the crisis center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which operate by true professionals,
but we were up to 120 people from different departments to work there, and premises are not suitable.
We even met internal communication problems. It is necessary that we have the means to carry out this
monitoring: there goes our credibility.
When we were in contact with the families, we don't speak not as an association, but as members of the
interdepartmental victim cell. With its sensitivity to victims association, the FENVA can play the role of
Advisor, guide or make proposals to government departments. Being ourselves victims, we have different
experience and insight on what to do or not do. This is the associative value we have given to what
remains a device state.
But, as said Sabrina Bellucci, we wonder when we get victims who tell us not have had knowledge of the
interdepartmental cell phone number.
Inter-departmental education provides training and means. It must be effective. The feature is good, but
need to improve it and to train. The case of Excel files is not a simple story: when you're in contact with a
family, that you have to scroll your screen an Excel file that you can not change because you are
networked, the situation is extremely complicated. When the stewardship does not, follow the families and
victims feel. There is a practical solution for each of these problems.
M. Guillaume Denoix de Saint Marc. The tender that we won in January of last year issued prior to the
attacks of January. The budget was limited, as a small remnant which had the prison administration. The
time was relatively short since, in one year, it had three objectives: review the detection tool - which was
not an easy matter-, two sessions of support of 15 inmates in two different prisons, and pass the entirety
of our process to the prison administration.
Our goal was not dradicaliser, but to bring certain individuals to change their behaviour. We conducted a
multidisciplinary work with prison services integration and probation (SPIP), management, monitoring,
information, schools, medical, etc. We have proposed several detainees, chosen by all individuals
involved with them, to follow our program. In general, these people have no reintegration approach and
do not have tools which are available to them to prepare for their release from prison. In six weeks, we
had to get them to set a personal goal, i.e. to work in their future reintegration. Therefore, the scope of the
experience was very limited. We have noted no disclaimer, while the experiment being conducted on the
voluntary basis, they could stop at any time. Together in a group led by social workers, they listened to
various external actors, which, depending on the dynamics of the group, victims of terrorism, judges, of
ex-detainees: it was to bring detainees to ask questions, to deconstruct their vision of the world, and then
to go on a personal project. Ultimately, most of them changed their behavior, even if some are probably
engaged in a process of concealment: If one wants to give in the cartoon, they say that they are all for the
SPIP "super well", while for intelligence, none of them has changed... The truth is probably between the
two.
Is that we have the beginnings of a process: through all the rehabilitation tools that exist in prison and if
there's no dysfunction, can bring these people to be less dangerous when they emerge than they were at
the time where we have encountered. I remain very cautious about the results of the device, but we have
other solutions? It is impossible to get someone to change their ideology by force. This can be done only
through a personal work. We tried to initiate consideration of another reality to get them to see the world
differently.
The specialized districts are a real subject of debate in Europe. I am part of the Radicalisation Awareness
Network, in which a group is working on prisons and probation. There are advantages and
disadvantages, both to bring inmates to separate them. Isolate them prevents proselytize to prisoners

who have no desire to be harassed by recruiters. However, if individuals isolated in these specialized
areas are not supported, there is no interest.
Our methodology for research-action on a short time much inspired the way these people will be
supported in a much longer time. From the discussions we have had with the prison administration, it
appears in fact that our action, with its testimonies of victims and its exchanges with the detainees, will
continue. There again, we were leaving a white page. We have tried to include something that looks
promising.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Mr Lacombe, you spoke of frailty in the agents of the State in prison. Could you
clarify what you mean by that?
Given what you have said, Mr Gicquel, on the management of the immediate crisis, and poignant
testimony we heard Monday, it has the feeling of a system failure. Several people have spoken of the
need as an administration any manages and coordinates the device, with the support of your
associations. I would like to know your feelings about the handling of the crisis. You said that 120 people
had come to assist. How, specifically, have been taken in charge? They came in one place? It speaks of
the Quai d'Orsay and the CIAV. Is it that things are organized? How this was built with health services,
hospitals? There is coordination? Hospitals, who were in charge of the wounded, themselves had a
number to call? I have the feeling that there's no articulation between actors. I would like our Committee
of inquiry deepen the subject, because we must make specific proposals in this area.
If we can have specific elements, we will have more opportunities to be heard. All those who heard the
testimony gathered by our Committee of inquiry are convinced that it is imperative that we take this
responsibility. This is why I would like, ladies and gentlemen, hear you things very concrete, very specific.
I feel, in this case, that there is no crisis management. I hope that you can deny me on this point, but I
fear that this is not the case.
Ms. Aline lease-Kremer. One could already reflect on the establishment of a number of '08", with people
who are really, because families remained three days without information. We heard strong evidence on
the subject, but, for the having lived personally, this "08" number that did not was very disturbing. There
was then a colossal dud. Certainly, let's be fair, this time could well happen: should not be mistaken as
anger. But get well account of violence produced by this failure, additional injuries, disruption, not to
mention the waste of time and energy, and unhappiness added this number that did not, by the number of
AP - HP which did not and need to call 50 times to get partial information?
That said, could be to prepare for an event of such magnitude? It is perhaps healthier to not have been
prepared to this horror. But this is not rewrite history to say there has been staggering and breathtakingly
painful misfire for many families.
It is not to point the finger at individual crossed in the device: all were thoughtful. But there are failures in
their training. On Saturday, to seventeen hours, we were told "to not worry. The sentence was very
disturbing, and the less clumsy, but I don't want the person who said this. Like many other families, we
realized that these people were absolutely not trained. I was told also, light way: ' good evening! It may be
a trivial detail, but the addition of trivial details eventually show that there is something that did not work,
that people were not trained in any case those which we had case were not.
Admittedly the authenticity of pain expressed today or yesterday. If it gives free rein during the work of
this commission of inquiry, it is, I think, in response to what has spent the last three months. We have
addressed to various officials for answers, but questions have been as wiped out a setback of handle. We
even felt some form of contempt, which was very difficult to live for people collapsed, suffering. Perhaps
this contempt and this non-empathie have contributed to highlight the pain, which has exploded lately.
That is what I wanted to say about this device, knowing that I lived the situation from the inside.

I would add that definitely must be seats at the Forensic Institute...

M. Stphane Gicquel. With regard to this device of crisis, we are moving, even if we had difficulties.
However, it is necessary to take into account the large number of victims. Opinions are diverse; Some
people enjoyed the device.
Specifically, please note that calls to the number which had been communicated resulted in the
prefecture of police, which did not operative interdepartmental victim cell, although the Ministry of the
Interior has been associated.
On Saturday morning, was brought together a whole team at the Quai d'Orsay. We had even, through
standardized digital information system (sine wave), list of the distribution of persons by hospital. But the
phone did not sound. It took that one gets excited much, at the highest level of the State, so that calls are
broadcast automatically from the prefecture of police to the interdepartmental cell, and towards a service
of the city of Paris. At the same time, we hear say that the city of Paris had opened, without consultation,
a device of home to the victims. Similarly, when the military school reception centre has been opened, we
learned in seeing a banner on Betty.
I do not want to overwhelm the device, which is good. However, there were neither training nor
preparation, but a degree of improvisation, with officials arriving backgrounds very various. I believe that a
call on ten only resulted in the prefecture of police. Once transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all
calls were taken into account.
Relations with hospitals have not been satisfactory. The AP - HP did not transmit data that it considered
as confidential. You should know that the departments each have a different appreciation of what is a
victim. In the early hours and the first days, the priority of the interdepartmental cell was bereaved
families. But, I repeat, we were leaving a white page. We had the list of deceased persons, but not the
composition of the family of Mr. X nor its coordinates. We therefore expect that the family manifests. It is a
real operational difficulty, which is not essential, but exists.
The rapporteur. Why would the AP - HP not transmit these data? Is it because of medical secrecy?
M. Stphane Gicquel. Medical confidentiality could be relied on, indeed. Staff of the establishment of
preparedness and response to health emergencies (EPRUS), which is somehow the Ministry of health
strike force, were present within the interdepartmental unit, but it did not give them the information.
There are also professional secrecy, with regard to the victims who were welcomed by medical and
psychological emergency cells (CUMP). It is also a real difficulty with respect to the Census of victims. At
the military school, someone from the Red Cross reported details of each person presenting themselves,
but she kept them for the Red Cross. Anyway, at the military school, there was no internet connection to
communicate with the CIAV. All these small disturbances have accumulated and have complicated the
operational management.
Ms. Sabrina Bellucci. I hear that we start from a blank page to each event, but it was our second
experience. The interdepartmental victim cell worked twice, in January and November. Which means that
one has learned from January, who have put a lot of time to be heard and implemented. In other words,
been nothing, whether for training or practice, so that we are able to work well together.
I say this more calmly that we have traced this note to our Ministry. We have said clearly that it seemed
important that voluntary professionals mobilized all departments are trained to listen. We do not give that
elements of the language, we are not scholars monkeys who are merely to provide information. We have
online for people who are looking for their loved ones, who are in a State of stress and anxiety. We do not
say 'Good evening' to a person seeking a close. People must be trained to respond to such calls. It is a
profession.

By 2015, the CIAV unfortunately worked twice. One could organize interdepartmental training for all
volunteers, so that they OEworking in the same direction. I said twice, the first just after the January
attacks, the second in November. When will we we train together and do exercises? A crisis, it anticipates
and is prepared. The military know well; White plans, red plans, this exists. Why not exercises in support
of the victims? We owe it to the victims. We who have been in action, all as much as we are, we must
rectify and improve our action all together.
Finally, it must be said, all professional aid to the victims that we are, mobilized on a voluntary basis, we
were also a little lost. Our approach, each with its own organization, was there not a homogeneous
intervention framework grouping us all under the aegis of a same driver.
The rapporteur. Have you done since November 13, a return of experience?
Ms. Sabrina Bellucci. We did one in January, and we are developing that of the month of November.
These feedbacks were sent to our respective departments. The interdepartmental statement took some
ideas.
The rapporteur. The return of experience from the month of January helped to improve operative of
November 13?
Ms. Sabrina Bellucci. Of course, but not enough, and the scale was different. Crisis management is a
real job. It is necessary to train people who work there.
The President Georges Fenech. In any case, it can only hope that you're very quickly heard.
Mr Stphane Lacombe. When I mentioned the weaknesses, I was shooting especially some officers of
the public service, not personnel in prisons. I much traded with personnel of institutions of Osny and
Fleury-Mrogis. I want to rent here their complete dedication and professionalism. I learned a lot of things
with them. However, we found some weaknesses in meetings with municipal officials and educators. We
should not generalise, but they exist. We are attentive to the expression of these weaknesses, for
example, around the motto 'I'm Charlie' , that is, for us, a Republican motto. But this is not self-evident for
all. Many educators and some teachers gave me their helplessness. They believe not be equipped to
explain the meaning of Republican currency among young people and deplore the fact, sometimes do not
feel enough support on this subject.
The President Georges Fenech. I thank very you much. Your response will be very useful for the work
of our Committee of inquiry.
Hearing, open to the press, by Mr. Daniel Pszenny, journalist to the World, victim of the attacks of
November 13, 2015
Record of the hearing, which was open to the press, Wednesday, February 17, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We end our afternoon of hearings and heard Mr. Daniel Pszenny,
journalist at the world. You have been the victim of the attacks of November 13, 2015 at the Bataclan :
you have filmed the flight of spectators and you received a shot in the arm in rescuing one of them. At
your request we receive you: you wanted to share your testimony and be happy that we are going to
listen to you.
In accordance with order on November 17, 1958, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr. Daniel Pszenny oath.

Mr. Daniel Pszenny, journalist to the World, victim of the attacks of November 13, 2015. I wanted to
bring my testimony on the evening of November 13, including on police intervention: I commend not
questioning his conduct, to which I also did not attend, but it had consequences for us - that is for myself
and for the American wounded that I rescued.
We were at the beginning of the attack, he was twenty-two hours: we were refugees both in the lobby of
my building, we were uncertain; I thought that the police would arrive and that the wounded would be
evacuated by an ambulance. After I was injured by bullet, we had a moment of panic, we didn't know
what to do: a neighbor thought that the terrorist was in the street and that he would come to the hall to
complete us. It was then that I decided to call a neighbor who courageously came to pick us up to put us
away. We boarded at his home on the fourth floor. This is that things are complicated. We had to make
ourselves the Goldeneye: I had a bullet in the arm and the blood flowed very much; the American, who
had a bullet in the calf, was in very critical condition - it was all white, he vomited. We were very worried.
I phoned the newspaper Le Monde, which called the police and relief, explaining that we were on the
fourth floor, isolated fact. We were in the cOEheart of the action, but there was such chaos in the street
that the police had secured the area and that person could no longer. My intention is not to criticize the
police Protocol: it is rather effective, seen at the Bataclan. But I find that the two injured that we were
e
could not be evacuated, despite the intervention of authorities - including the 17 District Fire Chief who
told me on the phone that he was aware of our situation, but could not come pick us up. We therefore
stayed three hours in the apartment until it allows us to evacuate. Three hours is very long when it loses
its blood. We wondered how many litres of blood does a human body and we feared to eventually lose
everything. We say: 'we die while relief are 50 metres! Despite the police, ambulances, civil security, no
one can pick us up!
It is this stress and this anxiety that we have felt. Emergency services knew that we were there, but
despite all the good wishes, no one could come pick us up. Also, I wonder if we should not redevelop the
Protocol. I do not exactly know police devices in extreme situations like this, and it seems normal that it
secures the area, but there is the rule, and there is the spirit of the rule: can we still organize the
evacuation of the wounded, as soon as it is notified of their situation? It cannot be put into play as long
the lives of two people. We released miraculously, and I am delighted. But should the National Assembly
examines this issue, to prevent recurrence of such a case. Of course, seen in the video that I shot, chaos
was general: nobody knew what was happening, there were deaths and injuries in the street, ourselves
were injured, and it was very complicated to analyse at first glance probably of OEit for the police.
During these three hours of waiting, the other injured, Matthew, had moments where he was very evil. We
couldn't do anything. Then we learned, on a news channel, that the assault had been given. First aid are
worn with the bodies that were lying in the streets many injuries and dozens of deaths before and
inside the Bataclan. I will not say that had abandoned us, but what had to happen happened: you forgot,
there was so much to do that nobody had time to get to the fourth floor of a building to come pick us up.
My neighbor so demonstrated in the window to remind that we were there: immediately, ten laser beams
are focused on him. Forces the agenda down we were allowed to get off. I had the chance to walk, I
warned that I walked down on foot to avoid confusion - I had lost my shirt, I was in a pretty dismal state.
On the stairs, I met a policeman who rode, highly armed: following the Protocol, he points me his gun to
and starts to feel me. I said to myself: if he thinks I'm a sniper seeking to flee, he will shoot me. I found
myself in this paradoxical situation: we waited hours at the risk of dying due to lack of care, and we run
the risk now to kill because the Protocol required that the police search us. This policeman was followed
by an officer who told him to let me go and we could finally go down. But I assure you that it's weird, when
you come out of three hours of anguish and stress, to point a gun to! It is part of the Protocol, explained to
me. I do not dispute that he should apply it. But some points concerning the evacuation of the wounded
are perhaps to review. And if there had been a blunder? If the police officer had taken me for a terrorist,
he would not hesitate to shoot. There is still something that does not work.

After this unfortunate incident, the police officer who was at the door of the building did not let me go,
because, he said, the area was not yet secure. After we be emptied our blood for three hours in the
apartment, we have therefore had to wait an hour more in the lobby. No doubt the area was not secured,
but the forces of order were not numerous enough to be able to evacuate us? These precautions, which
have demonstrated their effectiveness, are no doubt justified, but they are double-edged. It is impossible
to say to two injured that they should not come out because the area is not safe, but could tell them was
assumed their request into account and that we will do everything so that they are rescued. But perhaps
the policeman at the bottom of the building didn't know that we already waited three hours.
It is this question that we need to think: If, during an assault, certain rules are mandatory, not can you
keep a margin of appreciation, an ability to judge the situation, or should we simply implement the
Protocol?
After that I was allowed to come out, it took me another hour to go walk - and barefoot! - until the circus
winter, located at least 500 metres, where it took me in charge. It was an hour thirty in the morning: I was
waiting from the day before, twenty-two hours, I am asked perfusion and done me a dressing. For
Matthew, that firefighters have descended on a stretcher, I think it was faster.
Certainly, it was a truly exceptional situation. But we will probably, in the light of this experience, reflect on
improvements. It could be many more casualties inside the building. What would we have done? It must
take into account this case, which, unfortunately, could happen again.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Thank you for your testimony. In the period of time during which you
were entrenched in your neighbour, have you been in direct contact with the police? Have you been
informed regularly?
Mr. Daniel Pszenny. We had information, either by my interlocutors in the World, or by other persons. My
e
memories are pretty fuzzy. I believe that it is the Commander of firefighters from 17 district who was
aware that we were there and who told me that he could not pick you up. However, I proposed a solution:
it would have been possible to evacuate us by the roofs with the cooperation of the police down.
The President Georges Fenech. If your injuries were more serious, given the time that has elapsed
before you benefit from medical relief, you could not be here today to tell us about.
Mr. Daniel Pszenny. This is the absurdity of the situation. The forces of order and relief were fifty metres
at the end of the street, but we couldn't access them!
E

Ms. Lucette Lousteau. district 17 firefighters Commander asked you about the State of your injuries
and the other injured to assess their severity?
Mr. Daniel Pszenny. I explained all my interlocutors the State of our wounds - in this case of gunshot
wounds. If I was lucid, the other wounded was in a critical condition. Despite the explanations and the
urgency of the situation, the answer was always: "Unfortunately, cannot do anything."
Mr. Serge Grouard. The situation is absurd. You have direct contact with the fire: police forces are
therefore necessarily aware that two injured are there. How is it that the information was not in the chain
of command, not reach to a police authority which could decide to lift the ban?
Mr. Daniel Pszenny. There is no coordination between the different stakeholders - police, fire, rescue,
Mayor of Paris. The command knows that we are on the fourth floor, he calls us, do not let us fall. In the
chaos of the assault and its aftermath, there are emergencies in and before the Bataclan. Everyone knew
that we were on the fourth floor, but needed the police to secure the building, floor by floor. However, if
the chain of command knew he had two quite serious injuries in the building, the information had not to be

passed to the police base on the ground. If the police officer I meet points his gun at me, it is because he
had no information. If he had been aware, there would have disregarded us for terrorists. I do not put in
question the chain of command. It is an immense chaos reigned on the spot, the entire chain would be
very complicated to manage.
Mr. Serge Grouard. But you have been injured at 22 hours: or the assault was given that although later,
past midnight. Therefore, it was not yet the chaos of the assault.
Mr. Daniel Pszenny. Question is there. Between ten p.m. and midnight and a half, we have had many
contacts with relief, who did not want to make the decision to come. I guess that, as long as the RAID or
the GIGN customarily area, firefighters had no access. When I came out at a time in the morning, there
was more ambulances or civil security. I had to go back on foot, without having yet healed until this field
hospital installed in a restaurant. There, we were saved and taken in charge. There are priorities in the
evacuation or rescue, and the release of the hostages was undoubtedly at the forefront of these. This is
not for me to assess the hierarchy of injury.
The President Georges Fenech. Have you since then, met with officials to communicate your
questions? Were you given explanations, you are presented an apology?
Mr. Daniel Pszenny. I claim no excuses. The important thing is that we we are out. It is taken by little, but
we we are out. In the three months that followed, I had to receive care and deal with complications,
before search explanations than your fact-finding or various meetings could bring me. What is certain, is
that it must try to find solutions to improve the management of such situations. I want to understand why
that is is not done faster.
The President Georges Fenech. This is the first time that you ask these questions. Published on 19
November in Le Monde article is very factual: you tell what you just said, but without the slightest
question, as if everything was well finished. You talk of the hours of waiting, but you don't ask any
questions.
Mr. Daniel Pszenny. As a first step, after such a clatter personal and collective, believed to seek
treatment and to gather the pieces of the puzzle. It is a good thing that your commission of inquiry
focuses today on what happened. Our testimonials and varied will probably build and move forward.
It is indeed the first time that I publicly ask these questions. In the journal, the facts spoke for themselves.
It is not for me to put the policy at issue: she did her job and went fairly quickly. But it is necessary to
review the strict application of the Protocol and the information in the chain of command. In other less
dramatic situations, the issue may arise also. Centralization of information among the various
stakeholders is necessary to know exactly what information is communicated.
Ms. Anne-Yvonne Le Dain j.. Thank you for your concise and accurate testimony. You ask the question
of the chain of command. The subject is complex, because stakeholders are many. You ask why
important information that arrives at the command itself can not be passed to the operational. This can be
understood in the context that one tonight was: assault, anxiety, the perimeter secure, uncertainty - it is
not known if it is not s sniperall around. On the bottom, securing the perimeter does not shock me. Once
it's over, how is but, that the first person you meet is a single policeman who also does its job? The
information is not received, and that is what appeals to me. Ultimately, on the ground, people did their job,
not only according to the Protocol, but putting himself in danger.
Finally, I find it staggering that you have travelled 500 metres walk.
Mr. Daniel Pszenny. I don't know how the chain of command was organized. A police command post
was to be installed at the Bataclan. Why did he not relayed to officers information that we had
communicated - we have then accompanied by officers in civilian clothes? No doubt, on time, everything

happens very quickly and everyone has fear, including the police, which I can understand. There is still
something that did not work, and must be wondering about the device that the police have put in place
before the Bataclan. Apparently, the information is lost one mobile phone to another. If we were not
shown us the window, we could wait a long time. It is this that is dramatic. It is necessary that information,
whatever it is, be passed. Obviously, that we had not been done.
Ms. Anne-Yvonne Le Dain j.. And the 500 meters walk?
Mr. Daniel Pszenny. There were ambulances on the boulevard, but I do not know why - probably for
security reasons - they could not come in the passage where my. building Some victims had yet been in
before. I was able to walk, but this is not what it is better when one is in this State.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you very much, Mr Pszenny. Be aware that the commission of
inquiry will move the scene of crisis and command. Your testimony is important to us, because it will
enable us to ask questions based on what you've experienced. I hope that we can make responses and
improvements.
Round table, open to the press, devoted to hospital for victims of the attacks of the year 2015
support: Mr. general physician armies Jean-Marc Debonne, head of the health service of the
armies (SSA), Mr. doctor general inspector Dominique Vallet, Deputy "provides care and
expertise," Mr. physician in Chief Jean-Christophe Bel; Mr. Martin Hirsch, CEO of the Assistance
publique-Hpitaux Paris (AP - HP), Dr. Christophe Leroy, head of the "management of health
crises" in the AP - HP
Report of the round table, open to the press, Monday, February 29, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We wanted to start our work by hearing from the victims, who are
entitled to the attention of national representation. We are pursuing them engaging in their hospital care.
I am pleased to welcome to this end Mr. general physician armies Jean-Marc Debonne, central Director of
the service de sant des Armes (SSA), accompanied by the doctor general inspector Dominique Vallet,
Deputy "provides care and expertise" to the central Director, and the Chief doctor Jean-Christophe Bel.
The health service of the armies is a joint service whose primary mission is to be closer to the fighting, but
he also participates in the management of risk in the field of health and natural disaster relief.
I am pleased to welcome also Mr. Martin Hirsch, CEO of the Assistance publique-Hpitaux Paris (AP HP), accompanied by Dr. Christophe Leroy, head of the "management of health crises" in the AP - HP.
The AP - HP is a public health facility and the centre hospitalier universitaire (CHU) of the region le-deFrance. It includes thirty-nine hospitals, which welcome 7 million people sick each year.
We decided that our hearings would be open to the press, because we conduct this investigation in the
greatest possible transparency. This therefore is the case of this round table, which is also broadcast live
on the internet video portal of the National Assembly. His record there will remain available for a few
months.
Our Committee may decide to include in its report any part of the record of the hearing.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of November 17, 1958, I ask you to take
the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Mr. Martin Hirsch, Mr. Christophe Leroy, Mr. Jean-Marc Debonne, Mr. Dominique Vallet and Mr. JeanChristophe Bel successively take oath.
I leave you the floor for a keynote presentation, so that you can include answering questions addressed
to you have previously written. Then, the rapporteur, the members of the commission and I will have to
ask for clarification or you have other questions.
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne, central Director of the military health
service. It is an honour to speak to you in this Committee of inquiry.
In 2015, the SSA, because it is at the crossroads of the worlds of defense and health, was indeed
particularly involved in the fight against terrorism in the national territory. Share the most visible of its
action, but not the only, rest the participation of hospitals in instruction of Begin and Percy (HIA) armies in
support of the wounded from the attacks of November 13. Tonight there and in the days that followed, the
SSA strongly mobilized alongside other actors in health, first among which is, of course, the AP - HP. The
fact that you have wanted to hear me together with its Director general is indicative of the
complementarity of our services.
Before present you the role played the SSA in the action of public authorities in response to the attacks,
let me briefly highlight its current positioning in the management of health crises in the national territory.
With a long experience in the management of health crises in the theatres of operations external (OPEX),
SSA has developed a number of specific skills, which can be placed at the service of the Nation. SSA
could be led to consider the crisis management on the national territory as a new dimension of its action,
and not only as an optional contribution to support the civilian structures of health.
It is not for the SSA to supplement, and obviously still less to supplant civil institutional actors of the
response to the crisis on the national territory. Our organizations must be neither redundant nor
competitive, but, well rather, complementary. It is therefore to share our skills and our abilities with all of
the health community. To quote the remarks made last November by the Chief of staff of the armed
forces about the action of the armed forces on the national territory, I also think that "to be a recovery,
and not a trivialization" of the action of the SSA.
It is in this spirit that the health and defense ministries currently operate a rapprochement unprecedented.
This should take the form, in the spring, a protocol agreement aimed at identifying our complementarities
to deal with threats involving the health sector in domestic crises. Without waiting for the deadline, for
example, we are working together with the Directorate General of health (DGS), the branch of care
(DGOS) and the national Council of the hospital emergency (CNUH) to put in place very quickly training
for the benefit of civil order to support health professionals wounded during attacks using weapons of war.
Early versions of the training modules are being finalized, and training will begin very soon.
Here's to the context and timeliness of our action since the onset of the attacks from January to
November 2015. However, let's not forget that, alongside this increasing contribution to the resilience of
the Nation, SSA must permanently have the ability to perform its primary mission: support the military
action, wherever it is located and regardless of the terms. De facto, by the medical support that it provides
to the armed forces, the SSA is actively involved in the fight against terrorism, both by strengthening the
posture of protection of the national territory by the intervention of our forces abroad.
I turn now specifically to the facts: what was the participation of the SSA to the action of public authorities
in the immediate aftermath of the attacks? Without detail the chronology says - which is the object of the
document that we communicated to you that same day-, I will try to highlight the outline. As you asked
me, my intervention will only concern personnel "under my authority". I will therefore not mention the
action of the medical service of the fire brigade of Paris (BSPP) brigade, which has forty-five practitioners
of SSA in its ranks, since it is placed under the orders of Commander the BSPP.

I propose to articulate my point in a chronological way referring to initially the attacks of January, before to
address more extensively, in a second step, those November 2015, which largely involved means of
SSA.
The action of the SSA during the attacks of January is in the line of his habitual action. If the attacks from
7 to 9 January 2016 have been an "unusual" event, they don't in have not caused an unusual situation in
military hospitals: we have not seen a massive influx of wounded. It seems that geographical proximity
played a role in the orientation of the wounded. Therefore, the participation of the HIA Begin de SaintMand, located almost on the same avenue as theHypercacher of Vincennes, is not surprising. This
hospital has received a policeman of the RAID shot and wounded during the assault.
The HIA Percy de Clamart also contributed supporting injured Jogger shortly before the attack, a designer
of Charlie Hebdo, as well as the police municipal injured in Montrouge, unfortunately arrived in a State of
apparent death and declared dead soon after.
The action of the SSA also concerned medical centres of the armies (CMA), which provide the first use.
They were mobilized in support of operation Sentinel triggered in January. As a first step, the SSA could
rely on its territorial network to ensure support of proximity. Secondly, a specific organization was set up,
with including the designation of a medical director of the Sentinel operation, like what is practised in
OPEX. The Parisians Macs were then reinforced by teams from other regions. Finally, all of the deployed
has an individual Kit with a pressure dressing and a tourniquet tourniquet.
The action of the SSA during the attacks of November was, meanwhile, more unusual by its magnitude. I
would like to insist on the four most significant points of the commitment of the SSA on the occasion of
these dramatic events.
The first point concerns support for physical injuries. Placed on alert in the minutes that followed the first
events, hospitals in the le-de-France military hospital platform went on capacity, in less than 90 minutes,
to ensure a simultaneously supports a maximum of wounded, according to Mascals - mass casualties plan, which is the procedure OEwork in OPEX mass influx of wounded. Shortly before midnight, the
wounded arrived in successive waves of seven to eight ambulances, regulated effectively to limit the
saturation of hospital capacity. These wounded benefited from strategies and techniques to support
widely used and proven in OPEX, as damage control, but also, when necessary, a transfusion of
Lyophilised Plasmas (PLYO), which is routinely used in first intention in case of hemorrhagic trauma in
the HIA as in OPEX.
In total, these are fifty-two wounded who have been supported on the night, including eighteen absolute
emergencies on the ninety-eight who were counted in the Parisian hospitals. Fifty surgeries were
performed in forty-eight hours for the benefit of these wounded, thirteen of them being admitted in the
ICU. In parallel, these hospitals contributed to the resupply of some ambulances the BSPP and
emergency medical service (EMS) to enable them to continue their mission. Tomorrow afternoon, the HIA
are rearranged to integrate support for the wounded in their usual activities programmed and emergency.
At the same time, the center of transfusion of the armies (ACSW) launched OEimplement its ramping up
emergency procedure, allowing to ensure continuously the two HIA transfusion support. On Saturday, at
7:30, all the military and civilian personnel of the CTSA responded now to accommodate 500 volunteers
from the surrounding communes come spontaneously give blood. It took indeed identify 164 - the most
immediately useful, as you know - Group O donors, then take the 132 people who had no contraindication
to donation blood. Preparation of collected products and their qualification were able to start immediately,
the ACSW being able to qualify blood products even the weekend.
Also, the establishment of health supplies (ERSA) of Vitry was mobilized in support of the HIA. It allowed
their continuous operation as well as the regeneration of their means in an extremely short period of time.
Before strong anti products consumption, it constituted 'stocks buffers"to respond to any needs of our

surgical structures currently deployed in OPEX. Sunday noon in anticipation of the arrival of military
reinforcements of the Sentinel operation in the Paris region, he has delivered 2 000 tourniquets and 2 000
compression bandages to equip our soldiers. It also comes without notice of individual kits of the fighter to
two parachute units arrived in Paris in emergency, as well as to the BSPP.
The second marking point concerns support psychic injuries, which had two components: one in the HIA,
another in a dedicated cell at the military school.
In the HIA, our psychiatrists and our psychologists have been present since the arrival of the first wave of
victims. They have supported both the aware wounded non-vital emergency and patients involved without
physical injury, which have benefited from individual exchanges in a dedicated space, with a permanent
concern for traceability. During the night, the teams were progressively strengthened in order to support
people coming to find an injured person, but also to support deeply anxious people after the unsuccessful
search for a loved one in other Parisian hospitals.
Past these first hours of immediate mobilization, medico-psychological emergency cell is reorganized to
support the earlier hospital casualty - i.e. as soon as their clinical condition permitted-, as well as their
family. In total, more than 100 consultations were conducted in less than forty-eight hours in the two HIA.
Social service assistants were strengthened under twenty-four hours this device of crisis by the overall
consideration of the needs of victims and their loved ones. At the same time, care teams have been the
subject of particular attention. Medical and psychological debriefings have immediately been
programmed. They then conducted gradually, to allow health care providers to address otherwise the
experience they had to cross.
In parallel, at the request of the DGS, a cell of medical and psychological assistance was implemented on
the site of the Military Academy to cock a device to support the families and the people involved.
Psychiatrists and psychologists of the HIA Percy, Begin and the Val-de-Grce, the psychological service
of the armies and the psychology of the Navy Department, brought their expertise in the organisation of
the psychological support to families and victims. They have implemented an area home and prioritization
of persons in difficulty, with a first level of medical and psychological support that might continue in
individual interviews. Our staffs have led to total of more than 80 individual interviews, not to mention
many other informal meetings. Each time, they proposed a follow-up appointment to ensure the continuity
of support. It is a fundamental principle that we apply to each deployment of a psychological support cell.
Thus, SSA has been fully associated with psychological support he served continuously for nearly twentyfour hours, in close collaboration with civilian health personnel, before be relieved by other civilian teams
mobilized by the Ministry of health.
The third aspect I should briefly like to mention is the accompaniment of the rise of the Sentinel force. All
staff of the CMA of the region le-de-France went on alert, and nursing personnel were recalled, or even
returned spontaneously. Saturday morning, satellite clinics affected by the arrival of military
reinforcements have anticipated the medical support of the first reinforcement of 1,000 soldiers and have
implemented a specific military psychological home.
Finally, it is essential to recall the fourth aspect of our commitment: during this time, the SSA continued to
guarantee the permanence of the support of the forces projected OPEX, where seven surgical teams are
currently deployed, two of them from elsewhere of the hierarchy of le-de-France. Medevac - medical
evacuation - alert has been provided, an air medical evacuation being carried out the day of the attacks
between Cte d'Ivoire and the HIA Percy. Supply of our operational medical units deployed in theatres of
operations has been carried out continuously during this period of high tension in the national territory and
during its course.
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to take advantage of the Forum that is given to me today to greet you
the commitment, dedication and the competence of the staff of the SSA. They have demonstrated

exceptional responsiveness and unbeatable efficiency in such a context. They all put in OEwork to bring
to the victims of these terrible attacks support to preserve their chances of survival and, where
appropriate, less physical and psychic effects. This SSA specifically mobilized five fundamental skills in
his first mission, which is, I recall, the medical support of the armed forces in operations.
In the first place, the SSA has not only technical, but also organizational expertise in treatment of warwounded. Support the victims, sometimes "under fire", their categorization, being put in condition to the
front, always taking into account the time and security factors, is the culmination of a highly proven and
OEwork again today on many theatres of operations.
Beyond the procedures and coolness that it assumes, this support is based on specific and sometimes
innovative surgical techniques. Take the example of damage control, which I mentioned: this
complementary concept of combat rescue, gives priority to the correction of physiological disorders, and
not to the immediate surgical repair. His interest is to reduce the initial operative time realizing that the
strictly necessary vital actions. This technique allows to support rapid resuscitation, centred on the control
of hemorrhagic shock with the early use of derivatives of blood and medicines promoting coagulation. It
allows a possible surgical recovery within 24 hours at a stabilized casualty, therefore in much better
conditions.
The concept of war surgery exceeds very much, you will understand, the simple support of a gunshot
wound. It is a comprehensive strategy aimed at adapting the surgical Act the conditions under which it is
exercised. The nature of care will depend, for example, means and time drain and possibly hostile, or
even aggressive environmental character.
Second, the SSA has particularly reactive hospital teams. Last November, head physicians of the HIA
initiated the white plan within thirty minutes that followed the beginning of the shooting. They immediately
organized to prepare teams and local. They were also reactive in the reconditioning of their institution:
Sunday, 15 November, in the afternoon, they had restored all their abilities and were able to cope again,
where appropriate, to a massive influx of wounded, without never compromised the ability of the SSA to
provide medical support to forces in OPEX.
The third door fitness on the logistics health incorporated. In peacetime, it belongs to the SSA to establish
and maintain preconditioned stocks so that they are immediately usable on the ground and transportable.
This objective implies to maintain and renew a stock "floor" consisting of all pharmaceuticals, surgical and
produced equipment labile blood needed in support of the forces. It also means to have teams ready to
package and distribute these products at any time. This allows us to be self-sufficient in the operational
context in order to not to curb the medical action.
The fourth ability concerns the ability of organization in the conduct of operations. The organic chain of
service overlaps permanently a functional chain dedicated to operational commitment. This chain of
command is able to provide global coverage of risks. Its pivot is the staff operational health (EMO).
Integrated with the operational pole of the staff armies to Balard, the EMO-health leads continuously
operative level of SSA placed in OPEX, overseas or in mainland France. He coordinates the projection of
teams and structures, their supply and, above all, the evacuation and repatriation of sick and wounded
soldiers. It allows to control and monitor the manOEwork health across its spectrum and thereby retain
autonomy of decision. This know-how to activate instantly and simultaneously a set of skills to address a
problem given in its entirety. This is what we have done throughout this terrible weekend. This is also
what we did during the crisis of ebola fever.
Finally, the last of the five skills that I wanted to report concerns the employment doctrine, which is
ultimately the key to all our abilities. This doctrine governs all of our operational activities. It is continually
revised with lessons learned experiences feedback continuously. It leads the SSA building and planning
scenarios of crisis response. It is the Foundation of our auto-resilience, because it guarantees the means

adapted to the situation, by medical teams properly trained and present in the right place and at the right
time.
In conclusion, beyond his expertise, the SSA is characterized by a capacity for action permanent and
responsive, adaptable to its environment, structured by his chain of command and its employment
doctrine, which integrates a self-sustainment. All this is made possible by the strong commitment and
cohesion values shared by the staff of our service, such as those of the armed forces in general.
SSA staff skills and the means available to it, have been used in the attacks that hit Paris in 2015. To be
truly effective in such circumstances, the operational experience of the SSA must integrate into a more
comprehensive response combining many other actors. It is what is the SSA through the process of
opening to the public health service, which characterizes its new model "SSA" 2020.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, Mr central Director. You told us that the white plan had
raised approximately thirty minutes after the beginning of the shooting, which occurred around 21:20. You
also mentioned that the first wounded arrived a few minutes before midnight. It therefore happened about
two hours between these two events. How do you explain this time of latency?
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne. Our doctors heads have been informed
immediately that attacks were taking place in Paris. This simple warning occurred 30 minutes after the
start of the attacks. It was them not yet requested support for the wounded, but to ability to support as
quickly as possible in their hospitals a number of wounded that we needed to indicate. It is actually taken
about two hours between the first warning of the military hospitals and the arrival of the wounded.
According to the interpretation I can make, this time due to the fact it took put the wounded in condition of
evacuation and transport.
The President Georges Fenech. Unless the evacuation had started that late? Do you where applicable
an explanation other than that which you have given?
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne. No, I have no other explanation. It is
logical that we have been pr-alerts and that we had asked to put us in capacity to absorb injuries. On
this simple warning, we have activated the white plan. Our hospitals have been requested - they were not
alone in being - at the time where the regulation it has deemed necessary.
The President Georges Fenech. When distance separates the Bataclan and the hospital Saint-Mand
Begin?
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne. The question is rather of time that was
required for that distance. In my opinion, the movement would be very disturbed. I can't comment on the
time that was necessary in the context of that night to carry wounded rather than attacks from the Begin
hospital.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. I welcome the remarkable work done by staff of the SSA and the AP
- HP.
I complete the question put by the Chairman on the support of the wounded: can you explain very
educational way how they were divided between military hospitals and those of the AP - HP? The
question of delay is obviously important, and victims have a number of questions about the pre-hospital.
Determining if there are places available in any hospital extension deadlines?
Do you consider that the things have happened as they should on November 13 - certainly, the
circumstances were exceptional - or have you critics to make in this regard? With regard to your

experience, what, if any, avenues for improvement? I would like to have your personal feeling on this
subject.
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne. I regret not being able to answer your first
question: the regulation of the wounded is not at all in the field of the SSA. As I said, a quarantine of the
SSA practitioners working within the BSPP, but it is not placed under my authority. I can absolutely not
enlighten this commission on what prevailed in guidance of the injured to any structure, or give you a
relevant opinion in this regard. I am also not aware of what is spent in the field.
On the other hand, with regard to your second question, I can tell you exactly how we experienced the
arrival of the wounded in our hospitals: first, in no case we don't have been saturated despite the influx of
wounded. Secondly, under any circumstances, the wounded have been misguided - if that were the case,
it could be dramatic for some of them. All the wounded have been directed to the Parisian military
hospitals were able to be supported by these hospitals without secondary transfer. Initial alert of the
hospitals sought to identify and verify beforehand their capacity and skills to ensure the adequacy of
these skills to prospective injured Guide. It worked perfectly: at any time, HIA Begin, and Percy don't have
been saturated by an influx of unregulated ambulances. The wounded arrived in significant numbers, but
the situation was perfectly manageable and elsewhere was perfectly handled, using the techniques of
initial categorization that we place in OEwork. That is what I can tell on the question of the prehospital.
The rapporteur. The question of the distribution is not your responsibility, but it is asked. On the other
hand, to listen to you, I feel that you could support many more injured in the HIA Begin, and Percy.
According to the figures available to us - Mr. Hirsch may come back-, hospital Georges Pompidou, HenriMondor and La Piti-Salptrire, as well as St. Louis and Saint-Antoine because of their proximity, have
welcomed their only 80% of the victims. How is it that there been no rise in charge of military hospitals
and other civilian hospitals who had offered their services - AP - HP or non-AP - HP - have not been
asked?
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne. In an operational context of war, in
theatres of operation, we are forced to support all the wounded, regardless of their number. It is also the
case for a number of operations. On 13 November in the evening, Parisian military hospitals have not
been saturated in the strict sense of the term, at least not at the point of being unstructured, but the
occupancy rate has been largely sufficient. Certainly, we have not reminded all personnel, neither open
continuously all operating blocks. But if we had to do, these hospitals have clearly placed in "abnormal"
operating mode We had to handle an unusual situation, but this has not resulted in dysfunction. The
capabilities of the Paris military hospitals, increased given the context, were used optimally. I can't say
that there's a large pool of home in these hospitals.
M. general medical inspector Dominique Vallet, Deputy "offers care and expertise" to the head of
the military health service. So just bring it up the central Director, HIA Begin, and Percy were not
saturated, but they have been widely used, well beyond their usual operating capacities. I would say that
they have been used 100% of their capacities and available human resources, which also mobilized
spontaneously. Let's measure that thirty-five wounded arrived at the HIA Begin within an hour and a half
in three waves with an interval of half an hour - and that, as such, operating theatres have worked
continuously for nearly 36 hours, given the time necessary for secondary triage of patients, carry out their
assessment in the Emergency Department and transfer them to the blocks.
At one time, there may be still home and medicalization of patients in emergency capabilities, but the
capabilities of operating theatres meet a limit, to the extent where the completion of surgical gestures
asked awhile, even if it is by first intention or rescue actions. It must also take account of the recovery
time of surgical teams, which are necessary. We also pr-alert military province teams so that they
eventually joined the Parisian hospitals, knowing however that should be also retained some reservations
where they were, where other attacks occurred in the territory.

The President Georges Fenech. Who conducts the prior identification of hospital building to the
orientation of the wounded?
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne. The UAS and the BSPP who are
responsible for the regulation, and we are responding to their requests. Mr. Hisrsch is probably better
placed than me to answer.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. The morning agenda where the attacks occurred, a response to a terrorist attack
exercise multisite was organized. It has mobilized many hospital services, including the SAMU de Paris
and the Paris region. Its goal was unfortunately what has happened the same night. Have you, the SSA
and yourself, Mr Director central, was solicited in this dress rehearsal?
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne. I learned subsequently that this exercise
had taken place and that the SSA agents had been involved. To my knowledge, which is perhaps not
exhaustive, this was an opportunity for them to ensure that their response capacity in the event that such
attacks occur, including their ability to activate the white plan and to remind staff. But this was not beyond:
there was no simulation life-size of a massive influx of wounded in military hospitals Parisian.
The President Georges Fenech. For clarity of this hearing, before moving on to other issues, I give the
floor to Mr. Hirsch for his introductory statement.
Mr. Martin Hirsch, CEO of the Assistance publique-Hpitaux Paris. In my presentation, I will try to
provide clarification on issues that you have begun to address.
In a straight line with the remarks of Mr. Debonne, I indicate that we have worked, including mid-2014, on
relations between the AP - HP and the SSA, on the one hand, and between the AP - HP and the BSPP,
on the other hand. In both cases, this has resulted in the signing of an agreement - one that was passed
between the AP - HP and the BSPP was prepared at the end of the year 2014 and formalized at the
beginning of the year 2015. We thus organized our daily relationships and our joint actions in training,
exercises, communication and distribution of our forces. We wanted to make our three organizations play
a complementary role in the care of the wounded, both in normal times and in the case of dramatic
events. These conventions have played a very important role in coordinating relief and of the means put
in place during the tragic moments we have experienced.
At least January, several episodes have occurred in four days. We have supported victims in serious
condition, in many obviously much smaller than in November. Nevertheless, this was an opportunity to
examine the conditions and the time of access and support. We were also faced with support of
psychological victims, relatives and witnesses, both of the attack against Charlie Hebdo as the taking of
hostages at theHypercacher of Vincennes. For the first time, we organized this support in a unique
location, at the Htel-Dieu, where teams of professionals were available, with psychiatrists, psychologists,
somatic doctors and a number of volunteers. We opened this home structure at Htel-Dieu in the
afternoon of January 7, maintained it in intense activity for several days and left it run another several
weeks. We found the usefulness of this type of support and given thought to its sustainability, so as to
activate it in other exceptional situations.
On the other hand, as you pointed out, Mr Villaum, the year 2015 has been devoted to several regular
exercises on different scenarios, some being unfortunately close to the events that we have experienced.
The most recent year was held the morning of November 13, what is obviously the result of a sad
coincidence. On the other hand, the fact that these exercises were organized regularly was not, him, the
result of chance. This work led by the AP - HP medical services and other services of the State was
intended to prepare for various contingencies. It continues of course today. These exercises are
fundamental.

As you pointed out, Mr president, the AP - HP brings together thirty-nine hospitals, but it also has a
responsibility in the prehospital, since it has four UAS, those of Paris, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis
and Val-de-Marne. The SAMU de Paris plays the special role of UAS area: when resources are deployed
beyond its own spring, its operational responsibility extends to all other UAS in the area of defence and
security.
On November 13, the first events which occurred close to the Stade de France, the first active SAMU was
the Seine-Saint-Denis. He arrived a few minutes after the scene. Then, when information that shootings
taking place in downtownParis was known, other UAS, including that of Paris, and the BSPP were also
activated and arrived on the scene. The SAMU de Paris and the BSPP have a central control system.
There are relationships, on the one hand, between these two central systems and, secondly, between the
actors on the ground.
That night, the pre-hospital context was marked by specific elements from planning we can do. First
characteristic: some shootings occurred in close proximity to hospitals, victims were able to
spontaneously in these institutions, either by their own means, or doors by others injured, either with the
assistance of medical teams that are outputs of hospitals to go look for them. AP - HP has therefore
experienced a symmetric situation to that mentioned Mr. Debonne: the first wounded arrived in our
hospitals very quickly, before the outbreak of the white plan. Such was the case in St. Louis and SaintAntoine, which are not particularly intended for the support of victims suffering from heavy trauma, but
have organized themselves into a few minutes to deal with the situation.
At the same time, the EMS and firefighters have set up jointly the regulatory mechanism to transport the
injured to other institutions. About 130 vehicles of the AP - HP have been mobilized for this purpose.
There are some rules: Paris and the small Crown are divided into districts, so as to find the shortest paths
to the most appropriate hospitals. A census of the means available and ready teams is carried out either
by the dispatch of the SAMU de Paris centre, the crisis of the AP - HP centre. Responsible for regulating
doctors whose knowledge of the reality of availability compared to the conceptual framework of the
number of bulk operation places or in the ICU.
Second characteristic of the context: it was very evolutionary. At the time when the shootings began in
Paris, no one knew what could happen, particularly after the first explosions in the Stade de France. As
for the situation at the Bataclan, it is revealed that a little later. The number of terrorists and their
movements were not known. In these conditions, the teams of regulation - the professionals that you plan
to audition you tell you with more precision and skill that me - have made the choice to reconcile two
objectives: firstly, to ensure that victims, especially those that were of "absolute emergency", arrive in
institutions completely ready to take them over for complex trauma; on the other hand, keep available
facilities to accommodate additional casualties in case the balance sheet increase beyond the first tens or
hundreds of reported casualties, as a result of the ongoing attacks or any other attacks.
Support wounded was organized within the AP - HP using the best of very equipped establishments,
including the Georges-Pompidou hospital and La Piti-Salptrire hospital. About Saint Louis and SaintAntoine, who do not have vocation to be mobilized in an attack of this nature, they received
reinforcements in staff, in part other institutions. Finally, we put other hospitals on alert that they welcome
a small number of wounded sent by regulating or spontaneously.
When access roads were closed for security reasons, it could happen that emergency vehicles are
diverted: went to a hospital, they have been redirected to another establishment. In this regard, the fact
that several hospitals have been mobilized represented an advantage: This allowed the system to adapt
as the field constraints to the current dramatic events.
As well as I could judge by myself during the course of the night, we checked permanently injured support
capacity, including serious injuries by various hospitals, firstly by those of the AP - HP, and then by those
of the region le-de-France - military hospitals, general hospitals out of AP - HP or health institutions

deprived of collective interest (ELKAZAK) - who have been mobilized by the regional health (ARS)
Agency , in close relationship with us. Fairly quickly, institutions outside of the le-de-France were also put
on alert, including CHU with advanced means of helicopter transport, so that there is no loss of chance
for patients in case the number of injured exceeded a few hundred.
What has indicated Mr. Debonne about hospitals placed under his responsibility also applies to those who
are placed under mine: the distribution of the wounded was made so that some institutions provide
support for as many patients as possible without reaching their limits. I can give you a very clear
illustration: the La Piti-Salptrire hospital, which has supported numerous serious injuries in the early
hours before the Hpital Europen Georges-Pompidou takes over, was able to continue at the same time
to save lives through very heavy interventions, including a registry of c OEheart and kidney transplant.
This shows you the strength of these institutions and their capacity to mobilize: within minutes, a dozen
operating have been opened in parallel. Open a procedure block, this is not just open the door: this is to
ensure that all of the teams - surgical, medical, anesthesia, paramedic - is available, which has been the
case. In any of our facilities, we have lamented lack of personnel or equipment.
And I'm talking about all the personnel: not only those to which we immediately think, which I have just
mentioned, but also of those who provide the support functions, for example the sterilization of the
instruments or the provision of medicines and equipment. At no time, I repeat, there has been lack of
staff, despite the small uncertainties we had regarding access to settlements: that night, several
perimeters have curly, and staff members did not necessarily have on them their business card or a
document proving their belonging to a hospital team. This had no consequences, because we had many
contacts with police services to facilitate their access to hospitals. Similarly, in January 2015, traffic had
been cut off or disrupted on some roads for reasons of security, which had complicated the journey of
some of our agents until their establishment, especially when they lived - it is often the case - relatively far
from it. This is an important point on which we work today.
In summary, support for the wounded is made according to a thought and organized to maintain technical
capacities available in the event of subsequent developments, but, as any planned action, she also had to
adapt to the reality, i.e. the conditions of access to any particular institution. Some patients who were en
route to a hospital were therefore probably been redirected to another, although not the result of an
improvisation, because at any time, regulators were aware of the availability in different institutions. I
insist on this point: prediction capability, which involves a census of needs and means, as well as prior
exercises, must go hand in hand with a capacity of adaptation of the actors on the ground.
AP - HP, we reported the outbreak of the white plan to our hospitals at 10:34. Why I made the decision at
that time there? In the half-hour preceding, we we are asked about the opportunity to mobilize all
institutions across the AP - HP, which, to my knowledge, no never was. This presented a benefit: deploy
all of our capabilities. But it also had a risk: mobilize on a night of hospitals that could, therefore, not
"keep" in the long term. However, we considered that the evolving nature of the crisis, the number of sites
affected in Paris and Saint-Denis, as well as strong uncertainties regarding the number of possible victims
at the Bataclan - 22 pm, we were unaware of what was happening there. We knew only that a large
number of people were trapped with terrorists - to justify all our hospitals alert setting. They therefore all
recalled personnel, knowing that it is difficult to distinguish between those who responded to this recall
and those who have returned spontaneously. Yet once, it was lack of staff in any establishment nor in the
hours immediately after the attacks, nor in the days that followed.
As you know, among hundreds of wounded, at least a hundred 'absolute emergencies' have been
supported in our hospitals. There were a few transfers secondary, but for reasons quite justified. What all
our surgeons and our doctors told us, is they could intervene, albeit in exceptional circumstances, but in
the same conditions of security and quality as the previous week or the following week, in the conditions
of health care provided in these very high tech facilities. In other words, do we not got in a situation of
having to compromise on the quality and safety of care; no professional had the impression to practice
surgery or a degraded medicine. This is why most patients, including those suffering from extremely
serious injuries, were rescued. The hundreds of victims who have arrived so far in hospitals, some only

have died: two upon arrival, one on 14 November in the morning, another a few days later. These data
have no scientific value, but further studies would probably confirm.
The information question quickly arose: we immediately received calls, which led us to activate our phone
response system by putting in place a dedicated number, that we use generally in day when people have
lost sight of one of their relatives and want to know if he is hospitalized. To this end, institutions have
communicated to the crisis unit all data regarding the identity of the victims. The number was operational
around 1 in the morning on the night of 13-14 November. We have received about a thousand calls to this
number in the twenty-four hours, then about 4 000 in the days that followed.
I insist on the fact that we could answer a single question: where were we given a name, say if this
person was or was not hospitalized in a facility of the AP - HP. We were able to provide this information
very quickly during the night, and with almost complete certainty, early in the morning of Saturday 14
November. Our system being centralized, relatives were not to make the tour of the various hospitals of
the AP - HP. But, of course, we could not indicate if a person who was not on our list was hospitalized in
an institution out of AP - HP, or say what she had become. These are the extremely painful issues that a
number of relatives were able to arise several hours or even several days. Some families have
experienced an excruciating journey, travelling from one hospital to another. The people they were
looking for could be, among others, have died or fled elsewhere. We have therefore set up, in each of our
hospitals, teams to answer them.
In addition, in the light of our experience in the month of January, we have in place at the Htel-Dieu,
shortly before midnight, a place capable of receiving relatives or people being found at the scene of the
attacks, but with no serious injuries. As I could see going on site, a large number of psychiatrists and
psychologists were available in the night at the Htel-Dieu. They received relatively few patients in the
early hours, especially because other centres were opened.
On Saturday morning, we found that a number of issues were saturated, that the sources of information
were siloed and that there was a limit to the information that we could provide - as you know, hospitals
give no information on deaths when an investigation is initiated. It then felt the need to provide a place
where would be centralized and updated all the information to the families and loved ones, and where
would present the authorities empowered to issue such information, as well as psychiatric and
psychological supports. Late morning, government authorities have decided that this place would be the
military school. It was able to receive families from 15 hours.
Of course, the AP - HP has also provided psychological support and supported the victims of extremely
serious stress resulting from the attacks. Thus, more than 1,000 people came in consultation or to receive
support and care, or to obtain a certificate from a doctor. The stream of patients has been very important
for at least ten weeks - the second half of November, December and January all. Teams of the HtelDieu, medico-psychological emergency cells (CUMP) deployed during the night of 13 to 14 November
and teams who have taken their relay saw a large number of patients.
Agents of the AP - HP, regardless of their profession and their rank, have demonstrated a dedication - I
would even say a "vocational consciousness" - quite remarkable. But we must also remember the shock
that this was for these professionals: they have faced a situation of rare violence, to the fact that many
victims were young, serious injury, somatic and psychological shock, the pain of the relatives and the
victims. We have therefore implemented in both collective and individual psychological support
mechanisms. They have been widely used and will be again in the coming months. This dimension must
be taken seriously for a long time.
I can confirm that Mr. Debonne indicated you during the first part of the hearing: our means were not
saturated, and they have been mobilized to deal with a possible deterioration of the situation. On behalf of
the teams that I represent, I have to say that, when many feedback that we organized, nobody raised
disruption of relief, from some point of view whatsoever - administrative, technical, logistical, surgical or

medical-, including in the hours immediately following the attacks. I do not speak here of terrain difficulties
during the phase pre-hospitaliere taking into account the extremely difficult conditions, but the intervention
once that access to victims was possible. It is to the credit of the great professionalism of the teams who
have been mobilized. And I put on the same plane as and those who had to cope with an influx of injured
extremely important and those and those which were in reserve with little or no injuries to take charge, but
whose role is equally important in circumstances of this kind. This is why we ensure that the exercises are
not only those and those who may find themselves in the front line, but also those and who are secondline.
Our institutions maintain a dual role: the first, visible and quite fundamental, is a health response; the
second is to be a factor of stability facing the threat. If I can speak on behalf of my team, everyone feels,
beyond the effect of bombs and Kalashnikov bullets, a psychological destabilization attempt. And we see
in the exercises that we organize and discipline demonstrated by different teams a response to this
second threat, which kills less directly than the first, but is is also formidable. Even if everyone is touched
in his flesh, as you have seen and heard many testimonies, the teams showed great composure.
We held that our institutions are accountable in the hours, days and weeks that followed the attacks,
strongly restricting access media to our institutions, as needed both enable teams to work and preserve
professional and medical secrecy. It is important for the stability of a sanitary device in conditions as
dramatic as those that we have experienced.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, Mr director-general, for this very comprehensive
presentation.
The rapporteur. You explained that support had focused mainly on three institutions as well as two
nearby hospitals simply because they knew what could happen. However, why hospitals that do not
depend on the AP - HP don't have not been mobilized more?
As well as some politicians have said, we are facing a State of war with the use of weapons of war.
Hospitals have had to deal with the wounds of war received full c OEheart of Paris. You mentioned that
medical and surgical care had not been degraded. For his part, Mr. Debonne spoke of the damage
control. The doctrine of the AP - HP on this type of intervention and support has evolved with regard to
the experience that has been hers on 13 November?
Victims associations, we have received a few weeks ago have done us part of their difficulties in obtaining
information on the identity of the victims, particularly on the part of the AP - HP. As you pointed out, this
was a course for some people. In light of lessons learned, how do you improve the arrangements,
especially to families?
Mr. Martin Hirsch. In such circumstances, the concern is not to ensure a harmonious distribution of
victims among different institutions, but to ensure - this has been the case - No patient arrives in a place
where it is overwhelmed.
As general manager of the AP - HP, I me am not busy regulating, and therefore very well: regulatory
decisions are not political or administrative, they must be purely medical and operational. I find them
retrospectively. And I can say retrospectively that, if I had the legitimacy to do this, I would not have given
different instructions that have been given.
If one examines the scene of the attacks, the geographical distribution of victims is easily explained.
The first attack occurred next to the Stade de France. AP - HP has two relatively close establishments:
North of Paris, Beaujon and Bichat, hospitals that are part of the same hospital group and, in Bobigny,
University Hospital Avicenne. These two institutions have been preserved.

Near Bataclan and the places of other shootings are hospital Lariboisire, Saint Louis, Saint-Antoine and
La Piti-Salptrire hospital. Logically, it is this set of institutions that has been sought.
The only institution that has been sought at some distance from this perimeter is the Hpital Europen
Georges-Pompidou. It has been for a quite simple reason: it is one of the few hospitals that has all the
expertise needed - orthopaedic surgery, surgery of the spine, resuscitation, cardiac and vascular surgery,
etc. Some institutions have told me that they could have come from other teams in reinforcement of their
specialties, but it was better to call facilities perfectly adapted and fully armed.
I would add that, in Paris, hospitals and emergency services are not idle, even in normal times. It is
therefore quite logical to keep settlements to cope with daily emergencies, for example to the infarction.
The rule is that are "crossed" the availability of facilities and their labelling. The Hospital of La PitiSalptrire is labeled for the reception of the trauma. L ' Hpital Bichat-Beaujon is also, but it has been
placed in reserve precisely for this reason. Still, when viewed retrospectively, the distribution of the
victims I appears to have responded to the objective of general interest is the protection of patients.
The professionals that you auditionnerez later will be more legitimate and more competent than me - who
am not a doctor - to answer your question on the evolutions of the support. In any case, they were not
taken on the night of 13 to 14 November. Very deadly weapons that have been used in fact cause many
injuries and trauma. Lately, our teams, especially the pre-hospitalization teams, have interacted fed with
their french, but also British, Spanish and American colleagues, in order to adapt their support. The
ballistic conditions dictate the conditions of support.
We work a lot on identification of victims and information issues. There are several aspects. First, we
need faster and better a consolidated list of taken victims supported in different institutions, not only in 39
hospitals of the AP - HP, but also in other hospitals, where the wounded were able to arrive on their own.
This was done under the auspices of the ARS not not in the early hours, but in the days that followed.
Then, there is a delay of incompressible - that I'm not able to assess - for the identification of the
deceased victims, taking into account the time needed to survey and identification sometimes operations
extremely difficult to achieve. This expectation will remain painful for relatives and families.
Finally, in my opinion, it is a good thing to dedicate a central and accessible location to host families and
relatives. We had suggested that this place is the Htel-Dieu, that we had to open. This is not the choice
that has been retained, for security reasons I understand very well. We are ready to organize, for the
future, a place similar to the Htel-Dieu, providing adequate reception conditions, with personnel and
information technology required, which is seen by stakeholders as a natural place to receive the families
and loved ones.
M. Philippe Goujon. I express my gratitude and admiration to the teams who intervened in Paris also
particular conditions and difficult.
In normal times, the AP - HP hospitals face a considerable influx of patients, including in their emergency
services. These are saturated almost permanently. Even if everyone does what he can, it is not
uncommon that it expected up to six or seven hours to emergencies in Parisian hospitals, for example the
Georges-Pompidou hospital, which is located in the borough which I am Mayor. How can we reconcile the
arrival of war in large numbers wounded, as was the case with the steady influx of people seeking
emergency care? In one such case, what happens to people who are not taken in charge in
emergencies?
Hospitals that are AP - HP nor the SSA were almost not solicited during this crisis. To my knowledge,
very few injured - it would be also interesting to know the exact number - have been directed to these
establishments, so that they could take care under the same conditions, without upsetting the General

Organization of the emergency. Why has it been so? I raise this issue again, because many doctors and
officials of Parisian hospitals arise the. They have anticipated "the weapon at the foot" - pass me the term
- that wounded arrive, but this has not happened, then the AP - HP hospitals were saturated.
Civilian hospitals surgeons are not accustomed to treat the injured suffering from war injuries. Is there a
training or preparation for war for civilian hospital medicine? If not it was decided to put one in place,
particularly since the attacks? The SSA, the AP - HP and, where appropriate, other agencies cooperate in
this matter?
Hospitals of the AP - HP are themselves adequately protected against the risk of attack? I imagine that
those of the SSA are. If an attack occurred in a hospital, the crisis could still be much more serious than
we have known.
Mr. Serge Grouard. I would go back on what has happened during the night near the scene of the
attacks. You mentioned, Mr. Director general, "field problems", an expression that alerted me. What were
they? We understand very well that members of the medical staff could face difficulties to reach their
respective hospitals, as you explained. But what health professionals under the UAS or firefighters - we
will have the opportunity to hear? They had difficulties in access to the wounded who were at the scene of
attacks or nearby? How the first rescue happened very concretely? I am referring to the testimony of the
victims that we have received a few weeks ago. Many have said have been supported after a certain
time, that they were sometimes quantified. One of them reported the following facts: she called his cell
phone to mean that she was in such a place, that she was injured and she was losing a lot of blood.
health workers were aware very quickly, but they were unable to access to it while it was not in the
immediate vicinity of the Bataclan. So, it seems that health professionals could not overcome some
security perimeters. How is coordination with police forces passed?
The President Georges Fenech. We auditionnerons the UAS and firefighters March 16. They can
provide answers to your question.
Mr. Martin Hirsch. Expected indeed too long to emergencies. This is not normal, and I am the first to
admit. We have made the commitment to halve the average time of care in emergency services - which is
currently a little less than four hours - on the duration of our strategic plan. We work a lot on this point.
However, this has no impact on the conditions of care in circumstances such as those of November 13,
for several reasons. First, the wounded then follow a prepared circuit. They are often supported directly in
recovery room without going through the nurse orientation, including. It is one of the strengths of this
support. Secondly, in addition to the recall of staff, the white plan is designed to "make room", not in the
physical sense of the term, but accelerating the circuit of patients already in hospital. For example, a
patient in recovery room will move more quickly to the next step. There was no trouble from this point of
view on 13 November. As well as have reminded me some teams the next day, they is there were
prepared morning, during the mentioned previously.
On the other hand, I insist, by reasoning in professionals, agents of the AP - HP or AP - HP hospitals that
have not supported of victims should not express frustration. They could do if the hospitals who have
been on the front line had been overwhelmed and had poorly supported victims. However this has not
been the case. Share patient flow between the St. Joseph Hospital and the Hpital Europen GeorgesPompidou rather than direct them all to it would have been a poor medical decision, because teams of
Georges-Pompidou had prepared all aspects of support - material, sterilization, etc. Imagine the opposite:
that it has allocated victims between hospitals in the interests of fairness and that one of them has been
poorly supported...
As Director of the AP - HP, responsible for both part - the four SAMU I mentioned - prehospital and
hospital, I believe we should assume fully the apportionment that was made. She was rational from the
point of view of the quality of support. It also allowed some institutions, which were not necessarily

labeled for the reception of the neurotransmitters, to cope with a larger number of 'small' emergencies.
People who watched the news continuously knew that, if they were getting a sprain, it was hardly the time
to go to Georges Pompidou, and that there are other hospitals that were not, them, in first line.
Concerning the support at the scene of the attacks, there were difficulties in two orders. On the one hand,
as well as stakeholders in the field can attest, some places were secured, including the Bataclan and its
surroundings, because the bursts of fire continued and that it was to avoid additional victims. As such,
relief could not get immediate access to some injured - which, probably, journalist of the World that you
have received. Police forces discouraged doctors rescuers to borrow such or such street, the instructions
being to get away under porches or in the surrounding streets. That was the logic. I don't know if there are
things to review in this matter. It should be noted that the situation was unprecedented: we were in Paris,
the number of terrorists was indefinite, as well as the amount of weapons they had.
On the other hand, less dramatically, we have alerted on the case of nurses blocked at roadblocks while
they joined, for example, the St. Louis hospital. I called the prefect of police of Paris and his collaborators,
and we agreed on the fact that, given the circumstances, any means of identification could agree. We
have also heard on a telephone number to verify the identity of persons in case of doubt. Currently, we
are working on the development of an identification card identical to the access badge that would be
updated more regularly and that each staff member would retain upon him permanently. Everyone did not
have such a document on 13 November.
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne. I wish to come back to the question posed
by Mr Goujon about emergencies and bring the light of SSA in material, in addition to the response of Mr.
Hirsch. I remind you that I am a doctor by training.
In a situation such as that which we have seen on 13 November, there are two keywords to remember:
"separate circuit" and "categorization". Influx massive injuries, this is not the same circuit which is
borrowed, and it is not the staff of home emergencies (SAU) who is requested to support. The
categorization of the wounded - also sometimes referred to as 'tri' - is a method that we have learned in
theatres of operations and that we have established in our hospitals on the national territory. It is quite
suitable influx of wounded in large numbers, or in lesser number but in a State serious, which can have
an effect very disruptive activity. This is to ensure that the largest number of wounded have maximum
chances of survival and lower sequelae.
Firstly, it is important to dedicate a specific categorization circuit: it cannot be done in the premises of a
SAU, whatever it is. On the night of 13-14 November, we implemented such dedicated in HIA Begin, and
Percy circuits. On the other hand, personnel who will have to accomplish this major medical Act, which is
to determine which is a matter of absolute urgency and which depends on the relative urgency, must be
predefined. It must be particularly savvy professionals: it always sets this task the most experienced
professionals.
In any case, it should prepare upstream for categorization. Because, if we view this method at the time
where one is confronted to the events, it is more complicated. According to our experience, support for a
massive influx of wounded is not in competition with the daily operation of a SAU, because most affected
workers are not the emergency physicians of the SAU: it mobilizes other jurisdictions, anesthesiologistsresuscitators and surgeons, I stress, particularly experienced.
We faced, we too, in frustration of the staff, either because they were in hospital structures that had no
injuries to support, either because we did not appeal to them while they would have liked to come - we
wanted to keep them in reserve, because we didn't know, we either, what could happen. This feeling of
frustration is perfectly understandable, especially since we had perhaps not enough prepared personnel
to such a situation, more customary on theaters of operations abroad. We have learned the lesson that it
had now put the cards on the table upstream towards them, clearly telling them that, if an event occurs,

they must wait until they are called. It is probably preferable to a massive influx of personnel, which can
be destabilizing.
I come to the question of training.
First, he must understand that war surgery is not a series of procedures or a method that it is to apply, but
the overall management of serious injuries in a context of war. This is equivalent to the question of what
is the context of war. Gold - this is a major issue - there is no unequivocal war context, which means that
there's no recipe. In other words, in a theatre of operations abroad or full c OEheart of Paris, this is not the
same thing.
True, there are techniques, including damage control, which we have spoken. It is a technique that aims
to preserve all the chances of the patient but taking into account the conditions of exercise, the first of
them being the massive influx of wounded. Spend several hours to operate a single patient when there
are other absolute emergencies, this raises many questions from the ethical point of view. Damage
control allows precisely to give the greatest number of chances to the largest number of wounded, which
is perfectly admissible both technically and ethical.
War surgery, they are therefore technical gestures, applicable on special wounds, but in a much more
holistic support which takes into account the context, which can be aggressive. In Paris, on the night of
13-14 November, based on the feedback we had, there was aggression at the time where caregivers
intervened. It is a situation that we live daily on the theaters of operation and which requires special
techniques. As gunshot wounds, they are not specific to war surgery: are treated routinely in the AP - HP
and other french hospitals.
On the other hand, in Paris, it is not faced with the problem of "elongation" we, military, meet on theaters
of operations abroad, for example in Afghanistan or Mali: almost every week, we realize the evacuation of
one serious injury by air on 4,000 or 5 000 kilometres, which affects the gesture that must perform the
surgeon.
The existing SSA for three centuries, the military have, unfortunately or fortunately, experience in war
surgery. We have been very quickly asked for training in this area. First there were exchanges between
civilian colleagues and military - surgeons and resuscitators, including - and between institutions. Then, at
the beginning of this year, the DGS and the DGOS we sent an official request, Professor Pierre Carli,
president of the CNUH, and myself.
As I said in my introductory statement, that we are trying to meet this demand: we are currently setting up
training of trainers to be relayed throughout the territory, in order to prepare the civilian teams - not only
surgeons, but the full teams - to support a massive influx of wounded. Whenever feasible, military teams
will be associated, knowing that we have hospitals located in Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Toulon, Bordeaux,
Brest, and Metz. The night of 13-14 November, as indicated by the general medical inspector Vallet, we
did not come from military surgeons from Lyon or elsewhere. We preferred to cooperate there where we
were, because none of us knew what could happen.
One of our courses, the advanced course of surgery in external mission (CACHIRMEX), is already open
to civilian surgeons who make the request, including to those who engage in the operational reserve of
the SSA and leaving on the theaters of operations abroad. Some practitioners of the AP - HP also offer
courses in the context of the CACHIRMEX alongside their military colleges. We are very pleased that the
cooperation works as well in both directions, the SSA in need of reservists. Therefore, relations between
military and civilian health care professionals exist, and they are a little more institutionalized under the
impetus of the recent applications of the Ministry of health.
Mr. Martin Hirsch. I would like to emphasize a point. All the professionals will tell you that they have
been beaten by the altruism of the wounded, who often told them to go take care of others rather than

themselves. I myself have witnessed. It is therefore, in such circumstances, a phenomenon of resilience I do not know if this is the appropriate term - remarkable within the population, Governments must take
into account.
This brings me to push the reflection one step beyond: in addition to the question of the preparation of the
public authorities themselves, it must go further in training first aid awareness and dissemination of
knowledge on civil protection. When I was Chairman of the Agency of civic service, we did ensure that all
voltaires civic service must have the patent of first aid training. In our country, the proportion of the
population who has undergone such training is too low, and knowledge relating to emergency
preparedness are little taught. Or this awareness is fundamental to the population itself, including that it
acquire reflexes that can save lives. In addition, these are all opportunities for exchanges between the
population, health professionals, military personnel, firefighters, etc.
The protection of hospitals is for us a source of major concern, so that they are easily accessible places.
We took ourselves measures to strengthen their security, in conjunction with the prefecture of police of
Paris. Beyond that, there is a very heavy work to be done, including the budgetary point of view. It is a
course. In my opinion, we change to a certain extent the traditional doctrine of hospital security.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. How many victims of the attacks of November 13 are still hospitalized today?
According victims associations, not you passed some information to the cell interdepartmental assistance
to victims (CIAV) after a few days, after ministerial intervention. Why?
Mr. Martin Hirsch. There are still eight hospitalized victims.
It was strictly no withholding information from us. We have forwarded the lists of victims both real-time
health authorities - dependant for the ARS to disseminate to those in need - and the judicial authority whose representative came in crisis. These lists included the name, first name and date of birth. Within
thirty-six hours after the attacks, almost all of the victims had been identified, and their list was well
known.
At midday Monday, the CIAV asked us the coordinates of the victims - postal address, e-mail address,
telephone numbers fixed and portable-, information that we had not requested in the early hours. We
returned to the patients or their loved ones to get.
I understand that this problem could be perceived as extremely painful by the families, but in my opinion,
there has been not malfunction.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. Indeed, it has been felt in a very painful way by families. It has even referred to
problems of software and formatting documents between the different services concerned.
Mr. Martin Hirsch. The coordinates are not part of the information collected in the early hours.
Ms. Anne-Yvonne Le Dain j.. During previous hearings, a victim has indicated that a number of
information, including his name and his first name, had been collected by health at a first meeting, but
that this information had not been transmitted when she was taken over by another structure. Everyone
was impressed by the medical home, but there was, it seems, a great disorganization of the
administrative point of view. In your opinion, could certain aspects be improved?
Mr. Martin Hirsch. To my knowledge, it is possible that were asked twice their identity to the victims: a
first time on site, before placing them on a stretcher and take them to vehicle, and, a second time, at the
entrance of the hospital. Perhaps there were cases where information has not completely followed

between these two moments. It is the only gap that could occur. But moment victims were recorded at the
entrance of the hospital, it was no loss of information, in any case in the establishments of the AP - HP.
Mr. Christophe Leroy, head of the "management of health crises" assistance publique-Hpitaux
Paris. The identity of the victims has indeed probably been requested a first time on site - I wasn't on site,
but the cell of crisis - by pre-hospital stakeholders and, a second time, on arrival at the hospital.
The identitovigilance is a very complex issue to the hospital. On a daily basis, often identity collected in
the pre-hospitalisation treatment by the UAS is not really consolidated, such as when the patient is
unconscious. But an error on a first name can lead to very serious consequences, with regard to the
blood group card, the results of biological analyses or history contained in the medical record. This is why
we do a first check by asking once again their identity communicating patients when they arrive at the
hospital. Regarding non-communicative patients, we are obliged to keep a provisional identity, which is
subsequently consolidated. Thus, after the attacks, a number of identities remained interim in our
application victims, which concentrates all the information relating to persons supported. These identities
have been consolidated over time, sometimes allowing to refine the answer we have given to the families.
On the phone, it is extremely difficult to communicate information concerning a patient if we are unsure of
the spelling of his name, especially if there is a risk of disambiguation. Because it is just as dramatic to
give an incorrect answer to say that we do not have the answer. Ago so an incompressible time needed
for the identitovigilance, resulting in the queue for families.
Through the victims application, designed in 2007, we recover from our institutions all data which have
enabled us to establish lists of victims early in the night. In the morning, the vast majority of identity
records were consolidated.
It was very complicated for us to do the additional work requested by the CIAV Monday morning, because
it took us back in the records of the victims. The lightest wounded were already out. We didn't used to
communicate to third parties the trusted people telephone numbers and contact persons. This has been a
big job for hospitals to retrieve them and send them to the ARS to the attention of the CIAV. As there was
no other system, the tables has been made in Excel format. Successive stakeholders with different
versions of this spreadsheet, it was technical difficulties for the CIAV. For its part, the AP - HP has been
able to package all of the coordinates and references victims supported in its institutions.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. Can you explain what is actually a white plan? How many beds and vehicles are
available? What are the modalities of activation? As Chairman of the supervisory commission for the
Paris-Sud University hospitals, I do not ignore it, but it would be useful that you bring elements of
information for the attention of the public that viewing this hearing. White plans also concern all hospitals.
You mentioned in mind, Mr director general: it comes to rescue victims of a dramatic event and take care
of them, but also to keep availability to meet future needs.
How many injured people arose spontaneously in the UAA or other services of different hospitals, they fall
under or not AP - HP? We were told that victims had themselves left the scene of the attacks and that
they had sometimes been encouraged to do so, for reasons of security, where they were able to move.
Regarding the management of psychological trauma, I understand from your speeches that there is no
overall plan, but that each institution - the AP - HP, the SSA and, possibly, other hospitals - has its own
arrangements. After the echoes I have had families, victims and caregivers, but also of health personnel,
need support and accompaniment in this matter. Specifically, what are the supported implemented? What
are the terms and the duration?
Mr central Director of the SSA, once you have done the acts of medicine or surgery required, make sure
the follow-up of victims that you have supported, or else reorient them you to other hospitals? In the
second hypothesis, how many people have been redirected?

It is expected that the Organization of the SSA operates, and a new strategic plan of the AP - HP has just
been adopted. From your point of view, with regard to the experience that you just live, is there
reorientations needed in your institutions within weeks or the coming months - constant ways, I guess?
Mr. Martin Hirsch. The white plan is a procedure, a set of procedures organised, on several aspects.
First, it comes to fill staffing needs, is now on the spot the agents present, either in recalling others. In an
institution such as the AP - HP, there is first a policy decision that is taken in all institutions; then, each
institution, depending on its particular specialities dcachette a list of staff to recall, with their
qualifications and their contact information. This implies a knowledge of specialties and occupations of
each.
Secondly, as I mentioned previously, it is speed up the circuit of the sick already supported, for example
passing phase of hospitalization who are in recovery room, or making emerge more rapidly those whose
departure was planned for the following day.
Thirdly, there is a component to logistical issues, including the provision and sterilization of equipment.
It should be noted that the "operating instructions" is specific to the context: the white plan will be not
activated in the same way depending on whether it is an accident or an attack of such or such type,
affecting this or that category of the population.
Support for the psychological trauma is organized. For about twenty years exist the CUMP, which I have
spoken, which are each attached to a UAS. The unit of the Paris SAMU has a zonal responsibility and
may need to coordinate others. On the night of 13-14 November, the Director-general of health found it
necessary to appeal to province to reinforce CUMP. This has allowed to have more teams present on the
spot, but we saw at the feedback that they did not necessarily have the same modes of intervention or the
same work habits. We must therefore ask ourselves the question of the evolution of the device. The ARS
is currently working with us and the other actors concerned in the refresh of a form of "psychological white
plan." Because everything didn't work optimally in this mobilization and this support: to say caricatured
way, in some places, there were present professionals but few patients have been oriented towards them,
while, in other places, there were relatives of the victims but not necessarily necessary professionals.
We had a discussion on this topic with the elected officials of the city of Paris. They believe it is better to
install the venues in the immediate vicinity of the trauma. This can be justified, but imposes a certain type
of organization. Conversely, one can consider that it is better to provide places that have all the useful
resources. For our part, on 13 November, we left on this second option, and we had to adapt, though
vainly, to the first option. These options should be studied again - it was very difficult to do during the
period of crisis-, with requirements that are not necessarily all easy to take into account.
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne. I can not tell you exactly how many fiftytwo patients that we have supported are still followed in the hospitals of the SSA. When we take care of
the victims in such a context - this evening there, they were obviously brought in our hospitals regardless
of their will-, we follow them at least some time before you redirect it to a more usual circuit. Some of the
patients that we have supported resided in the province, or to three of them abroad. We have sometimes
redirected them to other hospitals, some are in a serious condition. We continue to follow in our hospitals,
those who live in the Paris region and those who would have liked.
I have no additional evidence to bring white plan.
A dozen injured arrived by their own means in military hospitals. It was of minor injuries or psychological
injuries.

I leave it to the doctor general inspector Vallet, who is a psychiatrist and head of the hospitals with me, to
explain how the SSA arranged, in a very structured manner and for a long time already, to support the
psychic trauma. It talks a lot about surgery of war and bullet wounds, but the psychic dimension of these
injuries is absolutely essential. Support cannot be as comprehensive. The SSA has fully integrated this
requirement, which became for him a no-brainer for a long time.
M. physician general inspector Dominique Vallet. The confrontation with events of such magnitude
obviously has important psychological consequences, both on the direct victims and other people
involved, including the rescuers. We must acknowledge that it is sometimes difficult to act on these
consequences, civilians scattered is by definition and constituting a population less "captive" or "cernable"
as military units or personnel of a hospital.
About 180 people currently receiving psychological counselling in our three Parisian hospitals. They have
made contact with us either in hospitals on 13 November and in the days that followed, or through the cell
to families who had been directly implemented at the military school, where we intervened for 36 hours.
For the rescuers, the SSA is concerned primarily by the staff of the BSPP, which has military status. The
impact of events on these women and men have been quickly perceptible, a large-scale action plan was
decided: 840 concerned firefighters received in personal interview by a psychiatrist or psychologist in the
following days, and 24% of them wished to have a second interview. A specific action plan has been
implemented to the BSPP: command is formed to the detection of a number of indirect signs that can
translate a suffering of staff in distance from events. In the context of medicine personnel available to
these units, a special procedure of screening of psychic trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder had
set up periodic medical visits. They concern either the whole unit, specifically targeted staff.
These measures more widely are part of an action plan put in place for three years by the SSA for care of
psychotraumatic disorders. This plan includes routine screening during the debriefing or the Airlock
immediately following interventions, as well as on annual or biennial medical visits that pass the military.
It is essential to keep a very watchful eye on these personal in the long term, beyond the events and
beyond emotion and collective attention to which they gave rise. The suffering of these personal may
express themselves sometimes very indirectly, either through behavioural disorders, which in the military
environment, can potentially have a disciplinary translation, either through incidents in the technical
performance of duties, or even of malpractice. These facts, which distance, seem to be reduced to simple
failures of staff, may be a reflection of his psychic suffering. It is therefore very important that the
institutions implement devices that follow these personal time, without forcing them and respecting their
privacy. We must continue to provide support, which interested parties can take or not.
With regard to civilian casualties, the task is more difficult, I said, because of their dispersion and the
absence of structures "of cohesion' which enable to perform a collective look. This makes it even more
necessary attention on the part of all the actors of the national community, particularly in the medical and
medico-social sectors. Do not forget what people have gone through and strive not to miss any
opportunities in which you can provide practical assistance, be it medical, medico-social or the order of
repair. In addition to the follow-up of 180 civilian casualties in our hierarchy, I mentioned, we did more
than 60 initial expertise away from events for victims who require a medical certificate, which is a
recognition of their suffering and a first step towards a repair on the part of the national community.
Indeed, these victims may seek compensation in respect of military invalidity pensions or civil pensions,
the two devices being open to all victims, civil as military.
The President Georges Fenech. Would you like to add something on one or other of the subjects
discussed, Mr Chief doctor Jean-Christophe Bel?
M. the Chief Medical Jean-Christophe Bel. No, I have no additional points to make.

Mr. Martin Hirsch. Regarding possible policy changes concerning the Organization of the AP - HP, the
first lesson, it is that it should maintain our potential. He has been extremely sought, but did was either
saturated or disorganized. In recent weeks, I participated in a return of experience before the
ambassadors of the other 27 countries of the European Union, and I discussed with the Americans. All
observers, who informed themselves by following the news or by consulting the scientific articles that we
have published, consider that we have a system of high level, both in terms of capabilities, technical
means and skills. It is likely to reassure Parisians and the Franciliens.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. We are talking of the le-de-France...
Mr. Martin Hirsch. Indeed. Moreover, all capitals are not a public service civil and military capable of
bringing such a health response. It seems to me important to emphasize to the representatives of the
Nation.
Our challenge for the organisation and use of the means is to consider permanently that exceptional
circumstances may arise. However, our reorganizations are less dictated by this requirement the need to
cope with the demand for care on the day the day. One of our goals is to reduce waiting for patients to the
emergency room, as mentioned. In my opinion, there is no need of more intensive care or services
centres for trauma in le-de-France. Yet once again, we have strong capabilities, that other cities of the
same size can envy.
On the other hand, our concern is that our "strike force" - personnel, vehicles, etc. - can be mobilised if
the other points of the territory would be affected. Although the likelihood of disasters of this nature is
highest in le-de-France, there may be, one day, as many victims elsewhere in France. There, I said, a
very strong solidarity between the institutions and professionals of Paris region and province. It can play
in two directions: in the same way that provincial colleagues told us that they were at our disposal on 13
November, the region le-de-France will be available if necessary, not only to support them
psychologically, but also to provide organizational assistance and concrete.
M. the surgeon general of the armies Jean-Marc Debonne. For three years, the SSA undertook a
deep reform: it highlights OEimplemented its new model, called "SSA" 2020. It is characterized by two
keywords: 'concentration' and 'opening'.
The 'concentration' is not an unusual process: any institution must periodically questioned the adequacy
of its resources to its missions. From 2012, the SSA had anticipated the need to put an end to a certain
dispersion of its activities, which was the result of history: the service was brought to meet the needs of a
very wide community and some specific applications, for example in tropical medicine. Today, the SSA
focuses its activities on the current needs of the armed forces, i.e. the military projected in theatres of
operations, which also correspond to those which must be answered in crisis situations. This is in
particular the trauma and the medical defense against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) risks. The SSA has very extensive expertise in these areas, not only care, but also training and
research.
Corollary of the concentration, the 'openness' is a newer principle for us. The SSA has decided to no
longer assume only the medical support of the armed forces - as central Director, I felt it was my
responsibility to say that it would be more difficult to do so - and has therefore proposed to become a fullfledged health territories, which are currently in full reorganization. It is necessary that the SSA is a
rightful place within these territories of health. Section 222 of the Act, modernization of our health care
system, which has just been passed, empowers the Government to make orders for this purpose. This
law will allow us to go further. As I indicated in my introductory remarks, in accordance with the request of
the Ministers of defence and of health, a memorandum of understanding will be signed very soon. The
framework agreement that will follow will aim to set the SSA on the basis of the contribution it can make in
the national territory.

Behind this, there is another keyword, I borrow the Army Air: 'United deal ". In crisis situations, we
consider that we must work together in a complementary manner: If the crisis takes place outdoors, the
SSA may need sometimes, support; If the crisis takes place on national territory, the SSA can support
institutions that have the responsibility to respond first. In both cases, this works perfectly.
The SSA had anticipated these developments. The events which occurred in 2015 have led us to
accelerate the development in OEwork of our new model for all components of the service: not only the
hospital, but also the first use of military medicine, training, research and health supplies.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, gentlemen, for your important contribution. It will nourish
our thinking, our work and, undoubtedly, proposals from us, which will, I think, in the direction you want.
Hearing, open to the press, Mr. Patrice Paoli, Director of the interdepartmental victim cell
Record of the hearing, which was open to the press, Monday, March 7, 2016
M. presides overnt Georges Fenech. We receive today Mr. Patrice Paoli, Director of the
interdepartmental assistance to victims (CIAV) cell. Mr Director, thank you for having responded to the
request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means OEimplemented by the State to combat
terrorism since January 7, 2015.
You know that we wanted to start with victims who are entitled to the attention of national representation.
We continue our series of hearings with you who head the CIAV. Established at the Quai d'Orsay, on the
premises of the centre of crisis and support (CDCS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international
development, the CIAV was set up on November 12, 2015, in accordance with section interdepartmental
of the same date, relating to support for the victims of terrorism. Your teams mission is to establish, for
the victims and their families, an exclusive interlocutor able to communicate answers to their questions or
direct them toward good experts.
The CIAV consists of more than 110 people. These are officials of the ministries of justice, Interior, health
and Foreign Affairs, from health professionals including the Red Cross, the establishment of
preparedness and response to health emergencies, of the cell of medico-psychological emergency and
members of associations of victims such as the national Institute for victim assistance and mediation
(INAVEM) and the National Federation of victims of attacks and collective accidents (FENVAC).
I recalled that this roundtable is open to the press and subject to a live broadcast on the internet site of
the National Assembly; registration will also be available for a few months on the video portal of the
National Assembly, and I would point out that the commission may decide to include in its report any part
of the report that will be made of the hearing.
I leave you the floor for a keynote presentation which will be followed by an exchange of questions and
answers. But, first, in accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of November 17, 1958,
I must ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr. Patrice Paoli oath.
Mr. Patrice Paoli, Director of the interdepartmental assistance to victims (CIAV) cell. I should
mention that I am an intermittent Director since the CIAV does not permanently; It is convened by the
Prime Minister in particular circumstances.
I followed with great attention, on the website of the National Assembly, the debates that you have done
so far, in particular the round table dedicated to the victims and associations that accompany them. The
indescribable pain of people and their families prompts us to the greater modesty when we are faced with

situations such as that the France has known this November 13, 2015 and the following days. In my
speech, I will discuss what we tried to do and imperfections that have emerged during the implementation
of the system.
Some of my staff with me, sign of team spirit which animated us. I insist on this word of team and this
notion of collective work in the service of our fellow citizens. Thank you have invited us to this meeting
offers us an opportunity to know us better.
The CIAV was an unknown object; She had never met so. As you pointed out, Mr president, it premiered
by an interdepartmental instruction signed on November 12. It has been activated for the first time the
next day, at the request of the Council of Ministers, the aftermath, i.e. November 13, 2016. This
interdepartmental, invented cell in a hurry, brings together staff from four departments - justice, Interior,
health and Foreign Affairs-, FENVAC and INAVEM, associations and also the guarantee fund of the
victims of acts of terrorism and other offences (ITMF) which is an essential actor.
The CIAV emerged from the discussions at the inter-ministerial level after the attacks of January 2015,
which resulted in the signing of this statement, November 12, 2015. I imagine that you will wonder about
the difficulties of its implementation, a theme addressed by all interviewees. Over the hours, we managed
to create a truly cohesive team. It is an ad hoc organization that depersonalizes those who come: we
represent the CIAV, regardless of our departments or agencies of origin. The CIAV is the object that we
had to create and I think that we have managed to give it life.
From the moment where the telephone response has been localized, the CIAV received 11 300 calls - I
don't count outbound communications. Some 120 officers have been mobilized continuously for about
fifteen days, and this number has reached 160 during the last days, when we were tasked to prepare the
ceremony of national homage, which expressed the solidarity of the nation with the victims and their
families.
The CIAV ended up working, I insist. She found little by little its rhythm because there are precedents on
which we could support us: on the one hand, the feedback of the painful hours that we have experienced
during the attacks in the month of January; on the other hand, work habits acquired, often in an
interdepartmental Framework, international crises in which we assure precisely support to victims. In the
event of attacks, we are exclusively responsible for assistance to victims, and we do not interfere in
investigations or technical work which has been described by many of the people that you have already
interviewed.
One of the principles to establish quickly confirmed by the visit of the Prime Minister to the CDCS - is
one of the three units: place, management and team. However, we were confronted to the necessity to
break with this principle provided by the inter-ministerial circular, for us adapt to the circumstances, to the
needs of the moment, by opening a physical home at the military school centre and a device host and
accompaniment of families at the medico-legal Institute of Paris. The CIAV coordinated these devices that
were not anticipated at the outset. The first hours were occupied by the setting up of the device, by the
constitution of teams able to make it work, in order to meet the expectations of the families. As of
Saturday, 14 November, we could try to perform the best missions which were entrusted to us:
centralisation of information on the status of victims; information and support to relatives; coordination of
the action of the ministries involved in relationship with the associations and the public prosecutor;
preparation of the ceremony of homage.
In regards to the accompaniment, I saw that the victims and their relatives require psychological and
support assistance to access their rights, particularly with regard to compensation. They also ask to be
assisted in administrative procedures, including those related to death.
To operate, the CIAV needs a fuel: the coordinates of the victims and their loved ones. This is precisely
what has been a blind spot for the first hours. The contribution of hospitals is decisive. It was necessary to

create a common culture with agents of the State, hospital personnel from all sources, who did not have
the habit of working together or new procedures which were adapted in the emergency.
After the ceremony of homage to the Invalides, we spent the relay to the follow-up of victims Committee,
which has been implemented since November 27. Installed at the Ministry of justice, this Committee is
under the authority of Ms Juliette Madel, Secretary of State for assistance to the victims.
I come to some elements of balance to introduce our debate. Unity of direction, team and site was
devoted during the meetings organized under the authority of the Prime Minister. December 11, we
conducted a first return of experience to confirm that the CIAV should well be hosted and driven team up
to the CDCS.
Second lesson: the collection of the necessary information should be centralized. According to the
statement which is being revised and which should be signed soon, the telephone response, which was a
little jingly initially, must be located directly at the CIAV. If, unfortunately, new terrorist acts occur on our
territory, the telephone response would be immediately entrusted to the CIAV.
Another problem has been raised, rightly, by the victims: the choice of a 800 number did not allow access
for callers from abroad. We have therefore set up, as soon as possible, a dedicated number that allows to
receive calls from abroad in the future. We do not want to have to use it, but such occurrences to
reproduce, a regular number would allow everyone to have direct access to the cell.
The next instruction will devote the military school as venue for victims in Paris, placed under the authority
of the CIAV and coordinated by it. Operative military school, created as of Saturday, 14 November, was
announced before its implementation. Then, families flocked to a centre that was not yet operational,
which caused difficulties. Similarly, the CIAV will structure the reception of families at the medico-legal
Institute of Paris or other medical institutes who would be responsible for the identification in order to save
time.
Another question arises, even if it is not the CIAV: means of the ITMF to term. If the ITMF is called to
compensate a number of Crescent of persons, must be that it can cope with these demands.
Reflections on the adjustment of the device have also led to consider the hypothesis where attacks occur
both in Paris and outside Paris. The idea, which has come to a stage of maturation, advanced, is to
appoint a person who would be the procedures in each prefecture. This correspondent could take the first
provisions concerning places of families and forensic institutes including, until a team of the CIAV arrives
on-site within a period which should not exceed a few hours.
The hypothesis of attacks on both the France and French nationals abroad was also discussed. In fact, it
is concrete since November 20 a bombing took place in a hotel in Bamako whereabouts of many French.
We have installed a crisis cell in our rooms to treat concurrently this attack and the attacks of November
13. We were able to turn it off quickly, because luck, no French fell victim to this attack. Nevertheless, we
must consider where events so require an important mobilization in different theatres of intervention.
Attacks that led to the activation of the CIAV are a range of new, unprecedented magnitude. So we had to
adapt. Personally, I find that mobilization - men and Governments - has been exemplary, even if it has not
been perfect, far from it. It was not easy to bring together with at the outset all powers of the State in a
body whose operation is unique.
In conclusion to this opening remarks, I'll just summarize our work post-attentat. First of all, we tend to
adapt the interministerial instruction to make it operational and correct detected shortcomings. Feedback
of experience took place in the various ministries. For our part, we participated in a feedback to the
Ministry of health where I met Mr. Georges Salines, a president of association with which I made contact.

In the coming days, I will present our thoughts for the future Mr. Salines and other association
representatives.
I have already said something about the reflection that we drive on the link between Paris and other
cities. We also want that inside the CIAV, everyone can speak better crops and other procedures. We
therefore began a work of systematic and fussy knowledge with technical and scientific Lyon police, with
the police prefecture which has made us visit recently and with whom we shared our experiences with
associations. The objective is to reduce the uncertainties. For this, in addition to the work of
conceptualization and adaptation of the tool, we do exercises at the interdepartmental level. Before that
not be totally devoted the new interministerial instruction, we have tested and verified the proper
functioning of the CIAV.
The President Georges Fenech. I note, but it's the tragic coincidence, the CIAV was created on
November 12, 2015, i.e. on the eve of the attacks. It is quite disturbing to see this concurrency.
Regarding the place of support for the victims, it was decided in an emergency it would be military school.
At his hearing, Mr. Martin Hirsch, the Director of the Assistance publique-Hpitaux Paris (AP - HP),
suggested to configure the Htel-Dieu to make this unique place of care. What is your opinion?
Mr. Patrice Paoli. At this point, I have more notice since this issue has been resolved: in the
interdepartmental statement, which is being finalized with input from all services involved, the military
school was chosen as a place of support in Paris. With teams of Mr Le Drian and Ms. Madel, we went to
see last week how it was possible to improve the layout and organization of this place.
The President Georges Fenech. Could you give us a little more details on the methods and the means
that are at your disposal to identify victims?
Mr. Patrice Paoli. The identification of the victims is not the responsibility of the CIAV. Initially, the cell
must identify all calls it receives. All calls are considered relevant and are saved to a software where we
must register the details of people, thereby enabling us to recall and to exchange information with
families. This collection of information is not in the investigation which is centralized in the Ministry of the
Interior. In a second stage, the cases are broken down into three categories: the dead, the wounded, the
other people involved and possibly eligible to compensation after review of their situation by the
Prosecutor's office.
Instead of the victims, established home at the military school, has a cell ante morten. It will be now held
of at the outset in a coherent and solidarity, and it will collect all the data that the families may have to
bring to the attention of the authorities: distinctive signs, tattoos, etc. No method will be excluded to
identify victims. The identification work itself will be carried out in the required forensic institutes. The
collection of all these elements to gradually tighten the circle of investigations.
The President Georges Fenech. During the first hearings, someone told us how it was announced the
death of a loved one in the attacks. She made us share the shock and emotion felt when the person, at
the end of the wire, announced it the death of that parent before wishing him a good night. This is
probably a lack of training, experience. Your current organisation does to correct this sort of thing?
Mr. Patrice Paoli. The communication of such information to the relatives is not done by phone and
respects extremely precise rules. It is an officer of judicial police (OPJ) who must announce the new
exceptions provided for in the texts and motivated human and not not administrative. In these cases, it
comes to protect families from the dissemination of news by the media or social networks, which you had
the evidence, it seems to me. Cannot make sprain to the rule for human, psychological reasons.

We know the unspeakable pain of loved ones, but this system is set up by men and women. Not always,
everything works perfectly. In a hurry, given the scale and the novelty of these events in France, certainly
there was of the quack Pack.
If we insisted that information is centralized, it was not for the sake of defending a territory: the CIAV
respect procedures which offer guarantees, but they can be time-consuming and therefore be challenged
by families. Information cannot be given as long as it has not been verified. We have the same problem
with the identification procedures. To answer quickly, it was decided to speed up the procedure as much
as possible. It is difficult to reconcile two partly contradictory requirements: inform more quickly by
humanity; take the time to observe the procedures to be sure to give the right information.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. On several occasions, you mentioned the unity of place,
management and team, and you made reference to the fact that, during the first twenty-four hours at
least, phone calls was managed by the prefecture of police and not the CIAV. I can imagine that this
dissociation - phone home to the prefecture of police and the management of the monitoring of calls to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - could cause difficulties of organization. Who took the decision to separate
places? Has it been a real handicap?
He said that the switchboard of the prefecture of police jumped four times between 13 and November 14.
Was the CIAV sufficiently equipped to manage the call flow? 11 300 incoming calls you mentioned also
include those who were managed by the prefecture of police? Was the CIAV sufficiently staffed to handle
the calls? If Yes, for what reason and by the decision to send calls to the police prefecture which was
taken?
From what time and by what authority was the CIAV mobilized? In how long have you been able to
mobilize personnel? As you mentioned in your introductory remarks, more than 100 officials - including
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - and volunteers were solicited.
From what time the CIAV began to retrieve live phone calls?
At the hearing of Martin Hirsch, the Director of the AP - HP, it was said that you asked the numbers of
phones of the victims hospitalized Monday morning. Why and for what purpose?
When returning experience, necessarily useful since you continue to evolve, did you pointed to other real
difficulties as those concerning the telephone reception?
Mr. Patrice Paoli. In relation to the activation of the CIAV, in fact, all went us to the crisis centre as soon
as we were informed of the attacks. We went there because circumstances so require, without be
concerned to read the statement on the CIAV which had been signed the previous day and that we had
not yet. The interdepartmental cell was then activated in the evening, at the end of a special Council of
Ministers and therefore by a decision of the Prime Minister. I do not have the exact time. We were already
on the spot and we had already started to use voluntary staff that we mobilize regularly, in particular the
staff of the Red Cross. The CIAV is formed gradually. He had run a hour and a half between the
announcement of the attacks and setting up a structure which was beginning to be operational,
incorporated first volunteers and teams of crisis centre before staff of other departments are beginning to
arrive.
The interdepartmental instruction on 12 November provided that calls arrive at the prefecture of police.
The text was used as it was intended. I wasn't myself at the prefecture of police and I do not know what
means have been deployed but there was actually a saturation of the lines. We stayed in contact with
prefecture throughout the early hours to see how we could solve the problem of access.
In this regard, I come back on this question of common culture and the fact that we have asked for the
telephone number of the victims of the attacks. It is not only to answer all calls; We must also do so as to

ensure follow-up to the victims. How can we reach them? That is the first question which must be
answered. To process calls, we use the Crisenet software which is not available to all government
departments and was not in place at the prefecture of police. This software allows to record requests and
contact information for the people. This first call we receive is of value only if we follow him because the
relationship with the victims and their relatives is interactive.
In the morning of Saturday, November 14, it had to be about nine hours, it was decided to switch calls to
the CIAV, as I had requested. I was in communication with our Chief of staff representing us at the interministerial crisis centre instead Beauvau. The operation took several hours, and the telephone response
we has been definitively attributed to nineteen hours on Saturday, November 14. We then could start to
function. Intaglio, we can guess the saturation mental or moral of people in distress who, having failed to
gain access to this telephone answering in desirable conditions, were perhaps discouraged. But the
telephone cell operated as soon as we were able to take over.
I come back on the issue sparked by the hearing of Martin Hirsch and to which I already partially
answered. Indeed, it is not in the habits of a hospital contact the telephone of his patients but for our part,
we cannot work if we do not have these numbers. They are required to inform people of their rights, to
ensure the follow-up of the files, and simply, that person is left aside during the ceremony of homage.
These numbers are the fuel of the crisis centre and the CIAV.
The rapporteur. The statement of 12 November provided that the telephone reception is in the prefecture
of police. That is what motivated this physical dissociation between the call center and the CIAV? Then,
the telephone reception was transferred to the CIAV. But he has passed one lapse of time between the
time the cell was active, i.e. from twenty-three or twenty-three thirty hour on Friday evening, and the
recovery of the phone home at seven o'clock the next day. In this interval, inevitably there was an influx of
calls. You have enough? Have what difficulties you encountered?
Could you tell us a little more about the software Crisenet that you have just mentioned? During the
hearings, each and others spoke of tables in Excel format that were struggling to pass. The AP - HP
explained us that their paintings were distorted at the CIAV, that lines don't necessarily correspond to
starting model, etc. East - this linked to the use of this software? The question may seem anecdotal but it
was raised many times, including by victims and associations representing them.
Mr. Patrice Paoli. On the contrary, it is an excellent question. We ask constantly the question of the
compatibility of the tools. We discovered things that we did not know that we had not thought. I repeat, we
must create a common culture.
Telephone response was so designed because the event had occurred in France, in Paris, in this case.
There were reasons to do like this. For my part, I got under negotiation, when I took up my responsibilities
to the crisis center, at a time when a number of things were already written. No one thought it could be a
problem. It is found only in there was one, under the effect of the influx. I'm not here to judge and to count
points. We all work together. Throughout the day on Saturday, we were in connection with the police
Commissioner and his team for this technical problem.
For the rest, there are methods of collection of information. The Crisenet software has been created to
deal with the events occurring abroad and managed by the CDCS. It was to collect the essential raw
material, i.e. the right data to work. The current interdepartmental debate will improve the system. Who
said new mission, also new ways: the CIAV will appeal to programmers to adapt the tools to ensure that
they are perfectly compatible with each other, as we indeed met compatibility or simply data transfer
problems. At times, it was difficult. We have managed to overcome these difficulties. It is also that a crisis
cell: not sure how things will stand; you need to adapt constantly to respond to questions that had been
neither asked nor even imagined. In the future, the software should be interoperable and we should no
longer meet these kind of problems.

One of the points identified is in direct relation to your question: the rise of the information from hospitals.
A hospital is not necessarily to communicate such or such type of data. To provide some information, it
uses procedures that constrain it to pass by the regional agency of health (ARS) it depends, etc. Now we
needed to recover data directly and transmission systems were not necessarily appropriate.
I don't have to decide on the manner in which the wounded were welcomed in hospitals. I think they were
in extremely harsh conditions and difficult. Good reflexes were not necessarily obtained and shared. But
this common culture is developing. This is what strikes me in the feedback and interdepartmental
meetings that we have had since November 27. In meetings, everyone knows now what is our job, what
are our objectives and the means to achieve. We are trying to correct all of these potential problems.
The President Georges Fenech. Can the Commission of inquiry consider that you are at the bottom
owners claimed by victims to facilitate all their health, administrative and legal formalities? Are you this
stop being constitution?
Mr. Patrice Paoli. It was the objective when the CIAV is created. The statement of 12 November aimed
to create a single window, bringing together stakeholders somehow depersonalized administrative:
agents refer to the Director of the CIAV and not to their Ministry. The CIAV is therefore fully in charge.
Since the national tribute, we have given way to the Committee monitoring, but throughout this painful
experience, between 13 and 27 November, we found that victims and associations were calling this single
window. We are in perfect harmony on this point and our goal was actually to be for them this single
window.
In the future, God forbid, this single window should make it possible to collect all phone calls from the first
hour but also to supervise and organize the reception of families in the military school and the forensic
institutes which would be mobilized. In November, we were somewhat in a race against the clock to adapt
things that were not yet completely even.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. The vocation of the CIAV was to become a single window but how long until what
point? How is effected the passage of relay with the Monitoring Committee you mentioned?
The CIAV deals with support and assistance of victims. Specifically, what do you do after work
identification and support to medico-legal institutes or the various institutes? During the work of our
commission of inquiry, it appeared that there was a high demand for support in the long term, beyond the
national tribute, for everything including the steps of compensation and psychological help. Is the single
window organized to meet these demands in the long term or to ensure a mission for coordination with
the Monitoring Committee and the medical structures?
The identification was made by the medico-legal Institute of Paris. Why not have appealed to other
institutes in order to accelerate the identification?
Mr. Patrice Paoli. First of all, I'll go a bit back because I failed to mention an item concerning the
telephone numbers of the wounded, that we ask. These numbers will provide the list of victims (LUV),
established under the auspices of the Attorney of the Republic, which will serve as a particular base in the
work of the ITMF.
How big is the CIAV? In the texts and in practice very clearly two time ago: work in the emergency which
is that of the CIAV; work in the length which is that of the Monitoring Committee. The CIAV has stopped
working operationally after the ceremony of homage. From the afternoon of Friday, November 27, a
meeting was held under the aegis of Mrs Taubira, keeper of the seals at the time, to create the Monitoring
Committee. As Director of the CIAV, I am not responsible. This Committee is located at the Department of
justice and placed under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for assistance to the victims. The
CIAV feeds the Monitoring Committee with any information that it has collected. Access to law and justice

and service assistance to victims (SADJAV) leaves the CIAV for the Committee to follow up with all these
data, to ensure continuity. We will give everything we have.
You are right to point out, the big challenge for the Government now is to succeed to create this structure
able to follow up with empathy and humanity. At the centre of crisis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we
have experience, small scale, this kind of situation. We are follow in the long term the French, for
example, that we receive and that we are witnessing in their relationship with the ITMF. The evidence
showed that the victims of such events are sustainably shocked and need assistance.
We give all the information we have to the Monitoring Committee. I come back, again and again, to what
is essential: the coordinates, the ability to reach victims at any time in order to ensure this follow-up and
answer their questions. We must also be able to inform on procedures. We have developed documents
that did not exist in this form before: fact sheets summarizing procedures to be followed; the details of
health care, psychological support, the ITMF structures, etc. This compendium of data created in a hurry.
Remain modest, but there is now a tool, a background documentation and practices. We must now give
its relevance to the Monitoring Committee, whose task is to accompany all these people with empathy.
Turning now to the forensic institutes. The choice of the institution in charge of the identification of the
victims is the Prosecutor of the Republic. In the present case, the medico-legal Institute of Paris was
chosen as the place of centralization of the victims for their identification. In the future, one of the
questions is to know how could expedite procedures by sharing the task between various structures,
whether it's forensic institutes or other institutions that may exist within the national gendarmerie or other
services.
The President Georges Fenech. We will also have the opportunity, ladies and gentlemen, to audition
the Forensic Institute officials.
Mr. Michel Lefait. Mr Director, in the preamble of your speech, you did state of understandable groping
this new instance that is the CIAV. You also outlined some very interesting avenues for improvement. Do
you have any other suggestions or wishes to still develop the structure that you run?
Mr. Patrice Paoli. Thank you for your question. It is always possible to improve things even if any human
institution retains a degree of uncertainty. Perfection is not human. I should like to take this opportunity to
pay tribute to the fantastic work that has been done by all the volunteers, all personnel of various
institutes, facing the pain of the families and the difficulties.
What you ask? First of all, I would insist on this common culture created with all departments that knew
nothing of the CIAV until it begins to operate, in the early hours that followed the attacks. It is now a reflex
for them to articulate with the CIAV, unique location of treatment which federates all the energies and
skills.
To consolidate this work and, now, do exercises. Updating the practical test to make sure that the device
is functional, that each and others have understood basic changes and the cultural adaptations that
implies the CIAV in attitudes and procedures. Such exercises allow, for example, to identify with precision
all the measures to take to well to funnel people to the Military Academy, as prefecture or such other
specific place.
Secondly, there is the question of the means. We got our means, including telephone capacity increase.
We can mobilize immediately sixty-five phones, provided they also have staff capable of using them,
which would no doubt about two hours to arrive. At the height of the emergency, we had up to 120
phones in operation. This is not to create all telephone rooms. These are rather offices with
disconnectable positions, as it exists at the crisis center.

Other means not us were not yet affected in whole to arm, forgive me the expression, the monitoring
committees and in particular our. There are personal needs: magistrates aware of procedures; medical
personnel able to define psychological means, even if we rely on medical and psychological emergency
cells (CUMP) and other bodies; specialists from the emergency management services to which belong
the three colleagues who accompany me in order to be able to send people experienced to the
prefectures. We also need money to finance our technical tools such as these new software which should
be compatible with those of our partners.
The President Georges Fenech. You talked about 110 people at the CIAV. Are permanent, detached
from their Department personnel?
Mr. Patrice Paoli. On average, we were between 110 and 120 attending the CIAV. To be honest, at the
beginning, we didn't know how we were. In a hurry, we have not started by accounting. We have created
a tool and developed, little by little, a system for registering with badges. So there was always some 120
present personal, never the same course, since there's a rotation. At the time of the preparation of the
ceremony of homage, we climbed up to 160. When feedback, we shared the organization charts of the
CIAV with all departments. We have especially provided a sheet where our personal needs are
summarized to arm every cell, knowing that one is responsible for the follow-up of the deceased, one of
the wounded, the other psychological support, etc.
So there is sufficient personnel to power this rotation - the task is very demanding - we have
correspondents in each entity that participates in the CIAV, loaded to form a pool. 120 refers to events of
a scale comparable to that of November 13, this is not an absolute given. According to the interministerial
instruction, I established the needs with my team, and staff are sent by departments.
The rapporteur. During the attacks of November 13, social networks have played a special role in
relation to the search for identification. A hashtag #RechercheParis was created. Have you discussed this
phenomenon in your thoughts and feedback? You social networks constituted a disability or assistance?
In the context of this commission of inquiry, we will look at the likelihood of attack in the province. You
have indicated that you will work with the prefectures and see how the CIAV could project themselves in
the province. What is your thinking on the subject? In this case, the CIAV remain physically within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or would it be partially detached concerned Prefecture? Could you tell us a little
more about how an attack could be managed in the province?
Mr. Patrice Paoli. Social networks are a fact; These are media that exist and which we must take into
account. We thought about how we could use them to collect information and have an internet address in
addition to the telephone number. Social networks are also a means of disseminating information. It is a
hypothesis that is naturally present in our minds and considered.
As for the idea of cells in the prefectures in the event of attacks in the province, it is very advanced. In
Paris, projected cells are the Military Academy and the Institute forensic - and possibly other institutes
mobilized. For the province, we are finalizing a modus operandi : the prefecture identifies the nature of
the needs and the tasks to be; We send a team of two people, a framing and an operational, to help and
to allow a good liaison with the centre which would remain in Paris. This is what is envisaged for the
moment.
The President Georges Fenech. It remains for me to thank you, Mr Director, for your important
contribution to our work.
Hearing, open to the press, of Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior
Record of the hearing, which was open to the press, Monday, March 7, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Minister of the Interior, thank you for having responded to the request
for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means OEimplemented by the State to combat terrorism
since January 7, 2015.
We started our work since one month approximately and we already conducted several hearings devoted
to hear victims, their advisors or the officials who are called to take care: the Director general of the
Assistance publique-Hpitaux Paris, the central Director of health of the armed forces, or, at the moment,
the Director of the interdepartmental assistance to victims (CIAV) cell. We will soon hear the commanding
general of the Paris fire brigade and the medical director of the emergency medical service.
At this stage of our work, we thought useful to hear you, Mr. Minister, mainly on matters relating to the
conduct of operations, to the intervention of the forces of order and the means at their disposal.
Intelligence issues will be dealt with later, in may, and we will ask you to return to this subject before the
commission of inquiry, in accordance with which we agreed.
This hearing is open to the press and is the subject of a live stream on the website of the National
Assembly; registration will also be available for a few months on the video portal of the National
Assembly, and the Committee may decide to include in its report any part of the report that will be made
of the hearing. We have decided that, in a manner General, when will this raise no difficulty, for the heard
persons or with regard to the confidentiality of the information collected, our hearings would be open to
the press because we have to conduct this investigation in a transparent manner.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958, relating to
commissions of inquiry, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.
Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve oath.
The President Georges Fenech. I leave you the floor for a keynote presentation which will be followed
by a broad exchange of questions and answers.
Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior. Thank you very much, Mr President, ladies and
gentlemen, for giving me the opportunity to speak before your inquiry. I myself am very keen on this
subject and on all those who fall under the purview of my Department, to respond at any time before the
parliamentarians of the action that I drive, let alone on something as tragic as that is the subject of your
inquiry. However, I am constrained by a number of principles of law, preventing me from here reveal
elements that would be covered by the confidentiality of investigations, by nature, since I do not have
knowledge, or which would be covered by the confidentiality of national defence, but your Committee has
the possibility of requesting all documents necessary for its investigative work. For my part, I have always
been very favorable to that given to the Parliament, on these subjects, all of what it wants. Having, at
other times, been myself rapporteur's fact-finding missions for which it was very difficult to get the items
requested, I still have such memories of these complicated periods that I have a duty to provide you with
everything you need.
Our country is today confronted with a terrorist threat of extreme seriousness, unprecedented. In January
2015 and last November, we had to cope with two campaigns of attacks right in the OEheart of Paris and
its suburbs. Between these two events and since then other terrorist attacks were committed in different
parts of the national territory, and other attacks have been thwarted by our services. Until then, never we
had known a threat of such a nature or magnitude in France.
Over the past year, 149 innocent victims, stricken barbarism jihadist, lost their lives, while hundreds of
others will remain a long time marked in their flesh, sometimes even for the rest of their days, and entire
families have been shattered forever. In January as in November, I myself have visited the scene of the
attacks, and each time, I saw a horror without a name and a desolation that I will never forget.

I know that several victims, as well as some of their loved ones, have already brought their testimony to
your Committee of inquiry. Despite the trauma these people have suffered, despite the sorrow and the
pain of mourning which inhabits, they spoke with dignity, and it is important that you started by listen to
them. I wish at the outset to express, as well as their families, my deep compassion, as I think also with a
very strong emotion to all those to whom terrorists brutally took the life.
I also know that after me, in the days and the coming weeks you will also, as is normal, auditioning
several officials of the security forces. Now, I want to emphasize the coolness and the very high reactivity
that they have shown in the exceptional events that we have crossed. In the cOEheart of the tragedy,
they have accomplished their mission with professionalism and an admirable sense of duty which they
share with the women and men who then intervened under their authority, in circumstances that none of
us can really imagine. We should not forget what was at that time where their investment.
Since the crimes committed by Mohamed Merah in Toulouse and Montauban in March 2012, which were
terrorist-related crimes, we face on our soil to the threat of jihadist, who had previously beaten the United
States, the Spain and then the United Kingdom, and who has also transferred over the last ten years.
Indeed, our opponents now recruit some of their activists within Western societies they target and
terrorists use internet and social networks to spread their deadly propaganda.
This terrorism of proximity, both endogenous and exogenous, so commands us to take precautions that
apply throughout the national territory. Everyone must be aware that in order organizations such as
Daech or AQIM, the France is today as yesterday a priority target.
Faced with the existence of such a threat and after collective trauma that we experienced last year, I
believe that it was normal, healthy and necessary that Parliament could consider in detail the action of the
authorities during the events of 2015 and in time long for combating terrorism. Also, I want to thank the
members of the commission of inquiry, particularly its president, Georges Fenech, and its rapporteur,
Sbastien Pietrasanta, for the important work they drive.
I recall indeed that counter-terrorism Government always endeavoured to demonstrate the greatest
possible transparency. For my part, I have never refused to answer no solicitation nor the questions of
parliamentarians; This is quite normal, even a duty in the function which is mine. Three times since I was
at the head of the Ministry of the Interior, I have been auditioned by commissions of inquiry into the fight
that we are conducting against jihadists in France and Europe. Furthermore, many debates were held in
meeting and legislation Committee on the occasion of the review of the various laws proposed by the
Government. I am thinking particularly in the great debate that preceded the adoption of the law of July
24, 2015 on our public policy intelligence, thus breaking with what must be called the "culture of secrecy"
that, on this subject, had long prevailed in France.
Finally, after the attacks of November 13, we have not hesitated to implement new control procedures of
the actions we take under the State of emergency, including procedures of parliamentary control. In my
opinion, the exercise that brings together us today therefore fits in the same righteous logic. I am myself
convinced that democracy can only emerge stronger from such an approach, since it is conducted with
the necessary rigour.
I said: never the threat was also raised that today ' hui. But, at the same time, never the State's response
was also strong. This is the meaning of the message I want to deliver today before you, without ignoring
that zero risk does not exist. I will begin by mentioning operational response that we opposed to the
attacks by 2015, before coming to our counter-terrorism policy and the means that we OEwork in the long
term to prevent the Board from further attacks.
Because zero risk, I repeat, does not face the threat of terrorism, public authorities have the obligation to
prepare for the worst, plan in advance the means to react to a sequence of high-intensity attacks.

It is in this spirit of anticipation that the services of the Ministry of the Interior have worked over the past
years. And the quality of the feedback we had is very important. How the services of the Ministry of the
Interior, and more broadly the State apparatus, they reacted to the two waves of attacks in January and
November 2015? Were they properly organized and adequately prepared for this mission? And what
lessons should be drawn for the future of these tragic events?
These issues are extraordinarily complex, due to the very large number and service personnel who have
been mobilized in the hours that followed the attacks, and the multitude of tasks that it took them perform
in an emergency. For the clarity of the presentation, I propose therefore to distinguish four main subjects
of reflection, knowing that we will have the opportunity to come back as long as you wish in the context of
issues which will follow this introductory presentation: general coordination of the resources committed;
the mobilization of intervention forces; investigative procedures; disaster relief operations.
See, first of all, the general coordination means committed.
In the face of exceptional events, which lead to take decisions in an emergency and to mobilize significant
numbers, the question of the overall coordination of the means of the State is of course crucial. However,
it seems to me to be asked in a different way in January and November.
In January, in fact, the action of the security forces first focused on stalking of the Kaye brothers, after
they have managed to leave the capital. All services and all security forces have therefore found
mobilized: prefecture of police, General Directorate of internal security (CSB), Directorate-General of the
national police (DGPN), Directorate-General of the national gendarmerie (DGGN). Very quickly, it
appeared the need to strengthen their coordination and ensure a smoother information sharing between
them. This is the reason why I wanted to what the leaders of these major directions meet permanently in
the living room of the Ministry of the Interior said "the smoker". This operational management tool has
demonstrated its effectiveness any long-term management of the crisis of the 7 and 9 January 2015,
since it allowed a cockpit fully integrated to the neutralization of terrorists.
The situation was very different on November 13. Indeed, the prefecture of police had this time naturally
intended to ensure the operational management of the device, as at Saint-Denis in Paris, but he had to
coordinate ways to many more to meet the unprecedented circumstances of this attack: plurality of sites,
use of belts of explosives by terrorists, absence of targeting and high number of victims. In the space of a
few hours, our services first had to intervene, at the time, to put out of harm terrorists remained on site,
including at the Bataclan, to secure sites and prevent the risk of surattentat, rescue victims and carry out
the collection of data relevant to the investigations. In a second stage, it took them realize the judicial
investigation and ensure the follow-up of victims, families and their loved ones, all of this without
forgetting, information exchange and coordination with foreign services, cyber action, nor the information
of the general public.
Overall, the operational management by the prefecture of police of these means and complex missions
can be judge as having been, in a context of extremely difficult, optimal. The reactivity of the security
forces allowed to mobilize the staff needed to secure sites, to conduct investigations and to the aid of
victims in the shortest possible. However, operationally, we must learn some lessons concerning the
Organization of the command, the Division of personnel on the various sites and integration in our device
of people who spontaneously offer their contest - I think the military Sentinel force, civilian physicians and
residents.
Finally remember that beyond the operational coordination, there is a system of interdepartmental
coordination, interdepartmental cell crisis (CIC), which was activated by the Prime Minister in January and
November 2015 and which was placed under my responsibility. The CIC played a very useful role to
share streaming information between administrations, to mobilize in favour of the prefect of police,
national reinforcements and, in November, to ensure in OErapid implementation of the measures taken
under the State of emergency and the restoration of the border controls.

Mobilization of intervention - GIGN, RAID, and BRI - forces is a second fundamental aspect of our device
in the event of terrorist attack, especially since we are facing, as is the case with Daech terrorists, to an
enemy resolved to strike randomly and sometimes to die to make the largest possible number of victims.
After Mohamed Merah crimes, RAID and the GIGN have thus had to evolve their doctrines of
employment, as well as their tactical and operational intervention schemes. Their men must be prepared
to act quickly to rescue victims, prevent the aggressors to initiate explosive charges and do not give them
the opportunity to communicate on the continuing news media and social networks.
In July 2014, the RAID introduced its new strategy of intervention in individuals radicalized having already
killed, based on the phasing-in this case specific negotiation for preferred, if possible, a contact controlled
by the forces of order. It is supplemented by a so-called tactic of "nonreversibility" i.e. an assault fast and
continuous, sometimes double technique consisting of to offer the operator the RAID, protected by a
heavy jacket and a ballistic shield to enemy fire in order to divert the attention of the potential killer of
hostages. These techniques have been used in Vincennes.
For its part, the GIGN has implemented a standby cell of the terrorist phenomenon and on the procedures
of the planned killings. Four specific exercises have been programmed in 2015 in the context of the
operational readiness of the unit.
At the same time, a collaborative work between the heads of the RAID and the GIGN led on 24 July 2014,
to the drafting of a common note organising cooperation of the two units in a serious crisis. This feature
has been implemented in January 2015. Similarly, close collaboration was initiated between the RAID
and the bis under the Force of the national police (FNIF). January 9, 2015, for the first time since its
creation, I decided to raise the FNIF, giving command of the device made of two forces in the RAID
leader.
Following another of my decisions, sometime in the year 2015, the RAID has new equipment acquired on
anti-terrorism funding, including urban tanks allowing to approach the fire zones including in shopping
malls. These vehicles have been hired to evacuate safely of the wounded and hostages of the Bataclan.
Another essential issue, faces a terrorist threat that is not focused on the Paris region, deals with
projection capabilities specialized intervention forces. It is to respond to this challenge that the decision
was taken in April 2015 to seven groups of the national police in Lille, Strasbourg, Lyon, Nice, Marseille,
Bordeaux and Rennes of the antennae of the RAID, updates in ability to perform the same actions as the
central level. These antennas make it possible for the RAID to project more quickly on any point of the
national territory. Faced with the same operational necessity, the GIGN has developed a 'immediate
assault plan' based on a start immediate level - at least four teams of five for the GIGN-, able to leave
Satory in fifteen to thirty minutes, twenty-four hours twenty-four and three hundred and sixty-five days a
year.
Finally, I myself asked the branches of the police and the national gendarmerie, as well as to the
Commissioner of police to update the national plan of intervention specialist in order to adapt the
conditions for emergency response units in case of attack on the territory of the whole nation. This
scheme is currently being finalised, will be presented in the coming days.
I come, third point, in the conduct of investigations.
I will not elaborate, you will understand, on a subject which belongs first to the judiciary, but I would like to
stress the importance of the investigation work carried out by the services of the Ministry of the Interior
throughout these crises.
In January 2015, and more in November, investigative services had to face a double challenge, because
they both had to proceed in a coordinated manner to the acts of investigation on several scenes of

attacks having a very large number of victims, and identify the surviving perpetrators and their
accomplices to absolutely prevent the commission of terrorist acts.
From November 13 to 23 hours, the Paris Prosecutor's office jointly seized the ITSB, the Regional
Directorate of the judicial police (DRPJ) of Paris and the Central Directorate of the judicial police (DCPJ)
and told the anti-terrorist branch (SDAT) latter coordination, centralization and the direction of the
investigation. At 11.45 p.m. the SDAT triggered the "attack plan", as in January, permitting the
establishment of a crisis PC, the activation of the emergency number "197" and of the website dedicated
to gather the testimonies of the population, the activation of the "hand current attacks" and mobilization of
reinforcements of the territorial services of the DCPJ (Versailles, Lille, Orlans, Rennes Bordeaux,
Ajaccio). What are these reinforcements which quickly allowed to apportion the work between the
investigators and the DRPJ of Paris six scenes of crimes to establish acts of recognition.
Between 13 and 24 November, investigators have established 5 300 minutes and made more than 4,000
seals. This work enabled to make findings on the six crime scenes, to identify nine terrorists killed or was
being committed suicide, locate two conspiratifs places in the Paris suburbs and three in Belgium, to 26
arrests in France. Activation of the call in witnesses 'alert attack 107' number has notably raised three
decisive information, including one that helped to pinpoint three terrorists in an apartment in Saint-Denis
before they can commit new attacks.
Finally, I would like to stress the importance of the Franco-Belgian cooperation, which particular
materialized by setting up a joint team of investigators, and the contribution of the technical and scientific
police, both for forensic identification, criminal documentation and operation of trace information and
technology. Media operated by the Sub-Directorate for technical and scientific police (SDPTS) in Ecully
helped demonstrate the preparedness of the attacks and to trace part of the trips made by terrorists in the
days prior to November 13.
I come, fourthly, in relation to the relief.
Support of victims and their relatives has been for the State a major concern, particularly in number given
the very high number of victims. I recall that on the morning of 14 November, the provisional toll was 124
dead, 100 victims in an absolute emergency and 157 victims in emergency.
In the hours and days that have followed the attack, it has therefore been both wear as quickly as
possible relief to victims and make their escape to the appropriate hospital structures, but also give to the
families of the reliable information on the situation of their loved ones. And it took then accompany longterm victims to medical, psychological, legal and financial.
The evening of November 13, relief had to intervene simultaneously at six sites, in Saint-Denis and Paris.
They did it with extreme agility, including through the mesh of the Parisian relief centres, arriving on the
scene very quickly. For the only brigade of firefighters of Paris (BSPP), are 125 gear fire and rescue, 450
firefighters, 200 rescuers of authorized associations of civil security, 21 medical teams, who joined in to
rescue victims on various sites.
This very high level of response is the result of a long preparation inter-service work. I visited December
4, 2014 at the Champerret barracks where me were presented to a multi-site attack modalities of
response of the BSPP. And a joint between the BSPP and SAMU exercise was organized in the morning
even the attacks of November 13.
Since November, I therefore wanted to continue this work of anticipation and training nationally, so
particular to prepare for the Euro 2016-related security issues. On 16 March, I thus the security and relief
of 16 large agglomerations and cities hosting Euro 2016, to discuss post-attentats issues and the
adaptation of procedures. I'll also in Nmes on March 17 for an exercise simulating a terrorist attack in a
"fan zone".

If nobody challenges the responsiveness, professionalism and dedication demonstrated emergency

services, I know that the accompaniment by the State of the families raised more questions. The attacks
of 2015 have prompted this point of view an important evolution of the response of the State.
During the attacks of January, Prime Minister has indeed decided to create an ad hocstructure, placed
directly under its responsibility, to provide information and support to the families of victims, sheltered and
armed by the crisis and support centre of the Quai d'Orsay, with the assistance, of course, the various
ministries. This interdepartmental cell of the victims was obviously strongly mobilized in November. I want
to underline the major contribution is his crisis: it offers a permanent accompaniment provided by
professionals trained to do this and experienced, who are in the period of real referents for the families of
victims.
It remains that two points have focused, rightly, critics. First, many families have indicated have been
unable to reach the green number established by the prefecture of police, which has been recipient of 93
000 calls in a few hours, resulting in its saturation. Such a situation must not happen again. Now, a new
organization will be OEwork in the event of new attack, in connection with the CIAV, to ensure that the
appeals of families and relatives will be treated with Celerity.
Then, the large number of deceased victims very strongly mobilized teams of the judicial police and the
medico-legal Institute of Paris, in charge of their identification. It cannot be done by an identification
commission chaired by a magistrate, at the end of a rigorous procedure framed by Interpol protocols. This
procedure resulted in very long delays, often even unbearable until formally informed families plunged
into anxiety. Saturday, 14 November, in the morning, more than 1,700 people were thus remained
unanswered after will be manifested as looking for a loved one through the CIAV telephone platform.
In this regard, I must point out in November as in January, the services of the Ministry of the Interior did a
job experiencing in order to proceed with the identification of victims, with a very high level of
involvement. The DCPJ usefully benefitted on this occasion reinforcements of the Institute for criminal
research of the national gendarmerie (IRCGN). Their professionalism cannot be questioned but it remains
that measures must be taken to accelerate the identification process to avoid families to remain long in
uncertainty, this naturally without calling into question the requirement of rigour, any error which may
have dramatic consequences.
Finally, the State must obviously accompany long-term victims and their loved ones, medical,
psychological, legal and financial. When the CIAV, structure of the emergency, has finished his OEwork,
the relay is supported by an interdepartmental Committee of follow-up of victims. The establishment of
the secretariat of State to victims shall ensure the coherence and the effectiveness of this monitoring, but
of course, I will let my colleague Juliette Madel bring you more details on this subject.
I now turn to the provisions we have taken over the long term to prevent the commission of further
attacks. I come therefore to the question you have asked, so reiterated, on decisions, the provisions that
have been taken since 2012 and, more particularly, since the month of January.
In this regard, I would like to make a preliminary clarification on a point that is in my view of great
importance and to which no one seems yet attention: today, we are not talking about the attacks which
have not taken place. By definition, nobody is talking about never. And by definition, I asked no question
about how have prevented them us, so that, of course, many questions would be on the job today if these
attacks occurred. In fact, often no one knows even that these attacks have been averted, and person is
informed of the exact services business.
Thus, since 2013, thanks to the diligent work of our services, no less than eleven projects of attacks have
been thwarted whose six since the month of January 2015.

I add that, to date, 325 individuals involved in one way or another in longlines jihadis were arrested by
ISB. Among them, 201 have been indicted, 155 have been imprisoned, and 46 have been placed under
judicial control. Generally, I recall that ISB is entered, own or with the judicial police, the 236 judicial
follow-up, on 1 088 individuals for their involvement in jihadist terrorism-related activities.
These figures thus give you an idea of the number of potential attacks or attacks which we so far
managed to hinder the commission on our soil. Thereby, they show you how the daily action of services,
under the authority of justice, bears fruit. And while it is quite legitimate that you querying me on the
attacks of 2015, I consider that it would be regrettable that we proceed under silence important results
that are the fruit of the work without discontinuity of services of intelligence and internal security services.
Very early, the Government took the measure the unprecedented and multifaceted threat. From 2012 and
the adoption of the law on the security and the fight against terrorism, so-called 'law Valls', we have
ceased to strengthen our anti-terrorism device and adapt our legal arsenal to the developments in the
situation. From the month of April 2014, we have implemented a plan to combat violent radicalisation and
the jihadists dies, which formed the matrix of our overall strategy of prevention, security and suppression
of terrorism. Since then, this action has ceased to climb power to give us the means to act on the various
components of the threat.
Because, if it is proven that the attacks of November 13 have been planned since the Syria and
coordinated outside our borders - I stress this point-, other attacks were made by persons radicalized on
our soil - sometimes within a very short time and in contact with an environment conducive to such a drift.
Most often, these individuals or small groups have benefited from accelerated training in the handling of
weapons in Syria or Iraq, before to return on our soil to blend into our social fabric, if necessary, to act
very quickly. Others, finally, intend to meet a general call to Jihad launched by Daech or any other
terrorist organization of inspiration jihadist, without it being possible to speak, for their part, a mission
specific to fill. At the same time, the procedures have evolved: executions isolated by handgun or stab
time in attacks with weapons of war, and for the first time on 13 November, using explosive belts. Finally,
I add the targets themselves terrorists have evolved. If they had been selected in January 2015, due to
their obvious symbolic - Jewish community, journalists, police - such was no longer the case on 13
November: the assassins were this time deliberately struck at random. Through these indiscriminate
mass murders, so it was a more global target which was referred: our way of life, solidarity that unite us,
brief morale and unity of our nation.
At present, we know that a little more than 1 850 French or usual residents are involved, in one way or
another, in the sectors of recruiting jihadist: 600 of them are present in Syria and Iraq, is not a low figure,
and 236 are already and already returned the national territory we demonstrate against them the utmost
vigilance. Among them, 143 are the subject of a judicial follow-up: 74 have been incarcerated after being
placed in custody, 13 are under judicial review. In addition, 100 French return to Syria or Iraq are
currently monitored by our intelligence services; 67 of them have already been the subject of
administrative interviews with CSB.
Our first objective is the strengthening of intelligence.
Because of the diffuse nature of the threat, the main objective that we set as early as 2012, was to
strengthen the Organization, the framework for action and capacities of our intelligence services, that they
are responsible for the supervision of the top of the spectrum, it is ISB, or detection of radicalisation weak
signals It is the case of the territorial intelligence. This was an absolute necessity to draw lessons from
the killings of Toulouse and Montauban and avoid that our country is found in a situation of extreme
vulnerability.
As early as 2013, we began to reform the domestic intelligence services. This is the reason why we
transformed branch directly placed and Central internal intelligence (DCRI) branch of Homeland Security,
established by the Decree of April 30, 2014 under the authority of the Minister of the Interior.

Furthermore, as early as 2013, we have programmed the addition of 432 posts over five years to
strengthen the skills of the ISB and diversify its recruitment. These new recruitments were accompanied
by an effort in appropriations out of title 2 of 12 million euros per year.
After the attacks of January 2015, we continued to raise our power device. Additional human resources
were first allocated to services in the fight against terrorism. Under the anti-terrorism plan in January, it
was thus decided that 500 staff would gradually strengthen the ITSB, in addition to the 432 already
planned and until 2017. Technical analysts, computer scientists, linguists are notably recruited to
strengthen its capacity for analysis, detection and prevention of terrorist risks. And 500 additional troops-350 policemen and 150 gendarmes--came to reinforce the central territorial intelligence (LSVCCS)
service, while 100 new staff have been allocated to the Directorate of intelligence of the prefecture of
police. Finally, other contributing in one way or another to the fight against terrorism and supporting the
work of the intelligence services have meanwhile was reinforced by the arrival of over 300 agents. Such
an effort adds of course to the mobilization of the police and gendarmerie forces and the military as part
of the Vigipirate plan.
However, while it is essential to grant more resources to our services, such an effort would remain
inadequate if we don't reform in parallel how they coordinate their action. To better take into account the
diffuse nature of the threat, as well as the phenomena of porosity between crime and terrorism, priority
was given to cooperation and the sharing of information among the various services concerned. We have
consolidated the articulation between the "first circle" intelligence, i.e. the ITSB and its partners in the
intelligence community, and the "second circle", i.e. the LSVCC and investigative services. In this regard,
the unit for the coordination of counter-terrorism (UCLAT) of course plays a decisive role. "Coordination
units" have been implemented, bringing together all of the intelligence services in a responsive and fluid
organization. Finally, we are strengthening the links between internal and external information, and a
team of the DGSE is now present in the premises of the ISB. We are making progress, and I have to the
truth to say that these reconciliations have generated no reserve, both the threat is global and that the
response to be effective, must be collective.
To better detect upstream the weak signals from radicalization, we have also reformed and strengthened
the position of the LSVCCS. Duties have thus clearly expanded to enable it to contribute to the prevention
of terrorism, including by the detection of weak signals of radicalisation. This is the reason why its network
in mainland France as overseas, has been strengthened to better territorialize its action and densify the
network of its sensors. Similarly, we decided to develop relays intelligence territorial in companies or
brigades of gendarmerie, as well as in police stations, whenever this proved necessary. Such proximity is
absolutely essential. In Lunel, for example, in the Herault - where we have, on 27 January 2015, carried
out several arrests and searches in the local Islamic community-, implantation of the mounted police
closer to the population allowed collect information that contributed to the dismantling of a jihadist
recruitment sector.
Finally, with the law of 24 July 2015 relating to intelligence, we have developed a modern legal framework
and consistent for the activity of our services, adapted to the new threats, the most recent technological
changes and the evolution of national and international law. This framework sets clear rules for use of
information technology in order to protect the agents that use while guaranteeing respect for individual
freedoms. The Act thus strengthens essential devices for assessment of the work of the services. A triple
level of control was introduced - administrative, judicial and parliamentary - and resulted in the law of July.
We also wanted to staffing and means reinforced for the forces of the order. The willingness to strengthen
the workforce and the capacities of the security forces has not only concerned the intelligence services.
Due to the magnitude of the threat, it was indeed essential that such a movement affect all of the internal
security forces.
I would remind you that, in a manner General, the Government agreed, from 2012, a national effort in
terms of recruitment within the police and the national gendarmerie. We have put an end to the cuts that
had considerably reduced the strength of the security forces in an earlier period. We replaced all the

retirements, and we have created nearly 500 new jobs per year in both forces. This effort is obviously a
positive impact on our anti-terrorism device: especially, we have seen when, after the attacks of January
2015, it was necessary to deploy urgently 120 000 women and men, all units and all services for the
protection of our citizens and ensure the effectiveness of the Vigipirate plan.
This policy of background, we added, after the attacks of 2015, two multi-year plans an unprecedented:
more than 1,400 net job creation in respect of anti-terrorism plan (flat) decided by the Prime Minister in
January 2015; 5,000 jobs to under the Covenant of Security announced by the President of the Republic
before the Congress on 16 November, in the wake of the bombings in Paris and Saint-Denis. It must be
added the 900 additional posts under the finance law for 2016 to combat illegal immigration. Here at the
end of five years, are therefore 9,000 jobs in all that will have been created in the police and the
gendarmerie.
I would point out that currently, alongside our armed forces of the Sentinel operation, many personnel of
the security forces are mobilized for monitoring and protection of 5 700 sites deemed sensitive, spread
over the whole of the national territory. Among them, 882 are subject to a static guard, while dynamic
devices are set OEwork for the 4 818 remaining. The monitored sites are mainly religious sites: 3 713 on
5 700, of whom 51% of Christian sites, 27% of Muslim sites and 21% of Jewish sites. Such a securing
device involves him also that we have sufficient enforcement.
Furthermore, the creations of posts that I have just mentioned are accompanied during the last months of
strengthening unprecedented means of equipment, investment and operation of the Department of the
Interior, to the tune of EUR 233 million over five years. Last year, EUR 98 million have already been
gradually allocated to services concerned so that they can carry out their tasks in the most efficient way
possible. A plan of modernization of the systems of information and communication for the benefit of the
anti-terrorist forces was also launched, in the amount of EUR 89 million over three years. Through these
funds, we are modernizing the CHEOPS system for the movement of the records of the police, as well as
platform PHAROS of analysis, cross-referencing and orientation of the alerts.
Emphasis has also been placed on protection and on new equipment - I think vehicles and arms - the
strength of police and gendarmerie. By 2015, we have kept our commitments, and in 2016, this effort will
be heavily pursued. Already, the service purchase, equipment and logistics of Homeland Security
(SAELSI) commissioned materials for an amount of EUR 55 million.
It is in the same spirit that I announced, on October 29, the implementation OEwork, beginning in 2016, a
plan ambitious and innovative capacity, on the whole of the national territory, equipment of the BAC of the
national police and monitoring and intervention of the gendarmerie platoons (PSIG). These units play a
vital role to protect our citizens, particularly in the case of mass murder. The objective of the BAC-PSIG
2016 plan is therefore to bring additional resources to better trained personnel, as part of a doctrine of
intervention tailored to the reality of the threats we now face, including increasingly frequent use terrorist
and offenders of weapons of war environments. Whether it's arms, means of protection or vehicles, be
aware that some of the equipment under the tray-PSIG 2016 plan has already been delivered. by the end
of June, the rest will gradually arrive in the units involved.
We also wanted to provide our forces with a reinforced legal arsenal.
Since 2012, we have made sure to strengthen and adapt our legal arsenal to the reality of the terrorist
threat.
First was the issue of the law of December 21, 2012: thanks to it, we can now pursue the French or
persons residing usually in France who participated in activities related to terrorism outside our borders,
and not just on our soil.

The law of November 13, 2014 then helped us build new administrative police capacity to prevent and to
prevent the commission of terrorist acts. In recent months, after the adoption of the decrees implementing
all the innovations introduced in our legislation have been, as you know, applied with the greatest
determination. I give you a few figures. To date, 294 prohibitions on exit from the territory, aimed french
nationals suspected of wanting to join the organisations active in the Middle East, have been handed
down - and nearly 80 are under investigation - 97 prohibitions of entry and residence have been handed
down against foreign nationals suspected of being linked to the jihadist networks, 54 hate preachers have
been expelled from french territory , because such individuals - I say this with force - have no place in our
country. From 2014, six individuals who were guilty of terrorist acts have also been deprived of French
nationality. On the other hand, 83 internet addresses have been the subject of a measure of
administrative block and 355 addresses have been dereferenced for spreading terrorist propaganda.
Finally, I would add that the other provisions laid down or strengthened by the law of November 13, 2014
are all also firmly applied, whether the freezing terrorist assets or the specific security measures imposed
on air transport companies serving the national territory. I think also the extension of the investigation
under pseudonym or the adaptation of the procedures for computer search.
Finally, fourth objective: consolidate an aggressive policy of prevention and follow-up of radicalization...
The President Georges Fenech. Let me interrupt you. As I have indicated, we do not address the
problem of intelligence, which will be devoted the entirety of a second hearing. I also asked my
colleagues to book their questions on this subject at the second hearing.
On the other hand, we decided not to go back on the prevention of radicalisation. This has already been
largely processed by previous commissions of inquiry. I say this for the convenience and the Organization
of our work, but if you want to say a Word...
The Minister. Mr president, I have designed my comments from the questionnaires that were sent to me
by your Committee. As they involved issues relating to these topics, I did not want to leave this room with
the reproach for not dealing with all the points you have mentioned. If this is your wish, nevertheless, I will
keep me there. I am at your disposal - despite everything, I can send you the written replies.
For the sake of precision and meticulousness, I considered preferable that me be addressed the
questions you wanted absolutely that I treat, in addition to those that you are going to ask. This is what I
do...
The President Georges Fenech. We wanted not to go back on what has been studied very extensively
by previous commissions of inquiry, the rapporteur and other members of the also attended. We really
focus on the means of combating terrorism, means of prevention of radicalisation previously treated.
The Minister. I don't want to conceal any subject, Mr president, but I will not knock you out with answers
to questions you asked me. I put it aside, and if you agree, I will conclude with the subject of European
action. It is part of the action against terrorism. This is a subject on which we are much mobilized and I
propose to conclude with this point. Then, I will answer all the questions you want to ask me.
The European dimension of the fight against terrorism is central. Often, when we are faced with acts of a
terrorist nature in France, we forget to do the inventory of terrorists who have hit us, wondering about the
conditions in which they were beaten and on the premises from which they were beaten.
We are today facing a form of terrorism of a new type. There is of course the acts perpetrated by
individuals who are auto-radicaliss on the internet and who want to hit us. Aggression in Marseille, a
teacher of a Jewish school by a student of a vocational high school demonstrates this ability of the
information disseminated on the internet or social networks to initiate acts of extreme violence. There are
acts committed by those who knock after going on the theatre of terrorist operations and participated in

the abuses. There are also actions, more and more numerous, organized since the Syria by individuals
who are not french citizens. They prepare the commission of the attacks from abroad and strike us while
they are not in the radar of our intelligence services as they are in other countries, which do not report all
necessarily - I must say - to the Schengen information system. These individuals arrive on the territory of
the European Union after receiving false documents. Daech has indeed recovered lots of blank passports
on the theatre of terrorist operations in Iraq, Syria and Libya and has a real factory of false documents.
The European and international dimension of the action is so central - I evacuates diplomatic topics, but
they can be mentioned if you want.
What is the agenda? It is extremely accurate. It comes to make controls at the external borders of the
European Union should be considerably strengthened, because if we don't, the ability to enter into the
European Union of individuals likely to hit us is tenfold. Secondly, it is to ensure that at the time of the
entry of the European Union, the Schengen information system be systematically examined. This is the
reason for which we requested and obtained the modification of article 7-2 of the Schengen borders code
to ensure systematic and coordinated controls of our nationals at the time of the crossing of the external
borders of the European Union. Thirdly, we want to see all of the intelligence services of the EU power
systematically and homogeneous Schengen information system because records can sound suitably that
therefore that the Schengen information system has been documented by the country. Fourthly, it is to
ensure that there is a connection of the files of the Schengen information system with all criminal files and
that we can also use the Eurodac basis for security purposes, which is not possible now account of what
is European regulation. Should be modified to be able to use the file for security purposes. Finally, it is to
set up a real task force European airports and hot spots, including to identify forgeries of those who enter
under false identities with the intention of committing terrorist attacks. Two of the suicide bombers who
struck on 13 November were equipped with passports that were not their true identity. they had been
registered at the time of the crossing of the external borders of the European Union in Leros.
The European dimension is therefore a very important point, on which we have much acted. We much
mobilized and have achieved initial results, but they deserve to be strengthened. On these subjects, in
fact, the European Union has to feature of putting a lot of time to make decisions, and then plenty of time
to apply them-sometimes more that she proceeded to take them.
This is the reason why Europe is a fight. The presence within the European institutions must enable,
through our action to strengthen significantly the time management, because the fight against terrorism is
a race against the clock.
The President Georges Fenech. Many Members wish to occur as a result of your extremely
comprehensive.
You are cheerful, Minister, of democratic parliamentary control, precisely the one we have today. You
issued the vOEu this control is done with the rigour required. We will try to respond, being specified that
we do not yet have all the elements to ask all questions about the timeline facts. In this regard, our
Committee of inquiry expected to ship at the Bataclan March 17, to try to better understand the running.
Many among us and our fellow citizens are asking why the means that you mentioned, whereby it is
necessary to add the State of emergency, have not been in OEwork since the aftermath of the attacks in
the month of January 2015. Why have anticipated those of November 13 to react with this force? Yourself
have said, in an interview on January 8, 2016: we take the decision of the State of emergency when the
right conditions defined by the text of 1955 are met, it raises not because it offers political comfort but
because the situation warrants and that it can have efficiency You conclude by this sentence: "it means
that there is an imminent danger and that those who have hit are likely to hit yet."
Of course, it is always easy to redo history but, with hindsight, we now know that this threat was
imminent, we know that the terrorists struck again, because there has been 130 deaths on 13 November
of the same year. My question is very clear, very simple: have you not feel that the risk of a new wave of

attacks could be underestimated after those in January while all specialists said their fear before the
previous commission of inquiry, chaired by M. Ciotti, whose rapporteur was Mr. Mennucci and which our
rapporteur and I participated? According to them, the question was not whether if a new wave of attacks
occur, but where and when. Don't you have therefore the feeling of waiting a bit too much to implement
OEwork all these means?
The Minister. Thank you, Mr president, to ask this question in as direct a manner, because I saw her
flush several times in public debate, thus, sometimes only in newspapers that contained the terms; It calls
the most accurate response.
We waited for the attacks in the month of November, or even those of the month of January 2015, to
assess the extent of the terrorist threat? I come by my presentation to reconstruct all of the chronology of
the decisions we have taken. We decided to rearm the intelligence services and the internal security
services from 2012, for reasons having the conscience that we had, at the time of the State of weakness
in which these services were, following the reform of General information, which had shaken the
intelligence organization in the territories, the decrease of 13,000 of the staff of the police and the
gendarmerie who had not been without impact regarding the ability of the country to respond to the
terrorist threat and the evolution of the means of the intelligence services of a decrease of approximately
17% of the credits out of title 2 of the police, depriving it of significant materials. We took legislative
provisions, particularly with the Act of December 2012, intended to strengthen the means to fight against
terrorism, and the law of November 13, 2014, which offers a set of resources that I recalled: prohibition to
leave the country, ban on entering the territory, administrative blocking of sites, blocking of internet
addresses, possibility for intelligence to speak under pseudonym in social networks implementation of the
individual terrorist criminal criminality, implementation of the status of repentant, possibility to use the
funds of the Agency for management and recovery of seized and confiscated assets (AGRASC) for the
financing of this status. I could list all of the measures that have been taken before the January attacks.
After the January attacks, we decided to strengthen further the capacity of intelligence: 1,500 jobs
created, 233 million euros released, including 98 million spent for absolutely strategic from the year 2015
issues, implementation of the Act on intelligence, absolutely essential for the fight against terrorism, with
the introduction of the continuous monitoring of terrorists and detection in anonymous data - the risks that
these statutory provisions could pose to civil liberties aroused enormous debates during which we
brought all explanations. We also began to prepare first responders strengthening devices, and the plan
from October 29, I've presented before the attacks of November 13, was the result of an important work
of reinforcement of intervention forces.
There remains the question of the State of emergency, I understand that it arises when we know the end
of the film, but, Mr president, ladies and gentlemen, how many parliamentarians, political leaders have
requested the establishment of the State of emergency in January 2015?... I don't hold it against anyone,
the reason is very simple: the State of emergency is not a device for convenience, the conditions must be
met legally to declare.
I am very precisely what you said. Your reasoning is as follows: the fact that other attacks were
committed after those in January proves that the risk was imminent. I would remind you because you
have to be extremely precise on these subjects that in January, at the end of the assault to
theHypercacher, we knew that those who were responsible for the killings had been neutralized: the two
brothers Kaye in Dammartin-en-Gole and MIT Coulibaly atHypercacher. Therefore, the risk of an
aftershock in the next hours was relatively low.
This is not at all the case on November 13. What has led to the outbreak of the State of emergency, it is
this mass slaughter whose actors, where I speak, were not yet all recovered by the services under the
authority of justice. I think one of the Abdeslam brothers and some of his accomplices. We are in a very
different configuration.

If person in January 2015 proposed that it raises the State of emergency, it is that each following this
rigorous approach, saw well that the legal requirements were not met. I add a point: has escaped to the
sagacity of none of you that three days after its release in November, debate has emerged - because
democracy is made and it is well make it so - on the procedure itself, as if the problem was not the
terrorist attack but the State of emergency.
In addition, as the State of emergency can not be continued indefinitely, I ask you the question: If the
State of emergency had raised after the attacks of January while the legal requirements were not met, its
re-triggering there was accepted after November 13, while he was already in force several months after
January 13? A series of actors is would be asked why it had not allowed to avoid new attacks.
The argument that you develop is quite reversible, Mr President. You say that the danger was imminent,
the evidence that there were attacks then, but the legal conditions were not met for the reasons that I
have just mentioned, and if it had been raised and that there had been attacks then we could have said:
"but then, you have taken measures that are worthless!
The conclusions I draw from all this are very simple. The first is that the State of emergency cannot be
raised that once the legal conditions are strictly met so it is. The second is that the State of emergency
cannot last indefinitely. Therefore, it is essential to take right to the provisions which allow to follow the
State of emergency after he ceased to know its effects. This is what we have done until the State of
emergency is raised, even before the attacks in the month of January 2015. November 13, 2014
legislation and a number of administrative police measures to take over the State of emergency - I am
thinking, for example, bans exit from the territory, as the legal conditions are met to apply to those who
are subject to assignment to residence. On the other hand, I also relies heavily on the fact that the State
of emergency is not the only instrument for combating terrorism: there are all the provisions I have just
mentioned, in budgetary terms, in terms of the creation of jobs, in terms of the legal means provided
services. From this point of view, the agenda which has been ours, and which resulted in a very strong
parliamentary mobilization, has been very busy.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for your answer, Minister.
I want to also ask about a point of detail, but maybe you won't answer, because it probably subject to
judicial information.
During the first round tables that we organized, we have heard victims. The father of one of them and his
lawyer asked a very specific question: why not secure the Bataclan while the name of this theatre
appeared on a record of the DCRI dated May 6, 2009, and it was covered by a project of attack? This
seems to have been confirmed by the hearing of a certain Farouk Ben Abbes, itself linked to the attack in
Cairo in 2009, in which a young French woman, Ccile Vannier, had died. According to the witnesses
heard by our Committee of inquiry, the Bataclan owners had not been informed of these threats and the
security forces did not plan of the premises at the time of the intervention. Do you have information to
meet the legitimate and painful interrogation of these victims?
The Minister. , Of course I followed very carefully these hearings. This issue is extremely important, but I
can't go beyond the secret of the statement. I'll tell you absolutely everything that I know, but it is not
exhaustive, is perhaps not all that you need to know - and I do not know because I do not have access to
the contents of the folder. How is it that no protection of the Bataclan has been put in place, while the
investigation into the bombing of Cairo showed that threats have weighed on this room, in relation to the
character that you quoted, Farouk Ben Abbes - a relative of the Clain brothers, themselves followed
closely by our services and involved in the attacks of November 13-, and that an individual arrested in
August was part of threats on this theatre? That is, if I have understood correctly, the question.
First of all, the judicial inquiry into the attack in Cairo in 2009 is still ongoing: I cannot comment on, for
reasons of law that everyone understands. I note however, that the referred to as Farouk Ben Abbes did

not, to my knowledge, the subject of proceedings in this case, nor, indeed, that the brothers Clain. I then
recalled that Farouk Ben Abbes was arrested and indicted in a second case, independent of the first, then
received a dismissal - in 2012. Therefore, keep to hastily, with end-to-end, in retrospect, fragments of
investigation, links that only the investigation may, where appropriate, establish. Me, I'm not, today, in
situation ascertained. I remember especially as threats by the jihadist's return from Syria arrested in last
August to commit attacks in show rooms were generic. He gave no room in particular and in no case the
Bataclan. In the same way, no suspect had referred, at prior arrests, projects aimed specifically at
breweries, restaurant Le Petit Cambodia or the Stade de France. Similarly, the churches of Villejuif, the
Thalys from Amsterdam and the military arsenal of Toulon, targets of attacks that we have thwarted or
prevented, have, at any time, previously mentioned by the terrorists in the earlier cases. I confirm to the
commission I have seen no note indicating a particular threat on the Bataclan or any Auditorium. The only
ones I've seen were general threats on show rooms - the term from surveys performed in the months of
May and June.
Therefore, that everyone understands that the threat of terrorism can hit places, targets very different - we
unfortunately saw. It is impossible, I say with great solemnity and sincerity, to place permanently a
platoon a strength rapid intervention or military within the Sentinel operation before each welcoming
public. It is physically impossible. And suggest that the terrorists smeraient of small stones, like Patufet,
for the police and intelligence to inform them of their future targets, would be a mistake.
These are the answers I can bring as precisely as possible on the basis of the information available to
me, a certain number of points to which you refer can be confirmed and in-depth, on the occasion of the
ongoing investigations, which are not conducted by me and which must be in strict compliance with the
prerogatives of Justice.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for your answer, Minister.
My last question reports directly to your Department and deals with the intervention on the evening of
November 13. Our Committee of inquiry must really understand what happened - and we understand
better when we go on the premises.
It has been some time between the beginning of the attacks at the Bataclan and the intervention of the
police forces. The first explosion of a suicide bomber, rue Jules Rimet in Saint-Denis, occurred at 21:20.
At 2125, so five minutes later, it is the first attack with the Kalashnikov, before small Cambodia and the
e
Carillon, rue Alibert and rue Bichat, 10 arrondissement of Paris. At 21 h 40, it is the beginning of the
massacre at the Bataclan. The final assault was given at 0:18 on the night of Friday 13 to Saturday,
November 14, being specified that the bis was already on the ground floor the Bataclan at 2220 hours to
evacuate first casualties and survivors. It therefore took two hours forty between the beginning of the
shooting at the Bataclan and the final assault. About an hour between the attack of the Bataclan and the
arrival of the bis elapsed in the room, where it took, then manage the taking of hostages. Where a simple
question: why it took an hour to the bis to arrive and enter premises? This question naturally brings
another: what authority gave the go-ahead to the final assault, two hours forty after the start of the attack?
The Minister. Forgive me, Mr president, but we cannot make things quite this way. I will reconstruct
extremely accurately the timing of this operation, because in this respect too, I read amazing things.
However I have the courage of officers of the bis to re-establish the truth about these topics.
Attacks take place almost in the same half-hour on eight separate sites, including three autour of the
Stade de France. At 9:17 pm precisely, the first explosion took place at the Stade de France. At 21 h 24
held the first shooting of the terraces at the corner of rue Alibert and rue Bichat. At 9:26, it is the shooting
of the rue de La Fontaine-le-Roi. 9:36 pm, is the shooting street of Charonne. At 21 h 40, it is the taking of
hostages at the Bataclan and the boulevard Voltaire explosion. It is a quarter of an hour after the
beginning of the hostage at the Bataclan in night tray is present on the premises and already kills a
terrorist. The night ferry immediately warns the bis. At 2200 hours the bis left her base, i.e. five minutes

after the arrival of the ferry. And at 2220 hours, i.e. twenty minutes after leaving his base, the bis is at the
scene. The PC is installed and there are the first increases in the ground floor of the Auditorium. The
question that arises, I remember very well because I'm so in line with the prefect of police of Paris, is to
know if these individuals, who were killed, were not trapped room. It is not no matter how in a room for
neutralization of terrorists: we must ensure that there will be no additional victims. A very precise analysis
of the places and conditions is required before any intervention.
So, twenty minutes after his departure, the bis is at the scene, his PC is installed, and a first progress is
possible on the ground floor of the Auditorium. The GIGN, meanwhile, is put on alert at 10: 26 pm for the
case where we need assistance. He received his order of departure at 22:45 to make himself available to
the barracks of the Celestines. Supported by RAID bis advance gradually in the establishment. The order
for the assault was given only when operational services, i.e. the bis, considered themselves to be in a
situation to do it, because they have totally mastered the places, and are able to proceed to the rescue of
the last hostages without additional risk for them. Once the information is transmitted that the conditions
are met, the order for the assault is given by the prefect of police, after I gave myself to do so since
securing the scene intervened and order that it is possible to do so.
There are belts of explosives, the ground is perhaps undermined, we do not know the number of
terrorists, we do not know where they are: in this context, intervention to save lives is possible that once
there is a total control of the place and the conditions of the intervention. This is therefore, very strictly,
what happened. And of course, for an intervention of this type, rated by operational services for
conditions of intervention is an element taken into account in deciding the assault. This is when the
conditions are met that the decision is taken. If we do not act as well and after a decision hazardous,
there had to be explosions and deaths, another question would be asked myself today. So it is that once
the operational conditions are met that the assault may be given: it is a classical modality of intervention.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for your answer, Mr president, and I give the floor to the
rapporteur.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Your unrolled the facts shows well, Sir, the importance of what is
called the first responders, already highlighted in previous hearings. Within the Bataclan, there was a
before and after: according to what has been said, the firing stopped after the salutary intervention of the
Commissioner of the BAC, which has eliminated one of the suicide bombers and save lives. Training or
in-service police or gendarmerie officials was revised after the attacks of January 2015, notably to allow
these first responders to act as quickly and as effectively as possible?
As the bis, the RAID and GIGN, which you have repeatedly stressed what were their roles and their
importance in the attacks from January to November, is their employment doctrine evolved, particular with
regard to what happened at the Bataclan but not only? For the first time, we were faced with suicide
bombers with explosive belts. Operating mode, the mode of intervention evolved? Were conclusions
drawn after the events of the 13 in the evening?
The Minister. Firstly, the 2015 attacks led the police and the gendarmerie to respond immediately to
customize the content and modalities of training in the field techniques and security in speech, both for
initial training and continuing education. An inter-ministerial decree was taken July 27, 2015, relative to
the continuous training techniques and the intervention of active personnel of the national police security
and security assistants. It reinforces the mandatory nature of this training, which includes shooting, the
use of weapons, professional practices in intervention, intervention techniques, defence and inquiry
techniques, first aid intervention. It consolidates the principles of an annual minimum time of twelve hours
of training and complementary training in shooting and professional practices in intervention. In these
training sessions, trainers benefit from new educational materials and enhanced training devices. Training
techniques and security in intervention of the guardians of the peace education has been strengthened in
firearms, first aid intervention training. And to work with the discernment in action, exercises on the factor
of decision-making in complex situations have been designed from real cases encountered on the
ground.

I've set new doctrines of intervention the PSIG and the tray under the plan from October 29, that I
introduced quickly in my explanatory statement, and new weapons will be used. I wished that the training
courses in the use of these substances, that allow the police to the BAC, which are sometimes first
responders, to cope with mass murder, be provided upstream of the delivery of the weapons, so that
these weapons can be used upon their delivery by the SAELSI to the various police and gendarmerie
services. This is not obvious, provisions for fire training being somewhat forced. So I asked that we look
beyond stands for training of the police and the gendarmerie, what other structures might be used with
the approval of private users in order to facilitate these workouts.
With regard to the doctrine of intervention forces, mentioned you just now, there are, on the whole of the
national territory, because there may be attacks and risk of surattentats everywhere, new arrivals, which
are not strictly speaking against terrorists, but who are in condition the site before the arrival of the first
responders. With the tray-PSIG plan and the deployment of the rapid intervention forces of the police and
the gendarmerie on the whole of the national territory, the aim is that first responders could be the scene
of the killing within a period of twenty to thirty minutes. This is the reason why I asked the Directors
General of the national police and the national gendarmerie to take advantage of the efforts that we do in
terms of increase in staff to distribute the forces of rapid reaction depending on their directions respective
throughout the national territory, with the aim that it is completely covered. I will make public the
distribution of these forces in the next few days since the copy must be made to me promptly by these
two Directors General.
M. Pascal Popelin. Upon review by the Committee on laws, January 20, resolution for the establishment
of this commission of inquiry into the means OEimplemented by the State to fight against terrorism since
January 7, 2015, I expressed my reservations on this boundary in time. Like many others, our country is
not facing the terrorist threat since January 7, 2015; Although its forms have evolved over time, terrorism
manifests itself in France since several decades, and the operational resources in OEimplemented by the
State to face fit into this long history. However, to know where we are going, it is always good to know
where one is, and hence are part
You have detailed, Minister, the Government's action since it is responsibility, and it was not useless.
I understood that we will return a next hearing on the question of intelligence, do you still feel that the
consequences of the decision of deletion of General information, merged with the formerly of surveillance
St
of the territory, to create the DCRI effective from 1 July 2008, are now behind us? Do you consider that
the measures taken since 2012 helped to return to the Ministry of the Interior its close intelligence
capability? You have also detailed the increase, increments, but steadily since 2012. Do you feel that
from the point of view of the fight against terrorism, these new means outweigh the 13 700 abolition of
posts of police officers and gendarmes decided between 2007 and 2012? You also mentioned the decline
of 17% of non-title 2 appropriations during the previous five years - it comes to the technical means
available to our services. How have things evolved since then?
The President Georges Fenech. I remind you once again: the issue of intelligence must be the subject
of a second audition. It is a question of respect for the Minister to meet ourselves our commitments.
M. Guillaume ledger. I will not return to the question of intelligence and strength. It would indeed have
much to say, dear colleague Popelin. If we wanted to raise the issue in the long term, we thus speak of
the period 1997-2002 and the impact of a number of reorganizations relating to the working time on the
mobilization of the forces of the national police.
I for my part five questions.
The first, I am well aware, is perhaps at the edge of the judicial investigation, unlike the other four. The
claim of the attacks of November 13 mentions specifically eight individuals involved. Or is there only
seven which have been the subject of a public statement. Can this point be explained? Similarly, the

th

th

claim asserts that were attacked the Stade de France, the 10 , 11 and 18 arrondissement of Paris, but,
if a car well was found in this last district, it is fortunately nothing happened. Also can this point be
explained at this point?
Second, plan Vigipirate and operation Sentinel, involving soldiers from the army, you consider they
achieve their goals in terms of the fight against terrorism? You seem most effective also with regard to the
means mobilized, who, assigned to these missions may not be to others?
Thirdly, the Government believes that the closure of the Val-de-Grce hospital can be sustained given the
persistence of a terrorist threat extremely high in Paris and le-de-France?
Fourthly, to Parliament in Congress November 16, the President of the Republic spoke about the
perspective of creation, from the reserves of the defence, of a 'National Guard framed and available.
What follow-up has the intention expressed today, particularly within the national gendarmerie?
Fifth and last question, you yourself concluded your speech rightly evoking the European dimension of
these issues. However, at the last conference of presidents of the European Parliament, last Thursday, a
coalition of diverse, ranging from the Socialist Party in the national Front, passing by the Greens and the
Modem, refused registration of the vote on the text on the PNR (Passenger Name Record) to the agenda
of this week's plenary session. Only the Group of the European people's Party and that of the
Conservatives and reformers Europeans voted for. How to explain this attitude of Socialist MEPs, which
seems to be directly contrary to the intentions, displayed and actual, of your Government? You are
actually attached, like us, to what this folder of the NRP finally advance to the security service in air
transport.
Mr Franois Lamy. Minister, you said that the GIGN was positioned at the barracks of the Clestins in
2245, therefore after the arrival of the bis at the Bataclan. Why the GIGN finally not intervened? Is it
because the bis and the RAID is considered to be sufficient? The rumor, to twist the neck of a "battle"
between intervention forces runs.
My other questions are more general and partly overlap with those of my colleagues.
Do you think that an intelligence service of the type of central created fairly recently, territorial intelligence
services in may 2014, requires human sensors and technical sensors? I can explain one day what
happened in my own Department when the background have been removed: suddenly, the territorial
information has disappeared. According to you, when the LSVCC be sufficiently recovered power to be
effective in the detection of weak signals, which, in principle, should come after one of the most important
signals?
You quite rightly explained that it was impossible to protect all of the sites. The measures have
nevertheless been taken since January 7, 2015: with 7 000 military operation Sentinel and 11 000 police
and gendarmes assigned to the protection of strategic sites near 19 000 officials attached to the security
and defence of the country are currently allocated to tasks that do not quite match their training. Where is
the reflection on the possibility of creating a force dedicated to the protection of sites, a force that would
not have the same training as our military and police? We talked of National Guard, private companies...
My last question, General, joined the president, but I will ask it in reverse manner. You explained the
effectiveness of policing on the evening of November 13, you mentioned a number of problems,
particularly in the identification of the victims. From your point of view of Minister of the Interior, which may
have been missed - it is not about if there were errors - at the level of the Organization of the security
services, between 7 January 2015 and November 13? In short, on which points would you like to perhaps
reinforce our security in the coming months? Were services fully developed? Have there been
improvements between January 7, 2015 and 13 November? Still spoken of war services, between the
prefecture of police of Paris and the other services of the national police.

The Minister. I am sorry, Mr president, but I must respond to issues relating to intelligence services, out
of respect for those who have interviewed me.
I am too aware of the difficulty of combating terrorism to discuss it with polemical ulterior motives. It would
be extremely easy for me to say that there are two periods: one in which it has removed 13,000 jobs, the
other where it recreates. one where it has dismantled the intelligence, the other where it reinforces. My
deep belief is that all Governments, right or left, who were faced with the terrorist threat - and they have
all been - tried to do the best in the Organization of services that were under their responsibility to ensure
the protection of the French. I'm not sure that my willingness to take on the subject the discourse the
stricter and as just as possible will lead all players having the same precaution to me but I think that the
question of terrorism deserves this approach. Otherwise, it creates the conditions for an extremely
unhealthy environment. The strength of a country facing terrorism, is not just the ability of administration
to organise themselves, even if it is of course essential, is also the ability of the forces which are or have
been in a position of responsibility to provide the French that the best is done. Do not convince them that
while this is the reality, it is considerably reduce the degree of resilience of the country. The ability of
resilience of a country depends for part of the conviction that have citizens that the maximum is done to
protect them: me, I have no doubts on the fact that the maximum was done to protect the French in an
earlier period. And, given the time that I spent today, I have no doubts on the fact that we try to do the
best.
The reform of the General information was based on the idea that there was a change of era, that we
could 'RTI' intelligence and that territorial intelligence, as he had been able to exist in the past, should
evolve given new technological issues facing the country. Was it a mistake? It's never a mistake to
consider that services need technology. Was - it enough? No. Since we are faced with the terrorist threat,
many analyses of experts or journalists develop the idea that would have been the choice in France, of
the technology against the men. But that is worth the technology in the intelligence services if there are
no men to analyze all the elements collected by the technology? This is pointless. The technology will
allow to do everything, including what were able to officers in the field, where they were immersed in
neighbourhoods where they knew all the actors? No. But not to arm the digital and technological means
police officers who allow such to enter into highly sophisticated devices used by terrorists in the
commission of terrorist acts would be stupid. This opposition, this species of Antiphon constantly
repeated on the theme of the choice of the technology against the men is so absurd. It takes competent
and technology men.
In the context of the fight against terrorism, we precisely today dramatically modernize the technological
means of services. This is what we did with the law on intelligence, that is what we are doing by as early
as 2015 EUR 98 million of credits off title 2 to this modernisation, within non-title 2 appropriations EUR
233 million allocated under the plan of fight against terrorism.
You mentioned, Mr ledger, the claim of the attacks, but I can not communicate information on this subject,
for the simple reason that, if I did, I diffuserais to your Committee on information covered by national
defence secrecy or the confidentiality of the investigation. Moreover, for reasons relating to the manner in
which the investigations are conducted and to respect for the principles of law, the Minister of the Interior
is not aware of the details of all judicial proceedings conducted by judges counter-terrorism, although a
number of elements of the investigation can be brought to its attention so that its services are organized
to prevent the commission of other acts. Therefore, I can't answer this question.
Plan Vigipirate is effective? It is not led by the Ministry of the Interior, which is only a contributor. I have a
reflection, which is the result of events that occurred in Europe, in the world and in France in January
2015 and last November and motivates me to make the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister
of the proposed amendments of the doctrine on the question of the modalities of intervention by the
military and the forces of order on the national territory. I do not want to deliver them here because they
have not yet been arbitrated. Perhaps will I situation, when you rauditionnerez me to explain the reasons
why I made these proposals, but without revealing them all. In my opinion, therefore we are dealing
terrorists, which can strike at any place and any time, and commit mass murder, how best to ensure the

optimal protection, it is to provide devices to patrol random and unpredictable that they may cross at any
moment. The means will be ever sufficient to protect by static guards all the places likely to be hit. If we
let people believe that, whenever people will be affected in a place, is asked why he was not protected.
The question, in fact very legitimate, evidenced by put to me on the Bataclan .
There are for example, all confused, 77 000 schools in France. To ensure a static guard standing before
these schools, should I mobilizes 220 000 police and gendarmerie officers, i.e. almost all of my strength.
It would be very complicated. It is also not safe, the first actions of awareness that we have conducted
evidenced that a static guard before each facility would ensure the optimal safety of children without
securing of premises. The best way to ensure this protection, it is to rotate forces permanently, so that the
dynamism of the guard allows us to lead to more effective solutions. As Minister of the Interior, I note
however that it is very difficult to get to share this point of view, even if it is for us to a common sense
approach, to those who are in anxiety and who can legitimately think that a static guard is more effective
than a dynamic guard. Thus, Charlie Hebdo was the subject of a dynamic guard. In the weeks leading up
to the events, was considered indeed that each fixed guard was a target for terrorists and that the best
way to ensure the safety of the premises without presenting targets was to energize the guards. This
theory has been much developed, we place it in OEwork.
I am in favour of an evolution and I make proposals in mind that I just tell you. This is also the subject of
reflection with the military, the objective being that the warning device to be sufficiently dynamic for
Vigipirate presents sufficient unpredictability to those to whom we have to face.
The subject of the Val-de-Grce hospital reports not directly to the skills of the Ministry of the Interior, but
maybe we can go back on what has happened on the evening of the attacks of November 13.
Firefighters, reinforced by the 21 medical teams worked to bring first relief and first aid. The objective was
to evacuate the wounded to hospitals so that they benefit from the most suitable support. It is what has
been done with a capacity of resilience of our relief and care system, which has been hailed. Paris has
many hospitals, and two military hospitals were also mobilized. at any time the device whereby we
appealed not found saturated. The Minister of health and the Minister of defence shall together ensure
exercises that we proceed, that there be no saturation of our means of intervention.
The President of the Republic actually referred to the interest of the National Guard before the Congress.
The Department is considering the creation of a guard national gendarmerie, and will make proposals in
this sense to the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic in mid-March. We think concretely to
quickly mobilizable force, under the authority of the prefects, formed to perform type security missions or
support of the police and gendarmes. The model the gendarmerie, with its 28 000 reserve reserves - 40
000 tomorrows-, inspires us, because it works well since twenty-five years, for a relatively low cost. If we
take this idea, I hope that we can create a national guard that does not overwrite the current reserve,
which is used every day in the brigades. I think many in this new concept, which will allow us to
strengthen our means extraordinary events. I can confirm that it is an idea on which we are working and
about which we soon make proposals; things are moving.
Your fifth question, on PNR, is devoid of any ulterior political motive. (Smiles.) I see this expression of
your malice and your very good knowledge of the topics, and I will therefore answer you without
precautions. I consider that it is absolutely not responsible, but then not at all, today postpone
consideration by Parliament of the NRP. When I went before the European Parliament LIBE in February
2015, the subject was out of reach. And the welcome that has been given to me was absolutely freezing,
not to say rebellious. (Smiles.) It was therefore extremely difficult to convince, but we convinced. And we
have reached in the trialogue, in a very good quality discussion which resulted in an agreement. Now we
want to defer consideration of the text by the European Parliament and link it to upcoming items on the
data protection! Let us be very clear: the only reliable instrument at our disposal to ensure the traceability
of the return of the terrorists on the territory of our country, it is the PNR - for those who return by plane in
any case. Do not have this tool, while we went at the end of the discussion in the trialogue and any
warranty is given on the data protection - it can always be enhanced by future texts - exposes us. Or tell
us about the terrorist risk is not at all responsible. So I have on this subject, taking into account the

combat that I conducted in the fora European and the interest it presents, a clear vision, and I can that get
in your concern and reiterate what I already had occasion to say on several occasions.
Regards the GIGN and RAID, Mr Lamy, I saw that there were polemics, but I gave earlier the precise
modalities of intervention of the RAID chronology: the GIGN is alert at 10: 26 pm and received his order
of departure at 22:45 to make himself available to the barracks of the Clestins in case it should be
engaged on other sites. It is the precautionary principle which leads us to mobilize the GIGN. In a
situation like that of November 13, it is not known if other attacks will not occur after those who come to
take place. The responsibility which is mine, and I said on several occasions in the two general
managers, who agree, is then not to organize the war of services but to make sure that all services are
war on terrorism. The time of the war of the services is exceeded; Today, it is the time of the war of all
against terrorism. This is the reason why we had mobilised the GIGN, for the case where...
Similarly, the patron of the national gendarmerie and the national police boss work in a great spirit, and I
will have the opportunity to expose him in a few days. With the boss of the ITSB, they did very important
work in January 2015, in the "smoking room", where we stayed together for 48 hours until the
neutralization of terrorists. They are well aware that in the event of mass slaughter, there no room for
Norman strategy to the stronger the pouque: it is on the contrary all together to face adversity and to
the need to neutralize the terrorists. Moreover, the map that we will present will show that we cover the
whole of the territory.
On the LSVCCS, I replied. It is already operational, and we give it additional means, including
technologically; It will be able to mobilize intelligence techniques. Already, in the fight against terrorism, it
is quite walk ofOEwork.
On the protection of the sites, we find today an excellent articulation with the military as part of a dynamic
and unpredictable process for terrorists. The static guards are an operational problem facing individuals
who can strike at any time and everywhere. Therefore, movement.
About gaps in the Organization of services, exercising my responsibilities and that it faces what has
happened in 2015, is not at all in the State of mind of someone who considers that everything went like
this had to happen. Incidentally, if I reasoned thus, I commettrais a fault with my services. I have no
suspicion of services, but events like the ones we have experienced warrant a return of experience
associate, and not simply by direction, a return of global experience that allows to identify the difficulties.
Due first of holes in the European system of cooperation between the intelligence - subject considerable,
November 13 has shown. Control of external borders is also deficient, with regard to the fight against
forgery. Furthermore, greater fluidity is necessary in trade between services, notably as regards the
individual follow-up of cases. This is the reason why I put in place the operational staff for the prevention
of terrorism (EMOPT) - complementary of the UCLAT - to ensure that each individual in the FSPRT been
extremely meticulous and attentive monitoring. It also involves, and it is fundamental, a cross in the
analysis of the services that we organize. It also means that we open more the Ministry of the Interior in
the world of research and the University on these matters. I would like much because, regardless of the
excellence of our services, to which I want still express my gratitude, regardless of the high competence
of those who serve, we cannot, in the period we are going through, do not open ourselves to the
intellectual and academic reflection on these topics.
I want to say to the commission of inquiry: I approach these issues with great humility and a willingness to
go upmarket our device in mind that I have just mentioned.
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, you are still eight to intervene, and our meeting
must terminate within thirty minutes. I ask you therefore to pick up your speeches, and requests the
Minister to make the synthetic responses. First hear four interventions.

Mr. Meyer Habib. Minister, thank you for your clarity and all these details. The controversy has no place
in our discussions, there is no here neither right nor left: there's that concern shared by the security of the
French.
Our system of de-radicalisation does not necessarily seem quite suitable. Thus the small Israel, aged of
fifteen years, who finally returned home, was being de-radicalisation, placed in a home and banned to
leave country - she had been found by her mother at the train station, two years earlier while she wanted
to join the Syria. In high schools, 617 cases of alleged radicalization have been reported for students from
more younger. How to improve our system of de-radicalisation?
Mr. Georges Fenech. I have already said that this was not the subject of this hearing.
Mr. Meyer Habib. I therefore leave this question aside.
I come to video surveillance. Do you think, Minister, especially after the assassination attempt against
Charlie Hebdo, that there is much to be done in this area? Terrorists were still able to circulate in Paris,
get out and remove screens for nearly 40 hours. Should we not, as in England and in other countries,
review in depth the mesh of our video surveillance system, using new technologies?
On the Bataclan, you already answered about the testimony of the lawyers of the victims, who recalled
that this room, owned by members of the Jewish community and having hosted some evenings for Israel,
was particularly targeted. We have arrested twice on this point.
I come to the doctrine of intervention. It is to your credit, Minister, to defend your men, your
responsibilities and keep you as a shield before your services, your police officers, who are doing a great
job, but if everything was perfect in the best of worlds, this Committee of inquiry would not exist and we
would have no questions to ask. The doctrine and procedures were followed, including at the Bataclan,
you recalled. However, the number of victims continued to increase as the minutes passed. Shouldn't we
therefore review the doctrine and procedures? According to certain doctrines, one must go to contact
directly; more we'll quickly in contact, minus the number of victims is high. This is not in the case of
hostage-taking but in that of a massacre. However, clearly, the Bataclan, it was a massacre, not a
hostage: he had no claim, they killed.
M. Olivier Falorni. All the questions that I wanted to address having been raised, I will simply share the
outrage that inspires me a news in direct link with the attacks of November 13, a stronger indignation that
we heard the families of the victims. I was shocked this morning by reading in the excerpts from an
interview given by Mr. Jean-Marc Rouillan, The Parisian co-founder of terrorist group direct Action, at a
Marseille radio on February 23. Fight against terrorism, it is also against the glorification of terrorism.
However, when asked about the attacks of November 13, Mr. Rouillan said: "they have fought
courageously, in the streets of Paris, knowing that there was near 3 000 cops around them. We can say
many things on them, that it is absolutely against the reactionary ideas, that it was silly to do that, but not
that this are loose kids.
Jean-Marc Rouillan was sentenced in 1987 to the imprisonment, including for the murders of Georges
Besse and Ren Audran. It boasts a system of parole from 2011, but this had already been the case in
2007. At the time, he had violated the obligation to refrain from taking on word that weighed on him
speaking in The Express and was returned to prison in 2008.
Given the circumstances, Minister, what we have experienced and heard, the seriousness of our
exchanges, while so many families are suffering, cannot accept such talk!
In any case, all this shows that, whatever the pseudo-ideologies that animate all these people, terrorist
criminals are found still in their hatred, be they anarchists, fascists or Islamist. I wanted to share with you

this outrage, and ask your reaction. What do you think of these statements? Do you feel that they are now
tolerable?
Mr. Serge Grouard. Minister, I wish to return to the employment doctrine, already mentioned several
times. If I summarized and simplified - perhaps too-, the question is whether to intervene more rapidly
and, indeed, less safe than the current doctrine allows. You answered need to have total control of the
situation before taking action. It is understood perfectly. At the same time, I understand that you think
such a development of the doctrine of employment.
In this logic, what our response capabilities? Is it envisaged closer, or even meet the GIGN and RAID to
have same operational capability or the idea you think is it absurd? Since the doctrine would encounter
such a development, should security forces more conventional may they also conduct this type of
intervention? You said: we were in Paris, with substantial resources. If such events occur in the province,
it would take more time to intervene. Should we not that more conventional forces can conduct the first
interventions?
My second question is more simple. What was, on the ground, the coordination between the security
forces and the first emergency services? What authority coordinating the interventions of each other,
including the Bataclan and to the terraces of coffee which have been the subject of these attacks?
M. Pierre Lellouche. To listen to this debate, I am not sure, Sir, that the formula of total transparency,
with regard to the Minister of the Interior and some senior officials of the emergency services and
intelligence, will move forward. There must be one hand position and unspoken, just simply because in
these matters, there are things that can not be said. I know work much on these issues.
Minister, certain comments have bothered me in your presentation, in fact very good, very solid, in
defence of our police officers and our forces - and I agree with you to express our gratitude. There are
indeed things that have not worked, that do not work, and who continue to be a problem in a war that will
be long and difficult. We must therefore be able to challenge us.
For example, you answered to the president that you've not heard to say in January 2015, that it was
necessary to introduce the State of emergency, but we parliamentarians! The responsibility of the State of
emergency, you know better than anyone, Government, and if you had introduced it in January 2015, you
would have perhaps given a kick in the anthill and allowed to trigger actions useful for intelligence in a
year where we were attacked a good fifteen times. Some have had luck, in the Thalys or Villejuif, but not
others - I am thinking of the unfortunates who was beheaded in Isre.
You say you have foiled many attacks, but if you consider the ratio between, on the one hand, which was
foiled and the cases where we had the chance and, on the other hand, the number of attacks, honestly,
I'm worried. I tell you because it happens that I spent several days in Israel recently, and, there, the rate
of prevention of the attacks is very, very high - because they have attacks every day... And I fear that as
we will win victories over Daech, we do not unfortunately have many candidates to attack us. Therefore,
increase the rate of prevention.
Once that the attack took place, it is too late, even though we may wonder about the modus operandi and
the management of the attack itself. Without deflower the subject of our work during the month of may,
the cOEur, is prevention, and therefore the coordination of intelligence, the place where information is
shared, and how this affects the operational forces. In addition, the European dimension, which you
rightly insisted.
Since we don't speak of intelligence today, I would like to emphasize two points for intervention. First of
all, the question of the Bataclan was raised with relevance. A theatre was attacked in Moscow, in 2002, a
school was then attacked in Beslan, in both cases it was appalling. I understand what you say on the
employment doctrine, the concern to secure the premises, but finally, when the victims must wait three

hours by land after injured to the weapon of war, that's a lot of dead at the arrival! This seems to me to
justify a dedicated training at the operational level, and perhaps a reflection on a change of doctrine,
which allows immediate action. This is not a criticism: a democracy that switches abruptly from peace to
war gropes. Therefore, wondering about the procedure, and it is also one of the objectives of this
commission.
I come to the intervention in Saint-Denis. The prosecutor referred to 5 000 cartridges. There were three
people with an automatic weapon. Should he do so? Again, this is not a criticism: the building could be
trapped, and we were coming out of a period of intense drama, but this experience feedback and
discussion - may not deserve in public.
As to the identification of the people involved, Kaye and Chung were spotted by the police, sometimes
intercepted. How is it that control measures have been suspended? How is it that one of them was able to
accompany her companion until Spain, so she took a plane to the Syria and found then involved in an
attack? These findings have also led me to not vote your act on intelligence: it is pointless to increase the
stack of information if it is not known to use the ones we have. Or you had a whole bunch of indications,
Verviers, on the Buttes-Chaumont on Molenbeek, on people who then participated in attacks. Are we sure
that we know use the information? This worries me, as many people.
Finally, I have not the time to talk about the limits of your anti-terrorism Act, discussed in the meeting last
week, but that is being done of those returning from Syria? Let them be returning home with more or less
controls?
I come to a double Parisian issue. I am the Member of the most attractive areas for terrorists: all that
there are more tourist in Paris is in my constituency, the Champs Elysees at the Palais Garnier, passing
by the Grands Boulevards, gare Saint-Lazare, etc. Every day, this Parisian geography me anxiety. When
the tray and stations have sufficient resources to cope with a strong strike or for a close combat? Then,
and I ask you to believe that my question not a polemical character, how will be to route 125 vehicles of
rescue or intervention, as was the case on November 13, if traffic is dropped on the expressway, on the
low platforms? The Mayor of Paris is actually considering make them pedestrians and cyclists. It is very
nice, but how to cross Paris if it is possible to travel on the high banks of the Seine? They will be
absolutely saturated. From the month of September, it will be Paris beaches all year round! How to
reconcile this project with an 'extremely serious' terrorist threat, as you yourself pointed out?
Minister, thank you for the work that you do, with great seriousness and rigour, but as a citizen, and not
only as a member of the opposition, I ask myself questions about the preparation of our countries in what
promises to be a long and cruel war.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. Your responsibility, the Minister, was first to remedy the consequences of budget
cuts and downsizing occurred well before 2012, and reset your services. If we lived the worst in Paris, city
of universal symbols, our responsibility for protection and anticipation must be exercised throughout the
territory. We must therefore continue our efforts and achieve the most effective distribution of intervention
throughout the forces. Wallow in demagoguery or psychosis, but our fellow citizens want legitimately be
protected everywhere. Therefore, can you clarify what is the deployment of intervention forces, including
first-aid? I am thinking in particular of the firefighters. Beyond the empowerment, is the issue of the
always-perfectible pooling of services that arises. We can draw on the devices already provided for other
major crises, which have resulted in simulation exercises.
Of course, the prefects have the responsibility to conduct these simulations that allow the field to prepare
and train security personnel in connection with those of local authorities concerned, and even hospitals.
What are the terms of this policy of exercises on all territories? You come also very soon in the Gard
region to realize its in OEwork. It comes to be able to cope, if applicable - hope that it will not - happen
the next major crisis.

Mr. Michel Lefait. Eleven projects of attack have been thwarted, you told us, Mr Minister, by the services
of the State, including six since the month of January 2015, but zero risk does not exist and all means of
the world never managed to prevent the replica of similar abominations. However, with could hindsight
and analysis of facts, useful for the safety of the French lessons, or even valuable recommendations, be
fired?
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. Is Minister, possible to pay the statement, as requested by lawyers for the
families of victims, some parts of business and previous records? I think the bombing of Cairo, in 2009, of
the Buttes-Chaumont or records of Artigat.
Then, as a reflection on the Sentinel device is in progress, do you think the S file, which brings together
individuals for reasons which I would describe as very broad, deserves also a reflection, and must
perhaps evolve?
The President Georges Fenech. The file S, this concerns the intelligence, Mr.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. During the taking of hostages at the Bataclan, have intervention forces and terrorists
communicated? In other words, were there negotiating?
The Minister. Mr Meyer Habib, I propose that we talk about the de-radicalisation again. As video
surveillance, as you know, we have mobilised EUR 20 million more per year on inter-ministerial Fund for
the prevention of crime for purposes of accompaniment of the equipment by local authorities of buildings
or the axes on which could be affixed to video surveillance. These EUR 20 million are at the disposal of
local authorities which have projects. We have already funded in this framework a very large number of
projects to improve significantly the equipment in video surveillance and video protection to a number of
sites.
In relation to the doctrine and the protocol response, are, once again, extremely accurate. When I talk
about securing places before the assault, this is to ensure that we will not further victims at the time of the
intervention. For example, I remember very well that before the assault order is given to theHypercacher,
there have been many discussions on the configuration of the premises, on the conditions in which we
could intervene, on issues that could be borrowed. According to our information, there were already at
least three dead: it was necessary to ensure that there is not further. When there are victims in a theatre
of operations of rapid intervention forces, our doctrine, simple and logical, is for now to create the
conditions that will allow to avoid increasing the number of the victims at the time of the assault.
This does not mean that it should not lead to reflection on the doctrine of intervention of these forces. I
share the sentiment expressed by Serge Grouard, Meyer Habib and Pierre Lellouche: it is necessary to
reflect continuously on the modalities of intervention. The competence of the forces are different - we saw
last November. So I asked a segmental analysis of the forces in the context of the return of experience
(RETEX) skills. It comes to be able to involve such force rather than another, depending on the situation
and skills, or several at the same time forces to be more effective. Each event must feedback to adapt or
even change our doctrine. I am on this subject, extremely pragmatic: each intervention should save the
lives of those who have been injured, always ensure that there is not more wounded, more deaths. Each
event is therefore the object of a RETEX which can lead to changes in doctrine and an evolution of the
modalities of intervention.
It is also the case for interventions of the kind of Saint-Denis. In this regard, Mr Lellouche, the RAID fired
1 300 rounds; the number of ammunition available is 5,000. I had the opportunity to respond to the
onslaught of Saint-Denis, in defence, indeed, of my troops. Some appreciation that is worn on this
intervention, conducted under the control of the judge in a legal transaction, I can tell you, for having been
all night in contact with the Director-general of the national police and the Central Director of the judicial
police, it took lot of guts on the part of the police of the RAID to intervene : no one knew how was the
building if it was trapped, etc. I hear the comments made here and there and, in a country like ours, all

comments are admissible, but I consider my role, taking into account the share of risk inherent in these
interventions and the courage demonstrated by my troops first noted this courage. This does not preclude
legitimate feedback. And defend its troops is not to refrain from thinking about how to optimize the
operation of the devices.
Mr Falorni, regards Jean-Marc Rouillan, I have asked my services to consider the legal possibility to send
to the Prosecutor of the Republic an alert in respect of article 40 of the code of criminal procedure, so, if it
is possible, that the proper procedures are triggered. On the other hand, it is for the Crown to seek the
revocation of the parole of this individual - it is the rule of law. For my part, I have no leniency towards this
type of connection. I believe that they are an offense to the memory of the victims and an additional injury
for families who have already much suffered. The response must be clear, and I hope, Sir, that you will
consider than just to the East actually
On the State of emergency, we regularly have a debate on this subject, Mr Lellouche, and is very healthy.
I consider that the fight against terrorism calls the largest legal rigour in the mobilization of the resources
to cope. I already had the opportunity to develop publicly the analysis that I have shipped earlier
regarding the legal conditions for activation of the State of emergency. I always wished that the utmost
rigour should be within my services, including direction on Civil Liberties, when it comes to measures of
administrative police of the State of emergency. Despite all the precautions taken, the administrative
judge nevertheless breaks certain decisions, because the right is not an exact science, and the Ministry of
the Interior or the Minister himself are sometimes questioned. It is in the order of things, but my doctrine is
to ensure that the Ministry of the Interior always scrupulously respects the law, even though this concern
may hamper a number of actions which we consider they are useful.
Of course, Mr Grouard, November 13, coordination was provided for the rapid intervention forces, as for
the forces of civil security, the crisis unit by either the Commissioner of police himself according to the
decision. You may find that the articulation of the intervention forces of civil protection, civil security forces
mobilized in the departmental fire and rescue services of the Paris Crown and the region le-de-France,
the BSPP was good; We need to ensure that it would be of even more distant territories, what is your
concern of Orlanais. I therefore gave instructions to prefects to raise exercises on the basis of an
extremely accurate method that allows this coordination and joint in each territory. I'll in Nmes on March
17 next getting in OEimplementation of this coordination on the ground, a concrete and real exercise. It is
the same philosophy that will chair the RETEX and what we will do on March 17 in Nmes.
Have we drawn useful information of the attacks prevented? Of course. In the context of administrative or
judicial interviews that followed, we recovered a lot of information. It will be same with 1 038 individuals
who have been or will be auditioned in 236 judicial proceedings. These elements are all
recommendations which, every day, lead us to adapt the intervention of our services to the risk. Terrorism
against people who make movement, we too must make movement every day on the basis of the
information that we collect.
Can we, Mr Laurent, pay elements from previous cases in the current records? I do not have to decide on
this issue, it is a matter of investigating judges. They may wish, in the context of supplementary briefs, get
additional elements or, possibly, pour into their records of the elements resulting from previous
investigations likely to feed the rest of their. Moreover, lawyers are there to ensure that this is possible. I
have understood, the hearing of victims and their lawyers, that some who wished that it be done so about
the Bataclan. Very well. Engaged on other issues - I think one of the Karachi bombing-, I repeat it to you
very solemnly: I will do everything to ensure maximum - not to say the entire - information communicated.
Judges and lawyers heard, which I know some, have a very good mastery of these techniques. They
know how to do to get these items of information necessary for the advent of the truth.
About plugs S, it is important that they be constantly updated. In the context of the work that we drive with
the EMOPT and the State of emergency, we had to proceed with thousands of updates - I do not have
the exact figure in mind, I shall give you the elements in writing. Therefore, give us the means to exercise

constant vigilance, inter alia through measures of police, those who are registered S and may present a
danger. The four-hour restraint envisaged under the Bill championed by Jean-Jacques Urvoas quite
meets this objective.
Given the speed of intervention, I do not believe that we can talk about negotiations between the bis and
the terrorists on 13 November. Very quickly, a terrorist was neutralized by the BAC. Incidentally, I take
this opportunity to tell Serge Grouard, the schema on which we work for optimal coverage of the territory,
it is the articulation between, firstly, new arrivals - first responders and public - security - tray, PSIG - and,
on the other hand, in a second time, the intervention, as soon as possible, rapid intervention forces.
The negotiator of the bis came into contact with terrorists at 23 h 27 at 23 h 29 at 23 h 48, at 0 h 05 and 0
h 18, but these calls allowed count terrorists and measure their determination to die as martyrs. There
has not been a negotiation itself, it was rather an attempt to contact and assessment. The last call made
at 0:18, was intended to capture their attention so as to facilitate the assault. It was not a negotiation in
the classic sense of the term. I think have answered you precisely, but we obviously are at the disposal of
the commission. Beyond the hearings, we respond in writing to your questions so that you have all of the
information you want.
Finally, Mr Lellouche, we came to agree with the Mayor of Paris on the fact that the conditions of security
and intervention forces - civil security or homeland security - must be evaluated in close discussion with
the city of Paris, whenever a development of highways is envisaged. This is simply to be able to deal with
risks in the best conditions. We will have this discussion about the tracks on shore.
M. Pierre Lellouche. You should therefore address this issue with Ms. Hidalgo? Normally, it is scheduled
for the month of September...
The Minister. This is indeed the legitimate desire of the Mayor of Paris. Whenever there are issues of this
type, in order to accompany the city of Paris, we study the conditions in which we can ensure effective
intervention of the internal security forces and civil security forces - not only in the event of attack.
Mr. Georges Fenech. Thank you, Minister, for your answers and your availability. We will meet in May to
talk about intelligence.
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue, the RAID (Research Assistance
Intervention Dissuasion) leader, and Mr. ric Heip, his Deputy
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, March 9, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, gentlemen, for responding to the request for
hearing of our Committee of inquiry. With the Minister of the Interior, we received Monday, we
began to address issues related to the conduct of operations, the intervention of the forces of
order and the means put at their disposal. We are continuing our investigations with you, Mr
general Fauvergue controller. You are the leader of the RAID and you are accompanied by your
Deputy Divisional Commissioner ric Heip.
I remind that the RAID (Recherche Assistance Intervention Dissuasion) is a unit specializing in
crisis management, which was established in 1985. It is able to provide its assistance to the
branches of the national police, branch of Homeland Security (CSB) and the gendarmerie units
seeking the addressing, inter alia, counter-terrorism missions.

Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, this hearing is held
in camera. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly. Nevertheless, and
in accordance with article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958 operation parliamentary
assemblies, its content may be published in whole or in part if we decide so at the end of our
work. I said that accounts of the hearings held behind closed doors will previously transmitted
people heard to their comments, which the commission may decide to report in its report.
The same article stipulates that shall be punished by penalties provided for in article 226-13 of
the penal code, or one year in jail and a 15,000 euro fine, any person who, within a period of
twenty-five years, disclose and publish information relating to non-works of a commission of
inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the Commission referred to this
information. Employees are not allowed to attend the hearings held behind closed doors.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, the truth, nothing but the truth, to raise their right hands and saying: "I swear".
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue and Mr. ric Heip successively take oath.
The President Georges Fenech. We enter the heart of the matter: the conduct of the attacks and
the intervention of the forces. Given the multiplicity of the facts and their complexity, we we will
attach, for the clarity of the hearing, to distinguish the events for the month of January from the
month of November. You want so much, Mr Comptroller, split your introductory two-part
presentation, one on only the attacks in the month of January, the other, on the month of
November, each of them being followed by questions of the Commissioners of inquiry.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue, Comptroller general, the RAID leader. Mr president, I cannot
properly expose the facts of the month of January without refer to preparing the RAID has
developed for acts of the same nature since the case Merah. It is considered by the RAID as the
year zero of one type of new terrorism that is found in the year 2015.
It is first a terrorism low cost, which does not require much organization and uses automatic
weapons and explosive vests. Then, it is characterized by a new way of acting. Initially,
Mohamed Merah took to high visibility and high emotional potential targets: the military that he
has killed, Jewish school and Jewish children that he killed and completed on the sidewalk. As a
second step, once it was found by the investigation services, he did not try to flee, it is cut off.
Third time, the terrorist radicalized, who wants to die fighting, Mujahid, awaits the arrival of the
intervention forces and then loads to try to make the most possible damage, both in their ranks
and on the surroundings.
We worked from what we saw in the case Merah, but also events around the world. We've been
particularly tagged by the case of the Westgate shopping centre in Kenya, which took place in a
somewhat similar way, but others are also produced in other countries.
Building on these findings, the RAID is prepared; to reason, since brothers Kaye, a side, and
MIT Coulibaly, on the other, acted exactly as well. We were expecting until July 13, 2014,
during the visit to the RAID and all new Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve, I made him this

same statement. We made him the demonstration of new intervention techniques we would use if
or when this type of event would happen.
It emerged from our analysis, that when this type of individual takes hostages or is pre-empted,
never not travelling. It not was one example, neither in France nor in the world, where this was
the case. This means that the negotiation that we are still committed with family madmen or
mentally deranged hostage takers, and resulting favourably in 80% of cases, has no other utility
for radicalized terrorists that prepare their explosive devices, use social networks, especially to
movies showing the massacre of their victims, and rest. This is what did Mohamed Merah.
The new technique of intervention of the RAID, the GIGN uses also, is to ensure that negotiation
cannot be used to the radicalized. It is transformed into contact: at that time it will serve in the
forces of order to possibly prepare for the final assault, it leaves an opportunity for dialogue to
the individual who, at the last moment, would like to go.
This preparation, we therefore presented it to the Minister on July 13, 2014, but I'd put it in a
confidential memo from the month of February of the same year - it is in the folder that we sent
you. Important at the time, it was the abandonment of the negotiation, which was a tradition for
us, but also for public opinion and possibly politicians. However we knew now that the
negotiation was playing against both the hostages and the outcome of the case.
The case of the porte de Vincennes was traced on a timetable that we sent you. In the morning, I
was with my staff on Dammartin-en-Gole, which is not in my jurisdiction but in that of the
gendarmerie. We were there to lend a hand to the GIGN, if he wished, to the title of the theory of
the "leading and competing", developed by the heads of the RAID and the GIGN. It gave rise to
the signature of a text by the Director-general of the national gendarmerie, the Director-general
of the national police and the prefect of police. The principle is that, in the event of crisis or
multiple, a unit can lend a hand to the other, even if it is not within its jurisdiction. The unit
which is within its jurisdiction is called "drive"; It gives missions to another, which is
"concurrent". In this case, I was competing on Dammartin.
When broke the case of theHypercacher, I was pre-positioned on Dammartin with two assault
columns, plus a column of the bis, so many staff. Obviously, on the crisis there, the GIGN didn't
need us. It was in sufficient numbers, he managed the case without any problem. At 1320 hours,
I have heard of the shooting of theHypercacher, I ordered my first Deputy here, Divisional
Commissioner ric Heip - for convenience, I shall refer in its callsign, Laser 2, on the
understanding that I am Laser 1 and that Laser 3 is my second Assistant-, starting immediately
with a column of attack on Vincennes. I stayed on Dammartin awhile. When we had
confirmation that he was a hostage, I went myself at Vincennes, by starting a little before me a
second assault column.
Along the way, the intervention of the national police (FNIF) Force was triggered, at the request
of the Director-general of the national police, by the Minister of the Interior. The FNIF is a
banner under which are grouped, in a major and serious crisis on all troops RAID - at the time,
seven national police intervention groups, become the antennas of the RAID from April 2015 and BRI - PP. To be more precise, the bis is CRISPER, not the sense of the anti-crime brigade,

but the commando brigade. The BAC - PP, therefore, consists of bis and other structure which is
the brigade of Paris. The whole is placed under the command of the leader of the RAID, so
myself. This device was triggered at the porte de Vincennes. He had also been a day earlier,
when we had done the raking of the sector of Villers-Cotterts, in the zone of mounted police, to
assist the GIGN.
To theHypercacher, things are put in order. I quickly resume the chronogram: 01: 20 pm, I take
notice of the shooting of theHypercacher. 13 hours 21, I send the number 1 column of the RAID
with Laser 2 in the direction of the porte de Vincennes; 13: 25 pm, I ask the constitution of a
third column of the RAID.
The President Georges Fenech. The FNIF is triggered on 8 or 9 January?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. January 8, to sweep.
The President Georges Fenech. You are certain?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. January 8, I had under my orders both columns of the RAID, a
GIPN de Lille column and a column of the BAC - PP.
The President Georges Fenech. According the elements that I have, in this case your report, the
FNIF was triggered on 9 January at 13: 40.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Yes, it was triggered on 9 January at 13: 40. But the day before, I
had also all these people under my command.
The President Georges Fenech. The FNIF was actually and legally, triggered the 8? Are you
certain?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. It has been triggered DFF. Certainly I have not receive any
particular order, but I took command of all these people.
The President Georges Fenech. It is still the Minister, on referral by the DGPN or another,
which can trigger the FNIF. You can request it, but you cannot trigger.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. No.
The President Georges Fenech. We are in agreement. What is January 8, the FNIF was
ordered?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I do think reminding me that it started officially. But the only
opportunity I have to take the command of everyone, it is in configuration FNIF. As that day, I
had the command of everyone, I think - but perhaps I wrong - I configuration FNIF.
The President Georges Fenech. Why has it not been triggered on January 8?

M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I do not know why it has not been formally triggered on January 8,
as I do not know why it has not triggered at the Bataclan.
The President Georges Fenech. We shall return. I'll let you continue.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. At 1340 hours the DGPN advised me of the outbreak of the first.
I'm off to theHypercacher. Once there, I take command of the entire device.
Without going into the details of the device, it comes to place snipers, assault of emergency
teams, teams that are going to exfiltrate people located in the building next to theHypercacher
and those who were in the pastry Lentre, just opposite. Places all so secure, we start work:
installing our two PC, authority and operational, and we begin to look for intelligence. What
matters in particular, it is to recover plans, to know where are the inputs and outputs, and how
the walls are made for whether it can enter the explosive - this is not possible if they are carriers.
We seek to know how to open the doors and, to the extent possible, the number of hostages - we
thought they were nineteen, in reality they were 26 - and hostage-takers. Since the beginning, we
knew that Coulibaly was takers of hostages but, until the end, we thought that there were maybe
a second.
15 hours 55, according to my timetable - but it's check-, the Minister of the Interior arrives on the
scene and I him aware of the situation: we are faced with a radicalized individual, at least
nineteen to twenty hostages are located indoors, there are maybe two hostage takers. A first
contact negotiation, it is very well known not to be one, took place just before. During this fast
enough contact, MIT Coulibaly appeared as such, and said a number of traditional things.
During a second contact-negotiation, at 1615 hours, MIT Coulibaly claim of his Jihad, will ask
that the France so its soldiers from Mali and pass the headbands on TV channels. I realized the
Minister until his departure, and then, as he had asked me, I was referring to the regional director
of the judicial police Bernard Petit, who himself reported to the Minister and reported back me in
feedback information from the Minister.
At 1715 hours on preparing the assault. From the start, referring to the demonstration which had
been made on 13 July of the previous year, I told the Minister that the assault would be the only
solution if we wanted to save the hostages maximum, but I garantissais not rescue all hostages or
have no losses in our ranks, even if the FNIF would do everything to save each and other.
The President Georges Fenech. At this point, our commission of inquiry wishes to know how
the services are coordinated. Therefore, from January 9 to 13: 40 pm the FNIF is triggered. At
this time, there is therefore the RAID and the bis.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Yes.
The President Georges Fenech. How is it that the presence of the bis at the scene of
theHypercacher is not mentioned in your report, while she arrived there between 12 hours 30 and
13 hours, and even then, if I have understood correctly, you're unit drive and concurrent BRI?

M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. The framework of leading and competing concerns that the two
national units RAID and GIGN. With the bis, it is under the FNIF, which is an integrated force.
When I mention the RAID or the FNIF interchangeably, I mean all.
The President Georges Fenech. You don't mention the presence of the bis in your report while
she was at the scene. For what reason?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. There is no particular reason. Since it is within the framework of
the FNIF, my report overall aim is the total workforce. However, I develop how we intervened,
with the bis and the RAID.
We work with two negotiators, so-called N1 and N2: the first, which belongs to the bis, takes
phone calls; the second part of the RAID and he analyses what is being said. It is therefore well
in the FNIF formation.
The bis was given the mission of diversion on the back of the building by blowing up the back
door to the explosive and, if possible, to enter. This is a door tirante, i.e. an emergency with a
door bar that push from the inside of the store to evacuate people in case of fire. This button bar
is not accessible. The challenge is therefore to arrive from explosives whose quality is to push, to
pull a door. Quite quickly, the head of the bis tells me that he doesn't have the resource to the
explosive to achieve. Our bomb disposal experts working with several s unitsObservers,
specialized in this field. Two deminers of the RAID are therefore responsible to carry out the
mission, and the door is open.
The opening of the door gives the signal for the assault, both front and back. At the rear, the BRI
unit rises to contact with our two pyrotechnicians. We knew already, and this is confirmed by the
loaded pallets of sugar, flour, and other commodities would prevent staff to go through the rear
entrance. Nevertheless, there were exchanges of fire through these palettes, which allowed to fix
Coulibaly.
We have it surprise, because just before the attack, we had last telephone contact with him; We
knew it made over the phone, and this constituted a first fastening for Coulibaly abscess. Then it
was flabbergasted by the explosion of the door - as the explosive has a staggering-, followed by
exchanges of gunfire with the bis on the outside. As happened the explosion of the back door, the
two columns of the RAID went forward at the front, protected by the truck shielded bis - ours
could not be sent because they were caught in traffic on the device. The FNIF assuming
coordination, cooperation, ready to instruments and modularity, we have use of the bis. Our two
columns of assault of the RAID arrived until the door of the front contact. They were able to
open it with the key we had retrieved - we had, otherwise, planned a system of explosion. They
have then entered inside, as you know, as seen on all televisions.
This is how this assault took place.
The President Georges Fenech. How is it, while Kaye brothers were still in nature and that the
perimeter was perfectly circumscribed, that you, January 8 at 10: 30 pm, raised troops and
returned the bis in Paris?

M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Because these are the orders I received.

On 8 January, we combed the entire device, where I was competing national gendarmerie: orders
received by the national police were given by the national gendarmerie, and the orders received
by the RAID were given by my colleague from the GIGN. During the day, we combed a number
of woodlands and worked on several target sectors, in particular of the houses that has reported
us as suspicious, in which we entered to search them. We also checked very many journalists
who broke on the sector. The GIPN de Lille, with which I found myself, including arrested two
young local journalists who had the same car as the Kaye. They are many in the forest sector,
inside a device that should have been sealed.
The President Georges Fenech. In this connection, we were surprised by the presence of
television channels, January 8, at Reims, then that is your service that had this information.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. What information?
The President Georges Fenech. The one that the authors were possibly localizable in Reims.
How is it that television was already present? Come from leaks?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. This is a question I'm always asking myself, Mr president.
The RAID is a unit of service, i.e. that it puts at the service of the units of investigators to detain
dangerous individuals, generally in enclosed areas. It is the armed wing of the SDAT (antiterrorism Sub-Directorate) related to terrorism, from the DCPJ (Central Directorate of the
judicial police) and SID (Directorate General of internal security). The latter is also home to a
small group of intervention, but when it is busy, it's the RAID involved. As such, we arrested last
year a number of terrorists who were returning or wanted to go to Syria. When it, the RAID does
not know its objectives. I went on Reims with two columns of assault of the RAID, and I was
joined by a column of assault of the GIPN in Strasbourg. My Laser 2 Deputy went on
Charleville-Mzires, and joined by the GIPN de Lille. We 'typed' several objectives that I never
knew before.
Already, on the highway, I was caught by journalists bikes. If I remember correctly, there were
two, which followed me up to Reims. But in Reims, there were already TF1 and others.
The President Georges Fenech. You do not know come from leaks?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I do not know whence the leaks.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. To theHypercacher, we know that there are hostages. Chua
calls BFM to say that if the assault is given against the brothers Kaye, it will perform. Therefore,
the two operations of Dammartin and the porte de Vincennes were strongly correlated. And after
my memories, you had to intervene to release the hostages before the assault is given against the
brothers Kaye. Only, they came out at this time, surprising the GIGN, which has upset plans. It
seems to me that the scene was filmed live by BFM. Coulibaly was therefore certainly aware of
the assault. However, according to them took place which were given to us by each and others,

there is a gap of about a quarter of an hour between the Dammartin assault and assault to
theHypercacher.
During this quarter of an hour, were you already in place? Had you planned to intervene, and to
what point? How was the link with the GIGN? What is it that you decided to intervene? Was
there not a great risk to do so? And why have waited a quarter of an hour?
You said in your introductory remarks, that you have reviewed your doctrine of intervention
depending on case Merah. With regard to what happened in January, and then in November, you
re-evaluated it again or remained modelled on the events of 2012?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. In the matter of theHypercacher, after discussion with the Minister
who had travelled on the spot, the priority of intervention had been given me. I'd claimed him
because there were about 20 hostages, twenty-six, in reality, while the Kaye held not - who was
hidden has been taken hostage. This was decided in consultation with Mr head of the GIGN, with
whom I am close and excellent reports. A first go between between the GIGN and RAID was
ensured by the presence at Dammartin of a negotiation of the RAID team who, with interesting
elements that could be used in the negotiation was strengthened that of the GIGN.
The rapporteur. But you told us that there was more negotiation?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. It was elements of context on the Kaye family, on their past. We
we not forbid to have such elements, or where appropriate, use it even when radicalized
individuals are involved. It was interesting for the gendarmes who had not, to know. I therefore
left, knowingly and in full collaboration with the GIGN, two of my negotiators to possibly work
from these elements. But, there again, the negotiation has not been used; We were well in the
situation I described at the beginning.
A second go between with the GIGN had been implemented. Two other of my officers were the
link between them and me, and two officers of the GIGN stayed with me on Vincennes all the
time. We had with them a relationship direct and narrow, which also allowed me to know that
the GIGN was giving the assault.
Smoothly, therefore, the priority of intervention me had been given, except that Kaye brothers
came out. I'm not sure that the gendarmes were surprised, as you said. In my opinion, it is an
assumption that had been studied by the GIGN.
The rapporteur. They are the ones that have come out, this isn't the GIGN which came.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. This kind of behavior is no longer surprising, to the extent where
we now know that these individuals come out, load, DART police or police, and they want to die
in Cervantes, into martyrs. We know through experience that it has acquired, including in the
RAID.
The rapporteur. I meant that the time was not necessarily yours.

M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I was going to come: it was not exactly what we had planned.
When the Kaye emerge, they are hired by the GIGN, that pulled them. For my part, I know they
are engaged. There is concern that there is a link between them and Coulibaly and that it is fatal
to the hostages. But at the same time, Chung is busy on the phone, since we have a last contact
with him.
The rapporteur. Dammartin intervention comes at 16 hours 55, telephone contact at 17: 05 pm,
so ten minutes later, and your assault at 05: 10 pm. After the release of the Kaye brothers, there
is a period of time, at least ten minutes, during which Chung is not occupied. However, yet once,
the output of the Kaye brothers was broadcast live on info continuous chains.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Altogether: 16: 55 pm Kaye brothers out of printing; 17: 05 pm,
contact-negotiation on the phone. Coulibaly had been on the phone with the Kaye brothers, we
couldn't have it on the phone. So, I think that way General there has had no contact with the
brothers Kaye.
Latency between our attack and one who necessarily gave by surprise at Dammartin is, in terms
of intervention, very brief. We were unable to physically prepare our positioning. It was
impossible earlier put the explosives on the door, because we were filmed live. If Chung had
seen us do so, he would have known that we were going to storm. Never a case has been
resolved as quickly, anywhere in the world - in democratic countries means, where we have to
work with specific instruments.
Remains that we have served in the preparation of this assault. We could not move to go stand
next to the door because we were filmed live. Do it, it was condemning the hostage-taking. Or
twenty-six hostages were all saved by the RAID.
The rapporteur. Last question about the chronology: at 1320 hours, you become aware of the
shooting of theHypercacher. The first contact-negotiation contained in your timeline takes place
at 15: 38 pm. This represents just about two hours, which is relatively long. Do you have an
explanation on this? Necessarily should be on-site to start trading?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. We have an explanation.
It is not me who do the negotiating, it is a BRI negotiator who was there from the outset, long
before me. This negotiator tried to have contact with Coulibaly. His phone number is not known,
and the only possible contact passed by the shop landline number. However the line was
occupied by BFM and Itele, all those who wanted to live interviews with Chung taking people
hostage.
The rapporteur. The first tests of contact involved very quickly?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. The first tests of contact involved from the outset, but the line is
released that very late. It was well thought to call on phones of hostages, that is known, but I did
give up this idea, thinking that it could endanger the lives of the hostages. Only when BFM has

released the line that we have attached Coulibaly. This is why contact was able to be taken at this
time.
The media had a role very penalizing for us, not only points of view operational and strategic,
because our procedures are detected quite quickly, but also and especially the personal point of
view, for me and my team. When strings Live filming the injured police, families attend before
their television station. Probably because of this, I had ten departures from the RAID.
The President Georges Fenech. BFM has also announced the presence of a hostage in the
printing industry. It's still pretty amazing!
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Yes. It's huge.
The President Georges Fenech. We are certainly agree that there is an obvious danger
implementation.
Mr Franois Lamy. Why the intervention forces, either bis or the GIGN, RAID don't use nonlethal weapons? I think notably tear gas. In Dammartin, in contrast to theHypercacher, there was
no hostage. Interventions were of a different nature. Why this choice?
You do not know your goals when you go on intervention, but you still had items on Coulibaly,
his background. How have them you had? How to organize your mode of information? Who
gives you or you does them not, following the interventions?
More generally, in your opinion, is the fact of not be warned upstream, notably by the
intelligence services of the State of the real threat that you might face, not a fix?
On the other hand, is not a problem of not having, in this country, including a database of plans
of all the equipment receiving the public, malls? At a previous meeting, you did we share your
concern with regard to what had happened in Nairobi and the need for you to have these plans.
Should not go as far as making it mandatory for each institution receiving public, to
communicate its plans to a database, and update them regularly?
Mr. Serge Grouard. If I understand correctly, televisions you prevented intervention hogging
the phone from the store and filming. Do you confirm that preparations on the back door, to
Saut it with explosives, were filmed?
Would you intervened earlier in Vincennes if there had not been this problem with televisions or
other parameters entered into account?
M. Jean-Michel Vel. Monday, the Minister said we have asked a very detailed analysis of skills
depending on the forces and territories, to evolve the most efficient way. I would like to have
your feeling on this evolution.
Is territorial jurisdiction really a good criterion to designate which must take place? Is it not
rather the nature of the event which should be decisive? What is the added value of intervention

from the GIGN, RAID and the bis? How you coordinate you? How do you train you? These are
basic questions, but I have the feeling that the goal should now be to have a force of single
intervention in the territory. The State of the threat calls for an evolution in the coordination of
our various specialized units, unless this constitutes a questioning of their skills and the quality
of the work they are doing, which we congratulate you.
M. Pierre Lellouche. We're here to try to improve the system, also do not see in my questions a
critique of physical courage and dedication of the forces.
First, I think it is useful to have a mapping of all these forces which, for some, although that is
Parisian, I learn the existence that today ' hui: the FNIF, another tray as the anti-crime brigade.
The President Georges Fenech. It will compile.
M. Pierre Lellouche. It is a real subject that Mr. Villaum has raised before me. I hear that there
are two negotiators different, trained differently, one with information than the other did not;
There are two types of vehicles, blocked each, the others do not... Would it not more reasonable
to unite all of these devices?
The connection between intelligence, collected and analyzed, and the operating system seems to
me to be a real fundamental problem. It's been a while that Kaye and Coulibaly, walk around the
nature. They have been photographed in Murat in the Cantal, when they went to see Mohamed
Beghal, who had already been sentenced and that we had tried to expel. Therefore, we know
them; they were arrested but not controlled. We know now that they were in contact with each
other, but intelligence professionals should already know - or so the system does not work. And
if they knew, why did you not, you, from the beginning? It is clear that there was a lag time.
The President Georges Fenech. These are questions which will be asked heads of intelligence
services. For the time being, we hear the heads of intervention forces.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Not remains the key problem is the connection between intelligence and
operational. That is why I am trying to find out what these gentlemen have as information prior
to conducting the operation.
Regarding the operation itself, the famous ten minutes referred to by the rapporteur just now are
absolutely crucial. Because finally, we had great luck: If, during those ten minutes, Coulibaly
decided to shoot, it was a massacre. It goes back to the intelligence and the doctrine of
employment. You say that it is the fault of the phone that was blocked, but the doctrine of
employment was expected to coordinate all the operations. You have certainly released everyone
and are occurring faster than it had ever done, but there is this detail ten minutes: have we had
the chance? Coulibaly had been more responsive, it fired on hostages to kill them?
With regard to the press, I suggest that we send him a strong message, because that what we have
just heard cold fact in the back!

I end on an issue on which I have already questioned the Minister of the Interior and to which
your vehicles, blocked on device clashed. Can we hope to succeed in organizing the traffic in the
capital of the France, blocking axes, to be able to solve a problem in broad daylight?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Wondered about the fact that we only aircraft not used gas during
the assault against Merah, what the Russians had done in the case of the Moscow theatre, which
involved 800 hostages and that resulted in 117 deaths. Studies were made, that we have
abandoned. On the one hand, the police doesn't have the right to use anaesthetic gas; on the other
hand, tear gas have no effect on a madman or a terrorist.
Mr Franois Lamy. For having experience in my youth, I can tell you that when one is caught
in a cloud of tear gas, even outdoors, cannot do much.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Sir, you were not a madman. The adrenaline charge receives a
madman to deploy a vital energy incommensurate with that mobilization during a demonstration.
Myself, I have had tear gas; they do not stop a murderous instinct.
The use of anaesthetic gases in a room as a theatre requires measure on the most resistant
individual - in principle, the terrorist-, which may result in the least durable of the major
problems. These gases will be broadcast in high-intensity in one place, two up: those who will
find themselves side will also have major problems. Estimated number of collateral victims
between 17% and 20%. All this to realize, once in the room, that hostage-takers have bought a
mask gas at 40 euros in addition to side!
With regard to the threat, the RAID is aware. What interests him is the change of State of the
threat, when it becomes operational. With regard to intelligence, the RAID, intervention unit, has
no need to know how took the investigation; It is there to challenge and stop. Information
required are very precise and very operational: the distribution of places, the number of openings
are the type of information that allow us to respond quite quickly. It is those who have served us
at Vincennes.
If Chung did not kill the hostages during the ten minutes of beating, is not luck, it is because we
have made a plan, that I validated and on which the RAID trains and works all the time. The
action is informed, and I am saddened when I hear say that we were very lucky, especially for
my guys who volunteered in this way.
Regarding the plans, the RAID has, as the GIGN, a unit constitute aid to intervention (DAI) files.
We are in contact with all the major centres and we try to have DAI to each of them. Our
territorial coverage is invaluable because in addition to our centre of Bivres, we have seven
other antennas - ancient GIPN - helping us to collect these plans to intervene as soon as possible
and the best possible.
The President Georges Fenech. Did you have the Bataclan plans ?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. No, because it is located in sector PP, so that of the bis.

The President Georges Fenech. And the bis had?

M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I don't know, I can't answer you.
Mr Franois Lamy. A national database, in which each could draw, would be useful?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. It would be a beautiful instrument.
Would we intervene earlier if it had not been a TV channels? In terms of time, for groups as
heavy RAID, the GIGN and the bis, the operation that we conducted was very fast. Remains that,
actually, we have been hampered by cameras, without which we would have already prepositioned our assault columns, what did we gain a few minutes on the intervention.
The President Georges Fenech. What you say is very serious!
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I still have to answer the most important question: RAID, BRI,
GIGN, nobody found. It happens to me not me find themselves no longer. At the present time, it
is with what we have, given the history of each of the units. Thus, in the national police, a local
unit, the bis or tray, and a national unit, the RAID, divide up areas of jurisdiction between Paris
intramuros for bis and Paris outdoors for the RAID - which has not prevented us to come give a
helping hand to the porte de Vincennes and the Bataclan.
The systematic initiation of the FNIF - that has not taken place at the Bataclan - wouldn't be the
advantage to ensure uniqueness of intervention? In my opinion, it may be a solution. Unless one
is directly attack at the base of the problem, that we wondered about the relevance of keeping
France a security force in each of the bodies of the gendarmerie and the national police. This,
gentlemen, is beyond my purview. I am sure, but it engages that me, that within five to ten years
coming, another vision will prevail and that a merger of the two bodies will appear desirable.
No doubt can we pass through intermediate stages before arriving there. The army has perhaps
crossed one when it has created, for the special forces, a command of special operations (COS)
directly with the staff. Why not, before merging the two national units of the RAID and the
GIGN, make them lead by a command headed by people who are knowledgeable in intervention,
and located above the branches? Such a formula could also be generalized in trades directions: in
the judicial police in public security, in the PAF would be gendarmes and police officers. But
then, we're on another parameter.
The President Georges Fenech. I propose now to talk about the attacks in the month of
November.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. On the evening in question, there were two officials from the
RAID at the Stade de France to see, in the context of the preparation of the Euro 2016, what
improvements could be made. And luck that we have, with my three assistants and their wives,
all together in the same place for dinner. This served us when it came to rally the forces.

Very quickly, my staff who are on the Stade de France warn us of what is happening. I get a call
from my officer at 09: 43 pm, while according to the timetable, the first bomber blew himself at
09: 17 pm. Why this time? Initially, no one believed an explosion, but my officer thought. He
came out of the stadium, did the trick, saw the corpse, and then heard the second explosion. Once
it has verified all of this, he called me.
09: 48 pm, initiative, I put in warning any RAID. I am then notified by anyone except my officer.
21 hours 49, the slaughter at the Bataclan begins, and we see information on BFM - like what,
this also serves... At 09: 52 pm, I realize my Director General, who is not competent in Paris, that
I put everyone in early warning. At 10: 04 pm, I pass the warning to alert; I send, in accordance
with my Director, Laser 2 is positioning to Beauvau to wait first downsizing, rapid downsizing
of the RAID. At 10: 07 pm, noting well that the situation is extraordinary, I raises the general
alarm, i.e. the reminder of all troops of the RAID. All our antennas of Lille, Strasbourg, Lyon,
Nice, Marseille, Bordeaux and Rennes are set early warning. 10: 25 pm, I arrived at the RAID
with 3 Laser and Laser 4. A minute later, I ask by phone to my first Deputy to turn away of
Beauvau to go directly to the Bataclan and waiting first rapid downsizing of the RAID. 22 hours
28, Laser 2 is at the Bataclan. He makes contact with the head of the bis, which is spot on and
already has with him a fast team.
The President Georges Fenech. How many men in this team?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Seven or eight.
The President Georges Fenech. We hear seven or fifteen, without knowing exactly what it is.
M. ric Heip, Divisional Commissioner, Deputy Head of the RAID. I am quite affirmative on
the size of the bis group present on the spot. My bis counterpart, with whom contact since my
arrival on the site, I wonder, initially position 'fire support', i.e. support with long arms to
facilitate the progress of groups. Very quickly, it asks me to complete his column, because it is
not complete. It is the strength of the RAID under my authority that will complete this column,
dont l' effectif, a ce moment_ la, n' etait pas de quinze strength, at that time, was not fifteen.
The President Georges Fenech. We ask the question to Mr. Molmy tomorrow.
At this point, how is it that neither you, Mr Comptroller, or the boss of the BRI Paris asked the
FNIF triggering, intended to gather all the police forces?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. To answer you frankly, the FNIF was triggered in January, what
seemed to me the best of things. However, during a debriefing meeting organized with the
DGPN and the prefect of police a few days later, he said have not understood why the RAID
came on theHypercacher, need not be in being not felt.
M. Pascal Popelin. It's the prefect Boucault...
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. This has annoyed me much, but he was prefect, and I said nothing.

Therefore, it is initiative that I put myself in early warning and then alert, I send my Deputy on
the spot then that I go there, without ever being seized nothing. I realize my director-general
who, knowing this, gives me permission to go there. After, these are matters which cannot be
resolved at the level of the head of the RAID.
The President Georges Fenech. By whom, then?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. By the prefectural authority, who will apply the FNIF triggering to
the Minister.
The President Georges Fenech. Therefore, it is the political authority.
What appeals to us, these are the times of intervention: you have been informed of the start of the
slaughter of the Bataclan , 21 hours 49, but your making contact with the BRI Paris takes place
at 22 hours 28, thirty-nine minutes later.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. To 21 hours 49, I am not informed.
The President Georges Fenech. When therefore did you summer?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I see it on a TV at 21 hours 49 banner. But the information is
television, not administrative.
The President Georges Fenech. How is it that it will be thirty-nine minutes.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I'm going to initiative on the spot, while I am not mandated and not
officially aware.
The President Georges Fenech. Therefore, that there was a lack of information on the part of
the bis, which was already on the spot, the prefectural authority and yourself. How is it that the
information was not?
The rapporteur. If you had not taken yourself the initiative to go there, the strength of the bis
would have remained incomplete, which would have undoubtedly posed difficulties for the
intervention.
Mr. Eric Heip. The difference there may be in staff accounting is the way to take them into
account. The assault of the bis column had seven employees, but there were also on-site in size
of the anti-crime brigade and the Security section, which are integrated in the commando brigade
without constituting assault columns. It is as if, during a shift, the RAID took under his label the
size of the tray.
M. Pierre Lellouche. How many men form an assault column?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. An assault on the bis and the RAID column, in principle, has 15
staff.

M. Pascal Popelin. To ensure a good understanding, Paris and the small Crown are within the
jurisdiction of the prefecture of police. The competent person to refer to the Government and ask
for a number of things is the prefect of police. BIS referred to, it is the BRI - PP, a service that
depends on the prefecture of police, and whose mission is to intervene, primarily, on this type of
business. One who is accountable for the device, which can tell if it has the means to act, it is the
prefect of police. If it does not have them, they called the RAID or in zone gendarmerie, the
GIGN, or even, where appropriate, both.
Correct me if I'm wrong, so it is not illegitimate that, initially, the RAID is not sought.
Mr Franois Lamy. The RAID boss is still the FNIF.
M. Pascal Popelin. At that time, the FNIF is not triggered.
The President Georges Fenech. According to your report, at 2250 hours, you can see that there
are seven police stakeholders bis, if we exclude other personnel. Given the very low number of
intervention forces, why, while you have the possibility to request the initiation of the FNIF, do
you not?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I ask not because I gave a lot of information to my director
general, who passed it on itself to the authority, and probably also to fellow prefect. I sent a lot of
messages saying I put my staff on alert, I'm this, that I'll get the job done.
That said, if it the substance of the matter, my intervention is would not have prevented the
massacres because they have been committed from the outset. Nonetheless, the Paris anti-crime
brigade, which is primo-speaker, had a nice reaction. It intervened quickly, and once she opened
fire, the case has been frozen.
The rapporteur. Note that you have made us pass, dated July 31, 2009 and on the Organization
of the first and the territorial competence of police units, indicates that "the RAID acts on
decision of the Director-general of the national police at the request of dpartement prefects. For
the departments of Paris, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne, the request must
come from the prefect of police. On Paris, your authority is therefore, somehow, the prefect of
police, not the Director-general of the national police.
I understand that it is your own that you went at the Bataclan. At any time, the prefect of police
made the choice to mobilize the RAID.
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. The prefect of police has made the choice to mobilize the bis.
M. Olivier Marleix. When you call the Director general of the national police, is he aware?
There, itself, the prefect of police in the phone? At what level is the information exchanged?
Do you know what it is from GIGN, itself informed of quite fortuitously, at 2115 hours, events
which are taking place? According to the press, men are stationed in the barracks of the

Clestins, ready to intervene as early as 22 hours. Obviously, they have no education and will
remain on-site.
You said, very precisely, the Director-general of the national police on the device which is
envisaged? Tell you that the Commissioner of police is concerned?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. For us, it is at 0 hour 10 the GIGN was in the barracks of the
Clestins. On this point, there is a controversy, also maintained. But truth should not delay to
gush since cameras filmed. For my part, I don't the know. What I know is that I arrived at the
Bataclan relatively quickly, with the complete unit of the RAID.
The President Georges Fenech. So, you were in the perimeter?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I was in the Bataclan, and I haven't seen a gendarme kepi.
The reports that I have with my director general are by text message and telephone. He is busy
with the operational PC and the Minister, and my role to me, is to report. At one point, he told
me to bring closer us and to position ourselves to the Ministry of the Interior, place Beauvau,
probably because it does not encroach on the prerogatives of his colleague, Commissioner of
police, more importantly newcomer. I think that it is on this modus vivendi that things work.
What I am saying is that I am a national unit specialized in the intervention and that the bis is a
judicial police unit that made the intervention. There is a hue and a difference. We stopped to the
judicial police for four years because we know the importance of specialization. The GIGN is,
like us, a national unit specialized in the intervention. We are trained to do this. We could be
raised, as well as the FNIF. But this was not the case.
The President Georges Fenech. The unwinding of the schedules that you have provided
indicates that the first shots sound small Cambodia and the Carillon at 2125 hours. You don't
move that at 2315 hours or about two hours later, while you are in the area for an hour. How to
explain this?
M. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. According to the timeline, I arrive with my assault column at 23:
09 pm to strengthen the fast team that is already at the Bataclan where my number two is also
present. Another column of alert, collected in the RAID, went to work in a building in the rue de
la Fontaine - le-Roi where it is reported the deletion from terrorists. They search the building
until 2: 10 pm. Two assault columns are therefore incurred very quickly: one, rue de la Fontaine
- le-Roi, the other, with me at the Bataclan, where a third column later joined us. Once the
device is in place, all staff of the Bivres RAID therefore are in Paris, with the exception of the
injured.
The President Georges Fenech. At what time?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. The first column arrived at 23 hours 09. It must take account of
the projection period.

The President Georges Fenech. You just Bivres! Two hours, seems to be long!
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. The police are not housed in their workplace. Time to go back to
the RAID alert personnel and that they equip themselves to go, it takes three quarters of an hour.
We are well within these deadlines.
The rapporteur. As you went initiative at the Bataclan, is also your own initiative that you fill
in the size of the bis, and then you enter the premises? Have you received a statement or have
you acted alone?
Similarly, what your initiative that column of the RAID went to search a building rue la Fontaine
- le-Roi or an order you it was given in this sense?
I add a direct question that is not unrelated to the previous ones: what are your relations with the
bis?
The President Georges Fenech. The question is excellent: are your relations with the bis also ''
excellent '' than what you have with the GIGN?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I said I had excellent relations with the head of the GIGN.
On the spot, my number two has already taken contact with the head of the bis. They shared the
task in a hurry with the teams they had: the seven men from the bis, more a few others, and nine
members of the fast team of the RAID, is a total of twenty people. My assault column happens
concurrently with that of the bis - I cannot say whether it is before or after, I no longer
remember. Whatever it is, as soon as I arrived, I immediately take contact with Mr head of the
bis, which is appropriate because the FNIF is not triggered. We divide the tasks in a simple way:
I take down, it takes the top.
The rapporteur. You decide alone, without permission? It is the initiative of the two patterns of
the bis and the RAID?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Yes.
The President Georges Fenech. Who has the command?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Normally, the head of the bis is territorially competent. At this
stage, it is not so important who has the command of operations: he worked up with his men,
more one of my precision shooters (sniper) since it is not; I work down with mine. We secure the
place, ignore valid victims, and are in contact with the two remaining terrorists. It is from here
that it is important to know who will then give the top starting action; This will be the head of the
bis.
The President Georges Fenech. The bis was not on-site, precision shooter: single present was
yours?

Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I only say that I have strengthened their team with one of my
shooters.
The President Georges Fenech. How many operational shooters of the bis were present?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I do not know.
So, Yes, we have acted initiative. But in 37 years of police, I have taken many initiatives.
The rapporteur. I go back to my question about your relationship with the bis.
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. The bis is a judicial police unit that made the intervention. It is
composed of brave and courageous fighters who went to the fire. Personally, I am not persuaded
that today ' hui could practice the two trades.
Relations with the bis are good. A few days before the events, we even signed a memorandum of
understanding to work with it on a set of training courses to develop complementarities. Under
this Protocol, the bis will be required to specialize in intervention personnel, which is perhaps
not his dogma today, knowing that she wished to continue to make both the judiciary and the
intervention. The problem is therefore not relational in nature. What is, is that we can meet us on
identical plots in the professional field. Today, we more easily meet the GIGN bis because we
are talking about the same thing, we are two national units that make the intervention, and we are
also in international forums.
Mr Franois Lamy. If the FNIF was triggered, you would have been the boss of the operation at
the Bataclan ?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Yes.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you regret that this has not been the case?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. It is not by excessive ego that I wish to have the command, it is
because it allows me to organize my operational command posts (PCO) rest on the RAID
personnel I know and who are working on these PCO, to organize the noria's health services - we
work with doctors, as the bis. In short, this allows me to have visibility into the entire operation.
I repeat, when we arrived, the massacre was perpetrated. The hostages that we saved were no
longer under direct threat from terrorists, except that of the floor that the bis has issued.
Nevertheless, I have the feeling to have this operation although there has not been a collateral
damage. In fact, something is wrong when a specialized group of national jurisdiction puts at the
disposal of a non-specialized group of local jurisdiction.
The President Georges Fenech. Thanks for these comments extremely clear and sincere.
There was therefore no PCO outside the Bataclan ?

Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. No OSP of the FNIF anyway. Perhaps the bis in had it installed
one, but we have not had access. There was no common bcp.
The President Georges Fenech. When you come, you put up a PCO, and you take the direction.
There, you have been taken away by the bis.
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I have not taken away since I was inside...
The President Georges Fenech. I want to say that you have been kept away from the direction
of operations.
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I wasn't at the head of operations.
Mr Franois Lamy. I return to questions of chronology. How much time elapses between the
warning and when the RAID officials are able to be thrown from Bivres? What happens on
weekends, public holidays and during the holidays? How officials can you mobilize, and within
what period of time?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Between January and November 2015, the RAID has created a
rapid response team (ERI). Composed of eight to ten people, it now has sixteen. The ERI is able
to leave in ten minutes during working hours; night, she arrives more quickly much to the rest of
the convoy because men are pre-assembled and leave more quickly, or after about 20 minutes,
approximately. Knowing that, in the police, no staff don't live on-site, warning of the RAID at
non-working hours, holidays and weekends is ready to leave the service in forty minutes.
M. Olivier Marleix. At the Bataclan, there's no PCO. How and where to manage the response to
the other attacks that take place in Paris? What information do you have about all this, and how
can you cope as the RAID boss?
M. Pierre Lellouche. If I have understood correctly, this evening, there not command centre
where concentrate operations and intelligence information. During the evening, there is no
command.
Mr Franois Lamy. There's a police prefect!
M. Pierre Lellouche. If there is a prefect, he has not assumed command. Finally, how is
because, that the specialized anti-terrorism unit are not notified? If you learn the new TV, it is
that there is no command centre that alerts the relevant units. How is it that no one asks you to go
to Paris, and whether you decide to go there on your own initiative? Once on-site, either for you
to coordinate, at best, with your counterpart? It is that he has no command centre and that person
assumes command.
Don't get me wrong, I make or charge or in question; I wonder how to prevent that from
happening the same thing the next time. I note that the terrorists who were strafing the area were
able to leave. You're for nothing, but where were the police units? There is no integration of the

retort in a city such as Paris, where to enter three armed groups and where some terrorists leave
then.
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I have told you from the beginning that's for me: Middle crisis
intervention ended. On the Bataclan, I told me be made on-site initiative, where we worked
'better' with my college of bis - I prefer to remember this phrase rather than hear about
improvisation. This does not mean that it has no command, especially at the prefecture of police
(PP), which is the second police force in France, in addition to the DGPN. The PP has a
command room where you can find the first responders, the actors of the security perimeter.
Cannot pretend that this is not based on what I just told you. There is a command to the level of
the interventions and a general command on the whole situation.
That day, I'm not activated, because the PP staff appealed, by reflex, to the bis; It did not believe
in the RAID. Think clear, however, that the initiative I have taken to me on the spot is not
accidental: each head of the RAID, whenever something is happening in France has this reflex to
his unit on alert.
M. Pierre Lellouche. This is why you're not involved! We wonder about the system.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Put the feet in the dish: you have voluntarily away? Because, finally, two
French elite units are not solicited on major attacks!
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. No, I am not required to the gap, and I do not have the feeling of
being held away.
The current prefect of police of Paris, Mr. Michel Cadot, is currently reviewing the rules of
intervention of the various forces involved. It proposes that the bis may intervene in Paris
intramuros and the RAID to intervene in small Crown.
Mr. president Georges Fenech. East - this satisfactory?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. It's at best given the pressures exercised by its services. If the
Commissioner of police had no bis at its disposal, it would be more inclined to enter the RAID,
which has jurisdiction throughout the territory, has more resources and are better trained to pure
intervention.
The President Georges Fenech. We can therefore improve this organization. Need to improve
it?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. If you want to keep this Parisian specificity of a bis at the disposal
of the prefect of police in Paris Intra-Muros, should be, in my opinion, that it has a group of
about 30 people specialized in the intervention.
The President Georges Fenech. These personnel should no longer make judicial police.

Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. Yes. They must be selected and recruited on the model of
advocacy groups.
The rapporteur. That is what is provided for in the protocol you mentioned.
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. It's true, but this will not be at the same pace than what we
experienced with the intervention of the national police (GIPN) groups.
The rapporteur. There are already joint training?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. They exist under the FNIF, but each concerns that three or four
people of the bis. This is not enough.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Do you think that if you had the command of the operation, you would
intervened more quickly? You referred to the rapid response team, which probably takes much
greater risks. Today, in the light of what has happened, you privilgieriez the speed compared to
the complete implementation of a secure device? What is your return of experience in this field?
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. The intervention of rescue teams, assistance to victims, their evacuation
and their support have hampered the conduct of your operation?
Uncertainty as to possible other risks, to your knowledge, other forces were reserve this evening?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I do not quite understand the question about the gene that could
cause the rescue teams. Does reference to the assertion by Mediapart of a problem between the
UAS and firefighters? As national unity, we have the advantage of having a permanent medical
unit. It has five doctors who are physically able to absorb shocks and involved with us. Four of
them were present that night. In a theatre of intervention, we are putting in place one red zone in
which no relief doesn't fit other than our own doctors. Their role is to follow the column of
intervention to provide care first for stakeholders police, then to the wounded hostages.
At the Bataclan, we started by secure down in now the last two terrorists at the level of the
backstage area to gradually evacuate dozens and dozens of wounded we found arriving on-site
with the dead. We could hardly sneak us dragging the feet between the corpses. The wounded on
the ground fired us through the pants. It was a vision of horror. My four doctors and those of the
bis absolutely wanted to intervene. We have first secured places. Then, they began to evacuate,
aided by the present first responders on site with the equipment on board. This no doubt saved
the lives of dozens of people. We were in the war zone, the evacuation was using metal barriers,
back. We saw very nice reactions on the part of police officers.
In this way, we manage our rescue teams. Person enters the "light zone". It retrieves the wounded
that it leads to one nest of victims, where they are supported by the firefighters, the SAMU
emergency structures and other. We have therefore not been hampered. Say only that if our PC
had been installed, this noria could be implemented by winning two, three or four minutes,
enough perhaps to save a life.

Regarding the reserve for the RAID forces, I had engaged three alerts and I reserve all the rest of
the France antennas, which were mobilized. From Lille can come quickly enough in Paris and
we have the opportunity to use helicopter-borne means to carry restricted teams. On the other
hand, the GIGN was present in the capital, and we would not hesitate to hire him.
M. Olivier Marleix. I still do not know what information you had about what was happening on
other sites nor, consequently, what was your ability to coordinate.
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. When we intervene, we climb up a crisis room, Bivres, which
distributes information to the RAID leader and his deputies. It also manages the reserve officials.
It is a stand-alone tool that allows me to be informed 24 hours a day.
M. Pierre Lellouche. How many specialized staff do you have permanently?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. The RAID has 300 field operators. Taking into account holidays,
one can consider that 200 to 250 officers are available at any time.
The rapporteur. With regard to the assault of Saint-Denis, according to what the Interior
Minister said Monday, the RAID would have used 1 500 ammunition. Do you confirm this
figure? The press evaluates more than 5,000.
What weapons the terrorists had, according to you? Only a semi-automatic pistol was found.
In a situation where there was no hostages, the use of non-lethal weapons such as tear gas or stun
grenades, would it not have been possible? Can you tell us a few words about the other
procedures to which you think?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I can confirm that we have drawn about 1 200 cartridges.
The President Georges Fenech. Why have spoken 5,000?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. It is the public prosecutor of the Republic who transmitted this
figure, but there has been a confusion. We were asked how many cartridges were engaged in the
device, to know if we had ammunition in reserve. He has been told 5 000.
We know, for sure, the terrorists had a 9 mm pistol, because they shot us with, as well as on the
dog they have killed.
The President Georges Fenech. You can be sure that the dog was killed by terrorists?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. We have certainty. He is buried in Paris, and we are ready to dig
it up when you ask us - it would be pity for handlers who have almost built a mausoleum. What
journalists have told this subject was aberrant and unnerving.
The terrorists also had grenades which were five injured in our ranks. It was homemade grenades
or Yugoslav offensives chemises - my injuries have been affected by the chip.

Most importantly, they had explosive vests, which determines everything for a head of unit,
because these vests can do five or ten deaths among your men. In these circumstances, you take
no risk. Me, I don't got none. This is why 1 300 or 1500 cartridges have been drawn, to keep
terrorists remotely.
When it calls a terrorist at home, it is useless to try to sleep: it is on his guard, and need to
respond quickly. We used offensive and stun grenades mobile gendarmes serve no longer in law
enforcement, and that we have recovered. They are 72 grams and have a strong explosive power.
Today, the explosive vest is the constant concern for arraignment. All police officers and
gendarmes from France will no doubt be faced with individuals carrying a vest explosive or
likely to be infected. In this case, it must be quickly if they are left to advance or if pulled them.
Serious problem--, is that depending on whether there are explosives or not, there will be or not
self-defence. For my part, it was out of the question that my guys go to contact at Saint-Denis.
As long as I'm the RAID leader, he will be out of the question that I knowingly lose police
officers. This is what I did that day, and I do not regret anything.
The President Georges Fenech. You don't mention, in your report, the presence of the bis-Paris
in Saint-Denis. Why? In this case, I do not believe that the FNIF have been triggered.
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. The bis came at the end of the operation.
The President Georges Fenech. At your request?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. No!
The President Georges Fenech. At the request of who?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I do not know.
The President Georges Fenech. She was not there by chance. You know why she was present
or asked to intervene?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. The intervention of Saint-Denis is an assistance operation the
SDAT and SID, who recovered the addresses and done the work upstream, under the authority of
the Prosecutor of the Republic. As in the usual, we lent assistance to the SDAT. Ever the
presence of the bis had been scheduled in this operation: it is not the arm of the anti-terror.
The President Georges Fenech. Why is she there?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. I repeat to you, I do not know! It is here about eleven o'clock in
the morning.
The President Georges Fenech. It's still pretty amazing! And there again, still no FNIF?
Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue. No, but then this is explained.

The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, thank you.

Hearing, behind closed doors, of general Denis Favier, Director-general of the gendarmerie,
colonel Hubert Bonneau, the intervention of the gendarmerie nationale (GIGN) group, and the
colonel Armando de Oliveira, commanding the gendarmerie of Picardie region and grouping of
departmental gendarmerie of the sum
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, March 9, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the request for
hearing of our Committee of inquiry. With the Minister of the Interior, we received Monday, and
with the leaders of the RAID, a moment ago, we began to address issues related to the conduct of
operations, the intervention of the forces of order and the means at their disposal. We are
continuing our investigations with you. We entered the operational, and we want to ask you both
on participation in operations of conventional police forces on the intervention from the GIGN,
including specialized elite unit in the counter-terrorist.
Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, this hearing is held
in camera. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly. Nevertheless, and
in accordance with article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958 operation parliamentary
assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at the end of our
work. I said that the summary records of the hearings conducted in camera are transmitted to
people heard to their comments, which the Committee of inquiry may decide to State in his
report. I would remind you that, according to this same article 6, shall be liable to the penalties
provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code, or one year imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine,
any person who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish information relating to
non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the
commission referred to this information.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
nothing but the truth.
General Denis Favier, the colonel Hubert Bonneau and colonel Armando De Oliveira
successively take oath.
I leave you the floor begging you, for the clarity of our debates, kindly mention first the attacks
in the month of January 2015. We'll discuss in a second time in the month of November.
Army general Denis Favier, Director-general of the national gendarmerie. The gendarmerie
played a key role in operational research undertaken on the occasion of the attacks of January
2015. I distinguish three distinct operational aspects with regard to these events.
The first phase concerns the Charlie Hebdo attack that takes place in the morning of January 7,
from 11: 20 am, in downtownParis. Because of this location, the prefect of police of Paris is
unquestionably the manWork in terms of operational responsibility. Very quickly, taking into
account the indications given on the escape of terrorists to the North, the mounted police raises,
in the region le-de-France and great Parisian outskirts, a manWork of control flows and the axes

whose relevance will subsequently be demonstrated: we know today that the terrorists came
whacked on a mounted device installed on the A4 motorway.
Within a very short time after the commission of the facts, a structure of crisis is installed at the
Htel de Beauvau, to which I am associated while being not concerned first and foremost. For
experienced other crises in the past, I consider that this new organisation within ' smoking-room '
constitutes a significant added value, because all security actors are associated around the
Minister, in the crisis management and share the assessment of the situation. In this crisis room,
we took measures to strengthen the control device general flows, national palaces and nuclear
power plants - at this stage, we felt that there may be the risk of attack at different sensitive sites.
Early in the afternoon of January 7, the mounted police committed a very large volume of units.
In less than two hours, eight squadrons of mobile gendarmerie are mobilized, which represents a
considerable effort. In total, about 520 men are at the disposal of the prefect of police. At 3 p.m.,
the President of the Republic brings together for the first time, around the Ministers, all of
security decision makers. As Director-general of the gendarmerie, I am present at this meeting,
which allows me to fully grasp the situation and adapt my device with anticipation.
During this phase of judicial police, we are "force concurrent" and we bring this title to our
support and the support of our means to the national police, "driving force."
In the afternoon, we learn that the RAID will intervene in Reims to check the homes of relatives
of the brothers Kaye. The operation of judicial police therefore takes an extraterritorial
dimension, out of the jurisdiction of the prefecture of police of Paris to unfold in a zone that is
more within the competence of the national gendarmerie. It is clear then that the manWork that
emerges will be comprehensive and that it will require a strong commitment from all
stakeholders. In a spirit of participation and active collaboration with the police, we are means at
its disposal, in particular to ensure the closure of the sensitive site on which the RAID will work.
Ourselves also helicopters to ensure the sites are monitored.
In this initial phase, it is decisive that are gathered in the same room around the departmental
authority, all the security forces decision-makers: in such circumstances, the sharing of real-time
information proves essential. This point is a major concern of the Minister of the Interior and
guarantee the consistency of the overall system Artwork.
A second phase began on the morning of January 8. Things switch at 8: 53 pm with the
assassination by Coulibaly, the police municipal Montrouge Clarissa Jean-Philippe, and then, at
0920 hours, with the robbery of a gas station near Villers-Cotterts, on national highway 2, by
two individuals who are quickly identified as the brothers Kaye. This station is located in area of
mounted police. Out to an exclusively judicial phase into a phase of operational research. As I
am associated with the overall conduct of operations, I propose to the Minister to follow this
logic.
Our strong territorial implementation allows us to hold the ground: we put in place a hawk plan
within a radius of 40 km around Villers-Cotterts, controlling a large area which includes the
Retz forest. the GIGN are committed so that it brings its support to territorial units already

present on the site; We install Villers-Cotterts an operational command post (PCO), placed
under the command of colonel Armando De Oliveira. In its area of competence, the national
gendarmerie is more then force concurrent, but becomes force drive in an operation, not only of
the judicial police, but operational research. This is another key element that I think is also
crucial.
This operational search operation proved to be charged. We have been able to hold the ground by
mobilizing all our forces and capabilities: mobile gendarmerie, departmental gendarmerie,
Republican Guard, helicopters. All information collected from residents within the dynamic zone
control scheme has been verified to ensure the presence or the absence of brothers Kaye. The day
of January 8 search conditions are especially difficult: the weather is unfavourable and the night
falls early. We work in full complementarity with the national police. I myself defined research
sector of the GIGN, East of the area of Villers-Cotterts, and that of the RAID, which lies a little
to the South; There's no duplication of skills. Each force acts for the sake of the general interest
in a great spirit of coordination.
When night falls, we have sketchy information that leads me to propose to the Minister to
maintain the device. We would like, in particular, junctions and the hamlets, we patrol and check
whenever necessary the information collected. This option shows all its relevance, because the
morning of January 9, the brothers Kaye, who had been "fixed" in the area that we wanted out of
the wood, literally as figuratively. They just whacked on our interception curtain while they
leave the sector towards the Seine-et-Marne. At 8: 30 pm, while I find myself in a meeting at the
Elysee, the information comes to me that at 0820 hours, they took a car, after in expelling the
driver. I insulated me then to work with my cards and give directions. The GIGN, which lies a
few kilometres, unfolds immediately by helicopter to the site of Dammartin-en-Gole; workforce
of gendarmerie dpartementale, alert and there since the day before, control the axes. The Kaye
brothers find themselves caught in a trap; they are detected by a patrol that response with a
formidable lucidity to fire with Kalashnikovs. This strong opposition forced them to hide in the
premises of a printing press. I am part of this manWork to the President of the Republic and the
Ministers present, who ask me to go to the scene to coordinate all the operations.
When I arrive on site, to 11: 40 pm, the operational PC is already enabled: colonel Bonneau,
Commander the GIGN is present as well as the public prosecutor of Paris, M. Franois Molins,
and the prefect of Seine-et-Marne. The GIGN encircles printing in which Kaye brothers fled. The
RAID and the bis are present and put at our disposal and, at this stage, it is not necessary to call
upon their capabilities because we are numerous enough and able to handle the situation. We are
working on the site in a logic of global security: the situation of the hostage hidden in printing is
taken into account. schools nearby were evacuated. We then enter a phase of neutralization of
terrorists.
At this point, taking the grocery store kosher in Paris is not yet occurred. We take knowledge of
which occurs at the porte de Vincennes at 13: 30. The RAID and the bis then leave Dammartinen-Gole to Paris in order to take this new situation into account. From that moment, two heavy
operations take place therefore simultaneously, with an operational priority clearly given to the
kosher grocery where a large number of hostages held by Coulibaly. The scenario under
Dammartin is amended: the assault is now subject to the outcome of the situation of the porte de

Vincennes. However, things don't go as planned, as Kaye brothers out of printing in 16 hours 54.
I shall inform the Minister and I tell him that we are going to neutralize them, implying that an
offensive operation be organised at the same time in Paris to free hostages and neutralize
Coulibaly. Coordination is perfect between us, the RAID and the bis; liaison officers of the
RAID and the GIGN, respectively in Dammartin and Paris, ensure operational exchanges by
phone, confirming the information we share at the highest political level. It is in this context,
immediately after the assault has raised in Dammartin, the operation is committed to the porte de
Vincennes.
The President Georges Fenech. Among your written answers to the questionnaire we sent you,
you do State, at the meeting which was held in the hotel of Beauvau, nineteen hours, January 7,
an application for the Minister requiring a full sharing of information. Was there a problem at
this level so that you have felt the need to write this done black on white?
Army general Denis Favier. First, while we are in a phase of judicial police, intelligencesharing has a primordial dimension. It is for this reason that the Minister of the Interior has
decided to enable ' smoking-room ' in Beauvau, not only to streamline the exchange of
information between all the players, but also to optimize coordination of operational research.
I agree that the fact to come together around the table and everything in common constituted a
decisive factor that allowed me to very precisely understand the complexity of the situation in
my area of competence and to take the measures needed. Without information on the complexity
of the environment or data accurate on the situation, I risked not react upon learning that a gas
station Avia was deflected to Villers-Cotterts. If we be as reactive, it is because we are around
the table and the sharing of information is total.
The President Georges Fenech. During the attacks of January 7 to fourteen hours, you send to
the interdepartmental centre of crisis of the Htel de Beauvau, your report on the pervier plan
involving seven departments. How is it that the crisis meeting, which brings together the
Minister, the Director-general of the national gendarmerie (DGGN) and the Director general of
the national police (DGPN), should intervene only five hours later?
Army general Denis Favier. On January 7, the first meeting at the Ministry of the Interior took
place around thirteen hours. You refer to a schedule which concerns a report relating to the
installation of the pervier plan.
We have quickly gathered around the Director of cabinet of the Minister. From fifteen hours, I
attend the meeting held at the Elysee. Three meetings were held at the Elysee: one on Thursday
at 3 p.m., as follows, on 8 January in early morning, and the last on 9 January at eight o'clock.
The President Georges Fenech. It was during this last meeting that you is assigned command of
operations in Dammartin-en-Gole?
Army general Denis Favier. When the President of the Republic and Ministers had finished the
meeting that I myself had left to work in an adjoining office upon learning that the brothers Kaye
had been located, they came to join me so I present the manWork that we should develop with

the GIGN and the gendarmerie of Picardy region. I presented the options, the President listened
to them and he asked me to go on-site to direct all the operations.
The President Georges Fenech. Why your report fails to mention the presence of the RAID and
a platoon of the bis at your side, in the vicinity of printing, just prior to the assault?
Army general Denis Favier. At the time of the attack, the RAID and BRI are more in
Dammartin-en-Gole. They have already failed over to Paris for thirteen hours, when the events
of the porte de Vincennes have been known.
We had associated with the RAID search operations in a spirit of openness, efficiency and
general interest, while we were force drive and that we had no particular need. Work areas had
been apportioned on maps, in a climate very calmed between patrons of the RAID and the
GIGN. Sincerely, the preparation and conduct of this coordinated device took place in very
satisfactory conditions.
Police and gendarmerie officers remained on the ground during the night of 8 to 9 January. 9 in
the morning, when the events are rushing, I do make movement in the GIGN, of Villers-Cotterts
to Dammartin, helicopter, and the RAID, which is nearby, moves by car. Occurs then at
Dammartin significant forces GIGN, RAID and bis, each knowing clearly at this point that the
GIGN is the main force and drive.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. The RAID, we have heard before you changed its
procedures aprs l'affaire Merah in 2012. The did you also? Have they been re-evaluated since
the attacks of last year? Do you continue to negotiate with the radicalized people? In Dammartinen-Gole, were there contact jacks with the Kaye brothers? Where appropriate, what were they
used?
How did coordination, January 9, between Dammartin and the porte de Vincennes? When have
the security forces before theHypercacher prevented the assault in Dammartin-en-Gole?
Kaye brothers out of printing at 16 hours 55 and the intervention of the RAID to theHypercacher
starts at 05: 10 pm. Without seeking to put in cause whatsoever, I would like to know if, in your
practice, this quarter of an hour appears to be long or not?
Army general Denis Favier. The doctrines for the use of special units have continued to evolve
since the hostage of the Munich Olympics in 1972. I have ordered the GIGN twice. The first
time, between 1992 and 1997, while we know extremely violent terrorism, but of a different
nature. Then, it was still possible to negotiate. Then, the threat evolves, we've been led to evolve
ourselves significantly. In the early 2000s, we had to incorporate elements that stemmed from the
hostage of Moscow Theater of the Dubrovka in October 2002 and the school in Beslan, North
Ossetia, in September 2004. Mass terrorism has forced us to totally change our structures and our
precepts of intervention.
In 2007, we have deeply restructured the GIGN and I again took his command on this occasion,
until 2011. During this period, the negotiation was still possible, but the modes of action had

significantly hardened: it now had to have the ability to work in the workplace trapped or
polluted by nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical (NRBC) and products that use explosives
very intensively in order to free the hostages. The Bombay attacks, in 2008, led to adapt our
procedures in order to respond to the attacks or multiple hostage. Over time, we have ceased to
adapt to the threat.
Today, situations that we face require that we are able to quickly initiate fire when we arrive on
the area of operation. An immediate assault plan allows us, when we leave our base by vehicles
or helicopters, "brief" in motion and to quickly hire an offensive operation to neutralize the
terrorists. Because for three or four years, we find as a constant that it has more possible
negotiation with terrorists who face the forces of order. Since the events of the month of
November, the GIGN has significantly evolved the doctrine of employment.
To go further in the reasoning, I consider that the commitment against terrorists is not only
special units. We have not necessarily tomorrow, time to wait for the arrival of the RAID or the
GIGN. In the depth of the territory, should be able to engage the fire with more conventional
units, in order to put a stop to terrorists who want to kill until we come to contact them in a logic
of martyrdom. Between January and November, we have accordingly "doped" our basic
intervention units: under a plan bin (anti-crime brigades) for the police and PSIG (platoons of
monitoring and intervention of the gendarmerie) for the gendarmerie, which includes weapons of
quality, the armour of the sighting helps, gendarmes and specially trained police officers are able
to engage the fire quickly enough. When the Minister talks about a plan of action to twenty
minutes, he refers to this ability that we have to take emergency situations in different parts of
the territory, without waiting for the national units. The doctrine has thus evolved and capacity
are considerably strengthened, especially for units from the top of the spectrum as the GIGN for
what concerns the gendarmerie.
The President Georges Fenech. You therefore confirm us what we explained the Minister of
the Interior on the new heavy armament of the BAC and of PSIG.
Army general Denis Favier. The weapons will be delivered as early as next June. I established
150 PSIG hardened, so-called PSIG "SABRE". There are in all departments. I put them in place
for every fifty per year over three years, as the budgetary costs are important.
These personnel will be equipped with the HK G36 rifle, which is a powerful weapon, a personal
ballistic protection and ballistic shields that will allow the police to go to the contact under fire.
We will thus have a solid capacity of primo-speaker, that must be distinguished from primoengaged which is the 'classic' patrol that arrives on the site, is taken part, stands, observes,
response if it can, and reports. In the aftermath, the first speaker is sent on the spot, as soon as
possible.
Mr President, the communication between Dammartin-en-Gole and the porte de Vincennes
happens dialup, on the one hand, one I have with the Minister, on the other hand, one of the
GIGN and RAID operators present on the two sites. A few minutes before their release of
printing, Kaye brothers to have partially opened the door. Colonel Bonneau conveyed to me the
information and I have notified the Minister that I said that it should neutralize them if they came

out. The operational priority, which went to the grocery store, kosher, is then reversed, because
could not accept the idea that Kaye brothers leave without be neutralized. 16 hours 54, when they
come out, everyone knows that we will incur the fire.
The rapporteur. At what precise time open the door?
Army general Denis Favier. To 04: 40 pm.
The rapporteur. Therefore, is the information given to the RAID that he must prepare for the
priority inversion?
Army general Denis Favier. It's what he does from the start. The situation in theHypercacher is
very complex.
The rapporteur. I thought the quarter of an hour elapsed between the outlet of the Kaye
brothers and the assault on theHypercacher. One may think that the moment where the Kaye
brothers open the door, even as it allows the RAID to anticipate more, further increases this time
of a quarter of an hour. It consider you it long?
Army general Denis Favier. Very sincerely, and to have managed myself this type of situation,
the answer is no. It took in the RAID time to place, taking into account operational situation and
the accurate perception of the complex environment. Things are more delicate in Paris to
Ponthieu where they are contained - overall, brothers Kaye can not get out of the printing. The
porte de Vincennes, the case is much more volatile and is undertaken not a release of hostages
without preparatory work. Really could not find that the time for action was too long; the
situation was hardly complex.
Mr Franois Lamy. In Dammartin-en-Gole, unlike what is happening to the porte de
Vincennes, it has not held hostage. In these circumstances, why not use non-lethal weapons, such
as gas, even if you know dealing with people who want to die?
Colonel Hubert Bonneau, Commander the intervention of the gendarmerie nationale
(GIGN) group. For several years, we work in depth on the evolution of the procedures of the
opponent. Within the GIGN, we have a follow-up advance office, where officers, former
operational, devote their time to observe what is happening in the world. In addition, we are
engaged in countries in crisis - we are present in Baghdad 12 years-, and we understand how the
opponent plays. Capacity deployed in January have not been, for us, a surprise. We know that we
have in front of us people who act without notice, which kill and with that there's no possible
negotiation. The killing stops when it encounters the opposition of the forces of order. Follows
then a retrenchment phase which must last as long as possible to have coverage. For Merah, it
was to show the failure of the State to a single person who remains locked up for 36 hours. But
the outcome is always the same: it is death, not in Cervantes, but inghimasi, supreme soldier,
whose goal, both Daech than al-Qaida, is to sacrifice his life taking with itself the largest
possible number of soldiers of taghut, i.e. Supreme categories that are RAID or the GIGN. These
procedures we have studied them, and we know them perfectly in January. And whatsoever
Merah, the brothers Kaye, Coulibaly, the terrorists of the Bataclan, Mali or Burkina Faso, it is

them who decide the moment of their death and who throw themselves on the security forces.
These procedures, we have seen appear abroad, are carried out by individuals totally determined,
potentially carrying explosives belts.
This is what we have facing us when Kaye brothers come out at Dammartin. Orders are not to
kill, but to try to take them alive by neutralizing. Shots are made about one hundred meters by
elite snipers and men in position of hand and other printing. They aim the shoulders, hands and
thighs. But we are dealing with combatants who want to go to the end. I see Said Kaye fall first:
hit in the arm, he loses his gun, but retrieves it with the other hand and continues to pull. While
our goal was to maintain the Kaye brothers on the parking lot in order to avoid that they fail on
the road in contact with groups of the GIGN, we could not do otherwise than to neutralize them
completely.
Face also determined people, it is illusory to want to use weapons such as the taser or non-lethal
weapons. We also have an obligation to protect our own men.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. In addition to the operational aspects of the services, should we not evolve
their employment criteria, in particular from the territorial point of view? Do you feel the need to
establish a genuine common command of the GIGN, RAID and the bis rapid intervention forces,
and, why not, to consolidate these forces?
Mrs Franoise Dumas. The presence of the press, or information that could be disclosed during
operations have constituted a nuisance for your actions? Should what kind of behavior adopt in
the context of such operations? How far can you go in tolerance of freedom of the press?
M. Pierre Lellouche. General, to listen to you, I understand that it would not have a
coordination between services if it had not been called in At the level of the Minister himself, or
even that of the President of the Republic. There's no pilot in the aircraft. Despite the Merah
case, which dates back to 2012, we have not counter-terrorism control center to share
intelligence and manage the command of a crisis.
Something there escaped me? Do I understand correctly that if security forces had not been met,
January 8, to share information, you could not make the link with the Kaye brothers learn the
robbery of a gas station in large Crown and react accordingly? That the RAID had moved his
side without you prevent, in the East of the France, while it is theoretically your area? In three
years from 2012 to early 2015, it took no time in France, put in place the means to manage and
coordinate this kind of situation.
The rapporteur. I was surprised to read in the documents you sent us, that Coyote applications
report the roadblocks put in place by the gendarmerie. This presents a real operational challenge?
East - this common?
Army general Denis Favier. The problem with applying Coyote, is that motorists think warn of
a banal speed control while they report the presence of gendarmes operating within the
framework of the fight against terrorism. Indeed, it is penalizing. I cannot estimate the frequency,
but the phenomenon is not factual, it deserves to be analysed and taken into account.

With regard to the press, it seems to me necessary to lead a reflection with the security forces.
While I'm moving between Paris and Dammartin-en-Gole, a specialist reporter for issues of
Homeland Security calling me to tell me that it comes to have Kaye on the phone and he will
pass it to the antenna. I asked him to not to do so, due to the presence of a hostage. In the forest
of Retz, the bis or the RAID carried out their research under theEye of the cameras. This is not
satisfactory.
I call my vUnemploy the conduct of a reflection, a kind of forum that would bring together
actors of the press and those of security to remind the rules and the limits of the commitment of
each. This approach should be initiated quickly.
Dammartin-en-Gole, we managed to put in place a wide perimeter around the operational zone.
Very few images are out, and those that exist are distant and blurry. In Paris, on the other hand, it
seems totally impossible to isolate a perimeter when journalists can access to the apartments of
the neighbouring buildings.
There is also a problem with social networks. The tweets about developments in operational
status frankly put us in difficulty. This is a major issue that must be addressed.
Coordination is a key but issue, in this matter, I have a positive appreciation of the events for the
month of January. A crisis of internal security of this nature, a major political involvement is
necessary, and there is that the Minister of the Interior that can gather in the same room all
Directors General to tell them he wants to know everything and that all information must be
exchanged. From that moment, is well understood to unite energy, gather and put everything flat.
The structure exists: an interdepartmental room allows exchanges. But, from my point of view, it
is extremely strong ministerial commitment that toggles the things.
In the preparation of operations, the political involvement is essential. It must be present to make
decisions, and on our side because the orders are from cards and very accurate techniques and
tactics. To us, then, to translate into action the clear intent of the policy.
In addition to the presence of the latter, a unity of place is required, where should gather all
involved patrons: intelligence, judicial police, gendarmerie, police, health services. It is
necessary that the 'specialists' Exchange, and they should speak on behalf of their respective
Ministerial authority. We have felt even more the need in November.
Mr Lellouche, activation of ' smoking-room ' has demonstrated its usefulness at the time of the
robbery of the Avia petrol station: it allows in fact do not remain confined in judicial treatment
and go immediately on a phase coordinated large scale operational research. Thus, we resume the
initiative and the ascendant on the terrorists.
What distinguishes special units from each other, have the ability. Counter-terrorism, it is the
action once the terrorist act occurred. It requires few capabilities held by little units. Today, more
person does pass through the doors in these groups; You must be able to pass through walls,
crossing a slab through the floor or ceiling without causing collateral damage. In an extremely
fast offensive movement, it must be "dpiger", i.e. detect traps installed by terrorists and

neutralize them, work tainted with individual breathing apparatus or the suits, working also in
areas not lit with night sighting devices.
Under the national scheme of intervention which goes on foot, I propose that these rare abilities
that we hold are put at the service of all the security forces regardless of the area of competence.
It is in this spirit that we have brought our contest Belgian special forces in January 2015 to
neutralize a formidable group of Salafists. They turned to us, because the GIGN is probably the
only one in Europe to hold the ability to open a breach in specific locations.
The idea that emerges in the national plan of action, is to share the rare capacities so that they are
made available which do not control them. These capabilities cannot be reduced to technical
means, it is a concept of employment carried by men, whose operation is based on the principle
of modularity for example, explosives specialists module that works for the benefit of another
force. I think that the national plan of action will quickly lead to this point. An exchange of
capabilities will be possible at the central level; in the province, the trade will be between
specialized groups of gendarmerie and police, the RAID and the GIGN antenna.
Inventory of the capabilities of each and the other must be issued but not only on a declarative
mode; each ability should be tested. Counter-terrorism, on the top of the spectrum, mastery of
abilities must be assessed objectively.
M. Pierre Lellouche. The Israeli Yamam works with special forces commandos in a number of
heavy operations. Need to start preparing as early as today a cooperation between your forces
and special forces of the army?
Army general Denis Favier. A strong cooperation already exists and very regular exchanges,
particularly with regard to maritime counter-terrorism. In 2008, the GIGN intervened in the case
of the Ponant, conducted by Navy commandos.
Protocols exist also with regard to commitment outside the territory. The GIGN unit military,
able to integrate in interoperability with special forces, deployed whenever there is a hostage
abroad. We went to Mali, last November, when the hostage of the Radisson Blu in Bamako. We
were early warning with regard to Burkina Faso, a few weeks ago.
On the national territory, one could imagine such cooperation in an extreme situation. I consider
however that between the means of the police and the gendarmerie, we already have solid
capabilities. Hypothesis may nevertheless concern the issue of support for health in the event of
mass hostage: the health service of the armies would be a tool particularly suited to provide
emergency care. Should close the door on anything, but on the national territory, we must start
by optimizing what exists.
The President Georges Fenech. Now, could you tell us a few words about the role of the GIGN
at the time of the attacks of November 13?
Army general Denis Favier. Things have occurred mainly in Paris, we were therefore less
directly involved than in January. We however had a significant action on the evening of

November 13 to control external axes to the capital. Our action on the flow has also borne fruit
since, on 14 November in the morning, we controlled, at Cambrai, Salah Abdeslam, who ran on
a mounted device put in place in respect of the manWork of the flow control.
The GIGN was implemented with alert on 13 November, at 22: 26 pm. It was deployed in Paris,
to the barracks of the Clestins, located close to the place de la Bastille.
The President Georges Fenech. At what time?
Army general Denis Favier. Between 10: 40 pm and 10: 45 pm. The GIGN Commander arrived
at 23: 15. All the units, composed of forty-five operational crew, what constitutes a heavy
commitment, is present and willing to act at 23: 45. At this point, mission that is assigned to the
GIGN is arming an intervention reserve, because it is not known if other attacks may occur. We
are thus engaged.
The President Georges Fenech. Who asked this commitment?
Army general Denis Favier. As in January, a meeting is held in crisis room Ministry of the
Interior. The Director of the office told me to quickly engage the GIGN.
The President Georges Fenech. The instructions come de Beauvau and not the prefecture of
police of Paris?
Army general Denis Favier. In a case like this, the prefect of police dispatched to the field is
hardly reachable. Many uncertainties weigh further on the nature and locations of commission of
terrorist acts.
The rapporteur. Therefore, the Director of cabinet of the Minister of the Interior which asks
you to mobilize the GIGN?
Army general Denis Favier. Yes. We are together in crisis room and we can clearly see that the
matter is serious. All means are committed, and we need everything that can provide significant
assistance to the operational management. The order of commitment is given to the Commander
of the GIGN at 22 hours 26. Left Satory base before twenty-three hours, it happens in Paris at 23:
15. All of the 45 armed crew of the GIGN consists in the barracks of the Clestins around 23
hours 45. The CCTV of the city of Paris can attest to this timeline.
The President Georges Fenech. After having heard the RAID and yourselves, we find that the
two elites of intervention forces did not control of operations, on 13 November. It seems,
general, that you have tried to come into contact with the head of the bis, 22 hours 15. It
reminded you?
Army general Denis Favier. It is the GIGN Commander who had attempted to contact the head
of the bis.

Colonel Hubert Bonneau. The evening of November 13, information back us quickly, because
we have personnel engaged in the protection of the team of Germany's football at the Stade de
France. Since the events took place in Paris, I then tries to join, the patron of the BAC - bis.
I put on alert at 22 hours 26 and I get, Directorate of operations and employment of the
gendarmerie, the order of commitment to 10: 40 pm. I am present in Paris at 11: 10 pm, and a
first wave of the GIGN arrives at 11: 20 pm, and a second at 11: 40 pm - forty staff. As soon as I
leave Satory at 10: 40 pm I have the reflex to call the RAID boss, thinking that we, as in January,
configuration FNIF. Jean-Michel Fauvergue tells me he went to Paris, but is not able to make me
a statement of position. I informed him that I go to the barracks of the Celestines.
The President Georges Fenech. You tried to join it, but in vain, and never reminded you?
Colonel Hubert Bonneau. No, but probably was it due to the configuration of this evening. The
head of the bis should be taken through his work for understanding the situation and
establishment of his own troops, where the inability to attach it.
The President Georges Fenech. 0 hour 18, you become aware of a message of a victim on
FaceBook which writes: "I am on the first floor at the Bataclan. Serious injuries. "Why do you
not ask the DGGN permission to intervene in support of the bis? Why do you not intervene while
you are present, ready and equipped?
Colonel Hubert Bonneau. I have received the order to go to the barracks of the Celestines. In a
so confused configuration, a collective discipline is needed. Also, I expect the specific orders on
my commitment. When I get to the barracks of the Clestins, I have no information.
The President Georges Fenech. Sounds normal?
Colonel Hubert Bonneau. I'm looking to have!
The President Georges Fenech. So this is not normal to you!
Colonel Hubert Bonneau. We usually manage crises; I know what a confusing situation. In
such circumstances, it is very difficult to have an accurate photograph of the situation. I do agree
not directly on the Bataclan because I have not received the order of my boss to do so: I do not
want to add to the confusion that may exist on area.
The President Georges Fenech. You remain helpless!
Colonel Hubert Bonneau. I am ready to intervene further if necessary. We are told, at that time,
to fire may occur in other Parisian stations, including at les Halles. I expect an order. Initiative, I
do not move at the Bataclan, because I have no information on the exact situation on the spot.
Army general Denis Favier. In crisis room, where I am, we measure the seriousness of the
facts, and we have a lot of difficulties to have a clear vision of things. The meeting is formed
around the attacks of the Stade de France, but as it unfolds, we understand that events have

moved to the centre of Paris. We therefore find it difficult to assess clearly what is happening
and go through a phase of uncertainty inevitable in such a situation.
In this context, trying to get the commitment authority that would come from the authority in
charge of the issues of public order in the capital is complex. The prefect of police is
unreachable, as well as the boss of the bis or RAID: they are in operation.
In the context of the national plan of action, we are working on the construction of a kind of plug
reflex for efficiency. This would make the GIGN, which is stationed today at Satory, near
Versailles, less than 20 minutes from the centre of Paris, can go to porte Maillot, without another
order that a commitment given by the Minister. Such a reflex plug remains to be validated.
We left the GIGN at the Clestins so that it can be committed because we do not know where
another drama can unfold. Moreover, what would he have done at the Bataclan ? Could he avoid
that there are 130 dead?
The President Georges Fenech. More at this time!
Army general Denis Favier. Could it help, thanks to its expertise in community care? Maybe,
that, having worked for years alongside special forces in Afghanistan, we have gendarmes who
are team members but may also ask a tourniquet. Whatever it is, we weren't at the Bataclan, and
we are not able to measure what would have been the impact of our presence.
On the other hand, we have to draw the consequences of the events: under the national scheme of
intervention units who hold capabilities must be able to commit very quickly from their base to
provide significant assistance where it is needed. We have debriefed those points with the
Minister, directors of police and the Commissioner of police. From November 23, all the
holidays of end of the year, a team of the GIGN mastering rare capabilities, including in the field
of explosives, has been installed permanently in the barracks of the Clestins, to be able to
engage in any point of Paris with the bis. We has also been asked to establish flexible and mobile
teams that can get very quickly in the capital with powerful vehicles. We are today able to
engage these small structures.
The rapporteur. On 13 November, you will yourself to the interdepartmental centre of Beauvau
crisis. The events taking place in Paris, the competent authority is the Commissioner of police;
He urged the bis but not the RAID. The Director of cabinet of the Minister of the Interior asks
you to position the GIGN to the barracks of the Clestins in case of other attacks would be
carried out. The fact that we were in Paris, with several authorities, the Minister and the
Commissioner of police, represents a particular difficulty?
You mentioned Salah Abdeslam control by a mounted device on 14 November, at 9: 10 pm.
Siren France office management task of the national section of the Schengen information system,
questioned, then asked Constable only retrieve information because Salah Abdeslam investigated
a plug S. It was only two hours later that he recalls asking a parliamentary question. What
information the office siren gives on the first call? Is Salah Abdeslam already sought as the
author of the attacks at this time? Do you work on the route of the car, once the requested arrest?

Army general Denis Favier. Your first question raises the problem of the areas of competence.
The areas of competence of police and gendarmerie Division makes sense for 97% of the
activity. In crisis situations, this approach seems to me offset from the action. A vital work must
be conducted to achieve without dispossessing anyone, to bring capacity given in any area. I
think that, in the course of the month of March or at the latest in April, we will have well
advanced on this issue. It comes to confirm the role of such or such force drive bringing it to
accept the assistance of another force. This is the answer that we are preparing.
Regarding Salah Abdeslam, we control it on 14 November, at 9: 10 pm at the Thun-Lvque
Tollbooth on the A2 motorway. Three people are in a vehicle: Salah Abdeslam and two of his
comrades from Belgium to retrieve. The gendarmes of the toll gate of Cambrai, that I went to
meet, say have detected abnormal behavior and stopped the car to control its occupants.
According to the computer check that Salah Abdeslam made the object of a plug, not S, but
Schengen, a judicial record that indicates only that it is known in Belgium for having been at the
origin of a trafficking of narcotics with the Netherlands. Conduct is to reflect, to learn and pass.
With regard to the suspicious behavior of individuals and of what happened the day before in
Paris, gendarmes are intrigued: they hold the vehicle during thirty minutes or beyond the
prescribed time provided for this type of control. They call the office siren France, which is not
foreseen in the Protocol, so that it confirms their conduct. After 30 minutes, they are obliged to
release the three men. They are recalled not two hours after, but 45 minutes later.
The rapporteur. This period of two hours comes from the documents that you have provided to
us.
Army general Denis Favier. I can confirm that we have been contacted by siren forty-five
minutes after the movement of the vehicle. However, no information regarding Salah Abdeslam
involvement in the attacks of the previous day is provided gendarmes during this telephone
exchange.
The rapporteur. The reform of criminal procedure, which provides four hours of restraint, is an
adequate response?
Army general Denis Favier. Definitely.
M. Pierre Lellouche. The search of the vehicle was not possible?
Army general Denis Favier. No.
Mr Franois Lamy. Under the command of special operations, various units of the army, as 13e
Dragoon regiment parachute (RDP), the 1St regiment of infantry (RPIMA) marine parachute or
air commandos, are under the command of general Chief of the special operations command, and
there's only a single decision maker: the Chief of staff of armies. Similarly, while preserving
their history and their specificity, could all intervention units not be placed under a permanent
single command? Isn't time to build a permanent organic system in this area? In short, can the
gendarmes and the police work together?

Army general Denis Favier. Special operations command brings together units of different
nature of the army, the Navy and the air force. 13e RDP is a combined arms training in
intelligence gathering; 1er RPIMA devoted himself rather to protection; Airmen manage the
protection of databases. If the military capacities are collected, trades they are different while
intervention GIGN, RAID, and BRI units have the same occupation. The subject is therefore not
of the same nature.
At first glance, the idea of the creation of a single command seems alluring; in reality, things are
more contrasting. We have nevertheless advanced. In 2008, we created a coordination unit of
intervention forces, the UCOFI, which seeks to coordinate the action of the GIGN and RAID in
the phase of operational readiness. With the next release of the SNI, this Unit aims to expand its
Missional field, I am thinking capability audits work forces. On the other hand, it is not intended
to take command of the operations.
Mr Franois Lamy. The difficulties to implement the single command in maintaining the
specificities of each are nonetheless not insurmountable.
Army general Denis Favier. We can out, in respect of each of the two houses, respecting the
balance and preserving the effectiveness, if we say very clearly and consolidate the concepts
"leading" and "contributing". They exist and they work well in the armed forces: force leads and
others bring the skills competition. One can construct something solid as long as one pushes even
further the idea of accepting the abilities of others: do not be afraid to ask them. Your
commission of inquiry must promote this today essential notion. We must obviously verify the
exact nature of the capabilities reported detained: this is for me very important.
The President Georges Fenech. You are not in favour of the 'merger' that call for some?
Army general Denis Favier. We talk currently only 3% of the work of the units in question. For
the remaining 97%, the work is performed in the area of competence with the arrest of wanted
individuals in judicial investigations, the neutralization of madmen...
Things are obviously for the top of the spectrum extremely complex. Take the example of the
aircraft: since 1994, it no longer passes through the door to get into a plane, it must be capable of
entering it otherwise. The GIGN has this expertise - which means that it can also enter a boat, a
train, a subway, a tram or high-rise buildings. If there is a situation of hostage to defence, should
be able to gain a foothold on the top of a tower and down floor by floor, by holes with explosives
in the ceilings without collateral damage. It is these capabilities that the mounted police brings in
the common pot. It is not sharing capabilities, but make them available.
M. Olivier Marleix. You have described an excellent coordination of forces on 7 January.
Things seem less clear with regard to November 13: a room of command at the prefecture of
police would have taken the decision to commit the bis at the Bataclan . the Beauvau crisis cell
was also; known only to the Stade de France, a PC security hosted a time the President of the
Republic and the Minister of the Interior. Where was the command that night?

Army general Denis Favier. We are talking about different crises, both in terms of geography
and in terms of temporality. The November 13 attack is sudden and violent. It produces a
stunning effect and takes place in a short time. The January crisis lasted several days. As we very
much structuring our action on the duration in January in order to build a real manWork with
operational research, as much, in November, we instantly need to build a manWork of
circumstance to regain the ascendancy. It is much more difficult. Everything happens in three
hours, which requires an immediate response. In this kinetic operations planning is very difficult.
This reflection is of course integrated into the ongoing work related to the national plan of
action.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Except that the terrorists manage to leave the town and hide - it's
incredible! -in thickets in Aubervilliers. This period where things are lengthy care, because even
a second team otherwise third Division, which has not planned its withdrawal, managed to leave
the country, and we have not managed to find the heads of networks. The last part of the
operations is not bright!
Army general Denis Favier. The return of experience shows very clearly that we need to build
to similar circumstances, a national Hawk plan to reflect the axes and the forced crossing points.
We are working on the development of this emergency plan of the flow control the first
components will be operational for the Euro 2016.
M. Pierre Lellouche. It is absurd that could leave Paris like this! That would be unthinkable in
Boston, Washington, Tel Aviv or London! There is video and many other tools.
Army general Denis Favier. We must strengthen our manWork of monitoring the flow of entry
and exit from the country. Terrorism comes from Belgium to Paris: we need to take the toll
barriers, stations, terminals. I think at the moment there is really for the control of migration at
national borders to us to be more active in the control of flows.
In a logic of commitment of the armed forces on the national territory, cannot be thinking only in
terms of personnel - those of Sentinel from reinforce the Vigipirate. It is necessary to think in
terms of new missions with regard to the context. Incoming and outgoing flow control mission,
conducted jointly between the police, the gendarmerie and the army would really of the meaning.
It would reassure our citizens and it would be effective. It is in this spirit that we conduct an
experiment in the Department of Isre during the second half of April.
The President Georges Fenech. The families of the victims and the surviving wounded wonder
about the time that has elapsed between the first shots at the Bataclan, at 09: 48 pm, and the
onslaught of the bis to 0 hours 18. What are your feelings on this subject?
Army general Denis Favier. It is difficult for me to take a stand, because I was not on the spot;
I am therefore not able to expressing an opinion on this subject. Commissioner of the BAC's
courageous commitment was, in my opinion, the key to put a first stop to the slaughter.
M. Pierre Lellouche. You have enough experience to know that injuries by Kalashnikov that
remain one hour without being rescued are convicted.

The rapporteur. There were evacuations during operations.

Army general Denis Favier. Some wounded have been evacuated, but not all. To be
constructive, units that undertake must be able to work very quickly in counterterrorism but also
in emergency combat. Should such that they can ask tourniquets.
Mr Franois Lamy. The GIGN acted differently at the Bataclan ? Precautions were clearly
taken before surgery - the Minister told us yesterday that it was asked if the room was being
undermined-, what did lose a lot of time. The GIGN took the same precautions or would it
intervene in from the outset?
Army general Denis Favier. For years, we have worked with the GIGN on the idea once on
places, it was necessary first observe, negotiate, make a contact. Generations of staff have been
trained on this model, but, today, we change. The intervention scheme is of a totally different
nature: we must now be able to engage the fire very quickly and powerfully. It is on this model
that we work.
The President Georges Fenech. If there were a new Bataclan, would we do the same thing?
Army general Denis Favier. Since November 14, we set up teams to provide significant
assistance in any point of Paris. It would engage teams as the rise of the alert. The gendarmes are
housed, by absolute necessity of service next to the barracks of Satory. Therefore, they are
willing to make movement, equipped, armed and briefed, very quickly. Twenty minutes later,
they can be on any Parisian site. These teams are today highly mobile: they move in light
structure with a single vehicle. They have the necessary weapons, and they are composed of
individuals controlling the rare abilities that I mentioned.
The President Georges Fenech. They come in any place without a prior security? You apply a
different protocol.
Colonel Hubert Bonneau. I do not know if we would have done better that the BAC - bis, we
were not on the spot. It is difficult for an operational which was not engaged a diagnosis. What I
can say is that, today, the GIGN undertakes on so-called plans immediate assault operation
modes. We leave our base up to thirty minutes after warning in force the GIGN, with five
autonomous teams of five. Warning of the GIGN, it's so twenty-five men able to engage in full in
less than thirty minutes to the departure of Satory.
Five autonomous teams master rare capabilities in terms of counter-terrorism. First, they arrive
in vehicles armoured and equipped with robust protections. These last three years, we have
completely revised equipment for ballistic protection of men. Then, the teams have fire power
that gives them the ability to enter everywhere, overcome any obstacle, including through the
control of explosives, to create the dazzling.
These abilities are empowered around a team to five that can be projected anywhere in Paris. If
the need arises, a five teams can be broken out then completed immediately by a second alert less
than two hours.

The President Georges Fenech. The commission of inquiry would be interested to see the
demonstration of what you describe.
You are the only ones to be able to do so. If a new Bataclan happens tomorrow, you would leave
again in a barracks or would it give you orders to take the direction of operations? Leave bis treat
a new Bataclan or will it appeal to elite as your units?
Army general Denis Favier. That would be my role as CEO to argue, in crisis cell, our
capabilities, which are known to the Ministerial authority, and to explain the added value that the
GIGN could bring. With regard to the lessons that we draw all of the events of November, this
posture is necessary. We have much discussed with the Minister. He asked us to place in Paris
during end-of-year festivities because he understood the need to appeal to our capabilities.
It is in this spirit that is designed the national intervention scheme to be shortly presented by the
Minister of the Interior.
Mr. Georges Fenech. These last words reassures us. Gentlemen, thank you for all of your
comments.
Hearing in camera, Mr. Philippe Chadrys, Assistant Director responsible for counter-terrorism to
the Central Directorate of the judicial police (DCPJ), Mr. Franck Douchy, Director regional of the
judicial police in Versailles, and Mr. Frdric Doidy, head of the central Office for combating
organized crime (OCLCO) and head of the brigades of research and national intervention (bis)
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, March 9, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, gentlemen, for having responded to the request for
hearing of our commission, whose work is to investigate the means Work by the State to combat
terrorism since January 7, 2015. With the Minister of the Interior, we heard Monday, then the
RAID and Gendarmerie, officials that you have just audioperate, we have begun to address
issues related to the conduct of operations, to the intervention of the forces of order and the
means that are available to them. We continue our work with you, who head the police services
sought in the attacks from January to November 2015.
You head, Mr Chadrys, the dedicated service to the gripes of prosecutors and magistrates in
matters of terrorism. Your service, Mr Douchy, participated directly findings and conducted
investigations at the two sets of attacks in addition to the Regional Directorate of the judicial
police in Paris and the SDAT, in particular at the brothers Kaye hunt. Finally, Mr Doidy, you
have steered the action of the national bis and different territorial bis following the two sets of
attacks, including - there yet - when the brothers Kaye hunt.
Given the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to provide us, this hearing takes
place behind closed doors and is therefore not disseminated on the website of the National
Assembly. Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of the order of November 14, 1958, his
account may be published in whole or in part if we decide so at the end of our work. I would
point out that the record of the hearing will be previously sent to your comments, which will be
submitted to the Commission, which may decide to State in his report. I would remind you that,

in accordance with the provisions of the same article, shall be punished with the penalties
provided in article 226-13 of the criminal code - one year imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine any person who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish information relating to
non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the
commission referred to the information in question.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the order referred to above, I ask you to swear to
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, by raising the right hand.
Mr Philippe Chadrys, Franck Douchy and Frdric Doidy successively take oath.
The President Georges Fenech. I now give the floor to explain your role on the occasion of the
attacks of January, and then we will return to those of November.
M. Philippe Chadrys, Deputy Director of counter-terrorism branch (SDAT). Anti-terrorism
branch that I lead, is a service to national jurisdiction and is one of the five branches of the
Central Directorate of the judicial police (DCPJ), responsible for investigating cases of terrorism.
In light of the weakening of Basque and Corsican separatist terrorists organizations, it goes
without saying that, in recent years, particularly since the case Merah in 2012, we we are
reorganized so as to adopt a configuration allowing us to fight against jihadist-inspired terrorism.
1St January 2015, the strength of the SDAT there were 121 people, including 97 active agents;
two plans of reinforcement will its theoretical strength more than 220 agents by the end of the
calendar year, and 240 in 2017. In other words, our capacity, as early as 2015, experienced a net
rise.
Outside investigations that it expedites alone or co-saisine with other services such as branch
(ITSB) homeland security and anti-terrorism section (SAT) of the prefecture of police of Paris,
the SDAT also relies on the territorial mesh from the DCPJ via the regional directorates of the
judicial police (DRPJ) and regional judicial police services (cells) so that it benefits relay
throughout the country to deal with cases referred to it, whether it's business that it processes
under the auspices of anti-terrorist judges or peripheral cases - which are not necessarily of a
terrorist nature, but which give us upstream an overview of what is done on the whole of the
territory before a possible referral to the anti-terrorist section of the Paris Prosecutor's office.
Daily as in a crisis, we rely also on the other branches of the judicial police: branch of police
technical-scientific, of course, but also the Sub-Directorate for the fight against organised crime
and financial crime - especially the central Office for the Suppression of the great financial
delinquency (OCRGDF) for everything concerning the financing of terrorism and the OCLCO
and the bis national as well as branch of the fight against cybercrime, newly created.
The SDAT has before it a number of affairs of most important jihadist-inspired terrorism.
Further investigations she diligent daily, she is involved in the case of major attack, 2015 having
unfortunately been a year black for us since we had to go through two major crises, in January
and November.
Above all, the SDAT is responsible for deploying device "Attack" at the national level. Created
in 2005 after the bombings in London and Madrid, this device is intended to face a major event

or committed attacks on several sites, as was the case in January and then in November. It has
evolved since its inception and was tweaked every year, through regular exercises. It has been
deployed for the first time in actual conditions during the attacks of January 2015. It allows to
coordinate and control all the DCPJ forces that are involved to a major attack. It is available at
several levels: at the central level, a crisis (PC) national command post is set up in the premises
of the SDAT and includes several poles to restructure staffing to deal with the crisis. The pole
'Surveys' takes care of all the investigations into the attack. 'Intelligence' is responsible for
collecting the completeness of the information coming into the police services. Finally, a pole
'International Relations' is created because, as demonstrated by the attacks of November, this
dimension is increasingly important.
This national crisis PC comes in each territorial Department of the judicial police, since the
DCPJ branches as well as interregional and regional directorates have similar PC with same
poles - apart from the pole 'International Relations', which is the only central level.
Finally, PC are created on the crime scenes to manage findings, testimony and investigations of
neighbourhood.
Operative "Attack" relies primarily on two dedicated tools: a green line, first of all, lets gather
countless calls to crisis centres. Between January and November, a short number - 197 - was
adopted and disseminated through the press; It allowed to receive many calls. On the other hand,
when the "Attack" feature is activated, we arm a crisis room in the premises of the branch to
fight organized crime and financial crime, in Nanterre, as well as a crisis at the prefecture of
police of Paris in case of attack in Paris, as was the case in January and November. Operators are
loaded around the clock to receive calls, which are switched to the PC of the SDAT crisis in
order to be processed by a tool called MCAA, i.e. "application main current attack", which
allows to process information and the breakdown in the whole of the judicial police seized. Thus,
when information require investigations in all parts of the territory, officers of the SDAT are
specially charged to analyze, and then fill Plug and transmit it to the relevant service so that it is
processed. It is an important mechanism, because the volume of calls is considerable. For
information, between 7 and January 16, 2015, the green line received 5 911 calls, which gave
rise to the creation of 1 600 cards - and as many audits. The attacks of November 13, 2015,
meanwhile, received 17 497 calls and 8 000 sheets have been formed, Central and territorial
services leading the corresponding checks.
The investigations began in the activation of operative 'attack '. During the attacks of January
2015, three services have been seized: anti-terrorism branch of the DCPJ, the prefecture of police
of Paris and ISB. The investigation was entrusted to the prefecture of police by the public
prosecutor of Paris. In case of major attack the referral to the DCPJ is requested - and naturally
obtained - so that all of its territorial services, what they are in Lille, Bordeaux or Marseille, may
act within this framework. In January, the three seized services so divided to expedite
investigations: the prefecture of police of Paris has made findings on the crime scene in Charlie
Hebdopremises, as well as all acts arising from the commission of an attack - exploitation of
videos and collection of testimonies. The SDAT was more specifically responsible for the
investigations into the Kaye brothers, whose flight quickly overflowed the boundaries of the
Paris region. It took action in the departments of Oise and Aisne, the SDAT relying on regional

services, in particular the interregional Directorate of judicial police (DIPJ) of Lille. When Kaye
brothers have been identified, the survey of relatives was divided among the police prefecture
and the DCPJ, which has led the investigations and searches in Reims and Charleville-Mzires:
very quickly, eight arrests have taken place, and as many searches. The findings made at the gas
station of Villers-Cotterts, which had been attacked by the brothers Kaye, were treated the same
way, as well as those that have been made in the Oise region, where they abandoned their vehicle
and have pointed one another before taking refuge in the printing house of Dammartin-en-Gole.
When Kaye brothers have been neutralized, the findings were made by the judicial police in
Versailles with the support of the technical and scientific police branch. On the other hand, it is
the prefecture of police of Paris who was responsible for the findings following the assault at the
store Hypercacher. SID, finally, was responsible for the component concerning international
relations and the as-built information, and also handled the departure of Hayat Boumeddiene via
the Spain.
Kaye and MIT Coulibaly brothers were known to anti-terrorist services, including the SDAT,
since Charles Kaye and Coulibaly were arrested in 2010 as part of a project to escape from
Sman At Ali Belkacem. We were also charged to draw up the minutes of environment of each
of these individuals. During the period of flagrante, four hundred witnesses were heard by the
different stakeholders, 81 telephone tapping were put in place and 31 persons placed in police
custody.
Clearly, we dealt with a huge amount of calls and information, the green line having allowed us as during the attacks of November 13 - locate the conspiratif apartment, in this case that of MIT
Coulibaly in Gentilly. At the end of the period of flagrante delicto, 3 500 minutes have been
written - either a large volume - and more than 2,000 seals have been formed; This represents a
phenomenal amount of work. This period of flagrante ended with the dismantling of the cell of
logistics support for Chung and arrests in the Essonne, with the support of the RAID as well as
national bis and other BRI involved on the ground in the management of these objectives. Such
is the rapid organization established to face these major attacks.
M. Frdric Doidy, head of the central Office for combating organized crime (OCLCO)
and national research and intervention (BRI) brigades. The OCLCO mission is to fight
against forms of criminal acts the most violent of which are committed to the detriment of
persons and property, to suppress certain traffic that contribute to the development of organized
crime, including the trafficking of weapons and stolen vehicles, and to find and stop some
criminals on the run or escaped. To do this, the OCLCO and, where appropriate, other central or
territorial the DCPJ services rely on a single device in France: research and intervention of the
DCPJ brigades which are branches of the Agency.
The bis act more often on their own initiative in the framework of the priority missions of the
DCPJ, in particular the fight against all forms of crime organized. These skills allow them to
demonstrate effective during surveillance, spinners and interpellations, on public roads or
enclosed workplace, evildoers with a certain dangerousness. This national system consists of 331
police officers recruited after drastic selection tests on their physical, psychological and
vocational - skills success to these selection tests, held twice per year, does not exceed 30%. The
BRI officers undergo training supported and suitable for the most delicate situations, after

completing a course of integration for a period of two weeks which is worth common training
base to interpellation on the public highway, spinning and weapons handling techniques.
Placed under a single command, the BRI can be mobilised very quickly in the event of major as
a mass killer or a hostage-multiple. Today, thirteen research and intervention brigades are
distributed throughout the national territory: in Lille, Strasbourg, Lyon, Nice, Marseille,
Montpellier, Toulouse, Nantes, Rouen, Versailles, Orleans, as well as Bordeaux, Ajaccio-these
last two BRI with respectively an antenna in Bayonne and SC Bastia.
These BRI are placed for employment with the regional or interregional directors of the judicial
police and under the functional authority of the head of the OCLCO. In Nanterre, the Chief of
the research and national intervention, that is placed under my direct authority, is responsible for
directing the action of the different bis during the deployment of operational devices in scope as
in the case of operation type go fast or centres-strong attacks. This territorial mesh to the DCPJ
date of creation, as early as 1976, the first bis in Lyon, this structure since reproduced throughout
the territory. The bis consist of numbers and with materials that allow them to fighting against all
forms of organized crime, particularly drug trafficking, extortion of funds, armed robbery,
kidnapping or even abductions for ransom. They perform each year to the arrest of several
hundred individuals, either on their own initiative or in support of central services or territorial of
the judicial police. By 2015, 688 criminals were arrested by the different bis of the DCPJ, of
whom 51 were involved in various capacities in matters of criminal conspiracy in relation with a
terrorist undertaking - whether basque or Corsican separatist terrorism or international terrorism
in connection, inter alia, with radical islam.
The bis now are an integral part of national counter-terrorism and possess a skill demonstrated
and recognized long-standing material, in particular through the participation of the BRI of
Bayonne and Toulouse in the fight against ETA, and Ajaccio, Bastia, Nice and Marseille in the
fight against nationalist groups Corsican. In 2014, a dialogue in close collaboration with the
RAID resulted in the creation of the FELINE Protocol, which enables to mobilize in the event of
attack or hostage-taking multiple bis as part of a tactical bubble of intervention involving the
RAID, research and intervention of the DCPJ brigades and the Central Directorate of the CRS.
The bis are then responsible for securing close the site of intervention of the RAID, the
exfiltration of the suspects after their neutralization by the RAID, the evacuation of the wounded
and implementing security of the hostages and victims; the CRS are responsible for the external
tightness of the Assembly of the device. Skills of each and others are clearly defined and divided
into three concentric zones assigned to the three services involved. It is under this Protocol that,
during attacks from January to November 2015, several units under my authority, I was then
head of the national bis, have been incorporated into many devices monitoring and questioning
in the SDAT and RAID support. This was the case on January 9, 2015, when the neutralization
of MIT Coulibaly to the Porte de Vincennes in Paris, on 16 January during the arrest of his
accomplice in Fleury-Mrogis, or even November 18 at Saint-Denis.
I come to the specific circumstances of the intervention of the bis of the DCPJ following attacks
against Charlie Hebdo. The same day of the attack, while the first tracks were revealed
concerning the Kaye brothers and that operations should be considered in Reims, the different
mobilized DCPJ especially the national bis bis, consisting of some 30 agents based in Nanterre,

and the bis of Versailles, closest to the scene of the crime, consisting of an equivalent agents
number - were alert at noon. RAID which had the mission of transport to Reims and CharlevilleMzires, the central Director of the judicial police (DCPJ) enabled the FELINE Protocol by
setting clearly the different bis mission to act in support of the inquiry that the RAID would have
to lead on brothers Kaye or operations at the home of some of their relatives in the two
aforementioned cities. To do this, I very quickly decided to seek additional support bis of Lille
and Strasbourg, near the place of operation. The same evening, not less than a hundred of these
bis investigators were mobilized in support of in Reims to ensure the tightness of the device and
recover the victims where appropriate, or even the criminals in the case of inquiry - which was
not the case.
Following these operations conducted the evening of the attack against Charlie Hebdo, several
operational groups of the different mobilized BRI were left on-site at Reims and CharlevilleMzires, because some members of the entourage of the brothers Kaye, targeted but absent
from their home, were not arrested. The groups left behind could give their support to other
operations RAID which would possibly be planned urgently, in exercising the same missions of
sealing of the device and, where appropriate, recovery of the victims or the injured. I remember
the first mission the DCPJ bis is a spinning and mission monitoring in civilian dress of hardened
criminals that it's often challenged on the public highway. In January, however, while operations
were still underway at Reims and at Charleville-Mzires, a reserve of officials of BRI was left
on-site support at the SDAT to monitor the homes likely to be used or frequented by the Kaye
family members, or even by the fugitives themselves.
The SDAT then identified in Villers-Cotterts another track which deserved to be exploited. The
next day, the national bis agents who had not been deployed to Reims and Charleville-Mzires
began to ensure the permanent monitoring of different addresses in the commune of VillersCotterts, supported by officers from the BRI of Versailles and Lille. The DCPJ BRI had not
participated in combing operations in the sector of Villers-Cotterts-led RAID, the bis of the
police prefecture and the GIGN; they performed that very discrete monitoring, spinning and
observation in civilian missions to detain the fugitives and to avoid a surattentat or the
commission of other criminal acts. The presence of the brothers Kaye was gradually targeted at
Dammartin, then the hostage was found in the printing industry; I have therefore modified the
device under my jurisdiction by asking all BRI staff deployed to Villers-Cotterts to abandon
their posts to win Dammartin, and I took the direction of the strength of the national bis and bis
of Versailles to put me on the spot at the disposal of the leader of the RAID under the FELINE
Protocol triggered by the DCPJ While the GIGN control operations at this stage of the crisis.
In early afternoon, we were informed of the hostage that had occurred in the store Hypercacher
of the Porte de Vincennes. In agreement with my direction, I then decided to keep part of the
Dammartin-en-Gole device in support of the present RAID units place - and in the event of the
assault that they would have to give themselves or where they would have to support the GIGN. I
then gathered about 25 police officers and we quickly transported to the Porte de Vincennes,
where we pitched a nearby PC in the store. It goes without saying that, in this type of operations,
the bis investigators are equipped with maximum ballistic protection and an ad hoc weapons
while retaining the flexibility to be able to project quickly. I then placed at the disposal of the
leader of the RAID. The missions of each were clearly defined for the assault which would be

given to the store in the next hours. During the assault, we placed in support of the columns in
the RAID. The mission that had been entrusted to us - and we have executed - was to recover the
hostages and ensure insofar as possible that no terrorist or accomplice not to be concealed among
them. Once the assault ended and the first hostages released, we have recovered then
accompanied safely and under major ballistic protection, a few hundred metres of the
establishment, to the advanced medical post, or a first sorting should be made between those
which, wounded, had to be taken urgently in the field hospital, and those who, shocked, had to be
examined by doctors and emergency such as ambulance and the Red Cross services on-site. We
had also to mission to recover some of the RAID police officers injured during the assault, and
always under armour, to complete the advanced medical post.
This is stopped by my mission concerning the taking of hostages at the store Hypercacher. On
Monday, January 12, however, the SDAT told the bis mission concerning logistics support to
Coulibaly in the Essonne, notably in Fleury-Mrogis. That day, further units mobilized the
previous days - the national bis and bis of Versailles - had been put under alert near BRI, i.e.
those of Rouen and Orlans; We were tasked to conduct round-the-clock monitoring of all or
part of logistical support by Chung until their arrest by the RAID on the night of Thursday,
February 15 to Friday, January 16. On this occasion and always in connection with the cat, we
drove the columns of assault of the RAID close to the place of arrest and we are made available
to retrieve any casualties and hostages and secure rear RAID operations.
These were the tasks entrusted to the various bis of the DCPJ and chronology of the operations
they have conducted during the attacks of January. A hundred officers were mobilized from 7 to
January 16, early events and on several sites: in Reims, Charleville-Mzires, Villers-Cotterts
and Dammartin-en-Gole then the Porte de Vincennes and, finally, in the Essonne.
M. Franck Douchy, regional director of the judicial police in Versailles. Regional branch that
I run is part of the territorial mesh from the DCPJ. As my counterparts based in Marseille, Lyon,
Bordeaux, Rennes, Lille, Strasbourg and Dijon, I am responsible for a particular territory - even
if this notion may seem paradoxical face a crime whose perpetrators are criminals who move
throughout the national territory. It is indeed necessary to divide our action. In the sector placed
under my authority, I run a service consisting of approximately 420 persons, which are both
traditional investigators but also financial specialists or criminals able to perform very specific
finding on specific scenes. I also run a BRI in the framework presented to you by Mr Doidy.
Clearly, my direction is autonomous and able to treat all types of business.
For each of the thematic fields in which we operate, we naturally depend on our national leaders
represented in the offices, or related to terrorism, the SDAT. In other words, we represent in each
of these areas a central antenna. For information, I occupied myself Mr. Doidy functions to the
DCPJ before going to Versailles. In fact, we all know, working together for many years and,
above all, rely on the same head. This is important because of terrorism even more elsewhere,
the logics of action are national, or even transnational, and the complexity of the police
organization - as evidenced by the abundance of acronyms we use - is opposed to the extreme
mobility of the criminals that we neutralize. It is, however, and we must adapt; It's even easier
when officials stationed are very familiar.

We have very quickly alerted to the attacks in the month of January, even if they are for the most
part took place in Paris. From a strictly legal point of view, we so not were approached
immediately or over the next two days. On the other hand, the DCPJ has its strength, especially
in the DRPJ of Versailles, rather peculiar immediately aware of since it is competent in the four
departments of the large Crown Ile-de-France - Val-d'Oise, Yvelines, Essonne and Seine-etMarne. In other words, it was more than the other regional directorates concerned by two
sequences of attacks which your Committee is investigating. However, in the middle of this
device is the prefecture of police of Paris. On the Ile-de-France plaque, which is a kind of
criminal continuum, overlapping so two regional directorates that have neither the same CEO except to be traced back to the Minister of the Interior - or the same modes of operation. There
should also articulate these different services between them. As for me, I place appropriate staff
of the BRI of Versailles at the disposal of the SDAT so that its leader can co-ordinate the use
with other bis staff it deems useful to mobilize.
Kaye and Coulibaly brothers were quickly identified and fled. The great Parisian East areas, until
Reims, were designated as possible areas of home; a whole range of forces has so deployed. Add
to the complexity of the device the fact that some of these areas are geographical and legal of the
gendarmerie, which explains the involvement of gendarmes in the conduct of investigations. In
reality, the track open to Reims and Charleville-Mzires resulted in no arrest and that criminals
were targeted more accurately, the device has been redirected towards the Paris region, more
precisely in Seine-et-Marne - which falls within my jurisdiction. The presence of the brothers
Kaye was confirmed in Dammartin-en-Gole, which lies north of the Department. It goes
without saying that the heads of the different DRPJ had been notified of the development of the
investigation by the information system of the Central Directorate - in such cases, indeed, it is
essential to have both reactive and proactive forces which are able to anticipate the establishment
of surveillance and spinning devices, but also areas for investigation. From the beginning of the
case, the handrail attack (MCAA) was triggered to operate all the elements transmitted by the
citizens concerned to close or far via the telephone line dedicated to hearings, visits and checks
to be carried out as part of the investigation. However, these elements are also territorial services
according to the place of domicile of victims and witnesses.
Therefore I was alerted by my direction, in the morning of Friday, January 9, moving the case
toward the Seine-et-Marne, and I immediately anticipated going in the area. In addition to its
headquarters in Versailles, our DRPJ has four antennas covering the territorial ring on which it is
competent, in Cergy-Pontoise, Meaux, Melun and Evry. Early in the morning, I naturally alerted
the head of the antenna of Meaux in him asking to gather all his troops as soon as possible, and
to immediately attend Dammartin-en-Gole. It was important to identify the places in this very
specific area where the national road 2 connects Villers-Cotterts in the Paris region - an
industrial area where surveillance operations are not always easy - and, above all, to prepare the
home of force projection of the seat, I was organizing at the same time. It is indeed at
Headquarters that is the criminal brigade, whose specialized investigators would have to
intervene in the case of assault. Local staff are so very quickly moved to study the field and find
an area to accommodate us, however that headquarters was started with the criminal brigade and
the support of the technical and scientific police to respond to the more quickly to the
requirements of an assault and the subsequent investigation, as well as any other possible Act.
When we arrived on the spot, in fact, a contact already occurred between the criminals and local

gendarmerie forces; Parquet immediately designated us as investigators to address these first,

hear the military personnel involved, understand what had happened and put the procedure in
music - all these acts resulting in Court of Assizes where accuracy is essential.
The decision-making authorities gathered in Dammartin-en-Gole, in municipal premises, where
I was in the presence of general Favier, the Prosecutor of Paris with several substitutes, and the
Director of the prefecture of police of Paris. Instructions could be given in perfect synergy and I
was able to identify further over the day the real links that existed between the brothers Kaye and
Coulibaly, which we had not initially understood that they were acting in a coordinated manner.
We have witnessed the arrival of the GIGN and RAID support: an assault was preparing on the
spot.
Before even the assault in the printing industry, a new scene of hostage-taking has occurred. Part
of the agents present in Dammartin have so moved to Paris, other remaining on-site. It is always
difficult to anticipate a "sur-attentat" or a new Act, and we especially learned a lot concerning the
movement of staff, which allowed us to be faster in the November attacks.
The GIGN has stormed the premises of the printing when evildoers came out; they were quickly
neutralized. Meanwhile, the number of technical and scientific police, based in Lyon, had joined
us; our technical extra force was thus largely sufficient to perform the findings inside and outside
the premises of the printing and to treat the bodies of the two criminals. These findings careful
and long have occupied us almost overnight, after which we drafted the minutes. It is late
evening Sunday that we delivered the results complete, clean and final of our work to the judicial
authority. Near eighty investigators participated, including all of the criminal brigade - or about
30 investigators. In these extremely complex and sensitive investigations, everyone wants to
make sure not to omit no detail, not to commit any error that could be fatal to the investigation.
We are therefore doing extra work compared to the daily surveys, which requires not only to
spend more time, but take more decisions.
Barely past Sunday night began as early as Monday the prosecution of accomplices of the three
criminals in the Essonne - which belongs to the DRPJ de Versailles - and specifically in FleuryMrogis, difficult area known for its prison, but near which is also a difficult city, the large
terminal, Grigny. I naturally put the BRI of Versailles available to the staff of the SDAT and the
national bis deployed on-site, which was all the more timely that we had precisely been seized a
year earlier of a criminal case in this same area. Familiar places, we could pave the way and
prepare the home of our colleagues from the central management by explaining the context.
Surveillance operations lasted several days, until the arrest and the arrest of all of the criminals
suspected to have provided support to the terrorist acts of the previous week.
M. Philippe Chadrys. In addition, I would point out that the attacks of January have, during the
period of flagrante, mobilized about 550 officers DCPJ, services of police territorial, the bis, of
the branch of the police technical and scientific, and of course, the SDAT.
The President Georges Fenech. The bis from Versailles and Lille as well as the national bis
conducted surveillance operations to Villers-Cotterts the night from 7 to 8 January. How the

brothers Kaye, who committed theft robbery in this town on 8 January at 9: 20 pm, have could
escape 24 additional hours to your monitoring.
M. Philippe Chadrys. When Kaye brothers fled, we identified fairly quickly since one of them
left his identification in a vehicle. We knew the registration of their vehicles and their
identification, monitoring devices have been implemented to potential drop points, the first being
the homes of their relatives in Charleville-Mzires, Reims and in the Paris region, where
interventions have taken place to verify that they do there had not fled. The characteristics of the
vehicle were immediately broadcast over the radio of all vehicles of police and gendarmerie of
the country. Kaye brothers-related information have been the subject of an urgent national
broadcast, called "Sarbacane". However, it was extremely difficult to find: Kaye brothers slept
outside and have not joined one of the potential drop points we could know them. On the other
hand, they changed vehicle after pointing a motorist. In other words, they didn't believe preestablished Tuck and argued at the discretion of their flight; Perhaps they thought be neutralized
before reaching the North of Paris, and in this case, Dammartin-en-Gole. However, data relating
to the vehicle and individuals circulated, including their photographs, which were also broadcast
in the press.
In such situations, as shown again by the attacks of November 13, the difficulty lies in the
amount of information transmitted to us. Each information coming via the green line is operated
and checked and, where appropriate, possible fall points are placed under surveillance. Alas, the
Kaye brothers were able to leave Paris, but, fortunately, without making other victims in their
escape.
The President Georges Fenech. Within what period were the bis de Versailles and the national
bis they informed the attack in Charlie Hebdo and the hounding of the Kaye brothers?
M. Frdric Doidy. Immediately, by our management and by the media.
The President Georges Fenech. By the media?
M. Frdric Doidy. The DCPJ was notified immediately and, as any central direction
hierarchical, immediately informed its branches.
M. Philippe Chadrys. When the Charlie Hebdo attack occurred, I was advised without delay
and I went on the spot immediately. Knowing that it was likely a major attack, the machine
immediately began running. When operative "Attack" is about to be raised, instruction is given
to all staff of the DCPJ - including in all territorial and not only Paris - services to reach their
bases all postpone business and are waiting for instructions, the central management then loading
to pass on the information. They reached us so quickly: I arrived on the site of the attack in
Charlie Hebdo around noon and the Prosecutor of the Republic, who was also there, we
confirmed the referral to the DCPJ alongside of the prefecture of police of Paris. I have
immediately referred to my direction, information is immediately reflected in the various
services of the judicial police. When operative "Attack" was raised at 1435 hours on decision of
the Minister of the Interior or the DGPN, services were therefore already advised. In addition,
the fact that information circulates sometimes faster still in the media and on social networks via

the phones of our management;. whatever it is, we have been warned in real time, because it was
obvious that we were facing a major attack.
The President Georges Fenech. Have you been in contact with the BRI of Paris in order to keep
you informed of their action within the intervention force of the national police (FNIF), set up on
8 January?
M. Frdric Doidy. The bis of the prefecture of police is not part of the device of the bis of the
DCPJ. This dichotomy is also between the prefecture of Paris police intervention units and the
DCPJ, who do not have the same missions. The police prefecture has its own branches - judicial
police, intelligence, public order, traffic, etc - and the DCPJ, meanwhile, has its own bis. Some
areas of our action, such as the fight against organized crime in all its forms, meet, including
monitoring missions, spinning, of arrest of criminals red-handed, before they commit a serious
crime or shortly thereafter. In contrast to the prefecture of police, however, the DCPJ is not
competent for action commando and in the event of retrenchment at home of a madman or threat
of suicide, for example.
The President Georges Fenech. You will then enable the FELINE Protocol?
M. Frdric Doidy. Terrorism, through interventions in enclosed spaces, we don't intervene
while hostage massive or multiple terrorist. From this point of view, our mission is not the same
as those of the bis of the prefecture of police and the RAID. Furthermore, these units are
responsible for intervening in case of deletion people at their homes or hostage-taking. Our
cFavorite pieces of business consists of operations monitoring, spinning and dynamic
questioning on the public highway, mostly in civilian clothes.
The President Georges Fenech. The BRI of Paris thus has a special additional training that do
not follow your services.
M. Frdric Doidy. Altogether. This intervention mission falls within the BRI of Paris, the first
to have been created in France. Its staff undergo special training and have some equipment which
we do not have. As the RAID and the GIGN, for example they have mastered techniques of
penetration in place closed by use of explosives, techniques that we use not since the bis conduct
arrests in closed environment - outfit with helmets and shields, unlike those that occur on the
highway - unless it's criminals - bank robbers, murderers, smugglers - pursued in the framework
of judicial police operations. The national bis and that of Versailles not are not solicited in the
Paris region - nor the other BRI elsewhere in France - to participate in operations concerning
entrenched individuals at home who would threaten to cause a gas explosion, for example. This
mission of public order is exclusively entrusted to the intervention forces RAID, the GIGN and
the bis of the prefecture of police.
However, by the end of 2013 and in 2014, the FELINE Protocol allowed us to fully integrate
terrorism cases in our action. In case of terrorist attacks, we still have 330 officials who, by their
recruitment, their selection, their weapons and their recognized professionalism, can participate
in any operation in support of the RAID - which falls within the Directorate-General of the
national police, as the DCPJ BRI.

The President Georges Fenech. Are you considering a similar development to that RAID has
followed since the time of the intervention of the national police (GIPN) groups?
M. Frdric Doidy. And the RAID has branches in the province, the OCLCO has the antennas
that are the bis, created in 2006 by Decree. Its seat is located in Nanterre, where three operational
brigades are based: the national suppression of banditry and traffic brigade, which is responsible
for conduct investigations of a certain level concerning major criminals involved in armed
attacks; centres-forts or in cases of extortion the national brigade of search of the fugitives, who
is responsible, at the request of the French judicial authorities, tracking and searching of fugitive
criminals involved in the most serious events and who also serves as point of contact for foreign
authorities requesting a provisional arrest; and finally the brigade of research and intervention,
which is the arm armed of the OCLCO. In the province, to the thirteen existing bis will be added
two new, always with the same goal: increase our responsiveness - for example to the
phenomenon of the go fast, the bis is the only units to be able to follow these convoys consisting
of an open vehicle verifying that there is no police tolls presence and a vehicle carrying several
hundred kilograms of cannabis resin. Indeed, they are able to mesh the territory to pursue
objectives related to OC from Perpignan for example, after the passage of the Spanish border,
and exercise policing to Lille or Strasbourg in case, in the absence of flagrante delicto arrest
would not be decided.
Developed since 1976, this mesh has changed since: in light of the evolution of delinquency, we
strive to duplicate the device so that all regional or interregional police directorates have, like
Versailles, of BRI units whose primary mission is to perform monitoring, spinning, stop on the
highway and a work of initiative for criminals that we are trying to address closer to the action
by bringing together a maximum of evidence for presentation to justice.
That the terrorist threat has become more serious, we close the RAID at the end of 2013 and in
2014 - well before the January attacks, therefore - to develop with him joint strategies, not only
in terrorist matters, but also in the case of acts committed by common criminals that it would be
necessary to address their home using techniques that the RAID is only to master in particular
the use of explosives to enter a place closed. Such a case occurred precisely at the end of
December 2013 in a suburb of Strasbourg, where a team of Belgian criminals had fomented the
project to attack forts centres in France and probably in Germany: we agreed with the RAID that
it would deal with inquiry in place, the most dangerous operations because criminals held
probably Kalashnikovs and other weapons of war explosives and powerful vehicles, and the bis
would take appropriate stops on the highway to ensure the progression of the RAID.
It is this same protocol which is naturally deployed during the attacks against Charlie Hebdo : at
Reims, we have ensured the evening even the security of the operations of the RAID then, above
all, we executed the previously agreed mission to retrieve hostages taken in the store
Hypercacher and implement security.
The President Georges Fenech. The Minister of the Interior recently announced the delivery of
new equipment - G36 rifles and other heavy weapons - control (LAC) brigades and platoons of
monitoring and intervention of the gendarmerie (PSIG). Are you concerned?

M. Frdric Doidy. We already have. In terms of counter-terrorism capacity decided by the

Minister of the Interior, the DCPJ strengthened its human and material resources even before the
attacks. We therefore use the G36 and the new ballistic protection during our daily operations.
We will receive no doubt more sophisticated arms and ballistic protection different and easier to
use - recall indeed that the bis agents work on the public highway or in their vehicle, which
serves as office and where should be any equipment allowing them to intervene quickly in the
event of a major event such as a mass killer or a hostage knowing that they must use to put an
end to a weapons and ballistic protection while protecting their lives, failing which their mission
might be accomplished.
In other words, we have integrated the terrorist problem since before the attacks of January - and
even more after - by expanding our territorial device. Under the national scheme decided by the
Minister of the Interior, two new bis will be created, one in Metz and the other in Dijon, in order
to be closer to the ground to fill our daily judicial police missions, but also to be very responsive
in the event of terrorist act. At this stage, the attacks took place in Paris, but others might occur
tomorrow in Toulouse, Marseille or Limoges. Again, our goal is therefore to mesh the territory.
The President Georges Fenech. Turning now to the events of the month of November.
M. Philippe Chadrys. During the attacks of Friday 13 November, we have also been informed
very quickly by our Directorate of the commission of the first facts about 21 hours 20. As a first
step, all staff of the SDAT have been recalled since it has immediately been question of a
terrorist act. The information we then arrived gradually, as officials gathered; the central
management, however, advised all services Central and territorial jurisdiction.
At 11 p.m., I received a call from the anti-terrorism section of the Paris Prosecutor's office
notifying me of their seizin and of that ISB of the prefecture of police of Paris and the DCPJ the
operations coordination is entrusted to the SDAT and no longer to the prefecture of police. This
is important, because we very quickly realized that the attacks occurred on several sites - during
our referral, we did not know yet exactly how much, some sites we nominated while it was
actually places where rescue services had collected the wounded. For a few hours, there has been
some confusion on the number of crime scenes and to the fact that a hostage was still ongoing in fact, it lasted beyond 23 hours.
Our workforce have quickly placed "in the configuration. In an attack of this magnitude without
precedent, coordination that has been entrusted to us was to guide and direct the investigations
carried out by all the services seized to distribute the tasks entrusted to them, to ensure the rise
rapid information consolidated the hierarchical authority and judicial authority, to break down
this information co-saisis services and investigators and Lastly, to centralize documents drawn
up by all of the services involved and establish a plan of procedure. What may seem like simple
is very complicated, because our objective was to transmit a single judicial procedure. At the end
of the investigation of flagrante, we had to collect all of the minutes drawn up in Paris and in the
provinces - until Corsica - following the exploitation of certain information, and transmit them to
the judicial authority according to a specific procedure plan.

When the investigation of flagrante, ended November 24, we had passed 5 338 minutes - a
significant number.
The President Georges Fenech. Therefore, the period of flagrante lasted twelve days?
M. Philippe Chadrys. Yes, until the transfer of the "owner" of the apartment of Saint-Denis. To
these minutes was added 4 000 seals which have been formed and the Coordinator service has
had to prioritize in order to prioritize the technical investigations to be carried out, by
distinguishing the most urgent investigations of those which could be delayed. In addition, it was
necessary to manage the 'workshop victims': very quickly, we realized that there were more than
a hundred dead. The final balance sheet is as follows: 130 dead and nearly thousand people
affected, including 653 were hospitalized in various Parisian establishments. No police
department had to manage this situation until then.
Very quickly, the DCPJ and the prefecture of police have agreed to divide the six crime scenes,
being understood that we were even if other acts would be committed in Paris, in the Paris region
and even in the province, which obliged us to keep some units of intervention and judicial police
in reserve in the event of new attacks. It was therefore decided that the prefecture of police
would address four crime scenes, the other two being entrusted to the DCPJ. It is as well as the
site of La Belle quipe, rue de Charonne, was treated by the judicial police in Versailles, as well
as the Counter Voltaire where, fortunately, nobody is dead except the terrorist.
The President Georges Fenech. By what authority has this allocation been decided?
M. Philippe Chadrys. This decision was the result of a discussion between heads of service.
Recall that we know all, especially among counter-terrorism services, the SDAT working
regularly with the prefecture of police; added to this is the experience of the attacks in January.
Specifically, I have agreed with Philippe Bugeaud, Deputy Director of the Paris DRPJ, that it
was appropriate to apportion us the crime scenes, what the head naturally validated. As Chief
Coordinator, I have proposed to the public prosecutor, to whom the device perfectly agreed. The
goal was in fact to mobilize specialists from the crime scene, because it goes without saying that
such scenes, of unknown proportions until then, could not be referred to services do not have
adequate experience. It is therefore the brigade criminal DRPJ de Versailles that processed the
crime scene of the rue de Charonne, one of the Counter Voltaire being entrusted to the DRPJ of
Lille - who, being one of the closest in the Paris region, had been mobilized without delay, as
well as the technical and scientific police based in Ecully. This device all set up in a manner
extremely fast and flexible.
As of 14 November, a first terrorist, Omar Mostefai, identified on the website of the Bataclan.
The findings continued and the investigation of environment has been initiated in order to detect
possible accomplices - in fact, we were unaware at this stage if other terrorists were on the run or
if they had all been neutralized, which was not the case.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Saturday, November 14 at 9: 10 pm Salah Abdeslam was
the subject of a check by the mounted police, which has been called between fifty minutes and
two hours later by the office siren asking him to apprehend the suspect. in the meantime, she had

naturally released him at the end of the half hour of control authorized. At what precise moment
Salah Abdeslam has been identified as one of the suspected terrorists?
M. Philippe Chadrys. I cannot tell you.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. On the morning of Saturday 14, presumably?
M. Philippe Chadrys. The first identified terrorist was Memoo. Others have been wire
investigations, using different methods, in particular samples of DNA and fingerprint research.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Salah Abdeslam would have therefore been identified
between the time where he was arrested for a control road, and one where the SIRENE bureau
called the gendarmerie so that he be apprehended?
M. Philippe Chadrys. It has been identified on 14 November at 15:30 from the search of the
vehicle Polo discovered before the Bataclan (its name modified lease agreement).
The President Georges Fenech. What time his profile aired?
M. Philippe Chadrys. After his identification (with the RPF).
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Can you confirm that the conspiratif apartment of SaintDenis was identified thanks to a telephone call received on the green line?
M. Philippe Chadrys. Yes. 17 897 calls received have resulted in the drafting of 8 000 plugs,
which have produced three crucial information for further investigation: the first allowed to
identify a conspiratif apartment in Bobigny, the second put us on the track of Abdelhamid
Abaaoud and allowed us to identify the Corbillon rue conspiratif apartment in Saint-Denis, and
the third allowed us to identify three of the terrorists in a petrol station in Belgium.
The President Georges Fenech. These information came the Morocco?
M. Philippe Chadrys. Intelligence has allowed us to identify the conspiratif apartment of SaintDenis is reached via the green line.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Was it from the cousin of Abaaoud's girlfriend?
M. Philippe Chadrys. Yes. It should be noted that, when it has been obtained, this testimony
reached us among thousands of others.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. How did you sort?
M. Philippe Chadrys. The difficulty was precisely to prioritize the calls according to their
degree of priority. This is why the 'Attack' device is centralized: only the Coordinator service has
knowledge of all the investigations and is able to prioritize them. When a call is received via the
green line, it gives rise to the drafting of a plug that is parsed by the pole 'Intelligence' of the

SDAT, which consists of a team of investigators headed by a police Commissioner. The

difficulty of our task is precisely to the analysis and prioritization of information reaching us, and
then monitoring of their treatment by the services which we refer for these purposes. Thus, the
testimony in question was collected between thousands of others. I recall that in accordance with
the distribution of the tasks which we had agreed, the prefecture of police was responsible for the
crime scenes and the SDAT of the individuals involved and their entourage.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. I barely understand how, in these moments, your work is
articulated with information that was likely to hold SID and which could establish branches.
How are you you coordinated?
The President Georges Fenech. Remember that these services are co-saisis the matter.
M. Philippe Chadrys. In this type of case, the services shall exchange of officers in command
positions. Thus, certain officials of the SDAT were dispatched to the PC of the prefecture of
police and certain officials of the ITSB - which we also share premises in Levallois-Perret - have
integrated our PC. For the record, we work with CSB on a daily basis, and in this case, we were
jointly seized of the case. It goes therefore without saying that in the event of attack, la DGSI
ISB does not claim the pilotage of the investigations since the attack having been committed, the
facts were part of judicial police work. However, it has naturally activated his judicial service
and its intelligence service; Similarly, foreign services have been mobilized.
Investigations are quickly directed to the Belgium and we set up a joint investigation with the
colleagues of the country team. The information that we have received were shared between
services seized and then analyzed to determine who would exploit them. On Friday, 13
November, for example, we treated Memoo environment-related information, ISB has dealt one
Samy Sumbua. Thus do we split the work.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. This distribution of tasks with CSB goes well?
M. Philippe Chadrys. Better and better. Again, we share the same premises and are co-saisis
most of the business; We experience on a daily basis.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. There is therefore no retention of information by the ISB?
M. Philippe Chadrys. By definition, I cannot say; in any case, information of a legal nature are
shared. Intelligence, need to ask my colleagues in ISB, because it is to them to decide whether or
not to share the information they have.
The President Georges Fenech. You do not belong to the intelligence community.
M. Philippe Chadrys. Indeed, but ISB communicates to us a number of information that could
be useful for the conduct of investigations that I due diligence. This sharing is done quite
flexibly, although I obviously can't say that ISB provides me the completeness of information
available to it, including those from partners abroad. In the event of attack, however, sharing
information of a legal nature is total, and I have also received information from external services.

Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Has the assistance of Europol been decisive for the
identification and monitoring of some migrants passed through the Greece?
M. Philippe Chadrys. A mobile team of Europol has been sought from the aftermath of the
attacks and presented to our premises in Levallois-Perret so we integrate it to the device. We
very quickly realized that the investigation would far exceed the framework of the national
territory, in contrast to that which followed the attacks of January. Our Belgian colleagues
immediately initiated an investigation and a joint investigation team was formed from 15 or 16
November.
The four officials of Europol team that has moved our premises would essentially treat certain
elements related to the crime analysis. Investigations concerning migrants, on the other hand,
were carried out in the context of bilateral relations and exchanges of information to which we
proceed with certain countries, in particular the Greece. The information thus obtained allowed
us to establish that two of those who blew themselves up at the Stade de France were entered in
the European Union by the island of Leros in a group of 199 migrants, on which we continue to
investigate.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Has the Europol agency played a special role?
M. Philippe Chadrys. She took knowledge of the elements that we put at its disposal, with the
agreement of the Paris Prosecutor's office, in order to analyze them, as in other investigations.
However, investigations have mainly occurred in the context of bilateral relations with Belgium
in the first place, but also the Greece, the Germany, the Austria and the United States, which we
have provided a number of information.
The President Georges Fenech. Could the BRI of Paris, which was competent on the site of the
Bataclan, ask the reinforcement of a close bis as that of Versailles?
M. Frdric Doidy. As soon as we were informed of the events of Friday, November 13, all bis
de France were on alert. The national bis and bis de Versailles were recalled and is equipped so
as to be ready to respond to any request. However, we have not been asked to intervene at the
Bataclan.
The President Georges Fenech. Why?
M. Frdric Doidy. I cannot answer you.
The President Georges Fenech. We are told that only seven of forty officials of the bis in Paris
were present on the spot. Was it possible to appeal to you as reinforcements?
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Is such a request already occurred?
M. Frdric Doidy. No, never for an event of this type. We work very rarely in conjunction with
the BRI of Paris; memory, we made it on the occasion of some cases of organized crime or
common law. During the attacks, we don't not been approached, although nothing prevented it.

The head of the BRI of Paris will be able to give you more information on the present staffing
and response time.
The President Georges Fenech. You were so available and ready to intervene, but nobody did
appeal to you.
M. Frdric Doidy. This type of mission is not at all our cFavorite pieces of business. Present
my service police officers on hand for other reasons could act as first responders, because this is
the mission normal of any police officer, any member of a tray or Police-help, for example, when
faced with an event of this nature, to try to stop. Thus, we would naturally acted if we had been
present on-site. On the other hand, such intervention is not cFavorite pieces of business of our
unity as such. We could possibly be approached under the FELINE Protocol alongside the
RAID, but many forces were already on the spot. By the commission of the facts, we have
activated a recall plan, but you will understand that it takes time to gather and equip officials in
Nanterre.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. How long?
M. Frdric Doidy. Our time booster and intervention start is at least an hour, knowing that our
agents live throughout the vast region Ile-de-France.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. How long preparation of the agents last?
M. Frdric Doidy. About an hour between the time where they recalled - given that the traffic
was quite fluid at this time of the evening - and they are ready to deploy.
The President Georges Fenech. If you had been asked, you would be deployed in support of the
RAID; However, it is the opposite that occurred since the RAID arrived in support of the BRI of
Paris.
M. Frdric Doidy. Indeed, but everything depends on the proximity of the various forces to the
sites of intervention - the Bataclan being cFavorite pieces of Paris, the BRI of Paris was closer
than the RAID, based in Paris. There again, it will be up to police forces involved to give you
more information.
The President Georges Fenech. Are you seized letters rogatory by the investigating judge to
continue the investigation?
M. Philippe Chadrys. Absolutely.
The President Georges Fenech. The investigation should lead you to get at the Bataclan ;
would the visit to the site be relevant in the context of our work?
M. Philippe Chadrys. Officers of the SDAT naturally visited all the scenes of crime with a
police Commissioner, even if I did not went personally because I had the responsibility of an
important work of coordination tasks to thousands of agents. The role of the Coordinator, indeed,

is accountable not only to the administrative authority, but also to the judicial authority and to
submit consolidated information. It sounds simple but, in reality, it is extremely difficult in the
case of a major crisis like that of November.
The President Georges Fenech. The SDAT always acts within the framework of a co-saisine by
the investigating judge?
M. Philippe Chadrys. Six investigative judges have been appointed, and the coordination of the
investigation was entrusted to the SDAT through a letter rogatory. SID and the Paris DRPJ are
also co-saisies.
M. Franck Douchy. Similarly, territorial services remain involved in the treatment of certain
aspects of the investigation concerning minors, for example, because the investigations are
limited unfortunately not the only survey of flagrante.
M. Olivier Marleix. The "Attack" device has been redesigned in 2005; How is it today, and who
decides its development in Work? When it was activated November 13?
M. Philippe Chadrys. The Minister of the Interior or the Director-general of the national police
decided its activation, in accordance with the judicial authority. On 13 November, when we
decided as early as 23 hours 45 to activate this feature, I en immediately advised the judiciary,
which is of course not objected.
This device allows to coordinate all of the investigative and police forces who are involved in
this case under the supervision of the SDAT. The key is to activate the call rooms - the SDAT in
Nanterre and the prefecture of police. In the event of a major attack in the province that would
not result in referral to the prefecture of police of Paris, we have in effect of a room allowing us
to trigger all the same operative 'attack '.
Since 2005, this device has been raised only twice: in January and November 2015. In March
2012, when case Merah, I was Deputy Head of the SDAT: we were hesitant to turn it on, the
terrorist character of the acts have fully proven that during the attack in the Jewish school of
Toulouse. It goes without saying that this device should not be raised at least attack. Thus, the
SDAT was co-saisie on the occasion of other acts of terrorism, whether the bombing of SaintQuentin-Fallavier, Sid Ahmed Gee case or the Thalys: in each of these cases, it was not
necessary to trigger the device "Attack" because it is very time-consuming and intensive staffing.
It is indeed necessary to affect a number of agents to receive calls and information processing
tasks. However, the events of November 13 showed that the publication of information or a
photograph generates with important peaks of calls, we need to treat to good use. On 17 500 calls
we have received on this occasion, three have been crucial, one of them including, allowing us at
the end of a work of monitoring, neutralize Abaaoud at Saint-Denis. A decisive call on 17 000 is
sufficient to justify the mobilisation of large numbers. However, this device is intended for the
case of major or committed attacks on several sites.
M. Olivier Marleix. I have read in the press that an operational staff of prevention of terrorism
has been created in June and directly attached to the office of the Minister of the Interior. How it

coordinates with the unit for the coordination of counter-terrorism (UCLAT), which meets every
week and to whom it seemed to me that this mission was?
M. Philippe Chadrys. I know the functioning of this mechanism, but I can't answer in place and
place concerned officials.
M. Olivier Marleix. What is the role of the EMOPT?
M. Philippe Chadrys. The operational staff for the prevention of terrorism (EMOPT), created at
the request of the Minister of the Interior, has identified all individuals treated by the competent
police departments on terrorism and radicalisation, especially the central service of the territorial
intelligence, which has certainly not jurisdiction in counter-terrorism, but who is to know facts of
radicalism. From this point of view, the EMOPT was the precursor to the automated processing
of personal data (FSPRT), file in which services contributing to the fight against terrorism or
having to deal with radicalized individuals can register their objectives, allowing services to
check if this individual is already known a service of territorial intelligence, the CSB or the
police prefecture for example. I don't know how many entries it contains, but its volume begins
to be quite substantial.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. My last question is about the phone call that put you on the
trail of the conspiratif Saint-Denis apartment where Abaaoud. When the RAID on this site, were
you certain that Abaaoud was there?
M. Philippe Chadrys. The SDAT, to continue the 'objectives' on the run, received this call on
16 November at 06: 25 pm; This testimony we has immediately appeared exceptional. As antiterrorist unit, we know indeed Abaaoud, but we didn't have a judicial file concerning it, which
means that we had no judicial inquiry concerning. However, this individual was part of the
sought-after objectives by Western intelligence agencies, and he appeared on a famous video
broadcast on television. At this stage of operations, we thought that he was in Syria, according to
CSB including. However, the testimony which reached us seemed credible.
The appeal in question was received, 18 hours 25; the convening of its author, the collection of
evidence on record and its verifying took time. Indeed, it is not sufficient to dispose of the
information; still had to know how to exploit it. We had to do this install a number of technical
devices, including wiretaps, of the mechanisms of geolocation in real time and physical
monitoring on the ground, what we have done in an area of Aubervilliers that we had designated
the witness. At this stage, however, we were unaware whether what was reported was accurate
and if Abaaoud was on the spot.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Therefore, this witness was received by your services the
same evening?
M. Philippe Chadrys. Yes.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. I guess that he has submitted his comments. However, the
intervention took place in the night of 17-18; that happened during the 17 day?

M. Philippe Chadrys. We have deployed wiretaps, physical surveillance and geolocation

features.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Was it possible to intervene earlier? We know indeed that
an imminent attack to defence project was formed and that it could have occurred on 17 or 18
November. Do you have information about this? Such a project necessarily question the
timeliness of intervention that would neutralize Abaaoud. Did you have knowledge of this attack
to defence project when you have gathered the evidence of the witness?
M. Philippe Chadrys. At this point, we were unaware of whereabouts of Abaaoud, and the
witness was ignoring him also; simply, provided us a possible point venue where we deployed a
physical monitoring device. We mobilized to do this a the SDAT unit which is specially
dedicated to monitoring and spinning, and we appealed to the bis to locate Abaaoud. We could
not therefore intervene earlier, since it was not located.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. The possibility of a new attack to defence was known since
November 16 in the evening and, where appropriate, a specific device do you have deployed onsite?
M. Philippe Chadrys. Should consider all of the hearings of the witness, who was heard on
several occasions, particularly during custody at sight. From memory, it seems to me that we had
not yet aware. This item appeared at a hearing of the witness on November 19, while he was in
custody.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. When have you had knowledge? When the Prosecutor of
the Republic, in press conference, this project of foiled attack, Abaaoud and his cousin were
dead. What is the evidence of the witness who brought this information either devices
monitoring and listening, or even the seizure of documents? Clearly, could an attack occur on 17
November to defence?
M. Philippe Chadrys. When the testimony of the witness, Abaaoud was not yet neutralized. It is
through other means, in particular the exploitation of technical data from GPS systems analysed
in the following days, we knew it was product of the steps to defence. Placed in custody at the
request of the prosecution, the witness in question has given us many elements, including the
presence of about 90 terrorists. I have no recollection of the details of its hearings, but delivered
information could be explained during the custody. We had not yet knowledge of an attack to
defence project, since things are rolling very quickly: the testimony was collected 16 in the
evening and apartment located on the night of 17 to 18 November - without Abaaoud, him, is.
Spinning has in fact led us to the apartment of Corbilln, at Saint-Denis Street, that we did not
know; We had no certainty that Abaaoud was there. We knew however thanks to the textile mills
that Hasna At Boulahcen there had led two people from Aubervilliers, what confirmed
telephone tapping to 10: 30 pm on 17 November. We then appealed to the RAID, whose Chief is
made at Levallois to take knowledge of the elements we have.
The President Georges Fenech. At what moment did you learn of the presence of Abaaoud in
this apartment? After his death?

M. Philippe Chadrys. His formal identification was made through his fingerprints. It goes
without saying that we did not have the absolute certainty that he was the person spotted during
surveillance operations, even if we could suspect him. Extracted a surveillance camera
photograph seemed similar to us, but we had no certainty about the identity of this person - even
if we knew that Hasna is the cousin of Abaaoud.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. The third person has been identified?
M. Philippe Chadrys. It comes to be. When we started the findings in the apartment of SaintDenis, where one floor fell, bodies were absolutely not identifiable, since an explosive belt had
been activated. they have therefore identified by other processes. That of Abaaoud,
unrecognizable, it was finally by fingerprinting.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you.
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Christophe Molmy, Chief of the research and intervention of the
prefecture of police of Paris, and Mr Marc Thoraval, head of the criminal brigade of the Regional
Directorate of the judicial police (DRPJ)
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Thursday, March 10, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We are continuing our investigations with Mr Christopher McMahon,
Chief of the research and intervention by Paris, the BRIP, and Mr. Marc Thoraval, head of the criminal
brigade of the Regional Directorate of the judicial police in Paris, which will appealr usefully supplement
the information that we have collected yesterday, particularly on the respective role and the articulation
between the different units.
Thank you, gentlemen, for responding to the request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the
means OEimplemented by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015. With the Minister of the
Interior, we received Monday, and with officials of the gendarmerie and the police, we heard yesterday,
we began to address issues related to the conduct of operations by the intervention of the forces of order
and the means at their disposal.
This hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes place
behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly. Nevertheless, in
accordance with article 6 of the Ordinance of November 14, 1958 the functioning of parliamentary
assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part if we decide so at the end of our work. I said
that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera you will be first passed to collect your
comments. These will be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report. I recall
that, pursuant to the provisions of the same article, "shall be punished by penalties provided for in article
226-13 of the penal code -" one year of imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine - "anyone who, within a
period of twenty-five years [...], disclose or publish information relating to non-public works of a
commission of inquiry, except if the report published at the end of the work of the commission has
reported this information.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr. Christophe Molmy and Mr Marc Thoraval take oath.
Can you first of all, one and one, give us your professional career?

Mr. Christophe Molmy, Divisional Commissioner, Chief of the research and intervention (bis) of
Paris. After a stint of two years in office, after my release from the school, I worked at the BRI in Marseille
as Assistant, then to the central Office for the repression of banditry (OCRB) for many years. Then, I was
responsible for two antennas of the judicial police in Versailles, Meaux for the Seine-et-Marne, and Cergy
for the Val-d'Oise. Then I participated, with general Cormier, the creation of the unit for coordination of the
forces of intervention (UCOFI) - intervention of the gendarmerie nationale (GIGN) group, RAID (research,
assistance, intervention, deterrence) and BRI of Paris. I went back to the central Office of the judicial
police--to the central Office for the Suppression of the violence to persons (OCRVP). Finally, there is a
little more than two years, I was offered the opportunity to take the lead of the BRI of Paris. My career
was therefore mainly held within the judicial police.
The President Georges Fenech. You don't have a police force of intervention training?
M. Christophe McMahon. In fact, if - and everything depends on the meaning given to the word
"intervention". Thus, in the context of the judicial police, for many years, I participated not only in
interventions in the environment - i.e., the interpellations on public roads - but also to so-called "home
helpers". For these operations, we are equipped as can be intervention - heavy flak units, guards ballistic
weapons. This is, for example, break a door at six o'clock in the morning and apprehend criminals, or
terrorists, on behalf of investigators services.
For three years, I then considered on intervention techniques and the problem of the coordination of
forces, before joining the bis and to spend part of my time in intervention. The BRI of Paris is indeed a
very atypical service: she spends as much time dealing with judicial, to proceed with the spinnersmonitoring, to intervene. This specificity is its history. It was the first group intervention in France,
provided with a jurisdiction at the national, or even international level since it intervened in the Hague in
the 1970s. Subsequently, with the creation of the RAID, the GIGN and other antennas, the skills are
divided divisions and the action of the bis is focused on Paris. With regard to the judicial aspect, the
technique of work upstream, spinning-surveillance, already mentioned, and intended to practice of
flagrant offences, has spread, including in Marseille where I worked. We work daily to fill these two
missions.
Mr. Marc Thoraval, Divisional Commissioner, head of the Regional Directorate of the judicial
police of Paris criminal brigade. For my part, I started my career at the Central Directorate of the
judicial police in Versailles, where I stayed four years. I then joined the prefecture of police, the Regional
Directorate of the judicial police, and I occupied successively the functions of Chief of section in the
departmental service of the judicial police of Hauts-de-Seine, Assistant to the bis, Assistant to the Brigade
for the repression of banditry (BRP), Chief of staff of the judicial police, head of the drug squad and ,
since five years, I am at the head of the criminal Brigade of the Regional Directorate of the judicial police
of Paris.
The President Georges Fenech. Turning to developments in Paris last November at the Bataclan,
several terraces and close to the Stade de France. The commission has received your elements of
answers to the questions you raised. We have a detailed report of your interventions in these attacks.
9: 19 pm, then 9: 21 pm, November 13, Mr Molmy, you have been informed of the explosion of two
suicide bombers at the Stade de France.
M. Christophe McMahon. Indeed I was informed by my staff. The prefecture of police of Paris is a very
'woven' service: in the context of the bis in the broad sense, i.e. commando, we integrate staff of the
Brigade (BI) of the Directorate of public order and traffic (DOPC), the Directorate of security of proximity
to the Paris metropolitan area (DSPAP) and its six brigades Rab (tray). Officials who work within these
services know each other, talk and, of course, as soon as the first explosions at the Stade de France,
they are called, so that, in turn, after a few minutes, I was advised by the first explosion. Like everyone
else, I hoped it was an accident - the explosion of a shack French fries for example; but from the second

explosion, the first elements suggesting that suicide bombers were involved, we became aware that it
was attacks.
The President Georges Fenech. What do you do at this time?
M. Christophe McMahon. I'm in connection with my staff, but, as you know, the units are divided based
on areas of territorial competence, participating in their good coordination, and the bis is not competent in
the small Crown. Firstly, I wonder whether if it is useful to leave immediately, knowing that these
explosions could not involve hostage requiring our intervention - which has proved - and, on the other
hand, as this was the area of the RAID, it seemed more prudent to wait in Paris and remain on alert in the
unfortunate hypothesis, where attacks are there produce - what happened.
The President Georges Fenech. Tell you therefore the Director general of the national police (DGPN)?
M. Christophe McMahon. It is not within my powers to prevent the Director-general of the national police
nor does even the prefect of police. I'm just head of the bis: I have contacts with my Director - which is,
moreover, already aware - and staff who confirmed the explosions near the Stade de France. I take note
and asked my staff to stay in the starting blocks.
The President Georges Fenech. At 21 h 25 began the slaughter of the terraces, first in Small Cambodia
and chime, then, at 9:49 at the Bataclan with three terrorists. By whom are you warned and what
measures do you, as we are here on your jurisdiction?
M. Christophe McMahon. I am not warned of shootings on the terraces of coffee in a very short time. I
am aware, up to 21 h 47, that of the attacks at the Stade de France. As soon as I learn, indirectly there
too, that fire occurred in Paris, I activate by the bis, the first, fastest (FIR) rapid intervention Force. The
members of the QRF have their equipment at home in order to project themselves immediately.
The President Georges Fenech. The FIR is composed of seven officials, is that correct?
M. Christophe McMahon. Not at all, we were fifteen, precisely.
The President Georges Fenech. Fifteen staff members make up the FIR that you enable?
M. Christophe McMahon. Indeed, it's the first blade that I selected. Then I launched the second alert,
known as 'H + 30': we must then be able to leave the service column incorporated, equipped with heavy
equipment, half an hour after the call.
At the end of 2014, while we were already in a context of risk of attacks, we were faced with an event that
had nothing to do with counter-terrorism: an attack on a jewellery Cartier on the Champs Elysees, which
e
ended a hostage in the 15 district. On this occasion, we found that the H + 30 alert was working fine:
called officials mobilized immediately and came kitted out to the squad, while we were at the end of the
day and they were trying to return to their homes. But the movement, in Paris, is so dense that the assault
column then put a lot of time to arrive: a little over half an hour, which is very long in the context of
counter-terrorism. So we decided to create another alert, with officials that day, are, to the service or
training, already equipped and able to leave immediately by motorcycle, by boat, depending on the
configuration of the crisis, with aim to arrive on the scene less than a quarter of an hour after the alert. In
the evening, so that they don't iron by the service and do not lose time, these officials return home with
their armament.
I activated this FIR, November 13 in the evening, as soon as I have read fire in Paris. We left immediately
and, on the way, I have confirmed to my staff that we were off. Thus we are we thrown immediately,
moreover, launching the H + 30 alert by phone.

The President Georges Fenech. If I understand correctly, your teams, you have a FIR which intervenes
H + 10 or H + 15 Max.
M. Christophe McMahon. It is more than that: H + 30 does not mean that my colleagues should be on
the scene half an hour after having been alerted, but they must start from the 36 quai des Orfvres half
an hour after having been alerted.
The President Georges Fenech. To equip themselves.
M. Christophe McMahon. Altogether. The QRF, meanwhile, does not obey a logic of "H +": she projects
immediately. Certainly, it is necessary to staff the time to put on a bulletproof vest and go down the stairs,
but they do not have the obligation, at night, to return to the service to equip itself, and they go directly
from home. So we went to strengthen the RAID, at his request, on 18 November: we arrived a quarter of
an hour after. It is a tactical choice: you should know that velocity is detrimental to ballistics; to be fast,
our equipment is less heavy. Heavy equipment, it is a helmet of several kilos, a bulletproof vest of twentyfive pounds, a long gun, grenades... Or FIR aims not only to move very quickly, but to "leaps" in Paris if
necessary - training, we have anticipated a threat moves - which is much more difficult with a heavily
equipped column, with a shielded, of artificers and any a caravan which follows.
The President Georges Fenech. What time do you think the arrival of the FIR at the Bataclan ?
M. Christophe McMahon. Firstly - and I take the responsibility-, notwithstanding the fact that the FIR
offers the possibility to project immediately, we met at 36 insofar as I had no precise information on the
part of my staff on the place where we intervene: reported of shootings in several places, rue de
Charonne... it all seemed a bit confused. In addition, it referred to the presence of terrorists belts of
explosives; However, in the configuration that I have just outlined, we don't operate not with shields,
which are large. Also it seemed to me that for the safety of staff, should recover some shields. We left
from us about at 9:50 for we find at 36; Some went seeking shields and we left for the 36 to 22 hours.
The President Georges Fenech. How much were you?
M. Christophe McMahon. 15 with the doctor.
The President Georges Fenech. Aren't you therefore seven normally?
M. Christophe McMahon. No, we have twelve minimum and we are fifteen with the doctor, the depiegeur
of assault and the head of Department.
The President Georges Fenech. Yesterday we heard the RAID Commander who said that, when he
arrived as reinforcements, he found seven officials of your service; It is in its report.
M. Christophe McMahon. I leave him freedom of this counting and his remarks. We were fifteen: I can
give you the list of the officials in question and you can hear them. Perhaps the Commander of the RAID
has it counted only those of us who were outside, but I can assure you that we were fifteen.
The President Georges Fenech. So you were fifteen?
M. Christophe McMahon. We were fifteen.
The President Georges Fenech. You have arrived at 10:30 pm, is it?
M. Christophe McMahon. No, to 10.15 p.m., time to get out of the cars, make the point with staff on-site.
You should know that in this kind of situation, the interoperability of forces is very complicated. Should be

officials who are on-site and which make us focus on what they have seen, lived, how they intend the
crisis. I personally asked whether the firing had ceased; I was told that they had stopped for a few
minutes and we no longer heard, indeed, until the assault. I asked then if the terrorists were still present;
they have failed to answer me, what is natural.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Who have you interviewed?
M. Christophe McMahon. An officer who was in the lobby of the Bataclan.
The rapporteur. An officer who was involved?
M. Christophe McMahon. No. I confess that I have not identified his identity at this time there. Several
officials of the DSPAP were at the entrance of the Bataclan and who did this they learn - bis form the
strength of the night ferry and company security and intervention (CSI), which are part of its feature -:
they had ceased their involvement since the firing had ceased. Their work, in the event where the firing
cease, is not, in fact, to enter and progress the presence of explosives or fire terrorist risks and the risk
of sur-attentat are important but to freeze the situation, that they were also very well done. We asked
them to point and they told us, again, that the shooting, a priori, had ceased; They wondered if there were
still terrorists and if some had not been able to escape at the same time as hostages who were released
by the issues of relief or by the entrance. Complete silence reigned in the room. We have taken this
situation into account and we returned in the Bataclan with the first FIR at 2220 hours approximately.
The President Georges Fenech. How much are you entering?
M. Christophe McMahon. Always at fifteen. When we leave, it tells us the rue de Charonne and the way
my manager calls me to tell me that we must rather go at the Bataclan, where we are so. While we were
leaving, a second team arrived at 36 finally equip themselves. I gave to this second team, which had a
dozen minutes behind us, the setpoint to go nevertheless rue de Charonne for avoidance of doubt. Onsite, this second blade of FIR found that, unfortunately, she couldn't help, and she joined us at the
Bataclan.
The President Georges Fenech. You therefore are thirty?
M. Christophe McMahon. We are in fact about 30 around 22:30, 22: 35.
The President Georges Fenech. We again ask the question to the Commander of the RAID because,
when it comes to 22 h 50, he says find on place seven officials of the bis.
M. Christophe McMahon. On this point I will be very conclusive. I find even aberrant that a commander
of the RAID explains how we were. I am head of Department, I was there at 2215 with fifteen staff
members and, at 2220 hours, we started our investigations; We were quickly joined by another blade and
the bis all joined us around 2240, 2245.
The President Georges Fenech. What decision do you take at this precise moment? Indeed, given the
magnitude of the attack, you have an opportunity: to ask that it raises the intervention Force of the
national police (FNIF), which includes the forces of the RAID and the bis under the single command of the
RAID.
M. Christophe McMahon. Indeed, in this configuration the RAID leader change cap and his Deputy is the
head of the bis.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you have then the possibility or even coercion, as applicant, to
trigger the FNIF by the guardianship authority?

M. Christophe McMahon. On the form, I am only brigade commander and do not have jurisdiction to
trigger the FNIF. This decision rests with the Minister of the Interior - has also taken it in January - on a
proposal from the Commissioner of police himself informed by the Director-general of the national police.
On the bottom, I understand, in the case of major crises, that we try to reassure saying need to engage
the entire intervention forces we have at hand and immediately. However it is not necessarily the best
solution insofar as it must be 'size' crisis. What is important is to provide a response at the height of the
crisis, to plan in the long term, to consider the possibility that committed other attacks and especially to
ensure good coordination of forces. In this case, a coordination between the RAID and the BRI Protocol,
signed by the two heads of unit and the authorities, provides an articulation of these two forces, in
particular on the Parisian square, in order to provide a response at the height of the crisis.
When we arrive at the Bataclan, we are, in a first time, fifteen and thirty, then finally the bis. We must first
assess the situation: we ignore if terrorists are still on the spot - they could very well have already gone and, if so, determine their number and whether we are able to solve only the crisis. The question is not
whether we want to face alone, but she to know if we have the jurisdiction to do so - which seems so be
the case - and if we have digital, or technical capacity to do so. With regard to the Bataclan, we were
numerous enough to clear mines from the bottom so that the emergency services can take wounded in
charge. Could not commit quickly intervention inside the Bataclan forces: it is unclear, at this precise
moment, if hostages are trapped, explosive devices are hidden, if terrorists are fire. Therefore, the best
solution is not to rush inside. It must proceed step by step, carefully. It was for ourselves difficult, because
while we saw injuries on the ground, I took the responsibility to immediately enter the emergency services
- needed to do that in good conditions, after we were sure that bottom had appropriate security
conditions.
The question therefore not arisen to trigger the FNIF, because at that time, I have not felt the need to be
strengthened.
The rapporteur. Except that the representatives of the RAID yesterday told us that their elements come
on their own to supplement your staff...
M. Christophe McMahon. I think they wanted to do well, that this decision was a good intention, but yet
again, I did not find it useful to ask for backup: first was to assess the situation. Still, despite what we can
imagine, we are working in good intelligence. I have found that a small number of colleagues in the RAID
arrived on the spot; also we integrated them into our device and things went smoothly.
The President Georges Fenech. We well understand the coordination of your services with the RAID
and the GIGN. You have therefore felt that you were in number and strength sufficient to manage this
disaster - since there were 1,500 people at the Bataclan and we know the result: 90 deaths and hundreds
of injuries. you have considered on your own that you didn't suggest the outbreak of the first and that you
didn't need the RAID or the GIGN. Have you had contact with the RAID and the GIGN?
M. Christophe McMahon. Indeed, we have had contacts with the RAID since the RAID leader spoke to
me...
The President Georges Fenech. Spontaneously?
M. Christophe McMahon. Yes, spontaneously.
I come back, if I may, on the Protocol. We obey rules of territorial jurisdiction: the prefecture of police is
competent in Paris, the bis in Paris Intra-Muros, the RAID around Paris and the GIGN and RAID share
the province.
In Paris, off FNIF - the trigger does not belong to me and I have no difficulty: I believe that the FNIF
worked well at Vincennes-, bis is 'driving', namely that it is the natural response unit, while the RAID is

"concurrent" and therefore reinforces the bis, at its request, as appropriate, by staff, or other technical
means.
The rapporteur. This was not the case on 13 November: you were not seeking help from the RAID?
M. Christophe McMahon. Things have gone much faster than that, but I'll get back.
A few weeks ago, the RAID had to deal with two crises in the small and in the large Crown; it lacked two
snipers: they called me, I sent them two snipers and everything went very well spent - it is called
modularity.
Do you think that, on 13 November, when I enter at the Bataclan, at 2220 hours, I wonder whether if I
manage this crisis alone or whether to ask the help of the RAID, I do ask that the fnif, if I have sensitivities
in this regard? Not at all! My first concern is to clear the bottom of the Bataclan and take the measure of
what is happening inside. If we had one hundred officials, heavily equipped, they would have remained
outside. Moreover, a column of 20 staff members remained on the sidewalk: everyone is not entered. We
have met the terrorists in a corridor: the top ten are mounted the assault while the others were in reserve.
The dimensions of the crisis which I mentioned is important. It is not necessarily necessary to add units of
intervention on-site to be reassured and later, to say that they will be given all means. This is unwise,
because it is necessary to think about a crisis in the long term: it is necessary to anticipate the possibility
of record, that of multiple crises. When Jean-Michel Fauvergue arrived, he asked me what he could do.
We had already solved the problem of the bottom of the Bataclan and we were getting ready to mount on
the floors. I therefore told him to stay down to protect ourselves, but above all, I asked him, if another
crisis occurred in Paris, to take into account. It took note and it was, I think, the best solution. I perceived
no difficulty: operations is are well placed, well articulated, similarly in January 2015, the three
intervention groups worked preserved.
The President Georges Fenech. Short, everything went well!
M. Christophe McMahon. And I say this without irony or naivet. Only, I have not been embarrassed by
the RAID, I did have the feeling that we were not heard. In short, I have not experienced operational
difficulties - but possibly other considerations are beyond me...
The President Georges Fenech. Where is the command post (PC)?
M. Christophe McMahon. Advanced PC, bringing the Commissioners the bis and the RAID is installed in
situ, i.e. inside the Bataclan. Another PC of the bis has been set up, him, outside, in a coffee, a little
farther.
The President Georges Fenech. There are therefore two PC.
M. Christophe McMahon. In the Advanced PC, we are not sitting, but standing and we talk.
The President Georges Fenech. It is on the inside?
M. Christophe McMahon. Yes.
The President Georges Fenech. In the middle of the wounded, so?
M. Christophe McMahon. This PC moves depending on where I am, where is my Deputy and where the
RAID leader. We have also assembled a PC - BRI, a few tens of meters away, in a cafe.

The President Georges Fenech. And where you find yourself, at this precise moment? On the ground
floor?
M. Christophe McMahon. On the ground floor, upstairs... I'm moving with my officials.
The President Georges Fenech. You are on the ground floor, but where the RAID?
M. Christophe McMahon. I didn't spend my time looking at my watch to see what time each and others,
came but it is around 22:40 or 22 h 45 that the bulk of the troupe of the bis, which were grafted some
precursors of the RAID team comes about at the same time. We ask them to take into account the bottom
already secured to ensure coverage when we find ourselves on the floor. The RAID is downstairs, in the
pit, while we're on the floor from twenty-three hours.
The President Georges Fenech. Twenty-three hours?
M. Christophe McMahon. It is time that we start to make progress on the floors.
The President Georges Fenech. Therefore, you begin to advance on the floors at twenty-three hours.
M. Christophe McMahon. About, Yes.
The President Georges Fenech. Are you on the scene from what time?
M. Christophe McMahon. I said: since 22 h 20.
The President Georges Fenech. You should therefore put just about forty minutes to progress on the
floors?
M. Christophe McMahon. Yes and cela explained, Mr president. In this type of situation, you have two
categories of hostages: those who are in a hurry to get out, and those who find themselves in a catatonic
state. When a hostage rushes towards us, we need to stop it and take the precaution to ask him to lift his
shirt to show us his hands, because we do not know who it is, we don't know if he is trapped - the military
have in fact advised us that sometimes, in Syria, terrorists trapped hostages. So we took many
precautions to remove valid hostages, searched several times.
The rapporteur. From what time do you begin to evacuate them? From 22 h 20?
M. Christophe McMahon. As soon as we begin to make progress in the pit, we disperse by sectors...
The rapporteur. Excuse me you cut: the RAID leader described scenes, on the ground floor, during
which wounded pulled on the pants of the forces telling them: ' rescue me, rescue me!
M. Christophe McMahon. On the ground floor? I do not have this memory. Maybe had all they not been
evacuated... The first image I have arrived at the Bataclan, these are not only 90 dead and dozens of
wounded, but 300 to 400 lying ashore and that no longer, move for many gripped by fear - until we don't
arrive, as soon as one of them moved or as soon as the phone rang, you pull him over. Also, some
wanted more move and others dared not even when they saw emerge from police with assault rifles
officers, because they were still in shock. So we put a bit of time to reassure some, make them stand up,
evacuate them - it is here valid persons.
The rapporteur. This happens really from twenty-two hours?

M. Christophe McMahon. Yes.

The rapporteur. When we heard victims, we have asked them about the time not of your speech - what
you explain in this matter is quite justifiable-, but on their support. Can you explain to us how the
operations took place? How do you secure the scene and how have you progressed to the floors, to the
corridor where the latest hostages were and where suicide bombers were holed up, and other hand, how,
meanwhile, were supported victims? Can you give us clarification on the time where the rescue occurred?
M. Christophe McMahon. As have indicated you, when we enter approximately 22:20, at the Bataclan,
we have this image of hundreds of people on the ground under the eyes. We need a few seconds - a
minute or two, perhaps - to take stock of the situation and start to us "spread" carefully - you can imagine
that it is not running into a room where we see hundreds of people on the ground, where comes to
perpetrating a massacre, where we see from the dead, where it stalled...
The rapporteur. Is the darkness total?
M. Christophe McMahon. No: despite the half-light, can distinguish what we have ahead. and there
better that, I repeat, we see bodies torn to shreds, walking in the blood... Therefore, we know very well
where you are. It takes a little time to take the measure of things to begin to move forward in securing the
premises, i.e. by dragging civil servants on the right, on the left, trying to see the high points, because it is
difficult to work in a pit surrounded floor hence can come from the shootings. Technically, it is not very
wise to seek to investigate both the bottom and the top: Unfortunately it must proceed step by step.
We started to grow slowly - with the necessary discernment-, because, I repeat, we must be careful not to
fall on booby traps. It had in fact warned us, a few months before, had in Syria increasingly use explosive
vests, which did not fail. We are trained to cope: we have in our depiegeurs of assault columns to advise
us. Thus, progressing carefully, we made out the valid hostages, until we have completed the catenary
room, secure it, moment where we did come out in number the last valid hostages remained on the
ground.
The rapporteur. Around what time?
M. Christophe McMahon. Around 22:30, 22: 35.
The rapporteur. So, almost a quarter of an hour after you get the bulk of the workforce.
M. Christophe McMahon. A little less: maybe ten minutes later. When we began to be strengthened by
the second team, we went much faster, since we had already started to work. We then split the room, and
I also gave instructions to those who were valid to get up and go under our protection.
The rapporteur. Is the bulk of the hostages he exhausted pretty quickly?
M. Christophe McMahon. Yes, I would say: five to ten minutes after we entered - I speak well of the pit.
The rapporteur. You enter at 22:20 on the premises, the Bataclan , and at 10:30 10:35 or 10:40 p.m....
M. Christophe McMahon. At 2235, because I know that my Assistant comes around 22 h 40, time where
it says the latest hostages out. The hostages are then passed to sift by the ITUC and the night ferry
officials who are on the outside and who have tried to create a kind of bottleneck to continue
apprehending, to poke them, so as to ensure that there be no terrorist or person trapped among them.
The rapporteur. One of the hostages which the commission has collected the testimony has assured us
that, when you arrived, you asked the able-bodied to stand.

M. Christophe McMahon. It is myself that asked it, but not immediately: at the end, I told you five or ten
minutes, because it was necessary to secure the room. After that they came out, we end up with the
wounded. Firefighters and ambulance personnel would anyway not enter until the premises were not
secured, including the top. These are police officers who began to leave the wounded under our
protection to relief on Vauban barriers. The RAID arrived, the room has finished to be emptied of the
wounded that we wanted to get out and we began to make progress in the floors.
The rapporteur. From twenty-three hours?
M. Christophe McMahon. Pretty much, Yes.
The President Georges Fenech. Before coming to the progression in the story, no doubt want deputies
ask. It is you who direct operations and the FNIF is not triggered?
M. Christophe McMahon. The FNIF has not been triggered.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. You're doing so ensure that valid them can come out to be controlled, but I guess
that injured people remain on the ground...
M. Christophe McMahon. Injured or Catatonic - some no longer dared to move.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Indeed, and all deserve care. You are at that time about to continue to grow, but you
can no longer anything for them. Can not rescue as the UAS services intervene hot to take care of these
casualties?
M. Christophe McMahon. No: at this very moment, we enter the volunteers of the police - CSI, DSPAP...
- who are out injured, sometimes lying on Vauban barriers to be subsequently supported by the
emergency services. Still they are evacuated quickly enough.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. You continue your progress while he remains wounded on the ground...
M. Christophe McMahon. Some still are, I think.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. And are you sure that there are criminals on the floor?
M. Christophe McMahon. No. When we arrive, we make the point with the services located in the lobby:
they tell us that, from their point of view, there is more terrorists inside. Of course we wary - and the facts
will give us reason-, but, until 23:15 about moment where we have against this door behind which we
hear hostages us yelling not approach, we have no objective reason to believe that there are terrorists
because there's more shots. Because it must be realized that firing cease and we are making progress as
we have, either fire continue, and in this case, we face the terrorists immediately by entering.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. There is the terrorist who was killed on the scene by blowing up.
M. Christophe McMahon. He was killed a few minutes before our arrival.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. It is therefore always on the scene, when you arrive.
M. Christophe McMahon. Indeed, he is dead...
Mr. Alain Marsaud. And in your progress while you proceed with the necessary precautions, you do not
know if there are people at the top and you even think that it has more person?

M. Christophe McMahon. To be quite honest, spent twenty-three hours, while advancing on the floors
and before arriving at the famous door, I felt that it was more nobody and that the terrorists were well
away.
M. Olivier Falorni. The first killed terrorist, apparently killed by a member of the Paris night tray was
raised.
M. Christophe McMahon. Absolutely.
M. Olivier Falorni. How is it that this Commissioner was in a situation? He acted on his own initiative?
Was really able to intervene? His gesture had consequences on your analysis of rapid intervention in this
type of situation where there is not really taking of hostages, but where a massacre was perpetrated
almost immediately? I have struggled to understand indeed: a procedure provides that expected the entry
into operation of the intervention groups, what is legitimate; but we have here a Lac Commissioner who
intervenes, efficiently, with a weapon that I imagine light compared with Kalashnikovs... Why is it there,
how does and what does do then?
M. Christophe McMahon. Your excellent question will allow me to provide some explanations. The bis in
its commando training is a functional structure: as the prefect activates it, he places of de facto under my
authority of officials who are not usually, organic way. it comes to officials that we train, we equip and that
we integrate into our device. One speaks then of first, second and third perimeter.
The first perimeter consists of those who are recruited and trained for the assault, which are more heavily
equipped and train more often. It is the bis that, for now, incorporates the DOPC BI, and which, once
completed, ongoing restructuring will be a digital, completely independent perspective.
The second perimeter, meanwhile, has a vital utility, because it includes primo-engaged employees who
always arrive before us. Let me point out, in passing, that the bis intervened in twelve minutes to
Vincennes and in a little more than twenty minutes at the Bataclan, which, for an advocacy group, is very
short: I took the liberty to consider this type of operation almost everywhere in the world where response
times are often much longer. Surgery requires a lot of equipment, involves a logistics and will therefore
necessarily slower than two or three officials of a tray that spin in Paris aboard a civilian vehicle.
The night ferry and the CSI Paris thus include officials that we train, to which we entrust the mission to
arrive before we - under our operational control, somehow. We have thus, fifteen days, ago a night at le
Bon March exercise, exercise during which the BAC night was supposed to arrive before us who, then,
putting OEimplementing interoperability.
M. Olivier Falorni. Are all officers of the BAC night likely to intervene or only to volunteers?
M. Christophe McMahon. The night ferry and the CSI officials are trained and continuously, several
times per year - this was the case of the Commissioner which was discussed. These are the bis trainers
who go, the night train officials in night tray.
Their first mission is to go immediately to the place of crisis and, in the presence of fire, they enter the
premises and, thanks to the techniques that we teach them, they do stop the crisis by killing the terrorist,
either the firing stopped and they freeze the situation pending that we got and that we proceed to. Their
second mission, when we are working, then the resolution of the crisis, is to ensure our protection. He
arrived, in Syria, that the soldiers are attacked from behind while they were trying to deal with a crisis that one can imagine in the context of the Bataclan : we are working on the inside while two people come
to shoot us in the back. Their third mission is to take into account the hostages when they come out what has been done at the Bataclan. Finally, last mission, they provide with us what we call recovery:
when the crisis is over, that the terrorists are neutralized, it must be ensured that one of them is not

hidden in a corner. This operation goes very quickly to theHypercacher of Vincennes, which is small and
has only a small basement; It is longest at the Bataclan since it took an hour - and imagine a crisis on the
fifteenth floor of the Montparnasse tower: the resumption would compel us to check all floors. To do this,
we need staff that integrates our columns and with whom we train, staff members who are an integral part
of the device, for this second perimeter.
The third perimeter of the bis is composed of services contributing to the action and who are less involved
in the operative part: it comes to pilots of helicopters, boats, operational direction of technical and
logistical services (DOSTL) which provides us the means to implement the tactical bubble - trade data,
video, radio.
The bis, in these conditions, theoretically has a little more than 300 officials - for the record, the porte de
Vincennes, we were 148 and a little less than a hundred at the Bataclan.
M. Olivier Falorni. Which gives the Commissioner the order to intervene? And what weapons had it?
M. Christophe McMahon. Perhaps I was not precise enough. We train them for that: they have a
continuous mission that is to focus first on the scene of a crisis so, if possible, to circumscribe the
immediately confronting the terrorist - what did the Commissioner, since I believe have understood that
there was gunfire when he arrived; It has therefore done its job by stop the crisis and I think that it was he
who did stop the firing and the massacre; then it stops and it is not progressing on the floors, because, I
repeat, it is formed for this. The equipment of these officials, I believe they have shotguns, of handguns
and I think I know that they will receive more material, which is rather a good thing. They have, I repeat, a
mission to permanent.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. I also ask this question to your colleagues that we auditionnerons: when you
arrive on site, have you ever had contact with the press? The press you have, somehow, prevented in
your missions? Have you had this element to 'manage' in addition to all the other tasks that you
performed with great courage and composure?
M. Christophe McMahon. No. We are not going to lie: we all contacts with journalists. After more than
twenty years of police, some have my phone number, of course. But in a case like this, I haven't touched
my phone from the moment where I put the foot at the Bataclan. Leaving, I have received some eighty
text messages and missed calls 100. Journalists were not at all embarrassed us. That said, crisis
communication is a topic in itself, a little heavy and we'll not today treat.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. When I said 'you', it was not you personally; but journalists were already present
at the scene, and if so, have you been hampered by them?
M. Christophe McMahon. No.
M. Olivier Marleix. Patrons of the RAID and the GIGN, yesterday, we extensively maintained new
schemes of intervention related to the evolution of the terrorist phenomena you are facing, including
jihadism. If I summarize: we committed forces as and as, without waiting for the establishment of a
comprehensive, it is not negotiating...
M. Christophe McMahon. Let me interrupt you on this important point: it is false that there be no
negotiations. It cannot, in the case of a major crisis, offers the possibility of contact with the terrorist so
that it releases the hostages before the assault. It would be a mistake.
M. Olivier Marleix. I schmatisais course their words.

The rapporteur. Olivier Marleix is not if schematic: and the representatives of the GIGN and RAID told us
that, since the case Merah, it was more matter of negotiation but of contacts to obtain information in order
to measure the determination of the terrorist. And ultimately, you try contact the terrorist to fix before
intervening. Whatever it is, according to the interviewees, it was more matter of negotiations for the
release of the hostages.
The President Georges Fenech. In your report, you specify that at 23:27, 23:29, 23 h 48, 0 h 5 and 0 h
18, bis negotiator comes in contact with them. So there were negotiations...
M. Christophe McMahon. This is what I'm saying, Yes.
The President Georges Fenech. ... between a negotiator of the bis and the terrorists.
M. Christophe McMahon. As to the porte de Vincennes.
The President Georges Fenech. For complete information: reports, notably of the RAID, at no time does
state of negotiations.
M. Christophe McMahon. There is no dissonance. I recall that theHypercacher, to porte de Vincennes,
like the Bataclan, falls within the jurisdiction of the bis. It is therefore quite natural that the bis being force
driving, it is its negotiator who comes in contact with terrorists, which was the case in the porte de
Vincennes and the Bataclan.
The President Georges Fenech. Thus, there has been negotiations?
M. Christophe McMahon. Of course. After we play on words: when I consider that it is a failing not to
initiate negotiation, you answer to me that it is not quite a negotiation, but a contact plug. Of course. In
fact, what is not possible, is not to make the effort to come in contact with terrorists, is to refuse to talk to
them by saying that it will be useless and that it is therefore better move immediately to the assault. Now
that would be a mistake.
We have radicalized people and we know have a very small chance of getting them the release of
hostages and their accountability. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake not to try; in fact, we got Israelis
and military information returned from Syria indicating that, although this was rare, some terrorists to
ravisaient. Thus, I would not take responsibility to the attack without giving me this chance. Indeed, late
2014, before the attacks of January 2015, we did form the negotiator of the bis specifically on the issue of
radical islam by outsiders to the police and members of the intelligence services, or even by persons
versed in religion, so as to try to understand what could be the mindset of terrorists to master a certain
vocabulary to be able to discuss with them.
Speak clearly, and under the seal of confidentiality: at the Bataclan, after the second phone call, my
negotiator realize that happen to nothing, that there is no negotiation in the sense where there will be no
liberation of hostages or surrender, and the last three calls...
The rapporteur. The negotiator is a PC?
M. Christophe McMahon. It is the PC, Yes. The last three calls are not intended to free the hostages, but
to save time, to take stock of the situation. We are sometimes destabilized: the negotiator is at the
initiative of the first phone call while the others come from terrorists.
The rapporteur. For what reason?

M. Christophe McMahon. I think they want to get in touch with the negotiator. After the events, it told me
that as much MIT Coulibaly was very cold, very, very built in his remarks he was resolved to die and held
a speech on the Caliphate, as much at the Bataclan, it appeared to him that US aircraft dealing with
people more young, much more unstable and uncontrollable. Moreover, as early as the second phone
call, he told me that we wouldn't be able to keep and we had to be on our guard, because the situation
could get out of hand. I am so out column to get closer to the prefect of police and my Director to their
account and request permission to pass to the assault, permission that was given to me.
The rapporteur. You pull out of the Bataclan ?
M. Christophe McMahon. Yes, I assume it, because I consider that certain decisions should be made
visually : it is necessary to talk and I need to realize physically. As we were not far from each other, I
found that it was the best solution.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. How do you get the phone number of the terrorists, and how they were yours?
M. Christophe McMahon. In this case, the first contacts with terrorists are through a hostage who is
sitting behind the door and that they ask to tell us we go away. Their claim is that we were leaving.
Obviously, we explain to them that we cannot. In addition, on several occasions, they inquire whether
continuous news channels are present, without however requesting to speak to them. I considered that
there was a risk that they expect to be live on TV to jump.
The rapporteur. They wanted to take a little bit!
M. Christophe McMahon. I do not know if they wanted to "last", but I feared that they seek to have a
media forum to jump so that the images are around the world. Clearly, they were not seeking to confront
us: they knew that we were there and remained hidden on the floor for an hour, while they might remain
in the lobby of the Bataclan and face us. I do not know under what conditions we would have had the top;
We would have had it, but we could lament of the dead on our side. They are therefore mounted on the
floor and hid for an hour, without a sound, asking the hostages to shut up, and then they asked us to
leave. When we launched the assault, they declined.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. I return to my question: How can you call?
M. Christophe McMahon. They asked a hostage to communicate. As we do not intend, we call a phone
number and several hostages screaming a number that we communicate to the negotiator. This is the
phone call from the negotiator to this issue, which is the first contact with the terrorists, which have
reminded then repeatedly.
M. Olivier Marleix. The patron of the GIGN and RAID boss have described us a strong inflection in their
patterns of intervention. The bis has experienced the same developments and how do you feel to them
have applied during the drama of the Bataclan ? Did you go faster, slower that you would go once without underestimating the difficulty of your mission?
M. Christophe McMahon. As indicated you earlier, there were several steps: at the end in 2014, despite
the reactivity common to all intervention groups, we took the step that we had half an hour, regardless of
the hour, for columns: it was little, but still too long. This is why we have doubled the penalty, then, at the
beginning of 2015, created this rapid intervention Force which, over the months, is refined and has
disposed of more resources. I note at the porte de Vincennes, Chung between thirteen hours in
theHypercacher and the first columns of the bis are present at 13:20. We will therefore faster than before.

After the episode of the porte de Vincennes, we considered still need to strengthen the system. We did it
and this is why we are in a little more than twenty minutes at the Bataclan, which, for an intervention
group, seems to me very fast.
We conducted a wider debate on counter-terrorism and in particular, therefore, on the speed of
intervention, but also on training and the specialization of the negotiators, on crisis communication - topic
vast and far from being exhausted - and, important question on technical specialization, the tactical
bubble, that is what we have to Exchange data data video, radio, in an environment Wi - Fi and 4G on the
spot, when we climb a PC - on the understanding that an efficient PC implementation involves a crisis
that lasts a little bit, because the resources mobilized are very heavy: we go up not in ten minutes.
We continued our reflections after the events of the Bataclan. With regard to coordination, a national plan
of action, on which we have all worked, will be signed by the Minister, which seems to me a good thing.
This does not mean that there was no coordination before, but that we adapt to events. I believe useful to
recall, in fact, that, since the mid-1990s, the France had not been hit by attacks. We were obviously able
to intervene and the services were already coordinated, but it was perhaps necessary to go further in the
joint between them, at least for the Parisian plate.
M. Olivier Marleix. My question was about the crime scene itself. One of our interlocutors, I summarized,
said that was not necessarily expected that everything is secured, but needed to advance more quickly.
On the site itself, from a technical point of view, go you faster?
M. Christophe McMahon. As I said you maybe awkwardly, the rapid reaction Force consists of more
lightly equipped staff. The jackets they wear are heavy, but not as much as those provided for the
passage to the assault; their helmets are shielded, but do not shield in order to run. These officials are
geo-located so that we can ask them to move in Paris - to form a trap where gunmen are moving Scooter,
for example. Faster, they are less protected; you are swift, you are vulnerable. Thus, if you want to go
very fast, ask shields - so it's a matter of choice. Then, do not confuse speed with precipitation.
There are two different situations, technically, to the three intervention groups. It is triggered or a plan of
action for emergency (PAU) if shots are current, lives at stake, slaughtered people; in the case of figure,
we enter and do what we can; We immediately confront the terrorists with the means and men we have.
Or, in the event of a lack of shots, is applied (EAPS) developed action plan which is to define a tactic of
intervention and to submit to the political authority or, at least, to the prefect of police of Paris that the
valid - what has been the case for the Bataclan since he gave me permission to climb to the assault.
Remains that if we well are entered at the Bataclan, if we have not marked the steps, we are not for all
entered current and 150, what would have been a mistake in terms of security, both for the people inside
for security services, even for my colleagues. It is therefore necessary to assess the situation which is
always singular: enter at the Bataclan, is not to enter theHypercacher, nor at the Bon March where we
performed an exercise a few weeks ago.
The President Georges Fenech. Did you have the Bataclan plans ?
M. Christophe McMahon. We didn't have the Bataclan on us plans. We have not all plans with us when
we move. On-site, we immediately recovered the plans for firefighters by the security commission and
who were hanging on the walls and where we have torn off. We therefore have a ground plane. When my
assistant arrived with all of the bis, it recovered all of the Bataclan plans that were available to the PC. I
confess that, at this time, we had already much progress and these plans of mass we could at least move
us - and then, despite a few corners, it was not so great... We were therefore able to organize us with
these plans.
The President Georges Fenech. You therefore had the plans by the PC?

M. Christophe McMahon. No, I had bad formulate my response: I told you that, within the Bataclan, we
had ripped off layouts...
The President Georges Fenech. But then you had the plans available to the PC?
M. Christophe McMahon. One of Bataclan officials went to the PC to give to my colleagues all layouts,
but they have not been used, since we were already outside the door which we knew to give on a corridor
- one in which we have confronted terrorists.
To specifically answer your question, it is necessary to appreciate the volume, the number of staff, the
situation... I humbly think that twenty minutes to bring out all the people who were elongated to the
ground at the Bataclan , and to ensure that there are no terrorists or explosives, it's fast enough. I
remember seeing hostages out of ceilings, open conventional toilets where ten people had piled up. In
such a situation, it is impossible to ask them to rush out: we must speak to them calmly, make them out
one by one, lift the t-shirt each, accompany them asking them not to look at Earth - because there are
bodies everywhere. It takes much time, perhaps more that one can imagine.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Visibly, one of the terrorists tried to pass for a member of the security forces. All your
men, including first responders among the fifteen, are they already in uniform at the time of intervention or
are they in civilian and thread they then a bulletproof vest?
M. Christophe McMahon. No. As indicated you earlier, men of FIR leave in black outfit with a tactical
vest and the word "Bis Commando" in bulk in the back.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Was Commissioner of the BAC who intervened also uniformed?
M. Christophe McMahon. No, I don't think, or perhaps holding of the BAC...
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Do you have a single negotiator or a negotiator by context? Is this a police officer?
What is his background?
M. Christophe McMahon. We have seven negotiators within the Department. They receive specific, joint
training with the RAID, and, with them, is a psychologist. One of the seven is on duty each week, not to
mention the constant H + 30...
Mr. Alain Marsaud. The negotiator is not a man of action?
M. Christophe McMahon. If. The negotiator, at the Bataclan, was both Chief of staff and Chief of the
negotiators. It is a former Group Chief who served with columns. To the bis, we made the choice of
transversality: many public servants have many hats: they can be snipers and members of the climbing
specialists, negotiators, and column... Change cap is worth because they have more latitude on their
intervention.
M. Philippe Goujon. If we do a little foresight, we fear many more multi-site attacks in Paris. Indeed, you
are referred to a single site, the Bataclan. But imagine a dozen simultaneous attacks in different places of
Paris. You will encounter a first hurdle: you have indeed mentioned your difficulty to get to the scene in a
vehicle. And I recall in passing that, as from the month of August, the Expressway on the right bank will
be permanently closed to vehicular traffic - we also interviewed in this regard the Minister of the Interior,
yesterday, at the session of questions to the Government, as well as the prefect of police who received
us. What is therefore the prospect of attacks multi-site in Paris?
Then, you tell us that, arrived at the Bataclan, you have brought to snatch the planes of walls to find out
how to progress. Is there any other methods? The NSWFB also has plans for multiple institutions, some

services of the prefecture of police, the city of Paris has those schools. All this is not computerized and
likely to be put at your disposal?
What, finally, of a possible joint training between the police forces and the brigade of firefighters or
soldiers of the Sentinel operation? They are still several thousand in the Paris region, and if their
profession is certainly different from yours, in a crisis of this nature, do you joint exercises or a possibility
of joint action?
M. Christophe McMahon. We prepare, of course, to the possibility of attacks multi-site; We prepare for
the largest number of possible scenarios.
As I told you, it seems to me that things are well organized. The coordination of forces includes several
levels. In the first place, the bis is competent in Paris intramuros with a staff of 300 people, 80 for the
assault - we have therefore means. We design and see if we are able to treat one or two crises; We lead
this effect of exercises to determine a threshold of saturation. If we were faced with two crises similar to
that of the Bataclan, in an emergency, if we had no choice, we could try to split us into two and treat both.
We were about 70 prepared to assault at the Bataclan. However a dozen only have been mobilized. So,
we can to deal with two crises, but the wisdom, of course, first would be to ask their reinforcement in the
RAID and the GIGN which would take up other sites. We must nevertheless remain a Praetorian guard
and be able to handle multiple sites, since the RAID and the GIGN can be committed elsewhere in the
national territory.
Of course, we have no susceptibility to request reinforcements - what is foreseen in the RAID-BRI
Protocol. Several scenarios are planned: namely modularity - we ask that means, if I'm missing some
artificers or an assault column. I thus asked, two weeks ago, two snipers in the RAID; either that of
complementarity - modality that we applied at the Bataclan since, as our colleagues had joined as
reinforcements, we have integrated them with the device, which worked very well. of subsidiarity - to
which we entrust to the RAID or the GIGN a crisis to treat only.
Within the police, the FNIF can be activated by the authorities and by the Minister. Therefore, as to the
porte de Vincennes, we are all under the umbrella of the same standard and, as we know work together,
the system works. The GIGN can, in turn, need to strengthen us, which is specified in the national plan of
action.
I wouldn't you feared that there is no interoperability, in particular with the RAID. I think it useful to remind
that completeness of the RAID and the bis stakeholders participate in a same initial four month training
provided by the FNIF. Then, we organise meetings and, under the auspices of the UCOFI, joint exercises,
certainly not every week, because they are very heavy to mount, with the GIGN and RAID, either all of
the forces.
We can always be overwhelmed and it is difficult to not overreact. I return to the attack at the Stade de
France: my responsibility is also to not to move too quickly - our movements must be efficient - and avoid
to leave colleagues without stopping. Since November, if I had thrown them whenever feared something,
we would have not been. We moved two or three times in the District of Goutte d'Or. following an
e
explosion in a school from 16 district, as a precaution, we sent the men of FIR and we arrived in 12
minutes, but we cannot send them each time. It must take a little distance and wonder whether it was an
attack or a crisis with hostage justifying the use of an intervention force.
In regards to the firefighters, we are closely connected to them. Physicians who are with us in the
columns are physicians of firefighters. We have every week one of these doctors permanently with us and
two crises: the first part with the FIR and the second joins us. We organize exercises with them. Lately,
we looked at the hypothesis of a 'late Middle' intervention, i.e. a building in flames in which would be
terrorists holding hostages. The issue was whether if firefighters had to extinguish the fire during our
intervention or if we have the necessary equipment to do so ourselves, as long as we are trained. It is this

last choice that we made with the firefighters of Paris (BSPP) Brigade, which will we become familiar with
the material and form us. The GIGN has the same approach.
With respect to the plans, we didn't have those of the Bataclan, has not worked upstream on this site.
Although the bis has very many shots, she doesn't have all those venues. We have records of objectives,
established over the past years: they don't have not all been computerized, and we update them. We
recently developed a software allowing us to not only recover site maps, but to realize there video and
photo locations which will be very useful if a hostage is held. We do this for major tourist State,
administrative sites, but also for large buildings and large enterprises. Remains that we cannot do so for
completeness of Paris.
We are closer to the BSPP to retrieve the plans at its disposal. We seek to ensure that the tactical bubble,
in situ, when we assemble a PC, gives us access to all this data, taking into account security
requirements that we impose on Governments - we found a system that allows us to. Finally, the
usefulness of a plan is to far places: more a site is small, less its plan is likely to be used, while if we
intervene at Beaugrenelle, the site is so gigantic that we would need. As the Bataclan, the site is great,
but we quickly took the step of places.
I answer, finally, to the question relating to any relations with the soldiers of the Sentinel operation. We
know them well; We have many contacts with the military. We went the week last in their training centre
the actions in urban areas (CENZUB) in Aisne. We are getting closer in addition of the command of
special operations (COS). But we have not discussed this approach of interoperability with members who
can be found on-site. If they were forced to intervene, they would be behind us once we'd arrived.
Mr. Serge Grouard. We are going back then, I guess, on the final assault...
The President Georges Fenech. No, we have no time, even if it is quite legitimate that we have many
questions to ask.
We decided with the rapporteur to ask you to kindly introduce March 17 at 9:30 at the Bataclan, where we
will be ourselves. On-site, we can have a better idea of your speech and its timeline.
M. Christophe McMahon. Very well.
The President Georges Fenech. We can address the issue that wanted to ask Mr. Grouard. Are you
okay, Divisional Commissioner?
M. Christophe McMahon. I am at your service.
Mr. Serge Grouard. We see clearly the great difficulty of the intervention at the Bataclan . one can well
imagine the psychological effects including police officers - but it does not mention and I wish that we
mentioned a bit, that tell us very frankly, very simply if, among the officials under your responsibility, some
are marked by what they have seen, by what happened inside the Bataclan. Known by the army, meets
this kind of psychological problem: what is the case for your men?
Then, you mentioned scenarios of future crises. Do you have equipment CBRN (nuclear, radiological,
biological and chemical) to intervene?
M. Christophe McMahon. Yes, we've been tagged by the intervention. I find it hard to believe that one
can live such a situation without keep trace. I had never seen a mass grave of 90 people and my
colleagues no longer. This has been difficult, but not both in the handling of the crisis, because we act on
the basis of automatic mechanisms, and to resolution thereof, mobilized by our action, we manage to hide
as much as possible what we have under the eyes. The hard part is obviously after. The bis has contacts

with the military, we met through the military Governor of Paris who helped us in this matter. We made the
defusing sessions with psychologists. So far, I have registered no defection and I think that there's not
only one of my colleagues who would be more able to intervene. The weeks that followed were a bit
difficult, certainly. But they are not more in a spirit of revenge. They remain professional and have
resumed their brands. Remains that we have all been shocked, of course.
With regard to CBRN equipment, risk being faced with a nuclear or radioactive attack in Paris Intra-Muros
is more than infinitesimal material that it would imply being very expensive, coordination would be
required and I would have no susceptibility to involve the RAID or the GIGN - the latter with suits that
allow it to intervene in nuclear power plants. In case of a biological or chemical attack, we have
equipment - including insulating breathing apparatus (ARI) we expect to renew by purchasing a new
generation. We conducted an exercise in the subway after a chemical attack scenario. We would all be
able to intervene - case is a subject on which we are working.
Half of my staff is mobilized by the intervention and the other half by the judicial activity. They turn a week
to stay versatile. Each week, my colleagues train and we try to multiply the scenarios, whether on the
bateaux-mouches, in the subway, in malls, in railway stations, in the street. We strive to consider a
maximum of projections and the NRBC part.
The rapporteur. Document on the unfolding events, release at the hearing yesterday by the Director of
the GIGN, stated that at 23:08, information is sent to the operational centre group 86 by the father of a
victim notified by text message that one of the terrorists was in the lodges of the Bataclan and wanted to
negotiate with the police. At 0:18, another message says: "I am on the first floor at the Bataclan, serious
injuries, etc. These information and others have arrived through various channels to gendarmerie
brigades. It went well, I suppose, with the police through 17. You were this information likely to be useful,
communicated in real time? You indicate that, at twenty-three hours, when you start to grow, you didn't
know if there were still terrorists at the Bataclan, and that you doubt even. Did you have contact with
outside can communicate you this information?
M. Christophe McMahon. I do not know too much what information the Mounties have obtained; in any
case, many are at the prefecture of police, either directly by the officials of police or via the staffs. Most of
them were directed toward staff, inter alia, then, to the PC - BRI. He returned them to sort and give me
that information useful, operational - namely those which may affect the operation itself.
The rapporteur. The information that a terrorist is in the lodges, above, is necessarily useful...
M. Christophe McMahon. I do not remember that it is reached. On the other hand, I know that, just
before the assault, it informed me that a hostage would be trying tweeter there are exchanges of gunfire
and that hostages are being slaughtered; Yet we are behind the door and we don't hear shots. Many
information arrived, sorted by the PC and some are received, probably not all.
The rapporteur. Are you sent by the operational PC that you put in place or a crisis at the prefecture of
police room?
M. Christophe McMahon. I can't talk to you about the crisis of the prefecture of police room: I was not
and it is not my responsibility...
The rapporteur. I imagine that a number of hostages still present at the Bataclan called automatically 17
- we had regarding the testimony of several victims.
M. Christophe McMahon. I think the 17 but also to officials from police of their knowledge. The
information reached everywhere and by all means.

The rapporteur. The processed information you deem useful, operational, came, you say, of the police;
you have not necessarily obtained information on the part of the gendarmerie or well...
M. Christophe McMahon. I did not say that!
The rapporteur. .. .you don't know how sorting was operated.
M. Christophe McMahon. I do not at all know how sorting is operated at the headquarters of the
prefecture of police of Paris. I can tell you about my PC: when the information arrived there, they were
sorted and some are arrivals.
The President Georges Fenech. I come back on a contradiction that needs to be resolved: can you
send us, from here to next March 17, the list of the BRI of Paris officials present at the beginning of the
intervention at the Bataclan ?
M. Christophe McMahon. I will send you the list of the fifteen, of course.
The President Georges Fenech. So we will stand up any ambiguity.
M. Christophe McMahon. For me, there is no, but I have no difficulty to give you the list.
The President Georges Fenech. For us, there is ambiguity, since we have two different positions
expressed under oath.
I note in your report, you state twice advanced PC: somewhere, you write that the PC Advanced bis is
located on the ground floor, are we much agree?
M. Christophe McMahon. The Advanced PC, Yes.
The President Georges Fenech. And you also write that all these people contact numbers were relayed
to PC - bis on the site of the Bataclan.
M. Christophe McMahon. Is it good for my report?
The President Georges Fenech. Yes.
M. Christophe McMahon. I believe that it is rather the final document of the Regional Directorate of the
judicial police (DRPJ).
The President Georges Fenech. What are the elements of the DRPJ response.
M. Christophe McMahon. Perhaps there are an understatement.
The President Georges Fenech. I wish you to be clear on this point.
M. Christophe McMahon. The PC Advanced is my assistant and myself and officers heads of column;
We are one with the other, feet in the Bataclan. The Advanced PC is more operational: this is where we
take the decisions.
The President Georges Fenech. I inquired about what was an advanced PC: it's a command post, a
structure under Arbor...

M. Christophe McMahon. No. This is perhaps a misnomer from us, Mr president, but for us, a PC
Advanced, these are the authorities, those who take the decisions and who are each to the other, which
is the case when...
The President Georges Fenech. It is hard to imagine a PC Advanced with the authorities who are in the
middle of the dead and wounded.
M. Christophe McMahon. It may be a misnomer of our part consider whenever it comes to frequent
informal meetings of policy makers on the spot: we see and we talk.
The President Georges Fenech. Where exactly is the Advanced PC?
M. Christophe McMahon. In the Bataclan.
The President Georges Fenech. You make the distinction between the PC - BRI and the Advanced PC
which is in the Bataclan.
M. Christophe McMahon. Yes, I also do the distinction with negotiation PC and the PC for coordination
with other units.
The President Georges Fenech. In fact, the Advanced PC is an informal PC.
M. Christophe McMahon. Yes of course. The Advanced PC consists of the authorities who are indoors
and taking decisions. And, as told me just now my colleague, Mr. Thoraval, everything is function of the
configuration of the premises: one can sometimes isolate themselves in a room and ask. At the Bataclan,
we were in the pit, and then we climbed down the stairs. Before the assault, the Advanced PC was on the
first landing before the staircase that leads to the door - we will have therefore an opportunity to see all
on-site. We got there when we could we talk about security and make decisions.
The President Georges Fenech. During the attacks in the month of January, has the FNIF well been
triggered?
M. Christophe McMahon. Yes, it has been the day before, in the afternoon, and associated with the
GIGN to the beat conducted around Longpont where everything was, it seems, very well organized: we
shared the work between the GIGN and the FNIF, and within the FNIF, between the RAID and the bis by
sectors. The bis under the protection of the RAID has invested, in the evening, a House that has proved
to be empty. The next day, we left a column of each unit on-site to eventually demobilize them when we
knew that the Kaye brothers in Seine-et-Marne. The RAID and the GIGN gathered at Dammartin where I
also went and, believing that we were made redundant, I asked permission, which was given to me, me
fall back on Paris. Then, being already in Paris, the bis intervened only and one hour later, the RAID
joined us, we have integrated it in the FNIF configuration and we intervened preserved.
The President Georges Fenech. Unlike what happened at the Bataclan.
M. Christophe McMahon. Is it that important to trigger the FNIF?
The President Georges Fenech. Delete it then!
M. Christophe McMahon. It is not my responsibility, but I noted that the RAID and the bis, in Vincennes,
have worked well under this aegis, but worked very well at the Bataclan. The difference, perhaps, is that
to porte de Vincennes, the RAID was formed unit, with all its troops, while at the Bataclan, only a small
detachment has come to strengthen us. In both cases, the coordination was appropriate.

The President Georges Fenech. I thank you. I put an end to this hearing, as the rapporteur and I have
an appointment with the Commissioner of police and his staff in sixteen hours. Mr. Thoraval unfortunately
could not be questioned, but it would be interesting that him who led the findings after the intervention at
the Bataclan, join us next March 17 when we go on the premises.
Hearing in camera, Mr. Patrick Pelloux, physician
Hearing in camera, Monday, March 14, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. We thank you, Mr. Pelloux, in reply to the request for hearing
of our Committee of inquiry into the means implemented in Work by the State to combat
terrorism since January 7, 2015. We hear you on several titles: physician, you are also former
member of the editorial of Charlie Hebdo and you quickly went to the scene of the attack in
January 2015. November 13, you spent the night to the UAS of the Necker Hospital, Paris. The
lessons that you pull from your experience are therefore valuable for our commission, especially
as regards the organisation of relief and support for victims.
As you hoped, the hearing takes place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the
internet site of the Assembly. Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 14
November 1958 relating to the functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be
published, in whole or in part, if we decide so at the end of our work. Accounts of the hearings
that have taken place in camera will be first sent to people heard in order to collect their
comments; This will be the case for you. These observations will be submitted to the
commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I recall that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, "is punishable by the penalties
provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code - one year of imprisonment and a fine of
15,000 - for any person who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish
information relating to non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the
end of the work of the commission referred to this information". It also follows from those
provisions that the issues that we may need to ask the people we hear should not be State of
elements covered by the camera during previous hearings.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the order referred to above, I ask you to take the
oath to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.
Mr. Patrick Pelloux oath.
Mr. Patrick Pelloux, physician. I am grateful to have created this commission of inquiry, which
matters to me at the highest point. Speaking before you, I think my friends to Charlie Hebdo
brutally murdered, for which it was all that it was possible to save them. Many of you have been
parodied by those who are dead, and which were so strongly attached to the values of the
Republic and secularism. The victims of the attack against Charlie Hebdo are inseparable from
those of the kosher Hyper of Vincennes, business leader assassinated in Grenoble and the victims
of the killings in November 13.

Everyone, Charlie Hebdo, was aware of the threat since the newspaper had been an arson in
November 2011. It was the first time since the end of the second world war that the newspaper
premises were set on fire in France and, from that date, Charlie Hebdo was placed under
protection. The form of this protection has evolved over time, and I agree with what the Minister
of the Interior explained: it is preferable to static guards to dynamic guards, with regular rounds,
as was the case, rather than the police to potential targets. The guard was less visible, but it was
well.
Two days before the attack, I had lunch with Chakrapani, the only one of the team of Charlie
Hebdo still having a bodyguard. Although his photo had been published by Al Qada in the
Arabian Peninsula next to that of Salman Rushdie in a list of people to kill, it was rather
confident in the future and told me kindly cease this bodyguard, lower him seeming threat. I had
replied that it seemed like a very bad idea.
I chair the Association of emergency physicians of France, who wishes the modernisation of the
structuring of the emergency. Follow-up work undertaken by Mrs Michle Alliot-Marie, then
Minister of the Interior, in 2008, we made proposals to revise the decrees organizing relations
between firefighters and emergency medical services (EMS). It was not to end a war invented by
the media rumor but to modernise the organisation of the reception of emergencies, which passes
by the cooperation of systems and not by their competition.
Luck that January 7, 2015, a meeting has laid down in the National Federation of firefighters
from France, during which the Chief Medical Officer of the brigade of firefighters of Paris
(BSPP), Jean-Pierre Tourtier, and I had to present the renovation of contingency plans. It is the
seat of the Federation is located rue Breguet, near the premises of Charlie Hebdo. When the
designer of the newspaper phoned me to tell me what was in progress, we immediately went,
both. Having gone through without knowing the line of fire of the two terrorists who were being
cowardly murder policeman Ahmed Merabet, we arrived on a scene of carnage. Try to imagine a
room three times smaller than where we are, where the writing is reunited, that terrorists take in
pincer pulling with weapons of war... In short, entered in this room with a friend and colleague,
the Commander Tourtier, I'm out with a brother.
We entered the Newsroom ten minutes before all other relief. A vehicle rescue and assistance to
victims (FSEC) firefighters were already down. We have not seen the police forces who were
pursuing the terrorists. On 7 January, we have shown the same valour and courage than the
combined rescue workers and police, on 13 November. To say it another way, can always
prepare protocols and scenarios, are also the will and the courage of the men who will face
whatever it is.
We are part of a heroic system, assistance publique-Hpitaux Paris, where, as noted by its CEO,
Martin Hirsch, people are able to get up and be there, in a despicable period where, for the first
time since the end of the second world war, one commits such killings in Paris.
We did well to go there? But in such cases, it does not reflect! Also, the Minister of the Interior
had reason to tell you need to review the operational response to improve the effectiveness of
relief. We must adapt so that the desire to go rescue the victims of an attack manifests itself in

the light of an imperfect security system to date. It is practically not possible to the prefect of
police to decide that there is an exclusion zone, as rescuers and doctors want to go rescue.
This is what I experienced, on 13 November, when a colleague of the SAMU alerted me with a
call on my cell phone, that explosions and gunfights were ongoing. Since the attacks of January
2015 under the aegis of Professor Pierre Carli, chief physician of the SAMU de Paris - myself
taking much - we had developed the so-called damage controlprotocols, aimed at protecting
people victims of an attack as soon as possible. On 13 November in the morning, we had, as
often, a simulation exercise with our fellow firefighters. Once alerted, I decided to stay in
control. Having suffered in January, psycho-trauma, I was not sure to be really effective if I went
on the spot. I therefore helped to lead the relief of the UAS. He had to wear the alert, but we
didn't know what we were heading; the commanding general of the military health service has
also pointed out.
It is very important to develop protocols renovated including the chance - to put it otherwise,
"prepare to be amazed" - even though we know the essential, that is that these terrorists want to
do battle with the representatives of the State, rescue workers, police officers, as seen after the
attack on school Ozar Hatorah in Toulouse. There is no point to take these people alive because
they are doing everything to kill and to be killed, to flabbergast the country; could not therefore
be otherwise that neutralize them.
Come to the regulation of the UAS, I found that the personnel were not in service or who came
to leave returned spontaneously in hospitals. This demonstrates a very high level of citizenship, a
very strong commitment, a Valour that gives a beautiful image of the Republic, a compelling
desire to act. After the first calls, we sent the relief means that he had to divide. At the stage of
France, there was no need to send additional teams - the terrorists were blew up and the present
means on-site sufficient - but elsewhere, which means send, and when? The 'front line' was
moving but if, on the ground, links were made between Pr Carli and Commander Tourtier,
information went very badly, at the level of the commandments, between policing on the one
hand, ambulance and firefighters on the other hand. There is a source of possible progress; for
now, it is extremely difficult to understand how the forces of order are organised.
Similarly, a margin of improvement is possible in the commandments of health services, because
crises cells are created in the AP - HP, regional health (ARS) Agency, the Ministry of health,
SAMU de Paris, at the UAS of Seine-Saint-Denis... Need to review these plans of command with
a spirit of cooperation strengthened, to save time, because the imperative goal for utilities is to
respond effectively to the attack. Terrorists take advantage of stunning that they cause to the
more deaths possible. What are these mass killings like the one that has, alas, been committed
yesterday still in Ivory Coast, otherwise a war strategy? What engages otherwise in a war by
massacring civilians with heavy weapons in Paris?
Emergency personnel went on the ground very motivated and, although that gawking, they have
quickly adapted to the circumstances. Given the obstruction of the communication system
between the crisis unit and the doctors on the ground, we are constantly called with our personal
mobile phones, to regulate, i.e. to adapt our resources to the needs of victims to take them where
they could be treated the best and as quickly as possible. We sometimes installed several victims

in the FSEC's firefighters and sometimes split teams, making starting an ambulance with a doctor
and another with a nurse. Since the attack in January to Hyper hide it from Vincennes, we
changed our practice. : "It takes and it is", we have moved to: "take, is sorted and on hand to the
most appropriate place.
With this in mind, we directed many victims to the Hospital of La Piti-Salptrire group which
we knew that he had the necessary capacity in digestive surgery, vascular and heart to treat
gunshot wounds - this is so true that a current heart transplant has continued during this time. We
welcome from spontaneously surgeons offer their help in other institutions. Such was the case of
the cardiac surgical centre Marie Lannelongue surgeons who went to le Kremlin-Bictre
Hospital. But because we do not have the habit of cardiac surgery of such level in le KremlinBictre, transferring a victim would have been taking the risk of having the then transfer
elsewhere. I would point out that one victim died after his transfer to the hospital; 129 others
died at the scene of the attacks.
Concerning the assistance to the victims, I would like to talk to you about the medico-legal
Institute of Paris (IML) as what has happened to be weighs me. When we went to the lifting of
the body of Chakrapani, there we were told that it rested alongside those of his killers. I did share
this episode to the Attorney Franois Molins. Certainly, places are cramped, but was it wise to let
us know this? Above all, to put it politely, a reform of the IML in Paris is necessary. How to
understand the IML has refused on 13 November, to send bodies to autopsy at the Institute for
criminal research of the national gendarmerie (IRCGN) of Pontoise? In this structure ultramodern, where one has been able to identify a few weeks 4 000 body pieces that were delivered
after the Germanwings aircraft was precipitated in the Alps, yet each was ready as early as
midnight to receive drafts. In addition, I learned that the IML took advantage of the attacks to
claim Ms. Christiane Taubira, then keeper of the seals, a scanner of thanatology, although the
IRCGN has one - that has not been used in the attacks, I wonder why! Is that of Sainte-Anne's
Hospital which was used, and this has resulted in serious problems for his staff. I do not
understand why cooperation is no better between the IML in Paris and the IRCGN.
Another will focus on medical and psychological emergency cells (CUMP). They are essential.
So many people to consult after the attacks of November 13 it took open town halls for the
consultations. But such care of paramount importance must be more professional, I have found
personally. After the attack against Charlie-Hebdo, we were grouped in a theater, in stunning
condition. There, I was asked a number of countless times that I was and if I was involved in the
events which were to occur. I also remember these psychologists who absolutely wanted me to
swallow sugar... When you are lost as I was, there need to be supported by a psychologist or a
psychiatrist and one, to say once things, and then there is a follow-up. I think so, as Martin
Hirsch, that it is not appropriate to create a new structure to the Military Academy and it is
preferable to group together the victims at the Htel-Dieu de Paris, as has been done after the
attacks of January - because there's a Department of Psychiatry, physicians and the behavioural.
The victims need a listen, they need to see white coats. The suite is also difficult, and I hope that
the interdepartmental victim assistance cell will improve coordination.
Finally, while journalists do not have the right to show photos of the killers and just give their
name or to investigate them, they can give it to cFavorite pieces joy with the victims. Some

brides of my friends died in the premises of Charlie-Hebdo was pursued by paparazzi; as for me,
I was accused of having won 1.5 million euros, and I'll file a complaint against this bad journalist
of the magazine Le Point. The victims of the attacks are not protected at all; they should be.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for this intervention which leaves many open
questions. I can tell you that the choice of the venue for the victims in Paris has been sliced: will
military school, and not the Htel-Dieu as advocated Mr. Martin Hirsch. but it can still evolve.
Indeed, it is necessary to protect the press attack victims. This also applies to the hostages, of
which some have been put in danger by a lack of ethics or by professional journalists errors. We
probably auditionnerons representatives of media outlets and the Conseil suprieur de
l'audiovisuel to reflect on a protocol guaranteeing this safety.
You mentioned the evolution of the custody of the premises of Charlie Hebdo, which static
became dynamic. You know Ms. Ingrid Brinsolaro, widow of the police officer responsible for
the protection of Chakrapani, filed a complaint against X for "involuntary homicide". What is
your opinion on this subject? Chakrapani enjoyed a single guard the day of the attack, rather than
a bodyguard.
Mr. Patrick Pelloux. If he enjoyed a guard close by the VIP protection service.
The President Georges Fenech. This was previously.
Mr. Patrick Pelloux. No. The day of the attack, they were two police officers, one was at his
side; the other went to deal with the car or administrative tasks, as this can occur. As you know,
when a protected person is located in an enclosed area, the guard remains with him but it is not
the State to secure the premises. Charlie Hebdo was a private, place that was not secured without
money; There was only a door code. Inside the premises, Office Guard stood behind a door. It is
very difficult to trace accurately what happened but, presumably, when one of the "garbage"
started shooting, police released his weapon, put the man in play and tried to harness, but Cabu,
Wolinski and Elsa Cayat, that is were raised, made screen, and the second terrorist, arriving by
behind, killed the officer cuffed. Chakrapani was actually a bodyguard, and when the 11e district
police station argues that a car parked in front of the offices of the newspaper was not used to
much and might be taken for target, it has not been shocked, nor us. We even thought that the
premises in would be made less visible - indeed, this is probably why the terrorists, who should
expect to find a car in faction, began by mistaken address. But the police continued to go pick it
up and bring it where he should go; He had protection.
I understand what Mrs Brinsolaro but these atrocious events are now part of the risks of the
trade. Perhaps this should cause a reflection among these great and relevant protection police that
trivialize their professional activity while she can be - the drama is that you never know when the
shot leaves.
The President Georges Fenech. You mentioned the need to review the command plans,
including to better coordinate policing on the one hand, ambulance and firefighters from another
part I still struggling to identify who in the police, takes the decision to authorize the hospital

relief to enter the secure area. It seemed to me understand that at the Bataclan, is the Chief
Medical Officer of the brigade for research and intervention (bis) that would have given the
green light to what security services eventually let in relief; do you know what it was? On the
other hand, we were all struck by the time that it took to rescue some injured; Thus, a journalist
of the newspaper Le Monde said during his hearing having waited several hours to be rescued,
while he was suffering from a hemorrhage. Could you clarify what you mean by a better
articulation of the commandments?
Mr. Patrick Pelloux. I understand what victims feel since November 13 to 10: 45 pm, at the
time of the attack on the Bataclan, Ms. Hidalgo, Mayor of Paris, phoned me, asking me: "Where
are the emergency?". I recall that the Bataclan has been the theatre of a blitz, which lasted from
12 to 15 minutes. During this little quarter of an hour, one of "garbage" is passed to the right of
the room and two others left, all three firing Kalashnikovs which each charger contains 30
cartridges. If I know these details, it is ten days, at the request of the Director of the Bataclan, the
Hall was reopened with the help of the CUMP for a discreet meditation ceremony, which was
also the occasion for a debriefing. On the evening of November 13, 2015, at this point, two
people have been heroic: Lac policemen who transgressing their interference regulation, entered
inside the Bataclan instead of freeze pending the bis as they were theoretically required. Would
they not have it that four additional Chargers at least would have been fired on the crowd, with
more deaths in proportional numbers. The other two terrorists were mounted on the balcony,
holding hostages.
Then the bis happens, and what happens then is quite mysterious to me also. BIS, as the RAID search service, assistance, intervention and deterrence - and as the intervention group of the
gendarmerie nationale (GIGN), doctors a 'of column' that accompany the interventions to support
police or possibly injured constables. It is as such that was Mr. Denis Safran, the AP - HP but
working at the bis, retired University Professor and it was he who decided. But I do not know
who does what in the police, and the role of this distinguished Professor remains for me
enigmatic.
Like you, I have heard of testimonies of people who were waiting. Regulation of SAMU, split
into two units, and who had installed the post grouping of victims boulevard of Filles-duCalvaire, I was the "ungraded". But I was also responding to people hidden in the false ceilings
of the Bataclan, who called the 15 and who I told to put a tourniquet, not talk, to such or such
Act... We have also received calls from victims refugees "nests" in halls of buildings or
apartments, that we also advise by phone. The crisis cell was to handle this, but sometimes
telephone communications were not, which further complicated the situation, and police forces
prohibited the passage of relief. It prevents that firefighters are gone, valiantly; It was while they
did the count of victims in absolute emergency.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. You say that firefighters are entered inside the Bataclan; at
what time?
Mr. Patrick Pelloux. I think that they have entered an hour a quarter after the start of the attack.

The rapporteur. In other words, prior to the final assault which took place at zero hour
eighteen?
Mr. Patrick Pelloux. This is what I think, but should ask again it them.
The rapporteur. We will do it, because president Fenech and myself had understood that no
rescue service was entered in the Bataclan before the final assault.
Mr. Patrick Pelloux. It is a time zone that I cannot understand because the stories intersect or
contradict; Similarly in the reconstitution of the attack against Charlie Hebdo. Whatever it is, I
understand that doctors were able to enter at the Bataclan before completion the assault; It was
then that we knew that the scene was that of a butcher shop and was there 80 victims in absolute
emergency.
The rapporteur. We need to clarify this point. Information can indeed contradict, because each
was not necessarily theEye riveted on its shows and because perceptions may differ depending
on where one stood. Is this not the Saffron Pr who gave you these elements, since it was within
the Bataclan, accompanying the column of the bis? What do you mean exactly when you state a
problem of communication between the police, fire or ambulance?
Mr. Patrick Pelloux. Indeed, Pr saffron, who is also Commander in retirement of the BSPP,
probably warned firefighters but, as I know, he never contacted the UAS.
The rapporteur. What are the procedures followed during crises? The information passes all by
the BSPP? Stressing that everyone has his crisis cell, you seemed to imply that should unify this
set. How exchanges take place between the BSPP or ambulance?
Mr. Patrick Pelloux. The Commander of the relief operations - to Paris, it is a fire department
Commander - is responsible for all the logistics and relief, the latter being organized by a
Director of medical assistance, which is usually a doctor. This doctor manages the command of
rescuers, firefighters and doctors. In Paris, the Chief Medical Officer of the UAS is
complementary to the Director of medical rescue. However, the information does not pass: it has
no direct line between the UAS and the police, that between firefighters and SAMU, what we
call yet. Is always through normal lines if though, on 13 November, the continuing growth of the
appeals, the number has increased by 400%, caused congestion in the standards, the
conversations themselves taking place with in the background shouting, calls for help and
Kalashnikov fire. It was extremely difficult for us who needed bikers to secure trains, that is
convoys of vehicles to hospitals, because rumors reported other attacks, as had been the case
after the attacks against Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper hide de Vincennes. There was a lack of
coordination, communication and transmission of information. The physical grouping allows
better to talk: seen on the ground, and it must apply also to the regulation.
The President Georges Fenech. You are a doctor. Do you think that this lack of coordination
and the somewhat delayed intervention of the medical emergency caused deaths that could be
prevented?

Mr. Patrick Pelloux. You can always ask the question. Of course, it could have done better... If
it had known of at the outset the final scenario. But, in reality, has not been delayed. As noted in
the London and Madrid attacks, it is very, very long to intervene on the site of an attack. And
then there are always in mind, without having this condition the action of relief, the risk of 'surattentat', and the idea should not put all the Eggs in the same basket, i.e. that it saves resources. I
admit having made from relief and more columns at the Bataclan - several vehicles for Civil
Protection - without reference to the cell of coordination and regulation, because I felt the need
to do so. I do not think that we could save more wounded. It is impossible to say, but we did our
utmost and we even managed to save a woman who had received nine bullets from Kalashnikov.
But I am convinced of the need for a relief column ' the front', sticky to the bis, the RAID or the
GIGN intervention. I am not sure that it should be composed of doctors; rescue workers, would
be better because it is to extract the faster people still alive. Disaster, the classical Protocol, once
entered into a place, to determine who is in serious condition; in doing so, we lose a quarter of an
hour. On plots of mass slaughter, to extract the live casualties from the danger zone, group them
outdoors and convey them to the hospital as quickly as possible. Incidentally, I asked that the
hearing be held in camera because I am convinced that Daech and Al Qada observe the manner
in which we organize.
I have heard rumors delusional after the attack on the premises of Charlie Hebdo, when he said
for example that Georges Wolinski had a heart attack. However, we must not remain on a frozen
system, arguing that everything would have happened in a great way. Should review chains of
command and, since it is to fear that the attacks occur again, we need to move frome toe century
XXI XX by developing new systems of prompt relief very dynamic, engaging personnel trained
to crawl on 50 metres with a victim to extract it.
The rapporteur. According to you, the health service armies there this know-how? Can you tell
us if the UAS has disposed of at its sufficiency of vehicles and morphine? If the attack had
occurred in a school, could pediatric medical services cope?
Mr. Patrick Pelloux. To say bluntly, a Kalashnikov in a child's body ball doing a carnage, there
would have been lots of deaths and very few children could have been saved. That being so, we
reflect on these issues with paediatric hospitals, and we what to do. The best strategy is to take
innovative and fast anticipation and security measures. They have been tested at the time of the
recent attack on the commissariat of the 18e arrondissement of Paris: the confinement of children
in schools has been immediate. Any scenario is possible, including the attack of a school or a
hospital, we must be ready for anything and we are constantly working.
That the UAS has lack of morphine is a legend, but we have little used. There were two reasons
for this. The first is that we have seen wounded run with bullets in the abdomen or legs, in a
State of stunning as they told us, as mentioned by Martin Hirsch: "take care of others! The fear
was that they were not bad. On the other hand, contrary to what said a doctor who is not in the
SAMU de Paris, inject too much morphine to people in hemorrhagic shock, it is kill them. It is
therefore not advisable, and it is not more of intubated onsite wounded by bullet: to do to stop
the bleeding by using the famous 'Israelis' said Hemostatic dressings which we have. It must
accelerate the arrival in our services of these new materials that allow tactical goldeneyes.

With regard to intervention vehicles, the Organization, the 'red alpha' circulation plan of the
prefecture of police, did not too bad work, if we have experienced difficulties in manWork in
some places.
Finally, it is fortunate that our colleagues in the health service of the armies were there, because
they the military culture of support for weapons of war wounds, and it is essential. I consider the
closure of the military hospital of the Val-de-Grce as a mistake, but it's done, and statement of
Percy and Begin armed forces hospitals are formidable.
M. Christophe Cavard. The attackers targeted several places at the same time. What analysis
do you the distribution of the supported the terraces of the cafs? Are civilian personnel trained
to support for war injuries? If not, is an evolution conceivable, since it fears other deadly acts of
this type? Finally, is their own traumatic psychological injury treated?
Mr. Serge Grouard. Police forces have established a security cordon around the Bataclan. To
your knowledge, have the emergency services encountered difficulties through it? Relief was
delayed because they could not approach the Bataclan or some terraces affected by fire? Do you
confirm that firefighters arrived to Paris before the final assault? Do you know if they were
indoors or in its immediate vicinity?
Mr. Patrick Pelloux. You need to establish the chronology of the presence of firefighters at the
Bataclan with the commanding general of the fire service. This is probably due to the presence of
Saffron Pr, both the BRI doctor and former member of the BSPP has been raised the issue of the
presence of firefighters on site. What is certain, is that as soon as the particular assault, first
entered doctors were doctors of firefighters; Mr. Jean-Pierre Tourtier, physician-in-Chief of the
BSPP, can tell you about. As soon as the information has been disseminated, relief could arrive,
with vehicles, before the Bataclan. The problem was not that police leads prevented the passage
but that we did not know what was waiting for us. The difficulty is that we must protect
personnel and relief action. added to this is the latent concept of 'sur-attentat '. The difficulty is
inherent in this exercise. I take a moment my cap of social defence to underline that this type of
intervention is now part, alas, occupational hazards. My generation thought does not know war,
and we are.
But, I stress again, coordination between the commandments must improve significantly so that
we know exactly who does what in police services. I attended a symposium during which a
representative of the bis said that "it is the BRI who decides. However, when we arrive, the bis is
certainly on the ground, but we cannot see the members. And when I asked what was the role of
the military, he was told: 'Movement'... What is wrong: they have never been traffic! It is very
difficult to know who is doing what in the National Police and this poses a real problem.
Similarly, the crisis cells that were created in the field of health do not cooperate: they are
redundant. Despite this, we manage to be effective. The firemen of Paris are now working with
the National Police, with a common regulator, which gives them access to what the 3 000
cameras installed in Paris give to see. Should compel teams to better physical collaboration; We
shall gain in efficiency.

You asked me on the analysis of the distribution of relief. We went blind but, basically,
everywhere where relief were needed, there were doctors. Entering the premises of Charlie
Hebdo and saw my friends massacred, I can testify that in this kind of situation, every minute
seems an eternity. I immediately called the UAS, and Commander Tourtier firefighters. I stayed
in all ten minutes in this room, and I've aged 100 years. At the Bataclan, among the people
remained alive under corpses, some have actually waited an hour or an hour and a half, other ten
minutes, and they also had the impression that the wait was interminable. Need to understand
stunning and frustration in which everyone was and do not call into question their testimony.
Regarding the training of personnel, rest assured that since the attacks of January 2015, we all
reread books relating to the support of weapons of war wounds. A symposium was organized in
which took the word of doctors that took place in Afghanistan. SAMU de Paris, Pr Carli made
regularly come military doctors, including those who are assigned to the protection of the
Presidency and the Prime Minister. We have so far progressed technically; We know that in the
case of thoracic injury or abdominal by weapon of war, should infuse a coagulant, saturate the
hemostatic wound, maintain the casualty in a semi-upright position and transfer more quickly in
the operating room.
We try to train staff as soon as possible. Emergency doctor, I'm impatient, and I wish it to go
much faster, but everyone here knows the french through: administrative Yarrow complicates
things. Despite this, we caught our delay in training. Now, it is essential to develop a responsive
relief scheme, with overtrained rescue workers able to fetch the victims in danger zone to take
them more quickly to the hospital to save.
Finally, I never had an explanation to the fact that I find troubling. During the attacks of January
7, the preacher whose brothers Kaye followed the preaching was exactly there where needed: at
the Piti-Salptrire hospital emergency service. Despite its convictions, this man was able to
follow one of these courses very ' right--the emphasis "through which individuals who have
served a prison sentence may be health studies, which was previously prohibited. It has made,
has validated this course, and day attacks, it was above the recovery room, there where were
grouped the largest number of the wounded. I never got an explanation in this regard, nor Martin
Hirsch. The possibility that he is now subject to the decision of the Director of the ARS. Do not
be fooled: it is unclear how many individuals reported by a plug S work in public hospitals but
there are many and, contrary to what suggests the marks of the Observatory of secularism, we
have a real problem with the exercise of secularism in the public hospital, including those who
advocate a radical Islamism.
The President Georges Fenech. I thank you.
Hearing, behind closed doors, soldiers mobilized under operation Sentinel November 13,
2015: Lieutenant-Colonel d. D., Chief of the tactical staff of Paris, master P - M. A.,
Commander unit, Chief Sergeant G. A., head of the deployed section rue Charonne and
Marchal des logis R. D., leader of the Group spoke at the Bataclan
Hearing in camera, Monday, March 14, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the request for
hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since
January 7, 2015.
We started last week the issues relating to the conduct of operations, the intervention of the
forces of order, and the means at their disposal. We are continuing our investigations with
deployed soldiers on 13 November last Sentinel operation in 11e arrondissement of Paris.
I recall that in le-de-France, operation Sentinel is placed under the operational responsibility of
the military Governor of Paris, which is the general officer in the area of defence and security
(ZDS) and has a joint operations centre. The operations centre has responsibility three groupings,
which correspond to three geographical areas: Paris, western suburbs and suburbs is. These
groups are led by tactical headquarters: Lt.-Col. d. D. was the tactical Chief of staff in Paris on
the evening of November 13. The Paris Group is then divided into twenty basic units, which also
correspond to geographical areas. The master P - M. A. was the Commander of the unit that
includes 11e district. The elementary units are further divided into sections of thirty soldiers,
divided into groups of ten soldiers. Marchal des logis-chef G. A. was head of the section
deployed street of Charonne. The Marchal des logis R. D. was the leader of the group who
spoke at the Bataclan.
Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, this hearing is held
in camera. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly. Nevertheless, in
accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 14 November 1958 relating to the functioning of the
parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at
the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will
previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will
be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I recall that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, "is punishable by the penalties
provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code - one year of imprisonment and a fine of
15,000 - for any person who, within a period of twenty-five years disclose or publish information
relating to non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the
work of the commission referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the order referred to above, I now ask you to
take the oath to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.
Lt.-Col. d. D., the master P - M. A., the Marchal de logis-chef G. A. and the Marchal des logis
R. D. oath.
Gentlemen, I invite you to make a brief introductory statement which will be followed by an
exchange of questions and answers.
Colonel D. D. Thank you for the interest that you have shown in us asking us to be present
today: given our tactical level, it is rare that we let us be brought to meet parliamentarians. We

are very honoured to speak before your inquiry to explain what we did on the evening of
November 13, 2015.
I will begin by presenting our Organization at the time of the facts, before making a
chronological narrative of the night from 13 to 14 November as a experienced group Paris, being
specified that I will leave Captain P - m. A. on the one hand, the Marchal de logis-chef G.A.
and the Marchal des logis R.D. on the other hand, to tell in detail what happened rue de
Charonne, and at the Bataclan. I will say a word on the strengthening of the Sentinel operation
we had to handle the events, and I would like to conclude by referring to the points that appeared
me positive, or rather perfected.
End October 2015 took place a reorganization of the military of the operation Sentinel in le-deFrance: three circumstance staffs merged to result in the establishment of an organization similar
to that which is ours in external operations - a commanding officer, headquarters of the regiment
and the elementary units, which allowed us to benefit from a chain of command of great fluidity ,
because executives have a habit of order, assistants and subordinate are fully aware of their role
within the staff, and related units have a very clear vision of the functioning of the whole.
I was appointed to take my turn to head of the grouping of Paris end October 2015. Head of the
54e Rgiment d'artillerie de Hyres, I came with the staff of the regiment: a Chief of operations,
an intelligence Chief, a head of planning and conduct - exactly the same components as in
external operations. I had to my arrival of nineteen - nineteen companies - basic units, all with
different dimensions: there are companies to two, three, and four sections.
The area of intervention of the grouping is Paris intra muros. We have three main tasks. The first
is linked to the requisition BAT 13-04, consisting of monitoring religious sites; overlay, we have
the former missions of the Vigipirate plan, namely, the surveillance of tourist spots, as well as
observation of the stations in the network rail in le-de-France intra muros. Finally, the mobile
police response unit (UMIP) is a special unit responsible for including the supervision of the
embassies. One of my initial concerns was to assign to each geographical area the most
appropriate unit mission, seeking to achieve the greatest possible homogeneity throughout the
area.
The evening of November 13, the staff received unusual activity twenty-one twenty hours, with
the account made abnormal detonation, done by a this unit north of Paris. We asked clarification
on this subject and, at twenty-one forty hours, master P - M.A. reported me a shooting street of
Charonne, telling me that he was able to bring his unit in support of the internal security forces. I
communicated this information to my staff, namely the joint staff based in Saint-Germain, with a
proposal for a mission. Once you have validated this proposal, I was able to give the green light
to the master to make it enter his unit in action. The context of crisis being identified, we
operated a reorganization internal at the headquarters level, mainly intended to make the State of
play of our forces and to define who communicates with whom. To do this, I asked all of my
captains make me a specific point of the situation of their respective units in order to know
which were in mission and which were able to regenerate quickly - for this, ordered in
physiological rest staff to reach their home units as soon as possible.

I would point out that each unit has a participation rate of 75 per cent on its missions: on four
days, there is always a devoted to rehabilitation in condition by sport, operational readiness and
rest - personal are free in an area less than an hour of their unit. While I was doing the point on
units that can be mobilized, I was putting my elements of intervention, called quick response
forces (QRF) alert: on 1 500 personal component force that I order in Paris, I had three groups of
eight people in their neighborhoods, and that may take place within a period of thirty minutes.
The situation appearing likely to gain momentum, the idea was to regenerate the units that could
be: whenever a company had two sections ready to be committed, I was advised by his captain.
Having received a record indicating me that a new hot spot was identified rue Bichat, I sent the
first QRF on the area concerned, to ask a device closure or, failing that, support to the security
forces. Almost simultaneously, it pointed me an another hot spot at the Bataclan, where I sent a
unit comprising two sections. I also made the decision to get myself on the spot, as we usually do
in outdoor operation: it is indeed easier to manWork units when standing close to them. After
validation of this proposal by my hierarchy, I left Vincennes with a tactical CP, i.e. a team
tightened, destined to the place de la Bastille. Geographically, this place seemed to be the one
offering the best features for me to adapt to the evolutions of the threat.
I had at the start of three units of the Paris Group, and I've learned to count on two additional
units, one of the grouping of the western suburbs, one of the grouping of the suburb is. Before
leaving, I sent the Bastille place two QRF me remaining in order to prepare the area. Once there,
I received the order, between midnight and one o'clock in the morning, to defend four sites,
whose three institutional - namely, the National Assembly, the Senate, Matignon and the Necker
Hospital. I have sent a unit on each of these sites, and kept in reserve the fifth unit, pending
additional information. When we observed that security forces inside were present in numbers,
we were able to proceed with the gradual our own units at the end of night disengagement, the
latest however remained in place up to eighteen hours the next day - being specified that this
exceptional operation questioning not the continuity of the Sentinel operation, which was to
resume the next day at seven o'clock in the morning.
The next day, the Paris Group had to revise throughout its organization to reflect the arrival of
300 additional troops, namely two companies Cheetah TAP 3e (RPIMa) marine infantry
parachute regiment from Toulouse; 300 men arrived over the 15, and 400 16. Altogether, we
have therefore received 1,000 men over in four days, and had, on each new arrival, reorganize
the entire system to optimize its coherence and effectiveness.
When it comes to positive points that I raised, I emphasise first that the attacks occurred in a
favourable moment to our strengths in terms of timetables: to twenty-one hours thirty, most units
are disabled sites on which they were present in the day - for example, their presence is no longer
justified to schools , closing from seventeen hours-, but the time is not sufficiently late so they
completely unpacked: so they can easily reengage. From this point of view, the schedule played
in our favour, insofar as it allowed an optimal reactivity of our part.
Furthermore, the events have shown the relevance of having units in Paris intra muros. As head
of the Paris Group, I had units stationed in Paris, but also at the East fort - Saint-Denis - and
Villacoublay. This efficient mesh enabled Parisian units to be mobilised very quickly: even those

who were at rest were able to win their place of accommodation and to equip themselves before
leaving on the theatre of events in a very short time.
The structure of command, consisting of a Chief's body with his staff and elementary units,
demonstrated that it was as effective as in outdoor operation. I myself have had the reflex to
transport me to the closer to the action with my tactical CP, and the battle groups have had
similar behavior, for example by taking the initiative to implement baffling improvised in some
streets to slow down and filter traffic - even if the block temporarily-, in order to better
differentiate between a Parisian distraught from what could have been a terrorist at the wheel of a
car-Aries.
Finally, arriving at area, we have seen that our presence had the effect of reassuring the
population: the mass of deployed personnel, and our ability to quickly secure the perimeters
where we were present - through established dialogue in a simple and effective way with the
police on the spot - persuaded the Parisians we had the situation in hand.
I also noted some points that seemed perfect to me. Contacts between the army and the police are
well structured: thus, the operational centre (CO) joint level of Saint-Germain has a detachment
of liaison (DL) to the prefecture, and Captain Audibert could communicate on the ground with
an interlocutor of the internal security forces, and develop an intervention device with him. On
the other hand, when I arrived on the ground with my tactical CP, I have not found an
interlocutor to my level: none of the many police officers present on the place of the Bastille has
been able to give me a map of events. One of the possible improvements could therefore be to
put in place an intermediate level contact which today seems to be missing.
With regard to communications, it is a good thing that we have network access ACROPOL - the
National Police radio communications system - because it allows us to get a lot of information.
On the other hand, the fact that our own command system is based on the use of mobile phones
is source of weakness. In times of crisis, the network quickly saturates and in any event when
nineteen elementary units at the same time, call me I can only take a call at once - which explains
that the captain had difficulties to join the same evening. We must also deal with issues of
autonomy.
The President Georges Fenech. What communications system do you use in external
operations, and why do you not use during domestic operations?
Colonel D. D. OPEX, we are working with means of transmissions dedicated - terminals based
on 4 G technology - and it is probably for technical reasons, related to the power of the
transmitters or the reception in urban areas, we renounce in OPINT. Whatever it is, I simply
make the observation that communicate on the field through mobile phones has disadvantages.
On the other hand, I think that the profitability of the tasks entrusted to us could be improved.
Thus, if the personnel assigned to the protection of religious sites were motorized, and could
conduct patrols of observation rather than remain static, we would have a greater capacity for
action; the day of the events, we would have probably been able to mobilize a larger number of
staff, or to expedite their arrival. It seems to me that we would have, there still, interest to bring

closer our mode of action of that which we use in external operations. Be motorized, for
example, makes it pass more easily from one mission to another.
Master P - M. A. I arrived in Paris on 28 October, at the head of a unit consisting of sixty
soldiers. Our mission, essentially static, is to ensure the protection of two schools and five places
of worship - said that if an event occurs, it is the internal security forces that must intervene to
help us. The evening of November 13, my units had begun to return to their homes and a survey
was under way. From the point of view of the accommodation, my unit has the particularity to be
dispersed in the South of the 11e district and its surroundings; as to my command post, it is
located in relatively spartan conditions, in the attic of the Town Hall from 11e district.
This distribution has allowed me to have quickly a prime point of situation: to twenty-one hours
thirty, my head of section - Marchal des logis-chef G. A.-, then in free area, was by chance
Charonne Street while the shooting came to occur. He called me to notify me and asked
permission to bring in a group then boulevard Voltaire. I immediately gave my agreement - in
the light of the situation, it was necessary not to ask too many questions - and, the arrival of the
men on the spot, Chief G.A. arranged them to form a security cordon around the bar team and
the nest of wounded installed in the restaurant Le Petit Baiona. This group of eight soldiers
arrived at the race no, fitted with bullet-proof vests, helmets and long arms, took immediate
effect to reassure those present, including police officers, some equipped to deal with this kind of
situation. Insofar as it was not excluded that terrorists car makes a second pass, he quickly had to
secure everyone, including rescuers, to enable them to carry relief to the wounded without fear to
establish themselves targets.
The leader, until then in civilian clothes, climbed on foot to the Town Hall of the 11e, where
made me a point of the situation. This one, which I also followed the evolution thanks to the
ACROPOL radio system, seemed very confused, but I was sure of a point: we would be
necessarily useful street of Charonne. After reported to colonel, so I did converge all my troops
available to this area in order to proceed with the installation of a loopback device, with the
double aim to protect and reassure. At one point, I learned that one of the groups sent in
reinforcement - that of the Marchal des logis R.D. - was close to 52, boulevard Voltaire, where
a new attack was to occur: he was standing about 50 meters from the attackers! Insofar as it
happening more nothing street of Charonne, I decided to leave this group: having been able to
judge the effectiveness of the Marchal des logis training, I trusted him fully to get out only this
situation - at the same time, I continued the rise of the operative part of the rue de Charonne.
To twenty-three hours after I be assured that my device was stabilized, I made the decision to
leave rue de Charonne in the hands of the Chief G.A., and to go and see what was happening
boulevard Voltaire. I found my group at 20 metres of the facade of the Bataclan, in the suite of
the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage, behind emergency vehicles. The bis and the RAID were to
deploy, and the head of operations of the RAID gave us the order to cover the establishment of
its assault groups, what we have done, while securing the extraction of the wounded in the SaintPierre-Amelot passage through the armoured vehicle of the RAID. I leave it to the Marchal des
logis R.D. to the narrative of what happened near the Bataclan, because he came directly in
contact with the tray 94, under fire from Kalashnikov.

Once the situation is resolved at the Bataclan, I went back street of Charonne, where another unit
had arrived as reinforcements in the meantime. We have continued to ensure the closure of sites
up to five hours of morning, time at which our staffs are removed, leaving the judicial police
teams conduct their surveys. Our goal during this night was to make us relevant with the means
we have, on the points that we could identify, by applying the techniques learned in the training
and operations. Our added value was to be equipped with a weapon more powerful than that of
the police, of a bulletproof vest per person, and to dispose of the mastery of tactical methods
allowing us to implement, in coordination with the police, solid devices, reassuring. I would
point out that contact with the police were made easier street of Charonne in the vicinity of the
Bataclan, where they were able to establish that random encounters.
Marchal des logis-chef G a.. To rest on the evening of November 13, I was gone to have a
drink with colleagues Charonne Street, when I was alerted by a crowd and cries, among which
was the word "attack". I called my master unit on my cell phone and, after her share of what I
had seen and heard, I arrived at height of bar La Belle Equipe, offering a show excruciating after
the shooting that came to be. I went to see the head of police forces on the spot, a major, to
whom I proposed to involve the military groups that I knew to be nearby. After obtaining his
agreement, I reported to my master, who gave me the green light.
I was still in civilian clothes when I hosted my first band boulevard Voltaire, and drove to the
nest of wounded giving him to establish a first perimeter of security in order to secure the area
and to allow greater access and relief forces, thanks to the establishment of a logistics axis secure
and open, dedicated to the movement of emergency vehicles - this is what we do in OPEX. I
have then reported to the forces of police and returned to running the Town Hall from 11e, where
I reported to my captain before take my combat suit and to leave the scene, in order to
accommodate the different groups composing my section and ensure the command. That these
groups came and I had them in the adjacent streets to expand the device. I also took the initiative
to establish, through garbage and mattresses found in the street, baffles to slow traffic - as reports
police reported the risk of seeing arise snipers and car-Rams.
Our mission continued throughout the night, until the arrival of the judicial police services. Our
soldiers to resume, as soon as the next day, their activities under operation Sentinel, we left the
rue de Charonne around six o'clock in the morning.
Sergeant d. R.. I was head of group boulevard Voltaire on the evening of November 13. At the
end of twenty-four hours of rest of my group, I was leaving with it in a vehicle in order to reach
the site we had to monitor three days, when we arrived at the height of a crowd, more exactly
who ran. We continued to advance, until a civilian posted in the middle of the boulevard, which
deviated traffic. Noting that we were military, he let us go; 20 metres further, we discovered
injuries which firefighters gave first aid. Nearby, police officers of the BAC 94, column and
hand - placed police handgun in head is equipped with a pump shotgun - stood along a building.
I came down from my vehicle to come into contact with the police - I had not my means of
communication ACROPOL, these remaining always available on the site which we assure the
surveillance. While I was at the center of the boulevard, I heard a first burst of shots, which I
could not identify the source. I therefore returned hiding me behind my vehicle, in fact down my

battle group and did a 360 Security. On my right hand, I had the square the Bataclan, and on
my left, the faade of the theatre. I asked my assistant to call our head of section, to report that
we are witnessing a grounded part to 52, boulevard Voltaire. A second burst is a party, as
indeterminate as the first origin. A police officer in the tray then came to tell me that his
colleagues were in contact with the shooters in the corner of the street, and asked me support. I
have sent four personnel of my group in this direction, and tasked to secure the square and to
evacuate civilians, including journalists, who were there to four others.
Police officers then located facing the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage, just until the first elements
of the research and intervention (bis) and the RAID brigade arrive, and that we secure their
implementation before the assault which was to be given and then, once the assault carried out,
don't let us arrears in order to avoid a sur-attentat by a Shirker individual. We then stayed on
place the time of the evacuation of the wounded, and have not left the scene until five o'clock, to
go on sites which we monitor the following day.
M. the president Georges Fenech. Since you attended the arrival of the BIS staff, can you tell
us how much they were?
Sergeant d. R.. They arrived aboard several vehicles, in two senses of the boulevard. Six
personal took two vehicles which are are parked behind mine.
The President Georges Fenech. You've heard several bursts?
Sergeant d. R.. Yes, gusts clearly drawn on the outside, although we cannot determine the exact
provenance. I arrived shortly after twenty-two hours before the Bataclan, and heard no fire inside
the building before the assault is given.
The President Georges Fenech. What vehicle is the bis personnel arrived?
Sergeant d. R.. The two vehicles that arrived by the same route as us and are parked behind our
own vehicle were a Passat. Others went to Park further away, that I could not identify.
The President Georges Fenech. Altogether, how many vehicles do you have seen happen?
Sergeant d. R.. I do not know how many vehicles arrived in addition to the first two.
The President Georges Fenech. How many personnel from bis have you seen descend from the
two first vehicles?
Sergeant d. R.. They were six.
The President Georges Fenech. Are you sure? Have you counted them?
Sergeant d. R.. I've seen them go.
The President Georges Fenech. What was their conduct?

Sergeant d. R.. They were dressed in black, they wore tactical vests and weapons.
The President Georges Fenech. Are you sure to have seen happen to other personal bis?
Sergeant d. R.. Yes, other vehicles arrived a few minutes later, but they came in the opposite
direction of the boulevard, and parking buses prevented me to see staff who alighted.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. When you have noticed that the attackers fired bursts and
that the BAC 94 opened fire in response, could you have, you and your men, proceed also with
gunfire? How is coordination with Lac 94 made before the arrival of the bis and the RAID,
which you have requested secure?
Sergeant d. R.. The first officer came to see us, and at his request, four of our staff went to join
those of the tray. All trips are made on information and the orders given to the voice: the Lac
staff we have indicated that the terrorist fired from an emergency exit, my men are positioned so
as to have a view on this access. They were however able to open fire, with no Visual on the
terrorist himself.
The rapporteur. If you had a Visual, you fired?
Sergeant d. R.. We would have obviously done in sort of neutralize the terrorist. When he
opened fire for the third time, he has done in opening the door and pulling the, leaving that
exceed his weapon before closing the door.
The rapporteur. The shooting occurred around twenty-two hours fifteen, and bis came five
minutes later. Once the bis on-site, have you kept your position?
Sergeant d. R.. Yes, we stayed in place until the outbreak of the assault.
The rapporteur. So, these are other personnel of the sentry system which secured the
establishment of the bis and the RAID?
Sergeant d. R.. No, it is indeed my staff who have accomplished this mission. Their role was
precisely to monitor the emergency exit located in an alley, in order to avoid that terrorists out
there to take to reverse the bis and the RAID staff.
The rapporteur. This emergency door was well situated on the ground floor?
Sergeant d. R.. Effectively.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you describe the arrival of the RAID?
Sergeant d. R.. Men in the RAID arrived aboard an armoured vehicle, to retrieve two wounded
who were in the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage. They came from the part of the boulevard
concealed in my view because of the bus.

The President Georges Fenech. How have them you identified as men of the RAID?
Sergeant d. R.. I recognized them in their uniform, and registering that they wore in the back.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Gentlemen, I would like to start by saluting your commitment and thank
you, on our behalf and on behalf of our fellow citizens.
I would like to know if, during an operation as of November 13, you are placed under
operational command, or if you stay under military command, as I suppose. On the other hand,
how the opening of fire management is effected? Is it in instant response to enemy fire,
protection, or on an order from your unit commander?
I feel that throughout the evening, you have prepared as scattered information that you had
yourselves managed to collect, but that the operational command of the police has never exposed
you the situation in detail, which would allow you to organize your workforce of optimally requiring you to to react to different events you were facing. My colonel, do you confirm that
there was on the ground a dysfunction in the sharing of operational information? Can you tell us
in detail that tells you what during an operation as of November 13?
Colonel D. D. I have a very regular exchange with higher CO, which informs me that such and
such area is identified as a hot spot - that is why I have been informed of what was happening rue
Bichat, for example, and not by the ACROPOL network. Conversely, when the captain makes
me account rue Charonne, events I back this information to my leaders. It is obvious that when
we are immersed directly to the cFavorite pieces of events, we don't have a vision of the facts as
clear as the person who watches Betty the next morning: for our part, we found that after the
attack on the rue Bichat, events seemed to form a wave moving towards the East, and it is this
analysis of the facts that we have shared with our superiors and our subordinates.
M. Pascal Popelin. Among the missions that you were previously assigned to events, you
mentioned the surveillance of some places of worship and the rail network stations. Were you
also tasked to monitor performance and concert rooms?
Colonel D. D. No, he had not been give us to monitor the venues or stadiums.
M. Philippe Goujon. My colonel, I expressed you all our admiration at the courage of your men.
I would like to know if you consider that the hierarchical chain of command could be subject to
some improvements. On the other hand, can you explain how you follow the evolution of an
event to which your men take part, under what circumstances you may need to ask for
reinforcements, and what transmission difficulties which you feel have been confronted?
Finally, armaments and ammunition you are equipped with you seem most appropriate to carry
out a mission like that of November 13?
Colonel D. D. I think that the chain of command as it was reorganized late October was relevant
from an organic point of view, insofar as it allowed great fluidity of the commitment at all levels.

When it comes to information arriving at the command level, no doubt things are improved, as
they are everywhere: it is clear that better a head is filled, more it has a clear vision of the
situation. With regard to the connections with the internal security forces, they could be
strengthened, as I have already noted in regretting that the tactical Chief of staff that I had been
unable to contact its counterpart in the internal security forces in order to make a point of the
situation: this possibility exists at higher and lower levels, but not at my intermediate level.
With regard to the means of liaison, I repeat that if we use mobile phones as part of operation
Sentinel, it is because it is the means best suited to our mission technically: This allows us to
have regular accounts of the events recorded on different sites - for example, the discovery of a
suspicious package- While the materials used in external operations we probably would not
allow to communicate from a station located in the basement. However, in times of crisis, it is
clear that we quickly reach saturation when nineteen elementary units try to join simultaneously.
The evening of November 13, I also feared that is activated a "bubble of silence" resulting in
disabling laptops within a given radius, which fortunately has not been the case. If this had
happened, I had planned to go to a cafe so my PC establish communication with higher CO
through a fixed line.
Finally, the weapons we have, namely the FAMAS assault rifle, gives us any satisfaction insofar
as it allows us to shoot accurately at a distance ranging from 25 to 400 metres - in pairs with
binoculars in the latter case.
Mr Franois Lamy. In relation to transmissions, you have regretted not being able to
communicate at tactical level with the internal security forces. How do you explain that contact
with the police forces might not be provided at your level, while it is at the top level, that of the
prefecture of police? Furthermore, only could the information that you want to get be given to
you by your hierarchy?
Colonel D. D. I was actually getting information on the part of the inter-service operational
centre (COIA), which some had been communicated to him by the prefecture of police. That
said, I would have liked to be able to compare this information with those that my counterpart in
the internal security forces could give me on the ground.
Mr. David Comet. As the military pressure Syria, increases the risk is growing to see back on
the national territory of the well-trained jihadists militarily and equipped with weapons of war.
For your part, you have the experience necessary to deal with this threat, in light of your
obligations during external operations. How is it that Sentinel is considered most often a residual
forces of security force, while it has a large expertise in observation and is used to implement
Work of military equipment by demonstrating dynamism and stealth qualities that would be just
as useful on the national territory as they are outside our borders?
As long as you are asked to intervene as a proxy force, the question does not arise, but if we were
to deal with attacks of a still greater intensity that we had on 13 November, would it not
appropriate to further contribution the special expertise that I have just mentioned?

The President Georges Fenech. I remind you that we will soon proceed with the hearing of the
military Governor, to whom this question may also be installed.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. As a member of the Val-de-Marne, I welcome the interest of the
mission Sentinel from the point of view of the security of places of worship.
Can you tell us under what conditions you can make use of your weapons in support? A protocol
has been established, instructions were given to all personnel involved in Sentinel?
Furthermore, your operating mode, that changed last October, evolved in the same way in Paris
intra muros and outside the capital?
Master P - M. A. for Sentinel, the one instruction for opening fire on the metropolitan territory
is the same as that applied for Vigipirate, namely self-defence for oneself and for others. In the
context of the Bataclan, the Marchal des logis R.D. had to deal with his group to an individual
who firing at random with the Kalashnikov, endanger death individuals on-site - what is regarded
as a State of war. If he had been physically able to do so, the Marchal des logis would have
been quite entitled to neutralize this individual on the basis of self-defence. The order that he
took the initiative to give his men - take the provisions of combat, in this case put the cartridges
in the room - was perfectly justified.
Colonel D. D. In connection with the Sentinel, our rifles are equipped with a shutter of Chamber
(OCD) witness implemented after first attacks of January 2015, and which constitutes additional
security through use of the weapon on a daily basis. Remove this device allows the cartridge
access to the room, which makes the fully operational weapon.
Sergeant d. R.. The TOC is introduced into the Chamber instead of a real ammunition. When
the charger is hooked on the weapon, a loading movement has the effect ejecting the TOC and
bring the Board munition: the weapon is then provisioned and armed.
The rapporteur. Have you wondered if you were to go beyond self-defence and penetrate the
Bataclan ? In hindsight, do you need to consider to evolve on this issue?
Sergeant d. R.. I actually asked this question but I had no Visual on the entrance of the Bataclan
and therefore rather gave priority to the monitoring of the emergency exit, from which the
terrorist was shooting in the direction of the street. However, it would have been impossible to
open from the outside.
The rapporteur. Was entry into force in the building, made with the BAC 94 possible?
Sergeant d. R.. With the tray, we could probably enter. On the other hand, I could get into such
an undertaking with the only participation of the Group of eight men I had, to the extent that I
knew or the layout of the premises, or the number of attackers and their level of armaments: not
equipped of my ACROPOL, is that over the evening that I was able to collect from the BAC of
the information on this point - in this case the presence of four attackers armed with weapons of
war and a belt of explosives.

Colonel D. D. I also note the fact that, if he had entered the building, the Marchal des logis
ought to deal with the difficulty of distinguishing the enemies of civilians to protect. We are not
trained to discriminate in terms of a terrorist attack carried out in urban areas.
The rapporteur. Is this question likely to evolve?
Colonel D. D. We did not receive instructions in this sense. In the current state of things, our
training is simply to improve our reaction time to a concerned individual to at the outset as an
enemy.
The President Georges Fenech. As the captain said, you are a force protection and security, but
not an intervention force.
Colonel D. D. In any case, each force is specialized and, for our part, we do not have the of
know-how to discriminate against the enemy in a situation corresponding to the attack of the
Bataclan.
The President Georges Fenech. To resume the question by David Comet, do you consider that
a terrorist attack of a greater intensity than we have known last year could justify that you be
asked to intervene as a priority, taking advantage of your military experience, and not as a force
of support?
Colonel D. D. The scenario you mention deserves that you consider, but it is not for me to
answer a question of this order, to the extent that I am here as the tactical Chief: what interests
me above all is to know how I'm going to divide my units depending on the situation which I
have to face.
The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, thank you for your interventions that have been
rich in lessons.
Hearing, behind closed doors, police intervened during the attacks of 7, 8 and 9 January
2015: Mr. B. B., police Commissioner, Mr. M. J., Commander of police, Mr. J-S. B., leaderboard tray 11
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Monday, March 14, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the request for
hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since
January 7, 2015.
Last week, we began to address issues related to the conduct of operations, the intervention of
the forces of order, and the means at their disposal. We are continuing our investigations with
police officers of the Directorate of security of proximity of the Paris metropolitan area (DSPAP)
during the attacks of January 2015. We will then proceed to the hearing of police intervened last
November.

I remind that the DSPAP is competent in Paris and in the departments of the small Crown; it of
mission is to fight against the small and average delinquency, and particularly that committed on
the public highway, such as flights with violence. On the other hand, the DSPAP receives and
processes the call to number 17.
During the attacks in January 2015, the DSPAP units intervened. We receive Mr. B. B., police
Commissioner, Deputy Head of the Department of security and intervention (CSI) companies
and head of the ISC Paris, M. J., Commander of police, Chief of the CSI du Val-de-Marne (CSI
94), and Mr. J-S. B., head of edge to the the eleventh arrondissement of Paris (tray 11) anti-crime
brigade. We should also welcome Ms. Catherine Morelle, Commissioner of police, head of the
mobile intervention and protection (UMIP), including for the protection of Charlie Hebdo, but
she was unable to join us this evening.
Due to the confidentiality of the information that you deliver us, this hearing is held in camera.
Therefore, it is not broadcast on the website of the National Assembly. Nevertheless, in
accordance with article 6 of the order of November 14, 1958 on the functioning parliamentary
assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at the end of our
work. I should mention that people heard in camera will receive the accounts of their hearing and
that they will be able to comment. These will be submitted to the Commission which may decide
to State in his report.
I would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of article 6 above, 'is punishable by
the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code - one year of imprisonment and a
fine of 15,000 - any person who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish
information relating to non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the
end of the work of the commission referred to this information.
I'll let you speak, asking you to rapidly present the role that you have been led to take personally
or with your unit, with all the precision geographical and time possible.
But, first, in accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I must ask you to take the oath to
tell the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth.
MESSRS. B. B., J-S. B. and M. J. take an oath.
Mr. J-S. B., head of edge to the anti-crime brigade of 11e arrondissement of Paris (tray 11).
January 7, 2015, I was head of on-board vehicle of the tray 11. While we were on patrol, we
received a call informing us any shots at number 10 rue Nicolas-appears. Has not specified us
whether it was public or inside a building. We reconciled. I asked my driver to drop us off on the
boulevard Richard-Lenoir.
I'm down with two colleagues and we headed on foot towards rue Nicolas-appears. It is a kind of
cul-de-sac and it is not known as a street to problems. Arriving in the street, we have nothing
noticed particular; There's even a truck that was delivering packages. Outside the door of number
10, a maintenance employee told us that he had a colleague inside, shot and wounded. We still

knew nothing about the building and we asked him what was the nature of the institution. It has
failed to answer us.
In the opposite building, there were people in a window. They have called us, told us that they
saw three armed people entering the building and that they had heard gunfire. One of them told
us this building housed the offices of Charlie Hebdo. It was then that we heard bursts inside. A
few seconds later - we had barely time to depart slightly from the entry-, the doors are open and
the two brothers Kaye came out. They fired in our direction. My two teammates and I were able
to hide behind walls.
At that time, colleagues in mountain bike (MTB) arrived. The Kaye brothers focused on these
gentlemen in dress, pulling in their direction. We have fire, without effect. Then I tried to
transmit messages to indicate what was happening. The Kaye brothers are mounted in their car;
they are gone; they crossed a police car and new exchanges of fire took place. They left.
Director station asked us to return to number 10 rue Nicolas-appears to know what had happened
originally. We came back on the scene. Upon arriving, we found firefighters who have informed
us of the death of the maintenance officer who was inside. Mr. Pelloux came to pick us up and
asked us to climb to the second floor where there were many victims. We climbed; We have
secured places; We discovered the carnage in the offices. We have provided the first information
and have then been identified by other services that have arrived on the spot.
M. B. B., police Commissioner, Deputy Head of the Department of security and
intervention (CSI) companies and head of the Paris CSI. For my part, I am the Deputy Head
of the Department which brings together the four spring of the DSPAP ISCS - there is one
Department with Paris. I have a double-hatted, since I am also the head of the Paris CSI.
So you can understand their role in this device, I'll explain briefly what are the CSI. Multipurpose intervention units, they are competent in anti-crime as the ferry, but also for the
maintenance of order and urban violence, and they play a role of primo intervening in crises, i.e.
face of hostage takers, terrorists or the madmen. The CSI then intervene before the arrival of the
specialized body of third service research assistance intervention dissuasion (RAID) and the
Brigade of research and intervention (bis). The CSI have units dressed in civilian clothes, on a
motorcycle. They also have small groups of intervention called operational support groups
(GSO). The CSI 75 sends every day about twenty cars and ten motorcycles in Paris. The CSI
service intervened in all attacks that took place in le-de-France in 2015: Charlie Hebdo,
Montrouge, the Porte de Vincennes, all places of November 13, 18e district police station.
January 7, 2015, I was in my office. Over the radio, I heard that a call to police emergency had to
be received, announcing that two individuals hooded and equipped with guns came from entering
a building situated rue Nicolas-appears, without further specification. I thought a settlement of
accounts or a flight armed. I grabbed my GSO and I asked my men to begin to equip themselves,
explaining that we would probably intervene to pursue the robbers or the authors of settlement of
accounts. The time I team me and I get to join them, radio calls have proliferated. We understand
that a shootout was underway in the 11e district.

You should know that the DSPAP has seven conferences - in other words channels - radio.
taking into account the very important stream, only one conference would not ensure all
missions. The problem is that one can not know exactly everything that is happening in real time:
at the moment where the tray 11e arrondissement (tray 11) intervened on the 44 conference, I
was on the 137. There may be a small delay in the lifts of information, but we did find a better
system: with less than conferences, we couldn't work at all.
We then went to the Porte de Pantin, the last direction announced over the radio as being that of
the fugitives in Clio white. We thought that, if they caused an accident while driving too fast, we
would have a chance to locate them. With a bit more luck we could even fall on them and cause
an accident for fastening to a place. For an hour, we shot between the North of Paris and the
neighbouring cities - Aubervilliers, Saint-Denis, Saint-Ouen. Unfortunately, we have never
managed to get their hands on these individuals. We then returned in the eleventh district where
we have secured the perimeter of Charlie Hebdo to avoid surattentat risks associated with the
arrival on site of the President of the Republic and the various governmental authorities. We
have also activated the DSPAP mobile command post, a truck which the CSI is responsible.
January 8 in the morning, I learned by France Info that a shooting had just occur in Montrouge.
It is that I live in Clamart, just next to Montrouge. France Info was anything more precise. I
turned on the police radio and headed Montrouge. I had difficulties to communicate the correct
address by the command room: how the shooting was recent. When I got there, there were
already police officers, and first aid were given to the police municipal, Clarissa Jean-Philippe,
who was in a State of death apparent. In this context of surattentat, I took the command of units
of the CSI des Hauts-de-Seine (CSI 92). We have organized a wide perimeter, fearing being
attacked in our back. At the end of this intervention, I left for Paris.
In the morning, we were informed that Kaye brothers were aboard a grey Clio, that they had
committed a grivlerie of gasoline to Villers-Cotterts and they roll on a national direction Paris.
The DSPAP decided to secure the gates of Paris through checkpoints with officials equipped
with ballistic protection and a weapon heavy, to be able to intercept the vehicle. We held this
position from 10 h 30 to twenty-three hours, after which we have identified by the tray of night
of Paris. These are companies in the CSI dress who ensured this securing of the gates of Paris.
Our personnel in civilian, our motorcycle and our GSO were dynamic patrol in Paris, in order to
detect possible acts of terrorism and have a quick projection capability.
On Friday morning, we learned that the Kaye brothers frozen in Dammartin-en-Gole, which
allowed us to release a little attention to the issues in Paris, but we did not know if there were
other threats. To thirteen hours, we picked up a radio message indicating that an individual was
the long gun on the front of the store Hypercacher of the Porte de Vincennes. I went fairly
quickly, coming from Paris. I parked my car on the main roundabout of the Porte de Vincennes
and I took command of the operations at this location since it was already a lot of police officers
from different police stations. I was joined by the CSI 75 vehicles, with men better equipped than
the Police Commissioner.
The store Hypercacher opens on two streets at right angles, the main facade being situated on the
Porte de Vincennes avenue, and a service door overlooking the other side. The author of the

shooting was entrenched inside. In this kind of situation, the tactic is designed to "limit the
damage": it is trying to confine the individual apparently heavily armed indoors, to avoid to a
greater number of victims in apparent. We do not deliberately choose to sacrifice those who are
inside, but trying to avoid the situation from getting worse. It strives to keep it out with an armed
opposition to the various outputs that he could use, and on time-delay refraining from any
unnecessary action in anticipation of specialty services, RAID or bis.
For my part, I worked on the West and South sides, and I reorganized the positioning of officials,
making back those who were unnecessarily exposed. I was then joined by other staff. At one
point, by the turn of the device, I managed to join the Commander M.J. who was already there
also, but rather on the northern and eastern flanks. With our units, we extracted residents who
had taken refuge in shops, for example, and who could have been in line with shooting by
Chung. The exercise asks some technical: to create columns of intervention with men equipped
with shields, to surround people and evacuate them under the safest conditions possible.
Then, the RAID and the bis stormed. When it intervenes in this kind of crisis in Paris, the bis is a
commando brigade: the bis teams are at the centre and, in a second circle, found those of the CSI
or the tray of night night intervention. Our goal is to support the columns of the bis to retrieve
their casualties or hostages they remove. When the RAID and the bis stormed, we recovered four
hostages and one policeman of the RAID who was injured, and we have set up the command
post for the DSPAP. So much for the purely factual aspect of events.
M. M. J., Commander of police, head of company security and intervention of the Val-deMarne (CSI 94). Personally, I have not affected by the events of January 7. On the other hand,
the unit I have the honour order was called January 8 in early afternoon to arrest an individual in
a bank branch in Gentilly and that may correspond to MIT Coulibaly reporting. We had already
received information that MIT Coulibaly could return in this sector, either aboard a white Clio
more or less marked at the time of the shooting of Montrouge, or by public transport. We then set
up a column of intervention and we arrested the individual within the banking agency. The
judicial police took over and suspicions were raised after 24 hours in custody.
On 8 January, in addition to this intervention, we sent staff in the northeast of the Department
and in the vicinity of the national arriving in the capital, including the national 2 and 4, following
the news that the brothers Kaye were in northeastern Paris. Our staff were equipped with heavy,
i.e. heavy bullet-proof vests and long arms, so that it can intercept the individuals if they returned
to Paris. This device was covered by the size of the tray of the Val-de-Marne (BAC 94 N) night,
and continued until Friday morning.
On Friday, January 9, I was in the police headquarters for a meeting of the heads of the CSI
when, to thirteen hours, we were informed that shots had been fired at the store level
Hypercacher which has the characteristic of being the limit of the departments of Paris and Valde-Marne. It overlooks the avenue Gallieni, small aisle of Saint-Mand, and at the corner of the
street of the Commander-the L'herminier. Following this call, my CSI 94 staff visited themselves
on the spot where I joined them from the bois de Vincennes and Saint-Mand.

Arrived on the spot, I took the measure of the case. The staffing of police, spread throughout the
avenue Gallieni and street of the Commander-the L'herminier, were extremely dispersed,
equipped with various weapons, including rifles to pump, and from different units: management
of public order of movement (DOPC), Paris Intra-Muros, territorial police of public security of
the Val-de-Marne. I started to gather strength, even make two or three small sprains, to integrate
in the columns of colleagues in other units, equipped with heavy vests and ballistic shields, in
order to have a fire support. It was mainly brought by staffing DOPC of company transfers,
escorts and guards (COTEP), who were armed with type M4 5.56 mm assault rifles, and
colleagues with shotguns.
We positioned the workforce at the corner of boulevard Gallieni and street of the Commanderthe L'herminier, but also to the rear of the building of theHypercacher. You should know that
this building overlooks a small building that is integrated into a city. We positioned intervention
columns, equipped with heavy and protections, so as to avoid any release of this building, mainly
on the East and northeast of places facades. Waiting for the intervention of specialized units, we
have also retracted the perimeter, that we did back colleagues who were too close to
theHypercacher and the main entrance overlooking the boulevard Gallieni, so as to protect
everyone. I also proceeded to the closure of the gates of a nearby service station which could be
the subject of an arson by fire.
The establishment of this device took some time. I was in contact with Commissioner B.B. here,
who gave me to continue to manage this area waiting for the intervention of level 3, i.e. the
RAID and BRI units. Once we have identified by columns of the bis, we put at their disposal as
support elements. The bis was asked to proceed with the evacuation of a store located at the
corner of boulevard Gallieni and street of the Commander-the L'herminier, in which there were
still people. We also knew that there were people in another store, Charles Traiteur, contiguous
to theHypercacher, but were unaware if the two businesses communicated with each other.
These people were forced to stay inside the store, so they are protected and also to prevent any
inadvertent release of hostage-taker. Later, the RAID went to pick them up and put safely after
having touched.
Then we stayed in position, in support of the RAID unit that was on this side of the device. To
seventeen hours, we received messages saying that the assault had been given in Dammartin-enGole. At the same time, an officer in the RAID came to tell us that he was going to assault and
that we would have to take its place, i.e. the positioning of the RAID just before the assault. We
have assembled a column of the CSI 94 at the boulevard Gallieni and level of the Commanderthe L'herminier Street, on the right sidewalk, to support the RAID unit that gave the assault.
We collected and implemented security several hostages - three women and a man - and a
colleague of the RAID who was wounded. We palpated the hostages, which was made possible
by the fact that there were women in these units, to ensure that they carried no weapon. We
wanted to ensure that these persons were not weapon and there was no accomplice of Coulibaly
among them: at this point, we thought that he had a wife with him. We were able to remove
doubt through information collected from the families of the hostages, who were in the outer
perimeter. In terms of perimeter, you need to know that the CSI 94 was engaged on an area first

very limited which has then been expanded when we intervened in support of the size of the
RAID.
At the end of all this, we returned home with the feeling of accomplishment.
The President Georges Fenech. And be aware that it is also our feeling.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Thank you for your respective speeches. My first question
is addressed to Mr. J - S .B. happened among first responders. At the time when you arrive on
the scene, do you know that the Charlie Hebdo is headquartered rue Nicolas-appears?
Mr. J-S. B. no, not at all. Personally, I knew that Charlie Hebdo had to leave 20e district, but I
was unaware that he moved into this street.
The rapporteur. When you in did you realize? When you have entered the building? When
you've had dealing with Mr. Pelloux? Is that you have been notified by radio?
Mr. J-S. B. when we arrived, three people at a window of the building opposite have told us that
heavily armed individuals entered the building where the premises of Charlie Hebdo were.
The rapporteur. What can you tell us of the radio link between you who were on the ground
and the command room? You raised the topic, and the press reported difficulties in this area. It
would appear that the command room occupied the airwaves. Since then, the Organization has
been modified to give priority to field officers. Have you had difficulties to join room command?
Has the practice actually changed? Do you really have the priority when you intervene?
Mr. J-S. B. I confirm. On 7 January, when Kaye brothers came out, we have become the target
of their shots. I managed to hide me behind a wall which, unfortunately for me, was right next to
their parked car. But we were in civilian clothes and they focused on uniformed police who
arrived in mountain biking. Suddenly, I had them on my right. I knew they were going to enter
their vehicle I registration, since I was about 15 metres. I wanted to send all this information, but
I have never been able to speak because all police calls emergency which confirmed the shooting
in the street.
The rapporteur. This information came from the room command or other units?
Mr. B. B. People call the 17, the number of police assistance. Information back to the command
room which reflects to the radio.
The rapporteur. Is there not a filter at the level of the command room?
Mr. J-S. B. we pass to our Director station which is one of the 11e district either that oversees
the district, namely the 11e, 12e and 20e districts. Above, there is still a level.
Mr. B. B. When you dial 17 to join the police, the call comes in a standard. If it is a non-urgent
mission, the operator shall complete a form which is sent by e-mail or by an electronic system to

the command room. There is a command for the DSPAP room, then a room by district, then
another by borough.
It happens that standard recovers very valuable information that must be sent urgently. In these
cases, the electronic means is not necessarily the most timely. The operator can then contact the
command by radio room, and everybody hears the information. The command can then give
orders on the basis of the information received. It has technically a priority over the radio. This is
justified. For example, if a policeman steal his radio during a stormy speech, priorities is that the
malicious radio thief won't be able to disrupt the command room messages since the latter will
have a systematic priority on the messages from the stolen radio. But the perverse effect of this
radio priority is that nobody can interrupt command, including emergency room.
Colleagues arrived first date wanted to prevent that they were shot; they could give the position
of individuals, their description, the vehicle registration, etc. These information were very
important, not for the second vehicle of intervention: police do not similarly approach if there is
gunfire at the corner of the street or if shooters are already gone.
But the room was sometimes used inappropriately radio waves, preventing stakeholders to
transmit. When the same message must pass on all conferences, using a relatively cumbersome
procedure, the general call: after a jingle, a small introductory music, the message is
disseminated in a very specific format, and then repeated. For the duration of the call, which can
last a minute or a minute thirty, nobody can speak. In this case, General calls informing them of
the street situation Nicolas Appert aired without relevant operational elements. This has
disrupted the first responders who wanted to communicate. However, if this insecure
stakeholder, I do not think that the outcome of the mission was particularly impacted.
The rapporteur. This is what happened January 7?
Mr. J-S. B. I confirm, this is what happened. Command room takes precedence over the
airwaves: it can cut us, but not vice versa. While I was trying to convey my messages, I could
hear the calls.
The rapporteur. They lasted a minute or one minute thirty, but, I imagine, that seemed you an
eternity.
Mr. J-S. B. indeed.
The rapporteur. Are always fixed in the same way with the jingle or procedures have evolved
since 7 January to account for the observations brought up the field ?
Mr. J-S. B. there is always the famous jingle, but things have evolved. When a sensitive
operation is in progress, the guidelines stations broadcast the following message: "radio silence,
we leave the priority stakeholders staffing. Everyone must wait to pass messages about other
cases. The first step is respected. However, all calls are always priority and they can fall at any
time.

The rapporteur. But you noted a positive development. My last question concerns the shots.
You you are found facing the Kaye brothers twice, if I understand correctly?
Mr. J-S. B. we were against them three times. When they came out of the building, we have
become a target for them. We have sought to hide and we have responded. When they crossed
the vehicle arriving in front, I did fire on their car. Then, they left on the boulevard RichardLenoir. We heard shots because they drew on others, but we knew exactly where they were. It
was delicate. In fact, they turned, they have circumvented the boulevard Richard-Lenoir for back
in our direction, but across the median.
The rapporteur. And after what you describe, we understand that you're found with several of
your colleagues facing the heavy fire of the Kaye brothers. One of your colleagues is sadly
passed away. You say that you have responded and elsewhere there were quite a few exchanges
of gunfire. However, never you have managed to reach the brothers Kaye. For you, is this related
to your arms? It has been said and reiterated that there was a discrepancy between the terrorists
arming and yours. Is it a question of training? You get to explain it otherwise than by the
difficulty of the intervention, in the heat of the moment? It is not rush you, but some of your
union representatives say that the police know more pull. Since January, are things they
improved? Have you received additional training? Have you had a change of weapons?
Mr. J-S. B. for our part, when we pulled on the Kaye brothers, they were at a distance and
largely protected by heavy vests then their vehicle. We don't even know if we hit them, because
we didn't have back. Other colleagues have crossed them by car, so moving.
We are essentially trained to use weapons in response, i.e. we defend, at a short distance very
quickly. We are not trained in marksmanship. I do not think that training is to question. We had
quite the same armament as the individuals in question and we were moving. It is possible that
we have touched them in their vest, and we reached their vehicle - there are impacts and
windscreens have fallen - but this has not changed the situation.
We were promised more heavy weapons. We have received means of protection - ballistic
helmets, flexible vests - we were not equipped with until then. It expected the arrival of long
guns, the Heckler & Koch G36 (HK G36) that allows to be more able to respond to this type of
individuals.
The rapporteur. These weapons should arrive in the coming weeks. With regard to training, it
told me it varied from one office to another, one brigade to another, depending on the trainers.
The shots are static targets, but some trainers use moving targets. The strength of the ITUC, who
are the primary stakeholders, they enjoy additional training or are subject to the same regime as
the base police who derive 90 cartridges per year?
Mr. J-S. B. for my part, I am on a local ferry. We have a minimum of 90 cartridges per year, but
we can use much more by going to pull more regularly. We go there several times a month.
The rapporteur. How many cartridges do you get each year?

Mr. J-S. B. is variable. Whenever we go there, we derive 30 cartridges, and we can do it twice
per month.
M. Christophe Cavard. I understand that the rapporteur insists on knowing the details of your
experience, because you are the first to be made in January. Our Committee is interested in these
facts to study ways to combat terrorism. However a turn has been taken at this time there and we
are changing some legislative frameworks concerning weapons and the rights granted to the
security forces. Your point of view on the effectiveness of our proposals concerns us so greatly.
How can the police protect themselves, face what they discover, and then in a context where
terrorists have disappeared? If I have understood correctly, Mr J - S. B., deposited you on-site,
you left on foot and you were without a vehicle. How is getting contact to find out if you must
remain on the premises or prosecute the perpetrators?
By 2015, we have experienced commando operations, carried out by several armed persons
acting preserved. How the professionals that you grasp this kind of situation? What do you think
the debate that expands capabilities of direct, or even immediate action in this kind of situation,
even if there are more suitable than others specialists to intervene?
Mr. B. B. In principle, the policeman tries to manage to be always with a teammate that will
ensure its coverage. In practice, because of the topography, he can be found alone. In this case, it
must locate its crew to the vote if it is not far away, by radio or mobile phone.
For a long time, in the police, it has taught us to address any intervention with great caution:
should first analyse the situation, to observe the topography, the number of individuals, their
modus operandi and their weaponry, etc. We were taught that intervention should lead to an
inquiry being conducted to protect police officers and those detained. Any teaching in police
training is based on self defense, with systematic reminders that with some deem too inhibitors.
The training is provided by graduate police trainers in security in intervention (FTSI) techniques,
which were formerly called monitors physical and professional activities (APP). A few years
ago, trainers interested in the killings that took place in North American universities, wondering
what had to police in this kind of situation. They have developed a four day training called fight
against killers chain internship, or stage 'Amok', from the Malay word meaning "frenzied" or
"berserk", a description that fits well with the perpetrators of these killings.
This notion of chain killer seems to be relevant to a police officer. On the tactical level,
regardless that the person is qualified psychiatric cases or terrorist, since the intervention will be
pretty much the same, except that the risk of trapping will be higher for the policeman there case
to a terrorist. During this stage, the educational approach was radically new. In classical training,
we are taught that, when a thief is for example being 'to the son of a car', should be approaching
nearby, try to see the person, ask them to raise their hands, etc. During the Amok, it made us
understand the urgency to establish a ballistic or physical contact with the perpetrators of
killings. We realize that, as soon as it drives them, as soon as it reverses the pressure of fire, they
are forced to hide to stiffen, which allows to stop their criminal enterprise.

It was an exciting internship. Unfortunately, far from be generalized, it even was suspended in
2013 or 2014. As I had the chance to be part of the trainees, I to am moved me. Why is this great
course, which was taught in a comprehensive manner a tactical and technical approach to dealing
with a phenomenon that we were a priori not trained to face, Hung? First of all, I was told that
the General Inspectorate of the national police (IGPN) had decided to suspend the training after
finding that the notions of self-defence is there were not taught properly. Having done the course
myself, I was very surprised: the rules of self-defence were those that one had always taught me,
those that apply against a threatening individual, armed and prepared to kill us or kill others; We
in weren't always to discuss the deactivation of an individual that opposed us his back, for
example. I interviewed the IGPN. I was told that the decision came from the RAID. I
interviewed the RAID. I was told that the decision came from the IGPN.
Recently, I finally knew what had happened. I am a member of the Working Group of the
General Directorate of the national police (DGPN) which, since the attacks of last November,
seeks to develop a new intervention doctrine. We resume about everything that has been done
during this internship Amok, which means that we have lost two or three years. As the direction
of education participates in the Working Group, I finally managed to know why the course had
been suspended.
Support Branch, the training branch has decided no longer to ensure this course after realizing
that she was very far from a prospective point of view: it was, in fact, by train to develop a new
intervention doctrine, what is normally the jurisdiction of active as the DGPN branches or the
prefecture of police. Judging that it exceeded its role, the training branch has decided to cancel
this internship. That is why it has stopped train officials for two years, which is a shame.
The President Georges Fenech. Who gave the instructions to make the training resumed?
Mr. B. B. The DGPN is developing a new doctrine, very interesting from a tactical, and strategic
perspective that's coming out soon. The strategy is to get in touch. Everywhere in the world, after
analysis of these situations, it is realized that as soon as the police had contact with them, the
authors of such facts stop, because pulled them, either because they are hiding. We can delay
until the intervention of the RAID and the bis. Once the DGPN will be formalized this new
doctrine, the training branch will feel authorized to teach it.
To return to your question about the shooting, Mr President, I can understand the astonishment
of non-weapons. It may seem incredible that as many balls have been drawn rue Nicolas-appears
without the fugitives have been affected. In fact, the vision of people is distorted by the movies
where we see police officers who are in the hands of criminals. In case of "smearing" - which are
also often not smudge - means of fellows ask: "why have they not taken in hand? '' It does not
because it is impossible with a gun. A very good sniper will be still less efficient with a gun than
the worst of the shooters with a rifle, due to the length of the barrel. Because, you may regret it,
it is with fist weapons that we retaliate to the Kalashnikovs.
You will hear the Commissioner who spoke at the Bataclan. What he did, at a distance of twenty
or twenty-five metres, is exceptional. I do not want to speak of chance for do not disparage the
quality of his shot, but in terms of probabilities and statistics, it was of the order of the

impossible. I went at the Bataclan and saw shooting distance. Do not think just about anyone is
able to succeed as a shot. More than seven or 10 metres, it is almost impossible to touch with a
gun someone who is in action.
Even before January 2015, we asked that the CSI be strengthened weapons. We then relied on
the events for the month of January to argue our requests for additional weapons, including
rifles. In fact, we have never had response. We had yet produced detailed reports based on events
that had taken place in Tunisia, at the Museum of Bardo and on beaches in Sousse. We yet
explained these facts could occur in Paris.
Certainly, there are budgetary constraints. The impossible one is required: If there is no money,
there is no rifles. But we have learned by the band that weapons were available to some
armouries and that it was sufficient authorization. This impossible to obtain permission arrived
on 14 November. This is regrettable. Cannot redo history, and the day of 13 November was very
well handled. However, it is regrettable that our January request had been accepted - and again,
partially, to the margin - than on 14 November.
Last October, there was drama at the police station of Saint-Denis: a police officer of the local
BAC took a bullet in the head, during an intervention against the robbers. The Minister of the
Interior is obviously made on-site to be aware of the situation and show solidarity to field
officers. As they did him part of their problem of arms and equipment, the Minister decided to
create a tray to provide them. Unfortunately, the CSI is not called tray and it has been excluded
from this plan. In my opinion, this is the result of a deficiency in the decision-making chain and
not a ministerial commitment: no one had to point out to Mr Cazeneuve that ICS were exactly
the same work as the tray. We are not very many in France, it is serving us. While the CSI 75 is
the only service of the national police to be reached on all the Parisian attacks in 2015, it will be
soon less armed than the tray of Charenton. I was once stationed in the Val-de-Marne and I only
denigrates the tray of Charenton, but it must have four staff members.
The President Georges Fenech. You have been heard, don't worry.
Mr. Serge Grouard. What you say, Commissioner, sheds light on the malfunctions our
administration has the secret, and this since too long.
I would like to revisit issues of doctrine. You hear, and caricaturing a bit, should practically
apply the doctrine of the glass of water of the fire rather than wait for the pump-ton van. Can you
react on this point?
With regard to Vincennes, where you were both, Mr B.B. and Mr M.J., how it happened with the
media? You talked about securing the site in order to avoid the surattentat and to evacuate people
who could be found in the axis of fire. Yet according to images broadcast on television, we had
the impression that the media were very close to operations, but maybe cameramen and
photographers were further and did they use zooms. One can also wonder about the saturation of
telecommunications. How did you do? Have you taken into account the presence of the media?
How could you manage it? In the future, how could you do? Obviously, you met many worries
on this side there.

M. M. j.. The nearest small perimeter of the place where the crisis took place was double of an
outer perimeter. At our level, we have been little affected by the media management. However,
we have had returns on the fact that the media had arrived quickly and had managed to enter
private apartments that were opposite theHypercacher, in locations that have been taken into
account by the marksmen of the intervention units. Can be deduced by analysing the images.
As a general rule, the CSI and primo intervening units Act in a restricted area and have no
contact with the media. How could address the problem of the media in the future? In my
opinion, the strategy of the black screen, which is to do nothing, is the best way to avoid that
information arrives to the terrorist, the hostage taker or.
I would like to fire. You should know that any officer placed in a stress situation loses between
70% and 80% accuracy in a shooting stand. This extremely important phenomenon has been
studied by the Americans. It should also be noted that education refers to the usual ranges of
police officers, less than or equal to seven or eight metres in 80-90% of cases. So far, the
teaching of handgun shooting was adapted to these situations. Currently, monitors are interested
in the issue and propose new methods, somewhat like the cine-tir experienced by those who have
done their military service there is extremely long: shots are conducted live ammunition at
targets placed before images. These workouts are very popular colleagues.
The CSI staff have training of specific tir - behind ballistic shields, in column, on the road which give them a very small added value compared to traditional units. Since 7 January, we
have systematically shipped in vehicles of the long guns which we have: the shotgun 12ga,
which is an excellent weapon, because it has a great stopping power. the submachine gun. Since
November 14, we hit a few 5.56 mm weapons which are pretty much effective that old design.
M. Olivier Falorni. Mr B.B., we cannot only be interested what you told us internships and
chain killers - we have been able to see in theWork last November.
Back to your intervention to theHypercacher and the strategy of containment that you adopted.
When you arrived at the scene, what did you know? Did you mean dealing a hostage-taker or a
chain killer? There were victims very quickly during these facts you will tell us whether to call
them or not taken hostage. When you came here, did you have knowledge that Chung had
already executed people? Did you mean that an intervention was necessary in an emergency?
You mentioned the need to keep it out to kill. Feel you be a logic of negotiation with hostagetaker?
You have described the inhibitory process of prudence and analysis. Do you think this process is
penalizing compared this new doctrine of rapid response?
In January, it had to deal with two simultaneous situations since, at the time where you to
intervene at the porte de Vincennes, the Kaye brothers were holed up in Dammartin-en-Gole.
Has this concomitance prevented certain actions? It seems indeed that intervention at
theHypercacher was precipitated by the release of the brothers Kaye of the company where they
were cut off.

Mr. B. B. We quickly realized that it was rather a hostage. Of course, he had already killed - we
saw the legs of a body at the entrance to the store, as the curtain had been lowered to two-thirds,
but, if he had wanted to continue to kill, he was free to do so. Since there was more killing, this
turned into hostage. Things were rather frozen.
It is precisely the kind of status that we seek as first responders during a crisis: we must freeze
the situation to offer it to the RAID or the bis; We must not cause a catastrophic chain. If things
are frozen in a hostage, it suits us. We procrastinate; We try not to excite the hostage-taker; We
expect people that it really is the business to manage this kind of crisis, i.e. the RAID or bis, as
we quickly reach the limits of our powers.
On the other hand, if he had begun to execute hostages, we would not have had any other choice
but to intervene. We are the public service of the police. We can not watching things get under
the pretext that we have not been trained. In this case, it launches an assault emergency, but
without the technicality of the RAID or the bis. At the time of launch an assault of emergency,
we know that there will be considerable losses both for us and for the hostages. It does
everything to ensure that this does not happen. The criterion is this: things are frozen or hostagetaker is in action? If he walks into the shop with his rifle, for us, the situation is frozen. If it starts
to shoot at people, it is in action.
M. Olivier Falorni. Would you have been able to launch an assault of emergency in light of the
simultaneity of the two scenes?
Mr. B. B. In fact, at the beginning, we didn't even top what took place in Dammartin-en-Gole.
We did not know that the two events were linked. The link appeared only later, after the arrival
of the RAID and the bis during the first contacts of the negotiators with Senthil Coulibaly. He
told them: If you perform the assault at Dammartin-en-Gole, I kill the hostages. At that time, we
had fallen a notch and we were more than in support of the bis. Such decisions then reported the
RAID and the bis.
Mr Franois Lamy. My first question is for Mr. J - S .B. and to penalties before Charlie Hebdo.
How far were you Kaye brothers when you retaliated? Arguably, in fact, that the exercise is
difficult even for a good shooter.
My second question is addressed to Commissioner B.B. You explained that the CSI did the same
work as the tray. Do you consider that there is a duplication? Since the beginning of the work of
this commission of inquiry, we are facing many acronyms and services. In General, do you think
that there is a little too many services? It is always difficult for a professional to explain that its
service is pointless, or does the same job than another. This is not what I ask you. But, honestly,
we say that a bit of simplification may not be useless.
Mr. J-S. B. before Kaye brothers out of the building, we were two metres from the door. They
fired before getting out, which allowed us to move away from ten or fifteen meters. We were on
the run; they were in our back and we have not sought to retaliate immediately. Once protected,
we were fifteen or twenty metres of them. As to our colleagues who have crossed them in
vehicle, they were closer, perhaps eight or ten meters, but fast-moving.

Mr. B. B. The police-gendarmerie duality poses no problem. In addition, geographical shares are
clear enough.
Mr Franois Lamy. It is for this that I have not asked you about this point.
Mr. B. B. For the rest, I understand that one can be surprised by the existence of a DGPN sphere
and a sphere prefecture of police of Paris. There are a lot of services, but I rarely see police too
much on intervention. There are also many victims who complain do not see police officers at
all.
Mr Franois Lamy. Reduce the number of services does not mean that police numbers will
decrease. The idea is rather to optimize their work. It is in this perspective that your views of
practitioners interest me.
Mr. B. B. The policeman is very technical, much more that citizens think. As the police is a very
democratic tool, all citizens have an opinion to give on its operation, on the conditions of any
particular intervention, while they would not the idea to comment on surgery, wondering if it
would be better worth go through this or that place, use this or that scalpel. This suggests that
everyone could be a police officer and that this job is simple. In fact, this is not the case. This is a
real job, very technical, where this tangle of services. Each has its small additional technicality,
his little trick and more.
It is also what led to create the ISC while it existed the BAC. It wanted to create a more versatile
tool. The local ferry stations are almost always in civilian: he therefore often lack the
competence of police officers held in the maintenance of order or urban violence. The night of
the Paris conurbation tray are uniformed, but they have developed only recently and marginally
the jurisdiction of plainclothes police. In the CSI, there is coordination between units uniformed
and civilian units. Our bikes do not resemble those used for medical assistance service escorts
urgent (SAMU) or roadside checks; These are all-terrain motorcycles which must fit on
sidewalks in sensitive cities where there is a lot of pedestrian areas. These are products that were
missing and that have been developed.
The bis and the RAID intervened together during the intervention to theHypercacher. This was
perhaps more a political choice. Perhaps, a service could manage only the intervention. I have
trouble to answer you better.
The President Georges Fenech. How do you explain this difficulty, that can be described as
functional, between the DGPN and the prefecture of police of Paris?
Mr. B. B. It is difficult. I could illustrate it by countless examples, every day reminding us that it
is not in the same world as the prefecture of police of Paris. Honestly...
The President Georges Fenech. You speak under oath.
Mr. B. B. I know it well, but it is very complicated.

The President Georges Fenech. Mr M.J., you have an answer?

M. M. j.. I think it's just a question of power, protection of areas of competence which touch
each other and complement each other on the whole of the territory.
The President Georges Fenech. What do you think of the idea of the existence of the prefecture
of police of Paris? I hasten to clarify that I have nothing against the prefecture of police of Paris!
Mr. B. B. The DGPN is a very nice direction, the prefecture of police also. (smiles) It is not easy
to explain, because we know the advantages and disadvantages of each of the two systems, and
we can compare them... To the DGPN, there are more staffing problems as the prefecture of
police of Paris. As it has more strength, the prefecture of police of Paris has managed to invent
missions and easements that are totally unjustified. Indeed, while there are more theoretical
strength, we are left with the same understaffed on the public highway.
The creation of the DSPAP in the context of the Grand Paris security is one of the consequences
of the problem DGPN-prefecture of police of Paris. If everything had been placed under the
aegis of the DGPN, it would not have needed, to secure a little better the suburb, to create the
DSPAP. All would have been grouped under the same Central Directorate of public security
(UMD) and commuters had the staffing reinforcements they needed.
The President Georges Fenech. It is very clear: thank you very much.
M. Christophe Cavard. Going back to January 2015 interventions, I would like some
clarification on the identification of the people involved. At what point did you know to who you
matter? Who has taught you?
M. M. j.. In General, when he is called to a mission, our information come from the halls of
command to which it is attached by means radio. To the command room, picks up the
information to the right and to the left, by 17, with specific instructions.
In the specific case of theHypercacherinformation arrived us from our hierarchical channels. As
we were on the edge of Paris and the Val-de-Marne, the information arrived me both of SIC 750,
which is the room of the DSPAP command, that of the SIC du Val-de-Marne. Information
arriving me through these two channels were generally identical, but they could also be
complementary. On the other hand, when the assault gave Dammartin-en-Gole, we learned by
the press alerts on our phones. Two or three minutes later, the assault was given by people in the
RAID who warned us so we take our provisions to replace them.
It can also happen that colleagues warn us of this or that event by telephone. This information
could reach them in different ways, including through a chain of command which, at a time,
preferred to take an another bias.
M. Christophe Cavard. And the brothers Kaye?
M. M. j.. We did not have to deal with this case.

M. Christophe Cavard. But, if you had crossed them, it would have been better that you
recognise them!
M. M. j.. Effectively. The picture for the ID found in the vehicle was circulated on mobile
phones of police officers.
Mr. B. B. Known as the registration plate of the Clio. Information passed over the radio to the
police by these famous General calls that sometimes prevent the police to intervene.
The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, it remains for me to thank you for all these
explanations and your availability.
Hearing, behind closed doors, police intervened during the attacks of November 13, 2015: Mr. B.
B., police Commissioner, Mrs C. P., Commissioner of police, Mr G. P., Commissioner of police, Mr.
G. B., police captain, Mr. Z. I., Commissioner of police, Mr D. K., Divisional Commissioner, Mr. S.
Q., Divisional Commissioner, M. J. M., Commissioner of police, Mr. F. C. , Commissioner, Ms. V.
G., Divisional Commissioner, M. T. D., Commissioner of police
Hearing in camera, Monday, March 14, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the
request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat
terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We started last week the issues relating to the conduct of operations, the intervention of the
forces of order, and the means at their disposal. We are continuing our investigations with police
officers of the Directorate of security of proximity of the Paris metropolitan area (DSPAP)
during the attacks. We have just heard police officers intervened in January 2015, we now
welcome officials intervened last November.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of the order of November 14, 1958 on the functioning
parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at
the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will
previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will
be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I recall that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, "is punishable by the penalties
provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code - one year of imprisonment and a fine of
15,000 - for any person who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish
information relating to non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the
end of the work of the commission referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you now to take the oath to tell the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Mr. B. B., Mrs. C. P., Mr G. P., G. B., Z. I., D. K., S. Q., J. M., F. C., Ms. V. G. and Mr T. D. take
oath.
The President Georges Fenech. The first of the many questions we want to ask you is the exact
time at which you received the alert and the time in which you have visited on the spot.
M. S. Q., Divisional Commissioner. At the time of the facts, I was the head of the 2e district,
comprising the 10e, 11e, 12e, 18e, 19e 20e districts. As such, on the evening of Friday 13
November, while I was in the family, I was advised by my room command (SIC), and
information to 21 pm or 21 h 22 shots in 10e district and potentially causing injuries, and even
deaths.
I immediately asked officials of the command room to dispatch on-site most people as possible,
so that we can be enlightened on the facts, knowing that, at this time, information which had the
SIC were very patchy.
Three or four minutes later - at 21 h 24 or 21 h 25 - the SIC reminded me to confirm me the
seriousness of the situation and tell me that the shots had been fired in different locations of the
10th and 11e district.
So I decided to join my command room, immediately in order to take stock of the situation in
order to report back to my superiors. At the same time, I reiterated my request to send as many
staff as possible, specifying that the safety instructions should be recalled to stakeholders.
I went through Paris in seven to eight minutes and came place de la Rpublique, 9:42 pm or
21:43 pm, my initial idea is to first win my service, so as to equip myself of my weapon of
service and my bulletproof vest, to get then on the affected sites. Noting that the some had been
installed, I interviewed a guardian of peace, which indicated to me that the attack took place at
the Bataclan. I headed to the bathroom - it was about 21 h 48 - against the tide of pedestrians
fleeing, panicked. This has confirmed the seriousness of the situation. I heard the shots and,
without more information, at first thought they were taken outside.
Having received confirmation of my command room that the events took place before the
Bataclan, I left fit me, make the point since the SIC with my superiors and spread over different
sites available crews, knowing that we were close to the time of day brigades statement, who
complete their service at 22:30. These naturally have all been kept in place, and night shifts have
been divided where they could be useful, including for establishing security perimeters and
provide assistance to the wounded.
Once my instructions relayed by my radio operators, I joined, accompanied by two officials - one
transmitter and a driver - my Director, Pascal Le Borgne, beside the Bataclan. It had to be
between 22 h 30 and 22 h 35. With Commissioners and the crews who have joined us at the as, I
did in order to organize the security perimeter and the relief inside the Bataclan. I should
mention that I am not made me on other sites affected - referred to as the "terraces".

The President Georges Fenech. You came for the first time before the Bataclan to 21 h 48:
how many were there police officers already on the spot, before the arrival of the Brigade of
research and intervention (bis)?
M. S. Q. It is hard to say, as chronologically, the Bataclan is the last contested site, after the
terraces. Patrols arrived at the scene of the attacks at the as, as well as Commissioners, who
themselves are carried locally on their own initiative, including those who did not work.
Regards the Bataclan, I cannot give you precise response, because, during my first visit, the
situation was too confused to be volumetric accurately. So I took the initiative to win my service,
trying to inform me by radio.
The President Georges Fenech. Who saw bis arrive on the scene? What were its workforce?
M. B. B. police Commissioner. The bis has created a few months ago a rapid intervention force
(FIR). It is she who first was dispatched on places, either ten or fifteen of officials. It is difficult
to be more precise in light of the chaos that reigned at the scene.
The President Georges Fenech. They were therefore more than six?
Mrs C. P., Commissioner of police, Paris night service (SN 75). The bis came in two stages. I
cannot say precisely when the bulk of the troops arrived, but the first elements arrived at around
10:25 pm, their mission being to get immediately in contact with the crisis to take over from
crews first responders. At this moment, I see five staff of the FIR.
The President Georges Fenech. This is a point that we do not manage to clarify.
Mr. B. B. In my opinion, this is not essential. You should especially remember this police
intervention, is that, after the intervention of the Commissioner of the BAC 75N who entered the
Bataclan and did one assailants, the shooting stopped. Whatever the number of members of the
bis, between the firing of the Commissioner and the onslaught of the bis, has more there helpless
victim.
The President Georges Fenech. Nevertheless, it is important that we know in what conditions
the bis has arrived. The FIR consists of 15 staff members. Gold Commissioner C. P. talks about
five or six men.
Mrs. c. P. When the FIR happens between 2225 and 2230 hours, we ourselves in a situation
blurred and confused, including emotionally, so it is difficult to accurately describe what we saw.
I only know that FIR has taken place very quickly, as provided for in the Protocol.
The President Georges Fenech. Were you doing each and others, part of the advanced
command post established on the ground floor of the Bataclan ?
Mr. B. B. You probably refer to the bis command post located at the bottom of the stairs. Only
were there the bis technicians for to decide the modalities of the assault.

Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Divisional Commissioner S.Q., when you got the first time
before the Bataclan to 21 h 48, have you had case at BAC 94?
M. S. Q. At that time, I have not intended to intervene, but to win at the earliest my service. This
is because I heard shots that I approached the Bataclan. But in this kind of situation, if one is
unarmed, it turned around. I therefore see no. I know however that alert messages are passed
over the airwaves and that crews from the DSPAP have been dispatched to the scene.
The rapporteur. Is there among you of others who were on the scene before 10 pm and have
been in contact with BAC 94, which is the first to be arrived on the spot with the Commissioner
who has shot and killed one of the terrorists?
Could you, on the other hand, relate us the facts between your arrival to some and to others and
bis, between 11:20 and 22:25? What was the role of those of you who were present?
Mr. B. B. The first police officers on the spot belonged to the DSPAP, whether it's
Commissioner who entered the Bataclan or 94N Lac crews. Other officers quickly arrived,
including Commissioners P.C. and D.K., as well as myself. I repeat, after the intervention of the
Commissioner of the Interior, the firing stopped.
The rapporteur. This is indeed what everyone has said, but the Commissioner in question,
which recounts the events in the magazine of the Union of the Commissioners of the national
police, The Tribune of the Commissioner, said that, in spite of his intervention, "shots continued
but more on us. We thought they were completing people, but unfortunately we couldn't do
anything.
Mr. B. B. You ask him the question when you auditionnerez it. For my part, I know that he
announced on-air that he will enter the Bataclan. It pulls, then spring. It is then that we have
entered in our turn with him inside.
The rapporteur. All this is happening so long before the arrival of the bis? When precisely?
Mr. B. B. I don't have exact timestamp, but I can try to trace the sequence of events. I am, as
what I am concerned with my assistant. It is only from the shots that take place rue la Fontaine le-Roi that we understand that we are dealing with a multi-site attack. Prior to this, the
concomitance between what happened at the Stade de France and rue Bichat may still be only a
coincidence.
We therefore leave towards rue de la Fontaine - le-ROI. Along the way we hear on-air shots to
be held at the Bataclan. Then we turn away towards the Bataclan, we guarantee good distance to
avoid the shots. Moving carefully along the sidewalk, we fall a victim very seriously injured. We
manage it, which takes time - too much time, I would say with hindsight.
We are then boulevard Voltaire, about 30 meters from the entrance of the Bataclan, but it is
night and the caf terraces that lie in the interval prevent us from see the entry. It was then that I

hear the radio message from the Commissioner announcing his entry into the Hall: I remember
accurately, because I could not help thinking that he was insane.
After having entrusted our victim relief, we got back our progress. I then saw the Commissioner
v. P., who had to arrive on the scene while I managed my victim. so, I think that it was in contact
with the Commissioner of the tray before me.
At that time there was absolute silence. We entered the Bataclan and we started to evacuate the
first victims we could access. If we knew that one of the terrorists had been neutralized, we were
unaware of whereabouts of the other and we feared they are ambushed, waiting for our approach
to us. This is when FIR arrived and, gradually, the device was packed.
The rapporteur. Can you specify what time you entered the Bataclan ?
Were the victims you have evacuated before the arrival of the bis in the room where you
inadvertently wipe the firing of terrorists?
Mr. B. B. When we penetrate the Bataclan, the room is silent. All, we remain stunned a few
tenths of a second before the accumulation of bloody bodies among which entangle dozens dead,
the wounded and those who pretend to be dead. Unaware of where the surviving terrorists, we
are trying to protect us and to analyse the situation, but quickly realize that, among the mass of
body are living, that move or groan. We therefore organize with some police equipped with
shields.
The rapporteur. How much were you?
Mr. B. B. Not very many. Perhaps a decade to enter the room first. I know that we were five
members of the CSI 75, to which must be added the seven members of the BAC N as well as
three or four peacekeepers of the borough, either in total between fifteen and twenty.
We fired the first injured that we have seen to our sheltered area, then we have evacuated them to
the corner Voltaire-Oberkampf, because relief were not admitted in the immediate perimeter
deemed too dangerous. As we have no means of escape, we used the Vauban barriers as
stretchers.
Mrs. c. P. I believe my time of arrival at the Bataclan around 22 hours. Around 21:45, I was in
telephone contact with my boss - the famous Commissioner that entered the Bataclan - and
therefore I progresses very quickly, knowing that it is inside the building and needs
reinforcements. We arrive at five: three civilian employees of Lac 75N, my driver and myself.
We stop the vehicle upstream Oberkampf and move forward on foot along the buildings. We
cross wounded, pedestrians who have not yet understood what was happening and who are being
asked to get out quickly. It's also on the Bataclan employees who will make us a diagram of the
outputs of relief and the site because, at this time, we do not yet have the establishment plan.
I find my head and his teammate before the input sas where several corpses. We strive to
understand where are past the hostile, which we have no idea. It was then that we will have a

first Visual of what we believe to be one of the terrorists, overview at the level of one of the
Central Windows on the first floor. We learn later that some hostages had been positioned at the
level of the windows, and we finally never know if it was a terrorist.
The rapporteur. When you arrive at the Bataclan around 10 p.m., you use you to evacuate the
victims pending the arrival of the bis. When it arrives on the scene, one of you him render
account of the situation? Notify it you that you have spotted terrorists on the floor?
Mrs. c. P. We have no certainty that the man seen on the first floor is a hostile.
At the time when we are in contact with the authorities of the national police (FNIF) intervention
Force - as were also present authorities RAID-, we give them the information we have. We are
trained for this and know to manage this type of situation without difficulty.
The President Georges Fenech. You therefore get the first victims to put away well before the
attack, which occurred at 0:18. Are you assisted by other emergency services?
M. T. D., police Commissioner. I personally spent the evening in the Saint-Pierre-Amelot
passage, which gives the back door of the Bataclan. When I arrive on the site of the Bataclan,
around 22:10, after passing the Voltaire counter where one of the terrorists comes to explode, the
police presence outside the main entrance is very important. So, I decide to ride up to the passage
of Saint-Pierre-Amelot, where I found several police units which are spontaneously at my
disposal because I carry my grade on my tactical vest. From there, we perform recognition
pedestrian passage to the rear of the Bataclangate, where we are going to be required by passersby, to us in a residence where took refuge, in public areas, on the floors, fifty-two spectators
injured and twenty-six bullet wounds.
Let us call the firefighters. They don't come to us because the sector is not secure, and I have
therefore leave on foot until the PC security, where I ask to a captain of the firefighters to release
me some of its workforce in response reserve to enter the Bataclan at the time of the assault.
Twenty firefighters will be sent to me: they are going to recover, under the fire support of the
staff that I have placed about 20 meters from the rear exit of the Bataclan, the twenty-six injured,
who are all saved.
A few minutes after this intervention, I ask the column that I order to accompany me for
recognition, to the rear door of the Bataclan. It is at this time that we will see, inside the
building, a hostage, hands in the air - the terrorists probably being behind his back. We
communicate with this human shield by looks, which we report to the bis.
The rapporteur. The half of staff who are on place before the arrival of the bis has received
policy not to intervene in the floors looking for terrorists?
What was your role once the bis has arrived? Were you asked to identify the Bataclan ?
Mr. B. B. When the bis arrived, it grew to the mezzanine. Therefore, we had no reason to win at
our tour the first floor. The RAID, arrived a little later was deployed to the back of the room,

while BAC 75N sent a column of intervention to an area that was searched by the RAID, nor by
the bis. All these manWorks are organized in reality in real time.
The rapporteur. During the 20 minutes that preceded the arrival of bis, are you acting on set or
on your own initiative, and, in this case, one of you takes the leadership of the Group?
Mr. B. B. Before his arrival, the bis disclose us no setpoint. It takes time so that we can find and
communicate with each other. Each therefore manages the situation in instinct. The firing ceased,
we had no interest in investing scene with the risk of revive them. With the reinforcement of
territorial colleagues who have joined us, we therefore proceeded to the evacuation of the
wounded, while the BRI, arrived in the meantime, began to isolate access to the places where the
terrorists were.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Beyond the initial moments of doubt about the nature of what is happening
and past the first stunning effect - which leads me also to pay tribute to the action and the various
initiatives of each and the other in this operation - how things are over the minutes? How are
they coordinated? Who takes the operations Steering? In principle, it is the Commander of the
bis, when it stands on the spot, to take command of the operations: how reflects it on the
situation?
I understand that it you took, in crisis situations, Act and react, but how is is precisely articulated
device? What orders you received some and others, and from what time?
It is also extremely difficult to react well in these situations if it has not been prepared for crisis
management. Do you, after the attacks of January, made of framework exercises or in situ to
prepare for various types of scenarios? What happened on November 13 was part of the
scenarios or was it for you to an unprecedented situation?
M. S. Q. It was difficult to predict an attack multi-site as of November 13, but the
Commissioners, officers and the DSPAP team leaders who participated, as was my case,
management of the attacks of January 2015 exchanged experience returns accompanied by
debriefing on the role of each and the difficulties encountered. This has been greatly helpful.
With regard to the Organization of the operations at the Bataclan, the device has gradually
mounted power with the arrival of local staff who came in support of Commissioner B.B. and the
present Commissioner of tray 75 on-site crews.
For my part, I said that, after having given my instructions to dispatch on-site every available
crew, I joined the Bataclan to 22 h 35. I found other Commissioners, including D. K. and Cyril
Lacombe, the 3e district. Our mission will be to organize a security perimeter perfectly sealed in
order to avoid the risk of surattentat or the intrusion of unwanted people - journalists or
photographers. We also organize relief.
Coordination is at the as, with the arrival on site of the authorities - the prefect of police, the
Director of the DSPAP, the Director of the PJ. Two points of command is put in place, one at the
corner Oberkampf-Voltaire, where the above-mentioned persons, the other inside the Bataclan,

which operate the bis and the police of the SDSS's our direction. Radio links are established with
the headquarters of the bis installed in a nearby cafe, the barometer.
The chain of command goes so gradually and works perfectly to 22.30, knowing that we have
understood that it was a terrorist attack to 9:40 p.m. and that one Friday evening, staff are not all
to their position.
Mr. B. B. When we relate retrospectively the succession of events minute by minute on the five
or six scenes of bombing, tends to avoid anything that has infested the transmission of the
information at the time of the facts. Indeed, dozens injured by bullets have fled and collapsed a
few hundred metres further on, where people have called the police, which has maintained the
confusion on the number of sites affected, who might well have been 30. In these conditions,
organize the chain of command was extremely complex.
In regards to the exercises, on 4 November, the SDSS, which brings together the CSI and BAC
N, had organized an exercise which the scenario as follows: three individuals come from Lyon
Station in a vehicle, alighting, shoot the Kalashnikov on travellers, before escaping in the
direction of Crteil. On the way, they stop before a college there return home, pull on all the
young people that they are, then hide in a classroom with 15 students hostage, asking that the
France would withdraw from its overseas operations. The exercise took place in real conditions,
stakeholders officials being on patrol on the highway without knowing in advance the scenario.
It is obviously regrettable that this exercise had to be organized on our own initiative and that we
have therefore struggled to ride, but it testifies to awareness by the services of the priority issues.
The President Georges Fenech. The rapporteur and myself are extremely surprised by your
testimony, because before your hearing, nor the bis or nobody has mentioned your presence. We
thought that, after the intervention of Commissioner of the BAC, who shot one of the terrorists,
the firing had ceased and that it was more nothing happened until the arrival of the bis. We hope
to see more clearly that you accompany the commission which must surrender Thursday
morning at the Bataclan.
Mr. B. B. Indeed, looking at coverage of the hearing of victims, it seemed to me that they had
the feeling that nothing had been done before the arrival of the bis, which can be explained by
the post-traumatic State in which they were located.
We others, Commissioners, are trained, as managers, to make 'beautiful things' and act as we
have done. But I think these young guardians of peace of the territorial management of Paris or
of the SDSS, aged for 20 years, that I myself would find it difficult to identify today. They
brought to the dying and the dying fire. Dozens of people have been saved thanks to these small
hands, and I wanted to what are reminded.
M. Christophe Cavard. You confirm that the first of you to have entered the Bataclan before
the arrival of the bis have done so on their own initiative?

What information do you have then on the terrorists who are indoors? Do you know their
number, know you what weapons they have and if they are equipped with explosives?
It appears from our hearings that, on 13 November, security forces have privileged action on
reflection. We can only thank you, but our role is also to ask ourselves about the protocols
applicable in this type of situation.
It furthermore much was said that some of the hostages had been able to communicate with the
outside world, particularly with the forces of order, through their mobile phones. Were you one
of those people who have been in contact with them and, if so, that you have said?
Mrs. c. P. You must know that, when entering the Bataclan, we all had the same operational
reflex consisting of cutting our radios to not make us identify. Therefore, we had more contact
with the outside.
On the other hand, we come into contact in the sas of entry with one of the victims managed to
escape in the first minutes crawling on the outside. It is a police Commissioner, who
immediately informs us that terrorists are three or four, and they are armed with Kalashnikovs.
The other victims, as they are in State of shock and unable to teach us anything.
In regard to our Organization, work us for several years at the SDSS in Protocol bis - BAC, as
well as with the RAID on the other departments of the DSPAP. This means that we have the
habit of interoperability, we know when the bis will happen, what she will need and how will be
the relay. Some officials of the BAC 75N are formed by the bis, and we have equipment more
suited to this type of situation, i.e. the ballistic protections and higher level armaments. What is
my personal case, my head is on place tonight: so I have to follow.
Mr. B. B. Somehow, it is indeed the Commissioner of BAC 75 that we paved the way. I will
never forget what he told me emerging from the Bataclan : the terrorist on the scene, putting in
plays someone himself and teammate who take their weapon, targeted and pull; the terrorist who
falls to the ground, grows a rattle and blew up causing a cloud of 'confetti '... It is how I have
understood that the terrorists were wearing belts of explosives.
Then, play the power of the collective, which is that one feels stronger. It is likely that, alone,
none of us would have dared to go there. But given the urgency, each must take its
responsibilities and act without having the time to ask for permission. It is an individual decision.
M. Christophe Cavard. Do you think it is now as well as consider the response: tethering is to
Protocol and without waiting for the units, but in seeking immediate action? What would happen
with less well trained than your own units?
M. S. Q. We have no choice. We are police, and we must intervene. It is a normal and natural,
obligation provided that it be framed by rules of intervention, in particular as regards security. It
was necessary to penetrate the Bataclan. This is what made the Commissioner of BAC 75N, in
its own way, and we were, in any case, provide assistance to the victims.

Protocols are what they are. The SDSS has more sophisticated equipment, which is normal
because its members are more exposed that general service officers, although these police
officers rescue, are sometimes the most exposed, since they focus on situations of which they are
unaware. It is that in this case it is the SDSS that was primo-intervener. But, in my opinion, the
problem you raise does not arise. What image would have in the population a font which does
not intervene?
Ms. Anne-Yvonne Le Dain j.. First of all, I would like to know how you go, you and your
troops? How have you handled the situation in the days immediately following the attacks? How
is are made the debriefings? Did they concern that all of the troops or officers? What have been
your dealings with your hierarchy?
How, then, are you preparing other attacks?
Finally, I would like to thank you and the staff that you frame. those who went to the battle
brought the wounded, have faced fire. I measure the test that it could be.
M. D. K., Divisional Commissioner. It is the first responders that evening were members of a
crew of the 3e district who performed surgery on a hardware traffic accident in the sector of the
Filles-du-Calvaire, i.e. just off the Bataclan. Hailed by a security officer of the Hall which
warned them that fire took place, these three young peacekeepers, among whom was a trainee
with six months ' seniority, rushed to the Bataclan, which they had to look for the address on
their personal phones, because they did not know this room which is not located in thee District
3. Arrived during the shooting, helpless, they had to await the arrival of reinforcements. I stress
this, because it is important to note that were also before the Bataclan tonight of the largely poor
police to what was happening.
For my part, I have been warned at 2150 and got there at 10:30 pm, in the company of my
assistant, Cyril Lacombe. We split the roles in a quite natural way: it is busy traffic, because
firefighters blocked the rue Oberkampf and that it was necessary to release access to the
intervention of other emergency vehicles; I am first concerned to know if my guys - seven in
total - were not injured. My peacekeepers are occupied to cardiac massages, tourniquets on
individuals dying, which are, moreover, all died in the minutes that followed. They were then
transported alive victims to the corner of the boulevard Voltaire and rue Oberkampf where the
firefighters were. I lent their assistance, then we got into the room, too ask question without
seeking permission from the hierarchy, to recover others wounded.
M. S. Q. We entered the room after we were informed that the bis had secured the ground floor.
M. D. K. Rest that a sort of effect "tunnel", it does not landed lots of questions and we evacuated
the victims that we were, one after the other, to lead them to the fire.
When the operations have been completed, I met with my team in my office, about five or six
o'clock in the morning, and we have made a first debriefing hot, during which everyone was able
to share his feelings and what he had lived. My guys were very marked, covered with blood and

human remains. They had perceptions - sound, Visual, olfactory event - quite different but
apocalyptic.
I then organised, on Monday at ten o'clock, with two operational psychological support Service
(SSPO) specialists, a session focused more on the emotional backlash. We learned a lot on the
various phases of stress, anxiety and nightmares in which we were supposed to go.
There was also of other operational debriefings, in which we have put radio bands, to analyze the
workflow and improve what could be.
We are also conducting exercises and are thinking about a bombing exercise enabling us to work
our responsiveness and our reflexes.
M. S. Q. I would add that we organize in many boroughs of simulations on cards, so as to
prevent movement of panic in the population. These simulations are conducted without
commitment of civil servants, but in coordination with the firefighters to prepare for joint
operations.
I also specifies that all the Commissioners present at the Bataclan brought their teams at dawn.
We all returned work Saturday, November 14, all day, to talk and to exchange with each other.
The prefecture of police finally mobilized psychologists from different backgrounds so that they
are present at our side throughout the week that followed. This listening did much good, in
particular in my district where many officials lived successively attacks against Charlie Hebdo,
theHypercacher, then the attacks of November 13 - 2015 has been for them a year difficult.
M. Olivier Falorni. Is measured and you heard what have been self-denial and courage of police
forces. I would like to pay tribute to them. Your hearing is all the more important in that it allows
us to measure the work you have done between the intervention of the Commissioner of the BAC
and the arrival of the bis.
You have spoken about fifteen stakeholders who have entered relatively quickly in the Bataclan :
was it an "amalgam" officials belonging to different units and how this amalgam is made? Was it
spontaneous?
Did you all have the same level of training and what equipment did you have? The bis form you
to intervene in this type of situation?
The President Georges Fenech. If I understood your words, you are not made to go in contact
with terrorists, but to secure the premises and save lives. It is to the bis onus to neutralize the
terrorists.
Mr. B. B. Amalgam has been quite naturally, because we have a common professional culture.
The SDSS units, which are units of reinforcement and support, work daily with the part # DTI
units. We readily identify the field through our uniforms, our crests or our vehicles. Whether it's
a crime, a crime of common law or attacks, we have the reflex to work together.

With regard to our equipment, they are a little different. The SDSS units had that evening of
heavy bullet-proof vests, as some of the part # DTI officials.
With respect to training, the bis ensures indeed some, but the technicality of the SDSS is not
based on these some formations.
M. Olivier Falorni. And what weapons did you have?
Mr. B. B. The CSI 75 is based boulevard Bessires, door of Saint-Ouen. Leaving the boulevard
Bessires to rue la Fontaine - le-Roi - Bataclan had not yet been attacked-, I went to the Armory
recover my weapon. I there met civilian officials of the BAC 75N who I learned what was
happening. They are therefore equipped with accordingly, including a shotgun.
Mrs. c. P. Our priority has been to equip Lac 75N column which needed long guns. The first
crew was composed of three civilians, who are equipped with conventional bulletproof vests as
well as a shotgun; my driver and myself, as well as the Chief and his team-mate, had also the
classic equipment - vests and handgun.
We had also two heavy vests in the vehicle, which is not enough for seven, knowing that these
vests may have a psychological effect reassuring, but they protect not caliber bullets 7.62 drawn
by the Kalashnikov. So far, this type of ballistic protective equipment was reserved for the
intervention units, but it is changing.
Anxious to arrive as soon as possible at the Bataclan which was one of our crews, we have
probably made the mistake not to complete the equipment in vehicles. We have particular
helmets we have not taken this evening there.
Mr. B. B. I would point out that, if some headsets stop the bullet impact, the kinetics is such that
it can cause rupture of the cervical deadly.
I would also add that just tell the Commissioner C. P. that one of the trinomials of the CSI was
also equipped with a ballistic shield and helmet, but without bullet-proof visors. For my part, I
wore a heavy vest, which was not the case of my assistant because, between January and
November, our service has been remove thirty heavy vests reformed for failure, but which have
never been replaced. He therefore had to borrow hers to a peacekeeper who asked therefore to
leave the inside of the Bataclan.
M. Christophe Cavard. I am one of those who believe, in the light of what has past on 13
November, that we are going to change our response procedures, and it seems to me that I can
infer from your comments that protocols that include securing and negotiating phases are
exceeded.
The rapporteur. Your hearing is important because it allows us to fill holes in the unwound
operations and to have an overview of your work, I would like to acknowledge here.

I would like to know if you are coordinated with the military of the Sentinel operation, some of
which were located at the rear of the building.
How then - and I am sorry to come back - has been the link with the bis? Which one of you
spoke personally with one of its members? Do you have them transmitted to information?
From 22 h 20 Finally, time at which the bis enters the Bataclan, you stop to evacuate the
wounded? Otherwise, how was the link with Professor saffron, the doctor of the bis, which was
the task of coordinating the evacuation of the wounded?
The President Georges Fenech. Have you had direct contact with Commissioner McMahon?
M. S. Q. The link with the Commissioners of the bis was naturally since we were at their contact
to, and then inside the Bataclan.
We provisions of technical guidance on their modus operandi as well as information on obstacles
that could meet the police forces, but this has not prevented us to continue the evacuation of the
wounded, to the extent possible, until 0:15, where we asked to leave the Bataclan, because the
assault would be given.
Mr. B. B. I have personally not spoken to Christophe Molmy, because I saw the Commissioner
of BAC 75N him talking.
The rapporteur. You confirm that the Commissioner who spoke first at the Bataclan had an
Exchange about 22:20 with the head of the bis?
Mr. B. B. This is what I remembered, but the Commissioner C. P. seems to think that it was
rather the captain who ran the FIR. It is possible. Whatever it is, as a privileged witness of the
intervention of the bis, I honestly found this particularly successful intervention. When the FIR
arrived, she has not procrastinated, without hiding behind such or such pretext for not
intervening before the arrival of the reinforcements. It is to his credit.
M. S. Q. For my part, I believe that the coordination between the different units occurred
gradually quite natural and effective manner, taking into account the difficulties related to the
context and the staggering number of casualties.
With the on-site presence of the prefect of police, the Director of the PJ, in contact with the bis,
the Director of the DSPAP, the Director of the part # DTI and myself, the chain of command was
in place.
Querying us much about the State of this coordination in the first moments of the intervention,
but the question seems not so fundamental to me. The key is that the ITUC and the bis are made,
the CSI in primo-intervener, the bis support, and I believe that we can only welcome the results
achieved.

The rapporteur. Our intention is not to fault anyone. We simply seek to trace the chronology of
events, and it is important from our point of view to know if there was contact between the bis
upon arrival and you, which you find on place for 20 minutes. On this point, the information we
have had are not those that you give us. I would like you to confirm that the Lac 75N
Commissioner who shot dead one of the terrorists had contact, to 22 h 20 or 22 h 25, with one of
the leaders of the bis.
Mr. B. B. Yes. It was in my opinion either of FIR, either Commissioner McMahon's captain.
The rapporteur. After 22 h 20, at the time where the bis enters the room to make progress
towards the floors from 23 hours, you continue to evacuate the wounded? We were told that a
first wave of hostages had been evacuated to 22 h 35 or 10:40 p.m. on the instruction of the bis,
but that the bulk of the wounded had been evacuated after the final assault, i.e. after 0 h 18. You
say, you, that, until 0:15, you have pursued the evacuation.
Mr. B. B. That is correct.
The rapporteur. Was there not a risk that one it pulls you from the balconies? How have you
assessed this risk?
Mrs. c. P. There were two contacts between the DSPAP and the bis, I stated with certainty. My
boss, the Commissioner who has shot and killed one of the terrorists, has been in contact with the
head of the FIR - I do not know if he had the rank of captain or Commander-, who immediately
fell at its level to position itself within the Bataclan.
For my part, I have a contact with the head of the bis, at the level of the rue Oberkampf. I put at
its disposal the BAC N column that had just arrived. Subsequently we are committed behind the
bis, by staying on the ground floor of the Bataclan.
On the management of the injured there was a brief moment of floating with the medical team of
the first...
The President Georges Fenech. But the FNIF has not been triggered! Moreover, it is not a
minor detail.
Mrs. c. P. There were on-site bis physician and the physician of the RAID - it is in this sense
that I used the term.
M. D. K. The RAID and the bis - BAC are units that constitute the FNIF, even if it was not
triggered.
The evacuation of the victims began shortly after 10 p.m. and continued until past midnight. We
were even more aware that the area was not secure that one of the members of the bis warned to
me, at some point, that we were in the axis of the terrorist shooting.

Mrs. c. P. In my memories, Professor saffron, we saw at the very beginning, was, it seems, most
prominent in the room. I had for my part to my side a doctor - probably the RAID - which has
helped us to organize the extraction of the wounded. Our colleagues equipped with heavy would
seek the wounded into the pit or in the corridors to the sas of entry, where we strive, though
vainly, to organize a stream that does not interfere with columns of assault being set in place.
The President Georges Fenech. You have somehow acts as emergency service, but who gave
permission to relief from entering this area services?
Mr. B. B. After the assault, there was a kind of consensus.
That can receive on my radio waves of the bis, I had knowledge of the end of the assault, which I
have warned a fire brigade officer who stood at my side, so that it can be worn with the
wounded.
After using the Vauban barriers to transport them, we had ended up getting stretchers, which
were stored in the sas of entry of the Bataclan, where two or three doctors on the RAID or the
bis and probably Dr. Safran, performed a presorting, whereupon we wore the stretchers to
Oberkampf Street, where the first advanced medical post (PMA) was installed in the Court
building which is unfortunately quickly became too small.
We were thus able to save dozens of people, but it would be interesting to know the number of
deaths between the fifteenth minute - before which all deaths that occur are unfortunately, from a
forensic point of view, almost inevitable - and the sixtieth minute that followed the attack. This
would probably help advance in first operational aid, by improving early care.
The President Georges Fenech. You talk about consensus, but can't imagine a device with a
single command? It is in all the lives that are at stake in this type of situation.
Mr. B. B. It is certainly improved, but I note that on November 13, with a situation much more
degraded than in January, the national police has proved more efficient. We have made progress,
and we will be even better the next time. During our debriefings with the bis, we are particularly
committed to establish quick contact, from the first moment.
As regards to the soldiers of the Sentinel operation, at any given time, a policeman asked over
the radio authorization to use the services of a member who was with him facing one of terrorists
who pulled him over, leave which was denied by the staff. This is a wrong question calling a
wrong answer. The staff should not have refused, but when one gets shot, it does not require
authorization to retaliate. This is part of the kind of inhibitions that generates the system.
M. S. Q. I said that at the moment the bis informs us by radio that the terrorist commando has
been undermined - I find myself then beside the prefect-, it runs a few seconds before that
firefighters come to the rescue of the wounded, with the authorization of their superiors, and then
take over from the police. Everything flows fluidly.

Mr G. P., Commissioner of police, night of the Hauts-de-Seine bin. Lac 92N unit was
engaged on order. Around 10 p.m., I received my classroom instruction command to attend
Bastille. At Bastille, I received from the command room Parisian instruction to direct me to
Republic, where I'll never stopped by traffic and emergency vehicles. That is how I ended up
with Commissioner Didier at the rear of the Bataclan, where we were able to intervene to assist
firefighters and retrieve the wounded.
M. J. M., Commissioner of police, central Commissioner of the 10e district. I found myself in
the 10e district on the site of the first Paris bombing, which took place at the corner of rue Bichat
and rue Alibert, where terrorists fired on the terraces of Carillon and Little Cambodia, many
deaths and many injured. I stayed there from 21:45 to 4 h 40, somehow cut off from the world,
concentrating on protection traces and indices - 7.62 mm Kalashnikov Chargers and many
Sockets were scattered to the ground. It was a place hardly defensible, because the intersection
has the shape of a five-pointed star, and the prefect of police, already on scene at my arrival, I
was asked to secure the premises on a priority basis. My main task was to avoid a surattentat and
to facilitate the work of firefighters and SAMU. If, in hindsight, this mission seems quite simple
compared with what clashed with our colleagues at the Bataclan, it nevertheless required
coordination between different types of units, including units of the ITUC.
Thank you, Mrs Le Dain, you worry about the morale of the troops. They are much better, thanks
to the valuable assistance given to us by the SSPO, in the days that followed. Psychologists were
very available, involved the night for night shifts. The work they did was essential to allow our
colleagues to integrate the extraordinary events in the truest sense of the word - they had
experienced and that they still speak with emotion not feigned.
E

District 10 staff obviously felt things very special way, insofar as they sometimes work in this
district for many years - 25 years for some. Before a such slaughter, they met all the more deeply
they have this arrondissement in the skin. They know the merchants and residents, the
associative and socio-cultural fabric.
Our intervention is made without bis or the RAID because the situation did not, it our 'crime
scene' being frozen. Our staff have worked with the greatest possible serenity and they avoided
dramas - I think among other idiots or imbalances that arose to them suggesting that they were
carrying weapons or explosives. The stress had undergone officials could lead to burrs, which are
not produced through the coolness of all these colleagues to whom I want to pay tribute.
M. F. v., Divisional Commissioner. For my part, I had the charge of the perimeter security on
the site of La Belle quipe, the Charonne Street. Soldiers of the Sentinel operation is are
available to me since my arrival on the scene and helped seal the security perimeter. Their
structures and their modes of intervention are different from ours, but they were able to adapt. I
had made sure to place soldiers almost on every point of traffic around the perimeter, and their
presence has been enough deterrent, including against journalists.
Mr. j. M. I have also resorted to the military on the securing points and thank them.

Ms. V. G., Divisional Commissioner. Forty-three of my officials, attached to the station from
18e district spoke about the events of November 13, scattered everywhere, except around the
Stade de France. I am myself of 9.30 pm to 4 o'clock in the morning rue la Fontaine - le-Roi,
who was not at the place where I would have had to happen, because I had to make me rue
Bichat. It is by chance that I found myself at this place, where some staff were already involved
with firefighters who provided first aid to the victims of the Good beerbar, while it was
necessary to ensure security of the restaurant Casa Nostra, in which many witnesses said that a
terrorist was cut off.
It is an operation that took awhile and before you can involve support operational (GSO) and the
RAID group, it took firefighters can evacuate victims. I was struck by the fact that the captain of
the firefighters had no doctor at his side. Therefore could not make no stabilization as it is
customary practice on the spot, evacuating the wounded to the hospitals directly.
The device was very vulnerable, and stakeholder colleagues, including many young people who
had never seen a single corpse of their lives, proved to be very brave. I was so immediately
concerned to protect the rear bases, the information broadcast on the left think that there could be
terrorists in the subway and that another attack was possible.
I acted without intermediate hierarchy, with the exception of a commander who arrived later in
the night. This has complicated command ultimately rather extensive on-site procedures.
At one point, I was notified by the Red Cross that a quarantine of traumatized people fled to the
Ice Palace, a few hundred metres. It therefore took me run right and left, to check a suspicious
vehicle and a suspicious package in the basket of a Velib'.
We have not seen by journalists, and nobody told us the next day in the media, which surprised
most of my staff.
As all our colleagues, we proceeded to the debriefings and mounted the psychological support
cells. I have conducted individual interviews with some 20 staff members among more shocked.
The trauma is often several days to return to the surface, and I thought that the number of sick
might be important: nobody stopped, and if we had to start over the following days, they
returned.
We got these last time equipment extra. We have also distributed fact sheets 'Reflexes attacks.
Experience feedback have been organised, including a meeting at which all the Commissioners
of the DSPAP were debriefed by the RAID and the bis for two hours. We learned a lot, and this
allowed us to convey to our troops of the helpful advice.
With regard to risk taking, it can never prevent a peacekeeper, an officer or a Commissioner to
forge ahead if there are injuries. The risk is part of our work. Account held nevertheless risks that
were taken on 13 November, I consider that it is a miracle that no police officer has been injured
or killed.

In the case of a nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical (CBRN) attack, we may however
be in a bad position because we do not yet have established protocol. This does not prevent
troops declare themselves ready to go, with the understanding that when you leave in operation,
it is not always for what type of situation they will be confronted.
M. S. Q. You have strongly emphasized the question of command. I failed you clarified the role
of the command of the DSPAP, the SIC 750 room, in the conduct of the facts. She played a lead
role throughout the operations since the Commissioners present on-site him reported
continuously and systematically on all events. This has contributed to the dissemination of
information from the committed police, but it has also allowed to pass orders. SIC 750 speaks on
behalf of the Director and, throughout the evening, the chain of command was able to operate,
despite sometimes the difficulties inherent in the lack of information.
M. T. D. I would like to finally pay tribute to the courage and dedication of the staff which
began spontaneously at my disposal unless I know them, 22 h in the morning. They came to 95,
92, 93 and Paris, including civil column of the BAC 75N. They behaved with exemplary at a
time where we had to act in the greater uncertainty. Indeed, when we engage in the Saint-PierreAmelot passage, the strength of police accompanying me do not know where the shooters.
Should therefore have a certain courage to enter. And I wish to commend them for this.
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, it remains for me to thank you for
lighting that you have brought us.
Round table, open to the press, devoted to support for the victims of the attacks by the year 2015
by the brigade of firefighters of Paris (BSPP) and medical assistance service urgent (UAS):
general Philippe Boutinaud, commanding the BSPP, Professor Jean-Pierre Tourtier, Chief Medical
Officer of the BSPP, surgeon Michel Bignand, colonel Jean-Claude Gallet, Deputy to the
e
commanding general of the BSPP, colonel Grard Boutolleau Head of the 2 groupemement fire
and rescue and commanding officer of relief at the Bataclan, Professor Pierre Carli, medical
director of SAMU de Paris, head of Department at the Department of anaesthesia and
resuscitation of the hospital Necker-Enfants-Malades, Professor Frdric Adnet, Director of SAMU
93, head of the Center home-emergencies-imagery of the hospital Avicenne, Dr Franois Braun,
president of the SAMU emergency of France, head of emergency medicine, Dr. Yves Lambert,
head of the pole of the urgency, Director of SAMU 78, Dr. Valerie Charlotte Chollet - Xemard UAS
94 at hospital Henri-Mondor hospital practitioner
Report of the round table, open to the press, Wednesday, March 16, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, Madam, thank you for having responded to the
request forudition of this commission of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat
terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We wanted to start by hearing the victims who have obviously right to the attention of national
representation. We continue our series of hearings with you in we interesting today to their
support, as we have done on 29 February in receiving the Director general of the health service
of the armies and the Director-general of public welfare from Paris.
I am pleased to welcome today NSWFB of Paris (BSPP) officials: general Philippe Boutinaud,
commanding the BSPP, accompanied by Professor Jean-Pierre Tourtier, Chief Medical Officer

of the BSPP, the surgeon Michel Bignand, the colonel Jean-Claude Gallet, Deputy to the
commanding general of the BSPP and colonel Grald Boutolleau, head of the 2e Groupement of
fire and rescue Commander of relief at the Bataclan. I said that the BSPP, strong of 8 500
officers, ranks and Sappers is placed for employment under the authority of the prefect of police
of Paris, and that it has jurisdiction, in addition to Paris, in the 124 communes of the departments
of Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne.
We receive also the Service of emergency medical (services EMS) officials: Professor Pierre
Carli, medical director of the SAMU de Paris, head of Department at the Department of
anaesthesia and resuscitation of the University Hospital Necker-Enfants-Malades, president of
the national Council of the emergency hospital, accompanied by Professor Frdric Adnet,
Director of SAMU 93, responsible pole home-emergencies-imagery of the University Hospital
Paris Seine-Saint-Denis Avicenne Bobigny, Dr Franois Braun president of the SAMU
emergency of France, head of emergency medicine, the doctor Yves Lambert, head of the pole of
the emergency, Director the UAS of Yvelines and Dr. Valerie-Charlotte Chaudhuri - Xemard,
SAMU 94 at hospital Henri-Mondor hospital practitioner. I would point out that the UAS, public
service deal with emergencies outside the hospital, is able to support patients in the most serious
situations.
This roundtable is open to the press and is the subject of a live stream on the website of the
Assembly; registration will be available for a few months on the website. I would point out that
the commission may include in its report any part of the proceedings of the round table. We
decided that, in a manner General our hearings would be open to the press because we conduct
this investigation in a transparent manner.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of November 17, 1958, the
commissions of inquiry, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth.
Mr Philippe Boutinaud, Jean-Pierre Tourtier, Michel Bignand, Jean-Claude Gagnon, Grald
Boutolleau, Pierre Carli, Frdric Adnet, Franois Braun, Yves Lambert and Mrs Valrie
Charlotte Chaudhuri-Xemard successively take oath.
General Philippe Boutinaud, commanding officer of the Paris Fire Brigade. It is an honour
for me and for the officers who accompany me to be before you. For my part, it is the fourth time
in three months, that I have the opportunity to interact with parliamentarians, and I find it quite
beneficial.
I'm here because on November 13, I was the Commander of relief of Paris plaque and SaintDenis. It was but very complex relief operation that is considered by the professionals of the
french and foreign emergency as a success despite the immensity of the challenges. When there
are 130 dead, however should remain modest, and it is in this spirit that I approach this exchange
with you. Naturally, my first thoughts go to the victims and their loved ones, to which we believe
greatly because we saw with our own eyes this evening there.

I will present the general framework of the operation, the difficulties that we have encountered,
that I identify as factors of success, which is also friction forces, finally cooperation with the
other actors.
First the facts: this is the largest operation of relief in the French capital - at least by the number
of victims - since the World War II bombings. The last time that Paris has been hit by terrorist
attacks, it was about twenty years ago, at the Port-Royal RER station. On 13 November,
firefighters intervened simultaneously on seven different sites, which was never produced should keep it in mind. We were 'laid down' on two sites: the Stade de France and the 10e and 11e
districts. Of course, nothing to indicate us to twenty-two hours that we are going to restrict
ourselves to seven sites, which led us to take a number of precautionary measures to avoid to
overflow.
Forty minutes had elapsed between the first explosion, at 9: 19 p.m., and the fixing of the
terrorists in the Bataclan at 2200 hours. In the Parisian part, events have occurred within a very
limited square since less than four square kilometres. The terrorist acts of the Bataclan were the
last point but we constantly in mind that other strikes might occur.
All of the action of the emergency is established within a period of a little less than eight hours
since we started at 9: 20 pm and active operations ended at 5: 30 pm, being understood that all
evacuations have been completed well before 5: 30 pm.
You can divide our action in four successive phases. The first is a phase reaction, chaotic and it
is still in such circumstances; the best way to 'recover' is to have reflex actions and planned
measures. Clear: people call to firefighters, and systematically, it sends means to the addresses
indicated. This phase lasts, I have alluded, 40 minutes from the first strikes at the Stade de
France and the beginning of active operations at the Bataclan.
The second phase is to regain the initiative and stretches between 10 p.m. and the final assault at
the Bataclan between midnight and midnight and a half approximately.
The third phase is that of the concentration of efforts, because he shouldn't forget that while
things continue in Paris, I have a permanent concern: that of the 72 000 spectators who are at the
Stade de France.
The fourth and final phase is the return to normal because, from five o'clock in the morning, I
gave orders that at eight in the morning all the means of relief are reduced to 100%.
In total, at 4: 21 pm on November 14 balance sheet given to the prefect of police stood at 381
victims treated by Paris firefighters, divided in 124 deceased persons, 100 absolute emergencies,
157 relating emergency. Other victims have arisen spontaneously in hospitals.
The potential, I just mentioned, has been reduced to 100% at 8 o'clock on Saturday morning,
which means that all vectors had been completed again oxygen, in all that you can imagine as
pharmaceuticals for reanimation ambulances and vehicles of relief and assistance to victims
(FSEC).

About 500 firefighters of Paris intervened to which must be added the 200 who were in the chain
of command and support. Deployed 125 devices whose two were hit by bullets, just opposite the
Bataclan, one being rendered completely unusable. The first responders arrived, following sites,
between three and twelve minutes after the first call - twelve minutes for the Counter Voltaire
since it is the fifth hit site and that it was necessary to seek relief in a little more distant barracks,
the surrounding barracks being already mobilized. I recall that in France the relief are supposed
to arrive within 30 minutes. Therefore, we could hardly do better. This period relates to the first
responders who requested reinforcements.
The initial difficulty is, you can imagine what is happening, where, and who is against that...
Between 21 h 30 and 22 o'clock, we have received 700 calls. 21 hours 20 to 22 hours, we took
down 584 calls for conversations for an average of one minute and twenty seconds. The waiting
time was six to forty-nine seconds, excluding disk which tells you that your conversation will be
recorded, which lasts 20 seconds and that under the terms of the Act we are required to pass. One
person waited two minutes and fifty-five seconds before we give. I spoke with a framework for a
major French company of telephony: he told me that no other platform as ours, in France, was
able to meet one such flood of calls. We must add to this difficulty the large number of different
addresses that has been given to us: when things happen at the corner of several streets, you are
given several addresses; In addition, it happens that some people are so panicky that they give
you their home address.
With regard to the Stade de France, I immediately asked myself the question of whether to stop
the match and to evacuate the stadium. It is that I was already on the spot. I joined the staff and
an officer commanding relief operations (COS) - present, as the Director of medical rescue
(DSM), as soon as is organized an event bringing together more than 30,000 people - asked us
our instructions. We ask to tell the authorities located on place not to evacuate the stadium, since
we had at that moment the certainty that no explosion had taken place indoors. We also asked
that we play the game to the end in order to prevent any flow of people coming out before the
end. The prefect of Seine-Saint-Denis was on the spot with the President of the Republic and it is
at level that the decision has been made, decision which, it must be stressed, was considerably
used relief.
We had multiple reasons for leaving, each calling us to report one explosion, others one gunfight,
others still hostage.
Despite all the difficulties we have been facing, I think that it was a rescue operation successful,
because it was really hard to do better and, that being said, once again, I bow with respect the
sentence of the bereaved families.
I discern four success factors. The first was the anticipation. This is ten years, indeed, that we
share with our colleagues in other European cities, in particular those engaged in capitals. We
have learned the lessons of what was spent in Madrid, in London, in Bombay. Paris firefighters
had created the 'Red' plan, subsequently generalized to the whole France: designed in 1978, it
was designed to cope with large numbers of victims but at a single point. On the basis of lessons
learned with our Spanish and British colleagues, we noticed that if we were faced with several

simultaneous keystrokes, which has never happened and which took place for the first time on
November 13, the 'Red' plan wouldn't the correct answer.
Also, in 2005, we designed the 'Red Alpha' plan. There are in Paris and most of our colleagues in
major French cities are trying to adopt it. It allows to cope with several simultaneous strikes in
various places and to speed up the treatment of the victims.
We are so tailored to the threat, we follow what is happening elsewhere and observe how our
foreign colleagues react. However, in recent months, it was clear that multiplied the deadly
shootings. We worked well before the summer 2015. On 8 October, with the concurrence of the
prefect of police, Professor Tourtier and I went to see Professor Carli. Our reflections have led to
the Organization of an exercise on 13 November in the morning with all of the UAS.
The second success factor has been the organization. To the BSPP we collocated treatment
centre of the alert, which receives calls from applicants, the operational staff, which is our crisis
management, and medical coordination which is my part since I has more than sixty doctors in
the BSPP. This configuration has been defined in 2011 and works very well because when you
give an order or circulate a setpoint, simply open a door...
The command is very centralized. It is the Commander of relief operations, the Chief, that is me,
who gives the orders. Their performance, conduct field is not less than totally decentralized.
Once the priorities have been displayed, each centre that receives a start of relief knows where its
workforce must go and for what reason, the operation is being entrusted to the framework the
first arrived on the spot, who has any authority to take his radio and ask ways in strengthening. It
is the operational centre, which then sends him the resources he needs. This system is perfectly
ground, because the BSPP performs near 1 250 interventions per day.
We have also an operational staff at two levels. In immediate posture, the crisis of the BSPP
room turned on about 280 times per year, either very regularly - it has been, on 13 November, at
09: 25 pm. But the crisis can also be enabled in posture reinforced with a number of persons
housed on-site or nearby and who are on call, and while they have an hour and a half, all arrived
in forty minutes. We can therefore consider that 22 hours 10 all of the crisis of the BSPP room
was operational.
The third success factor has been the operational readiness. Our procedures are lapped due to
exercises we do every Saturday morning on themes relating to the attacks. We we also exercise, I
said, with the UAS and Paris in particular. Do not forget that the BSPP is a military unit: fortyfive of our sixty doctors have external operations (OPEX), and most of the officers of the
Brigade also participated in the OPEX. As a consequence, take into account injuries and act
under fire, this happened to us at all and is not likely to destabilize my frames.
The decisions taken were the fourth factor of success. Some are planned. Building applications,
for example, were designed to anticipate a rise, the risk that multiple sites would be hit. The
corresponding messages are pre-formatted and simply redact them for which we have no need,
messages that go much more quickly to send if we were to specify each time that need us. So we
asked immediately two columns of reinforcement-attack to the operational centre of the area of

defence and security of Paris, but also the assistance of helicopters where should evacuate
wounded, secondary evacuation outside the Paris region - we have not had need, so much the
better. In addition, civil security associations contest is planned. Between the attacks of January
and those of the month of November, we have indeed developed, with the Red Cross, the order
of Malta and the Civil Protection of Paris an agreement under the terms of which those
organizations immediately, send us in case of need, a liaison officer at the operations centre.
Approximately 22 hours 15 I had a representative from each of these associations, which allowed
us, through them, to send vectors of evacuation on the points where it was needed. Another
measure of anticipation is to be able to rely on Begin and Percy military hospital.
Alongside the planned decisions, there are driving decisions. Among the latter, we have passed
in an hour from seven to twenty-one ambulances of resuscitation. A resuscitation ambulance is a
small hospital on four wheels, with a doctor, a nurse and a driver. The BSPP must have six
online every day. There, on 13 November, we had seven because, occasionally, we may need to
carry out medical evacuation - it is we who, for example, take into account, at Villacoublay,
soldiers repatriated from a foreign mission. Dr. Bignand, here, offered me to remind doctors and
arm vehicles of relief and assistance to victims into ambulances of resuscitation. So, after an
hour, I had twenty-one vectors medical with each doctor, a nurse and a driver.
A second decision has played a lot in favor of the success of this operation: the baptism of the
field. I told you, we have received a large number of different addresses, and the idea was to give
a keyword for each site so we all speak the same language. About 10 p.m., 22 hours 10, I called
the operational center of area, talk with the Chief of staff to which I propose to give a name to
the various sites: 'Republic', " Bataclan " etc. So much for the BSPP and the prefecture of police;
I do not know if this idea has been taken up above.
On each site, I asked that it identifies a commander of relief operations, and that ensures the
presence of a Director of medical relief - what has been done.
Two decisions have also enabled us to regain the initiative calls on: we changed the welcome
message of the 18 and 112, to inform that due to the serious events that took place in the Paris
region, if the call was not urgent, it was recommended to postpone. This measure alone resulted
in the collapse of the number of calls. A little later, to 23 23 hours 15, we started to communicate
on Twitter and on Facebook and our message, of the same type, was relayed 29 000 times per
tweet and 39 000 times via Facebook - based specialists, it's good figures, showing a high
penetration rate.
All, of course, not much happened in the best of worlds: you must know, the families of the
victims need to know that there were forces of friction course concerning the victims, but also
relief.
The security problem. It is imperative to protect the relief. However we know not when we
arrive, if the terrorists are still in the vicinity. My men did not hesitate a single second to engage,
but they did sometimes at the risk of their lives. The police had done all she could but then again,
the first sites are covered, when you get to the third or fourth, it becomes difficult. Rest

everything ended well since there was no additional typing - but this, it knows that at the end of
the story.
The second difficulty is the identification of the Commander of police operations (COP), which
adds to the COS and the DSM. The COP is for us important because it is he who sets up the plan
'Red Alpha movement' (PRAC) that helps free the roads to bring relief and, especially, to free the
areas of evacuation of the wounded. It is therefore necessary to be able to immediately identify
the responsible officer. The prefecture of police is well aware, and I can assure you that decisions
have been taken since since November 13, during several operations, I have seen happen the
COP easily identifiable yellow tabard.
Secondly, external inquiries are time-consuming. I have received a lot of calls from people
seeking to know what was happening. However, when we order, is not the time to reply to
everyone. I am polite, therefore I have replied to everyone; but it is likely you demobilize at the
time where he must make a decision.
A last friction force is what I call false alerts from the top. Do not personally see a critique of the
media but, often, they report live from the information which lead to a 'high-level', whereupon
they call us to ask ourselves if we are aware, for example, of an attack at the gare du Nord. We
check: there is no attack at the gare du Nord. Ten minutes later: "my general, told us that there
are one hundred dead at the gare du Nord." However I am sure that nobody died in the gare du
Nord, since we sent firefighters to check. Where the interest to collocate processing centre of the
alert with the crisis room: we ask operators to interrogate people who possibly call on this
subject to find out where they are exactly, and whether or not they are wounded, whether or not
they see armed people. After five minutes, nobody had seen anything: everything was so that
rumors and these rumors came from the top. During the taking of hostages of theHypercacher, I
was then Commander second Brigade and present to the operational centre: they asked me five
times in the afternoon of relief for hostage who were not. However we are unable to leave the
relief on the basis of a rumor.
After referring to the forces of friction, I come to the cooperation with the other players what I
call excellent despite the difficulties.
First with the SAMU, with which we regularly and as a result we know. There are always of the
initial apprehension difficulties but I can assure you that coordination, that evening, worked and
for a simple reason: we had thought together, we were exercised together morning and night, at
the Bataclan, Professor Carli, Professor Tourtier - my Director medical relief - and I have all
three made the decision to evacuate the wounded coming and medicalize approximately 500
metres away. All access to the site were curly by police and only rue Oberkampf was usable.
The President Georges Fenech. You've made this decision all three?
General Philippe Boutinaud. Altogether. We were all three before the advanced medical post.
So we decided to evacuate the wounded to the rear because make them go forward would have
been to shift in the axis of shooting terrorists.

We use standardized digital information system (sine), which consists of a bar code printed on a
bracelet that is put around the wrist of the victims to identify them and ensure their follow-up
throughout the chain of support. All services of the State are not yet using this system but a
reflection is currently conducted at the Ministry of the Interior for its generalization nationally. If
I can assure to the prefect of police at 4: 30 pm I have 381 victims, it is because each has a
SINUS bracelet. Those who went spontaneously in hospitals without passing through the hands
of firefighters are also victims, but I do not have to post. Improvements in this area are not my
responsibility.
Then I have alluded, we have strengthened coordination with the authorized associations of civil
security. Remains, and told it them, to curb enthusiasm: you must send what is necessary there
where it is necessary, in order to keep the reserve. We will continue to organise exercises in this
sense.
What is our relationship with the police, on the list of guard, every day, binding elements are
identifiable and depart whenever it rings them to go to the Security Directorate's proximity to the
Paris metropolitan area (DSPAP), to the public order and traffic (DOPC) branch, the operational
center of area etc. In other words, these directions of the prefecture of police receive a firefighter
who is the correspondent of the centre - it is important for the police to know what are the
firefighters.
I return to the case of a journalist in the World who has taken refuge in a stairwell, and then in an
apartment on the fourth floor which was precisely in line with shooting of the exit of the
Bataclan. We got it seven times on the phone, and seven times we have explained to him - and to
the lady who was with him - that we couldn't reach him because he was in the exclusion zone.
We have not said to this reporter because he was injured by bullet, which is certainly painful, but
once someone takes two hours with a pressure dressing, we consider it as a relative urgency; his
sentence nor his anguish are diminished and this does not minimize the respect that I owe him.
But, I repeat, it was within the exclusion zone and it was very difficult to fetch. I was put
personally aware of the presence of the journalist in this place as the Commissioner of police
himself reported me - we thought at the outset, as there were two people, that there were two
journalists from the World. I tried, personally, to get involved in the passage, but the security
forces meant that it was not possible. I think that there are less than twenty metres between the
Bataclan emergency exit and the entrance porch of the building where was this Mr. I agree that
this case is part of those who are difficult to treat, but there is always this type. I don't know if
this example is well-chosen, but it looks like that of a wounded soldier between two trenches in
1916: you know it's there, there's sentencing, that it goes wrong, but so far - I return to the case
of the journalist-, can we afford the luxury of risking the lives of two or three people for trying to
enter the hall? It's complicated. And, anyway, the police is uncompromising on the buffer of the
exclusion zone. Can discuss but I think that the decision taken this evening there was good.
I mentioned the difficulty of protecting firefighters and that recognize the police, and I to do
them any grievance; but we were fortunate to have several soldiers operative "Sentinel",
including on the website of Charonne and the Bataclan, soldiers who are found to be quite
useful.

What have we done since? We proceeded to the psychological support of all Paris firefighters
who have spoken this evening there. There are victims, of course, but there are also men and
women that I order all - myself included - are passed into the hands of a psychologist or a
psychiatrist, and all will be monitored over the long term. To my knowledge, such support was
never organized at this scale.
In addition, you may know that we ran out of stretchers. A vehicle of relief and assistance to
victims is equipped with a stretcher because it is supposed to carry only one person. However it
should be first and foremost to transport victims to the horizontal. We have therefore updates on
what we had on hand, i.e. crowd barriers. At first glance, this may shock and suggest that it has
not enough resources. No: it is difficult to concentrate as many resources in a single moment. For
the moment, what counted, I insist, it was that the wounded are transported horizontally. We
distributed kits damage control in which there are turnstiles tourniquets, Hemostatic, kits
dressings that were already in all intensive care ambulances. Now, all the BSPP gear are
provided.
We also conducted, at the national level, the consolidation of the call centre of the police and
firefighters in a unique place. Also, for Euro 2016, a single call platform will be operational.
It is appropriate to add, with the support of the Mayor of Paris, Ms. Hidalgo, the creation of a
training module on first aid for Parisians. In such circumstances, indeed, support of people who
are on the premises is fundamental, not to accomplish the first gestures which save. Thus, since
mid-January, in twelve barracks of the BSPP, the Franciliens are invited to attend and learn two
hours how do you save someone between the moment where relief has been called and where
they arrive.
I personally invited last week, my counterparts in London, Madrid, Berlin and Brussels, with
which we have begun to achieve a return of experience.
I'll stop there. I would simply say, in my conscience, that I believe that it was difficult to do
better. We should not believe that firefighters are merely indifferent players. A firefighter from
Paris was spectator at the Bataclan : he has suffered two cardiac arrest and had to be amputated a
leg. Keep things in our ranks as we stand in solidarity: we let our wounded soldiers and we keep
them. I personally wrote eleven letters of support or condolences to Paris firefighters who lost
someone during these tragic events. This to say that what happened to these people has affected
us deeply. Professor Tourtier and myself were in the Bataclan : we will never forget all the
phones that vibrated on victims leaving messages starting with: dad, MOM... ". . I conclude on
this point to tell you that this is the biggest operation that I ordered in my life - and I have
participated in many operations in my existence. I have 33 years under my belt in the French
army; I am very proud of the men and women that I order and let me reiterate you very sincerely,
in the eyes: it was difficult to do better.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you very much, my general. We understand your
emotion and believe me that national representation salutes the courage, bravery and dedication
of all the men you have ordered this evening there. You have the sympathy and recognition of
our Committee.

You have been long but it was helpful. I immediately give the floor to Professor Carli who leads
the UAS. Could you make a short presentation insofar as we are together until 17: 45 pm only
and where many questions will be asked?
Professor Pierre Carli, medical director of the SAMU de Paris, head of Department at the
Department of anaesthesia and resuscitation of the University Hospital Necker-EnfantsMalades, president of the national Council of the hospital emergency. I will do my best, Mr
president, but I think that I will deal with many issues. My presentation will be complementary
to that of the general Boutinaud and, like him, I think that, on Friday, November 13, 2015,
occurred the most serious attack in France since the second world war. The human toll is
horrible: 130 dead, 350 injured. It is obvious that the victims, their families and many people are
asking questions. We will try to explain our action, to respond to their expectations, and we
thank you for giving us the opportunity to do so in a solemn setting.
Our doctors mission is simple: we are at the service of the victims. Every day, in Paris and the
Ile-de-France region, there are eight UAS; each of them has a medical regulation, it is the law,
and each deploys sixty medical intensive care teams. The SAMU de Paris, or SAMU 75, receives
about 800 000 calls at 15, has nine medical teams and carries out some 13 000 interventions
nursing per year. Custody, namely the evening, as on Friday, November 13, we have six teams of
emergency and resuscitation (SMUR) mobile service, two Pediatric teams, two regulators
doctors and four assistants of medical regulation responding to the phone. Disaster, the SAMU
de Paris is responsible for coordinating the action of the other seven SAMU of the Ile-de-France.
As pointed out by general Boutinaud, the previous attack dates back to 20 years ago. He was
there and me too. The bomb that exploded at the Port-Royal RER station killed tonight there
seventy people including 12 serious emergencies. On-site, we were more than 300, and in less
than two hours, seventeen hospitals were all victims. There's a victim three or four personal
health and relief.
In twenty years, things have changed with the emergence of the hyper-terrorism. I want to
mention three highlights that the general has mentioned: in Madrid, in 2004, occurs a multi-site
bombing the bomb; in London, in 2005, a multi-site also and there attack also in transport; in
Bombay, in 2008, a multi-site attack again, using all possible means to cause the maximum of
victims. The analysis of these attacks, their conduct, multiple contacts we have had with our
colleagues from other countries have led us to develop many plans: the matrix plan of support for
multi-site in transport bombings - is the plan of the police prefecture which provides two
statements that firefighters, the Red plan alpha, and zonal plan of the SAMU nicknamed 'plan
camembert', name that the prefect of police at the time had much appreciated...
This plan coordinates the eight UAS, divides the Ile-de-France region in sectors and allows us to
therefore avoid the accumulation of medical on a single site means, to have a reasoned
commitment to divide our forces - for the SMUR teams, small Crown comes immediately to
strengthen Paris and the great Crown strengthened, for its part, the little Crown-, but also to
divide hospitals. This is very important to understand how we organized the evacuation to the
hospital. In each sector, hospitals are in fact shortlisted, which avoids, during an evolutionary
event like an attack, that appear white boxes, i.e. without medical help or available hospitals.

The President Georges Fenech. These hospitals are pre-screened by whom?

Professor Pierre Carli. By ourselves, but if you allow me, Mr president, I go into this point
later.
Simplification of control procedures allows us to go much faster than on a daily basis where we
can deal with the issues in detail, and we keep resources in reserve to cope with the evolutionary
potential. Facing an organized attack, to a real act of war, should not only oppose means, it must
also have a strategy to thwart the goal of the enemy, which is to make the most of victims, but
also to disrupt our support. On this point, international cooperation proved to be important for us.
At the beginning of the years 2010, the general noted, changes the nature of the attacks: the
bomb attack is replaced by much more deadly attacks, including using assault rifles. At Utya,
Norway, 69 people are murdered by a sniper: this is one of the first mass murder. Firearms will
be used in Toulouse in 2012, then in Brussels and elsewhere. At this time, we have implemented
two important axes of work: first in relation to the care of injured by military weapons, including
assault rifles, then for what is the adaptation of our daily strategy to support these multiple sites,
apart from the transport.
In this framework, we have many contacts with Professor Tourtier. However as mentioned,
general Boutinaud, firefighters are military, and having been on the field, they know the weapons
of war. We will work with them to convert their techniques on theatres of military operations in a
supported of civilians unprotected by civilian medical teams, the UAS and the SMUR. We
develop and publish protocols, submit them to our colleagues. We thus conducted two exercises
of simulation, including shootings, in 2013 and 2014. We took these initiatives as heads of
service and of course approved and supported by our guardianship: the Directorate-General of
public assistance, the regional health agency (ARS) and the departments concerned.
In January 2015, the attack on the editor of Charlie Hebdo will unfortunately confirm the
correctness of our anticipation: many people are killed very quickly with an AK47. There are
also serious injuries and there is the involvement of many individuals. We draw two lessons.
First, we understand that the danger is important: a policeman who stands in the way of terrorists
is murdered; However we know very well that our ambulances are in the immediate vicinity and
that we can therefore find us at any time to people who run us because we wear a uniform. The
second lesson concerns the psychological urgency which, if significant disaster, proved essential
in the case of an attack. However, on the occasion of the attack in Charlie Hebdo, this demand
exploded. Thus, we do take operational decisions on the ground. Thus, with the predecessor of
general Boutinaud with Professor Tourtier, street front of Charlie Hebdo, we decide that medical
and psychological victims should be brought to the Htel-Dieu in a structure 'hard' security,
where they can be supported in the most reassuring environment possible.
The taking of hostages in Dammartin-en-Gole and of theHypercacher are a new experience.
Indeed, we are here to contact police and its special units. Unlike the context of a shooting, we
have time to organize us: a negotiation is engaged. We can provide very fast evacuation routes,
ask the police to keep it safe. It is therefore a very different device where, clearly, the police
forces say us: ' you, civilian physicians of the UAS and the SMUR, you must not enter the

danger zone because you are neither prepared nor trained for this; you are very close to us and
we establish a relationship between us to support victims.
From January to November, we will not waste our time: we acquire material, tourniquets, drugs;
We carry out practical exercises of shooting training, once again - and this time we decided to do
it in a TGV on the night of 17-18 June, at the gare Montparnasse and, you know, this attack
scenario will be the same as the attack lack of August; We are discussing plans, opportunity for
me to meet for the first time the general Boutinaud including the first word, when he sees me, is:
"Bombay." Branch exchange Ars, and exactly in the same way, we are working on the multisite
attack that seems closer.
On 13 November, at 9 o'clock, while we have already achieved, during the year, many exercises,
we conduct to control zonal, prepared with the BSPP, the eight UAS and hospitals that should
receive serious injuries in first intention. The exercise lasts three hours and involves the use of
phones, tables, maps. It covers thirteen sites and the hypothesis is 66 dead and a hundred injured.
Many participants consider it as an exaggerated scenario and is not one that will occur.
Subsequently, you know. We had planned, the same week, other formations which one was '
security when you are on the sites of shootings ', exercise that we were not able to carry out and
which we would have been very useful on Friday the 13th, but we have, since, of course,
directed.
This Friday the 13th, an element much hit us. Between the UAS and the firefighters of Paris, for
several years, there is no competition or conflict: we are complementary to the daily; We have
created a roadmap; an agreement, signed by the relevant ministries, approved by our
guardianship; our exercises and our formations are common; We exchange our doctors.
However, that evening, the action of doctors on the ground is shared by the BSPP and by doctors
of the SAMU. Mentioned communication deficiencies. Well, the second person who calls
Professor Tourtier, it's me. Throughout the evening, we'll be side by side on two sites: rue Bichat
and at the Bataclan, our means of communication with respective allows us to account to our
teams. We divide the roles: at the beginning of rue Bichat, Jean-Pierre Tourtier told me: 'I'll at
the Bataclan, you take Charonne. '. And I'll street of Charonne. He told me: ' strengthen teams! I
double mine with a doctor and a nurse from firefighters who ride in vehicles of UAS. We are
therefore working together. We are all three, in the evening, as you said the general, in the street,
next to the Bataclan, rue Oberkampf, to make decisions.
What us concerned in the event of a multi-site attack, Mr president, it was warning, in any case
the UAS. In London, our colleagues, for very long, did not know what was happening, which has
greatly hampered in their action. Here, fortunately, the alert has been rapid. The situation in the
Stade de France becomes quickly evident, the UAS will very quickly exchange information. So,
we can start the Census of beds available to remind staff, open the zonal room - which was not
removed from the exercise of the morning: there just clear the tables and start over. The strategy
we put in place - the "strategy of camembert" - is immediately to take an important decision and
I assume: I tell Jean-Pierre Tourtier phone that no SAMU de Paris team will travel to Stade de
France - which is yet very closely. We have to defend the territory and, as a result, our teams are
going to have to deploy in the capital - they also leave immediately - because we know that this
is a multi-site attack.

Paris is divided into three areas - the portions of camembert. The Northern is supported by the
UAS 93, represented here by Professor Adnet; to us to find ways to strengthen it; hospitals are
assigned to this sector: the Avicenna, l ' Hpital Beaujon hospital, Hpital Bichat, the
Lariboisire hospital and the Hpital Europen Georges-Pompidou (HEGP); reinforcements
from the small Crown - with SAMU 92 - and the large Crown with SAMU 95 - will come to
support it. The sector is located mainly in Paris and will be so especially supported by SAMU 75
immediately reinforced by the UAS 94, here represented by Ms. Chollet-Xemard, which is the
small Crown nearest; as hospitals assigned to this sector, it is, as expected, Piti-Salptrire,
Henri-Mondor hospital, the Hpital Saint-Antoine and Bgin hospital. With regard to sector
West, there is no attack at the moment. SAMU 92 comes so quickly strengthen the UAS 93 and
75 and 78, represented by Dr. Lambert, SAMU approximates the SAMU 92 to know when it will
be deployed in the capital, what comes a little bit later on the site of the Bataclan.
I told you: there is no problem of communication between us, but the communication tools are
subject to a very high voltage. General Boutinaud gave you his figures. The switchboard of the
SAMU, meanwhile, undergoes an increase of calls of 420% in the half hour following the
attacks. Between 22 and 23 hours we will have up to 200% increase continuously. One of the
centre 15 quality criteria is in sixty seconds. For awhile, this criterion will collapse to 20%,
which does not mean that we do not answer but that, after twenty minutes, 20% of calls are
answered within 60 seconds. In the time coming, we escalate this rate to 50% through recalled
personal and immediately take the phone and that open lines without even taking the time to ask
their business. The crisis room lines are free, the radio system ANTARES - National Adaptation
of transmissions to risks and relief - there are some problems during the evening, but without that
we are surprised - you know no doubt by c.Favorite pieces the report of Senator Vogel; and you
know also that, pragmatically, we use our cell phones service because the coverage is very good,
the relays work very well, and because these phones allow us to have contact custom - we 'jump'
so over the standards that are reserved for the reception of the public.
About the Organization of the command that you indicated the general Boutinaud is perfectly
true: there is no discussion on the subject. There is a commander of relief operations, a Director
of medical relief which, inside Paris, is always a firefighter and, at his side, a regulator the
SAMU physician. The latter is a senior physician who knows the regulatory procedures, knows
hospitals and is responsible for organizing groups of patients who will be evacuated.
How hospitals are chosen, you asked me, Mr president? This issue has been much ink. They are
determined on the basis of geography. The medical regulation was deported on the site - the
medical regulation, this is what we do every night for all serious patients; It receives operational
information of the UAs that indicates what are the available hospitals and if they received not too
victims. Thus, we will only send injured chest at the Saint-Antoine hospital, yet near the sites,
since it specializes in orthopedics and digestive surgery, specialties for which, on the other hand,
we will use hotel. Sitemap Bichat hospital Saint-Louis, him, adjoining, receives spontaneous
arrivals of injured and proximity brancardages are organized; also the medical regulation
requires us to not send serious patients since it received unexpectedly.
This concept of regulation is not rigid but dynamic. Cardio-thoracic surgery, neurosurgery
involve centres limited in Paris. We only are therefore not "stuck" in "camembert", if I may say,

but we use it to the maximum. The pre-hospital organisation is a quality criterion that you should
know: after this regulation was not there interhospital transfers - patients were treated in the
hospitals where they arrived. If everything goes well on arrival at the hospital, and that was the
case here, it is because the hospital has time and the information needed to organize themselves
and because he gets good patients and in a suitable number. A very fast transport, referred to by
some, to go to the hospital nearest without care or control, that is, in a way, the scoop and run
from the Americans, if that was the rest such a strategy to be applicable in the event of attacks
multi-site - I'll show you just now that it has never been-, would have caused a massive influx of
wounded toward hospitals with a chaotic home and a reduced immediate quality and safety of
care. The scoop and run made that move a problem from the street to the entrance of the
hospital. The medical regulation, the plan 'pie' that we put in place, instead allowed a
homogeneous distribution of the victims, and in this sense we have done better than Madrid and
London, not to mention the fact that we have not dispersed throughout the region our medical
resources.
For hospitals receiving the victims, tonight, there not saturating influx but a continuous flow
because they receive patient groups, which allows to adapt the work. The Piti-Salptrire
hospital that has received only fifty injured, or 15% of the total, while it is the most important
site, resumed its activity, as you said Martin Hirsch, by 6 a.m. the next morning, by making
grafts that were waiting for a few hours.
The medical regulation has many advantages over foreign hospital experiences not integrating
this device. In Madrid, only two nearby hospitals have received 50% of victims military
hospitals were not used while we for our part used. In London, five hospitals were close to sites:
Royal London Hospital received him only a third of the casualties, or more than 200, and in the
absence of regulation, a paediatric hospital in the vicinity, received him 20 adult wounded while
it was not his type of regular patients at all.
The hospital mortality in the evening of November 13 - 1.4% - is explained in particular by the
quality of care, the absence of saturation and the pre-hospital and hospital organization.
The pre-hospital medicalization, which has been discussed, is very important. The rate of
medicalization, the number of medical teams in the field was greater than what it was in the
London and Madrid attacks. The arrival of the teams nursing in contact with victims has been
more rapid in Paris than in London: two sites on four, in the British capital, had a doctor for an
hour or an hour and a quarter after the start of operations. Gold all colleagues faced, in Paris, this
situation reports say that the medicalization allows to yard medicalized, detect the patient whose
case worsens, of applying the technique of damage control the wounded, manage time,
encourage support. We have tried to use the maximum of doctors on the ground. Thus, here,
some vehicles depart from the UAS in reinforcement with two medical teams to the site of
Charonne; There, two nurses leave with additional material. We act as the BSPP: with vehicles,
we create additional intensive care ambulances. The medical result thus achieved is higher than
that observed in other circumstances of attacks. This at least shows that scoop and run is
probably not a panacea.

Detailed scientific analysis of what I am trying to tell you is underway: the data of each victim,
all waiting time, severity of lesions, exam scores, are integrated into a data bank. This work will
take a long time - several months - but will be completed and so we will get a result by patient
and which will show the importance of the medicalization.
Sounds sophisticated but, in the 'Red Alpha' plan, with the general Boutinaud and its
predecessors, we have provided security locks. One of them is interesting. In the 'Red Alpha'
plan, for any reason whatsoever, if not fast enough doctors on the spot, the COS, officer of the
fire service, may decide an evacuation of nearby without waiting.
I turn to the safety of sites referred to by the general. You have seen the videos and found that all
shooting venues, including at the Bataclan, there was a real danger for us. A car entered the
perimeter where we had installed the medical outpost; our first teams are taking shelter under a
porch. The police were extraordinary with us: all were trying to protect us to enable us to provide
the maximum of care for victims. He went in exactly same with members of the Sentinel
device
The safety of evacuation is a different topic. It is indeed much more difficult, in this area, to
secure our evacuations. There are many small streets, blocked, after which we do not know what
is happening - another attack is always possible. Nearby sites, vehicles in all directions form a
very complex problem to solve for the police, to which it is difficult to tell us we can go with an
escort. This resulted in what could be considered by some as the long evacuation time. However
they were not so long that: the fact that victims arrive at the hospital within two hours in an
emergency on - their lives were not in danger - and then the attack occurred in the places and in
the circumstances mentioned, has been found on the occasion of all other attacks. Certainly, the
individual variations are very important, and if victims reach hospital in a few minutes, the last
will succeed of course much later.
In London, for example, while we are in urban areas, it will take more than two hours some
patients to get to the hospital. In Madrid, the majority of patients will arrive at a hospital also
important that La Piti-Salptrire and who is nearby, between two or three hours after the
attack. The most terrible is an example of Utya: the shooting took place in a place where there
is a risk for relief upon arrival. Victims escape and will be quickly evacuated when others are
stuck on the spot and will be evacuated until five hours after the attack. For this reason, we do
not put all our energy into the scoop and run of the Anglo-Saxons, because this device plays the
only card speed without medical care. Is to take the bet to be able to quickly evacuate the
victims; However, as part of a multi-site attack, the feasibility of an immediate evacuation is
never certain. Our Organization - SAMU, BSPP - has the advantage of adapting to the realities
on the ground, that is to use the best compromise between the rapid evacuation and
medicalization.
In Paris, that evening, the evacuation time was not due to a problem of medical regulation or a
means of medical care or communication problem. Need to be patient groups to be able to
organize these small convoys to hospitals, protected by police and be able to leave with the
escort. Medicalization has enabled us to "prioritize" the evacuation of the most serious patients,
place head and to more quickly. The problem of accessibility to the victims, much discussed, has

actually played for the Bataclan since, you know, the extraction of victims in large numbers is
very difficult when a police operation is underway and this unprecedented situation was not
similar to that of theHypercacher. Also is the reflection that we have on these points with the
police very important changing so that we can go even further.
Let me dwell: retrospectively, evacuation times are similar to those found for other attacks, or
even shorter. Hospital mortality of victims was low - 1.4%, I repeat-, and one of the lowest. We
operated at best the advantages of the system Artwork.
I will say a word on our control room which we are very satisfied: we have been able to dispose
of in December 2014, a few days before the attack on the editor of Charlie Hebdo. Previously,
we had not. The means are Hardy: we use tables, maps on which we do not hesitate to draw. We
had many contacts with foreign colleagues: they perform exactly the same as we. Indeed,
information technology, it is very beautiful, but is long to Work and it takes a large staff to enter
data. The regulation that we applied coordinated other regulations, provided information to those
who were on the ground. Its role with regard to regulating doctor is simple: it receives the
information, asked for reinforcements and the SMUR teams, once deployed, can be "returned" in
the regulation. On average, all teams have worked twice on two different sites. Thus, the UAS
93, from the Stade de France, was redeployed to Paris. There again we have planned a security
lock: If in the regulation plan, the communications are interrupted, each regulating doctor on
each site, be they Samu or BSPP, continues to work to evacuate the victims, without leaving the
area assigned him to.
I want now, while being aware that time passes, to communicate to the commission a few points
which seem to me important.
The fact that we have kept pre-hospitalization and hospital resources in reserve was the result of
a strategic choice and it is even a criterion of quality: the situation was evolving and, initially, we
did not know what would be the nature, the places, the magnitude of the attack continued. We
only had one idea in mind: the goal of terrorists is to harm and therefore we disrupt. The multisite attack is not a natural or technological disaster: it is an act of war. Or to be opposed to an act
of war a strategy able to thwart the plans of those who attack us.
Second point: this night was long and we could hold thirty hours - this was the aim, - duration of
fighting in Bombay. We had sixty teams and in used forty-five; Fifteen were used as
reinforcements. At the Bataclan, the potential of aggravation was major. We took a number of
decisions which the maintenance of daily activity the public service has been maintained.
Finally, the reserve for the pre-hospital means identified the teams at the end of the night because
I can tell you that at four o'clock in the morning, we were really on the knees. For the hospital it
is more terrible still: when it receives victims, even in small numbers, it will burn its resources,
all its teams being mobilised, and if we "eat" thus all the hospitals, there is more nothing. All
hospitals were alerted and communicated their forward-looking, immediate availability to the
regulations of UAS. But some of these hospitals have received actually victims: 60% for public
assistance, 30% for the region. The West sector was the major reserve for hospitals. It's hard for
these teams because they are mobilized as others, because their SMUR teams are already parties
on the ground, but, in this sector, we have centres hospital quality and highly motivated. Still, the

device is not made for doctors but for victims. However, for the victims, it was important, I
stress, to keep resources in reserve and to propose good quality care, what has been done.
130 dead and 350 injured, it is a horrible. I have 35 years of UAS, as general Boutinaud has
thirty-three years in the army, and me nor I did had never been facing this extreme violence.
Extreme violence which have faced young doctors who have supported, in the street, victims
who had their age. The oldest had the age of our children. The children of several doctors - that
you have received - were killed this evening there. A woman doctor of the SAMU in Paris call
center, was unfortunately among the victims: doctor Verry was in the wrong place at the wrong
time...
Faced with a tragedy like this, give satisfaction is impossible.
But, and this is my conclusion, I would like to emphasize the fact that we we were prepared, we
have tried to anticipate, that we have a strategy that we have repeated. However there is always a
gap between strategy, anticipation and what happen. Remains that this complicated was that a
hypothesis before Friday the 13th became the basis of work on which we are building the suite
which can be much more serious, much more. I want to say to the victims and their families that,
really, health personnel are mobilized: 70% of those of the UAS. And our teams have not
hesitated to engage physically while the context was dangerous. We did the best we could with
the resources we have. Our goal was that the wounded are supported in the best way possible.
Us, civilian physicians, our way to fight terrorism was to be here this evening and to the
maximum.
The President Georges Fenech. On behalf of the commission, I address to you - and, through
you, to all the personnel of the SAMU - the same tributes as those which I have addressed to the
BSPP. Thank you for your presentation, so thorough that it leaves little time for discussion, but it
was important that you bring all these details.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. In my turn I welcome the exemplary work of the BSPP and
SAMU.
I will return to your speech at the Bataclan. At what point do you start to support the wounded?
When penetrate inside the Bataclan and who gives the order to you? What is after the final
assault? Finally, how do you have your action with that of the doctor of the column of the
research and intervention (BRI) brigade which has played an important role, which was inside
the Bataclan and, a priori, in link coordinated with you? Can we have clarification of
chronological order?
General Philippe Boutinaud. The action begins at the Bataclan around 22 hours. Memory, the
first call was received by the firefighters of Paris at 21 hours 49. We therefore sent a first team
and who arrived on the spot, was immediately taken under fire from terrorists, pulling from the
inside of the Bataclan. The fire engine was hit by several bullets. During all the time leading up
to 0 hours 20, the final assault conducted by the bis with support of RAID - research, assistance,
intervention, deterrence - we have received victims who managed to get out of themselves during
the time where the terrorists changed the charger from their Kalashnikov - these victims there

were valid as injured, sometimes a bullet in the arm, leg or elsewhere. We have therefore
supported them that they were leaving by groups. It took also take into account the wounded who
were on the sidewalk - because it always evokes the Interior of the Bataclan, but the terrorists
began firing on those who were outside smoking their cigarettes. All the people we were able to
recover, we have taken them on the side, in the rue Oberkampf where we opened successively
three medical outposts.
It should be understood that, when the police arrived, they were able to penetrate to the ground
floor after one of their own - I learned later--killed a terrorist. Then, and Commissioner who
command the bis had to explain it to you in detail, the rise on the floors is taking time: very
many people came out, you had to search them, make sure they did not vest of explosives.
Therefore, throughout the evening, we took into account of the victims and, obviously, as soon
as the final assault was given, it took to go for those who were unable to move, and we entered
when the bis gave the go-ahead. Right next to the intervention forces, I was in continuous contact
with them.
The teacher who was in the column, I know very well - I work with him on a daily basis-, came
to see me directly at the corner of the street to talk to me and, in particular, ask me additional
stretchers. We have continually coordinated our work both and it is visually that we have
established the procedure for evacuation of victims.
Once the bis gave us the green light to enter the room of the Bataclan, our first action was to
verify that, under the body, he was not injured, alive people.
M. Philippe Goujon. As an elected Parisian, my gratitude goes to the action of men of the BSPP
and SAMU.
The BSPP missions are increasing, which should eventually add those related to the occurrence
of other attacks multi-site - who knows, harder still to treat it-, the construction next to the Grand
Paris Express, at the risk of a flood and so the application of (IRPP) flood risk prevention plans,
to be held in June , Euro 2016, the possible organization of future Olympic Games, next World
Expo...
Yet we find that the prefecture of police special budget dedicated to the firemen of Paris is
declining. And if we were able to stabilize it for this year, it is nonetheless decreased sharply
compared to 2014, so you lose staff - loss that I estimated at 250 people, which is far from being
negligible - and although you need to close several sites, abandon a certain number of vehicles,
not only large scales but certainly others too. Suddenly, the investments are down... In short,
there is a distortion between the increasing needs of the Brigade - and God knows if you had to
intervene massively in this attack - and the decline of the means, even if latter, I stress this, could
have been more serious still - implementation The modernization plan has almost halted.
You mentioned the PRAC and the speed with which you arrive on the premises; but here too, the
policy of urban planning of the city of Paris, I say objectively is to restrict more and more traffic:
development of half a dozen Parisian places provide a supranationality of the movement; the
right bank expressway will be permanently closed from the month of July - I am speaking in the

presence of the concerned constituency MP, Pierre Lellouche, who also recently asked a question
to the Government on the subject. A number of police units made us part of their difficulty,
already under the current circumstances, to go to the places where attacks have been committed.
What therefore capacity of intervention of the BSPP, of its capacity, in particular, to achieve as
quickly on the premises that has been the case at the Bataclan ?
I then a question for Professor Carli: the wounded have certainly been treated but, we stated the
Director-general of the Assistance publique-Hpitaux Paris (APHP), the average length of
waiting in emergency, in Paris, is four hours - duration that will often up to seven to eight hours
in some hospitals among those that you mentioned and I know well. Also, what happens to
patients who are already in the ER and are waiting, so four to eight hours, and not necessarily for
simple sprains, while hospitals where they welcome hundreds of people injured by the attacks?
Why did it not transfer also those wounded to private hospitals, you have not mentioned?
General Philippe Boutinaud. The budgetary part directly under my responsibility. I confirm
that the budget discussion was somewhat complicated. For the year 2016, I have submitted
arguments to the prefect of police who believe the need to preserve the operational resources of
the BSPP, the has relayed to the municipality of Paris and then at the Council of Paris.
Fortunately, the BSPP for 2016 budget allows it to fulfill its mission. Budgetary problems have
an impact on what happened on 13 November? Quite frankly, no. Any rationalization of the
BSPP to which it conducted key logistical support but absolutely did not affect the operational
part.
In addition, we have indeed closed sites during the previous two years but, thanks to the budget
that I could get for 2016, is there no other. And if the budget had decreased, the sites affected by
a closure would have been relief centres. Also the operational coverage of the BSPP is in no way
affected.
In regards to the PRAC and the difficulty of movement, the statistical truth obliges me to say
that, if the criteria for analysis remained constant, the closure of lanes would well obviously
increase of traffic jams. It is located over the previous years was never reached to establish,
statistically, that the closure of a number of axes of movement slowed relief. I tell you in all
sincerity. Indeed, people adapt and flow decreases. In contrast, and I am very attentive to this
point, facilities throughout the axes, as the curbs that delimit the paths, constitute an obstacle to
the implementation scales fire station. But with respect to the limitation of the routes in Paris, I
am not able, statistically, you prove, I stress, that it slows down the backup. Finally, I do not
mean entering into the political debate.
Professor Pierre Carli. Sir, what are we talking about? We are talking serious emergencies,
victims who are supported because they suffer from a wound by bullet, fired by a military assault
rifle, or injury related to an explosion. This type of victim enjoys an emergency circuit that is the
trauma and the most serious injuries. This circuit is marked by the LRA for a number of public
hospitals. However, in these hospitals there are surgeons trained to support and there is a very
particular feature which is the use of the circuit to reverse, i.e. the use of the surveillance room
post-interventionnelle as entrance hall in the surgical procedure which is the subject of exercises
that trauma centres are able to achieve.

As I said, and it is probably the sense of your question, there is not much, here, from minor
injuries. Those that we call related emergencies are injuries that are stable, but there's not, I stress
to small injuries to others, and so it's difficult to send them to other institutions. Because it does
well than what we do often.
I'll tell you an anecdote to show you that the comments today are the same as those of yesterday.
One of the serious attacks of 1995 occurred close to the Htel-Dieu, where you practice more
than digestive surgery. In this hospital is also a great service of obstetrics, whose Chief is a
former soldier who perfectly knows war surgery. He sent letters of protest to everyone, to the
Mayor, MP... to denounce the scandal have not received, the day of the attack, victims who yet
were very close to his place of practice. We do not doubt the competence of our colleagues in the
private sector - they are extraordinary people - but the circuits, one cannot invent them at the last
moment. This is the answer to your question.
M. Christophe Cavard. I will avoid the effects of tribune and therefore come directly to my
questions. I would like to get clarification on the concept of protection of relief. What do you,
my general, on the subject? Is it question the training of rescuers incorporates the concept of
risk? It is probably already the case for the military that you are, but it is a new concept for
rescue workers in the civilian sector. This question of training due to the fact that we are a
number of MLAs worried that other cities as Paris are affected and which lack the organization
you describe.
Then, it understood that inaccessible victims had telephoned a call centre. How the standard
establishes the link with a doctor so that it can give indications of behavior?
M. Pierre Lellouche. I will nor effect of tribune, but a question taps me since November 13:
how long does, gentlemen military doctors, one wounded by gunfire from an assault rifle, to die
of his wounds? You will answer me, probably, it depends on injuries, but, according to their
typology, I stress, how long does it take to die to someone who "pissing blood"?
Professor Jean-Pierre Tourtier, physician-in-Chief of the BSPP. If it is a population subject
to the risk of injury by weapons of war, it is the military. When we examine the statistics of the
time of death compared with the time of the injury, almost a death on two occurs during the first
five minutes; three-quarters of deaths occur during the first thirty minutes, i.e. during the phase
of medicalization and possibly pre-hospital. There is a strong concept, in military medicine,
which is avoidable death. It is on this point that we have been very careful with Professor Carli
and general Boutinaud: what are these deaths that can still avoid relatively easily? The French
army has shown that, on the one hand, by stopping bleeding, 90% of the dead were preventable;
on the other hand, by draining the pneumothorax and controlling the upper airway can allow in
more injured fighters, to more, in this case, Parisians injured to arrive alive at the hospital. We
modeled these efforts of emergency medicine, in agreement with the SAMU in Paris three years
ago, through a publication that puts civil military medicine to trauma medicine.
M. Pierre Lellouche. You pointed out the low hospital mortality - 1.4% - and everyone is
grateful for the work that you have done, whether civilian or military. However, the question that
interests me, and that of why I sit in this Committee, is how, in operational terms, to ensure that

the minimum of people die in a case of this kind - because we know other. When I heard that two
hours forty had elapsed between the beginning of the attack and the intervention of the security
forces, I wondered how many people had died. That is the question that torments me and on
which I hope that we work. I therefore have noted the very low mortality once you take the
victims support and the very high mortality during the first thirty minutes. We, I guess, more
accurate data as our work progresses; no doubt we will give you the result of autopsies and will
we thus know the consequences to be drawn as to the modus operandi of our security forces because that is the topic.
The President Georges Fenech. You have indicated that, under the terms of the Protocol, you
could not enter the exclusion zone. In contrast, we learn that reflection is under way on the issue
and that perhaps announces a change. Is it possible, I spoke in Beotien, to imagine an elite unit of
doctors duly equipped able to penetrate into the exclusion zone to go to rescue those who are
dying? We have indeed seen that you couldn't rescue seriously injured victims.
General Philippe Boutinaud. I will respond in part to your question, Mr president, but
excluding registration so intrusive and malicious ears do not use my response against us.
For the rest, the question is to know if we can invent security forces, GIGN, BRI or RAID, which
a little fire, or should make these units of elite security officers Paris firefighters. This complex
issue is not resolved and we are thinking about. It's complicated, because it is imperative that you
are protected at the time where you are acting. Even at war, when a doctor asks an infusion, it
does not take a gun - this is the ambiguity of the question. And firefighter, if you equip him with
a bulletproof vest and a kevlar helmet, do not it may be shot like a rabbit. There is a balance to
find, and I am not persuaded that there is solution. We have begun to examine foreign practices
and, for now, to my knowledge, no political decision does ask the lifeguards, be they military or
not, to equip themselves as special forces.
Then perhaps we able to establish such a device in Paris, but I am unable to tell you whether it is
possible in other cities of France, in metropolitan France or overseas. We must therefore think
about the scope of this type of proposal. If, today, Parisians are perhaps more exposed than
others, and if this device allows to better protect, terrorists might strike in the cities that would be
lacking.
I'm so ready, again, to answer you off mic on the technical aspect of the question; as for the
political aspect, he of course returned to national representation to think.
The President Georges Fenech. I can confirm that a discussion is underway on the subject.
Professor Pierre Carli. There are two points in your important question, Mr Cavard. You
understand that there's not only the teams of rescuers, but also of medical doctors, nurses,
personal teams whose vocation is not to be injured on the ground but to heal others as effectively
as possible.

First, all the emergency teams must learn to protect themselves when, unexpectedly, they are
faced with a risk. Need to know turn back, get away very effectively, namely also alert other
teams, security organizing themselves so you may not become in turn a victim.
Then, most important is training. It is necessary to train the personnel to protect themselves,
therefore, but also train them to support victims of weapons of war, often, with both rapid and
specific treatment protocols. Directorate-General of health (DGS), the Directorate-General of the
Organization of care (DGOS), Sant des Armes (SSA) service we have asked from November
13, to develop a national programme in the sense so that all hospitals, in the regions, especially
those that are located in cities where it will be difficult to quickly bring reinforcements from
major centres can effectively take the first steps as well on the ground, with limited teams, as in a
general hospital that is not necessarily of the same resources as a teaching centre. So time will be
won, lives will be preserved and will be developed a network of care that will come as
reinforcements. As you can see, Sir, your question has been anticipated.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. My question, Professor Carli, relates to your effective cooperation on the
ground with the military health service. Do you usually work with the hospitals of Paris, and if
so, how? Have they been involved in exercise on 13 November in the morning? SSA has still a
jurisdiction military, from experience in the field, in particular external operations; or can you
not use it more? I indeed feel, in the light of a previous hearing, that these services have been
underemployed.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. You mentioned the saturation of the means of communication. How do
you think to improve relations with the media, radio, social or other networks on the occasion of
other types of disaster such as, for example, floods, occurring in other departments? Have you
felt the need to improve your device in the area and it not was, at times, redundancy or
impediment in the communication?
Professor Pierre Carli. I begin by dealing with the military hospitals, question regarding
civilians that Professor Tourtier exercises in the Val-de-Grce. The answer to your question, Mr
Villaum, is very simple: the military hospitals and military doctors, we work daily with them. In
my service, there are military doctors from custody. I myself was a reserve officer. We all have a
military culture but we do not have all the experience in the field of those who fought. That is
why our cooperation is most effective. The SSA, represented here by Jean-Pierre Tourtier,
provided us support for developing care protocols that we have applied to civilians. I recall that
should change these protocols where civilians are not protected as the military: they don't wear
bulletproof vests, helmets to avoid the balls - also weapons of war wounds are often fatal
civilian.
Military hospitals working with us? The Percy hospital is part of the Group of hospitals that
receive serious injuries on a daily basis. Moreover, results for the injured supported by the Percy
- in this case - and by the Begin hospital flagship hospital are fully integrated with the overall
results in this area. It is not possible that we forget the military as they are always at our side.
I myself close enough to the health service of the armies and I work with the doctor-general
Debonne you received. We work, with Jean-Pierre Tourtier, on the future of emergency medicine

to create bridges between military emergency medicine and civil emergency medicine. In these
professions, we are engaged on the ground and must be able to act quickly, with the same criteria
of quality, civil and military medicine pursuing the same objective of excellence.
Professor Jean-Pierre Tourtier. To reassure you, Mr Posselt, ballistic victims support is a
centre of excellence for military health service. Now we have to cFavorite pieces, for many
years, to share our knowledge with civilian trauma centres. Many scientific works has been made
to this end by Professor Carli and myself.
The evening of November 13, military hospitals were very helpful. On the 98 absolute
emergencies - the most serious wounded, which quickly required a surgeon and a resuscitator-,
18, or 20%, were taken in charge by a military hospital, whether it's Begin or Percy.
General Philippe Boutinaud. I'm answering the question of Ms. Dumas. It is necessary to learn
from the saturation of call centres. I know that you have people who have phoned the police,
which, according to them, they would have hung up on. You should know that it is sometimes
very difficult to hear what the people say.
For what concerns us, I said, the number of appeals has collapsed as we changed the outgoing
message. We quickly enough thought to use Twitter and Facebook and since November 13, we
continue in this direction, but about using the call to the relief efforts through tweets, solution
apparently very tempting, do not forget to subsequently operate the message, and need men for
this. In addition, in a telephone conversation, you can start to accompany the victim: when we
receive a call for a cardiac arrest, we give instructions to our interlocutor so that it starts the heart
massage. And we try to catch a maximum of people this way. Also, in the current state of
technology, the telephone conversation remains very important.
In relation to people who were in the Bataclan, us not have hung up on anyone. Remains that it
should be understood that this kind of psychological support mobilizes a line. Therefore, since
then, we have created a sort of overflow room. You should know that the psychological support
of a victim, very important indeed, can mobilize a line and an operator for half an hour or three
quarters of an hour.
I will bring to finish a further response to Mr Lellouche. In the column of the bis, Professor
saffron was there to ensure security and medical support of the men of the bis. Nevertheless, he
spent his time out of the victims and so we were able to get a maximum of well injured before
the final assault of 0 hours 20. People, families should be aware that all those that we pick up, we
went to look for them. Remains that Professor saffron, it was equipped with a bulletproof vest, a
kevlar helmet, and was therefore easier to do. Quite honestly, he must tell the truth: the bis had
more support health because bis physicians were only victims.
Mr. Serge Grouard. My first question prolongs your considerations, my general, on
psychological victims. When it is in situations of extreme emergency such as you have
described, one suspects that there are priorities, but you've certainly seen, we heard victims who
have raised this issue of support in the long term. Can you tell us a Word?

Do not see in my second critical the slightest question, but the present commission has intended
to understand what has happened and, if possible, to propose avenues of improvement. Yet once,
it is in no way a criticism, in the light of the dedication of the staff who were on the spot. The
mass bombings, are there others, and in Europe, you recalled. Have you imagined before
November and perhaps even before the attacks of January 2015, this type of scenario and
conducted exercises to test your response capacities, adaptation like the military regularly do? I
attended several national defence White books in which one can find scenarios and subscenarios, description of crisis situations. We can of course provide for everything, but I wished
to know if scenarios considering attacks of mass such as those we suffered were anticipated,
which would have enabled to apprehend reality.
M. Pierre Lellouche. The Moscow Theater attack and hostage-taking in Beslan are two
precedents at the Bataclan.
The President Georges Fenech. It seems to me that early responses have been made to
questions from Mr. Grouard.
General Philippe Boutinaud. Firefighters are exercised regularly, every Saturday morning.
Once a month, fire groups are associated with the exercise. We define issues company by
company. It would be difficult to detail the astronomical amount of our exercises. And it is not
today. Eight years ago, I commanded a group of fire and our exercises were unannounced - the
part does not know if it is for an exercise or an actual intervention - then probably to least
interfere with the population, they have been planned. I asked the Commissioner of police the
possibility of resuming the unannounced exercises and it recently cleared me. Coordination with
other services is another matter and that is decided above me. We we are in any case almost
always with the police, while it is a little more complicated with other services. Should also not
lose sight of that, when you perform an exercise, you are somewhat impoverished if happens
something while there.
Professor Pierre Carli. Unlike the military, civilians time to exercise does not exist, so we take
it. Each year, the SAMU de Paris, in an academic setting, that of the capacity of disaster
medicine, i.e. in the context of the training of doctors - which, on this occasion, from the France we organize an exercise. Large-scale exercises conducted during the period 2005-2010 on multisite attacks in transportation. At that time, the scenario was bomb explosion as it happened in
Madrid and London. Came to add the notion of shooting, which was not part of the scenario, and
which changed the support of victims, forcing us to predict different paths. This is why we we
there are harnessed as early as 2013. We therefore conducted three years of shooting single site
that allowed us to have some - admittedly theoretical - knowledge of the subject.
The President Georges Fenech. Are the BSPP and the UAS the exercises from attacks by
nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical (NRBC)?
Professor Jean-Pierre Tourtier. Next Thursday held a joint BSPP-UAS training on CBRN risk.
On the other hand, I do not wish to give pieces of information to ears that us would not caring.
We adapt our contingency plans to the evolution that we perceive the threat.

The President Georges Fenech. Among those present who have not yet spoken, does anyone
wish to speak?
Dr Franois Braun, president of the SAMU emergency of France, head of Department of
emergency medicine. I will return to the province. The principles established by our colleagues
in the SAMU de Paris and the BSPP are several years in all regions of France. We apply exactly
the same principles of sectorisation of filierisation of the victims than in Paris, on a scale that
will nevertheless impose on us a more response capacity. In the Lorraine region, for example,
there are 24 teams SMUR's guard, which is not at all the same volume as in Paris. Also we apply
principles of obligation of very fast, duty to interfere reinforcements, if it can be summarized as
follows. In other words, proximity UAS, under plans ORSAN - acronym for "Organization of the
response of the health system in exceptional health situations" - defined by the Ministry of health
will send immediately additional means. In addition, and this is something that has not been
seen, all the areas of defence sent in anticipation of the means to Paris without even our
colleagues Parisian we have requested them. In particular, heliborne ways were road before even
the assault of the Bataclan. And, noting that, unfortunately, the victims had died, they did turn
around. The idea is that each send some reinforcements in order to not be poor, but which
represent altogether much for those receiving. This is, roughly, what is the architecture of all
plans now in place in the province, based on concepts of support, of intervention in kit damage
controlteams, established as a result of the Parisian experiences.
The President Georges Fenech. Is it not possible to carry out evacuations by air in Paris?
Professor Pierre Carli. This topic is very important. Not only it is not easy to land helicopter
night in Paris, but we have hospitals nearby. Civil security and ambulance helicopters were there
yet, and they were eight, equipped with medical teams who have gone for some until the Issy les
Moulineaux heliport. These helicopters were the third line of defense. A raised area was planned
next to the Bataclan that would enable the use of helicopters to transport victims to hospitals in
small and large Crown.
The President Georges Fenech. Where was the raised area, exactly?
Professor Pierre Carli. A little behind, to the cours de Vincennes.
General Philippe Boutinaud. Raised areas are identified and we know which use of day, of
night. The authorization of the overview of Paris belongs to the prefecture of police. It is not
uncommon, in the small Crown, we used a helicopter which, in general, precisely serves to
overcome difficulties in traffic to save a patient with a particular disease. The case that was
somewhat different. We requested helicopters to anticipate secondary evacuations in the event of
a scenario "in the Bombay' with many more victims even if, of course, the number of victims
was already far too high. Knowing the capabilities of the AP - HP for discussion with Pierre
Carli well before the attack, needed, if much more numerous victims, be able to send related
emergencies to hospitals in province. Indeed, a casualty in extreme urgency must be treated
immediately, under penalty of death within the hour. Related emergencies can, for their part,
wait five or six hours.

It is therefore well on emergency victims which were possibly intended to be evacuated by

helicopter. We would be gone to pick them up in hospitals where they could be treated and we
would have taken using our FSEC to an area where could arise heavy helicopters, namely the
NH90, capable of carrying ten to fifteen people. Places we had already been allocated to Lille,
Nancy and Metz. We have finally didn't need this device, it is anyway necessary to predict in
advance rather than assemble at the last moment.
The President Georges Fenech. Why not have these helicopters used to transport the wounded
from the Bataclan to Parisian hospitals?
General Philippe Boutinaud. Because the distance was almost more than the land distance
between the Bataclan and the hospital. Helicopter would have brought no added value.
Colonel Jean-Claude Gagnon, Deputy to the commanding general of the BSPP. There was
even a risk to fly a helicopter at night. The manAirmobile work was launched at 22: 30.
Dr. Yves Lambert, head of the pole of the urgency, Director of the UAS of Yvelines. To
resume a previous question, there is no that Paris. The wounded, in this horrible attack, were
close to the hospital - this is just show stating that the helicopter was not here, added value.
However, not only in the large Crown, we see that we would be led to use somewhat different
means, a fortiori, therefore, the rest of the France.
Generally, we are talking about plans, preparation of different activities. Still need to emphasize
the importance of the medical-psychological urgency cell that very-heavy. The reports of the
relevant departments showed that the involvement of these cells has lasted more than a month
after the attacks.
When occur events that do not quite match the plan, the objective is not to apply the latter but
save the maximum of patients. This requires a reasoning of staff. In this case, involution the
plane has been in the right direction. Thus, within the framework of the damage control, we had
to support a number of patients was not provided for by this system. The damage control, which
is a thoughtful support, which is not the scoop and run of the Anglo-Saxons, is a method that
must be understood by all the services, including by the police. Curl which has been
mentioned repeatedly is very important. Also, on our side, as SAMU, we understand how to
work the police services in order to intervene. We had the 'luck', if I may say, police services, for
brave they were as well as everyone has pointed out, have been little involved. But as there in no
doubt will not go always thus, we need to understand the strategies of all.
In short, it is not to implement a plan because it is the plan, but the plan remains fundamental to
help structure action, driven by a joint staff reflection involving therefore all services.
Professor Frdric Adnet, UAS 93 Director, responsible of the home-emergencies-imagery
at the University Hospital Avicenne Seine-Saint-Denis Paris, Bobigny. I was responsible for
the service that has supported the first attacks, in accordance with the plan 'camembert '. The
specificity of the attack at the Stade de France, is that we were on the front spot. Inside the
stadium, is a command post where are represented the medical service of the fire brigade,

ambulance, police forces, the RATP... This prudential has enormously helped us ensure the
interface between different services to support victims and know immediately what was
happening. It seems to me important to emphasize because these prudential devices must in my
view be developed in future gatherings of masses which will take place in 2016 and thereafter.
We must integrate the fact that medical personnel and those of the BSPP must be very present in
such devices. Indeed, we know the places and the men.
Then it spoke much the safety of the personnel involved; but I can tell you that the 'sur-attentat',
we have experienced. The second explosion, at the stage of France, occurs when a team of the
UAS is present and first aid of the BSPP are present. The third explosion, one that causes the
greatest number of cases of absolute urgency, occurs long after and all medical teams are
present, as well as all the teams of firefighters. Fortunately for intervening teams, this explosion
took place at the level of a queue of the Mc Donald's , which was a bit away from relief. I mean
there do you measure the risk of sur-attentat is not only theoretical. If the explosion had occurred
in the middle of relief, not only balance sheet would have been worse but the relief would have
been really disorganized. Also, I stress, balance between securing the committed staff and
support for victims is it not only theoretical.
Colonel Jean-Claude Gallet. I suggest an easy to apply improvement track. It is a political will
and reports to the interdepartmental level. It concerns the sharing of information.
It must be done upstream, so as to know the procedures that describes very well the Professor
Carli: development of a strategy, preparation of exercises, cela compared to the modus operandi
of terrorists. It is also for agencies to know each other - the emergency chain is composed of a set
of heterogeneous actors. We must fight a battle, develop joint doctrine. However, for the time
being, we have no doctrine, we are different players, so we need to get to know us, we need to
know our dimensioning, our critical abilities factors - because decision is taken within two to
three minutes.
The sharing of information must also be performed during operations. The general said that it
was a sequence of forty minutes. We are dealing with one wave to another, we are faced with a
CBRN attack... This information is necessary for the policy so that it has a time frame of
communication. Because then there's resilience, the resilience of the nation.
Finally, the sharing of information must be done in the phase that follows: that is what we are
doing with you at this time. This is the phase "experience feedback".
M. Pierre Lellouche. I heard you say that you you were trained for operations in the trains, you
were drawn to face of strafing; but I come back to the question of Mr. Grouard. There was an
attack on a Moscow Theater in 2002, then attack in Beslan and in 2009, a bombing in Egypt
where it was made to attack the Bataclan. Indeed, a survey revealed that the Bataclan was
quoted. At any time, naturally, you have been put to aware of this? And at any time you do not
you are trained on the venues? Annex question: do you intend to do?
The President Georges Fenech. The question is clear: do you have indeed brought to have
plans of venues? Did you know that the Bataclan was a possible target?

General Philippe Boutinaud. The difficulty for firefighters is that they are not identified as a
public service needing to receive sensitive information. Police has its feedback system, the army
of his own, and firefighters, to the crossroads, are called when something happened. However, in
order to anticipate, you need to know exactly what are the modes of action. This was the sense of
entirely apposite intervention of my Deputy.
Personally, I never knew that the Bataclan was threatened. Someone in the country, really knew?
What I can tell you is that colonel Gagnon and I spend our time to peel the modes of action of
others. You mentioned Beslan; the day before, in Beirut, there was an attack in which relief have
been hit. We are discussing with a number of our counterparts engaged in highly exposed areas. I
know many of my colleagues, in the Lebanon and elsewhere, and we meet our information. But
this practice is not institutionalised.
M. Pierre Lellouche. It was the meaning of my question.
General Philippe Boutinaud. Should progress in the matter. I discussed it personally with the
prefect of police, and he is quite aware.
With respect to the plans, firefighters have plans across for a long time. Moreover, when you
enter any venue, if you turn the head to the right or to the left, you'll find the site plan, which
display is mandatory. These plans are made for firefighters and represent the level where you
are. As in smoke, you don't see anything, you tear off the wall plane to serve you. Thus, in
France, you have to find in all establishments receiving the public, the plan of the level where
you are, it is the law.
Thence to dispose of the basement plans, the outline of a building, is another question. Police
officers, for example, can take our plan but having that one level where they are, they do not
know quite what there will be to the floor above. Constitute a database in which we would find
all the plans is not impossible to imagine, but its use would be complicated do - what to update:
the office for the prevention of the BSPP treats 700 deposits of building permits or requests for
new accommodations per week!
Mr. Meyer Habib. I wish to return two hours forty minutes that preceded the final assault at the
Bataclan. Last week, in the context of this Committee, I asked the Minister of the Interior on the
possibility of a change in doctrine, which would be, when it is not a hostage but a massacre, to
join as soon as possible contact. Earlier, one of the officers said that one of the doctors, equipped
with a bulletproof vest and a helmet, was able to get out of victims. I wish to have your feelings
about this change in doctrine, in particular on the Israeli doctrine that should go to the more
quickly in contact when you are not confronted, I repeat, a hostage. Can we thus imagine that
many physicians are placed behind the units...
The President Georges Fenech. The question before that you not to join us, my dear colleague.
General Philippe Boutinaud. I would however like to recall a point: the doctor who follows the
bis or the RAID column is there to provide medical support to the police. Now it happens that
the Saffron teacher, in this case, I mentioned, spent his time out of the victims so that we take

them into account. With regard to the change of doctrine, I did wish give you all details of the
reflection underway on the subject, at least publicly.
The President Georges Fenech. We eventually auditionnerons you behind closed doors.
It remains for me, Madam, gentlemen, thank you very much for having brought us these very
valuable explanations for our Committee of inquiry.
Hearing, open to the press, Mr. Jean Benet, Director of transport and the protection of the
public from the prefecture of police of Paris, and of Professor Bertrand Ludes, Director of
the medico-legal Institute of Paris
Hearing, open to the press, Wednesday, March 16, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, gentlemen, for having responded to the invitation
of our Committee of inquiry. The medico-legal Institute of Paris is attached to the Directorate of
transport and the protection of the public from the prefecture of police of Paris. It receives the
body in the event of accidental death or not, on the highway of death of criminal origin or
considered as a suspect, by request of the family, for hygiene public or well even when the body
is not identified.
I indicates that this hearing is open to the press and made a live broadcast on the video portal
website of the National Assembly. Registration will be available for a few months.
I would also point out that the Commission may include in its report any part of the report that
will be made of the hearing. We decided that number of our hearings would be open to the press
in order to ensure the necessary transparency towards the public.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of November 17, 1958, I ask you
to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr. Jean Benet and Professor Bertrand Ludes successively take oath.
I leave you the floor for a keynote presentation. Then, the rapporteur, the members of the
Commission and I will have to ask for clarification or you have other questions.
Mr. Jean Benet, Director of transport and the protection of the public from the prefecture
of police of Paris. I supplement your words, Mr president, by specifying that the Directorate of
transport and the protection of the public from the prefecture of police of Paris (DTPP)
participates health work which belongs to the prefect of police. The prefecture of police
exercises, in place of the Mayor of Paris, the follow-up to the Forensic Medicine Institute in
administrative and financial matters, but does not interfere in its missions of medico-judiciaire
nature which prescribers are the judicial police authorities. This means in particular that, on the
occasion of crises, the DTPP can come give its support to the Director of the Forensic Medicine
Institute, Professor Ludes, without so far as there are hierarchical relationships. The Forensic
Institute is affiliated, not integrated, at the DTPP.

From the point of view of the chronology of events, Bertrand Ludes kicks in for the attacks in the
month of January 2015, because I was not yet in position at that time. Regarding the attacks in
the month of November 2015, we have been alerted immediately by the services of permanence
of the office of the prefect of the dramatic events of the evening of November 13. We are placed
in an alert situation and I contacted Professor Ludes and the heads of all services that could be
mobilized quickly. It's officially at 4 o'clock in the morning that he was very clearly asked me
what was the capacity of the Institute of forensic medicine and it is at that time that we had very
precise information on the extent of the drama. We already knew that the Institute would have to
receive very quickly many bodies.
Professor Bertrand Ludes, Director of the medico-legal Institute of Paris. We have received
the bodies of the victims the next day, Saturday, November 14, from 6 in the morning. Imagery
post-mortem operations began in the afternoon. Actual forensic operations were conducted from
Sunday 15 November and ended, for the victims, on Thursday, 19 November. In total, we had to
process during this period of time 123 body, whose 17 bodies mutilated, under judicial M.
requisition the Prosecutor of the Republic.
Regarding the attacks in the month of January, we have approved a first body on 7 January in the
afternoon then the other body in the evening after 11 pm. The next morning, we conducted
operations for Imaging post-mortem and afternoon forensic autopsies. Friday, we continued the
forensic operations and received the bodies of other victims, including those of the attack of
theHypercacher. These operations have been completed, for the victims, Saturday January 10
late in the evening. With regard to the authors, autopsies were made Monday, January 12.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. I would like to know if forensic operations concerning the
victims of the attacks of November 13 have all been completed to date.
Professor Bertrand Ludes. We have completed the thanatological operations on all of the
victims.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you explain what this term?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. This is forensic autopsies and thorough body exams.
The rapporteur. NSWFB of Paris (BSPP) officials and the SAMU, that we heard just before
you, we explained that one in two deaths occurred within five minutes of inflicted by
Kalashnikovs gunshot wounds, and three deaths in four within thirty minutes. This means focus
on preventable deaths during operations first aid.
Autopsies that you have carried out allow you to establish costed deaths which could have been
avoided?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. The question for us is difficult to the extent that this notion of
preventable death is carried by emergency room doctors who treat people when they are still
alive. For our part, it is based on injuries that we see during the autopsies we can advise, with

extreme caution, on the possibilities of survival of the victim. Experience in the material is
owned by the military doctors who support the wounded.
The rapporteur. Further stated us that 90% of these preventable deaths are linked to bleeding
members and 10% to the obstruction of the upper airway. I understand the difficulty that was
yours, but given the injury that you have found, are you able to indicate to what extent the dead
are due to bleeding or obstruction of the upper airway?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. I can't answer your question concerning freedom of the airway. We
make our observations when all equipment has been removed: we can only see sores or lesions in
the respiratory tract. Freedom of the airway can be observed in a dynamic manner, when current
resuscitation and intubation probes are asked.
Then, our operations have not been completed. We have not delivered all of our autopsy reports.
We are still working on these issues. In any case, we often had to see multiple lesions on victims,
which suggest that there was not just a member who was affected. The victims have often been
affected by several projectiles.
The rapporteur. It is important for our Committee of inquiry: you seem to tell us that, according
to your first observations, there were few preventable death due to multiple injuries.
Professor Bertrand Ludes. This is not quite what I said. The work is underway. The overview
that I can withdraw is that there are multiple lesions gunshot victims.
The rapporteur. Deaths are therefore not only due to the fact that a member has been affected.
Professor Bertrand Ludes. They are not necessarily the fact related that one Member has been
affected. We carry out other work, once all the reports will be written at the request of Mr.
Prosecutor.
The rapporteur. I have questions about the organization that was yours.
In the answers you have made to the questionnaire we sent you, you mention the fact that the
Prosecutor, seems to me, made the choice not to mobilize the Forensic Medicine Institute of the
gendarmerie and focusing teams on a unique location, the medico-legal Institute of Paris. I ask
you in a little abrupt way: have you felt overwhelmed by the number of victims? I understand
that some policemen were dispatched to the medico-legal Institute of Paris. However, would
have you it seemed relevant to open the second Institute of forensic medicine? The Commission
needs to have explanations on the choice that has been made to open only one centre.
On the other hand, you have been warned at 4 o'clock in the morning on the night of 13-14
November. By whom you have communicated such information? Why tell you so late at night?
We need that you bring details of certain factual elements. The president and myself have
received the written testimony of a victim's family, who expressed the difficulties she has
encountered at the Forensic Institute. She reported that the switchboard was not commensurate

with the magnitude requests and said to have had the impression of being 'face to an ordinary
administration in its ordinary operation'. "On Monday, at 9 a.m., we called to prevent that we
would be there at 10: 30 pm Surprised and apparently not willing to receive us, our contact told
us that it was expected that would remind us very quickly. At 10: 30 pm no news, new call on
our part, new interlocutor and confirmation that we would not be able to see the body on
Monday. Asked us even if we would have other niches in the week". Attitude which shocked the
victim's parents, because their son's body had still not been identified and uncertainty still hung
over his death. In addition, they stress that it would be impossible for a while to know where the
body was located between the Percy hospital departure and arrival at the Forensic Institute. They
also say to be confronted with new difficulties during the lifting body: inappropriate schedules,
bad directions to enter the Institute.
I don't want to overwhelm you, as you did with your staff, exemplary work and I can clarify you
that this family shows in his testimony have an extremely available interlocutor, who gave him
his phone number and brought effective responses. The Organization of the Institute, with
notably from personnel in reinforcement crisis, appeared you strong enough?
M. Jean Benet. We were informed at the outset of what is brewing. At 4 o'clock in the morning,
we have seen very accurately the number of bodies that we were likely to welcome. But we were
already organized, including our support to some tracks. The Institute of forensic medicine is put
immediately in running order and he was able to receive the bodies from 6 o'clock in the
morning.
Professor Bertrand Ludes. I confirm what has just said Director. We were on alert as early as
the day before and had already contacted our colleagues so that they present the arrival of the
first bodies.
The Prosecutor of the Republic has decided to focus resources on a single centre. The IML has a
so-called disaster room, which can accommodate 200 bodies. And the judicial authority may
decide to mobilize.
In addition, we received the support of our colleagues in the Institute for criminal research of the
national gendarmerie (IRCGN): general Yves Schuliar visited on the spot as soon as Saturday,
and three doctors came to support us from the beginning of the thanatological operations on
Sunday morning, and a team of ballisticians, who brought us an invaluable aid.
With regard to the home, we mobilized our agents and the psychologist of the Institute. We have
welcomed four families on Saturday afternoon and made two presentations of body. On Sunday,
15 November, twenty-six presentations were held; Monday November 16, 43; on Tuesday, 37;
on Wednesday, 28; Thursday, 18; on Friday, seventeen; on Saturday, eight. Then these
presentations have followed a less brisk pace where families had already been to see the body of
their deceased.
We have extended the opening hours as much as possible: the Institute allowed the departures of
body from 7: 30 in the morning until the evening, 18 hours or 18 hours 30 during the week
following our operations. Departures for burial began from Thursday.

Regarding stakeholders, families have certainly been dealing with various people. The problem
of niches arise, taking into account the very large number of applications. It was necessary that
we can respond to each of the families. We have made so that families can see once the body
before allowing a second or third presentations.
One cannot speak of regular operation. We are organised on the basis of the magnitude of the
events. We even received families the night for some difficult presentations.
You mentioned the case of these parents who were more trace of their son's body. We ignore
when the body leave hospitals, we record them on their arrival at the Institute. I can therefore not
pronouncing on what happens before.
The rapporteur. Could the opening of the IRCGN help you better manage the reception of
families or the workload?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. Find it me difficult to answer. Having received the support of the
IRCGN undeniably helped us. The Exchange with the ballisticians has been crucial in our
judicial work.
Another extremely important point: we have also received the support of the interdepartmental
assistance to victims (CIAV) cell, which soothes both families and stakeholders.
M. Jean Benet. The Forensic Institute shall each year to 2 000 autopsies and 8,000 external
examinations, most often sensitive. It has one-quarter of the forensic autopsy in France. In Paris
and small Crown, it offers a great capacity for disasters of this nature. I do not know what is the
capacity of the IRCGN.
M. Pierre Lellouche. I would like to return to a question that I have already asked the
representatives of the fire brigade of Paris and the SAMU. Have you established a typology of
injuries? When you have completed the autopsy work? In other words, are you able to know how
many people could have been saved if relief had arrived earlier? It is the substantive issue that
arises, not only for the evening of November 13, but also for managing other attacks of this type.
Professor Bertrand Ludes. The typology is made, it is included in our autopsy reports. By the
end of April, this work will be completed.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Mr president, I would like that the members of the Commission may have
knowledge in order to better understand what can be done in the future.
The President Georges Fenech. These are items that you must first provide justice, is not it?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. Indeed. These works are carried out at the request of the Prosecutor
of the Republic, and now the magistrates.
The President Georges Fenech. We will seek the Prosecutor's office to find out if it is possible
to provide us with this information.

Could you tell us more about your methods to identify and discuss the difficulties that you may
encounter?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. Identification is the responsibility of the police for the identification
of victims of disasters (UPIVC) unit, which is divided into a cell ante-mortem and post-mortem.
In this regard, we compete in post-mortemdata. Investigators, meanwhile, are all the primary and
secondary - signs scars, tattoos, fingerprints, DNA, odontogrammes. What are these teams who
then submit identifications, which we enclose medical findings so that the latter can sign the
burial permit to the magistrate. It is a team effort.
The difficulties are always linked number of persons, alteration of the body and the knowledge
of the ante-mortem. The UPIVC teams are from the families of elements to establish an antemortemdata. At the same time, we realize records post-mortem with the investigators. And this is
the comparison of the two plugs that allows to establish the identification.
The President Georges Fenech. You have indicated that the first corps had arrived at 6 a.m.,
Saturday, November 14, and the last at 10: 50 pm, Thursday, November 19. How do you explain
this time?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. We received after November 14 the bodies of the victims have died
in hospitals. And then those of the perpetrators of the attacks.
M. Christophe Cavard. I would like to have more details on the steps separating the findings of
death on the spot and the transport to the Institute of forensic medicine. Who makes the decision
to transport of the body: the doctor who finds the death or someone else? This precision is
important when deaths are also numerous.
How visits to relatives actually took place? The limited number of places for the reception of
families posed for problems
What requests have been made for the bodies of the terrorists and what medical work you had to
make?
The President Georges Fenech. I recall that Professor Ludes is bound to the confidentiality of
the investigation. I think it is difficult for him to answer that last question.
Professor Bertrand Ludes. Regarding the circuit, it is the judicial police officer, placed from
physicians of the UAS and the Paris fire brigade, who decides the transport of the body and the
place where it will be routed through services of pumps-funeral, with authorized vehicles, once
all the necessary clues collected. The finding of death on place is established by the emergency
doctors and resuscitators. I am speaking to the reception of the body to the Institute. There was
no member of my team on the spot. We were together at the MLI to deal best with the situation.
Regarding the visit of the public, it should be noted that the deceased can be seen where it has
been identified or when we have enough criteria, in the light of the elements provided by the
judicial police officers, in order to make the body. There have been people who have made an

appointment via the CIAV, others which went directly to the Institute. We have supported
families in their order of arrival. They were first welcomed by medical and psychological
emergency cells (CUMP) installed in tents at the entrance to the Institute. Then we made them
wait in one of two waiting rooms where they were accompanied by a clinical psychologist who
gave their support and explained how things would unfold. Finally, we presented each body
individually in a large showroom where the family could gather. In other words, families have
been supported by steps with several Airlock to try to introduce as much serenity as possible.
We have had peaks of presentation, with, for example, on Monday, November 16, forty-three
body.
For the terrorists themselves, I can tell you, while respecting the secret which I am bound, that
the forensic treatment is the same. The questions posed by the judge apply to victims as for the
authors. We need to identify a number of elements set out in the mission, so we do it: they will
be included in the report. Some families of the authors wished that there's presentation. Funeral
operations followed their course in accordance with the wishes of relatives and regulation, but
delayed in relation to the victims of the attacks, what can add a greater complexity of work.
The President Georges Fenech. Have all the bodies been identified?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. For the victims, Yes, Mr Chairman.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. I would like to return to the family home. We heard victims and have
heard poignant testimony. I think that Sophie Dias, whose father died at the Stade de France. Is
your staff trained to accommodate families and announce the death?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. The staff is trained to the home. We shall certainly review relates to
the announcement of death in large numbers. I do not think can be allowed to mention the cases
you mentioned. I do not wish to speak citing proper names.
The President Georges Fenech. You are right.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. Do you think that other forensic institutes could be mobilized for you
allow to do your job more serene conditions?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. I mobilized other institutes. On Saturday, in the afternoon, we were
reinforced by a colleague of Strasbourg and a colleague of Lille. We have a network and can
activate it.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. What would happen if similar attacks occurred in the provinces? Could
the same benefits be provided?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. It is a comprehensive plan that will be studying with the forensic
community. The French society of forensic leads a reflection in this sense.

The rapporteur. Attacks in the province, would the Institute of Paris be able to dispatch
personnel? Where are you from your thoughts? Is a protocol or a plan under consideration?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. A plan is being developed. We've made our copy and the Ministry
of health is trying to process the data.
The French society of forensic medicine identified the capabilities of the various forensic
institutes of France and reflected on the possibilities of project personnel, be they technicians,
Secretaries, doctors, and send materials - chilled boxes and autopsy tables. Although not yet have
exercise, we have already developed an overall vision.
The rapporteur. In the days that followed the attack, have you been disturbed by third parties,
close the premises or by phone? How have you managed your press relations?
Professor Bertrand Ludes. Very clearly, we have not been hampered by third parties. Our
support is the prefecture of Paris police authority, we have immediately protected: the Institute
can be isolated in less than ten minutes, as we had already seen after the attacks of January 2015.
Both access to the MDU were guarded by police officers.
Concerning relations with the press, we have not had to worry about in. It is the communication
service of the police prefecture which took.
M. Jean Benet. Regarding the press, when the issues were of the judicial authority, permission
was requested from the Prosecutor of the Republic. There was support for differentiated
responses, depending on whether they were technical or that they involved litigation.
Mr. Georges Fenech. Director, Professor, thank you for having contributed to our work with so
much precision.
Round table, open to the press, dedicated to safety at the Stade de France on November 13,
2015: for the Consortium Stade de France : Mr. Christophe Bionne, Director of safety and
security, Mr. Jean-Philippe Dos Santos, Deputy Director of security, Ms. Florence Gaillot,
Executive Assistant, in charge of the seizure of the handrail of the event, Mr. Pascal Begain
responsible for fire safety, Mr. Damien Chemla, preventionist, responsible for the technical
and human means Ms. Suzanne Delourme, responsible for safety; for the French Football
Federation : Mr. Victoriano Melero, Director of cabinet of the president and Deputy
Director-general, Ms. Ccile Grandsimon, responsible for regulation and management of
the security of the meetings, Mr. Didier Pinteaux, responsible for safety and security; for
private security companies : Mr. Jean-Marc Peninou (Stand up), Mr. Mustapha Abba Sany
(Gest not sport), Mr. Bastien Rousseau (SGPS), Mr. Fabrice Laborie (ACA), Mr Olivier
Bruel (Als Event's), Mr Olivier Ploix (ISMA), Mr. Christian Glaz (MCS), Mr. Ludovic
Foret (JM safety), Mr. Olivier Roussel (Europa Secure Dog), Mr. Bruno Lafond and Mr.
Franck Chaboud (hand safety)
Report of the round table, open to the press, Wednesday, March 16, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Our final panel of the day deals with the events at the Stade de
France on November 13, 2015 and action of various stakeholders responsible for security. Are
thus present the security officials of the Consortium Stade de France from the French football
Federation, as well as the personnel of private companies, including for security. All took part in
the securing of the public November 13.
This roundtable is open to the press. It is under a live broadcast on the internet site of the
National Assembly. Registration will also be available for a few months on the video portal of
the National Assembly, and the Committee may decide to include in its report any part of the
report that will be made of the hearing.
We decided, in a manner General our hearings would be open to the press, because we need to
conduct this investigation in a transparent manner.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the commissions of Inquiry Ordinance of
November 17, 1958, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.
Mr. Christophe Bionne, Mr. Jean-Philippe Dos Santos, Mrs Florence Gaillot, M. Pascal Begain,
Mr. Damien Chemla, Ms. Suzanne Delourme, Mr Jean-Marc Peninou, Mustapha Abba Sany,
Bastien Rousseau, Fabrice Laborie, Olivier Bruel, Olivier Ploix, Christian Glaz, Ludovic Foret,
Olivier Roussel, Bruno Lafond and Franck Chaboud, and Mr. Victoriano Melero, Ms. Ccile
Grandsimon and Mr. Didier Pinteaux oath.
The President Georges Fenech. I give the floor to Mr. Christophe Bionne and Mr. Victoriano
Melero for an introductory remarks, and then a debate will engage in the course of which
members of the Commission arise you, ladies and gentlemen, issues.
M. Christophe Bionne, Director of safety and security of the Consortium Stade de France.
Safety and security at the Stade de France are based on devices created in common by the
organiser - November 13, it was the French football Federation - and operator, the Consortium
Stade de France. These devices, prepared in full partnership, are then presented in the prefecture
of the Seine-Saint-Denis, since the position of operational command (BCP) at events is placed
under the authority of the prefect.
There are many around this table - thanks for inviting us - for the simple reason that we employ
approximately 1,200 officers to safety by event at Stade de France, which can accommodate
more than 80,000 people. To bring together as many agents, we use several companies
referenced by the Stade de France.
How the device works on the evening of November 13 It is a bit hazy, in the sense where we
worked all night by reflex and in complete coordination with the services of the State - police,
NSWFB of Paris (BSPP), emergency services - not to mention the ISMA company, which
prepares medical devices for the Organizer. All this is the result of a total partnership: all devices
are prepared, the actors know for several years now and have a habit of working together. We
were also fortunate to have professional with us, which contributed to the security of all the

people in the stadium and especially permit avoid movements of crowd whose consequences
could be more dramatic than the action of suicide bombers outside the Stade de France.
Mr. Victoriano Melero, head of cabinet and Director-general Deputy of the French football
Federation. I confirm quite said Mr. Bionne. Responsibility for the security of the event in the
sports venue is the Federation as organizer in accordance with the code of sport and the
legislative provisions in force. In practice, there is a true co-management of security between the
Federation and the teams of the Consortium. Perfect knowledge of men and places allowed a
perfect cooperation, a very high reactivity, without floating point when it came to make decisions
on the basis of the sequence of events. There were a little over 1,000 security officers for the
event, either the classic security arrangements put in place for each important team of France at
the Stade de France game. I recall that cooperation involves both security teams of the
Consortium as security companies, the Federation and the authorities of the State, not to mention
the emergency services. If we could secure the sports venue and the evacuation of major smooth
spectators, this is really because the teams know each other and that the decisions in good time
without delay.
The President Georges Fenech. Immediately after that the explosions were heard at 9:19 and
then at 21 h 22, to doors D & H, what are the first steps taken by the person in charge of security,
the Consortium Stade de France or the French Federation of football, or by the agents of private
security companies?
M. Didier Pinteaux, responsible for the safety and security of the French football
Federation pole. As head of the safety and security of the French Federation of football I was
coordinator main to the PCO, under the prefect. From the second explosion, Mr. Warden has
taken hold on the event. He asked us to secure the East sector in its entirety and avoid any
departure from Viewer from this same sector. With the Consortium, we have arranged to close
access to no viewer left to this sector. All these operations have been conducted and, at halftime,
the spectators were released on the sectors South and North; none was allowed to enter the sector
East. While relief organized themselves under the authority of the prefect, we left the event to
continue until its end.
At the end of the meeting, we had to facilitate the departure of the spectators, always without let
them out by the industry is to avoid exposing them to possible new attacks. Everything went
well, but two minutes later, a group of spectators returned to the stadium, by the South sector, as
a result of the explosion of firecrackers near the A86 motorway, towards the RER D. Between 2
000 and 5,000 spectators and fled on the lawn. Twenty to twenty-five minutes later, the main
Commissioner present to the OSP having found the cause of the explosions, we left out the
people. All left without a problem.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. It has not quite understood how things has happened at
Stade de France, nor how the terrorists, who have failed to enter, were organized, structured. We
know the role played by private security, in particular by the vigil it rejected, in a heroic and
exemplary action, one of the suicide bombers, but not the exact scenario of events. What
certainty did you that there's no risk of sur-attentat at the time of the release of the public? The

question arises because the German team refused to leave and stayed on site. What was the level
of information, at this point there? And how the decision to leave out the spectators was taken?
Mr Didier Pinteaux. All decisions have been taken by Mr. prefect. For any decision I had to
take, I had to ask her permission. Only he can answer you on this point. As he worked with the
forces of order, on the spot and close to the attacks, it is the only one to know.
The rapporteur. At 21 h 44, the prefect had taken the decision to ban the audience out of the
stadium.
Mr Didier Pinteaux. He took this decision in the second explosion.
The rapporteur. According to the unrolled that was forwarded, is at 21:44.
Mr Didier Pinteaux. No, this is the second explosion.
The rapporteur. According to the handrail that was transmitted to us by some of you: 9:44 pm,
order of the prefect: "person out of the stadium. Spectators are out despite this order? Were areas
secure?
Mr Didier Pinteaux. They were trying to get out, but the prefect refused any viewer of the
stadium exit.
The rapporteur. Around 21:45, I imagine that information circulated by SMS, by social
networks, and that spectators were aware. Were there crowd at doors movements, requests for
output? How was the crowd managed inside the Stade de France? During the second half, it was
seen that the forums are not draining.
Mr Didier Pinteaux. To our surprise, precisely, nothing has circulated in the stadium, he had
not really communication. The spectators moved not. Some wanted out, but really few - between
50 and 100.
The rapporteur. You say that, surprisingly, they did not have the information?
Mr Didier Pinteaux. I think.
M. Christophe Bionne. Me, I think that people who had information have not believed.
To return to the risk of sur-attentat, there were three explosions: the first two to three minutes
apart, the third about twenty minutes later. After the third, we knew there was very little risk that
terrorists are entered in the stadium. It was decided that people there would be more safely. We
have waited until the police had verified the zone and all routes to the RER B and D, and line 13
of the Mtro, to let go people.
The rapporteur. The game ended between 10:45 and 22:50. The vast majority of the French
was aware of what was going on at the Stade de France, at least there were assumptions of

explosion. They could make the connection with the attacks that had occurred in five other areas
of Paris; information is disseminated. Until the end of the match, there has been no movement of
worry or panic, no attempt to exit? I'd be surprised that none of the 65,000 spectators had
information.
M. Christophe Bionne. The information circulated: the stadium is connected, push notifications
pass, and with BFM TV and the different networks, information circulates very quickly.
After the second explosion, I left sector West to go East. First, the OSP gave the order to close
all the doors. We pulled a line of Vauban barriers on the forecourt of the Stade de France. Then,
seeing that people are not moving, we are closer to the building to close the doors and
monumental stairs. At halftime, I was still on the spot. People came to watch, but they did
nothing because, even if explosions have emptied the street there was no departure from fire, or
vehicle returned, or smoke. People have not actually seen it happening something.
The rapporteur. I understand. They see anything and they doubt both an explosion at the Stade
de France seems surreal. But in the following minutes...
M. Christophe Bionne. No movement, Mr rapporteur.
The rapporteur. But between that time, 9: 20 pm, and the end of the match, at 2250 hours,
almost an hour and a half is happening during which information circulates. Continuous news
channels, social networks, family members informed, confirmed that there had been explosions
at the Stade de France. What happens in Paris, including at the Bataclan, is also known. I
understand that, in the minutes that followed the first explosions and during halftime, it nothing
was special. But more the evening progressed, most spectators were aware. How do you explain
that the crowd management posed no difficulty within the Stade de France? People felt safe that
confined because?
M. Christophe Bionne. Our greatest concern was the crowd movements. Also we asked all
coordinators or patterns of society here mention only a technical problem. At no time, they were
talking about attacks or suicide bombers.
The rapporteur. Is this explanation still credible to 22.30, while the whole world is aware?
M. Christophe Bionne. I have no other explanation to give you. I can tell you that what we have
done: we said never mention anything other than a technical problem and be reassuring with the
public. This is what has been done.
The rapporteur. At the risk of sur-attentat was added for you, the difficulties associated with
the management of the crowd. Has a particular device it been implemented Artwork by staff, in
connection with the police? I understand that the entrance of "reinforcements lawn", at 21 h 42,
is usual to avoid trespassing on the lawn for half-time. It had nothing to do with the attacks.
M. Christophe Bionne. Altogether.

The rapporteur. What additional provisions related to the attacks, have been taken to avoid
crowd movements, during the game and at the time the prefect, permitted the exit of spectators?
M. Christophe Bionne. Officers have been moved from their positions closer to closest to the
public, to reassure and block access to sector East and half of sector North, where vehicles of the
BSPP were initially deployed. Ultimately, we evacuated the stadium of France by two sectors
and a half instead of four, by positioning officers who have done their work very well. I have no
other explanation to give you.
As for the German team, I think that it has received instructions to stay at the Stade de France.
She had already undergone, it seems, a bomb alert at the hotel in the afternoon.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you repeat that?
M. Christophe Bionne. We were told that there was a bomb alert at their hotel in the afternoon.
Mr. Victoriano Melero. There was a bomb alert at their hotel. With, in addition, events around
the Stade de France, they decided to stay until their departure for the airport, at seven o'clock in
the morning.
The President Georges Fenech. Which hotel they took?
Mr. Victoriano Melero. At the Molitor, porte d'Auteuil.
The rapporteur. At halftime, around 21:45, nobody leaves the stage. Also have the deposit that
you had given to staff to communicate technical problems, messages been disseminated at
halftime? I know that was there at the end of the match.
M. Christophe Bionne. To brighten up the evening, animations during half-time are provided by
the organiser. We followed the normal programme; all the events took place, and there has not
been a message to say something else. We were as surprised as you are tonight to see that the
public did not respond.
Mr Didier Pinteaux. The main objective that we had given the prefect was clear: no one should
go in Sector East. In light of the second explosion, he wanted to secure it in full, by taking the
time it would take to remove the doubt. The second point, it was to reassure spectators in the
stadium. To do this, we gave instruction to all personnel to invoke a technical incident to explain
the closing of the gates. Seeing this, a regular fast includes there is a problem, because it is not a
usual device under event. The message was perfectly executed by security personnel, and no
movement of crowd was observed throughout this period.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Has the Federation considered at one point, interrupting the match? I
understand that you fear of crowd movements, but there are still terrorists who blow up in the
Stade de France!
M. Christophe Bionne. Outside the Stade de France, Sir!

Mr. Meyer Habib. Yes, outdoors. This is nevertheless question?

We at length heard Vigil, psychologically extremely marked, who saw the bomber. He has
noticed long before that to be exploded, and he thought that it was a police officer. What would
have happened if, instead of wait outside the stadium, the bomber had entered half an hour, a
quarter of an hour before the game, when people are lining up to pass security checks? Our
chance is that it be blew up after the beginning of the match, and outdoors. Since then, your
search protocol changed? I know that there is a physical pat down of all spectators.
M. Christophe Bionne. I will leave the FFF to speak about the possibility of a judgment of the
match. I would also ask Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Pinteaux to evoke the arrangements set in place
since the attacks, in partnership with public order and traffic (DOPC) branch and the prefecture
of Seine-Saint-Denis.
Mr. Victoriano Melero. The decision to continue the match was taken by the authorities of the
State present on the site tonight there. After consultation with the prefect, police forces and the
political authorities present, it was decided, fairly quickly, by all the world, that the most secure
place was the walls of the stadium. If the issue of a judgment arose, very quickly, the State
authorities have taken the decision that the match would continue as if nothing had happened.
Perhaps can Mr. Pinteaux answer other questions.
Mr Didier Pinteaux. I will leave the floor to Mr Dos Santos, who has Worked at rugby matches
played at the Stade de France since the attacks. The same device exactly will be deployed in the
next game of the team of France - France-Russia, March 29.
Mr. Jean-Philippe Dos Santos, Director Deputy of the consortium Stade de France security.
Security outside the stadium was much modified, level entries the public car parks and car parks
inside the stadium, including for VIPs who camped in the P0. All passengers descend vehicles
for a full search. In addition to the control from the cockpit and the luggage compartment, which
was already practiced, and specialized in explosives detection dog teams have been deployed on
car parks. This system was suitable for all stakeholders, but we quickly realized that the
explosives could be refitted inside the parking lot, in the form of very small parts. So we decided
to check a second time people leaving car parks. Once they have borrowed the stairs that bring
them to the level of the entrance gates to the stadium, the same search is therefore remade by
stewards - opening of the jackets, bags, quick palpation only on the upper part of the body. Once
past the parking lots, a pre-filtering takes place at the level of the doors to verify that the people
who come have well a ticket. Then they spend their ticket at the level of the tripod, behind which
a full pat down is redone.
The stadium is also on avenue Jules Rimet, where businesses whose it is not question to prohibit
access, we do not control the tickets. On the other hand, two hours before the shot sending - so at
5 pm for a 7 pm match-, while a device is set up on seven checkpoints, with the stewards and the
forces of order. The procedure is the same: opening of the jackets, bags, palpation of the upper
body before accessing the perimeter. Then people follow the same path as people arrived by car
parks: control of the ticket barriers, passage to the tripod level and full palpation. All these points

are requadrills by the forces of the order. The stewards are first curtain; behind, we always have
police forces armed, ready to intervene on all points of filtering, but also car parks.
Since the last three games, public order and traffic branch is also, on the access to the car parks,
three vehicles equipped with the system of automated reading number plates (ANPR) that allows
to know everything away if a vehicle is wanted for a reason any. On the eve of the events we
also do the same searches.
We cannot control all semi-trailers coming for deliveries inside the stadium, but the identities of
all persons entering the Stadium are recovered. Vehicles are selected randomly to be completely
discharged: stewards accompany them to the point of unloading where the crates and cartons are
open. Unfortunately, cannot do so for all vehicles, this would represent a huge work, and, above
all, a big delay for all preparations. The majority of the vehicles is not checked.
The President Georges Fenech. You are not obligated to give all the details.
The rapporteur. In the vicinity of the stadium, how are allocated the perimeters of jurisdiction
between stewards, security guards and police forces?
Are security companies chosen according to what process? How are recruited guards and
stewards, and what qualification?
M. Jean-Philippe Dos Santos. Companies respond to a call for tenders. Today, we in have
referenced thirteen. Depending on the type of event they are eight or nine to intervene at the
stage. Recruitment is managed directly by companies. We chose each of the companies
compared to a type of activity. Some are more specialized on the Pat-downs, others on access
control.
On the external mail, coordination is made with the forces of order. We operate that on the prefouilles, the forces of order will take place on all the problems that it might be on the mail crowd movements, etc.
The rapporteur. Specifically, is there, at your level or security companies, a job of screening
with intelligence? Such devices are provided, and reinforced, the RATP and the SNCF,
particularly following the recent adoption of a draft law.
M. Christophe Bionne. The 5,000 people who work on an event at Stade de France, sellers of
scarves to the bartenders, are accredited. The only other way to enter the Stade de France one
day event is to have a ticket to attend audit event. The FFF delegates us edition of accreditation
mission. All companies who need or want to work in the Stade de France receive a file which is
then forwarded to different services for screening. Security officers must have the professional
card issued by the national Council of private security (CNAPS) activity. For two years now, the
professional card number must be registered for accreditation, for a direct verification with the
services of the State of compliance of the professional card.
The President Georges Fenech. Screening gave results?

M. Christophe Bionne. I am not aware of this.

M. Christophe Cavard. The evening of November 13, it happens things outdoors since the
person who could not enter elects to explode next to a bar. Your staff is really confined indoors
or do, given the situation, some found outside?
Instructions are given to prevent movement of crowd and the public is not informed. But what
information issued to your staff? To what hierarchical level is made aware of the reality of the
attack?
As a member of province, I would like to know if the Stade de France has specific security that
would not pose significant stages of province? The FFF to work on possible developments of
devices in these stages?
Legislative developments are currently under review with regard to new administrative rights to
private speaking at major events security staff. The administrative opinion on personal in the
recruitment process would be reinforced but would always have a value of the opinion. What
would be the attitude of entrepreneurs of security with regard to this opinion?
M. Christophe Bionne. The scope of action of a security on the public highway officer is
subject to the authorisation of the prefect. Different perimeters traced between the organisers, the
operator and the police are therefore presented for prefectural authorisation. Asked to security
companies who will have to put agents on the exterior give the names and numbers of
professional card; It transmits it to the prefecture, and the prefect takes an order that allows these
companies to work on the public highway.
The Stade de France has 18 gates. In order to regulate the flow of public at best, a barriers with
prefiltering is installed. Two security officers check that you're well carrying a ticket. The
stadium is specific: If you're equipped with a ticket to sector East, you won't be able to enter to
the West. To avoid people to queue and direct them at best, security officers are responsible for a
home mission and invite them to proceed to the right door. This also allows to regulate better the
security pat-downs.
Who was aware of what? It is impossible to communicate by text message or by phone with all
the people with whom we work. We use walkie-talkies, between 600 and 800 per event, with
fifty-one groups of speech, which one is restricted to the coordinators and leaders, in addition to
what has FFF. We communicate on this channel.
M. Christophe Cavard. Up to what level are the people present aware that there is a terrorist
attack?
M. Christophe Bionne. Personally, I arrived five minutes after the second explosion; Therefore,
I have appreciated by myself. Then I returned to the operational command post raise JeanPhilippe Dos Santos, who has gone on the site. The OSP du Stade de France is a straight line
along which followed the police, the security of the Organizer, the operator, the RATP, the
SNCF, the BSPP and SAMU. We are all here and that is why we have had good results: we all

know, we are working together at each event, we participate in all the meetings of security in the
prefecture. We also work on all folders animation with the BSPP. It's really a college job, and
this is why it works as well.
The rapporteur. Do you tell your staff that there were attacks? If Yes, when? Alternatively do
speak you a technical problem?
Mr Didier Pinteaux. We are talking about a technical problem. And it has been transmitted to
the coordinators and leaders by myself.
The rapporteur. Never intermediate officials don't interviewed you? No one told it "you plug a
little while I have received such or such alert"?
M. Christophe Bionne. Absolutely not.
The rapporteur. I believe you, but I have trouble telling me that, until the end of the match,
person, staff or the public, only has doubted your technical problems while alerts referring to
explosions of kamikaze attacks in Paris and the Stade de France were sent across.
M. Christophe Bionne. Person. The only people who wanted to move, they were journalists.
The rapporteur. I want to believe you, but it's extraordinary!
M. Christophe Bionne. We have taken the oath to tell the truth. In addition, we have a machine
that allows us to record the walkie-talkies.
Mr. Victoriano Melero. What has been done is the mark of a great professionalism of all the
staff.
The rapporteur. This is true. We also heard, at the beginning of our work, one of your fellow
security guards whose action was heroic. Remains that it is amazing.
Mr. Victoriano Melero. With regard to the province, any movement of the team of France gives
rise to locations on the site where it will play and meetings, including in the prefecture, to define
the safety device. Of course, given events, reinforced safety devices will be implemented for the
games that will be held in the province in the coming months. Anyway, in principle, there is
always an organization, safety meetings, a strong collaboration with the operator of the stadium.
Due to the particular context, the devices will be strengthened in consultation with local
authorities.
M. Christophe Cavard. Is there a 'protocol attack' that anticipates up to events such as those in
the evening of November 13? Have these revealed the need to make changes?
Mr Didier Pinteaux. There is no ready dedicated Protocol, but everyone, especially Mr. prefect,
we have in mind everything that can happen at a big sporting event bringing together a large
number of spectators.

The rapporteur. How many are there guards by the door?

M. Jean-Philippe Dos Santos. This varies depending on the type of event and the public
expected. The Stade de France is equipped with tripod 141, and tonight, I think that there were
altogether 170 agents. There were a dozen agents by door.
The rapporteur. Once the match started, vigils remain a dozen by door or do they moved
elsewhere? The explosions took place near doors D & H, while the public had already returned.
How many guards were present?
Mr Didier Pinteaux. Should do this with the Main security company.
When we close the doors of the stadium, we leave one open by sector. That evening, we wanted
to test a deployment of stewards on another mission, and we found ourselves with far fewer
agents than expected at the gates, because they were closed. Remained so that agents who should
remove the barriers outside the gates to prepare for evacuation. They were very little. Should ask
Mr. Bruno Lafond.
The rapporteur. I complete my remarks until we leave the floor. I imagine that at the time of
the explosions, vigils, a radio-equipped personnel were present. The other guards have never
been aware of what past? Those who have seen the explosions have not reported? Then,
ambulances, firefighters have arrived... All this raised no query or is the subject of
communications between colleagues, door to door? The information is not widespread?
Mr Didier Pinteaux. In the OSP, the order that I had given to all sector coordinators and
company officials was clear: it would mean no communication referring to the attack.
The rapporteur. Can Mr. Lafond, you tell us what was your vigilante?
Mr. Bruno Lafond, representing the Main security company. Only stewards who were able
to see the explosions are those who were at the gates where they are produced. Only team leaders
are equipped with walkie-talkies and those who were there were perhaps communicated between
them. But as stewards, only those who were at these gates could see what had happened. There
been no other movement, even on the other doors.
Mr. Jean-Jacques Cottel. We are actually surprised by the calm that has reigned in this stage,
and we can that satisfy us that you have failed and that the crowd did not responded.
Typically, how long does it to evacuate during a demonstration where it happens nothing
exceptional?
From the perspective of the Euro's next football, the stewards are recruited, are not professionals.
Can the FFF indicate what recruitment criteria are used to have as many guarantees as possible?

Mr. Victoriano Melero. Security is provided by professionals. Volunteers and volunteers

participate effectively in the Organization of international events, but in no case not their tasks
security missions.
Security companies have been selected following a call for tenders by the company Euro 2016
SAS. Of course, many of the companies that today secure around the Stade de France will be for
Euro 2016.
M. Christophe Bionne. Stade de France, which holds about 80,000 people, is empty, if
everything goes well, in eight minutes. Then, spectators are to different stations. To ensure better
regulation, the services of police and gendarmerie, sometimes accompanied by Republican
guards on horseback, conduct some sort of filtering and flow control. There are also any
coordination with outlets that are being managed outside, to make the flying points and avoid
everyone arrives at the station at the same time - a pack of subway or train, it is 2,500 people. It
is to ensure this regulation that officials from the SNCF and the RATP are present in the OSP.
An RATP-police convention also allows us to have a return of the images of the different Quays
of the RER B and D and line 13 of the Mtro.
The rapporteur. The same vigil we heard said that when the first explosion, at Gate D, guards
who were with him at the door H is deported to the door D. Suddenly, he finds himself quite
alone in its door where takes place the second explosion. This offset of guards match a protocol
incident occurring in a door? Therefore, is there no risk to weaken the protection of others?
Mr Didier Pinteaux. The first thing you ask is to close the door to prevent spectators. The
second is to make a security perimeter to spread all the personnel. This is why they go to doors
that are nearby.
The rapporteur. In this case, were the doors closed during the first explosion?
Mr Didier Pinteaux. We were close, as is normally done once spectators entered the stadium. It
secures by limiting the number of doors open to four 18 - one per sector.
The rapporteur. What was the policy at the time of the first explosion? Initially, you do not
know when there is an attack.
Mr Didier Pinteaux. We have just secured the area. We thought that a gas cylinder had
exploded nearby. Video surveillance showed that the bars were returned, but not victim on the
ground. We thought a simple act of malfeasance. This is the second explosion that we knew that
it was an attack.
Mr president. And it is at 21 h 09 that the doors had been closed, with the exception of four for
latecomers.
The rapporteur. Without necessarily revealing everything, have you had a feedback suggesting
that any particular device should be improved? Can you tell which?

Mr. Victoriano Melero. A meeting was held in the prefecture with all the people and services
concerned this day there, to a State of play of what had worked well and which had worked less
well. Recommendations in emerged, of which some will be put into Work, and even
strengthened, for the Euro 2016. So, Yes, well there was feedback of experience at the level of
all actors and the Ministry of the Interior, including in the context of the Euro 2016.
Mr president. You talk about means and new features compared to what existed up to now?
Mr. Victoriano Melero. Reinforced devices.
Mr president. We can say, we touched a terrible disaster. What is not there another victim that
Mr. Dias is the miracle. Zero risk does not exist, but do you really think that all the new devices
would still be more efficient to protect themselves from this kind of abuse?
M. Christophe Bionne. It is difficult to answer this question. We do everything to ensure the
safety of the public, it is a fact. For my part, I myself am redone several times this evening film: I
would have not wanted to do differently. Fortunately, we had a lot of luck, but our luck too, it is
working with great professionals, with confidence and transparency. It is one of the keys to our
success, to the credit of the players both private security and public safety, even though we may
welcome to also have a little bit of amateurism on the other side.
M. Christophe Cavard. There is a life to the Stade de France, and not only game night. Even if
there are guards, how checks, after a game or at the end of an ordinary day, that the stadium is
empty at the time of any close?
M. Christophe Bionne. We have different control systems. The simplest is, as at the entrance to
the National Assembly, to put a badge in Exchange for identification, this for everyone. Other
processes which, if you allow me, I will not give the detail, involve filtration points, security
officers, a video surveillance system...
The President Georges Fenech. Wish someone among the attendees to complement it?
M. Olivier Ploix, representing society ISMA. ISMA, whose I am the Director of operations,
has a particular profile in what it provides, for the Organizer, the coordination of the medical
service and relief. As such, it refers, for its planned rescue device, the recommendations in terms
of medicalization, organization of materials and skills, issued in July 2014 by emergency SAMU
de France at destination of the organizers.
We are present at the Stade de France and we are also present in the province, where we cover
the year, nine sites hosting major events. There are pre-positioned both of doctors, nurses,
medical coordination, an interface with utilities and resuscitation equipment. The evening of
November 13, we have managed until two o'clock in the morning 200 people involved in what
has happened and have evacuated 34 without saturate hospitals periphery or in close proximity,
or significantly affect their activity. We took the relay inside the stadium and managed all people
involved in the first wave linked directly to the attacks, and then in the movement of crowd at the

end of the event. We were able to treat emergencies, delaying what was less urgent and guide in
coordination with the BSPP, in short, we were able to manage the device.
We are part of the security service, and are subject to the same rules and the same controls. Our
staff was fully informed, since to contact victims, but sufficiently busy to not be able to
Exchange. Communications with the outside world were very complicated because of the
saturation of the networks - data, telephone and SMS - which occurs therefore that the Stade de
France is full. The information of persons present capacity was therefore limited.
I wanted to just point out that in addition to security and control issues, need to manage both the
daily, the pathologies that occur normally in a population of 80,000, but also anticipate the risk,
the issue being the ability of immediate response pending deployment of relief. In this case, the
situation was even more complicated that it was attacks multi-site, and that we had to manage
with the internal device that went not only inside but also outside, some people had to be
repatriated to the Interior, as public emergency facilities were overwhelmed in the periphery and
the centre of Paris.
The President Georges Fenech. You mentioned that an advanced medical post had been
deployed instead of the Horn buds. That put him in place?
M. Olivier Ploix. There were two: one, put in place by the BSPP, to manage what was outside,
and ours, inside the stadium, in the basement, at the level of the main medical centre. The Paris
fire brigade operations commander was present inside the site, pre-positioned at the level of the
regulation, to manage internally everything was manageable with the equipment and the
personnel on the spot.
The President Georges Fenech. Anyone else want to add something?
M. Christophe Bionne. Just a small reflection on the skills that will be required in the future for
security officers. In another life, been in the situation of current claimants of the Stade de France,
it seems me useful and necessary to rely more on the training of security officers. From this point
of view, it must help them. Today, they are asked to do more in addition to things, but should be
a little more accompany them to the level of training. This is not because his driver's licence was
obtained when passing before an examiner known to lead. In this spirit, as for any mission,
continuing training or reminders would be welcome.
The President Georges Fenech. The Commission has heard you and take them into account.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much your availability and your answers, which will be
extremely useful.
Hearing in camera, the Divisional Commissioner X and Z, his driver brigadier
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, Thursday, March 17, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. We have the pleasure and honour to welcome two officials of
police of exception, which we welcome the action taken on 13 November 2015, at the risk of
their lives. It is the Divisional Commissioner X and brigadier Z, his driver, first responders at the
Bataclan, where we went this morning.
We have had the chronological account of the intervention of the three services: the Directorate
of security of proximity of the agglomration parisienne (DSPAP), the RAID and the Brigade of
research and intervention (bis). This allowed us, gentlemen, to realise the difficulty of your
intervention, and the composure you have evidence to put an end to the action of one of the
terrorists.
Thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the
means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.
On behalf of the members of the commission of inquiry, I salute your courage and your
exceptional composure. You are therefore intervened the first on the scene of the attack at the
Bataclan, and your testimony will be especially valuable to enable the Commission to
understand how to neutralize terrorists in such circumstances.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors and is therefore not disseminated on the internet site of the Assembly.
Moreover, I would point out that for security reasons, you speak under cover of anonymity.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, the record of the hearing - always under cover of
anonymity - may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at the end of our work. I said
that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will previously transmitted people
heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will be submitted to the
commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I recall that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, "is punishable by the penalties
provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code - one year of imprisonment and a fine of
15,000 - for any person who, within a period of twenty-five years disclose or publish information
relating to non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the
work of the commission referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.
The Divisional Commissioner X and Z brigadier, his driver, successively take oath.
Commissioner divisional X , I leave you the floor so that you relatiez the circumstances of your
speech. We will then ask questions, as well as to your driver.
Commissioner Division X. First of all, I would like to inform you of the difficulties that we will
certainly have to give an overview of the situation that night. During what we call in police terms

"tunnel effect", we had, in fact, a fairly fragmented vision of what happened. My driver and I
also didn't have the same vision of fact while we were at only a few meters from the other.
Similarly, from a chronological point of view, it was quite difficult for us to list all the elements
that we had to live in time.
The early evening took place quite banal way. We take our service to 18 hours. We went to the
prefecture of police to take our instructions as to the usual, having equipped with our vehicle
with the equipment necessary for our mission. It's basically policing equipment, since our action
focuses on the anti-crime and law enforcement. Returning to service, I buckled down to my usual
administrative tasks. To 21 h 20 or 21:25, I was advised by the room and information command
with which I am in permanent link, by telephone and by listening to the radio, that an explosion
had taken place at the Stade de France.
I didn't support this service, which was under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of public order
and traffic (DOPC). So I contacted my colleague from Lac 93 - which depends on the DSPAP and who was on the spot. Initially, there was no specific information to communicate to me. He
told me that it was perhaps a mortar. Pending receipt of additional information, I stayed at the
service. Then, my manager contacted me by telephone to ask for clarification. I then decided to
go on-site. Before you climb aboard our vehicle, I met v. P., my colleague from Lac 75 you've
seen this morning, as she arrived at the service. I made him a quick point of the situation and
asked to equip emergency, telling him that we were leaving on the Stade de France.
Our staff do their service only at 22: 20. At this time, we had therefore still no workforce tray 75
at our disposal. We climbed quickly in the vehicle, and it is at this time that took place calls to
the first shooting, at the level of the rue Bichat. I should mention that we based boulevard
Bessires, between porte de Clichy and that of Saint-Ouen. As head of Department, I then
hesitated on the option to take: I didn't know whether I stay in Paris or I have to go on the Stade
de France. These are operational options which we must make choices at all times. I finally
decided to stick to my initial destination of the Stade de France. We then had to find us at the
level of the door of Clignancourt.
There was then a second call confirming the shooting. I then considered that the situation was
most serious in Paris, and I have instructed my teammate to divert and on Paris. I advised my
manager by telephone, telling him that the information regarding the situation in the Stade de
France would be communicated to him by my colleague. He confirmed my choice.
We headed to the center of Paris boulevard Ornano and Barbs boulevard. At the discretion of
the shootings announced on-air, we droutions to go to every time on the scene of the latest
ongoing. Entering on boulevard Magenta, we heard the call informing shots rue la Fontaine - leRoi, and once at the bottom of the boulevard Magenta, we heard the call on the firing at the
Bataclan. We were at about 500 metres, with the light and the siren two-tone. We went as
quickly as possible at the level of the Bataclan. We have removed our signals light 200 metres
before, usual precautionary approach from a place of intervention. We arrived so fast are that we
have stopped suddenly before the Bataclan : we thought it was farther away and we don't we
realized we were there than a decade before meters. I reported to my teammate that the Bataclan
was there, and we stopped just behind the artists bus, which was parked outside room.

We immediately stepped out of the vehicle, and we each fact the bus tour. Someone was on the
phone, certainly with police services. It requested us saying that there was an attack on the
inside. We bypassed the bus, and immediately, on my left at the level of the Saint-Pierre-Amelot
passage, I saw some police staff. I there was not very attentive, because my attention was
immediately focused on deceased persons, on the ground, before us. I remember to have seen
two: a man before ' Bataclan Caf ' and a woman at the entrance. We've been tagged because
someone was filming with a mobile phone. We told him to clear.
We could hear the artillery fire. We advanced towards the glass door that was not already there:
she had fallen. As soon as we began to make progress, the Bataclan wooden hinged doors are
open to us, and between fifteen and thirty people fled running in our direction and screaming. I
remember a man who told me: quickly, quickly, enter, there's my wife indoors! We have
revised this gentleman later in the premises of the bis, and we were advised that his wife had
died.
We told people to flee along the buildings on the boulevard Voltaire towards rue Oberkampf,
what they have done. At the same time, through one of the doors which was open and that was
close, I could see one of the terrorists. He had a Kalashnikov in hand, he was out and was not
looking in our direction. We were 35 or 40 meters, the vision was very furtive and the doors are
closed. I just had time to see two or three seconds. People fled and we have made progress. I got
a radio message announcing my arrival on-site. According to the information that I have then
received from the room, it should be 9:54 pm, quite shortly after the first call to Policeemergency.
We have made progress in the hallway and we arrived at the level of the swinging doors, that we
have open. We were struck by the extremely strong light, since the spots had started, certainly
from the beginning of the attack, by the Rgie. Very powerful spotlights illuminated so in our
direction. From the moment we began to make progress in the corridor, the firing stopped, and
when we got back, there were more no, it was silence.
There, the vision was indescribable - you can imagine. Hundreds of body - for us, everyone was
dead - were entangled with each other: at the bar, in the pit, sometimes even piled on more than
one meter in height. On was really aware that people were thrown out on each other. For us,
there was no survivors: nobody moved, there was no moaning, no noise, there was an icy silence.
Our first reaction was to wonder how they had to kill so many people in such a short time. Very
quickly, we we're reconcentrated. I turned off my radio because we wanted to be as unobtrusive
as possible, and with the estate of radio messages, this could not be the case. From this moment
on, we were completely cut off from the outside. We started to move very quietly inside the
room.
One of the terrorists, which we have identified later as Samy Sumbua - it was the only one who
had shaved - appeared on the scene. He walked backwards, coming from the left. He was facing
us and wanted to hand his assault rifle by threatening a young man a few meters from him. He
gave the order to lie on the ground. We found this person later; She explained to us that these
orders were in fact intended to a person located in the pit. With the optical effect, we had the

impression that it was to him that he was addressing. This young man, initially in the pit, took
advantage of a moment of lull to attempt to gain access to the emergency exit. But in fact, it fell
nose to nose with the terrorist, who had asked him to come back to him.
For us, it clearly threatened. Even if the orders were not for him, this young man still began to
soil the hands on the head. I have appointed him to my driver, who was not immediately seen.
We have even advanced a few metres. I had spotted a column, you had to see this morning with a
guardrail. I wanted to build above with my weapon to stabilize my shooting. Pretty quickly, we
took position and we have committed the terrorist shooting.
I fired four times, and my teammate twice. I think it pulled from my second or third shot, since I
heard his last shot. The individual has pushed a rattle, collapsed and fell to the ground. I think he
fell on his back.
We were about 25 meters and with distance, we have not really distinguished what he was doing.
In the few seconds that followed, an explosion occurred, but it was very high, at about three or
four meters from the ground and above the pit, that is well advanced compared to the scene. We
have therefore not understood immediately that it was he who had exploded, we thought that his
colleagues had launched a grenade on us from the floor.
In the wake of the explosion, there was a succession of shots. We sheltered putting us close to
the ground. After the timeline I had retrospectively, we it would shot dead at 21:57. It is
therefore taken very shortly between the time we got off the vehicle and one where we shot it,
because we have never stopped our progress. So there was shooting, and we we are protected.
Our feeling was that we were going to stay there: we were some not out live this hell. This lasted
awhile.
After that, there was a lull. As a head of service, I realized that our action was a little limited. We
were only both, we had no long weapons, we did not know where were the terrorists. I therefore
decided to out to see if reinforcements had arrived. I stumbled on my service officials who had
already joined us. There were three civil servants from the tray 75, which one was equipped with
a gun to pump, three officials of the Lac 94, which also had a shotgun, and two or three other
officials of another tray. They were in position at the level of the access corridor. I joined them,
and we made the point of situation.
Then the gunfire resumed inside. I had a doubt on my action: I did not know too much if he had
to wait outside. But humanly, in light of what was going on - one felt good that they were
completing the hostages-, could not stay away.
One of the officials proposed to wait for the bis. I replied No. We therefore all went back inside.
I repositioned my fire on the ends support, as we had with shotguns. Yet there was firing in our
direction, unless we can actually know where they originated. I responded twice. We took over
position and we have tried to sanctuariser the ground floor by prohibiting the return of terrorists,
but we still did not know where they were: in the boxes above, or on the side, because at the
same time, the BAC 94 staff were also taken under fire from a sniper - indeed, this was filmed,

we could watch it on the internet - and had returned fire with their shotguns. It could therefore be
one of the terrorists either outside or at the level of the emergency exit. I stabilized my staff.
I forgot to clarify something: before returning with these numbers there, while we were waiting
outside, a shadow appeared under the door. In fact, it was one of the terrorists which was the
front door. But we didn't; It could also be a victim, and we couldn't shoot through the door
without identification. This shadow is passed, then departed, and we distinctly heard a
Kalashnikov reloading: the noise of the charger which falls to the ground, and the cylinder head
which is drawn back.
A few seconds later, we saw other grazing shadow pass, and the door opens slightly. We thought
it was him, he would make an exit on us, and we are prepared to receive. In fact, it was one of
the victims, a police Commissioner who was there personally and who was trying to crawl to the
door. He has just released the hand: we ran to fetch, still without knowing the whereabouts of the
terrorists. We pulled him onto the sidewalk. He explained that he could no longer walk, that he
had been hit on the back, and there were three terrorists armed with Kalashnikovs inside. It was
extracted by officials towards the advanced medical post. We are as we left behind.
A few seconds later, this time on the right, another shadow appeared and a hand came out. This
time it was a woman. We have extracted it to the curb, I personally dealt with it. Then we
decided to enter again with the present staff.
We took position inside. I did fire again twice. We have also endured gunfire. Then the firing
stopped, it has calmed down. We have maintained the position some time - I can't be more
specific. People moved still not before us; well, one felt that even the living were pretending to
be dead not to draw attention. Noting that our action was still quite limited, I left my officials on
the spot and I'm out. I expected the size of the tray 75 had taken their service in the meantime
and that should happen with heavy equipment, i.e. ballistic protective helmet and heavy ballistic
shield. But when I'm out, there was nobody. I waited even a little; then I did back and forth
between the inside and the outside for awhile.
After that, I managed to make the junction with the strength of rapid response (FIR) in the bis,
which arrived. I can't tell you how much they were exactly; they were positioned in column and
adjacent buildings, from the rue Oberkampf. They were perhaps six or seven.
Meanwhile, there was gunfire burst on the street in the direction of the fire trucks stationed a few
meters from the Bataclan. I made the junction with the officer of the FIR. I told him to make
rapid progress to the entrance of the Bataclan, because this area was more or less secured.
I progressed with him and I made him a small point of situation because I did not have much
information. I told him that there were perhaps two or three terrorists inside, with Kalashnikovs,
that we were not sure whether they are still in places because there were more shots - we did not
know the configuration of the premises, we did not know if there were exits on the roofs. At the
same time, there were many calls about gunfire, in many parts of the capital. We didn't really
know what was happening: people were talking about firing at the level of the Place de la

Rpublique, others were wounded everywhere. We had a rather limited view of the overall
situation.
The FIR intervened. They found the situation and considered rapidly than their number, they
could not do much. Then, the rest of the bis is arrived, followed by our own tray 75 forces,
without I can determine the time that had elapsed. The bis has begun to advance on the floors,
while I positioned tray 75 staff that I had recovered along the trench, waiting. There again, this
lasted a while. I had no vision on what was the bis, my peripheral vision was low.
After a while, no more there were movements or shots. I decided to go for the victims who were
in the pit at a few meters from us. People have begun to move and manifest. We started to
reassure them by voice, telling them that we were going to intervene as soon as it would be
possible for us.
I have omitted to say that while we were in position, one of the hostages spoke from the lodges.
Provided us a telephone number on the part of terrorists, for intervention forces. We made him
repeat two or three times, the times noted, and transmitted it to our Director station. Then, he
walked away. In the light of what I read in the press, one of his relatives was to be withheld on
the inside. Terrorists had therefore sent him this message with the certainty that he would return
to them.
To return to the situation, we began to seek victims without knowing the whereabouts of the
terrorists. We are therefore spoken without being protected - if they were positioned above, they
could shoot us.
We have begun to implement an evacuation noria, with all these difficulties: the soil was
extremely slippery because there was blood and Sockets everywhere, and Kalashnikovs
Chargers. We were forced to climb over or move of deceased persons. There were also people
whom we knew very well that they were seriously injured, but had we extract anyway, without
being able to use the actions of regular aid for the transport of the victims. We have learned as
we could. We began to be exhausted. Meanwhile, indeed, we we were equipped with heavy
armor and we had in addition to collective armaments, pump rifles or submachine guns, thereby
increasing our weight people were also very heavy: they were fully dressed, and blood, for the
most part.
So we started out people. As you've seen, there are two or three steps between the pit, output,
and the bar. They were extremely difficult to climb because, in this area too, there were bodies.
We have implemented a noria between the center of the pit and exit, where emergency personnel
supported the victims. We did this for tens of minutes. Other intervention forces arrived then,
certainly the RAID, but I cannot tell you at what time. It was announced while the shooters had
fled and were rue Amelot. It turned out subsequently that it was in fact of victims who had fled
and that had gone to take refuge there, but we didn't. I therefore recovered all my troops tray 75,
and we left there by the boulevard Voltaire and the rue Oberkampf, up any Amelot Street to the
rear of the building. We have an increase in buildings to secure the premises. It is there that we
stumbled on victims who had were hidden among people and in cellars.

Once the area is secured, we returned to the entrance of the Bataclan where we continued to
participate in the evacuation from the entrance of the Bataclan and the advanced medical post,
either transporting people with bare hands, either with construction and barriers of Vauban
barriers that were available. We have helped as we could and proceeded to frisk of security of all
victims and hostages, coming by the dozens or even hundreds. Everyone should be palpated
before leaving the premises. We conducted these operations at the entrance of the Bataclan, and
this lasted awhile. I only remember the time that I was able to gather my strength at the end: it
was 3:30. We blew a little, then returned to service for the operational debriefing between us.
Brigadier Z. I won't be able to tell you much more than the Commissioner. The only difference
between our two experiences - we in have found three weeks after the events - is that when he
went with the rue Amelot column, because we thought the terrorists were fleeing, I stayed inside
the Bataclanin protection of the bis colleagues who were increased to secure the surroundings of
the scene without knowing that he had left the scene. As Commissioner explained you, we have
seen the tunnel effect. It is through radio and the story of every colleague that I was able to
reconstruct the chronology of events. Today, I am almost unable to give you the exact sequence
of events. It is not complicated: I stayed four hours in the Bataclan, to handle particular bodies,
but still me have 10 minutes of memories of this period. The brain has completely "zapped"
everything that has happened.
Our intervention of departure, during which felled the terrorist, takes place on very short time,
just three minutes: time to arrive and shoot it out. I remember very well the trips we made then.
Regarding the disposal of the body, I have a few memories. After, there is all the time
progression, and waiting for the arrival of some colleagues. We were always on the lookout. I
found myself, means that struck me again, with a shotgun in the hands that did not belong to my
service. A colleague who had one over me it had been to make a progress. I had to stay an hour
with the rifle to shoulder to monitor the high points: he had to be able to shoot immediately if a
terrorist came to irrigate the ditch.
Then, I will not say that it is the black hole... These are round trips, the evacuation of the
victims...
Mr president. Listening to your stories, we can consider that your intervention - initially with a
handgun, then with a long weapon - undoubtedly had cause to withdraw the two terrorists who
remained on the floor. One can imagine that if you had not provided this kind of security for
yourselves, they could do a lot more victims in the pit.
Brigadier Z. This is a no-brainer. Although it is impossible to know what would have happened
if we had not shot a terrorist from the outset, and if we had not stayed present - because we
received fire, and the Commissioner made two shots of response, they felt so a police presence
which prevented them from descending.
Commissioner Division X. I think they were surprised by the speed and the 'perimeter' attack:
we were on the main road, and at the same time, the 94 colleagues fired four times. Moreover, I
do not know if you've seen the emergency exit: there is an impact in the middle of the door, the
colleague thought also hit one of the terrorists. They had to say that intervention forces arrived

very quickly, and that they were trying to encircle the site. It is at this point probably they are put
together.
According to the witness that we met, the two terrorists who were always on hand had
consciousness that the third had been shot, since they spoke among themselves. One asked:
"where is Samy?", and another was told that he had died, it had exploded. They therefore knew
what had happened on the ground floor.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. I was told that you were, one and one, very modest, but I
would like to salute your courage. You really are heroes. Of course, there are others, but you
particularly and I wanted to tell you personally. Your action was exemplary and allowed to put
an end to the massacre which was underway. Any national representation is grateful for the way
in which you acted.
First of all, I would like to ask a general question. There are protocols, and real life: I imagine
that the protocols you not allow access into the Bataclan on your own initiative, without
reinforcements. Have you thought, or you entered instinctively? Have you made your decision at
the sight of the victims?
Turning then to the unrolled events, you have notified by radio that you were on-site at 9:54 pm,
and you kill the terrorist at 21:57. I have not grasped the situation: was he on stage? I understood
that he was playing a young man. In testimony published in the tribune of the Commissioner, you
write that if the shooting had failed, you were finished. When you are logged in, there's ongoing
executions, or had they taken place? This morning, he was told us that terrorists saved their
ammunition. They were shooting in the head not burst. When you are involved, had most victims
they already been killed?
In addition, other terrorists appeared to be on the floor when you shot. You say seeing them
charge when you are out, do you think they are redescendus?
It has been said that after your intervention, the fire inside the Bataclan had ceased - trade were
held outdoors with the BAC 94. Now you learn that when you entered for the second time, you
have again exchanged gunfire with the terrorists. These shots you were they, or well were there
other executions of current hostages?
Commissioner Division X. A killing spree of mass of this type was a first in France. Protocols
exist for conventional hostage, in a banking institution or any other place. The mode of
intervention is then to stay outside and send civilian workforce make a discreet observation.
Cutting traffic, it prohibits the escape of hostage-takers and establishing a security perimeter. We
fix the situation and expected intervention forces, only empowered to intervene. This is what is
done in the presence of madmen with weapons supposed or actual: it freezes, and expected
response services.
Attack of lesser importance, or stab, generalist services can intervene. It is the usual Protocol.

For the mass murder, he had not yet Protocol. But we used to work with the bis in Paris, and with
the RAID in the suburbs. Generally, it freezes, is an exclusion perimeter in which we only
present because we are equipped with heavy equipment, that of the intervention Force of the
national police (FNIF) - which we are part. Then, with the arrival of specialized staff, we do
surveys column, that they are point-by-point. Then them progressing, possibly with support back
from us: we follow the column of the bis or RAID for extractions of hostages which are made by
them. We are therefore their base back on this type of intervention.
Since then, notes have been drafted, changing patterns of intervention so that newcomers are the
first responders, the extent of their possibilities and material protection they have. I think
especially in note EVENGRAVE, which was prepared by the defense area, which you had to
have knowledge and which describes this pattern of intervention: the concept of perimeter of
exclusion, controlled area, from support area, detailing the role of each.
On our intervention at the Bataclan, it is true that, according to the Protocol, we should perhaps
remain outside. Personally, two elements have inspired me to enter.
Firstly, I consider that as a man, cannot stay outside while people are slaughtered. In addition, we
do not choose our profession by accident. If you become a police officer, it is that one has a
sense of duty and public service that make the daily, we are ready to take physical risks to our
citizens. This is the cFavorite pieces of our profession, one of the reasons why we are entering
the police. Even in functions that involve more administrative tasks, like those of Commissioner.
I pointed out, but with my teammate, we had very little verbal exchanges at the time where we
entered. We looked at, I believe I said: "Should we go." I am not even sure that he has answered
me: he looked at me and that was enough to understand that we were on the same wavelength
and that therefore we are more than one. I believe that we have the same perception of our
intervention on this point.
Maybe the rank of Commissioner puts extra weight on my shoulders. This gives me a
responsibility and a duty to exemplarity. If I is not, nobody will do. I can't ask my staff to enter if
myself I am not front. This is my place as head of Department.
Has therefore not there doubts about the need to intervene; We have not thought. I believe that
was not there with fear at this time there. Perhaps he had afterwards, when we started to shoot.
We then became aware of the risk.
Our intervention was no misplaced bravery, we felt ready to intervene. My teammate is the
container for a long time and I made me also many land positions. We usually also work together
as we have been doing for more than four years. We had therefore no apprehension at the
technical level.
With regard to the situation before our shooting, for us, the terrorist threatened the young man. It
appears receding, coming from the left of the stage, behind the curtains, toward the center of the
scene. He kept his Kalashnikov at man's height and pointed it towards this young man, who had
the hands on the head. For us, he said to him: 'Layer you down', and the young man starts to bend

down. The weapon is pointed in its direction and there was a carnage before: for us, there's no
doubt he's going to run it. At this time, even his Kalashnikov would have pointed toward the
ceiling, we would have fired, even if legally, self-defence was not incorporated. Often, in the
actions of police, police are reluctant to make use of their weapon as they wonder if they are in
self defense. In this situation, at any time we don't we are asked the question.
The rapporteur. Are there shots when you enter?
Commissioner Division X. No. When we arrive at the Bataclan, we go out of the car, there are
many shots in quick succession. In fact, it wasn't the gusts, it were very close hits. I think that
they have fired burst when they fired on the first floor to the outside on the sidewalk and fire
trucks.
The rapporteur. When you arrive at 9:53 pm or 21: 54 p.m., you hear gunfire in the Bataclan.
Initially, it was to run. Your entry in the room can thus stop these executions.
Commissioner Division X. Upon our arrival, there were a few shots. When the doors are open
and people ran towards us, we specifically heard the shots. It probably wasn't the fire burst,
because when we tug burst, shooting is not precise and tends to climb. It was gunfire, closely
spaced, continuously. Terrorists were not trying to run people down; they were firing into the
crowd.
When we entered amounts, the shots had stopped for about a minute. It is for this that we entered
the room: if they had fired continuously, I do not know if we would be entered. It is when we are
out, after having fired at the terrorist, that we suffered gunfire. I think that there was a terrorist at
the top, and another at the level of the emergency exit. Chronologically, it is at this time the tray
94 staff fired. Incidentally, means an explosion on the video where one of the colleagues of the
BAC 94 after falling under fire, takes up position. It is fairly short, but there is the explosion. I
think that it is at this time that our terrorist blew himself up.
When it rebooted his Kalashnikov, the second terrorist should come back from the emergency
exit. Certainly, it is a hypothesis - perhaps he was at the top and it fell... But I think that if we
were not emerged at this time there, or we would have seen on our left, and we were late, we
were still in our "tunnel effect", or is it that us was swinging. It is played in a few seconds
because when we did fire, our peripheral vision was obscured. In times of stress, peripheral
vision is reduced, indeed. Being really concentrated on the room, we could not see what was
happening on the sides.
We are therefore emerged progress because there were more shots, and it is at that time that the
terrorist came charging his Kalashnikov behind the door.
The rapporteur. It is not known if it was the terrorist who was upstairs.
Commissioner Division X. For me, it was the terrorist who was doing fire at the Saint-PierreAmelot output level. It seems more logical to me. I do not see why that was at the top would be
returned.

At this moment, there's more shots. This is when I picked up my first staff - my officers in
civilian contact and those of the 94, we be nine in all that the firing started. And this time it
really was piecemeal. Therefore, we understand that they are trying to run people. These are
unique, spaced a few seconds shooting. I am unable to tell you how much was there, maybe a
dozen.
It has an area of shade for us - I have heard victims to ask questions this morning on the radio -:
we don't quite know how the victims died. We do not know if they died as a result of their
injuries, if they have been executed immediately or later. We know not how the ninety dead are
divided between the ground floor and the first floor. We would also have explanations, because
there is a pretty traumatic impact, and we ask ourselves many questions.
The rapporteur. Some executions would therefore still held inside the Bataclan, after your
release. It is after your return and following the exchange of fire, that there is nothing?
Commissioner Division X. When we come out, there is actually still of the shots. I think they
come from the first floor, because they seem quite distant. I am 99.99% sure that there are more
executions on the ground floor. In my opinion, nobody was shot on the ground floor, after we
shot the terrorist.
When we entered again and we took over position, there are a few shots on us. We could clearly
see them: there was smoke and impacts over our heads. But we did not know from which it
came. I do not have the memory of other shots after.
Mr. Serge Grouard. I of course join the tributes that have been sent to you a moment ago. You
have experienced a situation of war, how are you today? Can you take the distance?
On the other hand, you draw lessons from this experience, particularly as regards the forces
employment doctrine? General doctrine, especially when he is taken hostage, is to freeze the
situation, to secure, to seek to make contact with the hostage-takers - it is a long time - hoping to
calm things, to limit collateral damage and to put an end to the situation of how the ' less risky
possible.
You have not done this: you broke first, directly, and, thanks to this intervention, you have
avoided a larger killing spree yet. Are you getting education in this type of situation, facing
people who are no longer in the psychological springs known, it must go right away, with all the
risks that entails?
Commissioner Division X. To answer your first question, I'm fine. It is clear that we were near
death, so many things change, especially with regard to families. It is not easy to explain to his
wife and to his children that one is ready to give his life for people is not known. "That's fine, but
if you die, that we become?": they asked me. This has been difficult to manage, but there has not
been too many reactions of nervousness within the family unit.
Then, I evaluated the time during which I dreamed of the Bataclan : This lasted almost three
months and every night. I was not nightmares, because I was serene, but I saw the scene, I was

thinking about what we could have done otherwise: If we were mounted on the floor perhaps we
could have put an end to this attack. We ask ourselves many questions on this point.
What makes us good, on the other hand, is to have received letters from victims - still preserving
our anonymity. I replied to each stating that my grade. Some have sent photos showing them
sometimes on a hospital bed. They thank us, and tell us if they are still alive today, it is thanks to
us. Power put faces or names on all of them, we did good.
We also have knowledge of the young man that we found. Finally, there is this small Committee
of victims, very limited, that has already been filtered by our Union, we're going to meet at a
particular.
Mr president. Why you absolutely want to remain anonymous?
Commissioner Division X. For security issues, especially with respect to our families.
Mr president. You fear retaliation?
Commissioner Division X. Altogether. We have fanatics. In normal times, already we fear
reprisals, because we reach thugs.
Mr president. The three terrorists in question are dead.
Commissioner Division X. But there are ramifications, and a whole bunch of fanatics that
revolve around these people, their loved ones. This is not so much for us as for our families.
Therefore, we are very careful.
Personally, I am armed permanently, even non-service, that I did not before. I am so ready to
retaliate when I drive my kids to school because I think that one of these fanatics will perhaps
land and attack the school. I explained to them that if it began to shoot, they had to flee by
emergency exits. These are a whole bunch of things that change on a daily basis for us.
Brigadier Z. I'm fine, too. As I said, the majority of memories was overshadowed by the brain.
What remains, I live with. That being so, and as the Commissioner has said, we redraw the
history. These are not nightmares, what are dreams as the first weeks, we had new items almost
every day, which changed the perception of what we had done, and what we could have done. I
revivais our entrance at the Bataclan. I imagined what would have happened if we were not
focused we on one of them.
With respect to the employment doctrine, this is not for me to say, but I think that it was essential
to cut their intervention scheme. These terrorists have a well-defined project, in this case, the
Bataclan, proceed to a mass slaughter. The fact to eliminate one right away disturbed them. They
expect the elite units to confront them. The arrival of "lambda cops" has upset their schema.
In the future, and in comparable situations, new arrivals will be brought to be the first
responders, to break this pattern.

Commissioner Division X. We have developed a theory from theHypercacher and the Bataclan
events: from the moment the police intervenes, the terrorists stop to look at the victims, hide, and
expect confrontation with intervention forces. But these two cases are not sufficient and we do
not have the perspective necessary to develop doctrine. I do not know what is happening abroad,
perhaps as the RAID or the BRI have other experiences.
One assumes now that newcomers will be the first responders, and that in response, the terrorists
will stop killing their hostages. But these fanatics there do not have too much logic. Of all this I
shoot therefore education that we must act quickly, because it is difficult to do otherwise. But I
also infer that it cannot establish a doctrine to be applied continuously by staff: this is in the guts
that it happens. We entered on 13 November at the Bataclan , but if such an event happened
tomorrow on another site, perhaps we fear to do so. We cannot instruct all staff to enter, some
will be afraid, others are not ready technically, others yet will be entered in the police since only
a month or two, it will sometimes be security assistants... It reassures saying that we will
establish a doctrine, set a pattern of intervention, and that things will take place now as well, but
in fact, things will be different.
M. Pascal Popelin. I associate myself with the words of thanks that have been sent to you. We
welcome you to be good shooters, is what allows you to talk to us today.
We were on site this morning. Where were you exactly over the front door when you have taken
the decision to commit a shot?
Regarding the conduct of the facts, you indicated when you are followed, there have been a
number of shots. How long that lasted? The firing ceased when you are back. How is is this
articulated with the arrival of the bis?
Shoot the terrorist who was on the scene has greatly disrupted their strategy, but everything does
not stop immediately. There is a second event that made into a logic of deletion and taking of
hostages. Is it your back? The arrival of the bis?
Commissioner Division X. Regarding the topography, we are ever back in places, so I was
unable to redo the schema. In my mind, the bar is slightly raised, there is a column to its left, and
a handrail. I took support on the handrail, while my teammate, who had no support, was about a
meter on my right. We were some 25 metres from the scene - shots in stand allow us to fairly
accurately judge distances. The terrorist was in motion, but did not move too much. In addition,
he was in the spotlight and dressed in black.
One may wonder, in this regard, whether or not it is necessary to turn the lights in such a
situation. It is the technicians said.
Regarding your second question on the time key where cease fire: we entered for the first time,
we shot the terrorist, and there were more shots when we're out. A second terrorist then charged
her Kalashnikov. This is when we were doing the junction with the first numbers that we have
heard this decade shots in piecemeal. When we have again penetrated the Bataclan, there have
been four or five shots in our direction, and after, of memory, it is more had.

M. Pascal Popelin. Were intervention forces there?

Commissioner Division X. No, they had not yet arrived.
M. Pascal Popelin. This is so you that have frozen the situation.
Commissioner Division X. This is my perception. But it is perhaps distorted. After our first
entry, there has been more shots down; above, the firing stopped after our second progress in
room.
M. Pascal Popelin. When the bis arrives, there's more shots. Were the shots stopped before?
Commissioner Division X. Yes as I said to the precursor of the rapid intervention force of the
bis that I did not know if the terrorists were still inside. The junction with the bis is therefore
with the FIR - the rapid intervention force, the precursors of the bis - along buildings, roughly at
the level of the laundry. I went to them - they don't also not identified me immediately and asked
me to push me. I explained to them who I was, and I escorted them back inside the Bataclan,
where they remained waiting for the support of the bis. We could not overcome, inter alia, the
left door that overlooks the staircase. In this regard, and I failed to mention this element in the
decision to intervene, there is certainly the objective, but there is also the weighting and limits.
So, I thought at any time that could mount. I did not know the configuration of places, I didn't
have heavy protections. Although even I had, I do not think that I would be mounted because it
would have sufficed for a single sniper above with a Kalashnikov to destroy the team.
I have no remorse on this point; I know very well the limits of our intervention.
M. Olivier Falorni. Gentlemen, I want my turn convey to you our gratitude and our admiration.
I wanted to ask you two questions, one on the visibility and the other on the distance of your
shots. The concert takes place in the dark. When you enter, the scene is lit. Were the lights back
in the room? Could this put you in danger?
On the other hand, the distance at which you shot seems exceptional. How far can you
reasonably shoot someone down with your arms? I was flabbergasted by your ability to shoot a
terrorist at such a distance, even more in light of the stress to which you submitted.
Commissioner Division X. As regards visibility, it was informed. I was dazzled even from
outside, when the doors are opened for the first time and people ran towards us. We were still on
the sidewalk, at the edge of the glass doors. These are spots in concert. Is it better to turn off or
turn them on? If they are off, people may be able to escape more quickly but they see not
necessarily emergency exits... An intervention in the half-light, should be equipped with night
vision devices, which we do not have.
M. Olivier Falorni. It seems that after the lights have been off, since the bis said we have
progressed in the half-light.
Commissioner Division X. Perhaps there are a different light on the first floor?

M. Olivier Falorni. You differentiate the pit?

Commissioner Division X. We differ about. The bar was a little less informed.
Regarding shooting in police shooting distance, it is usually a lot of reflex shots, but it will have
to evolve. The actions of shooting on the highway, in self-defence, are between 5 and 7 meters.
We train so much on these shots of response. As we like for our part to precision shooting, we
train so from time to time, 25 or 30 metres, which is not necessarily the case for all police
personnel. In addition, from shooting ranges are limited in distance.
M. Olivier Falorni. What is the frequency of your workouts?
Commissioner Division X. Legally, should be three sessions of shooting a year, during which
we derive two Chargers, so 30 cartridges. But we, we draw more often. We have booked the
night shooting niche. We thus may have a dozen sessions in the year. If we wanted to shoot
every day, we could do... Without throw us flowers, we are two good shooters.
With regard to the distance shooting and the accuracy of the weapon - a weapon that I appreciate
- it is 25 to 30 metres in shooting. So we were almost to the maximum, but I support, which
allows to gain even a few metres, sighting not moving devices. My teammate even better than
me, since tire even without support, he managed to touch.
Regarding the choice of shooting, I considered that we were too far away to make a shot to the
head: I therefore referred her bust. I didn't know if he was wearing a bulletproof vest underneath,
but as he stood a little profile, its flanks were not protected. To the trunk, I was persuaded to
touch to 99%.
M. Pascal Popelin. You saw?
Commissioner Division X. No, it's what allowed us to take our time, despite the urgency. We
were not ourselves under fire. If he had learned us above, the conditions would have been totally
different. Technically, we have not stressed at all: we know well our weapon, we regularly leave
the intervention not necessarily fire, so a mechanism is created.
Mr. Olivier Falorni. But the context, dead bodies everywhere...
Commissioner Division X. Our brain has had to hang to disregard of the environment. I have no
recollection of corpses - I tried to not look at them. We focused on operational aspects.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. I shall return or on the timeline or your action, that we call all heroic and
allowed to put a stop to the massacre. I would like to ask you about your terms of intervention
operation on your material resources. How can we improve them? You said the need to intervene
quickly. In practical terms, what does this mean? At the hardware level, what do you expect from
us, who are voting on budgets, programs? What are your needs?

Commissioner Division X. As you know, we had no protective equipment. But I am not sure
that that have harmed us. We had the advantage of speed and discretion. A ballistic helmet can
indeed cause reflections and attract theEye. With a bulletproof vest and heavy shield, you are
necessarily more noise. In addition, you can take that with one hand. Therefore, I don't regret
having the usual equipment to intervene.
With regard to the means of protection and ballistic, let's receive material with the SANDBOX
plan: either heavy armor type bis, either door plates. Most officials will now be equipped with
means of protection. It is necessary that each agent individually has a bulletproof vest heavy
indeed or a door plates, able to stop ammunition type Kalashnikov, as well as ballistic protection
at the level of the headset. Then have a heavy shield or a flexible ballistic shield with double
door plate by crew would be a good thing, with a long weapon.
There was a controversy over the choice of weapon. The G36 is a good weapon. The shot by shot
or two shots is enough, because the sustained firing cannot be mastered. Caliber 9 mm, type PM
or Heckler & Koch, is not enough punching if individuals are wearing body armor: so from the
point of view of the munition, the G36 is suited.
On the other hand, we are lacking means hearing protection and means of communication, which
are essential for us. Has delivered us ballistic protection helmets and it's good. But you are deaf
after firing once or twice with a G36 rifle. Therefore, also think about what is not visible from
the public, such as ear protection.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Did you?
Commissioner Division X. No, but the 9 mm, it is less annoying. Moreover, in a concert hall,
the configuration may reduces noise. We don't have therefore not suffered sound trauma, while
we pulled one metre from the other.
This hearing protection must be associated with means of communication. When we move
forward in closed areas, in the column of intervention, we must communicate, know where
everyone is and speak. This is essential in terms of safety. Therefore, officials wearing a ballistic
helmet are also equipped with means of communication that also serve as hearing protection.
Mr president. This hearing is soon finished, and I do not want that you have committed an error
in your statement, I would therefore like you to repeat us a specific item. You were boulevard
Voltaire, at the entrance of the Bataclan, after be emerged after neutralizing the terrorist when
the QRF arrived. How many men were there in the first column?
Commissioner Division X. I could not determine the exact number. Visually, I would say that
they were maybe six or seven.
Mr president. Are you sure they weren't fifteen?
Commissioner Division X. I see that represents fifteen officials when I align mine: I have the
impression that they were a little less, but I can not be formal.

Brigadier Z. I confirm the figures of the Commissioner. But you should know that we were
entering the Bataclan. The first part of the FIR was there, we consider it to six or seven people,
but entry could not accommodate more people than that. I have not seen them, but it is possible,
and even highly likely that colleagues were just behind, waiting for the advance of the first.
Mr president. That is why I ask you to clarify this point: you said that FIR had arrived at six
people, without doubts. You even said that they were waiting for their support. What does this
mean?
Commissioner Division X. I believe I said that I wasn't sure of their number. Their support, it is
in reference to the mode of intervention of the bis: there are FIR, and then H + 30. What I call
their support, it is the bulk of the troupe. Me, I had Visual on the column head, officer. The men
were along the wall, and I was dealing with their officer. I think they were six or seven, but they
were perhaps double, perhaps the second part of the FIR was more away in the street. I made
contact with the precursor, I then progressed with him inside the Bataclan, and I have all
watched what he was doing.
Mr president. You cannot exclude the presence of the second part of the FIR behind, arrived at
the same time as the first column?
Commissioner Division X. I don't have precision on their exact numbers, knowing if they were
split up into two or three columns. I cannot say.
Mr president. Gentlemen, we have to thank you for coming to our Committee. It is very
important for us to have all of these elements. I again expresses you our gratitude.
udition, in camera, the night of the Val-de-Marne bin officials intervened on November 13,
2015: Mr. T.P., corporal, M. L. S., corporal, Mr. O. B., brigadier, Mr. N. B., peacekeeper,
M. A. D., keeper of the peace, and Mr P. T., peacekeeper
Hearing in camera, Monday, March 21, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, we are completing your hearing with the study of the
chronology of the events of 2015. Your testimony will usefully complement that of your colleagues in the
Directorate of security of proximity of the Paris metropolitan area (DSPAP) we received last week.
You belong to the anti-crime (BAC) of night brigade 94, and you're spoken, November 13 with the attack
at the Bataclan, at the corner of the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage and the boulevard Voltaire, where you
have exchanged gunfire with the terrorists.
This hearing takes place behind closed doors, because of the confidentiality of the information that you
are likely to deliver us. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly. Nevertheless, in
accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning of the
parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at the end of
our work.
I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will previously transmitted people
heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will be submitted to the Commission of
inquiry, which may decide to State in his report. I recall that, in accordance with the provisions of the

same article, "will be punished with the penalties provided in article 226-13 of the penal code, i.e. a year
'
d imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine, any person who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or
publish information relating to non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the
end of the work of the commission referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr. T. P., corporal, L. S., corporal, O. B., brigadier, N. B., guardian of peace, A. D., peacekeeper, and
P.T., peacekeeper, successively take oath.
I'll leave the floor, asking you to quickly present the role that you have taken to keep either personally or
with your unit, with all the precision geographical and time possible.
Mr. T.P., corporal. The evening of November 13, I was head of the indicative vehicle BAC 952-11,
assigned in priority to the Val-de-Marne, in which took place the Brig. N. B. and Mr. n.. B... We were to
Ivry and Charenton when we heard the first message on the Parisian air of the 137 regional conference,
concerning an explosion at the Stade de France. Our unit has integrated the Sub-Directorate for specialty
services, which aims to intervene in any area of the DSPAP in the particular event. So I decided to go
back to Vincennes: we wanted dinner quickly in order to be available subsequently to the 93.
We had the second explosion in path information, which led us to accelerate the movement. Then, at the
time where we were installing at Vincennes, we learned, by the waves of the 137 conference that attacks
took place on Parisian terraces. Initiative, we took our car and our material. Hearing where took place the
second attack of terraces, we decided to place the Nation, where the path of terrorists seemed to lead
them. We are are put in position, waiting.
We there were, at the corner of the boulevard Voltaire, when we heard that attacks were other terraces
and that a Black Polo registered in Belgium had fled in the direction of the boulevard Voltaire. We then
engaged on the boulevard to try to intercept the vehicle. At the moment, we heard an explosion, a
detonation. In pursuing our road, at 300 metres, we reached the corner of Montreuil, to counter Voltaire,
in which a suicide bomber came to blow and before which wandered victims.
After having circulated information on the Paris conferences, I placed Mr. N. B. position of protection on
the boulevard Voltaire with the shotgun at the level of the vehicle, and Mr. N. B. took the corner of rue de
Montreuil and the boulevard, handgun to hand - we did not know at that time if terrorists were still on the
spot. For my part, I made a death toll inside and outside the bar in order to request relief. I can count two
minor injuries at the level of the bar, to the front, and two other, more seriously injured, on the side.
Outside, two pregnant women were hit by shrapnel. In the bar, under the covered terrace, a waitress was
on the ground, very seriously injured, and a man from African type. At the bottom of the terrace, someone
offered a cardiac massage to a European or North African type male person.
When I came out of the bar to request relief, I learned by waves that gunfire took place at the Bataclan. L.
S., reported its presence on the spot with the 952-12 tray. You could hear shots on the radio when he
announced that there were a lot of victims that they began to evacuate. We felt helpless because we
could not leave the Voltaire counter where he had to handle the victims.
A rescue vehicle of the Red Cross who passed by there we focused assistance as well as a female
doctor and a nurse. We have continued to ensure the protection of the place. Two vehicles of firefighters
then arrived: a vehicle fire and the large scale. A firefighter told me, when I asked him about the presence
of the large scale, this allowed to have staff on-site. Firefighters then took in charge the more serious
injuries.

A Parisian police vehicle is presented. Given the age of the car, we had doubts about his membership in
e
the police fleet. Commissioner of the judicial police of the 15 arrondissement of Paris was on its Board.
After hearing radio messages, it had shipped two colleagues with heavy jackets to come as
e
reinforcements on the ground since the 15 . I described to him the situation, and given that we have a
heavier than his own equipment, he decided to stay put and send us at the Bataclan help our colleagues.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Was what time?
M. A. D., peacekeeper. I am the driver of the 952-12 tray. We leave Crteil, 21 hours 42 and we arrive at
the Bataclan at 9: 51 pm.
Mr. t. P. Between the moment where we are at the counter Voltaire and our arrival at the Bataclan, it
must elapse up ten minutes.
To counter Voltaire, we believe dealing with a shootout as on other terraces. It is a victim who explained
to me that a man had entered the bar and that there had been an explosion, without tell me that we were
in the presence of the Act of a suicide bomber. I went back on the terrace to see there was no sockets on
the ground. It was therefore not a shooter. The presence of a lot of bolts indicated that a bomb had
exploded, that I immediately indicated to TN 750.
Arriving at the Bataclan, between a fire truck and one as police, we saw the Polo of terrorists, regularly
parked on the corner of the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage and the boulevard Voltaire. After we be
equipped with a ballistic helmet with non ballistic visor and a shotgun, O. B., N. B. and myself we are
placed in column to the left corner of the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage in order to avoid any retired
individuals. Whether they came out of the room to reach their vehicle, we can commit ourselves in order
to neutralize them.
L. S. was at another angle, side Bataclan, and A. D. stopped private vehicles and taxis, in which he was
evacuating wounded with the help of a waitress. I could also see P. T., who was helping the victims out of
the Bataclan.
Parisian numbers from car of police who was on the spot, the TC 82 G, did not have any equipment
except their individual lifejackets and their weapon. They had broken a door that was behind our position.
It gives access to the administrative offices of the Bataclan, where they had installed with fire an outpost
medically equipped to provide first aid to the victims. A. D. and the waitress I mentioned you were to take
victims.
BAC 915 in Saint-Maur-des-Fosss civilian, who joined us, placed last we, and the trainee colleague of
TC is positioned with us in the column. We heard three or four shots inside the Bataclan and explosion,
and then the door opened and we wiped a first burst of Kalashnikov.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Which door was it precisely?
Mr. t. P. The first door of room from the boulevard Voltaire escape. It overlooks the Saint-Pierre-Amelot
passage.
I could not retaliate with my weapon as a civilian, out of sight of the terrorist, was standing at the door
height and tried to carry a woman injured or deceased. The windows of the store behind which we were
all sheltered me could see the individual armed, but he also saw us. I said to my colleagues who were not
protected from release. The individual has closed the door. N. B. settled in fire support behind me.
When we took an another burst, I could retaliate by two shots, because this time the civil was lying.
During tactical reload my weapon, I explained to Nicolas that we had two solutions: "the top would be

trying to go home, but one of us or even we two will stay there, because we have no protection; the
alternative, knowing that we have facing us firepower largely superior, it is to play the surprise effect and
change places so that I can have a better shooting position. "Nicolas told me: ' do this!
We then moved. Colleagues are installed behind the fire truck, and I positioned to block-level fire support
engine axles of because of police - the only area which provides protection. I had a good support for the
shotgun. We then wiped a third salvo of shots. The individual shot on the corner of the boulevard Voltaire,
noting that we were more, it has covered police truck and the fire truck. A ball went through the vehicle of
firefighter from side to side to out not far from the head of A. D I was again in the inability to respond,
because civil was relieved.
The Vigipirate military then joined us. They were equipped with weapons of war, therefore more to even
as we respond to the shots. I requested permission to engage them on air, but I was told: ' negative, you
don't engage the military, we are not in a war zone. '' I told a soldier that if we were under fire, and he
could not use his weapon, I me to use myself if I had more ammunition.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Who made you the response you are talking about?
Mr. t. P. It is the command of the prefecture, by the waves! We communicate through a radio conference:
TN 750, the highest Paris authority at the radio level.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. How this happens, normal time and exceptional situation?
Mr. t. P. In normal times, we listen to the conferences of the Val-de-Marne. If necessary, we are also
always listening to the 137 conference providing regional information from the room's command of the
DSPAP who has authority on Paris and on the tiny Crown and the Crown.
M. Pierre Lellouche. It reports directly to the Commissioner of police? An officer directs the command
room?
The rapporteur. I believe that the Chief of staff was in the command room. We will have the opportunity
to clarify these points.
M. O. B., brigadier. For their part, the military are not managed by the room of the DSPAP command.
They depend on another PC radio.
Mr. t. P. The military explains that there no orders and it will not be able to engage the fire, even when I
tell him that we are drawn as from rabbits and well need to neutralize those who emerge.
The rapporteur. How many soldiers were there?
Mr. t. P. They were eight: four us and four behind.
M. Pierre Lellouche. How much ammo do you have for your shotgun normal staffing?
Mr. t. P. 10. I had six in the rifle, and four in my pocket.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Are the Brenneke? Do you have other weapons?
Mr. t. P. These are the Brenneke. This gun is the only weapon we had. L. S. has the same weapon, but
he could not initiate fire because his shooting angle.

In the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage, civil, in which we asked several times to do not stay put, fired the
person on the ground behind the emergency doors and has slept on it. The terrorist, noting that he no
longer had the advantage in terms of firing position, opened big two emergency doors. In front of me,
thirty metres, the individual found himself behind the left door open to shoot a burst of Kalashnikov. We
saw only exceed his arm. I've referred twice through the door. After my first shot that was too high, I shot
to the chest. The Kalashnikov collapsed suddenly dry ground. The doors themselves are closed all gently.
The civilian who was on the ground made me a sign that I have not understood, by raising both hands.
We have kept the position while waiting for reinforcements.
The whole of our unit came next, i.e. the rest of the night ferry 94 in holding with heavy equipment: helmet
heavy ballistic shield, heavy jacket, more adequate weapons. We went to look for the equipment in our
car of intervention, then we came back to take our position. In the meantime, other staff had intervened in
reinforcement including specialized field brigade (TSB) and the tray of Champigny-sur-Marne. Of the bis
(FIR) rapid intervention force arrived at this time there.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you estimate the time that has elapsed between your arrival, the
first exchanges of fire, and the arrival of bis? Fifteen minutes?
Mr. t. P. Between the first Exchange of fire and the last, there are almost ten minutes. We are
approximately between 22 and 22 hours 15. The bis arrived at around 10: 45 pm.
The President Georges Fenech. To 22: 50 pm?
Mr. t. P. About: I was not looking at my watch.
They have asked us to support them because they were not numerous enough.
The President Georges Fenech. How many members of the QRF were there?
Mr. t. P. Initially, they were to be a dozen.
They have borrowed the ballistic shield used by O. B., a second to the TSB of Champigny and, I believe,
a third to another service. They lacked other than their body armour. Their sniper asked fire and ballistic
support to cross the boulevard Voltaire in order to have an angle of shooting on the facade of the
Bataclan. We we are equipped in heavy with two shields and two shotguns, and we accompanied him to
three.
The rest of the bis arrived as well as the RAID. They are put in position. Thanks to their armoured vehicle,
they were able to penetrate in the passage Saint-Pierre-Amelot to rescue civilian that was there with the
Lady on the ground. I do not know how long after they stormed.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Is it normal that the forces of the bis is not ballistic shields?
Mr. t. P. I do not know what was the means of transport of the men of the bis. Perhaps, they came in
motorcycle. Soft or heavy, i.e. rigid, shields are bulky, and administrative vehicles available to us are not
suited to our current missions. It does not put a ballistic shield in a Peugeot 308. I speak even not
colleagues in police station with their Peugeot Partner.
L. S. had a ballistic shield because he was travelling in Mondeo. You should also know that the soft
ballistic shields do not stop Kalashnikov ammunition - it is necessary to equip them with a special plate
that weighs more than 20 pounds. Rigid shields stop the firing of Kalashnikov, but they do not fit in our
vehicles.

The President Georges Fenech. Mr L. S., I believe that Lac 952-12 arrived first at the Bataclan, is not it?
M. L. S., corporal. I am the leader of Group of M. A. D. and M. P. t... We were in the sector of Crteil
when we heard explosions took place at the Stade de France. We first headed to Saint-Denis, then we
changed route to reach Paris and the Bataclan when we learned what was happening there. I admit that
I'm a little angry with the times: the keeper of the peace. D will be more accurate than me about this.
M. A. D. I am the driver of the Chief L. S. and keeper of peace P.T. We left Crteil at 09: 42 pm, and we
arrived at 9: 51 pm at the Bataclan. I get the time on the dashboard of the vehicle, and I phoned my wife
to prevent at the time when we left
The rapporteur. You arrive before Commissioner, intervened first on scene?
M. L. S. We arrive just a little bit before the Commissioner and his team-mate.
Our intervention was conducted in three phases. As a first step, Mr. A. D preparing safety equipment, i.e.
heavy helmets and ballistic shield - we have no heavy jacket. During this time, Mr. P.T. and myself are
committed in the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage. We realize our Director station of what we see: it is a
scene of war, people are on the ground, injured or dead. I believe, to have debriefed with him later, when
Commissioner and his driver penetrate the Bataclan by the main entrance and neutralize one of the
terrorists. Two hundred to three hundred persons out of the Bataclan by the passage. We scan the crowd
of eyes looking for potential terrorists. We are witnessing a movement of panic, but we ask able-bodied
people to help those who are less. Some are back to help the wounded. We decide to escort persons in
question until a safe place so that they are supported by an emergency service. I believe that we take a
burst of Kalashnikov: we see fall from the people around us, but we cannot determine the origin of the
shots - it is quite frustrating. MR. HAS. D is then come join us.
In a second phase, after us be better equipped, we joined Commissioner at the main door. In the
meantime, the BAC 952-11 joined us; We were happy to see them arrive. We then waited for specialty
services, bis and RAID.
In a third phase, once all these reinforcements, we have secured the scene and participated in the
evacuation of injured people.
The rapporteur. You are the first to arrive at the Bataclan!
M. L. S. Altogether. We are the first three police on the spot. Commissioner and his driver arrived quickly.
The rapporteur. At 09: 54 pm!
e

M. L. S. Some 20 police arrive then.

M. A. D. Some also come from the central police station of the 3!
M. L. S. A few minutes later, we are a dozen of officials.
The rapporteur. When you arrive, you attend, in your own words, a "war scene." For what reasons you
set yourself on the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage? Why do you decide to enter the Bataclan? You miss
staff of equipment?
M. L. S. When we arrive, people come out of the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage, what attracts our
attention. We believe that the gunmen will perhaps attempt to escape by this passage in which we are
making progress. We hear gunfire and explosions so strong that they resonate in our body.

The rapporteur. What explosions is it? Suicide bombers who explode?

M. L. S. Inside the Bataclan, we hear a noise that resembles that of grenades exploding. We also
recognize the characteristic sound of fire with Kalashnikovs. The explosions are so powerful that we hear
them from the outside, despite the thickness of the walls of an Haussmanian building.
We felt that we were able to do. We have neither staff nor material resources to intervene correctly. Most
of the staff were engaged on the site of the Stade de France.
The President Georges Fenech. If you had prepared necessary means and equipment, would you be
returned to Paris?
M. L. S. Perhaps, you could freeze a bit the situation. What is frustrating is to see people fall off. We
would have liked to do more, but we could not do so due to lack of material means.
The bis with which we have debriefed told us that we had the good reflex: it was necessary to identify the
Bataclan to terrorists and show them that we were there. As soon as a police presence attracts their
attention, there are chances that they are interested less in the hostages.
The rapporteur. After Commissioner killed the bomber, two or three hundred people come out of the
Bataclan, we tell you. What is at this time that several bursts are derived? Victims of these shots among
the spectators of the Bataclan has it been?
M. L. S. People collapsing at the exit, but we do not know if they were wounded inside. As I told you, we
know not whence fire, even if we see impacts. In a moment like this, all our senses are both awake and
disturbed. We try to be more responsive and to analyse the situation, but stress undermines part of
professional reflex. We try to work properly. The aim was to save a maximum of people.
The rapporteur. After the intervention of Commissioner, when spectators come out in droves, pulling on
them?
Mr. t. P. When we wipe gusts in the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage, it is more than the gentleman whom I
spoke to you, which moves a woman.
M. L. S. Mr. P. T. comes just after us. Upon our arrival, there were world running in all sense leaving the
Bataclan by Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage.
M. A. D. When viewers emerge from the Bataclan, the individual or individuals derive from inside on
spectators who are almost at the door. A Kalashnikov bullet through everything: L. S. and P. T. are
witnesses of these shots.
The rapporteur. This takes place before 21 hours 57 and the intervention of Commissioner.
Mr. t. P. Yes.
The rapporteur. After 21 hours 57 and the death of the bomber, there's more shots, aside from the gusts
aimed directly the BAC in the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage?
Mr. t. P. Commissioner came with his driver. Means then his shots and an explosion. Once the targeted
individual is neutralized, we wipe the first gusts side passage Saint-Pierre-Amelot. For ten minutes during
which the terrorist pulls us over, we hear no more shots inside.

The President Georges Fenech. Because the other is dead.

Mr. t. P. One of them has been neutralized. The other is up there in the process of... I tend to tell me that,
as long as they shoot me, it kills anyone else.
M. Pierre Lellouche. What do you mean by "in the process of...". ?
The President Georges Fenech. I believe that some things have never been said. I think that might be,
at this point, brighten things.
Mr. t. P. Bodies were not presented to families because there were decapitated people, slaughtered
people, people who have been eviscerated. There are women who have been stabbed at the level of the
genital apparatus.
The President Georges Fenech. All this would have filmed on video for DAECH!
Mr. t. P. It seems to me. The victims spoke.
The rapporteur. These acts were committed by the two survivors. Do you know if you hurt one on which
you have drawn in the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage?
Mr. t. P. I think, but I have no certainty. As they blew themselves up, cannot be whether it was wounded
in the trunk. I think touched him because the firing stopped and the door is closed. The fact that the
Kalashnikov collapses and that doors close seems significant to me. Later, we spoke with the civilian who
made us signs in the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage: he told us that we had touched the shooter and that
that is why he had stopped to shoot.
After that time, the shots we heard inside were very sporadic. There are more gusts. In all likelihood, one
of the terrorists or more completed people. Then, I confess that I did that 15 metres inside the Bataclan
behind the bis. My presence was not necessary, I am therefore emerged. What I had seen was enough to
me.
M. Pierre Lellouche. The abuses on people took place where?
Mr. t. P. On the first floor.
M. Pierre Lellouche. This happens after the person you hurt is put together?
Mr. t. P. I even think that it happened before, but this is just my personal opinion. While we lay down a
terrorist to the emergency door, another was all these vile things upstairs.
M. Pierre Lellouche. The video is a party?
The President Georges Fenech. I believe that videos are parties.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Can know if it has recovered mobile phones of the victims. They have been?
Mr. t. P. They blew themselves up. There have been people beheaded, slaughtered, eviscerated. There
were expressions of sexual activity on women and the stabbing at the level of the genital apparatus. If I
am not mistaken, the eyes of some people were ripped off.

M. A. D. I would like to make a clarification in response to the question from Mr. rapporteur who wondered
why my colleagues had immediately assumed leadership of the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage. They said:
it is because they saw victims out through emergency doors, but it is also because, some time after we
descended by car, a police vehicle arrived and is is parked in front of the main entrance to the Bataclan,
in the direction of rue Oberkampf, pending no doubt other colleagues. So it naturally, since we were on
the side of boulevard Richard-Lenoir, that my colleagues have taken the direction of Saint-Pierre-Amelot
passage where they saw victims, while those who arrived on the side of the boulevard Voltaire were the
main entrance of the Bataclan.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Commissioner arrived three minutes after you and it directly enters the Bataclan.
You talked?
M. L. S. No.
M. Pierre Lellouche. In fact, you don't even know he came in the room?
M. L. S. We knew nothing, and he did not know that we were on the side of the emergency exits. In a
second step, we retreated to just protect the victims, and we had Visual contact with Commissioner. Our
crew is then separated into two groups: A. D. joined the BAC 952-11 Mr. T. P, while Mr. P.T. and myself
joined Commissioner at the entrance to the room.
The latter wished to again enter the Bataclan, but light dazzled us, we did not know the exact topography,
and we were still sous-arms. We had therefore neither equipment nor knowledge of places that would
have enabled us to make progress in the Bataclan. If terrorists were out, we would have done everything
to neutralize them, but we knew that we didn't have the material means to intervene in the room safe.
M. Pierre Lellouche. It is during this time that your colleagues leave the wounded from the Bataclan?
M. L. S. Two or three people have managed to get out, we have accompanied them. When specialty
services arrived, they took the relay. We have expanded the perimeter and we have secured it by
working, when it was necessary, in teams mixed with the bis. I found myself for a moment with a
colleague from the bis which had its operational wave. I had kept the frequency of the tray 75 N. we
exchange our information. We had a lot of difficulties to communicate on this intervention. It was a big
problem. We had difficulty in obtaining the emergency frequency...
M. Pierre Lellouche. Several frequencies emitted at the same time?
M. L. S. In normal times, if you ask the priority on this wave, we grant you, but tonight, the request came
from everywhere at the same time, which has saturated the system.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. At this time, are the military present?
M. L. S. They are present in a second phase, but not at the beginning of our intervention.
Mr. t. P. We arrived on site ten minutes after Laurent. We have fired passage Saint-Pierre-Amelot for ten
minutes, and the soldiers arrived in this interval as they were with us during the two last rounds. They had
to be on the spot a quarter of an hour after the intervention of the team of L. s...
With regard to coordination and communication, terrorists have managed to do what they wanted:
saturate the airwaves. They used a military process that consists of multiplying the points of impact to
saturate the emergency and intervention services.

They were surprised because they were expecting probably not as quick response on our part, but they
have, in a sense, successful. Laurent and myself went on-site initiative. At any time we have asked
permission to go at the Bataclan. Lac 75, 92, and 93 were compiled to form the agglomeration of night
tray. We have therefore the possibility of taking initiatives.
The President Georges Fenech. First responders all came initiative. This is the case of the DSPAP
Commissioner's, of the BAC. Those who respond on command arrived in a second time, around twentytwo hours fifty.
Mr. t. P. Also be aware that, for radio coverage, Paris is divided by borough. The waves were therefore
already monopolized because, in the same area, propagation of attacks then calls has had to rescue the
victims. Before this bottling, neither Lawrence nor I did take the airwaves to announce our movements.
We have done so only once to destination: me at the counter Voltaire, Laurent at the Bataclan.
M. Pierre Lellouche. When we went on the spot, last Thursday, Mr. B.B and Ms. C.P, two members of
the CSI - 75, the company securing and competent intervention for the Paris metropolitan area, have told
us that they had evacuated victims throughout the evening. They were there when you got: you had to
see them?
Mr. t. P. The CSI was not at the Bataclan, but on the terraces. They have arrived until well after we.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr. B.B. went directly at the Bataclan.
Mr. t. P. We were on the regional conference 137; We didn't have the Parisian air.
M. Pierre Lellouche. There is something not well-bonding: I see Commissioner arrive, rely on the bar
and down a terrorist. But there were these two police officers...
The President Georges Fenech. There's the B.B and P.C. Commissioner who is his assistant.
M. P. t.. I participated in the evacuation with Commissioner B.B. The bis that popped us up, installed a
Ramses shield outside the door of the Bataclan before entering inside the establishment that they secure
as they could. The column of the tray 75 N followed with the arming of assault. Order of BRI, we started
to evacuate all valid wounded who could move by themselves. They came to us and, after a summary
palpation, we directed them to the PC security. We then started to evacuate the wounded who were in the
ground through security barriers. Commissioner B.B helped us with other colleagues.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Basically, it happened an hour between the time where the Commissioner kills the
terrorist and the assault.
The President Georges Fenech. The assault took place in twenty midnight.
M. L. S. Broadly speaking, Yes.
Schedules of events matched overall succession between the CSI, who works by day, and tray 75 N.
During the survey, we sometimes have a problem of means, since some materials are shared between
the teams of the day and night.
M. Pierre Lellouche. You were on site at all times: you've most heard of shot between the moment
where the Commissioner has fired and the assault?
M. L. S. Only in very sporadic way.

Mr. t. P. In piecemeal.
M. L. S. We hear more gusts.
M. Pierre Lellouche. How many shooters there?
M. L. S. We do not see them. We hear gunfire from time to time. I extrapolate, but one can imagine they
are round and that, from time to time, they put a cartridge or two in some of the victims.
Mr. t. P. What is certain, is that, from the arrival of the BIS staff, there was more shooting at all. You'll
excuse the expression, but there was dead silence. There were more no noise.
M. Pierre Lellouche. At that time, they were more than two with twenty people trapped at the top.
Mr. t. P. Yes, I think. I think that they were isolated at this time in the room in which they blew themselves
up.
M. Pierre Lellouche. If you had had the necessary material, you'd be gone with it?
M. L. S. If we have the means to protect ourselves in a serious way, and equipment in connection with
the assault, it balances the forces, and we become operational. Tonight, I tell you frankly, I took my guys
in hell. They have gone beyond their physical and material capacities. Fortunately, I have with me good
athletes, guys who have both a head and legs, exercising seriously and who are able to properly respond
to stress. You cannot do that with anyone. If we had had more than physical protection and more effective
weapons, we perhaps could be more reactive or operational.
The President Georges Fenech. What your feeling is staff with regard to the intervention of
Commissioner who entered the Bataclan with a handgun with no protection?
M. L. S. Shooting instructors told me that Commissioner was sporty and trained in shooting regularly. It is
a versatile field man, both physically and operationally. It is very uncomfortable with his weapon. He and
his teammate showed composure and courage. They are really gone beyond their capabilities, and I
admire in their regard. Compared with the means available to them, they have really been 'culotts '.
Mr. t. P. What does Commissioner and his colleague, at the time where they have acted, with a material
that was the same as ours - I believe they didn't even have helmet which, anyway, is useless against a
Kalashnikov-, it is technically in police terms, the maximum that can be done. The shooting was carried
out at the level of the door to the room. They were concealed but not protected. They were able to
neutralize the terrorist by surprise.
In the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage, Laurent and his crew nor me nor mine couldn't advance: we'd stayed
there, that's for sure.
On the side of the main entrance, what they did was 'nickel', if I can afford. It was what needed to be
done: an attempt to neutralize the individual without too much advance. That is why they have not
progressed in the room.
The President Georges Fenech. They are still returned a second time!
M. L. S. At the risk of shocking you, the purpose - that we have initiative, almost subconsciously - was to
curb terrorists and let them, unfortunately, in the Bataclan to avoid that they do other victims in a new
place. Pending the special forces, it was necessary to try to contain them at the place where they were.

The rapporteur. The Minister of the Interior announced that additional equipment would be delivered,
including to the tray. Do you know when they come to you?
M. L. S. Two days after the events, we met Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve, the Minister of the Interior, which
announced us that we would be equipped with vehicles and additional facilities. They arrive us little by
little. There is talk that we recover sedans whose trunk is more suited to the material that we need. We
received ballistic shields with reinforcement plates that protect shots from Kalashnikov, and intermediate
weapons: projectile calibre of 40 mm, Taser, grenades launchers.
M. Pierre Lellouche. I regularly train shooting in the premises of the police. I know what it is to shoot at
forty-five metres in the half-light: this is not obvious, unless it is very well trained. How many times a
police officer of land draw per year?
M. L. S. Sandbox, we have some 'open fire' once per week. We arrive to shoot once a week, or once
every 15 days. We have a sports training once or twice a week. You should know that we are privileged.
Also there were periods of lack of ammunition during which we learn that two times eight cartridges. We
were then left in the position of the general service that must perform a minimum of three annual shots.
Mr. t. P. We are fortunate because, thanks to the special Lac shooting sessions, we can learn much more
than others. We generally take at least ten times per year.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Wholesale, so you shoot once per month. How many cartridges? Fifty?
Mr. t. P. and M. L. S. No! 30.
M. L. S. We have two Chargers of 15 cartridges.
Mr. t. P. Fortunately, our shooting instructors know how to adapt. They offer fire situation that optimize
the ammunition we have. I repeat that we are privileged: Commissioner colleagues draw three times per
year, i.e. 90 cartridges... when there are cartridges.
M. L. S. We are going to be equipped with the HK G36 rifle: we try to find shooting ranges adapted to this
weapon cartridges.
The President Georges Fenech. Perhaps Mr. N. B., who has not yet taken the floor, wish to add
something?
M. N. B., peacekeeper. I am the shipmate of the BAC 952-11. That evening, my leader board was Mr.
T.P., and my driver brigadier N. B.
On 13 November, we first stopped at the counter Voltaire. My mission was to secure the corner of the
coffee towards rue de Montreuil. The T.P. corporal gave me instructions and informed me. In the cafe, it
found that there was a blast and not gunfire.
We were looking for the Polo on the run. I took the time to look at the license plates - the Polo was
registered in Belgium - and the passengers of each vehicle passing.
We then left at the Bataclan.
M. O. B. When we were in the corner of the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage, while people in the Bataclan
suffered atrocious things, we had a lot of luck. We returned on the spot, and the owner of the tile store
behind which we were sheltered explained that his shop was a former Bank whose windows were
armored. This has protected - I had only a ballistic shield without additional plates.

At the corner, we could hear people moaning, but we couldn't go help them because we didn't have the
right equipment.
The President Georges Fenech. For the information of the commission of inquiry, Mr P. t., can you tell
us how you learned that there had been acts of barbarism within the Bataclan: beheadings, eviscerations,
enucleations...?
Mr. t. P. After the assault, we were with colleagues at the level of the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage when I
saw out a crying investigator who went to vomit. He told us what he had seen. I did not know this
colleague, but he was so shocked it came out naturally.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Acts of torture are passed to the second floor?
Mr. t. P. I think, because I went to the level of the ground floor where there was nothing, only persons
affected by bullets.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. To your knowledge, they were three without a doubt? There is no chance that a
fourth either fled?
Mr. t. P. It is certain that they were at least three, but they were perhaps four. Waves transfer calls to the
police emergency number, 17: it had heard of three individuals, or even four.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Is it excluded that a fourth person could escape by evacuating among the wounded?
Mr. t. P. It is not excluded. This is the reason why my colleagues conducted summary frisk of all victims,
even injured, coming through the main entrance.
M. L. S. We systematically perform a summary palpation, at least at the level of the plexus, from the base
of the torso, and legs.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. A fourth terrorist might have been injured himself or to escape among the wounded?
Mr. t. P. Among the wounded, I think not.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. There are only three weapons of war.
M. L. S. Responsibility investigations. For our part, we know nothing.
The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, thank you very much to have delivered this very important
testimony. The commission of inquiry salutes your courage and the intervention that was yours.

Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone, Director general of the national police, and Mr.
Marc Baudet, Advisor strategy and prospective
Report of the hearing in camera, Monday, March 21, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of
our Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7,
2015.

You know that we have already held numerous hearings, devoted to victims and their support by
relief and then to the chronology of the events of January and November 2015.
We start with you a new phase of our work that, in the light of the experience of the attacks in
January and November 2015, to wonder about the means and missions of police forces.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if
we decide so at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in
camera will previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These
observations will be submitted to the Commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, ' is punishable by
the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code - one year imprisonment and
15,000 euros fine - any person who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish
information relating to non-public works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published
at the end of work of the commission reported this information.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone and Mr. Marc Baudet take oath.
I leave you the floor for a keynote presentation which was followed by an exchange of questions
and answers.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone, Director general of the national police. Ladies and gentlemen, I
shall be very brief. I would simply, out of courtesy for the Commission, reposition the
Directorate-General of the national police (DGPN) among all of the internal security forces, then
very quickly expose you the action of this direction in response to the attacks that we have
experienced in January and November. Then, I will present schematically the provisions that I
could take my level as Director general after feedback with my services as a result of the attacks.
The Directorate-General of the national police is composed of 145 000 agents, and relies on
active police directions.
Among them, the Central Directorate of public security (UMD) is a general direction. It includes
the central territorial intelligence (LSVCCS) Service.
We also have directions say specialized national jurisdiction, such as the Central Directorate of
the judicial police (DCPJ); the Central Directorate of the police at the borders; the central
management of the compagnies rpublicaines de Scurit, which also have national jurisdiction;
the Search Service, assistance, intervention, deterrence - the RAID - which is directly attached to

the Director-general of the national police; and the service of protection, which is responsible for
protecting the personalities likely to be threatened.
The commitment of this branch was real, although attacks only will not place in its area of
competence, the prefect of police of Paris with a specific jurisdiction. We are talking about full
exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, directions that I have just mentioned have contributed to
operations during the attacks. Thus, on 7 January, police services located in the departments of
the Val-d'Oise, of the Oise, Seine-et-Marne and Marne were mobilized to searching of the Kaye
brothers: almost 700 agents brought their assistance to research.
On 13 November, around 22:40, I did converge on Paris police 215 of the departments of the
large Crown - Seine-et-Marne, Yvelines, Essonne, and Val-d'Oise - to provide reinforcement to
the prefect of police, and in particular to the Directorate of security of proximity of the Paris
metropolitan area (DSPAP).
The Central Directorate of the judicial police also was extensively mobilized, with device
attack", on which I will be able to come back if you want. More strong attacks from November
13, is not less than 750 this direction from investigators who participated in the research,
findings and technical and scientific police operations on Paris.
The Central Directorate of the police at the borders has also been updated with contribution;
nearly 5,000 officials of this branch have been deployed on the borders when the State of
emergency has been declared.
And of course, RAID staff contributed by its action in the context of its missions, response
following the attacks from January to November, in collaboration with the Brigade for research
and intervention of the prefecture of police of Paris (BRI - PP). These servants of the RAID
participate several times per week in operations branch (ITSB) homeland security or antiterrorism branch (SDAT) when these services involve individuals radicalized or likely to spend
to the Act in a terrorist.
Since the attacks of January, I repositioned the central service of the territorial intelligence on the
prevention of terrorism, following a number of so-called people radicalized. Currently, nearly
3,000 are followed by this service.
I've also created a staff with me, because we noticed that the Directorate-General of the national
police was no longer in the same position as in past decades. It must now play a much more
operational role to manage on a daily basis the staffs of different directions that I have just
mentioned. So I created a staff that integrates a clearinghouse of the national police, which will,
in the coming weeks, information devices from all directions, which were, until this split. I
therefore with me a staff to control all the branches of the police, and an information centre
which will consolidate the information centres services and directions that I have just mentioned.
Central Directorate of the judicial police, we did climb in power branch of the fight against
cybercrime with the programme PHAROS (Platform for harmonization, analysis, crossreferencing and orientation of the reports) and related cybercrime investigations. The bombing

device has been Work in November; and the strength of the anti-terrorist branch (SDAT)
increased substantially, which was necessary in view of the number of investigations it must
follow.
The seven Metropolitan GIPN were transformed into antennas RAID, under the command
unique and centralized central Bivres RAID, which allows to give instructions and have 270
operators that make up the antennas and the central service.
Finally, I did climb to power the coordination unit (UCLAT) counter-terrorism with the cell call
radicalization and the FSPRT file, which lists all of the persons reported to be radicalised.
Tactically, we decided to adapt the features of initial and in-service training of police officers,
because we noticed that the threat had changed in nature, including in its increasingly violent and
latent forms. We have made sure to train all the brigades and officials.
We are currently finalizing the national plan of action, that the Interior Minister will be able to
stop within a week or two. He had made the request after the November attacks, in order to focus
and articulate all of the emergency services.
We also distributed a doctrine destined for the first responders, because by definition, this will be
the first to be exposed to acts of terrorism, and terrorism by increasingly violent and killer. I have
therefore rebuilt a doctrine with "reflex plugs" that circulated before Christmas.
He also had to organize the judicial police to take into account the decision of anti-terrorism
prosecutors to capture systematically the SDAT DCPJ so she coordinates the investigations in
the event of attacks on the territory.
We continue to conduct various recruitment decided by the Government, mostly in the context of
multi-annual plans: the anti-terrorism plan, the immigration plan and the Covenant of security of
the President of the Republic. We also plan the exceptional recruitment of peacekeepers contest
organization, since we do enter this year 4 600 guardians of peace in schools, while both emerge
at the end of year as well as next year. So, it took my administration to respond as quickly as
possible, with the most complete possible, and means adapted to these applications while
ensuring sustained initial training in order to benefit of these reinforcements which we need.
As regards the means, the SANDBOX plan comes into force. The anti-crime brigades, composed
of trained people whose expertise is stronger than that of the first responders have a response
capacity. On killings of mass or of terrorist acts, they can stabilize and fix the terrorists. We have
seen in Paris during the intervention of the Commissioner of the BAC.
That is, schematically, how the various services were able to intervene, and that I could develop.
Mr president. Two introductory questions, firstly, to fully clarify matters.
As the DGPN, it is you who have the authority to, where appropriate to trigger the intervention
of the national police (FNIF) Force?

Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Everything depends on where. In Paris, it is the prefect of police
requesting me when he wants to emphasize Work the FNIF.
Mr president. It is therefore on the request of the prefect of police of Paris that the DGPN raises
the FNIF. Could you the authority?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. After an Exchange, I propose to Work the FNIF, but Parisian
nameplate, it was he who asks me, e.g. in the case of multiple attacks, or because the bis may not
be sufficient to the task.
Mr president. Do you confirm that when the FNIF fires in Paris Intra-Muros, the RAID leader
takes the command under your authority, despite the territorial jurisdiction BRI - BAC?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. If the FNIF is triggered in Paris, it is the patron of the RAID who
takes direction, and which is placed under the orders of the prefect of police.
Mr president. November 13, 2015, you trigger not the FNIF, as was done in January. Why use it
in January and not in November, while the attacks were far more important? One could imagine
the RAID to take the direction of operations, but you left the bis act as a driving force.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. It is that in January the Commissioner of police had made the request;
such was not the case in November. The RAID has still been sent on Paris, as you know; He
acted in contributing of leading, which was the bis.
Mr president. This answer cannot satisfy me. I want to know the motivation of this decision. I
understand that it is your decision but I can't satisfy me a response to say that it is the Prefect
who considered not asking to Work the FNIF, while it is you who have the authority on this
strength. What objective criteria have led to make this choice while we are facing a series of
large-scale bombings in Paris?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. January and November situations are different. In January, when MIT
Chung entered theHypercacher, another action was underway at Dammartin-en-Gole. Need to
combine the two interventions in a coherent manner. Implementation The FNIF work has
therefore requested by the prefect of police at the time.
In November, the first reactions included send the RAID on Paris, in column.
Mr president. Who made this decision?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. There was an exchange between Jean-Michel Fauvergue - the RAID
leader - and me. The Commissioner of police also requested the assistance of the RAID.
Mr president. It seemed to me that the RAID had moved on its own initiative.

Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. No, not at all. I spoke with the leader of the RAID at 22 h 05,
informing him that there were attacks. He already knew: my staff had the RAID at 2145, and it
had carried out its grouping. He left Paris at 22:10.
Mr president. We had not had these details on the part of the RAID.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. I have a handrail of the SVOPN (operational intelligence of the
National Police service), my staff, outlining the list of the people I informed in time and hour
from 21 h 55. I you a copy.
M. Pierre Lellouche. What time do you say to have ordered the RAID to prepare?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. I had Jean-Michel Fauvergue by telephone at 10:05 pm telling him
that there had been attacks in Paris, and my staff had called the RAID at 21:45. The RAID was
conducting its merger.
M. Pascal Popelin. Had the RAID he anticipated your order?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Yes, because he had information. As, in preparation for the Euro 2016,
an officer in the RAID and the GIGN officer were present at the Stade de France. They have
therefore lived first live explosions and have traced the information to their bosses.
Mr president. You explained that in January, the prefect of police had considered asking you to
Work the FNIF because several sites were concerned. What objective criteria you think it relied
upon to not solicit you in November? Do you not suggested to him to do so?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. No. We were in the heat of the action. The information which reached
Beauvau reported multiple attacks: explosions at the Stade de France, shootings before
institutions receiving public and then taking of hostages in the Bataclan. The first instinct of all
has been to send the maximum of specialized forces to intervene in different sites.
Mr president. I try to understand the doctrine that you follow. The note by the DGPN of 17
January 2014 streamlining the referral and the FNIF employment terms includes a section I,
interventions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the FNIF. It is expected that the commitment
for a unit of intervention must be systematic in hostage situations. Now we are already in this
case at the Bataclan.
If reference is made to this note, should therefore be quasi-automaticite to use this intervention
unit as soon as it is taken hostage.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. The FNIF?
Mr president. This is what it seems.

Section I, paragraph (a)) of the FNIF regulation provides: 'the present territorially competent
public safety Manager on site (...) '. appreciate the gravity of the situation (...) Considers
requiring a response unit, to take home without delay with the staff of the FNIF (...)
We were in this situation. However it has no referral to the staff the FNIF, nor recourse to the
FNIF. I'm not saying that's a bad thing, I try to understand the reason for this decision. It is
necessary that we clarify this point.
If the FNIF, it is the RAID which would have been leading, and concurrent BRI.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. These units would have constituted a single force, under the authority
of the skipper of the RAID.
Mr president. A such mass slaughter - there were 1,500 persons in the Bataclan - have you
considered that the bis was better able to act?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. No. The bis and the RAID as the GIGN are units composed of skilled
personnel who have the necessary expertise. I do not say that the bis was better able to invest the
premises in the light of its weapons, its expertise and jurisdiction. They were there, the
Commissioner of police also, he had already committed its BRI and me I had sent the RAID. It
considered that the two forces should divide the various places of the Bataclan to invest places
and proceed to the final assault. I should mention that rue la Fontaine - the - King, a column of
the RAID was also securing the places where it seemed that terrorists had fired.
Mr president. After the return of experience that did not lack occur, do you think that you
would take the same decision again, or is a reflection underway to review what the FNIF, and
how it should be triggered?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. You have well understood: the FNIF is not a perennial structure: it is
an ad hocstructure that meets a need.
When it was created, there were the RAID, seven GIPN (national police intervention groups) and
the BRI of Paris. The Minister of the Interior at the time had considered that this multitude of
independent intervention forces from each other should, in case of problems, or mass killings be
made available to the prefects - the prefect of police of Paris, but also other territorially
competent prefects.
This is the document you mentioned refers: it was necessary to be able to create a structure under
the authority of the boss of the RAID, which was normally the eldest in the highest rank. It is a
controller-general of the national police which has the expertise to take command.
In the intervention scheme on which we are putting the finishing touches, the question of the
mode of induction of the FNIF is asked, at least for Paris intramuros. Must be automatic when
the RAID occurs on Paris? Still must depend on the request expressed by the Commissioner of
police? Alternatively the DGPN should make the decision?

Mr president. He is not here to criticize the bis, which should instead acknowledge the work,
but the brigade relates essentially to the judiciary, the arrest of gangsters, madmen. The RAID
and the GIGN have another vocation. Why have you sent at the Bataclan, leading, deserving
officials but whose exclusive mission is not to dislodge terrorists? It was the mission of the
RAID.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. I totally understand your question. But the BRI - PP can intervene in
training bis - BAC, which is a bit more trained in this type of intervention than the bis of the
central directorates of the judicial police, you know, and which provide interpellations, spinners,
etc. It is also the mission first of the BRI - PP.
Undoubtedly, the GIGN and RAID are composed of personnel who train all day, acquire
expertise and develop doctrines to intervene. However, all this is done in conjunction with the
BRI - PP, working more and more with the RAID. These two units were training and common
equipment. If he had to do a gradation, I place the bis - BAC above the BRI of the Central
Directorate of the judicial police in terms of intervention.
Mr president. But below the RAID.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Below with regard to mass hostage-taking RAID.
Mr president. What was the case in November.
You place the BRI - PP beyond bis located outside the jurisdiction of the prefecture of police of
Paris, thanks to specific training, but it can not be considered at the same level as the RAID. We
are agree?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. She close more...
Mr president. But it is not at the same level. And it is for this that we wonder why you have not
given this operation in the RAID, as you gave him the order to intervene.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. I had ordered him to move on Paris to put at disposal by the prefect of
police in order to strengthen the intervention units, since it reported a multitude of attacks. I
didn't give the order to intervene in the RAID.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. With regard to what happened on 13 November, well
measured the importance of the first responders. Outside of Paris, it is mainly men and women
who make up the DGPN and the National Gendarmerie.
Since the attacks, what means were donated to your workforce in the equipment? The Minister
announced a number of measures, including for the anti-crime brigades and companies security
and intervention. Can you tell us more about the anticipated capital master plan?
The question of firearms training was often mentioned, especially after the January attacks, so
that several police officers, confronted with the brothers Kaye, had fired on several occasions

without reaching their target. Has this training been strengthened? Either because of the increase
in personnel was necessary to reduce the initial training to the shooting?
Continuing education, highway policeman pulls statutorily 90 cartridges per year - this number is
higher for members of specialized services, such as the tray. However it seems that the quality of
the courses depends on many of the trainers. In some centres, for example, it is possible to
practice on moving targets, while in others there is only fixed targets. Do you plan to develop
this training?
On the other hand, "Amok" courses for the first responders, seem to have been suspended. Can
you tell us a Word?
As regards the employment doctrine, are instructions passed on the way in which the first
responders could intervene in situations of mass murder?
Finally, what is your point of view on how intervention forces are spread over the territory? The
territorial criterion sometimes seems a little outdated with regard to news and the threat. Where
is this reflection, and how do you see things in a personal capacity?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. After the January attacks, we had considered indeed that a new form
of terrorism was developing on the national territory, that of the mass killings carried out by
people who refuse to negotiate and who want to go to the end of their "mission". We therefore
felt the need to review the device of the first responders.
We have distinguished three levels. General service, i.e. police-emergency, will arrive first on
the mass killings, because people will call the 17. These agents were instructed to stabilize the
situation, accountability and involve other units. It is the doctrine to which I have referred in my
introductory remarks and which is explained in section - reflex of December 2015.
A second category of staff, more broken, consists of units of intervention in the province, which
are the DCPJ BRI and the tray. Represent 3,200 people spread over the whole of the territory.
BRI - PJ are already equipped with individual and collective protection and efficient heavy
weapons. Such was not the case of the tray. At the request of the Minister of the Interior, a tray
plan has thus been developed - my counterpart of the Gendarmerie will benefit for its monitoring
and intervention of the Gendarmerie (PSIG) - platoons to staff these units of individual
protections: caques ballistic and vests can stop Kalashnikov cartridges. Above all, it has been
decided to equip them with arms long newly acquired - the Heckler & Koch G36 - capable of
firing 5.56 mm caliber ammunition, equivalent to those of the Kalashnikov.
The deliveries required by this plan have already begun, and are accompanied by training,
particularly in the handling of this new weapon. All this will be part of the national plan of
intervention.
The doctrine of employment is provided in records to which I have referred. The door on the
belts of explosives - alas new phenomenon on the french territory another is devoted to the

surattentats, to ensure, as much as possible, to avoid. Finally, a sheet exposes the doctrine of
intervention for the first responders in the event of mass murder: what are reflexes that should
be.
Regarding internships 'Amok', in the light of events, we use now, in the context of the new
doctrines of intervention, plugs - reflex, and RAID provides in all departmental public security
training to cope with the mass of such killings.
The rapporteur. With regard to firearms training, our officers train better today?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. All police officers have Sig-Sauer 9 mm automatic pistols. At the
police academy, they derive 390 cartridges in 44 hours of training.
M. Pierre Lellouche. It doesn't do much cartridges per hour.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. The training also includes situations.
The rapporteur. Has this volume decreased recently?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. No, it has remained constant.
Recycling consists of three shots a year at least, either 90 cartridges, and concerns all personnel
who must be trained.
With regard to the submachine gun-today is the Beretta, but the situation will be the same with
the new model - the habilitation in school is six hours and 60 cartridges, and rehabilitation is
done annually, with 30 cartridges, to ensure a continued in condition.
This volume of training has not fallen, and will not drop under the new schooling.
I come to the territorial distribution. Intervention forces include the central RAID, based in Paris,
and an aerial RAID in each of the six areas of defence - the GIPN were transformed into
antennas RAID to respond to the need for a joint headquarters. Furthermore, 336 officials make
up the national bis of the judicial police in addition to bis spread over the whole of interregional
police directorates. We also have 3 200 officials from the anti-crime brigades, which are spread
over the 330 districts of public security and ensure the mesh of the whole of the metropolitan
territory and the overseas.
The rapporteur. The GIGN intervened in font box, your forces intervened in area police, we
mentioned the difficult relationship sometimes between the bis and the RAID in Paris
intramuros: this territorial and administrative division still has a meaning? Is a reflection going to
specialize these forces? Known, the GIGN is more specialized, for example, on chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear hazards.

Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. For me, the administrative division always has a meaning for current
missions, which are numerous: madmen, hostage of low intensity, arrests carried out almost
every morning in assistance of CSB or the SDAT.
For the mass killings, the Minister asked us to no longer consider the administrative distribution and we have been working in this direction with the prefect of police and my counterpart, the
DGGN. In the case of mass murder, there is more area police and gendarmerie zone: this will be
the closest and most available force which will take place and who will be driving as long as
other territorially competent forces will not arrive on the site. And if intervention is very
committed, the first intervener force will keep the hand for obvious reasons.
Mr president. It would seem that the BAC, primo-interveners at the Bataclan, be found poor
against terrorists, because of the weakness of their equipment and their armament. The present
UNFICYP Sentinel, on-site military, had meanwhile long guns. The police therefore asked these
soldiers to intervene, to stop the advance of the Kalashnikovs. But order was given not to involve
the army, or even use their weapons.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. I am not aware of this.
M. Pierre Lellouche. I was also struck by the testimony of a police officer, which the military
with a long weapon that he had sought had answered that there was no order. The order was to
come, I'm told, of the command room. What is it?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. It is the prefecture of police.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Does depend on you?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. No, it comes to the halls of command of the prefecture of police.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Therefore the possible use of military forces next to yours depends on the
prefecture of police?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. On Paris. I was unaware of the statements to which you are referring.
M. Pierre Lellouche. How is this possible?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Because I am not competent on Paris. It is the Commissioner of police
who has the entire jurisdiction throughout the territory of the capital, just like for triggering the
FNIF. I have therefore not had knowledge of this statement, and I didn't know.
M. Pierre Lellouche. You have 145 000 agents under your orders, including RAID and the tray
Assembly!
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. With the exception of the prefecture of police of Paris police officials.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. It seems it relevant in the situation?

M. Pierre Lellouche. I find that absurd!

M. Pascal Popelin. This is not a discovery.
Mr president. Clearly, the Director replied that this fell outside its territorial jurisdiction.
M. Christophe Cavard. This is the third commission of inquiry in which I participate, and I
already had the opportunity to hear you from 2012. Today, the press, and in particular the Obs,
returns to war of the font. What a fantasy, or are there problems of coordination? Imagine the
surprise that can cause the reading of certain statements, including that of a general let us
audition after you!
In addition, there is a debate on the role and functions of the territorial information, relying on
the Central Directorate of public security. Things have greatly improved since 2012, but from
your point of view, other developments of this particular service are they desirable? Could help
to provide reinforcements in order to alleviate the staffing problems?
Finally, regarding the use of the two forces that are the police and the gendarmerie, I understand
from reading the press that the Minister had given instructions, at least for the elite units. How
will it be implemented Work?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. With regard of the supposed war fonts, this is not a new phenomenon
in the history of the police and gendarmerie of our country. The National Gendarmerie and the
National Police have, unquestionably, skills and expertise, which is also identical in very many
areas.
I also read this article of Obsand I me y am not recognized. With general Favier, we have made
enormous progress. First of all, we get along well, what counts as institutions are also made of
men, and leaders. In addition, the Minister of the Interior shortly would appreciate that wars
fonts can once again see the day, in the light of the dramatic events that we live. We and our men
know very well that we cannot play it.
M. Christophe Cavard. I refer to the words of the leaders of the RAID and the bis.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. These people have our respect, because they climb into the fire; their
position is not that of the two heads of the police and the gendarmerie, I can assure you.
With regard to the central Service of territorial intelligence (LSVCCS), the Central Directorate of
General information has been removed. A part of its workforce has joined the Central
Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI) at that time, and the other 700 or 800 people, is a
party in the SDIG - departmental information services General - which even the name mentioned
most intelligence, which clearly shows that all the intelligence doctrine had disappeared from the
device. After two or three years, it is clear that the strength and expertise of these services were
inadequate. Thus, the Samson of the Department which I was prefect featured a dozen people
while a few years ago, the direction dpartementale de General information there were twentyfive or thirty!

The creation of the General Directorate of internal security (CSB) by the Minister of the Interior
has coincided in the creation of the central territorial Intelligence Service - the word 'intelligence'
has returned, and this is not just a matter of semantics. Currently, there are 2 200 to 2 300 fulltime equivalents. It is spread over the whole of the territory: an important central service in Paris
provides summaries, analyses and expertise, and a national division of intelligence allows to
focus on major events to provide aid and assistance to the territorially competent staff.
Mr Franois Lamy. Mr. Director general, what was your level of information on the State of the
terrorist threat between January 7 and 13 November? You could hear including many talk about
the risk of simultaneous attacks.
Have you made proposals to the Minister of the Interior between these two dates for the
Organization of the police services? The existence of a note that the Prime Minister would have
had in hand on the evening of November 13, recommending inter alia the declaration of State of
emergency, has often been mentioned. Had measures been considered?
My third question may call a simple answer by Yes or not, but it is the most difficult. I know the
history of the prefecture of police of Paris, and the reasons for its existence. Do you think it is
still news to have, within the National Police, a State within a State which has its own
intelligence services including? Is it still useful?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. The intelligence services, the UCLAT and the general secretariat of
defence and national security (SGDSN) produce weekly, notes on the State of the threat. The
President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior ceased to repeat
that the threat level had never been as high.
We had experienced the beginnings in October 2015 in Jou-ls-Tours, when radicalized
someone entered the police station with a knife to kill the police before getting neutralize. We
had information, Executive Director I had information, perhaps not as extensive as ISB which is
skilled in the art, but in the light of the information exchanges that exist between the
Directorates-General, I knew that the threat level was high.
Regarding the proposals that I could make to the Minister of the Interior, we particularly
reviewed the plans of training and equipment of officials. When we worked on the COP 21, we
proposed the temporary restoration of the borders, and the device was implemented on 13
November in the evening to ensure the necessary protection as a result of the attacks. We had
also put in Works collaboration between the GIGN and RAID to coordinate these two forces.
So I was well informed, and we worked individually and collectively at weekly staff meetings on
terrorism and public order, around the Minister of the Interior. We all participated in the
development of different strategies and different plans.
For the prefecture of police, I believe that at Paris, there must be a prefect of police and a police
prefecture, because of specific problems. Therefore a boss to direct all of the police forces in the
capital, which requires an organic and functional authority over staffing.

Mr Franois Lamy. There is a police Prefect who has authority over the police in Marseille. But
you are also competent on this city.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Not quite.
Mr Franois Lamy. Indeed, the prefect of Marseille is directly attached to the Minister of the
Interior, if I remember correctly.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. But in Lyon, for example, I can lead the forces of the order.
M. Pierre Lellouche. In Lyon, you know the operating instructions of the military, but not in
Paris.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. In Lyon, the day where it will have to involve the military, this will be
done with the prefect of Lyon.
M. Pierre Lellouche. But you have a doctrine on the use of the military in the event of mass
killing?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. No, it does not exist.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Do you intend to develop one?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Work is underway with the Ministry of defence.
Mr president. The question of Mr Lamy was very accurate. The existence of the prefecture of
police of Paris, survival of the past, justified yet in light of the threats facing our country today?
Again, it is an institutional problem and not person.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. If things are going well between the police Commissioner and the
Directors-General, in view of the specificity of Paris, have a full police prefect justified,
provided that they do not make the PP a fortress.
Mr president. In one of his books, the new keeper of the seals had proposed the deletion of the
prefecture of police of Paris...
Mr. Meyer Habib. The time factor is critical. On 13 November, there were attack to the Stade
de France and then five events in parallel. Terrorists have killed nearly 100 people at the
Bataclan before the arrival of a Commissioner of the BAC, which by neutralizing one of them
has, it seems, an end to the massacre.
At the limit, regardless of the trigger or not the FNIF, because time it prepares and that she
arrives, it is already almost too late. How to make sure to have, at all times, in major cities,
forces equipped and ready to go in the minute, as happens in some countries? It takes trained
people capable of arriving in minimal time. To carry out an operation like that of Saint-Denis,
intervention forces are mistresses of the time. In the case of mass murder, on the other hand, the

time is not for us, and the terrorists kill. Only one element that disrupts their strategy can stop
them.
How to have in the future of forces ready to respond immediately? Certainly, it is very difficult
on a territory of 550 000 square kilometers, but at least in major cities.
M. Pierre Lellouche. My question relates to the command, and it is similar Franois Lamy. I
find it implausible that the command in Paris is the prefect, unlikely that you are competent in
Lyon but not in Paris. This point should be effectively addressed in the conclusions of our report.
I wanted to revisit the chronology: you said have been converging on Paris 215 policemen of the
large Crown to 2140. On the other hand, you speak well RAID after. Your reflex is to mobilize
the BAC of the departments rather than the RAID?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Not at all Sir. It was at 10:40 pm I gave the order the police to
converge on Paris.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Except that the police of the Lac de Crteil were at 21 h 42 at the
Bataclan.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. The order I gave at 22 h 40 was addressing the crews of large Crown,
so that they go to lend a hand to the prefect of police. We have given instructions from the
interministerial crisis Center (CIC) of the place Beauvau.
M. Pierre Lellouche. But the Lac staff was already at the Bataclan for an hour, at 21:40.
What appeals to me is that when the tray policeman asks the conditions of employment of the
military, it is not known to answer him. And you, as for you, intervene specialized forces one
hour after the arrival of field officers on-site. There are certainly good reasons for this, but I
would like to know them.
Finally, you say you create around you a staff intelligence and operational...
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. No, it is my central intelligence service that feeds me intelligence.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Is there a place where all intelligence converge near you? The intelligence
service which makes account to your staff, is that of the police, which is not connected to the
other?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Mr Habib, the instructions given by the Minister of the Interior, which
will be available in the intervention scheme, respond to your concern. This schema indeed
combines the intervention, before the arrival of specialised forces, new arrivals and especially of
the tray and the bis that we equip to allow them to intervene in the best conditions of security and
with the means of attack or defence the most efficient - I made reference earlier. By the end of
the month of may, the training, the equipment and the vehicle fleet will be therefore suitable to

fill make interventions in case of killing of mass, with the aim to stabilize and neutralise the
situation, like what happened at the Bataclan.
Obviously, it cannot create units of intervention throughout the country. They are located as
harmoniously as possible in the territory. And in case of mass murder, there is more area police
and gendarmerie sector: is the intervention force nearest the scene of the drama that will take
place.
Mr Lellouche, my staff has contacted the head of the RAID at 2145, mobilize the intervention
force. I myself have called him a few minutes later, before joining the CIC place Beauvau. Then,
when I arrived at the Ministry of the Interior, I was accompanied by my Central managers,
including the head of public safety, with whom we exchanged. We have considered that if this
continued to hit Paris, should bring reinforcements to the prefecture of police, not intervention,
but general service forces. We therefore sent available patrols, without nullifying the police
presence in the four departments of the Crown.
At 22 h 40, we required units to ensure the dam points, assistance, patrols. Thus, the prefect of
police could send in the stations - no one knew if all the perpetrators of these massacres were
fixed. Intervention forces have been the priority, even if the first has not been put in Artwork: the
goal was to send the largest number of units trained and armed to put an end to these events. It is
in a second time, that we decided to put units of general service at the disposal of the Security
Directorate of proximity of the Parisian metropolitan area (DSPAP) the prefect of police.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Mr. Director general, I have the feeling that we were not at all prepared for
these attacks, it is stunning that has prevailed. How have you, as well as all officers and
stakeholders, you felt it?
You mentioned all the evolutions in progress following the attacks of November 13 - national
intervention scheme, employment doctrine for the first responders, the criminal investigations,
plan tray, etc. But why not taking these measures earlier? Of course, it is always easy to raise
these issues post-clearance -we are closed and it is not meant to be worn in the public square.
Why not having acted after the January attacks, as prior to this, there had been attacks of mass
everywhere in the world, in Spain, in Britain... Maybe we thought - and we also, ladies and
gentlemen - that the France was sanctified and that this would not happen with us. Why it took
the carnage of November 13 to begin to take things into account?
M. Pascal Popelin. On the first, I have noted in your explanation that it had been created in a
different organization of intervention forces context from that which exists today, if concerning
in particular the articulation of the RAID and the GIPN, which now form an integrated structure.
We have also observed that on the ground, at the Bataclan, the operational relationship between
bis and RAID appears to have been appropriate.
Do you think that if we had formally been in operative FNIF, this would have improved the
efficiency of the Organization's interventions in the evening? Or this would it change anything?

M. Jean-Michel Vel. I would like to return to the conditions of employment of the armed forces.
There are 10,000 troops mobilized on the territory, thousands in Paris. What do you wear on the
role of the military? Could you better work together, or the military of the operation Sentinel
should remain a deterrent force?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Mr Grouard, even when one is Director general of the national police,
Director of cabinet of the Minister, Commissioner of police or director-general of the national
gendarmerie, was necessarily a moment of query when you are told dozens of deaths and
multiple attacks. But we weren't in the stunning and we understand very well what was
happening. Admittedly, we were unaware of how things unfolded exactly and how much time it
would take, but we knew very well, to hear the evidence coming to us, that these events were
unfortunately a scenario that other countries had already known.
My introductory point was voluntarily fast and schematic, but we had implemented a number of
features from the attacks of last January. We thus worked on the doctrines of employment,
prepared controls armament and protection for our staff. I had assembled the unions before the
end of January to consider a deployment of equipment. Regarding coordination between the
GIGN and RAID, there are earlier than November 13 notes.
No, everything was not done after November 13: predates the staff to which I was referring, the
briefing also room, as well as recruitment. The SANDBOX plan decided by the Minister when
an official of the BAC of the 93 took a bullet in the head on a robbery - and it was before the
November attacks.
Of course, after November 13, it took confirm the coherence of these devices doctrinal,
organizational, of equipment, human resources, but we worked from 9 and 10 January, to
develop within the national police - police included prefecture - a device deployment and
acquisition of new equipment because we had considered that you might need for this device in
the light of the threat.
As soon as the end of 2014, the central territorial Intelligence Service shifted, as I said earlier, on
radicalisation and terrorism in order to follow a certain number of objectives that could be
considered dangerous, with a different spectrum of severity depending on the individual. We did
not mount the territorial intelligence in its jurisdiction radicalisation and terrorism after
November 13. This is done before, including the development of the Platform calls on the
radicalization of the UCLAT. And after the attack in the Saint-Quentin-Fallavier plant, it was
decided to create the EMOPT - the operational staff of the terrorism prevention. Many devices
have therefore been set up before 13 November.
The operation at the Bataclan, the FNIF is a procedure that puts a man at the disposal of the
prefect of police - because it cannot be Work on the metropolitan territory, where only the RAID
is competent.
Mr president. The decision not to Work the FNIF was taken in full agreement with the Minister
of the Interior?

Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Yes, the Commissioner of police has not expressed the wish to see
implement the FNIF.
Mr president. Therefore the Minister of the Interior was fully informed?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Yes, we were all in the same room.
M. Pascal Popelin. It has not even been addressed?
Mr president. Mr. Director general, where were you physically, with the prefect, when the
decision to intervene the bis in force drive?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. I called the RAID when I headed to the CIC, which is located in the
basement of the Ministry of the Interior.
Mr president. Who was present at this time?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. There was my counterpart of the mounted police...
Mr president. That is the general Favier?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Yes. There were also central, representatives of other government
departments directors, since it is an interdepartmental room.
Mr president. It was not the Minister?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. The Minister came afterwards, with the President of the Republic and
the Prime Minister. They came to make a point.
At no time, in this room, we talked of putting in Work of the FNIF.
Mr president. This was raised at any time by you or by the prefect of police, or by the Minister?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. The Commissioner of police was absent, by definition, since he was
on the ground.
Mr president. The question even not arisen?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. The objective, that night, was put at disposal of the prefect of police
the maximum of competent intervention forces to put an end to the killings.
Mr president. We are in agreement. But in the context of this reflection, no one has suggested,
at any time, to Work the FNIF?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. No.

Mr Franois Lamy. The Commissioner of police was on the ground?

Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. Yes.
Mr Franois Lamy. In defence, there is a staff and a tactical command, which is on the ground.
On 13 November, the main decision maker was not in command, but on the ground room. And
thus, easily reachable.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. I haven't tried to get in touch with the prefect, I leave work.
Mr president. The Commissioner of police was thus not to the CIC at the time. Yet it was he
who would have jurisdiction to claim implementation Work of the FNIF.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. He was on the ground, surrounded by its directors, head of the bis and
Jean-Michel Fauvergue, head of the RAID. It considered, in the light of events and a situation
that he lived as a Manager, had not asked the FNIF.
Mr president. Could political authority dispense with the opinion of the Commissioner of
police, and take the initiative to implement Work the FNIF without that the Commissioner of
police the application?
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. The Minister controls the police prefect, the GIPN, and everyone. He
could have provided that we have discussed, which was not the case. Our only concern was to
send forces. And who was responsible for these forces to put an end to this massacre was the
prefect of police.
The Commissioner of police was on hand, intervention forces told him how they had to
intervene, and he took his decision as a Director of operations.
M. Pierre Lellouche. In Lyon, it would have been otherwise.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. This would have been exactly the same.
Mr president. Not quite, there not exclusive jurisdiction.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. In Lyon, is the RAID which is competent. However the FNIF cannot
be Works only when there are two forces.
Mr president. The RAID is competent in Paris from the time where one raises the FNIF. If it
does not, the RAID is not competent.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. The RAID may intervene in Paris without triggering the FNIF, as a
concurrent force. If one raises the FNIF, it becomes leading, under the direct orders of the prefect
of police.
Mr president. Here it is, and this is not the case outside of Paris.

M. Pascal Popelin. Things are clear: the only change that would have resulted in the outbreak of
the FNIF - which was not mentioned or asked - would have been the patron of the RAID would
be mechanically became the boss of an operation which in this case was conducted by the
Commissioner of police and the bis, with the support of the RAID who was present and who
coordinated with the other units.
The rapporteur. The RAID would have been leading under the authority of the prefect of
police.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. The leader, in Paris as in all departments, it is the representative of the
State and of the Government, either according to the Constitution, the prefect.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Agree that it is not neutral to give or not, operational command, under the
authority of the prefect, the most experienced organization among your strengths for the mass
murder and terrorism.
The question is this: what is the doctrine of employment forces specialized counter-terrorism an
evening like this? It is not neutral that these forces are not used as forces menantes. It is our duty
to try to understand.
Mr. Jean-Marc Falcone. I try to bring you the most objective possible answers.
M. Pierre Lellouche. If the reason is that the prefect is sovereign, it is not satisfactory. The
Government is sovereign, and in this case the Minister of the Interior, who has the authority over
all prefects, including the prefect of police of Paris.
Mr president. In the end, bis was driving, and with regard to our two national elite forces, which
we are envied by the whole world, one was concurrent and remained on the ground floor, while
the other was on the foot of war to the barracks of the Celestines. In fact, our two elite forces
were indented.
M. Pascal Popelin. Having regard to the hearing of various previous speakers, and following the
useful travel site last Thursday, I do not think we can say that the RAID was simply competing.
It was actually under the authority of the Commissioner of police, as it would have anyway been
the case, but indeed coacteur of the operation.
It is always easy to remake the film after the fact, but I believe personally that confined the
GIGN to the barracks of the Clestins in case other events yet occurred elsewhere had meaning.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. It's a no-brainer!
Mr president. Thinking that we have addressed the future. In any case, we don't invent anything
because of the ongoing discussions on the territoriality on the doctrines for the use. It is therefore
normal that we ask these questions.
Gentlemen, it remains for me to thank you for your availability.

Hearing, behind closed doors, general Denis Favier, Director general of the national
gendarmerie and colonel Samuel Dubuis, Member of his cabinet
Hearing in camera, Monday, March 21, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. My general, my colonel, thank you for having responded to the request
for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means OEwork by Etat to combat terrorism since January
7, 2015.

You know that we have already held numerous hearings devoted first to the victims and their
support by relief and then to the chronology of the events of January and November 2015 on
which we also had the opportunity to hear from you.
We continue with you a new phase of our work, begun today with the Director general of the
national police, and that tends, in the light of the experience of the attacks in January and
November 2015, to wonder about the means and missions of the internal security forces, and so
now those of the gendarmerie.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if
we decide so at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings which take place behind
closed doors are first transmitted to people heard in order to collect their comments. These
comments are submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I recall that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, ' is punishable by the penalties
provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code a year of imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine any person who, within a period of twenty-five years disclose or publish information relating to
non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the
commission referred to this information .
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.
General Denis Favier and colonel Samuel Dubuis successively take oath.
I leave you the floor for a keynote presentation which was followed by an exchange of questions
and answers.
Army general Denis Favier, Director-general of the national gendarmerie. Mr president,
ladies and gentlemen, thank you for hosting me again. I am very pleased to speak to you on the
adaptations that the gendarmerie had to make in the coming months to flow to deal with the
terrorist threat.

My opening remarks will be limited to make a few observations on the current state of a threat
you know, that has been set here on several occasions. My analysis aims to explain the
consequences that I have learnt in terms of adaptation of my device.
Firstly: we are faced with a terrorist threat that is part of the time. Therefore, our adaptation may
not be timely but it implies - it really must be stressed - a deep renovation of our action.
Second observation: this terrorist threat latent, diffuse, is characterized by low cost of weapons
used that promotes the transition to the Act, but also by its link to the great common crime. This
feature requires us to better combine the operations of administrative police and judicial police.
It is a priority and guidance have already been provided to units to optimize this critical
component.
Third and final observation: no point of the national territory is preserved, which requires us to
have a global approach for the whole of the country. The jurisdiction of the gendarmerie extends
over 95% of the national territory, an area where a significant portion of the population but
where also many sensitive sites: nuclear power plants, plants of type Seveso, built shopping
malls on the outskirts of the cities, and most sensitive military sites, to mention just a few
emblematic examples.
Once these findings is prepared, I identified four areas in which our action should be improved:
intelligence; the control of flows and in particular of entries on the national territory; the mesh
territorial intervention units, subject to cFavorite pieces of news and your concerns, which is the
subject of a very advanced reflection in the Ministry of the Interior; our resilience capacity, to
develop in relation to the operational reserve of the gendarmerie and a future French National
Guard.
In the area of intelligence, we must continue working together already committed and identify
the margins of progress. The gendarmerie is not part of the six entities of the first circle of
intelligence and it does not claim to become a member. The first circle units are doing their job
and know what I would call firm intelligence. The national gendarmerie intervened in the second
circle, with the units of general jurisdiction of the national police, to collect and analyse
territorial intelligence.
Given the extent of its area of operations, its 3 000 brigades, its 60 000 soldiers of the
departmental gendarmerie and its tools, the gendarmerie has the means to capture weak signals
in the territory, to analyze and to reassemble. Better taken into account than in the past, relying
on a high-performance data processing system (the OCs: departmental public safety database),
this ability is revealed today essential to the look of the number of individuals showing signs of
radicalization.
With this in mind, we decided to create 75 antennas of territorial intelligence (ART) in cities in
which we are in full jurisdiction. This innovative device already produced significant results. For
example, I would cite Lunel, a city that has known many departures for the Jihad, and where we
go back information of the highest quality for ten months, which allows us to conduct a
particularly positive action.

Our positioning in the field could be summarized as follows: Anchorage in territorial intelligence
and valorisation of this string; presence in the operational headquarters for the prevention of
terrorism (EMOPT), which was established within the Ministry of the Interior after the bombing
of Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, at a time where we realized that certain information prove
insufficiently shared. This structure of reduced size and where each service is represented, lets
streamline the sharing of information and check the reality of the follow-up of persons reported
and listed within the processing file reports for the prevention of radicalisation terrorism
(FSPRT). For my part, I consider it as a very positive step to maintain in the years to come.
Two avenues of improvement could be explored. On the one hand, and like our presence within
the Directorate of military intelligence (DRM), executive protection and security of defence
(DPSD) and Directorate General Security outdoor (DGSE), entities of the first circle, I agree
with the posting of Police General Directorate of internal security (CSB). It would be interesting
to explore this track in the coming months.
On the other hand, and in order to reinforce the high level of cooperation between territorial
intelligence and the gendarmerie, it seems appropriate to reflect on the positioning of the central
territorial Intelligence Service (LSVCCS).
Second area of possible improvements and which, in my view, is very important: the flow
control. Since the attacks of January 2015, I consider that the vulnerabilities of our device are
undoubtedly the nEgg motorway, railway stations and airports. We need better control, in the
depth of the territory, all axes which converge on cities and that serve as vectors for terrorists,
whether road, rail, port and airport infrastructure.
The reason for which include developing the system of automated reading plates (ANPR), which
would be even more efficient if data were collected at the national level. Central processing of
reading LAPI (STCL) system that I am defending would detect movements of vehicles on our
roads all but should also evolve the texts so that we can really exploit these data. Whatever it is,
we have a way of developing an action expected security of the national territory.
In this area, we can also build an engagement with the armed forces, particularly in the context
of the Sentinel device. Whenever we have taken toll barriers, what we have done after November
13 for several weeks, we have significant results. Such devices contribute to enhance the sense of
security and are likely to deter terrorist activities.
Go beyond the framework of the national territory and are slightly expanding the perimeter of
observation. I think that we need, more broadly, in the same vein of the flow control, having a
real action at the external borders of the European Union. This is the meaning of the feature that
we are putting in Artwork. If one goes beyond, I think that we also need to look sharp on the
terrorists starting areas: Africa, Libya, the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean rim. We have a
decisive action to drive. It is a general police action that must involve the Interior units and
probably also the armies. In doing so, we could develop a coherent policy of the flow control.
Third field: the doctrine and the intervention schemes. January and November attacks have
highlighted the need to evolve our schemas and renovate our national doctrines, by

distinguishing different levels of intervention. Today, I extend an analysis that I had already
sketched before you. Put aside the basic intervention, those of the primo-engaged arriving on a
fact of nature extremely serious and must manage it as was always done in our country: by
positioning itself, by observing, responding, as appropriate.
We work the intermediate intervention, one where we have a weakness, according to the plan
initiated by the Minister, which involves the Rab (BAC) brigades and platoons of monitoring and
intervention of the gendarmerie (PSIG). Before the intervention of the units from the top of the
spectrum are the search service, assistance, intervention, deterrence (RAID) and the intervention
of the gendarmerie nationale (GIGN) group, some units must be able to engage the fire within a
few minutes following a beginning of planned killings. We must develop such units, in the
province, with enhanced fire power, of suitable protective equipment, and aid in sight. We're in
the ramp-up phase in this register and the gendarmerie has reached its first target in the next
summer: 50 PSIG "SABRE", spread over the national territory, we will thus have such
intermediate capacity.
The GIGN and RAID, mainframes specialized must have arms armed in the province. The
gendarmerie has three antennas in the province - in Toulouse, Orange and Dijon - to which will
be added to those of Nantes, Tours and Reims in the year 2016. These units are being trained and
we term a pretty solid device, including overseas, since all departments and local authorities are
concerned. We will especially create an antenna of the GIGN in Mayotte, territory on which I
wanted to strengthen the existing system of intervention.
So much for the theory for intervention, but we must also achieve the national intervention
scheme, which is the subject of considerable debate. Particular, we must redefine what are units
from the top of the spectrum and that they know how to. In the context of the national plan of
action, we have listed capabilities that make the difference in terms of counter-terrorism. We also
identified the capacity of the units on the basis of declarations; We must now check their actual
existence in order to refine the national plan of action.
This scheme, currently being finalized, recalls the principles: the unit concerned in the first place
is that which falls within the area of competence of the relevant force. But if the latter encounter
a technical problem or if it does not control a capacity, an outdoor unit can come in concurrent
force. This intervention scheme seems to me to constitute a considerable step forward.
Intervention, the gendarmerie agrees a major effort towards friends foreign groups, including in
the Sahelian Strip where we deploy us. To be been there regularly, I consider that there is
considerable threats, a need for assistance. I advocate to resume training in five countries of the
Sahelian southerly arc - (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) and Senegal and
Cte d'Ivoire, in order to help them to face the threats they face today and that we will have to
face tomorrow.
Fourth area: resilience and the role of the mounted police reserve. The reserve is an exceptional,
consisting of 25,000 men and women, including 70% of individuals aged twenty-five to forty
years and which, in addition to their professional activity, come to work to contribute to their
own security, there mounted where they live. This concept, which works really well, allows me

to work every day, 1,500 reservists to strengthen coverage of the territory, to collect intelligence,
to assert a presence of the State, and to reassure our fellow citizens. It is possible to go even
more far by including soliciting reservists for the everyday safety, I think schools and hospitals.
This track of reflection should be dug. The success of the reserve is explained by its anchorage in
the territories which allows us to work people for very short periods, sometimes of only twentyfour hours.
Here in a few words, Mr president, what I wanted to say to start debates. I am of course at your
disposal if you want to deepen certain subjects including as regards equipment used under the
plan of fight against terrorism from the beginning of the year or the end of the year security pact.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, general, for these introductory explanations which
are very rich and innovative, reflect a true reflection that you submit to the political authorities,
in collaboration with the national police. You are proposing that the territorial intelligence (SRT)
is co-directed by the police and the gendarmerie, which implies considerable structural changes.
You talk about total redesign of fundamental developments.
I bounce on your last words because the inquiry Commissioners need to understand, on a
technical level, what you know to do and others do not know to do. For example, you say that
you can achieve by hot burglary breccias. Can you describe this technique? Other services, such
as the research and intervention (BRI) brigade, can they do it? What is the added value of the
GIGN intervention?
Army general Denis Favier. Mr president, I will speak to you about my job, what I do.
Given its nature, the GIGN has developed its concept of intervention counter-terrorist from
military capabilities that it has adapted to police missions. This is the followed path: we leave
our military capabilities and we weaken the side effects to reduce collateral damage, for
example, to intervene in the segment of police missions. It is more difficult to make the reverse
journey, i.e. from police missions to go to counterterrorism operations that involve the use of
heavy means. It is a different approach on intellectual and technical.
Our long-standing practice of operational commitments has led us to evolve, including to use
explosives for twenty years. To master this technique, which assumes a particularly fine dosage,
we have, in the start method empirically.
We have notably committed this reflection in 1994, after the Marignane operation where we
entered through the door of a plane to free the hostages. Once stale, a mode of action is lost, can
no longer develop it, need to find another. With the General delegation for armaments (DGA),
we then developed new processes.
We also work in atmosphere polluted by a nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical substance
(CBRN), equipped with light outfits or suits.
The President Georges Fenech. We are cFavorite pieces of the subject. Are there questions on
these points there?

Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. How would you have acted in Saint-Denis on the door that
exploded without falling? Do you have different techniques from those of the RAID?
Army general Denis Favier. No more than two weeks ago, I cannot answer you on this issue
here because I wasn't on the spot.
M. Pierre Lellouche. The RAID and the bis know respond to CBRN products?
Army general Denis Favier. I can answer that for the GIGN. Protective equipment are subject
to individual staffing and are rigorously controlled.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Imagine that there is a chemical attack in Paris, in the subway or in a
department store. Who will be able to handle the situation?
Army general Denis Favier. These capabilities are listed in the intervention scheme and they
will be subject to an audit. I can talk to you about what I have.
M. Pierre Lellouche. You are too polite to talk about others, my general?
Army general Denis Favier. I return to the purpose of the intervention scheme, because it is a
key point. In this debate, it is impossible to stick to statements. The Minister wants to go check,
capacity by capacity, which is able to do this or that thing. It is decisive. And at the end of the
verification capabilities, it will answer your question: who is able to take explosives, to address
CBRN risks? This is something very important and awaited.
The rapporteur. In Morocco, there were elements of a dirty bomb. The schema that you are
developing, obviously takes account of this type of particular threat. Do you have now increased
training capabilities or equipment to cope?
Army general Denis Favier. Yes, very clearly.
The rapporteur. This is a very important concern?
Army general Denis Favier. Units from the top of the spectrum concerned about for several
years. They are capable of treating the problem of upstream - work under diving, detection of
CBRN substances and explosives - downstream, i.e. until the actual intervention. This folder,
complex and ancient, is widely supported by the SGDSN, including in financial terms. We are
not late.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Are you going up to the decontamination?
Army general Denis Favier. We intervene at all stages: detection, intervention,
decontamination.

Mr Franois Lamy. You confirm that, on 13 November, the GIGN was positioned at the
barracks of the Clestins to respond in case there were other attacks in Paris? Was it well its
mission?
Army general Denis Favier. I can confirm, as two weeks ago, when I had given details of the
arrival times and the units engaged.
Mr Franois Lamy. Among the measures taken since January 7, we have the Sentinel operation
which mobilized up to nearly 10,000 soldiers and who has known the difficulties inherent in the
establishment of a new device. Static guards turned gradually into dynamic guards. The soldiers,
who work under the order of the prefect - what is not in their habits, - have seen their training
time be reduced considerably: nearly two-thirds of the training sessions were cancelled last year
and this year will still be pending recruitment. Some soldiers have six to seven missions Sentinel
in the year, while they also external operations (OPEX) and that their profession is, after
everything, to make war and not to keep places of worship, to make it simple.
We are considering each and others, on how to gradually reduce the importance of the Sentinel
device. It raises questions, including on the use of soldiers, on the evening of the attacks. Who
gives the order to fire? How? Why?
We have a military force that can also do operations police and guard static or dynamic sites
such as nuclear power plants. If a force is all the experience to perform the duties of the Sentinel
mission, it is the national gendarmerie. We will answer me that it is a matter of numbers. If we
could find the staffing solution, would the National Gendarmerie not all capabilities to fulfil the
mission Sentinel, which would allow our soldiers to go to war, or to prepare in any case, what is
their primary mission?
Army general Denis Favier. I spoke several times on this very sensitive issue. As a patron of
the mounted police, I think that we are facing in a satisfactory manner to the General problems of
insecurity: burglaries fell by 2015; our commitment is strong; We also face of heavy policing
sequences.
However, the nature of the threat we face we led to maximize national resources and, in this
context, recourse to military means is interesting. However, I am not defending the idea that
there was a strategic failure. Display this observation would indeed amount to admitting that
Daech succeeded in conquering a part of the national territory. This is not the case.
I readily admit to a hardening of the threat, but I think that we can manage the situation with
conventional and legal means available to us. The State of emergency allows us to cope with
most situations. From my point of view, the use of armed forces in the national territory must be
guided by the principle of subsidiarity, which is not a derogatory term in my mouth, and be
based on a close collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior security forces in a logic of
"leading-competing.
I am now convinced that the Ministry of the Interior has all of the technical expertise to cope
with new threats. In addition, gendarmes and police officers are able to move very quickly from

a posture of public safety to a posture of intervention, with the constant concern of the
proportionality of the means and force engaged. This principle of reversibility is part of our
fundamental and constitutes one of the pillars of training in all of our schools.
It is necessary in my view developing the use of the armed forces in the flow control logic, as we
do in Guyana for fight against illegal gold mining, as part of operation Harpy. The armed forces
and the gendarmerie are engaged in a similar mission, with a group of infantry fighting and two
judicial police officers (OPJ). This alloy of skills has meaning. The rules of the rule of law are
respected: Constable made his work of control, administrative police and judicial police, but
having the support and, if necessary, a fire support group combat. This Harpy device has been
proven in the field and deserves to be implemented on the national territory, in the flow control
logic that would impede the freedom of movement of terrorists and criminals while reassuring
our citizens.
To be complete in my answer, Sir, I indicates that, during the month of April, on the initiative of
the army, Earth and the gendarmerie we will engage a two-week experiment in the Department
of Isre. We will test this joint commitment by the two institutions, in a logic of the flow control
in a submission to a very active Crime Department, and then draw conclusions.
Mr Franois Lamy. You have not fully answered my question. If you had the strength, you
wouldn't no more effective and more appropriate than the military to fill the missions of the
Sentinel operation? You have all the paraphernalia to act in such a context, including because
your gendarmes are also intelligence when they monitor a place of worship. It is a bit in their
genes, I daresay.
Army general Denis Favier. If the mounted police had received reinforcements of staff you
have raised, it would have produced a 'ground effect' significant.
The rapporteur. On 13 November, useful information for the intervention at the Bataclan had
reached by various biases in some gendarmerie brigades. Were these information passed to the
police and the forces which intervened on the ground? If Yes, in these times of crisis, how is the
communication? Conversely, when the GIGN directs operations, information you get from the
National Police, including through the 17?
We all see the importance of the first responders and, as the Minister of the Interior, you
indicated that all PSIG would be fitted before July 1St . What is the level of training and workouts
to your gendarmes shooting? How many cartridges draw take per year?
Finally, how much the gendarmerie monitors places, in the form of static or mobile guards?
Army general Denis Favier. Management information differs depending on the nature of the
crisis, and on November 13 is what is called a fast kinetics crisis, during which everyone gathers
information, units of gendarmerie as police stations. In a crisis as fast, there is not time to set up
a command post to work intelligence and collect all the data, including those transiting through
social networks. Between the first shot at the Bataclan and the resolution of the crisis, it took two

hours or two hours thirty. This time is too short to be able to exploit all the information collected
by our brigades in the national territory.
We can do it in a longer crisis, if it is for example a hostage during which can place normal
Fireworks, including making contact by negotiation. You can then use tools that allow to work
information: observation of social networks, for example could not implement this during a crisis
that requires an assault of emergency.
With regard to the first responders and the primo-committed, had upset the doctrine. Until then,
mounted police as in police, when we were faced with a sudden and planned, killing the mission
given to the first commitment was to observe, to post and wait for the reinforcement of the
specialized units, the top of the spectrum. It is no longer possible: we can no longer wait because
the terrorists kill and there's no possible negotiation; We need to intervene very quickly to give a
judgment, mean that it is present and that it will not do.
The rapporteur. This change of doctrine occurred before or after November 13?
Army general Denis Favier. Reflection began after the January attacks, she has matured during
the course of the spring, we have built a doctrine with the police last June, and we are
implementing in Artwork.
Mr. Meyer Habib. It has not been used on 13 November?
Army general Denis Favier. The Minister presented this plan 23 October 2015 to Rouen and its
implementation represents a lot of work. Need to change the minds and business processes. For
years, the primo-incurred have been instructed to post, to observe, to account and wait, while
they are now asked to go to the contact. To change the doctrines for the use, equipment and
tactical concepts. It is very complicated. We have this step. We go to Reims on Friday 1St April
to assist in the training of the first units. It was necessary to acquire the weapons. It is done.
We adapt so weapons, ballistic equipment, the concepts of employment. We buy ballistic shields.
We must see what is a ballistic shield: it is very heavy, and it is necessary to integrate it into a
manWork cell. In some units, there were many voluntary Assistant gendarmes, i.e. of those who
are not active duty personnel. This is why I decided that each PSIG SABRE would be composed
of 2/3 of NCOs of gendarmerie. Branch follows with great attention the rise of this device,
including the tools and weapons training. If acting the volume of drawn ammunition every year
by our police, he moved to about 60 rounds of 9 mm, what who doubled with respect to the level
of training prior to the attacks. I shall send you a note detailing accurately the firearms training
development Work since the attacks.
In regards to Sentinel, I am not very favorable to what mobile gendarmes are engaged in static
devices which, in my view, are not sufficiently efficient. This concept must evolve. RCMP
currently keeps five sites in Paris. Passive, electronic means could be used. Need to optimize our
capacity in technical means to clear the RAM resource that can then be used in other missions.

The rapporteur. You are specialized in explosives and CBRN risks. The territorialisation of
intervention forces still has a meaning? Practice evolves in the event of mass killings, but should
we not go further? During the attacks of the month of January 2015, the GIGN, RAID and the bis
intervened in areas not covered by their skills. In your opinion, should things evolve on this
point? If Yes, how?
Army general Denis Favier. They will evolve with the national response plan.
The rapporteur. It should go further.
Army general Denis Favier. In 95% of cases, the job of special units is to master a madman, to
resolve a hostage to villainous mobile or a situation of retention family to stop dangerous
individuals in their homes. In these cases, the issue of territorial jurisdiction has meaning. What
we are discussing today represents 5% of the business that require that we revisit the process.
The intervention scheme will help us. Need so we know involved, regardless of the area of
competence, all available means. This scheme will allow us to, on the basis of the problems
encountered, to initiate ways held the title of the specific capabilities by any particular unit, in a
logic of 'leading' and 'concurrent '. We will lead in the short term on this evolution which seems
notable. For the 5% that I talk about, we will move in this direction.
M. Christophe Cavard. My general, you gave information that interests me particularly: you
regret that the gendarmerie is not associated with the highest level at ISB. With the military of
the DGSE and the DRM, you are between you, even if it is already an evolution. That could
bring you a presence in ISB?
The question of the co-direction of territorial intelligence arises at a time where a true reflection
is conducted on the reinforcement they may make. You cited the example of Lunel to enhance
the role of brigades, there where they are, and advocate a fluidity of information. At one time,
the information was in a sense but it was not much back and forth. How these developments
happen concretely?
Assignments to residence and other administrative decisions which multiply, are not just cities.
As that gendarmes, how are you prepared to respond?
The President Georges Fenech. I would remind you, ladies and gentlemen, we have planned an
entire block for the information, so we will have the opportunity to audition branch operational
anticipation (LOTRO) which depends on the general Favier.
Army general Denis Favier. The DGGN has a very constructive relationship with CSB and the
level of coordination has evolved positively in recent years. We clearly open the follow-up of
persons reported and assigned to residence, including through the creation to the Minister of the
Interior of the operational staff of prevention of terrorism (EMOPT) consecutively in the
bombing of Saint-Quentin Fallavier June 2015. I agree with the posting of a liaison officer with
the CSB.

With regard to the territorial intelligence, and as I indicated at the beginning of my speech, it
seems appropriate to lead a reflection on the positioning of the central Service of territorial
intelligence.
M. Christophe Cavard. There is a concern?
Army general Denis Favier. In the departments, the detachment of gendarmes to the bosom of
the SDRT, the weekly meeting of the liaison office helped to enhance the level of coordination
of interesting way. It must continue in this direction, particularly in the area of monitoring of
radicalized individuals.
As the post-release residency conditions, we have taken our part: we drove 1 200 administrative
searches, and we have had up to seventy under house arrest between November 13 and the end of
February - it should remain a dozen. ISB systematically notify us whenever an individual is
assigned to residence in our area of competence.
M. Philippe Goujon. On intelligence, I would like to deepen the previous question. After your
response, the optimal solution would not be that you be integrated in the first circle of the
intelligence community, since you regret not having corresponding to the SID and the codirection of the LSVCC?
The GIGN was the barracks of the Clestins, near Bataclan, ready to intervene. So much the
better, but this was not possible because the territorialisation. Told us you were placed there in
reserve, to possibly intervene in other sectors. Is this not a handicap? You were perhaps the
service closest to the Bataclan, and one that would be reached soon. Should we not envisage a
sort of fusion of the forces of intervention or least interoperability? The question arises as the bis
told us that she had trouble accessing the site, due to the Parisian traffic.
You talk about a national guard that could occupy part of the tasks assigned to the army as part
of the Sentinel operation. The operational reserve, transformed into a national guard, would be
under the authority of the gendarmerie. Might what role precisely in this kind of mission?
My last question concerns the strength you have. You're not convinced by the static guards,
which I can understand. Number of squadrons mobilized to guard National Palace, the National
Assembly, the courthouse, etc. Under these conditions, is it not appropriate to reduce these
forces? We are certainly in a crisis situation, but it may be possible to employ other means or
other staff, so you retrieve personal.
Army general Denis Favier. Sir, I will not claim attachment to the first circle: it is a particular
intelligence which is part of Homeland Security, while I am rather on general information. The
role of the gendarmerie in the second circle is satisfactory. If I think we have to be present at the
ISB, is to better work the border area between the first and second circles.
The GIGN was indeed present at the barracks of the Clestins with forty-five men. Could he
change? Frankly, I to am not convinced. At the time it arrived, many things had already been

made. I can not answer in this sense. I am not sure. I have no exact knowledge of what happened
inside the Bataclan.
Should we merge the intervention units? It's the jewels of the two houses. We need to be
responsible for having a powerful tool. In my opinion, in the event of planned killings face
emergency situations that occur at the time the worst, we must collectively accept - and it
intervention scheme which will lead us to-the immediate commitment of all available capability.
In such a context, must no longer asking the question of who does what; need we would all soon
put an end to the crisis. It is a matter of responsibility. Need to be taken the means available at a
given instant. The schema provides this situation of action under the sign of absolute urgency. I
think that it will have to face. The GIGN is already able to deploy more quickly, in particular in
the form of small teams 'all abilities' whose mission will be to give a judgment to the
perpetrators. Well, we have seen how terrorists behave: at first sight of judgment, the exchange
deal. We have to place us in this logic. If we go at the end of the intervention scheme, we will
achieve in the very short term.
RCMP's expertise is widely recognized in the management and use of the operational reserve.
Our operational reserve derives its efficiency of its "territoriality". If you want to manage it at the
national level, to work in the North of the France one month an individual who lives in the
central region, it will not go. We must be able to work individuals where they live and during
very short periods. Any other scheme, which would not be in this sense, will meet from my point
of view serious difficulties of implementation. Prefects are best equipped, if necessary with the
support of the mounted police, to control this form of reserve "National Guard" which seems to
be an interesting concept.
Your last question concerned the static guards. I assure five and I have four squadrons mobilized
in this framework.
M. Philippe Goujon. These guards are especially the National Palace and the Palace of justice.
Army general Denis Favier. We will soon recover part of the squadrons mobilized at the palais
de justice: this is the prefecture of police of Paris which will ensure the custody of the new
premises, which work is progressing very quickly, to the Batignolles. However will need to
retain a certain number of posts for the Court of appeal and the Court of cassation will remain on
the le de la Cit.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Your example on Guyana surprised me a little. For spending a little time
with the mounted police, I observed that the system of cooperation with the army was going
well, indeed, but that our policy against the Stampeders was a resounding failure. With respect, I
would not use this example, even though I can see that you are referring to the operation.
The President Georges Fenech. We are not seized of the problem of the Stampeders.

M. Pierre Lellouche. Agree, but the general was talking about the coordination between the
military and the police in the fight against terrorism, giving the example of Guiana where,
unfortunately, the results are not at the rendezvous.
I had a specific question about what happened to Cambrai, when Salah Abdeslam was
wandering. The press, the car where he was reportedly controlled three times. It was certainly in
Cambrai by the gendarmerie. Why the police had no information? Why the intelligence system
did not work between Paris and your men on the ground? In addition, we learned then that
information were not circulating between the Belgian and us: the total! How can we solve this
problem?
On intelligence, your idea to relate the LSVCCS to the Director-general of the gendarmerie and
the Director-general of the police should be one of the conclusions of our Committee, so it seems
obvious: there is no reason for territorial intelligence depends on the police and not the
gendarmerie while you contribute.
Regarding the first and second circles operating, let me tell you that, as opposed to inter-State
Classic intelligence, anti-terrorism intelligence requires to consolidate all the information in a
single place and in a period very close between the collection and the operational use. In other
words, the fact that the force is not in the first circle, while you have sensors on the whole, seems
nonsense to me. You demonstrate statesmanship by you stating very well in the second circle
but, in truth, it is necessary an aquarium where all information arrive, are processed and
transmitted as soon as possible on the ground.
My last question relates to a very important point: human intelligence. Do you have information
about what these groups in Lunel, Molenbeek or elsewhere? For our part, we do not have. On the
other hand, we see that Mr. Salah Abdeslam can survive four months without phone in an area
where it is fed and housed. It is finally spotted on denunciation, which means that the
intelligence services are absolutely deaf and blind. This is very worrying. What is your capacity
to penetrate these circles?
Army general Denis Favier. Sir, taking the example of Guiana, I referred to the structures. In
terms of structures, we conducted a reflection and coordination works well now between the
army and the gendarmerie to accomplish this difficult mission in an inhospitable environment.
The experience seems interesting and can be duplicated.
At Cambrai, we put control in the night of 13-14 November. The morning of November 14, this
car is shown control point in the Thun-Lvque Tollbooth on the A2 motorway. There were three
men on board, including Salah Abdeslam. The police have intercepted them and they
interviewed files. A plug came out, actually, but it was a judicial police Schengen Plug and not a
French S plug: the individual was known for trafficking narcotic drugs between the Belgium and
the Netherlands. At that moment, no one knew that he was the man we were looking for. The
drive to keep was to release him and to report his passage.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Did you not say yourself that there is a link between organised crime and
terrorism? This was not in the pipes at this time?

Army general Denis Favier. The link has been established for several months. The Constable,
who was aware of the existence of such a link, has retained the individual against any rule of
law, and telephoned the office siren France, responsible for the operational management of the
national section of the Schengen information system. He felt that there was perhaps something.
Made audit, the office siren told Constable pass. The work has been done. The Constable was
cautious: overstepping his role, he took photographs of passports which have been used
subsequently to seek information. The investigation subsequently establishes the direct
involvement of individuals in the attacks of November 13. I recall that the plug had the police
was not a plug S.
I come to your question about the incorporation of the LSVCCS to the Director-general of the
gendarmerie and the Director-general of the police. All heavy and services joint between police
and gendarmerie which work well - whether it is international cooperation, telecommunications,
information systems or equipment - are copilots by the two Directors General. With this in
mind, it might be considering repositioning the LSVCCS.
You return to the issue of the first and the second intelligence circles. The Constable is openly. It
is known to the population. In the second circle, I can collect general information, forward it to
populate a database. I can stay in the second circle and be associated with the intelligence of a
terrorist nature. As explained you a moment ago, we collectively need to amplify the fluidity of
exchanges of intelligence, in the sense rising and falling. The EMOPT embodies this new breath
in the vital area of adapted from radicalized individuals and effective follow-up.
M. Pierre Lellouche. The solution is that there is one circle.
Army general Denis Favier. With regard to human intelligence, one must be careful. It is not
clear to return in some areas. The creation of the territorial intelligence antennas (ART)
accompanied by pedagogy to explain all the interest to have gendarmes inserted into cFavorite
pieces of populations. If it does, it really collects information that it did not before. In Lunel,
constables live in the city, they are in the club including the youth of the city. As a result, an
exchange of information extremely fluid, really beneficial and which goes in the direction of
specific feedback you have raised. We have made progress in this area and we are continuing our
rise.
M. Guillaume ledger. My general, you mentioned the opportunity that should have new legal
ways to better control the flow of entries on the national territory. On which points could us as
legislators to change the law?
Army general Denis Favier. An important step would be to optimize the ANPR system, which
records the views of cars and plays their registration plates. We do not have local applications
which do not allow to exploit the data at the national level. In a light post November 13, it would
be relevant to connect all sensors of DGG N, the DGPN and customs to a centralized system to
ensure the exploitation of information instantaneous.
I shall give you in the next few days proposals I formula to increase the efficiency of the flow
control operations.

M. Guillaume ledger. If the president and the rapporteur are in agreement, I think a note written
by the Directorate-General of the national gendarmerie on these legal points would be useful.
Mr. Meyer Habib. My general, you spoke of the importance of the 1,500 reservists you use
every day. I am convinced that in the medium, short or long term, we must empower all citizens,
that is, we will have to return to a form of military service. I am afraid that we are obliged to
empower and train, at least at a minimum level, the population, as happens unfortunately in some
countries who live with this kind of threat.
Turning now to the doctrine. As in all the armies of the world, there is a healthy competition
between the various bodies of army and police, which must fade in absolute emergencies. We
also live at a time when "uberisation": the client wants the taxi that will happen soon because it
more closely; he prefers a 4L coming to look it up in the minute to a Rolls Royce, which is an
hour and a half of it. The goal is to have, in all cities, appropriate forces to intervene as soon as
possible. The fact that a Commissioner of the BAC has managed to kill one of the three attackers
of the Bataclan, thus changing the course of events, well demonstrates the importance of going
to contact as soon as possible. What do you think of the idea to have the maximum of police
officers, and even military, armed, distributed in the population?
Army general Denis Favier. The reserve is a great tool that allows to make the link with the
company. During the summer, in July, we train young people who are then recognized fit for
service in the reserve, and who do a job of Constable for twenty days per year. These are young
people from civil society that provide a service. It's empowering for them and it's good for our
society. This system works really well. I chair each year a ceremony of end of formation and it is
very impressive: in one month, these students change; they have a different vision of society and
they are really part of a logic of general interest. I am a strong supporter of Creative Commons.
For the gendarmerie, the ideal target would be 40 000 operational reserve.
After November 13, we have seen happen in the brigades, who asked what they could do to help.
They can secure schools by cross children out of classes, intervene in hospitals, etc. People want
to make their contribution to the general interest. One can extend the concept, although I am not
convinced that we should go to the model of the U.S. National Guard. It is not about that. But we
have something to build on the national territory. In any case, in my area, I'm really going far
with regard to the reserve.
The doctrine must evolve, and the work that we have engaged tend to boost the capabilities of
first responders. The port of armaments "out of service" is allowed within the gendarmerie
during the period covered by the State of emergency. This provision is rigorously framed, it
allows the voluntary military and sensitive benefit from territories.
The President Georges Fenech. General, do you think is missing, alongside the interministerial
crisis cell (CIC), an operational staff that would institutionalize the smoking-room?
Army general Denis Favier. This is part of the feedback which the Minister asked us to think.
There could be a permanent structure. Beyond classical permanence, which traced the General

information, we must have a more operational structure, which if fitted more harmoniously with
the posts of command of the Directorates-General.
The rapporteur. In January, you were in the smoking room and on-site, in Dammartin-enGole. When you go on the field, don't you default to the Minister?
Army general Denis Favier. I went to Dammartin-en-Gole at the time where the crisis was
going to end.
The rapporteur. She was in Dammartin-en-Gole andHypercacher then, in an area which, of
course, was not really in your jurisdiction. We fear multiple crises, occurring in various places
such as on 13 November. Should the patron of the gendarmerie, the police prefect and all leaders
be necessarily on the ground? We were told that it was better to be on the ground to pass orders
and have the information as soon as possible. What is happening to the smoker, place Beauvau,
is it less important?
Army general Denis Favier. In January, we have respected the different phases. The phase
smoking room was required to build the operation with strong judicial and manage the crisis as a
national whole. I was at my place in the smoking room to conduct operation in my area of
competence and make proposals for commitment to the Minister. This period lasted for two days.
The manBox around the petrol station control work was controlled from Paris, by orders ranging
in detail until the distribution of areas of commitment of the police and the gendarmerie. We did
so during the night of 8 to 9 January. On the morning of January 9, we had the result of our
operation: Kaye brothers tried to get out of the device. They have been detected and took refuge
in the printing industry and we knew that they could no longer move in. This was to contribute to
the resolution of the crisis which would end there.
The rapporteur. Forgive me to insist, my general, but we are very concerned by the risk of
multi-attentats that can also occur in your area. What happens if a second attack occurs when you
went on the field to resolve the first? In the smoking room, accompanying you?
Army general Denis Favier. Branch active in every crisis operations centre that has the ability
to drive operations throughout the territory to gather intelligence in real time, to educate myself
constantly and to relay my directives to all territorial heads. The continuity of command is thus
guaranteed, regardless of the place where I find myself.
The rapporteur. I imagine but is there not a loss of information?
Army general Denis Favier. Quite frankly, I think not. I went to Dammartin-en-Gole, imbued
with the spirit of the operation to Artwork. The place of the mounted police was held in
"smoker": collaborators, as colonel Dubuis, present here, followed the entire operation from CIC
and the "smoker". We do not lose the thread. At one point, should the boss to go on the ground.
The rapporteur. The place of a pattern is really at theFavorite pieces of the operation?

Army general Denis Favier. That is how I understand the exercise of command, especially at
the crucial moment.
M. Christophe Cavard. I have one last question concerning the PSIG which may become of
first responders in the area mounted, if I have understood correctly.
Army general Denis Favier. This ability of primo-intervention will be owned by the 150 PSIG
"SABRE" whose deployment is programmed according to a three-year plan at the rate of 50 units
per year. The first will be operational during the summer 2016.
M. Christophe Cavard. And some have 'glorified' spontaneous reaction of an officer who
enters, who kills, reflected, in making the decision alone. But in this case, are there more
protocol, more nothing. How do you prepare personnel, which could be of first responders, to
change of response protocol?
Army general Denis Favier. Change of our doctrine of intervention requires well obviously a
pedagogy and training with regard to our personal effort, including towards soldiers at the breast
of the PSIG "SABRE". This work is ongoing. The reason why I put less voluntary and more
professional. 98% these PSIG will do the work of normal General supervision. Maybe, one day
they will be faced with a situation where they will have to act as first responders. This
reversibility cannot be improvised.
The President Georges Fenech. We have completed this very rich hearing. It remains for me to
thank you for having responded to our numerous questions.
Hearing, behind closed doors, general Bruno Le Ray, military Governor of Paris,
and the colonel Marc Boileau, Chief of staff
Report of the hearing in camera, Monday, March 21, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. My general, my colonel, thank you for having responded to the
request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat
terrorism since January 7, 2015.
You know that we have already held numerous hearings devoted first to the victims and their
support by relief, then to the chronology of the events of January and November 2015 - as such,
we have also received the Sentinel operation soldiers deployed in the 11e district on the evening
of November 13.
My general, as military Governor of Paris, you are the general in the area of defence and security
in le-de-France (OGZDS) and order units deployed in le-de-France in the context of the
Sentinel operation. You are also responsible for planning operations in the event of disturbances
to public order, at the request of the prefect of police. We are eager to hear from you, both on the
action of the armed forces on the various bombing sites and the coordination of the security
forces, on the le-de-France sentinel device and its possible perspectives of evolution.

Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, this hearing takes
place behind closed doors, and is therefore not disseminated on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if
we decide so at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in
camera will previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These
observations will be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is punishable by
the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code (one year imprisonment and 15,000
euros fine) any person who, within a period of twenty-five years disclose or publish information
relating to non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the
work of the commission referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.
General Bruno the Ray and colonel Marc Boileau take oath.
I'll let you speak to a keynote presentation which was followed by an exchange of questions and
answers.
General Bruno the Ray. Mr president, Madam, gentlemen, I am very pleased to speak to you
today as the military Governor of Paris. Here since the summer 2015, I exercise the operational
control of all forces under the command of the Chief of staff of the armed forces. During the
opening remarks, I'll remind you the conditions of engagement of our forces, particularly as they
have been applied on 13 and 14 November.
The attacks of January had already created an exceptional context, including militarily, with the
deployment of a significant number of military personnel on the national territory, in particular
in le-de-France. The attacks in November have we to take an additional step: on two occasions,
units of the Sentinel force indeed found themselves closer to the combat zone - an expression
unusual for an event that occurred within our borders, but corresponding to the reality of the
facts-, in situations of direct of the internal security forces support.
Friday, November 13, before that occur the attacks, close to 4 000 soldiers were deployed on the
le-de-France, divided into 49 elementary units - this figure is important with regard to certain
aspects of the command - engaged in missions of protection of 325 sensitive sites: 20 sites socalled "Historical Vigipirate" - mainly tourist places and stations - and 305 sites faith - almost
exclusively Jewish places of worship.
Our device in le-de-France had reorganized current 2015, from fifteen to eight tactical staffs; in
mid-October, a second evolution had smuggled us three tactical staffs. The Paris region was
therefore - as it still is to this day divided into three areas: Paris intra muros, with a PC
established at Vincennes, Paris Est, with a PC at the East fort, and Paris West, with a PC in
Satory. These three groups are under the orders of Heads of bodies in title, the regiments

Commander relying on a staff of regiment - said that, since last year, we do ensure that the
deployment of the units corresponds to the territorial division, in order to facilitate the
coordination with local administrative levels, the boroughs measures, districts and departments.
November 13 late in the evening, we have still about 1,000 troops deployed in the field, since the
Guard does end that between twenty and one thirty and twenty-two hours thirty, depending on
the activity of the sites concerned. In the absence of precise information enabling us to have an
exhaustive of what vision happened during the early hours of the evening, the main thrust of the
decisions I made was to make sure that all the military means in contact, i.e. incurred on one or
other of the events, were in effective capacity to coordinate their action with that of the internal
security forces , and that the reinforcements that may be necessary were available at the right
time and the right place. Therefor, a reflection was conducted in two phases, first with staff
located at the contact, and then with those likely to be called as reinforcements.
It is the evening of November 13, I was at the stage of France, sitting a row behind the President
of the Republic. I heard the two first explosions having sounded close to the stadium and quickly
enough, just twenty-one thirty hours before, I was informed by my staff stationed at Saint
Germain en Laye - since the attacks of January 2015, it works 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, in
order to coordinate all of the soldiers deployed in Paris...
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. By which himself had your staff been informed?
General Bruno the Ray. It is powered by two channels: on the one hand, the forces themselves
- thus the 54e regiment of artillery, based at the PC of Vincennes, collected information
transmitted by the soldiers on the ground-, on the other hand, one formed by the liaison officers
in the different operational centres (CO) of the prefecture of police. In addition, my staff is also
in contact with the general secretariat of the defence area (SGZD), which is his natural
interlocutor in ordinary times. It is just the time of the facts, the SGZD was not fully operational,
making that information arrived through all channels. That is how I have been personally
informed shortly before twenty-one thirty hours that many attacks had been committed in Paris.
I left the Stade de France at half-time - the President of the Republic himself had left the public
gallery some time ago to gain the security of the stadium post - to reach my workplace located at
les Invalides, from which I continued to ensure the monitoring of the operation and his command
throughout the night. From the outset, I gave orders to alert, within each of the three groups,
rapid reaction element intended to deal with this type of situation - it's a company in each
grouping. I asked that are secure all sites on which soldiers were still deployed, and I did
remember all soldiers who were in rest - some who were at the stadium of France, thus had to
regain their unit at Vincennes small strides.
As soon as I got my co - which held itself intelligence of the prefecture of police - confirmation
of the fact that we were faced with a coordinated attack multisite, I did enhance the security of
all sites on which soldiers were deployed, and I hired an element of reserve of the Group Paris
centre, in order to strengthen the unit already in contact rue de Charonne and the Bataclan.
Reserve of the grouping of Vincennes company reinforce the units of 11e district, while I was
running the other two - one of the group is to Group West - to Bastille, where were grouped by

the security forces, so that they can respond quickly if necessary. At the same time, I did place
the Assembly of the device under the orders of the head of the group, who left the field with a
tactical CP in order to coordinate the action of the military and overcome any difficulties of
liaison with ISPs: in this way, he could indeed "order directly to the voice".
The military presence in the form of the arrival of heavily protected and armed soldiers quickly
took effect of reassuring the population, firefighters and police. Building the internal security
forces following the instructions they were given on-site, our men cordoned off areas, they have
covered certain directions and prohibits others - in order to avoid the leakage or the arrival of
terrorists. I did secure the Bourget airport, taking into account the presence on this site of items
posted in the context of the preparation of the COP21 and unarmed. Finally, at the request of the
prefecture of police, we have supported the replacement of the internal security forces which
ensured the protection of Matignon, of the National Assembly, the Senate and the Necker
Hospital; with regard to this last site, we received information from the secretariat in the area of
defence, that this place welcoming injuries might be the subject of an attack.
At the same time, to prepare for the future, that is to anticipate the likely arrival of
reinforcements in the hours and days, I did put on alert staging of Brtigny, who is the place
through which arrive and leave all military units of Paris: they perceive their equipment - tear
bombs, telescopic batons, bullet-proof vests and heavy Helmets - before you go on site , and will
render them the return of mission. In total, we have in the middle of the night of approximately
500 personnel engaged on or near the places of attack of 11e district - I includes units in
reinforcement contingent Bastille - and 500 personnel engaged on the securing of four sites I
have mentioned previously.
Tomorrow morning at six thirty, we took the usual Sentinel mission, to secure the 325 sites I
mentioned - I had doubled employment on all sites "Historic Vigipirate", in particular stations.
The evening of 14 November, we hosted the first reinforcements in the form of two companies
Cheetah TAP 3e (RPIMa) marine infantry parachute regiment. In total, within forty-eight hours
after the attacks, we have received the reinforcement of 2 500 soldiers. During the duration of the
operations, I stayed in contact with the office of the Ministry of defence and the Chief of staff of
the armed forces.
The President Georges Fenech. You have explained that the role of military forces was first to
reassure the population, firefighters and the police, by the presence of weapons, as well as staff
to support internal security forces looping sectors and through traffic. The evening of November
13, the first forces to intervene were those of the tray. While military forces were also present,
they lacked the legal framework that would have allowed them to intervene - I mean, to
participate in an assault against the terrorists.
While it was in a State of war, with assailants armed with heavy weapons, the military stood so
backward, merely to secure the neighborhood, while police forces - which were equipped by
small arms were at the most close to the action and even attempting to neutralize one of the
terrorists at the corner of the boulevard Voltaire and the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage. At one
point, police officers asked operation Sentinel staff if they could lend their weapons, but clashed
with a refusal.

If you had been the first to intervene at the Bataclan, would it have been conceivable that on
hearing the shots fired inside, you decide to enter the building to neutralize terrorists?
The rapporteur. Furthermore, were there an evolution in your doctrine of intervention, making
you interviendriez should a similar situation arise tomorrow?
General Bruno the Ray. If I let you think of the first mission personnel of operation Sentinel
was reassuring, I badly expressed. In fact, the primary mission of the military is to support, to
support the internal security forces. I have been informed, in the course of the evening, that the
military had removed their weapons - the TOC - safety devices, in order to make them
immediately operational: clearly, members who were alongside police and firefighters were able
to open fire immediately if terrorists were released from the Bataclan.
The rapporteur. In reply?
General Bruno the Ray. In reply, actually: as all security forces, we apply the rules of selfdefence.
The President Georges Fenech. But you have not sought to enter the building to go kill
terrorists?
General Bruno the Ray. The only moments where shots were exchanged, this is when a
terrorist has partially opened an emergency exit to unleash gusts to the blindly - impacts have
been identified on some vehicles, including those of firefighters-, which did not allow our men to
retaliate effectively. If the terrorists were really out of the building by opening fire in the street,
the military reportedly fired in turn in self-defence, without that I do need to allow them.
The President Georges Fenech. You have not answered my question.
General Bruno the Ray. I answer by saying that like the internal security forces, we would have
opened fire if the conditions of self-defence had been met, as soldiers did in Valencia in January.
The military are not inhibited in the use of their weapon: they perfectly know the rules of selfdefence and apply them rigorously.
When it comes to enter the Bataclan, we have acted in accordance with our mode of usual action
- in external operations as the national territory - who wants that it is not in a bottle of ink, that is
without knowing where we are going, what we will do and against that! In my soul and
conscience, I would therefore did not order my soldiers entering the building without a
predefined action plan. I can imagine that we intervene in support of the internal security forces,
who decide to assault because they know places and know what they will find there, but not that
it is embarking on the unknown.
The President Georges Fenech. You hear just the same shots from the inside!
General Bruno the Ray. Certainly, but noises of shots provide only very little information about
what is happening on the inside.

The rapporteur. You knew, however, that the terrorist attack had dead and wounded, since
some were outside. A Commissioner of the tray and one of his police colleagues have taken the
initiative to enter the building, even though they knew no more than your men what was
happening; armed and protected much less efficiently than the military, they managed to kill one
of the terrorists before out. It being specified that this question is in no way a value judgment we simply seek to understand-, how is it that you have not taken the decision to do the same, or
given permission to do so?
General Bruno the Ray. No application to enter the Bataclan has been sent to me, and I gave no
permission in this sense. I do not know the exact circumstances of the intervention of the officer
to the tray, and if I admire his courage, I repeat to you that he was excluded that I involve my
soldiers without knowing what was happening inside the building.
The President Georges Fenech. There were dead on the sidewalk!
General Bruno the Ray. As there are in all theatres of operations. It is unthinkable to put
soldiers in danger in the hypothetical hope of saving others. The intervention in exclusion zone is
a very touchy subject. For me, the first question to ask is whether it is able to ensure the
protection of personnel going to contact. If the soldiers that I send in the building do kill
themselves, because they are not in capacity to meet fire which they target, we have hardly
progressed in the resolution of the situation.
The President Georges Fenech. Is this not the vocation of soldiers to protect civilians?
General Bruno the Ray. If, of course, and this is what they do. On the other hand, they have no
vocation to throw themselves into the mouth of the Wolf if they are not insured to have
reasonable chances to accomplish their mission.
The rapporteur. If the Commissioner entered the Bataclan had asked for military support to his
intervention, they have requested permission to do so, could they take themselves the initiative to
enter the building with the police, or that their have been purely and simply banned?
On the other hand, what link did you have with the prefect of police during the various phases of
the operation?
General Bruno the Ray. Soldiers have pipes to take depending on the situation they are facing,
but we cannot predict all cases...
The rapporteur. Since the facts, have you incorporated November 13 situation your response
scenarios?
General Bruno the Ray. As the National Police, the terrestrial armed forces work in the
development of pipes in different situations, including a terrorist leaving the Bataclan , without
threatening the soldiers, seeking to escape - with possible intent to commit other acts of violence
elsewhere. If the policeman of the BAC had wanted to do a second foray into the building by this

time accompanied by soldiers, I can say with certainty what response he would have received,
but I tend to think that they would be entered with him.
The President Georges Fenech. What is certain, is that they refused to give their weapons!
The rapporteur. More precisely, when the BAC asked them if they would agree to lend their
weapons to police in the event of a new intervention, they responded that not.
General Bruno the Ray. This is not surprising: the military never entrust their weapons to
someone else.
On the other hand, a policeman of the BAC asked the soldiers to cover the exit of the building
and to open fire if the terrorists were - he even stated them preferably aim for the head, or in any
event outside the areas of the body likely to be surrounded by a belt of explosives-, and my men
would have done if the situation arose.
The question of the entrance into the building is similar to that of a mass hostage: in such cases,
appeal is made systematically to specialized, units involved only at the end of a minimum of
preparation. I put myself instead of a soldier entering a room where it may fall on both the
terrorists and their victims, in an unknown configuration, with perhaps insufficient brightness
and people screaming from all sides: how, in these circumstances, to instantly discriminate the
aggressors of the victims? My own operational experience leads me to think that such a thing is
virtually impossible.
The President Georges Fenech. I do not think that the "aggressors" and "victims", terms that
evoke a situation of ordinary crime, are adequate: indeed, we were dealing with suicide bombers
terrorists trying to perpetrate a massacre.
Imagine that soldiers of Sentinel is located at the outskirts of Saint-Lazare, and that terrorists
opened fire inside the station with a Kalashnikov. What would be the reaction of your soldiers?
General Bruno the Ray. They would open fire in turn, without a shadow of a doubt.
The President Georges Fenech. In this case, why in they did not similarly at the Bataclan ?
General Bruno the Ray. The situation was not the same. At the Bataclan, the terrorists were
holed up in a place closed, while a station is an open place.
The President Georges Fenech. You assault a closed building assume intervention by
specialized, units whose Sentinel does not part?
General Bruno the Ray. Sentinel soldiers are trained to intervene in external operations, but not
in that of a hostage of mass in a closed place.
The President Georges Fenech. A reflection was engaged on this point?

General Bruno the Ray. Our special forces are working on this issue, because they are induced
to intervene, at Bamako or elsewhere, on very similar situations. On the national territory, our
soldiers 'database', which represent 99% of the workforce, are not trained in this type of
operation. But I can confirm that if an attack were to occur at the gare Saint-Lazare, the soldiers
of Sentinel would hesitate a second to open fire--as they did recently in Valencia.
The President Georges Fenech. I unfortunately couldn't listen to the statement made by the
Minister of defence before the National Assembly, since the work of the Commission of inquiry
was underway at the same time, but we auditionnerons it soon. It would be good to know if a
reflection will be conducted with a view to better to associate military force with the internal
security forces when occur situations similar to those we are talking about.
General Bruno the Ray. Reflections are ongoing, but I think the police officer and the military
base are not prepared to deal with such situations: this is well special skills and training. The Lac
officer who entered the Bataclan is placed perhaps beyond what was reasonably supposed to do,
and my soldiers are not trained to go dislodge terrorists holed up in a concert hall.
M. Olivier Falorni. If I understand correctly, the military's Sentinel cannot intervene in an
enclosed space where a massacre occurs. I recall that at the Bataclan, after intervention isolated
from two policemen of the BAC, 15 police officers entered a second time in the building, in an
organized manner: it comes including not of an uncontrolled and individual initiative, as you
imply.
For what is a military intervention, you say that she would no doubt in a train station, but that it
is any otherwise part of an attack like the Bataclan. Imagine that the police was not able to arrive
as quickly as it did, and that your men are found only boulevard Voltaire: in this case, they
would have remained outside without intervening, even though they have heard gunfire and
screaming inside? While they are accustomed to combat, they would be denied to enter on the
sole ground that they did not know what they would find behind the door? Do not take this for
indictment, but I confess that the idea amazes me.
General Bruno the Ray. Away from me the idea to denigrate in any way whatsoever the
intervention of the internal security forces, with which we work on a daily basis: I just told you
what inspired me, in the light of what I have read, the conditions of their intervention.
In an open space, we see what is happening and there is no difficulty to distinguish between
terrorists and potential victims. On the other hand, the Sentinel soldiers are not trained to
intervene in a similar context of hostage in a closed environment. There, among the military
units, special forces competent to intervene in such cases. It is the same within the police and,
from this point of view, the BAC units already are special units.
Moreover, I do not say that we would be absolutely unable to intervene, but simply that it is not a
mission that our men are prepared. The services of the Chief of staff of the army reflect the
means to do better in the hypothesis where again occur such a situation on the national territory,
being specified that in such a case, we would not be in a State of war in the legal sense - it is the
common law, and non-military law, which would apply. In some respects, intervene in the

cFavorite pieces of Paris is far more complicated than to battle in the depths of Mali and Cte
d'Ivoire, as is obviously not the same freedom of action, and it is good to be aware.
The President Georges Fenech. Since January, 2015, military exercises were conducted in
cooperation with the internal security forces?
General Bruno the Ray. I'm just a user of the forces of the army, the operational readiness of
the units are not at my level. If exercises are actually carried out, I don't think that they have to
object to prepare ourselves to intervene in a situation of type Bataclan - in any case, not with the
soldiers of the Sentinel operation. The use of special forces in such cases was discussed recently,
but this could be done only in very strict framework conditions, in addition to the forces of
internal security and special units.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. For my part, I would like to discuss the situation in the province, said
that I am elected territory with a high risk, insofar as there are a large number of mosques,
synagogues and churches. You mentioned earlier your personal faith on-site deployment. To the
extent that your men do not search people entering places of worship, how would you react if an
attack were to occur within such a place, which is by definition an enclosed space?
General Bruno the Ray. There is no simple answer to such a question. What I can tell you is
that soldiers under the watch before a site is would be if they saw terrorists preparing to commit
violence.
At the Bataclan, the military have not seen enter the terrorists, and therefore did not know what
was happening inside. On the other hand, they know very well the synagogues they have to
monitor - happens even to sit indoors - as well as supposed to be there, they see enter and exit. I
therefore imagine that in such a case, they would systematically intervene if they were in a
position to do so.
The President Georges Fenech. You "imagine" that they intervene? You are not sure, even
though you hear gunfire from Kalashnikovs from a crowded synagogue?
General Bruno the Ray. Maybe I'm wrong expressed, Mr Turmes. What I mean is that soldiers
on guard in front of the single entrance of a synagogue could not fail to notice the arrival of
terrorists.
The President Georges Fenech. It cannot be excluded that terrorists enter the premises via an
underpass, as is done in the Gaza Strip!
General Bruno the Ray. There is no ready-made answer to this question, but I think that they
would intervene...
The President Georges Fenech. You "think"? How can you only imagine that armed soldiers
remain at the threshold of a synagogue where innocent victims are slaughtered! This is not
possible!

General Bruno the Ray. I do not place me in terms of the principles...

The President Georges Fenech. The simple risk of blame a failure assist anyone in danger
should order them to intervene!
General Bruno the Ray. You put in parallel two radically different situations: firstly, that of the
Bataclan, where no soldiers knew what was happening inside, or even how many terrorists and
how many victims were there, on the other hand, that of a synagogue, which is never crowded,
contrary to what you say, and that the soldiers of Sentinel familiar - it is why it is 99.9% chance
that they are entered in case of attack , because this corresponds to their skills in terms of
location, number of people on the spot, and ability to manage the situation of chaos inside.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. An attack on a synagogue is probably not the best example, because this
place of worship is generally controlled at the entrance...
The President Georges Fenech. So, what will happen in the event of a school attack?
General Bruno the Ray. We are before the schools all day long, and very carefully screen their
access. Certainly, it cannot be excluded that someone runs through roofs or subways, and in this
case we DIA, because we are very familiar with all these places we protect for more than a year,
be they schools, synagogues, space Rashi - the Centre of art and Jewish culture 5e
arrondissement - or the great mosque of Paris.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. But what will happen in a cathedral or a church where a marriage would
be, i.e., a place where the comings and goings are not the subject of the same control?
General Bruno the Ray. I have been requisitioned to protect certain places of Catholic worship
during the Easter period. I would point out that the access of these places are generally filtered
by the faithful themselves - is in any case the advice given by the Commissioner of police to the
religious community. To this basic protection will complement security carried out by my men
outside of the sites concerned.
The President Georges Fenech. No one could imagine coordination of internal security forces
and military, as is already the case in certain specific situations - I think in particular to operation
Harpy implementation in Guyana, whereby the mounted police is working with the military? An
operational centre could be set up, which would coordinate the action of the forces of Homeland
Security and the military.
General Bruno the Ray. I know well the Harpy operation, which is not to work together the
police and the military, but to integrate the Mounties to a military chain of command. Across
Paris, tens of thousands of police are deployed as part of a general safety activity. It seems
difficult to imagine to set up a permanent coordination centre, which would not have vocation to
coordinate the action of the police and military only in very exceptional cases where is beyond
the scope of General safety activity to enter the management of a crisis situation.

The President Georges Fenech. We are in State of emergency: is this not an exceptional
situation which would warrant the establishment of a coordination of interventions in times of
crisis?
General Bruno the Ray. One of our lines of thought is to find ways to be able to switch very
quickly in a normal mode of operation to that of a period of crisis, requiring the establishment of
a system of coordination.
Today, officers of bonds are present in different areas of the prefecture of police, and we decided
that in times of crisis, a liaison officer would be sent to the NSWFB of Paris (BSPP) CO general Boutinaud, who commanded this brigade had to tell you about-, this CO being
particularly well informed of the nature and location of incidents that occur , and with the special
ability to quickly discriminate true the false alerts.
If I very often the prefect of police by telephone, this was not the case on the night of 13-14
November, because he was unreachable because of the situation. On the other hand, all its
services were ongoing with mine, and we have responded to all the requests that have received
us. When we was asked to replace the present internal security forces at Matignon, the National
Assembly, the Senate and the Necker Hospital, this is done at the request of the prefecture of
police.
The rapporteur. What do you wear on the effectiveness of the Sentinel operation? If the
protection of 325 sensitive sites is an important mission, a debate is open on the effectiveness of
the static guards who are currently performed, compared to what might be dynamic guards. Your
doctrine evolved on this point in the last months?
General Bruno the Ray. The doctrine has indeed evolved. If we ensure the protection of 325
sites early November 2015, we to protect now slightly more than 1 800 across the le-de-France,
according to different modalities. Thus, a large number of sites are now secured by patrols,
allowing us to address the fact that the static device consumes a significant part of the armed
forces: a patrol cover indeed many sites, unlike a static guard - that some people still prefer,
because they attach importance to the fact that a site is protected at all times , and that this way.
As the internal security forces, we tend always more toward dynamic devices, which also have
the advantage of being more random, so less predictable for our potential adversaries.
The rapporteur. Ile-de-France elected - I am Mayor of asnires-sur-, I was recently chatting
with the Commissioner in my constituency about the dynamic guard that there has been
implemented and covers both high schools, the train station and some metro stations. Can you
tell us if you are in contact with the Commissioners to coordinate your actions of protection with
those of the police, and if the choice of places and times where you come depends on your
initiative, or is defined in agreement with the Commissioner of police?
General Bruno the Ray. This question is very interesting. Half of 1 800 sites that we currently
protect contained in the requisitions that address the prefect of police, while the other half is
defined by direct contact with the prefects and the Commissioners of district or borough, as well
as the departmental offices of public security (DDPS). This gives rise to a very close

coordination: thus, each captain is responsible for a district of Paris and coordinates with the
territorially competent Commissioner to perform the distribution of staff according to the sites
and schedules, to optimize the use of the internal security forces and the armed forces. In the
same way, the chefs de corps, unit commanders and section heads coordinate each at their level
with their interlocutors of local security forces, in order to avoid that some sites are doubly
protected or are not at all.
A liaison officer ensures coordination with the Directorate of the territorially competent police it can is a DDPS or a territorial Directorate of security of proximity (part # DTI), depends on the
concerned place. Apart from the sites to which the prefect of police performs requisitions, the
prefect himself may request the heads of bodies to ensure the protection of a site appearing to
him exposed to a particular threat.
The rapporteur. Do you need to protect a too large number of sites?
General Bruno the Ray. No, I think that we are much better than what we did previously, and
that we can do even better if it leaves us free to define the modes of action that we consider to be
the most suited to our mission. Our reference is the statement Ministerial No. 10100, which sets
the 'contractual' relationship between the payer, i.e. the prefect, and the armed forces. This text
establishes the principle according to which a mission is entrusted to the armed forces, which
determine themselves the modes of action and volumes of staffing to fill. It is by applying the
principle that we will be able to secure the largest possible number of sites.
M. Christophe Cavard. Having been part of one of the last contingents of conscripts, I am able
to distinguish the different uniforms of the Sentinel operation staff, and so I have awareness of
the great variety of the regiments involved in this operation. The question of an over-questioning
of some units was discussed, as well as personal fatigue. Can you tell us what criteria it was
decided to involve any particular regiment, and for how long?
Furthermore, during a hearing, members of the military have told us be housed in the attic of the
Town Hall of the 11e district in 'pretty spartan' conditions - which was probably an
understatement. Personnel are able to respond quickly and effectively in crisis situations, require
they are experiencing physical and moral to do so - and in a sustainable manner, because it is
feared that the current situation is prolonged. Do you consider that the conditions of life,
including accommodation, your men, be satisfactory?
Mr. David Comet. My general, I thank you for the action of the army during the difficult period
that we are currently experiencing.
There is currently a growing interpenetration between internal security and external security. We
are in a State of war, even if it is a diffuse war, and these are the same soldiers who are involved
in external operations or on national territory: they have the same skills. Last month, I met with
the French forces in Cte d'Ivoire - in this case, porpoises from 1er Rgiment d'infanterie de
marine (RIMa) of Angoulme - and I know that these soldiers, who are fighting against terrorism
in Africa, may be led to do so also in Paris in Sentinel.

A new doctrine of employment has recently entered into application on internal security,
highlighting the strategic role of the first responders: it now recognizes the importance of
intervene effectively early, in order to freeze the situation. In this context, one could conceive
that a group of eight soldiers, for example, be held at the disposal of the police forces, which
eventually would appeal to them to contribute to their action. Do you think that such a device
could be implemented at the Bataclan and, more broadly, whether he intended to be adopted to
cope with crisis situations that may arise in the future?
The principle of cooperation between military and internal security forces is very important
strategically. Conversely, do not apply it we will run the risk of leading to situations of nonassistance to person in danger: people could be tortured and killed in a building while staff
intended to ensure the safety of the population nearby, but do not intervene.
General Bruno the Ray. The issue of the solicitation of army personnel is not my responsibility,
since I am only an employer of the means put at my disposal. That said, it is a particularly
sensitive topic. In early afternoon, I did a presentation to the Minister of defence, which led me
to get on island Saint-Germain and Eastern fort sites. For me, this was an opportunity to recall
that 43 different regiments - about 80 regiments about in the army - are present in this moment in
Paris for a six-week rotation, being specified that some units are involved for the seventh time.
The solicitation of army personnel is therefore actually very strong, which justifies the
recruitment campaign currently being Artwork. If this campaign gives excellent results, we will
not immediately take advantage, because the necessary training so that a new recruit can
intervene on the ground lasts a while.
Making me here, the spokesman for the Chief of staff of the army, who is also my head on
another part of my responsibilities, I think I can say that additional units will be incorporated
within the regiments from the end of the year, which will allow to return to a more satisfactory
rotation rate, allowing staff to be engaged on operations to properly prepare for the possibility of
having to deliver high-intensity fighting in Mali and the Central African Republic, and take a
little rest in the meantime. In the current state of things, the intense stress of the regiments
requires us to determine more than just the volume of staff to deploy to meet the needs.
With regard to the accommodation conditions, those island Saint-Germain seemed altogether
satisfactory, while the East fort is more Spartan. As Mayor of the 11e district, if it has indeed
little comfortable accommodation - cannot install that Picot beds-, it has the advantage to be
located in the veryFavorite pieces of the 11e district, which allows units based to reach their
place of mission in ten minutes on foot, instead of having to make a journey of an hour and a half
by truck to come from Brtigny-sur-Orge, for example - not to mention that concerned personnel
enjoy, when they are at rest, to go drink a beer in the city very easily : this is why, if you did a
survey among the personnel of the units housed in the Town Hall of the 11e district, you would
probably not that negative opinions.
In any case, the conditions of accommodation are a permanent concern and significant
investments are made to improve the situation - so some buildings of the fort from the East are
renovated thoroughly. We had deserted - when they had not been sold - the military speakers
located inside Paris, and we reinvest in order to sustainably raise our capabilities, which will take

a year or two. The work done at the islet of Saint-Germain - where's offices must be transformed
into places of life - and at the Val-de-Grce will enable us to host approximately 1,000 men in
Paris under satisfactory conditions.
On the fact that the same soldiers would be brought to intervene, in external operations and the
country I want to stress that soldiers present on the evening of November 13 have established
Work that their battle field experience had taught them: they went to the contact of the internal
security forces in order to offer their services, and then divided to ensure missions support or
secure access - for example by installing improvised baffles-, which have helped to identify and
control the situation.
For me, the notion of primo-intervener implies responsibility: However, from my point of view,
responsibility for ensuring security on the national territory must remain in the internal security
forces. If the military are involved, so it is always under the control of the civil authority, and
they do not claim to be more self-reliant to go to war in a district of Paris or Marseille. The
internal security forces and the military must coordinate on the spot as they did on 13 November.
Every day, my soldiers are asked to perform tasks falling within their competence. It can be, for
example, to set up a security perimeter in an airport when an abandoned luggage is found, secure
areas where speakers of drug detector dogs, or to put in place a bubble of air protection to cover
some major events.
When the military are confronted only to a situation that requires intervention, they freeze the
situation as would the police, and come into contact with domestic security through ACROPOL
forces asking them to intervene. Fortunately, they occur more often for other situations than
terrorist attacks: outside assistance loan, it can be blatant crimes - whether they are in the
presence of individuals breaking glass front of Montparnasse railway station, or other taking
pictures on the esplanade de la Dfense-, in the presence of which they do what is supposed to
make every citizen, namely freeze the situation pending the arrival of skilled personnel.
M. Christophe Cavard. If the military are solicited by the internal security forces, at what level
of hierarchy is the decision taken to intervene or not?
General Bruno the Ray. The basic field cell consists of three soldiers, including a corporal, who
is responsible for this decision. It is the framework of extremely precise use of our soldiers
allowing them to react to 99.9% of situations without requiring authorization from a superior
hierarchical - being specified that they are accountable ex post, obviously.
M. Christophe Cavard. Is the decision to shoot subject to the same conditions?
General Bruno the Ray. Absolutely. Once the conditions of legitimate defence are met, the
soldiers can take without requesting permission, as they did in Valencia and as they were about
to on the esplanade of Invalides - even if, in the latter case, it is a Constable who opened fire.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. The intensive request for many units of the army Sentinel operations, to
support internal security forces and to reassure the population, has consequences on the morale
of the troops - although efforts are being made to improve coordination between military forces

and those of the internal security forces. Has interdepartmental device been set up to ensure
coordination of the field units, but also of civil and military authorities?
In terms of communication, are there, in addition to the physical contact on the field, common
information networks designed to walk up or down the information?
With regard to the return of experience, can you tell us what has been the level of activity of
Sentinel since its implementation, i.e. the number of times where soldiers had to intervene, and
what is the cost of the device representing a particular line on the budget plan?
Finally, I tend to consider that the military has more authority to intervene outside our borders.
What do you think of the idea of relieving the 7 000 personnel of the army's missions as they do
on the national territory, with more appeal to the reserve?
I could tell you about the fort de Bictre, located on my constituency and housing units, which
contribute significantly to the Sentinel device, but I do not want to monopolize the floor too long,
also I myself to discuss this issue with the general, Director central, present on the site.
General Bruno the Ray. You were more to evoke the mission of Sentinel to reassure the
population. If this mission exists, it is in third position after those of protect and deter, it is above
all an induced effect. This is not just a question of semantics: this hierarchy of priorities reflects
our way of conceiving the mission entrusted to us, and it would be to insult the soldiers to tell
them they are there only to reassure.
With respect to coordination, an interministerial crisis cell (CIC) is activated in times of crisis this has been the case from November 13 for a few days during which she worked 24 hours a
day. In normal times, interdepartmental meetings are regularly organized by the Ministry of the
Interior, involving the staff of the armed forces and, as necessary, the Parisian forces.
Coordination is therefore implementation Work upstream - in the programming of activities by
ministerial - and in the field - through physical contact or by radio, since all our patrols are
equipped with means radio to communicate with security forces inside the perimeter where they
are located.
We list all the incidents, allowing me to tell you that last year, we have identified 1 600 incidents
of any kind, which include mainly of rudeness, insults or attempts to photograph a sensitive
device, but very few assaults or attempts to assault on the soldiers - most of the time, the
incidents are also made by people under the influence of alcohol which do not render account of
what they are doing. We often lend hand to the internal security forces to establish security
perimeters, and we detect actions of monitoring of our sites or websites that we protect - our
soldiers are trained to identify the comings and goings suspicious. Each incident is systematically
a report transmitted by radio to the security forces with which we are coordinating.
With regard to the cost of the Sentinel operation, even though it is not my job as military
Governor of Paris, I will say memory amounted to EUR 170 million for 2015.

There are already a number of reservists among the personnel available to me. On average, since
January 2015, these are a little less than 200 reservists who are deployed permanently within the
Sentinel system - this figure amounted to 400 during year-end festivities, which is explained by
the fact that reservists are free more easily during periods of leave.
Finally, with regard to the use of the armed forces, that Mr. Laurent would prefer to see my point
of view of military assigned to missions outside our borders, leads me to think that it should deal
with the threat wherever it is: I would find it difficult to consider that my men are able to fight in
Mali, but we have no role to play in the defence of our compatriots , of our families, on the
national territory. However, this must not go up to transform the military in internal security
forces, as if soldiers prepared for overseas missions are able to operate on the national territory,
the reverse is not true. In saying this, I think express a point of view which is also one of the
military chiefs and the Minister of defence.
The President Georges Fenech. My general, we thank you for your response to our Committee.
Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Michel Cadot, prefect of police of Paris, M. Christian Sainte,
Director of the police judiciaire in Paris, Mr. Jacques Mric, Director of the safety of
nearby the Paris metropolitan area, and general Philippe Boutinaud, commanding the
brigade of firefighters of Paris (BSPP)
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, March 23, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We shall proceed to the hearing of Mr Michel Cadot, prefect of
police of Paris, accompanied by Mr. Christian Sainte, Director of the judicial police, of Mr.
Jacques Mric, Director of the security police of agglomeration, and general Philippe Boutinaud,
commanding the brigade of firefighters of Paris (BSPP).
We have already held numerous hearings, devoted first to the victims and their support by relief
and then to the chronology of events from January to November 2015, and finally, in the light of
the experience of these events, means and missions of the security forces. We have thus received,
Monday, the Director general of the national police (DGPN), the Director-general of the national
gendarmerie (DGGN) and the military Governor of Paris.
Mr the prefect of police, we are especially eager to hear from you and to question you on the role
of the prefecture of police, on the Organization and coordination of forces.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, and in accordance with article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958 operation
parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at
the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will
previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. The latter will be
submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report. I recall that, pursuant to
the provisions of the same article, "shall be punished by penalties provided for in article 226-13
of the penal code -" one year of imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine - "anyone who, within a

period of twenty-five years [...], disclose or publish information relating to non-public works of a
commission of inquiry, except if the report published at the end of the work of the commission
has reported this information.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.
Please raise your right hand and say: "I swear."
Mr Michel Cadot, Christian Sainte, Jacques Mric and general Philippe Boutinaud successively
take oath.
The rapporteur and I have already met you, prefect, when we went to the police headquarters
where we already had a comprehensive exchange on several points which are the subject of this
commission.
M. Michel Cadot, prefect of police of Paris. I took my duties as Prefect of police at Paris on 20
July 2015 in the context of terrorist threat high. The first concern of a prefect of police from
taking up its duties is to the highest level preparedness by the prefecture of police facing this
threat, as well as the responses may be amended to possible attacks.
Since 13 November, I keep the memory of the intensity of the violence and the horror of what
we saw on the spot permanently. I think obviously to the families of the victims, and considers
that they are entitled to the truth. The State and its representatives must draw all the lessons from
this somewhat unprecedented attack. After these months, I remember the organisation of relief
the courage, the professionalism of the teams and people who support me in this ambition to
bring the answer to the best level. I am convinced that the prefecture of police of Paris was at the
rendezvous and that she has completed its task in the various missions entrusted.
I would remind you in a few words the role of the prefecture of police in the fight against
terrorism and how it has, and will return to the lessons that we can learn from the events of
November 13.
The prefecture of police of Paris model is original: Organization, allowing all of the missions of
police, including, moreover, those of relief, to be placed under a single command: that of the
prefect of police and his cabinet. This feature allows an optimal sharing of information and
territorial coordination organized to meet the terrorist threat here.
The jurisdiction of the prefecture of police is available in diverse ways according to the
territories: in Paris; in the Paris metropolitan area - i.e. Paris and the three departments of the
small Crown; and in the Ile-de-France region - namely the eight departments of the region, with
zonal coordination under the Prefect's area, which is the prefect of police of Paris.
In the fight against terrorism, both directions are mainly involved: the Directorate of intelligence
of the prefecture of police (DRPP), which has a total of 870 officers, and which depends a
branch more directly responsible for the fight against terrorism and extremism to violent

potentiality - which, for its part, has 245 employees. The Organization of this branch is
classified, officials who work there have no jurisdiction, and their activity is devoted exclusively
looking for intelligence - the difference of the Directorate General of internal security (CSB),
which has a jurisdiction and jurisdiction of intelligence.
The DRPP has a coordination and intelligence gathering mission in the fight against terrorism,
which is carried out at several levels. Regarding the city of Paris, a rhythm of more frequent
meetings has been in place since last September. Each week, I chair a meeting on terrorism, with
all services of the prefecture to join CSB and the central service of territorial intelligence
(LSVCCS), to directly track terrorist threats, by analyzing individual situations and the reported
files. Fortnightly meets a group of evaluation, as in each Department, with the difference that this
group, at the prefecture of police, is duplicate, taking into account the importance of the territory;
It assesses reports of radicalisation. Finally, two monthly meetings focus more directly on the
prevention of radicalisation, so in the case that we are reported by the platform of appeal or the
information that we collect from the various services.
I also chair a zonal meeting monthly with the prefects of departments of the region and
representatives of the departments concerned, for the monitoring of intelligence and zonal
coordination. At the zonal level, always, a meeting is chaired by the DRPP.
Since the beginning of the year 2015, the links with central services have been significantly
strengthened. A liaison officer of the CSB, with the rank of Commander, is two years affected
within the DRPP, to the responsible Deputy Director of terrorism. The DRPP two officers are
assigned to the LSVCC which, as you know, depends on the Director-general of the national
police (DGPN). The DRPP obviously participates in the national intelligence coordination cell
installed in the premises of ISB and establishment in may 2015 following attacks in the month of
January, and helps coordinate the exchange of information, as well as the non-judicial action by
the services. Finally, bilateral meetings are held very frequently, between myself and Mr. Calvar
or, more broadly, between ISB and my services. All the DRPP notes are communicated to CSB,
and vice versa.
We are strengthening our device on airport platforms le Bourget and Roissy, where intelligence
is provided by the Central Directorate of the police at the borders (DCPAF). I have in fact
proposed several months ago to the Minister a better coordination and a better taking into
account of this intelligence, and this mission which will be entrusted to the DRPP device is under
development in Artwork.
As the Regional Directorate of the judicial police (DRPJ), she has an anti-terror (SAT) and a
brigade of research and intervention (bis). On a workforce of 2 222 agents, the SAT has 59
officials and the bis, one of seven brigades of the judicial police, taking 48 - workforce that can
be increased to 110 staff with the support of other units of the prefecture of police, such as
intervention brigades. The bis will be a reinforcement of 45 officials who are under recruitment.
The President Georges Fenech. The Minister of the Interior announced the doubling of the size
of the bis, is that correct?

M. Michel Cadot. This is about: 48 current staff will add 45 new, either a doubling, to three
people closely.
Finally, the cooperation between the two regional of the judicial police (DRPJ) directions of
Paris and Versailles is now institutionalized, with the agreement of the two General parquet.
So much for the means and the role of the prefecture of police.
With regard to the evening of November 13, the role of the prefect of police of Paris is double. It
is firstly to ensure the rigorous feedback and specific to government authorities, including by the
activation of the operational centre of the prefecture of police (COPP) - actually a crisis cell
equipped with a permanently we have strengthened from 21 h 25. COPP is responsible for
ensuring continuous information of the interministerial crisis cell (CIC) under the authority of
the Minister of the Interior and, although heard, to coordinate means reinforcements and the
liaison between services. Similarly, we have immediately strengthened the zonal operational
centre (COZ) who liaises with the military authorities and that works, him, permanently. I would
point out that these two cells are working on "Cree-ORSEC" common software that allows to
have identical databases.
One of the teachings of the night of November 13, given the number of victims, is the need to go
further in the definition of a common mapping between services. I also put in place a single
command vehicle that will gather more easily on the ground, in such situations, the information
coming from the various rescue and police services.
Saint-Denis and Paris events unfolded in a very close manner since the shootings took place
between 21 hours 20 and 22 hours. I myself informed the Minister, through about 20 phone calls.
I've given up going to the Stade de France, where I headed, to go immediately to the place of the
first shooting, where I arrived ten minutes to a quarter of an hour after the passage of the
assassins. The police and firefighters had just arrived. I stayed about 20 minutes and I arrived
around 22 hours 15 or 22 hours 20 at the Bataclan. The role of the Commissioner of police, in
this kind of situation, is to inform, and then take the direction of operations and to ensure the
proper conduct of the police and relief actions, relying on police operations commander, in this
case Jacques Mric, Director of security of proximity of the Paris metropolitan area (DSPAP)
here by my side , on relief operations commander, general Boutinaud, commanding the brigade
of firefighters of Paris (BSPP), finally on the Commander of the judicial police to establish
liaison with the judicial authority.
At the Stade de France, we have immediately, at 9: 40 pm, shared responsibilities with the
prefect Galli, who took the direction of the operation in a planned preparatory device given the
arrival of the President of the Republic and several Ministers, on the occasion of a very
important game. As whenever unfolds an important game, whether it's at the Stade de France or
at the Parc des Princes, the safety device is very organized and the Director of public order and
traffic (DOPC), who was on the spot, took the command of police operations.
In Paris, gunfights broke out at five sites. My responsibility was to verify the implementation by
the commanders of police and adapted measures relief operations and in particular the

establishment of perimeter security around each of the sites, allowing the satisfactory conduct of
relief operations; There is no question here of the Bataclan but well the five terraces. On-site
Alibert-Bichat, the first rescue team arrived at 09: 35 pm. At 09: 48 pm, the Commander of relief
operations took command, the police, having arrived before the rescue - I myself on the spot and
assured me in am. On other sites, operations were conducted in the same manner as vehicles of
attackers progresses. The only site where we had a doubt about the possible persistence of a
threat, and therefore a retrenchment of terrorists, was the site of the Casa Nostrapizzeria on the
corner of the rue de la Fontaine - le-Roi. I was the witness because, when I arrived, the police
officer told me that it seemed that terrorists were holed up in the corner building, around which
we have therefore installed a security perimeter. We asked the bis then group research,
assistance, intervention, deterrence (RAID), which took the mission in charge of raising doubt,
because there was no more shooting and more no action.
In total, on the five sites, supported by relief and set up security perimeters times were fast
enough, given the sequence of operations.
It is at the Bataclan, site affected by a hostage from 9: 40 pm about, that I positioned as Director
of operations. Indeed, an action is there extended while this was not the case for other sites. I
have grouped those responsible for security and rescue operations. We installed different
perimeters laid down by the directive 'EVENGRAVE' of the prefecture of police, setting a
controlled area, an exclusion zone and a security perimeter. The latter has been installed at the
top of rue Oberkampf, at the corner of the boulevard Voltaire - which was under potential fire of
hostage-takers. We split the spaces between the different missions. Because the cars parked on
the side, relief had little room to access the site - which has proved a real fix. Commander
operations of police (COP), M. Meric, arrived very quickly and has facilitated the evacuation of
some cars. We have tried to improve the holding of a perimeter of command. The commanding
officer of judicial police operations (COPJ) happened subsequently, before the general
Boutinaud, Professor Tourtier being there from the start. This unique location allowed to share
information, to make decisions, to make rapid and coordinated responses. Were also at my side
the Procurator of the Republic, Mr. Franois Molins, and the Mayor of Paris, Ms. Hidalgo,
arrived quickly enough by the Filles-du-Calvaire Street since it could not cross the boulevard
Voltaire.
Securing, both of the five sites where took place of the shootings of the Bataclan, has mobilized
1 100 police. Members of the Sentinel force are close in 'second curtain', if I may say, and are
positioned - I saw upon my arrival - across the boulevard Richard-Lenoir for perimeter
protection of the site.
With regard to the intervention itself, I will highlight three points.
First, the specialized intervention forces arrived quickly. The first responders, i.e. brigade Rab
(BAC) at night, arrived at 09: 54 pm at the Bataclan and the firing of the Commissioner
intervened at the scene of its own initiative, occurred at 09: 57 pm, at the time where the tray 94
arrived in turn and positioned itself in the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage. Territorially competent
specialized intervention forces (bis), are alerted to the permanence at 9: 30 pm. The first group of
15 officials, part of the prefecture of police of the 36 quai des Orfvres at 2200 hours. It

happened at 2220 hours at the Bataclan and second training joined him at 22: 40. Therefore, I
stress, a pretty rapid response, and you can wear the same appreciation on arrival in
reinforcement of the RAID.
Then, the coordination between the services was good. I will return to this point.
Finally, the decision to intervene for the assault has been very fast and even almost immediate. I
was next to Mr. Sainte when Mr. Molmy came to inform us of the failure of the telephone
contacts with terrorists and permission to carry out the assault. The authority immediately was
given to him after I called the Minister.
To conclude, I would remind you that, within the Pact plan tray and safety, significant
enhancements have been made since November 2013, allowing to provide teams of first
responders - BAC and of security and intervention (CSI), companies that are day BAC in Paris
and the metropolitan area - shooting equipment and protective equipment. Specialty bis services
have also been strengthened.
The President Georges Fenech. I have four sets of questions to ask you, Mr prefect: the first
series concerning the lack of initiation of the intervention of the national police (FNIF) Force;
the second focuses on the operation at the Bataclan itself; the third is related to the possible lack
of cooperation between services - or their perfect cooperation if I judge by your satisfaction in
this matter; Finally, I'll you on the Euro 2016, which will be held from June 10 to July 10, 2016.
You have confirmed that the BRI of Paris was competent in Paris intra muros as well as in the
three departments of the small Crown. You pointed out that at the time of the facts, the bis in
Paris consisted of 48 men, these numbers being brought to increase, so that the Interior Minister
has said. What was the strength of the bis in Paris November 13?
M. Michel Cadot. The bis is competent only Paris in quality of service Director - told while she
is 'driving '. It is not drive, on the other hand, therefore not competent in first place in the three
departments of the small Crown, where the RAID which is, or in the other four departments of
the Ile-de-France region, where it is the GIGN in RAID and gendarmerie areas in police areas
that are. The Bataclan being in Paris, the intervention scheme provides that the service known as
bis.
The bis has projected fifteen persons who arrived at 22: 20. A second team of the bis, composed
of 25 officials, arrived at 10: 40 pm.
The President Georges Fenech. We had therefore 40 officials of the bis, in addition to those of
the tray.
M. Michel Cadot. Of course, but who have acted in primo stakeholders and are not specialty
services.
The President Georges Fenech. No, indeed, they have come as reinforcements.

M. Michel Cadot. All the first responders were part of the reinforcements, which must
guarantee the security perimeter and preserve the exclusion zone and the zone of security the
second perimeter. Then there are specialized forces to intervene in a context as complex as the
one it comes with, inter alia, a hostage.
The President Georges Fenech. We have therefore 40 officials of the bis at 10: 40 pm.
M. Michel Cadot. Then we have the (BI) brigade, structurally integrated into the BRI when an
action is triggered.
Mr. Christian holy, Director of the judicial police. There were three waves. The rapid
intervention Force (FIR) came in first.
The President Georges Fenech. Namely the fifteen first.
Mr. Christian holy. These are indeed the fifteen first. The 25 following arrived twenty minutes
later. Arrive at the same time BI officials which aggregate to those of the bis. So in total, we
have about 70 men.
The President Georges Fenech. We try to understand the choices that have been made. The
RAID, which I would remind you that it is located in Bivres, has an operational strength of 148
officers for direct intervention, on a total of 300 people. On one side, we have 40 first responders
and, on the other, 148 officers of direct intervention. The proportion is so very different. We try
to understand, I stress this, why it appeals to such force and not to another.
This being said, I turn to annex 5 the RAID provided to us and which organizes the FNIF
triggering. Us you confirm, the prefect, that when the latter is triggered, the BRI of Paris, which
is one of the components of the FNIF is placed under command of the RAID?
M. Michel Cadot. The FNIF is a feature enabled in a number of situations...
The President Georges Fenech. We are going to come, the question is precise, Mr prefect:
according to annex 5...
M. Michel Cadot. What schedule do you reference?
The President Georges Fenech. In annex 5 of the RAID.
M. Michel Cadot. I.e.?
The President Georges Fenech. It's the annexes provided by the RAID to the commission of
inquiry.
M. Michel Cadot. The FNIF is not the RAID...

The President Georges Fenech. It is, more accurately, note that we provided the DGPN and
annex 5 concerning the RAID.
M. Michel Cadot. The FNIF is not a note of the DGPN only...
The President Georges Fenech. This annex No. 5 takes note of January 17, 2014, which
streamlines procedures for referral and employment of the intervention of the national police
Force, addressed by the Director general of the national police to Mr. the prefect of police,
yourself, in Paris.
M. Michel Cadot. It is circular, to be precise, the Minister of the Interior, dated January 2014
and which sets out the conditions for activation of the FNIF.
The President Georges Fenech. I refer to this note, or to this circular, as you want to ask
yourself this question: is it true that, when the FNIF is triggered in Paris intra muros, the BRI of
Paris, which is one of the components of the FNIF, is automatically placed under the command
of the RAID?
M. Michel Cadot. Of course, since it is stated in the circular that you just mentioned.
The President Georges Fenech. Annex 6 records of the RAID, joint note, this time, the DGPN,
the DGGN and the prefect of police, has that at major events, namely terrorist acts requiring
armed intervention, or a taking of hostages, the FNIF is triggered and, according to annex 5 that I
have just mentioned, the head of public safety territorially competent, i.e. yourself, Mr Reeve , or
even the head of the BRI of Paris, this on-site, appreciate the seriousness of the situation and
considers whether it should appeal to a response unit. You stop me if I make a mistake. At this
point, you must take the clip, without delay, according to your assessment of the situation of the
staff of the FNIF.
The head of the bis in Paris, Mr. Molmy, that we heard, he himself informed beforehand, and
without delay, the staff of the first to assess the situation and trigger the action of the FNIF? My
question is accurate. What was your assessment, since you are present at the scene, since the
Divisional Commissioner McMahon is present at the scene and notes, ministerial circulars that I
have mentioned provide whether or not you need to assess the situation to trigger the FNIF?
What matters here is whether what has been your appreciation, being recalled the items I have
just mentioned, namely the workforce available to the BRI of Paris and the workforce available
to the RAID, said, it is important to remember for the Commissioners of inquiry, Mr Reeve as
the bis - BAC, which has police soix72 deals generally with small and medium delinquency flights, riots, extortion, violence, drugs, prostitution... Therefore, it is not able to intervene in the
case of major crises such as terrorist acts with hostage.
M. Michel Cadot. The text you read, Mr president, correspond to a circular, a comment...?
The President Georges Fenech. This is a question I ask. I could be wrong, Mr Reeve, but I'm
trying to enlighten the commission of inquiry.

There are several units, one has for exclusive purpose of terrorism or hostage situations, and the
other also aims to make the judiciary and to respond to the arrests. So, when you are on the
premises, Mr Reeve, with Commissioner commanding the BRI of Paris, you analyze the
seriousness of the situation, you decide to book the intervention at the BRI of Paris and you do
not trigger the FNIF. Why?
M. Michel Cadot. I will answer you very clearly, Mr president, and I will answer you as Prefect
of police having a long career of prefect behind him and who had to deal with many crises,
particularly difficult situations and very diverse nature - I think in particular to the operation that
followed the crash of the plane of the Germanwings : I was responsible as Prefect of area and I
can assure you that the decisions were not easy to take. But I took them always.
What I said just now about the case which concerns us here was not a rhetorical effect: I
constantly thinking of those families who have lost theirs, to the faces of the hostages that we
saved, who, at the time of the release by the bis, emerged from the Bataclan in terrible
conditions, Dazed by the hundreds. I am convinced of having made the right decision. I assume
it and I will explain why.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Reeve nobody you involved here. We ask you questions.
M. Michel Cadot. I did not 'booked' intervention to the bis. I remember the rule: the outbreak of
the FNIF is not the prefect of police alone! This decision is taken at the ministerial level. To raise
the FNIF if, indeed, the territorial device of common law, which here provides for the bis,
appears not suited to the nature of the risks or the nature of the attack to contain and reduce.
Not being a specialist myself this type of surgery, I listen as Prefect, my specialty. I knew what
was the Bataclan and far away the complexity of an increase of forces so that there were a very
large number of hostages - is the information that we had at this time - and two or three
assailants who had fled upstairs. The bis came with 30 people. I learned from the analysis of
what had passed to theHypercacher that it was not necessary to be four times as many. On the
contrary, the number is not necessarily a guarantee of effectiveness. What is one, is the
professionalism, the method and the timing of the intervention.
However the intervention at the Bataclan is carried out without causing no casualties; It was
wisely conducted and I conclude that the selection was not bad and that he was even justified.
At what point should have been proposing the FNIF triggering? Obviously, if there had been a
second hostage, as let him worry about rumors that have been circulating for hours and that there
were attacks at the Chtelet, in gare St-Lazare, would have had to send the RAID. And it is at
that moment that I would have proposed to the Minister, while we continue to treat the Bataclan.
This is what was my belief. I have not felt, then the slightest need to obtain additional resources
on the site of the Bataclan.
This is why I am sorry these difficulties, as the media, I think, have accentuated. Indeed, an
agreement has been reached with the RAID, arrived about 11: 10 pm - after will be announced
on-air at 23 hours 03-, then the bis had already engaged the progression on the floor. The bis and

the RAID shared tasks, the first continuing the mission it had undertaken - it teams had to do and
it did very well - and the second dealing with the ground floor and the basement.
Finally, the two forces are not opposed: they have common training; a doctor of the RAID was in
the column and has endeavoured, with the bis doctor, to get a maximum of casualties.
Here is what my conviction, Mr president.
The President Georges Fenech. The prefect, we simply try to understand. So you are on the
spot, you are informed of the attacks, from what is happening in the 10e and 11 districts.
exchanges of fire occurred at the corner of the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage, boulevard Voltaire.
officials we heard spoke of scenes of war without precedent; We know that 1500 people located
at the Bataclan ; We know that several individuals armed with Kalashnikovs are found indoors.
Neither you nor the head of the BRI of Paris have solicited the help of other special forces - as
the RAID that would come in competition, as you explained-, you assume it and tell us have
made the decision to book the intervention at the bis in Paris and not in the RAID. "It was my
decision, us declare yourself, it was in my power, so I assume it and I believe it was the right
decision." This is what you tell us?
M. Michel Cadot. No, this is not what I told you, Mr president. I never said that I had 'booked'
response to the bis, but I stated that it had not seemed me necessary to activate the FNIF for the
operation of the Bataclan. I repeat to you that the RAID was commissioned, as a first step, to
raise doubt as to the possible presence of terrorists in the building of the fountain Street - le-Roi,
next to the pizzeria Casa Nostra. The RAID which would have taken the operation in charge if
the rumor had proved so it correspond to an actual deletion from terrorists. If it had been another
important hostage in another place, you probably should entrust the operation to RAID. Also, I
repeat, I did not 'booked' Bataclan operation to the bis, I applied the procedure...
The President Georges Fenech. At your discretion.
M. Michel Cadot. Course: an appreciation that I assume fully and that the results seem to
confirm. Remains that this is not a personal, individual decision...
The President Georges Fenech. But you have the responsibility.
M. Michel Cadot. I assume it and I am proud. But I had around me of the persons entitled to
advise me and I heard their opinions. No one asked me to engage the RAID: it would not have
sense, since the bis knew more places and was therefore better able to act, and she was trained
for this.
The President Georges Fenech. Therefore, you assume this decision, Mr Reeve, believing that
he came to the right decision. If a new attack of this magnitude happen in Paris, you reprendriez
so the same?
M. Michel Cadot. Each case is a different case, Mr president. I repeat that the decision to call
the FNIF, this is not the Prefect who takes only: it proposes it to the Minister...

The President Georges Fenech. That have it you proposed? To the Minister?
M. Michel Cadot. The question is not asked in these terms at the time of intervention since the
bis assumed the mission and was in the lead. You ask me the question in a biased manner,
because...
The President Georges Fenech. Ask you not biased questions, but on the contrary very simple,
very clear questions.
M. Michel Cadot. Then I answer very simply.
The President Georges Fenech. Why are you talking about biased questions? This is not the
case, I stress, it's clear questions.
Mr. Christian holy. It seems to me important to revisit the nature of the facts. Those on the
terraces are characterized by a succession of episodes. At the time where we know that
something has happened, it is already completed even though we plan to project forces. In the
single case, referred to by the prefect of the pizzeria Casa Nostra, the noise ran that it might be a
man with a Kalashnikov. We have not believed because there was no reason that an individual
stays there, as the chosen operating mode was, I repeat, that two or three individuals, in a
vehicle, alighting, rafalent, to speak bluntly, and back in the vehicle to move to the next step.
The procedure is therefore very dynamic.
The Bataclanis the place where we have an attachment point. It's at the bottom, the only scene of
crisis to manage. However, it seems to imply that the bis would not skills to intervene, in any
case the powers equivalent to those of the RAID, as has been mentioned earlier...
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Director, on this point, where, last week, I asked the
question, and without bias, to the Director general of the national police, he has very clearly
presented us the hierarchy of intervention forces: at the base there is the tray, then the bis and to
the type of intervention that interests us here, it has the RAID because RAID is trained for this
and only this. I do not say so no bis no is not formed, as you have reminded us, Mr Reeve, that
there were common to both units training - I want, in passing, know when the last took place-,
but you'll no doubt agree with the DGPN that RAID is training which, faced with this type of
event, when even the biggest know-how!
Mr. Christian holy. At what level the DGPN he placed the BRI of Paris in the hierarchy?
The President Georges Fenech. Below! I am speaking under the control of my colleagues.
M. Pascal Popelin. There's no hierarchy!
The President Georges Fenech. It is not a functional hierarchy, but of a hierarchy in the
jurisdiction.

Mr. Christian holy. First, in fact, operators who integrate the bis of the prefecture of police have
joint training with the RAID four months. Then courses, exchanges, joint exercises are planned.
A response protocol was developed prior to the events mentioned here - on coordination on
communications, on issues related to tactical bubbles, on-site command posts (PC).
Then, when the RAID happened at the Bataclan, I can confirm that everything is passed
naturally - I was there - and, moreover, Christophe Molmy reminded you last Thursday while we
were on the scene. Two operators of the RAID are well mounted down the stairs to join the
column of attack of the bis.
The President Georges Fenech. This is indeed what we were told.
Mr. Christian holy. In parallel, the bis of the prefecture of police practice of judicial
surveillance. This mean, with regard to the operation...
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Director, I take note of your position. You put on the same
footing the BRI of Paris and the RAID. End point.
Mr. Christian holy. I note that, during the intervention to theHypercacher, the bis men took
their place alongside their colleagues in the RAID, and I note that during the intervention at the
Bataclan no person has been injured by the intervention forces.
The President Georges Fenech. Perfect. Turning now to the gendarmerie forces. The head of
the GIGN tried to enter into contact with the head of the BRI of Paris at 22: 15 pm without be
reminded by him. Order of the DGGN, this same head of the GIGN has posted his troops in the
barracks of the Clestins at 10: 45 pm. Why deal with the disastrous situation of the Bataclan,
not have solicited them? I think know your answer, but I think useful that you ritriez the.
M. Michel Cadot. This has already been stated, it seems to me: the GIGN has been alert to 22
hours 26. Instruct the GIGN, at 2245 hours, to pre-position at the barracks of the Celestines was
a very good decision: in case other attacks in Paris, it was indeed better that the GIGN is located
in the barracks of the Clestins rather than Satory. At 23: 15 pm arrive at the barracks of the
Clestins Commander the GIGN and the Commander of the intervention force. Alert groups, i.e.
staff, arrive for their part around 11: 30 pm, namely at a time where the interventions were
already engaged, and for a long time, on the floors of the Bataclan. The pre-positioning of the
GIGN is certainly a good decision, since we need to be able to cope with new threats. I recall
that the entire evening was beset by rumors of attacks in other places, and that it is in the case
where these attacks would have had to raise the FNIF, and a single coordination was necessary
would be proved: each dealing with the Bataclan, others from the gare Saint-Lazare or others of
les Halles, for example. This is the FNIF: sharing tasks, under a single command, to project the
only services can intervene. It's specialty - and bis is part of these three groups, at the national
level, who each speciality: thus, in an airport, the GIGN is the only competent
The President Georges Fenech. We heard Mr Psenny, journalist of the World, who has taken
refuge, wounded, on the fourth floor of a building. Done us cited a lack of communication
between the officers outside, who's mission is to secure the area, and the command inside. How

can we, you, Mr Reeve, improve the exchange of information between the forces that lie inside
and those who are outside to evacuate the wounded?
M. Michel Cadot. It is indeed one of the challenges posed by this intervention. This person,
injured in the arm and the leg, which has called for help, was in a building of the Saint-PierreAmelot passage. She did the message, which was sent to us - I did not know who he was at that
moment-, and I asked the Commander of relief operations (COS) if it was possible to get it down
and out of the building where she had taken refuge, and from which she passed his phone calls.
Firefighters have returned to me, after some time, it was not possible to get safely to the passage,
which was part of the zone of exclusion in which, normally, should intervene in relief that in
sufficiently guarantees safe conditions. However, I repeat, I was assured that it was not possible
to intervene at this moment.
How to facilitate this type of relief in the future? A better connection between the forces of relief
and intervention forces be? The two protocols of intervention of the RAID and the bis favour the
neutralization of the attackers - and more that never therefore they are ready to explode, since
their approach is that of suicide bombers. Therefore, take a very big risk to carry out
interventions in immediate range of hostage-takers. It must first neutralise the terrorists. It was
therefore very difficult to envisage an intervention, and the image of the wounded soldier locked
between the trenches, employed by the general Boutinaud at the hearing of March 16, is enough
to reality.
Furthermore, the clarifications provided by telephone to the BSPP by this reporter on his
wounds, that he could speak without difficulty on the phone, probably allowed emergency
services consider that response time was manageable.
The President Georges Fenech. General Boutinaud was indeed explained this situation.
M. Pierre Lellouche. However, one can imagine that there are more doctors accustomed to an
environment of war, like those of the bis or the RAID, so able to go immediately in contact with
the victims in emergency cases. We understand all your needs: I speak myself with the street fire
white, in my constituency. It is not to transform fire into targets, but having to Park 300 metres
and be unable, except under very complicated conditions, they bring the wounded, requires
perhaps a review of the modus operandi, with including more doctors equipped and protected,
capable to go to contact injuries. It is perhaps one of the lessons that we can learn from these
discussions.
M. Michel Cadot. This is a track where we're working and appears to be desirable: the
professionalization of firefighters, to share the risk of the intervention of much more closely. But
this implies fundamental changes: These firefighters should be more closely integrated with the
intervention units and work regularly with them, which is not simple and did not correspond to
the current protocols.
M. Pierre Lellouche. The advantage is that the firemen of Paris are military.

M. Michel Cadot. Exactly, and this solution, specifically, would probably be more suitable in
Paris and the small Crown. It would be much more difficult to implement Work in the
departments of the large Crown or the rest of the France, where fire and rescue (SDIS)
departmental services cannot comply with such a device. Once, device of the prefecture of police
of Paris is adapted to the particularities of a Parisian "plaque" where focus even more risk than
elsewhere.
The President Georges Fenech. Yesterday, met in the presence of the Minister of the Interior a
Steering Committee - to which, the prefect, you have probably participated - following the tragic
events of Brussels, on the security of the Euro 2016. Can you convey to the commission
investigative strategies that you could put in place?
M. Michel Cadot. With regard to the Euro 2016, the first point concerns security in stadiums
and the device for pre-screening and pre-filtering. We have adopted this device tomorrow
November 13 insofar as it became apparent that, at the Stade de France, the scheme of
strengthening precautions and controls had, to a large extent, prevented terrorists penetrate in the
stadium as it was their project, although there was no doubt malfunctions in the Organization of
their attack. Since then, we have put in place, and we will apply it to the Parc des Princes and the
Stade de France for the Euro 2016 games, a system of pre-filtering avoiding that cannot access
the ticket control at various entrance doors of the stadium - where, precisely, the attackers had
planned to detonate themselves-, persons who previously excavated. This system works well, but
request for additional ways since we are obliged to mobilize mobile forces increasingly large
number, which will be particularly difficult on the occasion of the Euro 2016. It is in any case the
solution that we have adopted, and which convinced the Minister: it is safe with regard to the
pre-filtering and control in stages, as long as the number of agents of security and frisk
conducted is suited and sized.
The second point concerns the fan zones, these areas where tens of thousands of people
congregate to see broadcast the games or to participate in other festive events. The two sites
envisaged to this end in the Paris region are, in Saint-Denis, the nearby park of the House of the
Legion of honour and the Basilica, place firm enough and relatively easy to secure, and in Paris,
the Champ de Mars, which requires him, a device very complex. The Town Hall has entered into
an agreement with a company of the Lagardre Group and we have a demanding discussion with
departments and the office of the Mayor of Paris manning not only security, but primarily of
persons responsible for carrying out of Pat-downs: the aim is not, indeed, to simply have a set
number of security officers, but to be able to control people uphill i.e. before they come to attend
the control of entry into the area closed by barriers. The palpation should be fluid enough to
avoid the accumulation of a large number of uncontrolled people who would obviously be major
targets. At the rate of four frisk about per minute, if 92 000 people flocked to the Champ de
Mars, staff of the Pat-down will be important. All threads are not yet successful.
Finally, always about Euro 2016, it will likely limit the number of festive events around the
games. However, there are a lot of applications in Paris. We will have to limit the possibilities
for securing these gatherings, on a more limited number of events. We have already informed the
organizers of shows and elected officials that we will not be able to secure a very large number.

The rapporteur. You have reminded us, Mr Reeve your experience in dealing with crises. The
bis was created, I think, before the RAID and the GIGN. As for you, Mr Director, you're back on
the existence of a joint RAID with the bis training. I even understand that elders of the RAID
were members of the bis. Can elaborate us on this last point?
To theHypercacher, RAID and the bis intervened with a workforce of around 100 people. How,
among this 100 people, actually entered theHypercacher ? Similarly, at the Bataclan, I
understand that the whole of the bis had not necessarily mobilized, a part of the men remaining
on the sidewalk; they have a mission of securing? More importantly: when we went to the scene,
Commissioner McMahon told us that it had been decided, following the intervention in
theHypercacher, the columns would be shorter. His explanation made us cold in the back: if
suicide bombers were exploding, he told us, the devastation would be less on the first column
and, at the time, a second column could happen more quickly. If I understand your answers,
feedback leads to the conclusion that it is not necessary to hire a lot of world, because men might
interfere each other. Pending unforeseen RAID on the operation of Saint-Denis, can you
enlighten us on this point?
As you, my general, I read the press, in particular Mediapart and article of the World yesterday,
and I would like to not ask you about the criticism about the absence or delay in relief to the beer
and the beautiful team. Some victims have criticized the lack of relief with good beer and their
delay in the beautiful team. The latter institution boss said, in fact, before we had passed a certain
time between the gusts and the arrival of the rescue. Can you give us specific timetables, either
now, or in a document that you send us? Can you give us information about the potential
problems of radio connection between the fire brigade and emergency medical service (EMS)?
Furthermore, the police prefecture has supported phone calls until Saturday afternoon and
attendant, told me said, has "exploded" in at least four occasions. How many operators have you,
Mr Reeve, and envisioned by 12 November establishing the interdepartmental assistance to
victims (CIAV) cell plan that it was good at the prefecture of police support before phone calls
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes the relay? Have you drawn the conclusions from this
experience? Reprendriez you to your charge phone calls during a similar crisis?
Finally, can you tell us a word of the plan of the BAC in arms equipment? The DGPN told us
that the tray Assembly would be equipped with here in July. What is in Paris, and in particular
for police officers under your responsibility? Has firearms training been reinforced, particularly
since the attacks of January?
M. Michel Cadot. With respect to calls, in fact, the public information unit has been activated
from midnight-midnight and a half. Immediately, this cell was equipped by a dozen people who
were recalled. Around seven or eight o'clock in the morning, staff were brought to twenty
operators, through the reinforcement of associations of civil protection volunteers. There were
also representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since the CIAV will fall under this
Department. This team was pretty well dimensioned for a normal crisis, and the prefecture of
police is a great habit to mobilize quickly, i.e. within a few hours, a cell dedicated exclusively to
making calls. However, as you know, we received 93 000 calls and only 10 000 could be treated.
So there was a real bottleneck, as indeed, I am told, happened in Brussels in the early hours that

followed the attacks. Subsequently, to return to Paris, the number of call fell to 3000 or 4000,
which is very easy to treat. The governmental authorities and in particular Ms. Madel will
announce the lessons from this call management system. Nevertheless, I can already tell you that
it is planned a number of single entry, which will be the CIAV and which will immediately
return to specialized cells. With regard to information of victims, it is the CIAV which will
operate (with the possibility of ante-mortem, post-mortem... cells). However, requests for
information or the communication of general information, on the existence of threats in other
parts of the city, for example, which were very numerous and have drowned the device, will be
returned immediately to the cell to inform the public of the prefecture of police, which is the
role.
The rapporteur. These calls will be transferred automatically, or do callers will have to dial
another number?
M. Michel Cadot. Their call will be immediately switched without requesting it them to explain
what takes time and clutters the lines. The device is in focus and is installed in the premises of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Failover, provided by the circular of November 12, arrived in the
early morning of 14 November, was unable to be applied on the same day before 7 pm.
Operative, interdepartmental, reports to the Prime Minister. I note also that, unlike other
situations, mobile phones worked, having not been saturated networks. Finally, in connection
with the office of Ms. Madel, we dig the idea of disseminating messages on social networks in
order to avoid unnecessary calls, indicating, for example, how. On 13 November, we sent sixteen
behavioural messages on social networks: "avoid travelling in such district", "no phone not
unnecessarily if you don't have a specific reason to do so", etc. You must develop this practice in
a more systematic way.
I come to the bis. It has indeed celebrate its fifty years, and if the age is not a guarantee of
effectiveness, it appears that this brigade has constantly adapted; the reinforcement of 45 men,
mentioned earlier, is this constant adaptation to progress and search to respond to difficult
situations. The issue of the relationship between bis, the RAID and the GIGN is better to identify
their respective specialties. Also the Minister asked the two Directors-General and the
Commissioner of police will propose a national pattern of intervention stating conditions for
functioning of the FNIF and identify in real conditions, i.e. from exercises, the ways that each
unit is capable of mobilising. It is not enough to announce that they are 80 or 500; you need to
know when they can be thrown at Clermont-Ferrand, Paris, Boulogne, Versailles.
I was not yet in position at the time of the operation in theHypercacher, and I will therefore keep
me any comments. I however feel, seeing the pictures, that there were many people, and I have
the absolute conviction, since I attended on-site, at 4: 30 pm, led assault in Saint-Denis, that for
this type of operation, it must be very strict with respect to the areas. In Paris, we have, between
the RAID and the GIGN, use the primo-intervention means that are the bin or the CSI of many
possibilities. Staff put in place must therefore be proportionate to each case: this is the lesson that
can be drawn from these experiences. Regarding the Bataclan, I am deeply convinced that the
strength for the assault was suited to rapid intervention to neutralize the hostage-takers without
putting them in danger, and this in a configuration of the building making it complicated on the
columns.

Mr. Christian holy. We lived two dramas, two assaults last year: that theHypercacher in
January and the Bataclan in November. We can draw two lessons.
As regards theHypercacher, pictured on the film of the events the two columns involved: on one
side the RAID bis. There is no need to be a specialist to see that there are many stakeholders,
there is a traffic jam. The number is therefore not necessarily a guarantee of effectiveness or
success.
With the intervention of November at the Bataclan, it is the need for responsiveness, speed, that
is the lesson to remember. Indeed, we can intervene with 15 operators, as indicated you. 20, is
better, but with fifteen you can already do.
You must also bear in mind that we reason here from two operations which lasted only a few
hours. But, in the case of a hostage longer - I think what has happened in Moscow several years
ago-, should be able to regenerate the workforce. This is a third teaching.
It is therefore not necessary, I come back to many officials who will rush, high-risk shots leave
accidentally.
The President Georges Fenech. My general, can you answer question on delay in relief the
beautiful team, reported the newspaper Le Monde?
General Philippe Boutinaud. I know that Mediapart had explained that the fire had not been
fast enough. I have explained them to you at a previous hearing, relief arrived on all sites within
a period between three and twelve minutes. The interventions took place within a perimeter
whose surface was less than four square kilometers, the relief coming from the nearby barracks.
However, in less than half an hour, five sites have been hit, and the addresses given to us were
very imprecise.
It is true that there was a problem with good beer. The distance between this institution and small
Cambodia is about 500 meters. We lacked mobile hospital units (UMH), i.e. vehicles with
doctors. Indeed, we had tonight there seven ambulances resuscitation and, in an hour, we moved
on to 21. In the meantime, we immediately sent four of these ambulances at the Stade de France the BSPP is responsible for the three departments of the small Crown - and the other three are
parties to the small Cambodia. When occurs the attack with good beer, firefighters have already
more medical resources, therefore the SAMU taking over. The patron of good beer was shocked
that the first firefighter saw it happen has no equipment with him: it was normal, because it is my
Deputy, who was out in Paris and who, upon arriving, told him he was a fireman. In has
nevertheless raised the 'Red Alpha' plan. The beer is the place, I recall, where there were less
deaths. In addition, the five people who died were unfortunately too serious to be saved. I read
Mediapart and other newspapers, and I think that some, including here, have been influenced by
the peremptory statements of the media; therefore to you that I pay accounts.
The rapporteur. Can my general, you send us specific elements on the beer and the belle team ?
We will, of course, the same request to ambulance officials. It is important that the commission
of inquiry can answer, in his report to these criticisms.

Mr Franois Lamy. My questions will be very practical.

Prefect, you do you feel sufficiently informed on the reality threats, in particular concerning the
Parisian theatres? Is it possible to design a plan of "locking" of the city of Paris?
On the other hand, when you are on the ground, you are, by definition, nor in the command room
nor, a fortiori, with the Minister of the Interior, the Prime Minister or the President of the
Republic. Do you consider that this is a problem? The military that we have heard have told us
that the Chief of staff remained with his staff and was a colonel who was on the ground.
Finally, wouldn't be more effective to merge, ultimately part of the DRPP, in any case that deals
with terrorism, with CSB?
The President Georges Fenech. If you will allow me, Mr Reeve, I complete the first question
from Mr Lamy. I have the eyes minutes dated May 6, 2009, written by what was then the Central
Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI), issued by the Deputy Prosecutor of the Republic in
Paris: 'to information received by the service, it appears that the target of the attack project
instigated by Farouk Ben Abbes, arrested on April 3, 2009 by the Egyptian authorities might
relate to a building of the Jewish community in the town of Saint-Denis. However, in its various
hearings, Farouk Ben Abbes would have proposed the Auditorium of the Bataclan, located in 11e
arrondissement of Paris. According to the person concerned, the choice fell on this place because
of support and fundraising events carried out for the benefit of the Jewish community. "In
addition, at his hearing, Me Olivier Morice, who expressed astonishment that, reported the arrest,
in mid-August 2015, a french jihadist of return of Syria who had to project an attack against a
concert hall in Paris. You can make the link between the two.
The question posed by the victims, and that obviously we ask, is what use was made of this
information. Have into you taken account? Why, we asked, have not informed the owners of the
Bataclan of these specific threats, which have been the subject, there are a number of years, a
report?
M. Michel Cadot. Do we, in the prefecture of police, good information on the reality of the
threats? Intelligence services, whether the CSB or the DRPP, provide sufficient evidence?
All information items, starting with what we call the weak signals - i.e. messages dating back to
different actors and particularly police stations - are systematically followed by effects. Each
week, we receive dozens of reports which are the subject of audits - license plates, domicile,
identity... - to dig any information on potential risks. Then, based on the information from the
Directorate-General for external security (DGSE), including elements from strategies, speeches,
publications of DAECH, measures are taken concerning potential targets.
Between my arrival at the prefecture of police, July 20, 2015, and on 13 November, I have
knowledge of no specific threat relating to venues - we have however, subsequently secured
them much more broadly - or aimed in particular the Bataclan. I do not know when or under
what conditions, between 2009 and 2015, it was considered that protection measures which had
to be taken at the time were less relevant. The threat was not the same...

M. Pierre Lellouche. You has intelligence not been transmitted?

M. Michel Cadot. He had to be passed in 2009.
M. Pierre Lellouche. There are still databases!
M. Michel Cadot. We will check, but I am convinced that in 2009 it was shared by the
intelligence community, it seems obvious to me.
The President Georges Fenech. This is something to check.
M. Michel Cadot. The judicial inquiry will confirm.
M. Pierre Lellouche. The intelligence service keeps track of threats against different targets and
attacks, and for years, he could not work. This is not only judicial issue, but an issue that really
touches to the intelligence and therefore concerns the commission of inquiry. The question is if
this information has been transmitted to your services - and I return to the question of Mr Lamy:
wouldn't not clever to consolidate certain services for improving its functioning?
M. Michel Cadot. I do not say that it was not passed, but that, for my part, I is not got
knowledge between July and November 2015. This information was in 2009. The threat is
multifaceted: teams are commissioned by DAECH from the Syria and are the subject of specific
information and monitoring circuits; others act more individually, as was the case in the Thalys.
The threat level is not exclusively focused on a form of attack. Unless you ask the question to the
Director of the Prefecture of police intelligence, I altogether it myself and we will send you a
note specifying under what conditions information may 6, 2009 has been known of the
prefecture of police.
The President Georges Fenech. His hearing is scheduled.
M. Michel Cadot. I come to the presence of the prefect of police at the place of operations. The
Commissioner of police has the privilege of having with him, under his direct authority, three
prefects: prefect Secretary general of area, the prefect Chief of staff and the Secretary general of
the prefecture prefect. Of course, when the prefect of police is on the ground, it is expected that
the Director of cabinet directs the COPP. It is that that night, the prefect Director of office was
doing an internship at Saint-Astier from the National Gendarmerie. He returned immediately and
arrived in Paris at five o'clock in the morning. The prefect SGZDS, the Deputy Director of the
cabinet and the Chief of staff were of course on site. Therefore, in crisis situations, the presence
of the prefect of police on the ground interfere with nothing running the command centre.
Regarding the relationship of the prefect of police with the Minister of the Interior, the latter
needs to be quickly informed, because these are the first minutes that count. However, in this
respect, the presence of the prefect of police on the ground is highly desirable. If we are facing a
crisis in short kinetics, as was the case at the Bataclan, this presence is maintained until the end.
When an operation lasts several days, as in January 2015, the situation is different. The prefect of

police is then driven to attend meetings with the Minister of the Interior, and is the Director of
cabinet which, meanwhile, ensures the prefecture the in Work taken instructions.
At the Bataclan, the issue was that hostage operation ends more quickly and in the best
conditions, which required two hours, two and a half hours about; It was therefore preferable, I
stress, I'll be on the spot to inform the Minister and facilitate decision-making. In addition, we
did not have to coordinate several places, in contrast to the operations of the month of January
2015 where, to preserve the lives of the hostages, it took coordinate the operation of Dammartinen-Gole, and Vincennes.
From this point of view, I think that the current organisation is perfectly armed to cope both with
the presence of the prefect to the Minister if it wishes to gather around him its directors and the
competent prefect, and in the presence of the prefect on the ground where it is needed. Of course,
the Attorney was on hand at my side and was not the "smoker", as it can be on other occasions,
when operations lasting and require that we consider a strategy for action under the authority of
the Minister.
Finally, you will allow me to consider that the idea of a merger between the DRPP and ISB
exceeds my skill level... I note however that successive Governments posed themselves the
question and that none has retained this solution, no doubt because, in the Paris region, the
territorial sense, and that given territorial responsibilities to Central directions, albeit the DGPN
or ISB and despite their high quality, is probably not always a good thing. The central
directorates must set directions, check that they are well Work, evaluate the success of the
actions of land, but it is necessary that decisions are taken at the territorial level to facilitate
coordination.
M. Philippe Goujon. I accept the formula of the prefect of police: in Paris, the territorial sense.
My small experience of 12 years as Deputy Mayor of Paris responsible for security leads me to
think that it is essential that all of the security forces be in Paris, and now in the area of the
agglomeration, ordered police - except, perhaps, when it comes to intelligence, a subject that we
will study later - by a single leader, which allows to measure the commitment of means and to
avoid competition from the forces What would be the worst thing. Also, with regard to cohesion,
coordination, command, efficiency, optimization of the forces, the institution and the
Organization of the prefecture of police with its head one leader, seems it a marker, for two
centuries, our history, and in particular of the Republic.
You mentioned, Mr the prefect of police, as did the DGGN with platoons of monitoring and
intervention of the gendarmerie (PSIG) or the DGPN with tray, equipment, training,
strengthening of the conditions of the units response. I would like to know what you expect for
the offices of borough. They may also, indeed, find themselves confronted with situations of this
kind, and be the first responders. It is therefore expected that their should be allocated the means
which they fail to do so: arms, heavy equipment... Well saw indeed, on the occasion of the attack
against the drafting of Charlie Hebdo, that the police lacked the necessary equipment in their
vehicle or on them.

You mentioned the fan zones and I will share a concern in this regard. We are at war, the same
words of the Prime Minister, and I think that we are perhaps undue risk to maintain a rally of
100,000 people every day, throughout the day, ten o'clock at midnight for a month, under the
Eiffel Tower, right in theFavorite pieces of Paris, even if are implemented by security conditions
that we have indeed discussed. Does not risk, now the fan zones, that the party turns into a
nightmare? Inside will not be, indeed, police officers, but the stewards of entertainers. The
police, who will be around the area, will have to mobilize a large staff; It has perhaps another
thing to do than to deploy staff to the fan zones.
M. Pierre Lellouche. I totally agree.
M. Michel Cadot. The Minister again asked the prefects to check in each Department, with
elected officials, the security conditions that allow to consider the authorization of fans areas.
The discussions have not yet succeeded on this point in Paris.
With regard to police stations, the choice that has been made is very clear: newcomers are
generally patrols '17 police rescue "; units of elementary interventions and, in the event of an
attack, their role is to fix the situation and alert; normally, they must not intervene and can only
exceptionally be in situation of first responders. The first responders are more normally the BAC
or CSI, intermediate intervention units; then come specialized intervention services, i.e. the bis in
Paris, the RAID in the departments of the small Crown, the first in the case of a multiplication of
the number of sites affected by terrorist attacks. These are rather protective equipment that are
intended for police stations and weapons.
Mr. Jacques Mric, Director of the security police of agglomeration. You are quite right, Mr
Alavanos, question Paris stations, which could also add those commuter. The prefect just specify
that they are the first responders. This was the case not only for the attack against the editor of
Charlie Hebdo, but also on 13 November. It was, rightly, much talk of tray, but the first vehicle
to intervene at the Bataclan, has been a vehicle of the commissariat of the 3 district, who was
trying to treat a nearby traffic accident and that is diverted to the Bataclan while hostage had
begun.
Mr. Meyer Habib. What time exactly the action of terrorists did begin at the Bataclan ?
Mr. Jacques Meric. Except error, we received the first calls for 21 hours 43.
These personnel Commissioner, endowed with equipment that I would describe as classic discreet bulletproof vests, SIG-Sauer pistols...-, are not equipped to deal with terrorist attacks by
heavily armed individuals. So we decided to provide equipment for the protection of three types:
ballistic helmet with visor, in order to be protected from firing of firearms, vest plate, in which is
inserted ceramic plates to protect an assault rifle bullets, finally flexible ballistic shield which
deployed, can also be protected against fire weapons such as a Kalashnikov. It is a heavy
investment, taking into account the number of officers concerned.
M. Philippe Goujon. The allocations will be by stations?

Mr. Jacques Meric. We went further and considered quasi-individuelles allocations.

You should know that only the part lined with ceramics of the ballistic shield stops bullets from a
Kalashnikov. This means that it will take to provide training for personnel, so that they become
aware that their equipment will not protect them. A heavy ballistic helmet with ballistic visor, for
example, does not a Kalashnikov bullet; protect any type of headphones, moreover, stops bullets
from Kalashnikov.
M. Pierre Lellouche. I am back on the information that the Bataclan was a target as soon as
2009. It seems to me very important that we have a light on this point, as this will tell about the
State of our intelligence, as, I would remind you, show rooms had already been referred to in
other countries.
Over the hearings, Mr Reeve, I was struck by the fact that a number of stakeholders have said we
have learned things by BFM TV. I almost fall out of my chair and heard this. Of professional
intervention forces have BFM TV for means of information, if that, somehow, there is no
command center! However, if we are, as I believe, and as the Prime Minister rightly said, in a
context of war against terrorism, with different forms of attacks, you have greatly interest you
acquire a command of special operations (COS), like have the military, operational 24 hours / 7
days a week where is the intelligence and where someone is able to transfer orders to alert so that
a response is prepared immediately without waiting for it to learn things by television or radio.
The groping is certainly understandable: it is not the State of peace in the State of war from one
day to the next. Have you nevertheless planned to set up a command centre that will immediately
set the forces in motion?
About relief, another question torments me: that of chemical weapons. Yesterday, in Brussels, on
the occasion of a search warrant, found chemical weapons. As we know that this type of weapon
is commonly used by DAECH...
The rapporteur. It was chemicals.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Indeed, it was product chemical, but which are sufficient to make a bomb
'dirty' in the prospect of a terrorist attack. It was not question to miniaturize a chemical head for a
missile.
The rapporteur. It was product for the manufacture of explosives and not intended for the
manufacture of a bomb "dirty".
M. Michel Cadot. With regard to the command center, the place where the information goes
back more quickly is the PC of the DSPAP that receives and processes calls "17 police rescue.
We decided, in such a situation, to bring immediately on-site representative of the RAID and a
representative of the bis as liaison within this command centre officers. Furthermore, we have
activated the device of scalability of COPP, what is done in a few minutes as each of the centres
of command sent an official from the centre of command of the prefect of police, which is
directed, whether it is on the ground, by his Chief of staff.

M. Pierre Lellouche. This centre is located at the prefecture of police?

M. Michel Cadot. It is located at the prefecture of police. We you can visit, if you wish,
command rooms.
With regard to the reception of calls, officers of the DSPAP are grouped with the firefighters of
the BSPP, since we have established a unique platform of appeal which can be traced in the same
room the '17' and '18' information So this is where, I repeat, that information will arrive soon.
The exploitation of the very many calls, of very diverse origin, received during the first quarter
of an hour, is not always simple. We thus got agreement so that the three forces - BRI, RAID and
GIGN - have information online.
M. Pierre Lellouche. When has this device it been implemented?
M. Pierre Cadot. As soon after November 13. Previously, the circuit was that provided for in
the circular of 2014.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Prefect, how are you going to sustainably manage the deployment of
devices such as the Euro 2016? Well, mobilized workforce will have rest. Faced with a diffuse
threat, how all of the security forces can ensure sustainable mobilization? I fear that it be robbing
Peter to pay Paul.
Mr. Meyer Habib. We salute all the courage and professionalism of the forces. Perfection, on
the other hand, is out of reach: more than 100 people lost their lives, and our Committee aims
precisely to explore avenues of improvement.
The key moment of November 13 seems to have occurred at 09: 57 pm, when an official of the
ferry has killed one of the terrorists inside the Bataclan. It is between 09: 43 pm, time of their
entry into the Bataclan, and 21 hours 57 - or fourteen minutes later - that terrorists have killed
nearly 100 people and made a lot of wounded. After 21 hours 57, on the other hand, more a
single shot has been fired. In other words, the shooting of the officer of the BAC interrupted a
massacre that could have been much more serious still.
The RAID is prepared to act in the event of hostage, when negotiation is possible; in this case,
these terrorists do that kill and kill again. The only solution, as confirmed me Israelis, who know
something, seems to go to the contact as soon as possible. On 13 November, the shooting of the
policeman - who, if he had not taken it, would be killed immediately - changed everything.
Another question: how many simultaneous events are we able to cope? Unfortunately, I believe
that we are only at the beginning of a series of attacks which, in the future, could occur
simultaneously by ten, fifteen or more. Consider that about 15,000 messages denominated 'I am
Kaye' or 'I am Coulibaly' aired on Twitter after the attacks in January. Assuming that hundreds of
terrorists coordinate, how many attacks could we cope?
Some police officers have told us that the attackers were on the floor of the Bataclan ; others said
the opposite. It goes without saying that the firefighters should not expose themselves to

penalties, but wouldn't it have been possible to act sooner - the assault occurred two hours after
the shooting of the officer of the BAC - to avoid that injured people die? Did you know where
the terrorists were, and their location allowed to bring relief more quickly to save some of the
very many injured?
M. Michel Cadot. On our ability to meet ongoing multiple solicitations and probably
increasingly heavier, recognise and at the outset, as has repeatedly said it the Minister, zero risk
and the guarantee of absolute security does not exist. Our requirement is to provide maximum
efficiency to prevention and information devices and measures for immediate action in case of
attack. To do this, we need to consider some static devices that are consumers of staff very free
to respond fully to the mobility of the opponent and the surprise effect they are looking for; on
the contrary, they can be easy targets, and from this point of view, the usefulness of a private
static guard before the Bataclan, if it existed, is not obvious.
Above all, we must consider a device comprising protective perimeter and situational measures
in some places receiving public, with procedures for filtering and control, or even the presence of
armed security staff, new direction in our country, which has already been experienced once or
twice, which is currently explored by other major groups managing places receiving a large
audience. To increase our responsiveness, we must also develop the video protection at the zonal
level. Parisian nameplate, is the region le-de-France which is the relevant scale. When terrorists
involved in Paris or leave the capital, we should be able to cross and to exploit the data gathered
by the intelligence services, those which are responsible for traffic and public order, the police
and the judicial police. So, we developed a zonal plan of video protection, for which the Minister
has mobilized a budget of EUR 15 million. In Paris, we will thus quadruple the surface of
monitored public space, including targeting major traffic routes, the transport networks,
including surface, and by integrating video protection for Paris (PVPP) plan shopping centres
and networks of communities which have. We will also improve the usability of the data by
refining detection of abnormal and febrile behaviour, as well as facial recognition techniques.
In clear, we need to put us in a situation of war and adapt our resources accordingly, by
reflecting in particular, with the military, to the strengthening of the dynamic at the expense of
the static guards patrols, while maintaining the same level of security in the nearby islands most
affected by the threat.
Mr. Christian holy. Regarding our ability to deal with several simultaneous events, we
obviously share your concerns. At the Bataclan, the terrorists were armed with hundreds of
ammunition. However, when Commissioner McMahon and his column arrived, we were
unaware of how many terrorists were on the premises and their exact positioning. It was not until
11: 10 pm they could be located by people who referred to them. If the column has grown by
small, it is because she had to take all necessary measures to protect police officers and victims.
In such circumstances, it was difficult to go faster.
M. Michel Cadot. The command post, where I was, even received messages that terrorists were
progressing on the roofs.
Mr. Christian holy. Indeed, while they are never mounted.

The bis could intervene on three simultaneous sites. If taken hostage or sites of additional
attacks, it should seek the support of other forces.
M. Michel Cadot. In one such case, the Paris metropolitan area is the territory of the country,
which has a capacity of specialized importance means relying on the bis, the RAID and the
GIGN. The country should also strengthen its ability to quick projection on the large and
medium cities of province, in which questions of coordination between forces would arise not in
the same terms in the event of multiple attacks, well on the contrary: the RAID or the GIGN
would indeed forced to project their means, while it would be for the bis to secure the capital.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Face of such massacres, is it not better to skip the security to go immediately
to contact in order to limit the number of victims?
M. Michel Cadot. The doctrine States to go directly to the contact and neutralize as quickly as
the attackers. To do this, must be an organized column in place, as was the case at the Bataclan
to 23 hours. When this column, over its progress, ended before the closed door of the room in
which hostages were held, a beginning of negotiations is committed. In fact, the shots were
interrupted; It was therefore not necessary to act immediately, before even turning away victims
who were still on the ground floor. Hundreds of people were able to be evacuated while the
terrorists were attached to the floor. If it is indeed necessary to intervene quickly, should also
allow the evacuation of the wounded when possible.
Mr. Christian holy. To intervene more quickly and in the best conditions of security, it is not
necessary that the rapid intervention force (FIR) is composed of thirty or forty agents; a nominal
strength of fifteen people enough.
M. Olivier Marleix. After your arrival at the Bataclan at 2215 hours, Mr Reeve had telephone
discussions with the Minister of the Interior informing him of the operational mechanism in
which the bis were in force controlling and RAID in force support?
On the other hand, I barely understand the cockpit for the coordination of intelligence. In June,
the Prime Minister would, according to the press, support the Minister of the Interior to
coordinate itself intelligence in the framework a "operational headquarters", which I guess it
meets the "smoker". Once, it is the UCLAT that incumbent this mission, under the authority of
the Director-general of the national police, including allowing exchanges with the DGSE. You
also mentioned a structure of ISB. How this coordination work, and in what instances are you
participating as Prefect of police?
M. Michel Cadot. It goes without saying that I had many telephone exchanges with the Minister
after 22 hours 15, informing him of the situation such that we perceive the outside of the building
and that prevailing on the other sites of shooting. I informed him of the arrival of the bis
approximately half an hour later, and the fact that she was preparing to move to lead the assault
against the attackers. Without developing retail committed means and distribution shares of the
bis and the RAID, I informed him as soon as the assault phase was initiated.

The "smoking room" meeting that we were discussing gathered around the Minister competent
managers in areas falling within the gendarmerie, the DGPN and the prefecture of police, in
order to pilot tracking the information obtained. It was reproduced in the same format after 13
November, on the exchange of information, the Minister being held informed by the services of
the actions undertaken as a result of the attacks.
The operational staff for the protection of the territory (EMOPT) is a quite distinct operational
structure. It is composed of a dozen officers who identify and deal with the cases of persons
listed in the file FSPRT, the prefects of area to feed each week by tables listing the reports
collected in each Department. We work in connection with it at regular meetings around the
Minister.
Ms. Marianne Dubois. Can we already draw some additional lessons from the attacks that come
from happening in Brussels, whether it is the modus operandi of terrorists or the reaction of the
security forces, in order to feed our own reflection?
M. Michel Cadot. I observed to start a new element: for the first time, the terrorists used
explosives, in large quantities, places in suitcases, unlike what has happened in Paris. It goes
without saying that this poses questions relating to controls at the entrance to stations, airports
and metro stations.
Mr. Christian holy. Equipment used in Brussels were the same as in November: firearms type
Kalashnikov and the craft type TATP explosive, manufactured with products chemical enough
easily accessible. As for me, I observed the large amount of product used and the perfect mastery
that have the terrorists of his design, while it is an unstable explosive. Use suitcases, and not
jackets, allowed them to use more, where damage in the Terminal and the subway, which is torn
open. In addition, nails and bolts would have also been employed.
Mr. Patrice Verchre. Each notes that you try to learn all the lessons of November 13 and that
the intervention was correct, given the scale of the attacks and the multiplicity of sites. However,
we knew for several years that the terrorist threat was very high, and in the months preceding the
month of January 2015, all indicated attacks would occur soon. Above all, we know that there
will be other large-scale attacks. How your services are prepared from January 7 to respond to
such attacks to large-scale, unfortunately predictable last?
M. Michel Cadot. First of all, the human and material resources of intelligence and judicial
police - both directions of fight against terrorism - have been strengthened through a real
budgetary effort made at the initiative of the Minister, effort that already bears its first fruit.
Then, procedure called EVENGRAVE, in the event of serious, has contributed to the
effectiveness of the intervention on 13 November as it has developed jointly with all branches of
the prefecture of police, who were able to appropriate it and prepare its implementation in Work
before even its publication - which indeed took place only a few days after November 13. We
have updated it with the lessons learned attacks on 13 November.

The rapporteur. Have the Bataclan terrorists committed some beheadings or mutilation? Deaths
occurred otherwise than by shooting or explosion? Us conflicting information - including some
have received us in our hearings - needs to be clarified.
The President Georges Fenech. Indeed, the commission is disturbed by this information, that
nowhere have filtered. Thus, the father of one of the victims sent me a copy of a letter he has sent
to the investigating judge, which I quote summing up: ' on the causes of the death of my son a.,
at the medico-legal Institute of Paris, I was told, and this with reservations given the shock that
this represented for me at that moment, had cut it the testicles. that them it had been put in the
mouth, and had been torn open. When I saw him behind glass, lying on a table, a white shroud
covering it up to his neck, a psychologist was with me. "The latter was told: La only showable
part of your son is his left profile." I found that he no longer had toRight eye. I made the remark;
I was told that they had punctured him theEye and down the right side of his face, where very
large bruises that we have all seen when putting it into beer.
This specific evidence could corroborate the words that we kept one of the BAC, whereby one of
the investigators vomited immediately leaving the Bataclan after seeing a decapitation and
officials the eviscerations. Are you aware of such facts?
M. Michel Cadot. I had no knowledge of these facts, nor by the Forensic Medicine Institute or
by the officials in question. It is obviously for the judicial investigation to assess the veracity.
Nevertheless, I understand that it has been found on the site of the attack no or no other gear
cutting knife which would have allowed this type of mutilation. It will be easy to check as part of
the investigation. Regards me, yet again, I have received no message of the kind from the
Forensic Medicine Institute or the direction of guardianship of the concerned BAC.
Mr. Christian holy. I can hardly go on this point, given the State of the investigation, but
nothing in the current state of my knowledge allows me to think that what comes to be read is
just. I said, to make things clear, that some of the bodies found at the Bataclan were highly
mutilated by explosions and weapons, to the point that it was sometimes difficult to reconstitute
the dismembered body. In other words, injuries described this father may also have been caused
by automatic weapons, explosions or nails and bolts projections that resulted.
The President Georges Fenech. His testicles would put in the mouth...
Mr. Christian holy. I don't have this information, and if those facts had been established, I
believe that such information would have not escaped me.
Mr Franois Lamy. Is locking of Paris possible?
Mr. Jacques Meric. Given the density of highways, it is extremely difficult to completely lock
the capital. The question was raised on 7 January, when the two brothers Kaye fled by car to
begin a journey in Paris. In cases of this type, room command directs the positioning of vehicles
of interception at the main gates of Paris, which are supposed to leak axes. It is quite feasible, but
this does not guarantee the complete closure of Paris. Furthermore, the birth of the insurance
settlement put an end to a long period of disconnect between the police and the banlieue: since

2009, it is possible to intervene in Paris and its suburbs, using the same radio system and, thus, to
stop vehicles in the three departments of the small Crown. Recall, for example, that the store
Hypercacher is located almost to horse in the commune of Paris and Vincennes, Val-de-Marne.
Mr Franois Lamy. Therefore, the total lock of Paris is not possible?
Mr. Jacques Meric. No.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. The weekend of November 13, a restorer refused me access to his
institution on the ground that the prefect of police of Paris had given the order to evacuate the
restaurants and cafes and forbidden to take shelter. There are many who have opted for the
subway which, from my point of view, is a very bad idea, especially when there are attacks
terrorists multi-site strategies. Wouldn't be better, in the circumstances, that the people are
locked up in restaurants and cafes rather than wandering the streets or in the subway?
M. Michel Cadot. As a first step, several cafs located near the scene of the attacks were used as
command posts. In addition, the prefecture of police published on Twitter 13 messages in
emergency on the evening of November 13, which it into several panes: "Suite to several serious
events, the prefecture of police recommends that in the next few hours to institutions receiving
public to strengthen monitoring of entries and accommodate those who needed", or the opposite
of what was said to you. Similarly, we recommended 'to those who are at home, with relatives or
in professional premises in le-de-France to avoid to go out unless absolutely necessary", and the
organizers of shows" to interrupt the events or current events outdoors. It was common sense
instructions; Perhaps the restaurateur you mention, do not read our messages, he preferred
shutting himself in his establishment. Similarly, closure, at the initiative of its owner, a great
hotel near the Champ de Mars in the days that followed sparked a panic movement, being treated
as a hostage. I would add that we also published messages of information on Noctilien and metro
lines stop; I would naturally like all these messages at your disposal. The number of subscribers
to the Twitter account of the police prefecture has increased tenfold during the evening of
November 13.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for your participation in this long hearing.
Round table, open to the press, of the national police unions: Ms. Cline Berthon, General
Secretary of the Union of the Commissioners of the national police (SCPN), Mr. Jean-Luc
Taltavull, under-Secretary-General; Mr. Thierry Clair, delegate pole province of UNSA
Police
Report of the round table, open to the press, Wednesday, March 23, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Before, Madam and gentlemen, you pass the word for a
keynote presentation, I inform you that this hearing, open to the press, is also rebroadcast on the
video portal of the National Assembly, where it will be available for several months. The
Commission may decide to include in its report any part of the record of the hearing.

In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958, relating to
commissions of inquiry, I ask you to swear to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.
Ms. Berthon, M. Tartavull and Mr. Clair successively take oath.
Ms. Cline Berthon, General Secretary of the SCPN. Your commission of inquiry, which
thank you for allowing us to intervene, pursues an aim in noble and healthy: inform and make the
point about what happened - or which is not passed. As in other commissions of inquiry in which
we participated, we are very careful, as representatives of the chiefs of police, in that they turn
not in search of any responsibility, or even indictment or trial. The dramatic attacks that have led
to the creation of this commission have affected women and men, to whom we believe first and
foremost; Similarly, intelligence, intervention and investigation and even the daily police
services consist of women and men, who have made the choice to serve the security of the
France and who experience pain, punishment, and the impotence of not being able to do better.
The SCPN is the majority Union of the police commissioners. As such, the threat of terrorism
and Islamist radicalisation hit us head-on in January 2015, but we there had already been
extensively sensitized in all police services, and we had the opportunity to warn about its
magnitude in France, in connection with the international context. In the aftermath of the attacks
of January, the Autonomous Federation of trade unions of the Ministry of the Interior (FASMI)
to which we belong - as the UNSA-Police - and represents all the trades and all the personnel peacekeepers, ranks, officers, Commissioners, personal administrative and scientific national
police - addressed in writing to our administration and the Minister's proposals for improvement
concerning the necessary evolution of our Organization our tactical schemes of intervention, our
means of protection equipment and our legal means of intervention.
If this threat was heard, she took as many body when our country was unfortunately struck again,
more heavily again on the night of November 13. We then recalled to our authorities and all the
directors of services what are the expectations of field officers, all body and all ranks: have the
necessary means of action intelligence, intervention but also the daily police to deal with this
threat which we are convinced that it can become a reality in all parts of the territory. This is why
it is essential to empower the police and intelligence services not be helpless. These means are
legal - the use of the firearm, for example, is currently the subject of a bill on which the SCPN
has presented several proposals - but also wear on equipment in armament and protection, or on
methods of work. It is true that several legislative measures taken over the past year helped to
strengthen intelligence capabilities, and a project to strengthen those of investigative services is
under consideration.
We have formulated all these proposals in a constructive manner, convinced that the issue of
coordination and cooperation between the services is at theFavorite pieces of the problem. We
have known for long that everything pressure us makes the game of the thugs and the opponent,
which is now so powerful that it is out of the question to lose in fratricidal wars. We have always
defended all vectors of a better coordination between services, that they fall within the national
police, the Directorate General of internal security (CSB) or the national gendarmerie.

Mr. Thierry Clair, national Secretary of the UNSA-Police. The UNSA-Police represents
degrees and guardians - i.e., the framing and enforcement - the national police body. The
question of the means implemented Work by the State to combat terrorism is more topical than
ever. The involvement of all stakeholders in the State is necessary and the police, whom we
represent, is particularly important. Since the events of January 7, 2015, the State could count on
the unfailing commitment of police officers, custodians of the public peace and freedoms commitment that a large part of the crowd showing January 11, 2015 has also welcomed. We
keep all remember the vigorous applause that welcomed the passage of the police forces on this
occasion, and the many accolades given by citizens to the police. These symbols are part of a
spontaneous show of national solidarity. We have indeed witnessed a real rapprochement
between the police and the population. If their vile and despicable acts, terrorists have sought to
divide among themselves the various components of our society, they have in fact brought the
population of its police, its army and its institutions.
In the weeks that followed the attacks of January, police commitment was total. General
awareness has earned our ranks; some of our colleagues have interrupted their holidays without
even being contacted by the administration. Each has demonstrated increased vigilance. Two
new elements have appeared, indeed: first of all, the police intervening in such situations are
facing determined individuals who do not seek the leak, as is the case in common law cases, but
whose goal is to kill a maximum of people to sometimes transform themselves into suicide
bombers. On the other hand, the police are targets because they represent the State: Ahmed
Merabet and Clarissa Jean-Philippe colleagues have been murdered on the sole ground that they
wore a uniform and an inscription.
To take account of this new situation, our trade union organization claimed responsibility for
individual and collective protection means additional - any equipment heavy bullet-proof vests,
helmets and bullet-proof visors, Bulletproof shields - and means of intervention reinforced-including collective weapons - and the possibility for police officers wishing to remain armed
outside their hours of service. Some of our colleagues, indeed, have expressed any fear of
returning home, taking into account their place of residence. Finally, we claimed the adaptation
of the rules of use of weapons so that their legal framework is not questionable.
As early as January 2015, it occurred in services increased clearances to use collective weapons,
especially weapons of shoulder. Shooting and handling of these weapons courses have also
deputized most other internships, becoming the priority of training between January and March
2015. BAC-PSIG plan, currently being deployed, involves providing services of assault rifles
HK G36 and of helmets and bulletproof shields; We expect the announcement of additional
vehicles. Whatever it is, our Union will be vigilant with respect to the delivery schedule.
The UNSA-Police approves all these provisions but considers that they should be extended to
other services. Certainly, it is not necessary that a policeman be equipped as an infantryman to
exercise police general and daily missions - and for example intervene in family disputes,
shoplifting and traffic accident. However, it must have at its disposal the tools to respond to any
eventuality. All police districts do not have a brigade control (LAC), and where these brigades
exist, they do not always cover all the slots. The equipment of the tank must therefore be
extended to all of the emergency services - at least in the context of the training courses, who

come to start. Legitimately made for the benefit of the priority services or specialized efforts
must not make us forget the police of the daily, which can at any time be faced with isolated or
concerted terrorist actions.
The President Georges Fenech. December 22, 2014, the first president of the Court of Auditors
addressed to the Minister of the Interior, Mr Cazeneuve, and garde des sceaux of the time, Mrs
Taubira, a summary that the territorial distribution of the strength of police and gendarmerie
would be unbalanced compared to the number and the seriousness of the facts to be treated. I
quote: 'it is not uncommon that the two forces' police and gendarmerie "compete for the
assignment of complex cases", including in judicial matters. The main branches of the police are
"organized separately and compartmentalized. "There are many opportunities for the police
service and gendarmerie units to investigate initiative on the same"targets". However, "Although
the principle is placed in the code of criminal procedure, sharing intelligence, keystone of the
profession of judicial investigators and remains rare and fuels rivalries. () Competitive
relationships between the two forces prompted the project, announced at the beginning of 2014
by the Minister of the Interior before be removed, creating a "common structure" to the police
and the gendarmerie, intended to combat organized crime and terrorism in Corsica. () A
Protocol framework distribution judicial skills, common to the two security forces, could be
concluded with the Ministry of justice and then declined through local protocols concluded with
the floors".
In other words, this issue is not new; It goes back to the existence even of the two forces. Is the
point of view of the Court of Auditors concerning the rivalry and lack of information sharing
based? Can we improve the current organization, or even lead to the unity of the two body?
Ms. Cline Berthon. This is a vast subject which, in my opinion, is irrelevant to the question of
the terrorist attacks. The Court of Auditors based its views on criminal investigations, evokes a
proposed organization of the services of police and gendarmerie in Corsica, and refers to the
territorial distribution of competences. However, none of this has malfunctions during the
terrorist attacks of 2015.
The President Georges Fenech. July 7, 2015, Mr. Jean-Michel Fauvergue, the RAID leader,
declared to the press that "can no longer afford a war of services" between police and
gendarmerie. In light of "the evolution of the threat, one needs all operators. In fact, the question
of sharing information was often asked, to the point that Mr Cazeneuve himself had to enter the
fist on the table so that information circulates more. It is therefore not only crime of common
law, but also of terrorism.
Mr. Jean-Luc Taltavull, Secretary general Deputy of the SCPN. In the majority of cases, the
sharing of information, under the authority of the Prosecutor's office, works. At Creil, where I
was stationed before, the police and the gendarmerie held every two months a coordination
meeting on the problems related to the priority zone (PSZ), on the understanding that the rule of
intervention was as follows: service best placed to intervene on a case in charge. Coordination
and sharing of information does not mean that it must necessarily merge. Fratricidal wars exist
also within the same service; they are inherent in human nature. It also happened - even if this is

not the case today - that administrative and political leaders beyond the healthy emulation to
compete, which cannot take the place of management practice.
However, it is not our priority to reorganize services. The duplicate detection is built and soothed
when the pre-positioning of intervention forces. It is obviously out of the question for a police
service ready to intervene in case of attack to expect victims on the grounds that the site falls
within the jurisdiction ratione materiae of a mounted police unit, and vice versa. It is the service
best geographically positioned to intervene; remains to determine who, the police or the
gendarmerie, is the responsibility of the direction of the operation depending on the area of
action. It can certainly happen voltages when the insufficient number of cases addressing pushes
the various services to compete to be seized, but we see the opposite: judges often struggle to
find a service that accepts a referral, particularly with regard to economic and financial crime.
In other words, it should be not to generalize the observation made in the summary proceedings
of the Court of accounts, to which the Minister has also responded quite built specifying that the
plurality of actors does not necessarily translates into a toxic duplication or a shallot race.
Ms. Cline Berthon. I add that intelligence, tremendous progress has been made in recent years
to integrate the forces within the central territorial intelligence service, the logic of competition
having the same time disappeared or almost. If he remains without doubt and fro human
problems, systemic opposition between institutions no longer exist, because also the fact that
there is enough work for all of the services, it is the general interest that premium.
The President Georges Fenech. Have you been consulted about the new national scheme of
intervention of the internal security forces, which is being developed under the authority of the
Minister of the Interior?
Ms. Cline Berthon. Not yet. It was presented only very recently to the Directorates-General of
the police and the gendarmerie which one and the other, seems to express their satisfaction. It
seems that one has therefore managed to find an intelligent balance of distribution of powers
across the country to intervene as soon as possible and in the best conditions.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. What auditors relate to coordination on a daily basis from
the police with the military mobilized as part of the Sentinel force?
My second question relates to the rise of the information in the fight against terrorism. How
things happen specifically in the case of a handrail in office? Are there avenues of improvement?
Then, several recent examples have shown that respect for the judicial review is rather uncertain,
to say the least. It seems that in the event of failure, when the check is not performed in office or
the mounted police, information is sometimes up to several weeks before rising to the
intelligence services. Have circulars and measures been taken to strengthen judicial review, in
particular when it concerns persons linked to radical islam and terrorism?
Finally, the BAC and equipment the PSIG - monitoring and intervention of the gendarmerie
platoons - is underway, and we are as much as you respecting of the fixed calendar: it should be

completed at the end of June, either shortly before the presentation of our report. At this point,
this plan normally following its course? Do you think that this equipment, in terms of armament
that protection, corresponded to the expectations for staff?
M. Jean-Luc Taltavull. Hundreds of Commissioners with whom we link we have passed on
their own initiative or at the request of the information concerning the coordination with the
Sentinel force which have evolved over time. The first phase is characterized by instability, or
even difficulties, and reason: police services have not, in normal times, contacts at this level with
the armed forces. In January, and even more in November, the patrols have been deployed in a
context where it was necessary to determine if other commandos were preparing to commit
killings here and there. In practice, some dynamic military patrols have been deployed without
that auditors and competent prefects in the area concerned notification. In this initial phase,
during which some of our members have had the feeling that are putting the cart before theEggs
by dispersing patrols without giving them specific purpose or coordinate with police forces,
succeeded a second phase where, apart from a few special cases where patrol leaders fail to
inform all competent police and gendarmerie forces of a succession, information that back us are
very complimentary to the point of being sometimes concern: in the province colleagues tell us
that they could not function without the contribution of the Sentinel force which has static guards
who were previously the police force - and that perhaps return them one day, unless they are
entrusted to private security companies. In this area, in fact, no track is excluded because,
according to all the experts, the issue of terrorism is expected to last twenty-five to thirty years;
We therefore need to build sustainable solutions.
Clearly, the degree of coordination is satisfactory at this stage. Questions persist as to what the
military planning now in terms of articulation of their interventions. On 13 November, the
Sentinel force soldiers were near the Bataclan : a rank of Lac, reached the exit, were asked to
intervene, to which they responded that they had not received orders to this effect; It goes
without saying that they have not lent their weapon, a Famas, the police. No doubt is there room
for improvement of the methods of intervention. There are many colleagues who, the same
evening November 13, went spontaneously to their office while they were on leave or recovery as have also the rescuers - to put at the disposal of the most senior. One of our Commissioners
could find their way into the Saint-Pierre Amelot passage with a unity of market composed of
hybrid elements. At the time, the articulation with the military was impossible because she had
not thought upstream. Work in this sense have been undertaken, and we hope that they will lead
to the adoption of mechanisms for provision and identification of the operational commander.
The information from the filing of handrails mechanism was refined from before the attacks to
measure that rose in power Tracker of radicalisation. The objective is to manage the multitude of
local observations from heads of schools or social workers that a person in the process of school,
for example, suddenly interrupted any contact. With the creation of the national platform of the
unit for coordination of the fight against terrorism (UCLAT) calls, the process was formalized.
As for the handrails, they give rise to a written account when the person moved in person or, if it
is a phone call to the platform of the UCLAT, in a message sent to the local territorial
intelligence service in which it will be to contact the person in question to provide an interview.
In a second time, more or less discrete and further measures may be taken: we now have a
worthy of this name and more appropriate work tools file.

The President Georges Fenech. Is there any leakage of information?

M. Jean-Luc Taltavull. Not more now. On the contrary: we receive too much information,
which makes their difficult discrimination. The problem arises especially from the output of the
list of suspects: a person who would have been registered following an alert and on which checks
would have performed without result should really remain? For example should deduce its
inability to work on an airport hub where in other occupations? Everything is a question of
proportion: it is a living process in which we are trying to make us the idea the most accurate of
any particular person, being understood that the error is possible in a system which, in any case,
remains democratic - suspects not being subjected to vigorous Questionings, we part prisoners of
appearances, especially for relation to the cleverest suspects. From this point of view, the
question of access to the encrypted data of mobile phones. Any small local cad, indeed, knows
very well that it must encrypt his phone.
Ms. Cline Berthon. In fact we ask ourselves the question of the release of the follow-up of
radicalisation tables, because the danger for services is to have an endless list that they would not
have the means to treat. On the other hand, reports reaching police services should be articulated
with the information received by other enforcement agencies of the State contribute to the deradicalization and support to persons who, without being necessarily dangerous, deserve to be
followed.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. According to the prevention of terrorism (EMOPT)
operational staff and the UCLAT, we interviewed in January, the output of the trace file is done
already. To are you informed?
M. Jean-Luc Taltavull. I don't know the details of the operation of this file. On the other hand,
when it is created, the EMOPT, which the perimeter of competence overlaps somewhat of the
UCLAT, resumed a number of files of individuals listed here and there for insertion into the said
file FSPRT. As a result, some antennas of territorial intelligence had to demonstrate once again
the futility of the inclusion of this or that individual on the list of radicalized people, whereas this
demonstration had already been made. However, redo a demonstration already made several
months earlier causes an additional workload in a period where services not in yet were not
lacking, because we were entered in a phase of attacks. However, this difficulty should be
resolved once tasks accompanying the implementation of the FSPRT will have been purged.
On judicial review, we ignore if new instructions have been given. The difficulty is not only for
the targeted treatment of stakeholders, but also to the lack of sharing of information between
justice and law enforcement - that do not assign an any intended malice, but rather to the
difference of the bureaucratic process. A typical police service manages tens of judicial reviews
per week, and deficiencies are most of the time instead in the drafting of reports which do result
ever by a suspension or revocation of the control measure. It may be that sometimes slips into the
lot of the controlled an individual possibly radicalised, but mostly known for acts of armed
robbery or drug trafficking. I hope that such cases give rise to a particular phone call: if it is
seized of the specificity of a case, a police service into account. This is what happens to sex
offenders registered with the automated judicial file authors of sexual or violent offences the

FIJAISV: no doubt should reproduce the automatic alerts system that this file is attached to
refine the monitoring of radicalized individuals.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Yet, it happened that should be more than a month before
the Commissioner reported failure to comply with a judicial review: it is problematic.
Ms. Cline Berthon. Judicial review is a measure applying through an opening of information to
a person who is not remanded in custody. Judicial records which are seized most of the stations
are on matters of any kind which are not necessarily link with terrorism. However, the reality is
as follows: the competent services establish dozens of reports of violation of judicial review, that
the violations in question are on the prohibition to be in the presence of such other person or in
such territory. This is particularly true in areas affected by a chronic crime. However, police
services found the inanity, somehow, these reports of violation, since it is sometimes necessary
to write dozens before attention of the investigating judge - which faces a strong mass of work
and is not always able to revoke the judicial review to decide the remand.
We managed to put in place a warning system to not pass the slightest violation of judicial
review in certain particular cases? On this subject as on others, we want to take care to avoid
slipping of responsibility. The services of the offices, which are responsible for the monitoring of
judicial review, are also a very large number of other missions, and should not be the
responsibility of the loss of such reporting is attributed to the single police officer stationed at the
relevant time. From this point of view, it would be probably appropriate, indeed, consider a
reporting system on the model of the one who accompanies the FIJAISV.
M. Jean-Luc Taltavull. I would add that it is impossible, in the entries in the file of the ITSB, to
mention a criminal record. Cannot therefore be to identify the alleged individual offences. This
approach siloed, which certainly offers guarantees, question.
Whatever it is, the stations redouble their vigilance. They however faced two challenges that we
have always deplored: on the one hand, the procedures for judicial review are not specified,
which allows the individuals concerned to point at the time of their choice - in the middle of the
night, for example, requiring a patrol to return. On the other hand, individuals in questions report
addresses that are no inspection. However, it is sometimes fictitious addresses - non-existent
address or address of a "girlfriend" residing in a territory where the person concerned is not
known to local police departments. All this does not facilitate the ability of services to detect
breaches of judicial review.
M. Christophe Cavard. What is your point of view of representatives of the Commissioners on
the first responders - knowing that the situation naturally differs according to whether it is
located in the Paris region or province? To what extent can you consider to intervene, and who
decides on the subject?
On the other hand, what link do you have with the central service of the territorial intelligence,
especially following the events of 2015?

Finally, how do you work with the police and with certain specialized units, knowing that
changes are to be expected from this point of view?
Mr. Patrice Verchre. Several press articles have recently appeared on the progression of
religious fundamentalism in police stations. Are you alerted by some of your colleagues who is
in concerned? The risk could indeed exist, as seen in the United States and Afghanistan,
radicalized police turn against their colleagues.
Mr. Thierry Clair. To this day, Mr President, we have received no unfavourable rise concerning
the deployment of the equipment tray-PSIG plan, which has just been launched. Expectations
were high, in fact, not only among officials of the tray, but also among all the other first
responders-police-rescue, general services, companies of intervention. The HK G36 rifle sparked
a controversy that doesn't concern us much, both the operating conditions are different; a number
of services in are already equipped whether brigades of research and intervention (bis), the
Republican security (CRS) companies or RAID, for example. This material gives satisfaction by
its ease of use and transport. As for protective equipment, it consists of vests specific and
accessible allowing to easily move in ballistic visor helmets and a range of amenities that meet
the expectations of our colleagues, who are satisfied.
However, this equipment plan concerns only the tray; We would like to make it widely extended
to other services. Again, it is not question of equipping the officials of police rescue as
infantrymen, but at least put at their disposal the equipment enabling them to intervene - not in
the exchanges without tray.
Ms. Cline Berthon. As heads of service, we are opposed to the use of the term "primospeaker", which suggests that a crew has always deployed by knowing its objective of
intervention; It is artificial. In urban areas as in rural areas, the assumption that a crew of police
or gendarmerie intervene without knowing in a terrorist killing is possible knowing the extent
of the hazard to the Act, we believe. Our priority, which is similar to that of field services,
therefore, was to level the equipment according to the vocation units, some are intended to
intervene until the end - in a place closed during a hostage, for example - while others,
intermediaries - BAC and the particular PSIG - formed types of interventions that there can also
justify a higher equipment level without neglecting the newcomers police who carry out their
daily tasks on the public highway, and which may be confronted with a killing spree. We
demand that they have the right to sell dearly their skin, if I dare say, in being protected as the
other officers, but also that they are not condemned to impotence. It is very difficult for a police
officer confronted with an attack of identified as representative of the public power and unable to
do anything to stop the killing.
Clearly, while there is no question to General officers of the Robocop and they need to focus on
their priority tasks of daily life, must be however give them the means to defend itself and defend
citizens through on-board equipment securely in the vehicles. Today, most trained crews are
entitled to wear the weapon; other crews - this is particularly important in the exchanges that are
not of the permanent presence of a tray - must carry securely equipment they can arm themselves
in minutes to protect the population, because it is their duty.

The President Georges Fenech. Should we not why have adapted vehicles?
M. Jean-Luc Taltavull. Police-emergency car should be such when if it was bigger, because
such equipment taking up space, indeed. I was shocked, in Creil, that two of our vehicles are
"bent" by large sedans stolen or purchased with money from drugs, our cars being developed
inoperable while sedans in question were always moving. Face an evolving threat, it strengthen
as a result. Of course, this has a cost. It is necessary, for example, provide support to secure the
weapons, because some do not hesitate to use in police vehicles. Otherwise, patrols should
consist of four officers because, in some districts, three agents interventions can go wrong, or
else officers should carry on them all of their equipment from the grenade and the pistol to
electrical pulse to the assault rifle, while they do intervene on a marital dispute, for example. Is
not this policy we want. Simply, fast and secure access on board vehicles to equipment to
respond to a terrorist attack. Terrorists choose their targets: one can consider that they attack
simultaneously ten patrols of police and gendarmerie in ten different locations. Need then the
agents to be able to have at least a collective weapon pr-positionne to respond.
This goes hand in hand with an adaptation of the legal framework for using these weapons in
freeing himself of the extreme subtlety of the rules of self-defence - to which we are very
committed, because they contribute to a culture of controlled force we are proud - in exceptional
circumstances or terrorist attack, assuming that the officials concerned are aware Mr Ahmed
Merabet probably died without even knowing that an attack had taken place in the premises of
Charlie Hebdo. While reasonable, should therefore take account of the fact that we changed era.
We have not liked and regret, like everyone else. Since the terrorist attacks occur, we must take
note and allow the public peace police quickly mutate into police more strengthened which will
not have to undergo a any impotence.
Ms. Cline Berthon. The year 2015, Mr Cavard, was a year of consolidation of territorial
intelligence which by force of things, received an upgrade of its means at the height of its
mission. Territorial intelligence officials, in the wake of the attacks of January and in November,
made the remarkable demonstration of their reactivity and their mobilization. Work remains to
be done, but the departmental services of the territorial intelligence officials are fully mobilised
so that information flows and synergies developed. The link between territorial intelligence and
internal security services now more no problem. The challenge therefore remains to empower the
territorial intelligence of its operation, because it is first online radicalisation.
Similarly, with regard to the link with the mounted police, it is true that some competitions have
developed because nothing has been done - including in terms of policy decisions - to stop them,
but this debate is more central Governments. In the territories, however, officials are before all
anxious to work hand in hand. Better to build capacities to work together rather than destabilize
the system as there is, because the moment seems suitable.
Finally, like any institution, the national police has points of vulnerability, but cases of
radicalization that have been reported are extremely numerous. There are more problems related
to respect for secularism and religious practice in services, whether it be the requirement for a
time of worship during the service or the expression of a somewhat radical religious practice.

The President Georges Fenech. Radical or fundamentalist?

M. Jean-Luc Taltavull. There is any difficulty. The press article you quoted, Mr Varghese,
followed a confidential note of vigilance which, in reality, was that put black and white which is
a usual practice of vigilance among colleagues - whether it's radicalization, consumption of
drugs or other problems. According to the information available to us, the phenomenon of
radicalisation in the police remains very marginal and is confined to units employing officers on
public roads, which are more employees of the public service that the police full. Therefore, a
balance in not preventing those members wishing to flourish spiritually while remaining fairly
vigilant so that they don't ever cross the red line.
M. Olivier Marleix. What are the legal means you have to treat the case of the returnees from
Jihad? The Prime Minister said that 1,000 people would be parties and more than 250 revenues.
The old guard of the seals had taken a circular so that these people can be prosecuted only for
two criminal skills only: conspiracy in relation with a terrorist enterprise and individual terrorist
enterprise. Having no connection with the Syrian services, we do not have that information
piecemeal and casual. However, judicial authorities have regularly spoken against the
provisional detention of the persons concerned, which gives rise to a diffuse threat. Do you think
that one could resort to other offences provided for in the penal code, such as intelligence with a
foreign power, that is liable to a sentence of 30 years in prison, or other more specific skills? The
initiative has taken the Government to complete, in Bill strengthening the fight against organized
crime, the device applicable to persons on which we lack information, shows that the current
system is inadequate.
My second question relates to staff. I look at each Bill's settlement with the greatest attention,
and I notice after the last of them, focusing on 2014, that the number of positions filled in the
police and the gendarmerie was increased to five thousand jobs for the period 2011-2014, on the
contrary: it decreased by two thousand in the police, as is indeed echo The world. Every time I
questioned on this point, the Minister of the interior makes me an answer off topic on the ceilings
of jobs that increase indisputable, though virtual. I hope that this trend will change in 2015: some
specialty services, in particular, intelligence appear to benefit from reinforcements. More
generally, the high number of recruitment is linked to the evolution of the pyramid. What
analysis do you make of the current volume of the workforce?
M. Jean-Luc Taltavull. Regarding the legalization of the people returning from a theatre of
terrorist operations, the first of the difficulties is to provide proof of the acts committed. Some
people visiting the country in question as an authentic aid workers or journalists, or even
parliamentary: it is not easy to define the offence to discriminate between all of these cases.
According to our colleagues, an offence nevertheless lack our legal system: it would be
appropriate to adapt to the holding of a large volume of images of acts advocating violence the
same regime that works very well for pedophilia. Indeed, the possession of paedophile images
constitutes an offence, but not tens of gigabytes of images of gaping that it is shown to all pals of
the building. This request is transmitted to us on a regular basis, and I pound you such what, until
we formalisions.

The opening of a judicial investigation for criminal conspiracy in relation with a terrorist
undertaking or proprietorship of terrorism lies the question of the legalization of intelligence.
Although our official ties with Syrian intelligence services are virtually non-existent, we are still
collecting items via from other sensors. All these elements are covered by the defence secrecy
and the code of criminal procedure does not operate in a judicial proceeding. The mode of
transformation of these items of information in judicial evidence remains to build. Indeed, it
often happens that information collected by means of telephone interceptions defence secrecy
cannot be placed on the record of an adversarial trial. From this point of view, the search
administrative, often maligned and which has been the subject of so many fantasies, has at least
the merit raise doubts on reported individuals via the platform reporting, contact media Salafists
and having for example mentioned their caches of weapons during telephone conversations. In
the current state of law, no legal proceedings does go and check these items to the domicile of
the parties concerned, except to find a pretext or that they are arrested in the company of drug
traffickers, for example. Similarly, some 80 assignments to ongoing residence have defects and
are not the top of the spectrum of the suspects, but they at least have the merit of enabling
geolocation - geolocation of the poor, somehow - to individuals who, in spite of their protest
outraged in the media, spent the night from 13 to 14 November to welcome the attacks by phone.
These people are required to point three times per day, and any breach immediately triggers a
warning mechanism. Could perhaps be if inspired by setting the date and time of the judicial
controls, in order to take account of the workload of the services.
Mr. Thierry Clair. Regarding staffing, say for at the outset this: the national police has not been
spared by the general reduction in public policies. Since 2008, the personnel losses were
considerable. By comparison, the national police had training in 2000 twenty-five structures; by
2015, it had more than ten. With less than half of training structures, we must yet form an
equivalent number of staff - or integrating schools. In the early 2000s, 5 617 students
peacekeepers were trained annually; the 2 917 servants trained in 2015 in the ten remaining
structures, should add a substantial number of assistants security and cadets of the Republic that
the total number of persons trained in over five thousand. Schools are overheating, because if
there is real need for recruitment in the services, training hard to respond. To remedy, the
administration suggested decrease by more than 40% the formation of the peacekeepers who
were previously Assistant Security; from our point of view, such a reduction is not satisfactory
because it is not question of provide less good training, even if stakeholders have already
acquired skills in the context of their previous missions. The job of police officer is complicated
because, among other things, the use of new technologies and the evolution of the legal
framework. The issue of training is therefore a real problem.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Since the attacks of 2015, safety as a whole - information, intervention, or
even monitoring - device rises in power. How long will you hold as well? We salute the
professionalism, State of mind and the availability of our police forces, but the recovery time is
still needed. However, major events - sports, for example - are looming on the horizon, which
will generate the establishment of important features. How do you envisage the issue of leave,
working time, overtime, of recovery?
Then you lot mentioned weapons and protection means, but what technological means available
to the crews in geolocation, scanning, mapping, use of files in real time, sharing of information?

Finally, regarding the doctrines of employment - an issue that depends for part of the means-, is
police-emergency logic still suitable for the current situation? Should we not focus on the
permanent mesh of the territory in real time? In an attack situation, we certainly need that
response times are very fast, as was the case in 2015, but that answer you if imposed you a new
doctrine of accelerate neutralization times in the wake of an intervention?
Mr. Thierry Clair. As early as January 7, 2015, our trade union federation warned the Minister
on the fact that mobilization of officials of all the services of the body of supervision and
enforcement would be unfortunately in the long term, and should therefore, somehow, household
troops. It is pointless to mobilize officers in 100% all in the days and weeks following an attack.
better to conserve resources. This application has been partly heard and everyone has had the
ability to set periods of leave and recovery. Indeed, it often happens that police missions today
are in offsets or reminders in small units, and for good reason: there are many police services
who have problems of staffing. Our colleagues stationed at airports, for example, are net
overheating because they must monitor all flights, including those from the Schengen area.
Beyond a certain limit, this rhythm shall not be liable and we will have to find a niche for
everyone to recover or otherwise distribute missions.
M. Jean-Luc Taltavull. The issue of recovery goes hand in hand with that of the reorganization
to lead all our missions in a sustainable way. The Directorate-General of the national police
already driven reflections for these purposes. This concern for reorganization revolves with the
need not to destabilize the overall architecture of the device: yet again, better to consolidate that
revolutionize.
Perhaps today we pay the collateral effects of such or such reform services, intelligence for
example. Thus, General information as it was restructured during the creation of the DCRI
consists of one third of the staff of former General information for a spectrum of missions
unchanged. How could he do not result in a lessening of the mesh? In theory, the idea was
excellent: it was to combine the almost military thoroughness of the direction of surveillance of
territory (DST), which had demonstrated its effectiveness in the fight against the Soviet spies,
with the sense of initiative and the territorial General information mesh, to get some kind of FBI
French. Despite alerts launched at that time, as now we see for part results.
The equipment of the police in new technologies is progressing - I think the policing 3.0 project,
or the Neogend tablet. The deployment of such equipment is in experimental phase, not only
because resources do not yet in widespread use, but also because the police and gendarmes are in
need of a time of acculturation, as they are far from being all geeks.
In addition, the current priority is to train officers in the techniques of shooting and new weapons
- this leads me to address the issue of the doctrine of intervention. It is as follows: the first
arrived on the spot is not necessarily the first to intervene, knowing that it must distinguish
between areas of gendarmerie, where density is often less, and police areas, where patrols can at
any time be confronted with acts of violence, as shown in the recent case of a robbery in Paris
that turned into a shootout. It goes without saying that it is not in the command and the police
information centre to determine if, in the event of terrorist attack, it should send the tray rather
than the police-emergency patrol; the opposite is occurring. A police patrol, whatever it is, that

would pass in a Street adjacent to the site of a killing spree, obviously will not wait the arrival of
"first responders" to act. This is why we are calling for the prepositioning in all police vehicles,
let alone when they are not commonplace, most powerful means such as with sub-machine guns,
as did ten years the Germans, who have known massacres in schools.
Ms. Cline Berthon. The police-rescue mission, at the bottom, relates to sovereign State
security missions. We groom the distribution of skills with other security actors, which need to
talk to the major events that are on the horizon and that we were already discussing before the
terrorist attacks of last year. Mobilizing to deal with the attacks should not forget the migratory
pressure and manning it consumes in the sector of Calais and Dunkirk, for example, or in the
Alpes-Maritimes; However, this situation is not doomed to improve quickly.
Thus arises the question of the contribution of the forces of private security and other public
security forces, including municipal and local. Of course, we are very careful that certain
missions remain of the sovereign role of the State, since it is equality of treatment and equality of
the territories. Nevertheless, the question must be asked, because we are convinced that the
current threat will continue for years, even decades.
M. Jean-Luc Taltavull. I would add that the State police and the gendarmerie of everyday life is
directly related to the quality of the fight against terrorism, because proximity of weak signals
are patrols that know the reality of radicalization and information. However, the daily police is
now entangled in static guards, starting with those of the offices themselves. Probably should
consider investing today means in the passive security, be it of cult or sensitive installations,
buildings in order to save tomorrow on the operating costs of mobile military forces as a
Sentinel.
On the other hand, must be re-established on the public highway police patrols, implying that the
police are not captured by computer input efforts to collect complaints. A patrol of three officers
who finds an infringement and appeals to its author is, upon his return to the police station,
neutralized three hours because one of the three agents draws up the minutes and the other two
are not without him in many neighborhoods, both to two patrol is a form of provocation and
would also require intervention only while one of the two officers guard the vehicle. In any case,
the ongoing work on the reform of criminal procedure are essential to restore margins of
manWork and efficiency to the action of the police services.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for the quality of your answers complete and rich,
enabling us to make suggestions in the sense that you have expressed.
Round table, open to the press, trade unions of judges: Mr Olivier Janson, Deputy
Secretary general of the Union of magistrates, Mr. Benjamin Blanchet, Charg de mission;
Ms. Clarisse Taron, President of the Union of magistrates, Mrs Laurence Blisson, General
Secretary; Ms. Batrice Brugre, Secretary General of FO-magistrates, Mr. Jean de
Maillard, associate member
Report of the round table, open to the press, Wednesday, March 23, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. We are completing our work to date by receiving trade union
representatives of the judiciary, whose lighting will be very useful for us: Mr Olivier Janson,
Deputy Secretary general of the Trade Union of magistrates (USM), and Mr. Benjamin Blanchet,
responsible of mission; Ms. Clarisse Taron, President of the Union of magistrates, and Mrs
Laurence Blisson, General Secretary; Ms. Batrice Brugre, General Secretary of FO judges, and
Mr. Jean de Maillard, associate member.
Ladies and gentlemen, I would remind you that this roundtable is open to the press; It is therefore
subject to a live broadcast on the internet site of the National Assembly and its registration will
be available for a few months on the video portal of the Assembly. I would point out, moreover,
that the Commission may decide to include in its report any part of the report that will be made
of the hearing.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the order of 17 November 1958 relating to
commissions of inquiry, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth.
Mr Olivier Janson, Mr. Benjamin Blanchet, Mrs. Clarisse Taron, Ms. Laurence Blisson, Ms.
Batrice Brugre and Mr. Jean de Maillard take oath.
Mr Olivier Janson, Deputy Secretary general of the Union of judges. Thank you for your
invitation. We are sensitive to the fact appeared you important to hear the word of magistrates in
its Union expression. We are also sensitive to the manner in which you have conducted your
work so far. Indeed, when a parliamentary Committee of inquiry is created to investigate facts of
a judicial investigation, it is at the limit of the respective competences of the judiciary and
Parliament. Or did you know make your work focuses on the future and on the status of the
legislative device rather than the facts themselves.
The President Georges Fenech. I take this opportunity to say publicly to those which would
have misunderstood it that, contrary to what was claimed the press, our Committee of inquiry has
made no reconstitution at the Bataclan. It was only for us to examine means of intervention
forces and elite units - it does not investigators - in order to understand how they managed to
neutralize the terrorists and how the emergency services have supported victims. I would point
out that this theatre is currently in the works, that no seal there had been laid, and that we have
not encroached on the judiciary. I wanted to make this point, because I understand that some had
expressed moods. Do you agree with me, Mr President?
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Altogether.
The President Georges Fenech. Forgive me for interrupting you, Mr Janson. Please continue.
Mr Olivier Janson. The Trade Union of judges expresses a triple message.
First, although the judicial authority has recognized expertise in the fight against terrorism,
whether of the past or recent developments, it has absolutely inadequate. This lack of resources
is a recurring problem that affects as much intelligence as investigative services and the judicial

authority. Secondly, the legal instruments, which have evolved over time, respond to the needs,
they are expressed by the intelligence services, by investigators acting under the direction of the
public prosecutor or the investigating judge. But, and this is the third point - probably most
interesting for the work of your commission of inquiry-, this development has been accompanied
of no general reflection on ensuring the consistency of respective interventions of the
intelligence services, investigative services of the judicial authority. It is this lack of general
reflection that arouses the greatest concern for the future: who decides that such intervention is
intelligence and such other of the judiciary? Who decides on ensuring the consistency of the
information?
So, I begin by mentioning the lack of resources. It happens that the services placed under the
authority of the Prosecutor of the Republic were, alas, highlighted by attacks from January to
November 2015. I insist on this point because, for public opinion, which symbolizes, in fact, the
fight against terrorism, it is, like it or not, the Prosecutor of the Republic in Paris. It has indeed
demonstrated, by its interventions and its mode of communication, the reactivity of the judicial
authority and its ability not only to fulfil its immediate mission, but also to prevent the
disturbances to public order. It is not, here, to make his panegyric: it is so. And the judiciary
welcomed, no doubt fairly unanimous way, the image that has been given of his work and that of
all officials under the authority of the Prosecutor of the Republic in Paris. However, the means
available to the latter are laughable. That we judge. Anti-terrorism prosecutors in Paris, known as
section C1, which is responsible for the whole of the french territory, currently includes, after
a developments in the year 2015, twelve judges! As for those of the 16e room, tribunals terrorist
offences, they are nine. Finally, the pole anti-terrorism, nicknamed "la galerie saint-Eloi", has
now ten magistrates.
The President Georges Fenech. M. Molins, the Prosecutor of the Republic in Paris, told us that
reinforcements were planned to the prosecution service and instruction.
Mr Olivier Janson. The figures I have mentioned include reinforcements plan anti-terrorism
'dish 1', which dates from the beginning of the year. DISH 2 plans in effect to other
reinforcements, but they did not always arrive on time as I speak. Moreover, the year of 2015,
communication of the Department has tended to exaggerate brought reinforcements including at
the anti-terror branch. Calls for nominations were launched, but the reality is that I just described
to you. Although magistrates have integrated the Paris Prosecutor's office, they are called upon
to strengthen the anti-terror quite Alternatively, in the event of serious events. they are not
members of this section. I would add that a single judge of the enforcement of sentences is
specialized in counter-terrorism - a second post should be created in the year 2016.
In addition, the special Assize Court, I remember that it is entirely composed of magistrates,
requires seven judges in trial - nine on appeal - for a folder, knowing that these cases are
extraordinary in length. Extremely large numbers are so mobilized, while we have not the
necessary means also. I does not mention the situation of civilian judges, although many disputes
are expected, particularly with regard to injuries.

The President Georges Fenech. Representatives of other unions share the opinion of the USM
on the lack of staff, despite the announcement of reinforcements? You could also mention the
situation of transplants, Mr Janson.
Mr Olivier Janson. Indeed. The Criminal Chamber to try terrorist crimes has seven officers of
transplants. The numbers are - the term is perhaps not suitable in light of the seriousness of the
subject - ridiculous.
Ms. Clarisse Taron, President of the Union of magistrates. We establish a distinction between
the means specialized - that have been strengthened in the proportions indicated and which, even
if they are insufficient, have benefited from a real effort - and local capacities. A circular of
December 2015 provides that, in the event of multiple attacks, courts and local prosecutor's
offices must be activated. Magistrates referents in counter-terrorism matters have therefore been
designated within those jurisdictions, but it is not additional posts: these judges were assigned to
this task in addition to their service. I would add that we have real concerns as to the articulation
of these services and the mobilization of local procuratorates in case of need. Indeed, in this area,
nothing is done, and when it comes to technical means, they are what they are today in the
courts, i.e. overall dismal - I think including computing and telephony.
Ms. Batrice Brugre, Secretary General of FO magistrates. We address this extremely
important subject in a slightly different way. For FO judges, indeed, the question of the means
must be analysed on the basis of the targeted objectives. First of all, it was announced, after each
attack, a substantial reinforcement of means which did not happen. But the designation of 178
local referents could give the impression that we were going to get out of the dogma jacobin
centralisation of the Paris Prosecutor's office. Let me explain.
The centralisation in Paris from the fight against terrorism is a choice that was its raison d'etre:
terrorism has always had a political aspect, the intelligence services are in Paris and threats were,
from the quantitative point of view, relatively limited compared to what they are today.
However, as we are now dealing with what we call new extremely numerous threats, it seems
interesting to link the question of the means to a reflection on a new organisation of the fight
against terrorism. It could thus, as terrorism is now likely to grow on the whole of the territory,
based on a territorial grid similar to that which exists in Italy. Certainly, parquet Italian and
french are not entirely comparable since the investigating judge did not exist in Italy, but in this
country, more than 150 magistrates know terrorism Affairs, against a dozen to french antiterrorism Prosecutor.
Our vision of terrorism is separated from the fight against organized crime while the border
between these two types of crime is porous. Maintain the centralization of counter-terrorism in
Paris with so few staff translated especially, in our view, a vision defect: it did not anticipate the
next threat. Last December, 178 prosecution of province have been designated anti-terrorism
referents. Thus the Department announced that staffing had increased while in reality, these
judges have only a pine's "Anti-terrorism": this mission is in addition to all their other tasks.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you tell us specifically what an anti-terrorism referent in
province jurisdiction? There investigative powers?

Mrs Beatrice Brugre. They would know themselves... At the seminar to which they have been
invited to participate in Paris, last Monday, "C1", i.e. the anti-terrorism Prosecutor, reminded
them that the code of criminal procedure provides, in the fight against terrorism, a Parisian
jurisdiction, that Paris interprets as an exclusive competence - and, in fact, that is the reality.
Therefore, for anti-terrorism prosecutors in Paris, these referents magistrates must particularly do
anything: their role is to streamline information and him to go back. If it finds - and this poses a
procedural problem and, eventually, efficiency - that the commencement of proceedings is
terrorism, he will take things in hand, Paris magistrates will visit on-site. If he considers that it is
not terrorism, the prosecution must treat the case as a matter of common law, with the exception
of apologists for terrorism cases, which will be addressed in the regions, because they are
considered to be relatively minor.
The question of the means arises, of course, but you need to know what we are talking about.
Currently, for 'C1', the fight against terrorism must be centralized in Paris. It is an important
point, because if terrorist attacks are scattered throughout the territory, I do not know how, taking
into account the means available to it, "C1" can absorb these multiple attacks, which will require
particular movements and decision-making procedures immediate in order to avoid that they are
attacked by the lawyers of terrorists - because they are the law and they choose good lawyers.
Such an organization would therefore pose a problem of fluidity and warranty procedures.
The rapporteur. Is it not useful that information is centralized so it does not get lost? Although
too much information kills information, it makes sense that local referents the do back the antiterrorism Prosecutor so that it could operate a sort and locate relevant information. It is all the
more important that, even within "C1", it happens that information is lost.
The President Georges Fenech. Madam Brugre, deduct you the observation that you made
that we must remove the anti-terrorism section of Paris and restore competence to the courts of
province either to preserve this centralization by significantly increasing numbers?
Mrs Beatrice Brugre. I describe the existing. I commend not involved model Parisian jacobin,
which took its legitimacy and its raison d'etre. I'm just saying that, if we keep this schema, it is
private, in light of new threats, information, the ability to act effectively and with a capacity of
reaction on the whole of the territory. I said, Mr President, that the intelligence was not founded
in Paris, because such is not the role assigned to the so-called judges referents: If a crime is
committed, they must query "C1" to find out if it is competent, or if they themselves treat affair.
The President Georges Fenech. I believe that you were yourself anti-terrorism judge, is not it?
Mrs Beatrice Brugre. It lies in fact that I've been anti-terrorism judge - the 14e room, at the
time. So I, in this area, an experience that perhaps explains the passion with which I am
speaking. Whatever it is - and it is a crucial political choice for the future of justice - if you
continue to separate, one side, terrorism and, on the other, organized - crime and can think that it
is necessary - in estimating both types of crime will never meet, it will prevent that surveys
conducted by specialized interregional jurisdiction (JIRS) or on organized crime can anticipate or
in any case, to dismantle terrorism cases. But, again, this choice can be understood.

The President Georges Fenech. You did not tell us what was the ideal schema. Obviously, you
do not have the solution.
Mrs Beatrice Brugre. If, we will exhibit you it later.
Mr Olivier Janson. USM is a different opinion: can only be 178 anti-terrorism poles especially
competent and reactive, acting in perfect consistency throughout the territory. There is some
confusion between two notions, which brings me to the second point I wanted to mention: the
lack of consistency and reflection on the role and place of each.
We are facing a radical change in terrorist mode: channels are added individual terrorist
enterprises - the legislation was amended to take account of this evolution; the attacks, which
were centralized and attacked symbols, are held now - and perhaps, unfortunately, in the future in the province... The information must therefore be based on a complete mesh of the territory.
On the other hand, the work that involves backtracking, the consistency between different
surveys and identify links between information must obviously be centralized. It is a question,
not of Jacobinism, but efficiency. In all other areas, Parliament has created centres of
competence; It is nevertheless curious that we follow, related to terrorism, reverse logic that
would be to decentralize.
The President Georges Fenech. Nobody said this!
Ms. Clarisse Taron. The Union of magistrates has long supported that anti-terrorism is
addressed at the level of the specialized inter-regional courts. These, which are seven have
special skills and the ability to mobilize a little more resources than those of the courts of
province, with which they have, in addition, frequent contact. The JIRS level, I remember that
they are specialized in the fight against organized crime, seems to be the most effective, because
it would take into account the convergences between terrorism and organized crime, is known to
exist, including funding.
The President Georges Fenech. You would therefore, as for you, rather favourable at the end of
the centralization as such. Have I understood you correctly?
Ms. Clarisse Taron. Altogether, subject however that targeted training is provided to the
concerned magistrates. This is not to gather a hundred of magistrates for a one day seminar.
Currently, anti-terrorism referents skills boil down to consultation of the "C1" directory and the
apology business. The circular of 18 December evokes a competence, theoretically in
competition, but de facto exclusive. It seems necessary to get out of this reality and focus the
JIRS level.
Ms. Laurence Blisson, Secretary General of the Union of the judiciary. Our claim is
motivated by a concern for effectiveness. I recall that some of the people indicted are minor.
However this status implies a particular logic and a follow-up that will be better in a framework
that is not that of centralization.

Beyond the question of effectiveness, centralization, which was a continuous movement until the
creation of the anti-terrorism enforcement judge in 2006, has a political dimension. Not only it is
not a guarantee of effectiveness, but it carries a risk of loss of control by the judicial authority of
investigators and intelligence activity. Specifically - this has been studied by researchers-, it is
likely to occur within the saint-loi Gallery, forms of common evidence and working methods
that do not allow the judiciary to play its oversight role, role that requires that it be outside the
investigative and intelligence services. The questioning of centralization would therefore have an
interest in terms of efficiency and in terms of the principles. These two aspects the JIRS would
improve the functioning of the fight against terrorism. This is not to deny the qualities of judges
of these disputes, but remember that it is important for the institution to operate within a
framework which allows it to act effectively in respect for the prerogatives of each.
The President Georges Fenech. What you advocate would require many changes. You say that
the prosecutors or those of the saint-loi gallery must exercise control. But they are also there to
investigate themselves. The parquetier and the investigating judge leading the investigation until
evidence to the contrary.
Ms. Laurence Blisson. On this point, I refer you to the "Victor" Bill, and specifically in article
22, which specifies the role of the magistrate of the Crown - the definition of which has been the
object of many missions of reflection, including Nadal mission and mission bar. In addition to
the direction of inquiry, the magistrate of the Prosecutor's office, as a member of the judicial
authority, exercises a monitoring mission of the proportionality of acts of investigation and
legality.
M. Jean de Maillard, associate member of FO magistrates. The position expressed by the
Union of magistrates is not a synthesis of two extreme views, but the resumption, under another
form, from what we have said. It is clear to us that this is not in 178 TGI that must be dealt with
the issue of terrorism or organized crime. A "General" is necessary, but we believe that we must
go much further. Indeed, terrorism itself should be understood as one threat among others,
articulated with other threats and inseparable from them, even if each of them has its
specificities. When Daech sells oil, archaeological objects or powers networks of trafficking
humans, there is trafficking of weapons, drugs or counterfeit goods and that it feeds terrorism, at
different levels, it is counterproductive and inefficient to separate the fight against terrorism in
the fight against other threats.
However the question of how brings back all of the issue of the fight against terrorism and
organised crime, which is not to be taken seriously, despite all the produced agitation. Even if
there has been, it seems, 800 million euros on the table and that was promised hundreds, or even
thousands of new jobs, one realizes, in fact, that there is no doctrine or methodology, and that the
services are failing. Even if we think, of course, that the role of the judiciary is also to produce
some quality procedures that respect the fundamental rights of individuals, we believe - and this
is perhaps on this point that we separate the judiciary Union - that the problem lies not so much
in the control of these procedures than in the fact that justice had been offside in the fight against
these new threats. This update offside, which began long ago, was consecrated by the law on the
intelligence and will be definitively acquired with the terrorism Act, which eliminates the
investigating judge, entrusts to the public prosecutor of the powers that it is not able to exercise

and, moreover, raises the question of compliance by the Crown with the criteria of the Court
European human rights.
It is therefore not only a question of means. Centralization stressed the problem of the absence of
methodology. Finally, a comparison of Italian and French situations. The Italians, who were
confronted in the 1980s and 1990s to phenomena of extreme violence, whether it is red or black
terrorism, terrorism are familiar with the fight against terrorism and organised crime. However,
today, they do not have case to terrorism to which we face. I do not know to what extent this
situation is due to the quality of their justice and their police, but suggests that the existence of
directions anti-mafia in the district courts and of a public prosecutor national anti-mafia responsible for carrying out the coordination which worries you quite rightly, Mr President - has
contributed to create a culture of intelligence that allows judges to act strategically and proactive.
This is what is missing in the french system!
M. Olivier Marleix. I believe, like you, that we should be much more attentive to the continuum
between crime and terrorism. Why not devise a system that would be based on the JIRS, while
now an anti-terrorism Prosecutor national who knows the most important cases like the
prosecution?
Mr. Jean Maillard. We are in agreement. We believe that a national prosecutor is necessary to
treat the attacks or cases under the national or international level and to ensure coordination.
The rapporteur. I would like to know your feelings on the quantum of penalties on terrorism.
This issue is a reflection of the anti-terrorism Prosecutor, who considers that the penalty for
conspiracy in connection with a business tort (TN) terrorist is not sufficient.
The President Georges Fenech. I conclude the rapporteur's question questioning you on a topic
that has been discussed, yesterday, when the Government issues: creation, for crimes of
terrorism, a form of real life, without modification of sentence, which the Prime Minister seems
open.
Mr Olivier Janson. The sentences in TN are often at the limit of the maximum provided for in
the Act...
The rapporteur. And again: for this offence, I believe that they are an average of six to seven
years in prison, the maximum penalty is ten years.
Mr Olivier Janson. In many cases, the sentences are eight, nine or ten years in prison. However,
the fact is that it is relatively rare that an offence is punished first, such heavy penalties. This
may indicate, in theory, that the penalty is not suitable. But, in practice, let us not forget that only
crimes are punished for more than ten years imprisonment. However, crime equal Court of
Assizes - Special Court, in the present case. If the legislature, which also votes on our budget,
gives us the means to judge the crimes of conspiracy in relation with a terrorist undertaking, why
not? But if it is only to decide that the offence constitutes a crime, we will not be able to judge
the authors.

Ms. Laurence Blisson. The scale of penalties is in fact subject to a debate, particularly since an
anti-terrorist investigating judge took position in favour of an increase to fifteen years '
imprisonment from the maximum penalty for tort of criminal association. But before mentioning
the scale of penalties, it should be recalled that the criminal offence of conspiracy exists and can
be retained when it is determined that the project in germ is of a criminal nature.
The rapporteur. Let me clarify my thinking. Reflection is, in fact, on the case of people who
return to Syria after participating in a number of abuses within, for example, war crimes or
Shariah police. Is it necessary, in relation to them, remain in the tort field, as is the case today?
Ms. Laurence Blisson. I recall first of all, regarding the case you describe, that the jurisdiction
of the French courts is extended to crimes - or even, since the law of December 21, 2012, crimes
- committed on foreign territory. Then the Union of magistrates attached great importance to the
fact that, in the case of conspiracy, a relationship of proportionality must exist between the
evidence and the pronounced penalty. It is indeed a very particular offence, because just the
evidence of preparatory acts which, in themselves, do not necessarily have illicit character and
associate it with an intention which must be characterized, but not necessarily so specifies, for
lead to a conviction. From this observation, it seems to us not legitimate to increase the scale of
the penalties for this offence, as would lead to disconnection, concern with regard to criminal
law, between what is specifically criticized a person and the sanction that is imposed. We are
resolutely hostile to an increase in the penalties for conspiracy. And we cannot accept that one
justifies the need to raise the maximum penalty by the fact that sentences close.
With regard to real life, I would remind you that the European Court of human rights condemned
Britain for creating a 'real' life - the terms are often inappropriate - without any possibility of
review. The ECHR considers indeed that a person can be imprisoned for life - and this is the case
of many prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment in France - but that the Act should provide for
the possibility of a review. In this case, Bill 'Robert' aims to extend the perpetuity
incompressible, i.e. with a period of thirty years at the end of which any development can be
examined. We are opposed.
It should be recalled, in this regard, a fundamental element. It is clear that the 'incompressible'
so-called perpetuity concerns crimes of an extreme gravity, which provoke a very strong emotion
and have serious consequences for the company. However, it seems that the law should not lose
sight of the principles of a humanistic criminal law, which cannot be thought of as a right of the
social total elimination. Specifically, there are today, for persons sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for life, a period - of eighteen to twenty-two years - at the end of which they can
seek a modification of sentence. They must, for this, to submit to multiple expertise, pass the
national Council of the evaluation and the multidisciplinary commission of the security
measures, which will issue a notice, and make the subject of a very thorough review of
dangerousness. And, ultimately, it is difficult to propose a modification of sentence.
All French criminal philosophy is based on the idea that the punishment serves, certainly, as a
first step, to punish and put the company out of danger, but also to provide for the return of
persons sentenced in society, because it refuses to assume that, regardless of the nature and the

seriousness of their crime, could be sunk in principle. It is important that we lose sight, subject of
a legitimate emotion, these principles, which we consider fundamental, of criminal law.
The President Georges Fenech. Your reasoning also applies to one who, in the event where he
would have been captured alive, killed, with his Kalashnikov, 90 people at the Bataclan. Forgive
me the brutality of my question, but do you think that this type of individual may, one day, return
to the path of the company?
Ms. Laurence Blisson. I absolutely refuse to assume the opposite. The Court will decide to vote
or not, a sentence of imprisonment, then the jurisdiction of the enforcement of sentences will
review the situation after several decades. Incarceration must have, it seems, aims to try by all
means to advance people.
M. Benjamin Blanchet, mission to the Trade Union of judges. I would add that the
Constitutional Council stated in a decision of 20 January 1994, that any criminal sanction should
have aimed the amendment and the reintegration of the convicted person. If real life, when it was
introduced in our law for the murders of unaccompanied children of rape or acts of torture and
barbarism, was able to pass the test of the control of constitutionality, it is because the
opportunity was scheduled, beyond a period of 30 years, to review the situation of the convicted
person and, if applicable to consider a measure of liberation. In the current state of our
constitutional law, it is therefore not possible, in my opinion, to provide a real life, i.e. a sentence
of deprivation of liberty final, which knows no possible development.
Mr. Jean Maillard. The problem, for FO judges, is not so much that the extreme penalty which, as the forfeiture of nationality, would probably have very little opportunity to apply - than
in medium-term sentences. Remember, Mr President, that the sentences for criminal association
were on average six or seven years ' imprisonment. However you should know that, in our
system, erosion sentences is such that a person sentenced to six years ' imprisonment is, upon
entry into detention, "conditionnable" from about two years, taking into account reductions in
automatic penalties which will be granted to him.
We believe, generally, that the scale of penalties established in the reform of the penal code is
insufficient, especially in the area of organized crime and terrorism. Indeed, correctional, the
ceiling is ten years, meaning that in practice a person sentenced to the maximum penalty does
not perform, for the reasons I have just mentioned, a sentence of about five years ' imprisonment,
which seems to be extremely insufficient for facts of crime including.
The ceilings should therefore be enhanced, especially since, in these areas, the punishment is
important, and this for two reasons. First of all, many terrorist cases are processed in criminal
association. Indeed, most of the time, the terrorists are no longer present to attend their trial,
which has no place. On the other hand, they can be arrested, tried and condemned when it acted
pre-emptively; the majority of cases of terrorism are Correctional Affairs. Then the States can
intervene - even if it is probably less the case terrorism - for reasons relating to the management
of flows. Indeed, justice is not able, as stated by my colleague from USM, all assume, it will
prefer correctionnaliser some cases, possibly including terrorism cases.

But our concern is elsewhere. You mentioned, Sir, the question of whether what you are doing
from people coming out of prison after serving their sentence. The dangerous nature of some of
them is not necessarily less, regardless of the efforts that could be made, because our prison
system is certainly not able today to ensure the reintegration of ex-prisoners. It is therefore a real
concern, and we believe that this debate should be opened without exclusive, or fear, or shame.
The numerous discussions raised by offences of sexual violence committed by individuals with
pronounced psychiatric characters resulted in measures such as retention of security. We wonder
if it is not necessary that the graduated measures can be envisaged once the person has served his
sentence. When detainees as might have been brothers Kaye, for example, out of prison after
being placed in custody for X years, they are still brothers Kaye: what is being done?
Of course, there is the problem of predictability, we are well aware; This is why we provide no
answer. But we believe that it should not refuse this debate.
M. Olivier Marleix. I would like to extend the question of our rapporteur on the return of Syria
jihadists who pose a terrible threat to the security of our citizens. Opinion would certainly be
challenged if, unfortunately, a person who had been sued, or even condemned, ironed to the Act.
The difficulty facing us is the need to bring together elements of evidence sufficient, especially
as one of the people that we interviewed told us that certain information covered by secrecy,
could not necessarily, as serious as they, constitute evidence. We are therefore in a situation
where the jihadists or the people attending a jihadist enterprise are doomed 'by default' for
criminal association in relation with a terrorist enterprise, this qualification being a bit, if you
resume the circulars of Mrs Taubira, the alpha and omega of criminal policy on this subject.
So I wonder why we do not use other offences contained in the criminal code. I think particularly
in intelligence with a foreign power, provided for in article 411-4, which is punishable by 30
years in prison. Of course, this article has not been applied since 1944, which may raise
questions, but this incrimination is contained in our positive law, and the object of our inquiry is
whether one applies the law in our country. There are also, in Books II and IV bis, the complicity
in genocide or complicity of war crimes. I am well aware that, again, evidence of such acts is
difficult to establish, but complicity is a notion that judges are accustomed to handling. In any
case, these offences could at least explain, in a number of cases, a placement in preventive
detention that would leave more time as prosecutions for criminal association to examine the
situation of some people.
The President Georges Fenech. Some have even application of book IV, which relates to
military offences.
Mr Olivier Janson. Your question is paradoxical in various capacities. First of all, it seems to
me that, for its leaders, called Daech foreign power would be probably a form of victory - we
remember the debates over the use of the term "Islamic State".
Then, the situation you describe is at theFavorite pieces of the difficulties encountered both by
intelligence by the judicial authority. I want to speak of the hundreds of people who have gone
on theatres of terrorist operations, who have returned or will return and we know not much more,
which is in itself particularly worrying. However, although Parliament has recently legislated on

this subject under the law on organized crime, this behavior is currently no criminality, whatever
it is. Thus, the intelligence services complain to judicialize this type of behaviour because they
often lack one of the constituent elements of the existing criminal offences. That the offence of
terrorist proprietorship was retained, for example, should prove, in addition, that the person has
acquired or attempted to acquire weapons or explosive substances. However Parliament
considered that the response - he decided thus in article 20 of the draft law on organised crime should not be criminal but administrative!
The Senate had yet suggested, in the context of a proposal for a law adopted last December, that
this answer is criminal, so judicial, by creating a new offence that corresponds to the definition
of the behavior which would, under the terms of the Bill, of an administrative order, namely
went or attempting to go , without legitimate reasons - this precision helps prevent that
humanitarian personnel or journalists do fall within the scope of this new incrimination - in a
theatre of terrorist operations. The creation of such an offence would be an otherwise more
effective response to this type of behaviour than a month, possibly renewable residency once,
only because it would allow to decide a judicial review or take a measure of pre-trial detention. I
indicate in passing that Bill strengthening the fight against organized crime is under
consideration in the Senate. If it is the subject of a joint mixed Committee, perhaps should the
legislature consider not to submit to a vision that is intelligence.
Ms. Clarisse Taron. I would like to return to the fantasy of the States: I do not believe that
many judges consider correctionnaliser terrorist offences. The punishment is, admittedly,
sometimes used for reasons which take management of flows in the Court of Assizes, but
between the States of a robbery with a fake weapon and that of a terrorism case, the margin is
still important.
With regard to the retention of security, the Union of magistrates is very clearly opposed to the
extension of this measure, which is well suspected that it might back out of the window in the
context of the fight against terrorism. It would seem, moreover, that Jean-Jacques Urvoas shares
this opinion because he said that it should not be considered for this type of offence.
Finally, it should be noted that is the charge of conspiracy to commit a crime, which allows to
punish preparatory acts - which it said yet, there's not so long ago that they were not more
punishable than the tort intention. Therefore, the tort of criminal association apply behaviours
which, objectively, do not have to receive criminal qualification, for which the current penalty is
sufficient.
Ms. Laurence Blisson. It is obvious, for the Union of magistrates, that persons returning from
operational theatres must be attention services intelligence and investigative judicial
investigations. However, the two proposed responses on the one hand, assigning administrative
residence laid down in article 20 of the draft law strengthening the fight against organized crime
and, on the other hand, the creation of a criminal offence specific so to speak purely material
which would therefore consists that it is rendered or that attempts have been made to go to a
theatre of terrorist operations- These two solutions are not satisfactory. When a person is back in
France and that the elements enabling to characterize conspiracy or sole proprietorship - offence
which is used very little, so one can wonder whether it was really necessary-, it is possible to

implement the review and put in custody. Thus, seventy-three people returned from these
theatres of operation are remanded in custody and others were placed under judicial control.
In a democratic system, it is not acceptable that consideration be given to create an
administrative measure to fill the void created by the absence of serious and consistent evidence
that requires the law to put a person into consideration and then, if necessary, take a security
measure. In one such case, the investigation accompanied, possibly, measures of supervision must continue to gather sufficient evidence. It was said that it was often confronted with a
probationary fix. I recall in this regard that members of the intelligence services are subject to the
same way as any other employee, to article 40 of the code of criminal procedure, which requires
them to report to the Prosecutor of the Republic any infringement which would be brought to
their attention.
Regarding the creation of an autonomous criminal offence, it appears extremely problematic
because, this time, you disconnect the offence of any content concrete. Action shall be
characterized - 'he went'-, but you will not know what happened or, therefore, what is the harm to
the company. I am not saying that persons returning from those theaters of operations did not
commit or prepare no offences; I simply say that, in a democratic criminal justice system, it is
necessary, when one defines a criminal offence is constituted by material elements which are
prejudicial to an interest protected by the law and by an intentional element. However this would
not be for this offence.
Criminal law and counter-terrorism practice widely use existing offences. It is not good
legislation to extend on the administrative side or on the criminal side.
Mr. Jean Maillard. Just a word on the question of the punishment of terrorism cases. This is
obviously not of correctionnaliser the attacks of November 13, for example. But, between an
association of wrongdoers corrections and a criminal conspiracy association, we will choose the
first, because cannot enter the Court of Assizes on such grounds.
The offences referred to by Mr Marleix could indeed be used, but should extend their
qualification, because texts are not suitable. It nevertheless retomberait on the problem of the
tipping of the correctional to the criminal, that is not the preferred approach. Indeed, it is not that
the action of the judge may be a way to combat terrorism: focus on intelligence and the judicial
aspect is sacrificed. We believe - and we differentiate ourselves on this point of the Union of
magistrates - go to a theatre of operations without legitimate grounds must become an objective
offence because, therefore that this qualification will exist, it will be the person who comes back
from the theatre of operations to justify giving the reasons why she went there , and, if it has any,
both pis: at least the company will be able to protect themselves.
M. Christophe Cavard. I would point out that the quantum of sentences is still debate within
the Assembly. We are indeed a number suggest that it is not engaged in a bidding war in this area
that we will protect better terrorist acts. We, we are not agree on everything. Furthermore,
reference was made the role of incarceration and the question of release from prison, which me
particularly interested. It is obviously impossible, in the current context, discuss what will
become Salah Abdeslam after his detention: the emotion is too strong. We can wonder about the

accompaniment, at the time of his release from prison, of a young man who returns from a
theatre of operations, and there is evidence that he participated in a number of facts. I would
therefore like to have your opinion on the measures that would promote the reintegration of exprisoners potentially dangerous while ensuring the protection of society.
The President Georges Fenech. This is a very broad question...
M. Christophe Cavard. It's true, but you can answer me in writing.
Furthermore, I am one of those who believe that it is not necessarily necessary to create new
offences. Or an administrative measure can neutralize a person as long as the investigation.
Certainly, the time is perhaps not long enough so this investigation can be brought to fruition.
But it is one of the reasons for which a number of us have defended this measure.
Mr. Benjamin Blanchet. I'll try to answer briefly. Article 66 of the Constitution makes the
judiciary the guardian of individual freedoms. However, because of the increase of the role of the
administration on detention and administrative control of persons returning from theatres of
operations, the judicial judge is more and more spread, or even disappears from the treatment of
these issues and an important part of the fight against terrorism. This is a real problem.
Parliamentarians express a distrust of judges and, if that is the case, what is the cause of this
mistrust?
M. Olivier Marleix. The judge may not go investigate Syria currently and it cannot gather
evidence!
Mr Olivier Janson. The infamous article 20 of the draft law strengthening the fight against
crime is intended to punish behaviour, the fact of having gone on a theatre of terrorist operations,
by an administrative decision. The probative nature of the elements is finally not so important,
seems we think, since the person concerned could possibly enter judge administrative
retrospectively. But as, moreover, you have rejected the principle of an interim measures, the
common law would apply, so that the judge could decide within a period of four months, while
the duration of the measure is a month... We can understand that, in one such procedure, freedom
would be guaranteed in a way that is perhaps not quite consistent with the spirit of the
constituent of 1958...
Ms. Laurence Blisson. This question is nagging, since it was already raised concerning the
administrative ban of the territory. This is not a quarrel of chapels between judicial justice and
administrative judge, as wanted to believe those who have caricatured our criticism of the State
of emergency. In a democracy, the deprivation of liberty must be based on a clear basis, i.e. an
offence clearly defined in the criminal law, and not a potential dangerousness. It must be
preceded by an adversarial and the decision must be made initially by an independent judicial
authority. It cannot only be subject to control judicial ex post facto, that of the administrative
judge, which is, moreover, as seen during the State of emergency, limited by the terms of the
Act. We cannot, in a democracy, take a custodial measure if the legal basis on which it is based
is vague, as is the case in these devices.

The President Georges Fenech. I would point out that the last reform we have adopted entrusts
to judge freedom and detention (JLD) an important role, since the Prosecutor's office is
increasingly working with him.
Ms. Laurence Blisson. The problem posed by this evolution of the criminal procedure - which is
ancient, since she started with the Perben law - is that it marginalizes and delayed the
intervention of the justice court, even though the status of the Prosecutor's office will be
changed, if it is, only on the margin - since this amendment, we announced, would be limited to
the assent of the CSM - and that of the JLD is still fragile since he is still not appointed by
Decree and may therefore be transferred by decision of president. In addition, the JLD occurs
sporadically in a folder; It has not the knowledge that an investigating judge. Specifically, he was
asked in the emergency by a magistrate at the Prosecutor's office a folder on which it is not able
to exercise enough control so this offset of the procedure is acceptable. We are therefore not in
favour of these measures.
With regard to penalties, there is much to say about a system in which people would be in
principle, at the rate of the terrorist offence, excluded from the logic that presides over the
execution and enforcement of sentences for reintegration. Perhaps social sciences, currently
focusing on the issue of detection prioriwrong object. Told us in effect that it is not possible to
detect the passage to the violent act. On the other hand, can conduct a thorough reflection on the
way in which one can try to get people to such a course. As we know that profiles of returnees
from Iraq or Syria and the conditions in which they return are very different.
The President Georges Fenech. Our Committee of inquiry must soon to travel to the Hague to
visit Eurojust. I would therefore like to have your feeling on the level of judicial cooperation in
the field of counter-terrorism.
Mr Olivier Janson. It is difficult to answer in a synthetic way. The instruments exist; the
difficulty is related to the marginalization of the judicial authority which has just been recalled.
Of course, terrorism is not the same today that ten years ago, but at that time, the anti-terrorism
justice was represented by the anti-terrorist investigating judge. International cooperation worked
well because the judges were clearly marked, they occupied their functions for a significant
period and they had regular contacts with their foreign counterparts. Today, the co-investigating
judges are marginalized by the texts and practice; they are more classic European anti-terrorist
referents interlocutors. But the Prosecutor's office is not so far able to meet all the legitimate
expectations in this area.
In this connection, I would like to raise some points which not have been only touched upon
while they are, in our opinion, at theFavorite pieces of the difficulties related to the fight against
terrorism. How do you to handle a considerable mass of information - the technical means which
you have given to the intelligence services produce so much information that they recognize
themselves be outdated - and at the same time, reassemble dies? These two issues are not
similarly treated. Where to place the cursor to distinguish what falls within the administrative,
i.e. intelligence and what is criminal investigations? In the laws that have been adopted since last
July, Parliament has entrusted to intelligence to answer this question. The provisions in effect
neither control nor cooperation: these are the intelligence services who decide when they go to

judicialize what they do know and what they keep to them. This is a particularly important issue
with regard to the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism response in general.
I am well aware of me be dismissed from your question, Mr president, but what is our legitimacy
from our European interlocutors when we present ourselves in a disorganised, as is currently the
case? Perhaps the legislature restores consistency to operative entrusting to the intelligence
services care to treat the mass of information they collect, by providing that the judicial authority
must intervene as soon as is marked the beginning of something that is an offence, and in
deciding that records the long-term course will be treated by anti-terrorist judges. We must go
back to basics!
The President Georges Fenech. I remember everything you said at least one point of agreement
between the three unions that you represent: enjoyed the section C1 are pathetic, ridiculous, did
you say - ten investigating judges and twelve prosecution for the whole of the country, while the
cases are extremely complex and no doubt far from ending.
Mr Olivier Janson. And then even the competence of these judges is recognized!
Ms. Laurence Blisson. It seems to me that agree us also on another point, that the jurisdiction of
the judicial judge.
The President Georges Fenech. I understood it.
Mr. Jean Maillard. For us, the issue of means reveals - and that is the important point - an
absence of doctrine, method and coherence of action. We suffer in our countries, considerable
deficiencies in our understanding of this phenomenon, or even in the desire to understand, and it
is serious.
Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Franois Molins, Prosecutor of the tribunal de grande instance
(TGI) of Paris Republic, Ms. Vronique Degermann, vice Attorney of the Republic nearly
said TGI Prosecutor of the Republic Assistant near the same TGI, and Ms. Camille
Hennetier
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, March 30, 2016
Mr. Georges Fenech, Chairman. Mr the Prosecutor of the Republic, ladies prosecutors, thank
you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means
Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We have already held numerous hearings, devoted first to the victims and their support for relief,
then the chronology of events from January to November 2015, then, in the light of the
experience of the attacks in January and November, means and missions of the security forces.
Finally, we received last Wednesday the unions of judges.
Attorney, we particularly look forward to hear from you and to question you, in respect of the
separation of powers, the role of the Prosecutor's office, judicial procedures and the means to

fight against terrorism. You are accompanied by officials from anti-terrorist prosecutors, Ms.
Vronique Degermann, Prosecutor of the Republic Deputy, and Ms. Camille Hennetier, Deputy
Prosecutor of the Republic.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, pursuant to section 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if
we decide so at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in
camera will previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These
observations will be submitted to the Commission, which may decide to State in his report. I
would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is punishable by
the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who, within a period of
twenty-five years disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a commission of
inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this
information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.
Mr. Franois Molins, Ms. Camille Hennetier, and Ms. Vronique Degermann oath.
Attorney, I leave you the floor for a keynote presentation which was followed by an exchange of
questions and answers.
M. Franois Molins, Prosecutor of the tribunal de grande instance of Paris Republic. I want
to stress, firstly, that after each wave of terrorist attacks, in January and November 2015, the
Paris Prosecutor's office has made returns of experience which was to evaluate the devices and
set operating modes Work to identify what could be corrected or improved.
The anti-terrorist section of the Paris Prosecutor's office is competent to treat all terrorist
offences committed on the national territory, as well as, in some cases, abroad. It means the
police services responsible for the investigation and then assumes a role of the investigation.
Its numbers were seven prosecutors in 2014. This number was increased to eight beginning
January 2015, then in February 2015 and finally to eleven in January 2016. It is of the permanent
workforce, but the resources devoted to terrorist Affairs can be considerably increased
purposefully in the context of the crisis cell since we have the possibility of mobilizing
immediate way of many judges: located in Paris are of 134 prosecutors.
The crisis unit is a dedicated, integrated to the Procuratorate, and implementation unit led by the
Prosecutor of the Republic Work by the anti-terrorist section with the assistance of all of the
prosecutors. It is designed to be activated in the event of major terrorist event requiring the
mobilization, continuously and over a long period, a large number of magistrates.

Its mission is to ensure the conduct of public action but also of the investigations branch,
providing within the Palace of justice in Paris a permanence of judges of prosecutors and clerks
around the clock seven days a week, providing an entry point easily identifiable to all our
partners, whether of police services, headquarters experts from the Institute of forensic medicine
(IML), the interdepartmental assistance to victims (CIAV) cell or exterior floors, and ensuring
centralization and synthesis of the information collected.
The crisis cell is activated on decision of the Prosecutor of the Republic following the referral of
the anti-terrorist section and it is designed to operate for the duration of the investigation, to refer
the matter to an investigating judge.
It relies on a list of available judges at any time, which was composed of thirty-nine judges until
November 2015. In order to make facing simultaneous attacks on the whole of the national
territory, these numbers come to be brought to sixty-two magistrates, and so we have thus the
possibility of mobilizing a total of seventy-three prosecutors permanently.
Are the Prosecutor of the Republic, the Attorney Assistant in charge of the division in the antiterrorist cell, the Chief anti-terrorist magistrate responsible for communication of the Paris
Prosecutor's office, as well as a representative of the public prosecutor whose presence is
intended to facilitate the feedback to Directorate of Criminal Affairs and pardons.
The crisis cell has been activated four times in its history: on the occasion of the Merah case in
2012, on the occasion of the teal-Torcy case in 2013, following the attacks of January and finally
the aftermath of November. As soon as the cell is activated, the gentlemen on the list know that
they must make themselves available.
The crisis unit is responsible for the referral of investigative services. We take primarily three
services: section anti-terrorist brigade of the judicial police of Paris, for offences committed in
Paris and in the departments of the small Crown, the headquarters of the judicial police (SDAT)
anti-terrorist branch, and finally the Directorate General of internal security (CSB), for offences
committed abroad or by individuals with ties abroad. Attacks magnitude, the rule is to
systematically capture these three services at the same time, one of them being appointed by the
public prosecutor as Coordinator.
The crisis cell must then receive and process all the records relevant to terrorist events. It will
have to conduct investigations, provide a presence within the structures of reception and
assistance to victims, the IML, the CIAV, military school, as well as within the staffs and PC of
crisis at the Ministry of the Interior, the Central Directorate of judicial police (DCPJ), ISB, and
order the autopsies and expertise necessary forensic.
With regard to the attacks of the 7, 8 and 9 January 2015, the crisis cell was activated on 7
January at the foot of the building of Charlie Hebdo and worked continuously for fourteen days,
until what we seize an investigating judge. It has issued during this time 109 requisitions in
forensic matters, eighteen requests for permission to search at night, seventy geolocation
permissions, eighty-one requests for judicial interceptions, four requests for international

criminal assistance and nine research mandates, managing in addition thirty-one measures of
custody.
Regarding the attacks of November 13, 2015, the crisis cell has been activated from the referral
of the anti-terrorist section, November 13 to 22:30 or 10: 45 p.m., and worked continuously until
Tuesday 24 November, date of the opening of judicial information and the transfer of the person
held in police custody. She worked continuously for eleven days, involving thirty-nine
prosecutors, including the nine judges of the section, and eleven clerks.
The magistrates of the anti-terrorist section were specifically affected transportation on the
premises and the follow-up of the investigation, according to a breakdown by theme, while
judges in reinforcement were mainly assigned to the victim-witness workshop. Given the very
high number of victims, it is indeed on this theme that are concentrated most of the
reinforcements: the establishment of the single list of victims (LUV) required to synthesize more
than a thousand police hearings. Similarly, the presence of a magistrate had to be ensured to the
MDU during the entire investigation.
During the eleven days of the investigation of flagrante on the attacks of November, we issued
325 requisitions in forensic matters, five requests for permission to search at night, forty-one
geolocation permissions, forty-seven requests for judicial interceptions, six requests for
international criminal assistance, with the Belgium and the Germany, a joint investigation with
the Belgium, signed on Monday, November 16 , and three research mandates.
For the attacks of November, in the presence of multiple and simultaneous attacks scenes, it was
decided to track each event by a joint between different judges present on the spot and the
present head of room in the premises of the crisis unit. Thus, several magistrates were
simultaneously projected on the premises from 10 pm. I myself have visited the scene of the
crime for the good beer and the Carillon, before joining the Bataclan. We projected a magistrate
on the scenes of crime of the Stade de France. We stayed on the site of the Bataclan until the end
of the assault by special intervention units.
Given the fluidity in the flow of information in the various departments, we were not obliged to
send judges in different headquarters, contrary to what had been the case in January, and we
focused on the support of victims and their relatives.
In addition to the 'victims' pane, investigations are articulated around two axes: the reconstitution
of the conduct of the facts and the identification of the perpetrators.
I would first remind our skills in the problems of the victims. Inquiry of flagrante - pane
"forensic medicine"-, the Prosecutor's office determines the examinations to be carried out on the
deceased and wounded victims to the manifestation of the truth. It has the free choice of the
experts.
With regard to victim support, we have a double competence. The first is to report to the
guarantee fund for victims of acts of terrorism and other offences (ITMF) victims who should be
compensated, in accordance with the code of insurance. This requires to identify as soon as

possible victims or survivors in case of death, investigators obtain their coordinates, and if
possible to assess the physical and psychological damage, and then promptly transmit these
elements to the ITMF.
We intervene in the interdepartmental mechanism set up in the event of major event, with three
specific skills: we establish the unique list of victims, founding act of initiation of the right to
compensation, and which is also used to determine the timing of the announcement of death to
families, we remain in close contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs crisis cell and the
CIAV interdepartmental and consists of multidisciplinary teams, and we provide the families of
the victims information on the scheme and the status of the investigations. To better carry out
these tasks, we have within the anti-terrorism section of a referent victims.
The attacks of January made 17 dead, 20 injured and dozens of shocked victims. In November
left 130 people dead, and the LUV always under development lists more than 1,600 people: 486
people injured, 1 032 shocked victims.
An interdepartmental instruction on support for the victims of terrorism had been signed on 12
November in the evening, the eve of the attacks.
For the January attacks, the issue of victims was supported by a pole 'victims', with a referent
within the section. For the November attacks, taking into account the very large number of
victims, we densified our device. A pole victims has been implemented, mobilized and reachable
around the clock, including the magistrate referent of the anti-terrorist section, recipient of all the
lifts of information about victims, interface with external partners, and a team rotating present
judges: a present judge at the MLI to validate IDs, sign permits burial and relay to the referent
victims all difficulties relating to the signing of the burial permit two judges present at the CIAV
and the military school, specifically responsible for the announcement of the death. This Centre
also hosted a workshop to synthesize the victim-witness hearings, to refine the status of victims
in real time.
To carry out our missions, it had to be in possession of information relating to the victims and we
had fortunately learned the consequences of what had passed in January. We had highlighted a
weakness in the articulation of the means of justice and police: there was not, at the level of the
police, a victim, Commissioner or OPJ referent, which is cleared of all missions relating to the
progress of the investigation, which had led to wait almost forty-eight hours the elements
necessary to establish the LUV. We have learned from this experience and obtained the
designation by the DGPJ to a police Commissioner at the level of the SDAT cleared of any
concern investigative and whose role was exclusively devoted to the collection of information to
list the victims. This referent victims was assisted by a full team of investigators within the
SDAT and the criminal brigade.
With regard to the coordination of the actors in our feedback on the attacks of January, we found
that the single window for the victims, under the impulse of the prefect and the coordination of
the Department of Veterans Affairs, was not suitable, and we have therefore made the idea of a
permanent structure with them means ad hoc, in this case the center of crisis of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

The eve of the attacks, the interdepartmental statement of support for victims of terrorism
endorsed the principle of the CIAV, hosted in the premises of the centre of crisis and support of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It brings together members of different departments. Its role is to
centralize all the information concerning the State of the victims, to inform and to accompany
their loved ones and to coordinate the action of all stakeholders departments in real time.
The need for a place home, information and referral of families has rapidly emerged, given the
scale of the attacks, and the military school has been designated. It took then quickly put in place
a unique number for the support of victims and their families and provide multidisciplinary
teams to announce deaths to families.
We faced a number of problems in the care of deceased victims and hospital for the wounded,
which are managed under the SINUS software. This software is an application that allows the
identification, enumeration and follow-up of victims and must make the recovery and treatment
of information essential for the follow-up to the victims. It is a necessary tool to establish a
balance and find out where the hospitalized victims.
Each victim is equipped with one ID materialized by a strap bar-code, equipped with additional
stickers identifying documents or effects attached to the victim, and medical front plug (FMA):
associated with the number of identifying SINUS, containing personal and medical, data it is
implemented only on victims in the pre-hospitalisation treatment within the advanced medical
post.
We found that a number of points deserve to be improved. It thus seemed relevant to enrich
SINUS by adding personal data, phone number and address of the victims, to speed up the
support. The observed difficulties, include duplicates, soiled by blood and become illegible
bracelets, bracelets do not include the place of origin and support... We believe that investigators
should take responsibility to designate the scene and ask themselves the bracelets on the body,
multiplying the laying of decals on the shrouds, the body bags in order to avoid the loss of
information. Each body must be saved under X ab initio to secure the identification process and
only head-bust sets must be registered on the basis of the SINUS software, excluding the
fragments of bodies. The need for harmonization of the use of the SINUS software in the Paris
region, beyond the Ministry of health, and more widely at the national level immediately made
sense.
In January as in November, the choice has been to seize the IML in Paris, which strengthened.
The Institute has four tables of forensic medicine which, for reasons of internal organisation,
three work. IML joined three forensic experts of the National Gendarmerie, bringing the
workforce to fifteen, as well as ballisticians of the Institute for criminal research of the National
Gendarmerie (IRCGN). The storage capacity of the bodies of the IML amounts to 400
refrigeration boxes.
The IML has recorded 168 entries corresponding to bodies or fragments of bodies. The absence
of scanner within the IML was addressed by the use of scanners to surrounding hospitals, the
Htel-Dieu and la Salptrire.

We were very quickly faced the need to make a choice. The causes of death were known. If an
autopsy was performed systematically, it would need at least two, or even three, weeks and
would have delayed for so many presentations and refunds of body to the families of the victims,
whom the request in this regard was extremely strong. The choice of a second site to perform
autopsies have also complicated the process of identifying the bodies and multiplied the referring
of each committed service teams; Finally, and most importantly, this would have much
complicated course victims, that we have tried to simplify the more possible.
So we decided to discriminate between essential autopsies and thorough body exams. It was thus
decided that would be subject to complete autopsy the bodies of the terrorists, the debris of body,
the body of unidentifiable victims, and the bodies of the victims have died after hospitalization,
as well as all bodies with embedded projectiles, i.e. with inlet ports but not of outlet ports. For
the other, it was decided to submit to examinations of body with medical imaging, i.e. radio and
scanner, and use the services of a balisticien of the IRCGN. It was requested to the Director of
the IML to be more precise as possible in its reports on the causes and the circumstances of the
death.
This choice has enabled to carry out all the acts of legal medicine in less than a week between
Sunday 15 and Thursday, November 19, and return bodies to families within a reasonable time,
which was not to exceed one week from attacks. On 130 victims, we made eighty-two extensive
external reviews and forty-eight complete autopsies. We are, however, aware of the limitations
of the system and know that, in the event of more large-scale attacks, it will be necessary to
double, even triple, the number of review sites.
The identification of the victims is a challenge major but how nuanced depending on the types of
attack. A bomb attack, as in Brussels last week, translates into major problems of identification
of the bodies. For a procedure to the weapon of war, we do not have the same difficulties.
For the attacks of November 13, the national unit for the identification of victims of disasters
(UNIVC) has, for the first time, was activated by the DCPJ in this type of context. The
identification of the bodies was made by this unit according to the Interpol Protocol. The UNIVC
Committee met all day November 16, 2015 for the correlation of the ante-mortem and postmortem elements. The identification process was completed on 19 November with the final
presentation to the families.
However, it became fairly quickly that the classical UNIVC Protocol, the meeting of a
commission subsequently and the systematic collection of footprint genetic, relevant in the event
of accidents collective or a bombing where the bodies are severely degraded, was not suited to
the attacks of November 13, where the bodies of the victims were the most often identifiable
photographs or by families with distinctive signs such as tattoos. The relief of this procedure by
simplifying the process helped to accelerate the identification of the body, prerequisite for the
restitution to the families.
As a result of the feedback which we did, we also believe that early intervention of the postmortem cell, if applicable directly at the scene of attack, may be likely to speed up the
identification process. The collection as a precaution of the primary identification with the

families from the home by the ante-mortem cell phase also accelerates this process. Finally, we
will hold in the future an ante-mortem post-mortem meeting at least once a day, to work over
water.
Mr president. The question of resources is very important and our Committee of inquiry will no
doubt led to formulate proposals in this regard. Outside the crisis cell, sixty-two magistrates can
be mobilized very rapidly. The permanent staff of the anti-terrorist section of the Paris
Prosecutor's office, which has national jurisdiction, are eleven. -What are adequate given the
existing threat?
M. Franois Molins. These numbers correspond to the needs of the activity of the section today
but this no longer the case in a few months. The figures that have been submitted to us yesterday
are State of 250 inquiries or information in progress on the Syrian-Iraqi Jihad and 782 people
questioned, they are already indicted or even sought. These figures are increasing.
The number of people tracked by intelligence services is generally constant since several months,
between 1 850 and 1,900. On the other hand, the number of individuals legal continues to
increase, consequence of the very significant increase in the strength of the judicial Department
of the ISB and the SDAT. The number of defendants therefore aims to double or triple.
The staffing of the section will therefore have to increase in the months and years to come. In the
context of the new Palace of justice of des Batignolles, judicial branch has recorded the fact that
the premises of the anti-terrorist section will be configured from November 2017 to
accommodate a staff of eighteen to twenty judges.
Mr president. Following the attacks in November, he was referred to the commission of acts of
barbarism.
M. Franois Molins. It's a rumor. Medical examiners were formal: no act of barbarism, no use
has, inter alia, bladed weapons. According to testimony, the testicles of a person have been cut,
but no finding has been supported.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Attorney, I applaud your work. Your voice is heard and
respected by all.
What is your assessment of the quantum of sentences? The reflection is ongoing on conspiracy in
connection with a business (TN) terrorist criminal. This is not a simple topic. You are also faced
with mothers, young girls, minors. Can you give us figures on convictions handed down these
past two years?
How do you work concretely, with intelligence? Do you consider that this cooperation is good or
do we still need to improve the flow of information? Same question about your relations with
Eurojust and European partners.
The press has reported a 2009 related DCRI report a threat on the Bataclan. Similarly, on a 'rock
concert' threats have been reported in August 2015. During our hearing of victims point of view

has often expressed that, the Bataclan being threatened, precautionary measures such a situation
required have not been taken. What is your feeling?
Finally, is there according to you the possible points of improvement at the level of the
Prosecutor's office?
M. Franois Molins. We have reports of very high quality with CSB, which has the initiative to
submit to the parquet elements that seem to have be seriousness.
Criminal policy has evolved considerably towards businessman Jihad. In the first folder, it
objected that the France was supporting the opposition to the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. You
can see the path that has been accomplished since then. Awareness took place. Criminal policy
went in the direction of densification and greater repression.
The configuration of correctional TN does not make a difference between those who have
committed acts of lesser severity - logistical organisation of a sector - and those who participated
in the terrorist activities of Daech as fighters. We therefore announced in our hierarchy two
weeks ago that we were now leaving on criminalisation. When we open today a survey or
information against people who joined Daech, we do more for correctional TN but for criminal
TN. The business will go before the Special Court of Assize, which is not either without the
question of the means.
Ms. Camille Hennetier, vice Attorney of the Republic to the tribunal of Grand instance of
Paris anti-terrorist pole. 261 people indicted in the Iraqi-Syrian conflict, twenty-nine are
minors, including a fact subject to an arrest warrant, eight are detained and three are indicted for
acts of a criminal nature. On these twenty-nine, there are seven young girls, of which two are
held. Eight of these twenty-nine miners were under the age of sixteen years at the time of the
commission of the facts.
Fifty-four women are currently indicted, nine of them are detained. It cannot be said that we have
a policy of not further pursuing against women, but we considered that they deserved no doubt
differentiated, treatment insofar as they do not participate in the fighting zone. We will review of
women who are involved in the logistical support of the sectors, finance Daech fighters, or else
have to project to the Act on the national territory or to recruit other women from marrying
combatants on area.
Reflection on criminal AMT is not recent. It is not to cap the sentences to 10 years for
individuals fighting within Daech when even reach this terrorist organisation involves DFF
intent to commit crimes of injury. But we autocensurions us because, if we are criminalising
people based on area, must be special Assize Court to be able to follow. We can no longer think
in this way: it takes more adapt our penal policy to the means at our disposal but adapt the means
themselves. A revolution is to conduct on the side of the Assize Court, which must decide within
shortest deadlines of individuals not appearing on the basis of folders in which there is little
evidence.

We have relationships of trust with CSB. The phase before the legalization has minutes which
whitens the intelligence and lays the Foundation for the initiation of an investigation. A dialogue
between SID and the parquet on the elements of information disclosed and the reasons for which
ISB seeks the legalization of an individual. It happened to us, last week, to refuse a legalization it wasn't, I assure you, a fighter on area-, believing that the items were too required.
Ms. Vronique Degermann, Prosecutor of the Republic Deputy to the tribunal of Grand
instance of Paris. I should mention that we are working with the judicial Department of the ISB.
The latter also provides us PV of context in the procedures, which is very useful to locate
individuals, allow reconciliations; We are in high demand.
The rapporteur. We have the feeling that the protagonists of terrorism are known people of the
intelligence services. It's former networks that break up, and will resurface. How are the
exchange of information between intelligence and prosecutors on a daily basis? What is the
method of work?
M. Franois Molins. One who can push the button, it is that holds the information, i.e. the ISB.
We are therefore dependent on when she'll come see us to tell us about a case. This is done
almost every day. Each time, a dialogue in order to find if the folder as is presented to us to open
legal proceedings. In the vast majority of cases, this is what will happen, but it can also happen
that we asked the CSB to deepen such or such point. We do not yet have enough recoil on the
application of the law of 25 July about whether she has enriched or amended the legalization
process.
International cooperation is going well. Eurojust played an important role of facilitator and
Gatherer on investigations involving several countries. In criminal matters, cooperation on the
attacks of January and November has been positive with a number of countries. Working with
the Spain is still of very high quality. Cooperation has worked also very well with the
Americans. In the context of a request for international criminal assistance, we got elements in
one night--when they want to go fast, they get there! The Belgium is a more complex case.
Relations between the two floors are excellent, but our two systems are very different.
Legislative developments in France has strengthened the powers of the Prosecutor's office,
allows guards to view up to six days, telephone surveys... In Belgium, custody is 24 hours, the
federal prosecutor is obliged to open an information very quickly, wiretapping must be fully
transcribed, even what is irrelevant. However, the joint team of investigation, signed
immediately after the attacks, has worked well. The Belgium is the country with which we have
the most current joint teams.
With regard to legislative improvements, can never say 'fountain I drink not your water. " the
problem is constantly evolving. We have the feeling that Bill currently in the Senate is going in
the right direction, notably on the extension of the possibilities of action the night. We wanted to
harden a little enforcement scheme penalties, including by providing ways more offensive to the
fringe of five to ten years, with the socio-judiciaire monitoring and judicial, to avoid surveillance
the output dry.

About the Bataclan, it would be risky to suggest that the attacks could have been avoided on the
basis of information received from the Egyptian authorities in 2009, which could never be
substantiated in procedure and instead were undermined by the attitude of Egyptians, which have
released the main players suspected to be in connection with Mr. Ben Abbes all this leading to a
decision of dismissal by an investigating judge. It cannot be denied that the problem arose at one
point but, as soon as an investigating judge concluded, after investigation, that the threat was not
proven, it was difficult to engage protection, which should extend over several years.
Mr president. The folder was not supported in 2009 and has been the subject of a dismissal
order. There was then, by 2015, the information of a threat to an auditorium. But the issue of the
rapporteur is not the legalization; it comes to know if he should not have been to inform the
owners of the Bataclan threat. We put this question to Mr Cazeneuve, who replied that he had no
specific information because of the confidentiality of the investigation.
M. Franois Molins. I am not best placed to answer you because justice is not responsible for
the protection of persons and public order, but if we had brought the information of a threat in
2009, we would have also brought in 2011 that dismissed partly because nothing could be
verified.
Ms. Camille Harker. According to PV in custody, Raj Hame speaks of a rock concert in a
European country. He said that Abaaoud asked him to choose "an easy target, a concert, for
example, where there's of the world. It remains rather vague and the Bataclan is not targeted.
Lots of targets today are likely to be the subject of attacks. The presence of two police officers or
soldiers at the entrance of the Bataclan dissuaded three individuals armed with Kalashnikovs and
vests of explosives to enter the premises?
Mrs Franoise Dumas. On behalf of the Socialist Group, I thank you, Mr Prosecutor, for the
serenity and the accuracy of your communication at the time of the attacks. How do you manage
the press? How, first of all, do you have apprehended this question during the attacks and how,
then, could be improved operative in the sense both of prevention, information useful and
protective, and combating the rumors and irresponsible information?
Mr Franois Lamy. I agree with the issue of Franoise Dumas on the management of the press.
How have you dealt with the problem between January and November, and since November? In
an environment of permanent information, social networks and other new must procedures not be
considered?
Also, what are your feelings on the role and usefulness of the State of emergency?
M. Franois Molins. According to the times and issues, approaches to the press can be
extremely permissive or on the contrary extremely repressive. When is today opened an
investigation for violation of the confidentiality of investigations and concealment of violation of
the confidentiality of the investigation, legislation is such that you can almost do anything
against a journalist who refuses to indicate how it obtained information. On the other hand, the
need for information in terrorist cases is immense and I think that it is the duty of the institution
to communicate a minimum of objective information to the public; It is the responsibility of the

Prosecutor, pursuant to article 11, paragraph 3, of the code of criminal procedure. We have
integrated it into our operations, but we are obliged to respect certain principles: objectivity,
respect for the victims, presumption of innocence... Thus, it is difficult to speak during a custody;
the right time is rather the transfer of persons indicted, and after.
There are leaks. We try to call journalists to responsibility but we have not met with much
success so far and we are sometimes very shocked to see that some newspapers are in possession
of information that they shouldn't have as they relate to ongoing investigations and are protected.
Some play the game and retain this kind of information, others disclosed. As to social networks,
it is absolutely impossible to control. I also learned that a news agency had lost a big market
because one of the shareholders had got wind of the fact that the Agency had not provided
information in its possession...
Mr president. Why don't you a flagrante delicto in concealment of violation of the
confidentiality of the investigation, not only to mark the spirits?
M. Franois Molins. When we open investigations, ninety-nine times out of 100 they might lead
to nothing. They lead only when photos are shared on social networks, by journalists at the edge,
police or fire brigade apprentices who took pictures on the crime scenes...
The rapporteur. In January, Mr. Jean-Paul Ney, on social networks, is the first to broadcast the
identity of the brothers Kaye. I imagine that this could greatly harm the investigation. Have it
you pursued?
M. Franois Molins. Yes. I do not think that his revelation has hindered investigations but it is
certain that she could have that effect.
It must also take into account the European Court of the human rights, whose attitude is
extremely permissive with respect to the right to information. It has thus shrunk like a skin of
grief the jurisprudence of the french courts, since it recognizes a right to inform as this
corresponds to a legitimate need for information to the public. There are the facts for which we
could condemn a person 20 years ago and we cannot today.
Mr Franois Lamy. The secret of the statement no longer exists. We saw last week that minutes
of police found in the press. Do we not have interest to move to another system, a crisis
communication by information in real time from the French?
M. Franois Molins. Judicial communication must be mastered and rely on the certainty of the
truth and the reality of what will be brought to the attention of the public. It is no coincidence if
the parquet communicates very little in two or three hours that follow this type of event, because
we would be led to say things that would be contradicted later. I want not to pollute the
communication of the policy, and our communication will be anyway limited by the fact that we
can say things that could harm the conduct investigations.
Mr president. Still, it would seem that you have been a moment misled on the number of bullets
fired at Saint-Denis. Is this not an example of a too rapid communication?

M. Franois Molins. Altogether, this is a good example.

M. Jean-Michel Vel. Counsel for Salah Abdeslam threatened to file a complaint against you for
violation of the confidentiality of the investigation.
M. Franois Molins. It is more than a threat, he said, but as I said publicly, I am very serene.
The french and Belgian folders are connected by a particular device that is a joint investigation
team, which feeds both in the same way. French and Belgians are therefore working on an
identical record, but we communicate each according to our own rules. I communicate in
accordance with article 11, paragraph 3, of the code of criminal procedure french and Belgian
code. Therefore, there is no problem.
The State of emergency, Mr Lamy, to proceed to an administrative mode searches for which
there is insufficient evidence to lead them in a legal framework. The judiciary remains outside. I
have the feeling that the State of emergency gave rise to many results in organized crime but
more modest results on terrorism: five searches resulted in the opening of judicial proceedings.
Mr president. Four of which are the apology, is not it?
M. Franois Molins. No, we are on the AMT. To be precise, one of these five searches allowed
to enrich an existing prosecution process.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. If I had any doubt, I just realize, listening to you, that the world has really
changed since the time I left your House. We were within the anti-terrorist section, lovers; We
did not have in charge of operations such as those that you have conducted, and I admire the
professionalism of this section today. I am reassured, while I had doubts and heard some players
heard by this Committee of inquiry.
I wrote to the Chairman of our Committee some time about an audio recording made at the
Bataclan ago and to determine the exact unfolding of the facts. President you grabbed and let me
hear that this document is covered by the confidentiality of the investigation, you could reveal
the content to our Committee. However, it would have been useful.
Do you have the reports with the DGSE, even informal, to obtain information about the areas in
the Middle East, including on the return in France, without going through the ISB? Our fear at
all, these are returns of Syria when the Islamic State will be reduced. You have indicated you
want to implement procedures for TN criminal. If according to our political authorities, this
would be between 500 and 700 French. Have you thought about setting up a specific criminal
procedure, purified? Should be significantly shorter deadlines.
M. Franois Molins. The soundtrack is indeed sealed. I listened and it shows that well there
were two time tonight there: the forward and the after the entry of the Commissioner of the BAC.
The executions of victims take place before the intervention of the Commissioner and his driver.

We have no institutional relations with the DGSE, even if I personally the best relations of the
world with Mr. Bajolet. Our interface is SID. It is she who makes the interface with all the
intelligence community, with the exception of Tracfin.
Regarding the return of Syria, I agree with you. It is certain that the criminal policy change arise
a question of means. It is necessary, as said my colleague, whether it means that follow.
It is not forbidden to think about how to soften criminal procedure. A questionnaire is being
circulated by the Directorate of Criminal Affairs and pardons for all of french floors on their
feeling on this subject. Procedural changes will be needed to judge all these people within a time
compatible with respect for the time limits for detention and the requirements of the reasonable
period of time of the European Convention.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Counsel for some of the victims, information should be forwarded to the
owners of the Bataclan that there was a threat on this room in reason, that she had organized
evenings for the Jewish community to Israel.
What you said about the internet is worrying. I remember the 20 000 tweets "I am Kaye" or "I
am Christian", and it is without doubt of de facto impossible to identify these 20,000 people.
Death on internet threats are not rare either. Is there nothing to do? Should there not be very
penalties to deter enjoy the vastness and the anonymity of the Web?
During the attack theHypercacher, Betty revealed that hostages were in the cold room, while it
was trying to block information. Would it not to enact laws to establish an absolute blackout, as
exists in certain countries: a total ban on contact with very heavy sanctions?
M. Franois Molins. I have nothing to add to what I have said about the Bataclan. If the
information had been given at the time, the dismissal would come to mean that the threat could
not be accredited.
The Internet is still guarded. I have no illusions, given the immensity of the problem, but there
the DCPJ platform PHAROS specializing in surveillance, which received many reports and
allows to initiate investigations when are discovered of illegal content, including crimes of
apology.
The embargo you describe seems a good idea. The Belgium has a system known in our jargon as
the 'small cats system. By putting 'small cats' on the internet, they manage to make it clear to
journalists and to the people that everyone must be silent about what is happening. And it works:
we saw a few weeks ago when a huge operation was conducted and no one has mentioned, which
led the Belgian police to put on the internet a huge flat of kibble to reward small cats.
Similarly, the Spanish procedure allows the judge to take a decision to embargo prohibiting
anyone to publish information about the relevant folder. This works also.
Mr president. It is what the Anglo-Saxons.

Mr. Meyer Habib. Israel also.

Ms. Camille Harker. A complaint was filed against Betty by one of the women present in the
cold room. We wondered what legal basis should give to this complaint, because it seemed to us
important, at least symbolically, to Betty and journalists who had relayed the information their
responsibilities. We have not found and we therefore had to resort to the generic offence of
endangering the lives of others, but we knew from the outset that it was doomed to failure
because it had to prove deliberate for a special duty of care or safety violation. This has allowed
to proceed with hearings. A transaction has taken place with the victims and the procedure is
stopped. The leak may endanger the life of persons or forcing services to precipitate arrest
operations, as happened in the case of the arrest of Salah Abdeslam, while extremely dangerous
operation should happen in a district with schools. Operations are conducted to adapt to the
timing of the press. It should therefore be to reflect on an offence to repress behaviors that
endanger police officers and the victims.
Mr president. The Commission of inquiry will think.
M. Olivier Marleix. I welcome the inflection of criminal policy. Were already there with
indictments on the basis of article 421-6 of the criminal code? What is the foreseeable timeframe
of the judgment on the initial review on this basis? On the other hand, could article 411-4 on
intelligence with a power or foreign organization serve as basis for the charge against the
terrorists of Daech, or else is an obsolete section? Will these people not be protected by the
principle of non bis in idem absence have been prosecuted on a sufficiently heavy qualification?
Mr. Serge Grouard. Should not go to a territorial network of the Organization, using the
parquet of province?
M. Franois Molins. It takes a territorial mesh in a pragmatic approach allowing anti-terrorist
prosecutors to use the resources of local procuratorates to deal with attacks of magnitude. If
multiple attacks occur tomorrow in greater Lyon or nice, then, when we will open a crisis unit in
Paris, support us - a circular was published in this sense last December 18 - on the human
resources of the local prosecutor's office, because we will need to assist the victims or the
management of forensic medicine in conjunction with IML. But this cannot result in a devolution
of powers to other than the Paris parquet floors. If a justice specialized in anti-terrorist matters
was created in 1986, it is precisely to fight against loss resulting from lack of unity of action and
coherence in the handling of these cases.
Article 411-4, when it comes to a foreign power, we think a State. This would give Daech of
titles of nobility that he does not deserve.
Criminal TN have already been notified for people returned from Syria, where they participated
in abuses, but we can deal with sprawling records referring to the organisation of courses as
much simpler folders whose treatment does not present the same difficulty.
Ms. Camille Harker. Records are open to the criminal once an individual is on zone, and we all
of old indictments under a correctional visa by soliciting the magistrate a residual referral on

criminal TN. The calendar, in terms of appearance before the trial court, should not be very long.
In addition to the individuals of which it is determined that they have committed abuses on area,
criminal TN is also covered on the investigations into the attacks. For example, when Salah
Abdeslam will be back in France, he will be indicted for murder, attempted murder and TN
criminal.
Mrs Vronique Davkota. The centralization of information is our strength. Climb up to this
crisis cell unique, only instead of decision, is absolutely essential. By comparison, it is very
complicated to work with Germany, whose structures are broken in the different Lnder.
Mr president. Thank you. We send you the recognition of national representation for the work
you do.
Hearing, behind closed doors, Ms. Laurence Le Vert, first Vice President of the instruction
to the anti-terrorism pole TGI de Paris, and Mr. David Bnichou, Vice President of
education at the anti-terrorism pole of the same git
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, March 30, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We welcome Ms. Laurence Le Vert, first Vice President of the
instruction to the anti-terrorism pole of the tribunal of Grand instance of Paris and Mr. David
Bnichou, vice-president in charge of education in this same pole. Thank you, Madam first VicePresident and Mr vice-president, for having responded to the invitation of our Committee of
inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015. We have
heard the Prosecutor of the Republic in Paris and anti-terrorism prosecutors officials and started
to address all legal issues; We continue with you, in the respect of the separation of powers, our
investigations on the means to fight against terrorism. We will focus the anti-terrorism pole and
the relevance of the legislation you are Artwork.
Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, this hearing takes
place behind closed doors and is therefore not disseminated on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of Ordinance No. 58-1100 on 17 November 1958 on
the functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in
part, if we decide so at the end of our work. Accounts of the hearings in camera will be first
forwarded to persons agreed to their comments. The latter will be submitted to the commission,
which may decide to State in his report. In accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is
punishable by the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who,
within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a
commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission
referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.
Ms. Laurence Le Vert and Mr. David Benichou take oath.

Ms. Laurence Le Vert, first Vice President of the instruction to the anti-terrorism Court of
major jurisdiction of Paris pole. The anti-terrorism section of the statement is currently a
Senior Vice President and head of section, as well as eight Vice-Chairmen, the last position
having been created by 2015 as a result of the attacks of January and provided last September.
We are all loaded with the statement and count each a clerk in our firm. two administrative
officers scan information kits, and four other officers - two full-time and two part-time highlight form records, establish trading, make them and issue licences to visit, these
administrative tasks to be very heavy.
Since the attacks of November 13, a new clerk has joined our team; placed with the vicepresident, magistrate first seised of the record of the attacks in November, he received the
constitutions of civil party, more than, at present, the six hundred. It is therefore a task full time
for one, or even two, since we had already received many constitutions of civil party after the
bombings in January and found that engorgeait cabinet and prevented the examining magistrate
to conduct interrogations, the presence of a clerk being indispensable. Also the competent
Registrar we received, another full-time administrative officer soon replace one of our agents at
half-time, which will go on maternity leave.
The aftermath of January 2015, we had exposed to the garde des sceaux and our the problem of
the treatment of data hierarchy. A wizard specializing in computer science, from the customs, we
finally joined this week and will help full-time section to operate all computer media seized,
which provide the main data of the information kits.
We have also been equipped with new equipment, including shelves that we avoid to carry our
computers and offer greater security because data are only on a USB key. We have developed a
dual computer display which saves us considerable time since it allows to copy paragraphs of the
scanned files. We have mobile phones, encrypted, on which we can receive our professional
mails, while this is not permitted on our phones and our personal computers for safety reasons.
Finally, we were the last service of the Ministry of justice to receive the system scanner NPP4:
more efficient and faster, it helps us especially to perform inventories of records.
We are six judges to investigate the attacks of November 13, 2015, and human and technical
reinforcement prove much-needed!
The President Georges Fenech. So much for the means. And for legislation?
Ms. Laurence green. We expect the vote on the draft law strengthening the fight against
organized crime, terrorism and their financing, and further improving efficiency and guarantees
of criminal procedure, currently being discussed in Parliament.
We encounter computer problems, the legislation is revealing insufficient to allow us to access
the data, while the systems used by members of the Islamic State (ARS) are very advanced. They
encrypt their documents, with containers, and have the latest iPhone enabling them to secure
their data. The volume of the latter is considerable, and we wanted that the law allows us to
capture, in the context of a technical commission, stored data and not only those to come, as
currently. Our request without impeding freedoms, and satisfaction we avoid losing mines of

intelligence on the activities of these people, on the way in which they left in Syria, on what they
have done and the people with whom they correspond.
We would like that the extension of correctional detention period, currently set at four months,
be increased to six months. Indeed, the current standard forces us to make an order at the end of
two and a half months to capture the Attorney of the Republic in order to obtain requisitions and
transmission to the judge of freedoms and detention (JLD). Between two extensions, inmates can
form up to two applications for release per day, which represents a significant loss of time for the
firm, and even a risk if we shall decide in due course on a request for referral to the Board of
education. Detainees may appeal every decision.
He must now integrate data carriers in the functioning of justice, their volume can be
considerable; can no longer commit expert so they print anything that might be of interest to the
investigation. Experts report their operations, describe the seals and the techniques used, and set
the data to which they have acceded on hard disk. It becomes a part of the procedure at which
lawyers have access; the consultation of the file requires a suitable material that we have not, so
lawyers can not see the rooms. We also duplicate six hundred times the hardware to put at
disposal of each civil party - not to mention the third review. It will be physically impossible and
even dangerous, because investigators often join on CD-ROM, a significant video that must be
included in the file; However, in the context of a request for freedom, counsel must be able to
consult the file at the Board of education, and if it doesn't have access to this data, the release
must be ordered automatically in the two days preceding the passage before the Board of
education. These data carriers have become inescapable, but there is no alternative but to place
them under seal.
The President Georges Fenech. The extension of custody all four months concerns well the
only criminal procedures?
Ms. Laurence green. Yes. In criminal matters, the first detention may last one year and the
renewal takes place every six months. We liked that we retain this same six month period for
correctional detention.
The President Georges Fenech. According to the Prosecutor of the Republic, more and more
before you on a criminal basis, via the criminalization of conspiracy.
Mr. David Bnichou, Vice President responsible for the statement to the tribunal of Grand
instance of Paris anti-terrorism pole. Yes, the Prosecutor's office began to change its doctrine.
Ms. Laurence green. At the end of information, should be correctionnaliser to avoid clogging
the Assize Court specially composed, because records are heavy and it has only two rooms. We
must ensure not to expose our country to be condemned by the European Court of the human
rights (ECHR), which considers that, except in exceptional circumstances, an Assize Court must
judge a person in pre-trial detention for a year.
The President Georges Fenech. How many judges work on co-saisine records?

Ms. Laurence green. We are at least two.

The President Georges Fenech. And the attacks of November 13?
Ms. Laurence green. We are six. After two weeks, 56 volumes of parts have arrived, with many
urgent to achieve - acts continue the action of a parquet on refunds of body and the
identifications of the victims, launch investigations urgent as rogatory international in Germany,
Belgium and Austria, which required travel. We are not too six for this folder, the biggest I have
seen.
The President Georges Fenech. This means that two-thirds of the anti-terrorist investigating
judges are mobilized by this folder?
Ms. Laurence green. Yes, while the statement of other folders.
The President Georges Fenech. You are not unloaded from the other cases?
Ms. Laurence green. No, but our staff to treat urgently required to be.
The President Georges Fenech. Who is the Director judge this folder?
Ms. Laurence green. Mr Christophe Teissier.
Mr. David Bnichou. It is true that our resources increase; We have thus received this week an
assistant, which will be very useful to us. It remains no less that we still need help, and that we
are still, on the legislative level, in application of adjustments.
In April 2015 was published an essay entitled "The jihadism" editions Plon, in which I proposed
very specific lines of thought. Some of them are already debated, others soon will be.
The President Georges Fenech. For example?
Mr. David Bnichou. The question of the relationship between the judiciary and the
intelligence. Since 2001, the United States have understood that we needed to shoot down the
wall of China between services. In France, it maintains the separation between intelligence and
the judiciary; However, in the field of terrorism, not shared information only will not operate.
We are sealed by this culture of division, inherited from history; in intelligence, it operates in
secret to perform Counterintelligence and we do not share information, while it should be
communicated, in the field of counter-terrorism, to all the departments concerned, and even to
our international partners.
Changing this culture is proving slow in our country, and requires a philosophical reflection on
the Organization of the State. Is there now a requirement justifying the separation of intelligence
and the judiciary? Perhaps in some areas, but not necessarily in others.

It is the practice that allowed me to draw up this observation. Judges have the legitimacy to use
certain investigative means, but they do not, while the situation is reverse for intelligence. The
situation has evolved to intelligence, who has the right, since the promulgation of the law of July
24, 2015, to do what it was already in fact. However, the legalization of intelligence remains an
obstacle course: the declassification of the documents is complex and administrative interviews,
normally systematized, are not defined. they can give rise to classified notes, even though they
sometimes make the starting point of criminal prosecution.
Judge, I am attached to the respect of the texts and their consistency with the functioning of the
institutions. In application of article 40 of the code of criminal procedure the discretionary
prosecution is the responsibility of the Prosecutor of the Republic. However, in counterterrorism, one who holds the information decides the law or not, resulting in the legalization of
de facto prosecution. The Prosecutor of the Republic is thus deprived of its power to decide
whether to prosecute; the intelligence service turn to him when he would take the necessary
legalization. Intelligence will always occupy an essential place in the device, but it is necessary
to find a joint to work more closely with the judiciary.
The President Georges Fenech. The Attorney we has indeed said that it depended on
intelligence, but it deems excellent relations between the prosecution and the service. A few
weeks ago M the rapporteur and myself met Mr. Molins and asked him if we could consider to
detach a cell of the ITSB with the Prosecution Department to encourage the legalization. He does
it not considered useful. What do you suggest for desegregating the intelligence and the
judiciary?
Mr. David Bnichou. I would not suggest you create a commission, I wanted to just the
problem... This is not because it works sometimes evil that relations are not good on a daily
basis; on the other hand, if we reason in terms of synergy between institutions, some things are
improving. The judiciary is completely alien to the activity of the coordination unit for
combating terrorism (UCLAT), the Ministry of the Interior and intelligence are circulating
information between them and define set of priorities. One could imagine an instance offering a
place to the parquet and each service, to exchange information, identify priorities and General or
concrete - concerns as the opportunity of prosecution to protect a source. Magistrates have
interest in knowing these items as early as possible for failing to manage improbable situations,
as, for example, a requisition of the Central Directorate of the judicial police (DCPJ) making us
fall back on a computer used by an agent of ISB!
The President Georges Fenech. You develop a parquetiere, very upstream Intelligence
vision, but you as a judge can issue a rogatory commission in co-saisine with the DCPJ and ISB,
and so have authority over the intelligence and access to information.
Mr. David Bnichou. My authority is limited to the judiciary, and my interlocutors to CSB
sometimes betray secrets to inform me - all being classified - information, so that the
management of the relations between the judiciary and the intelligence remains difficult. I have
no solution for this problem, which deserves a true reflection.

One can nevertheless consider concrete initiatives, such as the development of joint training to
magistrates and intelligence officers. Recently, I submit, to the Academy of intelligence, our
activity to people whom I'm told neither the name nor the function. These exchanges prove very
useful, no doubt because each Party largely ignores the work of the other. It is very important
from an operational point of view, to reconcile men: This allows to know the constraints of each
and to dispel the natural mistrust of intelligence against the judiciary, services fearing that any
information provided to the judiciary is found in the press.
Investigators should also receive briefing notes sent to the offices of the Ministers on the fight
against terrorism, because some information might interest them to ongoing investigations.
However, no return is effected.
Some technical means we are also lacking; Since the Act of March 14, 2011 orientation and
programming for the performance of internal security, known as 'LOPPSI 2', judges can capture
data remotely by implementing 'Trojan horses' legal in computers and phones. In November
2014, this faculty has been quite rightly extended to taking pictures and sound, but the legal
regime for use of these tools provides an administrative authorization, issued by the National
Agency for the security of information systems (ANSSI) and subject to very strict conditions. It
was suggested a relaxation to allow judges to appoint legal experts - honorable and competent
people who sometimes received the same training as people working in the ANSSI - able to
develop a specific tool for a folder, because flexibility is necessary, the window of opportunity to
deal with a case that could close in two weeks. But, in November 2014, M. Cazeneuve, Minister
of the Interior, estimating required the approval of the ANSSI, had convinced the Senate to
withdraw an amendment proposing this evolution.
This topic particularly interests me, and I will read an extract from the minutes of the debate that
was held March 3 to your Assembly, in which M. Victor, keeper of the seals, Minister of justice,
fond of these issues, stated, about an identical amendment, defended by M. Ciotti: " now that it
offers is built and that clearances are requested. ", we consider that this issue is behind us . I
was pleased to this declaration and have called my correspondent to the Ministry of justice,
because these tools can help me in a dozen business. My correspondent told me that two
companies have received approval, but that they develop products that work only on an operating
system. This administrative authorization system favours large industrial able to devote time and
resources to market systems allowing them to win public commands on the important market
uptake of remote data. So let's find us with heavy and little reactive investigative tools as is the
case of the platform national judicial interceptions (PNIJ), in service, already outdated.
Should be allowed judges to resort to experts who develop intrusion tools adapted to each case.
Alternatively, you can use the technical assistance Center (CTA), which reconciles the need for
confidentiality expressed by services and the need for justice result. The code of criminal
procedure permits the judge to require State means protected by the confidential defence to
decrypt media and could task the CTA to Implementation of the means of capture remotely. How
is made this capture does not matter, since it is legal in nature, being ordered by a judge in a
particular case and for specific reasons. The legality cannot result from the approval of a
technical service. Intelligence services use these tools, but they do not want to share them with
the judiciary, by legitimate fear of disclosure and threat on the job they do. However, the priority

is the fight against terrorism, and we need these instruments possessed by the State and funded
by the taxpayer. Mutualisons them so that they are used at full capacity; well, inventive members
will find the legal means to guarantee their confidentiality... Because based on the CTA for
decryption, could do the same for the uptake of data remotely.
This issue concerns not only terrorism. You have probably heard talk about scams to "fake
president", which I have taught one of the first cases, which involved the theft of one million
euros to the Caisse des Dpts et consignations (CDC) in 2012. I wanted to put in place a data
capturing remotely to identify the perpetrators, and an expert, former agent of the General
Directorate of external security (DGSE), could develop an effective tool. However, people told
him that he lacked accreditation and that he was not authorized to provide me with this
instrument. This would have perhaps failed to solve the case, but these scammers, who are
known and who stole total hundreds of millions of euros to French companies, will never be
stopped if it not hunts down in real time. Our country has the technical means to cope with this
form of crime, but we we sometimes create legal difficulties that make us unable to effectively
mobilize all the forces at our disposal to enforce the law.
Intelligence can serve the judiciary, but the reverse is also true.
We do not always the most suitable legal framework to our needs, and we really need to build
bridges of communication between the judicial and intelligence. I don't have a miracle solution,
and changes will be complex because each service has its own culture. Therefore at least launch
the reflection! We held last week, with the DRM and the legal service of the Ministry of defence,
a meeting during which we discussed the exchanges that we would like to develop; for each of
them, the legal service, doing his job, recalled the need for a legal vehicle.
When phones and hard drives found during a search, we realize copies to exploit data, and these
working copies of the digital seals pose an acute problem. We used to entrust a judicial expert
that made us six months later in wheelbarrows of paper... This method proved unproductive, we
in have changed, especially as it had become impossible to print the contents of all data
collected: the impression of an 80 gigabyte hard drive data represents a height of paper equal to
three times that of the Eiffel Tower. We therefore need to work with digital media, which
become elements of the procedure, but we are in the physical impossibility to issue copies.
However the Board of education releases defendants if they did not all media available to them.
You can place these items under seal to save the procedure, but then it does not operate the data;
Conversely, you can exploit them, but it poses risks to the procedure. To escape from this
dilemma, should the law stipulates that the working copy of a seal obeys the same legal regime
as seal, that one is not obliged to transmit to the parties. This would certainly provoke protests,
but counsel could always request an adversarial examination of seals. In any case, need
investigators and the judge to be able to operate these media to fulfill their mission.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. What method do you use to share information between
you? Can you establish the ramifications between the different cases which often carry on
nebulae and networks? How do you not lose the essential information on terrorism?

Furthermore, the Act of 13 November 2014 strengthening the provisions relating to the fight
against terrorism has created the criminalisation of terrorist proprietorship. Have it you already
used? Have convictions already pronounced on its basis?
Mr. David Bnichou. The sharing of information between us is empirical, because we don't
have our records information-sharing tool. The top version, NPP4, the scanning software
procedures constitutes a setback in my eyes. We put thirty seconds to navigate to a folder, and
this time now is five minutes. We are therefore talking between colleagues, but are sometimes
investigators or prosecutors who are the link between our business. Need us a database
containing all names appearing in our records, such as that available to the intelligence services.
The deployment of such a file would require a simple legal authorization, the human resource
was already available and the technique is not complex: just a server and software.
The rapporteur. A personal data file, FSPRT, common and powered by different services, has
been established. How not to lose the memory of records when a judge leaves the anti-terrorism
pole? You advocate the creation of a judicial database to gather information, but without going
so far make it common with the intelligence services might align with what is already used
elsewhere in the State? In times of crisis, rapid access to information is essential, so it is
important that investigators have access to your knowledge. How to establish such circuits of
transmission?
Mr. David Bnichou. When names appear in a case, I would like to know if they are known,
and a file as the FSPRT us would be most useful. Today, I have to call my correspondent that he
seeks intelligence.
The rapporteur. The UCLAT is responsible for the database of the FSPRT, that the operational
staff of prevention of terrorism (EMOPT) feeds. Can you claim the specifications of an
individual for any of your records?
Mr. David Bnichou. In our field, we still need to have all the information, because a simple
detail, even insignificant for one who has knowledge, may be important for such or such affair.
As for the FSPRT, ISB agent only told me about this pure intelligence file, which might be
useful for the judiciary. We also collect plenty of material that could be of interest to the
intelligence services. Our records are scanned and indexed, and a simple search engine would
benefit. Nevertheless, the secret of education authorizes the judge to have access to records in
which it is designated, even if the codesignation allows to share information.
The rapporteur. In the intelligence services, of this file has proved complex: think you can feed
such a file over water?
A common file to intelligence and the judiciary, beyond the legal issues he would ask, would it
be useful and allow you to reduce the separation between these two worlds?
Mr. David Bnichou. The idea of a common file is too ambitious, because its creation would
encounter too many problems. On the other hand, could construct instances of cooperation and

Exchange. The Americans have established working groups - joint task forces -in which several
services meet, present their applications to the other and are studying what can be achieved.
There is not necessarily need to create a new file dealing with the data, since all our records are
already scanned and indexed full-text. A search by keyword allows access to information.
The rapporteur. Do you have this search engine?
Mr. David Bnichou. Yes, I have a. I got, at the end of six months, the financing of a server for
my cabinet; It inserts all the seals of the procedures, which allows to find then all the data
immediately.
The rapporteur. But it is not common to the anti-terrorism pole?
Mr. David Bnichou. No, this is not possible legally. Yet, one could install a server with a
search engine like mine at the scale of an entire service. Need to know what you want: advance
quickly in investigations, or focus on the protection of data?
Yesterday I asked a person in a procedure of individual terrorist company, but cases are rare. For
a time, this tool is useful only on the margin. Indeed, it almost always falls on a company of two
or more persons; individual projects are often mounted by madmen. On the other hand, one can
imagine that this criminalization serves for a very determined person and not communicating
with anyone.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Your wishes regarding the communication between the judiciary and the
intelligence are the ideal world, but when I defended this idea, Ms. Le Vert witnessed, the
Minister of the Interior at the time criticized me wanting him to take "his" direction de
surveillance du territoire (DST)! It still managed to investigators from the DST to become
judicial police officers (OPJ).
Intelligence officers do not want to disclose the identity of their sources, still less to explain how
they obtained their information, their methods are almost always illegal. Magistrates would not
be in trouble if they had access to these items?
Mr. David Bnichou. We can share information without providing the identity of the source. In
the judicial field, we manage human sources for years for Narcotics Affairs. The world of
intelligence still believes that we are novices in the field, but narcotics, an identified source is
sentenced to death.
We have no need to know the reasons prompting a source working for an intelligence service.
Simply need us information and its verification. This exercise is complex, but the judge must
have confidential discussions with the intelligence services. In some cases, I see a big difference
between information collected by intelligence and what is contained in the court file. It happens
that a person is accused itself before someone to appear as a kingpin, ignoring that it speaks to a
source.

Mr. Alain Marsaud. And if Salah Abdeslam asked you to benefit from the status of repentant
informing you on a network in Molenbeek, in France, in Syria or elsewhere, what would be your
attitude?
Mr. David Bnichou. The procedure I can query a third review for my folder. If he wishes to
talk to intelligence, I can make it available and establish permits to communicate. However,
some services will not even appear on a permit to communicate while you must be registered to
enter a prison.
M. Olivier Marleix. Do you know democratic countries judicial systems where it was able to
overcome some of the barriers that you mentioned?
Mr. David Bnichou. In 2014, I did a study in Israel stay. This country has developed
jurisprudence and procedures in this area, and it was interesting to examine how a democratic
State was able to integrate the use of force in its operation. A modern democracy must have the
legal tools allowing it to use force under conditions laid down and written. The Israeli authorities
often evoke their procedure of administrative detention, but they would dream to have our pretrial detention. They have adopted an anglo-saxon system which is complex for investigators,
and they envy us our investigative judge, window unique and informal for investigators, which is
our strength. Indeed, it may very quickly the permissions issue. Intelligence is inspired by this
operation by creating the National Commission of control of intelligence techniques (CNCTR).
Certain ISB agents complain about the complexity of setting up administrative listening, while
the process of judicial listens is very simple because of the proximity between the judge and the
investigator. The latter will not take the risk to mislead the judge with whom he works every day.
There are fruitful exchanges to develop between France and Israel in these areas, Israel enjoying
unfortunately experience.
I just make a study trip to the United States, where the information is predominant. The
structures for the exchange of information between agencies work pretty well and are more
suited to our size, the Americans facing difficulties to coordinate coordination structures.
The United States have very restrictive criminal proceedings, but excellent sentences, i.e. the
inverse of our country, which has excellent criminal proceedings but less good sentences. I heard
a case in 2014, regarding very radicalized jihadis who returned in Europe from the PakistanAfghanistan area with plans for attack. These individuals, to the extremely worrying profile, no
nothing 'dropped '; prosecuted in corrections for conspiracy in terrorism (TN), they were
sentenced to eight and nine years in prison. Arrested in 2008 and 2011, they will soon release. It
then continued systematically for correctional AMT, for which the maximum penalty is ten
years. The Americans have told me that such a folder would result in twenty-five years of
imprisonment in their country. I note with satisfaction that the policy of the Prosecutor's office
starts to change and that it uses more prosecutions in criminal TN for people passed through
Syria, this procedure may result in a sentence of 20 years in prison. This evolution creates
debate, but we must understand what one faces. A very long prison sentence represents the only
way to permanently disable a person; Sometimes, it is even not enough, as shown in the example
of a convicted person who has yet tried two years ago to escape bombing from the high-security

district where he had managed to enter the C-4! People like him, we will have dozens in the
future!
M. Olivier Marleix. Article 411-4 of the penal code criminalizes the fact of maintaining
intelligences with another State or a foreign organization: could he provide a relevant basis for
prosecution? I asked the same question to the Prosecutor of the Republic in Paris earlier. We
search for effective penalties for many jihadis returning from Syria, knowing that it will be
difficult to gather evidence in respect of acts committed in the theatre of operations. In criminal
matters, sufficient intend to characterize the offence, one could ask on the use of article 411-4,
which provides for a criminal sentence of thirty years.
Mr. David Bnichou. I am unfamiliar with this provision and do not know if it has already been
used. It is interesting to explore all avenues, but rely on this article would be to recognize
DAECH foreign organization status, and even of foreign State, a problematic political. It would
capture communications to demonstrate the existence of the agreement with DAECH and
therefore make progress regarding the interception of encrypted content.
We can take action in the device getting the conversation before the encryption or decryption:
this action is called the uptake of remote data. The legislature has allowed us to do so in 2011,
but we have still not means.
The rapporteur. How do you work with the police and the gendarmerie in judicial review?
There were difficulties in this area; What are your thoughts on this subject?
Ms. Laurence green. Judicial controls are indeed hard. Either be conducted conventional
controls based on scores in a service of police or gendarmerie, on prohibitions in connection with
the alleged offences, as does to communicate with certain people, and eventually, on the port of
the electronic bracelet; However, it is a fallible tool, people can leave without you noticing.
Either they put in place judicial controls organised by the correctional services integration and
probation (SPIP), but the process is cumbersome because service helps the person looking for
work and follows in its obligations, as the score or the weekly account of its activities. Lunel is
the French town who provided the largest number of jihadists, whom many have died in Syria,
and once I set two with SPIP de Nmes and two with that of Montpellier, it has more than
capacity. In addition, the judicial control that is managed by the SPIP applies only to less
radicalized people. Among individuals returning from Syria, only minors or women may be
included in this procedure. Many people placed under judicial review go - this was the case of
jihadists with the headlines-, so that the detention proves to be much more appropriate for those
believed to be dangerous. The prison administration has implemented the de-radicalization
measures, which it is hoped the success to substitute bail under judicial remand.
I have instructed many basque terrorism-related issues. ETA is now trying to negotiate his total
surrender, because it was dismantled thanks to the frequent traffic accidents involving
clandestine Basque terrorists in France in stolen cars and, above all, thanks to operations carried
out on the basis of information provided by the Spanish services. The latter, from the murder of
two civil guards in Capbreton in 2007, have had the possibility of working armed in France; This
has contributed to highly develop the Franco-Spanish cooperation on intelligence. So the

procedure is valid, french services were a report intended for the judicial police, in this case the
anti-terrorist branch (SDAT), indicating that information highlighted the presence of such and
such individual in a cottage or a cottage. These elements were not conclusive, but enough so that
the Prosecutor's office opened a preliminary inquiry that turned most often in flagrante, since the
information was accurate. You could then open the information, and the procedure was
completely regular. Spanish and french services have therefore provided information and the
process worked perfectly.
Related to international terrorism, the intelligence services cannot communicate all of their
information, because some come from foreign services they can transmit at any price. French
operational intelligence will not turn to the co-investigating judges, but to their counterparts of
the judiciary. Once lying on minutes, the elements are transmitted to the Prosecutor of the
Republic who can open a preliminary inquiry. It uses the information to establish loads that will
be used to produce legal results.
Intelligence can be done only in the anonymity of investigations. If you judiciarisait this
information for the criminalization of conspiracy jihadists, it would force the services officer to
testify before the Court of Assizes. However it cannot make them run the risk of breaking their
anonymity. In the example cited by Mr Benichou, the DRM agent has been designated as an
expert and did not know that this status could bring him to testify. Cannot run such a risk to
members of the intelligence services, who assume a heavy burden and difficult and that, for
some, are exposed through infiltration and treatment of sources. Judges must be aware of this
situation and taken into account. When intelligence can be used in a suitable legal framework
and according to a clear and legal procedure, let's do it, but we shouldn't judicialize intelligence
if we are not some of conduct until the trial court proceedings without incurring the slightest
suspicion, without risking cancellation and without endangering the people who dedicate their
lives to find the perpetrators of the attacks or the persons committing.
The President Georges Fenech. Madam first Vice-President, Mr vice-president, thank you for
having responded to our questions during the hearing interesting and useful.
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Denis Couh, first Assistant Vice President of the
regional court in Paris, Mr. Laurent Raviot, Vice President of the same court, presidents of
the 16e correctional Chamber, and Mr. Rgis de Jorna, president of the Court of appeal of
Paris
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, March 30, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. With the Prosecutor of the Republic of Paris and policy-makers
anti-terrorism Prosecutor, of one part, and the anti-terrorism pole prosecutors responsible for the
investigation, on the other hand, we were interested this afternoon to the judicial component.
We will continue with you, Mr President, in accordance with - naturally - the separation of
powers, our investigations on the means to fight against terrorism. In particular, we will focus on
the specific role of the Parisian courts, in particular the High Court and the Court of appeal,
where sits the Court Assizes, as well as on the relevance of the legislation you are Artwork.

The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, and in accordance with article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958 operation
parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at
the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will
previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. The latter will be
submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report. I recall that, pursuant to
the provisions of the same article, "shall be punished by penalties provided for in article 226-13
of the penal code -" one year of imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine - "anyone who, within a
period of twenty-five years [...], disclose or publish information relating to non-public works of a
commission of inquiry, except if the report published at the end of the work of the commission
has reported this information.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Please raise your right hand and say: "I swear."
Mr Denis Couh, Laurent Raviot, and Rgis de Jorna successively take oath.
Mr. Denis Couh, Assistant first vice-president of the tribunal of Grand instance of Paris,
president of the 16e correctional. I will briefly present the 16e Criminal Chamber of the Court
of major jurisdiction of Paris, room that we chair, Mr. Raviot and myself, so that Mrs. Faivre,
who has not been able to come today. Since 1St January 2016, have been assigned to this room
the processing of all terrorist cases before the tribunal. It was not so far since the records of
terrorism were divided between three rooms, the 10e, 14e and the 16e, which were themselves
divided into two sections, each composed of a Chairman and two assessors, a total of six sections
which sat only two afternoons a week.
In addition to the records of terrorism, three rooms dealt with also the records of the specialized
interregional jurisdiction (JIRS), i.e. related to organized crime, drug trafficking, arms
trafficking, to networks of pandering, trafficking in human beings human, clandestine
immigration networks... This scattering of responsibilities was major drawback of fragmenting
the processing of these cases which, for many of them, would require several days of hearing.
Thus, at the rate of two hearings a week, three in the best of cases, these cases monopolized
certain sections for several weeks, or even several months.
From 2012, it was envisaged the creation of a specialized Chamber "JIRS", in other words called
to deal with any organized crime, but also the records of terrorism. This room has been set up in
September 2013 and has the particularity to sit not at the rate of two or three hearings a week, but
continuous, i.e. at a rate of five hearings per week. The 16e room, where there were more section,
is now composed of three presidents, today Mrs. Faivre, M. Raviot and myself, and of three
assessors, six magistrates sitting in alternation.
Nevertheless, it should be recalled that this room has retained all its powers and procedures
crime organized together with records of terrorism. These latest records, whether they relate to

Islamist terrorism, basque terrorism, the party of the workers of Kurdistan (PKK) terrorism,
terrorism Corsica - even if the latest cases here go back several years-, represent, in days of
hearings, as one-third of the litigation that is entrusted to us, even though, since 1St January 2016,
we received an exclusive on terrorism. This state actually created, the first months of operation
of the 16e room, a bottleneck of the trial scheduling. Despite its reorganization or well because of
it, she was soon unable to absorb all the big files relating to terrorism, organized crime, etc.
Engorgement concerned folders for which it had no detainees and that always went after the
other, the urgency being understood to treat the files for which there were detainees. Also,
records of terrorism and banditry, increasing stock needed to find a solution to purge.
It is under these conditions that Mr. Hayat, president of the Court of major jurisdiction of Paris,
sought and obtained from the Chancellery of additional staff to create, within the 16e room, a
second section - we have therefore returned to system, anterior - 1er January 2015, so events
unrelated a few days later. This second section, originally intended to absorb these stocks,
unfortunately does not work as the first, but as the other chambers of the Court, with only a
Chairman and two assessors, and sits that three days a week - it cannot absorb what, first section,
we absorb.
The influx of cases of terrorism Islamist, attached to the fact that the number of cases of
organized crime decreases, well on the contrary, most recently led Mr. Hayat to seek a
reinforcement of this famous second section to get an extra Chair and be able to sit a further
hearing a week. This reinforcement should be effective only as from September 2016. However,
it became obvious that this extra will be insufficient to absorb all the folders which are
announced. The Attorney was heard by your Committee, and I imagine he told you what was the
volume of files that arrived and we were going to have to support to the extent that they fall
within our exclusive jurisdiction. Obviously, it would be necessary to create a second section
which is equal to the first, that is operating with three presidents and three judges assessors - it is
in my opinion the minimum imaginable.
The President Georges Fenech. The twelfth proposal of the report of the commission of inquiry
on the monitoring of sectors and individuals jihadists, commission to the work which the
rapporteur and myself participated, planned to entrust the JIRS, with the agreement and under the
control of the Paris Prosecutor's office, the statement, the prosecution and the trial of terrorist
cases of low gravity.
Mr. Denis Couh. The problem is that we are both JIRS and jurisdiction dealing with terrorism.
We handle so all large cases of the JIRS. The fact that we are the only room to operate
continuously, whenever arrives a folder within the JIRS linked to terrorism and fixed on five, ten
or even fifteen hearings...
The President Georges Fenech. No doubt have I badly expressed: is it possible to entrust this
type of folder to province JIRS?
Mr. Denis Couh. It seems to me very delicate.

The President Georges Fenech. The proposal to which I have referred is planning to entrust
"pursuit, training and judgment of terrorist offences low gravity" to province JIRS. Do you want
that all cases are centralized, even those of low gravity?
Mr. Denis Couh. Personally, insofar as there is an anti-terrorism Prosecutor in Paris, where the
offices of the investigating judges are in Paris, it seems logical that all cases are tried in Paris. In
addition, these cases still have a feature which takes the measure by practicing this type of file. It
therefore seems important to limit the number of jurisdictions that have to deal with. This is why
Mr. Hayat decided, what is completely new to entrust all records of terrorism since January
2016, the 16e room, which was absolutely not the case previously: I thus chaired there ten years
the 10e room, where succeeded, notably, basque terrorism files. Willingness is now to
concentrate all folders not only in Paris but in a single and even bedroom, even ask that these
rooms are robust, like what is on the statement or the Prosecutor's Office.
Now we know that a very large number of files will reach us, and we wonder about the
conditions in which we can actually treat them all, with the understanding that we don't want, by
experience, be specialized exclusively. Indeed, it seems to us somewhat dangerous rooms treat
that's records of terrorism: there is a risk of identification by the terrorists of the five or six
magistrates who exercise that this activity and that would therefore be targets; In addition, we
need to extract us, occasionally, this type of file anyway particularly heavy on psychologically
and stress, not to mention the media aspect...
The President Georges Fenech. That was the fate of specialized investigative judges.
Mr. Denis Couh. Of course, but they are ten in number and deal with that terrorism, while we
don't have, on our side, as three presidents to deal with terrorism between other things. This
deserves that we think. This is why our proposal that two chambers work continuously with
twice six magistrates seems not bewildering - especially, I insist, the JIRS records arrive us in
numbers and that they monopolize our days for three weeks in June, either 15 hearings. This
poses intractable problems of trial scheduling, especially when we need to organize hearingsrelays and extend detention because we are not able to judge these records within the period of
two months set by law. We are thus now almost always forced to extend deadlines to the
maximum, twice two months, for a total of six months, which is satisfactory for anyone.
The President Georges Fenech. These problems are probably taken into account by the
president Hayat as well as by the Chancellery.
Mr. Denis Couh. We fear in the very short term, i.e. from the start of September, as our
colleagues in the Prosecutor's office indicate us, there is a real problem: we are not going to be
able to absorb all the folders.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you also, in the field of terrorism, immediate appearance
hearings?
Mr. Denis Couh. No, none.

Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. And with regard to the justification of terrorism?

Mr. Denis Couh. It is another room.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you share the same feeling, Mr Raviot?
M. Laurent Raviot, first vice-president of the tribunal of Grand instance of Paris, president
of the 16e correctional. I agree with my colleague on the centralisation, for two reasons: firstly
it allows specialization of judges and a better knowledge of terrorist cases, which present a real
particularity; It then allows a harmonization of the jurisprudence, as should avoid dissonant
jurisprudence that would be difficult to understand for opinion and even for the litigant.
I know however the paradoxical nature of such centralization because, like my colleague, I do
not wish to become a potential target on the part of people that we consider or who are close to
them, risk which can lead the exclusive specialisation of a room. I am thinking the difficulties
encountered by the JIRS de Marseille, which deals with Marseille and Corsica banditry and
makes very strong criticism on the part of local lawyers and the press - phenomenon that we
don't meet in Paris. Therefore criticized this JIRS too limited jurisdiction.
The President Georges Fenech. It's a bit lot of all repressive rulers.
M. Laurent Raviot. Certainly but, I insist, this criticism is rarely made to us in Paris, even
though we sometimes conjures up the specter of the State Security Court, a subservient to the
power Chamber. In any case, personally, I've never experienced this criticism.
Mr. Denis Couh. It is more common in the province, indeed. When I was chairing the JIRS of
Bordeaux, meant more regularly that in Paris the room to be treated by Special Court. Insofar, in
addition, where we are three to co-chair this room, and where we are almost always dealing with
the same lawyers, they realize that the composition is not strictly the same, which shows that we
are a number to be able to treat these files with different sensitivities and a form of jurisprudence
is created thanks to the assessors. Indeed, by definition, presidents do not participate in the trial
presided over by their two colleagues; on the other hand, our assessors, them, rotate and inform
us that on this record, they have made such decision, that on such other landed such problem that
has been set in such a way. However, even two rooms, with six presidents and six assessors,
would be not sufficient to pop this jurisprudence. Because I'm about to agree with Mr. Raviot to
consider that disperse the treatment of terrorism in the France would cause disparities that would
make it difficult to understand jurisprudence.
The President Georges Fenech. Are your decisions often subject to appeal?
Mr. Denis Couh. Terrorism, very little.
The President Georges Fenech. And when they are, they tend to be confirmed?
Mr. Denis Couh. Few calls were rather on the initiative of the Prosecutor's office and focused
on the quantum of the penalty.

The President Georges Fenech. And in what direction will the Court?
Mr. Denis Couh. The Court will generally in the direction of the parquet and aggravates the
penalty.
The rapporteur. Is the low number of calls on terrorism issues related to the fact that the
jihadists recognize that divine justice? A few months ago, of the Paris bar made me meet a
number of lawyers of jihadists; but I was struck by the fact that most did not recognize the
French justice.
Mr. Denis Couh. This isn't the discourse which we face of Islamist terrorism. This challenge,
we meet the rather with Basques who regularly refuse to speak, do not defend and do not use
since they do not recognize our jurisdiction and consider themselves political prisoners.
However, I repeat, we don't encounter this argument among Islamist terrorists or people that we
consider for criminal conspiracy in relation with a terrorist undertaking, which are very talkative.
They challenge, discuss, argue, enormously - streamline their hearings are very heavy. And,
generally, they fold to our decision, knowing that the Court of appeal tends to aggravate the
penalties we speak.
The rapporteur. Since how long do you of cases related to terrorism?
Mr. Denis Couh. Twelve or thirteen years. It was at the beginning of files essentially related to
basque terrorism and incidental to the Corsican terrorism.
The rapporteur. Have you noticed, with terrorism linked to radical islam, a change of attitude
of people that you are facing?
Mr. Denis Couh. With regard to customers in corrections, i.e. those prosecuted for preparatory
acts - those who leave or plan to go to Syria-, it is wrong to imagine, contrary to what means
very regularly in the press, that there is a profile-type. We systematically hear that these people
have a criminal record. However, two weeks ago, I found a folder which not one of the twelve
protagonists had criminal records. The next folder that I will have to judge concerning 15 people
which one has a record. It is therefore an absolute mistake, I stress, to think and to say that there
is a profile type.
What unites all these people is ideology, even if in hollow, some profiles are not: I have not yet
met with son of a family from the 16e arrondissement of Paris... We have, in any case, very many
converts, and in particular converted; the intervention of women has in fact, initially, very
largely escaped investigation services. The importance of women in this type of file, and their
number now, are very worrying. First women - most of the time of the converted - began to be
referred to the tribunal.
Certainly, the persons concerned have in their family, their personal history, faults, but it is also
the case, often criminals linked to drug trafficking...

The President Georges Fenech. You may, gentlemen presidents of the 16e correctional to be
somewhat relieved, if one believes the new criminal policy announced by the Paris Prosecutor, to
criminalize conspiracy for terrorists. It will however be a load for you, Mr president of the Court
of Assizes, since it can be assumed that by some time, there could be more business to judge.
Mr. Rgis de Jorna, president of the Court of appeal of Paris. There are in Paris three courts
of Assizes unspecialized. None specializes in terrorism, or specially composed, i.e. not including
therefore jurors but professional magistrates.
Related to terrorism, it just almost finished everything that relates to domestic terrorism, whether
it's Corsican terrorism - apart from a few very high - or basque terrorism disjoint files - except, if
I am not mistaken, a call still under way-, and there is only a file linked to the PKK. On the other
hand, will arrive first terrorist records heavy, gangs, organized conspiracy. Come out of the
training firms what I would call the little publicized prevented attacks.
These prevented attacks resembled of many attacks in the month of November 2015, with the
same logistics, the same intention... It is thanks to flaws they could be foiled.
The President Georges Fenech. You learn how we it! Are you telling us that have foiled attacks
of the kind of 13 November?
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. Altogether.
The President Georges Fenech. This is good news, that we were unaware of.
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. I am referring to the Cannes-Torcy sector.
The rapporteur. We had knowledge of prevented attacks recently as the Thalys, those that Gee
wanted to commit in churches, others still, ill-prepared against two military forts... As CannesTorcy chain, it was very organized.
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. Indeed: twenty-two people are returned in the Court of Assizes, and
during the trial, the public will see the similarity of swathes of the case with the attacks of last
November.
The President Georges Fenech. Are they being trial scheduling?
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. The statement is terminated. The preliminary investigations Chamber
delivered its judgment, but there is an appeal. Remains that it is ready to audiencer.
The rapporteur. What are the deadlines?
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. The Criminal Division has not yet delivered its judgment, but the trial
scheduling will likely take place in 2017.

A folder will be media important, with an indictment order which, absent error, is not under
appeal: l'affaire Merah - more accurately, what remains of the Merah case. I know not the detail
but the bulk of the record, and I believe that returned one of the Merah brothers for the flight of
the scooter including. If the case should come before the Assize Court - I do not know what it is-,
on a judicial level could be considered the mountain gave birth to a mouse...
The President Georges Fenech. Indeed, it will not be the main author.
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. No, but the case will be provided a certain media impact.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you revisit the role of the three Parisian assize courts?
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. So far, these three assize courts dealt with the folders according to their
output, if I may say. From 2017, arises the question of if it will not take a fourth Court of Assize
which is dedicated only to terrorism, or who is responsible for issues such as those related to
genocide, which take a lot of time. Faced with the influx of cases of common law, which lasts an
average of three to five days, it is necessary, in Paris, to have three assize courts. So far, every
year, one or two folders - mainly linked to the Corsican national terrorism or basque - were the
subject of a court specially composed. However, it may now have heavy and long records. One
can thus think that case Cannes-Torcy will be two or three months of hearing: twenty-two
people, several facts involved... Will have to cope with the possible mounted power of this type
of folder.
The rapporteur. The Prosecutor wishes to criminalise the association of criminals in relation
with a terrorist undertaking, which implies an adaptation of our means. In this perspective, is it
possible to reduce delays and to provide more personal?
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. This is a problem which affects generally the assize courts and which is
the subject of reform projects. The deadlines for each case increase: whereas, ten years ago, we
considered a mean case in two days, he will soon have four. Indeed, lawyers argue more and
more, make the procedure, so that each case becomes more and more time-consuming.
The President Georges Fenech. This is valid also for the Correctional Court. Do you have a
particular training, sensitization to the phenomenon of jihadism, to what is Salafism? Seminars
are organized by the cole nationale de la magistrature (ENM) for specialized judges such as
you, or do you do you do on the job your own culture on these new and complex phenomena?
Mr. Denis Couh. We we train to this question mainly on-the-job, in reviewing the records.
However, two years ago, I followed a very interesting one week course on terrorism, organized
by the NHS. Experience also forged in the contact of individuals themselves, indeed very
important and who learns much contact.
Furthermore, you advertise the criminalization by the prosecution's conspiracy in relation with a
terrorist undertaking - the investigating judge to still be in agreement. We know that in the
Assize Court a procedure of this type takes much more time than the Correctional Court. We
know that the Paris assize courts are particularly crowded, and I see very bad some records leave

the correctional tribunal for the Court of Assizes without energy loss. Thus, there are fifteen
days, thirteen people were indicted in such folder, which some on arrest warrant as in Syria, and
the investigating judge has chosen to make a disjunction for only one of them, still in Syria,
which will be so judged by default. This means that I was forced to take knowledge of the entire
folder for 12 persons; but the president of the Court of Assizes is, be forced to take knowledge of
the entire folder for judging a person, which in addition will not be there. Is it the good system
good?
My next record to 14 persons and will require eight hearings; However, fourteen warned before
the Assize Court, this represents a period of two months. How many judges raised on only one
case, while we are only three judges to be mobilized on a case in corrections? We had suggested
to Mrs Taubira, when she was a keeper of the seals, that, in reform projects, instead of
criminalizing the association of criminals in relation with a terrorist enterprise, with all the
difficulties that entails, it exacerbates rather sentences maximum, now ten years, to fifteen years.
The President Georges Fenech. As it exists on drugs.
Mr. Denis Couh. Altogether! This possibility exists and I don't know why it is not the hour to
please while, obviously, in some cases, we are stuck on the sentence of ten years. If, in case of
recidivism, we go up to pronounce a sentence of twenty years, most of the time, as I pointed out
you just now, defendants have no criminal record. However it would be more interesting to
aggravate the maximum sentences while keeping the correctional qualification. The difficulty for
us is that we end up with, on one side, one that gives fifty euros to allow a friend to take a plane
ticket to go to Syria, and on the other, who went to Syria and we know that he will fight:
however we have only a range of sentences of 10 years for both. If one adds those who stop to
the Syrian border but that will come back, we will end up with more and smaller ranges: between
six and ten years, which can be largely insufficient. Sometimes, we would prefer a much longer
sentence for some known they fought, so that our decision is consistent with the involvement of
each and other. Also will the proposed criminalization not necessarily adjust much.
The President Georges Fenech. Except that the criminalization allows longer provisional
detention...
M. Laurent Raviot. Since two and a half years, about a dozen procedures for jihadist terrorism
defendants, a single folder has been criminalized. Therefore, I do not think we can wait for a
miracle of criminalization. I got to know, lately, a folder linked to a chain of support for Islamists
who had join the Syria and, for this, had financed their project by committing an armed robbery qualification here typically criminal. However prosecutors made the choice of the punishment, to
which no one objected. The sentences handed down by the Criminal Court were aged seven and
eight participants. Nobody did appeal: neither prosecutors nor the defendants. I don't know if it is
the pledge of a good decision, but it is already a sign. This folder could, of course, be referred to
the Court of Assize, but for what? If the Prosecutor requires penalties similar to those handed
down by the tribunal, there is no interest.
I'm not sure in the long term, I stress, criminalization is a solution, except for certain folders.

Mr. president Georges Fenech. Regarding the scale of punishments, you probably followed the
political and legal debate on the perpetual penalty. You, Mr president-Dasgupta, we share your
opinion?
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. You ask me about the parole...
The President Georges Fenech. Yes. You already made it?
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. No. Imprisonment to life imprisonment has not been pronounced in the
case of basque or Corsican terrorism. As regards case Carlos, the period was then limited to
twenty-two years.
Already, legally, the possibility exists of incompressible sentences, but it must be compatible
with the requirements - inter alia - the European Court of the human rights. In other words, a
parole should not be exclusive of the possibility of any appeal.
The President Georges Fenech. It is also the right of pardon by the President of the Republic.
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. Altogether. There are currently, I think, two or three individuals whose
convictions are indeed incompressible; But however remains the possibility of a remedy so that
this incompressibility is only theoretical.
Mr. Georges Fenech. It's three or four cases, such as Fourniret, or those of murderers of
children.
Mr. Rgis Dasgupta. This is.
I believe that we will get to that. If one looks at the legislation in force, the parole exists, with the
possibility to derogate from it through some remedies. It is a little the bottle half full or half
empty. If we want to apply the texts, in any case, it is possible.
Mr. David Comet. Back to centralization, you think positive in the fight against terrorism, heard
us of the Italian model, which seems to have been proven in this matter.
Furthermore, are links between the intelligence community and justice solid? Should change the
paradigm and make sure there is closer cooperation between these two "communities"?
Then is the indoctrination of apprentices jihadists similar to that practiced by cults to recruit their
followers?
Finally, why is the jihadist propaganda also easily accessible on the internet? Why are these
publications not blocked?
The President Georges Fenech. The Italian model is indeed decentralized, particularly for the
major mafia trials, and this seems to give results.

Mr. Denis Couh. We are indeed rather favourable, for which we are concerned, the
centralization.
Furthermore, at the stage of judgement, it goes without saying that we have no contact with
intelligence. The rest would be difficult to imagine that there could be contacts since, in
principle, they would be underground and could therefore be formalized, while the Act requires
us to be totally transparent.
Regarding the indoctrination of the jihadists, I don't feel that it is similar to that of sects. It is
often individual and, as I indicated earlier, there is no ideal profile: it is not known why,
suddenly, a young man is indoctrinate. Certainly it's not going to be indoctrinating alone; It will
be through, inter alia, of the internet, but also by going pretty regularly to the mosque - which is
not necessarily the place where he goes to indoctrinate, but rather the place where to find a way
to indoctrinate. In the next folder that I will have to deal with, meetings themselves did not at the
mosque, which was the point of appointments, but outside. Still, I stress, that is not really why
they are indoctrinating, otherwise because of flaws in their personality, I said, but these are faults
are found fairly regularly in other cases.
M. Laurent Raviot. If profiles are in fact very individualized, there are still sectors of
indoctrination. I got to know recently a record concerning people in Syria and who came from
traps. In examining the record in detail, one notices that there was in this county a true home of
indoctrination, with people who have led a real sector: smugglers, contacts in Syria... There is
therefore a fairly common process, despite very different individual cases, which may lead to
these departures for Jihad.
The rapporteur. Did you have to judge the individual terrorist enterprises since November 13?
M. Laurent Raviot. For myself, Yes.
The rapporteur. And your third colleague?
Mr. Denis Couh. No, as she arrived very recently. Most of the files are indeed dies, and I agree
with what has just said Mr. Raviot on indoctrination homes found in some municipalities.
The rapporteur. What was the profile of the individual in question, Mr Raviot?
M. Laurent Raviot. It was an individual party to Mali to join the ranks of Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and who fought against the French army, especially during the
offensive in Diabaly. He was arrested during the French intervention while he had found refuge
in a village north of Timbuktu.
On reflection, I had to deal with a second case of the same type. He was a jihadist party under the
same conditions as the first to join AQIM in Mali and who fought against the French army, and
that has been discovered by french soldiers in the Adrar des Iforas, so after the rout of AQIM
around Timbuktu.

The rapporteur. Have what sentences been passed against these individuals?
M. Laurent Raviot. Eight years imprisonment for both.
I add that to the difference of the Basques, who claim their belonging to an organisation that
Moreover they do not consider terrorist, the defendants suspected of involvement with Islamist
terrorist organization, do not recognize, or even dispute the fact of wanting to integrate a terrorist
organization. Most of the accused, after many reversals, admit be parties in Syria, but that it was
ever question, according to them, to be a combatant activity. They say will be made to conduct
humanitarian activities, to improve their knowledge of islam, but not to integrate a fighting
group.
The rapporteur. Conversely, have you dealt in with repenters sincere, or you giving to think
they were?
M. Laurent Raviot. It is very difficult to assess, because we're here to cFavorite pieces of the
difficulty of judging, not over an act committed in the past, but compared to the risk and the
potential dangerousness of our defendants. In my house, we had a miserable experience. Mr.
Couh neither I chaired the hearing. Among our assessors, a young woman had participated in
the trial of a jihadist sector in which Chung was involved. After the events of January 2015, she
explained to me that she was appalled by what had happened: Chung had received judicial
leniency because he had the best profile of rehabilitation against the other accused - he it is who
was sentenced less harshly. How will I now be able to judge this type of defendant, wondered, if
I have in mind, anyway, he will only say lies? However, I stress, Chung was a true profile of
reintegration. We all face this difficulty: some defendants appear sincere, others not at all. How
do share things? It is difficult to judge, there is no rule for this. I'll never have the guarantee that
a person to trust will not become a murderer.
Mr. Denis Couh. I agree with what has just been said. I even think that people can be Pentiti
sincere the day of the hearing, and in the months that follow, in contact with people who are not
at all, will become real human bombs.
M. Laurent Raviot. We cannot exclude that among people that we consider and who are
arrested after a return from Syria, there is sincere repentance. They have seen what was the
Islamic State and decided to return to France because they are not at all agree with the practices
of this organization.
The rapporteur. Especially with the practice of the Tamas.
Can exist, depending on you, alternatives to prison for such individuals? We speak of deradicalization centres... Could you be brought to less problematic cases, the less dangerous, to
propose such an alternative?
M. Laurent Raviot. I am in favour. In all cases, even after the sanction, even after a period of
more or less long incarceration, should be that these folks are followed by a very active.

The rapporteur. And as an alternative measure?

M. Laurent Raviot. In principle, cannot exclude it, everything depends on situations. We have
defendants appearing under judicial control, which are therefore not made of detention or very
little.
The rapporteur. Your experience you could have, if this measure was planned, pronounces it as
alternative to prison? For some individuals, you wonder if, given their apparent fragility, it
would not be better avoid to send in prison, instead of "socialization", if I may say, between
radicalized people?
M. Laurent Raviot. There again, this is a complex issue. It is not that I want to discard me, but
whatever happens, that a person staying in prison or it is left free, even under duress, even in a
de-radicalization Center measurement, you can never exclude that, in contact with some people...
In prison, according to his associates, an inmate will be able to access a beginning of repentance
or not. This raises the problem whether it makes all Islamist detainees or if it separates them.
Here again, I do not think that there is a certain response. Really need to judge case-by-case
basis. We must isolate Islamist inmates of other Islamist detainees, whenever one feels at home a
possibility of change.
The rapporteur. These include away from those who have a special aura.
M. Laurent Raviot. Obviously. Should not be the latter with other common law detainees, to
prevent any proselytism, and should be avoided, if possible, to put with Islamist labeled fragile
prisoners. There is no rule, I repeat, and the situations are really appreciate case by case - taking
into account, inter alia, of the evolution of people.
The President Georges Fenech. We will retain your details very interesting and important, as
well as your concern about the means necessary to deal with the mass of folders that you are
going to have to deal. Of course, we will discuss these issues with the keeper of the seals in the
context of the discussion of the draft finance law for 2017.
M. Laurent Raviot. If you allow me, Mr president, I would like to give you some figures
showing the evolution of litigation related to Islamist terrorism.
The President Georges Fenech. I beg you.
M. Laurent Raviot. September 2013 - date of creation of our room - December 31, 2013, we
had, on 79 hearing days, 16 days for terrorism Islamist or 3 cases.
In 2014, on 208 days of hearing, 25 days were spent on terrorism Islamist, or 8 files.
By 2015, we had, always for this type of business, 14 files for 40 days of hearing.
By 2016, we are already at 9 folders for 30 days of hearing.

These figures show that we have to deal more in addition to cases of this nature.
The President Georges Fenech. And there is unfortunately no reason so that this will stop.
M. Laurent Raviot. With regard to the forecasts that we were given by the public prosecutor,
the phenomenon will indeed need to escalate.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for this very interesting information.
Hearing, huis clos, Ms. Isabelle Gorce, Director of prison administration, and Mrs
Fabienne Viton, head of the bureau of prison intelligence
Report of the hearing in camera, Monday, April 4, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Madam Director, Madam, thank you for having responded to
the request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat
terrorism since January 7, 2015.
With the Prosecutor of the Republic in Paris, as well as makers of anti-terrorism prosecutors,
charged the anti-terrorism pole judges of instruction and the presidents of the Court of special
foundations and the 16th Chamber of the Court of major jurisdiction of Paris, we are interested
Wednesday last to the judicial component. We will continue our investigations on ways of
combating terrorism with you concerning the prison facet of the subject. We can ask about
sensitive issues such as the problems posed by the detention of radicalized individuals or even
approach that of human and material prison intelligence resources. The information that you give
us us will be all the more valuable that some of us will go to the prison of Fresnes immediately
after your hearing.
Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, this hearing is held
in camera. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the website of the National Assembly. Nevertheless,
in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning of
the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so
at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will
previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will
be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report. I would remind you
that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is punishable by the penalties
provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who, within a period of twenty-five
years disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless
the report published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce and Mrs Fabienne Viton take oath.

Madam Director, the fight against terrorism is an absolute necessity, and we are many that the
prison administration should take part in this fight, including by strengthening its resources, so
not only to ensure the safety of prisons and its personnel but also to create its intelligence service
likely to bring information from the detention sometimes decisive to the forces in charge of
combating the most serious security breaches of our country. I think courses in Mohamed Merah
prison, Kaye brothers or MIT Coulibaly. One of your predecessors, the prefect Didier Lallement,
had taken into account this need by creating a large Security Branch, entitled 'security staff',
which had important capabilities within the prison. This branch was doing an outstanding job
and acknowledged by all. While the France was faced with cruel attacks, you have however
decided to revert to this organization and you have removed, by order of 30 June 2015, security
staff and mixed this safety issue in several branches.
Today, the bureau of prison intelligence is placed within branch of missions, alongside the
management of detention office, the office of social policy, insertion and access to rights, the
legal action and the prison law office and the office of the alternatives to imprisonment and the
penalty arrangements. In these circumstances, Madam Director, this choice it seems you sensible
in terms of involvement and visibility, especially in view of the insertion of prison intelligence
within the second circle of intelligence? And, since the attacks of Charlie Hebdo, how have you
organized the central level of coordination of security and the prison intelligence? Finally, to
enable the commission to make useful recommendations, it would be useful that we knew the
instructions you received or, Alternatively, your own position on the creation of a specific prison
intelligence within the prison service.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce, Director of the prison administration to the Ministry of justice. The
reorganization of the central administration had widely preceded, of course, the attacks from
January to November 2015. The organizational structure is nevertheless entered into force last
September, so in the middle of the year.
Why this reorganization? Why have removed the security staff? When I took up my duties, I
estimated that the prison administration was very well boned, with legislation and regulatory
system rather well done, and fairly structured decentralized services. EC that was greatly lacking
and which was almost never treated by the Central Government or by decentralized services, it
was work enough on its trades - I knew something, since I had already worked twelve years at
Headquarters, from 1990 to 2002, I also participated in one of the first reorganization of
headquarters. This is one of the major deficiencies of the prison administration, and this
observation is still valid: it works on its missions, but it does not work on how to. This is one of
its major weaknesses: it lacks reflection on the performance of its duties. So it was for me
absolutely essential to restructure the central administration to work better on the know-how of
the prison administration and professional practices, whether it be monitoring trades, grafts or
prison insertion and probation (SPIP) services, personnel management and other functions.
A branch of trade therefore was created, which today is totally inclusive branch of what may be
decided on the tasks of the prison administration. Everything by this branch and are measured at
what point it is absolutely essential to have a service completely dedicated to the know-how,
working methods and how to intervene in schools - seen with the regional intervention and
security (ERIS) teams, with transfers of judicial extractions, with the enormous task of

restructuring of methods of intervention of the SPIP that necessitated the setting in The work of
penal reform.
In this context, he obviously had to make choices, and I was not convinced, twelve years after its
inception, the effectiveness of the security staff. I felt that this branch is was totally stove-piped
and worked very little with others. The office of intelligence, inter alia, was closed on itself and I
had very little information about what he was doing. I knew that he worked much with
specialized intelligence services but, on several occasions, I saw that I could not get the
information that I asked him. I therefore felt that it should be relocated to the cFavorite pieces of
the missions of the prison administration and security institutions, the management of prisoners,
because it is our first mission, before work to specialized intelligence services: manage
detainees.
The President Georges Fenech. "I felt", you say, but I assume that you had the agreement of
the garde des sceaux?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Of course. I submitted this project very early...
The President Georges Fenech. The removal of security staff is therefore made with the
agreement of the garde des sceaux of the time.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Of course.
Today, security issues are treated in transverse way, within the prison. I would remind you that
the first branch of the missions office is dedicated to the management of prisons and detention,
including the office that handles crises. It works round-the-clock, a permanent back all incidents
morning and evening - and the entire chain up to the Minister is thus informed twice daily
crises and incidents that occur in prisons. This essential desktop is totally turned to prisons and
prisoners, including the most dangerous management, so-called particularly reported detainees,
managed in close collaboration with the M3, which is the office of intelligence.
We took advantage of this reorganization, but also two plans of fight against terrorism, plate 1
and plate 2, to strengthen the role of intelligence and especially to restructure the entire chain,
whether at central, regional or local level. In my view, the positioning of this office within
central administration poses no problem. It is well integrated into its branch and works better
with the other services of the central administration.
We can always improve. Tomorrow, another mode of organization may be able to draw, to favor,
eventually, integration of the prison administration in the second circle of intelligence - this is
not yet fully voted. In the light of my experience and what has become over time security staff, it
seems in any case very important that intelligence office remains fully secured the prison
administration and the Ministry of justice. The information available should be used first to the
security institutions and those working in their midst. But it can and must clearly convey useful
information to the specialist services of intelligence, either at the request or on its own initiative.
I think essentially to the Directorate General of internal security (CSB) and the central
Intelligence Service territorial (LSVCCS), with whom we have protocols, but also to the unit for

coordination of the fight against terrorism - with which we have weekly meetings with the
UCLAT. I get myself the correspondent of the prison administration, since I put a Director of
penitentiary services at the disposal of the UCLAT, who now works full-time within this service.
This allows us to have an interface with the unit. This prison framework participates every first
Monday of the month to the Executive Committee that we organize on combating radicalisation.
The prison administration therefore maintains strong links, at the highest level, with the UCLAT.
From this point of view, I think that the integration of the office of intelligence in the functioning
of the central administration is better.
What about the possible integration of the prison administration in the second circle of
intelligence? I followed the entire debate, which began at the beginning of the year 2015. For
nothing hide you, I had no idea completely stopped on the subject. I saw undeniable advantages,
including better consideration of know-how that exists within the prison intelligence. If there are
indeed people who know how to observe what is happening in an institution, it is prison staff,
who have this special gift, and the time, above all, to observe dangerous individuals and
information. I saw no benefits but also risks, as compared to the specialized services of
intelligence, we are small artisans: we don't have the infrastructure necessary to oversee all
intelligence techniques and apply the provisions of the Act. The discussions therefore followed
their courses, including within the institution, where the positions are fairly shared. It cannot be
said that there is unanimity on the issue between interregional directors, within the senior
management of the prison administration and professional organizations.
Today, my position has evolved. I do not know if we need to be part of the second circle, but it is
certain that we must be much more professional that we have ever been, and it is absolutely
essential that we have a capacity to do what we cannot do today. So, while we face the massive
introduction of mobile phones in prisons, we do not have the power to harness this wealth of
information. Of course, all these phones do not have the same interest, but when they are found
among prisoners who interest us, we can only let know our colleagues of the judicial police.
However, as they are themselves overwhelmed, one cannot say that they do use up what we think
possible. It would be good that we can make a first analysis contained in these phones determine for example what people they put in contact - before hand. The prison administration
does not claim the status of an intelligence service, in the noble sense of the term - is not his
profession-, but there is a wealth of information and we manage people who cause massive
security problems. We may collect a number of elements which the exploitation by specialized
intelligence services would be useful. However, in the State of the law, we do not have the
possibility of acting.
Does this require a reform of the code of criminal procedure or will integration of the prison
administration in the second circle? I cannot say, but it is certain that the possibilities for action
by the administration must be improved.
The President Georges Fenech. If we have understood correctly, a reflection is under way, on a
matter which has already occupied us in the Committee on laws, at the time where it was chaired
by Mr. Jean-Jacques Urvoas and where we look at the draft law on intelligence. You have
decided to remove the security staff, and the prison Intelligence Office is today integrated within
the Subdirectorate of the missions. According to you, it works well but this could still be

improved, no doubt through the integration of the prison administration in the second circle of
intelligence.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. I am the author with Philippe Goujon's amendment to allow
the bureau of prison intelligence integrates the second circle of intelligence. How do you
envisage the possibility of using techniques of intelligence? We had good felt a reluctance of the
garde des sceaux, Mrs Taubira, which I think it was shared by a number of officials of the prison
administration. Today, the debate continues in the Senate. How do you practice your
reorganization through this integration at the second circle?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. In the State of my reflection, it seems to me that there are two ways to
consider the matter - in any case, I have not found other. Either branch of the prison itself with
an ad hocservice, a new intelligence, branch directly to the Director, with a network that is
available, either we keep an integrated system. Organizations are made to evolve, and it is quite
possible that the flowchart be amended with regard to the evolution of the situation, but today is
a good tree. Beyond intelligence, indeed, there is everything: the activity of the prison
administration is still, overwhelmingly, to deal of detainees and persons followed in an open
environment. However, in this matter, we have real deficiencies in terms of method.
So the system remains consistent, the office of intelligence must remain integrated into the tasks
of prison administration and moored in its operation. If the service gradually disconnected from
the prison, there is a real risk. Even would it finally decided that the prison administration joined
the second circle, it is essential that its intelligence network remains moored to its missions and
support for persons placed in the hands of justice, that they are held or not. Today, we have 67
000 inmates, and 175,000 people followed in an open environment. Part of the issue, not the
easiest or the thinner, thus for the open environment. So we also need to be very close to openenvironment services, more closely the follow-up of individuals in open - I think including
everything concerning the approach of the public. In an open environment, insertion and
probation prison advisors work greatly in proximity to the litigants. Ask them to be vigilant, for
example, on the process of radicalisation, it is not the day after, and it is absolutely necessary to
irrigate the entire institution so that everyone understands the stakes of this observation and the
feedback to the interregional directorates.
For me, the nerve center of the prison administration predominantly in the interregional
directorates. It is themselves capitalizes most of the information, and that intersection that comes
from the national level and dating of local and departmental, the SPIP. Whatever the final choice
maintenance of intelligence within a branch or establishment of an entity reporting directly to
the Director of the prison administration , is the structuring of the network of prison
intelligence which is today one of the major issues.
The key activity of Ms. Viton collaborators within the office of intelligence is to enter data that
come from the ground in the software because. The analysis capabilities of the office are now
very low. I therefore exerts a real pressure to make the office able to do analysis on what
happens during the detentions, to let us know to what processes we are exposed. In France,
particularly in Isre, the Albanian mafia is very important. What is being done? How behave the
people in detention? We know that the Albanian mafia interests in common with radical islam -

traffic of weapons, drug trafficking, trafficking human-, and much money passes through the
Albania. Should therefore monitor closely including in detention. However we lack today
analytical skills on what is happening in the detentions. How the networks formed? Who speaks
with whom? How people share with each other? What are these analyses that I expect from the
office of intelligence at the national level, more than treatment, seizure and management on a
case by case basis. It is at the level of interregional directorates and establishments, of course
with ski-lift facilities at the central level, that the bulk of the activity of intelligence field must
be. This is what we have begun to develop through the obtained means, especially in the context
of flat 1, in January 2015.
The rapporteur. To summarize, you have attached the office of intelligence missions branch
because, if he had good relationships with other intelligence services, it did really meet your
solicitations.
It integrate the second circle, would be - for you a real intelligence full service? Or a very strong
bond should remain between you, Director, and this office?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. The bureau of intelligence was one of the offices of a Sub-Directorate,
security staff, which numbered three: the Management Office of the detention, the Intelligence
Office and the office of the security of the institutions, which managed, grosso modo, passive
safety, was of audits on the security of the institutions and flying regional response and security
teams. When I took up my duties, I found this EMS3 of prison intelligence bureau worked in
isolation within this Sub-Directorate, and did not, in my opinion, the service expected of him in
terms of management both settlements that detainees posing difficulties - particularly reported
detainees, and others. I can confirm that I couldn't get this office a number of analyses, and even
information about persons held. I felt very turned to services specialized intelligence but more
adequately moored to the Directorate of the penitentiary administration.
The priority, for me, was to work on the prison business. However, if the reorganisation
necessarily affected security staff, I obviously did not remove the office of intelligence, which is
very important within the Directorate of the penitentiary administration - it is so true that my
assistant and I fly it almost constantly. So, with Ms. Viton, we have made a three-day trip to
Morocco, last week, devoted to the question of intelligence and radicalisation. I am therefore
personally in this office: given the importance of the issues, it is necessary to have theEye
continuously on its operation. I also changed the team who ran it: Ms. Viton took his duties at the
end of the year 2015 as well as his assistant. I asked this new team take over the desk to be much
more tied to the prison and he devoted himself more to the services requested.
If we integrate the second circle, I do not know if this office is densifiera, but it must in any case
driving techniques that we master today and animate a network still in construction phase. It is a
very big challenge, that we do not give up obviously meet.
The rapporteur. What happened to Ms. Viton's predecessor at the head of the bureau of prison
intelligence?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. He was appointed Director of the prison hospital of Fresnes.

Mr. Meyer Habib. I wish at the outset to return on mobile phones. In the context of a previous
commission of inquiry, we learned that near 22 000 "items" were seized in prison: phones, chips,
etc. This is considerable, even unlikely. In addition, more inmates are affluent, more they arrive
bring phones but this obviously requires complicity within the prison. Does interfere with
communications or, instead, to facilitate the introduction of phones to allow better monitoring of
radicalized inmates? This is done in other countries. Need, moreover, to consolidate the
radicalized inmates or separate them? From the outside, it seems to me that we must avoid any
group dynamics.
In France, it does not classify prisoners according to their religion. However this taboo promotes
the most far-fetched rumors. Perhaps can the number of halal meals give an indication, even
though, fortunately, the overwhelming majority of those who eat halal are not radicalized. Our
obsession is that an inmate sent to prison for acts of crime so radicalized - consider Mehdi
Nemmouche.
M. Pierre Lellouche. During this legislature, I participated in the review of seven anti-terrorism
laws, of the intelligence Act and amended the code of criminal procedure, and so on. When I was
in the prison of Fresnes with Mr Guillaume Larriv a year and a half, we were amazed to learn of
the Director of the institution that the prison administration had no right to listen to mobile
phones that come into prison. We had yet to vote a law on intelligence that lets listen to all
French! Look for the error. Should we therefore additional legislative text, Madam Director,
even though the law on intelligence allows to listen to everyone? And, without preventing the
introduction of these phones in prison, the Government has planned to accompany you with
interception means? It is known that a large part radicalized individuals are radicalised on the
internet or in prison.
Second question, what about the management of the return of the jihadists? The Director of the
Fresnes prison was, at the time, started to separate the newcomers, arrived Jihad, of common law
prisoners by placing them in a gallery to share, but Mrs Taubira was rather skeptical, as you
know. Where are you? Returns of Syria and Iraq will be more likely that pressure will intensify
on Daech...
Thirdly, it would appear, from trade unionists of the prison guards posed a number of safety
problems. Some recruited in Baroque conditions, would be a habitual criminal, while others
would show some understanding to the fundamentalist environment inside the establishments.
Confirm you?
Fourth question, how many agents do you have to exercise your mission of intelligence with 67
000 prisoners and 175,000 people in an open environment. And how many agents should have?
Finally, where are these famous de-radicalization programs? Is there a budget, a method? I am
interested in how is addressed the issue in other countries, including Saudi Arabia, because it is
there there... Do in fact enter these programs for beginners of Jihad, not of the confirmed
jihadists. What is your doctrine on this point?

The President Georges Fenech. I myself have received some prison unions of the information
according to which 300 prison guards are themselves the subject of cards S, and there would be
tensions within the prison staff, with some attending mosques Salafists. Is it correct?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Mobile phones, I have already said, are undoubtedly a scourge for the
prison administration, and the number of seizures does not diminish, it increases.
M. Pierre Lellouche. This is because the search was removed!
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Yes and no.
An amendment to article 57 of the Prison Act of 2009 just adopted by the Senate on the
Government's proposal. I do not dispute that the application of this provision has a problem as I
am Director in developing Works article 57. When I took up my responsibilities, the law yet
adopted by Parliament, was not applied. However, if there is more systematic excavations at the
end of the parlor, inmates are still searched on other occasions.
The President Georges Fenech. This article was adopted by the previous majority, in
accordance with a European directive. Actually, one may wonder whether it should not revisit
this provision.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Let us however in mind that the number of mobile phones, USB keys and
tiny materials related to the use of a mobile phone has increased in prisons even when article 57
was not applied. This increase is therefore not particularly related to the implementation in
Respect of this provision. I believe that the excavations were not so well that do this. A number
of objects were already entering prisons at a time where, in theory at least, they were systematic
at the exit of the parlor.
There are three types of means to bring mobile phones into prisons: projections, and there are
many; the parlours, surely; staff or outsiders, this happens. Regularly, agents are arrested, placed
in custody, convicted and removed.
The President Georges Fenech. 'Regularly '?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Yes. I revoked nearly forty officers these past two years. The Directorate of
the penitentiary administration is uncompromising in the event of involvement of staff in
different trades.
The President Georges Fenech. The number you give is still considerable. These agents have
some sympathy for the Salafist movement? Work for profit?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. The religion of detainees is not necessarily involved. It is mainly a trade,
although there may also be pressure on supervisors. And this trade is not unique to the France.
How to fight against the introduction of mobile phones? There are several ways to see things.

The simplest is to develop jammers. If it kills demand, it will kill traffic, which also creates
tensions between detainees; There is pressure on a number of them, often the most vulnerable, as
are those who are not searched. It is to them that be asked to introduce, at the time of the parlors
with their families, mobile phones for bullies. It's a perverse effect. The best way to fight against
the introduction of laptops, so it's interference.
Why this work not today as you want? Because jamming systems installed in prisons are not
progressive. Thus, a number of jammers can interfere only the 2G or 3G, but not 4G. In new
establishments such as those we are currently opening, for example in Valencia, 4G is scrambled
and no mobile phone only circulates. But when the 5G will arrive on the market jammers will be
more suitable. Therefore, changing equipment.
The rapporteur. How many are there jammers currently?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. More than 400... I shall give you the exact figure, I do have it in mind.
Second subject, jammers on the market were not thought to prisons, with their corridors, their
corridors, their stairs, their different levels. Then should ensure to scramble en masse, at-risk
scramble in the vicinity and no doubt a few problems of public health? We blur some areas of
detention: the isolation quarters, or some wings where detainees likely to cause problems.
We are looking for technical solutions: first, a scalable scrambling system; Secondly, a
scrambling system adapted to the architecture of prisons. I have a lot of contacts with the
Belgians, who tell me that everything works well at home, but they certainly made like us: they
have installed interference 4 G systems. It works so well, but I don't know how they will make
when the 5G - I doubt that they are better than us. The problem of the evolving nature of the
devices remains.
Above all, the question arises of adaptation to architecture. We have worked with industry to test
an innovative device. On the basis of this experiment, we launched a market to competition from
industry on a device adapted to our needs; This is what is called a competitive dialogue. Nine
companies responded. They will test a system on site, in a facility, and we will choose in the fall
of that with which we will pass a market to develop a new system of interference, adapted to our
needs.
M. Pierre Lellouche. And you need a new legislative text, Madam Director?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. According to the analysis of our lawyers, Yes.
The Act allows us to listen to and record telephone communications legally passed by inmates in
the booths installed in prisons. On the other hand, no text does allow us to detect illegal
telephone communications, to listen to or save them.
One of the difficulties is that inmates call people outdoors. We would listen so not only prisoners
but also their interlocutors on the outside.

M. Pierre Lellouche. It is not! You can listen to all French!

Ms. Isabelle Gorce. An intelligence service can. Specialized intelligence services can listen to
inmates, and it may happen that the judicial authorities, having learned by listening to people
outside that an inmate had a mobile phone, we ask especially him leave, but it is good to a
judge's decision that this inmate conversations will be recorded by a system of telephone tapping.
The prison administration has inherent jurisdiction or powers to do so. On the other hand, if she
joined the second circle, she can do as other specialized intelligence services.
The President Georges Fenech. It could then use all the techniques laid down in the Act on the
intelligence.
M. Pascal Popelin. According to the Act on intelligence, these are the Ministry of the Interior,
through its services, the Ministry of defence and the Ministry of the budget which may be a
folder.
The President Georges Fenech. I recall that Mr. Popelin is a member of the National
Commission of control of intelligence techniques (CNCTR).
M. Pascal Popelin. A number of services are entitled to this type of request, but there is nothing
to prevent the prison Intelligence Office to request ISB. Then the file arrives, and it is covered by
the Director of cabinet of the Minister of the Interior in the case concerning the CSB. The
CNCTR renders an opinion on the opportunity and it is the Prime Minister, or his representative,
who decides to authorize tuned for a renewable period of four months as much as it is necessary.
The President Georges Fenech. Between administrative authorities and judicial interceptions,
how you is a new legislative framework necessary?
M. Pierre Lellouche. The prison is unable to listen to.
M. Pascal Popelin. Even in the current state of things, nothing prevents the prison
administration to seek authorized services - in particular, I think given the subjects occupying us,
ISB - so listen be conducted.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you agree with that?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. This is exactly what is happening. The prison administration cannot not
itself, alone, listening to someone. It can appeal to others to do so.
M. Pierre Lellouche. It is this that must be changed!
M. Pascal Popelin. Currently, only three departments may apply for the use of information
technology. During the examination of the draft law strengthening the fight against organized
crime and terrorism, the National Assembly has planned to add the Department of justice, and
the Senate confirmed this possibility. It will then take that the garde des sceaux seeks itself the

integration of prison Intelligence Office in the intelligence community to the title of the second
circle. Today, the use of these techniques is still possible, with an extra step.
The President Georges Fenech. We were going to address the issue of the consolidation of
radicalized inmates.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Radical Islamists or not, dangerous prisoners are generally managed on the
mode of dispersal by all prison administrations of the world, with a few exceptions closely. And
sometimes they make turn between institutions.
After the initiative taken by the Director of the Fresnes institution, we decided to create units
dedicated to manage the radical Islamists, for several reasons.
First, we noted that a number were real problems in detention, engaging in proselytizing with
other inmates, with sometimes great capacity to gather around their person. It therefore had to
intervene to prevent too many detainees to take in the meshes of the net. As these proselytes are
often bullies; they are not interested in the soul of their fellow prisoners: they provide them also
in material goods. It was therefore, in the first place, to avoid proselytizing.
Then, if a large number of those who return from Turkey or Syria were placed under warrant of
committal, in fact, we know nothing of them: come? who are? Why are they parties? What they
tell us is not necessarily the truth. So we decided to devote dedicated units, that of Fresnes,
because of the proximity of the national assessment Centre (CNE), and then that of FleuryMrogis because we needed to expand our device, the assessment of these detainees returning
mainly from Turkey or even who are arrested in police operations against criminal gangs. The
idea is to do a review to find out why they got in there. We know that a number is converted, that
others had not particularly had links with crime, or then only with the small and average
delinquency, without talking to them on the basis of radical islam. This balance is needed to
know how to manage, i.e. how to set up a support program. I felt the need to try to do something
with them from the moment where we had them on hand.
We can handle the isolation or disperse them in schools in the Paris region, but to put in place a
specific support programme, while the footprint of establishments in the region of the Paris
region reaches new levels, needed to organize and group together them.
So we started to group them in small groups to house arrest in the Val-d'Oise, in Osny. One year
we are tested, with the French Association of victims of terrorism, a program of support for
groups of fifteen detainees. Some call it a "de-radicalization" program: we do not have this
argument, we do not necessarily seek to intervene on the issue of religion, we focus instead on
the behavior. Our problem is not as long as they will be converted to determine if they are
hazardous and may pass to the Act.
After a year, the result proved sufficiently interesting so that we decided to develop this type of
program. So we created a unit dedicated to Osny, and another in Fleury-Mrogis, where we work
with another partner, the Foundation for strategic research, to test another approach.

In Osny, twelve prisoners, who come mainly from Fresnes and Fleury-Mrogis, have been
integrated into the program. Grouped together for a period of six months, they are supported in
the morning until the evening. They are alone in a cell, and follow a program imposed on them it's part of the contract which allowed them to leave overcrowded facilities to come in Osny.
Obviously, this is experimental. We try to test an individual and collective approach to
questioning their commitment and their behavior, and we got some attitude or speech changes
that suggest us that the approach is interesting and that we must continue.
These obviously aren't completely inmates locked in their radical islam that go into these
dedicated units of de-radicalization - these do not want to communicate with us. It should be of
prisoners able to exercise self-criticism. An initial assessment, at Fresnes or in Fleury-Mrogis, is
necessary.
With regard to the more radicalized, either we manage to isolation, in the Paris region, or we try
to transfer them to the penitentiary centre of Lille-AnnOeullin, where we have created a unit
dedicated, destined, it, to detainees much more rooted in radical islam. In their case, a more
individual approach seems necessary. In addition, we are much more working with imams,
because you must get to the heart of the religious approach to things.
We try, we test. I've always said that it was necessary in any case organize ourselves to take care
this problem. So much the better, if we get any result. If this does not work, we will draw
conclusions and we will otherwise. In any case, the approach is extremely interesting, and some
prisoners 'wake up', almost in the sense the term clean, an analysis critical and become capable
of jeopardising the commitments for which they are incarcerated.
With regard to supervisors, I know what say professional organisations, but this is not credible.
No, there are not 300 supervisors who are the subject of cards S. There's not a large number of
supervisors followed in respect of radical islam by the intelligence services. A few isolated cases
however problematic, and we organize ourselves at the level of central administration to create a
watch on these information upwelling cell. We will bring closer us to the UCLAT to exchange
information on these supervisors and ensure that they pose no risk. The subject is extremely
delicate and requires a lot of composure.
You asked me about the means. We have created more than fifty jobs by 2015 to strengthen
prison intelligence. It should also create a hundred. We have strengthened the office of prison
intelligence, but we are currently experiencing a small wave trough, because a number of agents
are gone in favor of our move from Fox, in the Marsh Street in the door of Aubervilliers. We are
therefore in the recruitment phase.
In the interregional directorates of prison services, fourteen officers were positioned on the
prison intelligence, we have thirty-four today. We created eleven jobs analysts-Vigil, twelve
digital investigator jobs, three jobs for translators - we still have seven to recruit. We have
delegates from the prison intelligence in all institutions. Our goal is to reach forty-four officers
job full time in 2016; We are trying to recruit them. Joint administrative boards were held last
week. We did not full, but we will now have officers who specialize in these issues full time. We
also asked the 103 SPIP to identify a contact person of the prison intelligence - it is almost done.

It is the link between their colleagues who have information to give, the intelligence services and
the interregional directorates; These referents participate with their Manager to the staff of
security of the prefectures.
The phase of deployment of means is not complete. In addition, we must at the same time to train
officers, professionalising them. It simply that they know what they must observe. What is a
radical Islamist? What changes in behaviour must be identified? What information do I
absolutely back, at the regional level and at national level? It is a network which is being
constituted. We went from the small handicrafts in the SMEs.
M. Pierre Lellouche. If the mission of an agent is to provide information on possible damage to
the establishment or what is happening inside the prison, it is not of intelligence including the
country needs work: should rather find any connections between these people and groups
jihadists outside prisons. It is good to have an intelligence service... still need to know what its
mission! Is it to stay in the prison setting or to contribute to general intelligence and the fight
against terrorism? The question is not without implications for the training of your staff.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. The intelligence services are not only jihadism and radical islam but also of
banditry, of organized crime, linked to the ETA basque terrorist - this still concerns hundreds of
inmates in our facilities. In addition, it was not Islamic radicals in all penitentiary establishments
french.
There is a work of intelligence, monitoring and collection of information within the institution:
who are the prisoners? What do do? With whom are they in the course? With whom are they
talking about? Change of behavior? This information is then transmitted and shared with the
specialized services of intelligence. They also irrigate the chain of the prison administration. If
we believe that an inmate presents risks or problems in a penal institution, our first duty is to
change of establishment, to ensure the security of the institution and the inmates. Thus, the
Islamist proselytizing of Bziers prison whose case was referred to last week by BFM were
transferred to another institution or placed in solitary confinement. A number of information
gathered by the intelligence officer suggest that such prisoner is in a situation of vulnerability
towards others, it is becoming the kingpin of the place or it begins to proselytize, it should first
manage this person at the level of the prison - this is called the management of detention. Then
the specialized services of intelligence will be seized as intelligence officers see them weekly
and share with them the personal information on inmates followed. Moreover, these exchanges
are also an opportunity for the prison administration to receive information from the outside:
specialized intelligence services reported us the detainees followed by them, and ask us to inform
them of what is happening inside the detentions with the detainees there. It is therefore to
manage the collective of prisoners and ensure security within institutions while contributing to
public safety.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you clarify this, Madam Viton?
Ms. Fabienne Viton, head of the office of the Directorate of the penitentiary administration
intelligence. I confirm what has just said Ms. Gorce. For several years, there are permanent
exchanges between the bureau of prison intelligence and Central Intelligence or police services.

They take place today at the most local level, thus finally close the phenomenon at the level
where it's the finest knowledge. We have clearly moved to a higher speed lately.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. I don't wear a judgment on the decision to dissolve the staff of security in
the midst of crisis; It belonged to you - or it belonged to the garde des sceaux of the time.
According the echoes we have various special services which would fail within the prison office,
they are analysts, people really able to deal with the "raw" information However, for jihadism,
you are a Government that has the most information, that it is on what is happening in the
workplace closed or open. Would you not possible to 'borrow' these analysts - by way of
secondment, for example - to specialty services? I understand that they were quite favourable to
the idea of working more with you.
My second question relates to prisoners sentenced to penal servitude for life on terrorism which,
Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, was of my 'clients' - it must be in his thirty-third or thirty-fourth year
in Lannemezan, where it is regularly visited by parliamentarians who support it. Do they have a
special status?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. I repeat, the bureau of intelligence was not a branch. This is the security
staff who was a branch, composed of three offices: the management of the detention, which are
always; celui that intelligence, which also still exists; and security, reinstated in the SubDepartment of trades. The skills of the staff of security have thus not disappeared from the
Directorate of the penitentiary administration, I even think that they are rather developed.
Respect the competences of the office of intelligence, Yes, do us need to move up a gear and us
focus on our ability to analyze what is happening inside our institutions and to correlate what is
happening inside with what is happening on the outside. We need to help our services to better
understand the phenomena occurring within the prisons. As I said earlier, most of the current
staffing of the office of intelligence is composed of officers who seized on the software because
that does currently exist only at the central level. It's a little a little craft machine that we want to
completely restructure to decline at the regional level; When seizures will be made at this level,
the central administration office can devote himself to something else. To move up a gear, we
need means: a completely redefined information system, different skills from the ones we have
today and, indeed, analysts. I do not despair to recruit - why not by way of detachment - personal
that would, inter alia, the Ministry of the Interior.
As our "historical terrorists" sentenced to penal servitude for life, they are almost all distributed
among the different penitentiaries. Wanting to know how they were managed by these
institutions, especially in terms of dispersions and groupings, I asked the inspection of
correctional services to conduct an audit. Inspection has toured all the Central houses in which
these detainees are incarcerated. It appears - it is quite positive that institutions know how to
handle these detainees, much of which are totally remained locked in their radical islam, and
have not evolved since decades. One can say, too, that it does not really dealt with them nor... A
part of them works and continues to practice his cult in custody. Their commitment, their
behaviour have not really changed, but they are under control - close.

M. Olivier Falorni. The prison administration has closed eyes: she was blind to buy the peace
within the prisons. I have argued my parliamentary rights to visit the Central House in my
constituency, that of Saint-Martin-de-R. I have discovered some prefabricated, known as
"casinos". One was taken in hand by the Basques, another by Haitians, and a third, whose
windows were caulked, is in fact a mosque clandestine Salafist, where staff were very difficult to
enter. When I went there, a placard in Arabic above the door advocating Jihad. And it lasts for
years!
Soon after this visit, when the issues to the Government, I asked the Minister of justice to destroy
these casinos - so named because they were originally from the rooms where they played cards.
The Muslim chaplain told me that he met more detainees in Saint-Martin-de-R: obviously, the
Republican islam it professes there more audience, or then the pressure is strong on inmates who
would be likely to go see this man, considered to be a "contributor" and a spy for the french
State. Mrs Taubira told me that it would be carried out the destruction of these casinos, but I am
still waiting for confirmation that it has taken place. This situation is perfectly scandalous.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Saint-Martin-de-R 'casinos' existed for years, and have always been places
of grouping of prisoners, returning by affinities. Sincerely, I cannot clarify today if casinos were
destroyed or not, but I can tell you that this destruction has been programmed and budgeted. In
any case, it is not my intention to keep situations of this nature.
If an illegal Mosque is installed in the casino, it is left to do. There is a takeover of the institution
work, isn't that a question of bulldozer - I also say to all the staff of the plant.
M. Olivier Falorni. They abandoned the Central houses?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. No, but it is necessary that the staff are also there. A certain decline of
supervisory staff may have effect of behaviors that are not eligible on the part of inmates,
groupings that are no longer under control. We must regain control everywhere.
M. Pierre Lellouche. But the directors of the Central houses rely on your leadership, Madam!
The rapporteur. I don't understand. If the situation is known to your services, why not simply
close this "casino"? Why are agents not to tear the posters? No doubt a number of agents are
more comfortable to avoid going to contact to preserve "social peace" in the establishment, but
this situation is problematic - and probably not unique in France. We must reaffirm the authority
of the penitentiary administration.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. I fully share your point of view. Simply, in these very old casinos, there was
also a library, and laundry facilities.
M. Olivier Falorni. It has more library or laundry! We find that Salafists talkers.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Are there other similar cases?

Ms. Isabelle Gorce. I just tell you that I did make an inspection of all the penitentiaries. I don't
have a return of this nature.
The President Georges Fenech. So it's very specific to Saint-Martin-de-R. We look at this
problem.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. Do you feel that radicalisation is rather certain territories, some
populations? My region - Southeast - is very strongly affected by radicalism. There most unspoilt
areas? Do you feel a worrying development? I would also like to know how many incarcerated
minors are involved and what is the proportion of women or girls?
Can preventive measures be taken? What is the role of religious chaplains? Are they useful to
you, or you they put sticks in the wheels?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. We have five minors detained for terrorism, a dozen women, and a single
underage girl.
We started to map reports made at the level of the institutions on the issue of radical islam.
Draws an axis Paris-Lyon-Marseille, which is not so surprising, coupled the LanguedocRoussillon, which is not entirely surprising either. This overlaps with what is said also by
intelligence services. Obviously, it is interesting to see how this evolves, especially for open,
services that are really in contact with the run of the persons placed in the hands of justice.
The number of arrested minors is roughly stable: 700-800 continuously. They are difficult.
Imprisoned in neighbourhoods of minors or institutions for minors, they can quite easily be in the
provocation. A specific action is therefore needed, quite different from that conducted with
major. We work a lot with education on education for citizenship, secularism, Republican values,
by mobilizing external, cultural or other partners. It cannot be said that there is a massive
movement of radicalisation among minors. They are more ambivalent in their behavior.
You queried me about the number of Muslims in prisons: it counts the number of people who
report do ramadan - and the number of people who eat halal. 18 000 67 000 inmates, said do, last
year. It is not known if all are Muslim. Given prison overcrowding, prisoners who are not
Muslims can indeed do ramadan because they are detained with others that do. Because of a
phenomenon of social conformation in prison, sometimes follow the majority of the group. In a
juvenile institution, the proportion of inmates making ramadan can reach 80%. In Porcheville,
West of Paris, almost all of the miners said do ramadan last year. This does not mean that they
will do so throughout the period, but there is a phenomenon of group and social conformation. It
is a risk that needs to be especially careful.
Chaplains are very important partners in the fight against radicalisation. We have created 39 jobs
of chaplains in 2015, on a volume of 60 planned under the first plan of counter-terrorism of the
month of January 2015. And we obviously regular and close contacts with the national Chaplain
of prisons. The Muslim Chaplaincy is complex; the currents, the persuasions, the struggles of
influence are not neutral. It may happen as well as detainees refuse to see a chaplain not because
they are radical but because they are mostly Algerian and the chaplain is Moroccan.

M. Pierre Lellouche. Therefore missing 20 chaplains.

Ms. Isabelle Gorce. We don't recruit them not ourselves. It is the national chaplain who, with
regional chaplains, looking for people who agree to perform the duties of chaplain. It's a poorly
paid, part-time and recruitment is not easy, because for Muslim chaplains, is almost a
professional activity while Catholic and Protestant chaplains are mostly volunteers. We got a
Revalorization of benefits under plate 2. It should intervene in the coming weeks - need to
change an order to increase the amount paid.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Are your chaplains above all suspicion?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Prefectural survey was taken before any approval.
Mr. Serge Grouard. What is the proportion of Muslims in the prison population? I am sure that
you can have relatively precise indications.
On the other hand, you said, Madam Director, that the inspection report that you asked did not
mention other cases as outlined by Mr Olivier Falorni, but this case itself included in the
rendered report?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. The report does not mention the persistence of such phenomenon that noted
by Mr. Falorni.
Mr. Serge Grouard. It promises that there are others.
The President Georges Fenech. Could you keep us informed on this point, Madam Director?
And can you give us details of the number of Muslims?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. We do not account for the number of Muslim prisoners.
The President Georges Fenech. The sociologist Khosrokhavar, in the context of the work of the
commission of inquiry on the monitoring of sectors and individuals jihadists, including ric
Ciotti was president and Patrick Mennucci the rapporteur, was delivered to an estimation, as well
as Mr Guillaume Larriv in a previous report, but the law prohibits this type of encryption.
M. Pierre Lellouche. If it is illegal to tell the truth, then he need to change!
The President Georges Fenech. They felt about 60% the proportion of Muslim detainees.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Obviously, I do not want this kind of statistics. Yet once again, we know
that the number of inmates who make ramadan. And it is proportionally much larger Paris region
than nationally, where it represents 25% to 30% of the total prison population - I think Mr.
Khosrokhavar evoked rather Parisian.
Keep also in mind that a prison is also a place where to exert pressure. There is a form of social
conformation, which is very important. Inmates who are not a priori especially observant will be

in prison, subject to the law of the group, but he was already yesterday and this was not the
terrorists!
M. Pierre Lellouche. Of course, you do not keep such statistics, but if you had the opportunity,
you would be helpful to know who is who in a prison?
The rapporteur. Do you have precise figures on the number of inmates incarcerated for
terrorism linked to radical islam? That is the common law detainees whose your services notice
that they are linked to radical islam? Within the office of the prison information, are these people
individual follow-up? If so, under what terms? Is there a file at the central level? Is where
appropriate, how it used by other than the UCLAT intelligence services?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Our figures are based on statements. We did a search on demand worship
from all prisons but it is highly variable. It is extremely difficult to determine establishment by
establishment. to what extent the presence of a Muslim chaplain is necessary.
The rapporteur. The level of certain Muslim chaplains is unsatisfactory.
It would seem that we have a problem of training and content. It was thus narrated that a Muslim
chaplain had unwittingly smuggled texts Salafists of detainees without even knowing! He was
obviously discarded.
In fact, Muslim chaplains can be useful to avoid a certain contagion of the 'soft underbelly', but
are hardly heard of the most radicalized.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. Undoubtedly, number of Muslim chaplains do not have the sufficient level
to stand up to radical Islamists, or to have the good speech against suburban youth who don't
have to knowledge of islam that a species of loan to think full error found on the internet. It takes
a strong personality to confront Islamist rhetoric. Build the counter-discourse is not within the
reach of everyone. Many of our imams are not able; They recognize it and are seeking training,
technical support.
The President Georges Fenech. You'll soon have the load of the detention of Salah Abdeslam.
We hope that, contrary to the ex-instituteur of Villefontaine, it will not be able to put an end to
these days. This would cause an earthquake, because victims await a trial and, for the moment,
he is the only survivor of the perpetrators of the attacks in Paris. The keeper of the seals
indicated that the detainee would be particularly monitored. Can you tell us a Word?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. We are actually preparing the arrival in France of Salah Abdeslam, in a
large facility in the Paris region. It will be placed there in solitary confinement, under maximum
security conditions, as all such inmates.
Mr. Meyer Habib. What TV channels do detainees receive?
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. It is a bouquet, which I cannot specify you the detail.

The President Georges Fenech. Can Ms. Viton, you give us some figures and answering the
questions of the rapporteur?
Ms. Fabienne Viton. There is no today's file of the radicalized in prison establishments. Police
services are a number of files. If our prisoners therein, we are informed, but we do establish
records 'AP', after the manner of the "S" plugs, for inmates who would be radicalized.
What counts above all, prison intelligence, is to observe and to capitalize a number of
information: who are? Who are? What do want to do tomorrow? These observations are
fundamental. Once capitalized and operated, they can enable us to identify phenomena - it is the
side 'analysis' of the intelligence process. This is the meaning the exploitation of data which,
thanks to our expertise in intelligence, are collected every day in prisons.
M. Christophe Cavard. According our information, it may happen that police services are not
informed of incarceration, for reasons of law, of a radicalized person that they followed. Is this
always the case?
Ms. Fabienne Viton. I wish I could say that this happens more. In any case, there has been
progress. A number of events, including last year, have forced everyone to progress in both
departments.
As to the figures, the 1St April, 256 radical Islamist movements from terrorists were detained in
our prisons, including 186 defendants and 70 convicts.
Ms. Isabelle Gorce. According to information lifts by the interregional directorates and
institutions, between 800 and 1,000 detainees would be near or far involved in radical islam.
However be very careful: the detection of these cases is not scientific.
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies, thank you for your contribution to the work of the
commission of inquiry.
Hearing in camera, Mr. Marc Trvidic, Senior Vice President of the TGI de Lille
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, April 6, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of
our Committee of inquiry; you have occupied many years the duties of investigating judge at the
anti-terrorism pole and your experience is valuable to us. We look at the specific role of this
Centre as well as to the relevance of the legislative provisions that apply or those that can be
taken, and I know that you have taken very recently against certain provisions of the Bill under
discussion on the grounds that they would weaken the institution of the investigating judge.
You have been heard, on February 12, 2015, by the commission of inquiry on the monitoring of
sectors and individuals jihadists. Then occurred the most serious events of November 2015.
However, you had stated publicly, especially in an interview published September 30, 2015 by
the magazine Paris Match, that we were not able to prevent an attack of this kind. Why explain

your observation? Is there still gaps in the legislative arsenal, well that we have legislated
repeatedly on these issues - taking into account your suggestions, for example through the
creation of the offence of "individual business of terrorism", idea you had defended? To prevent
the attacks, should further optimize the coordination between the police and the intelligence
services?
This hearing, which takes place behind closed doors, is not broadcast on the internet site of the
Assembly. Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958
relating to the functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published, in
whole or in part, if we decide so at the end of our work. Accounts of the hearings which will take
place behind closed doors will be first forwarded to people heard in order to collect their
comments to be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report. In
accordance with the provisions of the same article, ' is punishable by the penalties provided for
in article 226-13 of the penal code - one year imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine - any person
who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish information relating to non-public
works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of work of the
commission reported this information .
Before you speak, I ask you, in accordance with the provisions of article 6, to take the oath to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr. Marc Trvidic oath.
Mr. Marc Trvidic, senior vice-president of the tribunal of Grand instance of Lille. I would
briefly remind what situation we were before January 7, 2015. First, the number of investigators
was very insufficient. Certainly, when has a such exodus to the Syria, cannot be upgraded very
soon, but was extremely unprofitable. This explains the discovery, several times during
subsequent investigations, that of French or persons residing in France were managed to go to
Syria or to return without that we know. The disturbing number of income people while it was
unaware they were gone demonstrated effectiveness that was not full.
Added to this was the inability to prevent from those who were monitored. I remember elders of
Artigat: be the subject of a judicial investigation when they came out of prison are not prevented
them from leaving Syria them also. Certainly, these seasoned people had to first concern, every
morning, to remove their car to find the micro which they suspected the installation.
Nonetheless, that they were volatilizing while they were monitored.
On the other hand, we were greatly hampered by the attitude of the Turks - and I think that it
lasts forever - that returned us French without explanation. Perhaps the information affecting
them were passed intelligence to intelligence service, but individuals landed at the airport in
France were never the object of litigation on the part of the Turks, which is problematic to the
french investigator. Imagine arriving at Roissy, since the Turkey, of a young man whose
intelligence services say it probably went in Syria: as it was unaware that it was gone, no
investigation relates; Therefore, build a judicial case in emergency, in a few days. Of such
outbreaks occurring every week, the absence of judicial cooperation on the part of the Turks
raises significant difficulties since we must be able to demonstrate, when we seize the judge of

freedoms and detention, that the person we present to him is actually made in Syria; It is not
enough that she is gone in Turkey.
I also told the commission of inquiry on the monitoring of sectors and individuals jihadists my
very deep concern when it became gradually apparent that were parties in Syria of people who
surrendered in Afghanistan in the 1990s. With phenomenal address books, they can easily
operate relays in France and Belgium and immediately form a support network. The Belgium
made the same observation. Contrary to the idea that we had at the very beginning, it is not only
of spontaneous departures of the younger generation, but also confirmed terrorists ' resuming
service.
From 7 January 2015, the anti-terrorism centre which, I told you, the workforce was already thin,
found himself in a complicated situation. Our means are not extensible, and when 70% of the
population of the anti-terrorism investigators are, as it is logical, assigned to the investigation
into the attacks, there is only 30% for all the other folders. Also, between mid-January 2015 and
the end of August, the date of my departure for Lille, my obsession was to know how I was
going to be able to work my folders without anyone to help me to complete. We have cancelled
operations and we have delayed many - one in particular was a network in La Runion. To
investigate these large-scale attacks, we were faced with the inability of the machine to handle all
other folders. But do not do so, it was to potentially miss out on other preparations of attacks; It
is a factor of great anguish. Having seen what was committed in January, know that a few
individuals returned from Syria are left in nature because one does not have the means to mount
operations to detain them is anything but innocuous.
Then took place several attacks or attempted attacks who occupied what was left of investigators.
These episodes were difficult to decipher: why launch operations involving individuals isolated,
although Abaaoud could send three people going on a killing spree in the Thalys? In my opinion,
it was occupying the ground to prepare for a major in addition operation. Is there a technique
used by Al Qaida in the past and to increase the small cheap: if they walk, so much the better, if
they don't work, both pis. Meanwhile, all investigators are taken, and something much more
solid can be put in place. It was my state of mind when I left, end August 2015. But, before that,
on 15 August, a young man arrested four days earlier on his return from Syria told us clearly that
an attack was planned at a rock concert.
The President Georges Fenech. You have therefore drafted a report?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Yes, since I minding the folder.
The President Georges Fenech. But you have not made the link with the 2009 report, which
mentioned the Bataclan as the target of an attack? Were you aware of its existence?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. No, because I had not heard this folder at the time. The difficulty also what
one interviewee evokes different projects.
The President Georges Fenech. When they give you indications such as those that you have
been given August 15, do you share this information? Are you part of a threat of attack?

Mr. Marc Trevidic. I took these signs very seriously, because the person to whom I was dealing
was accurate and its allusions to the preparation of an attack of great magnitude in the territory
were very clear. On 15 August, in first appearance, he mentioned explicitly a bombing planned
in France at a rock concert, but he did not know what was the exact target.
The President Georges Fenech. What happened then?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. I cannot tell you, because I changed assignment on 28 August.
The President Georges Fenech. But when information is given to you by this man that an
attack might include an auditorium, you take it seriously?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Seriously, because everything he said also had been cut and was true,
whether the manner in which he had been recruited and trained or the people he had encountered,
including Abaaoud.
The President Georges Fenech. I know that there are many theatres in Paris, but what is your
opinion on the fact that preventive security measures were not taken to protect them? Your
interlocutor mentioned Paris explicitly?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. No. He didn't know what was the precise target. I thought that it might be
rock en Seine, main rock festival of the season, accessible to all passing by the Park of SaintCloud.
The President Georges Fenech. So, you have not been surprised by the attack at the Bataclan ?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. No, but it could be elsewhere, because there are a very large number of
festivals and concerts of rock in France and, at the time, I had not at all in memory that the
Bataclan was mentioned in 2009.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Do you consider that there is a "Bataclan matter? For you,
was it a concert of rock and other Hall, or else the overlap of your minutes of August 15, 2015,
that of 2009 and repeated attacks on the Bataclan was the subject on the internet on the grounds
that the room hosted galas of charity for the benefit of the IDF and its owners would be Jewish
have to specifically warn?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. I think that if I had instructed the Farouk Ben Abbes folder in 2009, I'll be
reminded of this name, but this has not been the case. In addition, many projects of attacks were
mentioned throughout all these years, and those who speak them change sometimes targets. But
it is true that if the relationship with the fact that many elders of Afghanistan whose names had
appeared in procedures were now in Syria had been made, it could have done the background
work of search targets that had then been mentioned as potential targets. They are members of Al
Qaida or the Islamic State, these people are the same, and who thought to take at the Bataclan in
2009 can have the same project in 2015.

The President Georges Fenech. In 2014, the ISB succeeded the Central Directorate of internal
intelligence (DCRI) who drafted the minutes of 2009 mentioning the Bataclan as a potential
target. Could ISB link?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. So, provided that someone within the Department to bear; but the turnover
is strong enough. I'm certainly missing an episode, but my functions 1St September in Lille, I
worked in Paris until August 28 and started my move on August 29. There has been very little
discussion, except for a meeting about this issue.
The President Georges Fenech. It is very surprising to hear you mention the important turnover
within ITSB to explain this loss of information. I can't believe that the continuity of the services
is dependent on human memory. The folders remain, and which happens to dive!
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Of course, but I do not think that a folder lists all of the targets mentioned
by the terrorists during their custody.
M. Pierre Lellouche. You apparently normal do not identify somewhere targets and procedures
when working in anti-terrorism? Is it normal that, if the judges change, overlappings and crosses
can more be done? A prosecutor told me recently that the floors are connected nor between them
or with CSB, investigations are not related to each other; as a result, that information are not SID
prosecutors, and vice versa. It seems it normal in the context of combating terrorism?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Should of course share the information up. In time, when two coinvestigating judges only sought radical islam, they had a global vision of all the anti-terrorism
files to education; but then, by force of things, their number increased to eight and we changed
registry. In addition, the referral of judges is done turn' beast', regardless of the folders already
instructed by colleagues; Thus, I was not of those who heard the case Merah, while we knew the
importance of Artigat I case this folder. The loss of information is due to multiple factors.
Finally, a terrorist group for a year has very fluctuating targets and change ten times project.
The President Georges Fenech. Why, in 2009, the investigating judge or the DCRI not alerted
the owners of the Bataclan of what a threat weighed on their establishment? This question haunts
the families of the victims.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. I understand them perfectly, but I can't answer because I wasn't
investigating judge in the 2009 folder. At the time, things were quite confused and the Ben
Abbes folder was broke into several pieces - one giving rise to a preliminary investigation to
prosecutors, another information... - due to the complete absence of connection of the
Prosecutor's office at the time. This has improved lately, and the exchange of information
between the prosecution and the statement are much clearer. In 2009, the Prosecutor's office
"kept in preliminary." Thus, case Artigat I remained so eighteen months.
The President Georges Fenech. Why, when a judge or a service learns information of this kind,
is not transmitted?

Mr. Marc Trevidic. There your question a legal response. A folder with conspiracy in
connection with a business terrorist, even if offending people is not passed to the action, those
who are covered by a project of attack are potential victims; as such, they shall receive a notice
to victim.
Mr Franois Lamy. A few days after the attacks, the press gave a wealth of information on the
concerned terrorists: their name, the previous attacks in which they were involved, their
networks and the number of people - from 110 to 120 - suspected to consider to commit such
acts, that the intelligence services knew of them... This raises question.
You've done State difficulties to prevent the departures to the Syria, taking into account the legal
tools at your disposal. I understand wrong that you receive no information from the Directorate
General for external security (DGSE), even though many relationships exist with the Syria,
including with informants. Certainly, these networks had to be partially destroyed by the war, but
the DGSE knows to do his work. How did these people, once gone, come back from Syria unless
you be warned? ISB perhaps attempted to get in touch with Abaaoud after the hearing that you
have recorded on minutes August 15, 2015, but that really knows the DGSE of what is
happening in Syria? Yourself, in your capacity as a magistrate at the anti-terrorism centre, had
regular contact with the DGSE, or secrecy problem?
On the bottom, means excepted, what is missing to anti-terrorist judges to do their job well? Do
you consider that the establishment of the State of emergency and the house arrest would have
been good tools to keep in France those who unfortunately left in Syria?
M. Pierre Lellouche. To answer the question by Mr Lamy, you can't overlook the dimension of
foreign policy. Since that in 2012 the France decided to cut relations with the Syria, the
relationship between the intelligence services are interrupted, so we had more info on who came
and that emerge. And if the Turkey never really cooperated in the fight against terrorism, it is for
other reasons, foreign policy.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. I am personally responsible for meetings between the DGSE and what was
at the time the DCRI - at the request of the. The judicial police is not and does not have to have
direct institutional contacts with the DGSE, direction including all the action is covered by
secrecy. However, it happened that the DCRI asks us to intervene, in particular because the
DGSE dealt, in Egypt, inter alia, the French who were legal targets. It could be, and should let
them know.
Indeed, after the Embassy of France in Damascus has been closed, we saw return the Divisional
Commissioner of the DCRI, as well as the 'official' agents of the DGSE who were stationed
there. I don't know if, since then, information flowed through services 'action', but nobody ever
told me that such and such information originated from Syria; It is the absolute black. It is not so
with the Lebanon.
M. Pierre Lellouche. If you hear you well, the DCRI, not speaking to the DGSE, had to pass by
you for a meeting? It is chilling.

Mr. Marc Trevidic. This is not so much that it did not mention, is that nobody decides. In this
case, the Egypt was, a moment, a nest of french terrorists - most of the members of the network
Artigat I, for example - who attended cairene universities. Obviously, the DGSE wanted to deal,
or even approach them. He had to let him know, at the request of our investigator service, it
could. We have not done so on our own initiative, but I guess that they were unable to come to
an agreement. The episodes of this kind are relatively rare, but it happened.
M. Pascal Popelin. Do you consider that the creation of the intelligence community cutback
relations between services?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. I did have this problem for a long time, but I can't talk about that folders
that I was responsible. The Prosecutor of the Republic in Paris could better answer you because
it has a broad overview. I would not put my hand to fire everything is for the best in the best
worlds today still.
Mr Franois Lamy. If one reads the entirety of the pedigree of Abaaoud in the press on 16
November 2015, three days after the attacks committed in Paris, this means that these
information were known of a service - and it is necessarily the ITSB, which does not have the
right to intervene outside our borders.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Let me a correction. One hundred twenty very senior officers of ISB are
stationed in embassies. They are heads of network for requests for mutual judicial assistance but,
in my opinion, an ISB agent posted to Damascus passes 90% of his time to intelligence.
State of emergency worries me because, by assigning an individual at home because there is no
evidence against him - if it were otherwise, it would be the subject of a judicial procedure-, does
grow it is not in the arms of the Islamic State? At the end of three will months of house arrest,
not as dangerous as it was before? In my opinion, need to be sufficiently efficient to collect
evidence so that the offending individuals are brought to justice, and then sentences must be long
enough so that they are prevented from damage sustained. All formulas that don't force them
only very temporarily and undifferentiated way are dangerous.
To the tribunal of Lille, I presided over many hearings in immediate appearance. Several
individuals have been referred due to discoveries in their homes during administrative searches
and there the very clear impression that these searches were used to a lot of other things that the
fight against terrorism. If the assigned are actually of Salafis, they will no more love after house
arrest than before! I will give you for example that of a young yet undecided Salafi, who gave an
interview to the daily La Voix du Nord. He explained that after the administrative search and the
residency which ensued, he lost his job; then, no longer able to pay his rent, he received a
deportation order. He wondered therefore ironically where, now being expelled from his home,
he would be placed under house arrest.
The fundamental question is: what can promote the recruitment by Al Qaida or the Islamic State?
Any measures envisaged to take must be assessed in this light. Nobody does more reach, these
organizations are finished. In this perspective, a residency condition make reluctant youths less
hate in our regard, less receptive to ideas Salafists, or not? In my opinion, it may precipitate their

decision. Individuals who are visited at the beginning of the State of emergency are people who
were still tangent; I am afraid the evolution of these measures could lead to. The State of
emergency is necessary immediately after an attack, while people are in the streets and that
another attack may be committed, that should be avoided. But in the long term this can have
perverse effects.
The President Georges Fenech. You have expressed in the press of the highly critical opinions
on administrative searches also. Thus the Belgian daily Le Soir quote as follows: " imitate not the
France, the State of emergency, it is stupid; the slew of administrative searches that are
worthless, it is very heavy, very derogatory to our system, for a very limited effectiveness .
Mr. Marc Trevidic. It is a synthetic version of a more global reflection...
The President Georges Fenech. But nevertheless, you feel that the administrative searches are
not useful in the fight against terrorism.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. They are useful for a time reduced, because it is urgent and immediate
potentiality of other attacks; then, the real villains have hidden everything they had to hide. I can
see in immediate appearance of the people who found the shit during an administrative search.
what think? This has nothing to do with the fight against terrorism, which justifies the postrelease residency conditions. I expect that one shows me the opposite: how many terrorist cases
have been updated following the administrative searches?
The President Georges Fenech. Five, say.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Is this more than what is usual? It is necessary to find solutions, but observe
the effectiveness of a beautiful survey conducted with sufficient resources: This allows, for
example, to stop the man who was arrested in Boulogne, to update the cache of Argenteuil and
avoid an attack. I believe in investigations; They allow to find links, people and caches, and we
manage to prevent attacks. Therefore, capacity of inquiry to get to the bottom of things.
Intelligence feeds the judiciary: everything is discovered during a judicial investigation is a gold
mine for intelligence.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. I remind our president that the judge is not responsible for public order
cannot ask them to take the initiative to alert potential victims.
The President Georges Fenech. If the judge is a little conscientious, it will pass a call to the
Prosecutor of the Republic or him will send a letter to inform him.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. I have to agree; It can also refer to the prefect. But it is not its
responsibility first to directly alert potential victims.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. The law obliges the investigating judge to notify the victim of the opening
of a procedure of judicial information. But, when is involved an association of criminals in
relation with a terrorist undertaking, take the time to appreciate if the victim is characterized and
well targeted. However individuals that we follow a year change target without stopping; We

cannot notify all potential victims they could mention. On the bottom, I'm embarrassed to talk to
a folder that I have not instructed: I don't know if the threat was very real, or if it was not.
M. Christophe Cavard. You've heard in 2013 by the commission of inquiry set up following
the case Merah. You did state at the time of major difficulties in the exchange of information
between the Prosecutor's office and the internal security services. You had explained that some
information remained in the intelligence services and that you often had great difficulty
accessing. What is today? He also said that after the attacks, the intelligence services provide
suddenly white notes in many judicial services. What is the reality? Finally, what can be the role
of the local procuratorates in the fight against terrorism?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. It is true that after Merah case officers of the DCRI arrived here with scores
of records, wishing to Chamberland that they kept until then as the elbow. I think that this is the
same after each attack. We are in a system where it is up to the intelligence services, whose
activity is covered by secrecy, to decide if and when they judiciarisent a folder. It is difficult to
find a fully satisfactory system. However, certain information us would have been sufficient,
since very little is sufficient to open a preliminary investigation aimed at determining the
existence of a possible infringement. I don't know what it is for the hierarchy, but I know that
ISB officials regret unable to judicialize records. They know the clogged judicial system and
think they can load it more, even though everyone knows to judicialize to stop people. But the
judicial system cannot have control of what is relevant: for ISB, article 40 of the code of criminal
procedure has no meaning, since the activity of its agents is covered by secrecy. There is an
intrinsic contradiction, and cannot be faulted for a service to keep for him information that it
does not have the right to give because it is classified.
Ms. Anne-Yvonne Le Dain j.. When consolidated the information collected during the different
instructions? Is it even possible to consolidate them, and with what guarantees of respect for
public and individual freedoms? How to make accessible the perception or a premonition of
danger three or four years before the commission of an act?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. There is a tendency to think that any element appearing in a folder enters a
"large memory" computerized ISB, and that will be evident years later when one presses a
button. This is not the case, and it is why I spoke of human memory. Justice has no tool to make
reconciliations and keep all records, overall; each investigating judge does for so far. When a
name was telling me something, I get my files - that I had scanned; It is thus, for example, that I
finally found that individual appeared in 1998 during an investigation on the Afghan track. I
often operated in this way reconciliations that SID had not made. This means that the individual
memory works better than banks data; There is a problem of duplication of information.
Mr. Serge Grouard. This means that the databases are not formatted as they should be.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. I also remember, about the Copernic Street bombing, that one went digging
in the archives of 1988 by j. Boulouque thanks to ISB officer retired, who remembered a name
mentioned during the custody of a third party. The transmission of the individual memory doesn't
happen. The colleague that succeeded you arriving the day when you are appointed to another
function to the Court from another town, how the passage of the relay, except coming the

weekend in question talk records? This results in a massive loss of information. Goes to SID
during the departure of functional managers: from one day to the next, their memory disappears.
I don't know what software tool could be created to interconnect all folders; for justice, it would
mean also to scan all old folders which were not.
Ms. Anne-Yvonne Le Dain j.. The question is moral before being practical. Putting next
individual freedoms and collective interest, do you consider desirable the principle of the
consolidation of the information?
The rapporteur. One cannot simply rely on the memory of the men - we see the limits of such a
system, with a significant loss of crucial information during deployments. In addition to what
you seek in your ancient records, there is interchange between magistrates? And you heard, one
has the feeling that the same names return for many years, sometimes decades. could SID and the
investigating judges come together to display the portraits of their 'clients' on the walls to share
and complement their information? How to centralize various business-related information? Is it
you who give information to the ISB? Do you consider that the available information is actually
shared in respect for the prerogatives of each?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Oddly enough, we have no statistical data on the information gathered
during the criminal investigation in terrorist matters, so although I do not know if the recidivism
rate is higher than for any other type of crime. This may seem innocuous, but it would help,
because the ideology of the persons considered. At least should cross-check information
collected on individuals or targets and why establish a database of the judicial business
transacted; they would then be available to judges under any other procedure. The problem is
that populate the database for each open case represents a very important work. The file thus
constituted would be judicial use. Then, intelligence aspire all the judiciary, since the ITSB,
because its double-hatted, treats all files: all the information - connections, addresses... - from a
court record books themselves in intelligence databases and are processed intelligence. ISB also
asked the Prosecutor to be systematically referred to in all the "Syrian" folders, even those who
arrived through the anti-terrorist branch (SDAT). Sometimes, ISB agents are not writing a single
record: they are there only to feed the database 'intelligence' of what is found during criminal
investigations.
Everything depends then on the use which is made of the data bank, for what purpose, by whom,
under what control, and the control is effective. The advantage of a criminal record is that if
information is not reliable, if a fact is not proven or not proven, the thing is being debated
publicly, in the presence of a lawyer, and the Court finds that we have committed a "missed".
There is no secret-defense, control and enforcement are naturally: If a folder does not, it is said
that it does not.
The President Georges Fenech. I seem to recall that in at least one case you had to know a
Masterful magnifying glass: a judicial review not met unless you're informed followed by a false
statement of loss of identity papers leading to the establishment of new documents which
enabled the person concerned to leave the territory while the ban. Is it correct?

Mr. Marc Trevidic. It happened several times that people under judicial control stop point and
that we don't know that much later. This has happened also in the folder including one of the
authors of the attack against the Bataclan and two other individuals. I don't know if those were
repeat identification. In this case, two co-investigating judges had been designated. I had not
asked Sumbua but the other two at a time, me who both requested the lifting of the ban on
leaving the country aimed them: one because his grandfather had died - but I have never received
the death certificate I asked-, the other to see his family. I refused in both cases. Some time later,
with a year of offset from the start of the investigation, according to the exploitation of their mail
boxes by the ITSB that one of them always wants to go to Syria. I then summoned for
questioning; It does not and I learn with difficulty, none of the three was more pointing to the
station for at least four weeks if not more, even though they were held to a weekly control.
This isn't the only folder in which this has happened. Examining magistrate in anti-terrorism
matters are housed in the same boat as their colleagues: they have two tools in everything and for
everything at their disposal, prison or judicial review of base. In other words, shit traffickers and
terrorists are the subject of the same treatment, the latter being not more monitored than others: if
they don't come point, it makes account or not according to the workload of the Commissioner.
This is the reality. Between classical judicial and prison, there has never been a third way.
Should be, possibly, centres where they would be very framed and where one would deal with
the various aspects of the question, but such centres do not exist. It has also used the electronic
bracelet - which did not prevent one of my colleagues to realize that one or two individuals were
left in Syria after they abducted. Therefore, put into perspective the effectiveness of these
measures.
The President Georges Fenech. How have these departures in Syria been possible? I imagine
that, in pronouncing the prohibition to leave the country, you you submit identity documents?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. The case is old; as it has been judged, you should be able, for more details,
communicate you the side of the folder. I have the specific memory of a case in which the person
concerned had made to redo his identity papers after by falsely declaring the flight, but I can't
remember if it is this one. At the time, in any case, there is no interconnection between the file of
bans on exit from the territory and identification documents, so the prefecture to which the
documents were reported stolen in established new.
The President Georges Fenech. That individuals subject to judicial scrutiny for acts of
terrorism can leave the national territory safely after a such sequence of circumstances shows
that there are some flaws in our system.
The rapporteur. The problem is, as has been said, that the police or gendarmerie services apply
judicial review in the same way, it is a question of drug trafficking or terrorism, and that
information on non-compliance with judicial review cannot judge that late or if he requests. But
it seems to me that a circular was issued on this subject.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Any request for new identity papers normally raises the consultation by the
prefecture of the national file of wanted persons (FPR), in which bans on exit from the territory
are worn; We believe that consultation is not systematic.

The President Georges Fenech. -What is establishing a national judicial file would use, as
suggested by our colleague Alain Marsaud?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. If it is consulted, no doubt. But if the RPF is well fed, it is not necessary to
create another file. The problem is that officials of the prefectures, faced with the mass of
documents they need to establish, do not systematically consult the RPF. In addition, stations
must exercise extreme vigilance when we address for judicial review someone who has the
qualification of terrorist seemed to be a no-brainer; I saw that this was not the case.
Mr Franois Lamy. Could we not admit that the DGSE transmit information at its disposal to
specialized investigative judges and that to this end are entitled to secrecy?
We understand the principle whereby the permanence in certain specialized functions is limited
to ten years, but given the lack of resources, no one could design exceptions to this rule, for a
given duration and for some functions?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. I was eligible for secrecy because the anti-terrorism section of the Paris
Prosecutor's office also deals with compromise of the secret files: it must be that during a search
the judge can recognize document which has been trivialized. But because the elements covered
by secrecy, are not open to contradictory discussion, may be included in a criminal record, I
wanted to have only the minimum information that I could share it, including with the civil
parties; otherwise, it means not to say victims and a part of the truth, which does not conceive. It
is a big problem. Also, although skill, I never used this option, otherwise in the case of
compromise of secrecy; for the rest, I me in wanted to the classic claim of declassification,
declassified in the adversarial elements. Because known me empowered, he arrived that it gives
me "off" information, but are not proof that can be paid to the court record. The investigating
judge is subject to contradictory; He must be honest and fair play, and fight with lawyers on the
basis of what is contained in the folder. We are not an intelligence service, and seen although
there is overhang if we lean too far on the side: "I am in secret."
In certain highly specialized functions and leading to deal with complex issues relating to matters
which are equally, there should probably be a passage from relay two or three months during
which the Republic would pay the judge who is going to remain with one that arrives. This
would facilitate things, avoid very long breaks in statements, and given the low number of
persons concerned, I do not think that it would a major expense in the State coffers.
M. Christophe Cavard. Common criminals may be of interest the internal security services;
also, without calling into question the role of the Parisian anti-terrorism Prosecutor, how to make
territorial jurisdictions also play a role in this fight? On the other hand, what do you wear on the
sharing of the information with your counterparts in other European countries, the Belgium
including?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. It is true that the population on which works the anti-terror branch is now
much more disseminated in the territory that it was. One could imagine, without breaking the
parquet to national competence, to create antennas - e.g. within the specialized inter-regional
courts dealing with organized crime. But it would make sense if the local branches of the ISB

had the power to intervene very important: synergy would then, the investigation would begin
and dialogue would be with Paris. It would be a good idea, but I have observed that everything
that is processed by the local services of the ISB in the province back to Paris whatever it is. I
therefore fear that decentralized branches of national prosecutors are worthless if they are not
interlocutors on the side of investigators: teams must first determine whether a given folder is
terrorist or if it is not. For Mohamed Merah, there was no corresponding judicial specialist, so
everything is reassembled in Paris; then, the information return - or not.
European cooperation is a complicated issue. We begin to evoke the idea of a "European FBI",
but the European Union, is not a federal State, is not federal courts. In the United States, when an
FBI agent has a case, it refer to the federal prosecutor. It is hardly possible to create a European
Community of intelligence without knowing to what authority its members will report or who
will then process the information.
Do not believe as far as the judicial European services work together. Thus we always worked
well with the Belgians and, from a judicial point of view, we have never had need of much more
than what we already have: joint investigation teams, the Schengen area, telephone relationships,
visits to our counterparts if need be... I have seen that flexibility in the judicial operation, this is
not the rub.
The President Georges Fenech. What is your opinion on 'chain Molenbeek?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. At least 160 Belgian fighters have been recruited It's huge. There were a
real problem in this area. If a quarter of your nationals recruited by jihadists networks comes
from the same place, this should make you think that this is to "update package".
The President Georges Fenech. Is that what took place?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Obviously not, or a little late because we sin by a time delay with regard to
what has happened. But this was eventually done these past two years, so Khalid Takako and
Fouad Bartlett - the leader of the group Sharia4Belgium - were arrested. Against the first, which
it realized that it was the great recruiter of Molenbeek, a heavy penalty - fifteen years of
detention - was required.
The President Georges Fenech. There, according to you, "a hundred of Molenbeek" in France?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. There. In my capacity as former investigating judge, I feel dangerous the
existence of areas completely Salafists, or at least from areas in which no serious investigation
may be conducted if people find shelter. I had to deal with a very important in Trappes dossier; It
took an extraordinarily long time to find the time to put a microphone in an apartment or a car. If
you need to operate in hostile environments and when a policeman appears, everyone noticed, it
is extremely difficult to use modern means of investigation and surveillance: should arrive at the
apartment without that neighbors cry wolf, and is reached no more make physical spinning. It is
dangerous because it can no longer investigate, and this makes us blind.

M. Pierre Lellouche. It is striking to hear a judge say there in France of 'hostile zones' in which
it is impossible to put a micro - because it's war, in short!
I note that in anti-terrorism matters the judicial machine is not refers to itself: we have just heard
that there are no connections between the folders and that each judge, the nose on his handlebars,
does not benefit from the results of surveys made elsewhere. It seems to me that should be down
cultural walls between services and put this information in a common pot, so you can cross them
as necessary.
It should also bring justice to the intelligence community. We have already raised this issue in
prison matters; everyone has in mind the resistance of the old guard of the seals on this subject,
but you do it gradually. Similarly, it must achieve a sharing of information between criminal
investigators and services. For the moment, the justice does not have them all, and I am not sure
that the intelligence services have all either - even if, theoretically, they aspire to what is said in
the law firm judges, I am not sure that is systematic.
It is another area where everything is to do: relation to the 175,000 people which are not owned
but subject to judicial review. As a result of the overhaul of the public (RGPP) and because
policies should be empty of overcrowded prisons, the laws of 2010 and 2014 organized the early
release of many prisoners - including that of 'clients' for terrorism. This release is accompanied
by a probation, but each probation officer loaded 60 to 70 former detainees, none are actually
followed. Maintaining the roster of terrorists or those who have a link with terrorism in this
particular population seems vital.
Lastly, as regards European cooperation in these matters, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
heard Mr. Didier Le Bret, national coordinator of intelligence, December 8, 2015. He was
returning from a Defence Council, in the aftermath of which had taken place the first meeting of
the heads of intelligence of the EU ever, which means that the intelligence services of the
Member States do not talk. It is an illusion to believe that the information remontraient to Mr
Gilles de Kerchove, co-ordinator of the European Union for the fight against terrorism: not a
European intelligence service will do. Suffice to say that there is no such thing as the European
intelligence community. It must therefore be good internally, and have contacts with the key
countries that are the Belgium but also the Turkey and Syria - and there arise, as I said, foreign
policy issues.
The President Georges Fenech. Obviously, we will discuss these issues with the intelligence
services, Europol, Eurojust and the European authorities.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Any intelligence service has the culture of secrecy and it is inherently
difficult to share its information with a judge or with another service.
Mr. Serge Grouard. The importance of the connection files and the preservation of the memory
of the business cannot be underestimated. All of our proposals, also good they are, will remain
unfulfilled if the governance and operational tools are not defined which allow their
implementation Effective work. To date, information disappear as those who completed folders
change an assignment, or because the data are not entered, or because the search engines are not

efficient or even, sometimes, compatible with each other. Each must fend for themselves. This
set is not necessarily a deliberate one or the other; It must be reviewed as a whole an inadequate
system. All services need.
Have you been threatened, your honour, and if so, have you been protected? Some of your
colleagues have, in the exercise of your sensitive functions, is the subject of threats and
pressures? What is fear?
Mr. Marc Trevidic. I got some bodyguards for ten years. I stopped to have August 28, 2015, the
date on which I made my Parisian Office keys, since they are not attached to the man but to the
function. If I was in danger until August 28, 2015, was it I less August 29? I leave you to judge.
But many people need to be protected, and there is a budget issue. I have never felt truly
threatened. I have received a few letters and threatening emails from various morons, but this has
not worried me grossly. Abroad, in difficult times, in the Lebanon in particular, what was to be
done was. And, given the atrocities that can commit terrorists, if they take a particular individual,
it is a lesser evil...
Mr Franois Lamy. I wish to return to the parallel that was made between the situation in
Molenbeek and the situation in France, in such a way that you hear on the terms. To have been
Minister of the city, I am fully aware that one cannot enter in some districts without everyone
knows immediately that the police is there, but the difficulty of the work of the law enforcement
is drug trafficking and banditry. Are you saying that you cannot enter certain areas because they
are fully controlled by the Salafists? This is not the same thing.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. There is, if you let this neologism, areas very 'salafisees', and those who
live there know that they will be safe. I spoke of traps but it is also true in Toulouse, as
evidenced by the tributes to Mohamed Merah written on some walls. Should not be fooled, this is
not from these areas that someone will call the green number to indicate that its neighbour is
radicalized! So, Yes, there are in areas controlled by the Salafists France, but they are probably
not the extent of Molenbeek, which has 100,000. In some places, it will remain neutral. My
proposal was not confrontational, it was the finding of a practitioner. I believe that it is not
without significance that in terrorist matters could not go to work in some places, reason for
which wanted persons will go to take refuge.
Mr Franois Lamy. I can cite four or five quarters of this type in France, but it is far from the
hundred or so, and I do not think that Molenbeek is an appropriate example for who wants to
fight against terrorism in France.
Mr. Marc Trevidic. Better to act, be pessimistic and say that we are not far away.
The President Georges Fenech. I thank you.
Hearing in camera, Mr. Vincent the Ganguly, vice-president in charge of the
implementation of the regional court in Paris sentences
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, April 6, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. We receive Mr. Vincent the Ganguly, vice-president in charge
of the enforcement of sentences to the High Court (TGI) of Paris. Your hearing, Mr president,
fits later in those of magistrates, prosecutors, judges of instruction, presidents of Chambers, of
Chairmen of Court of Assizes, presidents of the 16e Chamber of Paris TGI. We with continue
you our investigations on the more specific question of enforcement of sentences and on the
means available to you and the relevance of the provisions that you put in Artwork.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, and in accordance with article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958 operation
parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at
the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will
previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. The latter will be
submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report. I recall that, pursuant to
the provisions of the same article, "shall be punished by penalties provided for in article 226-13
of the penal code -" one year of imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine - "anyone who, within a
period of twenty-five years [...], disclose or publish information relating to non-public works of a
commission of inquiry, except if the report published at the end of the work of the commission
has reported this information.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.
Please raise your right hand and say: "I swear."
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly oath.
Mr. Vincent Ganguly, Vice President in charge of the enforcement of sentences to the
Court of major jurisdiction of Paris. I would remind the legal framework of the speech:
competent penal enforcement judge on terrorism was created by the law of 23 January 2006 on
the fight against terrorism and containing various provisions relating to security and border
controls, Mr. Pascal Clment as keeper of the seals. Article 14 of this law, article 706-22-1 of the
code of criminal procedure provides that, ' by way of derogation from the provisions of article
712-10 are only competent judge of the enforcement of sentences of the Court of major
jurisdiction of Paris, the Court of enforcement of sentences of Paris and the Chamber of the
enforcement of sentences of the Court of appeal of Paris to take decisions concerning persons
convicted of an offence within the scope of application of article 706-16. namely, acts of
terrorism, "whatever the place of detention or residence of the convicted person. This same
article provides that "for the exercise of their powers, the magistrates of the courts referred to in
the first subparagraph may move throughout the national territory, without prejudice to the
application of the provisions of article 706-71 on the use of means of telecommunication".
In adopting this text, the legislature has expressed the wish to centralise to the courts in the
enforcement of Paris the follow-up of all those sentenced for acts of terrorism, regardless of their
place of residence or detention, probably with the aim of achieving a unified jurisprudence and
more uniform treatment of criminal situations convicts which were previously different judges

for the application of the penalties on all the national territory. In addition, on the practical level,
these provisions were probably taken to avoid extractions of detainees particularly monitored and
to limit travel of judges by using audiovisual means of telecommunication.
Once this legal framework is recalled, should bear in mind that the enforcement of sentences, on
terrorism, works according to certain specific provisions. First, it is a court whose jurisdiction is
exclusive and not competing as is the case for the local courts for training and judgment. This
exclusive jurisdiction in is still somewhat limited by the texts since, except in cases of
emergency, I have, every time I take a decision, take before the opinion of the judge of
enforcement of sentences of the place of nut of the convicted person or, if he is free of his place
of residence. Where the practice of double records, both among the territorially competent penal
enforcement judge, and the judge of enforcement of sentences in Paris - which kinda complicates
things.
This centralization principle requires the competent penal enforcement judge terrorism Chair,
usually, enforcement of sentences (CAP) commissions in different prisons, i.e. on all the national
territory, when must be examined requests for furloughs, to additional sentence reductions or the
review of sentence-reduction credits. To this end, I am moving - I go fairly regularly in Corsica
since you probably know that most of the convicts of the full-bodied movement are serving their
sentences in Borgo - but I also use video conferencing - what is the most common, - especially
when I have to preside over CAP for several convicted persons serving their sentences in the
same establishment. I thus Chair of CAP in videoconference with the Paris Prosecutor's office
for the penitentiary centre of Lannemezan, the Central House of Saint-Maur, the house arrest of
Fresnes, Tarascon detention centre... Finally, especially where the institution concerned has only
one sentenced for acts of terrorism and in order to avoid bureaucracy, the local penal
enforcement judge can replace me and preside over the CAP; Therefore, issues an opinion that it
passes and I statue by order.
With regard to the discussion of modification of sentence, the code of criminal procedure
provides that they have held in the Court of major jurisdiction of Paris, so in the presence of the
Paris Prosecutor's office. They stand in general by videoconference with the prison where the
convicted person; However, displacements, with the Paris Prosecutor's office, are regularly
organized when circumstances so require and more particularly when we are dealing with a first
application for a convict serving a particularly heavy sentence. Therefore, therefore, the Court
for the application of the punishment - namely j., assessors, representatives of the Prosecutor and
the registry moves in the establishment to take the adversarial. I thus chaired a Court of
enforcement of sentences in the penitentiary centre of Lannemezan to consider the application
for conditional release of Georges Ibrahim Abdallah. I also Chair discussions contradictory
when, in the same establishment, many convicts were of the applications.
In addition, it seems to me necessary that we were moving when have before us us a request for
suspension of sentence for medical reasons: it is important to decide to physically see the
condemned, to see his conditions of detention. I thus went recently to the Central House of
Rennes following a request made by a basque sentenced Ms. Guimon.

You should also remember that I have multiple interlocutors: I'm alone in Paris to manage all
sentenced for acts of terrorism, but I have vocation to work with some 95 prison services
insertion and probation (SPIP) of France, depending on the place of incarceration of convicts or
their place of residence if they were released. I work also with 40 prisons where convicted
persons serving a sentence for acts of terrorism. I work with psychologists, psychiatrists of all
appellate experts experts. This is not without difficulty, as the supported are more or less
homogeneous of a SPIP or one prison to another.
I will now give you a few figures on the functioning of my office. When the jurisdiction of the
enforcement of sentences of Paris was established in 2006, the Chancery has created two posts: a
competent judge of enforcement of sentences in terrorism and a substitute post. The firm is
therefore awarded follow-up of 111 sentenced for acts of terrorism. In December 2015, there
were 240 convicts followed by my office, an increase of 26% from 2014 - 43% the previous year
to 2013. The increase in the number of supported is so massive and fast, this number reaching, at
the present time, 264 convicts.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. How many are from the jihadist chain?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. I'll get to in a moment.
On 240 convicted persons that I followed in December 2015, 181 are followed in a closed
environment, whether it's prisons, of the investments under electronic surveillance, eleven of
them, or parole for a convicted person. The 59 other convicts are generally followed in an open
environment, essentially under the regime of conditional release, after a probationary period;
Fifteen of them are in sentence with probation - they are more numerous in this case with mixed
convictions by the correctional tribunal of Paris; Finally, there are five prohibitions on residence
and a medical suspension of sentence.
The President Georges Fenech. And no criminal constraint?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. No, no criminal constraint was delivered by the 16e Chamber of
Paris TGI.
The President Georges Fenech. How is it?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. This probably seems pretty little suits with concerned criminal
population.
To answer your question, Mr rapporteur, on all of those sentenced for acts of terrorism, 38% of
those followed by my cabinet belong to the Islamist movement: 64 were followed in custody and
some 20 workplace opened. To give you an element of comparison, prisoners of the basque
movement still represent 35% of the total and those of the mouvance Corsica slightly more than
12%, the remainder being composed of prisoners linked to the workers party of Kurdistan
(PKK), the Revolutionary Party-Front (DHKP-C) people's liberation and the Tamil Tigers, not to
mention a few cases related to direct Action.

The strong growth in the number of convicts followed by my cabinet should again accelerate in
2016, due to the multiplication of correctional hearings at the correctional tribunal of Paris for
acts of terrorism in connection with jihadism. The Act of 13 November 2014 strengthening the
provisions relating to the fight against terrorism included in my sphere of competence - which, in
my opinion, is not a very good thing - the facts of provocation and apology of an act of terrorism
which were previously common law and the Act on freedom of the press.
Alongside the very significant increase in the number of tracked, there is an increase not less
important in the number of applications for development of sentence, judgments and orders.
I noticed over these past two years, that convicts of the Islamist movement are very seekers
arrangements of sentence, unlike, for example, the Basques. In general, moreover, the duration
of pre-trial detention allows them, at the time where they pass judgment, entitled to a
modification of sentence almost immediately after the hearing.
In addition, the individualization of sentences Act of August 15, 2014 and strengthening the
effectiveness of criminal sanctions - in particular its provision requiring the systematic
consideration of the situation of persons sentenced to two-thirds of their sentences has greatly
affected the operation of my office.
I have a few lines of thought. First, sentence planning, legislation in force for convicted of acts of
terrorism is the law of common law. This means that the current legislation does not test of
public order to disregard a request on the ground that the person is sentenced for acts of terrorism
and that there is a risk of disturbing public order. Indeed, you should know that, often, prisoners
belonging to the Islamist movement pose no particular difficulties in detention and that their
requests for modification of sentence are admissible on its merits: these people are pretty well
inserted socially, their families offer to host them, they are well inserted professionally - hiring
proposals, that I check through the police or prison services insertion and probation are solid.
Finally, do not omit these convicts are backed by very good lawyers: in Paris, for claims before
the judge of enforcement of sentences, the practice is to designate systematically, as counsel,
Secretaries of the conference of lawyers of the bar. Also is it often difficult to find legal
arguments to dismiss the claims.
It is probably desirable to introduce into law a criterion of public order to disregard certain
requests. Indeed, by receiving these convicts at the hearing, the contradictory debates, despite a
solid record, despite a good promise of social, professional and family integration, parquet and
ourselves sometimes have real concerns...
When is it right to requests for modification of sentence, they take the form almost exclusively
preparatory probationary assorted parole, namely, more frequently, investments under electronic
supervision, well, rarely, probation parole. When the parole shall be granted under this scheme,
test timeout is systematically elongated to allow a longer follow-up, which nevertheless has the
consequence, for insertion and probation prison services with known low means a heavier load.
M. Pierre Lellouche. How many agents of probation are there, and how many concerned
people?

Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. I work with 95 SPIP, since convicts are distributed throughout the
national territory. I more work with some with others - I think the prison services Corsica, the
Basque country or the Paris region. In each prison service, these are generally the most
experienced, most solid which are designated for the follow-up of those sentenced for acts of
terrorism, which does not exclude a certain heterogeneity in their support as lies, for example, in
the Creuse or the Yvelines.
To return to placement under electronic surveillance, it is the most often used tool of
modification of sentence. If it is interesting, it has its limitations: it is hardly bearable and
supported by the convicts over very long periods. then it does not ensure the de-radicalization of
the individuals concerned - electronic surveillance, it is only the prison at home...
M. Pierre Lellouche. They are free from eight to twenty hours and weekend also, is that
correct?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. No, not weekends, in any case not for folders processed by my
office. They are placed under electronic surveillance on the basis of their work schedules: the
journey time from home to the place of work and actual work time are only taken into account.
The rest of the time, they must be at home, and on weekends, they can go out to sport, through
proof and for a very short time: two hours on Saturdays and two hours on Sunday or even four
hours one Saturday.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Do you have proof that they work?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. I works differently from the common law service: the controls are
much more sustained. Firstly, the hourly plan is different and, on the other hand, checks are
regularly carried out by the SPIP at my request. It is not uncommon that I send the police
services to verify that the person who enjoys a modification of sentence is well on his place of
work at the time when it should be. Otherwise, of course, we are never sure.
The President Georges Fenech. I understand: how much are you judges to the Court of
application sentences specialized under the terms of article 706-22-1 of the code of criminal
procedure?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. Myself, that's all.
The President Georges Fenech. That is, you only manage this population? You are alone?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. In fact, I'm completely alone.
The President Georges Fenech. This situation seem it normal?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. No, but when the last visit of the garde des sceaux, Mrs Taubira,
after the attacks of January 2015, then after the attacks of November 2015, me has been
promised the creation of a second competent penal enforcement judge position on terrorism. I

must say that, for the moment, the Chancery has not filled this post since, if an additional post
was created, it was awarded to a person who had a Union discharge full time.
The President Georges Fenech. It is extraordinary!
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. If so, the position in question was not created by the Chancellery, he
was, on the other hand, by the president of the Court: the president of the regional court in Paris
has indeed decided that at the beginning of September, a second post would be established, taken
on the staff of the enforcement of common law. So, in September, we will be two.
The President Georges Fenech. We in well noted.
You well recalled the derogatory legal device to common law - under the terms of article 706-221 of the code of criminal procedure - in which you are working, and, at the same time, you
explain that you apply the same texts as those applicable to the convicted criminals. Then you
start a reflection track that we should introduce a derogating criterion, which would be one of
public order, to decline, possibly, a parole to two thirds of the penalty, the examination of the
application of this management is now automatic.
Do you not think that, if we introduce this criterion, many lawyers dispute as being for less Tote,
and rather vague - how appreciate disorder to public order? -would give you not too much power
but too much responsibility to enjoy by yourself, alone, disorder to public order? Do you not
better to legislate to introduce a more objective system planning of sentences for terrorists? Do
you not need to revisit the alignment of first-time offenders and recidivists credit for reducing
sentences and remission?
Indeed, it is clear, in reading the press, citizens wonder: MIT Coulibaly was sentenced in 2013.
to five years imprisonment; He should have come out in 2018, except imputation of pre-trial
detention periods; However it happened we know in January 2015, the Hyper hide of the porte
de Vincennes. If he had not been released... Do you know more of the reasoning that is usually.
It is true the enforcement judges are facing this risk whenever they cast someone freedom, not
prematurely, but in accommodation of penalty.
So you are applicant for a disturbance of public order criterion, but it would put you only face a
very heavy responsibility because the day where you decide to release such terrorist because you
consider that it does not threaten public order, if it repeats the next day, you will have the entire
France against you!
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. I understand perfectly. I think more, to be precise, at the risk of
disturbing public order. In addition, the criteria for parole are particularly fuzzy, but they do not,
allow us to the Prosecutor's office nor to myself, to refuse punishment facilities who "hold the
road. If, indeed, a convicted person behaves perfectly in detention, made obvious reintegration
efforts, working, or courses, or even a training outdoors, if there is then a solid project, if it can
certify that we have suitable accommodation, we will be, legally speaking, in big trouble to deny
a modification of sentence while, in some cases We are legitimately concerned because of what
is said - and especially what has not been not said - during the hearing.

Efforts should be made to define a more accurate device; the definition of parole, pursuant to
article 729 of the code of criminal procedure, is today unclear: it is question of good prospects
for rehabilitation, social rehabilitation... This imprecision leaves a lot to be able to judge. This is
why I wish to add a criterion more strict and specific to this category of convicts, although it
should be, of course, to define.
The President Georges Fenech. Without going to introduce this criterion, one could imagine
the deletion of any modification of sentence for the offence of terrorism.
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. The question I has been asked on several occasions. You mentioned
the alignment between recidivists and non-recidivists. As a judge of enforcement of sentences, I
was shocked by this measure: this is not at all the same thing of dealing with a convicted person
repeatedly or a first-time offender. This alignment was probably badly lived elsewhere than in
my cabinet.
The President Georges Fenech. Why?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. Because people, overnight, became eligible for parole; because
people, from one day to the next, have benefited from significant remission credits while
obviously no had seen no change in their behaviour in detention. Our job is to construct
sentences based on individual routes, and when, suddenly, the rules are changed, the operation of
a law firm is affected.
The President Georges Fenech. And with regard to the concept of eliminating any modification
of sentence for acts of terrorism?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. I sincerely believe that it is not the right solution. However, there
should be a criterion for different time. Currently, when we look at applications in mid-sentence,
we know, the convict as the Court for the application of penalties, that approach is futile because
of the jurisprudence of the Court of appeal of Paris to expect a certain level of execution of the
sentence in order to obtain a development.
The rapporteur. You decide on the basis of objective criteria that you recalled, but also based
on your impressions of hearing. What is the share of the latter in your final choice?
We were last Monday to the house arrest of Fresnes, and several officials told us the growing
importance of the practice of the Tamas, i.e. of the concealment strategy which use many
detainees, who strive to overcome early prison, seem want to reintegrate and keeping, at the
bottom of themselves, their beliefs.
Have you been confronted with convicts who were detained in the district dedicated the House of
Fresnes? What is your feeling on the issue?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. With regard to the debates that take place before me or before the
Court of enforcement of sentences, is indeed account folder and the impressions of hearing. The
latter, for the acts of terrorism, are very important, because debates are very long. Each hearing

before a tribunal of the punishment lasts an average of an hour and a half or two hours a
convicted person, allowing in some measure to form an opinion on the strategy of it, and I indeed
found especially among the convicts of the Islamist movement, a desire for obvious
concealment.
The rapporteur. They have a stopper speech.
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. Indeed, and this phenomenon is fairly recent. The elders of the
armed Islamic Group (GIA), them, not conceal anything. On the other hand, the convicts of the
Islamist movement in connection with jihadism adopt, during their detention but also, especially,
for adversarial hearings, completely smooth profile; where the importance of these debates
because, after a while, we finally collect some details. It is difficult however to transcribe the
hearing impressions: we cannot reject an application for modification of sentence relying solely
on them. To explain why it rejects it and do status of legal criteria, because a sense of hearing is
not a legal criterion.
We are therefore sometimes facing a person who presents a perfect project, the course in
detention without roughness, but on which information is lacking. It is an experience that, as the
Paris Prosecutor's office, I live for several months, and quite difficult. After these hearings, we
have 'cold in the back' - it really is the expression that should be-, and yet the record is perfect.
The President Georges Fenech. And with regard to the dedicated areas?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. We must distinguish between, on the one hand, the districts of
Fleury-Mrogis, Osny and Lille-AnnOeullin, and, on the other hand, the more empirical
experiment conducted in Fresnes. I went to the home of judgment in the Val-d'Oise, Osny, to
examine dedicated unit projects: the team launched, for starters, an action program search deradicalization which seems pretty serious to me. This unit, such as Fleury-Mrogis, appears well
work, in any case for the beginning of the support. As to Fresnes, it is not really a dedicated unit,
but a part area, which is not completely closed: walks are done with the other convicted
criminals.
The President Georges Fenech. It is still the case?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. Yes. Also the expression of "dedicated neighbourhood" seems to me
not adequate with regard to Fresnes.
The rapporteur. I know very well the house arrest of Osny, where I went several times and
where, last spring, a fortnight of inmates participated in a de-radicalization program. Among the
arguments put forward by inmates to request a modification of sentence, have some argued that
they had participated in a de-radicalization program?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. Not yet. The direction of the SPIP has posed as a precondition that
convicts should not expect any benefit whatsoever from their participation in a de-radicalization
program, otherwise these programs would not to be manipulated. It has therefore promised
additional sentence reduction or secondary benefit in the event of participation.

Consideration could be given to the idea of subordinate participation parole, for example,
measures to a de-radicalization program, but on condition that it is adapted to the person
concerned.
The rapporteur. A second type of de-radicalization Center is in preparation. It would be in the
hands of justice and would avoid the outlets dry. What do you think of such a device?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. I participate in a working group, in the Chancellery, on this issue. It
very well might, the texts permit, pass through these centres of disengagement - term I prefer to
that of de-radicalization - in the form of foreign investment. It is the device to which we are
moving to convicts for acts of terrorism serving moderate sentences. It is a good idea to dig.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. How can you evaluate the dangerousness of a jihadist terrorist which
practises concealment?
I hope hear also you on the scale for penalties, and in particular on what is called real life.
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. With prison services insert and probation, institutional or outdoors,
we strive to verify the authenticity of the speech held by the convicted person, in order to be
completely fooled some strategies. Nevertheless, we lack the means: these assessments can be
carried out by multidisciplinary teams. It was, at one time to have prisoners requesting a
modification of sentence by a national assessment centre. The formula of dedicated units is a
little different, but the idea remains to involve multidisciplinary teams.
I particularly stress the positioning of the convicted person of the fact he committed. This ranges
from denial to recognition, by the partial recognition. There, over time, changes, and this
dynamic is important: move from denial to recognition is a good sign because we can talk about
awareness. When the sentenced person is mature in denial, we can estimate that it does not lead a
personal reflection on the meaning of his conviction. The advantage, when it acts as a judge of
enforcement of sentences, is to be able to measure how the conviction is lived and mostly
understood. All this requires a lot of time.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. Do you mind of 264 files; However the year has 365 days and you're
alone. You tell us in addition you need to have a multidisciplinary team to help you make the
right decision. Since when are you single?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. Since always.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. At any time you do not you are found two?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. No.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. So, you're the only one treat 264 cases, you are devoid of
multidisciplinary team... Should not happen you to anything. I do not see how you can not put
you in difficulty, particularly as regards safety. I find this quite dangerous situation for you, but
also for us.

Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. I am pleased to hear you say. Remains important decisions by the
Court of enforcement of sentences, where we are three, if that can reassure you. It is nevertheless
true that the skills covered by the enforcement judge, i.e. for less than ten years sentences, I am
completely alone, which is not without some difficulties, particularly when I'm training or leave in which case colleagues responsible common law deal with emergencies, and only emergencies.
Thats why, I said, the president of the Court decided to add me a colleague in September,
colleague who will be charged on the general service since the Chancery, obviously, has not yet
created the post.
It is true that it is difficult. I have no protection. When I move in a prison, I go there with the
Prosecutor's office and my clerk. We are more or less well greeted according institutions and it is
true that, when I go in Corsica, I'm not necessarily assured.
For what concerns the Islamists if most are incarcerated, some are under the regime of the open
environment and are serving sentences of placement under electronic surveillance - what is
certainly not always easy.
The President Georges Fenech. We understand that there is a specialization for the antiterrorism prosecutors, the investigating judge, the magistrates of the courts, since they apply
derogations texts to the ordinary law - governing police custody, search- and that they have
contacts with services themselves specialty. But for you, judge enforcement penalties, what is the
justification for exclusive and national jurisdiction, since you apply exactly the same rules as for
the convicted criminals? Why require you to take airplanes, you make in Corsica, to go in
Basque prisons or elsewhere while I stress this, you apply the same penalties as your
counterparts in other jurisdictions? Feared more lax decisions? Feared that other judges of
enforcement of sentences are less sensitized or less well trained than you to the terrorist
phenomenon?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. This specialization is justified mainly by the need for a unified
jurisprudence and consistent support. Before the 2006 Act, convicted persons, depending on
whether they were imprisoned at Lannemezan or in Poissy, were not taken in charge by the same
judges application sentences, and depending on the courts and especially the course of appeal,
there was divergent jurisprudence.
The President Georges Fenech. However sentence planning meets the principle of
individualization and not a rule of uniformity...
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. The course of execution of sentence of those convicted for acts of
terrorism are often long, and these convicts go through different prisons. The fact that records are
centralized in Paris to have a complete vision of the support from the beginning to the end.
The President Georges Fenech. Where the maintenance of specialization. You treat 264 cases;
What is the average number of cases per judge of enforcement of sentences?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. For a judge of enforcement of common law, the average is between
600 and 800 files.

The President Georges Fenech. You have therefore less...

Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. Much less, indeed; We can see things as well. I should add that the
majority of the 800 records concern persons placed under the open environment.
Mr Franois Lamy. What kind of training do you follow? You process files of terrorist Islamist,
Corsican, Basque, linked to the Tamil Tigers... Beyond the fact that they may all have the same
procedure or the same willingness to commit attacks, there is not much in common, in
ideological terms, between all of these people. Should not you be specialized in order to
understand the convict?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. The interest of my work is precisely to not having to treat only
persons convicted for similar offences and belonging to the same movement. The specialization
of a judge of enforcement of sentences in support of the Islamists, another in support of the
Basques, a third in taking in charge of the Corsicans, seems to me a good idea, the risk being
precisely that too large customization. I am indeed probably more perceived as the representative
of the judicial institution by being "multi-card" whereas if I was only dealing with the fullbodied movement, I might be more likened to a specially designated judge to face the question
Corsica.
Support of those sentenced for acts of terrorism are the same, according to the law, those planned
for the convicted criminals, but the specificity lies in the fact that all requests for modification of
sentence pass by me, so that the jurisprudence is quite unified, not only for absences and the
additional sentence reductions. Convicted persons know about, so, what stick: they expect to
obtain such or such additional penalty reduction and no such other because, precisely, there is a
body of jurisprudence. If there were judges specializing in movement, we would have different
judgments, which, I repeat, do me not necessarily a good thing.
With regard to training, I trained 'on the job '. I held various positions within the french judicial
system: I've been judge of enforcement of sentences in Beauvais and Paris to Affairs of common
law and, after these experiences, I was asked to support the anti-terrorism office. Training
various terrorist movements and convicted of acts of terrorism is provided by cole nationale de
la magistrature (ENM) once a year for one week, I of course followed.
The rapporteur. You exchanging information with intelligence services or not at all? On the
other hand, are you competent to deal with cases concerning minors and what are your relations
with the juvenile judge? Finally, if you are competent, you detect a trend?
Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. I meets regularly with the intelligence services of the prison
administration. On the other hand, I have no links with other intelligence services, in contrast to
section A2 of the Paris Prosecutor's office which has contacts with the C1 section, which takes
supported acts of terrorism and maintains relations with intelligence.
The rapporteur. Can you, in your decision, take into account information from the intelligence
services of the prison administration? Are your exchanges informal? You communicate the white
notes?

Mr. Vincent the Ganguly. I does not consult the intelligence services of the prison
administration to case by case, to avoid being leads to information and not be able to treat it
judicially and mentioned in my motivation. On the other hand, through corrections, I have
information on the detention of the person behaviour which may me be transmitted in writing
and which, therefore, are placed on the record and feed the adversarial.
To answer your first question, it is the juvenile judge who is competent concerning persons
convicted and followed as being minor. On the other hand, I am competent to deal with the case
of a person, minor when she was sentenced, once it became major.
The President Georges Fenech. We have to thank you, Mr. president, for your availability.
Round table, open to the press, trade unions from the press: Mr. Jean Viansson - Ponte,
president of the Union of the regional daily press (SPQR), Ms. Haude D'Harcourt,
Councillor responsible for relations with the public authorities, and Mr Jacques Lallain,
Secretary general of the drafting of the Parisien . Mr. Denis Bouchez, Director of the Union
of the national daily press (SPQN); Jean-Christophe Boulanger, president of the Union of
the independent press of information online (SPIIL)
Report of the round table, open to the press, Monday, April 25, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We continue our work today receiving representatives of
media, and at the outset of the print unions. Thus, we welcome Mr. Jean Viansson-bridged,
president of the Union of the regional daily press (SPQR), accompanied by Ms. Haude
D'Harcourt, Counsellor on relations with public authorities, and Mr Jacques Lallain, general
Secretary of the drafting of the Parisian ; Mr. Denis Bouchez, Director of the Union of the
national daily press (SPQN); Jean-Christophe Boulanger, president of the Union of the
independent press of information online.
I recalled that this roundtable is open to the press and subject to a live broadcast on the internet
site of the National Assembly; registration will also be available for a few months on the video
portal of the National Assembly, and the Committee may decide to include in its report any part
of the report that will be made of the hearing.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958, relating to
commissions of inquiry, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth.
Mr. Jean Viansson-bridged, Ms. Haude D'Harcourt, Mr. Jacques Lallain, Mr. Denis Bouchez
and Mr. Jean-Christophe Boulanger took oath.
M. Jean Viansson-bridged, president of the Union of the regional daily press (SPQR).
Regional and departmental press, these are today 18 million daily readers, for print and 18
million unique visitors every month for online news which means that with its 5 000 journalists
and correspondents 20 000, it is the primary vector of information in France.

With regard to its practices, they have not substantially evolved substantively since January 7,
2015. It's more for us to pursue a development that rests on a solid foundation: ethical reflection
of our editors who, as early as 1991, codified our rules and usages, which are listed in a
document annexed to the rules of our Union. These rules and practices have been significantly
revised in 2011 and are now being tracked by an Observatory, emanation of the commission of
the information of the Union of the press in the region.
The regional daily press deals essentially contradictory information, which does not, sometimes,
the inquisitorial, but gives our rules and practices, ordered around the four pillars are the
requirement of rigour, the affirmation of respect for the person, the respect for the presumption
of innocence and the practice of the right of reply, an extremely concrete character which implies
that every journalist hired in our newspapers take knowledge.
Another of the reasons why we did not have to change the way we do in depth is that several
events in regions by 2015 - I think including AZF or case Merah - we had already led to a
reflection on the action to be taken in highly sensitive situations.
On the other hand, our environment evolves, him, in a manner increasingly faster, because of the
development of more and more organized social networks, and it is important that journalists
have a good knowledge of the way in which information is produced through these information
channels and that they are perfectly aware of the risk of drift or manipulation that conceal these
uncontrolled flows.
The strength of our 5 000 reporters is precisely that they are trained to practise their profession
on a multiplicity of media. The news is not only culture. Even if it meets a strong expectation of
citizens, they work in parallel for different digital channels and press paper, where, once the
news printed, there are more possible remission.
I note here that, regarding the events that exceed the local field, we are dependent on agencies,
and especially the largest of them, the Agence France Presse (AFP). Thus, it took us, to cover the
events in Brussels and get photographs, wait two hours before data validated; During these two
hours, we had we cope and fetching information on social networks, check it, in order to treat it,
which naturally raises the question of our responsiveness and the timeliness of the information.
I would also like to insist on the fact that the law of November 13, 2014 has released Act of 1881
the offence of condoning terrorism into the penal code, altering a framework whose relevance
and efficiency are more to prove. This framework, which is the result of internal balances
hitherto preserved, has been proven, and it cannot be changed without that has previously
conducted a thorough reflection on the desirable changes, particularly with regard to limitation
periods. However, if I mentioned the law of November 13, 2014, it is precisely because she is
back on prescriptions abbreviated, periods that were part of the balances to preserve.
Beyond these observations, it must however underline the fact that, in the difficult situation
where we are, and despite the implementation of the State of emergency, none of the essential
freedoms of the press has been questioned, which we can only welcome.

The President Georges Fenech. The Paris Prosecutor and the Prosecutor of Brussels we have
expressed their concern and their concerns about leaks in the written French press, particularly
on the identification of Salah Abdeslam before his arrest in Forest, while the Belgian media, for
their part, had met a gentleman's agreement and had not released the information. Beyond the
main principles that you have rightly reaffirmed, what is your feeling on this issue, knowing that
we are here talking about terrorist attacks? Do you think that there is a balance to be struck
between freedom of information and respect for the ongoing investigation? Have you since the
attacks of January 2015, proceeded to experience feedback? Have you reviewed the rules and
practices which codify the dissemination of such information?
M. Jean Viansson-bridged. I doubt that any of our members had an any contact with the
Belgians from the perspective of a gentlemen's agreement. What is certain, however, is that we
consider that it is counterproductive that the public authorities do not provide information to the
media. In difficult cases, where the Prosecutor provides objective and validated information
press, there is never problem. With regard to the specific point that you mention, I hear about for
the first time, and I'm not sure that the regional daily press is concerned.
With respect to the revision of our rules and practices, they are a permanent reflection on the part
of our editors, who looked particularly lately on the issue of the right to oblivion; feedback, after
events of importance, can indeed give rise to changes in these rules and practices.
The President Georges Fenech. You don't shoot therefore of particular consequence of what
has happened in 2015. So, you feel that, in a manner General, French newspapers did not fail to
its ethical rules, which, however, - and I think that's also the opinion of the rapporteur - doesn't
seem to be the opinion of the Belgian judicial authorities.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Indeed, even if the PQR is probably less relevant than the
national press, the fact that The Obs has revealed Friday morning that Salah Abdeslam had been
detected in Forest asked to true operational difficulties, which would have compromised his
arrest. Where the strong dissatisfaction of the Belgian federal authorities, knowing that the
Belgian press, in possession of this information from forty-eight hours, not them had yet not be
released. Beyond this specific case are also regularly broadcast in the media of minutes of
hearing involving sensitive information. What reflection do you conduct on the need to preserve
the work of investigators while informing your readers?
Mr. Denis Bouchez, Director of the Union of the national daily press (SPQN). My testimony
cannot be that general, and I can't answer for each of the editors whom we represent. I
nevertheless endeavoured to contact them all from the perspective of this hearing, to ask them
about the three points that feed our exchanges: the rules adopted by each of the newspapers to
not broadcast of information that might interfere with police investigations. the rules concerning
the dissemination of information that may interfere with the action of intervention forces and
cause a hazard for any hostages; the rules to protect the dignity of persons and the presumption
of innocence.
It is important to keep in mind that as the PQR PQN are media historically derived from the
paper, which released their ethical rules - inflected in charters internal business press - to editors

digital, as the latter grew, knowing that, if the manufacture, verification and dissemination of
information on paper obey a daily rhythm and can only return on a printed information the digital
press is characterized for its by a continuous flow of information. Editors, aware that this
streaming on the web is not free from risk of drift, reflected on their practice and did evolve
between the attack against Charlie Hebdo and those of 13 November. All have told me, on the
one hand, take the time to verify their information and do not relay, without checking,
information appearing elsewhere, including in other media; they guaranteed me, on the other
hand, that they had information that might interfere with police investigations or intervention
forces.
The rapporteur. You refer here to broad principles, which we know that they are regularly
violated when the news dictates. You talk about withholding information, but you know like us
that, in a climate of heightened competition, it is difficult to give up the scoop. However, I
repeat, when the press released the name of a suspect, this hurts the work of investigators. In
these circumstances, where you place the cursor between the legitimate information of your
readers and the protection of investigations?
The President Georges Fenech. Our Committee of inquiry strives to highlight what worked or
not in the management of the attacks. It is essential, in fact, that we improve our devices, of
which you are part since you come "live" on tragic events, we follow through you minute-byminute.
You are saying that the AMIRA settled for rule retain sensitive information, but who makes this
decision? Is taken in link - whether it's codified procedures or informal exchanges - with
parquet? Are there protocols prepared in collaboration with any particular Department, or with
the judicial authority, or well are you acting on your own initiative to assess the opportunity to
publish any information? Still, the revelation of the presence of Salah Abdeslam in Forest
precipitated the intervention of the police, and things could have wrong turn.
M. Jean Viansson-bridged. No editor or no journalist will never ask permission to publish
information, and it is happy. This does not prevent the spirit of responsibility. I was senior
officer in the Burgundian newspapers Le Bien public and Le Journal de Sane-et-Loire, in an era
where a terrorist group was arrested during a speech muscled in the suburbs of Dijon. Was asked
to the journalists who were on the case not to disclose certain information in their possession,
and the embargo has respected the time required.
Remains outside of well-defined cases where the interlocutors are clearly identified on part and
another, it is difficult, in an open world, to codify the dissemination of information. You claim
that the french media committed a fault in the Belgian security forces, but the information is
output in the French press? Has it not been broadcast in the Netherlands, Germany or Great
Britain? Once confidential information are disclosed by those who have the responsibility to
keep secret, it is a bit easy to blame that which has information at the same time as everyone else
and chooses to disseminate.
The President Georges Fenech. I hear what you say, but stick to the front hex us interest in
what is going on elsewhere. He is happy you that journalists have no permission to ask whether

before publish what that is, although do I remind you of the role played by the press in the
Outreau case, which had also led it to make his self-criticism, with great lucidity? We speak here
of an area covered by secrecy, whether it is the secrecy of the investigation or the confidentiality
of the investigation. You must abide by the law, and when a journalist publishes a survey item
covered by the secret - in this case, the name of the one who owns a fingerprint identified by
investigators - carelessly, not only it is not allowed, but there Moreover the obligation not to do
so. While also attached you to freedom of the press, I am obliged to remind that there are laws
and professional ethics that are not intended to be violated, especially when one is dealing with
terrorists.
M. Jacques Lallain, Member of the SPQR, general Secretary of the editorial of Parisien. I
can testify here as editor-in-Chief of le Parisien, having covered both the attacks of January and
in November 2015, on tools established or lessons learned from these tragic events, which have
shaken public opinion, but also the journalists, who are also citizens.
It is above all essential that there is, in each preparation, journalists specializing in police, justice
or politics, and who have, in their area of competence, reliable sources which bind them long
relationship of trust. This ensures, especially facing dramatic events that occur in an extremely
picked up time, that the collected information are worthy to be published and that allows the
journalist to do its work of information in respect of the investigation.
The President Georges Fenech. What sources are you talking about? Is this official or informal
sources?
M. Jacques Shantanu. I speak from official sources.
The President Georges Fenech. An official source is not a source. It is a public prosecutor
making his press briefing. The sources you are talking about are rather informal contacts
between a person close to the investigation or having access to confidential procedures and a
journalist to which the unit trust.
The rapporteur. Our debate focuses less on the reliability of the sources - your professionalism
is not questioned - that on what allow you or not to disclose any information covered by the
confidentiality of the investigation, knowing that this disclosure may pose a risk to the action of
the forces of order, as has been the case in Belgium.
Since you ask by the permission to publish this information, which thus takes such decisions,
which can sometimes be heavy consequences, such as in the case of the revelations made by The
Obs on Friday morning of the arrest of Salah Abdeslam? What then informal relationships
between journalists and authorities? Finally, what criteria decided the disclosure of information?
The President Georges Fenech. Our Latin tradition done us put the freedom of the press, which
is not the case among the Anglo-saxons, which apply the rule of the contempt of court 'contempt of Court' , pursuant to which, when a journalist violates the prohibition decreed by a
judge to disclose information about an ongoing investigation, it is punishable by two years in

prison and fined so heavy that a newspaper look twice before publishing any confidential
information.
In light of the threat information continuous chains have on the lives of some hostages, our
Committee of inquiry wondered whether we shouldn't provide a repressive device - and I'm not
afraid of the word. When one is as important as your own responsibilities, it seems indeed that
there are accountable to society. However today, outside your ethical charters and your
dedication, nothing poses limits to journalists, including when it comes to the lives of some
people.
M. Jacques Shantanu. I do not know who at The Obs, took the decision to publish the
information on Salah Abdeslam, but it is usually either the Editorial Director, or the editor who
has responsibility for such a decision. The only permission that can be given to us will be made,
where appropriate, by the official voice, and that is why we are very seeking regular press
briefings on the part of the Prosecutor of the Republic, because they are the opportunity to see
rumors turn into truths official, likely to be published.
When we are holders of information that have not been validated by the spokesman of the
Government, journalists then acting responsibility, under the authority of the Director of writing
and the editor-in-Chief. In other words, this means that, as a first step, they assess the reliability
of the information on the basis of the credibility of the source, they strive to cut returns with
other sources before to decide, in a second time, the opportunity to publish - this point is often
the subject of debate in the bosom of the drafting. You cite the case of The Obs, but for our part,
we have been holders of multiple information linked to the attacks that we have not disclosed,
despite our concern to inform our readers, and it seems to me that the responsible exercise of our
profession of journalist allowed the press to limit the number of burrs.
The President Georges Fenech. No doubt are Mr Baker, as a representative of the press online,
you more concerned than anyone about these issues, taking into account the immediacy of your
broadcast and its impact. How do you organize to inform without harming?
Jean-Christophe Boulanger, president of the Union of the independent press of information
online (SPIIL). Indeed, we are particularly concerned by this issue, to the extent where the press
online - I recall that independent press online companies are more than one hundred and fifty,
employing 700 journalists - has the advantage of immediacy, but also be able to amend
retrospectively the information published.
With regard to the consequences that our profession has been drawn from coverage of the
attacks, they are two in number. First of all, we have gained an increased sense of our
responsibilities. We understand, during these dramatic events, the importance of the press in line,
which is the first news media. This gives it a special responsibility for ethics. Indeed, ethical
recalled by my colleagues apply to the press in line, which is above all the press and inherited as
such secular principles that govern the press. I add that having the Web an online press
guaranteeing these principles is particularly useful when it occurs events such as those we are
talking about.

We promote the Charter of Munich, which gives journalists rights and duties - including that of
worry about the impact of what they publish. We also have a guide to good practices of
newspaper editors, regularly updated.
As our decision-making procedures, they are the same as in the Clipboard, the decision to
publish under ultimately the Director of the publication or the editor, which assesses liability the
opportunity to get out information.
The rapporteur. January 7, 2015, when the killing of Charlie Hebdo, were first ignored the
identity of terrorists until a surfer, holder of a press card without being affiliated to any company
press, diffuse social networks the name of Kaye brothers as well as photocopying of the
identification of Said Kaye. How the press has effectively responded to the dissemination of this
information, which spread like wildfire, with all the pressure that this posed to your journalists,
and which has also forced the authorities to confirm the identity of the brothers Kaye officially in
the evening?
Ms. Haude D'Harcourt, Adviser to the SPQR, responsible for relations with public
authorities. The editors I consulted to prepare this hearing spontaneously cited me the example
of one of the suspects of the Bataclan which they knew the identity, but they have not disclosed
before you have the green light from the police, evidence that they are careful not to compromise
police investigations or the lives of the population. The fact that we can ask them about this issue
has even surprised them.
M. Jacques Shantanu. Le Parisien has disclosed the name of the brothers Kaye that once they
have been officially identified. Previously, we identify them by initials.
Mr. Jean-Christophe Boulanger. Our job is to make information, which implies to check. To
my knowledge, no pure player relayed information about the identity of the brothers Kaye
played on social networks, our role being precisely us differentiate these networks in the way we
publish information.
The rapporteur. Most of your journalists now have a Twitter account, which they make it clear
that the contents commits only themselves and their writing - what is also quite questionable.
What do you think of cases where a journalist published a hand, in his diary, officially validated,
any information by broadcasting, on the other, on his Twitter account, which Governments have
not explicitly authorized the dissemination? It does debate in newsrooms?
M. Jacques Shantanu. The emergence of social networks in the life of journalists is fairly
recent, it dates from the trial of Dominique Strauss-Kahn in New York, during which French
national newspapers have, for the first time, used the Twitter network to disseminate
information.
Compared to the traditional practice was to publish information on D + 1, the exercise to
concentrate in a few words information is much more complex and requires that our journalists
are trained to use the right words, knowing that the legal value of the information is the same
only if it appeared in print. On the other hand, it is a practice which is the subject of discussions,

and most editors are developing charters regarding the use of social networks, in order to avoid
the mixing of genres between the personal expression of the citizen and the work of the
journalist.
Social networks are an extraordinary source of information for the press, but we must manage
this overabundance and remove only the most reliable. We are well aware that social networks
are a chance for our journalists, but they can also pose a danger to our information brands if we
establish not the extremely precise rules on dissemination.
Mr. Jean-Christophe Boulanger. The media that I run on the web has created a Charter for the
use of Twitter, and we decided that whenever a journalist mentioned our newspaper on his
account, he engages the responsibility of the latter and must therefore apply the ethical principles
that have been the editorial.
M. Jean Viansson-bridged. The issue of social networks is one that mobilizes much
commission of the chief editors of the Press Union in the region, knowing that in french law the
notion of free-lance does not exist and that a journalist is necessarily defined by the exercise of
his profession as part of a publication. To distribute under the same signature from one side to
the citizen and the other journalist survey so schizophrenia attributable information.
The President Georges Fenech. The aftermath of January 2015, the higher Audiovisual
Council, meeting in plenary, noted 36 breaches attributable to television channels and radio,
whose fifteen resulted in warnings, and twenty one, most serious, justified the warnings. Does
you not directly of course, but in the light of these figures, would you support the creation of a
High Council of the press?
M. Jean Viansson-bridged. My answer is clearly no. The press is governed in France by the
Act of 1881, which exists nowhere else. This law defines a chain of responsibilities clearly
identified: in a press offence, the first convict is the Director of the publication, decisions then
taking within editorial offices, with the aim of combining right to information and respect for
people.
The President Georges Fenech. What you say is true also for the audiovisual press. What is it
that ultimately separates you from the latter?
M. Jean Viansson-bridged. First and foremost, our respective histories. The audiovisual press
was originally at the ORTF and a single string of information, which has influenced the
development of the sector until the 2000s. We can always, by a legislative proposal, try to extend
to print specific provisions in the audiovisual sector, in order to strengthen the control it
exercises over it. Fact remains that the two sectors are different. The weight of history is an
important factor in the audiovisual world that has become multi-polar with heterogeneous
audiences.
Mr. Jean-Christophe Boulanger. To the question of whether it be creating a Supreme Council
of the press, the independent press online responds "no, but". We are opposing the establishment
of a forum with powers of regulation, but advocate the establishment of a moral authority, as

exists in the vast majority of democracies. She would serve as safeguards to the profession,
highlighting ethical breaches. This authority that one can imagine tripartite - publishers,
journalists and readers - would help to strengthen the confidence of players in the press.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Viansson-bridged, this moral authority scares you it?
M. Jean Viansson-bridged. More little we fear today is. We live in times that require especially
energy and responsiveness without any need to add additional limits to the exercise of our
profession, as an appeal to the competent courts already allows to sanction breaches of, which
are not so frequent. I further observes that the self-proclaimed authorities are enough little
representative of the profession and collect more fees journalists and so-called academics of the
media as active journalists.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you know how many there were, in 2015, of convictions for
violation of the secrecy of the statement or the investigation?
M. Jean Viansson-bridged. I do not know, Mr president.
The President Georges Fenech. None. That being said, and giving you that it is better to
prevent rather than suppress, I see a difference of appreciation between the paper and press in
line on the need to regulate the sector. I hear that the term of moral authority can scare, because
freedom of the press characterized democracy, but in the exceptional situation where we find
ourselves, the proposal of Mr. Boulanger to create an authority consisting of members of the
profession and which could, as the CSA - which I do not think it infringes on the freedom of the
audiovisual media- being not Constable, but print media regulator seems relevant to me.
Mr. Jean-Christophe Boulanger. Independent press online editors are not in favour of the
creation of an authority having powers of sanction. In this regard, the CSA, which has these
powers of sanction, is precisely an example of what we do not want to. In addition, the CSA is a
political-administrative instance, which by no means represents the sector that it controls. We
want to, we, the establishment of moral authority, that is truly representative of all stakeholders,
newspaper publishers, journalists and readers.
Mr. Denis Bodhe. My position is closer to that of Jean Viansson-bridged from Jean-Christophe
Boulanger.
Add to the fact that the legal regime of the press based on unique criminal responsibility of the
Director of publication offer an effective system of sanctions is that, unlike of audiovisual media,
the press in France is mostly an opinion press. The values upheld by each journal determine its
editorial content: thus, it will have not escaped you that Les chos favour economic information
when the information in The crossis instead presented through a Prism cultural and religious.
Each drafting is therefore required to have a specific ethical reflection, and it is important to
preserve this diversity if we want to maintain an opinion press. Indeed, to submit all of the
organs of print media in a unique compliance requirements affadirait inevitably our press,
guaranteeing in its diversity of our democracy.

Except the journal in which it was made a reference, nobody has put in evidence in our
discussions of breach or derivative which is would be guilty the press of political and general
information. This unique case then justifies the establishment of a national authority with powers
of sanction? It seems to me that editors have made the evidence of their ability to adapt and that
they knew, between the attacks in January and November 2015, evolve their ethical principles,
particularly as regards verification and retention of information.
The rapporteur. Nobody here does call into question the existence of a press of opinion in our
country. Away from us the idea of censoring an editorial or a forum, and we do not question your
professionalism.
You are mostly in favour of a system of self-regulation, ensuring practice retention of
information when needed. It is a fact that print has been the subject of no conviction for violation
of the secrecy of the statement in its coverage of the attacks, but our Committee wondered
specifically whether it should not harden the legislation in this area, and I ask you your opinion
on this point.
You say you do not have an example of breach which is would be guilty the press, but I ask you
once again: that is what can decide a journalist to publish information or a record of hearing
covered by the confidentiality of the investigation, when even indeed may jeopardize an arrest or
the dismantling of a terrorist network? It is a serious issue, since, in recent weeks, such
revelations have put in turmoil the Belgian authorities as the French authorities, and poisoned
relations between our two countries.
The President Georges Fenech. Nobody can claim here that the major principles such as the
presumption of innocence, are not regularly violated in our country, despite the adoption of
several pieces of legislation that are never applied. It ends in general in a court by a defamation
suit, known what kind of sentence he leads.
The problem is that it is more talking here about damage to the image of this or that, but
endangering the lives of others: the President of the Republic has said, we are at war against
terrorism. While out in the press notices of hearings conducted in the context of the fight against
terrorism, you refuse to submit to a regulatory authority, you felt sufficiently capable to decide
only what should be published or not. That is what allows you to say that, as publication of
information covered by the secrecy of the investigation you are breaking the law? We cannot that
insist on this issue both the Paris Prosecutor and the Prosecutor of Brussels appeared us annoyed
by these leaks detrimental to the smooth operation of the investigations. I don't know if we are
well understand...
M. Jean Viansson-bridged. There is nothing contradictory between the views that I am
defending and your words. Prior authorization no longer exists since the end of the Second
Empire, and I think it is normal that we do not have to ask permission before publishing
something. That however exercise our profession with the sense of responsibility and the
application of the law seems a no-brainer; need to ensure that those who violate the presumption
of innocence or guilty of defamation be systematically condemned. As to censor the press as
during the first world war, this seems excessive. We prefer to defend the law of 1881 and the

editor, and then the author's responsibility. But I would point out that the examples you
mentioned do not seem to concern the newspapers that I represent.
I added that a large part of the information or the pseudo-information circulating on the net today
is not from the press, but a universe where manipulation and all the drifts are possible without
the devices that you are proposing is able to put an end to.
The President Georges Fenech. I want to clarify here that, in its great wisdom, by vote the law
on State of emergency, the legislature took care to exclude any damage to freedom of the press,
to which we are committed as much as you. But this freedom has a price, and it seems to me that,
liability, you have not fired all lessons from the attacks of 2015.
Mr. Jean-Christophe Boulanger. To the question of whether new legislation to ensure the
secrecy of the statement there are three levels of possible answers: a legal response, an ethical
response and editorial response.
At the legal level, it seems to me dangerous to alter the fragile balance of the Act of 1881, which
already provides for sanctions for breaches that you mentioned. We are not in this case in the
legal void. At the ethical level, we lack however, in France, authority for the profession to reflect
collectively on good practices, which are currently the spring each editorial and the editorial line
that it is necessary.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. I would like to know your feelings about the false news that spread on the
internet like a virus, contributing, in these times of terrorism, to install a climate of fear and
anxiety in the country. I proposed, to stem the phenomenon, to strengthen punishment of the
crime of false news in the context of the law on the digital Republic, which immediately aroused
a lift of shields on behalf of freedom of information.
Mr. Jean-Christophe Boulanger. If I dare this analogy, internet, it is a coffee trade around the
world. Such as around the counter, people discuss on Twitter or on Facebook. Their discussions
are free, even if they contribute to spread bad news and should not forget that, on the counter,
hang out often one or two newspapers which are the guarantors of reliable information. In this
sense, the phenomenon that you mention only reinforces the value of our profession.
Mr. Denis Bodhe. With regard to the press, the 1881 Act establishes the principle of the
responsibility of journalists and punishes the disclosure of false news. When it comes to
information circulating on internet, they are not our responsibility and are subject to the same
legal standards or the same ethical requirements. But if one can regret the proliferation of false
news on the internet, this paradoxically helps strengthen the credibility of media brands who do
real work of analysis, as evidenced by strong hearings conducted by online news sites.
Here, I would like to dwell on the example of the drafting of the digital World and how it is
organized to cover the attacks. Two teams of journalists have been implemented. The first, in
connection with the Ministry of the Interior and the police forces, has been tasked to verify the
information and to ensure that their broadcast did not prejudice to the work of the security forces,
which clearly shows that newsrooms have evolved, agreeing to withhold information without

seeking the full scoop at any price, and emphasize the responsibility on the race at the hearing; as
for the second team, is a team of 'decoders' responsible for monitoring what is circulating on the
web and to differentiate between rumors, true and false news.
The rapporteur. Indeed, it should be noted the educational value "decoders" in the World as a
work of other journalists, particularly to remove the conspiracy theories.
M. Jacques Shantanu. One of the great lessons we have drawn from the coverage of the attacks
in January and November, it is that the paper press editors, who work to J + 1 and are formed of
specialists, must, on this type of events, working closely with editors that provide digital
information continuously. Le Parisien is thus given to rule to publish online that information
previously validated by specialist journalists.
We also, in our digital newsrooms, married the talents, organizing our teams around, on the one
hand, journalists experienced in responsibility online, and on the other hand, journalists more '
geeks ', responsible to operate a watch on social networks.
I would add that our editors are extremely competent, composed of journalists all journalism
schools recognised by the profession and are equipped with a solid cultural and legal baggage.
Finally, I believe we must take the measure of the extraordinary mobilisation of all of the editors
on the occasion of these attacks. As police and gendarmerie forces or magistrates, journalists
mobilized massively. The evening of November 13, Le Parisien had four envoys to the Stade de
France and a score of journalists in the national writing, at Saint-Ouen. an hour after the
beginning of the attacks, they were a hundred journalists who provided coverage of the events.
Occurring spontaneously in the journal, they worked all night, responsibly - and I welcome here
the fact that the legislature chose to leave the press means to work responsibility.
This responsibility, we strive to be worthy. I do not say that he has never Burr, but the mindset
that drives our journalists in these dramatic moments is dominated by the desire to testify
without being guided by emotion, by controlling the information as images.
No lesson was taken from the attacks seems so inaccurate. On the occasion of these events, the
editorial staff showed that they were able to organize. Thus, Le Parisien decided to appoint
several "project managers" charged respectively the investigation, victims, tracking down
terrorists or international attacks, political and economic impact. I think this has enabled us to
produce a respectable information, both in our paper newspapers and our media online.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for this beautiful conclusion but you will
understand that our Committee of inquiry must look at some burrs which do not call into
question insofar as the quality of the press in our country.
Round table, open to the press, representatives of audiovisual media: Group TF1 : Mr.
Antoine Gulaud, Editorial Director of TF1, Mr. Nicolas Charbonneau, CEO of LCI, Mr.
Philippe Moncorps, legal information Director, Mrs. Nathalie Lasnon, Director of
regulatory affairs and competition; Group France Tlvisions : Mr. Michel Field, Executive

Director responsible for information, Mr. Alexandre Kara, Editorial Director, Ms. Audrey
Goutard, Assistant to the head of service investigations and reports; BFM TV : Mr Herv
Broud, Ms Ccile Ollivier, reporter, Director of information policy; Itele : Mr. Guillaume
Zeller, managing editor, Mr. Alexandre Ifi, Deputy Director of the writing; Group Radio
France : Mr. Olivier Zegna Rata, Director of Radio France international and institutional
relations; Mr. Grgory Philipps, Deputy Director of the drafting of France Info, Ms.
Anglique Bouin, Deputy Director of the drafting of France Inter . RMC : Mr. Herv
Broud, Director of information
Report of the round table, open to the press, Monday, April 25, 2016
M. president Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the
request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat
terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We continue our work today with representatives of the media. After hearing the press unions,
we are now interested in radios and televisions, to account to the public for events, produced
special editions going immediately on the spot or by searching for evidence in the attacks from
January to November 2015. But their response has not gone without giving rise to legitimate
questions and our Committee wished to update on the treatment of the information by addressing
the problems that may raise this treatment for victims as for security services.
We welcome:
For the TF1 group: Mr. Antoine Gulaud, Director of the drafting of TF1, Mr. Nicolas
Charbonneau, CEO of LCI, Mr. Philippe Moncorps, legal information Director, and Ms. Nathalie
Lasnon, Director of regulatory affairs and competition.
For the France Tlvisions group: Mr. Michel Field, Executive Director responsible for
information, Mr. Alexandre Kara, Director of the writing, and Ms. Audrey Goutard, Assistant to
the head of service investigations and reports;
For Betty: Mr. Herv Broud, Director of information, and Ms. Ccile Ollivier, reporter police;
For I-Tele: Mr. Guillaume Zeller, Director of the writing, and Mr. Alexandre Ifi, Deputy
Director of the writing;
For Radio France: Mr. Olivier Zegna Rata, Director of Radio France international and
institutional relations, Mr. Grgory Philipps, Director Deputy Editor of France Info, and Ms.
Anglique Bouin, Deputy Director of the drafting of France Inter;
And, for RMC, the same Mr. Herv Broud, Director of information.
I remind that this roundtable is open to the press and subject to a live broadcast on the internet
site Assembly video portal will make available the registration for a few months. Finally, I

would point out that the commission may decide to include in its report any part of the report that
will be made of the hearing.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958, relating to
commissions of inquiry, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth.
Mr. Antoine Gulaud, Nicolas Charbonneau, Philippe Moncorps, Mrs Nathalie Lasnon, Messrs.
Michel Field, Alexandre Kara, Ms. Audrey Goutard, M. Herv Broud, Ms. Ccile Ollivier, Mr
Guillaume Zeller, Alexandre Ifi, Olivier Zegna Rata, Grgory Philipps and Ms. Anglique Bouin
take oath.
Mr. Nicolas Charbonneau, CEO of LCI. I am today CEO of LCI, but, last year, I was Director
of information of the TF1 group, and it is for this reason that I covered the attacks from January
to November 2015. The editorial staff of TF1 and LCI are independent one from the other, but
enjoy common assets and are subject to rules for all our editors - whether they are broadcast or
digital.
The attacks of November which led to the failover of the LCI antenna on that of TF1, you will
understand that Antoine Gulaud and I wanted to introduce our purpose for two voices - the rest,
the direction of the information is common within the group.
Mr. Antoine Gulaud, managing editor of TF1. The situation was unprecedented for
everyone, both for the French, for journalists, who have played a role of interface for the
authorities in general and those of police in particular. With regard to the TF1 group, we
distributed approximately twenty-five hours of direct - at the rate of 150 direct through special
editions and news - and 200 subjects, mobilized dozens of journalists and the editorial and field
staff.
Since the wave of attacks in 1995, the France had not experienced such a situation and the
attacks of 2015 caused a stunning effect that has affected all of us both by their magnitude, their
duration and the fact that they have perpetrated in several places simultaneously. It is obvious
that, since 1995, the media landscape has changed significantly, with the development of news
channels and, above all, that the technical means allowing live broadcasts - both by professionals
by individuals - of all the facts that can happen on the public highway. All French owner of a
smartphone can indeed shoot a scene and the broadcast almost live. Remains that, if social
networks have played a highly important role, traditional media have played them.
Mr. Nicolas Charbonneau. We have constant relations with the authorities. Some are official
and have the merit to provide a framework. The Ministry of the Interior, in particular, sometimes
invites us to adopt such or such behaviour - because, if we are journalists, we are also citizens.
Thus, during the taking of hostages of theHypercacher, we recommended not to broadcast live
images of the assault: we not only listening, but we have shown no image of the preparations.
Similarly, we have respected the perimeter security in Dammartin-en-Gole.

Other relations, informal, are those of our journalists specialized with sources who provide them
with information that, in conscience, editors decide or not to broadcast after having verified.
Mr. Antoine Gom3z. Rules already apply to journalists: this is a binding legal framework
includes the law of 29 July 1881 on freedom of the press, the Charter of ethics of journalists,
which dates from 1918, but was revised several times until 2011, signed agreements with the
Conseil suprieur de l'audiovisuel (audiovisual regulatory body-CSA), legislation allowing it
filed complaint not to mention the internal ethics charters established by some media, including
TF1. In addition, editorial editors-defined filters are limits. Finally, we remain vigilant about the
images coming out of non-traditional way - and, if we can always be more efficient in this
regard, we have implemented a training "Research and validation of content on the internet" in
order to more effectively trace the source, which is not always easy. and, when our journalists
succeed, as the case may be, we do not give certain information and not disclose certain images.
Furthermore, as regards specifically on 13 November 2015, it should be noted the continuity of
programmes: we does not break the retransmission of the football game in order to avoid a panic
movement, we have not interrupted nor programmes for youth on 18 November in the morning.
In short, we have responsible employees, responsible journalists and responsible leaders.
Mr. Nicolas Charbonneau. As was the case for the authorities, we have, TF1, from the findings
of the attacks of January 2015, so we worked differently, more cautiously, on the occasion of
those November 2015, as well as during the recent attacks in Brussels.
I remembered that, journalists, writing patterns, we as citizens - and our treatment of information
bears the mark: we regularly have to withhold information. I think in particular to the model and
the license plate of the car of the commando who committed the attacks on the terraces,
information that we had several hours before it is disclosed and that it was of course out of the
question for us to not to impede the police searches. Similarly, during the assault at Saint-Denis,
on Wednesday morning, while we were aware of a track from the night before, we refused to
disclose any information whatsoever.
Mr. Michel Field, Director Executive in charge of the France Tlvisions group
information. I will not repeat many of remarks made by colleagues of TF1, as we have all
experienced the same type of situations. I should mention that Alexandre Kara and I were not on
duty at the time of the attacks of January 2015. I on the other hand was member of the Executive
Committee - but yet Director of information - France Tlvisions in November 2015 and we
were each in our current position, Mr. Kra and myself, during the attacks of Brussels in March
2016.
I observe, as a first step, a big maturation of media from one event to the other. If the most recent
were not treated in the same way as those of last year, this is particularly due to experience, to
the analysis of the perverse effects of this or that attitude. The cursor is moved: during the first
attacks, the journalistic reflex of the right to information, regardless of the price, prevailed on the
side of caution. Dialogue with the authorities and the 'return of experience' totally new situations
have enabled a maturation high speed. We are all, now, full awareness of our role as citizens. Of

course remain areas for improvement: we need, for example, of references within the prefecture
of police or the Ministry of the Interior to hear the requests of the authorities. Free to us then, in
conscience, to follow them or not.
My second reflection relates to social networks. The decision not to broadcast any particular
image, such or such declaration would be pretty easy if we were that between us; only, these
images and these statements, social networks can, disclose them. What happens to their wild
use? Should what images we, for our part, select as they will provide a source of reliable
information and that they will therefore not have the same status? What about the dissemination
of the image or the voice of hostage-takers? What to do when a hostage-taker threatens to take
them if he doesn't get to speak on television? We have organized several seminars in which we
examined all these topics - rest we ask more questions that we cannot provide answers. In such
situations of crisis, journalists are faced with choices of conscience without that there are a priori
answers or a kind of fixed specifications that would make the right decision - she cannot take in
particular and changing circumstances.
Mrs. Audrey Goutard, Assistant to the head of service investigations and reports of France
Tlvisions. In January as in November, the fix was to have lived it all live. I was in plateau
during the attacks, like my consFavorite pieces of Betty, and we have followed the entire process
reports, direct.
What seemed most important, initially, was the decryption: a multitude of information and
images circulating on social networks - it was the big news we were facing - and it was for us to
give viewers the most accurate information. We hear certainly do understand, but also soothing,
because, we have said, we are also citizens. Since Michel Field said, we thought a lot, we met on
many occasions, to progress, to change our way of dealing with such events in order to be as
objective and calm as possible, and to control the flood of information. Through Periscope,
anyone can shoot and broadcast live on the internet images of an attack, an assault or any other
event. One can certainly hear the trial of the big chains by accusing them of filming such scene,
interviewing such person. But, if they do not, others will do. Our mission is not precisely to
process this information and these images to help the Viewer to share things, to understand what
is happening, and to not to be lead by what diffuse social networks?
Michel Field also referred to the way in which we treat terrorists. I wondered what he would do
if one of them was called live and required to switch to the antenna, otherwise it would perform a
hostage. We must ask these questions in a serene way to define procedures. Remains that the
idea of no longer broadcast any image, not to give any information to protect the police action
seems absurd and unrealistic, since others, which will be probably less well-intentioned we will
do in our place.
The President Georges Fenech. I note already, on the part of the representatives of the groups
TF1 and France Televisions, the desire to reflect on the manner in which the information
received during the attacks of January 2015 were treated. We well perceive the difference, from
this point of view, between January and November 2015.

It may be also recalled that, following the attacks of January 2015, the CSA, convened en banc,
noted 36 breaches attributable to television channels and radio stations, whose fifteen gave rise
to warnings and twenty one, most serious, have justified the warnings. The problem is therefore
real. So we have all to cFavorite pieces to try to find solutions that preserve the right to
information without prejudice neither the investigation nor, above all, to the lives of the
hostages.
This leads me to mention Betty and the regrettable incidents that have taken place and that I
remember: at the taking of hostages at theHypercacher, one of your journalists unveiled live six
hostages, who were not known to MIT Coulibaly, always present at the scene, were entrenched
in the cold room in the basement. Why have disseminated this information? Your writing was the
subject of a complaint against X for endangering the lives of others, which has triggered the
opening of a preliminary investigation at the Paris Prosecutor's office. Counsel for these six
French, Me Patrick Klugman, said that the trauma caused by the media treatment of
theHypercacher was as bright as that caused by the taking of hostages itself.
On 8 January, after mediation between your chain and supra counsel, the complaint was
withdrawn. You also recognized, it seems, a fault in the processing information during the taking
of hostages of theHypercacher and you have therefore established an ethical Charter that I
purchased and on which we will possibly ask some questions. Before you speak, I wanted to
remember this event which must be lessons for the future.
Mr. Herv Broud. Fellow TF1 and France Tlvisions already widely expressed what I
intended to say in the preamble, I'll spare you the rehearsals. Anyway, I had planned to discuss
game input the wrong live on our antenna by one of our journalists, Friday, January 9, 2015. To
be precise, however, let me remind you that he has not said that six hostages were holed up in the
cold room of theHypercacher, but he referred, in twenty seconds, "a woman who would be
hidden in the cold room and who would always" - I repeat the terms of Dominique Rizet because
it is from him that it is. This information has been given only once to the antenna this Friday at 3
p.m., the editor-in-Chief immediately asked the reporter not to repeat. She also never appeared
on banners screen. Remains that the sentence has been pronounced once, and once too, we are
well aware. We have long discussed, for several months, with victims and their representatives,
so that time allows the appeasement. We have succeeded and are very happy, but we of course
do not forget the incident.
I must also say that, although we recognize the gravity of these twenty seconds, they cannot
obviously sum up dozens of hours of direct of our chain during the attacks of January 2015. For
countless reasons, these events were, for all the television channels, the most difficult to treat.
For three days, we are stayed as suspended from these tragic twists for which we were not
necessarily prepared. Today, Michel Field pointed out, we are, as we have demonstrated in
November and, more recently, during the attacks of Brussels, not to mention episodes such as the
Thalys.
I would therefore like to repeat that, if this episode is regrettable, it cannot summarize the
remarkable work done by our teams of journalists during these attacks.

The President Georges Fenech. I come to another element: the retransmission of a dialogue
with Senthil Coulibaly.
Mr. Herv Broud. This is a completely different item.
The President Georges Fenech. Ms. Goutard wondered what should be done if a terrorist
required to spend on television threatening to run one of its hostages.
Mr. Herv Broud. On Friday, January 9, we were in contact twice with Senthil Chua...
M. Pierre Lellouche. It is you who have called him?
Mr. Herv Broud. It was he who, shortly after fifteen hours, called our editorial. Alexis
Delahousse, Deputy Director of the drafting, received the call and spoke with him, very calmly
and very effectively, for four to five minutes, not the antenna, but the editorial. He has managed
to "control" it - to make sure it remains calm-, to ask questions about what was happening in
theHypercacher. And Senthil Coulibaly gave us very important information: the number of
victims, the number of hostages still with him, the fact that he was only... As soon as the
conversation ended, we have informed the police and barely an hour later, a biker came to
retrieve the record. The Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior have been informed. I
myself spoke with the negotiator of the RAID (research, Assistance, Intervention, deterrence)
this door Vincennes to inform him of what MIT Coulibaly came to Alexis Delahousse. Gold at
any time state of this conversation was done on the air! It is then, when everything was finished,
the evening of Friday 9, we decided to disseminate a short excerpt. I do not regret this choice. At
any time we have set the life of that whether it's in danger: on the contrary, we immediately
seized of this document the police forces and the political authorities.
Ms. Ccile Ollivier, reporter Betty police. I would add that, subsequently, Mr. Broud asked
repeatedly an appointment the Ministry of the Interior in order to know what line follow if a
terrorist called us; or does never responded it. These are specialized police negotiators who have
given us a small card with some guidelines. We have therefore prepared a note that we have
circulated internally. Therefore, we strive to make our own rules.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. One of the concerns of the terrorists, we have seen both on
the occasion of the attacks of January with Senthil Coulibaly and the brothers Kaye, on the
occasion of those of November - and this was one of the first questions asked during their
negotiations with officers of the Brigade of research and intervention (bis) - is whether
continuous news channels are present at the scene. We perceive so well the exploitation of which
they may be subject. As mentioned by Michel Field, you are, in this regard, full reflection phase.
I return to the taking of hostages of theHypercacher. When we heard the representatives of the
RAID, they indicated we have arrived on the site at approximately 14: 30, the bis is already onsite. First contact with MIT Coulibaly is established around fifteen hours thirty more than an
hour later. I asked the boss of the RAID the reasons for such a delay and we were told that MIT
Chua phone was busy because he was in contact with continuous news channels. Or you just

clarify that the conversation between the terrorist and your assistant had lasted four minutes. I
could be wrong, but it seems to me that you are the only channel that Chung has called.
Did you take the initiative to get in touch with terrorists or you do you prevent it? And have you,
since events, adopted procedures in this matter?
Mr. Herv Broud. We have never called theHypercacher's MIT Coulibaly who called us to
fifteen hours ten for five minutes. Recording of the entirety of the conversation has quickly
handed over to the police.
The rapporteur. Were there other attempts, share and other?
Mr. Herv Broud. For which we are concerned, but I do not represent the whole of the media.
The rapporteur. The RAID indicates that he has put more than one hour to contact MIT
Coulibaly and yourself consider that the conversation between Coulibaly and your assistant
lasted only four minutes...
Mr. Herv Broud. I don't "" not considered, it is a fact, and registration was given to the police
as early as Friday.
I come to the taking of hostages of Dammartin-en-Gole. On Friday morning, started to spread
information according to which two men - we were unaware that this was Kaye brothers - were
holed up in the premises of a printing of this municipality. One of our reporters called printing to
find out what was happening. The person who won was Charles Kaye. The conversation lasted
two minutes, and immediately after, we called directly Manuel Valls informing him that we
were, despite us, having Charles Kaye to the phone. However, here again, this information was
never broadcast.
The President Georges Fenech. The CSA has warned Betty, Euronews, France 2, France 24, ITl, LCI, TF1, Europe 1, France Info, France Inter, RFI, RMC and RTL to respect the
imperative of safeguarding public order, after considering that the fact to announce live that
clashes had erupted between the security forces and the terrorists in Dammartin-en-Gole could
have dramatic consequences for the hostages of theHypercacher insofar as - everyone knows it
now - MIT Coulibaly said linking their fate to that of his accomplices of Dammartin-en-Gole.
How, one and other, you made this decision? How have you found the opportunity to disclose
information which could, in fact, have dramatic consequences? Were there admonitions on the
part of the forces of order or political authorities?
Mr. Guillaume Zeller, managing editor of I-Tl. I have come to the writing of I-Tele that last
September, but we have, since then, widely discussed. It is suitable for judging to come back on
the configuration of the premises and the security apparatus put in place. We are then deployed
as many of our colleagues outside the security perimeter established by the forces of the order.
At the time of the assault, our reporter saw a cloud of smoke, heard detonations and thus
informed of what he observes to the distance imposed by the forces of order. If I had to I-TV at

the time, I would have probably been in phase with the preparation to consider that we were
there at the cFavorite pieces of our business and that we do not irresponsibly Act giving this
simple information: smoke rise above the scene, we hear detonations and we therefore assume
that the assault is underway.
Mr. Alexandre Ifi, Director Deputy of the drafting of I-Tl. Do not interpret the facts based
on the information that MIT Coulibaly had intended to link the fate of the hostages to the fate of
his accomplices of Dammartin-en-Gole, because then we do not have this element. All editors
are animated by the same desire to inform reliably, without endangering the life of anyone, and
with dignity. These principles are those of I-Tele, and I have no doubt that they are also those of
all my colleagues here.
I return to the case of Dammartin-en-Gole. We are immediately asked if we were or not
broadcast the sketch of the Kaye brothers once they had been identified - and information came
first from internet. It is that all the editors knew then their name and their photography. However,
for five hours, they were not given this information because had asked them.
The President Georges Fenech. Which requested you?
Mr. Alexandre Ifi. Our specialist for police and justice affairs, Jean-Michel Decugis, told us that
the Ministry of the Interior did not wish that information be known. We have therefore not
disseminated it, and no other editor has done. But Reuters, a British news agency, it was
published in twenty-one thirty hours. Therefore, the Agence France Presse (AFP) has in turn
published.
The rapporteur. This information circulated extensively on social networks, your colleagues - if
I dare say, but he has his press card - which broadcast the identity of the Kaye brothers as soon
as Wednesday afternoon. Therefore, you are still subject to the pressure of social networks.
Mr. Alexandre Ifi. In this case, I did not feel this pressure.
I'll give you another example: when, during the night of the attacks of November 13, media
announce an attack at the Chtelet and the Louvre, we send a team powered to verify
information.
With regard to the Kaye brothers, I repeat, I have information at 3 p.m. via social networks. We
confirm quickly enough, but we decide to not to disclose. Thus, in January already, editors
behave in a responsible manner.
Regards Dammartin-en-Gole, the formal notice of the CSA refers to a breach of the imperative
of safeguarding of public order. However, at this moment, the situation is rather complicated: a
huge security perimeter has been established, so journalists are placed very far - and to
theHypercacher. As our special envoys - and we also see it from the Board - see the smoke rise
and hear gunfire, does say nothing? Then, it is argued that MIT Chung looked perhaps
continuous news channels; but person of the Ministry of the Interior only warned us that it
intended to link the fate of his hostages to one of his accomplices. However, if had given me this

information, I would have perhaps acted otherwise. Deprived of this information, I took the
decision that seemed the most responsible. I am sure that all editors have acted in their
conscience.
The President Georges Fenech. Several media - France 2, TF1, Betty, LCI and RMC - reported
the presence of a person hidden in printing where the Kaye brothers were holed up. We are here
far from "smoke seen from Afar"...
Mr. Alexandre Ifi. You quoted my writing, I know hardly what say you on the subject.
Mrs. Audrey Goutard. The first mentioning the presence of a person in the printing industry
was member of Parliament for the constituency in an interview he gave to TF1 at ten o'clock.
The second person who mentioned the presence of a hostage in the printing industry is the
sFavorite pieces of the hostage himself who crazy concern, has called us live on the plateau - and
we knew not at all that she was going to talk about. She then told us, panicked, that his brother,
who worked in printing, was probably hidden... Also, at any time a journalist of the offending
channels did spontaneously information.
Mr. Nicolas Charbonneau. I would add, since it was on the antenna of TF1, that it is indeed an
elected official of the Republic - which sits in this House - which gave live this information that
kills us immediately after.
Mrs. Audrey Goutard. Same for us.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for these details. The representatives of Radio
France wish to add a Word?
Ms. Anglique Bouin, Deputy Director of the drafting of France Inter. Suggested just now
by my colleague, it is necessary to start with the idea that we experienced two exceptional
events.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Wish that they stay.
Mrs. Anglique Bouin. It must take into account the mobilization of editors who, on this
occasion, have worked responsibly. Usually, when information reaches us - and it is true that
social networks, since a few years, have pushed our way of working - we cross-reference the.
This is the basis of our business.
Faced with the attacks from January to November 2015, we find all our reflexes and send
someone on the ground to verify the information. With respect to terrorism, we have highly
professional services, journalists who are in contact with police officers, with the prefecture of
police of Paris, with the Ministry of the Interior. Imagine that, on Friday, in the Newsroom,
everyone works for three days and three nights; some of our reporters on the ground have not
slept for three days. Some editors - including my own - have been bereaved on the occasion of
the attacks of January 2015. In short, imagine the conditions in which we worked. I am moved in
retrospect. But I really emphasize the fact that we were all responsible for: we have defended our

profession, we did take risks reporters - I sent one to Saint-Denis in full shooting, without bulletproof vest, without giving the slightest precaution...
These events have therefore all led us to reflect on our practices. If we are challenged by social
networks, we still keep our reflexes of every day: send someone on the ground, put someone in
the cabin to call in the immediate vicinity of the place where it is reported a gunfight or
explosion... Thus, there are fifteen days, an explosion is heard in Paris: we get in writing the call
from a panicked girl who tells us that a bomb has just exploded on his street. In a few minutes,
all of our editors are mobilizing tens of journalists, but we say nothing to the antenna and, soon,
the prefecture of police of Paris informs us that it is a gas explosion. We simply processed
information evening on the theme of emotion in a neighbourhood in the context of possible
attack.
In the weeks that followed the attack on 13 November, I stopped to send people for attacks under
the Eiffel Tower or in museums. If you have never heard speak, it is because we have done our
job, even if it happens that we make errors.
Like others, France Inter announced the assault of Dammartin-en-Gole. I was in the control
room. It is true that none of us had information that announce the assault would endanger the
hostages of theHypercacher. I defer to France Inter and France Info in 1994, at the time of the
diversion of the Airbus which liased between Algiers and Paris. When the Airbus arrived at
Marignane, I am sent to cover the event. The editor calls me to tell me that the intervention of the
gendarmerie nationale (GIGN) group will give the assault in fifteen to twenty minutes. France
Info was at that time one of the few radios of continuous disclosure, if not the only. It informs,
my colleague from Marseille and myself, we'll probably see the GIGN men approaching the
aircraft and we are asked to not say. We in have nothing said. However, in Dammartin-en-Gole,
nobody has given us such information. It goes without saying that, if they had warned us, we
would have made differently, because, when our police contacts communicate us such elements,
we retain the information. We have so many solutions, once we have contacts.
The rapporteur. It is understood that here nobody questioned the professionalism of journalists:
we are, one and other, sufficiently in contact with your colleagues for their dedication. However,
there has been difficulty, some of your edits have been recalled to the order by the CSA and ask
yourselves.
During the stalking of the brothers Kaye, January 7, multiple addresses were examined,
including by the RAID, including one in Reims. However men in the RAID noted with
astonishment that, going to Reims, they have been exceeded on the highway by vehicles of
journalists - which were waiting for police forces to the supposed brothers Kaye address, which
poses a problem not only for the protection of journalists, but also from the operational point of
view. Imagine that the Kaye brothers are actually found at this address! What is your opinion on
this episode?
M. Gregory Philipps, Director Deputy Editor of France Info. Then, we are in January and in
November 2015, against such events, the media noise is so loud, I give instructions to my
presenters to extinguish the competition, not to consult social networks, not to disclose any

rumor, no information that would not be checked. The only information broadcast by France
Info, for thirty-seven hours of special edition compter du 13 November in the evening, have
been verified and validated by our specialists on policing and justice, even if it means be lagging
behind the competition. Thus we have not mentioned the Reims track; When rumors reported a
shooting at the Chtelet, we sent a reporter checking out them, and never he was did state to the
antenna.
France Info was also made in house by the CSA about the coverage of the events of Dammartinen-Gole. If a representative of the Ministry of the Interior had called us to tell us that evoke the
assault would endanger the lives of the hostages of theHypercacher and we ask to withhold
information, we would obviously kills it for fifteen or twenty minutes, with the utmost
seriousness, the greatest calm, the utmost rigour, and maintaining our free will, because there is
no question that we pliions with the requirements of the Ministry of the Interior. Indeed, we can
decide for ourselves not to disclose information that may be detrimental to the operations of the
security forces and put the life of hostages in danger.
Herv Broud said have called directly Manuel Valls...
Mr. Herv Broud. Because I did not know who to call!
M. Gregory Philipps. What interlocutor call place Beauvau? Can the Department not have our
hotlines? All patrons of writing are available around the clock, and a fortiori to such moments. If
it explains without delay issues posed by such or such information, we can then, in conscience,
decide to hold for a given duration. One of the former bosses of France Info, Pascal Delannoy,
saying that the truth could wait five minutes - it is even more true in situations that we are
mentioning.
Mr. Herv Broud. In contrast to what has passed for Dammartin-en-Gole, to theHypercacher,
following our contacts with Senthil Coulibaly, I received a little later in the afternoon, a call from
a relative of the prefect of police of Paris who informed me of the imminence of the assault
against theHypercacher. However AFP camera filming the facade of theHypercacher, and the
images were broadcast by TF1, France 2, Betty, I-Tele and LCI. My friend asked me if we could
cut this camera. As he had no details of my colleagues, I gave Catherine Nayl telephone, Thierry
Thuillier and Cline Pigalle, numbers that were so called by the prefecture of police, and we all
decided at the same time to stop the live broadcast of this image. It is as well that the assault took
place without that no image is broadcast live on French television channels. If we had, in the
same way, been warned of the assault in Dammartin-en-Gole, we would have certainly acted
similarly.
Mrs. Audrey Goutard. We also were amazed to see these hordes of journalists who followed
the police in Reims. It must be remembered that, in 1995, less than ten media followed attacks;
However, today, we end up with about 50 traditional media and journalists who are improvised
"media", because they are on-site with their mobile phone.
It seems amazing that since years, and even between January and November 2015, intervention
forces have never taken into account the media in their response procedures. The Ministry of the

Interior has no doubt found as lacking as we face this extraordinary event. Why didn't we have
an interlocutor? Because the Ministry of the Interior had not thought! Intervention forces
grumble, but they have never thought to 'manage' journalists. Anglo-Saxon countries are much
better than we: a representative of the Ministry, hourly, made the point, that he has something to
say or not, which has the advantage of grouping journalists somewhere while the police work
elsewhere. It is still surprising that we have not been able to think in France. In January, the
problem is with the Chase in Reims, in surreal effect, but it went well in November. The
Ministry of the Interior took consciousness that should now reckon with the media and not just
with traditional media. Remains that we are very far behind the Anglo-saxons.
Mr. Alexandre Ifi. I still have no explanation on what exactly happened in Reims, because, in
general, when services like the RAID want to establish a security perimeter, they prevent us from
moving forward with them. I am also amazed at the number of citizens who were circulating in
this area of Reims at the time we are talking about. I have still not understood why so many
forces of order, journalists and citizens could find themselves at the same time in the same place.
M. Pierre Lellouche. My intervention I will perhaps not only friends. I nevertheless reminded
honourable journalists here that I was the press during a decade card holder and I was very
proud.
Madame Bouin, I am interested in the protection of journalists on the theatres of war and I was
even the author, with Franois Loncle, who does not belong to the same camp as me, of a
resolution that would later defend the France to the United Nations, specifically on the protection
of journalists in time of war.
It is not here to question the intellectual honesty or the professionalism of the French or foreign
press. The President of the Republic has said, we are at war: it's unfortunately true and there will
be other attacks. Under these conditions, how to ensure that information flows without being an
instrument of the battle that we deliver terrorists? How to avoid the media noise participates in
the terror effect sought by our opponents? The purpose of this hearing is to my eyes. And that is
what is interesting in your speeches: you have become aware that we are indeed at war and we
have to change the modus operandi.
There is one point which annoys me more in the general interest. Is it possible, in an arena
system, to produce a "safe and reliable" information respecting the life and dignity of others?
The information continuously requires journalists to be the first to publish a new. At the time a
serious event, which is also where you will have a maximum of information, it is difficult to hold
in a system where everything is subject looking for the buzz, and therefore noise. It is therefore
not to make you a bad trial, but to recognize your difficulties. Ms. Goutard remarked that, if the
treatment information was not provided by traditional media, it would be by social networks. In
short, he should wonder about the race at the hearing that pushes to find a topic, or even several
daily - raison d'etre of a continuous information chain.
I hope that we are all aware of the need to take into account both the right to information central in a democracy - and the fact that, in the context of a war against terrorism, you can be
the vectors of terror if you enter the logic of the opponent. Therefore, implement firewalls.

Perhaps, indeed, must police learn to work with the media in a clever way. The police that we
have heard explained to us that it was very difficult to intervene if preparations are filmed. I do
not claim to have the solution, but it seems to me essential to find, on the occasion of the next
attacks because there are others-, the means of informing the public in keeping a certain
distance.
In any case, one thing is certain: you won't be able to provide "safe and reliable" information
instantly, though even you would be the best professional in the world. A certain distance is
required, which involves time. You need to establish a rule of the game between you all, less
than consider that competition will always win: this isn't me, it is Reuters, and if not Reuters,
these are social networks... us leave never.
I therefore believe that there should be a sort of bed of justice between media on this case.
The President Georges Fenech. Is the ratings race a criterion, Mr Field?
Mr. Michel Field. No doubt competition was sometimes cause of skids or reckless accelerations,
but many of the criticisms made on the treatment of the first attacks were taken into account. I
enough crossed iron, very friendly, with fellow Betty to note that what could shock me a year
ago and a half is not bred.
The President Georges Fenech. I confirm. The CSA, on the occasion of the attacks of
November 13, 2015, not identified shortcomings in the exercise of editorial responsibility, unlike
the attacks of January.
Mr. Michel Field. I do not intend to make me the arbiter of fashion, but we are all convinced of
the difficulty of our job.
I return to the intervention by Pierre Lellouche, that I know well and with whom I also gladly
crossed swords in other places. The dream of a war without images, we had it during the Kuwait
war; as for the dream of the military to have alongside them as embedded journalists who do that
recite the texts of the staff, I'm afraid, when I hear you say that we are at war, whether the model
you have in mind.
M. Pierre Lellouche. This is called a trial of intent.
Mr. Michel Field. This is what your words have inspired me. We have to solve contradictions...
M. Pierre Lellouche. This is not what I said, Mr Field.
Mr. Michel Field. I understand, but it is not natural for a reporter to withhold information: its
job is to give it. Agree that, some years ago, it was not so obvious, for none of us to admit that it
could be necessary to withhold information whenever the authorities demonstrated us.
I abonderai on the other hand in the direction of Pierre Lellouche to consider that we have
probably not quite the extent that we are facing a war by the image. Questions that we could

already ask us on the use of the media by such or such ugly occasion of a villainous hostage have
nothing to do with the manipulation of the media by terrorist groups. The resonance is part of
their plan. In the case of attacks, the immediacy makes the potentially offending decision. At the
beginning of the year, when a new video of Daech circulated on social networking, Alexandre
Kara and I decided, by note of 15 February, that no image of the Islamic State would be
broadcast on the antennas of France Tlvisions, but after State of the existence of these videos,
we expliquerions to viewers why we do not diffuserions. Indeed, we anticipate the
instrumentalisation of which we may be subject.
It is easy to restore retroactively the sequence of events and consider that, here or there, we were
wrong. When it is unclear that the disclosure of information can such consequences, cannot be
faulted for have broadcast it.
Ms. Ccile Ollivier. You are right, Mr Lellouche, when you mention a very competitive world,
but we do not practise the race to scoop at any price: we retain information even when it does not
require us. Thus, we knew that the Salah Abdeslam DNA was found in the Forest hideout, and
without that we are asked, we decided to not talk about it, because we thought that an arrest was
imminent.
The President Georges Fenech. Everyone has acted in this way.
Ms. Ccile Ollivier. It is the press who released the information.
The President Georges Fenech. It's the Obs.
Ms. Ccile Ollivier. Another example: the day before or two days before the onslaught of SaintDenis, we knew that Abaaoud was in France. We have not disclosed what could have been a
huge scoop, because we did not want to jeopardize this arrest by disseminating information. We
are therefore not headless ducks, we will not run after the scoop at any price. In short, we live in
a competitive world, but we correspond not to the caricature that it sometimes makes us.
M. Pierre Lellouche. I have tried earlier - and Michel Field pointed out - to show that since the
emergence of Al-Qaida, the war is led by the image, on the internet and television. Therefore, it
enters this game there, either or one keeps his distance. Now there's a contradiction between the
mode of capital operation of information, which is competitive and assigns itself a moral
dimension - the moral of the journalist is to give information-, and the use of this system for
military purposes against us.
Consulting on internet magazine Dabiq, there are all sorts of exciting videos: a Saudi imam
explains the art of beating his wife - is educational! ; a Foundation funded by the Qatar State
explains to young children how Muhammad had conquered Europe... This is quite interesting
stories, which I hear enough, on France Info or Betty...
The President Georges Fenech. This is another topic.
M. Pierre Lellouche. On the contrary: it is the same war.

Mr. Nicolas Charbonneau. We intervened very quickly on these issues. I do not want this
commission of inquiry to trial the trial of that whatsoever. I hear what you say and is rather
positive that we have this discussion. We are responsible. After the attacks of January 2015, the
CSA imposed us some warnings, some reminders on the agenda, what he did not after those last
November. Michel Field reminded us, we face a war of images. But today we are very vigilant
on the use of the images, even if it is sometimes difficult to speak of an event without in any way
showing. We worked - especially with the CSA - on the image, the sound - which is important:
remember, after the attack on the drafting of Charlie Hebdo, sound of the brothers Kaye. Their
treatment subject to vigilance at every moment: we do not do anything.
On 13 November, the explosions around the Stade de France sound to twenty-one hours thirty or
twenty one forty hours. TF1 staff is on-site and decides responsibility not to interrupt the match.
As soon as it ends, Christian Jeanpierre makes the antenna by announcing that it is something
dramatic in Paris. It would have been irresponsible to interrupt this broadcast both towards those
who were in the stadium and the 6 million viewers. The next Wednesday, at the time of the
assault in Saint-Denis, we have obviously not interrupt programs for youth - we wouldn't the rest
not really knew what announce.
I am, like my colleagues, rather dubiously on what happened to Reims on Wednesday evening.
Of course, we are rendered, the work of a journalist is to go on-site check what is happening
rather than waiting for the dissemination of information or images by Twitter or Periscope. The
attack on the editor of Charlie Hebdo was held on Wednesday morning and we know that the
brothers Kaye in nature. We have information that an intervention will take place in Reims. I
remain amazed thinking that arriving on-site our teams have seen no security perimeter.
Moreover, people, equipped with smartphones, were for their part to two metres behind the
players in the RAID! I would have not shouted to the scandal if arrived at Reims, we found the
loop district. This had also been the case in Toulouse when Mohamed Merah was entrenched in
his apartment: we were kept 200 metres away. The situation of Reims is all baroque: we see
members RAID Israeli, overprotected and, behind them, residents in shorts!
Mr. Antoine Gom3z. Behind them, or even to them!
Mr. Nicolas Charbonneau. We are not going to hear the trial of the Ministry of the Interior, the
police or intervention forces. Rest that journalism is not an exact science - it is perhaps what
makes his charm. We made mistakes, but it is nevertheless collective error, and none of us has
been spared by the CSA. We have recognized, analyzed and corrected, since, following the
November attacks, the same CSA we issued full marks.
Of course, we are competitors, but I think, too, that truth can wait five minutes.
The rapporteur. You are all sceptical about what happened at Reims. Nevertheless, it should be
recalled that this intervention was carried out in a legal framework. Their representatives told us
that, on the highway, the forces of the RAID were exceed by journalists.
Mrs. Audrey Goutard. Not necessarily by our teams, Mr rapporteur. There were on-site more
than onlookers and journalists.

The rapporteur. Either, but give me that Parties Paris journalists exceeded the RAID on the
highway and arrived before him; What still has an operational problem. Imagine indeed that
Kaye brothers are really entrenched in Reims: the arrival of TV crews would obviously put them
the flea in the ear! Such behaviour, besides they endangered colleagues, were putting the RAID
in difficulty and could affect the quality of its intervention.
I come to the issue of privacy. You regret the absence of contact person at the Ministry of the
Interior. At the same time as someone would have not announced you that surgery was in
preparation in Reims to verify supposed addresses of alleged terrorist. Yet once again, the
present Committee of inquiry has no vocation to instruct a trial against the role of the media, but
rather to define constructive proposals. However, in this case, you must reconcile your work,
which is to disseminate information, with a necessary deduction for not to interfere with ongoing
operations. Also, in regards to this episode of Reims, I would like to know where you have
placed the cursor.
Mr. Nicolas Charbonneau. We are among those who went to Reims enough quickly
Wednesday evening. The attack took place in the premises of Charlie Hebdo that morning and
we have learned that its authors are two brothers on the run is known to most very well if they
are in the North or northeast of Paris. According to a rumor, they would be trying to return to
Paris and the police would take position at some gates to secure the capital. Or one of our teams,
which I don't know if it is located from Vincennes or place of the Nation, sees the RAID vehicles
take the motorway leading to Reims. At the same time, journalists who, on TF1, are specialists in
issues of justice, police and terrorism learn the imminence of an intervention somewhere
eastward.
The work of a journalist is to go on-site, gather information, images that are then sorted. Gold at
any time we have said that the brothers Kaye were at Reims and that the RAID was going to
intervene. Indeed, the situation on the ground is somewhat baroque to twenty-two hours, with
specialists of interventions, at the foot of the buildings, with the population a whole two meters
behind them. Yet once again, this would have asked me no problem that the RAID we are asked
to stay behind a security cordon established to 300 or 400 metres to the round.
Mrs. Anglique Bouin. We start, in fact, to ourselves on the need to go or not on-site when we
have this kind of information, we have more to stop our work. However, the situation such as we
have described it, must lead us to reflect. Remains that, take the decision to go on the spot, I the
however would echo what.
Mr. Alexandre Ifi. We learn that one of the brothers Kaye is originally from the area of the Red
Cross in Reims and we will place without even be aware of the RAID intervention project, to
collect testimonies from door to door, not only to verify the information. I think that both
phenomena are crossed.
I was able to speak after the attacks of November 2015, with some senior officials of the police
and justice who have told me that they had information via Betty and I-Tele and so that they
understood what was happening.

M. Pierre Lellouche. They said we also.

Mr. Alexandre Ifi. Beyond the reflection on the image, to the attacks, when our role is to inform
citizens about a crisis affecting them. However, let me repeat, officials of the police and the
gendarmerie, sometimes very critical about our work, we have nevertheless said that we help
them to learn!
M. Gregory Philipps. I would add, in relation to the assault at Saint-Denis, we have intended to
inform residents around while an operation is in progress and that it is better stay away at home
and away from windows. It is also part of our work to recommend caution when something is
happening.
M. Pierre Lellouche. This is not your work, but that of the State!
Mr. Alexandre Ifi. But people call us, we, at this time, to ask ourselves what is happening in
their neighborhood.
M. Olivier Falorni. You are told 'competition' and you reply "maturation", which seems pretty
logical to me. We realized, moreover, that competition was not a feature in the media, since we
now know that terrorists, on a site, whether it's theHypercacher, Bataclan or other, are attentive,
on the one hand, the presence of the media and, on the other hand, to the fact about what
intervention forces will lead the assault. We were told very clearly that terrorists wished indeed
to die under the bullets of special intervention units, because from their point of view, it would
be more noble. You know, competition also exists within the emergency services. Moreover, the
Minister of the Interior has just set a new doctrine that the three competing forces of intervention
would be better coordinated. Also competition to the two factors affecting terrorists: the media
and the intervention of the police and the gendarmerie groups.
How to treat this issue in a highly sensitive context of attacks? Can it not design a coordination
of the media, which would take precedence over competition? Must certainly reckon with the
pressure of social networks, but they do not do everything and you still keep the main
responsibility for information.
Then the question of the European, or even global-wide information: we know very well that, on
the sites of attacks, there are not only french media.
We discussed your feedback of the attacks of January 2015, which resulted in the coverage that
you have carried out the attacks of November 2015. Gold truck satellite to a private Flemish
chain, VTM, was installed outside the House where was hiding Abdeslam, Molenbeek, even
before the arrival of the security forces came to stop it. In addition, related recalls the situation
previously described in Reims, when intervention forces stand before the door of the House, you
see people, at the same time, on the street or behind the window of a store. I do not have the
feeling that maturation on which you insisted be extended to foreign colleagues. Can we
therefore consider a broader reflection on the media across European, even international?

Finally, I will return to the diffusion of the images after the events. The channel M6 aired
Sunday evening a documentary on the attacks of November 2015, consisting of unpublished
images. I am not giving in question the quality of the documentary, but from the point of view of
dignity, some scenes have shocked me or not seemed in any case not necessarily needed, even
retrospectively. And even if it is more question, in the context of this round table, the
dissemination of the live images, it seems to me that the notion of dignity continues. However
some images from this story only seemed not timely.
The President Georges Fenech and Mr. Alain Marsaud. What images?
M. Olivier Falorni. Some images of wounded, taken using mobile phones, and not necessarily,
incidentally, by journalists.
The President Georges Fenech. In other words, it is the right to the image.
M. Olivier Falorni. Indeed.
What, on the other hand, filtering of images? Some images of the attack in the Moscow metro in
2010 were thus released to illustrate one of the Brussels metro.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. You have rightly estimated need to take into account the citizen
dimension in the exercise of your job, one of the noblest which is since you also serve the
general interest, the information having its importance in a democracy. Or you have become
instruments of action of terrorists, who need you to pass for Heroes: this data is part of their war
strategy. The role of the media is fundamental for them.
Unfortunately, the events that we have experienced renew no doubt and we all must change our
reactions, mature - but already the CSA noted the progress you've made.
How is it possible, in this perspective, to communicate in a more pragmatic way with the
Ministry of the Interior? I find it quite inconceivable that, in the circumstances that you have
recalled, it was necessary to directly join the Prime Minister to provide him with information.
How could the State help you build tools taking advantage of this period of thought-provoking
serenity? I believe in the establishment of a telephone loop, for the appointment of a
representative... Have you considered to create this type of tool?
Your ability to get a large audience also depends on your ability to provide the most accurate
information and reliable as possible. I am also a citizen and, as such, looking for the most
reliable information. If this information is reliable, even if it is not disclosed immediately, it will
allow you to win market share.
M. Pierre Lellouche. It is true, Mr Ifi, that senior police officials were informed by Betty of
what was happening. We were several deputies to remain stunned by the learner. This means that
there was no coordination centre, and this Committee should seek to find out why. Then, it
appears necessary to coordinate the action of the news channels continuously, but also with the

intervention forces, otherwise we will become toys for people who use media and publish images
of our mess in their magazines.
I will then respond to Mr. Philipps: this isn't France info to tell citizens how to behave in any
particular area. When it is the press that informs the police of a problem and these are journalists
who replace the State for the information of the public security, it is that we have a real problem.
For myself, I have asked that the bulk of the work of the commission be held behind closed
doors, precisely to avoid their exploitation by our opponents.
The President Georges Fenech. A vThe ueo that has been satisfied.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Indeed, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The President Georges Fenech. We were majority, if not unanimously wish. The
Commissioners work in good agreement, as can attest the rapporteur.
Recent interventions focus on the coordination of information. Can you imagine?
Mrs. Audrey Goutard. In any case, one could imagine a better coordination between the
Ministry of the Interior and ourselves. I previously mentioned the anglo-saxon model, which
certainly isn't ideal, but to remember.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you tell us a Word?
Mrs. Audrey Goutard. The United States have unfortunately used to mass murderers, and thus
treat of extraordinary events in public places, with the establishment of security perimeters, etc.
However, since tens of years, on the occasion of this kind of mass murders, a person is always on
the scene and expressed every half-hour in times of great crisis, on behalf of the police and
judicial authorities. It is contain journalists, and to give or not to give information.
It would be important that we have someone whose role would be to disseminate information or
to warn us to the Ministry of the Interior. It is true that these moments are worrying, we are
afraid to pass information. It therefore must not fall into another excess, as pointed out Michel
Field, to want to remember everything. I have indeed heard a journalist to ask why there is not a
representative of the police in the newsroom to advise us... It's probably comfortable, but at the
same time very risky. I also heard one of its members to ask why the CSA would not present
within the editorial staff on the occasion of this type of crisis. I also do not think it is a very good
idea: the best is sometimes the enemy of the good. But if, on the premises of the crisis, was a
person able to hold us back, to give us information, if we could also have a contact person in the
Ministry of the Interior, it would be a huge progress.
However, it cannot move forward that we have no links with the Ministry of the Interior. For my
part, when I tray, I am in permanent contact with the Minister's office. And must be noted
progress, in this area, between the attacks in January and November 2015.

M. Falorni has addressed the question of the dissemination of images. I have not seen the
reportage of M6, but we have received, from the early days that followed the attacks, the images
of these young people dying around the Bataclan. We decided not to disclose: we broadcast
barely a tenth of what we see. Please note that these images haunt me and that I'm traumatized
for life by what I watched.
You are right, moreover, to point out that we are at war of communication. I am specialist in
terrorism: I know so what are capable members of the Islamic State. Perhaps commit us to errors,
but we have permanently this data in mind. Thus, when we receive a video showing assault
theHypercacher, and specifically MIT Coulibaly falling bullets police, we decide to not show it,
because this image can be used. Indeed, we try to put ourselves in the head of the terrorists ask
us if this or that image would benefit them and to try and find out how they could be used. It is
for the sake of human dignity that we have never disclosed the videos of the horror of the attacks
of November 2015.
The President Georges Fenech. One can already and already noted that you agree on the
necessary reorganization of the relationship between the Minister of the Interior and the media Mr Bentley told us that lack of referent, he did not know who to call.
Mr. Herv Broud. Immediately after the attacks of January 2015, we referred to the Ministry
of the Interior the need for better organization, because we thought that this resume. Or nothing
has been done to date.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr. Philipps also notes that person of the Ministry of the
Interior has called his writing; Mr. Field we has shown the need to establish a dialogue with the
authorities and no doubt appoint a referent; Finally Ms. Goutard and representatives of the TF1
group went in the same direction. In total, we perceive so well the need for better coordination
between the police authorities such as judicial, and yourselves. For discussing these issues with
the attorneys of Paris and Brussels, I tells you that, for their part, expectation is also very strong
in this area.
Mr. William Zeller. I wish to return - to him twist his neck - on an idea mentioned repeatedly:
that of competition. If there is time, indeed, where we are not subject to a logic of competition - I
am specifically referring to the continuous news channels-, but these phases of mass attacks. Not
only we are citizens and live these events in a very strong way, but we measure the gravity of
what is happening.
In this context, we are we not asking who is going to hold a scoop. Our wish is obviously to give
information quickly - since this is the vocation of the news streaming channels - but on condition
that it is reliable. And this does not, of course, that some points remain to be improved.
It was argued at the time that this competition doubled a capital stake. However you should
know that, when we pass Special Edition - which was the case, for I-Tele for almost a week
when the attacks of November 13, 2015-, we delete all advertising screens, while the hearing is
maximum.

M. Pierre Lellouche. But these special editions are also used the image of the chain!
Mr. William Zeller. I just can't help but react to the idea that, in this kind of context, we
subirions a capitalist pressure.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Forgive me, but it is not serious arguments!
The President Georges Fenech. This is your point of view, Mr Lellouche.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Cannot support such a position. Of course you are going to remove
advertising during the special editions, but these will contribute to the reputation of your chain.
Do not tell me that there's no capitalistic competition between you!
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Marsaud, I find you well quiet today...
Mr. Alain Marsaud. You will no doubt think that I am an obsession, but I reiterate my wish that
we could hear the Belgian Ministers of justice and of the Interior who had both offered to resign,
suggesting that they had something to be ashamed.
M. Gregory Philipps. I return to the concept of competition. I represent the most 'historic'
continuous news channels, since we operate for thirty years. We have new competitors, and if the
competition play, it is more on the quality of our information on their timeliness. We all share
the concern to give verified and rigorous information. It has previously suggested the institution's
firewall. It is to France Info, before even the attacks of January 2015, we have created an internal
agency made up of twelve journalists charged to seek information about social networks to check
them, validate them as information France Info so that we can release them immediately.
Competition is therefore well on the quality of our information: for my part, I have no desire to
tell nonsense to the antenna, and especially not in the moments we are talking about.
Then, I disagree with you, Mr Lellouche, on alert function, which is part of the prerogatives of
public service radio. Thus, the France Bleu network is responsible for a public service mission to
warn the population in case of nuclear accidents. Although the context of the attacks is not
comparable, we indeed have this mission to alert the population in case of danger.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Certainly, but this requires that you have a message of the State: there is
not question that you act on your own!
Mr. Alexandre Ifi. Ms. Dumas referred to the media as instruments of terrorist action. There
may be a lack of confidence. It cited the example of the United States where, of course, there is a
referent, but where helicopters are immediately at the scene of an event that is so experienced
live. Americans like their press and maybe the French dislike them - what should make us think.
For things to go a little better, it must to establish a relationship of trust with the press which, in a
democracy, is an important power.
The President Georges Fenech. We will stay in this beautiful conclusion on freedom of the
press and democracy. Rest assured that the commission fully shares this point of view. It was

therefore important to hear you and think together. We will make proposals that will probably go
in the direction you indicated.
Hearing, open to the press, Mr. Guillaume Blanchot, Director-general of the Higher
Council of l'audiovisuel (audiovisual regulatory body-CSA) and Mr. Thomas Dautieu,
Assistant to the Director of programs
Record of the hearing, which was open to the press Wednesday, April 27, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, the commission of inquiry into the means Work by
the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015 completes, with your hearing, the chapter of
his work that she devotes to the media. After receiving, Monday, unions press and
representatives of radio and television stations, we wanted to hear the Supreme Council of
audiovisual that was led, the aftermath of January 2015 to meet many failings on the part of the
latter and pronounce warnings, or even of the warnings. Our Committee of inquiry wished to
focus on the treatment of the information by addressing problems that may raise for the victims
as for the security services, and the response of the regulatory body.
This hearing, which was open to the press, subject of a live broadcast on the internet site of the
National Assembly. Registration will be available for a few months on the video portal of the
Assembly, and the Committee may decide to include in its report any part of the report that will
be made of the hearing.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958, relating to
commissions of inquiry, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.
M. Blanchot Guillaume and Mr. Thomas Dautieu successively take oath.
The aftermath of January 2015, the higher Audiovisual Council, meeting in plenary, noted 36
breaches attributable to TV channels and radios, whose fifteen resulted in warnings and twenty
one, most serious, justified the warnings. The sanctions that the freedom of communication Act
of 30 September 1986 allows the CSA to pronounce are, from your point of view, adapted to the
deficiencies? Was it possible, from a legal point of view, of heavier sanctions? Need to complete
the list of sanctions that the law allows?
The CSA has been prompted to update to a warning or formal notice one or more media for
breaches of obligations resulting from the texts, recorded in other terrorist attacks than those of
January and November 2015?
The aftermath of January 2015, it seems that the CSA has met officials of TV channels and
radios for a "joint reflection. That it resulted in? Have TV channels and radios defined a
framework or a Charter of good practice for the media treatment of the terrorist attacks?
On the occasion of the attacks of November 13, 2015, the CSA not identified breach in the
exercise of editorial responsibility televisions and radios, apart from signage youth it has

estimated inadequate. What are the reasons? For you, what have been the main differences in the
treatment of information in January and November 2015?
Do you think the media coverage of the terrorist attacks should be subject to stricter supervision?
Should define the nature of the information to be communicated, as well as the contours of the
collaboration between the media and the various actors engaged in terrorist attacks - parquet, the
prefect of police or dpartement prefects, representatives of the security forces and relief?
How do you fight against leakage of information arrangements put in place by the audiovisual
media? How could we improve them?
M. Blanchot Guillaume, Director general of the Conseil suprieur de l'audiovisuel
(audiovisual regulatory body-CSA). The tragic events of the year 2015 recalled how
audiovisual media play a vital role in informing the public on the terrorist fact. From this point of
view, a crucial question is how freedom of information, which is essential, can be reconciled
with the necessary safeguarding of public order and preservation of national cohesion.
A response is given by article 1er of the Act of 30 September 1986 on freedom of
communication, which States that the exercise of this freedom "cannot be limited only to the
extent required" by a number of specific elements including the "protection of public order",
"respect for the dignity of the human person", and the protection of young people. It belongs to
the audiovisual media subject to this law to ensure this conciliation under the control of the
Conseil suprieur de l'audiovisuel. It should be recalled in this connection that this control never
intervenes before the dissemination of programmes. The intervention of the CSA is done
retrospectively, on its own or on referral by a third party, so, as appropriate, to enforce the major
principles laid down by law.
The CSA has to do this, a power of sanction, should be to exercise in a graduated manner. The
sanction, which may take different forms and which is pronounced after the prosecution and
investigation of the case by an independent rapporteur, cannot take place until after a formal
notice, itself often preceded by a reminder letter closes with the Act and regulations, and put in
custody.
I come to the question of the action of the CSA with respect to traditional media are radio and
television during the terrorist attacks in the month of January and November 2015.
There is a little more than a year, the president of the Council, Olivier Schrameck, recalled,
before the commission of inquiry of your Assembly on monitoring of sectors and individuals
jihadists, in what manner and spirit in which the CSA intervened from the publishers of services,
radio and television, in the first weeks of the year 2015. The warnings that he had been led to a
decision based on facts small but widespread, because repeated by many publishers. You pointed
out, Mr president, fifteen failures have resulted in warnings, and twenty-one, considered more
serious, layoffs remains. I recall that Council had conducted a careful review of all of the footage
aired during these tragic events, nearly 500 hours of programmes. He had also received a number
particularly high complaints from viewers or listeners, moved the conditions of treatment of the
attacks.

I want to emphasize the difference in treatment by radio stations and television channels of the
events of January 2015 and those of November 2015. After viewing the programs broadcast on
the channels it controls, the Council expressed, in a statement press released as early as
November 25, 2015, its satisfaction to have found the virtual absence of failure. Coverage of the
events of November 2015 has led the Council to intervene only once so far, for poorly adapted
youth signs with regard to emission information.
Admittedly, the circumstances of the attacks of November were different from those of the
month of January 2015, but I wish to emphasise that the Council sees in this difference of
situation reflects a greater awareness by the audiovisual media of the specific requirements, in
terms of public order and respect of the dignity of the human person, imposed by the media of
events also treatment sensitive. He sees also the fruit of the educational action that he wanted to
conduct as soon as January 2015, irrespective of the control procedures undertaken leading to the
warnings and warnings that I have mentioned.
Indeed, faced with criticism and questions about the conditions of treatment of the attacks of
January 2015 by the audiovisual media, the Council had taken the initiative of bringing together,
on 15 January, representatives of the radios and TVs to have with them "a common reflection on
the issues and the difficulties that could be raised by the accomplishment of their mission."
During this meeting, publishers had inter alia expressed difficulty to resist competition from
social networks on which were many and varied, information often not checked. This asymmetry
was, according to them, the risk that they are seen as spokesmen for an "official" information
They had also stressed the risks involved in the dissemination of information too sanitized with
regard to the horror of these days. More generally, they had mentioned the special difficulties
encountered in the course of the mission to inform because of extreme urgency and gravity of the
situation.
The CSA considers that this meeting has been extremely beneficial for himself, as it allowed him
to feed his reflection, but also for publishers, who were able to discuss with the Council and
confront between them their views on their common difficulties. The media treatment of the
attacks in the month of November 2015 seems to result from the taking of conscience and the
later teachings to the events for the month of January. I also noted, without pronouncing on the
merits, since procedures are underway, a significant number of editors has decided to discontinue
appeals against warnings that had served them the Council in February 2015.
If acting means Work by the CSA in the fight against terrorism, I would like, as a result of these
initial findings, to inform you of several considerations.
The CSA has internal tools, to the extent of its human and financial resources, to ensure a
continuous and immediate major media control upon the occurrence of tragic events. It has set up
a special device that allows its agents to follow the main channels French who treat topics of
information, news streaming channels, and the main radio. A cell of Eve, composed of volunteer
officers, thus allows, in events such as the attacks of 2015, increased instant and effective
information to the Chairman and members of the college of the CSA. This cell, which can
operate for several days if the situation so requires, is composed of a dozen agents.

Such a mobilization represents a significant cost for the Council, both in terms of human
resources as hardware. Should amplify this effort but, in the context of control and reduction of
public expenditure, the Council, and it is quite normal, takes its share of effort.
Mr president, you ask me about the possibility of expanding the powers of punishment available
to the CSA. These are necessarily graduated. Following the review of programmes by the
Commission services, a folder can be educated and then presented to the college in deliberates. If
facts that already gave rise to a formal notice are repeated, the independent rapporteur to institute
legal proceedings and instruct the folder is seized by the Director-general of the Council. Where
appropriate, the rapporteur proposes sanctions to the college, which deliberates in. In the current
state of the law, the Board cannot immediately sanctioning a breach, because sanctions, whether
pecuniary or withdrawal of the authorisation to issue, for example, can be imposed only after a
formal notice and the repetition of shortcomings that prompted the latter.
Obviously, we do not dispute the legal framework in which the Commission exercises its power
of sanction. The range of penalties provided for by the Act of 1986 seems broad enough so that it
can respond to the diversity of situations of breach that he can see.
Furthermore, it should be noted the questions raised by the global evolution of the information
landscape. Wondering about the conditions of the media treatment of the attacks inevitably leads
to wonder about the information relayed over the internet, particularly through digital platforms.
With regard to the extension on the internet from traditional media, such services online
newspapers or radios, reflections and analyses are underway to determine if it comes to
audiovisual media services on demand - SMAD according to an acronym very in vogue in
Community audiovisual law and in the middle of the audiovisual. In this case, they would be
subject to the European directive of March 10, 2010 governing audiovisual media services.
These reflections were informed by a recent judgment of the Court of justice of the European
Union which ruled on the quality of SMAD of an Austrian press organ.
The question posed by the wealth of information on the internet is particularly noticeable with
regard to digital platforms. The open character of these platforms - I am thinking in particular
social networks and platforms of videos - offers a communication tool of very broad scope to
those who want to spread speeches of incitement to discrimination, to hatred, speeches
advocating terrorism or detrimental to the dignity of the person. But the role of these platforms is
more and more difficult to understand according to the liability regime provided for in the law
for confidence in the digital economy of 21 June 2004, that transposing Community law,
distinguishes hosters and publishers, the responsibility of the first being less wide than that of the
latter.
Regarded today as some hosters, even though it appears they play, some aspects and in varying
proportions, a role of Publisher and Distributor, digital platforms have a liability regime which
leaves them very wide room for manoeuvreWork to control a posteriori on the content they
broadcast, according to criteria which remain unclear and changing from one platform to
another, knowing also that the judge intervenes only rarely. In our view, this situation is not
satisfactory. The CSA to the Council of State, through the national consultative Commission on

human rights, much work was carried out on this subject to proposals to advance the current
legal framework. They show the interest of greater intervention of the public authorities in order
to avoid the criticism relating to a 'privacy policy' of content, sometimes made when a platform
decides to remove content that it deems illegal. For example, this intervention could take the
form of issuance of labels or the drafting of charters, which would associate, in addition to the
private stakeholders, civil society, representatives of users and public authorities. In this
framework, the experience of the CSA for conciliation between freedom of expression and the
protection of the values necessary to our democracy may seem useful.
This reflection is also carried out at European level. With regard to the CSA, it stands including
the Group of European audiovisual media (ERGA) services, so that the specificity of these
platforms is better taken into account by European law.
Finally, I want to underline the difficulty posed by some programmes broadcast via satellite from
countries outside the European Union. The subject is rarely discussed but it has its importance,
particularly with regard to the subject discussed in your commission of inquiry. The jurisdiction
of the CSA shall respect very many services - they would be a thousand - transmitted satellite
and subjected to the Act of 1986, as received in Europe. Such jurisdiction shall either because the
editors of services use an uplink to a satellite from a station in France, or because they use a
French satellite - in this case, Eutelsat capacity.
When the CSA finds the existence of content that may be deemed to be contrary to the principles
laid down by the law of 30 September 1986, it can intervene with the satellite operator to request
the cessation of dissemination of the relevant string. He has done several times in recent years,
especially for some channels broadcast in the Middle East by satellites of Eutelsat, due to the
diffusion of very raw and violent images, affects the dignity of the human person or inciting to
hatred or violence for reasons of race or religion.
The exercise of this mission is difficult, because it raises two questions.
One is the definition of the jurisdiction of the CSA in this area with regard to the criterion of the
uplink. It is difficult for the Council to refer, particularly because the location of this link can be
easily changed. In the context of the deliberations of the Commission on the evolution of the
demand media services directive, the CSA is favourable to that consideration be given to the
removal of this criterion to stick to only one satellite capacity.
The other issue is that of the resources allocated to the CSA for the control of satellite
programmes of a thousand channels broadcast in foreign languages - mostly in Arabic. We
certainly sometimes receive alerts - the Embassy of Egypt, for example, in has addressed us
repeatedly-, but the mass of information to process is such that we are not able to fully exercise
our mission. We are open on several occasions to Governments of these difficulties and the need
that the CSA has to perform this mission, additional resources, especially human resources.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you give us details of the shortcomings noted by the CSA
in the media treatment of the events of January 2015?

In the current state of the law, the CSA cannot pronounce a possible sanction in case of repetition
of a breach after a formal notice. According to you, should the sanction be possible as soon as
the first breach? Do you want the establishment of a more repressive device? Updates
notification and reminders to the law were sent to channels, but sanctions have been imposed?
What the CSA he learned that BFM TV gave information on the presence of persons in the cold
room of theHypercacher of Vincennes during the taking of hostages, which could put the lives of
the latter in danger? The Charter of good practice drawn up since by this chain you seem
interesting? Should be a model for other media?
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. Some seven grounds justified the decisions taken by the Council in
February 2015, as a result of the shortcomings noted in the treatment of the attacks in the month
of January.
January 7, 2015, France 24 has broadcast images of the murder of the police officer Ahmed
Merabet by the perpetrators of the attack against Charlie Hebdo. Even if the precise moment of
death has not been shown, the sequence was heard detonations of weapon fire as well as the
voice of the victim. The Council considered that "the dissemination of this sequence was not
necessary to inform the public", and that it infringed the dignity of the human person. He put the
chain in home of respect this fundamental principle.
The President Georges Fenech. France 24 is not the only channel to broadcast these images:
the last words of the victim were heard by a large number of us on other channels.
Mr. Thomas Dautieu, Assistant Director of programs of the CSA. Unlike other chains,
France 24 issued the complete sequence, the arrival of the terrorist to the shots, passing through
the point where the victim begged the latter.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. The APF considers the images seen on other channels did
not infringe the dignity of the human person?
Mr. Thomas Dautieu. It is not easy to find the balance between the need to inform the public
during the conduct of a tragic event, and the respect for the dignity of the human person. The
Commission considered in February 2015, that the dissemination of a photograph, on which the
face of the police officer had previously been blurred, rendered account of the horror of the day
on 7 January, but that the choice of broadcast sequence full was impairing the dignity of the
human person.
The President Georges Fenech. We have all heard, and if I remember well, on other media as
France 24, the police officer addressing the terrorist and tell him: ' it's good, Chief! This moment
is probably, at once, one of the most painful sequence and the more intrusive to the dignity of the
unfortunate victim. However, no other media was put notice on this subject?
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. No, no other.

The President Georges Fenech. And in relation to breaches of the necessary caution in order
not to prejudice security?
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. The college has warned a number of channels for disclosure of
information regarding the identification of the brothers Kaye before launching an appeal to
witnesses by the prefecture of police. These media gave information despite requests precise and
insistent of the Prosecutor of the Republic, which had appealed to their responsibility on these
issues.
The rapporteur. What are the relevant strings?
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. Itele and LCI.
The President Georges Fenech. By what means the Prosecutor of the Republic asks media not
to broadcast an identity?
Mr. Thomas Dautieu. This is not through our. I cannot tell you if it's informally or at a press
conference. Unless error on my part, he spoke at a press conference. In any case, media have
disseminated this information, then the Prosecutor's office made public what was already.
The rapporteur. Blanchot Sir, you mentioned in your introductory remarks the implementation
of a tool for immediate control. In a case like the one we just mentioned, knowing that the
disclosure of the identity of the brothers Kaye may interfere with the action of the security
forces, the CSA can, on its own, contact channels as soon as he has knowledge of the breach to
ask them to end? Have you had the opportunity to call in January or November, or in you stayed
at a control ex post facto ? In situations like this, the immediacy is at stake. It is good that a
sanction falls a month or two after the fact, but from an operational point of view and to preserve
human lives, should be able to intervene instantly.
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. In January, then in November 2015, the CSA issued a note to editors
calling for caution and measurement. The CSA thus wished to intervene during the course of
events giving is a skill that is not explicitly vested by law.
The note of January 9, 2015 was drafted in these terms: "Facing the tragic events currently facing
the country, the Conseil suprieur de l'audiovisuel invites televisions and radios to act with the
greatest discretion, with the double aim to ensure the safety of their teams and to allow the
security forces to complete their mission with the required efficiency." In November 14, 2015,
the Council strongly called "the attention of the editors of televisions and radios on the need to
give no indication that could jeopardise the smooth operation of ongoing investigations in the
tragic circumstances that saw our country".
Neither mission nor the means of the CSA make it, on the other hand, real-time detection the
failings of strings. In any case, to pronounce a sanction, control procedures would be required
and a decision would require a decision of the college.

The rapporteur. You were talking about a 'immediate control tool', 'composed of a dozen
agents', put in place during events such as the attacks with an "instant lift" information. What is
the role of these agents if they do not really support the immediate future?
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. Officers in charge of this control trace information to the members of
the college. If a breach is found, we enter into a classic statement procedure that can lead, where
appropriate, to the imposition of a sanction.
The rapporteur. There is therefore no procedure in real-time: you have no way to intervene to
stop the dissemination of information which would engage the security of an operation in
progress?
BFM TV told us, last Monday, announcing only once, for a few seconds, the presence of persons
in the cold room of theHypercacher. If the chain had taken over this information loop, knowing
that Chung looked this antenna, you no nothing could have done in real time?
Apart from the question of the ways that you mentioned, do you think you should have this
right? This could be a track of reflection for the recommendations of our Committee of inquiry.
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. Today, Act does not give the CSA the jurisdiction for a real-time
intervention. Furthermore, this approach is inconsistent with the philosophy of the Council based
on interventions a posteriori. Very attached to respect for the editorial of the chains, the Council
is well aware of the issues related to the protection of public order and respect for the dignity of
the human person, but this type of intervention is not in its missions.
The President Georges Fenech. This is perhaps not your skill, but do you think the Prosecutor
could issue an injunction to enforce information retention for a period of time? This type of
procedure exists in some foreign jurisdictions.
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. This issue is, in fact, not my field of expertise. It seems to me
however, considering the lessons learned by the chains of the passed in January, that the drafting
of charters of good conduct and improving relationships between the media and the security
forces would constitute privileged pathways to change things.
Among other deficiencies identified by the Council in January 2015, some chains have appointed
a person as being one of wanted terrorists.
Mr. Thomas Dautieu. The name and surname of a person potentially involved very quickly,
circulated information that proved to be totally false.
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. The Council considered that channels had missed measurement in the
treatment of the investigation, and that they had taken the risk of fuel tensions in the population.
He warned the five channels concerned against the renewal of such shortcomings.
The Council also dealt with the broadcast images or information concerning the conduct of the
current operations, while terrorists were still holed up in Dammartin-en-Gole and

theHypercacher of the Porte de Vincennes. The Council considered that the dissemination of this
information and these images could be detrimental to the conduct of operations as well as the
safety of the hostages and members of the security forces. It warned broadcasters concerned as
regards the need to reconcile between the safeguarding of public order and respect for the
freedom of communication.
The announcement that clashes against terrorists were held in Dammartin-en-Gole MIT
Coulibaly was still deleted at the Porte de Vincennes posed another problem. The Council
considered that the disclosure of this information could have dramatic consequences for the
hostages of theHypercacher of the Porte de Vincennes, where MIT Coulibaly said linking their
fate to that of his accomplices of Dammartin-en-Gole.
The rapporteur. Representatives of the news channels that we heard Monday told us that at the
time of the assault of Dammartin-en-Gole, they knew not that Coulibaly was linked to the Kaye
brothers. They consider, therefore, that the implementation still pronounced by the CSA in their
regard is rather unfair.
Mr. Thomas Dautieu. The Council has established an extremely precise chronology of
information available during the day of January 9, 2015. It shows unambiguously that the link
between the fate of the hostages of the Porte de Vincennes and the two terrorists of Dammartinen-Gole was known prior to the assault - I believe that the information has been given by a
radio. The CSA is pronounced in adversarial proceedings based on this certainty.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Blanchot, you can send us items on all of the shortcomings
identified not the CSA. In the end, apart from warnings and caveats, no sanction was pronounced
against no media.
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. This is due to the need for a reiteration of the breach. The statement
of any folder remains, moreover, at the initiative of the independent rapporteur.
The rapporteur. How long must this repetition occur? Should cover the same event? What if the
breach took place today?
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. There would undoubtedly be repetition, provided that the breach is
found on the same basis.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Last Monday, we attended a sort of mea culpa embarrassed but cautious of
television channels. They have especially told us that they did eventually that their profession in
a very healthy atmosphere of competition.
Do you feel that the warnings resulting from the events of January had a positive impact on the
behavior of the strings at the end of the year? Would it be useful to allow the legislature to the
Council or the Prosecutor to take up breaches as soon as they occur, rather than place you under
an obligation to wait for their repetition?

In the State of the law, chains are faring very well: they have failed to endanger the lives of
dozens of people, and they suffer no consequences. What has happened is extremely serious, but
it has changed nothing for them. If your warnings were not heard, should we not reach the next
level and provide for criminal sanctions? In my opinion, what has happened is the complicity and
falls within the field of criminal.
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. I have already said the difference in treatment of the information of
the attacks by the media between January and November 2015. It is probably due to a general
awareness on the part of the media, which is probably imperfect but still, in our opinion, real. It
results including warnings, warnings and home layouts pronounced by the CSA, but also
reflection that he wished to engage with the media, educational actions take place and
experience.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. All the institutions and all those who are involved in the events of 2015
are brought to question on what happened and the lessons that can be learned from to improve
our practices and our methods. The security forces or the relief were the subject of an
assessment; It is logical that those who have the power to disseminate information are not
excluded from this work.
What are your thoughts on the current legal framework for the action of the CSA? Should
evolve? The defence of the right to information can justify everything: the race in the ratings, the
antenna to the antenna, information that are not, the experts it is not known what expertise they
bring... Do you not think that rules are necessary for the dissemination of the information - for
example, on the maximum duration of the live in certain circumstances? Hearing records have
been recorded during direct that brought nothing objective or positive. Shouldn't we also
organize expertise, for example by issuing a kind of 'patent' to experts?
The President Georges Fenech. Is the analysis of the quality of the experts your mission?
Mr. Thomas Dautieu. The Act of 30 September 1986 poses a number of general principles. The
end of 2013, the CSA listed them in a recommendation for the processing of international
conflicts, civil wars and terrorist acts by audiovisual communication services.
At the beginning of the year 2015, it seemed that this recommendation was more terrorist acts
taking place abroad than those held in France. When he made public his warnings, in February,
the CSA announced that it would launch a cycle of thoughts with the media in order to adapt the
text of 2013 in the light of the experience of January 2015. These reflections were not initiated
pending the decision of the administrative judge hearing appeals against the warnings. The
adaptation work will differ depending on whether the positions of the CSA will be validated or
not.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Who has attacked updates still made by the CSA?
Mr. Thomas Dautieu. All publishers brought an appeal before the CSA. After his rejection, they
all attacked the warnings before the Council of State. To date, about half of them withdrew.

Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. And with regard to the events of November?

Mr. Thomas Dautieu. We subscribe to the same logic. We expect to know if the reasoning of
the APF in terms of human dignity or respect for public order is validated by administrative
justice to engage in reflection and recommendation of the Council on the treatment of terrorist
acts.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Has referral to the administrative judge prevented you to Act last
November?
Mr. Thomas Dautieu. In no case! The terms of treatment of the attacks were considered by the
CSA in the same way in November and January, even though they were extremely different, due
in particular to the circumstances, because there has not been a multiple hostage in November.
We expect only to have a stable legal basis to change the recommendation in a more restrictive
sense.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. Could provide a specific framework of emergency that would deal
differently with cases where lives are endangered?
In such circumstances, would a regular point of contact not useful? It in any case, convey with
great professionalism and rigour political messages, without affecting the safety of the people
ever in question.
You have mentioned the difficulties to control the satellite channels. Could the use of a European
police force provide a solution? The pooling of the efforts of the national police forces would
facilitate the work of all.
Mr. Guillaume Blanchot. Real-time intervention corresponds the CSA missions nor the
philosophy of its role as regulator. The Commission is, however, able to treat breach records in
time which may be extremely short - a few hours to a few days after the incident for an upgrade
remains, for example. Nevertheless, the CSA took the liberty to transmit the notes that I read you
to editors.
Services publishers and editors wish to improve the coordination of the action of the public
authorities in general, and the relationship of these media with regard to including the Exchange
and the issuance of information. This responsibility is not the field of competence of the CSA but
the ministries concerned.
Regarding your last question, Ms. Dumas, let me bounce on the 'police' term that you used. We
are not a police force, we are a regulator. I do not believe that a European police force is
necessary. Because of the existence of a french satellite operator, we exercise jurisdiction over
satellite channels for all of the European territory and on behalf of Member States pursuant to
Community directives.
The President Georges Fenech. How many complaints from viewers have you received
regarding the treatment of the events of January and November?

Mr. Thomas Dautieu. We have received hundreds of complaints in January, and a few dozen in
November.
The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, we have to thank you for this interesting
information.
Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Jrme Bonnafont, Director of North Africa and the Middle East to
the central administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international
development, Mr. Didier Chabert, Deputy Director of the Middle East, Mr. Philippe
Errera, Director-general of international relations and strategy of the Ministry of defence,
and Mr. Fouad El Khatib, head of the Middle East and North Africa Department
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, April 27, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Directors, thank you for having responded to the request for
hearing of our Committee of inquiry. We start with you a new chapter in our investigations in us
interesting aspects geostrategic of terrorism, the threats posed to our interests abroad and the
actions to be taken to deal.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, his account may be published in whole or in part if we decide so at the end of our
work. I said that the summary records of the hearings which were held in camera are first
transmitted to people heard in order to collect their comments. These comments are submitted to
the Commission, which may decide to State in his report. I remind you that any person who,
within a period of twenty-five years, would disclose or publish information relating to the nonpublic work of a commission of inquiry, would face the wrath of the criminal law.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of Ordinance of 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
nothing but the truth.
Mr Jrme Bonnafont, Didier Chabert, Philippe Errera and Fouad El Khatib successively take
oath.
Directors, I'll let you speak to a keynote presentation which was followed by an exchange of
questions and answers. Will examine you the situation in the Levant, from the point of view of
the State of the opposing forces and the evolution in recent months. With regard to the world
against Daech, formed coalition in September 2014, what are the aims pursued and the level of
participation of the France? We would also like to know the position of France toward the Syrian
regime.
Resolution 2254, adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations in December 2015
provides, inter alia to implement, "within six months", "a credible, inclusive and non-sectarian
governance." Where are we today? What are the sticking points?

What is the State of the forces of the opposition moderate in Syria? What support provide the
France and the countries of the world coalition? What role Saudi Arabia in the federation of
opposition groups?
How make you full truce introduced on February 27?
What free access and unhindered humanitarian assistance to all areas of Syria?
How would you judge the situation in Iraq? Where is the implementation Of the national
reconciliation programme announced in the fall of 2014, and what support the France brings to
the Iraqi regime?
What are the results of the military strikes in Iraq and Syria? What has been the impact of the
intensification of the French from September 2015 strikes?
How do you rate the Russian intervention? Has what results it achieved?
What are the means put in place by the Turkey to fight against the return of the jihadists in
Europe?
What are the main threats to french interests in North Africa and the Middle East? Where are
they located?
The protection of diplomatic buildings was reinforced in the recent period? What about the
protection of sites occupied by French companies?
Finally, how would you judge the situation in Libya? Can you give us the interlibyen agreement
and action of the France in putting in Work?
M. Jrme Bonnafont, Director of North Africa and the Middle East at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. I shall focus my speech on the purely diplomatic aspects of the fight against
terrorism.
First of all, we can say, so very general, as observed in the last months a change of mood as
regards the fight against Daech. Indeed, while its progress seemed difficult resistible, there that
the counter-offensive records of success thanks to the combination of the forces of the coalition
and the Iraqi national forces in particular. It seems to me important to stress this change in
atmosphere to explain how lies our diplomacy in this context.
With regard to the Syria, our motivations are double: on the one hand, obtain success decisive
against Daech and Jabaht al-Dhanub (JAN), the two major terrorist groups active on Syrian
territory and, on the other hand, lead to a political settlement of the armed clashes that have done
over the past five years, millions of refugees and displaced persons and, according to the UN
special envoy 400 000 victims. In this regard, Mr president, you mentioned the resolution rightly
2254 of the United Nations, adopted in December 2015, which provides a political negotiating
mechanism to address the Syrian issue. It is within this framework that meet, since autumn,

Vienna and now in Munich, the key regional players, including Iran, as well as the United States
and Russia, which are in dialogue, the France and a number of other countries European
participating very actively in these discussions.
The resolution, which is based on the findings of a former Geneva conference, provided a ceasefire that would lead to a commitment to negotiations on the political transition so as to set up a
body of interim government capable of preparing arrangements for Syria tomorrow. After the
vote on this resolution, a cessation of hostilities was obtained in Munich in March, with three
concurrent elements: cessation of hostilities, except against Daech and Jabaht al-Dhanub, access
of humanitarian aid to a set of sites under siege, essentially by the regime, and opening by the
special envoy of the United Nations, Staffan de Mistura, of negotiations between the regime and
the coalition of opponents gathered at the end of the Riyadh conference which brings together
the non-terrorist opposition, whether it's political opponents abroad or armed groups of the
Interior.
Initially, things went relatively promising way, since the fighting, including bombing, have
ceased, humanitarian aid began to have access to some cities and Staffan de Mistura met the two
delegations in Geneva. But in recent days, they have again deteriorated seriously. First,
humanitarian aid reached more that's very fragmented way across cities where it had to happen.
Then, if the opposition came with political and constitutional proposals considered interesting
and constructive by Staffan de Mistura, on the other hand the regime did on the table any form of
policy proposal. Finally, the regime resumed its offensives, especially against Aleppo, by
claiming to focus on the strengths of Jabaht al-Dhanub but causing civilian damage and by
targeting other groups, which is a violation of the cessation of hostilities. Therefore, the
delegation of the opposition decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations, and the
international community looking for ways of relaunching the diplomatic dynamics. Today,
Staffan de Mistura must speak to the Security Council of the United Nations on the situation so
that it likes it and is studying ways to go further.
This situation is, in our opinion, worrying from the point of view of the fight against Jabaht alDhanub and Daech. Indeed, the Government considers that the mobilization of efforts against
these terrorist groups cannot be final and effective as long as the political discussion has not
accomplished a breakthrough to turn the page on the civil war in Syria. Discontinuation of the
negotiations of course, delays the time when all reconciled Syrian forces can turn against Daech.
In the contacts that we have with the opposition, we ask him to mobilize its forces against Daech
also, that she agreed to certain conditions. In any case, we believe that we must find the way to
reconnect the political discussion.
With regard to the Iraq, you probably noticed that these days, the Government of this country has
experienced significant political difficulties. These difficulties are related to the fact that the
Prime Minister, Mr. Abadi, wished to appoint a new Government of "technocrats", in the context
of important events organized by the movement said "sadrist" - from the name of one of the
Shiite religious leaders - around the green zone in Baghdad. This new Government was
presented to the Parliament, which has not accepted as such, especially considering that the
Prime Minister should not yield to pressure from the street. After complicated negotiations and

certain parliamentary agitation, the Prime Minister was able to adopt a part of his cabinet
reshuffle, pushing the other party by.
What is reconciliation? This popular agitation is due to the fact that, in recent months, reforms
mark the step, fault for the Government to achieve the adoption by the Parliament. The redesign
was intended to remedy this situation because it is form a government able to present Parliament
with a number of projects more quickly. We continue to advocate, in our political contacts with
the Iraqi Government, so that national reconciliation is carried out dynamically. We have also
stepped up our military cooperation with this Government, and we are conducting within the
coalition to combat Daech and at the European level a policy of aid for stabilization, which
consists in the restoration of public services and civil concord in the cities listed in Daech.
It is impossible to ignore the situation in Kurdistan, particularly affected by the deep economic
crisis resulting from the decline in oil prices. Kurdistan has, moreover, a political crisis due to
the decision of the president of the Government to extend a mandate, excluding the constitutional
framework and the debate with the two major parties--Goran, who was until recently, the
majority and the PUK, which is in the opposition--which is about how will be institutional
normalization. But in addition to these political difficulties, progress in the fight against Daech
produced a change of mood. I was in Baghdad a few weeks ago, and I was struck to see how
politicians - Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish all - are determined to ensure that the fight against Daech
is progressing rapidly, with objective, now, the resumption of Mosul.
With regard to the Libya, the Government was concerned by the fact that the political instability
that prevailed until recently favoured the extension of the right-of-way of Daech, especially in
Sirte, with significant aggression against oil bases and oil terminals, and Tunisia where the
Organization has made several incursions. It was therefore urgent that is implemented The
agreement policy on a Government of national understanding and a Presidential Council which
concluded in Skhirat a few months ago. With the new representative of the United Nations, Mr.
Martin Kobler, and the new Prime Minister, Mr. Sarraj, things have recently brought forward in
the right direction. We are currently defining its takeover of control of the whole of the public
and financial administrations with the latter and to undertake discussions on the type of military
support that can be provided.
A word on the Yemen where the Al-Qaida presence, in the form of AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula), Daech is very important and feeds political instability and war extending
there. Peace talks that, under pressure from the international community, the United Nations and
Saudi Arabia began a few days ago in Kuwait are good news, especially as they are accompanied
by a cease-fire generally respected by the parties to the conflict and must lead to a process of
national reconciliation. It is clear that, like Libya, the Yemen must be stabilised politically if we
want to effectively combat Daech.
It would obviously have much to say on other areas, and I am at your disposal to answer your
questions on the subject. I just want to emphasize that we let us make no mistake: the military
successes against Daech or Al-Qaida as the progress of the political settlements here or there
should not lead us to underestimate the magnitude of the threat that remains. Let's not forget,
indeed, that these terrorist organizations, when they are threatened in conventional military

terms, still have ways of retaliation by asymmetric warfare, including the Organization of attacks
such as those we have experienced in Europe and that undergo the Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or the
Turkey.
The President Georges Fenech. We would like to know the nature of the proposals put on the
table by opponents of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad and on how the discussions broke down.
He had the departure of Bashar Al-Assad posed as a prerequisite? It had seemed that the speech
of the President of the Republic before the Congress at Versailles, marked a change of the
position of our country in this regard. The departure of Bachar el-Assad - for which, I would
point out, person, here, a particular sympathy - isn't always a prerequisite for French diplomacy?
M. Jerome Bonnafont. Members of the opposition agreed, in Riyadh, on a platform that
describes a Syria democratic, pluralistic, with a Government civil and respectful of the
components of the Syrian people and this applies to groups who would be qualified in France
of laity as for Islamist groups. This platform was interesting because it brought together
Christians, Kurds, Sunni, Alawite, Druze, etc. The opposition came with a prerequisite, the
departure of Bashar Al-Assad, who is a non-negotiable element, but by then accepting the idea
that a transitional Government with full powers, in particular the control of the army and security
services, would be responsible for drafting a new constitution on the basis of which elections
could be held within eighteen months which corresponded to the spirit of Geneva.
The french Government believes, for its part, anyway, it is necessary to discuss with the regime,
because it is with him that can define the transition. Moreover, educated by experience - I think
including the Iraq-, we aim, not the collapse of the Syrian State, but the replacement of the head
of this State, which must be led by people who can be accepted by all of the components of the
Syrian people.
The President Georges Fenech. Including persons belonging to the regime?
M. Jerome Bonnafont. Including persons belonging to the regime. But we cannot imagine that
Bashar Al-Assad will be, ultimately, who will lead this transition, simply because it can not be
accepted by all those who have left the Syria or who have taken up arms against him. We do
therefore not his departure a precondition, but we do not see how the future of the Syria can be
built on the maintenance of Bashar Al-Assad.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. You discuss with elements of the regime. The closure of the
Embassy of France, in March 2012, does mean that diplomatic relations ceased? Therefore, these
discussions are informal or official, and the closure of the Embassy is a showstopper in the
search for a political solution?
M. Jerome Bonnafont. If I indicated that we are discussing with the regime of Bashar Al-Assad,
it is an abuse of language which I beg you to forgive me, because this is not the France as such
which discusses, but the United Nations. The discussion is entrusted to the special envoy of the
United Nations, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, which has the responsibility to meet the negotiators of
the regime, namely Mr. Jaafari, who is the permanent representative of Syria to the United
Nations, to receive its proposals and to discuss with him. Among the countries that discuss

actually with the regime are, of course, the Russia and the Iran. This is not our case, because we
believe that the nature of this regime and the policy that it has pursued - which led us to close our
Embassy and therefore no longer maintain diplomatic relations with the Government do not
allow us to establish with him a useful dialogue. This would send a political signal inappropriate
to resume language with him as long as he has not decided to enter the transition which is
expected.
The rapporteur. The issue of the reopening of the Embassy therefore does not now arise?
M. Jerome Bonnafont. It is absolutely not present today.
The rapporteur. I guess - but this question is perhaps addressed to Mr. Errera, who may
respond later - that the closure of the Embassy asked a number of difficulties in the collection of
intelligence, to the extent that it has probably led to the rupture of relations with Syrian. Is that
correct or is it more complicated than that?
The President Georges Fenech. Mr. Errera, before you answer this question, I would like you
to tell us, because that is what interests us in the first place, what are the results of the military
strikes in Iraq and Syria, especially since their intensified in September.
M. Philippe Errera, Director general of international relations and the Department of
defence's strategy. I supplement the words of Jrme Bonnafont focusing more on the military
aspect of the action of the France. Before answering your question, I would like to mention our
intervention since it began in the summer 2014, putting it within the framework of the coalition,
because that is how we can establish the most comprehensive results and consider precisely the
objectives of the rest of the campaign.
After launching the Shamal operation and the first strikes in Iraq in September 2014, we have
strengthened our device in the last months the year 2014 and then, more sharply, after the
bombings in Paris from 7 to 9 January 2015. We engaged for the first time the carrier battle
group in Shamal operation in February 2015 and the training we provide to CITT (Iraqi Counter
Terrorism Service) and to the staff of the 6e infantry division, which is the bulwark of Baghdad
division, began in March and April. The first recognition of burst above the Syria flights took
place on 8 September and the first strikes against a site in Syria Daech intervened on 27
September. But it's in the aftermath of the attacks of November 13 that we have substantially
intensified our strikes against Daech, since as early as November 16, have been announced and
the intensification of these strikes and the deployment of the carrier battle group. It includes
eighteen burst and eight Super tendards modernised, which allowed us, in 48 hours, to carry out
six raids and destroy thirty-five objectives. The intensity of our engagement has not decreased,
despite the return of the carrier battle group; It is, moreover, strongly welcomed by the Iraqi
authorities, as the Minister of defence was able to see during his recent trip to Baghdad and
Erbil, on 10 and 11 April.
Since the return of the CSG, in mid-March, nearly 1 300 men are deployed on the theatre. We
provide including training of commandos of the Iraqi counter-terrorism units and instructors and
managers of the 6e Iraqi division, training which complements that of the peshmergas in Iraqi

Kurdistan. Air component of our military capabilities is composed of fourteen fighter aircraft six shooting from the Emirates and eight Mirage 2000-D since the Jordan-, a maritime patrol
Atlantic 2, AWACS aircraft and, if need be, a tanker aircraft projected from the France.
Regarding the naval component, a frigate ensures constant collecting of intelligence in Eastern
Mediterranean.
Knowing that you auditionnerez later the Chief of staff of the armed forces, I will not go into the
details of transactions, except to mention a significant figure: the France is the second
contributor to the campaign in terms of military capabilities and it is, with the United States, the
only country whose capabilities cover the whole spectrum of training on the ground, in Baghdad
and Kurdistan air means of collection of intelligence and of strike, Iraq and Syria, through the
naval assets. Since the beginning of the campaign, we realized approximately 5% of the strikes
of the coalition, the United States ensuring 90%, the remaining 5% being carried out by other
members of the coalition together.
The France is not alone in the fight against terrorism, be it in the field of intelligence or military
action. The coalition, led by the United States, includes sixty-three countries, barely half a dozen
participated in air strikes: in addition to the United States and the France, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, the Denmark and the Australia. Within this coalition, we do not merely to make
a military contribution in the context of a campaign plan decided by others: it's not the vision that
we have of the use of our military means, regardless of the theatre of operations. We seek to act
as a force of proposal to contribute to define the objectives and the axes of effort, including
bringing the United States and other actors to increase their efforts on Syria, knowing that their
priority objective, especially in 2014, when they are entered into the countryside alongside Iraqi
forces, was the Iraq.
To ensure the cohesion of the coalition and allow us to contribute to its politico-military
direction, we launched, with the United States, coordination of Defence Ministers meetings. The
Ministers concerned are of course the most active countries militarily in the countryside: JeanYves Le Drian and his American counterpart, Ashton Carter co-chaired, such, on 20 January, in
Paris, a meeting of half a dozen countries, and they will meet in Stuttgart next week. But this
format has been extended to the initiative of the France and the United States, so meetings bring
together the Defence Ministers of countries engaged against Daech: a meeting of this kind was
held in February 2016 in Brussels and another must occur in Washington in July 2016.
Many Americans talk, but do not underestimate the contribution of our European partners in this
coalition. Following the attacks on 13 November, the President of the Republic had requested the
Minister of defence to call its European counterparts in solidarity by invoking article 42-7 of the
Treaty on European Union. This call helped to politically facilitate consolidation and the
acceleration of the commitment of a number of our European partners. I think in particular to the
United Kingdom, which has extended its the Iraq strikes the Syria, and Germany, which
proceeded to intelligence over the Syria flights. This process could take a little more time with
regard to other partners Europeans because their internal political debate and the necessary
parliamentary validation of their commitment. It is thus, for example, that the Denmark approved
last week a contribution, with regard to the size of that country, since it consists in sending seven
F - 16, one C-130, trainers and SOF in Iraq and, if necessary, in Syria. A number of other

partners, including Finland, the Czech Republic and Poland, have, as we had prompted them,
announced contributions, not not directly in Syria and Iraq, but on other theaters, where they can
assume some of the burden currently borne by our forces, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa,
within the tasks of the United Nations in Mali and Central African Republic.
What are the results of this campaign and our actions in particular? It is difficult to quantify the
total of Daech forces. Most significant us seems to be the territory taken up, because it gives an
indication on the population excluded from the right-of-way of Daech and resources it is private.
With regard to the Iraq, the combined action of winbacks conducted on the ground by the Iraqi
forces, in the broad sense - i.e. internal security forces, CITT, the peshmergas and the Shiites of
popular mobilization militia-, allowed to take 30% to 40% of the territory that Daech controlled
in Iraq. By 2015, the victories of Tikrit, Baiji, Sinjar and Ramadi were significant in this regard.
With regard to the Syria, the action of the opposition and Syrian forces, with the support of the
Russia, the Iran and Hezbollah, allowed to return 15 to 20% of the territory of Daech, resumption
of Palmyra being the more symbolic but not necessarily the most important with respect to our
military objectives.
In sum, the expansion of Daech in the Levant was stopped and the enemy is more capable of
major offensive military actions. It retains the ability to conduct operations of opportunity,
multiply harassment attacks. But, his freedom of action is becoming increasingly constrained, its
scales of resources between the Iraqi and Syrian, theatres which offered him room for
manoeuvreImportant work, are increasingly thwarted by the progressive loss of the axis between
Mosul and Raqqah and strikes along the Valley of the Euphrates.
The important elements for Daech, not merely symbolic but also political plan, include the
concept of territorial continuity of the Caliphate which we tackle pressing logistical axes - and
access to resources. Thus, as early as last fall, in large part thanks to the insistence of France with
its American ally, we have undertaken a campaign in a much more systematic way Daech
resources, especially its oil infrastructure. We believe that today ' today, its financial base is
weakened by strikes supported against oil production, forcing it to increase its taxes, at the risk
of increasing the hostility of the administered people, what is positive in the long term.
Should we be optimistic in the statement of results? It is clear that we have moved on the other
side of the fight against Daech - the Iraqi authorities say clearly, and this corresponds to the
analysis of our military officials-, since we have broken his movement of expansion and he
staggers territorially. We are on the right track to militarily. However, it must not neglect Daech
resilience capacity. Indeed, less it can conduct military operations of scale, more it will take
asymmetric actions: suicide bombings, employment - increasing, the rest - chemical weapons
and explosive devices improvised (IEE or FDI in English, for Improvised Explosive Device) on
vehicles, which we noted the increasing technicality since some of these devices are now
chemical.
We must persevere in our action. The end of the year 2016 and the year 2017, we continue to
defend the principle of systemic analysis resulting from our analysis of Daech vulnerabilities. In
other words, the assets - in particular the concept of Caliphate and territorial continuity - that
Daech puts forward, particularly in its propaganda for Western, Middle Eastern or Asian,

opinions with which he seeks to recruit, are centres of gravity on which we seek to pressure.
After a first phase aimed at weakening Daech, we started a second phase, posted at the end of the
year last by the meeting of the chiefs of staff of the coalition, which aims more to dismantle the
organization.
We will focus the campaign plan on Iraq, in a first step, with for objective the release of Mosul,
Alambar and the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, and the resumption of the border
control with the Turkey, the Jordan and Syria, in order to cut Daech from its rear bases. Also there again, at the insistence of the France, notably with the United States, but the Defence
Ministers of the coalition agreed on this point in February-, we consider essential to the
resumption of Raqqah the main objective of our action in Syria, as it is for us essential in terms
of Homeland Security. At the same time, we will continue to increase our efforts to weaken the
financial capacity of Daech, whether it is oil revenues, currency or trafficking, and its human
capacity in pursuing the fight against foreign fighters round-tripping.
The success of these objectives, which is now part of a realistic horizon - I wouldn't said the
same thing in 2014-, even if I do not purport to advance a date, will not mean the end of
operations nor commitment nor, alas! one of the terrorist threat weighing on french soil. Firstly,
because Daech is not the only group terrorist that we face: Al-Qaida, whether it be its affiliated
groups in Syria, including the JAN, AQAP, or AQIM, remains a source of concern. Secondly,
because we fear that, when they will have more room for manoeuvreWork they have today in
Iraq and Syria, Daech fighters seek other territories to settle there. The Yemen and, more
importantly, the Libya, are a concern in this regard.
The President Georges Fenech. I note that you have not referred to the Russian intervention.
Could you tell us something about its results? On the other hand, you have explained the State of
the forces in presence: a hand, the coalition, consisting of some sixty-three troop-contributing
countries and possessing military means, including battle; on the other, about 25,000 men.
Therefore, it is difficult for a philistine like me, to understand why this force international,
including the Russians and the Americans, is unable to defeat a horde of 25,000 troops more
quickly. One wonders also, in this connection, why should totally exclude the hypothesis of an
intervention on the ground. Is it the Iraqi precedent that prevents us to consider this solution?
The rapporteur. It seems, in fact, amazing that 25 000 to 30 000 men are rain or shine. The
results that you have exposed we are encouraging, certainly, but how explain put as much time to
overcome Daech? It was read in Le Canard enchan , which a bomb cost EUR 1 million. If the
cost of the strikes is actually of this order, we can understand whether you are very attentive to
the targets. Do you confirm this cost? Moreover, are the bombing sufficient? Certainly the
political solution and the military solution will not one without the other, but I have the feeling
that we do not want to go too fast or too far, precisely because, for the moment, no political
solution does exist. Finally, has the closing of the Embassy complicated the collection of
intelligence?
Mr. Patrice Verchre. It seems to me that you have not mentioned the Turkey while it remains,
even if it is perhaps less than before, a place of passage for the French arriving in Syria and who
in return. It is clear that the Erdoan of Turkey had, until the recent attacks committed on its soil,

ambiguous relations with Daech. Is there a strategy towards this country? I am surprised that you
did not mention this issue, which raises many questions in the population and among some
lawmakers.
Mr. Serge Grouard. I apologize in advance for the disparate nature of my questions. Can we
have more details on the assessment by the Quai d'Orsay in the American policy towards the
terrorist? Are there elements on the links that the United States maintain or not, with groups
other than Daech - I think including al-Dhanub? And, if so, what are their goals and how the
France is located opposite that?
On the other hand, how to evaluate the results of the air strikes? I know that such an assessment
is difficult, especially when the enemy is very mobile and hides quite easily on a territory wide
and difficult to understand from the point of view of intelligence. But I remember the Balkans
and the war in Kosovo, where the results of the strikes were undervalued or poorly assessed.
You said that the resumption of Raqqah was essential to homeland security. Can you develop
this point? Are you feeding concerns about the use of chemical weapons? Do you think what is
out there in this area can be exported?
Is the Libya becoming a new center of gravity for Daech? Do we have what would fear a
grouping of this movement or that certify the Syria transfers to the Libya or the Yemen?
Finally, we know that, in the fight against terrorism, the "decompartmentalization" is important.
You have important information about the Middle East. It can also have elements on the French
and the French who have gone to fight. However I have a feeling that, despite all the efforts that
are being made, there are still margins of progress to achieve this decompartmentalization
between services that fall within the Quai d'Orsay and the Ministry of defence, on the one hand,
and those of the Ministry of the Interior, on the other hand. Can items available to you be sent
including to the Ministry of the Interior?
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. The progress in the fight against Daech are net and encouraging, but
with caution because you yourselves have emphasized the dangers of asymmetric warfare. We
need to name things. We talked long war against terrorism; However it is important to be precise
and target the war against Daech. In this regard, there is a certain realism, as evidenced by the
military planning law and the discussions surrounding.
The eradication of Daech is an absolute necessity and it must be quick, because we know that
risks remain. What joint is possible with the Russia and the countries of the region, which were
not cited so far for further? Even if there are difficulties of a political nature, can you confirm
that contacts exist? If such was not the case, it would be terrible.
Furthermore, what lessons pull you to the Arab spring, from the point of view of the
precautionary measures to take? It is obvious that these events have created a certain
destabilization and offered fertile soil for terrorism in Syria and Iraq.

M. Philippe Errera. First of all, why does it take so much time? This is an excellent question. It
is important to keep in mind that we do not face at 25 000 or 30,000 fighters consisting of
formed units, as could be the case in conventional combat. In such a case, the war would be over
long. Unfortunately, it is long that one has no more war of this kind, particularly against terrorist
groups. We face adversaries that combine conventional military capabilities of some States and
the advantages of a terrorist group, i.e., the ability to melt into the population and operate in
urban areas, so that employment of air weapon - our main tool, therefore that we will deploy no
troops on the ground - is limited by the need to avoid collateral damage in accordance with the
law of armed conflict. Our ability to conduct effective strikes in sufficient volume is directly
linked to the information available to us, in particular the ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance). This is why we have been particularly active with our European partners to
ensure that even those who, for political reasons, did not wish to engage in strikes can put at our
disposal by means of intelligence collection - I think in particular of surveillance drones-, which
are needed to constitute a record of objective and evaluate the outcome of the strikes.
In addition, during a good part of the year 2014, even by the year 2015, our American allies.
Gold it seemed to us that such an effort was important, especially as the Government of that
country conducting operations on the ground, the action of the United States, on the basis of the
coalition or not, should be more ambitious in Syria - President of the Republic as well as JeanYves Le Drian stressed to them in this sense - and that we need to go further in the type of
objectives for example oil infrastructure.
Regarding the Russia, I have not mention, in fact, in my description of the action of the coalition,
because it is not part. However, she leads a military action. In our opinion, it engaged in the
campaign in Syria with for first objective, not to fight Daech, but to save the regime of Bashar
Al-Assad, at one point, at the end of last summer, when this regime was really under pressure,
reduces located around Damascus and Latakia under the threat of the opposition. Therefore, as of
September 30, the Russia led strikes which, initially, were substantially non-jihadist opposition,
i.e. neither Daech nor on JAN, but all the groups that threatened the regime.
The President Georges Fenech. Is this a certainty?
M. Philippe Errera. It is a certainty.
The President Georges Fenech. It is completely refuted by Putin.
M. Philippe Errera. We have many certainties totally refuted by Putin; This is part one. Just
see, through our own means of intelligence, the localities where the Russia hit: most of these
strikes targeted areas in which Daech was not physically present but where only the opposition
stood.
Things have however evolved after the attack against the Russian Airbus over the Egypt, but at
the margin: If we set up the balance sheet of the Russian intervention, most of the strikes targeted
the opposition and it is still the case today, as part of the support that the Russian forces bring to
the Syrian forces. The Russia conducted strikes against Daech and the JAN, but in a small
proportion. It announced its withdrawal from Syria last March. However we note especially that

it has redesigned its device, to shoot, skilled enough manner, the political and diplomatic benefit
maximum ad without putting at risk its presence and its assistance to the Syrian forces. It has
strengthened a number of its military components, especially attack helicopters.
Whatever it is, we maintain our contacts with the Russia. The President of the Republic is gone
there as early as November 26, two days after his trip to Washington, the Minister of defence on
21 December and the Chief of staff on December 23. Mr. Jean-Marc Ayrault, meanwhile, visited
last week, and contacts between officials continues. At the military level, we maintain contacts
through our respective military intelligence services, and to my knowledge, the DGSE has never
broken its contacts with Russian civilian external services. So far, the idea of a policy against
Daech shared with the Russia is upset by the fact that it is not engaged militarily against Daech.
On the other hand, we believe that as long as Bashar Al-Assad will remain in power, the engine
of instability in Syria, which has fed Daech and he offered his room for manoeuvreWork, will
remain. Therefore, as long as the Russia does not whole way engage in a credible transition,
which implies that Bashar Al-Assad is not at the head of the Syrian authorities, our effort to fight
against Daech will remain heavily constrained.
Regarding the closure of the Embassy in Damascus, I will leave to meet Mr. Bernard Bajolet you
will hear no doubt. But I would say in General that our services do not only depend on
embassies, and this is fortunate, for their collection of intelligence activities.
I come to the Turkey. Yes, we are seeing of ambiguities and ambivalences in Turkish politics.
That said, we have seen an evolution of Turkish policy with regard to the control of the border
and, according to our colleagues from the Ministry of the Interior, french fighters. However, it
seems important to continue diplomatic efforts and our contacts with the Turkey, including to
ensure that the Turkish position in the fight against Daech and, more generally, in its role in the
region and its relationship with Baghdad, will not create another focus of instability.
How to evaluate the reality of keystrokes? Today we have a whole range of means that we didn't
in 1999, during the Kosovo campaign, whether it's intelligence of origin satellite or a Pod Reco
powering the Rafale or Mirage, allowing us to take stock of our strikes. In addition, the
strengthening of our exchanges of military intelligence with the United States about this theatre
is accelerated after the attacks of November 13.
On the other hand, if Raqqah is linked to our internal security, it because it is there that are
formed of French to carry out attacks on french soil.
Mr. Serge Grouard. This deserves to be told. It was the purpose of my question!
M. Philippe Errera. It is one of the centres of gravity of Daech in Syria. Most is weakened at
Raqqah, more it is overall and less threat to the France is important.
The President Georges Fenech. I do everything as you answer my question about sending
ground troops. Without too much forward, can you tell us when will it all stop, according to you?

The rapporteur. I would add that, according to the Israelis, in fifteen days, on the ground, this
could be "folded".
M. Jerome Bonnafont. They may want to talk about Gaza...
M. Philippe Errera. There are forces on the ground, Mr president, Iraq: Iraqi forces and
Kurdish forces. These are the only ones which, from our point of view, are able to ensure in the
long term a local situation that prevents the return of Daech.
The President Georges Fenech. It is a reasoning I have difficulty accepting fully. Do you feel
that if Europeans or Americans are doing this job, they will not have the same legitimacy with
regard to the populations? In other words, is the Iraqi example deterrent?
M. Philippe Errera. Assuming that a political agreement to intervene, supported by opinions, to
commit 150 000 forces in Iraq and Syria, we could, in the short and medium term, reducing the
footprint of Daech, but I do not believe that we would be able to eradicate it, i.e. to put an end to
its capacity of attraction. Instead, the fact that 'Crusaders' fighting would validate the idea well
lead the Jihad and would facilitate the recruitment of combatants. In addition, efforts in Iraq,
with regard to Americans and their allies, and in Afghanistan to which we are concerned, was
initially a combat action, then take part in training. We believe that, if this training and local
capacity-building action can be initiated right now, this will promote the sustainability of our
results.
The President Georges Fenech. Imagine that, tomorrow, a series of attacks occur in France,
including with a dirty bomb, which should be 2 000 to 3 000 dead. Do you believe that we will
continue to think so? We are engaged in a war; We had to deplore 130 deaths in 2015. We have
to wait for the massacres, because you can very well fear coordinated in Europe, actions for
deciding to use means other than simple keystrokes?
M. Philippe Errera. You do not mind if I answer you that this will be the President and national
representation to take this decision, where appropriate. If such a situation were to happen - but
everything is done so that this is not the case-, french politicians would be forced to consider all
threats to the France. Because, if we wanted to deploy a significant number of French troops on
the ground in Syria and Iraq, this would compel us, in light of the volume of our forces, to
denude the national territory and significantly reduce our presence in Mali and more widely in
the Sahel. Regarding the overall terrorist threat to the France, would not necessarily an
advantage.
The rapporteur. To carry out an intervention on the ground in Syria and Iraq, should reduce the
Sentinel operation and greatly weaken the other operations. Is this good?
Mr. Serge Grouard. It must be said clearly: we do not have the necessary military availability!
The army has 100,000 men, and it is currently used at full capacity. The French army, which is
engaged in all the theaters are known, including on the national soil, has absolutely no, today the
means to intervene on the ground in Iraq and Syria. Military personnel returning from overseas
operations can no longer benefit from the necessary before exiting operation Sentinel rest time!

The fact is that, in the framework of the white paper and the military programming law, was very
significantly reduced the wing. Admittedly, the previous law was probably illusory, but the
reality is that one.
M. Jerome Bonnafont. What is the link between the various services of the State? A " task force
Daech" was created. This interdepartmental working group brings together the different services
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Errera branch, Directorate of military intelligence, the
Centre of planning and conduct of operations (CPCO) and the DGSE for the Ministry of defence,
and the various services of the Ministry of the Interior. This task force meets weekly.
The rapporteur. There's no leader?
M. Jerome Bonnafont. No, it is an exchange of information and coordination. A number of
documents, classified "confidential defence" obviously, allow us to make a very precise point of
the actions taken by both.
I would add that the action of our diplomatic service has a dimension of cooperation with
services. It is naturally driven by the DGSE, SID and other intelligence services. This is part of
the ongoing diplomatic dialogue that we have with all of the countries with which we have
relationships of trust. There is unquestionably a continuum diplomacy, defence and Interior,
indoors and outdoors. We can always make progress and we strive, but the will exists.
To return to the point that you just mentioned, Mr president, what would be the legal basis for
intervention in Iraq or Syria? There is a legal basis at present, which is the one with which we
operate against Daech, on the basis of self-defence and an explicit request of the Iraqi
Government. It is however an extremely complex environment, given the number of national and
international actors already present on the ground. There is a multiplicity of factors to be taken
into account.
The President Georges Fenech. This is what seemed to have forgotten the Americans when
they intervened in Iraq.
M. Jerome Bonnafont. Indeed, and this is paying today in many aspects.
Is the Libya a center of gravity for Daech? The organization grew quickly in Libya in recent
months, until she is faced with a phenomenon that she had not planned: the hostility of the local
population. It has great difficulty to keep. The power it exerts on Syrte and some neighbourhoods
is a power of terror. It enjoys local complicity here and there, but it exercised power without the
consent of the populations. The restoration of the authority of the State, on which we are working
with the new Libyan authorities, aims to build the military operation and the political conditions
to prevent the Libya to become a centre of gravity of Daech. For the moment, it is not, but it
could become if this effort fails.
The issue of lessons learned Arab spring is complex, because the Arab spring are not born before
terrorism: it existed already for a long time. Over the past years, Al-Qaida has been weakened by
blows that brought since September 11, and Daech is substituted to it, with a new project, but in

Iraq, and not in the country where occurred the Arab spring. Daech is born of the failure of the
Iraq to recover and the inability of the Shiites and the Sunnis to find a national formula of
coexistence after the American intervention. Some of its fighters are from France, the Morocco,
Tunisia and Algeria, but previously they were on other theaters, in Afghanistan or Yemen with
Al-Qaida. I would also remind you that Boko Haram or the Somali Al-Shabaab are not born of
Arab spring but this potting soil, very difficult to define and understand, be it in France or in
these countries, of jihadist terrorism.
The fact is that today ' hui, we faced during the two or three years to the sense of invincibility
that gave Daech, feeling that has captured the imagination of the jihadists, who then joined in
number with that organization. If it was so important that exists a pivot in the military fight
against Daech, because it allowed the myth of his invincibility was destroyed. Thus, people who
fight on his side are beginning to return, with the beautiful story of triumphant Jihad that they
were telling themselves, but with stories of defeat of setbacks. And for its leaders, it becomes
necessary to redefine the political and military Daech project.
To return to the Arab spring, they have therefore only a very tenuous link with Daech. If after the
revolutions, a number of Islamist movements have conquered power, usually through the ballot
box, things have then evolved in a very diverse way. In Morocco, the Crown was able to build a
new political balance in which the majority led by the Muslim Brotherhood, who have also won
local elections recently, maintains a close dialogue with the Palace. In Tunisia, after a year of
very strong tensions that gave the feeling that the situation was going to deteriorate very quickly,
the Quartet, composed of the union of trade unions, leagues of human rights, of the order of
lawyers and employers ' organizations, has been able to encourage politicians to get around the
table and to adopt a Constitution which refers to islam but on which rests a civilian in which
political system a non-Islamic coalition supported by Ennahdha party Islamist, won a majority.
In Egypt, president Morsi led a policy which he quickly alienated large sections of the population
who demonstrated against him, so the army put an end to the experiment and that Marshal Sissi
took power and became the president of the Arab Republic of Egypt. His speech on the Muslim
Brotherhood is very different from that which held the Moroccans or Tunisians. Please observe
this diversity of discourse: some believe that the fight against terrorism through the eradication
of the Muslim Brotherhood. on the contrary, others think that they can be integrated into a
normal democratic political life.
The phenomenon Daech, I repeat, was not born in the countries of the Arab spring. In Syria, it
should be noted that its emergence is due to the decision of Bashar Al-Assad to release Islamists
who were in prison and to grant them a part of its territory under an implied non-aggression pact,
so arise, if there more than this way to be justified with regard to the international community as
an indispensable element in the fight against terrorist islam. You will observe, moreover, that
even that Palmyre has fallen into the hands of Daech almost without fighting, similarly it has
been covered by the regime and the Russians almost without fighting. You will notice also that
were present, of course, a few soldiers of the regime, but that it was, for many, the Hezbollah, the
Pasdaran units and from the Iranian regular army supported by Russian forces. Thus, if military
operations in Syria are nominally led by president Bachar Al-Assad, they are actually by this
coalition of foreign troops, leading the assault against targets that the plan their means - Aleppo

currently - in order to consolidate the so-called "useful Syria" to preserve the power of Bashar
Al-Assad.
One last word on American policy against Daech. Two terrorist groups are listed as such by the
United Nations Security Council: Daech and Jabaht al-Dhanub. Daech has territorial hold
extremely limited geographically - very large but very exclusive-, Jabaht al-Dhanub while
arranged to fit into other armed groups active in Syria. The difficulty we face is not whether if
we treat or not with Jabaht al-Dhanub, because nobody, neither the Americans nor ourselves,
deals with them. It is linked to the fact that, when it comes to the Russians to hit, they see Jabaht
al-Dhanub everywhere and hit so everywhere, while we, we see Jabaht al-Dhanub systems in
environments extremely disparate where groups not terrorist. However, I do not believe that
there is the slightest trace of an operational cooperation and political dialogue between the
Americans and Jabaht al-Dhanub. The Americans have an enemy, Islamist terrorism, which is
the same as ours and they fight with all available means, because they have been beaten in their
flesh.
The President Georges Fenech. This you can Mr. Errera, tell us on what horizon, you will see
at the end of Daech?
M. Philippe Errera. With regard to the end of Daech, this is counted in years - it is a personal
estimate. Above all, we expect that its militant groups settle in other jurisdictions when Iraqis
will have the military victory in Iraq. We must also be mindful of mutations of the ideological
compost which can be similar to those that we have witnessed between Al-Qaida and Daech.
The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, it remains for me to thank you for your answers.
Hearing, behind closed doors, of colonel Bruno Arviset, Secretary general of the Council of
the military of the gendarmerie nationale of Philippe squadron leader function - Alexandre
Akhigbe, Chief of Squadron Y, major Emmanuel Franchet, Chief Warrant Officer
Frdric Guaignier, warrant officer Raoul Burdet of warrant officer Vincent Delaval,
warrant officer Sbastien Perrier and Constable Annak Kernes
Report of the hearing in camera, Monday, May 9, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We continue our work in receiving representatives of the
Council of the military service of the gendarmerie (CFMG), national authority of dialogue
founded in 1990 and which is the true instrument of social dialogue at the National Gendarmerie.
We welcome colonel Bruno Arviset, Secretary-General of the Council, the Chief of Squadron
Philippe - Alexandre Akhigbe, squadron leader there, Maj. Emmanuel Franchet, Chief Warrant
Officer Frdric Guaignier, warrant officer Raoul Burdet, warrant officer Vincent Delaval, Wo
Sbastien Perrier and Constable Annak Kernes.
You can, and gentlemen, share with our Committee on your observations and your possible
criticism as to the means and missions of the mounted police, your staff training expectations and
your assessment of the cooperation between the internal security forces.

The office of the Director-general of the National Gendarmerie asked us this morning that your
hearing be held in camera, while we considered a hearing open to the press, as we did with the
unions of the national police. We wanted to accede to this request. Therefore, the hearing is not
broadcast on the website of the National Assembly. Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of
order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his
account may be published in whole or in part if we decide so at the end of our work. I said that
the summary records of the hearings taking place in camera are transmitted to people heard in
order to collect the comments of the latter. These observations are then submitted to the
commission which may decide to State in his report. In accordance with the provisions of the
same article, shall be punished by the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code
any person who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish information relating to
the non-public work of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the
work of the Committee reported this information.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.
Colonel Bruno Arviset, the Chief of Squadron Philippe - Alexandre Akhigbe, squadron leader,
major Emmanuel Franchet, Chief Warrant Officer Frdric Guaignier, warrant officer Raoul
Burdet, warrant officer Vincent Delaval, Wo Sbastien Perrier and Constable Annak Kernes
successively oath.
The President Georges Fenech. We will yield you the floor so that you make us part of your
analysis of the State of the means and the strength of the body of the mounted police. What are
major hardware requirements identified in territorial brigades? On what basis the national
gendarmerie soldiers get a shooting training? Has this frequency changed since the attacks of
January 2015? Do you have proposals to make on the subject?
Equipment monitoring and intervention of the gendarmerie (PSIG) platoons must evolve in
accordance with the tray-PSIG 2016 plan. What do you think of this new material? Is reserved to
the PSIG-Sabre? Is it already available throughout the territory? The 150 PSIG-Sabre
distributed optimally in the territory?
A new national scheme of intervention of the security forces was presented by the Minister of the
Interior on April 19. What are actions implemented in Work by the Directorate General of the
National Gendarmerie (DGGN) to prepare the PSIG-Sabre to fulfill their mission of units primointerveners in the case of terrorist attacks? Do you feel that the new employment doctrine is
perfectly integrated by the units concerned?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. I'm here surrounded by gendarmes about covering the whole spectrum
of the fight against terrorism - including military intervention force, especially of squadron
leader Y. The presence of the latter partly to demand for camera of the DGGN since, as a
member of the intervention of the gendarmerie nationale (GIGN) group, squadron leader is
protected by anonymity. There are also military covering the fields of intelligence and the
judicial police, as well as military representative territorial units, both at the level of the company
of gendarmerie of the PSIG-Sabre himself.

The gendarmerie is obviously put into running order, without waiting for the attacks of the
month of November, to provide a comprehensive response to terrorism. That an event occurred
in police zone or zone of mounted police, we remain in all cases at least a concurrent force, and
have flow control missions to ensure, when well even an event would be sprayed or have already
taken place in police zone. I would add that, on the Parisian 'plate' - which focuses the maximum
risk-, work by many gendarmerie units, beginning with the Republican Guard, here represented
by a warrant officer and responsible for the protection of all national palaces. All squadrons of
mobile gendarmerie of France are also in the Paris region and are as such included in this
mission.
We are at your disposal to answer your questions. Depending on the nature of the latter, each
will speak in his field of privileged jurisdiction, being naturally free speech.
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. I said at the outset that I order 200 gendarmes
in the company of Nantes.
Since the publication of the note relating to the management of the killings planned by the
gendarmerie units are attached to take into account the change in doctrine, and including the
passage of a posture of looping and recourse to specialised to a posture of contact with the
opponent, without bargaining units as possible. Have thus set up the Sabre PSIG, and I also order
for one of the first PSIG to have been transformed into PSIG-Sabre. The new should happen to
us here at the 1St September we received confirmation of the branch just now.
The President Georges Fenech. Was it not originally planned that they arrive at the beginning
of the month of July?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. Deliveries of equipment are planned by the end of June, but may be
anticipated for the benefit of the few PSIG-sword the most exposed because of the Euro 2016.
Thus all PSIG-sword of the first phase will be fitted with a means between June and August.
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. The training, however, already started, and
whether it drives, alerts, or determination of the tasks of each - the objective is, as they say at the
national training centre of Saint-Astier police forces, the "time war". Our doctrine, which has
already been put to you, is that of the "primo-engaged primo stakeholder. I sincerely believe that
the gendarmes of land took consciousness, since the attacks, armed people, all people, able to
intervene anywhere, whether in a supermarket, in a theatre or in another place. So, I have my
company-level, many contacts with local politicians, who do not hesitate to put at our disposal
which theaters, that supermarkets, which schools, for education and training.
The President Georges Fenech. How often you practice shooting?
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. Training, beyond the shooting, is already to
determine who does what. Indeed, in the circumstances that we are interested, just as when is
committed an offence under common law of relatively high severity, for example a homejacking,
all forces, police and gendarmerie, are concentrated on the search for the criminals. This

concentration of forces therefore already exists: it is the operational coordination that we need to
put in place. We are working at our level, with elected officials.
Training of the gendarmes of the territorial brigades, i.e. of the primo-committed, includes
shooting, but also the ability to intervene in sites open to the public: this type of training takes
place at least once a month at the level of the companies. It cannot obviously cover all personal
at the same time, since some of them remain at the brigade and others are on furlough.
As the PSIG-Sabre, there must be a monthly day of training, all gathered constables, but also
alerts on a daily basis. Its shooting training is done once all fortnight - knowing that we have the
chance, in Nantes, to have an antenna of the GIGN to lead us - but includes all personnel once a
month. These personal train then specifically in shooting, they did not necessarily previously.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. How do you get cartridges per year on average, knowing
that a policeman pulls ninety?
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. We must here distinguish the gendarmes in
territorial unit, who derive between fifty and sixty per year, - gendarmes from the PSIG. The title
of our new allocations, I received 4 500 cartridges for a 38 gendarmes PSIG. I only can tell you
how many cartridges will draw each of them, as I currently excluded from this instructional
training voluntary Assistant gendarmes. I do not know the exact number of cartridges fired by
Constable of the PSIG - whether it's long arms or handgun.
The rapporteur. To clarify things, could you confirm that a gendarme brigade pulls that fifty to
sixty cartridges per year?
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. Altogether. This is an average, once again, but
I insist on the contents of these firing sessions that combine implementation operational
situation, handling security, legal reminders.
Major Emmanuel Franchet. This is an average, but still need to distinguish between weapons.
We are talking here about shooting to Sig Sauer, who is the handgun of Constable. You can add
to this the cartridges they derive in the submachine gun HK as well as the shotgun. The
constables derive about 70 cartridges per year to the Sig Sauer, but also some 50 cartridges per
additional weapon.
Colonel Bruno Arviset. Should limit the preparation to the fight against terrorism to the
marksmanship training: it also includes training in the manWork, to acquire or reacquire the
individual acts of the fighter. Those of our police entering national school of non-commissioned
officers receive fairly extensive military training, many supplemented by participating in external
operations being career. Preparation to the fight against terrorism involves the man
trainingOperational work, progress in pairs and progression in group training which
complements the shooting training itself - shooting being the ultimate act that we try elsewhere
to avoid. Before shooting, you should already know to protect themselves, protect his comrade
and progress.

The rapporteur. I hear what you say, but both the attacks in January from the month of
November showed the importance of shooting: in January, it has not been easy for the police to
neutralize the brothers Kaye to exit of Charlie Hebdo, and, in November, it is thanks to the
marksmanship of a Commissioner of the brigade Rab (BAC) that we were able to neutralize a
terrorist. With the change of employment doctrine, which makes newcomers the first responders,
the gendarmes, wherever they may be in the territory can be persuaded to do the same. If a
policeman is unclear take, this can have dramatic consequences, where the importance of
firearms training, and hence this underlying question: do you consider your shooting as sufficient
training? Must it be reinforced? I understand that there is a distinction between the PSIG-Sabre,
which the Minister of the Interior recalled the importance as well as the BAC, and gendarmerie
brigades. But, again, these, wherever they may be, are potentially likely to intervene. The PSIG
and the brigades will be sufficiently trained to deal with the threat? I have heard your words, my
colonel, with respect to the other components of this training, but I specifically wondering you
about the shooting.
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. Dammartin-en-Gole, it is still a brigadier who
has injured the brothers Kaye and secure them in the printing industry, putting an end to their
run. Then, I want to emphasize that the units strive to organize shooting sessions, despite
constraints. Territorial units carry a lot of missions, and are the most versatile units, so that their
command is quite difficult. It is therefore very difficult to gather all of the military, which is not
the case of a Sabre PSIG, that can neutralize and who is always ready to intervene. Territorial
units are always requested, either for complaints or for something else. It is already when it
comes to fire 50 to 60 rounds by military, because even once, in scenarios and not that of a strict
shooting training happens. We try to experience the military and put in a State of stress.
The rapporteur. Sounds it sufficient?
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. The level at which are territorial gendarmes,
Yes. But, yet again, if we could increase this continuous drive, we would. Because, for the
moment, we have the means.
Colonel Bruno Arviset. There are also problems of infrastructure: it takes not only cartridges to
train, but also firing ranges. We have not in each brigade. Under the roadmap, the DGGN led to
facilitate access of the gendarmes to civilian infrastructure including.
The rapporteur. There, trainers...
Colonel Bruno Arviset. We can still find internally. The most difficult, at the level of a group,
remains to find shooting stalls which are not too far from the brigades and which allow us to lead
us to the situation believable and not just standing behind a target shooting.
The rapporteur. Are there common shooting stands with the police?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. When there is a shooting stand, as it belongs to the gendarmerie, police
or armies, agreements concluded at the departmental level allow us to pool use.

Major Emmanuel Franchet. This is why my classmate pointed out the difficulty of finding
slots. As soon as it pools a shooting stand, should there be shoot police officers, gendarmes and
police.
The rapporteur. Can there be Formators common to the national police, the gendarmerie and
the municipal police?
Major Emmanuel Franchet. Professional intervention monitors form the gendarmes and police.
The national police has its own technicians.
Chief Warrant Officer Frederick Guaignier. He comes to Paris research section, to go train us
shooting in 12 police stationse and 20e districts, where we have available slots, or else to go shoot
on Sunday on the gendarmerie stalls. We take our duty to shoot, every five to six weeks, 20
cartridges per meeting.
Warrant officer Raoul Burdet. I confirm the words of my classmates. The same problem arises
for the Republican Guard: it must find Parisian stands. We combine to Vincennes a small stand,
since it has only two places of shooting. This therefore requires a fairly accurate organization.
Chief Warrant Officer Frederick Guaignier. We have our own instructors but this has already
happened to shoot at the stand de tir of the commissariat of the 12e district, in being supervised
by a monitor of the police because it was available that day. This has enabled us to become
familiar with other methods.
The President Georges Fenech. To finish on this component of interventions and the first
responders, I will thus summarize your point of view: happen you to suitable material, and you
also receive adequate training. But the military of the weapon were they really integrated this
new doctrine of combat? The change of doctrine is it naturally, or are there still questions?
Major Emmanuel Franchet. The change was very naturally because we are military. Today,
the Constable - primo-engaged or primo-speaker - works in mode of professional intervention.
And I am speaking here as a member of PSIG-Sabre: when we intervene during a planned killing
spree or a terrorist attack, we naturally spend in combat mode.
The President Georges Fenech. Therefore, why not have adopted this doctrine earlier, given the
context appeared in France here a dozen years?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. It was always considered for twenty or thirty years, that, in a hostage,
time played in favor of the forces of order. As such, it was perfectly logical to assume that in the
case of taking of hostages or shooting early, better non-specialized units to be the area to prevent
the situation getting worse, pending the arrival of specialized units. I think that this doctrine is
not to be questioned for a number of facts, but that face killings planned by people who want to
make a massacre and not take hostages, then die as martyrs in a final confrontation with the
forces of order, we are obliged to adapt our modus operandi and restudy the doctrine. I am
speaking under the control of a squadron leader, who will add what he wants.

Squadron leader Y. Four years ago, general Thierry Orosco, who commanded the GIGN at the
time, had clarified the concept of killing planned in the context of terrorism lowcost , and from
this time on, we started to work across the GIGN, smallest unit in terms of personnel, on the war
time and the fastest onsite. Then appeared is the concept of immediate assault plan, which allows
us to intervene very quickly on any point of the great Parisian Crown. Now, this concept is
available at all levels of the force up to the level of the brigade or the PSIG-Sabre, for more
specialized units.
The President Georges Fenech. It is thus an adaptation to new threats.
Major Emmanuel Franchet. Whether if PSIG-Sabre are located optimally, I will answer Yes:
our territorial mesh is our strength. The Directorate-General of the gendarmerie has decided to
establish 150 PSIG-Sabre at the national level to intervene very quickly, incorporating also the
six antennae of the GIGN.
The President Georges Fenech. What you say regarding implementation of the Sabre PSIG is
not only for the metropolitan territory but also overseas, it seems to me.
Major Emmanuel Franchet. Actually, we have platoons of intervention (GPI) overseas groups
and an antenna of the GIGN in Mayotte, whose creation was decided this year.
Colonel Bruno Arviset. We have the GPI in each overseas territory. We already had specialists
on these territories. In metropolitan France, we were however more distant in some places of our
former platoons of intervention, where the idea of the Sabre PSIG. I think that the distribution of
these is made according to a pragmatic approach, but I speak under your control: it has created
150 PSIG Sabre, with at least one per Department, on the understanding that they are not
necessarily located in the county seat, but rather where can reside the main threat. Major is
modest, who command the PSIG - Sabre Avranches... This city is perhaps not much to everyone,
and one might well wonder why Avranches instead of Saint-L. This is because the PSIG-Sabre
of Avranches is specifically responsible to intervene where appropriate to Mont Saint Michel,
second tourist site in France.
Squadron leader Y. In the Caribbean, as in all departments and overseas territories, the GPI are
built according to the same structure and perform the same missions as the antennas of the GIGN
in metropolitan France.
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. To return to your original question, the
existence of a common core facilitates the reversibility of doctrine in the minds of each Member,
but I would still like to clarify three points. Firstly, at a conference I attended in 2009, the former
Commander of GIGN already spoke of "Amok" phenomenon, which was known at that time of
all the heads present. Then, for those who have participated in external operations, like me who
went to Afghanistan in 2011, this phenomenon of killing mass or attacks complex was weekly.
Many soldiers have thus already become aware of the existence of these phenomena, but have
yet to realize that they have made on french territory. Finally, I wish to clarify, with regard to the
gendarmes of territorial units, that information relating to this threat by planned massacre is
broadcast on our intranet and provided to each collective training.

The President Georges Fenech. I thank you. We shall now proceed to a second round of
questions to guard static and dynamic missions that are assigned to the Gendarmerie. Have these
missions evolved since January 2015? These guards consider it effective? Are dynamic guards,
referred to by the Minister of the Interior before our Committee of inquiry on March 7, effective
enough to replace the static guards?
Warrant officer Raoul Burdet. Monitoring of the National Palace is one of the pillars of the
Republican Guard commissioned. This is clearly in terms of personnel that the impact of the
attacks was felt on the Republican Guard: in places, its numbers have doubled, both in number
and in terms of difficulty of employment, since they have notably been equipped with flak
jackets and weapons of collective staffing. My comrades, who were previously six monthly
guards to the maximum, are now eight, or even more. The consequences on employment are
therefore real. Perhaps we now have cross-logics: should both increase the numbers on the field,
taking into account the context, and review their employment doctrine, but also to increase their
level of education. Increase our capacity in monitoring technical equipment - I am thinking
particularly video surveillance of barracks and quarters and not only to that of the Palace - would
solve one equation data. The Republican Guard is clearly waiting for additional technical means,
which would put more staff on the ground, because currently, the Republican Guards are daily
deployed on a mission, whether it's the cavalry or platoons of infantry regiments intervention.
The President Georges Fenech. Video surveillance, which could solve some staffing problems,
remains still undersized. Is a reflection carried out on this subject?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. Parisian nameplate or on the national territory in General?
The President Georges Fenech. On the national territory.
Colonel Bruno Arviset. Generally, big efforts have been made over the past decade in video
protection, but in places, there are margins of progress. These efforts are still based heavily on
the willingness of local authorities, which, admittedly, there are encouraged by the State through
financing and investments, but it is many places where one might go far beyond what was done.
If the video protection is not the alpha and omega of the protection, nevertheless, that it allows to
reduce the static guards and improve the elucidation of the offences committed.
The President Georges Fenech. The rapporteur makes me rightly pointed out that the Prime
Minister announced this morning a rise of the video protection.
The rapporteur. Apart from the Republican Guard, which is very specific, are you much sought
for monitoring static or dynamically, places the territory under your jurisdiction? What is your
opinion in this regard? On the other hand, how do you work with Sentinel? How do you rate this
operation?
Warrant officer Vincent Delaval. I am platoon warrant of the special protection of the mounted
police (OGSP) Nogent-sur-Seine. OGSP, protecting nuclear plants, are experiencing a rise since
the attacks. We act in partnership with the operator, which, for its part, also dedicated means to

the video protection. We are increasing as we our workforce to cope with the developments of
the threat.
The rapporteur. Perhaps can we return later on the very specific case of monitoring of plants,
which is actually the responsibility of the gendarmerie. Apart from the case of national palaces
and nuclear power plants, are but, you solicited for the supervision of places of worship or of
individual institutions?
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. A province such as Nantes company is being
sought in a timely manner during religious holidays or Christmas markets. But for tactical
reasons, we will never ensure, at least in regard to my company, missions tell static. We assign to
members of missions dynamic zone control, in relation to the Sentinel mission who is in weekly
contact with the territorial police monitor the sensitive points. The uniform became a target for
some time, if we remain static before a monument or other, it is certain that the target will be
attacked.
Colonel Bruno Arviset. The departmental gendarmerie conducted very little static guards in its
area of competence, including in the period immediately following the attacks. Anyway, the
strength of the brigades do not allow to monitor round-the-clock of sensitive points in the area of
mounted police. Therefore, we have instead opted for dynamic patrols visible, dissuasive and
intended to interfere with the freedom of action of potential terrorists. It is that, in the case of a
particular threat or gathering that we are possibly using static guards.
These are probably our mobile police, come as reinforcements to Paris in particular, who have
been most affected by the static guards. After the attacks of January 2015, these mobile
gendarmes were actually much made contribution for the protection of the press, but we have
quickly evolved towards more dynamic missions, because everyone agrees to say, here, that
static guards are extremely costly in personnel without always being as effective as the dynamic
guards, and they are even sometimes a "cure worse than the disease. , in the sense that they
return to advertise for places until then unknown to the public.
The rapporteur. Do you work with soldiers of the Sentinel operation? What do you think of the
latter?
Constable Sahil Kernes. For static guards, the gendarmerie of air transport, which I represent,
has undergone changes in its way of working. Since the attacks, it had to increase its presence in
some aircraft from Senegal, Mali and the Maghreb countries, and is also on the slopes, i.e. in the
reserved area airports, in-depth controls of vehicles and persons working in this area - the
passengers being them subject to the screening of the police aux frontires (PAF). This is a new
mission for us.
Warrant officer Sbastien Perrier. It has also put in place in each Department a pole's fight
against radical islam, led by the prefect and coordinated with services customs, police, mounted,
the URSSAF and any other service of the State likely to intervene - as the prison administration
or education. This pole is designed to combat the rise of this phenomenon on the national
territory, as well as against the underground economy that can grow in parallel. We do perform a

static guards. We will onsite visit cultural sites and commercial activity, once targets of our
controls preset monthly at the level of the prefecture.
Constable Sahil Kernes. I forgot to clarify that, before the attacks, we patrouillions with
Sentinel in the area of the slopes of the airports. Since these events, our staff do more, because
we are called to other missions. Sentinel so often patrol alone, just as it does in the terminals,
with or without the PAF which is independent.
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. Territorial units are actually in contact with
Sentinel. As I told you, the brigades know the territory. As a former member of the army, I
therefore urge members of the armed forces to take these contacts. However, I think that
information exchange could actually be improved.
The rapporteur. Sentinel seem it useful?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. The reinforcement of the armies on the national territory is helpful if
not essential in my view, it is called Sentinel, or it takes other forms. Perhaps should still think
about new types of reinforcement. I know for example that last month, in the Isre, the
gendarmerie has led a rather interesting experiment of flow control joint with soldiers of the
army. The latter brings us a know-how and a reinforcement of means; We bring him legal
capacity. This type of flow control operations coordinated deserves to be renewed, even though it
has yet to draw all the conclusions. It is perhaps the territories in France where the reinforcement
of military mounted police area would be welcome. I think for example to the southeastern
border, above Nice, located in mountainous areas. The gendarmes of the grouping of Nice can
control only all the crossing points at the same time: Alpine units could quite work in synergy
with the gendarmes to carry out inspections at the borders on the passes that are points of
passage known. In my opinion, the reinforcement of military personnel of the armed forces on
the national territory is very profitable, but still need it is structured properly with the missions of
the mounted police.
The President Georges Fenech. Our third series of questions concerns the territorial
intelligence. Work the lift information from your brigades according to you? Has changed since
the attacks of January 2015?
Warrant officer Sbastien Perrier. Currently, the gendarmerie holds its place in the second
circle of intelligence. We work with Homeland Security (CSB) branch and the departmental
services of the territorial intelligence (SDRT), whose intelligence is the sovereign mission.
The gendarmerie is central to its basic units and has no problem of feedback. We, at the level of
each Department, an intelligence unit, commanded by an officer Deputy intelligence and whose
mission is to animate and coordinate the monitoring of intelligence in the Department. This
officer has to do this, at the level of the elementary units, most particularly loaded gendarmes
from monitoring, particularly on radical islam, that make it information. Reports may be made to
him. He leads the research and reporting lines.

The files of the mounted police are also a mine allowing us to trace information. I think notably
to public safety database (OCs): brigadier can there be traced, without particular formalism, a
fact sheet at the top level, which is that of the group. Then information will be worked by the
FIU for truly become information and enroll in a framework if necessary. There are also more
specific files, such as the processing file reports for the prevention of radicalisation terrorism
(FSPRT), found at the level of the group. This file is an important mine, allowing access to
different information routinely recorded or tracked people due to terrorist radicalization, or are
still being evaluated. Officers who have to learn may also know if this person is followed by
other services. The gendarmerie has many other ways, such as the file of wanted persons, the
Schengen information system or the treatment of criminal record (TAJ).
There are, in addition to intelligence units, departmental brigades intelligence and judicial
investigation, which, themselves, can include persons or vehicles in files - on authorization of
Group of gendarmerie Commander. So there the elementary unit up to the central level, a
feedback permanent.
The rapporteur. Confirm that the FSPRT is very useful to the gendarmes?
Warrant officer Sbastien Perrier. Access to the file permission is very regulated within the
gendarmerie. In the Department of Vaucluse, for example, only the officer Assistant to
intelligence and the head of the operational centre of the gendarmerie intelligence have access.
They are there permanently and keep track of all the people on this file. They may also know
whether these people are followed by other services.
Colonel Bruno Arviset. This file is in my view essential to our units. If you allow me to be a
little critical, we have perhaps a too restricted. When in a Department such as Vaucluse, which
has a large population in the zone of mounted police and an equally important risk population, it
does allow two senior police officers to consult this file, there are, it seems to me, room for
improvement - especially when we know that the number of subscribers to the FSPRT in France
is estimated at 14,000.
The rapporteur. What, according to you, this margin of progression between the need to be
operational and the major concern of privacy?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. We have 400 companies of gendarmerie on the national territory, so
400 company commanders and their deputies - at the administrative level of the borough. It
seems to me that one could open access to this file. Don't see things at the level of the
Department, is to forget that there are within the jurisdiction of many dozens of radicalized
individuals companies.
The rapporteur. One of the ideas currently under consideration would be to reposition the
central territorial intelligence (LSVCCS) service so that it can integrate the mounted police: what
do you think?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. In principle, the LSVCC is a service common to the police and the
gendarmerie. However there's still too much police tropism. As he works, including at the level

of its departmental branches, to benefit two areas and that 50% of the population is located in our
area of responsibility, it seems to me that the ED should be established and that the balance
should be found at all levels of the chain of this service.
The rapporteur. If my memory is good, both in Lille to Marseille, where we moved to see how
things worked, the gendarmes are integrated into the departmental branch of the LSVCCS. Is the
gendarmerie represented in all departmental branches? From what you tell us, is not so much a
problem of positioning of culture?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. The gendarmes are certainly integrated into the LSVCCS, but still need
to take into account the relevant volumes. As a general rule, are found in each service
dpartemental one to two gendarmes, all ranks - on the understanding that the staffing of the
departmental services vary. This isn't annoying in itself, since we ourselves an intelligence unit
that feeds the SDRT. So far, we have only three (originally no), directions of SDRT, while
departments where three-quarters of the population are in the gendarmerie zone. Short, territorial
intelligence is a mission that we share with the police, but the direction is not always sufficiently
shared. It is not question of war fonts but balance in the representation, both at the national level
that departmental.
Mr. Serge Grouard. I would like to revert to the question of the files. Do you have problems of
compatibility between software? According to what procedure internal these files are fed or
reporting? For how long and how the information is stored there? Are they available easily? Are
they integrated with other files, which could, even once, cause compatibility problems? Do you
directly have access to this information when you need it?
Warrant officer Sbastien Perrier. There is protection of information within the gendarmerie.
Any person does not have to know the same degree of information. Officer Assistant to the
information which is at the head of the intelligence unit will not have the same information as the
brigadier who is in basic unit.
The registration of information on files is a decision subject to the authority of the Group at the
level of the Department Commander, as a first step. And, as I told you, a departmental evaluation
unit (GOL) combining the various services of the State meets each week. It is the Prefect who
decides to record or not in ad hoc files targeted persons, depending on the level of radicalization
that they demonstrate.
The recording of information in the FSPRT period is five years. Monitoring is structured in two
levels: a first level, whose follow-up is monthly, for targets from the bottom of the spectrum; and
a second, which monitoring is strengthened, for targets with greater sensitivity. This monitoring
can lead to engage services such as our research sections, which rely on specific intelligence
collection techniques.
Mr. Serge Grouard. You say that the information are retained five years. Once output file, these
information are lost or on the contrary re-stored elsewhere? Intelligence raises indeed the major
issue of its shelf life. Should be able to find courses, even beyond five years.

Warrant officer Sbastien Perrier. The information is not lost. We were also discussing the
file FSPRT, tool of the operational staff of prevention of terrorism (EMOPT), which allows, as
was the case of the event of Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, to ensure better monitoring of targeted
persons.
The rapporteur. The FSPRT is managed by the EMOPT file. It therefore comes to the same
thing.
Colonel Bruno Arviset. Altogether. But Wo Perrier will find it difficult to talk to you about this
file since person around this table has access. Very few people within the mounted police access.
The rapporteur. This file is effectively managed by the EMOPT and by the unit for
coordination of the fight against terrorism (UCLAT), that we auditionnerons. When you say that
it is being tracked weekly or monthly as the case may be, does this mean that you must send to
the EMOPT updating of sheets at this frequency?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. Yes, quite.
Warrant officer Sbastien Perrier. Exactly. It's a refreshing with a control for different entries
in the file of wanted persons, the aim being to check if a person is an individual hazardous or
unstable. When SID is a target, the gendarmerie is generally not leader. When SID is not, GOL
decides if the SDRT or the gendarmerie which will be. When we track of a target, we update its
file over the water.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you have the automated reading of number plates (ANPR)
system? We have had, in Lille, a small demonstration we found very convincing.
Major Emmanuel Franchet. In the inning, only two of our vehicles are equipped with this
system. Initially, this type of vehicle was reserved for the platoon of motorway. Then, we being
noticed that they did not grab enough vehicles, we have entrusted them to the PSIG. This system
works very well. Unfortunately, we lack vehicles of this type. If all the national gendarmerie or
national police emergency vehicles were equipped with such a system, we would get much more
positive results.
The rapporteur. We were also attracted by the new connected tool Neogend. We were told that
all of the police should be equipped with by 2017: is this the case?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. The deployment of the device is actually underway. He is already
completed in the North of the France - what is good, indeed. This deployment is underway in
Burgundy, and all areas of the territory should to be equipped by a year. It is an efficient and
friendly, asset to multiply the number of controls and reduce the burden of each at these control
operations. It's the tool of the future.
Warrant officer Sbastien Perrier. To have been functional administrator when I served in
PSIG, I would add that the ANPR system is a valuable basis, allowing both to record and store

data, which then allows to make very specific searches of persons or vehicles, through the
requisition. It's packed with valuable information for us.
The rapporteur. The evening of November 13, 2015 and in the days that have followed,
vehicles equipped with ANPR systems deployed? Are special devices used night of attacks to
multiply throughout the country the means to retrieve information?
Chief Warrant Officer Frederick Guaignier. In judicial unit, we use the ANPR system to
perform controls area, or route in all important cases of damage to property as well as in cases of
injury.
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. The evening of the attacks of November 13,
2015, although we have been quite distant events in Loire-Atlantique, was ordered nationally to a
manImplementation of flow control. Territorial levels were automatically released their LAPI
vehicles in addition to their complement of staff.
The President Georges Fenech. Are the Council of the military function of the mounted police
is not a trade union within the meaning of it usually, you when even subject to a reserve
requirement?
Colonel Bruno Arviset. Yes, in part. The defence code provides that members of the advice of
the military function may speak freely - even if, on the other hand, a duty of reserve is the
responsibility of each Member.
The President Georges Fenech. In light of your freedom of speech, I will ask you, and you say
as you want.
I was part of the mission of information on the fight against insecurity throughout, chaired by
Jean-Pierre Blazy, who auditioned for general Soubelet. You followed, as all French, the
comments made by the latter, then his new assignment and its recent ungraded, following the
publication of his book. Everyone will think whatever it wants in the way he expressed himself.
Still is it was done as part of a parliamentary and not a fact-finding mission. The gendarmerie
body really has the feeling of a lack of judicial and penal response to the "usual" crime - which
can also be linked to the changeover in radical islam? You enjoy overall an excellent reputation,
a true recognition and great - quite justified - respect in the country, although some extremists
use quite reprehensible to criticize the action of security forces in circumstances such as events.
However, do you feel, expressed by the general Soubelet, to provide greater efforts in your
missions for the identification and arrest of the perpetrators of acts of delinquency without this
very work taking the field is always followed by effects - both in terms of performance penalties
to fight against recidivism? You are not obligated to answer me, but you can do it if you prefer.
Chief Warrant Officer Frederick Guaignier. This feeling exists actually. When you work for
days, weeks, months, or even years, on individuals, with good teams, but that this work is not
followed by a real criminal response, this creates a certain discouragement of staff. I am thinking
particularly of all the brigadiers who stop ten times the same person then having ten times the

release - and when I say ten times, it is an understatement. Perhaps, it is true, we lack some
elements when we present a dossier to the magistrates.
That being said, when we introduce a person to justice, we are, most of the time, pretty sure our
result and it necessarily follows a criminal response. The problem is more for the crime of mass,
small and medium delinquency, even in rural and peri-urban territory. Sometimes, the person is
actually out before Constable. The time explain you with the magistrate - Prosecutor or judge,
the person will be already almost released while you will still be preparing documents...
The President Georges Fenech. The judicial logic is not quite identical to the logic of
investigation, identification and questioning: in the judicial context, considering the record of the
individual, his background and the possibility to put under judicial control. It often appears to
investigators as a non-response, while there are many judicial response. Simply, is perhaps not
what one might expect from a certain point of view. It is perhaps also what creates discomfort.
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. It is precisely - and fortunately - what makes
the richness of our Republic. We have a double job to do. As unit commanders, we must do a big
work of communication to investigators - who, taken as they are since days or months by their
folder, often little slept when arrive the phases of inquiry and end of custody at sight. We must
also provide information to magistrates work and maintain a relationship of trust with them.
However, you can mix action and decision.
Colonel Bruno Arviset. I should mention that at any time they are judges who are involved in
what are required here. Our Board meeting also the garde des sceaux about once per year. The
adaptation of the criminal response to delinquency of minors is a subject that we discussed quite
freely with the old guard of the seals and his cabinet. We talk about this subject without waffling,
while being aware of the constraints of each.
Chef d'escadron Philippe-Alexandre Akhigbe. And, ultimately, frustration is logical.
The rapporteur. Squadron leader, what do you think of the new doctrine of intervention forces
announced by the Minister of the Interior job? We have certainly identified as a result of our
different hearings, the difficulties posed by the rule of territorial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this
new doctrine of the 'first-mover primo-speaker' not risk exacerbating a sort of competition
between the GIGN, RAID and the Brigade of research and intervention (bis)?
Squadron leader Y. National intervention scheme which was introduced by the Minister of the
Interior was eagerly awaited, especially in the GIGN, for the reason that he had just put an end to
the principle of territoriality - within the framework of counter-terrorism - by putting forward the
responsiveness of units and rescue people.
There is always a healthy competition between the units, but the GIGN, RAID and the bis do not
play to try and be the first on the spot, where the rules of the game are clearly defined. The RAID
and the GIGN antennas are distributed as harmoniously as possible so that intervention units
mesh the territory in a fairly uniform manner.

In regards to the Paris region, point the most sensitive, the system currently in place is based on
the primacy of the bis in Paris Intra-Muros, one RAID in the small Crown and of the GIGN in
the large Crown, when only the zone. The small Crown is an area exclusively entrusted to the
police, just like Paris, but in the large Crown, which is a mixed area involving police and
gendarmerie, primacy is given, in the context of counter-terrorism, the GIGN. This therefore
opens access to police areas that were closed to us before.
The rapporteur. Competition between forces is a real difficulty, that we have identified in our
hearings. In situations of crisis such as those we have experienced in January and November
2015, many examples have shown that this competition was not necessarily healthy. Questioning
the territorial jurisdiction seems to me a good thing, considering what has been lived, but I fear
that, by boomerang effect, first-come become the leader and this creates significant difficulties.
Squadron leader Y. It is not the orders we receive currently, nor the message that we pass to the
bosom of our unit.
The rapporteur. I understand. I have a deep respect for the three forces. Spent a day at the
GIGN two years ago, I measured the work that is yours and the risks that you take. But I also
know that there is a competition between forces. Perhaps it is healthy, but we saw, also well
when tracking down the Kaye brothers during the killing of the Bataclan, that each and other had
the will to exist and respond. The distribution of roles seems well calibrated in the Paris region,
but I'm afraid that a territory between police zone and zone of mounted police, everyone wants to
go there first to be 'leader '.
Squadron leader Y. Perhaps, indeed; where the interest spread harmoniously the territory
intervention units. If a mass killer fires in the large commercial area of Vezin-le-Coquet, near
Rennes, which is located in zone of gendarmerie, it seems normal whatsoever which is makes
first RAID of Rennes antenna because it is next, andconversely, if the same thing happens at the
Znith de Nantes, which is in the area of police the GIGN in Nantes antenna that intervene.
The rapporteur. You think therefore that the distribution of the RAID and the GIGN antenna
allows this territorial mesh and avoid this competition.
Squadron leader Y. This is indeed the purpose of this distribution. In addition, we have within
the gendarmerie a big effort for the integration of the GIGN antennas, which were previously
interregional gendarmerie (PI2G) intervention platoons, towards the central GIGN. I think that
this effort will be continued and that we must go in the direction of a greater integration of these
regional units to bring them to a higher level than they currently have.
The rapporteur. My question is provocative, but I would like to do not put you: a fusion of the
three task forces would be for you a heresy?
Squadron leader Y. Yes. Not only our nature and our statutes are different - some are civilians,
other military-, but we have also the same culture nor the same way of working. In the current
state of things, it seems so difficult and undesirable, mixing units and to work in an integrated
manner. On the other hand, cooperation between units is quite possible and is already practiced

in some areas: for example, the GIGN is engaged alongside the RAID, in the context of the
interdepartmental negotiating cell, concerning certain abductions from abroad.
The President Georges Fenech. In case of competition between the two services, I can't quite
imagine that one or the other may seek to arrive first on the scene to support an operation. I guess
that the decision cannot be taken by the prefect or the Minister.
Colonel Bruno Arviset. We determine that of the units situated in the basin which is nearest the
place of facts, whether in police zone or zone of mounted police. Then comes a minimum a
decision of the prefect, or, more often, the Minister.
The rapporteur. Certainly, but both during the attacks of January than those of November, the
GIGN, RAID, and the bis intervened all on their own initiative. The GIGN is positioned at the
Clestins l'initiative - happy - the Director-general of the gendarmerie, the RAID occurred on
its own initiative and competent territorially, the bis has also mobilised. It is true that these
initiatives have been regularized by the prefect of police or by the Minister, but only after the
fact.
Squadron leader Y. The GIGN is is actually pre-positioned at the Clestins, then is is advertised
as being able to intervene if ever a crisis triggered on another point.
The rapporteur. When we went to Lille, we have seen that the protection of nuclear power
plants was a major concern for the gendarmerie. Could you confirm that, on 13 November in the
evening and in the days that followed, security has been strengthened in all of these? Since that
date, has been reinforced staff of this mission? Additional controls conducted? The information
we have collected after what happened in Brussels - whether through our commission of inquiry
or in the press - show that the potential for nuclear power plants or their personal attacks is not
purely theoretical.
Warrant officer Vincent Delaval. The next day the morning of the attacks of January 2015, we
have established with the operator a State of play of the present workforce. Then, the DGGN
immediately took measures. At the local level, members of the OGSP also volunteered at the
command level to swell these numbers. In November, it was necessary to redo this manArtwork.
We are since in posture of vigilance, the time of the State of emergency - which should be
extended.
The rapporteur. What are the practical consequences of this State?
Warrant officer Vincent Delaval. Prior to the attacks of January 2015, our patrols were a little
more outside plants. Now, they have been refocused on their main mission for the protection of
nuclear facilities. Then, the operator has deployed new means such as the introduction of new
badgeurs in Nogent-sur-Seine. Our workforce has been increased from six to seven military
additional plant, knowing that there are 38 gendarmes and other 56 OGSP. Nogent-sur-Seine
thus declined from 38 to 44 or 45 gendarmes. This decision, done in perfect harmony with the
operator, should be effective on July 1St . We make also aware personnel of plants for weak
signals.

The rapporteur. The gendarmerie deals with the screening of staff at stations?
Warrant officer Vincent Delaval. Individuals working in plants subject to verification on files.
The rapporteur. Certainly, but this is the responsibility of the ISB. Do you contribute to
investigations on the staff of power plants?
Warrant officer Vincent Delaval. Plants our military are involved for this purpose, including
that of Nogent where we check whether or not these individuals are in different files made
available by the gendarmerie. The police also performs the same work. A notice is then issued at
the prefectural level, determines the last instance if a person may enter a plant or not.
The rapporteur. If I'm not mistaken, in addition to the checks you perform, ISB examines
environmental and dating of these individuals.
Warrant officer Vincent Delaval. Altogether. I just wanted to clarify that any person from
entering a central is also the subject of audits based on files of the gendarmerie and the police.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you to have contributed usefully to the work of our
Committee of inquiry.
Hearing in camera, Mr. Jean-Jacques Colombi, Chief of the division of international
relations at the Central Directorate of the judicial police (DCPJ)
and Mr. Alexandre Pichon, his Deputy
Report of the hearing in camera, Monday, May 9, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, we now welcome Mr Jean-Jacques
Colombi, Chief of the division of international relations at the Central Directorate of the judicial
police (DCPJ) and his Deputy, Mr. Alexandre Pichon.
Gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of
inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We are going with you to the international aspects of the struggle by the police against terrorism.
You will particularly be able to inform the commission of inquiry into the actions of cooperation
between the division that you pipe and its counterparts at the European level.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the Internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if
we decide so at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in
camera will previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These
observations will be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report.

I would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is punishable by
the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who, within a period of
twenty-five years disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a commission of
inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this
information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
nothing but the truth.
Please raise your right hand and say: 'I swear '.
Mr. Jean-Jacques Colombi and Mr. Alexandre Pichon take oath.
We will discuss with you the precise role of the division of international relations (DRI). We
would like to know what are its workforce and how they have evolved over the past years.
Features DRI of a central section of operational police cooperation (SCCOPOL) in charge of the
exchange of information. What are the main interlocutors of the DRI? What is the nature of the
information exchanged? What are the countries with which Exchange of information is done in a
satisfactory manner or, on the contrary, unsatisfactory? For what reasons?
We would be also interested in the functioning of the office siren - acronym for "additional
information" required to the national entry of foreigners
What do you wear on the Schengen information system? In France, which fuels this database? Is
there power in a satisfactory manner by the other Member States of the European Union? Should
add other categories of persons, objects or information about persons or objects contained
therein?
Could you introduce the Prm Treaty which provides an automated comparison of DNA profiles
is present in national files of the Member States of the European Union? In France, which fuels
this database? What are the authorities who have access? What do you wear on its effectiveness?
What do you wear on the effectiveness of Europol? Police cooperation give satisfactory results in
the fight against organised crime and against terrorism?
What are the consequences of the release of the device "warning attack" on the Organization of
the DRI?
Following the attack of January 7, 2015, the Central Directorate of the judicial police (DCPJ)
was responsible for the investigation acts for the brothers Kaye. What role the DRI has been to
play?
Following the attacks of November 13, 2015, the investigation was entrusted to the DCPJ antiterrorist branch (SDAT). This decision had particular consequences for the Organization and the
role of the DRI?

On 14 November in the morning, a team of Europol has joined the premises of the SDAT. Are
you his main interlocutor? What is the nature of the cooperation between the SDAT and
Europol? What is the added value of Europol in the search for terrorists while in flight?
On 16 November, a joint Franco-Belgian investigation team was set up. What is the DRI's role in
this device? What has this joint investigation team it achieved?
What is the nature of the exchanges between DRI and its European counterparts from the 13
November in the evening and in the following weeks? These exchanges helped to obtain
concrete results in the search for the perpetrators of the attacks and their accomplices?
Has the DRI had exchanges with french intelligence services - Directorate General of internal
security (CSB), Directorate of intelligence of the prefecture of police of Paris, DirectorateGeneral for external security (DGSE) - the aftermath of the November 13? If any, what was the
nature?
Now, I'll let you speak to a keynote presentation which was followed by an exchange of
questions and answers.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi, Chief of the division of international relations at the Central
Directorate of the judicial police (DCPJ). Mr president, after a quick introduction to
international relations division, I shall devote to the role it played after the attacks of January 7
and November 13, 2015, as well as during the attacks hit of french nationals abroad Ouagadougou, Grand-Bassam, Bamako. To complete my remarks, I shall send you a document
relating to the various cooperation tools put at the disposal of investigators Interpol, Europol and
the bodies under Schengen and the Prm Treaty in the fight against terrorism.
The DRI depends on the central Director of the judicial police and his Deputy. It is somehow a
"branch abroad" without the name. Headed by a Divisional Commissioner - what is my case - or
by a controller general - what was the case of my predecessor-, it manages the channels of
cooperation with Interpol, Europol and the Schengen information system (SIS) for all national
security - police, gendarmerie, customs forces - and the French judiciary. It is immediately
mobilized in the event of a major attack to treat trade with our foreign partners.
His organization is based on two main entities.
It comes at the outset of the central section of the operational police cooperation, which is its
engine room. This interdepartmental platform is headed by a police Commissioner assisted by a
senior officer of the gendarmerie nationale. It mobilizes currently seventy-three people: forty-six
police officers, twenty-five gendarmes and two customs. The SCCOPOL works 24 hours on 24,
7 days a week, and is the single point of entry of the requests issued by french investigators from
foreign services as solicitations from abroad. You will notice that I have not spoken of the
intelligence services. Where appropriate, we are working for the judicial division of the ISB.
It is, moreover, the service responsible for the actions of European and international cooperation
(SCACEI), composed of a dozen items, all police officers, under the direction of a

Commissioner. He is responsible for the strategic functioning of Europol and Interpol and
institutional aspects. In other words, this service participates in the development of the guidelines
that we wish to see print in these two organizations.
Since last year, the DRI was responsible for the governance of the second generation Schengen
information system (SIS 2) for our country.
Finally, we participate in the development of the French positions in the future the exchange of
information in Europe.
In the event of attacks, mobilization of the DRI is always according to the same scheme. Our
service does not conduct investigations, it provides support and assistance to investigators and
prosecutors. I would point out that the Organization of our national platform is marked by a
characteristic: within the DRI is installed a unit of the office of international criminal assistance
(BEPI) of the Directorate of Criminal Affairs and pardons (DACG) of the Ministry of justice.
Clerks and chief clerks are present at all times to facilitate trade with the magistrates of the BEPI
reachable around the clock on the folders that require a judicial endorsement - European arrest
warrants, transboundary observations. This brings us a significant advantage over our European
partners in terms of responsiveness and processing, because decision-making is immediate.
When occurs a major attack, the DRI strengthens the capabilities of its SCCOPOL platform,
which operates round-the-clock. We assign two permanent teams: one at the command post (CP
of crisis of the Central Directorate of the judicial police), the other to the PC of crisis of the
SDAT. We take, our initiative or in connection with the services of investigators, all measures to
facilitate bilateral exchanges with our foreign partners directly involved in the investigations as
well as with major international organizations as Interpol and Europol.
On 7 January 2015, in accordance with the provisions of the plan attack the DCPJ and memo of
DRI's September 15, 2014, a Commissioner of police of the DRI has joined the SDAT PC to
facilitate taking account of requests for international cooperation. It was then relayed by the
Chief of the SCCOPOL. For my part, I joined PC central management, place Beauvau. During
the days that followed, my Assistant or the head of the SCACEI provided a permanent presence
with the Center Director or his deputies. The duty officer of the SCCOPOL was joined the
service.
No staff was recalled, but leave and absences have been reduced to the bare minimum, unless
compelling personal necessities.
The SCCOPOL works already 24 hours and it was not necessary to further strengthen its teams
because the international dimension of the survey was limited.
November 13, 2015, as soon as we had knowledge of the attacks, the Commissioners of the DRI
have joined different PC. A rotation device ' H24/7' was introduced to the DCPJ PC and the PC
of the SDAT, while my Deputy and other officials of the General staff of the SCCOPOL
remained in service for the operation of all machinery. As after January 7, leave and absences
were reduced to the strict minimum.

The attacks of November 13 had an international dimension significantly sharper than those of
January 7 and this had a direct impact on the number and diversity of requests for international
cooperation from the co-saisis investigators services - SDAT, ISB, prefecture of police.
A special monitoring cell has therefore put in place at the SCCOPOL, composed of the Chief of
staff and an officer of the Europol National Unit. In addition to a general 'Crono' of requests and
responses, this cell has established specific tables for special requests: identifications biometric
via Prm or Interpol, requests for identification of firearms, particular requests such as those
dealing with migrants from the Greek island of Leros.
DRI also quickly suggested to investigators services seek support of Europol and Interpol. The
two organizations not were not solicited for the same services, each offering specific tools.
Europol has mobilized mainly for its abilities of crime analysis and exchange of information.
The liaison office french of Europol - which is functionally under my authority - has
implemented as early as November 13, a rotation H24/7 device and took part in the daily
briefings organized with other national liaison offices and representatives of the Agency.
On 15 November, the agency sent to the PC of the SDAT, at the request of the DRI, a mobile
office composed of analysts with remote access to the database of the Agency. I insisted that this
team is led by a police officer french, that we know personally, himself of the judicial police.
The choice was quickly made to send many data collected through the survey in Europol, for
exploitation by its analysts. I went to the Hague on 23 November to ensure the full support of the
Director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, and to better define the terms of this support for the
investigation.
Given the volume of data and the importance of the issue, the Agency has implemented the 1St
December a task force dedicated consisting of fifteen analysts called "brotherhood". Including
several French, it is co-led by a french police Commissioner with the status of national expert
seconded to the Agency, in accordance with a claim that we had made to the Director of Europol
which very quickly accessed. The task force needed to count in its ranks of francophones and the
specialists knowing the criminal procedure French and Belgian, and required numbers tightened
closer to the investigation.
December 16, 2015, the Agency was formally associated with the common implementation
November 16 Franco-Belgian investigative team. Why this period of one month? Because, as
you know, the joint investigation team is a feature of judicial cooperation, and he took that
french and Belgian magistrates seized folder agree on the modalities of its participation. An
amendment allowed that it enjoys total access to all the data. Eurojust was also associated with
this team.
At March 12, 2016, 2.7 terabytes of data from French and Belgian surveys were provided in this
framework, among which 9 million telephone communications and 614 000 computer files,
including 330 000 media files including photos or videos. On this same date, the Agency had

organized inquiry five operational meetings and thirty-one reports, including 14 reports of
operational analysis.
This very strong investment by the Agency coincided with the creation in January 2016 of the
European Centre for fight against terrorism - European counter-terrorism Centre - new structure
uniting the various tools Europol dedicated to this theme. This centre accommodates including
anti-terrorist joint liaison team - Counter-Terrorism Joint Liaison Team -, in which France, with
the help of the DRI, has delegated a policeman specialising in the fight against terrorism, which
was deployed to emergency by January 4, 2016 as the french liaison office in the Hague.
Interpol has also been sought for his skills in the identification of victims of disasters.
The secretariat general of the Organization, based in Lyon, sent from 16 to 22 November in Paris
a crisis cell of five experts in the cell " ante mortem " of national unity for the identification of
disaster victims - UNIVC - set up by the police technique et scientifique of the DCPJ branch.
These experts are responsible for the collection of information from member countries,
concerning records of victims who died of foreign nationality or dual nationality 30 and about 15
missing people. An officer of the IRD was present with them to facilitate their action.
Regardless of these specific services, secure messaging of both organisations were established
for contributions to requests for cooperation with our partners. Exchange secure information of
Europol - network said SIENA for Secure Information Exchange Net Application - 996 messages
were exchanged during the inquiry, which is considerable when compared to usual flow - for an
important issue of common law, one reaches ten or even a hundred exchanges; They concerned
requests for cooperation, verification, biometric TFTP/ICE, identification requests financial
information. By channel 1-24/7 Interpol were exchanged 1641 messages shows notices, requests
for cooperation or biometric identification.
Many exchanges also took place through the siren in order to treat the 'hits' related to alerts on
persons or objects by french and European counter-terrorism services.
Finally, with downstream of the central Director and in respect for the secrecy of the
investigation, my assistant and I have broadcast messages of information relating to the facts and
the main changes in the survey to our foreign partners - the twenty-eight member countries of the
Union and thirteen States or international organizations related to Europol and one hundred
ninety States members of Interpol.
We also assembled several times foreign homeland security attachs of the most affected
countries - United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, Spain - in order to keep them informed and to
seek their support on specific points.
Various informal telephone contacts also took place with foreign police chiefs as well as with the
Director of Europol and the Secretary general of Interpol.
At my request, a more formal briefing held on November 23 at Europol headquarters in the
presence of Heads of offices of liaison with representatives of the Agency in order to make a

point of situation and explain the importance of certain applications. One of them dealt with
migrants of Leros: the survey showed that two of the terrorists of the Stade de France had
probably won the European Union via this Greek island, it was necessary to locate one hundredfour-twenty-sixteen other passengers of the boat that they had borrowed and determine if other
terrorists had won the Europe by the same means.
In addition, December 2015, 1er I made a point to situation to the Board of Directors of Europol
and more recently, at the last conference of the heads of national central bureaus of Interpol
which was held in Lyon from 26 to 28 April, I made a presentation.
This communication, faster, smoother and fuller after the January attacks, was appreciated by our
partners.
The DRI is also mobilized after attacks abroad, when the presence of French victims gives rise to
the opening of a judicial inquiry. The SDAT or technical forensic investigators moving subject
of Interpol messages to the country concerned. When the situation so requires, as was the case
after the bombings in Ouagadougou on January 15, a manager of DRI led a mission on the spot.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for your presentation, which illustrates how
cooperation at European and international level. We see that DRI is able to have a Look at all
this.
Our Committee would like to have more details on the Schengen, sometimes maligned,
information system which the SIRENE bureau manages data.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. The SIRENE bureau manages what we call the 'post-hits '. The SIS
is based on an international distribution of information relating to individuals or objects. These
are first broadcast nationally and included under certain conditions in the SIS. When an
individual reported to be located, guarded or arrested, or when an object reported to be seized is
of a positive control - what we call a 'hit'-, the information is transmitted in each of the States at
the SIRENE bureau.
The Schengen information system is indeed widely disparaged. It's the tool of international
cooperation that works best, even the Rolls Royce of international cooperation. It is used daily
by all police and all police in Europe, sometimes without that they know. When, in Chteauroux
or in Potsdam, a policeman controls an individual or a vehicle and initiates a search in the
national database to find out if the individual or the vehicle is reported to be localized or
monitored, it uses the SIS without knowing. If this individual or this vehicle is an indication of
the share of one of the partner countries, the officer then responds the requirements that appear
on its TTY computer, contribute contact the Office Siren of his country. Tells the office siren,
once contacted, then a conduct, always very simple: "challenge" If the individual is the subject of
a European arrest warrant, "drive before the judiciary", 'going to', 'monitor discreetly', "perform a
specific control".
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. We would like to have more details on the functioning of
the SIRENE bureau.

November 14, 2015, the gendarmes control Salah Abdeslam at 9: 30 pm. They then ask siren
office which responds that no information is and that he can leave. A few tens of minutes after is not known the exact time-, the SIRENE bureau reminds them to ask them to question him, but
he is already gone. The gendarmes fed yet strong suspicions against him because, apart from
usual procedure, they tried to keep it as long as possible.
What was the level of information of the SIRENE bureau? That what could allow to detain Salah
Abdeslam?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. In this case, the Schengen information system has worked well,
very well. Like everyone else, I can only regret that Salah Abdeslam could join the Belgian
territory while it was controlled by France. The question that you ask me, you it imagine, already
was addressed to me. We have a note specifically devoted to the control of Hordain.
On 14 November, shortly after 9 a.m., Cambrai gendarmerie platoon controls in the direction
France-Belgium at the highway Tollbooth Hordain a Volkswagen Golf registered in Belgium
which are Hamza Mansoor, Mohamed Amri and Salah Abdeslam. The consultation of the
persons sought in France by motorway platoon file revealed that Salah Abdeslam subject to an
alert in the SIS and that conduct is "quietly collect all relevant information and contact the
SIRENE bureau". One of the gendarmes so contact the office for more information. We confirm
him the existence of a valid in the SIS alert issued by the Belgium February 9, 2015 in respect of
article 36(2) of decision 2007/533 of the Council, which allows the reporting "for the
Suppression of criminal offences and for the prevention of threats to public security," so for
offences under ordinary law, article 36 (3) authorizing, him, reports when the security of the
State is threatened.
The rapporteur. This precision is interesting. When in February 2015, the Belgium proceeded
to registration in the SIS for Salah Abdeslam, therefore for reasons related to the common law
and not to its radicalization. Gold, from what I understood when I was in Belgium and by
reading the press - because there were a lot of leaks, unfortunately-, Salah Abdeslam had already
been spotted as radical.
Mr. Alexandre Pichon, Deputy Head of the division of international relations. Article 36-2
does not specifically cover the common law offences. Articles 36-2 and 36-3 May concern facts
of terrorism as facts not covered. What distinguishes the two articles, it is the nature of the
authority which shall carry out the reporting. The reports made under article 36 (2) linked to the
Suppression of criminal offences, they usually originate from criminal investigation, so judicial
police services. Those who are made under article 36-3, in the case of threat to the security of the
State are generally derived from the intelligence services of the CSB for example.
I don't know what service issued the alert in Belgium but when we asked the reason, our Belgian
counterparts pointed us it as radical islam, not a pattern of common law. The service at the origin
of the information should probably be a judicial police service.
The rapporteur. How to have the certainty that the reason for reporting has not changed? It is
easy to rewrite history after the fact.

M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. I take the timeline. We point out to the Constable that the Belgians
asking a discrete control, the platoon must continue control, remember to give us a description of
the vehicle, registration plate, the identity of the occupants - if possible, a copy of identification
documents-, provenance and destination of passengers and the reason for their move.
At 0940 hours, one Constable recalls the SIRENE bureau and communicates the information
requested, with the exception of copies of identity documents that don't are received until later in
the morning due to difficulties relating to the transmission of the images electronically.
At 9: 44 pm, operator from the siren of Paris Office transmits to the siren of Belgium the usual
discovery form office, said 'formula G', accompanied by a request for clarification on the
rationale for reporting, stating that copies of the identity documents would be transmitted upon
receipt.
About 10: 45 p.m., Office Siren of Belgium recalls the siren of France Office and informs him
that Salah Abdeslam was according to their services a radicalized individual, candidate for the
Jihad in Syria.
The rapporteur. This is extremely important information. It took an hour to wait the siren's
Belgium Office operates a rapprochement between the attacks of November 13 and an individual
travelling to Belgium identified as radical Islamist in the SIS. This time consider it it reasonable?
I try to understand and not to overwhelm, I want to say.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. The SIRENE offices operate by sending forms. It was after
receiving the form transmitted by SIRENE de France Office that the Office Siren of Belgium
took the provisions he had to take. I guess he came into contact with the Belgian investigators
office responsible for reporting. But I have no assurance in this regard: I does not supervise the
office siren from Belgium and I do not at all know what checks were made in Belgium. What is
certain, is that the number of individuals monitored in the SIS is very high and discreet or
specific checks are subject to a lift that takes a certain period of time.
The rapporteur. On the night of 13-14 November, how much information from the SIS you
were transmitted? How have concerned reports for radical islam?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. I do not know. I can provide you with the data later.
The rapporteur. What is the proportion of these "hits"? A few dozen? A few hundred?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. No, I think that the figure is low.
The rapporteur. I will not make political-fiction stories, but I would like to understand the
sequence of events.
In the aftermath of November 13, if the situation had been reversed and the siren of Belgium
Office had contacted the Office Siren of France, how long would you set to get the information
from the service responsible for reporting? What is the normal period?

M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. It depends on.

The rapporteur. What crisis?
I imagine that, in the night from 13 to 14 November, yourself, Mr Colombi, and your personal
had to contact the prescribing services. How long did take to get a return?
I would like to know if there was a malfunction of the Belgian coast or whether it was a usual
operation.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. Honestly, Mr President, I am unable to say whether it has been or
malfunction of the Belgian coast. And I am not there to exonerate anyone.
Times are variable depending on the case. When you contact a service for survey to obtain
details on a certificate that it has issued, the response can be very fast. This may involve,
sometimes closer to the head of unit or head of Department in charge of the case.
At the time, this delay of one hour do not seemed exaggerated, even if, of course, I would have
preferred that they respond within five minutes.
The rapporteur. At the level of the siren of France Office, can you have knowledge by
consulting the SIS file categories that have motivated the alert: common law, terrorism, etc.?
Could you know, referring to his reporting, that Salah Abdeslam was linked to radical islam? If
not, would it not necessary to create a specific category for radical islam or terrorism?
Mr. Alexandre Pichon. The Dutch Presidency of the Union is working on this idea with other
States. In France, we are not too favorable.
The rapporteur. For what reason?
Mr. Alexandre Pichon. Create a new category only makes sense if it is associated with a
specific action to take. However, for terrorism, three different lines are possible: challenge if
there is an arrest warrant, perform a discrete control, or operate a more thorough check, including
for example searches of luggage. This is what lead the various alerts: under article 26 to the
European arrest warrant; under article 36 for the discrete control or the specific control. It seems
to me more appropriate to introduce the category of offence by reporting, what is contemplated.
It will be visible at least for the SIRENE offices. It will then be possible to say that there is an
alert for terrorism under article 36.
The rapporteur. Can not imagine, within hours of an attack, when we hunt their authors, a
mechanism of derogation authorising other conduct to hold, as the restraint or arraignment, even
though the law on the fight against organized crime will already allow a deduction of four hours?
Mr. Alexandre Pichon. Should be reviewed each of the files of wanted persons twenty-nine
States connected to the SIS to trigger a new mode of conduct to hold. This would involve 66,000
people listed in the SIS II in respect of article 36-2 and slightly more than 8,000 people on the

basis of article 36-3. Many people would be likely to be retained, in circumstances which remain
to be defined. There is no European legal basis that would restrain a person in this way. Today,
the only basis of coercion are the European arrest warrant and measures for the protection of
minors or of major protected.
To return to the control of 14 November, even if we had known that reporting by Salah was
related to terrorism or radical islam, we could not question him because he would have had a
European arrest warrant, which was issued only on 15 November. The only action possible
would have been to take control.
The rapporteur. Could the France have information about the radicalization of Salah
Abdeslam?
Mr. Alexandre Pichon. We could get it if the report had been made under article 36-3 because
at the time of registration, States must send to the other SIRENE bureaux a Mr. form in this case,
the access to information would have been faster.
The rapporteur. Therefore, there is no other way to have knowledge of this information to go
through the Office Siren of Belgium?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. I even think that operator from the siren of France Office recalled
the siren's Belgium Office requesting clarification, given the context. It should still bear in mind
that all these forms of reporting into the SIS by the judicial police or intelligence services aim to
relocate individuals of which it is not feasible to monitor the comings and goings daily. All this
must be done, of course, for the sake of confidentiality. The exchange of information is not total.
As pointed out by Alexandre Pichon, if reporting had been done within the framework not of
article 36-2 but article 36-3, the french office operator perhaps could move forward.
The President Georges Fenech. That say the Belgians about it?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. The Belgians have told us that it was a radicalized individual, then,
we more had information overnight, 15 November, date on which the Belgium issued an arrest
warrant against Salah Abdeslam.
However, Mr president, it must nevertheless bear in mind that it is the Hordain control that
allowed the identification of two individuals come retrieve Abdeslam and leading to establish
with certainty that he was returning from Paris.
The President Georges Fenech. See the glass half empty, now: If Salah Abdeslam was arrested,
the Forest shooting would not have proceeded, nor the attacks of Brussels which left more than
30 people dead.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. I agree with you.
The President Georges Fenech. What is the answer of the Belgians?

M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. I don't the know, Mr president.

The President Georges Fenech. There has not been a return of experience between you and the
Belgians?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. In the context of the joint investigation team, many elements are
treated at the judicial level. Very close bilateral relations binding the first magistrates and
investigative services working on their behalf. The DRI transmits it has to transmit but these
issues are addressed by other than us. Some of my colleagues that you'll hear later may be more
able to bring you this answer.
Mr. Alexandre Pichon. It should be noted that the reporting by Salah intervened just prior to
introduction into the SIS, in March 2015, a novelty which is to associate with reports made under
article 36 (2) or section 36-3 an additional action to be taken, known as 'immediate action' immediate reporting jobs, when it comes to foreign fighters. It is the culmination of a reflection
aimed at improving taking specific account of the foreign fighters for the Syria or the Iraq.
Conduct 'immediate action' is now interpreted by the various SIRENE bureaux as a code related
to the foreign fighters. It is likely that, Abdeslam reporting had been made a month later, it
would have included this reference.
We know that after the attacks of November 2015, the Belgium was prompted to proceed to
more reports, including reports of foreign fighters, and to resort to article rather than in article
36-2-36-3. France, for its part, promotes since long the recourse to article 36, that we always
more used than other European countries.
The President Georges Fenech. Where is located the cooperation police international
Schengen, the UCCPI unit?
Mr. Alexandre Pichon. It exists only in the form of reference in section D8-2 of the code of
criminal procedure, which will soon be changed. The exchange of information between Member
States is more perform on the basis of the Schengen agreements but on that of the framework
decision of 2006, so-called 'Swedish initiative', which took the provisions. Therefore, the UCCPI
gave way to a national contact point, which is the SCCOPOL for the France. These are the
national unit of Europol and the national central bureau of Interpol that provide bilateral trade
with the other Member States of the European Union. This is the same, just the legal basis has
changed.
What is the SIS, there are two organs of governance in France: the national Board SIS 2, which
the responsibility has been entrusted to us in 2015, deals with the national part of the SIS - the
computer part that concerned food and consultation automated; on the other hand, the SIRENE
bureau manages the exchange of information related to the 'hits' through a dedicated application.
The governance of computer applications relating to SIS is therefore focused since February
2015 to the DCPJ. With regard to the national office SIS 2, she works with a myriad of services
and administrations of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because it
must be in contact with all the services that feed or questioning the SIS.

The President Georges Fenech. Profile DNA of Abdelhamid Abaaoud appeared in the Prm
Treaty-related tools?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. You want to know if the DNA of Abaaoud footprint was listed in a
national file of States signatories of the Treaty of Prm, is that correct?
The President Georges Fenech. Effectively.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. I do not remember it, but it is easy to verify information.
The rapporteur. During the assault of Verviers, Abaaoud was located in Greece. It was
understood that the Belgian had to act in coordination with the Greek. Or intervention in
Verviers was launched without the Greeks are kept informed, and Abaaoud was able to escape.
This leads me to ask you your opinion on European coordination in the fight against terrorism.
The President Georges Fenech. On our recent trip to Greece, we have seen the displeasure of
Greeks after this episode.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. I have no particular elements on the episode of Verviers. Obviously,
the commission knows more than me.
It is difficult to implement a genuine European cooperation. In this area, cooperation is easier at
the bilateral level, even if it is not always easy. So it works, should each country agrees to come
out of her own culture, to define clear objectives, determine the appropriate level of decisionmaking and stand next to what has been decided.
The President Georges Fenech. How is it that Abaaoud could move with ease on several
occasions in the Schengen area, while he was the object of multiple alerts?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. I'll be careful, Mr. president, because, tomorrow travel of Abaaoud
within the European Union will be perhaps reconstituted and so I am likely to be contradicted.
The Schengen area, it is a no-brainer, constituted by a strengthening of the external borders. The
main compensatory tool which has been envisaged, it is the SIS. Today, the system suffers from
a main weakness: the postponement of the controls on the external borders ruled out attention to
the need to put in place controls within the Schengen area. This same problem occurs when it
comes to implementation of the tool PNR - Passenger Name Record : all the DCPJ and DRI in
particular much insisted that intra-EU flights are integrated. Once in the Union, it is very easy for
a person to move to - this is a faculty which we all benefit. Need to think about ways to exercise
controls within the States of the Union.
The President Georges Fenech. The figures are impressive. The Electronic Frontier Computing
is being Work from 500 000 terminals of polling in 28 States. The SIS represents 36.5 million of
alerts, including EUR 1,204 deals million on wanted persons.

Mr. Alexandre Pichon. We do not have the same data. Today, the SIS has about 65 million
reports: the system therefore almost reached its limits, since its maximum capacity is 70 million.
It will increase to 100 million by the end of the year. These sheets are 800,000 people reported,
sought or monitor. They are overwhelmingly of lost or stolen documents (49.1 million) and to a
lesser extent other objects, including 3.5 million vehicles and 500 000 firearms.
By 2015, the number of consultations amounted to nearly 3 billion across the 29 countries
connected to the system, the increase is related to the connection of the United Kingdom. It's
consultations manual, operated in the booths of the airports or made on the occasion of police
checks, or even automatic, by querying from one file to another. I mention worldwide visa
interviewing a special category of data - the Schengen territory-ban decisions - for the
examination of visa applications, the prefectures that launch the research about vehicles or entry
bans on the territory, or the readers automated registration plates (ANPR), that check if any
vehicle is reported as stolen in the SIS. For France, the consultations totalled 555 million in
2015, what makes our country the first consultation.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. Add that Abaaoud had perhaps been controlled without we know, or
under another identity. One of the limitations of the current system is that it contains no
biometric data.
The President Georges Fenech. Could you tell us the number of people arrested with SIS in
2015 file?
Mr. Alexandre Pichon. I has no figures for the whole of the connected countries but for France,
arrest warrants, only to be able to justify an inquiry, allow each year to hail abroad 750 persons
reported by the France, and France, 450 persons subject to a foreign reporting.
The rapporteur. And what is the proportion for terrorism?
Mr. Alexandre Pichon. I can't tell you, because the statistics are compiled by type of reporting
and not by category of offence.
The rapporteur. And how many fall under article 36-3?
Mr. Alexandre Pichon. This article is about the controls and not the questions.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. I can also provide you with figures for the positive 'hits' in France.
Regarding foreign reports are submitted by the France 2 SIS, figures amounted to 7 546 in 2014,
including 5 389, and 11 412 in 2015, including 8 228 persons.
With regard to all of the countries connected to the system, the number of 'hits' positive' was 129
136 in 2014, including 88 961, and 156 447 in 2015, including 116 994 persons.
The President Georges Fenech. When we listen to you, one is struck by the close cooperation
between European countries: whether it's the SCCOPOL of the Taskforce 'Brotherhood', joint

investigation teams or analyses of Europol. Despite this, the common misconception that Europe
is a colander continues to prevail.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. November 13 attacks have created a shock and disruption, including
the apprehension of international cooperation.
I had throughout my career in judicial police and central services with an international
dimension. For a long time, international cooperation, without being incidental, was optional.
Today, a paradigm shift has occurred: an investigator may consider his work other than in a
European area.
There are a number of tools that investigators should take ownership of. It is a process which
began not very long ago and which making great strides. The occurrence of serious facts like the
ones we have experienced accelerated this evolution.
The joint investigation team constitutes the Ne plus ultra of international cooperation. Using the
tools of Europol is progressing much, but it has not been without difficulty, especially in our
country. International cooperation is based purely and simply on the exchange of information,
and investigators, in almost all countries Europeans - more in the Mediterranean countries in the
Nordic countries, we have to say - have a strong culture of possession of information. It is a work
of all the days that we are leading with my classmates to make them understand that use the
services of Europol gets them nothing, on the contrary, and that the concept of ownership
information only is not questioned in this context.
I told you in my presentation that we had given all our data to Europol, which created the task
force "brotherhood". It should be noted that this is the first time in Europe that a Member State
facing one such drama decides to get rid of the pan of the investigation under the criminal
analysis to Europol. It is naturally Mireille Ballestrazzi, Central Director of the judicial police,
who took this decision, immediately following the path we had chosen. It is I who contacted the
Director of the Belgian judicial police to convince him that cooperation between our two States
would make sense only if also entrusted it its data. And that is what he did immediately. For
Europol, task force "Brotherhood" is a test, because she has always demanded that States entrust
him criminal analyses in important cases, as its leaders have pointed out the Board of Directors,
where I lead the French delegation since I held these positions. French justice and police come to
give him the opportunity to demonstrate the merits of its creation and the added value it can
bring to investigations. And I am sure that this will work.
The President Georges Fenech. Can we imagine a perpetuation of the task force on European
and international terrorism? You know that the question of a European public prosecutor has
already been raised: some are favourable but this raises a problem of national sovereignty. Could
move towards a supplementary jurisdiction without undoing the Paris Prosecutor's office of its
powers with regard to the attacks in Paris?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. I'm too old to see someday materialize this development, but I think
that it is the sense of history.

When I started my international career nearly forty years ago, no one imagined that we could
entrust our data to an international organization. Europol is a tool, a tool that belongs to us. This
agency has the opportunity to carry out actions that we are not able to perform because it has that
we don't have. It is for example the only organization in charge of criminal police able to analyze
big data - I speak not of the intelligence services.
I am sure that a European public prosecutor, performing functions of coordination emerge. No
doubt the Europol staff participate in surveys on national soil beyond simply sending analysts.
But you are right to point out that it is a process long because the capacity for criminal police in
the different Member States are not the same for historical reasons: not all have the experience of
terrorism. It will be difficult in a short period of time to see the Paris Prosecutor's office to
dispose of its jurisdiction in favour of a supranational prosecutor who allegedly headed by an
official from a country having had the chance to not have been affected during the last century.
The rapporteur. During our trip to Greece last week, we found that Europol intervened in flows
of migrants in December 2015, very late so. What do you think?
The President Georges Fenech. And, today, a person only within the Agency is responsible.
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. This subject will be treated to the Europol Management Board next
week. The Agency invites the Member States to define a new model of police officers made
available: the guest officer. This would be for Member States to 'lend' smuggling specialists to
enable Europol to remedy to the difficulties to take into account this phenomenon. You should
know that the intromission of the Agency in the crisis of migrants is made from a political
incentive of States, including the France. Rob Wainwright, Director, had some doubts, that it is
open to me, because he considered that this action was more the mandate of Frontex. In reality,
there's a hole in the device: Frontex has jurisdiction to deal with the migration problem at the
external borders, but does not cover the movement of migrants within the European Union. Let
us remember the Danish controversy: the Danes had strongly criticized Germans not you advised
them of the influx of thousands of migrants by Schleswig-Holstein, arrival who them was forced
to close highways and cut railway lines during a weekend.
Born of a unit to combat drug trafficking, Europol has seen its mandate to expand up to embrace
all fields of crime. It has important means - 100 million euros of budget - because the European
Union is not miserly: whenever she was entrusted a new mission, its budget is abounded.
However, she runs into a difficulty: it must somehow be specialist in all areas. Originally, the
Agency consisted primarily of criminal analysts, because the Member States wanted it attaches
mainly criminal analysis, for reasons of property information that I mentioned earlier. Now, she
needs specialists in all thematic fields. She appealed to Member States which faced criminal
pressure strong, have difficulties to get rid of their best elements - to work at Europol, not only it
is necessary to control the material which is your specialty, but also be linguist and be equipped
with various other skills. In addition, the status of guest officers raises the problem of the
responsibility of the State which provides personal or the liaison office within the Agency.
However, this type of collaboration is a way of the future.

Finally, I would like to specify the volume of annual trade within the SCCOPOL: by 2015, more
than 450,000 inbound or outbound messages were recorded across the stream, against 350 000
the previous year. The development of terrorism, the crisis of migrants, the explosion of
cybercrime have raised fears of a further marked increase. Adjustments to information at
European level and the national level systems must be accompanied by a rise of SCCOPOL, tool
envied by our partners, but structure constraint in terms of personnel, which are forced to deal
with a very high ratio of messages.
The President Georges Fenech. You run the SCCOPOL?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. The SCCOPOL is headed by a police Commissioner who is under
my authority.
The President Georges Fenech. Apart from sovereign Governments - customs, economy,
internal security and justice-, do you have links with local authorities?
M. Jean-Jacques Colombi. No, our interlocutors are justice, the police, the gendarmerie and
customs.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, gentlemen, for this important contribution.
Hearing, behind closed doors, the general Pierre de Villiers, Chief of staff of the armed forces

Report of the hearing in camera, Monday, May 9, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, we have the honour and the pleasure to
receive the general Pierre de Villiers, Chief of staff of the armed forces.
My general, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of
inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.
You know that we have already held several hearings of members of the armed forces and that
we received, last week, the Director-general of international relations and strategy of the
Ministry of defence.
With the Chief of staff of the armed forces you are, the commission of inquiry will be able to
focus on the military aspects of the fight against terrorism as well in France, with operation
Sentinel, on external theatres of operations.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, and in accordance with article 6 of the Ordinance of 1958 on the functioning
parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at
the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings in camera will be first transmitted to
people heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will be submitted to the
commission, which may decide to State in his report. I recall that, in accordance with the

provisions of the same article, "is punishable by the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of
the penal code - one year of imprisonment and a fine of 15,000 - any person who, within a
period of twenty-five years disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a
commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission
referred to this information."
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I now ask you to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth. Please raise your right hand and say: 'I swear '.
The general Pierre de Villiers takes oath.
My general, I'll let you speak to a keynote presentation which was followed by an exchange of
questions and answers. I propose to intervene first Shamal operation click the Sentinel operation.
The Shamal operation raises some issues which are directly relevant to our work. We would like
to have a point of situation in the theatre of the Levant: evolution of the threat, territorial
situation, opposing forces.
Can you give us the coalition against the Islamic State: troop/police contributors and participants,
operational command, strategy, developments of the device?
The Shamal operation, we would know its intervention framework, the aims pursued and its
chain of command and coordination with the coalition, the human and technical means
implemented Work and their evolution. Could you inform us on changes made after the attacks
of January and November 2015? Could you give us the number of troops currently engaged in
the operation by detailing the data by type of missions, armed and services?
We would also like to know the number of outputs Airlines carried out since the start of the
operation. Could you give us more details on the evolution of these outputs over the months, on
the type of missions - intelligence, strike, on its objectives and targeted geographical areas?
Could you submit a preliminary assessment of the operation: number of carried out strikes,
destroyed targets, neutralized fighters? We would like to get particularly an idea of the results
obtained by the intensification of the strikes decided by the President of the Republic following
the attacks of November 2015. How many francophone targets have been identified as front be
minted? How much have been? How can we estimate the number of deaths resulting from these
strikes French?
Could you present us the State of the military, with the Iraq cooperation and modalities for
coordination of action of the global coalition with the Russia?
Would taking into account the existing armed forces commitments, you be able to provide to the
Levant denude your other operations what extra effort?
Finally, I submit to you this question: is a commitment on the ground totally unrealistic in the
coming months?

General Pierre de Villiers, Chief of staff of the armed forces. Mr president, ladies and
gentlemen, I would like to in all first and foremost thank you sincerely for having taken the
initiative of this hearing. You know, I attach great importance to the continuity and the quality of
the exchanges that armies have with national representation, regardless of the framework.
The terrible attacks on 13 November in Paris and those from 22 March in Brussels marked the
crossing of a new threshold of the terrorist threat that weighs on European countries. Aware of
this reality, the President of the Republic has decided to wage a struggle against terrorist groups
and to strengthen the defence effort.
As a result a solid commitment of our armed forces, sometimes Moreover beyond their
operational contracts such as orders in the White Book of 2013. Each of the components of our
defense is involved in this fight.
The question on which your commission is working is absolutely fundamental, because the
essential is at stake: the means granted to the fight against terrorism are both appropriate and
sufficient to ensure the protection of the France and the French? This need for protection is the
raison d'etre and the mission first of the armies. That's why you can count on me to speak this
afternoon without waffling.
All military means which could be involved in this fight have been and remain, with the desire to
provide an immediate response to the extreme severity of the blows to our country. The very
high level of commitment of our armed forces for more than a year, bears testimony. This
commitment continues unabated, and I think I can say an essential courageously conducted
combat support by our country. However, we continually adapt our means to evolution - and
increasing - this terrorist threat.
Indeed, the solid commitment of our armed forces has revealed certain threshold effects that
require a permanent adaptation of the tool and the revision of some of our models. Furthermore, I
am convinced that the action of the armed forces must always be considered as brought
competition placing in Work of a broader strategy, involving all the institutional players in our
country, the French population as well as Allied and friendly countries.
Before answering your questions on the Shamal operation more directly, I'll illustrate what I
have just said in terms of the adequacy of resources to the mission. I base my comments into
three parts. I will first give you a military analysis of the uniqueness of the current terrorist
threat, what distinguishes it from what we have known in the past. For one soldier, the central
question is always the same: who is the enemy? I then make the State of play in the fight against
terrorism, a struggle that is not new but has had to change abruptly dimension. Finally, I will
give you my points of attention, seamlessly.
To start so, it seems to me interesting to define the terrorist threat as I see it. Thought and used in
the service of a destructive ideology, terror, once located, has become globalised terrorism. It is
spread in previously preserved areas, hitting four of the five continents in the past twelve
months.

Terrorism is not new in itself - the world and the France have already faced several times this
scourge - although we feel that the magnitude and the springs of terrorism of radical islam are
singular. The difference is based primarily on the hegemonic ambition and the destructive logic
of this terrorism. The escalation of violence is erected by the terrorist organizations as the
preferred means of their power. It has been theorized by Abu Bakr Naji as early as 2004, in a text
translated into french in 2007, that I have here, under a perfectly clear title: management of
barbarism. What is unique here is that violence is considered beyond the simple way. it becomes
an end. This ideology of death carries any rationality. It has, in fact, another purpose that the
advent of a nihilistic terrorism erected in system that claims as an Islamic State or Caliphate.
Two extra lines complement the hideous face of terrorism: it is moving and upset the
benchmarks; It is opportunistic. We are facing a threat in permanent mutation and the faces
change: yesterday al Qaeda, today Daech, Djabhato al-Dhanub or Boko Haram. In fact, the threat
persists in the guise of a mutant that transforms and increases to spread. Islamist terrorism upset
also marks in the sense that it claims a territorial rooting while totally ignoring the borders of
States and coming knocking on our soil. He claims the purity when in reality that crime. It is
believed eradicated here, but there he is reborn in a new form. The threat is multifaceted and
nebulous; It is that harder to counter.
This terrorism is also opportunistic. It proliferates wherever institutions are fragile, weak or nonexistent and where poverty is inclined to despair. It uses the facilities that offer internet and
social networks, which provide access to the cFavorite pieces even corporations, to recruit from
the most exposed and the most impressionable population especially among the youth.
These comments I believe that we can draw a certainty: the dynamics of violence and fear are
engaged, challenging the legitimate force response. A new Warrior cycle is open; He opposed to
an enemy that seeks to impose its ideology. We do not war terrorism disembodied; We are war
with jihadist groups.
This is an enemy we have to fight. There objectives, resources and needs. However, the enemy
also has weaknesses you need to know to operate, to put an end to his project. I will mention
two: the challenge of regeneration; the division.
The challenge of regeneration necessarily relies on conservation of refugia. The ability to last
terrorist groups is based on the existence of sanctuaries that they need to train, to rearticulate and
sourcing. The loss of these shrines is every time a very serious to the enemy suddenly, as was the
case of the operations conducted by our armed forces in the Adrar des Ifoghas to northern Mali.
It is still the case. On this subject, it should be noted that our strategy of regionalisation and
expanded in the Sahel-Saharan Strip (BSS) partnership is a success. It is consistent with the
reality of the threat and the critical needs of the enemy. She favors modes of action based on the
surprise, key factor which allows to counter terrorist armed groups, and cross-border transactions
conducted in partnership with the armies of the Sahel G5, namely Burkina Faso, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger and Chad. Finally, Liza makes the spaces of northern Mali and Niger more
hostile to terrorists and more and more difficult to traffickers. This same strategy is also being
Work by the coalition in the Levant. Mosul in Iraq and Raqqah in Syria are the objectives which,
once taken, will undoubtedly contribute to seriously weaken the Islamic pseudo-State.

Second weakness: the division, competition between jihadist groups. Daech claim to establish a
territorial pseudo-State, share and other the the Syria Iraq border trouble to mask the absence of a
genuine vision shared by the whole of the Jihadist movement. Terrorist groups, in their diversity,
agree on the way forward. Their ambitions are various and competing, what constitutes new
evidence of their nihilistic logic. On this plan, the fratricidal struggles between al-Qaida and
Daech represent an asset for us.
In meetings with the chiefs of staff of the countries of the coalition, I often share with my
counterparts the conviction that one of the keys to our success will be the exploitation of these
oppositions, including through targeted operations in the field of Cyber Defence and counterinformation. It is a sensitive area and very consumer means, where the effort that we must
continue to expand our capabilities in Cyber Defence.
This strategy will be fully effective only if it is not limited to the military effects. The action of
the armed forces must be integrated into a comprehensive approach. It is the condition for
success. Only global action can quell this threat in attacking simultaneously in all dimensions of
the latter to reveal the inconsistency between rhetoric and Daech crimes.
Make sure that this vision is shared by all of the chiefs of staff of the armed forces involved in
the coalition. All stress the fact that the resolution of the conflict necessarily such a
comprehensive approach. It should reinvigorate the commitment of the countries of the region in
combating Daech and rebuilding what has been damaged or destroyed. Winning the war is not
enough to win the peace. I say time and at inopportune moment, because I believe that it is
essential in this fight. The armed forces contribute to this compelling need for comprehensive
approach by providing the expertise and capabilities, which I now take places.
At the time of the attacks of January 2015, our armed forces were already in action. To multiply
their efforts, they were able to rely on two essential bases: operational experience; the posture of
our armed forces.
First Base: operational experience. Since 2001, our armed forces are engaged in the fight against
terrorist armed groups, first in Afghanistan against the Taliban or the Haqqani network, and then
in the BSS against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al - din, or the movement
for unity and jihad in Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO). Our soldiers are frequently the eyes eyes,
within 15 metres of a fanatic enemy who will not stop. This is the reality of fighting we pursue,
far from any media exposure. Our soldiers have proven their ability to lead military action in
operational and climatic situations extremely demanding. They have won critical success. It is on
this amount of experience that answers were able to build on the first day. It was through this
experience that we have neutralized about 200 terrorists in the Sahel, under operation Liza, the
only year of 2015.
Second base: the posture of our armed forces who have two major advantages. Our first asset lies
in the completeness of our army model that possesses the widest possible range of abilities and
allows us to adapt the posture to the terrorist threat wherever it manifests itself. Our second asset
is our autonomous ability of appreciation, because of our intelligence, our satellites, our Cyber

defence capabilities. With these strengths, our armed forces can respond to the continuity of the
terrorist threat to as far as on the national territory. And this is what they do.
We currently have over 30,000 military personnel in operational posture, all armies and all
services included. In the distance, these are external operations: it is the defence of the front.
First, we are present in the Sahel where we act as a leader within the Bal operation, AirLand
dominant. What we do there is a model and a matrix for many of our future operations, with
adjustable force whose actions combine always more mobility, flexibility and ability to create the
effect of surprise. We win in the Sahel of undeniable success, alongside our African brothers in
arms. This success is the result of the total commitment of our troops deployed there. They know
the risks and accept them with courage and dignity. The death of three comrades on the trail of
Tessalit, less than a month ago, bears testimony. I wanted to pay tribute to you as do not forget
them.
In the Levant, our armed forces act in an anti-Daech coalition. By destroying their command and
training positions, pressing the action of the local ground forces of our bombs, our armed forces
help contain terrorists and they allow to curtail Daech territorial control. I would like to
emphasise here how many keystrokes conducted from air bases, strengthened for several weeks
by those aircraft carrier battle group, played a key role in the recent setbacks in the terrorist
armed groups in Iraq and Syria.
I also take this observation to insist on the need to maintain a balanced approach on the subject
of the effects of our actions. For months, some observers explained that the coalition strikes were
nothing. In recent weeks, other observers - unless they are the same - believe they can say that
the situation is evolving quickly and that a resolution is in sight. In fact, we know from
experience that the combination of actions takes time to produce its effects. Moreover, the time
of local forces, which act on the ground in addition to our actions, is not ours. Above all, a global
approach, acting on the fields of governance and the economy, is essential to allow the
emergence of a durable solution. We need to combine the political and military action, which
takes time. So much for the defense of the front.
On the outskirts of our territory, it comes to protect approaches to our country with standing
postures of safety and protection in their air and maritime components and a watch made by our
pre-positioned forces. Here again, our armed forces protect our country against terrorist
infiltration in the Mediterranean context.
At most, on the national territory, the terrorist threat settles in the duration. The contribution of
the armed forces - in addition to the forces of internal security and of course the responsibility of
the Minister of the Interior - is natural. The purpose of the military is about whole in the
protection of nationals french, regardless of where they are located. We could discuss the
doctrine - and necessary - but cannot discuss the principle or then to write another code of
defence.
The contribution of the armed forces exceed much dimension dissuasive and reassuring the
visible presence of soldiers on our soil. Planning, intervention and crisis management
capabilities, logistic autonomy and control of some rare specialized means are all assets relevant

to the particular fight we have against terrorism. Those of you who belong to the Committee on
national defence and the armed forces have already heard me on this topic.
Taking account of all of these dimensions leads to a new posture that we must improve and
integrate within a wider which forces us: the mission of protection of the France and the French.
I am of course at your disposal to answer any questions you have to ask me on the subject.
Specifically, we have an obligation to adapt the means of our armed forces to immediate threats.
We do this outdoors; It also must be done on the national territory. We must prepare for the
future in a world of multiplication and superposition of crises. One of my daily concerns was to
keep in mind that the threats facing the country do not consist only terrorist threats. It is
reminding this reality that I come to address the third part of my speech: my attention points
related to the necessary means to support the fight against terrorism.
These points of attention are concentrated around one simple idea: ensure our effectiveness and
our operational endurance in a situation where all the components of our armed forces are at a
level of commitment that sometimes goes beyond their operational contracts. The sizing of
military means cannot be envisaged without consideration for long time in which necessarily fits
the action of the armed forces. Choose a different route, is to take the risk of resources erode
more quickly that they regenerate, is mortgaging the future by betting on the utopia of a quick
return to ante.
Our ability to overcome depends on strict consistency between the threat, the tasks assigned and
granted means. The team that I formed with the chiefs of staff of army, behind our defence
Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian is particularly attentive to this need for consistency which revolves
around three components: human resources, operational capabilities, the army model.
With regard to the human resources component, the effort put in coherence found its translation
in the decision of the President of the Republic to cancel more than 10,000 deflations of staff
over the years 2017 to 2019, which are in addition to the previous update of the LPM 18 750
cancellations. Two-thirds of these preserved positions will be redeployed in favour of
strengthening direct operational units and the chain of Cyber Defence and intelligence.
Strings recruitment, training and protection of our armed forces, directions and services are
totally mobilized to succeed this manLarge-scale work. But to be effective, it must be supported
by a coherent budgetary effort that takes into account the payroll and the financial costs
associated with these numbers in support, training, operation, equipment, and infrastructure.
Currently, support and preparation for the struggle of our soldiers are under extreme tension
areas. Any additional budgetary cessation as soon as management 2016, seriously affect the
operational stamina of our armed forces in the fight against terrorism.
Beyond the necessary budgetary translation of decisions, I think it is just that the nation
recognizes the high level of commitment and the excellent state of mind with which our soldiers,
sailors and airmen have discharged their respective missions and support constraints. For this
reason, that at the last Council of defense from April 6, the President of the Republic decided the
adoption of a plan for improvement of the status of staff. Behind these measures there is a real
issue of attraction, retention and morale. It is the legitimate compensation face increasing

constraints on absence and overactivity. Many of our soldiers beyond 100 days absent from their
domicile in 2015.
Turning operational capability that it comes to strengthen following three axes: optimize the use
of the armed forces on the national territory; support the effort in intelligence and Cyber
Defence; support the intensity of our commitments in external operations.
To optimize the use of the armed forces on the national territory, we have chosen to adopt a more
aggressive posture, which focuses on mobile patrols rather than the fixed guards. So it does not
remain a dead letter, this commitment must be accompanied by an increase in the vehicle fleet.
We currently have 700 vehicles of all types in le-de-France, as part of the Sentinel operation.
We work with the Minister of defence, to the purchase of new tactical vehicles adapted, over the
coming months. Other capabilities should also be strengthened, including means of transmissions
and the means for exchanging information needed to develop interoperability between the armed
forces and the internal security forces.
Our second focus is to support the effort in intelligence and cyber defence. The spectrum of
identified needs is wide: it ranges from the cyber-force protection capabilities of backup and
standby on the internet, by means of processing of the image or interception. The ambition is to
quickly enhance the means intelligence and cyber at the height of the new threats that this area
evolve very quickly to the point of a level I would say concern. The war is also engaged in this
area.
The third axis is to support the intensity of our commitments in external operations, ranging from
operations we are conducting in the BSS or those which we participate in the Levant, because all
mechanically result in over-consumption of potential and material wear. Some of our materials planes, boats and vehicles are currently sur-employs and their availability rates are difficult to
maintain at a satisfactory level, taking into account their age for most of them. Some of our
reserves, as our stocks of spare parts and of ammunition, could run despite the replenishment. It
is the whole of the tool that we must regenerate constantly in order to respond to the intensity
and the duration of our operations.
We come to the third and final component, the army model, to which I attach particular
importance. It should not be necessary adaptations, I just brush rapidly, reflected the breakdown
of the balance of strategic functions: deterrence, prevention, protection, intervention, knowledge
and anticipation. Weaken a function, is to take the risk of a knock-on effect, which we do not
control the effects induced on the other functions and abilities. For example, it is the
expeditionary capability that allows us to bring us closer to the outbreaks of terrorism; This is
our prevention, including our pre-positioned forces, device that allows us to monitor and gives
us, if necessary, a reaction capacity. I saw on a daily basis. I repeat, the sustainability of this
model of army passes through a scrupulous respect for the budgetary commitments made in the
updated LPM. Otherwise, it will have to revise our ambitions. We have no choice, regardless of
the State budgetary context that I do not discount.
Before concluding, I would like to address a subject that want me toFavorite pieces in the depths
of myself: the State of mind of our armed forces. Victory over barbarism is also played on the

ground of the example. We need to invest this field to remove the mechanics of falsehood:
project against fantasy, authenticity against propaganda. On 8 may, when we commemorated
yesterday, reinforces our certainty that victory rests with those wishing more than anything the
freedom and justice, and who are willing to fight for them; victory cannot return to those who
shut themselves in a logic of hate and destruction. I am convinced that the armies, by what they
do and by what they are, may carry this testimony to the richness and the relevance of the values
of our Republic. Freedom, our troops are fighting for it, when others the fight with the rage of
despair. Equality, they live it in uniform. The brotherhood, our fuel, they build it on a daily basis.
This reality, the armies the recall in acts every day. Rather than regimentation, our country has
chosen the mobilization, and your commission is an illustration. This mobilization is expressed
in the dynamics that crosses our armies. The resilience of the nation will strengthen with the
awareness of this need of mobilizing and gathering, particularly in our youth. The establishment
of three centres of voluntary military service is on the plan, a good example and a source of hope
for the youth in search of meaning.
Mr president, ladies and gentlemen, the defence is more than ever at the cFavorite pieces of the
national interest. Our armies take their full part in the determined struggle that the country is
waging against terrorism, in all its forms and wherever it lies. This effort requires a total
commitment of the men and women of our armed forces to revive the action with imagination,
adapting continuously unabated until the final neutralization of terrorists targeting our country.
These men and women of our armed forces know how to count back to the nation, you are the
incarnation, to dispose of means consistent with their mission, for the success of the weapons of
the France.
Thank you and am at your disposal to answer your questions, in particular on the Shamal
operation you have discussed in your introduction.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you very much, my general, and I am the spokesman of
the commission of inquiry to greet your total commitment. Rest assured of recognition of
national representation for actions that you lead the defence of freedoms, the security of our
citizens and democracy. We come to the questions.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Thank you, general, for your presentation at the time very concise and very
dense. Should you listen very carefully to understand the real scope of each of your sentences.
General Pierre de Villiers. I worked a lot for this hearing because the question is fundamental.
Mr. Serge Grouard. I realize. When you talk about the maintenance in operational condition,
you say while a dense sentence which means that we now have the greatest evil to keep the tool
in condition. We have very specific examples of difficulties which, moreover, is not new.
For my part, I would first agree on the means. Do you think that some 34 billion euros initially
under the military programming law (LPM) are sufficient with regard to the threat that you have
described and the needs of our forces? You know for a long time my feeling: these 34 billion - to
already sanctuariser - are not sufficient.

Following the president, I would like to ask you about Daech of simple questions that require
extraordinarily complicated responses. We are just back from Turkey where we talked a lot and
the Syria Daech forces estimated at 20,000 or 25 000 fighters. What is your own estimate? We
can clearly see the relationship between Daech-held territory and the flow of terrorists that
happens to us. Can we eradicate Daech? This eradication require a ground operation? As a
member, do you think that such an operation, led by a coalition, would make sense? If this is the
case, should what means be involved?
In Turkey, we also talked a lot of the Libya. Why don't we stamping out the threat at this stage,
i.e. at a time where it is not yet completely structured? Why are we are not going to? A little by
provocation, I might as well rephrase my question: why are we not more in Libya and Syria?
M. Pierre Lellouche. We know a bit and, you know, I have the greatest respect for you.
Moreover, we all have a tremendous respect for what our soldiers. For seeing them in Mali in
Iraq operation, passing through the Jordan and elsewhere, we cannot but be admiring, especially
knowing the constraints and the ageing of equipment problems they are facing. Even if you were
very polite in your way to express yourself, as well as Serge Grouard has pointed out, we know
that some vehicles - for example the front vehicles shielded (GVA) - sometimes have two or
three times the age of their driver.
You do the best with the resources you have, but this Committee can help to address a
substantive debate: you are at the head of a machine that was designed to make something totally
other than what he is asked to. Military history shows that it is often late because the world is
changing faster than the tool. We have date of the cold war, it is largely with heavy infantry
forces and nuclear deterrence-oriented. We began to turn after the cold war but it remains quite
inadequate to this war of long term we have to carry out. You were right to include your thinking
about the long term. What model of army can respond to a situation of this type, which we know
only that it will last and contaminate a good number of countries in the immediate periphery of
Europe? The work of this commission can be useful to help ask and solve this issue. We must
begin to think about it.
I dresserais something more severe than yours because each level of your description reveals
problems, even if our soldiers and yourself do the best with what you have. Take the front circle.
We have the franchise to say that our bombings represent a small percentage of those operated
by the Western coalition and that they still appear more modest when compared to the massive
strikes of the Russians. It does not handle provided the substantive issue: How do we gain this
war? Win the war, to occupy the land. As it is out of the question that we occupied the land
ourselves, we must find allies to do so. Or we can't find them. Even if we are making progress,
we are unable to answer the question you asked yourself: how to win the peace? In this region,
hatred between Sunnis and Shiites is such that, even if we degrade the Islamic State at any
particular place, it reconstitutes elsewhere. Look at what is happening right now at the level of
the Iraqi Government!
The principle of a sustainable on a theatre like that one I have problem. The formula is even
more problematic in the Sahel. I can understand a short operation as a Serval - one enters, one
strikes, out - even though I believe that it was not yet quite brief. On the other hand, I am very

reserved with regard to operations such as Liza where 3,500 soldiers intervene in time on huge
surfaces that are the size of Europe. How and with whom manage the terrorist threat in any
particular area? The country lack of reflection on this issue.
You talked about the actions of the army in the Sahel. However we tend to militarize our policy
in the countries of this area, as we have done in Afghanistan: economic aid is insignificant
compared to the money we spend on the military side. The development aid does not arrive in
the Sahelian villages and we have strictly no policy in the field, yet essential, demography: these
five poorer countries of the world, the birth rate is still 7.5 children per woman, in the Sahel will
have 200 million inhabitants in 30 years. My general, I congratulate you for Liza but this isn't a
solution for the next thirty years. The military handle the daily, it's their job, but they must also
think about long term solutions.
With regard to the defence of the approaches, I ask you: How do you protect the borders of
Europe, where are the French armies and European? What do we in the Mediterranean otherwise
rescue at sea which guarantees the use of smugglers and garnishes Swiss bank account them?
These smugglers put people in Zodiac telling them that they will be supported by the Italian
Navy or another. Over the past years, the European navies held this role, because the game of
governments like Matteo Renzi. What might look like the defence of Europe's borders by the
French army and other armies? It has no reflection on the subject.
Internally, the question of the maintenance of the Sentinel operation that reassures the population
even if some Parisians are moderately reassured to see soldiers truss invest the place de la
Madeleine. With all the respect that I owe them, the soldiers are not made for this. There is a real
problem of doctrine. I hear you, yourself, and the Minister of defence that the same soldier must
go to Mali and then participate in the Sentinel operation. I am absolutely convinced of the
contrary. For once, I wonder if the solution is not to return to a form of conscription. On all these
points, I think that we lack cruelly reflection. I would like that we are achieving progress on
these long-term issues, while you giving Act of the work you do in the short term and under the
orders of the President of the Republic. You do what you are asked to do with the tool you have.
Personally, I am interested in the tool that you need in order to respond to the threat that will
continue to weigh on us for years to come.
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, I will ask you to pick up more questions
taking into account the time limit and the importance of the answers we expect on the part of the
general of Villiers.
General Pierre de Villiers. Mr Grouard, your first question is fundamental. Things must be
clear. We have restored the coherence between the threat, missions and means, thanks to the
LPM updates that occurred after January 7 then after November 13. These successive updates
include workforce reductions cancellation to height of 28 750 posts, on the granting of a
foundation of exceptional resources and 3.8 billion euros of additional appropriations and
budgeting for exceptional resources.
Such measures to cope with the current situation. Consider the period 2016-2019. I remain
vigilant on 2016 management: taking into account the initial finance (BIA) Act, the additional

costs of external operations, and the 600 million euros of carry-overs of appropriations, we arrive
at a sum of 33.5 billion euros all inclusive. I am also vigilant concerning the draft finance law
(PLF) for 2017. When one adds the BIA as provided in the initial LPM and measures that are to
be taken by the President of the Republic when the Defence Council, we are not far from 33
billion euros excluding additional charges related to external and internal operations. Watching
closely the budget process run its course because I can't carry out the tasks if I do not have the
means. We face enemies that do not arise the question of resources since they are in asymmetric
warfare. If I can't equip, train, and properly train soldiers, it will be impossible to properly
complete the missions. It is my responsibility.
We will then have to look at the period 2018-2019.
Is this army model viable with a budget of EUR 34 billion you mentioned to 2019? No, we must
move towards a budget equivalent to 2% of the gross domestic product (GDP), what are
committed the countries of the (NATO) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit of Newport.
This commitment should be reiterated at the Warsaw Summit. The percentage of 2%, which I
consider necessary for the period 2020-2022, includes pensions, that is, it compares to the
current rate of 1.78%.
This increase represents billions of euros, in a budgetary context I know. I understand all policy
decisions, but I will not understand you want to set ourselves ambitions without the means to
reach them. This, I will not accept it. We went at the end of the end of this logic there, especially
during the last ten years, and we cannot go further: long has more fat, that we have exhausted all
potential sources of economy. I was major general, which is number two of the armies, for four
years. I perfectly know the situation of the armies, and I am ready to discuss with all the physical
and financial budget content specialists.
You asked me about Daech forces, an organization that stretches from the Syria and Iraq to the
Libya, but we have also to deal with AQIM and its ramifications to Boko Haram in Northern
Nigeria, to the liberation Front of the Macina (LWF), to al-Mourabitoun, the former MUJAO,
Ansar Eddine, etc. The panorama of extreme complexity, extends to many other components
than Daech. The same ideology and resumed by different movements. To caricature, AQIM,
which is al-Qaida, rampant in the BSS, while Daech is mostly located in Syria, Iraq and Libya.
Processes are virtually identical in barbarism but, for the first time, Daech theorized a proto-State
which throws the tax, use of para-fonctionnaires and has a parastatal organization.
How to combat this threat? In a hurry, I see no other solution than the use of legitimate force to
combat violence, but this is not enough. He must attack the evil at the root: young people who
join this fight, especially since Europe and the North Africa due to poverty, despair, lack of sense
of their life. This is the cFavorite pieces of combat against Daech. As military, I would like to
stress: the military action is an urgent and essential part of the solution. There is a link between
security and development; one does not go without the other. You have alluded, Mr Lellouche.
You also ask me on the ground action. This is obviously a combination of aerial bombardment
and land action that allowed us to resume the offensive in Iraq and Syria. Daech recedes in Iraq,
either in the Valley of the Euphrates, Tigris or the province of al-Anbar. In Iraq, our goal is

Mosul, the cFavorite pieces of the cFavorite pieces of the organization. Daech back also in Syria,
but the situation is much more complex in this country where there are 1 500 katibats that are
undone according to interests and involving, directly or indirectly, the Iran, Saudi Arabia, the
Turkey, the Russia, Bashar al-Assad and the coalition army. Daech, deprived of massive
offensive capabilities, nevertheless falls under pressure from aerial bombing coupled with the
intervention on the ground of local forces. Why is it so long? Because we have not sufficient
local forces on the ground. It's simple. Local forces on the ground are those of the Iraqi army to
which must be added the peshmergas in Iraq and Syrian democratic forces. We need reform and
train these forces whose morale has been reached by the stinging defeat they suffered against
Daech. It takes time.
One could imagine a coalition of Western countries which would substantially increase this
action on the ground. For my part, I recommend extreme caution about this scenario: it's one
Daech wants to push us to adopt. Daech wants to attract us ground to remove hostages, cut heads
and swing public opinion. This is a trap. On the other hand, we must obviously that local and
regional forces are involved, but this area - political and diplomatic--is not my responsibility. As
a military expert, I think we will have local ground forces and faster we go. The good idea is to
combine the bombing and actions on the ground; the bad idea is to send Western forces on the
ground. That is what I say regularly to the Chief of the armed forces, the President of the
Republic.
Why not immediately go to Libya to be eradicate Daech? Because one must define a
comprehensive and international strategy before embarking on a new military action in that
country. We must learn the lessons of the past: we won the war but we have not won the peace in
Libya. Start by determining what we really expect a possible military action, and then prepare
the. We are in time political and diplomatic in this country where the situation is extremely
complex. On the ground, there are the forces of general Haftar in Cyrenaica and the Islamist
militias of different natures in Tripolitania, each backed by different countries. Corser all, to
reckon with a general tribal approach and many katibats.
There eradicate Daech, to also local forces on the ground. Which? Daech is present in Sirte,
Benghazi where it has a high concentration of forces. On the military side, victory involves airland actions and possibly operations of embargo and blockade to counter trafficking between
Misurata and Benghazi. The problem of the Libya is political. It will be solved not with the
French army. We contribute to international action, provided that there is an overall strategy.
Regarding the model we choose for the French army in order to win the war against terrorism, I
do not share your critical vision. I think that our model is facing all the assumptions: the war
marked by the return of powers, what we call high-intensity and which requires a powerful
machine. terrorism, which requires more flexibility and more means in the areas that I tried to
describe to you. Keep this global template, knowing that we are dealing with two types of
conflict.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Within the armed forces, you have real expertise for the future and provide
political leaders of more or less different models, taking into account the analysis that can make
the threat. Policies cannot do this in your place because you know your tool better than them. It

is on this point that reflection should be stepped up within the armed forces. It is not to ask you
to make policy decisions, but we would like to have your opinion to prepare for an evolution of
the model if necessary.
General Pierre de Villiers. We think of course all this, developing a real general military
strategy: you want to be able to act. Rebuild or alter a template? Reflection would require much
time. As I said, this model will be estimated at 2% of GDP on the horizon 2020-2022, taking the
perimeter that I described to you. Otherwise, we will not have the necessary means - and well
here is the place where to talk about.
With regard to the national territory, we already had an Exchange in the Defence Committee. It
would be a mistake to imagine that the French armies embody only the safety of the national
territory, which is the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior; We bring a complement. It
would also be a mistake to think that we are protection of the France and the French national
territory. The French would not understand such a vision.
Talk about Sentinel, even if this angle of view is a little simplistic to the extent where the
protection of the French also passes through deterrence, maritime, and air defence by Cyber
Defence, etc. Regarding Sentinel, you are right: our doctrine must evolve, we must become more
mobile and unpredictable, surprise the opponent. It is a change that is part of an
interdepartmental approach.
It is the same logic that led us to completely change our Organization from the Serval operation
to operation Liza. We are now organised in a highly flexible manner. Finished the static logic of
battalion, army of Grandpa! It changed everything. The effect of surprise has changed sides. This
is what should be on the national territory. And to do this, it is necessary that our doctrines
evolve. Far from being a culmination, the report on the conditions of service of the armed forces
on the national territory presented to Parliament is a step. We will go further.
In this issue, I'll give you a few examples illustrating the magnitude of the changes. First, we
have progressed very quickly in the reconciliation with the Ministry of the Interior, even if it is
never enough. I myself met Mr Cazeneuve repeatedly to try to reconcile the points of view of the
armies and Interior, with the sole purpose: maintain peace in advance.
We've changed our system of command. In Paris, three groups replace twenty different
commandments. Last week we have created fifteen islands of hardening, especially around the
denominational rights-of-way, applying the principles that I have already mentioned: play on
mobility, the unpredictability and the surprise effect. It is just the opposite of the Maginot line
that to some were described; It is just the opposite of what was Vigipirate.
Talk about the reserve. We went from 200 to 400 reservists engaged daily in the national
territory, and we should arrive with the number 700 at the end of the year, knowing that our
objective is to use 1 000 term. In cyber, we made a lot of progress. In the field of intelligence,
general Gomart, you're going to audition, will describe you the Herms cell putting all
intelligence services in the same room so that they share their analyses. In terms of resources, I
have told you of the vehicles. We also make efforts on the quality of the support of soldiers: in

le-de-France, 97% of dwellings are equipped with real beds and no longer beds Picot. We are
also improving the food, recreation, and protection of military allowances with the battleship
plan. Admittedly, protection of military way had been disarmed, civilianisee, outsourced.
The magnitude of the task related to the terrorist threat is gigantic. We are conducting new
experiments to deal. In April, for example, we conducted a joint exercise with the gendarmerie,
the Minerva exercise. The idea was to switch to actual operation on the national territory, a basic
unit that was present in the Department as part of a training. The requisition without notice of
this unit has been facilitated by the permanent dialogue between the prefect of defense area and
the area of defence and security (OGZDS) general officer.
The future model will draw on all these changes and experiments. Whatever it is, in the current
context, I hope that the defence be more an issue that it was in recent decades.
Mr Franois Lamy. On Sentinel, I'll introduce the things in a different way. If there had been 10
000 to 12 000 gendarmes and additional police officers after the attacks in the month of January,
I think there would have not been operation Sentinel. Moreover, the President of the Republic
and the Minister have well presented things in this way: the army has come to complement the
strength of police and gendarmerie, to protect places of worship and other public sites.
You talked about the constraints that you have faced following this operation Sentinel, and I
worked on the topic in the context of the budget report on the army. We note that almost two
third training sessions were cancelled last year. The managers we met told us if the situation
continues, the army would soon more able to keep places of worship. In addition, the Sentinel
operation has not prevented the attacks of November 13. Because the intensity of the threat will
last, I am concerned about the report that the nation will maintain with his armies, without even
talk about the effectiveness of the device. After a while, everyone wondered what do these
soldiers in the streets while attacks continue to occur. At the same time, the army is suffering
from loss of expertise due to this operation. Do you not think that it would be time to decrease
the number of soldiers involved in the Sentinel operation, so that the army can find breathing?
My second question is closely linked to the first. Do you think that our armed forces would be
able to operate on a new theatre, whether through an engagement with other military forces land
or an air operations of the same nature as that which is conducted to the Levant?
My third question relates to the nature of the information we have in Syria and Iraq. I guess that
the Directorate of military intelligence (DRM) works to prepare the strikes. Only work on the
preparation of these keystrokes, or have exchanges with other services information on the
combatants themselves? I ask you the question because, two days after the attacks, the French
involved were identified, we were able to tell which was the sponsor, etc. Our armies involved
looking for information on these individuals?
M. Philippe Goujon. My general, in your very comprehensive speech, you said that if you do
not have the means, you cannot perform the tasks. It is quite logical and consistent. However, in
the statement of the multitude of missions of our armed forces, it said that it will be difficult to
complete, as numbers declined considerably in recent years. It will be even harder to accomplish

all these tasks in good condition if the armies must intervene in new theaters of operation, as it
comes to be considered.
As a Parisian, I would also like to say a word about the Sentinel operation that represents a
significant portion of the device for securing the capital. There is the question of your ability to
accept this operation in the long term, knowing that the mobilized workforce cannot perform the
tasks for which they have been trained. Are there prospects for evolution of the mission,
involving or staff reductions? The static guards, who consume a lot of staff, still represent 50%
of your missions in Paris. Would it not possible to transform some into dynamic guards? I know
that this is not you, and that there are political imperatives. We must also recognize that the
transition from a static guard to a dynamic guard can worry about protected persons and
populations.
Material, is coordination with the prefecture of police of Paris sufficient? You tell us that you are
much closer to the Ministry of the Interior. What with the prefecture of police, under the
authority of which you are placed, in some way, in the context of the Sentinel operation? The
Ministry of the Interior has a lot of information and it has a network of cameras for video
protection to which you are not necessarily connected. There are other possible choices than the
static guard to protect sensitive points.
On your approximation with the Ministry of the Interior, you have mentioned with an experiment
conducted in Isre. Could you give us more details about this experiment which allows you to
work way more harmonious, more nested with the mounted police, and draw us improvement
pathways that exist with the prefecture of police?
A final problem seems very important to me: in Paris, you have virtually no possibility of
accomodation of staff. You have indicated that you are hosting 70% of workforce by region lede-France, i.e. Satory, Saint Germain en Laye or other places that are very far from the capital.
This distancing is wasting a lot of time to the soldiers and would not mobilise very quickly in a
crisis. It will still remove two barracks of gendarmerie Parisian - Exelmans and minimal - which
could very well be picked up by the military. You have more places where to install numbers
while we're at war, so I think the statements of the President of the Republic and the Prime
Minister.
Mr. Meyer Habib. My general, I will speak with my guts. Terrorism comes in large part from
the weakness demonstrated our policies - and I am speaking at the global level - in recent years.
Terrorists thrive in countries where they have training camps. We attended some of these
countries, we have even flirted with them, we closed the eyes. Jihadist terrorism, which has
nothing to do with nationalist terrorism, may be Sunni or Shiite. By not dealing to one of the
two, might achieve the opposite effect to that desired.
Daech did not exist three or four years ago. It happened because the eyes were closed, and that
Sunnis have had the impression that we give the Iraq, the Syria, the Yemen to the Shiites, under
the control of the Iran. Sunnis have felt that they were losing. It is a war of religion between the
two tendencies of islam and Western countries, the United States in mind, were very low. August
27, 2013, at a conference of ambassadors, president Holland had indicated that the France was

made in agreement with the United States on the principle of a military intervention in Syria. At
the last moment, Obama decided to seek the agreement of Congress.
When the war is, must engage fully, without fear. When our Minister for Foreign Affairs says
that our planes will go only to Iraq, that they will not cross the Syrian border, was lost. When the
war is, we go to the end. General, we have to intervene on the ground, it should do so. To say
that it will not intervene in a ground operation because it is afraid, is send a bad message.
Obviously, it is not to go there in a massive and total way. It is necessary to intervene by
commandos. But one must consider a ground intervention to eradicate.
What will be done if one, two, three, four, five or six new attacks occur? It is possible. Will we
put a policeman behind every citizen, at the door of each synagogue, Church, and school, in all
stages and metros? It is impossible. Terrorism is fought upstream. We are very tolerant. This
reproach, I address to our policies, not the military. We are weak, we are afraid that should go at
the end of things when it comes to a question of life or death. This is my firm conviction.
I have a more specific question to ask you. Are we ready to respond to an attack terrorizes
conventional, chemical or other?
My final question relates to Turkey, countries whose we return. I represent the French living in
Turkey, Greece and Israel and I am very worried. Familiar with this region of the world, I have
the impression that the Turkey is trying to gently tilt and that we yield to his wishes. I am
obviously in favour of a great cooperation with the Turkey, but the ouster of the Prime Minister
Ahmet Davutolu is not to reassure me. The fact that the Turks can enter Europe without visas
risk pose a huge security problem, to stick to this single account.
General Pierre de Villiers. Let's start with questions about the Sentinel operation. I believe in
this operation. We are involved not only because he would have missed 10 000 gendarmes. We
contribute to the protection of the French in a different way of Homeland Security, with means it
did not. Having the privilege of experience - forty-two years of service , I experienced both
sides in my career: before and after the fall of the Berlin wall. The second period, marked by
terrorism, was much more moving. Before the fall of the wall, let us not forget, our
neighbourhoods were protected by soldiers in arms, we had areas of loosening and a system of
operational defence of territory against possible spetsnaz parachute. Now, we have an enemy on
the national soil, which hit us twice. The army can play a specific role in planning, organization,
control of rare specialities, and zone control. It is more copy or extend Vigipirate, an operation
which mobilized fewer than 1,000 soldiers in some train stations and public places.
We have deployed 10,000 troops, unexpectedly, in three and a half days at the end of the attacks
of January 7, 2015. We have then evolved, more mobility, so as to make us less predictable. But
it is not easy to understand our fellow citizens that the military are most effective when they are
more static, stationed continuously at the foot of the building to protect. Fifteen islands of
security enhanced, which mentioned you, allow the control of area, which is more efficient. They
were created last week. We're protecting different denominational places, under this approach.
The majority of our forces deployed in Paris is mobile, which was not the case a few months ago,
or even a few weeks.

The great plan 'reserve' announced simultaneously, because it is consistent, will allow us to
territorialize reservists on national soil. Who knows better a canton or a constituency that live
there? This approach is consistent. It plans to use 1 000 reservists per day on the 7 000 to 10 000
soldiers deployed on operation Sentinel. There is a lot to build and the case is not merely to an
arithmetical calculation: 10,000 soldiers against 10,000 gendarmes and police. We have things to
bring in more, but we should not seek to override us do the forces of internal security in the
context of some missions. Confine the armed forces outside the national territory would not
provide an adequate response to the fight against terrorism. When I see how we've revolutionized
our modes of action outdoors, I say that we have some room for manoeuvreImportant work
indoors, using simple principles: the action is placed under the authority of the Minister of the
Interior; We must build on the chain of the territorial organization joint defence (OTIAD) which
works very well with the prefect, OGZDS, requisitions, etc. This allows us to be more rapid and
effective. We have made giant strides, especially in Paris.
I understand that the debate on the role of the armed forces on the national territory is taking
place. I am sure that the device is brought to evolve.
Would our armed forces be able to operate on a new theatre? Everything depends on the nature,
duration and intensity of this new intervention. Currently, I repeat, we are up to our capabilities
and our contracts operational, and even slightly above. You can draw conclusions: should
disengage from another theatre. Over time, I can not do more than what I do currently.
I would like to make a clarification concerning the duration of the Sentinel operation. Why are
we in trouble and why the army is facing enormous constraints of training? Because we expect
the arrival of 11 000 additional personnel in land task force, of which some are beginning to
arrive. Insist on a phenomenon that was more produced since the end of the war of Algeria: we
recreate elementary units of the companies. Pending these additional staff, we had to reduce
support for assign fighters to the Sentinel operation and strengthen the Marines, the air
commandos, etc. We will thus recreate a part of the 48 000 deleted posts - it is much - over the
period 2008-2013.
When we have recovered 11 000 personnel in land task force, the mi-2017, we resume the cycle
of instruction. We we prepare. We knew that we traverserions a difficult period, the time to
recruit and train new recruits, knowing that the initial training lasts six months. From 2017, I
assume operation Sentinel fitted and adapted, with an army that can hold in contours of constant
commitment in the long term. Do not rely on the current photograph that I do not discount: we
are going through a difficult period and many soldiers have accumulated over 200 days away
from their home.
You ask me about the experiment in Isre. My excellent relations with general Favier date not
attacks. Six years ago that I work with the gendarmerie and, when I was major general, I put in
place specific working groups for the mutation of the gendarmerie in the Ministry of the Interior
is going well. I know somewhat of the topic. We are experimenting with new procedures, as in
the case of fiscal Minerva. In the event of threat, if a basic unit is currently training, we change
posture "of the instruction to the operation. During this experiment, we are interested in the way
in which staff were adapting their equipment and additional equipment and ammunition. We

observed how focused command and tried to detect any interoperability or transmission
problems. We will continue these experiments that were rich teaching, very interesting. I believe.
In regard to cooperation with the prefecture of police of Paris, have reached us a level of trust
and dialogue that has nothing to do with that which existed a few months ago. The prefect of
police, and the military Governor of Paris will be able to confirm that the list of improvements
would be long to detail. One of the critical points, lies at the level of communication systems.
We have worked on the issue and, in the coming weeks, new systems will be put in place. It is
essential, and the army has evolved in this area.
Mr Stud, you are right to stress the importance of the hosting infrastructures in Paris. A certain
level of comfort is necessary to keep in the long term, but we must also fight to preserve these
military allowances. Between the islet of Saint-Germain and the Val-de-Grce, it is possible to
accommodate 1,000 soldiers. We know that we will lose these premises that will be sold. We are
rebuilding these 1 000 places elsewhere, after development of a true blueprint that leads us up to
the end of 2017. He is a real manWork of infrastructure.
Mr Habib, you did an analysis of terrorism that I don't allow me to comment on. However, I see
as the bottom of table: the rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites, between Saudi Arabia and Iran,
which is taken into account in all negotiations on the Syria, be they diplomatic, political or
military. We have this background constantly in mind to understand what is happening in Syria,
but also to the Yemen or the Lebanon. Having the chance to have access to my counterparts from
the countries of near and Middle East at coalition meetings, I can tell you that nothing is simple.
That is why the Syrian and Libyan folders are before all diplomatic and political: it is necessary
to get everyone around the table.
Need certainly to win this war and eradicating terrorism, but the solution is not only military.
One can win only by eradicating the evil at the root, which is a highly political subject. Why
youngsters go in Daech? What will find? That could provide them so that they do not there go?
These are the questions which must be answered. According to official figures, Daech have
recruited more than 2 000 veterans of French origin, but this is as fighters. I am really struck by
the choice of this youth, often owned by the poorest populations. Need to think about this. We
will win this war when we finally tarirons the flow of those who leave.
The armed forces really embody the whole nation and I well pretend to know these
disadvantaged populations who seek to give meaning to their lives.
Mr. Meyer Habib. There are 30% of converted!
General Pierre de Villiers. Certainly, but I think that you have to fight to dry up the flow and
that military action alone will not eradicate terrorism. On the safe side, I think that it does
destroy violence by the legitimate force.
The President Georges Fenech. Could my general, you complete your response to the question
by Mr Lamy on intelligence?

General Pierre de Villiers. General Gomart, Director of military intelligence, will enter more
than me in details. However, I can tell you that there is a continuum between internal security
and external security. We exchange information. However, we should not misunderstand how
happens the preparation of records of bombardment targets. First, we participate in a coalition:
the decision to bomb any particular target is collegial. Then, when even we decide to target this
or that objective, it is impossible to imagine places where it would be the French. We have made
considerable progress in the field of the exchange of information with our allies, particularly
with our American friends, and we exchange also and better interdepartmental meetings. If our
priority is obviously to prevent people from Syria from hitting us, we are also part of a coalition
that has a comprehensive strategy.
I would like to emphasise this international dimension. As we were attacked on our soil, we
legitimately tend to see the national side. However, the threat is global. The eradication of evil at
the root will go through a profound international cooperation. When you have sixty countries
around the table, it is striking. Every morning when I arrive at the office, I have the point of what
has happened in the last 24 hours. There are attacks everywhere. It happens not one day without
that there is an attack jihadist somewhere in the world. Hence the need to have a comprehensive
approach.
In response to your question, Mr Lamy, exchanges of information have actually improved at the
interdepartmental level and at the international level.
Mr. Meyer Habib. The fact that there are so many point of impact of terrorism around the world
clearly shows that radical jihadism has nothing to do with the despair and poverty. It beats its
guilt in criticising do not give enough while the France is the country which has the most
particular. With all the respect that I have for you, I am quite skeptical of this explanation of
jihadism.
General Pierre de Villiers. Each case of would-be terrorist is unique, but in large numbers, the
strategy of Daech, written black on white, is to neutralize the different Western countries security
forces to address the poor masses and convince them to join the Caliphate. There are obviously
conversions through social networks of radical mosques, prison, etc. Poverty is essential, but it is
not the only breeding ground; Daech attracts youth in search of meaning, whether they are poor
or not.
By the way, I can say that those who engage in the military, in the service of the France are
meaning, that's one of the reasons for their commitment. Unlike what happened two or three
years ago, they will not commit to have a job and a salary. They engage because they seek to
give meaning to their lives. It is characteristic, fascinating and extraordinary. We have a
beautiful youth I meet in all its diversity. It is a sign of hope.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. My general, I had several specific questions to ask you.
First of all, how many French were they killed by our air strikes?

Secondly, a change of doctrine was held with regard to interventions during terrorist attacks:
newcomers become the first responders. Much talked of the first responders of the police and the
gendarmerie. The military of the operation Sentinel could be the first responders in a concert hall
if they are the first to arrive, which is possible given the mesh in place? Could the military of the
operation Sentinel so need to open fire and get themselves into a concert hall or other place?
With respect, your answers to the questions on a possible intervention on the ground leave me a
little on my hunger. To you who are the Chief of staff of the armed forces and who earn fortytwo years of service, how much time the current bombing put to eradicate Daech? Let's do some
policy fiction and imagine what a coalition formed by the United States, the France and other
countries, including the Middle East, decides to engage in a ground operation. How much time
does it should to eradicate Daech?
We come back from Turkey. Over the hearings, in this Committee where the usual political
divisions are transcended, we have the impression of being in an in-between. Since September
2015, it was decided to carry out bombings in Syria, who gave significant results that you
recalled. Yet, from the outside, we have the feeling that things are not moving fast enough and
that we are same in some form of hypocrisy. It is, one strikes and weakened Daech, which is
very useful. Personally, I think however that we are not necessarily up to the task.
How Bataclan will take to be a commitment on the ground decided? In the event of another
attack of this type, the pressure of public opinion and political pressure will be strong. On 13
November in the evening, it is mounted very high with the State of emergency decree, the border
control and the announcements of the President of the Republic. In the next attack - and we know
that there are others - what will be the next step in terms of reaction? Will there be an
intervention on the ground? The answer is Yes. I know it is complicated but to prepare for this
hypothesis?
The President Georges Fenech. I'll complete these questions that we ask ourselves with more in
addition to sharpness. Daech wants to attract us to the ground and this is a trap, you said,
specifying that you discourage policies to lead in this direction. You thus give a more political
than military opinion since you place after a military intervention. How not to ask the question so
that we have in mind the unfortunate example of the American military intervention in Iraq?
Whatever it is, your position is somewhat political in nature, in the good sense of the word.
But basically, what do you know? How can you be certain that the trap is not refermerait on
those who want to tighten? And if there was a Bataclan power ten in France, as the rapporteur
dreads? And if there was a chemical attack, as Meyer Habib emits the hypothesis? Could the
political and military response be an increase in air strikes? This is all the more doubtful that you
have clearly stated that Daech cannot be eradicated by a combined forces air and ground action.
We turn around the problem from the beginning, and we come to tell us, with more and more
convinced that sooner or later, a land coalition should prevail. This is a purely political response
which escapes us as well as you as it depends on the President of the Republic. We remain on
our hunger to ask when Mosul and Raqqah will fall.

General Pierre de Villiers. How many French were killed by our strikes? We do not count
when air strikes or ground combat, even if our plays are sometimes killed francophones. I have
no figures to give you. We have a few certainties on the fact that such or such foreign fighter was
killed. We knock as possible groups which, according to the information available to us, are
more likely to come to the attacks in France.
The military of the operation Sentinel could act as first responders in the event of terrorist attack?
I know the theme of non-assistance to person in danger. An example: when hostage at the
Radisson in Bamako, I did not intervene the soldiers who were close to the hotel because it was
not their job and that the cure could be worse than the disease. On the other hand, since the
operations command special (COS) based in northern Mali, we have made come from
specialized soldiers who intervened and conducted the liberation of hostages, in support of the
Malian forces.
It is extremely complex to enter a place without having a minimum amount of information, and
the Sentinel operation soldiers are not trained to do this. We could take this kind of decision only
as a last resort.
I have the chance to follow the training of the specialized forces that are capable of releasing
persons held hostage in confined places. I recommend all the same great care with regard to such
interventions. Of when we are first responders, we are at the orders of the prefectural authorities
and homeland security which we generally entrust missions corresponding to our know-how.
Finally, Mr Cazeneuve introduced the system in place since the attacks: the device has changed
so there are possibilities of reaction near any place.
The President Georges Fenech. My general, you speak of confined environments.
General Pierre de Villiers. As a concert hall.
The President Georges Fenech. On the facts which took place last November, we heard from
officials of the anti-crime (BAC) brigade who were outside the establishment, impasse Amelot,
where there were exchanges between the terrorists and the tray. The police had handguns and the
present military refused to lend them their long guns.
General Pierre de Villiers. A soldier will never lend his weapon.
The President Georges Fenech. This is the question posed by one.
General Pierre de Villiers. Do not ask this question. A military is never separated his weapon.
The President Georges Fenech. It is a response.
General Pierre de Villiers. We must stop asking the question. This answer has already been
given ten times. It is the first thing one learns to Cotquidan, entering at Saint-Cyr: one is never
separated from his weapon. That is what a fighter without his weapon? As to why it has failed, it
is because at the time when the soldiers saw a gun protruding, they did not see the person. For

the rest, we are trained in combat in town and we will obviously use this skill needed, otherwise
it would be pointless that we are deployed within the Sentinel operation. We did in Valencia, for
example.
For what is the intervention on the ground against Daech, I repeat that I do not recommend the
dispatch of Western forces because I'm not sure that it would not return against us. It is a rated
military-political or military, I grant you. I think that the solution is, as always, by local forces.
This is what we do with the G5 Sahel in the BSS. In this piece, we all face a dilemma: the time
management. It must be accepted that a war - especially of this type - can be long, as history
teaches us, but we must also act quickly to do not then have to blame each other for not
intervened early enough to eradicate Daech until it strikes us. The notion of long time is
nevertheless important. It is not possible to eradicate an ideology in a few weeks or a few
months. It will take time. If expected an attack from us, we can decide to launch a ground
operation to do not have to be ashamed not to have done. For once, it is a political issue.
The rapporteur. As a member, how much do you consider the time it would take to eradicate
Daech continuing only the current bombing or doubling of an intervention on the ground?
General Pierre de Villiers. War is not going well. It is not possible to predict the end of a war.
The rapporteur. We interviewed many people, including french soldiers, still some days ago,
which tells us that this last five years or ten years, that gave us elements.
General Pierre de Villiers. It is all very well, but for my part, I would not venture to give an
estimate. Everything depends on the importance of the ground forces. Syrian democratic forces
have resumed Cheddadi much faster that we only had planned, for example, but they are
blocked. They will perhaps go West, it is a question of balance of power. I do not know how
long we are going to train local forces. I do not know how fast Daech people back if they fall
back on the shrines of Mosul and Raqqah, or what they will do in these two cities. They veer
elsewhere? I do not know. To sum up, I do not know how long is going to take the eradication of
Daech. I can only tell you that more there will be combatants on the ground and more that will
go quickly: it is the combination of the bombing and the action on the ground that we will
advance.
During the intervention in Libya in 2011, were we constantly asked questions of the kind: why
nothing is moving forward? Why is nothing there happened then that we bombed for four
months? In fact, the building suddenly collapsed, as is often the case. Yes, Daech recedes. When
you suffer such a mass of strikes by a coalition of 60 countries, you end up back. Yes, the local
forces are becoming better organized. It is the case of peshmergas and Iraqi Government forces
including of the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (ICTS), which is the equivalent of our special
forces. Nevertheless, it will take time. With new troops on the ground, we would definitely
faster, but to measure the political risk that it represents in relation to the military gain.
Regarding the risk of chemical attack, we can say that Daech has capabilities in this area.
However, the organization prefers to use other tools: trapped vehicles (vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device -VBIED), improvised explosive devices (improvised explosive device -FDI),

human bombs, mines, with snippers. One can imagine the use of such means in France. What is
we are prepare? In principle, we prepare permanently. However, I repeat to you, we are currently
at the maximum of our operational capabilities.
The President Georges Fenech. I wouldn't give you the impression the commission of inquiry
is concerned for the safety of our compatriots, with a lot of selfishness. As we speak, the terrorist
threat remains very high among us but do not forget these some 8 million people living under the
yoke of total barbarism. At each Territory resumed, we discover mass graves. There is a feeling
that the West is trying to abandon populations who are victims of unprecedented savagery. It also
lend a hand to these populations, often of the Muslim faith, who are the first victims of this
barbarity.
General Pierre de Villiers. You tell me it to me which command every day, 24 hours a day,
actions on the ground. Mr president, we are engaged in land operations. It's hard. It will look for
the enemy to fifteen meters. What countries are involved in the action on the ground? You just
tell us to go fight on the ground. We go there, in BSS for example.
The President Georges Fenech. You have given the figure of 32 000 french soldiers in
operational posture. How many Germans, Spaniards, Italians, Danes are there?
General Pierre de Villiers. There are different stages of commitment. The coalition is
composed of sixty countries. Some provide logistics, others bombard, others are training, etc. In
any case, I note that we are in the top three most committed Western countries in the Levant. We
were in second place after the United States when there was the carrier battle group. In the
Levant we are members of a coalition. In the BSS, we pilot and we have team members and a
few allies. To go in the direction of your note, I find it unbearable to see these populations
massacred or living under the yoke of this terrorism. But I am military leader 24 hours a day and
I have a very regular injuries and deaths among my soldiers. I hear that it does not risk and it
does not participate in operations on the ground, while I saw the families of the three soldiers
killed two weeks ago! What makes the France is all his honour and I don't see what it could do
more. I have the feeling that the entire French population supports this commitment. What more?
An operation on the ground in Iraq and Syria? How and with whom? Arises also the question of
the means. Would the army budget passes to 2% of GDP as soon as tomorrow morning.
Mr. Serge Grouard. If I may say so, my general questions returning a little loop are not on the
merits of the commitment of the French forces, each has hailed. We know that we are at the stop.
The problem is the international dimension of this conflict, that illustrate the daily strikes in the
world. In Syria, there are 20,000 or 30 000 affiliated with Daech, if I may call them so. Actually,
Western countries should not fall into the trap that would engage only in a ground operation. But
other countries, for some Muslims, themselves undergoing this terrorism should go there while
they are completely absent or almost. Without betting on a quick outcome, we can nevertheless
say that if an international coalition as it has been for other conflicts were ground against these
20 000 or 30,000 men installed in an almost desert territory, it may be possible to avoid a new
attack occurs. The international community seems to be incredibly low. The France and the
French army are not in question.

General Pierre de Villiers. I agree with your political analysis, even if I do not have to speak on
this plan. It is the honor of France to have this level of military commitment. This is not us
blaming respect a commitment that would be insufficient to this terrifying threat to populations.
This must be an international approach. For the rest, with the military tool at our disposal, we can
hardly do more against terrorism.
The President Georges Fenech. Remember what was said Jean-Claude Juncker, president of
the European Commission: the France saved Europe's honour. We finish perhaps on this
assessment. It remains for me to thank you, my general.
General Pierre de Villiers. I also thank you for the interest in these topics serious and
important, and I hope that your approach and your report will play a leading role.
The President Georges Fenech. We hope. It really is the objective that we set ourselves.
Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Grgoire Dor, Deputy Head of the unit for the coordination of
intervention forces (UCOFI)
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, Wednesday, May 11, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We receive Mr. Grgoire Dor, Deputy Head of the unit for the
coordination of intervention forces (UCOFI). He is accompanied by colonel Samuel Dubuis,
Member of the cabinet of the Director-general of the national gendarmerie.
Commissioner, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of
inquiry. We are especially eager to hear you on the rationalization of the operations command of
intervention, that the Minister of the Interior, introduced on April 19, the new scheme national
response of the security forces that creates such an absolute emergency procedure (AUP)
allowing units to intervene urgently on all points of the territory without criterion of jurisdiction
other than proximity and immediate availability.
Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, this hearing is held
in camera. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the website of the National Assembly. Nevertheless,
in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning of
the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part if we decide so at
the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings held in camera are first transmitted to
people heard in order to collect their comments. These observations are submitted to the
commission of inquiry, which may decide to State in his report. In accordance with the
provisions of the same article, shall be punished by the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of
the penal code any person who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish
information relating to the non-public work of a commission of inquiry, unless the report
published at the end of the work of the Committee reported this information.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you now to take the oath to tell the
truth, nothing but the truth.

Mr. Grgoire Dor oath.

The UCOFI was created in 2010, under the leadership of the Minister of the Interior Brice
Hortefeux and at the request of the President of the Republic Nicolas Sarkozy, to facilitate the
collaboration of special intervention forces. It was placed at the time, under the authority of a
gendarmerie general assisted by a police Commissioner. It has become a gateway, a place of
exchange of knowledge and sharing of knowledge, negotiation and action methods, radio
procedures, the aim being that there is no loss of time in preparation for an assault. It is intended
to enable the units in the intervention force of the national police (FNIF) - RAID, bis of the
prefecture of police, and intervention groups of the national police (GIPN) overseas - and the
GIGN to harmonize their intervention techniques.
How to organize the UCOFI? What are its strength and how are distributed among the forces that
I have mentioned? What procedures does in place during interventions, I think obviously those
that took place at theHypercacher and at the Bataclan ?
Mr. Grgoire Dor, Deputy Head of the unit for the coordination of intervention forces
(UCOFI). I am very honoured to be auditioned by your commission of inquiry. Firstly, because
it is the first time that the UCOFI is sought for such an exercise, on the other hand, because of
the importance of the issue that has motivated this solicitation and on which you work for several
months.
My opening remarks will focus on initial missions and achievements of the UCOFI since its
creation as well as on measures taken since the attacks of January 2015, then November 2015,
having involved or concerned the UCOFI. I conclude by referring to the prospects of unity,
particularly in the context of the national plan of intervention and the absolute urgency
procedure.
The coordination of intervention forces unit was created within the Ministry of the Interior, 1er
June 2010, following one of the recommendations of the study conducted by the army general
Guy Parayre mission and the controller general Luc Presson. Organically attached to the
Directorate-General of the national gendarmerie (DGGN), it is functionally subordinate to the
two Directors-General of the national gendarmerie and the national police, and the prefect of
police of Paris. It is hosted by a gendarmerie officer and a Commissioner of the national police.
At its inception, it was headed by a general of gendarmerie brigade, assisted by a Divisional
Commissioner. Today, as Commissioner of the national police, I have the honour to be in his
head, assisted by a Lieutenant-Colonel of the mounted police. This structure is very quickly
called to be extended.
No reporting relationship the ties with the national intervention of the gendarmerie and police
units. It is responsible, without calling into question their respective identities, give greater
coherence, transparency and collective efficiency to operative intervention of the Ministry of the
Interior forces. It must also prepare them for interoperability, which is the cFavorite pieces of
mission of unity.
Under its initial mandate, the UCOFI has several missions:

Facilitate coordination and cooperation between units without finding the scale but by
promoting, on the contrary, partnerships and operational synergies. The UCOFI enabled to
develop a common operational tactical language borrowed from that of NATO, because to work
well together, use the same words, for example 'neutralize', 'fix', 'confine '. Unity also currently
follows the work of the service technologies and information systems of internal security (ST
(SI)2) on radio interoperability so that radios of all intervention units are interoperable, which is
not currently the case;
Assess the implementation of the common guidelines enacted by the Directors General of the
gendarmerie and the police national as well as the prefect of police, through frequent and regular
meetings on field visits;
To synthesize and evaluate, to the attention of the Directors-General and the prefect of police,
the views of the heads of the intervention units of the gendarmerie and the national police,
promoting convergence towards the interoperability;
Joint exercises and propose training, training, exchanges, or even common commitment
procedures. It can thus propose the organisation of returns of experience (RETEX) of major
missions, training and important exercises, and participate;
Follow-up weekly and monthly activities of units and perform the dissemination to the
authorities, services and units that have right and need to know. It shall be provided upstream of
the draft conventions and Protocol which bind these units to public or private partners to ensure
their coherence within the Department. It ensures coherence and relevance of partnerships with
the armies of avoiding competition and preserving identities and cultures to units - I am thinking
particularly of the joint group of helicopters (GIH). She should be informed of all international
actions conducted by the two forces, GIGN and RAID. Finally, it organises regular meetings
with the heads of the units, and it sends reports to two Directors-General and the prefect of police
of Paris.
At the time of its inception, the UCOFI has made a first census of the different capacities
developed by specialized from the top of the spectrum intervention units: RAID, the GIGN, the
bis in its tray configuration, the advocacy groups of the national police (GIPN), groups of
platoons of intervention (GPI), the interregional intervention of the gendarmerie (PI2G) expelotons become the antennas of the GIGN. This declarative census conducted in 2011, updated
a first time in 2013, and then a second time in 2016, in the context of the preparation of the
national plan of action.
A joint note prepared by the UCOFI in July 2014, helped to formalize the cooperation and
coordination of national specialized of the gendarmerie and the police intervention units. This
note, prepared in consultation with the special intervention units, posed essential principles,
including that of leading and competing.
Since its inception, the UCOFI has focused, with intervention forces, on scenarios concerning
killings or planned mass or the mass hostage which require joint interventions. An exercise in
response to a mass killer, predicted in January 2015 at the Mall beautiful thorn in the Val-de-

Marne, but had to be cancelled. reprogrammed to Vlizy 2 shopping centre, November 17, 2015,
it had again been cancelled. You see, in any case, that the problem of catches of hostage-taking
and mass murder was treated early by the UCOFI, especially from 2013 and the attack of the
commercial centre of Nairobi.
I come to measures taken after the attacks of January 2015.
Tuesday, March 31, 2015, the UCOFI organized a feedback on the coordination between units
during the terrorist attacks of January 2015. This RETEX held in Bivres, at the headquarters of
the RAID, in the presence of the leaders of the RAID, the GIGN, the bis and the UCOFI. It
notably emerged that the articulation between the two forces was effective through the
application of the principle of leading and competing in the mission of looking for people on the
run, in this case the brothers Kaye. The GIGN reported internal reflection on its ability to deploy
on several crises with capacity sized to operational needs.
The events of January 2015 were also the opportunity to Work a simple coordination scheme: an
assault coordinated without application of leading and competing, each in its area of competence.
The two forces coordinate to the level of command structures through liaison officers, without
consequence on the Organization of command posts. This first level of coordination is acquired
by the units.
In the month of April 2015, seven groups of intervention of the national police (GIPN) of
metropolis, which were all attached to the Central Directorate of public security (UMD), have
been integrated at the central level of the RAID, Bivres, in order to ensure better coordination
and optimize the use of operators that make up this "great RAID".
Claimed by a mandate of the Minister of the Interior, June 8, 2015, the evolution of the doctrine
of joint between the police and the gendarmerie intervention has been developed and gave rise to
a note joint DGPN, DGGN and prefect of police, on October 16, 2015. This note offers, in
particular, forward the development of the primo-intervention of intermediate intervention
forces, including with the tray-PSIG plan, to engage without waiting for specialized units this
issue was the subject of an announcement by the Minister, October 30, 2015, in Rouen. This
principle is a doctrinal revolution for the police and the gendarmerie in the management of this
type of event.
The doctrine of joint intervention also provides for setting up a component equipment and
training to optimize the response in a crisis - a capital master plan has been implemented very
quickly.
Regarding the attacks of November 2015, RETEX has been integrated into the reflections of the
Working Group for the drafting of the national plan of action.
Both directions, DGPN and DGGN, made the fruit of their respective thoughts in specific notes
on the management of the mass murder, in December 2015. The prefecture of police has adapted
its management system of crisis through the general provision EVENGRAVE, 16 November
2015. A mandate was given to the UCOFI so that it is developing the national plan of action.

This mandate has been signed and validated by the Directors-General and the Commissioner of
police, on 31 December 2015, but the UCOFI worked there already since November 23.
The national plan of action has been validated by the two Directors-General and the
Commissioner of police on March 23, 2016. It was presented by the Minister on April 19, 2016.
A major exercise, organised by the UCOFI, took place successfully on the night of 19-20 April,
at the Montparnasse station, to illustrate the national plan of action. RAID and GIGN-BRI
intervened in a coordinated manner on three separate points to neutralize a fictional team of
terrorists during a simulation of mass killing.
I will end with the perspective that today are ours.
Implementation The national plan of action must begin by evaluating three raw capabilities of
the forces of intervention during the month of May. In this context, the UCOFI must be in power.
The unit has been strengthened by the arrival, March 28, 2016, of a Lieutenant Colonel of
gendarmerie. Two officers, police, gendarmerie, will soon come flesh out it.
The UCOFI is positioned as the entry point of the intervention forces as part of development of
the GIH Protocol and Government plans 'Pirate' for intervention forces. It is also closer
international cooperation structures to see if a similar coordinating structure exists abroad, and
possibly be inspired.
If you want, I will communicate a summary of the main points of the national plan of action.
The President Georges Fenech. It us interested, indeed.
We have a document from the RAID, dating from February 20, 2014, which indicates that the
perpetrators of the attacks of Bombay, In Amenas and Nairobi have shot the majority of the
victims from the first minutes. It is specified that "the willingness to allow time for security to
arrive is flagrant. Although engaged in a suicidal action, the aggressors do not behave in suicide
bombers but fight until the last moment, trying to kill as many victims as possible. However the
quick assault by the forces of the order may surprise them and thwart their project.
Since then, the new modus operandi of the FNIF calls for an intervention without negotiation.
This doctrine was provided to the Minister of the Interior as well as the Director of the UCOFI.
Why not follow this recommendation at the Bataclan ? The FNIF was triggered in January, but
not at the Bataclan. Document of February 20, 2014 yet clearly indicates: "in the light of these
recent examples, and the determination demonstrated by now radical Islamist terrorists, the FNIF
is now working on a doctrine based on immediate assaults and without negotiation. '' Why has
this procedure not been applied at the Bataclan ?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. At its inception, in 2009, the FNIF consisted of several entities: the RAID,
GIPN of the Central Directorate of public security and the bis - BAC of the prefecture of police.
The FNIF is a non-permanent structure enabled by the Director-general of the national police in
the territory.

The President Georges Fenech. Things are different in Paris.

Mr. Grgoire Dor. Indeed, in Paris, it is, somehow, a concerted decision because if the DGPN
remains the authority that enables the FNIF, it does on proposal of the prefect of police.
Today, the GIPN who joined "the great RAID", the FNIF consists of the RAID and BRI - Lac. It
seems to me that during the events that you mention, the BRI - BAC, which is part of the FNIF,
indeed applied doctrine and directives from the feedback of the first of the month of January.
The President Georges Fenech. Of course, but if the FNIF was triggered, the RAID would have
taken the controls. We are agreed on this point?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. If it was triggered, it is indeed the RAID leader who took command of the
FNIF.
The President Georges Fenech. Why he had no outbreak of the FNIF at the Bataclan events ?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. I don't have the answer to this question: I wasn't one of the decision
makers.
The President Georges Fenech. We know it well, but under the faith of the oath, you should be
able to explain to us why you think the FNIF has not been triggered during the attack of the
Bataclan, whereas it had been to theHypercacher.
Mr. Grgoire Dor. Because the Director-general of the national police took no decision to
activate it and that the Commissioner of police has not proposed it.
The President Georges Fenech. What criteria, what have, you base this decision?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. I can only make assumptions. The BRI - BAC was perhaps sufficient to
carry out the assault. Was RAID being reached as reinforcements, it a need to activate the FNIF?
I just assumptions. These questions should be directed to the Director general of the national
police and the prefect of police.
The President Georges Fenech. Commissioner, I feel, which is not necessarily shared by all
members of the commission of inquiry, that there was a real desire to the bis to maintain the
direction of this operation so that the magnitude of the attack could justify that "the gang proof"
leaves the direction to a unit specializing in this type of attack. We have heard a kind of 'war of
the fonts' - which also may constitute a form of healthy competition between services. I do not
say that the bis has poorly done its job, but do you have the feeling that there was a kind of
competition between services?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. In this case, I have no sense: If the bis found that she was able to intervene,
it is normal that it could intervene. This unit is perfectly legitimate to intervene initiative on a
killing spree of mass in Paris.

The President Georges Fenech. This is not to take such a decision!

Mr. Grgoire Dor. Not exactly. If this is to the prefect of police, the bis retains a certain
margin of initiative, including in emergency situations. Concerning the activation of the FNIF, it
is beyond my purview to comment on the decisions of the Director-general of the national police
and the prefect of police.
The President Georges Fenech. During the operation, have you had a link with the operational
of the bis Chief or the Commissioner of police?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. I had no contact with them. Indeed, I would like to remind that the UCOFI
is not an operational command structure. At any time, it must intervene to coordinate or control
intervention in operation forces. Its mission is to draw the consequences of the action.
We have learned a number of lessons from what happened at the Bataclan, including command
and coordination of the units involved in a major or multiple crisis. We are responsible for
strategic thinking so that the organization is the most effective possible when operational
interventions, but we have no role to play during the operations themselves.
The President Georges Fenech. The evening of the attack of the Bataclan, you had no contact
with the RAID or the command post on the spot?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. No.
The President Georges Fenech. This is a normal procedure?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. This is normal, Mr president.
The President Georges Fenech. This procedure has not been reviewed since?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. For the moment, it has not been reviewed.
The President Georges Fenech. It has to be?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. It is not intended: we leave the operations to the operational. The UCOFI is
a unit of strategic thinking which the missions have been listed in introductory remarks.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. What are the strength of the UCOFI?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. To date, we are two. In its initial configuration, the UCOFI consisted of a
police officer and a Constable, and the latter headed the unit.
The rapporteur. Why is the unit attached to the DGGN?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. Many units of coordination have been implemented during reconciliation
between the police and the gendarmerie. They must necessarily be attached to a structure. The

coordination unit of the mobile forces or the transit security coordination unit, for example,
involve the DGPN, then the unit for coordination of the fight against road unsafety is organically
attached to the DGGN. Aside from the Minister, the two Directorates-General are the Supreme
authorities, so there is no choice but to attach a unit in either of them.
The rapporteur. As it said our president, we felt that there was a "healthy" competition between
the three task forces. In this context, the Commissioner of police that you consider that the
joining of the UCOFI to the DGGN allows the unit to be adequately heard by the RAID and the
bis?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. When the Director-general of the national gendarmerie summoned me to
tell me that he was leaving the Minister's office and had to be Work a national pattern of
intervention, he trusted entirely a police Commissioner to write this document.
The rapporteur. This work as well in the other direction? The RAID and the bis rely on
UCOFI, unit attached to the DGGN? The unit has the necessary authority to accomplish the
many missions that you have described to us?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. Certainly, I want proof of the development of the national plan of
intervention in so little time. This wording would not have been possible if the intervention
forces had not cooperated or not is were voluntarily integrated in the work carried out by the
coordination unit.
The rapporteur. The national plan of action is a step forward, particularly because it relaxes the
principle of territorial competence, but the principle according to which the first on-site is
involved seems to be carrying perverse effects. Outside Paris, is said to me that the territorial
offices of the RAID and the GIGN mesh would avoid any risk of duplication. What do you
think?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. The procedure of absolute emergency under the national plan of
intervention allows the unit available closest to intervene. This procedure is obviously
specialized intervention from the top of the spectrum units, but also intermediate intervention
units, such as the BAC or the PSIG. It is not to organize a race, but to assess, at the moment
when a crisis occurs, which is able to intervene more quickly.
The national plan of action helped to revise the mapping of special intervention forces. Seven
new units are distributed over the national territory in a consistent manner. The RAID and the
GIGN antennas have been created in several cities of metropolis, and another was opened to
overseas by the gendarmerie in order to ensure that the whole of the national territory is covered.
There's no race who will be the first. Simply, the procedure allows the nearest and the most
available unit to intervene.
The rapporteur. There is the theory and practice. Nothing did, for example, that the GIGN is
positioned right in theFavorite pieces of Paris, in the barracks of the Celestines, as it did during
attacks on 13 November. However, this was extremely useful.

In practice, in the case of multiple attacks on a restricted area, several forces could converge at
the same time to the site. In this case, the first to arrive would therefore take responsibility for the
operations?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. No, because, according to the principle of leading and competing, the unit
located in its area took command of operations. Zone national police, the RAID would lead
operations; area police, this role would the GIGN, and in Paris, he come to the bis, except
activation of FNIF, which case the RAID would take the reins.
The principle of leading and competing allows the territorially competent units to use, if
necessary, to others that are not. However, the absolute emergency procedure allows units which
are not territorially competent but who are nearby and available to go on-site and temporarily
take command of the operations until the arrival of the driving force.
The rapporteur. The three task forces we interviewed told us that, operationally, it was
preferable that this force on-site first becomes drive, regardless of the jurisdiction: it has more
information, she took possession of the premises, it has frozen the situation... The change of
command during the operation and recovery of the criterion of territorial jurisdiction is not a
problem?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. Do not underestimate the good operation of the units, their ability to
cooperate and the good will of their leaders. The resumption of command by a unit that enters a
place together. If an action is brought by a unit, it will not be interrupted because another unit
arises.
The rapporteur. When is action taken? The bis was present at theHypercacher well before the
RAID. Yet it is the latter who initiated the action.
Mr. Grgoire Dor. The business will be able to answer you on the details of the events. Let's
say that an action is operationally committed to the "top attack" or, for example, when columns
are moving towards a hotspot.
The rapporteur. Once the national plan of action and the new doctrine for the employment
advocate to intervene immediately, waiting for the territorially competent unit has more
meaning.
Mr. Grgoire Dor. You are right to stress this point. In General, special intervention forces are
not necessarily primo-interveners on the whole.
Imagine it produces something in Orleans, where the RAID is not. Who will intervene
immediately? This will be the territorial police, Lac, the company PSIG. If we are at the limit of
area police in the outskirts of Orlans, and a vehicle of the PSIG is nearby, it will first, before the
tray.
The national plan of action provides for the Organization of the forces of intervention specialist
but also intermediate, which are distributed throughout the national territory, or almost eight

hundred units in total. Special intervention forces almost always need a delay before intervene
except in Paris. With the RAID in Bivres, the GIGN at Satory, and the bis on the spot, the
problem in Paris is not the reaction time, it is the Organization of the forces.
The President Georges Fenech. In the context of the absolute urgency procedure, the force that
first is located closest to the place of crisis. In Paris, it should be the bis since, as you pointed out,
it is located on-site. However, in simulation that you organised last month at the gare
Montparnasse, the RAID took command. Yet, the Parisian unit should be the driving force.
Mr. Grgoire Dor. In a mass killing, it must act immediately. The national response plan
organizes the immediacy of the response. A unit must "fix" the situation. At the Bataclan, a
Commissioner of the BAC 75N intervened the first: he shot and killed one of the terrorists,
which put an end to the killing. Then, it 'reducing' definitely the crisis, which is not the
intervention forces intermediate - bin, PSIG, platoons of intervention of mobile gendarmerie
Squadron or CRS (SPI - 4 G). The available specialized intervention - GIGN, RAID, BRI nearest unit occurs so quickly, before is organized possibly subsequently resumed command.
That is the timeline that guide the Organization's operations.
The President Georges Fenech. Why the RAID intervened outset at the gare Montparnasse?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. The RAID occurred not exactly from the outset. In the scenario that we had
established to simulate an attack from Montparnasse train station, nine terrorists were divided
into three teams, one committing a massacre in the commercial gallery, while the other two were
in a TGV. It's the 75N ferry which intervened the first, helped by the bis rapid intervention force
who shot a terrorist. After that, others are entrenched. It is then that special intervention forces
intervened.
The President Georges Fenech. Again, why the RAID?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. In this case, we decided that he had arrived quickly and that the first had
been activated. We could have another hypothesis. The return corresponded to the developed
scenario.
The rapporteur. Under the new national scheme of intervention does the FNIF still has a
meaning?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. It brings together if need there are national police forces.
M. Philippe Goujon. The criterion of proximity seems to be the only one to play to find out how
much force is involved in an attack. Does it not exist other? A unit can have know-how more
suited than another to one type of operation, it can have a better knowledge of the terrain, absent
another force specialists to be given.
Considering the single criterion of proximity, and that two forces themselves ready to intervene imagine that this is the case in Paris, the bis, the RAID and the GIGN-, who chooses the unit to
engage?

In fact, BAC or PSIG you describe as the first responders will rarely be the first on the spot:
there is more chance that it either staff of the brigade of mounted police or the nearest police
station - call the newcomers. How are things between them and the first responders, knowing
that it must immediately destroy the terrorist element to avoid a massacre?
Has the employment doctrine changed with regard to the military of the Sentinel operation? They
are several thousands in Paris, where they will necessarily have to intervene in one way or
another in case of attack.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. I wish, also, find out how your mission of coordination articulates with the
Sentinel army-led operation.
Do you feel that it is today still relevant to dispose of three elite units also performing and
qualified? Could they not working together and, eventually, be grouped? This is a personal
reflection, no doubt shared by some of us who are struggling to follow description of dense
devices to multiple stakeholders. This grouping seems to me to constitute a priority objective in
the medium term. The synthesis of the work of our Committee of inquiry must make a State.
M. Olivier Marleix. I am surprised to hear never mention the role of the Minister. It is still, to
my knowledge, the only direct hierarchical authority of command of the national police and the
national gendarmerie. Except for his Chief of staff, who can assist him, there is no other
authority for coordination.
On an attack multisite, as of November 13, 2015, the choice not to raise the FNIF is
understandable - we were told that the fact of not knowing what could happen elsewhere had
pushed to maintain the capacity of the RAID and the GIGN in reserve. Whose act! However, in
my view, such a choice, reports to the Minister.
In the future, which will decide the development in The absolute urgency procedure work? Who
will decide the development in Work function of Commander and coordinator of special
intervention operations, as provided for in the new national plan of action? What should be the
role of the Minister in this type of intervention?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. All these issues were taken into account in the national plan of action.
The proximity is not the only criterion to be considered to involve a unit. Need to know if it is
available: it can be traveling for training far from his implantation, so not being able to intervene,
but it can do so, if necessary, where it lies. In addition, some units have developed more than
others to the specific capabilities. National intervention scheme takes this fact into account: it
contains one hundred and thirty capacity and sets out eight areas need to master in order to be
able to intervene in cases of killing. These capabilities have been standardized and will be tested
under the aegis of the UCOFI.
A unit that controls less while another capacity may have recourse to it thanks to the capacitive
contest procedure. This procedure applies or by modularity - for example, to perform a complex
burglary, it involves add-on "effraction" of another unit very specialized in this field-, either by

complementarity, to complete with members of another unit a workforce that is not sufficient. In
any case, everything is organized so as to maximize the response.
If two forces arrive at the same time on a place, it is not necessary to take a decision. Units know
where they must intervene; they know their area of competence. The principle of leading and
contributing then to define a framework, except in the case of application of the absolute urgency
procedure which primer unit arrived on the spot first. In addition, units to talk and agree: if they
arrive at the same time, the drive unit will take command of the operations. Pose no major
difficulty.
The joint note the DGGN, the DGPN and the prefecture of police, October 16, 2015, organizes
the articulation of the primo-intervention in case of mass killing. It revolutionizes a secular
doctrine, shared by the police and the gendarmerie, which non specialised in counter-terrorism
units were not involved. Now, the aim being to put an end to the slaughter, all personnel who
arrive armed contribute. When they have the means to put an end to the slaughter, then they have
an obligation to - as the Commissioner of the BAC 75N at the Bataclan.
However, it is not only new arrivals or the primo-incurred "go to cardboard. do not make targets.
An oversighting, a rider, a police-rescue team lack the equipment necessary to intervene; they
must give the alert so that intermediate intervention units arrive as soon as possible - can be a
few seconds. It is in this spirit that the BAC-PSIG plan unveiled by the Minister of the Interior in
October 2015 allowed to 'go upmarket"BAC and the Sabre PSIG, giving them capabilities of
primo-intervention with the aim of enhanced geographical coverage. Special intervention units
take over then, to reduce permanently the crisis, if applicable.
The national scheme of intervention, in its current version, is restricted to the internal security
forces. If the armed forces today give a hand essential to the internal security forces, they are
considered as a visible element that reassures the population without intervening. If they
intervened, they would do after having been solicited through specific protocols. The internal
security forces hold all the necessary attack capabilities.
The national plan of action is nevertheless Resetter: whenever this is necessary, and at least
every year. It is therefore possible to think instead of the armed forces. That said, we are not yet
under siege - hope never to be there - and some legal principles preclude the armed forces to
intervene in the same way as internal security forces. However, an experiment of collaboration
between the forces was conducted in Isre these past two weeks. This is not really my area, but I
think I know that she gave full satisfaction. It must now be the subject of a RETEX which will
assess the articulation between the forces.
Is it appropriate to have three elite units? To tell the truth, there is though three primary units, but
it also takes all the antennas of the RAID and the GIGN, and all forces overseas.
The President Georges Fenech. There are three even if they come in the territory. Could we
imagine that there is only one force?

Mr. Grgoire Dor. Your question implies that there is more than one force of Homeland
Security.
The President Georges Fenech. There is no distinction between national gendarmerie and
national police, the elite force.
Mr. Grgoire Dor. The GIGN has military status that allows him to intervene abroad. It
maintains relations with the special forces and works with the special operations command. The
RAID is a civilian national police force who works regularly on missions of the judicial police
and intelligence with CSB. Complementarity is excellent way: it seems to be a major asset. It
seems to me, personally, that the questioning of the different statuses does not deserve there
looks.
The President Georges Fenech. Some countries have however only a single specialized task
force.
Mr. Grgoire Dor. The operators of the GIGN, RAID, bis know, will attend and speak.
Military and civil statutes to conduct different operations on different theatres. Maybe did you
want to take me on the ground for a possible reflection on a single command...
The President Georges Fenech. What about the role of the Minister referred to Mr. Olivier
Marleix?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. The Minister flew itself the work of the national plan of action. He became
aware personally of the record of each of our work and each step of the scheme, which it follows
today each step in Artwork. Thus, he wrote the mail entering the UCOFI about the verification
capabilities. It is therefore totally involved.
M. Olivier Marleix. By reading the national plan of action, I have not seen when the Minister of
the Interior intervened itself or when taking decisions.
Mr. Grgoire Dor. This document is in the header of the Ministry of the Interior. The Minister
is present at each line and each page of the national scheme.
M. Olivier Marleix. We found, in the dramatic evening of November 13, in particular at the
Bataclan, that coordination between police and gendarmerie should, at some point, be able to
incarnate. Practical and operationally, it cannot be endorsed, place Beauvau, than by the Minister
himself. Physically, no one else can give orders both the DGPN and the DGGN. I am surprised
that the intervention scheme explicit not more precisely the share of responsibility that the
Minister will take in the event of a major crisis taking place simultaneously in several points of
the territory.
Mr. Grgoire Dor. It seems to me clear that the Minister pilot operations regardless of the
crisis. We have seen that, both in the smoker lounge of the Ministry of the Interior within the
interministerial crisis cell, was coordinated by the Minister in person. The smoker lounge, where

were the Directors-General of the police and the gendarmerie and the police Commissioner, it is
the Minister who was the manArtwork.
The national plan of action gives an operational role at the "specialists" that are the DirectorsGeneral of the police and the gendarmerie, and the prefect of police. The Minister obviously
takes the necessary decisions and ensures coordination. Crisis multi-zone of jurisdiction, the
Minister necessarily pilot operations. The national response plan provides (p.27) that the
operations coordinator of special intervention, i.e. the RAID leader and/or the GIGN, which
coordinates in case of multiple crises, "is positioned always with the authority which coordinates
operations (police prefect, Director general, Minister of the Interior) as technical advisor.
Mr. Serge Grouard. The amendment, last April, of the doctrine of intervention by the national
scheme shows that it took the attacks in France, particularly those of November, to adapt our
operational tool while other attacks of mass took place abroad - including in European countries
- and that our intelligence services were not stingy warnings about the threat.
Regarding the structures of special intervention units, we can understand that there are different
status and specific stories. But why have not held a single command? We actually want to take
you on this ground, as this solution would solve all questions of coordination. A gendarme and a
policeman could lead these forces to turn - in the same way that the Chief of staff of the armed
forces is alternately from the army of air, army and Navy.
Furthermore, have you drawn other consequences of the events of 2015 as reflected in the
national plan of action?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. It is true that the work on the national plan of action began after the attacks
of November 2015. However, the Ministry of the Interior remained without doing anything while
attacks took place abroad and the threat was announced.
I have presented in my opening remarks what had been decided, particularly in the context of the
mass killings. Thus, on 8 June 2015, a mandate of the Minister defined the Organization to
change the doctrine, which arose the October 16 note to the primo intervention and the tray-PSIG
plan presented by the Minister in Rouen, on 30 October. The common special intervention forces
instructions date, she, 2014. It has been drafted after the feedback of Bombay and Nairobi attacks
that allowed to define the principle leading and competing. It already included two essential
items that have been included in the national plan of action: the capacitive contest procedure and
that of the absolute urgency. In reality, the national scheme takes existing items by clarifying and
expanding them after the events of 2015, but we didn't need to be at the foot of the wall to
engage in reflection.
A single intervention forces command is part of the mentioned solutions; It is one of the lines of
thought. The example of the command of special operations (COS) is often mentioned, but
besides that there is a difference in status between civilians and military, there is not staff of the
internal security forces as there is a staff to which the COS is attached. Moreover, the head of
State is head of the armed forces, whereas the Minister of the Interior is the "first COP of France.

If the single command seems, on the surface, a simple, obvious solution is perhaps not the most
effective response that is.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. The recent exercise which took place in Isre with the armed forces
leads me to think that a new entity of these forces, involving men and materials, will be added to
the already numerous special intervention units in the field. I am worried about this. What is your
level of information on the exercise in question and mobilized equipment? Acquisition projects
are underway to continue the committed experimentation?
Mr. Grgoire Dor. Should not be mistaken with regard to our armed forces that contribute to
national security in the context of the Sentinel operation: Security public, they don't act
autonomously and they have no legal power. Feedback will evaluate this experiment which is not
my field at all. We could make you pass a note on this subject.
The President Georges Fenech. Commissioner, it remains for me to thank you for your
important contribution to our work.
Round table, open to the press, of specialists on the Middle East: Mr. Pierre-Jean Luizard,
historian, Director of research at the national Centre for scientific research (CNRS); M.
Bligh Nabli, Director of research at the Institute of international relations and strategic
(IRIS); Mr. Wassim Nasr, France 24 journalist; Mr. Pierre Razoux, Director of research at
the Institute of strategic research of the military school (IRSEM)
Report of the round table, open to the press, Thursday, May 19, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, gentlemen, for having responded to our request for
hearing. Let's we look with you at the political, diplomatic and military aspects of the situation in
the Levant and deepen our reflection on issues that we measure, of course, the complexity.
This roundtable is open to the press and subject to a live broadcast on the internet site of the
National Assembly. Registration will also be available for a few months on the video portal of
the Assembly, and the Committee may decide to include in its report any part of the report that
will be made of the hearing.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958, relating to
commissions of inquiry, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth.
Mr. Pierre-Jean Luizard, M. Bligh Nabli, Mr. Wassim Nasr and Mr. Pierre Razoux successively
take oath.
What events or phenomena explain, in your opinion, the emergence and progression of Daech in
Iraq and Daech and Djabhato al-Dhanub in Syria?
What are the external support which could benefit these two organizations?

How has the number of foreign fighters incorporated evolved over the past year?
To what extent the two organizations benefiting from the support of local populations in the
territories they control? There were popular uprisings against their fighters?
What is your perspective on the world against Daech, formed coalition in September 2014
action, including on the place of the France in its midst?
What do you think of the position of the french government towards the regime of Bashar AlAssad? The departure of it appears it as a prerequisite for rebuilding the country's political?
What do you think of the support provided by France to the Iraqi regime?
What is your perspective on the military results of the air strikes in Iraq and Syria? What has
been the effect of the intensification of French strikes from September 2015?
The airstrikes in Iraq and Syria have impact on the attractiveness of Daech and, if so, which?
Air strikes in Iraq and Syria have an effect on the ability of Daech to organize and implement the
terrorist attacks in the Middle East and Europe?
The recent military setbacks suffered by Daech and contraction territories it controls are likely to
lead to the multiplication of shares of asymmetrical warfare, i.e. terrorist attacks "reprisal"?
The war against Daech can it, according to you, be won without the intervention of ground
troops?
What is your point of view on the role played by the Turkey in combating Daech and against the
return of the jihadists in Europe?
How would you judge the situation in Libya and the Yemen? What is the State of Daech forces
in these two countries?
Finally, what is the State of the threat, to the France and french interests abroad, Al-Qaida in
general and Djabhato al-Dhanub in particular?
These many issues, we have the lighting of the recognized experts that you are.
M. Pierre-Jean Luizard, historian, Director of research at the national Centre for scientific
research (CNRS). Thank you for your invitation.
We very often hear about how to combat terrorism or de-radicalization, and these issues are
certainly legitimate, but they are often of a vision "psychologizing" of jihadism, which makes it a
disease or a deviation that could treat like an addiction. However, if this psychological dimension
is important in each individual case, it cannot obscure political and historical chaos to which the
Middle East is today in prey and which is born a broad movement that affects us even in our

countries, since there is now a western part, otherwise in the strategy of Djabhato al-Dhanub, at
least in the Islamic State which is a globalized Jihad.
The origin of the conflict is, in my opinion, in Iraq. Bankruptcy and the failure of the political
reconstruction of the Iraqi State by the Americans as a result of their intervention in 2003 which had itself been that bring the last shots, after many crises and wars, to the Iraqi State
founded in 1920 by the British mandatory power - have brought in their wake the crisis and the
decline of other States. The Syrian State is the first victim of the war in Iraq. The division of the
territory of Iraq into three entities - Kurdish, Shiite, Sunni - to State contention directly raises the
problem of the future of the Iraqi State in its present borders with the Sunni Arab community in
Iraq, which represents 20% of the population and who no longer recognizes in the Iraqi State,
which she has had the monopoly for more than eighty years from 1920 to 2003. We see today - I
was in Baghdad a few days ago - the limits of this political system, with the intrusion of
thousands of demonstrators in a Parliament totally paralyzed by community allegiances. But this
system is not reformed, because it hampers development of public institutions and minimal
public space, and it prevents the State meet a citizen based on fundamental claims of civil
society, such as access to electricity. Power cuts are so commonplace in Basra, which seems
even more shocking that it is a rich city, as located in the middle of a petroleum area.
We are today witnessing a questioning of certain Arab States in the Middle East, whose three Iraq, the Syria, Lebanon - who share their genesis agent. Crisis specific to each of these three
States interact with each other. The crisis whose origin lies in Iraq, cradle of the Islamic State,
moved in Syria by a game of dominoes, and we do not imagine that the collapse of the Syrian
State could leave the free Lebanese State.
This eastern part poses to our diplomacy a serious question: should we Work to restore the States
in crisis and bankruptcy or, to the contrary, ahead, what did the strength of the Islamic State, the
programmed death of political institutions that are not reviewable and which are unable to meet
the basic demands of civil society? It is a great challenge, where diplomats have for function to
recognize States and borders in place. But it is a question that arises therefore that the System
State and border is delivered flat to the point that actors involved in the territory of the country
for the neighboring country as if it were more borders between them. We look forward, in a way,
this development when the French authorities dealing directly with the Kurdish authorities for
delivering arms and provide military assistance, without reference to the competent Ministry in
Baghdad.
This is with regard to the eastern part of the origin of terrorism which is then grabbed by some
Western countries. The western part of the Islamic State is very different, because the past
colonial and agent as well as the confessional context are absent. But other factors there are
skilfully exploited by those who call for Jihad.
First, a colonial history during which Republican principles have systematically been in
contradiction with themselves, specifically in France. Thus, by the Crmieux Decree, secular and
Republican elites have granted the Jews of Algeria on a denominational basis, French citizenship
that they refused to Muslims and that they were then granted Algeria Europeans to Catholic
obedience. Similarly, the 1905 law has not applied to Muslims in Algeria. In General,

Republican ideals were perceived by the populations colonized as a legitimization of the colonial
fact - quite rightly, as shown in the speech by Jules Ferry on colonization. Same Clemenceau
who, inside the Republican camp, had criticized this pro-colonial a priori has in turn justified,
once in power, the protectorate to the Morocco.
If this story is obviously not known jihadists apprentices who leave our country to wage war in
Syria and Iraq, it feeds a grand narrative in which Muslims present themselves as the followers
of the religion of the colonized, a very confused and very vague speeches but who, in the french
context in particular, actually fly. Indeed, we live in today an identity crisis especially evidenced
by the impasses of our secularism, which neither strict secularism of our Prime Minister nor the
president of the Observatory of secularism cannot exit. Secularism, which was a civil religion for
France for more than a century, is today called into question and is no longer enough to lay the
foundations of living together. To live together, there must be a minimum of identity, and the
request for identity getting stronger as one goes down the social ladder. What are very likely
these no-man's-land identity, attached to the confused perception of a colonial past where islam
played the role I have described, which explain that young people who have a notion of islam
wave and colonial history a notion still more vague undertake on the basis of an ideological
discourse in which they find reasons for hope. Why such talk gives hope while Republican ideals
seem there have failed, at least for a fraction of our youth? It is no doubt on this point that we
must consider.
The President Georges Fenech. You insist above all on the disintegration of the Iraqi State.
What about the Syrian issue?
Mr. Wassim Nasr, journalist at France 24 This told by Mr. Luizard about the Iraqi State
applies to the Syrian State. We should try to get out of the Western views of this region to
consider its internal dynamics according to which, each time, communities spend the status of
underdog than the oppressor. Thus, what is happening in Syria is neither more nor less than a
war of survival for the two communities competing - because that is what it is: let us not the face.
The Alawites as Sunnis feel in danger of death where they would lose the war. This is not the
first time that the Sunni rebel: there were precedents, notably in Hama in 1982. Cannot call into
question the oppression in Syria, which has affected all communities without exception Christian, druze, Shiite... The Lebanese experience also attest.
Because the vacuum State and the fact that populations do not feel represented by their State, the
State is the issue of a fight for survival and dominance on the part of the Shiites in Iraq, the
Alawis in Syria. In the West, we carry on this situation a rational and secular look that is not
always relevant.
Feeds the Islamic State so local dynamics - the oppression of Sunnis, in Iraq and Syria-, but it
embodies also a revolution, as I write it in my book Islamic State, the fait accompli, and offers a
new system, in rebellion against the corrupt and sectarian States, but also against traditional
societies, customary islam and against the power of the clans Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, on the
grounds that the corrupt clan leaders who agreed the deal with the Americans have not met their
promises, a fringe of Sunni youth found of de facto in the ranks of the Islamic State. In Syria,
after five years of war, many young people have joined this revolution, civil way or military -

whatever it is, it is is militarized very quickly, as early as the beginning of 2012. Some have
gained the ranks of the Islamic lack of a better State, because the organization represents a
revolution against established systems: against the States of the region, and even against
capitalism and the global system.
The Islamic State gained aura with the establishment of the Caliphate, imagined and dreamed by
a fringe of the Muslim population in the world since the end of the Caliphate in 1924. What
attracts young people - less Western - towards the Islamic State more to Al-Qaida, it is this
historical and mystical dimension of the Syria and the Iraq, and the fact that the Organization has
managed to install a proto-State with institutions, redistribution mechanisms, offices of the
complaints for consumers, education, English schools - to the chagrin of francophones!
With the war underway, this system will may not continue. But the Islamic State will have
established Works that must be called, excluding any value judgment, a political project. There is
in human history horrible political projects, and the risk that this comparison is a point Godwin,
Nazism was a political project. What I repeat for four years, it is that we must take these people
seriously and estimate their action at its fair value. If is minimized, considering the Islamic State
as a sect and its members such as palms, drugs, it does not measure the danger he poses
materially and in the imagination of many people, lack of alternative.
I also develops in my book the idea that one cannot say that 'this is not islam. " Similarly, it
cannot be argued that the Crusaders were not Christians. Simply, the Crusaders, who have
besieged Constantinople and slaughtered other Christians, were not all Christendom. The
conquistadores were Christians, but they have decimated Aboriginal peoples. Similarly, the
fighters of the Islamic State are part of islam, they are Muslims, but they represent not all
Muslims of the world. On the other hand, they constitute a real pole of attraction for large
sections of the population.
Have asked us about the role played by the States of the region. These States, Saudi Arabia at
their head, are now in danger of death because of the Islamic State and its revolutionary
dimension. It is a revolution against the Saudi monarchy as it considers corrupt. All Saudi
jihadists with whom I could discuss repeated that they return in conquerors dethrone these
corrupt Saoud. Because the Islamic State is a pure theocracy, while Saudi Arabia is a monarchy.
As the Turks, they tried to offset the danger of the PKK - and not the Kurds, because there are
Kurdish pro-Erdogan, pro-Iranian Kurds, the Communist Kurds as followers of the PKK - by the
Islamic State, but they have failed. However, it must be remembered that famous Kobane
decision-making would not have been possible without the help of the Turks. They were
certainly closed the door to the PKK and its Syrian branch YPG, but they allowed the delivery of
the peshmergas from Iraqi Kurdistan to help the Kurds of Kobane.
The States of the region are in the front line, especially the Saudi Arabia, which sees a
revolutionary State to build on its doorstep. Lenin, who would create the Soviet Union, there was
welcomed as a refugee in Switzerland and helped by the German Empire? Could the imperialists
of the German Empire guess that the Soviet Union would arise and that it would become an

imminent danger for all of Europe for 70 years? This is always so historical constructions, based
on convergences and differences of interests.
This Islamic State revolutionary, very attractive for a good part of the population of the Arab
world, it is also for Westerners who come back to hit the countries of which they are nationals,
which is unpublished. The reasons are multiple. In addition to those cited by Mr. Luizard
interventions by Western countries abroad. The France is engaged in wars against the jihadist
movements on several territories for decades. The novelty is that the Islamic State manages to
recruit Westerners to carry out attacks at home. Those who have hit in Paris and Brussels are the
Belgians and the French; It is here that they have mounted teams, manufactured explosives,
bought weapons and hit.
Is it because the Islamic State is declining as it hits? I do not think so. Terrorism is a procedure,
not an end in itself. The Islamic State has demonstrated its ability to anticipate as soon as he
began to kidnap Western journalists, the Caliphate was not yet proclaimed while the Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant was still at the embryonic stage: he knew that Western countries
would react. The jihadists have the hostages under the hand. Fortunately, the french hostages - I
know some of them personally - have been released in time, but others were soon to be executed.
When the Islamic State began sending teams in France or of those responsible for the waters as
Mehdi Nemmouche, it was not at all declining. It is the summer 2014, at the beginning of the
strikes, he sent in Libya the Iraqi Al-Anbari, very close operational emir of Baghdadi. One
cannot say that the Libya is part of a withdrawal plan: she was in the viewfinder of the Islamic
State at the beginning of the year 2013.
The Islamic State has therefore a real project, if wrong may be, which may be viable and should
be estimated at fair value. It is neither a cult nor a deviant, nor from any illness.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. We are very pleased to have real experts around the table
and be able to take advantage of their expertise.
It includes listening to you that the problem arose including dismantling of nation States that
were the Iraq and the Syria. In the light of the current situation on the spot, particularly in Syria,
this problem can have, according to you, a political solution? So far, we stick to the aerial
bombardment, not wanting to intervene on the ground on the ground that it would permanently
solve the conflict and to not create an Iraq bis. If a political solution is possible, how? Do you
believe in an intervention on the ground? I did not say that. What could be more?
M. Bligh Nabli, Director of research at the Institute of international and strategic
relations (IRIS). I would like to make a few remarks on the jihadist phenomenon before saying
a few words about the geopolitical situation.
It is interesting for having organized the round table around the idea of regional context, insofar
as the jihadist phenomenon, characterized by its transnational dimension and its tendency to
dematerialization, even deterritorialisation, is difficult to manage in territorial terms. However,
analyzing the transnational game and the game of the State powers themselves, be they
international or regional, should also bear in mind the local situation. There is a tendency to

ignore or minimize while it is she who nourishes, otherwise the phenomenon, at least the success
of the political offer that represents the Islamic State.
Second, the jihadist phenomenon is part of a historical, geopolitical and ideological framework:
it would be naive or simplistic to reduce it to a religious phenomenon. However, the project of
the Islamic State is political, because it aims to create a State, and religious: it is the prism of
religion which allows you to qualify that State and religion is a factor of ideological
mobilization. There is an interweaving of political fact and the religious fact that makes this
difficult to identify and to analyze complex creature. But it is also this double dimension which
explains its success.
Thirdly, regarding reading in vogue grids, that is to reduce the contemporary geopolitics to a
clash of civilizations is simplistic: we are witnessing not a confrontation between civilizations or
between religions, but conflicts within communities a priori of the same religion. This state of
fact escape binary reading proposed us and which continues to experience some fortune. Hence,
again, the importance of the sub-national or local when it comes to explaining these phenomena
regional, if not global, but equipped with an anchorage sometimes purely local.
I come to the regional context and geopolitics. It is difficult to delineate the relevant territory. In
this regard, your instinct is right: Although the Bataclan is very far from the Syria, we know that
what is happening is closely linked to the Syrian situation. At the same time, can we really define
the boundaries within which would be the "war against terrorism" referred to us? I doubt it, as I
doubt the very concept of war on terror - have the opportunity to come back. Nevertheless, it
seems to me that the Mediterranean basin is unquestionably at theFavorite pieces of the strategic
issues that are directly or indirectly linked to the jihadist phenomenon. Its southern shore, its
shore is, but also, today, its North Shore - Europe - been affected by the rise of jihadism. So
there's a strategic reflection on our relevant report to the Mediterranean as a geopolitical space.
Thus, the analysis of jihadism seems to me give a particular question, classic interest among the
geopoliticians, whether the Mediterranean exists as coherent, geopolitical space.
To support this hypothesis, emphasize general and structural framework more wide in which fits
the jihadist phenomenon. In recent years, a series of major events upset the geopolitical situation
in the Mediterranean: the popular uprisings on its shores South and East, the dislocation and the
bankruptcy of a number of States, or even nation States, as well as insufficiently underlined facts
such as the discovery of hydrocarbons in Eastern Mediterranean, which could represent a source
of tension in the medium term.
In addition, the contrasting role played by the two major world powers: the United States and the
Russia. Firstly, under the two terms of Barack Obama, there was the definition and the
implementation of a prudential doctrine, which has materialised in the Middle East by a
withdrawal at least apparent; on the other, on the contrary, the Russia adopted a diplomatic
strategy and now relatively aggressive military. This rather striking contrast must also feed our
geopolitical reflection.
Furthermore, the Middle East today is plagued by two types of war: a cold war and a series of
hot, local wars that are proxy wars between the two protagonists of the cold war, namely the Iran

and Saudi Arabia. There again, the purely denominational grid does not suffice to explain the
sources of this confrontation, which led to the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two
regional powers. There is, in my opinion, a much more conventional configuration, with a
confrontation in the exercise of leadership, in the context of a fairly troubled game on the part of
the United States.
The President Georges Fenech. You say you skeptical about the concept of war against
terrorism, which regularly refers to the head of State and the Prime Minister. Why? Is this not a
war that we deliver to terrorism?
M. Alexander Nabli. Fight against terrorist acts, including preventively, and, naturally, in a
repressive way, of course. This is not to discuss the fact that is devoted to this objective all the
means that are available to the State. On the other hand, it is very problematic to switch in a
warlike rhetoric regarding terrorist makes especially Daech and jihadism. Because it would be
dealing with a war without end, since the main factor of mobilisation of jihadism is intangible: it
is ideological. If we can militarily defeat the Islamic State, dry it financially, break its
infrastructures and its ability to meet social needs which fall within what we call the public
services, if we can call into question the foundations of the system that it attempts to establish,
this victory - which wouldn't be a Pyrrhic victory will not suffice to eradicate evil to speak in
more moral terms. Indeed, its roots are also ideological and the Islamic State embodies a political
offer which must be taken into account.
You mentioned the possibility to reconstruct a true nation State in Syria, but also in Iraq: it is one
of the solutions that might be considered. Others suggest create a strictly Sunni state in Iraq,
which would mean the end of Iraq as a nation-State - assuming that it really existed one day.
The President Georges Fenech. Some people also imagine a partition.
M. Alexander Nabli. This is actually another hypothesis. Whatever it is, there is the issue: our
response policy, and even - I am thinking of the young European jihadists - our offer spiritual or
almost spiritual. Because I doubt that make war in the military sense of the word is sufficient to
retain our youth.
M. Pierre Razoux, Director of research at the Institute of strategic research of the military
school (IRSEM). For my part, being a specialist terrorism or jihadism, I'll geopolitics - is my
occupation, I practice on a daily basis.
What are our interests on-site? What is the game of regional and global actors in the region?
If the Middle East remains crucial for us Westerners, is no longer at all because of the oil or gas,
contrary to popular belief, but for commercial reasons. Most of our industrial production, trade
between Europe, Asia and a part of the world pass through the Seaway that part of Asia and
travels by the Indian ocean, the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, and then across the Red Sea, canal of
Suez and the Mediterranean, to arrive at the major ports Europeans. In a sense, buying raw
materials, spare parts; in the other, it forwards consumer goods. If we cut this vital artery, is
kneeling part of our industry, not only french but European.

Other options exist. First borrow the road to Cape Town, as has been done in the past. The
problem is that this route is 25% longer, and 20 to 22% more expensive. In this highly
competitive world, would our industrialists be able to pay the extra cost? It could also pass
through the North, but not all, perhaps in ten to twenty years. There is also the new silk road that
the Chinese are trying to propose; but it boils down to a railway track and two highways, so that
it could drain only a marginal share of traffic, 20-25% any more, while the world maritime traffic
is expected to double within fifteen to twenty years.
This crucial road that passes by the Middle East and the Mediterranean, we are therefore doomed
to defend if we want to defend our economy.
It has a kind of bottleneck: the Red Sea, with an entrance door and an exit door that are
alternately the Suez canal and the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. It is, for us Europeans, infinitely
more important than the Strait of Ormouz, which only serves to the passage of oil and essentially
concerns the countries of Asia that buy their oil in the Middle East. This is because the Strait of
Bab el-Mandeb is crucial that everyone is now present in Djibouti: the French and the Americans
- it is well known-, but also the European Union, the Germany, the Italy, the Japan, China, Saudi
Arabia and soon the United Arab Emirates, not to mention the India and the Russia that are
knocking at the door.
The access to this area of the Red Sea is easy to ban. Thus, Al-Qaida in the Arabian peninsula
(AQAP) may soon threaten the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, and Daech might be tempted, in the
case of fragmentation of the Saudi Arabia, melt on the Red Sea from the Syria and Iraq, putting
at risk vital to our democracies commercial supply axis European. I do not insist on the Suez
canal, absolutely essential since it serves, I said, door entry and exit.
As said strong precisely Tina Nabli, a new geopolitical data is emerging: very large gas reserves
natural offshore which are discovered every week, every month and represent a true gas eldorado
. Israel and the Egypt already operate this gas; the Lebanon dream to do so but, entangled in its
political problems, it fails again; Cyprus, the Syria and the Palestinian Authority would also want
their share of the cake. This region of Eastern Mediterranean, which covers the entrance to the
Suez canal, thus becomes a zone of turbulence and potential conflicts, but could also bring the
appeasement in the medium or even long term: if reason prevails, all sit around the table to try to
divide the windfall.
Finally, I would like to introduce you to what are, for the geopolitician than I am, the security
challenges in the Mediterranean and in North Africa. This point of view, where to pass the
southern border of our European interests to more effectively fight possible against jihadism and
avoid the unification of the jihadi fronts? These are five in number: in Iraq and Syria, of course;
in the Sinai Peninsula. in the Libyan coastal area that I call 'Libyan chaos', or any half North and
coastal Libya, the Egyptian border south of the Tunisia and a small portion of Eastern Algeria. in
the immense Saharo-Sahelian Strip; in the Yemen. Our vital interest is to do everything so that
the jihadist movements have the least possible access to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, to
defend at all costs our maritime and commercial security and tourist vessels, and absolutely
avoid that these five homes meet, which would mean that we would have lost control of the
region.

The most effective strategy to compartmentalize the jihadi fronts is to project our safe defense
line in the southern most possible, so as to separate the Libyan front, the Sahel-Saharan Strip and
the Sinai Peninsula. In other words, it seems to me that to mislead all those who, in Europe, say
in substance that we should, if you will pardon the expression, let Arabs get together and focus
on the defence of Europe by maritime operations, establishing, as in the Renaissance, a large line
of defense against the ottoman Empire, passing through Cyprus , Crete, Malta, Sicily and
Gibraltar. Because if we got there, it is our last line of defence that we would be: in other words,
we would have already lost. We need to build a defence of the front, the most upstream.
For France, the priority concern is the Libya. Daech has not yet access to the Mediterranean facing the Syria nor in the Sinai Peninsula. But the jihadist movements present in the "Libyan
chaos" are active and directly threatening our interests.
A country is decisive, as located at the intersection of three fronts jihadists, and possibly four: the
Egypt. So, we have interest to support. I do not speak of morality, but of geopolitics. We will be
able to more easily secure the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Suez canal, the aim
being to maintain the "front line" as far as possible of the maritime communication line.
What do the United States? It is often said that they are disengaged or they disengage from the
Middle East. This is absolutely not the case; simply, they gather to intervene decisively than in
the past, but not more at every field, any crisis: in accordance with the doctrine of Obama and his
administration, only if their strategic interests are threatened. These interests are freedom of
navigation - they converge on this point with ours-, the safety of American citizens spread out
along the axis of communication, the security of Israel and control of energy bound from Asia.
This represents 75% of the oil and gas produced in the Middle East, and to represent 85% the
day after tomorrow. Today, the biggest consumers of local oil are Asian countries - China in
mind, but also the Japan and South Korea.
The President Georges Fenech. Let me interrupt you, Mr Razoux. Your presentation of the
economic and geostrategic of Middle East issues is very interesting, but it a little beyond the
scope of our Committee of inquiry. The rapporteur asked a question to which it has not yet made
response. In the event where the terrorist groups, in particular Daech and Djabhato al-Dhanub,
would be eradicated, how do you envisage the reconstruction of viable States?
M. Pierre Razoux. First of all, an intervention on the ground, particularly in Syria, is an
absolute trap. What wish Daech, it is precisely that Westerners engage massively on the ground
in the region, in order to denounce the returning from the Crusades and the willingness of the
Westerners, not free, but to conquer the two seats of the historic Caliphate, Baghdad and
Damascus.
The rapporteur. This argument always returns when we ask the question of the appropriateness
of an intervention on the ground. But there is a real difference in perception between air strikes
and sending troops on the ground?
M. Pierre Razoux. The bombings are, in fact, a provisional measure. Everyone understands that
the solution will be political and military. In its military aspect, this solution will not be on the

ground, the fact of Muslim countries. Until the people of the region have agreed on what to do,
this allows to gain a little time.
The rapporteur. Let me respond to your last sentence. What you are saying is that waiting for a
political solution, it must bomb Daech to back a bit, but without seeking to eradicate it because it
cannot be what to do once he overcomes and is not ending up in the same situation as the
Americans in Iraq. But what solution do we need to wait and how long?
Let us not forget the issue of the public opinion. The evening of November 13, we were very
severely struck on our national territory. The State of emergency was decreed, the air strikes
have intensified in Syria. What is the next step? We know that the France will be hit again, and
probably even more harshly. Should we wait two or three other Bataclan to decide to eradicate
Daech without waiting a geopolitical solution?
M. Alexander Nabli. In your way of presenting the field of possible reason is a little too in
strictly military terms. The response cannot be exclusively military, including in the fight against
terrorism and our response to a terrorist attack. This is why I commend the idea of war against
terrorism. The main ways that we use are, it seems to me, of the intelligence services, police and
forensic investigation services. Perhaps we should develop in this area, by means of a different
nature since it seems that there was a malfunction. If they are proven - but I am not a specialist of
the question-, perhaps we should focus on these priorities. Indeed, the France does not have the
means to respond only to the military issue and, in any case, the solution, term, is necessarily
order policy. But it is complex and, above all, it is in the hands of the local actors.
However, in Iraq, the State of corruption of the elite, regardless of the communities concerned,
causes a political deadlock which does not allow that draws an institutional system that could
give a consistency to a sovereign Iraqi nation State. Regarding the Syria, one may wonder how it
would be possible to reconstruct a nation State at the end of a civil war waged by one who is
both the head of State and the head of a community. Nevertheless, the protagonists of the conflict
are the only ones able to define the terms of the coming compromise, and the international and
regional powers should put themselves at the service of this negotiation.
The rapporteur. There is a feeling, listening to you, it is urgent to wait. Of course, I share your
point of view that a military solution cannot be the only. But we are militarily engaged since
September 2014 in Iraq and September 2015 in Syria. Why are we not all the way? You reject
the notion of war on terror, and I respect your opinion, but if we say we at war, if the France is
hit its territory, why do we not seek to eradicate Daech? How long will it take if simply strikes?
M. Alexander Nabli. You always reason in a strictly military setting.
The rapporteur. We try to find a political solution, but who can come? No Bashar Al-Assad. Of
the Iran? Saudi Arabia?
The President Georges Fenech. Do you understand, gentlemen, our Committee of inquiry
questions. We asked the same question to the Chief of staff. We know that the military solution

is not an aim in itself - the political, geopolitical, religious and regional dimensions are important
- but it is still, in our view, a necessary step.
M. Alexander Nabli. Perhaps the urgency is of another nature: first try to address deficiencies
that were noted and to guard against future attacks. If we manage to avoid, it will already be a
victory. It would be military order, certainly, but it would be a victory against terrorism.
Mr. Wassim Nasr. As I told you in my opening statement, we must strive to understand current
terrorism through a new grid. The terrorism threatening the West during the XXe century,
whether because of the Palestinian factions, Hezbollah or the Red Brigades, was still State
terrorism; the negotiation was therefore possible. Moreover, terrorists came from beyond the
seas. Today, this is all the case: hit in Iraq and Syria does not alter the ability of terrorist groups
such as Al-Qaida nuisance or the Islamic State. When it began to announce that the Islamic State
was retreating, a Russian airliner was shot down over Sinai, using - perhaps don't know you - of
a can of drink trapped. It was announced again its retreat, and it was November 13. Later, was
still raised its retreat, and we had attacks in Tunisia and Brussels. Each time, the players in the
attacks were national. Teams that hit in France and Belgium were composed partly of persons
returning from Syria but also from people who had never gone. The weapons were not provided
on them by an obscure actor; they were purchased on the black market. The TATP, a highly
volatile explosive, was "home made".
The President Georges Fenech. Still, attacks have been sponsored since the Syria!
Mr. Wassim Nasr. In a way very diffuse. They were given a " Go !", they came with the
refugees - it is a reality-, but they managed to assemble their teams here, with very little means.
Remember, the day after the first strikes in Syria, a french citizen was slain in Algeria by
Algerians claiming to be members of the Islamic State. That is what we must understand: the
nature of the terrorist threat has mutated.
Denied to the Islamic State statehood, but it strikes as a State, by targeting its infrastructure, its
logistics. We try to hit them where it hurts in the hope that the population returns. But we must
take account of local dynamics: this might work in Syria, much less in Iraq. The fact is that in
Europe, the threat is the fact of European nationals who act with resources found locally and
finance very low. Therefore, I do not know if hit in Syria and Iraq will help secure Europe.
M. Pierre-Jean Luizard. I believe that we all say that, to defeat the jihadist movements,
whether it's the Islamic State, Djabhato al-Dhanub or other active movements in the region, must
couple the military force and a political solution. But it fails because we still have not taken a
political decision: we do not know on which us rest locally to combat. Insofar as we do not want
to engage us militarily, we delegate to the ground forces that exacerbate the conflict because they
are parties involved. Mosul will be freed by the Kurds or the Iraqi army, which is considered an
enemy army by a very large majority of the population of the city.
There is the great challenge: the crisis is such, in its political and historical dimensions that the
solution may not have States in place. We can rest or on the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, nor on

the Iraqi army, which is armed, nor national, but sectarian, as evidenced by the abuses committed
against Sunni populations when resuming from Tikrit.
This challenge requires that we take decisions that are not pure policy to the extent where these
decisions will depend on the fact of whether we intervene or delegate to the ground, and to
whom. In my opinion, the delegation on the ground is the worst of solutions, because it only
aggravates the conflict. Seen with the Russian intervention, which condemned any political
solution in the context of the Syrian State since the Russians have taken and cause for the Shiite
community, with the support of the Iran, the Government of Baghdad, Hezbollah and the
Government of Damascus. Why support a community against another, if we want peace?
Because that is our goal, ultimately: restore a form of stability for our own protection.
This stability, the States in place are no longer able to bring it to us. This means that we must
look at the question of the future of the Sunni Arabs of Iraq. In fact, bombing is pointless if it
does not offer a political solution to these populations who hosted the Islamic State as liberators.
However, in the context of the current political system as we acknowledge, since we have an
Embassy in Baghdad, the Sunni Arabs of Iraq are sentenced to a situation that, overwhelmingly,
they refuse. Thus arises the question of the future of the Iraqi State and possibly that the
matching of the Sunni regions with a predominantly Sunni Syria, which implies a discount flat
border-State system.
The President Georges Fenech. There is a feeling, listening to you, each and others, that the
strikes are worthless, that intervention on the ground is a trap.
M. Pierre-Jean Luizard. On the contrary, I think that we shall not escape to an intervention on
the ground when we recognize that rely on the Iraqi army, the Peshmergas and the Syrian army
made the situation worse.
The President Georges Fenech. You think an intervention on the ground of the Western armies,
is not it?
M. Pierre-Jean Luizard. I have learned through contacts that I still in Mosul, that, for many of
its inhabitants, the nightmare scenario would be a return of the Iraqi army. On the other hand,
would seem them acceptable that it is occupied by an international force, even to American
dominant.
Mr. Wassim Nasr. Or Turkish.
M. Pierre-Jean Luizard. Or Turkish. But the problem of neighbouring countries, is that they are
involved in the conflict. When I speak of an intervention on the ground, I'm talking about an
intervention that would exclude, after a political agreement, the Turkish army, the Iranian army
and the Arab armies who are stakeholders of a sectarian conflict. We have no interest in taking
advantage for one confession against another. Will not the shot of "Awakening Councils" to the
Sunni Arabs, who worked more or less in the early 2000s, a second time. The crucial question is
whether on which we must rest. It cannot be any for States which are not part of the solution, but
the problem essentially in which we think.

Mr. Wassim Nasr. I'll clarify my thought: in the current state of things, strikes do not alter the
terrorist threat in Europe.
M. Olivier Marleix. I take from your speeches that stability is, alas! not for tomorrow. In his
fascinating book, Mr. Luizard clearly explains that the current conflict is the legacy of the
collapse of the ottoman empire and the creation of artificial States, the Syria and Iraq, to which
the people themselves do not adhere. Therefore, even if we manage to reduce the importance of
the so-called Caliphate, the solution isn't, for us, to restore Europe's external borders worthy of
the name?
Certainly, this type of measure seems of another time, as evidenced by the outraged reaction
expressed by public opinion when some countries at the external borders of the European Union
decided to build walls or to unwind barbed wire. However, the Americans themselves have been
forced to build such wall at the Mexican border to control migration and regardless of any
terrorist threat. Knowing what you know about instability in this region, do you think that we can
make the economy of hermetic borders East of Europe?
M. Pierre Razoux. I am not at all an expert in terrorism, but it seems to me that sealed borders
will not prevent the attacks. Most of the members of the groups who acted in Europe were
recruited on-site. As for those of them who come from Syria or Iraq, they can take another path.
The solution, in my opinion, is fundamentally geopolitical. To resolve the Iraqi and Syrian crisis,
a triple agreement is required: between the Iran and Saudi Arabia, which must understand that
their vital interests are threatened and negotiate to fight Daech and raise the price of oil; between
the United States and Russia, who agree already because, in fact, Mr. Kerry and Mr. Lavrov
shared the Middle East; Finally, between the Turkey and the European Union, for the reasons
that have just been mentioned.
But, as said Pierre - Jean Luizard, the key question is fundamentally political: it is that of the
territory of Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis and their future. You can multiply the bombing or send to the
ground three armored divisions, this will not change anything! As long as local and regional
actors will be not agreed on this point, nothing will advance. This is, in any case, my profound
conviction.
M. Christophe Cavard. The France and other European countries had with some States in the
special relationship in the field of intelligence on terrorism, allowing to create a sort of buffer
zone. Many debates focus on the role of the Turkey. Do you think that this country fight
effectively against terrorism, particularly against Daech?
Furthermore, it was not at all question in your speeches of Salafism, especially of its ties with
Saudi Arabia - which is not to say that terrorists in Saudi Arabia. This religious current there, in
your opinion, reports with terrorism and, if so, which?
Mr. Patrice Verchre. Can only be worried you listening, because you confirm that the
difficulties current, internal and external, will continue for many years and that we are therefore
not protected from further attacks in France and Europe.

Do you think that some countries are playing a double game and informally finance Islamist
terrorism in Europe?
Is it possible today to a dialogue in France, with representatives of a moderate islam, in the literal
sense of the term? Can we consider the establishment of an islam of France, with a "clergy", or
even the existence of many religious currents within islam makes impossible the formation of
clergy who could fight internally against Islamism?
M. Alexander Nabli. Mr Marleix, a sacralization of the borders is a fiction, in particular relation
to a phenomenon such as jihadism, which relies on vectors of dissemination dematerialized. One
of the main means of mobilization and recruitment of jihadists, particularly in Europe, it is the
internet. This underscores not only the transnational dimension of the jihadist phenomenon, but
also and especially the boundaries of the State action against organizations that know how to use
modern means although their speech is presented as archaic. For now, the State is not yet able to
provide an effective response to this problem.
Mr. Wassim Nasr. I would like to reiterate that terrorism is a procedure that neither the Islamic
State nor Al Qaeda were invented. It has been used by many other groups throughout history: the
anarchists, the Communists... Therefore, understanding the jihadist ideology, who Springs
religious and socio-political, as it would cover that of another movement. Violent revolutionary
communism took advantage of the dissolution of the European States after World War II; Today,
the jihadist ideology takes advantage of the dissolution of the nation in the Middle East States.
Are there accomplices States? Some States have closed their eyes at the beginning of the Syrian
revolution, for various reasons. But, today, the Islamic State is a free electron that represents an
imminent danger for the Turks, the Saudis and the other States of the region. Also, its danger was
perceived by Western policymakers as early as 2014. Therefore, some Syrian rebel brigades
were encouraged to fight the Islamic State well until strikes occur. This transnational and way
ideology has emerged as a real danger for the region and, possibly, for Western countries, which
confirmed thereafter. Local dynamics are very real, but this ideology draws jihadists from more
than 100 different countries.
Moreover, are there people in the Muslim world? Yet again, the Islamic State brought a revolt.
Recognized Muslim leaders, be it of al-Azhar, Saudi officials or the Muslim Brotherhood, or
even of some ideologues of Al Qaeda, are love by the jihadists of the Islamic State, who regard
them as apostates. It is a real revolutionary ideology that is upsetting the Middle East and the
world, while enrolling in local dynamics. The answer should come, cannot even, come from
these companies.
The present era is characterized by a certain ideological vacuum, so well that many people are
attracted to this ideology. Pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism no longer exist, nor the Communist
struggles that were able, by the past, lead young Europeans to go to fight in Spain or to join the
Soviet Union to build a new State. However many are those who do not recognise in the
consumer society; many in the Arab world or third world, know that they will never have the
dog, the car and the job that goes with. They therefore seek another model of society, and that

through this violence excessive and this rebellion against everything, even against their former
mentor of Al-Qaeda. That is what should be taken into account.
Yet again, I do not believe they are aided by some States, because they represent an imminent
danger. Saudi Arabian prisons are filled with jihadists! There was much talk of the Shiite
religious leader executed by the Saudis, a few months ago, but nobody mentioned 42 Sunni
jihadist leaders who have suffered the same fate. The Saudis feel in danger, today. As for the
Turkish Government, he tried to protect themselves, because he knows lie within Turkish
society, supporters of Jihad. Let us not forget that the first jihadists in Iraq were Kurdish and that
there were Kurdish emirs in the ranks of the Islamic State. I recall that after the attacks of the
Kaye brothers, their imaginary funerals were organized in one of the biggest mosques of
Istanbul. Take these facts into account when considering the Turkey or Saudi Arabia, which
provides a large contingent of jihadists. It has set up a de-radicalization program - I dislike this
term - completely Lunar, to which she has devoted substantial resources, including torture, and
that has not worked. Some Saudi jihadists have joined Syria in a wheelchair!
This ideology has religious Springs, but it transcends the idea that one has of traditional islam, as
his followers revolted against it. Do you believe that those who have joined the Communist
brigades in their time or the Viet Cong who were explode against french tanks knew Karl Marx
by cFavorite pieces? Of course not! It is said that the jihadists do not know islam and have never
read the Koran. So what? This is not the subject. It is not their thinkers or anti-globalization like
the Roy young students - I followed - that is sent to carry out attacks in France, but the offenders,
because they know where to buy weapons and ammunition, where to find points of fall. When
they sent one Algerian student, he has shot himself in the foot and he called an ambulance...
M. Pierre-Jean Luizard. This went unnoticed, but the Arab spring and the failure of Islamists
who were elected including Egypt and Tunisia have caused a failover switch within the Islamic
world. The movement Salafist, Pietist and quietist for about a century, was opposed to those that
are called, wrongly, "Islamists" - I think including the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahdha in
Tunisia - and who were ready to play the game of elections, parliamentarism and the
constitutional system. However the coup d'etat of Marshal Sissi - endorsed, it must be said, by
the democratic powers - seemed to give reason to those who were warned Muslims telling them:
"our enemies do not believe in their own rules because, if the results of the elections do not like
them, they organize a coup. This failure has actually helped the Salafist movement out of the
militant apolitical and has signed the death warrant, programmed I believe, Islamist parties,
which are now declining in favour of the Islamic State or Djabhato al-Dhanub, who refuse as to
them the rules of political representation as we envision it. The Islamic State does not believe in
elections and majority rule, the constitutional system or parliamentarism.
In fact, the Arab spring released multifaceted segments of civil society, among which these
Islamist parties that had been long repressed everyone in his country, and which today we see
very few succeeded, with the exception, it must be said, of the AKP in Turkey. But it won the
elections in a highly conflictual context, since the Turkish identity as it has been recreated by
Mustapha Kemal on the ruins of the ottoman empire is built on fiction according to which
everyone is Turkish Muslim because. However, seen, among Muslims, there are also Kurds, and
all Muslims are not Sunni. Cancer of denominational communitisation, which comes from the

Arabic Middle East, today directly threatens Turkey, which sees the bases of his undermined
identity including by the kurdite which resurfaced. On the other hand, many Turkish
intellectuals are rediscovering their ancestors Armenians, bessarabiens or Cherkes, to remote
totalizing Turkishness which allowed Turkey to operate until today. Finally, the Turkish Alevi
community has multiple claims, but she wants to be recognized. However it is never under
Turkish islam, because it would be considered to be a heretical community.
The Salafist movement, derived of these historical movements, today directly inspired the
jihadist movements and arises in irreducible enemy of States in place, considered as illegitimate.
Thus as Waheed Nasr said, jihadist movements proclaim themselves heirs of the Arab spring,
because they feel those who carry the hopes of Muslims betrayed by the regimes and - tomorrow
it will commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Sykes-Picot agreements - by the unfulfilled
promises of the Western powers.
The President Georges Fenech. Listen to you, gentlemen, we have little reason to be optimistic.
The situation is so complex that, if I have understood you correctly, we have again for a few
years.
Mr. Wassim Nasr. A few decades...
The President Georges Fenech. No military solution, not religious solution, no solution
politics, no diplomatic solution, no borders!
Mr. Wassim Nasr. In my humble opinion, jihadism may represent the same upheaval than led,
in their time, communism, fascism or the idea of nation State.
The President Georges Fenech. Certainly, you are not there to reassure us, but the finding of
the experts that you is not an extraordinary optimism.
Mr. Wassim Nasr. There is little of Al-Qaida, but it is a more subtle and just as powerful as the
Islamic State movement: with AQIM, AQAP, their presence in Somalia and their Indian branch,
they are very strong. As the Front al-Dhanub, it is now deeply rooted in the Syrian rebellion.
This is something to consider, because they have, as evidenced by the manner in which they have
negotiated the release of the hostages, experience policy that does not have the Islamic State.
In fact, the failure of the Arab revolutions played a role. Thus Al-Zawahiri, the Al-Qaeda leader,
said that they now embodied the hope born of the Arab revolutions. When Morsi, the Egyptian
president, was imprisoned, posters have been released on jihadist networks which showed side
by side, one hand, Morsi behind bars, at his feet, one urn - a case of election, in Arabic - and on
the other hand, al-Baghdadi, at his feet, a crate of ammunition trying to preach to Mosul. On
Morsi was drawn a red "X", on al-Baghdadi a 'just' green.
At Sinai, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, one of the largest groups jihadists, although being Egyptian like
Al-Zawahiri, did not allegiance to Al-Qaida but to the Islamic State, with weapons and baggage.
It is a very strong group which rises in power for several years. They are in Libya, in the fief of
Gaddafi, because they have capitalized on the fact that the clan of the latter has been excluded

from the political solution. Ditto for the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. Today, they attract beyond
their borders, in countries such as the Indonesia.
The President Georges Fenech. And the Tunisia?
Mr. Wassim Nasr. The Tunisia provides the largest contingent. Do not watch this country
through the prism of the civil society of Tunis. The suicide bombers who explode in Libya are
Tunisian, while the Tunisia denies this reality by pretending that these jihadists come from
abroad. During the operations in Ben Gardane, the Islamic State had a plan A and a plan B: they
killed the local intelligence chief and held the city for several hours by establishing check points.
They were sixty; the operation was well prepared. Certainly, they were then dismissed by the
army, but they scored a point.
Today, the idea of military Jihad transcends rational geopolitical calculations. His followers want
to build one new system, like others before them. There is nothing exceptional, but it sometimes
has a short memory, and in our secular societies, there is a tendency to deny that religion can be
the engine of a political movement. However, the American President swear on the Bible,
Patriarch Kirill has blessed the Russian planes flying over the Syria. The religious spring can
motivate people.
M. Pierre Razoux. For my part, I'll be a little more optimistic. Beyond the irrational aspect, be
reckoned with rational factors, including the price of a barrel of oil. I do not at all believe that the
war will last decades. For a solution emerges, it must that the Iran and Saudi Arabia agree on
how they can again share the region and the fate that must be reserved to the Sunni Iraqi and
Syrian. Admit that they agree. If this solution is acceptable to the United States, the Russia and
Turkey, this can go relatively quickly. Or the Iranians and Saudis will be forced to negotiate
when they have more money. The price of a barrel of oil is a crucial element, as well as the
number of years of reserve each.
The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, thank you for this interesting contribution to our
work, which will be the subject of a report published in our report.
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. David Skuli, head of the police aux frontires (PAF),
Mr. Fernand Gontier, Deputy central Director, and Mr. Bernard Siffert, Deputy Director
of international, cross-border business and security
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, Thursday, may 12, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome this morning Mr. David
Skuli, head of the police aux frontires (PAF), accompanied by Mr. Fernand Gontier, central
Deputy Director, and Mr. Bernard Siffert, Assistant Director of international, cross-border
Affairs and security.
Mr. Director, gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our
Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7,
2015.

We will focus with you to the safety of all areas port, airport, railway and international means of
transport, as well as the issues of international and European cooperation in a context of
increased terrorist threat.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if
we decide so at the end of our work. I would point out that the minutes of this hearing will be
first sent to collect your comments. The latter will be submitted to the commission which may
decide to State in his report. I would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of the
same article, 'is punishable by the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any
person who, within a period of twenty-five years [...], disclose or publish information relating to
non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the
commission referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
nothing but the truth.
Please raise your right hand and say: "I swear."
Mr David Skuli, Fernand Gontier and Bernard Siffert successively take oath.
The commission arises a certain number of questions on which you may wish to make us a
keynote presentation:
The rise of the terrorist threat and attacks by 2015 led the PAF to amend his organization?
How is the distribution of the control of the flow of people on the national territory operated
between the PAF and customs?
The PAF contributes to the safety of all of the means of international transport and general safety
implementation Work on the port, airport and railway rights-of-way placed under his
responsibility. What means have to achieve? Have these means evolved over the past year, and
even since January 7, 2015?
What do you wear on the support given to the PAF by the European Agency for the management
of operational cooperation at the external borders of the Member States of the European Union
(FRONTEX)? Are technical and operational by FRONTEX assistance situations that require
frequent? Can you give an example of such situation?
Have the working methods of the police at the borders in train stations and airports evolved since
the attacks of January 2015 and in November 2015? Are they called to evolve in the short term?
What are the crossing points which are subject to increased surveillance since the beginning of
the year 2015?

Has the initial and continuing training of officers of the PAF been amended since the attacks of
January 2015 and in November 2015?
To what information the PAF officers have access when they control a passenger's identity?
Developments are desirable?
Joint patrols are organized between the PAF and the units of neighbouring countries, in
particular the Belgium, the Germany, the Switzerland, the Italy and the Spain. What are the
results? This device was strengthened during the year 2015?
The PAF has exchanges with french intelligence services? Have liaison within these services
officers? Welcome from these services liaison officers?
Finally, how are the exchange of information between the PAF and its European counterparts
organized?
Mr. David Skuli, head of the police aux frontires (PAF). I will first introduce you to the
Organization of the PAF.
The Central Directorate of the police at the borders is a specialized police branch which bears
this name since 1999. It was formerly called DICCILEC and before 1973, was a branch of the air
and border police who belonged to the great service of General information. Before the
Schengen agreements, the PAF was 181 border posts.
This central management has 10 300 staff among which 8 500 are active and involved both
metropolitan and overseas - Polynesia, New Caledonia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon... It is divided
into seven zonal directorates - six for the metropolitan territory and one for the overseas
territories, themselves subdivided into interdepartmental directorates, directorates and PAF
services.
The decrees of organization of the PAF, published April 12, allow us to increase our projection
capabilities, treatment of migratory flows - in border areas but also within the territory since the
border has become a notion of the more moving.
Departmental directions, as they are acting within the Department because of specific litigation this is the case of the Maritime Alps, of the Oise, of the Savoy, overseas departments...
We also have a national railway police service, security lines and which conducts joint patrols
with foreign services, finally ten aviation police offices.
Border control, one of the missions of the PAF, is carried out together with the DGDDI, namely
customs. It comes to controlling documents, take - especially at this time - of the measures of
refusing entry on the french territory, whether by air, rail, land or port.

We must then fight against irregular immigration and dismantle networks - 251 were in 2015 by
the OCRIEST, one of the only offices within the PAF, which does not belong to the judicial
police.
We are also responsible for the safety of means of transport - in particular airport-, sector that we
share with the DGAC.
We also intervene in aeronautical police relating to air accidents and the control of the air spaces
in the context of specific missions that we entrust the prefects.
In addition, a pool of 100 experts, under the aegis of FRONTEX, are committed in the context of
the strengthening of external borders, in Greece, in Italy and in other countries Europeans in
which the agency asks the support of french experts, whether screeners, debriefers and even
experts in document fraud.
We also host the stationed liaison officers network in sensitive countries - West Africa, Greece...
- where there is evidence that many people, with false documents, try to fly to the France. Also
our agents conduct pre-boarding checks.
Finally, with our main European neighbours, we animate the ten centres of police and customs,
vectors of exchanges of information and cooperation which sometimes organize readmissions or
procedures of the joint patrols which operate at our borders. The PAF is in fact responsible for
applying the procedures for expulsion forced when persons in an irregular situation were arrested
on our territory.
I come to our action in 2015. Since the end of 2014, never the PAF is had been confronted with
such a migration crisis. Nearly 1.8 million people have entered the Schengen area, according to
FRONTEX figures, including 157 000 in Italy. Our proximity to that country resulted in the
establishment of an important device to curb this migration wave. In addition, you know what is
the situation in the calaisis region where 6 000 migrants, divided between Calais and Dunkerque,
attempt to cross the border to get to the United Kingdom.
The year 2015 was also marked by the Organization of the COP21 and, of course, by the terrible
attacks of 7, 8 and 9 January and November 13, 2015.
How was the border control organized in this context? Before 2015, namely before the attacks, it
was governed by the provisions of the code of borders Schengen, in particular by its article 7-2 later became article 8 which provides for the principle of a minimum check for nationals of
the Member States and of a systematic verification for nationals of third countries. The draft of
the NRP was already planned but it was blocked by the European Parliament and in particular by
the Committee on Civil Liberties, justice and Home Affairs (LIBE).
For the rest, controls were carried out in the band of twenty kilometres, as provided for in the
code of criminal procedure.

Furthermore, following an agreement between the Minister of the Interior and his Turkish
counterpart, defining a procedure concerning the jihadis returning from Turkey, was allowed the
recovery of 89 of them in 2015 and 6 others since the beginning of the year 2016.
The law of November 13, 2014 for its part created administrative territory (IAT) ban and the
prohibition to leave the country (IST), which apply to individuals, be they minor or major, which
it turned out that they want to go to places where Jihad is practiced. At the time where I am
speaking, files are 319 IST and 115 IAT.
In addition the missions 'incoming flights' that the PAF performs with the DGAC and the GTA
and which aim to ensure that, in sensitive countries, the security measures are taken by the
airlines and security companies. A decree of April 3, 2015 gives us the possibility of requiring
that additional measures be taken by such companies to ensure that flights from sensitive foreign
airports can be controlled according to standards closer to ours.
The SETRADER system, which is created in 2013, has been reinforced since the attacks. He
filled a way, the functions of the NRP because it was based on the exploitation of registration
data - while the NRP will take into account the reservation data - allowing screening RPF on 38
susceptible countries - whose list has been established by anti-terrorist services - 15 airports, 46
airlines.
The aftermath of the 7, 8 and 9 January, control of 22 airports which we are responsible has been
strengthened - it is the major Paris airports and those of Toulouse, Nice, Marseille, Bordeaux... to
Montpellier under the jurisdiction of the customs. Since the commission on the attacks to the
neutralization of terrorists, it was necessary to ensure that they cannot flee the country or other
terrorists come from abroad. Dynamic patrols carrying out controls in the twenty kilometre have
been mobilized. At the time of the attacks, near 4 000 staff of the PAF are positioned on land,
rail and airport vector.
After the attacks, the France submitted its willingness to revive the process of systematic control
of persons wishing to enter the Schengen area. I remember having participated in several
meetings with my counterparts in February 2015 to determine criteria for each country. This
procedure is in effect recently. In addition, measures have been taken - they have been
significantly strengthened since - concerning the control of badges and clearances. Well before
the outbreak of the State of emergency, we in fact started to control all of the employed a badge
allowing them to access the reserved areas of airports. Then the draft of the NRP was revived.
At the request of the Minister of the Interior, we began to explore the assumptions of
reinstatement of border controls which you can imagine, is likely to mobilise huge resources. We
presented our proposals to the European Commission in the context of the organisation of the
COP21.
It is in this context that has occurred the attempted bombing of the Thalys from August 21, 2015,
during which the referred to Karadeniz, coming from Brussels, sought to address the other
passengers. Measures have therefore been decided that resumes the Savary law but which
already allowed securing permanent daily Thalys 28. The device has been strengthened by the

installation of gantry by SNCF in the direction France-Belgium. Furthermore, the joint rail
patrols have been intensified, with the Spain, the Italy and the Germany.
After the attacks of November 13, the authorities have decided to restore the border control. We
were there the rest quite ready because, at the same time, started the COP21. We had already
informed the European Commission and, when the President of the Republic has raised the State
of emergency and prescribed the re-establishment of the border control, we were already, for our
part, in phase 3. This procedure concerned 285 authorized crossing points (PPP). I recall that the
PPF concern an external border - airports, ports of North, West and South facades - and - land,
rail or air - app apply to internal borders, namely those that separate us from our immediate
neighbours. Just before the attacks of November 13, the PAF has thus mobilized 5,000 officers,
to which they added 71 PPA officers of customs. And, in depth, i.e. in the band of twenty
kilometres, action was conducted both by public security and customs and services by three
compagnies rpublicaines security made available to the Director zonal of the PAF in the North,
to take the 15 border points declared as PPP.
With regard to the staffing reinforcements, our services have of course changed their methods
since we decided - on our own initiative - to control 100% of travellers from countries outside
the EU, but also all citizens of the EU from countries outside the Schengen area. In airports by
province, we control all passengers using Schengen flights, and to Roissy and Orly, taking into
account the importance of the number of flights and, therefore, to not block these large airport
platforms, we control between 30 and 40 Schengen flights per day at Roissy and a score of
sensitive flights per day at Orly.
Always in the airports, in the perspective of the Euro 2016, the new national scheme of the
national police will soon be fully operational. Exercises involving all the services of the PAF
were conducted with the RAID in order to react in the event of mass killing. The services are
currently receive, with specific equipment, 112 HK G36, using 5.56 mm ammunition. Training
in the use of this new weapon are ended. In addition, a new training is provided for the first
responders. The PAF staff in addition to those operative Sentinel, reinforced since 13 November
- thus, 289 soldiers are deployed in the different airports.
Approximately 400 staff members will swell the ranks of the PAF through the different plans
defined by the President of the Republic and the Minister of the Interior.
Finally, the famous PNR, the France had decided to acquire from 2014, resulted in the vesting of
specific numbers on dedicated sites.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. You explain that the border control process was already
initiated at the time of the attacks of January 2015, knowing that the borders should be closed on
13 or 14 November in the evening from the perspective of the COP21. You have specified that 4
000 officers of the PAF had been mobilized for this purpose. Now we have seen that this control,
including road control, was random, and that in some airports as Roissy, it was not systematic.
What is the percentage of people actually controlled? More specifically, is the road control really
useful?

Mr. David Skuli. The France has 2 940 kilometers of land borders. Also, as you point out, is the
border controls very difficult to ensure. There are in fact of the phenomena of workarounds: one
finds for example 400 points of paved passages between the Belgium and the France. You should
know also that 1.7 million commuters travel each day in one or other of our neighbouring
countries. I should mention also the importance of implementing Implementation of the dynamic
controls on the roads.
Principle of the Schengen area is that it provides a strong control at the external borders and that
prevails inside the free movement such as defined in 1995. The application of the Schengen
agreements has resulted in the dismantling of border posts. It took after the attacks, restore them
and re-enable BCNJ with certain countries.
Then the France is subject to European provisions and cannot restore frontier points in ignoring:
Please follow information procedures, to invoke grounds - in this case that under the former
article 23 of the Schengen borders code. This operation is therefore quite difficult to carry, not to
mention that the border control only makes sense, for little like it effective, unless settled a real
exchange of information between services. Databases must be populated by all the countries. The
difficulty to control can the rest that grow as the Syria or the Iraq do not appear to have made
include passports stolen from the SLTD database, all Interpol.
However, this control is effective in airports, in the border stations. We have developed a
program of automatic control with the INITIALLING sas and I would remind you that the
European Commission plans to put in place, from 2020, the Entry-Exit System where each citizen
entering and leaving the Schengen area will be subject to a control with the counting of the
duration of his stay. It is clear that it must take into account the effects of mass: Roissy, there are
1 600 daily aircraft movements; There are 890 Schengen in France flights every day. All airlines,
all airport managers claim, for their part, an improvement in the flow of traffic - where the
paradox consisting of to ensure at the same time maximum security and the necessary fluidity
that I have just mentioned.
By 2015, 15,000 people were the subject of a measure of non-admission. Since November 13,
when the border control was restored, this figure reached 17 363 people. Most files 4 700 S and
more than 7,000 individuals subject to a plug research were detected and the font files were
interviewed 9 million times. Even if the sealing of the border control is not perfect, for
geographical reasons, these figures still show in reality.
I would add that the device of a random control is perhaps more relevant that a control device
fixed.
The rapporteur. At Roissy, for example, do you control passengers leaving, coming back, or
both?
Mr. David Skuli. Thanks to the SETRADER system, previously mentioned, we control the
people leaving. In addition, procedures have been implemented since the attacks as the passage
by the aubette or sas initial depending on the type of this Passport. Other controls are carried out

at inspection filtering posts held by companies controlled by the PAF. Finally, a final control was
imposed on airlines: that of the correlation between the ticket and identification.
The rapporteur. I imagine that the Turkey is a priority for you.
Mr. David Skuli. The flights to the Turkey are obviously particularly controlled and STIs also
apply to flights to Istanbul or other destinations.
The rapporteur. To tell you, Mr Director, a delegation of the commission went to Turkey last
week, from Roissy, and was quite astonished, to say the least, the absence of controls: we went
to Turkey as anywhere else. The control to which we have been subjected has proved altogether
very usual.
Mr. David Skuli. What do you mean by 'very normal '?
The rapporteur. We recorded our luggage and then passed the security filter and it is only if the
correlation between passport and boarding card has been verified.
Mr. David Skuli. I was not present at the time of this control and I take note of what you
specify; rest, for flights sensitive as those destined for Turkey, a first control, essential, is that
directed to the police bus shelter where the documents you submit are confronted with all of the
font files.
The rapporteur. At what point exactly? One of the registration of the luggage?
Mr. David Skuli. At the time where you present the PAF staff your ticket and travel document passport - all the files is retrieved.
The rapporteur. We did not understand when this control was held.
Mr. David Skuli. You have not seen him, but I can assure you that it has been made. When you
go through the aubette by police to leave the Schengen area, all your documents are checked to
verify the validity, then check that you do not have the object of a particular form. The number
of detained persons subject to an alert IST, namely people who wanted to leave the national
territory to do Jihad, more than 100. These checks are made when people are reported. I assure
you in any case, I stress, that are thus controlled sensitive destinations - whether the flights for
the Turkey or the Greece.
The rapporteur. And for Greece returns?
Mr. David Skuli. Charter flights or flights arriving from Greece, at Roissy are considered
sensitive flights: we know the State of bankruptcy of the Greece. First, our OLI, in Greece,
control the passengers who embark; then, these flights are controlled 100% in airports in
province as if they came from a country not belonging to the Schengen area. And these checks
are sometimes performed in aircraft door.

The rapporteur. We have therefore really not had chance because, after the Turkey, we went to
Greece and, on return, control proved still lower. It was the following Friday the ascension
Thursday, also, perhaps, staff were less mobilized, what I understand also. We have seen nobody
in Greece and it was enough to show our passports, which took about three seconds per
passenger. And on arrival, at Roissy, we passed quite easily.
When the President of the Republic refers to the recovery of the control at the borders, in the
eyes of public opinion, it is a systematic control; but I quite understand under your
considerations, that it is impossible to implement Artwork.
Are personnel trained in the PAF, profiling? Are you going to develop this practice? One has the
impression that operative FRONTEX proves quite low, given the challenge represented by the
migrants and taking into account the possibility of terrorist infiltration. You indicated that one
hundred french experts had joined the Agency in the fight against document fraud.
Mr. David Skuli. We have indeed developed trained as behaviorists inspired by techniques
developed by the Israelis, who have some experience in this area. We already attended a lecture
in Tel Aviv on the subject and we will be involved, soon a next Conference. This training is also
followed by the Gendarmerie of air transport (GTA). The gendarmerie will focus its attention on
the personal that control hold baggage, as we act, for our part, in the public and reserved areas.
We then extend this action to the international trains.
The training, organized with researchers from the University of Toulouse, regardless of "police
flair" and observation of behavior techniques, aspects appealed to four medical criteria such as
sweating and heart beats. Sensors will be installed for that purpose in airports, in specific
locations.
The rapporteur. This training for all officers or experts in particular?
Mr. David Skuli. This training has been launched and will involve some 30 personnel of the
different french airports, as a first step, before being extended. Then I have alluded, it must be
carried out in cooperation with the academic world and in the context of international trade.
Thus, the use of facial recognition technology and medical parameters will help agent in his
work of detection. It will be one of the ways to control the people who come in the public areas
of airports that have become the true areas of vulnerability.
With regard to the hotspots, four out of five are active in the Greek Islands. We are almost the
first contributor in terms of present personal - screeners, debriefers, smuggled documentary
experts... Hotspots are rather operational and phases of the migrant are fairly well defined: they
allow to ensure the courses of the migrant, its history and to integrate its documents in the
Eurodac database. We projected 122 experts to which should be added escorts for people who
will be subject to a return to Turkey under the agreement recently signed between the EU and
this country.
The presence of European and especially french police is therefore quite important in these
hotspots. Faced with the influx of migrants in the Central Mediterranean, FRONTEX reorients

its device in the direction of the Italian hotspots where we have to send experts. Also the number
of police officers who operate outside the country starts to become significant; but the GreekTurkish border, ultimately, is our border and should protect the best.
M. Christophe Cavard. Tools that allow the exchange of information with our European
partners you appear sufficiently reliable or will require improvements in the fact of terrorism or
the migration crisis involving an overload of work for your services? In this regard, what,
beyond the presence of liaison officers, your links with Europol? What channels do work at the
speed of events? It seems that access to certain files must be subject to specific requests.
What is your perspective on the risk of terrorist infiltration among the flow of refugees? What
are your relations with the intelligence in this context? We are indeed for several years on trade
flows and communication tools between services that are not always used to cooperate.
Mr. David Skuli. There are tools at European level: the file of the Systme d'information
Schengen (SIS), including a second version will soon be implemented. the Galt file, Interpol,
which identifies the documents stolen or lost; Finally the PNR to be established soon. It must be
added, at the national level, SAF.
What is the capacity of countries to transfer the information in their national files to these crosscutting tools? The Minister discussed the subject during a recent meeting in Brussels where he
was matter of interoperability of files, the Dutch Presidency, this is one of the elements of its
roadmap, wishing to ensure that each country ensures the transfer of data from its national files
SIS to. If I had a suggestion to make, I would stress the great effort that remains to achieve
compatibility of networks and with regard to the rigor of their diet. Moreover, the France is a big
contributor to judge by the large number of sheets which was transmitted to Interpol or the SIS.
An agreement has been signed between the Agency FRONTEX and Europol since there is a
danger of terrorist infiltration among the cohorts of refugees, as shown by the case of the two
terrorists who blew themselves up at the Stade de France on November 13. The magnitude of the
crisis makes this difficult to control risk. However the agreement in question to collect a mass of
information which now reach of Europol which will therefore analyse and redistribute them to
the various services, including the OCRIEST, charge of the dismantling of the networks. Europol
has decided recently to create a sort of branch of fight against illegal immigration and the
organised networks, structure that will concentrate all the initiatives to better exchange of
information between countries on migration flows.
With regard to the fight against terrorism, it is essential that intelligence exchange between them
and pay some data in files accessible to other services. This is the case in particular plugs S,
which I would remind you that SID and the LSVCC are the major suppliers that feed the RPF
file that is searchable by the PAF.
Our relationship with the intelligence services are daily since, in large airports such as Roissy or
Orly, found ISB, the DRPP and the LSVCC antennas. In the context of the return of the jihadists,
we have permanent exchanges with these services. Consultation of S sheets which, I recall, are
not questioning but reporting cards, leads us to interact daily with them, to signal, precisely,

these people when they enter the national territory or that they leave. These relationships also
exist in each area where zonal directors have points of liaison with the domestic intelligence
even with foreign intelligence services. Incidentally, my service welcomes a liaison officer of the
DGSE which itself has a liaison officer of the PAF.
The margin of progression of this relationship lies above all in the interoperability of files: one
could imagine a better access of the intelligence services. It is one of the themes addressed by the
Minister recently in Brussels: intelligence or those responsible for the fight against terrorism
must have better access to the Eurodac file as well as the screw - system of exchange of visa data
between Member countries of the Schengen area. In addition to interoperability, should be given
to the conservation of data, knowing that the Schengen system was not designed to deal with a
threat taking body in its midst even: perpetrators of attacks were nationals of the Union
European.
M. Christophe Cavard. Take the case of an individual who would be from Syria through
several EU member countries that do not all still have in place the same standards of control. It
will achieve smart breaks that will make tracking his journey more difficult than if he goes
directly from the Turkey... However, if I have understood correctly, intelligence services, if the
person is likely to be dangerous, warn you and it is from this moment that you are associated
with the operations. But your agents may very well, directly, have doubts; Therefore, do ask their
opinion to the intelligence services, they directly involved? It is for us to try to understand who
does what.
Mr. David Skuli. On the procedures of return, a rather powerful device was set up after the
agreement between the two Ministers. Everything depends on two vectors: information, first,
because we services 'sensors '; cooperation with the Turks, then - I was heard by another
parliamentary commission at the time where the Turks, without notifying the french services,
had returned individuals to Marseille rather than in Paris.
Today, the data concerning all those who are in detention in Turkey and especially Istanbul
centres are communicated to both services: SID and the DCI that inform us immediately so that
we send security forces recover directly individual in Istanbul to accompany him on his return
flight. We catch him on his arrival at the border and give it to the intelligence services.
That a person should, at the outset as to the return, borrow another European airport, that justifies
the establishment of the NRP for intra-European flights. The European Parliament had not
understood the interest and prevented its adoption since 2007. Until then, it was almost
impossible to control a person regarded as sensitive under the terms of the 32 criteria. PNR
finally voted, the various countries must be establish within two years of coming. France, I said,
has anticipated since it has implemented its own PNR which should begin to be operational by
the end of the month of May to be completely at the end of the year.
Is obvious that we need to overcome the lack of a European system for exchanging information
on travellers. In a first time, it is necessary that the intelligence services share their records on
individuals suspected of belonging to a terrorist movement, these sheets are made to the SIS so

that all the sensors services are informed of the dangerousness of the individuals in question in
order to take such and such conduct at the time where they cross a border.
PAF transmit multiple information to intelligence on a daily basis. We communicate them even
photocopies of travel documents of persons reported, particularly for facts of Islam, or who leave
for particular destinations for example for the countries of the Maghreb. We are working also
in the context of the IST, new device that allows us to come into frequent contact with the
intelligence services.
To summarise, the answer to your question is in setting up EU-wide tools, tools that promoted
the France as early as before the attacks of January 2015. 1St January 2017, we systematically
monitor all persons subject to an alert.
The rapporteur. There are 4 700 sheets S since November 13. What happens when an agent of
the PAF control an individual being the subject of such a, who send information?
Mr. David Skuli. S are State security sheets that have generated great debate because the press
had not understood their purpose. There are 11 different profiles corresponding to 11 lines to
take, whose numbering can be confusing since some of these cards are referred to as S 15 or S
16. It's reporting cards and only the S 15 plug requires screening officers at the borders that they
hold the person who is the subject until the arrival of the intelligence services. It is quite
complicated because on what legal basis retain the person in question? Should then be last
control even if it means involving the Customs officers.
The rapporteur. You now have a legal basis with the vote by the CMP of the Bill strengthening
the fight against organized crime, terrorism and their financing, and improving efficiency and
guarantees of criminal procedure.
Mr. David Skuli. Indeed, but the S cards existed before. Each provides an action to be taken. As
soon as the agent finds that a controlled individual subject S plug, it reported to intelligence the
provenance of the individual and its destination.
The rapporteur. This reporting is done in real-time and from whom?
Mr. David Skuli. The information is transmitted in real time either by phone or electronically or
by calling the ISB agent present on the airport platform: everything depends on what contains the
product information sheet: it is sometimes asked to photocopy the travel document for
transmission to the intelligence services.
The rapporteur. But in concrete terms? You have well described the commercial pressure in the
flow of traffic. When you detect a person subject to a plug S...
Mr. David Skuli. The control has no difficulty once we have control first-line and second-line
control. When we detect a person covered by a sheet, we invite you to come in second line so
that it releases its position in the tail of first line. It is important to be attentive to the individuals
so identified because 80% of them are for a link with radical islam. Specifically, asked the

person concerned on the side and it is taken into account by the second line agents. Sheet S 15
further requests to retain the person controlled until the arrival of the intelligence services, which
is a matter for a few minutes on the major Parisian airport platforms. However, in the province,
when these services are not present, we pass the individual in the second row where we carry
out, with the assistance of the customs services, in-depth scrutiny pending the arrival of the
intelligence services. Telephone information that I mentioned are passed during a second line.
The rapporteur. Conduct sometimes provides that officers must act discreetly...
Mr. David Skuli. Indeed. When conduct is to identify elements of information about the
individual in all discretion, telephone notice does not have to be given simultaneously: the call is
passed when S plug has been processed and that the individual is passed in the second line. At
Roissy, an information unit has every day for mission to treat all the S returns detected at the
border lines.
The rapporteur. On 14 November in the morning, Salah Abdeslam is controlled with two other
individuals by the mounted police...
Mr. David Skuli. At nine and ten hours.
The rapporteur. At nine and ten hours, in fact. They come from Paris and travelled to Belgium
in a vehicle registered in Belgium. Salah Abdeslam, inter alia, been a plug S... In short, if I dare
say, all lights are red. This audit was conducted as part of the border controls announced by the
President of the Republic?
I imagine that, in the hours following an attack, you deploy personnel at the borders. A special
procedure is foreseen in this context, concerning the registered S, measures of restraint,
reinforced control? When Salah Abdeslam is controlled, the legal situation, if I may say,
certainly very wobbly: constables hold it more than a half hour, the limit of all legal rules. At the
same time - and this is by no means a charge - if the police had gone to the end of their initiative,
we would have avoided a few disastrous later adventures. So, I repeat, during such a crisis, a
special procedure is scheduled for officers of the PAF, including plugs S?
Mr. David Skuli. On 14 November in the morning, all Salah Abdeslam identification elements
were not known. It is very easy, in retrospect, once the file is completed for all the elements of
the investigation, to say what should have been. However, 14 in the morning, nobody knew that
Salah Abdeslam had abandoned his belt of explosives, nobody knew the links between people
who were trying to provide logistics back to Molenbeek.
The rapporteur. But he was travelling in a vehicle registered in Belgium, identified...
Mr. David Skuli. I was then in crisis so well, I saw how the information is received.
Then, the rehabilitation of controls does not mean the closure of our 2 940 kilometres of borders.
Only authorized crossing points are concerned, i.e. those reported as points of entry, which

removes anything passable points that allow to move from one country to another, as is the case
every day for frontier workers who are controlled by person.
As you said, to return to Salah Abdeslam, the gendarmes still conducted a thorough check since
they kept him more than half an hour.
With respect to the procedure, as a result of such an attack, the Ministerial crisis centre is
activated, declined by the Directorate General of the national police (DGPN) attached to each
direction a particular mission. Within this overall framework, the PAF must strengthen its
presence in the borders and thus to strengthen controls on exit - to intercept those who could
commit an attack - and controls input - to prevent the arrival of other terrorists. The same
evening, all the other countries has been advised and have, for those who could, immediately
strengthened control of their borders.
In regards to the S cards, are not the object of a specific procedure. They exist in the files
depending on the reporting made by CSB and the LSVCC. When SAF is queried, the sheet is
automatically detected and displayed on the monitor available agent unless the existence of the
card is indicated by radio.
After the attacks, all our action was to strengthen our presence at the border or even to restore the
PPP controls that are the main land crossing points: motorways, national roads, border stations,
or airports. This action, I stress, is coordinated by the DGPN and, at the top level, by the
Ministerial crisis centre where all the decisions are taken.
The rapporteur. I understand, Mr Director, but, in the hours following an attack, the PAF
officers could not systematically use of four hours withholding by Bill strengthening the fight
against organized crime and terrorism?
Mr. David Skuli. You ask me if we could apply this provision?
The rapporteur. Yes, all of the individuals covered by a sheet.
Mr. David Skuli. No, because, as I said, all of the plugs S aren't inquiry sheets. Or, to change
the nature of the card S It is, I recall, meant for the intelligence services so that they are informed
of the movements of the individuals concerned. With the exception, I said, the plug S 15;
However there are very little plugs S 15.
The rapporteur. I know very well what is a plug S, Mr Director, and I have even widely
defended the principle at the time where nobody understood nothing. And I personally would
make evolve the definition for a better understanding and better efficiency.
Once occurs an attack, we have not a multitude of tools. The card S, you are right to remember,
is a tool of intelligence and not questioning; but when, from a pragmatic point of view, an attack
is committed, all officers of the PAF, for example, does not have access to the FSPRT file - and
it is so much better. If the officers of the PAF control a fitch S linked to radical islam, one can
imagine, while the context is disturbed that they systematically hold the individual in question to

carry out the necessary checks. Certainly, the operation of plug S is designed to provide
information services on the whereabouts of the individual, when and with whom, in what
vehicle... But one can also imagine, I repeat, that in case of attack, this sheet serves to something
else only to gather information, that it is used as "derived" to ensure the safety of the French in
such a way that the withholding of four hours I mentioned can be used to avoid that a Salah
Abdeslam escapes several months and commit any other attacks.
Mr. David Skuli. Do not confuse tools and forget the role of justice: it is she who leads
investigations. Cannot do anything on the ground that attacks are being perpetrated. It is
important to keep tools in their vocation, which does not create new ones if necessary. If the
sheet is a means of reporting and exchange of information between intelligence services,
information that will perhaps allow to detect terrorist actions, it is not a tool of inquiry. For this,
one establishes a new system of records or alternatively is part the individuals concerned the
RPF with a code establishing a plug PJ for arraignment. There is also this possibility which will
be offered a deduction of 4 hours in a clear framework.
When an attack is committed, and we have a sufficiently precise to be paid to the RPF reporting
we use indeed another code, that PJ sheets which, I repeat, can, if necessary, to detain a person
involved in a court case. The sheet has a vocation and if you want to give it a new, should review
the device. It must also take into account the reluctance of some of our partners to the idea
thereby proceed to the restraint of people without any legal basis. We have to be very pragmatic,
certainly, but without that this pragmatism leads us to divert the sheet of regular use.
Indeed, it must take into account the reporting criteria that are not the same from one country to
the other. So, what is the assessment of the intelligence Belgian to consider a Belgian national, in
this case Salah Abdeslam, as a terrorist or as likely to engage in terrorist activity? What is, for
their part, the assessment of services french, German, Italian...? The situation is therefore quite
complex.
In short, it should leave the plug S vocation and create, if necessary, another tool or use plugs PJ
of RPF.
It will also need to consider this new provision of 'withholding of 4 hours' by Bill against
organized crime and terrorism.
Mr. Serge Grouard. I have the feeling that we are in a defensive logic that reflects also the title
of this commission of inquiry. For some time, I tell myself that even if the devices we are
discussing are of course necessary, it goes well have to ask the question of the strategy before
thinking to the "means used in. Work by the State to combat terrorism. " Therefore, our strategy
must continue to be defensive or even should it become offensive?
We are back from the Balkans. I have the feeling that we control more and more airports. It will
not prevent, obviously, despite the solid mesh, an Ant to pass, but the controls are organized,
densified and seem, in any case for the French, more operative part.

I take the example of land routes. In Greece, in 2015, a million refugees arrived. Some 500 000
there would be always without having been identified. Many are simple refugees who would
prefer to be in another situation, but there has been infiltration of terrorists. Also heard us
"Balkan highway. I somewhat know this area and know that there are real colanders. How can
we control this? It is mission impossible. We were told that the Aegean Sea was a place of traffic
all kinds. Has talked us about this "market of refugees '...
In short, this region - Istanbul, Athens, between the two teems with world, that sought
constantly of needles in a haystack. However as your services are effective and well organized,
you will find needles, but not all.
I have no solution but this situation reminds me of our defensive military strategy in 1940. The
idea of the Maginot line was not so stupid, but the Germans are passed elsewhere, exactly, once
again, by the Belgium - there are fatalities in the history.
My remarks are certainly somewhat disjointed, but intellectually I struck me this problem. It is
proposed to multiply files, devices... Take the example of drug trafficking: it also borrows from
motorways, and although they are known, the drug passes all the same. So what should you do?
This is what the State of my thinking.
The President Georges Fenech. What is your question, my dear colleague?
Mr. Serge Grouard. With regard to the FRONTEX Agency, Mr Director, how many are there
of personnel and how many French among them? I heard that they were 122 but I am not sure
whether it is the correct figure.
Then you mentioned the retention of data. What is? Indeed, I have the feeling that some files are
not preserved in the long term, which can make it difficult to research the history of an
individual, for example.
Mr. David Skuli. Indeed, it is better to have a strategy rather than reacting. It is already difficult
to define a strategy for himself, then to twenty-eight, this is even more. It also found that it took
from the dead so that the European Parliament vote the implementation of essential tools to
Exchange data or control. Should therefore conduct a substantive action and which must be
pursued to advance systems. The causes of terrorism are probably internal, but they are also
external - we think of conflicts identified requiring strong action.
With regard to the FRONTEX Agency, she will change of nature since the European
Commission has extended its action to the coast guard increased its personnel. There are
currently 300 permanent on a total volume of mobilized personnel by all of the Member States
which is several thousand. The France is a fairly major contributor: du vivier screeners and
debriefers hundred people, account number that will be increased. In addition staff we can send
responding to profiles 13 or 14 of the Agency, including document fraud and assistance to
catches of fingerprints.

Ensure interoperability within FRONTEX is complex: a french border guard must be able to
perform a check on the Greek-Turkish border. It must therefore master the language English - we
demand of our agents a B1 level. In addition, they must hold a European certification of the
border trade which requires a common background . Ponds of personnel trained by FRONTEX is
thus in each country.
I come to the conservation of data - sensitive issue within the European Union, to the point that
some of our partners, because of a sensitivity, blocked number of our devices in the field.
Remains that the French position has been retained for the PNR: data will be kept for five years,
masking is done after six months. A French action is committed to ensure that Eurodac data are
kept even after the return of the person concerned, which strikes me as a good approach because
it's the only file containing biometric and identity elements declared or certified. As the french
RPF files and other data can in be kept until dozens of years depending on the nature of the plug
and the nature of the offence which has justified the inclusion in the roster.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you have information about the circumstances of the attack
against the Russian plane in Sinai in October 2015?
Mr. David Skuli. No, I only have snippets of information or assumptions. We exchanged on the
subject with the DGAC with which we cooperate closely. Gold in her womb the DGAC includes
a cell of the risk analysis which examines disasters or air accidents.
The only information available to me concerning the nature of the explosive - it mentions the use
of TATP, of a cylinder, the problem of control of hold baggage. We had the opportunity to
discuss this topic with the DGAC during a mission in Tunisia. Still I have no very precise nor
very clear, certified, information that allow me to tell you anything in the context of the present
commission.
The President Georges Fenech. A France 24 journalist, specialist of the Middle East, told us
about a can of beer.
Mr. David Skuli. I also heard this information. Such way of storage of the explosive is likely to
cause significant damage on the plane, but all depends on the positioning of the passenger, of the
whereabouts of this COP... I have heard like you this information without as I know if it has been
disclosed by an officer involved in the investigation.
All elements are analysed and taken into account and it adapts to the threat - as indicated in Mr.
Grouard. We organize today on the basis of mass murder because we have been victims of mass
murder and it is very difficult to think of the future.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for all your answers.
Hearing, behind closed doors, Ms. Hlne Crocquevieille, Director General of customs and
Excise, Mr. Jean-Paul Balzamo, Deputy Director of legal and litigation, business controls
and the fight against fraud, and Mr. Jean-Paul Garca, Director national intelligence and
customs investigations

Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, Thursday, may 12, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. After hearing of the Director of the border police (PAF) which
has just taken place, we are pleased to welcome Ms. Hlne Crocquevieille, Director General of
customs and Excise, accompanied by Mr. Jean-Paul Garca, head of the National Directorate of
intelligence and customs investigations, and Mr. Jean-Paul Balzamo, Assistant Director of legal
and litigation, business controls and the fight against fraud.
Madam Director, gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our
Committee of inquiry. We are going with you, in a context of increased terrorist threat, means
you have to dry up financing channels and implemented methods Work for effective sharing of
intelligence.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly. In
accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning of the
parliamentary assemblies, his account may still be published in whole or in part, if we decide so
at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will
previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will
be submitted to the Commission, which may decide to State in his report. I would remind you
that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is punishable by the penalties
provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who, within a period of twenty-five
years [...], disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a commission of inquiry,
unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this
information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
nothing but the truth.
Please raise your right hand and say: "I swear."
Ms. Hlne Crocquevieille, Mr. Jean-Paul Garca and Mr. Jean-Paul Balzamo successively take
oath.
We want to ask you about several topics. The Customs has changed its methods of control at
airports and other border crossing points since the attacks of January 2015? Can you also present
the nature and the functioning of the cooperation between the Customs and the PAF officers?
Have what results you achieved since the reinstatement of border controls after November 13,
2015? How do you join the Frontex device?
By 2015, your results in the fight against the trafficking of firearms increased by 40% compared
to 2014: How do you explain it? What is the trend for the first months of the year 2016?
Can you also make your international cargo control device? What actions have been taken the
evening of November 13, 2015 and for what results? In the fight against terrorism, the Customs

has made available to other administrations the operational capacity and the technical tools
available to it: command centre, license plates, Cyberdouane... players?
We will then discuss with the National Directorate of intelligence and investigation (DNRED),
issues relating to intelligence, including your use of the file FSPRT and your participation in the
fight against terrorism (UCLAT) co-ordination Unit.
Ms. Hlne Crocquevieille, Director General of customs and Excise. The customs
administration, that I run for more than three years, is characterized by the multiplicity of its
missions: economic, fiscal, and protection of the territory. It is essentially the title of its mission
of protection that customs contributes, alongside the ministries of Interior and defence, the fight
against terrorism. Thanks to the diversity of its tools but also to its methods of work, customs is
now considered by the administrations in charge of security as a reliable partner in this field.
From 2014, the customs services carried out the arrest of Mehdi Nemmouche, on the occasion of
a Eurolines in Marseille bus control, and in January 2015, a brigade of monitoring control in
Modane feared two individuals suspected of being involved in the attempted attacks giving rise
the previous day in Belgium to the dismantling of the cell of Verviers. Thus, the customs, as part
of its normal missions for surveillance of the territory, can be in the front line in the fight against
terrorism.
I will outline in a first outline of the contribution of my administration in the fight against
terrorism and, in a second step, I will bring insight in terms of strengthening our action in the
fight against terrorism and controls at borders presented by Secretary of State budget on 22
January.
The customs administration has legal and operational means to intervene in the fight against
terrorism and its financing. Thanks to its privileged position, on the borders, its expertise and its
means for securing the flow of goods and people, but also through its ability to fight against
major trafficking customs registered its action in a process of complementarity and cooperation
with specialized services.
The contributions of the customs in the fight against terrorism are of different natures. First,
customs ensures the prevention of terrorist acts in the context of its specific missions of control
safety and port and air cargo security. She put in Work the Community programme ICS (Import
Control System) - true PNR of goods - which requires logisticians to customs, at the first point of
entry into the European Union and operators, a summary statement describing the contents of the
cargo, as well as origin and destination elements. On the basis of these transmissions - more than
seven million returns filed with the French customs administration in 2015 - customs services
conduct a risk analysis and targeting to perform efficient controls.
Still on the subject of securing trade in goods, customs participates very actively in the security
initiative against proliferation, the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) program, which aims to
intercept illicit flows of goods proliferation by sea, air and land. The customs administration
provides legal expertise and provides the most control and seizure of the goods diverted or
arriving by sea on behalf of the general secretariat of defence and national security (SGDSN).

Regarding the control of persons, customs mobilizes a little more than 500 agents to ensure the
safety of the flow of goods and travellers on the site of the channel tunnel and Eurostar train
stations. It is thus in charge of the detection of weapons and explosives on individuals and in
luggage.
As you know, the customs administration has particularly invested in the work of preparation of
the NRP, which aims to facilitate the processing of passenger data to improve the effectiveness
of controls. Since September 2015, the new interdepartmental platform, the passenger
information unit (IPU), is open on the premises of the Customs to Roissy. The IPU is responsible
for collection, processing and dissemination of data from the airlines. Its operational scalability
is provided current 2016 and the french NRP should be operational by the end of the year. The
data of this platform will be made available to control services in each airport of France.
In an interdepartmental Framework, customs also participates in the fight against illegal
immigration. Mission and land monitoring services are thus mobilized on eighty-two of the 131
(PPF) border crossing points in metropolitan France and fourteen PPF on thirty-seven in
overseas. As part of this mission, the customs administration highlights Working regime of bans
on leaving the country that participates in the device to combat the phenomenon of foreign
combatants.
With regard to the control of financial flows, customs, through its legislation on physical
transfers of capital, is a major player in the fight against money laundering and the financing of
terrorism. Controls on compliance with the declarative obligation of incoming and outgoing of
the territory capital to intercept sums, securities or values that might come from an unlawful
activity or be intended. Thus, in 2015, among records of findings of failure to declarative
(MOD), the national service of the judicial customs (SNDJ) showed a customs laundering in
fifty-two records, and in the other ninety-four folders, whitening of common law, for a total
record of 146 criminal records for money laundering.
This shows that the detection of MOD is a legal great way to highlight the offences of money
laundering. In recent months, customs officials found several MOD on important sums of money
- more than 3 million euros - held by people of Syrian nationality residing in Europe. Ongoing
judicial investigations have vocation to demonstrate the possible links between the MOD and
money-laundering or the financing of terrorism.
With regard to the fight against trafficking and organized crime, the DNRED, service to national
jurisdiction, is in charge of intelligence and the fight against the great international customs
fraud. She worked on violations of customs sensitive to terrorist threat, such as trafficking of
tobacco or counterfeits, which are potential sources of financing of individuals belonging to
radical Islamist movements. For example, the DNRED investigations were able to demonstrate
the involvement of individuals radicalized in trafficking of counterfeit clothing or hardware; the
gains from these trades were used to fund radical Islamist groups in France and abroad.
You will have seen, the contributions of my services in the fight against terrorism are many and
varied. Significant results have been achieved in recent months in this area.

I come to the empowerment of customs as a result of the attacks. Early 2015, given the
deterioration of the security situation linked to terrorism, the customs administration has
accelerated the modernization of its structures, strengthened awareness of its agents in the threat
terrorist and put in place of the rise of intelligence to a dedicated service circuits, the task of
combating terrorism (GOLT) within the DNRED.
Following the attacks of November 2015, in accordance with the commitments of the President
of the Republic, a plan to strengthen the action of the customs in the fight against terrorism and
border controls was introduced by the Secretary of State to the budget. Part of the extension of
measures that had already been decided internally at the beginning of the year 2015, this plan
provides a strengthening of our staffing, operational resources and legal tools. He definitely
spends customs as an essential actor on the security pact discussed by the President of the
Republic and a key administration in operative response to the terrorist threat.
This plan is designed primarily to strengthen our capacity of border control in the case of major
crisis, like the one we have known end of 2015. As such, the Customs has thousand additional
agents in 2016 and 2017, which reverses the curve of evolution of our workforce, declining for
20 years. These agents will be allocated in priority to surveillance brigades responsible for
controls at the land borders and in sensitive places of passage of goods such as sorting of express
freight or postal freight centres. Additional staff should also be devoted to the strengthening of
controls of safety, in search of weapons and explosives, on the cross-channel link and road
freight.
The action plan also provides a programme of equipment to increase the capacity for action by
Customs officers and enhance their security. Deterrence and response of units of ground
surveillance capabilities must be adapted in order to ensure the safety of the officers and the
effectiveness of interceptions. Is why, after a specific training, exposure units will gradually be
equipped with sub-machine guns, weapons which will complement the arms of individual fist not
sufficiently dissuasive. In addition, a contribution of over EUR 6 million will be allocated to the
staffing of the customs units in - body armor - protection and interception equipment. These
devices have been ordered and their distribution is underway.
Communication in times of crisis being fundamental, the plan foresees to accelerate the staffing
of our services in new ways radio, which will be connected to those of the Ministry of the
Interior.
Furthermore, the monitoring services must be able to rely on reactive land operational centres,
coordinating our teams between them and with other internal security services, for transmission
of real-time information. It is within these operational centres that dates back from the automatic
number plate recognition (ANPR) readers information, including customs continues the
deployment; by 2017, it should count eighty-five distributed sensors throughout the territory,
networked with the Lawson of the Ministry of the Interior.
In addition to the strengthening of the human and material resources, the collection, analysis and
sharing of intelligence are at theFavorite pieces of the plan to combat terrorism. The GOLT has
been profoundly reorganized and its workforce in order to boost the customs information. The

modalities of reporting lines to the GOLT were formalised end 2015 and a network of
correspondents of the mis GOLT in place within the customs service. The GOLT is now the sole
point of contact anti-terrorism in customs. It receives an average of sixty to seventy records
reporting weekly and works in close collaboration with SID and local intelligence services.
In addition, it was decided to strengthen the capacity of the cell Cyberdouane. On the operational
level, the Customs is currently a measure under the Bill to strengthen the fight against organized
crime, in order to allow agents of the cell Cyberdouane to carry out investigations under
pseudonym and thus more effectively combat major trafficking, including in the Darknet. I
emphasized the need for my administration to dispose of this legal tool. Otherwise, we will be
unable to effectively investigate internet.
The entire customs community been sensitized to the issue of terrorism and intelligencegathering. Training modules have been adapted.
Key player in control of the flow of goods, the customs must also increase its efficiency in
combating major trafficking, likely to have connections with terrorism, including smuggling of
weapons and explosives. Customs is the authority in charge of the issuance of authorizations to
intra-Community movement of firearms, their components and ammunition. In the context of the
draft revision of the European directive on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons,
customs currently supports the creation of a system dematerialized and automated exchange of
information at European level to secure the flows and ensure real traceability of weapons,
ammunition and their parts. This should take the form of a European computing platform.
At the national level, Customs has just finalised a plan of action to combat the illicit trafficking
in firearms, complementary to the national plan presented by the Minister of the Interior on
November 13, 2015. The plan aims to strengthen the legal, operational and intelligence of the
customs. The measures include the possibility for the specialized agents of implement Works
undercover and kick-purchase procedures to combat the illicit arms trade. This action plan also
to establish within the DNRED an investigation group who specializes in weapons, but also to
guide the analytical tools of risk and targeting for the identification of suspicious flows,
especially in the postal and express freight.
To enhance the effectiveness of controls and identify illegal flows, the fight against terrorism of
January 2016 plan not only to strengthen the cells responsible for targeting ICS, the postal freight
and express cargo, but also to equip the units customs of new means of better non-intrusive
detection - x-ray - on port and airport platforms.
Finally, the plan devotes customs as a key player in the fight against the financing of terrorism.
Through the findings of breaches of the declarative obligation and capital returns, customs is
able to update criminal phenomena of capital laundering and financing of terrorism. To increase
capacity, the draft legislation relating to the fight against organized crime and terrorism and their
funding creates article 415-1 of the customs code to facilitate the burden of proof on the customs
of money laundering offence, imposing on the offender to prove the legality of the origin of the
funds it carries fraudulently.

In order to be able to treat new litigation files related to money-laundering, national

administrative investigations but also the SNDJ will be reinforced staffing current 2016.
In conclusion, thanks to a strong mobilization of the entire customs community, the progress that
we have made these last months to adapt to this new threat are significant. The evening of
November 13, our device has been adapted in a hurry to respond to exceptional circumstances.
This emergency is transformed into a mode of organization in the medium term.
A crisis cell has immediately been set up within the Directorate-General and the DNRED has
mobilized all of its specialty services. For several days, Customs has worked in close
collaboration with other specialty services, ITSB, PAF..., contributing to the identification of
individuals and vehicles suspected to be involved in attacks or in deliberate. This has led to
perennial devices of enhanced cooperation.
I am at your disposal to answer additional questions.
The President Georges Fenech. You do State of a reversal of the burden of proof; can you give
us some details?
M. Jean-Paul Balzamo, Assistant Director of legal and litigation Affairs, controls and the
fight against fraud. The joint mixed commission met yesterday morning and the two assemblies
are in agreement on the drafting of an article 415-1 of the customs code.
When the Customs officers find a breach of the declarative obligation of capital (MOD), they
aim to search if this offence is accompanied by an offence of customs laundering or possibly
common law. Like the crime of money laundering law common (article 324-1 of the Penal code),
the future article 415-1 of the code of customs relaxes proof of customs laundering regime. It
belongs to the offender who has committed the MOD to prove the lawful origin of the funds that
it carries. The Parliament has even gone beyond our request because the Bill also contains a
provision which makes statements of capital in an amount greater than 50,000 to the production
of documents proving their origin.
The legal means of the SNDJ have also been extended. Have thus added to its field of
competence the laundering of terrorism and the financing of terrorism. Indeed, the SNDJ is
involved in the overall strategy of the customs in the fight against the financing of terrorism and
money laundering. However, this service has a limited in the counter-terrorism field of
competence. He cannot act until terrorism-related offences are related to offences falling within
its perimeter for the award. This Bill now fills this gap.
The President Georges Fenech. Ms. Executive Director spoke of EUR 3 million in possession
of Syrians. These people live in France? Who are?
M. Jean-Paul Balzamo. Two Syrians who have committed MOD resident in Spain, the third in
Germany, and were in transit in France. Amounts, in cash, were substantial and had undergone
no customs declaration, and the evidence presented to justify an alleged commercial activity

were also totally inoperative. We have therefore seized the judicial authority, which decided to
open a judicial inquiry and information has also been received to ISB.
The President Georges Fenech. You will be able to immediately apply the reversal of the
burden of proof device, is not it?
M. Jean-Paul Balzamo. Yes, because the law and procedure shall be immediately applicable.
The President Georges Fenech. You want a new legal mechanism for procedures anonymized
cybercrime. The legal certainty of these procedures is not sufficient, if I have understood
correctly.
Mrs Hlne Crocquevieille. This is legal security procedures but also that of our staff. To be
valid, the procedure must be that an agent be named. Given the dangerous nature of certain
individuals, it is important, particularly in the context of shots of purchase on the internet, that
our authorized agents can have recourse to anonymous procedures.
M. Jean-Paul Balzamo. The shot of purchase we is open narcotics, trafficking of cigarettes and
counterfeit. We were the first European Government to make purchase on the Darknet shots but
we very quickly faced the problem of anonymity. About two years ago, Parliament granted the
customs administration the possibility of purchase of anonymized way shots because the safety
of our officers was at stake.
Before switch on a whim to purchase, should be patrolling on the Net and to enter at specific
sites, show white paw. Where the interest to allow to record minutes under pseudonym, to
identify sites selling illegal products. This provision was unanimously approved in the joint
mixed commission yesterday.
The President Georges Fenech. Your request is therefore satisfied.
You did not mention your relationship with Tracfin.
Mrs Hlne Crocquevieille. TRACFIN is a member of the intelligence community, just like the
DNRED. Tracfin relations with the Directorate General of customs are fluid. We have a bilateral
cooperation protocol, which held an annual review of implementation in Artwork. I've also
repositioned, early 2015, a liaison officer with Tracfin. Finally, we are pursuing the
implementation of automated access to certain customs data files.
The President Georges Fenech. You received in 2015 body armor and with sub-machine guns.
Are customs agents now equipped with sub-machine guns?
Mrs Hlne Crocquevieille. The finance law for 2016 includes a first component of an
additional EUR 29 million and 15 million are planned for 2017, to strengthen customs services
equipment. We took in to generalize individual holdings in bullet-proof vests. Furthermore,
surveillance brigades are more and more frequently faced with refusals to comply within the
framework of classic crime, with individuals who don't hesitate more to darken in the vehicles or

pedestrian systems put in place, which led us to predict, for high-risk situations, the presence of
at least one officer equipped with a heavy weapon. An experiment was conducted. We will
develop as a priority on the most sensitive axes and units near the border points, with a heavy
weapon by unit. Staffing will be collective, assigned to the brigade. We are beginning to deploy
this equipment.
M. Jean-Paul Balzamo. This is not new for duty: coastguards have heavy weapons for years.
Our shooting instructors are already trained.
We have more than 400 objections to function annually, with passage of strong force - more than
one per day. One took place yesterday on the motorway the Capitou in Aix-en-Provence. Not
only the vehicle has not complied but he has twice tried to force our bikers, which forced them to
pull at the bottom of the body of the vehicle. The case is judiciarise. The search of the vehicle
gave nothing but the identities of the two individuals are completely false.
The President Georges Fenech. The rapporteur and I went to Marseille where we met your
services that succeeded the taking of Mehdi Nemmouche. What is suite for enhanced vigilance
or after a random check that the latter was arrested?
M. Jean-Paul Balzamo. Following the events recounted by the press, the vigilance of our
officers was naturally higher. Furthermore, our services, and it is less known, control the
sensitive lines of bus and train. Some lines are more conducive than others to certain traffic. The
control is indeed random but we work from concrete elements.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. What was the attitude of the Customs on the evening of 13
November, in the hours that followed the attacks? On the other hand, how goes your
collaboration with other intelligence, including the ITSB services? What would be, in your
opinion, avenues for improvement?
Mrs Hlne Crocquevieille. We were ready to quickly, deploy us on 13 November, as we were
preparing the COP21 and implementing controls strengthened in this context. Authorized
crossings (PPP) on intra-Community frontiers had divided between the PAF, and customs with
the support of the mounted police. The night of November 13, the President of the Republic
announced the reinstatement of border controls. I have therefore ensured, during the night, to
inform all of the chain of command. At the time their position early the next morning, customs
units deployed on PPPs in priority, and have implemented Implementation of mechanisms for
systematic control. Then, units of the hinterland came to strengthen the device in order to allow
rotations. The organisation of physical checks subsequently adjusted, under the responsibility of
the prefects, on the basis of observed flows and pressures induced population, including crossborder workers.
The President Georges Fenech. Since the creation of the Schengen area, you were indeed down
from staff. Today, the curve is reversed, for five years.

Mrs Hlne Crocquevieille. The announced plan covers two years. Consistency would that one
does not practice too many yo-yo HR but, for the moment, announcements were made for the
two fiscal years 2016 and 2017.
M. Jean-Paul Balzamo. Immediately after the events, on the basis of the information provided
to the DNRED by the Ministry of the Interior, we injected registration numbers in our gantry
LAPI. We were able to know the afternoon crossings of vehicles concerned by the attacks: when
they came to Paris and when they returned to Belgium. We have the same thing for our Belgian
colleagues the aftermath of Brussels.
Regarding the ANPR, the Customs has made a different choice of what had been expected in
interdepartmental, namely mobile ANPR because if such a device is adapted to the police and the
gendarmerie, customs searches as an offence for which nobody has yet knowledge. Using fixed
ANPR, we multiplied the information. With thirty-six fixed drives, the customs administration
works H24, thus collects more than 500 mobile readers of the Ministry of the Interior. We enrich
the files of this Ministry with our data.
The rapporteur. It was explained that the radar had also been used on the night of November
13.
M. Jean-Paul Balzamo. This does not.
Mr. Jean-Paul Garca, head of the National Directorate of intelligence and customs
investigations. If, after the January attacks, we had some difficulty to collect information
allowing Customs network positioned in terms of immediate effectiveness, in November, on the
other hand, we were ready immediately. Before twenty-two hours, the relay of the branch crisis
cell was installed at the DNRED and our liaison officer with the Allat cell, cell interagency
installed at ISB, was at his post at Levallois and could inform the whole customs structure of
warning, response and crisis before midnight. This difference is mainly due to better integration
of the Directorate General of customs in the operative part of the CSB. The difficulty in the first
half of the year 2015 was to obtain practical information to immediate use, ISB partner being
extremely reluctant to the idea of exchange of information as part of the operation is judiciarise.
Progress in this regard has been considerable because of the creation within ITSB cell Allat with
representatives from each of the six stations of intelligence as well as services of the second
circle, the central service of territorial intelligence (LSVCCS) and the Directorate of intelligence
of the prefecture of police (DRPP).
The GOLT was created within the DNRED in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, in close
relationship with Tracfin and other intelligence services. This service has been very active in the
months and years, and then it gradually became secondary to the extent that, during the decade
2005-2015, terrorism was no longer a major objective of the Directorate General of customs, and
the arms trafficking itself was rather secondary, behind narcotics, tobacco, counterfeit goods and
capital movements.

These are the OM events which led customs to strengthen its mobilization against illicit arms
trafficking. As soon as the inauguration of the new majority in 2012, the Minister of finance
asked of Marseille customs directors play a role more important in the fight against arms
trafficking feeding Marseille crime. The DNRED mobilized for this purpose skills and
capabilities including the GOLT. So we have been taken to strengthen the GOLT since before
the attacks of January 2015.
The GOLT attends the meetings of the UCLAT since 2001. My personal point of view is that the
UCLAT is a meeting structure, non-operational, where Exchange of General information. Very
different is the approach within the national intelligence coordination, which leads to exchanges
between services at the operational level. The Directorate of customs intelligence acquired
between 2010 and 2015 a real legitimacy both in its publications on strategic level as in
targeting, screening and result analysis of targeting and screening. We exchange operational
information and conduct of joint operations, more with the DPSD or DGSE with ISB, which,
because of its judicial purpose can less easily exchange of operational intelligence with nonjudicial services.
Nevertheless, by the end of the year 2014, a cell inter-agency was created within the Directorate
of military intelligence (DRM) and the centre for planning and conduct of operations (CPCO),
the cell Hermes, intended to make work together six power plants in order to provide information
in relation to the Iraqi-Syrian theatre. This cell was somehow the draft of the cell Allat, from the
organizational point of view, knowing that in one and the other, two major services, the DGSE
and ISB, set the tone for other partners.
After the events of 2015, the national coordinator of intelligence grows CSB to create cell Allat,
which is operational in June 2015 and produced all its effects from November of the same year.
The cell is headed by a Commissioner of the ITSB and includes officials of category A or
officers of six power plants as well as territorial intelligence, whose role is important because it
is the living network of intelligence on the ground, and the DRPP and the LSVCC.
The rapporteur. To summarize your remarks, you consider the Allat cell as a progress in the
exchange of information and, a contrario, the UCLAT as being little more than a kind of club.
What do you think of staff operational prevention of terrorism (EMOPT), created in the summer
2015, and what is your relationship with this structure?
Mr. Jean-Paul Garca. What is the EMOPT? The question is answered.
The rapporteur. The EMOPT is attached to the place Beauvau and manages the FSPRT. I am
surprised that the boss of one of the major intelligence services do not know the EMOPT one
year after its creation. I do not put in question, but I wonder.
Mr. Jean-Paul Garca. Mr rapporteur, this does not bother me to be questioned on the subject.
Before answer you, two clarifications. First of all, the DNRED has 700 agents, 200 care
management or tax and customs functions, namely the recovery and rehabilitation of rights, 400
work on Narcotics, tobacco, counterfeit, and 100 are intelligence for the customs community,

information to Customs prior to any purpose. All of these agents have been mobilized on the
priority objective of the fight against terrorism, which, for most of them, is something new.
Then, there in the middle of the anti-terrorism a multitude of structures within the Ministry of the
Interior, UCLAT, anti-terrorist branch (SDAT), the DRPP..., and SID, who is both an
intelligence structure and a judicial structure. From 2015, dealing with the operational services of
the Ministry of the Interior have improved, thanks to the cell Allat. In addition, we are always
within the UCLAT, where Exchange formulas for politeness and general information.
On what is organized within the Ministry of the Interior, apparently at a very high level since you
mention staff, if this is not the coordination of intelligence nor does not participate in the national
councils of intelligence, I am withdrawing to leave the floor to the Customs branch, which is
located at the level of headquarters. My service has some autonomy to the breast of the
national coordination of intelligence.
The rapporteur. You have therefore never heard nor FSPRT, a file concerning the persons
considered for radicalism and terrorism, established in the summer 2015 in order to avoid the
"holes in the racket" by centralizing the departmental reports of the mounted police, for example.
While the customs information is, I imagine, important, useful elements in the fight against
terrorism, the FSPRT, as I understand it, does not have customs elements.
Mr. Jean-Paul Garca. Reports with the services of the Ministry of the Interior are not always
simple.
The conditions of sharing were fixed immediately after the events of January 2015 to avoid, in
fact, holes in the racket. Therefore, we have no access to the entire file as you just described. On
the other hand, we have access, by the Allat cell but also through our partnerships with services,
to those of the the "S cards' whose theme is the radicalization.
The President Georges Fenech. The EMOPT seems to be limited to the Ministry of the Interior.
In any case see no personal questioning or your administration in the note of the rapporteur; It is
simply a question on the co-ordination of intelligence.
M. Christophe Cavard. We have voted there is little intelligence Act. Do you consider whether
its impact, especially in terms of means and techniques of intelligence, is real on customs
services?
Many wonder how can enter a country as the France, whose services are effective weapons of
war. What are networks? It has always existed or well is - due to the geopolitical destabilization
of certain countries, some of which are in Europe? For example much talked of the former
Yugoslavia.
Mr. Jean-Paul Garca. Before the intelligence law, administrative security interceptions were
codified, with control by the National Commission of control of security interceptions (CNCIS)
and a quota of lines, which subsequently became a target quota, generally sufficient. I wasn't
applicant of the Act because I was already putting techniques in Work: markup of vehicles and

boats, interception of communications satellite, IMSI-catcher - the press has echoed the
possession of this tool by customs-, and everything else, including intrusion into private
premises, and it was overall satisfactory. None of my officers has never invoked a personal legal
risk to decline a mission entrusted to him.
Intelligence Act has therefore failed to the DNRED extra capabilities. She on the other hand
provides significant legal comfort because the responsibility of implementing in Of the
techniques of intelligence, which was only mine and that of the operator, at the criminal level, is
now taken into account at the highest level of the State. The reports of the DNRED with the
National Commission of control of intelligence (CNCTR) techniques are excellent.
The bulk of the operational officers of the DNRED consists of categories B and C agents, which
is an exception within the power of intelligence. It required that these agents learn to write
intelligibly for Bercy services and we therefore had little time to adapt. I, however, indicates my
satisfaction of the reactivity of the CNCTR because we get useful authorities very quickly. The
process is intended to be computerized, what we will still save time. On the other hand, we have
never been refused since the entry into force of the device.
With the exception of techniques requiring intelligence human and artificial high level metadata... - analysis algorithms, we use all the techniques of intelligence, in France and abroad.
When we operate abroad, we do never in hiding: this always happens in a partner country, which
ensures the safety of the operation.
M. Christophe Cavard. Objects of art are a potential source of financing of terrorism. Have you
mounted power on this issue? When objects come from Syria or Iraq, you can not operate in
these countries, I imagine.
Mr. Jean-Paul Garca. The subject of cultural property is in itself complex. I have a few
specialists, the investigations branch. They work mainly on export - the protection of our
heritage - because the import ban is very recent. The United States had already asked US to
intervene on the import of native American cultural property, and force was to recognize that we
did not then have the legal capacity to act; We could only gather intelligence. Information about
the countries you mention, which are different theatres of operations, are much more difficult to
obtain. Furthermore, "advisors", people who inform us, have, concerning cultural property, a
different profile of those who inform us for the rest. This is a new challenge that we must meet.
Regarding arms trafficking, the DNRED, as I have explained, has mobilised due to the
Marseilles concern. We as always looked to be in anticipation, i.e. to know the networks. The
work done between 2013 and 2014, in concrete operations against the destitute trafficking in
delinquency, enabled us to develop a skill today largely handed over to service of the fight
against terrorism environment.
M. Jean-Paul Balzamo. We traditionally two modes of intervention classic, import cargo and by
random checks of the monitoring, but we now have recourse to other means on the trafficking of
weapons, means specific to the administration of customs and complementary to the action of the
other law enforcement services of the State.

The purpose of the ICS is that the frets to the European territory are not contaminated by
hazardous products, such as weapons and explosives. It is a means of intervention on which we
climb to power.
Express freight allows, with disconcerting ease, the acquisition via the internet, many goods
prohibited. In this sector, we climb to power upstream, on the analysis and targeting, and intraCommunity, and our results are progressing. More than a third of seizures by customs of
counterfeit, which correspond to 99.9% of the results of the enforcement authorities of France in
counterfeits, are carried out in the express freight. We are forty-eight findings for weapons in
express freight. We want to do better.
The plan arms mentioned by the Director-General cannot take full scope in an interdepartmental
Framework. This is why we would ask the Ministry of the Interior, which has databases on the
weapons used by criminals with the labs of the police and the gendarmerie. If the internal
services transmit to us the names of senders or recipients of arms, we drive action very upstream
and initiate extremely targeted and effective controls. This would trigger a virtuous circle:
services judicial, police and gendarmerie Holocaust inquiry the findings of infringement carried
out by customs services. Working together is essential. The victory will not be collective.
Mr. Jean-Paul Garca. We want to seriously discuss with the judicial authority on the fight
against arms trafficking. Should also be with the countries of the Eastern Europe, where
circulating so many weapons, without mention of the Balkans, cooperation as we have with the
United States, for example. The fight against this traffic involves also a work on the internet;
Cyberdouane fetches the people selling weapons or spare parts of weapons on the Darknet .
The President Georges Fenech. Would it be possible, Mr Balzamo, we communicate a written
document about what you say about arms trafficking?
Mrs Hlne Crocquevieille. Ministers have just to validate our plan weapons, that we can pass
on to you. The need for coordination exists between the various national services but also at the
community level where it is imperative that the regulation on the control of the movement of
firearms be strengthened and can rely on tools.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you.
Hearing in camera, Mr. Didier Le Bret, national coordinator of intelligence (RSS)
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, Wednesday, may 18, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We are pleased to welcome Mr. Didier Le Bret, Coordinator
national intelligence (RSS), accompanied by Ms. Agns Deletang, magistrate, legal advisor to
the CNR. Thank you, Mr Ambassador, for having responded to our request for hearing.
We have already started to look at issues concerning intelligence by receiving last week officials
of the Customs and the police aux frontires (PAF). But with you, as with the president of the
national commission of control of intelligence techniques (CNCTR) we will hear next, we'll

cover the cFavorite pieces even the subject. I recall that the Coordinator of intelligence, which is,
according to the white paper on defence and national 2008 security, the 'entry point of
intelligence to the President of the Republic", centralized intelligence-related information and
anime created national intelligence Council in 2008.
Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, this hearing is held
in camera. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the website of the National Assembly. Nevertheless,
in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning of
the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so
at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will
previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will
be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is punishable by
the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who, within a period of
twenty-five years [...], disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a commission of
inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this
information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr. Didier Le Bret takes oath.
Our questions will obviously turn around the dark year 2015. We are also interested in your
analysis of the differences between January and November, in the light of feedback from
experience and any internal audits carried out by your specialty services. Have what lessons you
learned? What is it that where appropriate, failed? Were the targets too many? Has the
dangerousness of individuals been poorly evaluated? We ran out of information from foreign
intelligence services?
In hindsight, how do you explain interruption of brothers Kaye and MIT Coulibaly listens, even
though, according to many analysts, the adoption of a discrete behavior is a sign that the passage
l'acte approach? How to explain that Samy Sumbua could leave the french territory while he
was under judicial review? Why was it not monitored by the intelligence services? How to
explain that Ismal Omar Mostefa, which was the subject of a sheet, had him also to leave the
territory? How to understand that intelligence services were unable, throughout the year 2015,
locate Abdelhamid Abaaoud?
Today, how many people are identified by the services as posing a terrorist threat Islamist and
monitored as such? Have what changes you observed in this regard in recent months? What files
their names appear in? Who follows them? Are these names shared with the entire intelligence
community? What is the added value of the new file FSPRT (file of reported for prevention and
terrorist radicalization)? On the 1000 present concerned individuals on our territory, how are the
subject of judicial proceedings? When decides on prosecution?

Can you give us different instances of coordination and data sharing of intelligence antiterrorism? What is the added value of Hermes and Allat cells? How many files do treat? Does go
to the interconnection of files of the different services? How do you get cooperation between the
intelligence services and anti-terrorist judges? How to improve the collection of information by
the prison intelligence? Where is the collaboration of it with other intelligence services,
including the territorial intelligence and homeland security (CSB) branch? What about
cooperation with European, American and Russian intelligence services?
Lastly, as regards the means, what first review keep you from the application of the new articles
L. 851 - 2 - on the monitoring in real time of a list of individuals - and L. 851 - 3 - on algorithms
- introduced in the code of Homeland Security by the law of July 24, 2015? Services recruitment
plans unfold properly? The number of Arabists, for example, is sufficient?
Mr. Didier Le Bret, national coordinator of intelligence. I will respond over the water to the
specific questions you asked me. If adventure I forget, I can come back during the discussion that
will follow.
Before respond you on the balance sheet for the year 2015, I, to illuminate the manner in which
we have our action oriented, insist on the uniqueness of the events that we have seen then and
until the first quarter of 2016, and which are in all respects exceptional, even extraordinary.
First by their unpublished volume: four attacks, including two massive; two attempts and six
projects thwarted, to which are added two new attacks in the first quarter of this year.
Then, a series of thresholds have been crossed. The first relates to diversity of acts that have been
committed. We had everything: acts of magnitude, prepared, planned, coordinated - the two
attacks in January and November. isolated acts, perpetrated by actors returning from theatres of
war in Syria or by others who, without ever leaving the national territory, may have acted at the
instigation of a contact on-site. Finally, individuals within the famous category of the "Lone
Wolves" who, autoradicaliss, have made their decision on a strictly personal basis, but more
often from the internet, such as, at the beginning of 2016, when the attack on office of la Goutted'Or and the attempted murder of a Jewish in Marseille teacher. Found in short here any typology
that has been described in the literature on terrorism.
The second threshold is the constant increase in the flow of departures. Certainly, it has finally,
for the first time, reached a plateau experienced by our European neighbours, with whom I had
the opportunity to discuss, there are nearly six months. I.e., departures tend to stabilize growth:
this is good news. But in 2015, it has also been most spectacular in France than in any other
country: French parties abroad - mainly in Syria - increased from 360 at the beginning of the
year to nearly double, or 600 people, end of the year, and 636 today, which represents a quite
unusual increase of 62% in one year.
A third threshold has been crossed in the stealth of the behavior of terrorists. The entire range of
clandestine actions has thus mobilized during different attacks I mentioned, especially those
from January to November: use of channels of illegal immigration, infiltration of migrant flows
if necessary, encrypted communications, prepaid credit cards, almost systematic use of oblique

so-called strikes, aimed at targeting a country from a rear logistics base located in another
country.
The fourth line, which hit much French public opinion, is calling the procedures that characterize
a theater of war - kamikaze actions, use of weapons of war.
The fifth threshold regards the continuing diversification of the choice of targets, that produces
maximum effect - the famous stunning effect, the saturation of our forces, but also a constant
concern affecting all potentially relevant sites. Thus, in preparation for the Euro 2016, services
work in priority on the stages - to which access may, was seen, be restricted enough deterrent
manner - and the fan zones ; but, by stiffening the conditions for access to certain sites, we
necessarily create "soft" targets that may appear tempting to those who seek to commit terrorist
acts. Pictured here at theWork a fairly sophisticated approach, characterized by a permanent
mobility faculty, as evidenced by the design of a multiple attack as the ability to hit a target
every time different.
I shall conclude by the massive use of the instruments of modern communication, which is
obvious and is part of the main features and news of the Islamic State. It allows both to reach a
wide audience and to adopt a very targeted approach, based on the local relay to make contact
with people who appear on the canvas.
To all these elements, which were perhaps even detectable before last year, the Government
undertook to answer from this period prior to January 2015, taking into account both the scale of
the challenge and different thresholds that I have raised. The first aspect committed personnel,
budgets, and tools.
With regard to personnel, as soon as the end of 2013, at the time where ISB, issue of the Central
Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI), is incorporated the human resources has increased
432 agents. Similarly, for the central service of territorial intelligence (LSVCCS), 800 posts have
been created. I recall that the creation in 2008 of the DCRI, born of the merger of General
information and the direction of surveillance of territory (DST), had lose 2 000 staff to the
structure - which is naturally not evaporated, but have been transferred elsewhere.
The President Georges Fenech. Forgive me for interrupting you. We would like to come to the
cFavorite pieces of the subject: your mission of coordination, on which were the questions that I
asked you about your role, how you have or the reasons for which individuals I have mentioned
have escaped the monitoring services. This will allow colleagues to then ask you useful
questions.
Mr Didier Le Bret. I am nevertheless my remarks if you authorize it, because I also have to
advise the President of the Republic concerning the questions that I started to talk about, and it
seems to me important to measure the progress made in this regard.
In total, these are more than 2 600 new staff who have been integrated into the intelligence
community, that I am responsible to animate and coordinate, from 2014 to 2018 - deadline for
execution of the recruitment plan.

Budget, performance, increased from EUR 1.242 billion in 2013 - for all six departments of the
first circle - to 1.329 billion in 2015.
On the legislative tools that you know better than anyone, their volume is also exceptional. I
would cite the law of 2012, which allows to continue acts of terrorism committed abroad, the
military programming law by December 2013, which strengthens the investigative means, the
law of November 2014, which reinforces the suppression, lengthens the list of offences, creates
the offence of terrorist proprietorship and allows the blocking of internet sites, finally the laws of
July and November 2015 define the new framework for the exercise of the tasks of intelligence,
giving them additional tools which allow to enjoy the services of the second circle of instruments
to which they previously had no access.
I come to your questions, Mr president.
With regard to centralization and coordination, taking into account the volume and flow that I
have mentioned, it was imperative that the State apparatus itself with one dashboard showing all
of the alerts. It was the follow-up of persons reported primer - mainly, but not exclusively,
through the platform created in spring 2013. There were 14 000 reports, including 4 000 from the
ITSB, the balance divided between the territorial intelligence, the prefectures and other services.
This action of centralisation, carried out under the prevention of terrorism (EMOPT) operational
staff, helped establish the FSPRT, which allows to know exactly which is followed by, in order
to avoid duplication and, worse, the absence of treatment with one or more services. The answer
is essentially decentralized: the prefects, with their staffs, can mobilize all the services of the
State to respond to any particular reporting.
Here is the important lesson I draw from what has happened: the challenge we have to face is the
distinction of weak signals. We are no longer at the time where the number of persons reported
did not exceed a few hundred, or rather a few dozen. It is therefore now concentrate the efforts of
the services, including SID, on what makes sense and which allows to identify the passage
l'acte. I will return to the different national intelligence Council meetings that have been
organized for this purpose.
Among the various forms taken by the coordination current 2015 are Allat and Hermes. The
lessons that can be learned from the experience are not identical for these two platforms. Allat
brings real added value to SID and all the services: they arrive with their respective databases
and interact directly on the basis of questions and reports from ISB or any other of them. The
function of Hermes is to identify more finely dies abroad, and help the defence and services
concerned to prepare dossiers to objectives and study the sites that interest us. The stakes are so
very different. For Hermes, the margins of progress are real, while Allat appears useful to all the
services that I gathered in this regard.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. One has the impression that structures exist, but there are
perhaps too many.

Thus, Herms has been installed by the Directorate of military intelligence (DRM) and the
DGSE, Allat by ISB. But Allat deals only with a few individuals from the top of the spectrum - it
gets indeed of significant results. This poses the problem of the interconnection of files.
Similarly, with the EMOPT and the UCLAT, does not superimposed two structures charged
roughly the same mission? Is it because the UCLAT was poorly positioned within the
Directorate General of the national police (DGPN) was created the EMOPT, attached to the
Ministry of the Interior? Yet, when we question the intelligence services of the first circle that
don't depend on the Ministry of the Interior, one realizes that they do not even know the
existence of the EMOPT, and even less that of the FSPRT! They have no interest, you might say.
But why did you not assureriez this mission coordination and connection between files? Is this
not your role as Coordinator? Could you not constitute a genuine autonomous organization?
How many members does your team account?
Mr Didier Le Bret. Less than ten: I have five Councillors.
The President Georges Fenech. But you are settled at the Elysee.
The rapporteur. Isn't this to you to coordinate all the services, to a file, to animate Hermes and
Allat? Do you not have sufficient authority to bring all intelligence services in the same room so
that they are pooling their files?
Mr Didier Le Bret. The EMOPT has no legal existence: this structure was designed and created
from the contribution of different services that contribute to the fight against terrorism within the
Ministry of the Interior. It is a staff placed with the Minister himself, attached to his cabinet, and
"the secretariat" is provided by the UCLAT, if I may say so without disrespect to it. From the
outside, it can actually wonder if the two structures are not competing. In reality, the merit of the
EMOPT is to sit everybody around the same table, and what the Ministry of the Interior.
Remains the coordination of services outside of it.
The rapporteur. To keep us in the Ministry of the Interior, would it not enough to directly relate
the UCLAT to the Minister's office, instead of creating the EMOPT? You can tell me the
contrary, but the EMOPT is what is supposed to make the UCLAT. He merely managing a file and again, since it is the UCLAT administering it. It does not include the distribution of roles
between the UCLAT and the EMOPT. One has the impression that it did not rob the UCLAT to
pay the EMOPT, but it has bypassed the first by creating the second. What you think, without
violating your reserve duty?
Mr Didier Le Bret. I asked all the services directly related to the Minister of the Interior: they
have the feeling of a progress...
The rapporteur. With the FSPRT?
Mr Didier Le Bret. .. .this which suggests that the UCLAT had perhaps not sufficient authority
to carry out this work. In this sense, the creation of a structure which, without the duplicate, is

directly under ministerial authority, and whose file is always fed by all services, appears as an
improvement. Maybe could have done otherwise, but it is the decision of the Minister.
Should NRC coordinate all the services, beyond those who depend on the Minister? First, these
are already numerous. I would not say that the essential plays in their midst, because all services
must be involved: the DGSE, the National Directorate of intelligence and investigation
(DNRED), that you have heard, the protection and the safety of la dfense (DPSD), Tracfin
branch, etc. But, administrative or judicial investigations, as services are largely in the hand of
the Minister of the Interior - anti-terrorism branch (SDAT) for the prefecture of police, antiterror (SAT) of the prefecture of police of Paris, ISB anti-terror branch, and even the services of
the gendarmerie. No doubt was the need to rationalize the approach and the public policy of
counter-terrorism felt internally.
My function, as RSS, is to ensure that this national public policy work upstream and
downstream.
For example, last January, was held under the chairmanship of the head of State a national
intelligence Council that one of the main points was to record the ISB leadership in the
definition of the manWork as a whole to combat terrorism. This may seem redundant given the
domestic jurisdiction of the ISB. Nevertheless, it was the first time that we were clearly this
principle: it is SID giving the major guidelines to all of the sensors of the intelligence community
under the authority of the President of the Republic and Ministers concerned, in order to
sanctuariser the national territory. This policy would seem to be self-evident to any outdoor
location to the territory, but we start from the principle that these are CSB investigations that
should allow other services to different backtracking and compete in the manWork as a whole.
The second decision endorsed by the national intelligence Council is to mobilize all the
possibilities offered by law - only the law, but all the law-, including the two articles you
mentioned, Mr president, to assist the CSB do its work of discrimination, by creating FTES and
forming analysts capable of processing the raw material collected by different services ,
including the DGSE, thanks to these new legislative provisions.
All this is taking place. This is complicated because the law defines precisely what is allowed.
Thus, the reinforced monitoring introduced by article L. 851 - 2 concerns the only terrorists who
pose a threat. It will therefore be necessary to work on the text to see how far we can go, through
dialogue and understanding in the CNCTR so that ISB can have these tools to distinguish, within
14 000 reports, what makes sense and allows backtracking and identify behaviours at risk.
The rapporteur. Do you feel that the coordination between our services was sufficient at the
time of the attacks? There was a problem of information exchange? What do you think of our
cooperation with foreign, including European and Turkish intelligence services? Finally, today,
the coordination between our services can still make progress or is it perfectly satisfactory,
notably through Allat and Hermes?
Mr Didier Le Bret. You can always advance. Perhaps these two cells foreshadow a greater
pooling of resources. In France, we have a particular organization, inherited from history, which

has accumulated several layers of public policy intelligence. Some countries have made other
choices, for example that of technical platforms in the service of the whole of the community;
with us, it is the DGSE that integrates a powerful technical direction, which must also serve the
whole of the community.
The evolution of the system takes time. Assuming that I can operate tomorrow, using the tools of
the DGSE, all data affecting the ITSB, it is not certain that it has, despite the efforts made for
many years, the ability to analyze the raw data which, as such, do not mean anything. Avoid the
fetishism of the data mining (data mining) which would by switching 14 000 selectors in a
machine we can know when, how and at what time will occur the next attack! At best, we will
reach of triangulations, elements concerning the environment of individuals which we did not
know the relationships previously, which will allow us to refine our approach.
The rapporteur. For you, there been in 2015 no problems of coordination between services, no
"hole in the racket?
Mr Didier Le Bret. I can say it: there is always 'holes in the racket.
Mr. Meyer Habib. The result is that we have not been good.
Mr Didier Le Bret. Once we were struck, it must be said that we have not been good. But we
have not been struck between 1996 and 2012.
The threat has changed, I have shown, and we have taken a series of measures accordingly.
To combat terrorism, the pooling of data should be the norm and not the exception, and should
exchange in real time, because time is always against us. This is the choice that some countries
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Between September 11, the attacks of 2004-2005 in
Spain and the United Kingdom and the year 2012 has not there many reforms of structure in
France to create a counter-terrorist super-pole as in the United States. We have chosen to
maintain structures which each had their raison d'etre, their specialization, their means and their
specific approaches. Today, it's my job to get them to operate the technical tools that have been
developed at the service of the community.
The President Georges Fenech. I have asked very specific questions. What is striking, for at the
outset, is that all individuals who have committed the attacks, without exception, were known by
our services. The problem is not that they have escaped their surveillance at one time or another.
I repeat, why interrupted listens to the brothers Kaye and MIT Coulibaly? How could Samy
Sumbua, which was under judicial review, leave the territory? Why was it not monitored? How
Ismal Omar Mostefa, subject of a S form, could leave him also the territory? How to explain
that, throughout the year, Abdelhamid Abaaoud has been able to stay off the radar? To do
something: they have escaped us, we cannot deny it.
Mr Didier Le Bret. You have certainly all participated, in one way or another, in the
development of the two laws of July and November 2015. So, you know how many interceptions
of security, to mention only of them, are framed. Under the terms of article L. 851 - 2, I repeat,

the terrorist threat must be proven; This device, which has done so much talk about it, can
actually be applied to anyone: it is very selective. In addition, the duration of listening or
connection data collection may not exceed two months. This means that, if we were to operate
the set of selectors which interest us, we would ask every ten minutes the CNCTR renew an
authorization.
I do not answer your question in terms of whether what happened when it was the National
Commission of control of security interceptions (CNCIS) which decided the renewal of
authorisations relating to interceptions of security or allowing access to the file of the people you
mentioned. But you know better that person, the Executive almost systematically follows the
recommendations of an independent administrative authority. In any case, this is what is
happening today.
Short, intelligence is 'plug' not people wild, but triply childcare proceedings - by CNCTR, the
Council of State and the parliamentary control.
There were interruptions, but they were motivated by the fact that individuals appeared more
particularly dangerous at this time there.
The maximum quota of simultaneous interceptions was attached to 2 190 in 2014. Even in
renewing the number by one-third, you necessarily eventually reach this limit.
The President Georges Fenech. This gave Charlie Hebdo and theHypercacher!
Mr Didier Le Bret. Yes, but it is also the result of a public policy assumed by our authorities
and the Parliament.
M. Christophe Cavard. This is several years that we are reflecting on the evolution of
intelligence. Thus, the commission of inquiry into the functioning of french in monitoring
intelligence and surveillance of armed, radical movements which Jean-Jacques Urvoas was the
rapporteur and myself President, made recommendations regarding recruitment. The figures you
quote span several years; We would like to know what has been done to date, knowing that the
risk is unfortunately increased. As for profiles, we recommend hiring linguists and computer
technicians, as we discovered with surprise, during the hearings, the existence of serious
technical flaws that required services to outsource a part of these skills, which obviously causes
problems with regard to intelligence. Have these aspects evolved as a result of the requests of the
President of the Republic and recent work? We will also examine the directors thereon.
What emerges from the January 14 meeting between the President of the Republic and all
intelligence leads us to wonder. It was to improve the pooling and the complementarity of the
work of the services. Finally, according to the press - sometimes better informed that
parliamentarians-, it has not been decided much, otherwise it will affect staff on land where there
were more person. At least thats what I read in The world. What was at stake for this meeting
and what is being done to make more efficient intelligence services?

Finally, with regard to connections and disconnections, it seems to me that it was far away, in
recent years and in particular time of the CNCIS, to achieve the maximum quota of listens.
Policymakers may well decide to "disconnect", but this doesn't seem to be for this reason. We
will also ask the new president of the CNCTR on this point. The authority expresses opinions,
but it is the Executive who decides ultimately.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Mr national coordinator, I had the opportunity to work with you under
your previous functions at the head of the centre of crisis of the Quai d'Orsay, and appreciate
your commitment to the service of the nation, taking into account the constraints of our foreign
policy.
Veteran I am notes that, for some thirty years, in counterterrorism, it tinkers, it creates
coordination bodies - I participated in the creation of the UCLAT, interdepartmental counterterrorism Committee (CILAT), central service for combating terrorism (novel)-, known
successes, failures. That is why I am very forgiving towards the failures observed around the
attacks of January as of November, and which concern the security and intelligence services.
Naturally, we have in mind the perspective of the victims and their families. But it is not an exact
science and I know how it is difficult to obtain the results continuously.
Abaaoud path is still extraordinary: it is in the viewfinder of the services and walk everywhere,
from the Middle East to Europe.
But with regard to those that you identify, you catch and that you locate, is there an employment
doctrine for their disposal repressive, and preventive - when we know what these people have
done and what they are capable? I ask you this question at the risk of shocking some members of
the commission of inquiry; I ask the also the patron of the DGSE and others that we
auditionnerons.
I was a week ago in Djibouti, on the U.S. base where the Predator, armed with Hellfire missiles,
drones take off to the Yemen. The American officers and agents of intelligence, including by the
CIA, have explained to us that these drones were leaving evening to targets and that they killed preferably of the Americans, we were told, even if they also kill others. It is a doctrine of
employment; clearly, most top state level - whether Mr. Obama or his collaborators-, we decided
to kill people. There are also special operations for which we can be informed by our services,
including the fact of special forces - acting already so, it seems, but it is, said actions of war.
Can it not consider practice outright elimination? I was recently with some colleagues in
Washington, the Department of Homeland Security; the Americans told US that 150 of its
nationals were left in Syria and, above all, in Iraq, that they are returned not since thirty years in
prison awaited them upon their return, and that they would all be "drones".
I asked the same question to the Minister of defence.
The rapporteur. But it is already!

Mr. Alain Marsaud. On 'drone '? The Minister of defence yet replied that we had no doctrine
for the employment of this type and that our Reaper drones were not equipped to carry out
actions of war. And it uses a burst. With dronage, you can target an individual, a car, etc. But this
assumes an employment doctrine: it is necessary that someone at the highest level of the french
State, decides to eliminate these people there.
What is already done, is it feasible? Can we give us such a doctrine?
The President Georges Fenech. I don't know if this question is the responsibility of Mr. Le
Bret.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. It is the national coordinator!
Mr Didier Le Bret. With regard to the employment doctrine, the concept of individual value
high (high value individual) is for France as for the United States and for all those who are
involved in the coalition's fight against terrorism. The command of special operations (COS) of
the Ministry of defence, with at its head the general of Saint-Quentin, driver for example
operation Sabre, op Liza. But this partly answers your question: we prefer that these targets are
taken alive, to question them and thus enrich the information we have. When comparing what
was known of these people at the beginning of the Serval operation in January 2013, and what is
known today, is measured path.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. If identified an Abaaoud today, would be able to act?
Mr Didier Le Bret. When President gives instructions on our military operations to the Minister
of defence or the Chief of staff of the armed forces Defence Council or Council, it is not about
targeting individuals. It identifies Raqqah, Mosul or Deir ez - Zor HQs, centres of propaganda,
training, arms depots, in short the logistically strategic places. These are the famous goals
records. It is they who are being targeted in the war we are conducting against the Islamic State,
in Syria and Iraq. If unfortunately - or fortunately - it is that the individuals we are talking about
are there, we claim not explicitly, especially if they are french, due to hit like the British or
others. We target goals that make sense to reduce the area occupied by our enemy.
The rapporteur. I imagine that you have read the record of the Parisian dated May 13,
according to which, if we started to bomb Syria, it is because we knew that Abaaoud and others
were preparing attacks on our territory. This tends to contradict your comments: we would so
precisely targeted individuals.
Mr Didier Le Bret. This is what I just told you.
The rapporteur. You say that the targets are General.
Mr Didier Le Bret. You can well imagine that what you are talking about is also the desired
effect once we have identified places of strategic command, headquarters, centres of propaganda,
places where are preparing attacks against our country.

The question of the penalties incurred by the Americans talked about Mr. Marsaud evokes a key
issue which we recently discussed with the Ministry of justice: the evolution of criminal French
policy to criminalize what is today covered by the offence.
To put it very clearly, 80% at least of persons currently detained for acts of terrorism will be
released during the next five years, more than 70 individuals over the next two years. The curve
will be strongly exponential since nearly 300 persons are currently being review; However, in
the current state of our penal policy, these people there - those who have prepared the attacks,
since it never stops those who committed them - face maximum penalties of 10 years, besides
non-places, which amounts in practice to seven or eight years, three years in light of the
remissions. In short, cohorts of individuals who have been indicted, tried and detained will start
to get out of jail during the coming months.
For our security, it is essential to amend our criminal policy to no longer make a difference
between the crime and the crime, between logistics support and direct participation in terrorist
action. When, in six months, you ask, this time about these former detainees, if continuous
monitoring is possible, my answer will be the same: No. These individuals are going to get out of
jail, adopt a very stealthy behavior, they will not come to Ple emploi, they will commit any
crime, and no obligation to point, no electronic bracelet will prevent them from disappearing
when they want to return then hit us! The length of detention and the punishment are a real
problem.
Mr Cavard, with regard to the means, the figures I have mentioned correspond to reinforcements
that have been deployed in successive waves, after January, the spring and the moment where the
President has made the announcement before the Congress. Without detail list by services, here
are the total: in 2016, 1 339 staff. by 2017, 2 228 cumulative, and 2 617 in 2018. Unfortunately,
the directors will tell you, it takes a period of recruitment and training before such personnel are
operational. What has been done for two or three years begins to produce its effects, but the rise
is gradual.
The real problem is that of the profiles. Until recently, for statutory reasons, CSB has not been
able to operate fantastic molt has accomplished the DGSE in opening up to civil administrators,
alumni of Sciences Po, analysts, engineers, the Polytechnique. The Technical Director of the
DGSE is not formed in six months: it took fifteen years of investment, openness,
communication. But the DGSE has no problem of status: it can adapt, compensate its agents because all is not to recruit, still need to retain its executives, who should not evaporate after a
few years after having had access to sensitive information. That said, the fact that CSB has been
separated from the DGPN to become a branch gives him probably more flexibility to recruit
nonpdl outside the body of the police.
Whatever it is, things run their course. Patrick Calvar will confirm. They will not suddenly,
magically change.
The decisions taken at the national Council of January 14 intelligence are covered by the secret
defence and that says The world is an extrapolation from the release. In this release, could
certainly decipher several elements, as some journalists have attempted to do so.

First, the leadership enhanced ISB anti-terrorism. This new dynamic is clear, desired and
assumed.
Then, the mobilization by the State of existing technical means, in the context of the Act. To put
it clearly, this is to ensure that the means of the DGSE are at the disposal of the ITSB, in order to
submit a job discrimination environment if not of the 14 000 reported, at least a part of them, so
we then focus on the segment that interests us.
The rapporteur. One has the impression that today ' hui, a multiplicity of files coexist. CSB
considers that the FSPRT him is useless, while the mounted police and the LSVCC find it useful.
Cells Allat and Hermes have a list of names managed in real time, each with its file since
interconnection is not possible: each service representatives meet in the same room, each one
with his computer, and report their information.
The top of the spectrum is processed by the CSB file. Now it is the preserve of the ISB.
Mr Didier Le Bret. No: except for ongoing actions that can be extremely sensitive, especially
because the sources must be protected, this file is to interface with the database used within the
cell Allat.
Whatever it is, services have a great habit of working together. Do not to exaggerate their
partitioning. Working together is their interest: thus, when a service loses track of an individual
who is no longer on the national territory, it needs good dialogue with the DGSE and other
services, including foreigners, to locate.
The rapporteur. Indeed, it cannot be suspect to the withholding of information services: the
issue is too important. But it is extraordinary that should bring together representatives of the six
services in a room to retrieve information, instead of creating a common file! This is true of the
top of the spectrum, within Allat, as of FSPRT, that SID describes as 'file of the prefects' and
whose certain services of the first circle did not even know the existence when we interviewed
them.
The files is therefore an essential issue, concerning the pooling of data bases, so coordination.
M. Olivier Marleix. In November 2015, Bernard Squarcini, former head of the DCRI, revealed
that it would be transmitted to the France a message from Syrian intelligence offering, provided
that we resume contact them, send us a list of present french jihadists in Syria; This proposal
would be met with a plea of inadmissibility. Are you aware of this case and the way she was
treated?
The British channel Sky News said recovered a list of 22 000 Europeans who joined the ranks of
the Islamic State. Services of the British Ministry of the Interior and their German counterparts
declare work on this document, whose public comments seem to attest the reality, even though it
contains no doubt repetition that reduce the number of persons concerned. French services have
communication from this list, and are they working on it?

Mr Franois Lamy. I would not ask you to confirm or not that a strike has targeted Abdelhamid
Abaaoud on September 27, 2015, as stated in article of le Parisien quoted. In any case, it seems
that we do not merely target decision centres, but that we did it to someone in their midst. Is - it
legal? Because if the action of the DGSE service is by definition to covert actions that are
beyond the legal framework, it is the case of the air force nor, a fortiori, cos, whose actions are
discrete, which is not the same thing. I'm not shocked that action as well, but I wonder in what
legal framework we can do. It is even not who should make the decision, but to protect those
who are responsible for running it where appropriate.
After 13 November have been released much information about terrorists and we saw emerge
otherwise flowcharts, or contacts between cells involved in different attacks. Of course, it is
always easy to reconstruct these structures after the fact. Is that the data can play their role,
which is vital, that if there's someone to analyze correctly, including the manner in which these
individuals think, live, lived and in inferring the existence of any particular link.
At your level, have you seen pass this type of charts before the attacks? Someone within the
services, is responsible for establishing these connections? I asked the same question to judge
Trevidic. Because we are interested of course in what has happened, but also how to protect us in
the future. The number of French parties has reached at least a thousand, not to mention those
who are present on the territory; but these charts are only 120 to 150 people. In this regard,
where do you focus your efforts? It no longer conduct research all over the place, but to identify
connections to circumscribe the threat once and for all.
Mr Didier Le Bret. With regard to the supposed offer of Syrian, I saw nothing like that. As you
know, we have no contact with these services. Even in more mundane areas where they could
help us, without that we have to ask, through the Russia or the Jordan, they never provided us
any useful information. I am thinking for example of passport series Virgin recovered by Daech
and on which it would be very valuable to have information. From my point of view, everything
that has been said on the benevolence and arrangements to cooperate M. Mamlouk and cronies is
therefore without merit. Though even the situation would be different, it is not consistent with
our vision of things, as you know, to work with a service that torture and is the main executor of
bass Works by Bashar al-Assad. Our services are bound to respect this political order.
In regards to Sky News, I asked services on several occasions; for the moment, and under benefit
of inventory, I don't have the feeling that our ability to identify anyone has been revolutionized.
M. Olivier Marleix. French services have the list?
Mr Didier Le Bret. Yes of course. They are in contact with the British and we meet our
information. But yet again, I do not believe that this has changed much to our knowledge of the
"stocks".
Mr Lamy, I can only repeat what I said earlier: we claim no individual strikes, especially in the
context of a formal military operation. The legal basis is self-defence, which justifies the action
of our armed forces. But we refuse to act as the British, specifically targeting individuals.

The reconstitution of the flowcharts is one of the main objects of the work of the DGSE, in
connection with other services. This is not easy, because many players have multiple aliases, and
things change often at the same time we start, thanks to an interception, make a vague idea of
their identity and their activities. But we know about who does what in the staffs that interest us.
Mr Franois Lamy. Since when?
Mr Didier Le Bret. It is hard to say: I see a lot of flowcharts, but evolving.
Mr Franois Lamy. Because you see a lot, you can identify those which are based on facts. This
gives a basis of work, although some may overlap, or even contradict.
Mr Didier Le Bret. We have little information documented, substantiated on files or
interceptions, concerning such cell with such staff contacts. On the other hand, we know what
may have been the contractors in most of the attacks.
Mr. Serge Grouard. With regard to databases, I have the same impression of blur than the
rapporteur.
If an ISB agent wants to follow such or such person may directly go to the files of the DGSE, or
should he seek it? In the latter case, it is not a common database, but compatibility of systems.
However I feel that the systems are not compatible. What is exactly? Specifically, are computers
compatible? The device was designed from the perspective of a common management? No!
However, when computer systems are different, it is terribly difficult to make them compatible.
Comes a time where we need to change all technical systems. This question is? Won't you do?
Are there other procedures of Exchange that could use?
You said earlier that should work in real time. This may seem obvious, it is essential. But how
where the systems do not? We must call, be sure to join her correspondent, who must obtain a
permit. All this, of course, has been organized so as to preserve the security of the data, which
must not be viewed by everyone at its option. But is it still appropriate? Should we not accept
losing a bit of this security to win many efficiency and reactivity?
Mr Didier Le Bret. It is necessary to distinguish several aspects. First the interconnection of
files, which is terribly complex and subject to the legal constraints that you know and that the
National Commission of computing and freedoms ensures respect - even if there are files of
sovereignty.
Then within cells that have been mentioned, different services interact directly, in real time,
about individual that interests.
Finally, most of these services have made personnel available in other services, at the level of the
branches of the Directorate of intelligence of the technical Directorate, of the anti-terrorist
branch of ISB.

In fact, so concerned are called and talk constantly. Interoperability, including human, exist. This
does not entirely solve the problem; but, we are working.
The problem is not only interoperability or the interconnection between the databases of
intelligence; It is also to ensure that the technical capacities of our services can be fully exploited
by the judicial investigation services - in Britain, this poses no difficulty - and that it opposed us
more technical barriers to the operation of this or that phone data. This is another aspect on
which we are working much.
Same, and this is part of eighty measures, including fifty news, of the action plan against
radicalisation and terrorism announced recently by the Prime Minister, we are helping to develop
tools and to upgrade prison intelligence service.
Mr. Serge Grouard. It is a very good example!
Mr Didier Le Bret. In doing so, I am fully in my services facilitation role. The law will also - in
the coming weeks, I hope - make prison intelligence service of the second circle, which will
allow access to certain techniques and to cooperate more with all the services. This should
produce significant results.
The President Georges Fenech. The rapporteur and I yesterday met Mr Calvar, we audition
next week. The Commission considers that considerable progress would be done by finding a
legal formula to share non-formalistic information as do Americans. In France, where
information is relevant, ISB, cosaisie, may use it, but not transmit it to the DGSE, which could
yet prove valuable, due to the confidentiality of the investigation. Does subject of reflection?
The rapporteur. Do you confirm that ISB cannot access the simple file ICST (treatment of
infringements found system)?
Mr Didier Le Bret. No: she has access since it is both intelligence and judicial police service.
Mr. Meyer Habib. How would you describe your relationship with the services of foreign,
particularly American, British, Russian, Arab, Israeli?
With regard to the UCLAT, people of the House, police say do not really understand its
functioning, its ranking, etc. The secret nature of these materials creates a kind of lead blanket on
which they tend to resign. But we must ask ourselves about this operation and on opportunities to
improve it.
What is the use of 'moles', agents infiltrated, paid for it and expected to resemble all points of
view to terrorists? Many services, including Israeli, that I know well, focus on human
intelligence.
That said, technology has advanced considerable and very fast. I was recently approached by
start-ups that are developing new usable in correctional systems and they seek to sell, especially
in France. These systems permit targeted interference, whether per metre, in which cell one

speaks, etc. Another company said be in contact with the main telephone operators in the United
States, and thus store information on a targeted person, but on everyone, at all times. Can know
where this or that was a year and a half earlier and use this information if the judge allows it.
This will probably never possible with us. Because of such feats technology, almost difficult to
believe, have something terrifying: any one of us can be plugged round-the-clock through its
smartphone.
Mr Didier Le Bret. With regard to our cooperation with the other services, our first partner
remains, by far, the United States. I went on the spot several times, and when it was necessary to
intensify our collaboration, in particular on the theatre of the Levant, we signed special
instructions, the American, to be treated as one of the Five Eyes formula: we enjoy the same
access to sensitive information, which allows us to build all the objectives within the coalition
folders. It worked; This step represented a real change. The Americans were able to show that we
were serious partners and that we control our techniques.
As for other services Europeans, I organized early February the first meeting of the coordinators
Europeans, in order to support the actions of our Ministers of the Interior, singularly Bernard
Cazeneuve, regarding the PNR (Passenger Name Record), the control of external and internal or
SIS file borders (Schengen information system), going as far as possible in cooperation between
services in this area of sovereignty which is not communitised. It is necessary because some
tools at the disposal of the countries are not exploited. I asked Gilles de Kerchove, European
coordinator of intelligence, to help us identify all blocking points. We are gradually promoting
this approach with our European friends. Without duplicate with more operational structures to
combat terrorism within the services themselves, it is to ensure the effectiveness of the decisions
recorded by the Ministers of the Interior in 'Justice and Home Affairs' Council (JHA).
With the services of other countries, our partnership is less supported, but we talk, naturally.
Israel is a friend service; the Israelis are very good analysts of the situation.
The rapporteur. And the Turks?
Mr Didier Le Bret. I went to see the pattern of the MT to convince the Turks that help us
repatriate our returnees was a good thing, but it was still better to allow us to get them the
maximum information. Until this period, indeed, we recover them a little "dry": they opened
more mouth once they arrive in France. It was for us to have more items, including through what
the Turks themselves could capture, for example by putting the hand on phones. We are in
dialogue with them on this subject. There are the margins of progress, but we have obtained
many: we have a liaison officer, we are the only ones to benefit from support of our nationals
from airport to airport. There are few countries with which the Turkey has pushed as far the
cooperation. Let's see the Turks, we listen to them, because we must work with them: the Turkey
is an important partner, although complicated.
The President Georges Fenech. There was also the visit of the Minister of the Interior.
Mr Didier Le Bret. Yes of course.

In that regard the UCLAT, temptation is always great everything flat, but it is difficult to
envisage a umpteenth reform at a time when the services are very busy. I hear the doubts which
some are echoed from you on this subject, the Honourable; but it was, it seems to me a step to
create the link, as the EMOPT today. We cannot ignore our history, we have inherited the
existence of police prefecture, the coexistence of the forces of police and gendarmerie, the
presence of intelligence within the gendarmerie, the police and the territorial level. Perhaps is
there a 'big night' where is prepared all this to create a great service of fight against terrorism. In
the current context, it sounds complicated.
With regard to "moles", more and more people will go back, which we hope they will give us
information that will enable infiltration. The protection of our sources is another issue on which
we are working. It requires the exorbitant measures of common law, for services rendered to our
country: exfiltration, change of identity, creation for the person concerned of one small business
to the other side of the world... However these measures are complex to the current state of the
law. There are the provisions, but they are not sufficient. Therefore, it will probably make a
small modification to the code of Homeland Security to ensure real protection for sources.
M. Christophe Cavard. Regarding the relationship between intelligence and justice, it is
regularly from our work - this commission of inquiry is the third on the subject - that the antiterrorism pole, including its investigating judges, complains about the information in dribs and
drabs. The question of the legalization continues to arise, particularly with regard to the
principles of french law, including the right to a defence. Developments are possible? Is it
possible that justice be considered an action service, which does not merely to repair or
condemn?
I recently spoke at a high school on these issues. The headteacher and teachers then presented me
a young man of sixteen which they told me that it was the subject of a sheet. What worries me is
not that it is plugged S - there is certainly a reason for this-, but both the headteacher and the
whole of the teaching staff who tell me. Certainly, the information must be shared, whatever else
the real danger of this young man - because we all understand what these cards are used. These
are services that have prevented the headteacher. We are not here at the top of the spectrum, in
the register of weak signals. We arrive precisely from Belgium where some local elected
officials rise to the niche about sharing information. If the Mayor of the municipality discovers
that the head of the school and the teachers are aware then that it is not, it might take it badly!
Mr Didier Le Bret. This is a delicate issue. Each must remain in its role: it cannot be the
substitute or the armed services in the exercise of an elected mandate or functions of the head of
school. There is a slide that is not very healthy. I believe however that this, in the long term, will
make the difference, is the contribution that each of us where it is, will be able to provide. I was
struck by the number of people who since January, and more since November, come find us
asking us what they can do. Among them are start-up and the CAC 40 companies that have
developed software to detect network heads, which speak to us of chemical processes, etc.
This is why I requested several months ago Alain Fuchs, president of CNRS, and Thierry
Mandon, Secretary of State for higher education and research: I am convinced that, in the long
term, the intelligence community will be better if it is more fluid, more open to the world. A call

for projects launched by the Secretary of State will allow to assign 5 000 to 10 000 EUR for
researchers; It is not known what this will give, but in the lot, there are certainly some interesting
projects. It is important to rely not only on our services which are in the manWork, on justice and
on the competent authorities, but also on these contributions and those of civil society. A report
by the Alliance Athena has also identified all intellectual productions of the past ten years on the
subject: it is exciting.
Services must adapt this information, to be aware of the State of research and diversify their
sources. Today, open information, if well exploited, already represents nearly 80% of the result.
Naturally, the 20% who come to own services make the difference. But it is important to treat the
information well. This is why each service develops structures analysis of the open information
or darknet.
Moreover, there will be never sharing between services if we do not act that new entrants must
be trained in a common mold, for example by the intelligence Academy. No interface with the
search in respect of the confidentiality of the activities, these individuals may sclerosis and
cannot build a course long term. The possibility of careers in intelligence depends on our ability
to organize the mobility and recognition of equivalence of status.
These issues are building to the long course that are also important. Because the results we can
achieve medium-term - take Mosul and Raqqah, initiate finance Daech, imprison the largest
possible number of persons present on our territory and embodying a threat - will not solve the
problem long term.
The rapporteur. If you could increase your prerogatives, in what sense would you do? What
should you, ideally, the role of the french Coordinator of intelligence?
I criticised the already high number of existing structures, but it seems to me that we lack an
equivalent of Belgian OCAM (coordinating body for threat analysis). Since 1995, the level of the
Vigipirate plan has not been lowered, because political power cannot take the responsibility to do
so - we are witnessing the same phenomenon with regard to the State of emergency, but it is
another debate. Should the Coordinator, which centralizes all information, formulate
recommendations in this matter? Would it not to depoliticise the decision?
Mr Didier Le Bret. In the United States, two reports of the Congress, which one relied on
almost two years of work, resulted in 2004 on the creation of the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), instance of coordination of all the services. It must be said that the United
States had sixteen, were not small services and that each had extended their jurisdiction, quasi
entropic way, across the fields of intelligence, which created major problems of duplication. You
know the lessons of 11 September: all the information was available, but there was no bridge
between different services. Originally, the DNI had one hundred people; they are now more than
a thousand.
I would be surprised that we had to create a Super-Agency of coordination of this type, even
though it may be part of your recommendations. The key is elsewhere. Here is indeed what gives
the power to the general Clapper, the current DNI. First, it is his access to the President;

However nothing prevents the RSS to benefit from the same prerogative in his role. Then it's his
relationship of daily information to the President, through the brief him delivered every morning
in the Oval Office. in a different form, the President of the Republic was also briefed every day.
Thirdly, it is the DNI who referee the budgets of the 16 agencies: This gives a means of pressure
in the case where the CIA would not play the game, where the NSA would be the retention of
information or provide services that unnecessarily dupliqueraient those of the FBI or the CIA and
parasiteraient system. However this means of pressure, I do not have it, because of our
administrative organization where the budget is organized by program and program managers are
Ministers and their representatives. I have only through special funds: I address a proposal for
the distribution to the Prime Minister, who commits or not. But this represents only a paltry
portion of the budgets of the services. Yet, the budget could be a formidable lever against a
service that refuses to share all or part of its means.
As for the Organization, I think much to the virtue of the platforms, on the model of the British
GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) and its structures, including the equivalent
of our GIC (Interministerial control group) and the unit of analysis: each service is delegates who
work together, not six months to a year as within Allat or Hermes, but for years. Executives learn
to Working together for terrorism-related data and analysis that can produce. It is a system that
has proven its worth and which opens up prospects. I don't know if we will do the same
tomorrow, but we should not prohibit us to think.
I do not think that we are less good than the British or Americans. They should not give us
lessons, because they are not in the same situation as us: they have only two boundaries and are
similar for the rest to an island, where one has already done much of the work when it controlled
the arrivals by air. For us, things are always more complicated. Similarly, regardless of the
organization that is adopted, technical instruments can improve overall performance, but, as
pointed out by Mr. Marsaud, it is difficult to just lock in the old Europe: we will always have
weak links.
As RSS, I put oil into the workings and help services, not to name and shame (name and shame),
make plans on the Comet or mount the Meccano administrativo-policies which would absorb all
the energy services already under pressure.
As to the OCAM, I do not believe that this is a very operational structure.
The rapporteur. It determines the level of the threat.
The President Georges Fenech. But the decision is political.
Mr Didier Le Bret. In case of Vigipirate, the apolitical role you were talking about is played by
the Secretary-General of defense and national security (SGDSN). It was he who traced all the
elements that contribute to the analysis of the threat. In reality, it has not escaped you that an
evolution is almost impossible: the rigidity is total, as the only question we ask is at the moment
where we are going to be hit again. But in absolute terms, you're right: it should be a structure
that objective analysis of the threat and does not hesitate to lower its level when it is necessary.

The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for this rich hearing of teachings.
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Francis Delon, Chairman of the National Committee of
control of the techniques of intelligence (CNCTR), accompanied by Mr. Marc Antoine,
Advisor to the president
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, Wednesday, may 18, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We have the pleasure of welcoming Mr. Francis Delon,
president of the National Commission for control of intelligence (CNCTR) techniques,
accompanied by Mr. Marc Antoine, Adviser to the president.
Mr president, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of
inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We are continuing our investigations on intelligence in us now affecting its control. I recalled
that the CNCTR, pursuant to the Act on intelligence, successor to the National Commission on
control of security interceptions (CNCIS), ensures that intelligence collection techniques are
applied in Work on the national territory in accordance with the texts and it gives its opinion
before putting in Work by means of surveillance by the french intelligence services.
Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us your hearing takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if
we decide so at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in
camera will previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These will be
submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is punishable by
the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who, within a period of
twenty-five years [...], disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a commission of
inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this
information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr. Francis Delon and Mr. Marc Antoine take oath.
The commission is particularly interested in how are controlled techniques of intelligence
available to our services.
After the attacks from January to November 2015, have you noticed an influx of applications
from services and, among the latter, how much now represent those related to terrorism?

What proportion of the unfavourable opinion issue concerning claims related to terrorism and on
what grounds? What is the developments in recent weeks?
The CNCIS refused the extension of the Kaye brothers and MIT Coulibaly listens in 2013 and
2014. What are the criteria that enable the CNCTR give a favourable opinion? How to better take
into account individuals who belong at the bottom of the spectrum?
In interceptions of security, the annual quota - 2 700 - is sufficient taking into account the
number of individuals involved in terrorist networks?
How do you organize to deal with the influx of applications, particularly as regards connection
data?
Within what timeframe is the CNCTR able to meet the demands of services?
What first assessment pull you from the application of the new techniques introduced by the law
of 24 July 2015 on intelligence? This Act is fully implemented or decrees of applications remain
to be published? How the list provided for in article L. 851 - 2 of the code of Homeland Security
- therefore the follow-up in individuals real - include names? Where is the application of article
L. 851 - 3 relative to the algorithms? Are the provisions to listen to the entourage used by
services? How do you control the use of the techniques decentralized such catchers IMSI
(International Mobile Subscriber Identity) or the tags?
Are services of the second circle fully seized of the possibility which is offered to them to use the
techniques of intelligence? How many requests have been made by these services since the
appearance of the Decree?
Do you feel that the CNCTR has sufficient means to fulfil its mission?
Finally, how do you control post-clearance use of security interceptions? How many
recommendations of interruption of tapping have been sent to the CNCTR these past months?
Mr. Francis Delon, Chairman of the National Committee of control of the techniques of
intelligence (CNCTR). The National Commission of control of intelligence techniques, you
have pointed out, was created recently by the intelligence Act of July 24, 2015. It succeeded the
CNCIS with expanded powers to which I will return.
The primary mission of the CNCTR is to verify daily that unsolicited intelligence techniques
comply with the Act and they relate to respect for private life an attack proportionate to the
alleged threats.
The CNCTR includes nine members, including four members of Parliament representatives, in
equal parts, the majority and the opposition. One of these members is present here in the person
of Pascal Popelin. Three members of the commission serve full-time - among which myself, as
the Act requires me. This collegiality reinforces the independence of the commission, promotes
the discussion and improves the effectiveness of its control.

With regard to its staffing, the CNCTR, when she moved, on October 5, resumed the CNCIS,
either five officers staff. She has recruited and today relies on a secretariat with a dozen agents.
Our goal is to reach a total of eighteen full-time by the end of the year, to address claims before
us and to ensure controls ex post facto that we must realize. A little less than 400,000 operating
budget is allocated to the commission.
Before the law of 24 July 2015, only requests for security and geolocalisation real-time
interception followed a process of authorization by the Prime Minister after a prior opinion by
the CNCIS. The Act did not specify that this notice was prior, but the practice had led to what he
was. Today - this is a great act of 2015 novation-, all applications in Artwork on the national
territory of a technique of information gathering are authorized by the Prime Minister after
consultation with the CNCTR.
Remains that the commission is competent only intelligence. Our activity of the administrative
police and stops at the threshold of the judicial police. When a case is dealt with by a court
judge, no technique of intelligence authorization is given. We ensure respect for the distinction
between administrative police and judicial police.
With respect to its activity, since its inception in place October 3, 2015, the CNCTR gave more
than 9,000 opinion, not in light of the requests for access to the data connection that the
commission control since February 1, 2016 and to which I shall return. Greater than 50% of the
volume of applications processed by the CNCIS on the same time increase the number of records
notices.
The law of 24 July 2015 provided that intelligence techniques could be put in place for a number
of purposes - you know, I will return so no -, including the prevention of terrorism.
The Act also gives the list of intelligence techniques to which services may be used, provided
that they are authorized by the Prime Minister after consultation with the CNCTR. There are
fifteen techniques that can be grouped by categories.
The first includes interceptions of security i.e. the contents and the container - and covered the
field of competence of the CNCIS. This is the most important part - aside from access to login
data - applications before us. These security interceptions are carried out by the operators on the
service request and are authorized by the Prime Minister after consultation with the commission.
An intercessor is the request to the operator; It is the interministerial control group (ICG). It is
also the GIC which ensures services access to the content of the communications intercepted in
its centres. Services can have direct access to these communications in the premises of the GIC.
July 2015 Act authorized the use of a new technique of interception of the content of
communications usingIMSI catcher - thanks to which we can collect the content of
correspondence - to intercept communications. We have given a positive opinion on this
technique only on very rare occasions and for reasons of operational urgency, including
prevention of terrorist acts (fear of preparing an attack, of a hostage,...).

A second category of techniques concerning access to data connection, namely the container.
There is access to the data of connection time. Since February 1st, 2016, is the CNCTR that
renders an opinion on these applications. Another possibility is given by the law of July 24,
2015: access to login data in real time - but for solely for prevention of terrorism and against
people that have been identified as a threat. This provision is also in force since February 1,
2016.
It related to access to login data everything which relates to the geolocation in real time, which
allows the localization of a mobile phone and its follow-up.
Finally, you can access data connection through an IMSI catcher, but who is interested only in
the data connection. It is a much more common technique, including terrorism.
The third type of technique involves access to a place or a computer system, whether in the latter
case, of the collection of data on a computer, the remote access to the contents of a courier and,
possibly, the trapping of a remote computer or by contact. Access to a private place or a place to
live for this operation requires a specific authorisation. Similarly, such an authorization is
required for access to a private place or dwelling to capture video or photo - images - or for it.
The law provided that, when there is penetration in a dwelling place, the decision is necessarily
in collegial formation by the commission.
The fourth type of technique, which aroused many debates on the occasion of the consideration
by Parliament of what would become the law of 24 July 2015, under article L. 851 - 3 of the
code of Homeland Security. This is what is called the algorithm that allows the automatic
processing of the data connection of a large number of people, with aims to determine what
might justify an alert and special supervision. Now as I speak, this technique is not established in
Artwork. The law provides that the CNCTR pronounces on the algorithm and make, where
appropriate, recommendations for amendment if it deems it necessary. At this point, we have
been seized by the Government to any proposal.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Do you know where we are in this area?
Mr. Francis Delon. It is rather the intelligence services need to ask the question; We will
examine it as soon as we entered.
The President Georges Fenech. Is there a technical problem?
Mr. Francis Delon. You should know that it is a tool very complex and which can't buy not on
the market. Therefore manufacture it, which requires a bit of time, and for this, to use special
skills available to the State. The work continues, and when the application will be submitted to
us, we will examine it carefully.
Finally, I will mention the international supervision that may have an interest in the fight against
terrorism. This surveillance is provided by the law of 30 November 2015. The legal framework
is here quite different, since the CNCTR has control only a posteriori. Are used in the case of
algorithms that analyze data of connection.

The President Georges Fenech. Do you have this type of monitoring on external operations
theatres technique?
Mr. Francis Delon. The law of 24 July 2015 shall apply only on the national territory. Thus, if
the Directorate of military intelligence (DRM) wants to apply specific techniques on an outdoor
theatre, it is not a priori of the CNCTR control, since these techniques would be implemented
Works outside the national territory.
Services that rely on intelligence techniques are the six forming what is called the intelligence
community or services of the first circle: the Directorate General of internal security (CSB), the
Directorate-General for external security (DGSE), the protection and security of defence (DPSD)
branch, the DRM, the National Directorate of intelligence and investigations Customs (DNRED)
and TRACFIN (information processing and action against clandestine financial circuits).
A decree of December 11, 2015 provides that a number of other services, so-called second circle,
can access, for certain purposes, certain techniques of intelligence. All these services are placed
under the authority of the Minister of the Interior - they belong to the gendarmerie, the national
police, of the prefecture of police of Paris, of the judicial police service; Therefore services
which have a mixed, both judicial and administrative, or services acting only in the context of the
administrative police, as the Directorate of intelligence of the prefecture of police (DRPP). For
some services, intelligence techniques applications may relate to terrorism.
In practice, the services of the first circle, more seasoned, have immediately made appeal to the
new techniques of information provided for by the law of 24 July 2015, while it took until the
Decree of December 11, 2015 for the services of the second circle the rise is revealing here
slower - lack of experience to put in Work these techniques. The coming back of training
programmes in order to ensure the application of the techniques in reasonable conditions of
safety and legality.
The daily operation of the CNCTR fits in the operational chain of intelligence. Indeed, if an
intelligence service wanted to realize an intelligence operation, he returned to the head of the
service to validate the request. After which it is forwarded to the office of the Minister of the
Interior, the Minister of defence or Finance Minister. If the Minister valid requests, it is
communicated to the CNCTR which expresses itself in a very short period, that Act was fixed at
twenty-four hours.
The folder is instructed by one of the members of the secretariat of the commission to be then
validated by a magistrate Member, namely myself or one of the other three members the CNCTR
magistrates. This procedure is about 95% of cases.
Mr. Meyer Habib. How much time elapses between the request and validation by the Minister?
Mr. Francis Delon. Parisian times are very short and their possible extension is attributable to
service. However, between the time where the antenna of a service in an area, application of a
technique, and the time of validation of the request, it may take a fairly long period. In Paris, I
said, treatment is very short: we most often do not use 24 hours available to us. Between when

the Minister receives, demand and that where it is transmitted to us it runs up a few hours.
Between the time where we give our opinion and that where the Prime Minister makes the
decision and also a few hours elapse. In total, the Parisian period is therefore about two days,
three at most.
M. Pascal Popelin. And, in an emergency, the time limit may be ten minutes!
Mr. Francis Delon. Indeed, we can, in an emergency, give our opinion in under an hour. This
has happened. We are available twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week - a permanence
is ensured.
We do everything to not unnecessarily slow down the process of intelligence. We control that
demand that us is formulated is lawful and proportionate. If it is, we will not compromise an
operation by excessive delays.
The President Georges Fenech. There is a procedure that allows, in an extreme emergency, to
require notice of the CNCTR asex post facto?
Mr. Francis Delon. The Act indeed provides an absolute emergency procedure. It was
developed in Work only once, on a ground of terrorism. We have been alerted by the cabinet of
the Prime Minister, himself warned by telephone, the threat of imminent attack. The Prime
Minister has informed us that he did not wish to take the risk of waiting not thirty minutes so the
commission pronounces - what she would have anyway been able to - and that he immediately
took the decision. It is found - so much better - that it had been a false alarm. The desire of the
Prime Minister has always been to go through the commission. We held that the passage by the
CNCTR was not an abnormal delay element; also find us in time still very brief.
The Act further provides two cases where the application must be considered in collegial
formation: the case where it comes to authorize entry into a dwelling place and where the
technique, whatever it is, concerns a person exercising a protected profession - parliamentary,
magistrate, journalist, lawyer... In the latter case, it is even the plenary training that is required.
We meet three times a week in collegial formation - which should not be the case for many
commissions-, besides the impromptu meetings that it is sometimes necessary to organize, in
plenary session, to examine a case of protected profession.
The President Georges Fenech. What is already happened?
Mr. Francis Delon. It's already happened.
M. Pascal Popelin. For the constitution of its quorum, the plenary session of the CNCTR, under
the terms of the Act, does not require the presence of parliamentarians, which however acceded
to the wish of the president to ensure that each meeting one of them had less to be present except during the consideration of applications for renewal of cases on which we have already
spoken.

With regard to the profession of journalist - one of those protected, justifying that the
commission decision in plenary - the CNCTR has an extensive conception, so that we often
examine the cases of individuals whose journalist is questionable.
The rapporteur. These cases were more espionage than terrorism?
Mr. Francis Delon. I nor can unfortunately not show me more specific, since I am forced by
national defence secrecy.
Rest that, fortunately, it is not so common that we have to consider applications regarding
individuals protected professions. The spirit of the law implies that the national representation is
present within the plenary formations. As noted by Pascal Popelin, if the matter is not new, if it's
the renewal of a case on which parliamentarians have already come, their presence is in fact not
necessary.
Where a collegial meeting is required, the time limit for giving notice is increased to seventy-two
hours. However, even in these circumstances, we do ensure that the time limits are shorter and
they do not exceed twenty-four hours. We attach so very great importance to the management of
time - is one of the main tasks of the president. The Act the rest provided that, if we don't agree
in the expected time, it is deemed made - this has never happened and we will try make it so
always.
Requests for access to the connection data - collection of bills, identification of numbers - were
not processed, previously, the CNCIS, but by a qualified personality, a time placed to the
Minister of the Interior and which, since January 1, 2015, was placed to the Prime Minister. To
process, we took two employees of the above-mentioned qualified personality and each other
loads of mission of the commission is also requested.
The President Georges Fenech. How do you control a posteriori ? According to criteria of
legality or opportunity?
Mr. Francis Delon. When we allow a technique, we we say, in some cases, that it will have to
follow it. Thus, after giving an opinion favourable and after that the technique has been
developed in Work, we will check with the service how this technique has been applied.
Control subsequently assumes a centralization of the data: what we control must remain
accessible. This is one of our first applications to the Prime Minister. This centralization is
already acquired for interceptions of security, for the geolocations in real time, but not for the
IMSI catcher that can be used in different parts of the territory. We organize services with a
Parisian centralisation of these data; We have access to the headquarters of the services, without
having to move in the province, which does not prevent us make us to examine the way in which
services are working at the regional level. We are therefore working on pieces and place.
It comes to interact with services that are seeking explanations on how the law should be applied.
We them are therefore part of our expectations and take note of their difficulties - which in some
cases lead us to adapt our jurisprudence.

The controls are different depending on the technique used: those concerning international
surveillance are not the same as those on the implementation in Work of the placement of a tag
by a service on national territory.
The President Georges Fenech. I measure the significance of your liability, but the CNCTR is
not an investigator service, it is an administrative control service. Therefore what are the
objective criteria on the basis of which you deny an application, without having to judge the
usefulness of any particular system of monitoring? I recall that the CNCIS refused extension of
brothers Kaye and MIT Coulibaly listens. Forts of what criteria do you take the responsibility to
accept or refuse an extension?
Mr. Francis Delon. The CNCIS issued a statement denying that it has never refused the
continuation of monitoring of the Kaye brothers.
The President Georges Fenech. We were unaware of it!
Mr. Francis Delon. This release was published by Le Figaro.
The communiqu of the CNCIS denies the information originally given by Le Figaro. To our
knowledge, there has not been at all of interruption of surveillance at the request of the CNCIS.
The President Georges Fenech. Where is this statement output?
The rapporteur. She stated in effect that the surveillance had been interrupted in August 2014.
M. Pascal Popelin. Apart from this case, you should know that we have access, in particular
concerning security interceptions in all productions, namely the content of telephone
conversations.
Mr. Francis Delon. We have access to everything.
M. Pascal Popelin. And live.
Mr president, you have my opinion used misused after investigation, insofar as we intervene
prior to it, therefore a service considers to be put on listening someone he suspects and justifies
the reasons for which he seeks permission to Work an interception of security. We then exercise
technical and legal control to verify that the person to be monitored corresponds to the criteria
laid down by the law. If this is the case, the authorisation is valid for four months, period to
which the request must be renewed. In the meantime, it is hoped that the service will be able to
gather evidence to support its renewal application. However, as we have access to the
productions, if there's nothing compelling in the records, the Committee will necessarily ask the
question of the appropriateness of the continuation of the monitoring. It will be the same if, on
the other hand, the grounds alleged by the service to solicit an interception are not expanded to
over time.
The President Georges Fenech. You therefore decide to opportunity, not in the law.

The rapporteur. Listening to the brothers Kaye gave nothing. It is that interceptions are made
difficult by the use than most common techniques of encryption on the part of the suspects. Has
your doctrine changed as a result? On the other hand, have you issued refusals of requests for
interception of security linked to terrorism? If this is the case, are services returned to the charge
concerning such individual to make you change your mind?
Mr. Francis Delon. We must ensure that the application enters the framework laid down by law:
it matches one of the planned aims and the applicant authority is competent? Then, we should
appreciate the proportionality between the infringement of privacy carried by the gathering of
information and the threat it's face. This does not mean that we are acting to opportunity: it is up
to the Prime Minister to take the decision to carry out the monitoring of any particular
personality, which is a matter of political expediency. Ourselves, we examine only if the request
is legal.
We have also a subsidiarity control provided by law for the use of more intrusive techniques:
before allowing penetration in an apartment for a microphone, to ensure that the service cannot
have the same intelligence by less intrusive techniques.
I return specifically to terrorism, subject of the work of your commission. In 2014, terrorism
represented 28% of the interception of security applications processed by the CNCIS, against
42% of the files on the prevention of organised crime. From 2015, these percentages are
reversed: terrorism became the first reason for applications in Work of technical intelligence, at
42%, while requests for organized crime increased to 28%. Then, in response to the rapporteur,
we happened to opposing such terrorism-related application advice, but this is rare. The refusal is
more often a service error - what can happen. Moreover, it happened that both services are the
same target: in this case, we warn the Prime Minister.
The rapporteur. This happen often?
Mr. Francis Delon. No, it is also very rare.
The rapporteur. But both services can not want to monitor an individual for totally different
reasons?
Mr. Francis Delon. In this case, there's not a problem, but if it is the same purpose, noted to the
Prime Minister, who will choose the service which will be allowed to monitor. We play so here,
although marginally, a coordinating role.
M. Pascal Popelin. You should know that the target is not necessarily Untel, born in such place
and living at a particular location. The target can be a phone number...
Mr. Francis Delon. Indeed, the target can not be identified.
The rate of adverse opinion of the order of 1% in general. It is less for requests related to
terrorism.

The President Georges Fenech. Do you motivate your opinions?

Mr. Francis Delon. Positive opinions are generally not - except when we want to make a
clarification. Can ask us an interception of security for a period of four months; However we
estimate that, in the circumstances specific to the case, the duration should be shorter, and in this
case, we explain why. Obviously, when the opinion is unfavourable, he is motivated.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Have you already given an unfavourable opinion in an application linked to
terrorism?
Mr. Francis Delon. It happened in some cases.
Requests before us are not only Islamic terrorism.
M. Christophe Cavard. What are your relationships - assuming that they exist - with the
DGSE?
A large part of the application of the law of July 24, 2015 is based on you, since you are
supposed to control the destruction of data. How do you proceed? Certain services, we will
recall, wished to keep them longer that the Act does - what is your feeling on the issue?
Finally, with regard to the IMSI catcher, there are a technical problem of data transfer, which
raises the question of their centralization. In addition, the Act provides that can allow listening to
the closest people - we think the discussion on the fact whether it was useful or not to listen to
the wives of the brothers Kaye. You happened to be an application of monitor environment of a
suspicious person?
Mr. Francis Delon. Of course, we have relationships with the DGSE as with all intelligence
services. We talk with them at all times and have therefor secure lines. The DGSE is placed
under two regimes: the plan home, because, contrary to what is often believed, it can lead
operations on the french territory - also can submit requests to the title of the Act of July 24,
2015; and the regime that covers the bulk of its business: international surveillance, under the
law of November 2015 - which we monitor compliance ex post.
With regard to the destruction of data, you are right to recall that our role is to ensure that the law
is enforced and, in particular, that the data retention periods are respected. This is why I have
mentioned the need for a centralised allowing us to have access to all data and to ensure that
statutory deadlines are met. Thus, for the IMSI catcher, which intercept the connection data, the
Act has provided that, at the end of a period of ninety days, the service must have destroyed all
data that do not directly relate to the target, implying a sort between many numbers. We care and
that is why we carried out multiple controls on this technique.
Finally, in regards to the entourage of monitored persons, the law provides that, in matters of
security interceptions, be allowed measures to listen on persons who are not directly involved,
but have a close relationship with a target and with which this target will communicate - it is, for
example, the mother who calls his son in Syria. The CNCIS considered could not allow such

listens. Now permitted by law and we therefore enforce the law: we of course authorized
interceptions of security in respect of the entourage.
The President Georges Fenech. Why do you consider to be part of the operational intelligence
chain, while the CNCTR is a body of authority and control?
Mr. Francis Delon. We are in the operational chain because we are the inspection body which
takes place before the decision is taken by the Prime Minister. And it is our opinion that will
have a great influence on this decision. So far, the Prime Minister has always followed our
unfavourable opinion, which was not the case with the CNCIS. I would add that if he did not
follow our negative opinion, we could enter the Council of State to contest the decision - that
could make the CNCIS.
The President Georges Fenech. What is already happened?
Mr. Francis Delon. No. The Prime Minister has always followed our unfavourable opinions, the
question not arisen.
Presidency of Mr. Meyer Habib, Vice President.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Specifically, how do you control the destruction of data? Are you from the
data itself, of their content, to verify that the part that would not relate to the scope of the
authorization was destroyed?
Then, how are you enjoying a renewal application? Will the requesting service communicate
information that he will be able to obtain? Is it from there you think the opportunity of renewal?
Mr. Francis Delon. To control the destruction of the data, it must be "traceable". If it is an
interception of security, it is very easy, because centralization is performed by the ICG which
ensures, under our control, that data shall be kept for the duration. It is more complicated for
decentralized operations. He must build a system of centralization of data that does not exist. It's
complicated, because you can carry data under conditions that preserve the confidentiality of
national defence. There are therefore the choice between accompanied luggage, if I may say, or
secure networks that do not always exist and we must build. The data therefore reach us either
electronically or physically and they are labelled to be attached to any particular operation. We
then check if we carry out a control in the service concerned, that the data was not kept beyond
the legal term. We operate case by case depending on the technique used.
It is necessary to have in mind that we do not control ex post implementation All of the
techniques work. We proceed by survey sampling. Control everything, would require
considerable resources.
M. Pascal Popelin. The percentage of risks is not the same according to the techniques.
Mr. Francis Delon. We are making the choice. When we allow a technique, if it seems special,
we decide to control.

With regard to renewal, all depends on, here too, the technique employed. If it comes to
interceptions of security, we have access at any time, in our premises, completeness of the
intercepted conversations. When an application for renewal is submitted to us, so let's check
what gave the previous authorization. If the results are in connection with the alleged purpose,
service, which must motivate his request, explains that the renewal is necessary for the success
of the current operation, if we are convinced by the results obtained, we will answer in the
affirmative. If in doubt, will have to wear an appreciation which varies according to the
purposes.
M. Christophe Cavard. You have previously indicated that the rate of requests for interception
on terrorism had increased from 28% to 42% since the beginning of 2014. What quotas? I
understand that it had never reached that fixed by the law concerning interception of security.
The rapporteur. A list is provided for in article L. 851 - 2 of the code of Homeland Security
concerning the monitoring in real time of individuals. Can you tell us a Word?
Mr. Francis Delon. There are two quotas, one, known for interceptions of security, which is
from 2,700, the other, which is not public, the simultaneous use ofIMSI catcher, much lower for
obvious reasons. None of these two quotas was at no time reached or even approached. The
quota on interceptions of security is sufficient. Consider the capacity of services: beautiful will
be put in Interceptions of security work, still need to have analysts to exploit. In short, these
quotas are not at all a brake to the action of the services.
I turn to the question on article L. 851 - 2 of the code of Homeland Security. This device allows
to collect real-time data connection of a person suspected to pose a threat of terrorism - and
terrorism only. This is, in practice, monitoring low noise of a person that does not justify further
surveillance - type interception of security or other - but that may present a risk, for example
because it would be radicalized. The law provides here that permissions allow collect non-not the
content of the conversations, as is the case for the interception of security, but the data
connection: that this person calls? By whom is it contacted? Where to move? What site consult
on internet? This technique begins to be implemented Work, but for the time being, a number
enough reduced people.
The rapporteur. I understand: is it the first?
Mr. Francis Delon. It is this: we know that the person to be monitored calls, which calls it,
where she walks on the internet...
The rapporteur. The requesting service, when it comes to terrorism, is therefore necessarily
ISB?
Mr. Francis Delon. Not only. This technique is open to multiple services.
The rapporteur. But it must be for 90% of cases of ISB?

Mr. Francis Delon. The DPSD is also concerned with counter-terrorism - particularly in the
military environment-, the DGSE also or the DNRED who can make a contribution. Still, you are
right, applications come mainly from ISB.
The rapporteur. It is about "weak signals". If I understand correctly, you check the degree of
radicalism of an individual. How many people on this list subsequently were the subject of an
interception by safety? How does one decide to move from monitoring low noise to an
interception by safety?
Mr. Francis Delon. I can give you my vision of things, knowing that the device is put in place
and that adjustments are still needed. Low noise monitoring allows potential activation of alerts.
Once the latter is triggered, the requesting service eventually decides to go further in the
monitoring.
The rapporteur. Why our files 10 500 S related to radical islam are not subject to this
monitoring at low noise?
Mr. Francis Delon. You should ask the question services. I recall that article 851-2 of the code
of homeland security applies to individuals who pose a threat of terrorism. It is therefore more
than a mere suspicion. You need a minimum of tangible elements for development in Work of
this technique - it is what has foreseen the legislator.
The rapporteur. Can you give us one or two examples? That is a tangible threat justifying
monitoring low noise?
Mr. Francis Delon. Is concerned an individual, for example, which, without being bound to
Daech, is is radicalized, is demonstrating an empathy for terrorist movements or which can have
behavior that worries. Still, judged on a case by case basis.
When we have seized of requests by the services, we examined them each with attention and in
permitted much; However, we are far from the figures you enter...
The rapporteur. I'm just wondering why, in monitoring low noise, are not fished over large, if
you'll pardon the expression.
Mr. Francis Delon. Because the law does not. The Act expressly provides that the individual
concerned must represent a threat.
The rapporteur. The ambiguity is there. Today 14,000 people are contained in the file FSPRT
(file from processing of the reported for prevention and terrorist radicalization).
M. Pascal Popelin. It takes into account all those who are not on the national territory.
The rapporteur. Either, remove in so 2 000.
The rapporteur. New data regularly feed the FSPRT. Why not mentioned practices coupled?

Mr. Francis Delon. My answer is very simple: we will consider all requests the services made.
The rapporteur. Are claims on this subject increasing?
Mr. Francis Delon. We are at the beginning of the implementation in Implementation of this
technique which is pointed.
The rapporteur. Have the services taken the measure of this technique?
Mr. Francis Delon. They collect data of connection, which are unreadable for people lay in the
use of information technology. Therefore, technicians able to exploit. This technique begins to be
implemented Work on an area much narrower than the one you mention. Remains that if we are
seized of requests within a wider perimeter, we will examine them of course.
Mr. Meyer Habib, president. Thank you, Mr President, for all these details and clarity of your
words.
Round table, open to the press, intelligence specialists: M. Jean-Franois Clair, former
Deputy Director of the direction de surveillance du territoire (DST); Mr. Philippe Hayez,
head of the speciality "information" of the school of International Affairs of the Institute of
political studies in Paris; Mr. Franois Heisbourg, special adviser to the president of the
Foundation for strategic research; Mr. Sbastien-Yves Laurent, Professor at the Faculty of
law and political science at the University of Bordeaux; Mr. Damien Martinez, Secretary
general of the Centre for analysis of terrorism (CAT)
Report of the round table, open to the press, Thursday, May 19, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We are continuing our investigations into intelligence, starting first with
a meeting open to the press, in the form of a round table bringing together intelligence researchers.
We have the pleasure of welcoming Mr. Philippe Hayez, judge at the Court of Auditors, responsible for
the speciality "information" of the school of International Affairs of the Institute of political studies in Paris;
Mr. Sbastien-Yves Laurent, political scientist, Professor at the Faculty of law and science policy at the
University of Bordeaux. Mr. Jean-Franois Clair, Honorary inspector-general of the national police, former
Deputy Director of the direction de surveillance du territoire (DST); Mr. Franois Heisbourg, special
adviser to the president of the Foundation for strategic research (FRS); and Mr. Damien Martinez,
Secretary general of the Centre for analysis of terrorism (CAT).
Gentlemen, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry. We
can discuss with you all the issues concerning intelligence, whether the coordination of services,
international cooperation, including European, or the empowerment, human and legal.
This roundtable is the subject of a live stream on the website of the National Assembly; registration will
also be available for a few months on the video portal of the Assembly and the Committee may decide to
include in its report any part of the report that will be made of the hearing.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of Ordinance of 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, nothing but the
truth.

Please raise your right hand and say: 'I swear '.
Mr Philippe Hayez, Sbastien-Yves Laurent, Jean-Franois Clair, Franois Heisbourg and Damien
Martinez successively take oath.
How to explain the interruption of tapping brothers Kaye and MIT Coulibaly, perpetrators of
theHypercacher and Charlie Hebdo, while analysts stress that it is when radicalized individuals adopt a
discreet behavior that they are closest to a passage in the Act? Similarly, how is it that Samy Sumbua,
one of the suicide bombers of the Bataclan, could previously leave the french territory while he was under
judicial review? Why was it the object of supervision on the part of the intelligence services? How can we
explain that Ismael Omar Memoo, which was the subject of a 'card S', could also leave the french territory
and, on the other hand, that the intelligence services could not locate Abdelhamid Abaaoud throughout
the year 2015? This also raises the question of cooperation with other European services. We seek to
understand these holes in the racket.
What do you think of the creation of the operational staff of prevention of terrorism (EMOPT)? Does not
duplicate with the unit for coordination of the fight against terrorism (UCLAT)? We found that the EMOPT
was not even known to all intelligence services, and that appeals to us.
Finally, should we not the same consequences as Americans after the attacks of September 11 and
create a common basis of counter-terrorist intelligence?
M. Franois Heisbourg, special adviser to the president of the Foundation for strategic research.
The UCLAT was established in 1984 as a result of serious deficiencies in the anti-terrorism fight,
including the transmission time and time of the information to prevent the attack on the rue Marbeuf, a
case reported in my previous book, Secret stories.
What is striking throughout recent years, is the very great difficulty to fully integrate the gendarmerie, in its
intelligence function within the two circles of intelligence. At the time of the preparation of the white paper
on national defence of 2008, I was responsible for the Working Group on the reform of public authorities
and a member of the informal group established to carry out the reform of the intelligence community. For
reasons that I do not know, the Elysee had decided that the gendarmerie would not belong to the national
intelligence Council (CNR) that we advocated to create. The gendarmerie has created a branch of
operational Moulineaux anticipation, that I invite you to visit; It is an extraordinary management of
operational intelligence command post.
St

While the gendarmerie is part of the Ministry of the Interior since 1 January 2009, I do not have the
feeling that this merger has been fully performed. I don't know whether to create an EMOPT to ensure
this integration: it could go through the UCLAT. However, if we want to combat terrorism with domestic
intelligence, it is better that the gendarmerie is integrated into the first circle of intelligence, not only to the
Ministry of the Interior, but also at the level of the CNR and the national coordinator of intelligence.
Personally, I am dismayed that it still did not act because the gendarmerie is the domestic intelligence.
With regard to the interconnection of files, which is the subject of your last question, the United States
have clearly gone too far in this direction because this interconnection has become itself a security
problem. When the young soldier Manning gave WikiLeaks some 750 000 classified telegrams from the
State Department, it was operating from a built-in file.
Like many of our fellow citizens, I was struck by the fact that the car carrying Mr. Salah Abdeslam to the
Belgium on the night of 13 to 14 November has been controlled three times without posed this problem to
its occupant. I note that the Belgians captured Mr. Abdeslam living at the end of four months, while it took
four years for our services to stop Mr. Colonna, presumed guilty of the assassination of a prefect in
Corsica, on an island of 200,000 residents, roughly the population of Molenbeek. We are therefore well
placed to give lessons to the Belgians or our other European partners in intelligence.

When an individual ceases to use his phone, the professional reflex is not to extend tapping, since it more
nothing happens, but to try to track the individual otherwise. I note that monitoring of brother Kouachi in
question was good when he was within the jurisdiction of the prefecture of police of Paris, and it is
completely out of the radar once in Reims; I infer that the Parisian device wasn't the same way as the
device in the province, which returns us to the question of the consequences of the dismantling of
General Intelligence (RG) and the integration of the gendarmesque intelligence in the province.
Mr. Damien Martinez, Secretary general of the Centre for analysis of terrorism (CAT). The specialty
of the Centre for analysis of terrorism (CAT) is financial intelligence. It is now possible to individuals
committing terrorist acts of hide with new tools. Hayat Boumeddiene, for example, this young woman
involved in the attacks, was able to flee the country using an anonymous prepaid card to save a ticket
under a false identity. Similarly, certain vehicles are rented with anonymous means of payment. These
new tools make difficult a real-time monitoring.
Crosses of files, the France has one of the most stringent data protection systems in the world. In the field
of the fight against the financing of terrorism, we realize the limitations of the system. The British private
sector has masses of data on credits; in France, for reasons related to the protection of privacy, this type
of data does not exist, while they allow the detection risk profiles.
M. Jean-Franois Clair, Honorary inspector-general of the national police, former Deputy Director
of the direction de surveillance du territoire (DST). I led the anti-terror branch, then the division,
Department, branch - that it was - from 1983 to 1997, before becoming Deputy Director of the DST. So I
know the difficulties of the work when the number of suspects goes from dozens to hundreds, or even
thousands. When the white paper of 2008 created the intelligence community, the DGSE was given 900
additional staff over five years while domestic intelligence received nothing; It took until 2014 so that it
receives more staff.
If RCMP is integrated into the intelligence community, need to also integrate the police, because the
gendarmerie is a font that works in a part of the territory while the police works on the other party.
The reform of 2008 was not complete. There was a long time that we want to put end to the very harmful
competition between the RG and DST in the fight against terrorism. Before the appearance of jihadist
terrorism, most terrorists came from outside - since then, it's a French population. The RG monitored
communities at risk and received pipes but the coordination did not exist, they kept them for them.
General information (SDIG) branch was created, but it was poorly designed. The elders of the DST who
have not joined the Central Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI) born of the merger of the RG and
DST have felt abandoned. It took the creation of the homeland security (CSB) and the territorial
intelligence branch in 2014 to ensure that responsibilities are clearly defined. The gendarmes are part of
territorial intelligence.
Permanent coordination takes place in the premises of the ITSB between intelligence services, the aim
being to divide the work. Territorial intelligence is present in all departments but it occupies not all kinds of
topics like GR did at the request of the prefects, as they informed of the situation in the departments. The
UCLAT is not an operational service. The only time where it was, it was during the 1995 bombings, when
the Director-general of the national police has directed her personally, with authorization services not
belonging to the police. The UCLAT is used to exchange information. It is she who manages, from what I
understood, the file of the jihadists.
Regarding tapping, when there are more calls, we pass to something else. S cards, are cards of attention;
to be useful, need people to be monitored.
The exchange between domestic intelligence works very well in Europe - these services meet in the Club
of Bern-, but not operational cooperation, which is between working on a common case. International
cooperation works, require that all countries involved. However, when a country was not hit, he is not fully

involved, and there are indeed 'holes in the racket. The France is involved since the early 1990s, as well
as England, since they were the representative of the Algerian GIA on their soil.
Mr. Sbastien-Yves Laurent, political scientist, Professor at the Faculty of law and political
science at the University of Bordeaux. Throughout the year 2015 could be heard the claim that
intelligence is improved. This can be done by improving sensors, human or technical, or reorganizing the
administrative structures and the legal framework, and this was done, but the real leverage through the
analysis of information from a perspective of anticipation.
This is a qualitative work on the basis of factual information. The main difficulty of what I call "intelligence
analysis" is to go beyond pure description of the phenomena to the anticipation at the strategic level. This
intelligence analysis investigated reflections, operational research and training, particularly at the
University, to the image of different masters, including the master gene (global security and trilingual
analysis) of the University of Bordeaux.
The three major challenges of the intelligence analysis are temporality - analysts or intelligence
contractors need to reflect on the different scales of temporality that appeal to different skills - the
spatiality and otherness - french interests lie on geographical and cultural areas extremely varied and it is
necessary that analysts have the tools to understand phenomena in these environments that are not
those of the France and the West -. Finally the uncertainty. On this last point, the Director of the DGSE
wrote in the reviewed national defence early 2014 to reduce the field of uncertainty at default reduce
uncertainty itself.
To meet these three challenges, the intelligence services have two advantages. First, they have the
possibility to leave the register of intuition, sometimes fragile, relying on methods and specific knowledge
in the humanities and social sciences. It is not where theoretical knowledge but knowledge of ground,
concrete, allowing to respond to specific questions, for example about the passage l'acte, that you
mentioned, Mr president. The second advantage is the use of 'massive data', to the big data ; We must do
the smart data and for this purpose reflect on the creation of software to assist in the analysis. The
analysis should use the quantitative to produce qualitative information. It should be, in my opinion, that
these software are produced on the basis of the needs of the users, who can participate in their
development.
The President Georges Fenech. What we have authorized in the last act on the information about the
algorithms, is answered, is not it?
Mr. Sbastien-Yves Laurent. In part. Detection algorithms to identify individuals likely to pass the Act,
but it is another thing to detect groups that without identified timescale, are in the process of
criminalization or radicalization.
Mr. Philippe Hayez, judge at the Court of Auditors, responsible for the speciality "information" of
the school of International Affairs of the Institute of political studies in Paris. The threat has
changed. We are now facing a threat of external origin with a population on European territory connected
in a profound way to this threat. This means that the response cannot be moved fully to the field of
domestic intelligence. There has been so far a year further on the nature of the terrorist threat: the White
Book of 2006. This reflection, which already ten years ago was conducted at a time when the main
enemy was Al-Qaida. It's time to redo a global exercise.
The intelligence community, a late creation in France it dates from 2008, is defined since the law of July
24, 2015 in a functional manner: an intelligence service is a service empowered to use the ten techniques
that the law reserves for these services. That said, the french administrative landscape is fractured: police
nationale, national gendarmerie, prefecture of police, that can be effective but also Island, armed forces,
who claim now contribute to the detection... Overcome these difficulties is not primarily through
operational coordination. I understand that the EMOPT has been created to resolve the difficulties caused

by the release of ISB of the perimeter of the national police and the need to restore within the Ministry of
the Interior an entity coordinating the gendarmerie, the national police and the ITSB. But it is a
circumstantial response; the real subject, it is that we are missing a step.
The President Georges Fenech. Is the national coordinator of intelligence useful?
M. Philippe Hayez. Created to physically embody the national community, it has a symbolic function
strong, but it's more an advisor of the President of the Republic than a real intelligence Coordinator.
The President Georges Fenech. Who is the operational Coordinator?
M. Philippe Hayez. It is the Ministry of the Interior and the services that depend on it. Lacking an
intermediate level between policy coordination and operational coordination. This is the lesson that were
the British and the Americans by creating a service dedicated to the strategic management. It's planning.
The fight against terrorism will be long and wide, it must mobilize not only intelligence, but also the
services of the State, local authorities, infrastructure managers...
The President Georges Fenech. You know that SID has been designated as the organizer of antiterrorism in France service.
M. Philippe Hayez. I am not sure that this is sufficient. I visited on several occasions, in the United
States, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), attached to the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), the American Coordinator. It is the function of strategic planningand strategic management, the
NCTC which is interesting: it causes all of the American national community to move forward in the
resolution of difficulties, including involving diplomatic actors - a role that the Ministry of the Interior in
France is not able to play.
With regard to domestic intelligence, at the time when the France was facing urban violence, there was a
great tool of feedback, "Lucienne scale", the name of a Divisional Commissioner of the RG, teacher, Ms.
Lucienne Bui Trong. It is a scale of the threats of violence, weak signals. I hope that the central service of
territorial intelligence (LSVCCS) will rise in power. I am not sure that the departmental is most relevant.
Need to ensure links are established with magistrates and local managers.
The British system of territorial coordination is based on a strategic planning body, the Joint Terrorism
Analysis Centre (JTAC). British officials I meet tell me that we were better that them ten years ago but
that they have caught up with us since then.
I have doubts about the ISB because we managed, through trial and error, to a hybrid model. Service was
removed from the branch of the national police, but Decree said nevertheless that it is a service of the
national police, as is led by police officers. It has also retained a jurisdiction. The British Security Service ,
meanwhile, is not attached to the police, has no jurisdiction, is not led by police and has therefore
developed a culture more specifically 'intelligence', versus more intuitive police culture. At home, some S
records are used to the legalization, while intelligence is mainly by nature, to project sources.
The white paper has become obsolete technology. Our law of 1978, revised in 2005, banned us, on
behalf of the protection of privacy, to interconnect files while we need to work on big data to detect certain
behaviors. We must have the courage to review this balance between the protection of private life and the
capacity of our services, but it is a taboo issue in our country.
The President Georges Fenech. To sum up, our intelligence organization lack a strategic planning body.

M. Philippe Hayez. We need a new white paper, a sustainable strategic planning function be carried out
within the central State, as well as a reflection on the internal organisation of the Ministry of the Interior
and the issue of the files.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Is there not a structural problem of organization? For example, our
intelligence services are not too numerous, or should we instead integrate other services into the
intelligence community? Would we be more effective if we decide a sort of Big Bang or, in this difficult
time for our services, a Big Bang, it would risk destabilizing their work?
There are multiple files, and we have sometimes the feeling that everyone has his files, his turf, that each,
and others simply pooling information from time to time on certain targets. Should it not a common file to
all the services of the first circle?
M. Philippe Hayez. I am not in favour of a Big Bang. We are in a virtuous logic: since ten years, we tailor
our services. There is no number of gold in this area. Should reflect on the means and tools rather than
the mechanic on the perimeters.
I do not share the scepticism of Franois Heisbourg on the interconnection of files. Manning showed little
classified files. Should certainly be security measures but do not prohibit interconnection because of the
risk of leaks. My suggestion would be to allow services access to some sort of file TIDE, the anti-terrorism
the NCTC database with millions of names. Interconnection seems essential to me but it will involve more
controls, including ex post, to ensure that there are no divergences; Currently, the National Commission
of control of the techniques of intelligence (CNCTR) controls only the justification for requests for access.
Mr. Franois Heisbourg. I am one of the six persons who drafted the white paper of 2006. It is our one
body of doctrine and we must obviously be updated. That said, I invite the Commission of inquiry to look
at scenarios considered in this white paper: they are very close to the facts which took place last year.
The creation of the community of intelligence as a result of the white paper of 2008 has been something
of a Big Bang. This Big Bang included two input data which we suffer again: fusion of the DST and the
RG and status RCMP. The Working Group did not mention these two topics because the President of the
Republic had taken its decision. The mounted police tried to carry out a contre-arbitrage, but the decision
has kept out of the first circle.
I consider that close intelligence should be incorporated in the first circle. On the other hand, if it has been
decided to make the DGSE the main technical platform of the intelligence community, the basic model for
coordination raised by some members of the Working Group was the British model with, within the
Cabinet Office, a power of arbitration on the planning of services and not a strategic role of conduct of
operations. This option was not adopted but it can be resurrected. Finally, lack us, also on the model
British, more neighbor of ours than the American system, a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), i.e. a
strategic Steering Body. We had not envisaged at the time because you have to walk before you run and
we had not then of the intelligence community.
The President Georges Fenech. Why the EMOPT does meet this mission?
Mr. Franois Heisbourg. It must be done in the interdepartmental most comprehensive. Cope with
events like those of November 13, it is the whole of the Republic which must be mobilized, and not only
the Brigades du Tigre, if you'll pardon the expression.
The President Georges Fenech. In fact, it should be an EMOPT to the Prime Minister.
Mr. Franois Heisbourg. It should be with the head of State.

The rapporteur. The UCLAT and the EMOPT are attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The
Coordinator, under the head of State, certainly allowed the creation of Hermes and Allat cells but it does
not really lead a scan job. Can we envisage a real coordination and analysis at the highest level, perhaps
like the coordinating body for the analysis of threat (OCAM) in Belgium, to adjust, regardless of the
political situation, the terrorism alert level? The Vigipirate plan, for example, has never changed since
1995 because it's politically complicated.
Mr. Franois Heisbourg. I am one of those who consider that the JTAC is a good model. An outside
body can facilitate decision-making political, sensitive in the case of a decrease of alert level where
punishment can be very hard if, a week after a drop the warning level, an attack occurs, what happened
in London in July 2005. Level alert in England decided by a body which is the trade has reduced the cost
policy measure.
M. Pierre Lellouche. The Commission of inquiry will have to tell if the deletion of the RG is originally
denounced by some disorder. I think that the RG were a baroque instrument which was much political
intelligence so that the terrorist problem has changed in France. In domestic matters, it is important to
ensure that intelligence dates back from sensitive areas because the problem is imported into Muslim
communities from terrorism of the contradictions of islam in the Middle East. Intelligence must be turned
in the direction of areas where there is a risk, and where he is also often involved in common crime, such
as drug trafficking. The means must be of course to the height; the gap between a country like Israel and
France in the number of intelligence officers is one to ten.
Regarding coordination at the strategic level, I agree with the analysis of M. Hayez. Lacking a place of
coordination, what Israelis call "the Aquarium". I have created during the 2007 campaign of Nicolas
Sarkozy, the national coordinator of intelligence so that the President of the Republic has a tool of
centralization of intelligence, knowing that the general secretariat for national defence (SGDN) at the time
did not this role - I also still do not know what this service, attached to the Prime Minister while the
decisions back to the President of the Republic. If the Coordinator, stuck between the diplomatic adviser
and the Chief of staff, has no space to exist and merely transmit the notes, it plays well obviously not his
role. The Americans have created an Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) where exists a
coordination office 17 intelligence agencies, with a role of watchdog so that information reaches to the
Director and be coordinated with the operational level. We have no such thing.
I leave aside the international cooperation and the total shambles that exists at European level.
M. Jean-Franois Clair. In regards to the Big Bang, apart from strategic coordination, we have all the
tools. If the Coordinator the role and the President of the Republic gives the impulse, the system can
operate. Must be an effective management.
We call since long the merger of domestic services, I said, and we have grazed the disaster in 1995
because the DST and the RG did not speak; We have not avoided the attacks but we have resolved
them. The territorial intelligence service fills the same role as the RG but in more concentrated and it
depends on public safety. When the SDIG was created, public safety is not believed Today, they are
motivated. Unlike some, I do not think that CSB should take care of everything, including territorial
intelligence.
Most of the agents of the domestic intelligence services in Europe are not police officers. That the
majority of our domestic intelligence agents are is an advantage of the France which it is recognized. Do
not forget that the American FBI also his jurisdiction. Counter-terrorism, intelligence was born of the
judiciary and the judiciary was born from the intelligence. We collect information from court cases.
Mr. Georges Fenech. Fact remains that at the moment the information is relevant, it cannot be shared
with other services.

M. Jean-Franois Clair. I do not think that this is an absolute rule.

M. Philippe Hayez. I confirm that, once the cases are judicial, services cannot access information. For
example, services that are able to decrypt and operate this type of data cannot do so on phones having
seized during searches after November 13.
One must ask if our anti-terrorism model, dating of the eighties and characterized by a strong relationship
between the judge, specialized, and security inside, is still a good model. No doubt there must be law but
this is not the only way. Our British friends, domestic security service has no jurisdiction and is not
composed of police officers, but there is no particular difficulties to pass items to the judicial authority.
Let me call your attention to the publication, July 8, the report of the Chilcot, the latest manifestation of the
British consciousness review commission after the Iraq. This report recounts the strange relationship that
is established under Tony Blair between political authority and services, with the observation that the
proximity also has limits. There is a critique of the JIC.
In the United States, was to services, after September 11, 2001, to have forgotten to 'connect the dots',
connecting the dots. They therefore created the ISA, which aims to ensure that the systems are
connected.
The word 'operation' was not pronounced. It is a missing word in the political language and administrative
french. You don't find the words in the Act creating the parliamentary delegation for intelligence (DPR),
which indicates that this DPR does not have the right to know current or past operations but does anyone
know what is an intelligence operation. Surgery is a risk that requires permission. We need a well defined
system of authority and responsibility; the procedure does not exist.
International cooperation is the least regulated dimension of the french landscape of intelligence. In the
first letter of mission of the Coordinator, the President of the Republic asked Mr. Bajolet to ensure this
coordination. I understand that there is nothing. The second dimension of the cockpit, is to ensure that
someone must ensure that we have good relations with foreign partners; the procedure, there either,
does not exist.
Intelligence is a matter of tribes and cultures, police, military, others; There are, as say the Americans,
dogs and cats. If it doesn't have this sociological dimension in the reform of domestic intelligence from
2006-2008, and strong police sociology of these services, one cannot understand why we are here.
Mr. Sbastien-Yves Laurent. A first report by Lord Butler, very clearly demonstrated that, in going to war
from Britain in Iraq, the JIC had failed. The politicization of intelligence played a role very hard in
anticipation of the alleged threat of weapons of mass destruction. This is explained by the fact that more
advisers policies that analysts have been recruited to the JIC in the 1990s. If it is necessary to develop a
strategic Steering Body, should however be wary of the risk of porosity between analysis and
politicization of intelligence.
The french intelligence unit changed from 2007 to 2015 in a big way. Ever since the Liberation the french
intelligence apparatus only had been all turned. It is necessary that services absorb these successive
reorganizations. This is a technocratic revolution in intelligence, should now be more discreet and
inexpensive reform: cultural mutation of intelligence. To anticipate threats, it is not legal knowledge or
administrative sciences that are the most relevant.
M. Christophe Cavard. Intelligence has a role of prevention, where the importance of the analysis of the
information. Now all services are not equal in terms of means: Mr. Clair recalled the part of the DGSE,
except in 2014, in the assignment of additional staff. Do you think the situation is balanced in this respect,
in particular knowing that today is ISB who plays the role of leader? Furthermore, what are the means of
the intelligence technology research?

What is your perspective on the Organization territorial intelligence, and particularly on interconnection
between services and the creation of the LSVCC? Need you develop a European intelligence service,
associated for example with Europol? It often opposed the issue of sovereignty, but the terrorists move
easily across the European territory.
Mr. Damien Martinez. In 1990 was created Tracfin, which identified last year 46 000 declarations of
suspicion - which some relate to the financing of terrorism-, with an annual growth of about 20%. Facing
an organization such as the Islamic State, we must think outside the codes. From this point of view, the
American and British examples are interesting. By visiting theOffice of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC),
the American equivalent of Tracfin, with much more resources, I was able to realize, on the technological
processing intelligence, not only a difference of scale but almost a difference of nature.
A large part of the European intelligence in financial matters is operated today as part of an Exchange
Protocol between the European Union and the United States, Terrorism Finance Tracking Program
(TFTP), which gave rise to more than 3,600 investigative leads these past two years.
Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT), in Britain, is a way of thinking innovative which
combines public and private operators, in particular the banking institutions, within a single unit. In
France, Bill FIR on the strengthening of anti-money laundering contains provisions to strengthen ties
between the two sectors.
Regarding technology, investments, the United States, are in several tens of billions of dollars. We are
not poor in France, we have very large operators of defence; the use of the big data could be a factor of
important development for our industry, particularly in the security and the fight against terrorism.
Mr. Franois Heisbourg. ISB is clearly underfunded. I do not consider that it should aim for parity with
the DGSE, for the good reason that the latter is surrogate mother in the technological field - this is a
difference in nature between the two services-, but there would still be interest to converge the ways.
The France has made the choice to have a mounted police on one side and the font on the other; less
than back such a choice in question, like the Dutch when they removed the Royal marechaussee a thirty
year ago, will continue to live with this model. I'm not sure it's bad, but I share of Mr. Clair views that close
intelligence must not be incorporated into the ITSB. A way of saying that it was a mistake to attempt to
merge the RG and DST.
I am struck by the difficulty we have to live with the consequences of technological development. When it
acquires the capability to intercept millions of communications at the same time, how do you manage,
intellectually, conceptually, doctrinally? It is not known. In the Manning case, this is not the level of
classification data delivered by Mr. Manning who was the major problem, it was especially the side big
data. Like many others, I looked if I was in the telegram: this was the case. I note that there was another
person whose anonymity was supposed to be protected by the Americans; they had written beside the
name, " strictly protect ". I entered the words " strictly protect " in the search engine and I thus obtained
within one click, some 3 200 names. As German business leader had to give up his place as he worked
against the interests of his country for Americans, and so on. This is an example very practice that gives
the big data. Snowden has been from this point of view the standard gold. Control conceptual and
doctrinal technology has perhaps more than technological development itself.
Mr. Serge Grouard. I have the feeling that there has been much talk this morning from the domestic
intelligence. I would like to mention two issues. The first is the national coordination of services. TRACFIN
has been mentioned but other services are not fully integrated into the intelligence community, and this is
a concern. Furthermore, with the number of services, the problem of coordinating retroactive on
European cooperation, because of multiple entry and exit doors, multiple flows in all directions so that the
analysis assumes a minimum of centralisation of information. In a logic of immediate reactivity, it is
worrying. More we service and more European coordination is difficult.

M. Philippe Hayez. There's not golden. Six services, this may seem much and it is a bit more than the
average European. But you will see that these are pairs and three departments are involved: the Interior,
defence and finance. TRACFIN and customs are part of the perimeter, unlike British customs, for
example. There is a coordination problem, we said, but the reduction of the number of services does not
seem to me to answer the question.
To meet Mr. Cavard, there's no science of human intelligence resources. Successive Governments have
made ongoing investments. The subject is rather that the diversity of these means. Services today, they
are of good officials recruited by competition; It must be able to recruit contractors, analysts, technicians,
people experience... The subject is more qualitative than quantitative.
The doctrine in technological matters is the pooling of resources: the DGSE is the most sophisticated
technological means and she has a duty to share them. It is important to invest but no duplicates.
The territorial dimension, the relevant level is in my opinion regional. We could have at this level an entity
comprising a representative of the State that is the regional coordinator, security, policing intelligence
services, the administrations concerned, public authorities, as well as private actors: the infrastructure
managers, the larger institutions receiving public and "bodies of vital importance" which are preferred of
terrorist targets.
I do not believe in a European Agency. Let us not confuse police and intelligence. We can make progress
on Europol but not an intelligence agency. There is a very small entity in Brussels, theIntelligence Center,
depending on the European external action Service, but it is not relevant in anti-terrorism matters. On the
other hand, if there is one area where Europe could be mobilized, it is that security investment.
M. Jean-Franois Clair. Regarding the international channels, I have known the time where foreign
services gave the same information to the RG, the DST, the DGSE. Needless to say that this was not
satisfactory. Since the creation of the ITSB, there is a single channel.
Mr. Franois Heisbourg. Following the bombings in Madrid in 2004, the European Commission has
created a European programme for security research that exists still and that it co-funds with industry to
the tune of approximately EUR 200 million per year.
Europe is a structure of Exchange and cooperation but also sharing. The Schengen information system is
totally common. The problem is that some share more than others. I understand that the France shares
more than some of its partners.
Mr. Damien Martinez. According to officials of Europol, the sharing is much more common after the
attacks of last year. French cooperation was a little lacking previously, according to them.
I invite members to meet officials of theIntelligence Center, the European Union, which is a carrier of
many advances foreign intelligence agency.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you all for this interesting round table.

Hearing in camera, Mr. Jrme Lonnet, head of the central Department of territorial
intelligence (LSVCCS)
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, Thursday, May 19, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We welcome this morning Mr. Jrme Lonnet, head of the
central Department of territorial intelligence (LSVCCS). Mr Director, thank you for having

responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the
State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.
With you, we continue our investigations in the field of intelligence, engaging the State of the
terrorist threat and the Organization of territorial intelligence.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors and is not broadcast on the website of the National Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if
we decide so at the end of our work. Accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera
will be first forwarded to people heard in order to collect their comments. The latter will be
submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report. In accordance with the
provisions of the aforementioned article, 'is punishable by the penalties provided for in article
226-13 of the penal code any person who, within a period of twenty-five years disclose or
publish information relating to the non-public work of a commission of inquiry, unless the report
published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of the same article, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
nothing but the truth.
Mr. Jrme Lonnet oath.
Mr Lonnet, the perpetrators of the events of January and November 2015 were they known
territorial intelligence? They had been monitored in the past? Territorial intelligence was
recipient of information on the individuals in question? If so, by what (s) service (s)?
What were the actions of territorial intelligence after the commission of the attacks in January
and November 2015? Contributed - and if so, how - to locate families and relatives of the
protagonists? He already had information about these people?
More generally, what is the State of the threat? How has the intensity of it changed since January
2015? Since November 2015?
How is territorial intelligence organised at the central and local levels? By 2015 have the attacks
led him to change his organization?
How many people the territorial intelligence follow to this day? How has this figure evolved
since the beginning of the year 2015?
Do you think that the incorporation of territorial intelligence to the Central Directorate of public
security (UMD) remain relevant? How has the place of the gendarmerie within the territorial
intelligence changed over the recent period?

Have the methods of work of the territorial intelligence agents evolved since January 2015? Do
you feel that the territorial intelligence has legal and technical tools necessary to carry out its
missions?
What use do you intelligence techniques laid down by the law of 24 July 2015 on intelligence?
What do you wear on the antennae of territorial intelligence recently implemented by the
gendarmerie within its territorial brigades?
What reasons lead to the passage of surveillance by the territorial intelligence to supervision by
the Directorate General of internal security (CSB)? In other words, how a monitored individual
going on "bottom of the spectrum" to "the top of the spectrum"?
What is the State of cooperation between territorial intelligence and homeland security? What is
the nature of the information exchanged? Through what channels? How often? Has the intensity
of the exchange of information changed since the attacks of January 2015?
What is the State of cooperation between territorial intelligence and other intelligence services,
including the prison intelligence?
What is the added value of the participation of the territorial intelligence in the fight against
terrorism (UCLAT) co-ordination Unit? What benefits the territorial intelligence removes?
What is the added value of the participation of the territorial intelligence to operational
headquarters for the prevention of terrorism (EMOPT)? What benefits the territorial intelligence
removes?
What use is the territorial intelligence is of the FSPRT? What do you wear on the usefulness of
this file?
What is the added value of the participation of territorial intelligence cell Allat establishment
within CSB?
Territorial intelligence and judicial exchange information?
M. Jrme Lonnet, head of the central Department of territorial intelligence (LSVCCS).
The rise of the LSVCC is recent. In 2008, an essential reform appropriately designated a leader
in anti-terrorism intelligence in France - the Central Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI)
now SID - because the situation prior to 2008 proved to be more competitive than collaborative
between services. This reform of 2008 left weakened the new Sub-Directorate of General
information compared to the old Central Directorate of General information (DCRG), since the
strength of the latter there were 3,500 people when one General information did not exceed 1
600 agents. General information, ancestor of territorial intelligence (RT), suffered from a severe
capabilities problem, that the different inspection missions have never ceased to report. In
addition, in 2008, it has forgotten the national gendarmerie, which, quite rightly in view of the
deployment of the weapon in the whole of the territory, wanted access to the intelligence mission

in its widest sense. Between 2008 and 2012, it has gradually reinforced the means and the staff
of General information, and then it hosted the first gendarmes in 2012.
In 2012, the Minister of the Interior, Manuel Valls, has launched a reflection on the work of
General information to strengthen both quantitatively and qualitatively the service. After a
prefiguration in 2013, this approach resulted in the creation of the RT in may 2014. On this
occasion, we acknowledged the mission of the RT, including by the return of the 'intelligence'
appellation that for agents, was of great importance. The name of territorial intelligence has the
double virtue of State intelligence work and territorial anchoring of the service. In 2014, for the
first time, the LSVCC has a doctrine operations and employment, essential step because it had
often been accused General information (RG) to do a little of everything and anything, without
guide and field of competence defined - in contrast, on the latter point to the direction de
surveillance du territoire (DST). This document scans all of the themes that the LSVCC
processes.
The LSVCC has fully integrated the expertise from the gendarmerie in the operation of the
service; Thus, a gendarmerie colonel was appointed Deputy Head of the LSVCCS in may 2014.
In addition, the command of two divisions of the central service and three departmental services
of the RT has entrusted to police officers. A police Commissioner was appointed to branch
operational anticipation (LOTRO) of the Directorate-General of the national gendarmerie
(DGGN). From may 2014, all written productions of the RT display the dual symbol of the
police and the national gendarmerie and are transmitted in real time to the central and the
national gendarmerie territorial levels.
The strength of the RT was 1,622 in 2008, 1 870 in 2010, 1 880 in 2012, 1 976 in September
2014, and amounts to 2 350 today. The strength of the RT is not, unlike the first circle of the
community of intelligence, in its central level, but in its settlements in the country. Thus, only
150 2 350 agents are affected in Central.
We have developed two new specialities in the RT: a division is responsible for the previous day
on the internet and another carries out research, monitoring and support.
Counter-terrorism did not belong to the cFavorite pieces of the profession of General information
to its creation. In 2008, anti-terrorism intelligence management was entrusted to the DCRI,
become the ISB. In contrast, General information had to deal with the prevention of terrorism in
three aspects: the fight against urban derivatives, the underground economy and organized crime
by monitoring the course of petty offenders that can, as Mohamed Merah, become terrorist. the
follow-up of the major religions including islam of France, led the RT to work with moderate
imams who are the subject of attacks and destabilization attempts on the part of preachers
Salafists and helping service for the reporting of persons in the process of radicalisation; Finally,
the reporting of the UCLAT platform to indicate to the RT cases of radicalization. In September
2014, the RT was brought to focus less than a hundred of radicalized, with the figure reaching
476 to the 1St January 2015 and rising today to 3,600.
Monitoring of radicalisation, which mobilized 5% of the capacity of the service and which today
is 40%, is part of the Division of powers with CSB. As soon as an individual that we follow has

the beginning of a link, same low, with a terrorist network or starts to emit the idea of wanting to
go to land of Jihad, the file is forwarded to the liaison office of the ISB in the central of the RT the service SID is also present within the RT in all of the areas of defence and in major centres.
Between the RT and the ITSB, the situation appears much more virtuous than a single
coordination bond, since the RT opens all of its production, from the realization thereof, to ISB.
The latter evokes the subjects it considers fall within its field of competence.
3 600 reports of radicalisation belong at the bottom or in the middle of spectrum and not to her
top. Nevertheless, 700 to 800 people present to us and individual frailties as a passage to the
violent act, such as Bertrand Nzohabonayo in Tours and Moussa Coulibaly in Nice, is possible.
We have developed a wide range of tools to ensure our mission: contact with people reporting parents, professional or academic environment, radicalization monitoring in connection with the
services of public security and national gendarmerie of a person disturbing his entourage, and for
profiles of most disturbing, closed workplace based on human and technical surveillance within
the framework of that authorized by law.
The RT staff were strongly reinforced by 2015, the plan of fight against terrorism covering the
years 2015, 2016 and 2017 having planned to equip the RT 350 policemen and 150 additional
gendarmes - 162 policemen have already joined us in 2015. At the end of the year 2017, the RT
should include between 2 650 and 2,700 people. The priority of the RT residing in its territorial
network, we implanted antennas of territorial intelligence in gendarmerie brigades. This
development seems to be essential, as it enables us to extend the territorial intelligence mesh in
areas of mounted police. Attachment to public safety requires us to develop our action with the
mounted police; This effort turns out daily, and one of my deputies, Member of the mounted
police, devotes much of his time to maintain ties of Exchange and cooperation with his weapon
of belonging. The balance sheet of the first antennae of the RT in gendarmerie brigades, created
by 2015, is very positive.
The President Georges Fenech. It has visited one in Marseille.
M. Jrme Leonnet. We are going to open 25 this year and 25 others in 2017.
We have received permission to recruit contract, important for our service because we need the
assistance of high academic potential, translators and computer scientists. They are only seven so
far, but they represent a significant contribution for the RT, and we recruit others in the future.
The operation and use of the RT doctrine was highly generalist, so I wished that we develop a
specific annex on radicalisation to give the territorial services tools, clues, and a working
method. We are often faced with a radicalized Middle spectrum, which should conduct
administrative interviews rather than run in monitoring; Annex thus comprises a frame for the
officers conducting these interviews. Allows sometimes standby records, even if on the fence
ever because of the fragility manifested by persons in the process of radicalisation. These
individuals, like those trained in sectarian derivatives, are highly vulnerable, but can sometimes
get out of this downward spiral.

We organized two seminars on radicalisation, in which all Department heads and their deputies
listened to our recommendations and those of SID on the subject of radicalization (may 2015 March 2016).
In 2015, two agents of the RT integrated cell Allat (ISB) full-time, the head of the device being a
Colonel of gendarmerie, former Deputy Head of the division of radicalisation and trained for
more than a year. Our production is completely open to the ISB, and missed us this operational
link to treat some cases likely to enter the field of competence of the ITSB, while the latter
cannot definitively decide the issue. The Allat cell represents the ideal place to discuss these
issues and ensure a smooth relay changeover between the RT and ISB.
We have also opened in September 2015 three new zonal services research and support (SZRA)
in Bordeaux, Rennes and Metz, which complemented the device created a year ago with the
national division for research and support and three SZRA in Lille, Lyon and Marseille. We will
also establish a research and support group in Toulouse, after those already in place in
Strasbourg and Nice. The capacity of the RT in the field of research and support amounts to 200
officers.
A decree of 27 July 2015 integrated prevention of terrorism within the scope of the powers of the
RT, which enabled us to obtain new technical means.
In December 2015, a decree for the application of the law on intelligence helped the RT, in the
context of the prevention of terrorism, to have access, in addition to traditional means of
technical intelligence - steals security and data connections-, the new information technologies
that are the interceptions International Mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), markup, the sound
systems and the videos.
The RT had no access to the entire file TAJ (treatment of criminal record) in the departments, but
a decree lifted this obstacle, especially, essential to ongoing procedures. When a spinning of an
individual, it takes a risk ignoring the nature of an ongoing procedure concerning. In addition,
the RT wanted to be associated with the treatment of Passenger name record (PNR), which was
granted.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Mr Leonnet, do you support the integration of the LSVCCS
in the first circle of the intelligence community? Everyone recognises the need to see the
territorial intelligence in power; the process is running, but should we not take quantitative and
qualitative? The Prime Minister ensured the progression of the strength of the LSVCCS, but
integration into the first circle would represent a qualitative step forward.
Would it not create a Directorate General of territorial intelligence to the image of the ISB and
Directorate-General for external security (DGSE), in order to make the most powerful RT and
confer a greater radiation?
The mounted police carrying out territorial intelligence, could not further strengthen links
between the SDAO and the LSVCC? What do you think of a possible rapprochement between
the two structures?

We moved to Lille and Marseille where the gendarmerie proved to be very satisfied with the new
FSPRT file, your services have expressed us their satisfaction in this matter and services of ISB
have confessed not to recognize him of interest to them. What is your opinion on this file? Your
services do use it and in what way? How do you assess the relationship between the EMOPT and
the UCLAT?
It opposes artificially human intelligence to technical intelligence; you mentioned that the RT
was based on men like moderate imams you spoke, but what is the situation of the human
intelligence in your service?
M. Jrme Leonnet. The rising power capabilities, the integration of the prevention of terrorism
in the field of competence of the RT, the proximity of the LSVCC with the services of the first
circle and its presence in the cell Allat demonstrate the effectiveness of a rapprochement with the
first circle concept that did not exist two years ago. The reflection is essential, but it must be
ensured that a joining of the RT in the first circle does not blockages in the service. Our staff are
people who could not get clearance to the highest level tests; I do not wish that integration into
the first circle mislead an inability to accommodate necessary profiles to follow an episode of
discomfort in the agricultural world or a classic social movement. These officers, elders of
departmental offices of public security and the General Intelligence (RG), have a work culture
that is different from that of the first circle. As those of the Directorate of intelligence of the
prefecture of police of Paris (DRPP), the missions of the LSVCC led him to evolve in both open
and closed environments; If one of these aspects outweighed the other, an imbalance will create.
In addition, the first circle services classify the whole of their production, including internal, then
RT needs of fluidity and write quickly to account for situations; This does not of course mean
that we do not classify the confidential matters. The strongest constraints surrounding the first
circle membership could result in a fix for the LSVCCS.
The RG encountered numerous difficulties to obtain field information, especially in the areas of
competence of public safety. Every morning, from 8 to 9 hours, all heads of the RT attend the
daily briefing of the entire activity the night before and the night of public safety. The link is the
same with our comrades of the gendarmerie, and the LOTRO gives us all the information. This
morning, I got so points on blocks of motor carriers issued by the gendarmerie as by public
safety; This allowed me to have very quickly a complete picture of the situation across the
country. The empowerment of the RT could be misleading, as was the case for RG, a lesser flow
of exchanges between the RT and police and gendarmerie services. The RT should be closer to
ground services.
The rapporteur. The degree of the threat spawned a decompartmentalisation, so that the
transformation of the LSVCC in branch would not lose information at your service.
M. Jrme Leonnet. When the RG existed, information highway (BIVP) brigades, composed of
skilled officers, acting in the field of intelligence on the ground for the benefit of public security,
in such areas as the link with the protesters or the anticipation of events. The forecast of these
brigades were often specific. In these matters of daily intelligence out of terrorism, a small
incident that can pass unnoticed may be important, so that the link with public safety is obvious.
The RT is not omniscient, he has developed cooperation with public safety services, which

transmit us all their elements; the LSVCC is responsible to sort and thus enjoys a wealth of
information. Public safety is is fully appropriate the RT and spends many ways: reinforcements
are very often pledged on the strength of public security and the latter uses 78% of its budget
dedicated to the training is intended for the RT, or more than three-quarters of this resource for
2,500 officers while it has 65 000. Public safety brings a lot to the RT and it, even if he cannot
foresee everything, makes him benefit from a very useful proximity, for example, to the
gendarmerie, to the dam of Sivens or the weekend last in Pont-de-Buis. Our notes immediately
reach before police and gendarmerie services even to arrive on my desk.
The LOTRO is a very efficient service to trace of information. All information from the field in
the areas of gendarmerie are not necessarily transmitted me live, but all elements of the LOTRO
receive me online. This often makes duplicate with the information already in my possession, but
since my assumption of office in September 2014, he never had is information lost between the
gendarmerie and the LSVCC - all our notes, without exception, are given to them. Incidentally,
one of my best works to the LOTRO and is one of the best officers of gendarmerie to the
LSVCC; like the other one are fully integrated in devices of each service. Last summer, general
Sauvegrain took his leave and the Commissioner of police of the RT on the LOTRO has acted in
the position; This demonstrates the confidence that exists between the two services. However, I
do not discount the importance for the national gendarmerie to be granted a place in intelligence.
The RT tries to give him using 198 gendarmes, although I hope that this figure will increase,
particularly in sectors complicated; among the seven divisions of the central service, two are
driven by a gendarmerie officer, Assistant to the Chief of the division of radicalisation is a
policeman, and the RT is represented by a gendarme in the Allat cell, which is the Holy of
Holies.
The creation of the EMOPT responded to the need to ensure a true control of the manner in
which associated services dealt with the subject of radicalization, whose importance has grown
steadily since the summer 2014. Need to make sure that prefectural network, which pilot
operative evaluation and monitoring, and the intelligence services all worked well together on
radicalisation that all cases deserving are followed. Following the deployment of the reporting
platform, the FSPRT to identify the different reports. It is an asset for the RT as the file for the
prevention of attacks on public safety (FPASP) of the LSVCC apprehends that the risks of
security breaches; It is not in the FPASP an individual reported by professional because it more
shakes hands with women or don't eat more than pig in the canteen without a screening
assessment. It remains not less reported in the FSPRT as it is important that treatment dedicated
to issues of radicalisation keeps in memory.
Moreover, the RT services were too much mobilized by the manufacture of the follow-up tables,
the FSPRT performs in real time. By March 2016, I organized another seminar where all
departmental services of the RT have all agreed this file to replace the tables evaluation and
closing, which will take place next July. The FSPRT will be for the RT a posting tool in the field
of radicalisation.
Mr President, you cannot make me more pleasure to recall the interest primarily basing the work
of intelligence on human. I just the culture of the DST who focuses on human intelligence on any

technical aspect. Despite the possibilities offered by the law, never we only will launch technical
devices without departing from a human validation.
We refounded the code's treatment of sources at the beginning of the year 2015, because my
experience on the IGPN showed me the need to apply a rigorous treatment of the human sources,
because it involves important information and the destiny of the collaborators and their sources.
We learned to deal with method of human sources, this task is not innate and must be controlled.
In this area, the RT has done a considerable work. In addition, to combat the idea that the
technical intelligence can do everything, imposed on departments a systematic search of human
sources. These bring us, in all areas of action of the RT, the best information, those that lead to
human and technical surveillance.
The rapporteur. Many people interviewed by the commission said that it was difficult to enter
some neighborhoods to place tags and deploy a monitoring device. Compensate you sources for
terrorism cases? If not is that this would be useful?
M. Jrme Leonnet. Was already following the arrangements in force in the national police,
namely the centralized registration of sources by the judicial police (PJ).
The rapporteur. Related to terrorism, are the remuneration of the sources high or not? Do you
need of more resources for this expense or the problems of recruitment and training make
unnecessary a progression of this budget item?
M. Jrme Leonnet. The recruitment of human sources is a priority for the prevention of
terrorism, competence recently recognized at the RT, led us to reorient the work of some of our
sources at the end of the year 2014 and in 2015; still us have margin to accomplish more and it is
necessary to recruit more human sources operating in this field, what we are doing.
The rapporteur. You don't have a budget problem?
M. Jrme Leonnet. Not for the moment. I can pay the sources that must be, the modest
remaining fees as they do not exceed a few dozen euros except for a few big shots where you can
give a few hundred euros. We have first recruited in neighborhoods, some of the sources of these
environments enabling us today to deploy operations of prevention of terrorism. In Lyon and
Strasbourg, were recently able to judicialize business from information from sources of RT and
forwarded to ISB and the PJ.
Mr Franois Lamy. The strength of the RG resided in its territorial network, hosted by a
composite human tissue, among others, elected representatives and members of association. The
merger of a portion of the RG with the DST has broken this architecture; in Essonne, everything
had built the RG disappeared and was unable to qualify on the RT. Have you found the quality of
the fabric developed the Gr?
Have you already set up a structure bringing together the services working in the districts? When
I was Minister of the city, only the prefect of Bouches had instituted such a cell, bringing

together representatives of the prefect, officials of social centres and police services. Is that these
groups have spread in the country and were not considering to operate this structure?
Can you carry out a work analyzing the springs of radicalisation? We always speak of the
districts - a recent controversy concerned the existence or not of neighbourhoods such as
Molenbeek in France-, but I would remind you that Kaye brothers were reared in Corrze. I'm
not sure that the over-representation of Muslims in urban areas is sufficient to affirm that these
areas are a breeding ground conducive to terrorism. Can you determine the causes pushing
someone doing traffic in a sensitive area to switch in radicalisation and terrorism then?
Mr. Meyer Habib. Mr Director, the progression of the number of radicalized people followed
by your services - 476 in January 2015 to 3 600 today - is staggering. After the attacks of January
2015, near 20 000 tweets have said 'I am Kaye' or 'I am Coulibaly': I said at this time there that
these 20,000 people should be controlled, arrested and put into custody for condoning terrorism.
You move the figure of 3600, but these people are maybe 36 000 or even 360 000. How to
ensure that the cracks are dense enough? Yassin Salhi, who beheaded her boss in the Isre, was
not followed by services.
The rapporteur. It had been, but he was out of the radar.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Our means has increased tenfold, but it is not certain that this is sufficient.
The human dimension of intelligence bonus, and it is necessary that many people accompany the
use of new technologies. The remuneration of sources not exceeding a few dozen euros are
insufficient! In Israel, the Shabak, which is the service of internal security, deploys highperformance technology and employee infiltrated sources to prevent the attacks. Imam
Chalghoumi is protected by the police because he receives threats; dozens and dozens of imams
should be in regular contact with the police. This wouldn't be one of the informers, but we cannot
remain silent terrorism.
What will be done if it undergoes three, four, five or six simultaneous attacks? I hope that this
will not happen, but if that were the case, what could be done more? Where we policy controls,
particularly in airports? This question arises with acuity today with the disappearance of a plane
left Roissy to Cairo.
A quarter of radicalized are converts - less men and slightly more among women: what actions
do you Work to follow this population?
How will you qualify the cooperation of your service with the DGSE to follow people leaving
France for a Jihad area ?
M. Jrme Leonnet. Mr Lamy, was obviously much lost the fabric developed by 3 500 gr
officers. We strive to find the whole of this network, and we have strengths that the GR had not
the first of them being support of our comrades of public safety. All instances partnership, local
associations, social landlords work openly with us and are no obstacle to the action of the RT,
instead.

This action of land allows us to recruit sources, and it has our very good relations with the whole
of the associative fabric to find these people whose task is very special. When a Chief of the RT
takes up its duties, I receive it and asked him to develop contacts with all partners. Given the
mission and the specification of RT in the current organisation of the fight against terrorism, the
presence closer to the field and the links with the imam, the local landlord and the neighborhood
association are essential. In this way, we can have contacts or even recruit sources.
The strong emergence of radicalisation - tens of cases in 2014, 476 at the beginning of the year
2015 and 3 600 today - prevents us to be completely clear about the phenomenon, and I try to ask
a weekly point on emblematic cases. However there are a few certainties: the cocktail involving
crime, contacts in prison and radicalisation turns out to be very dangerous; In addition, the
association between mental fragility diagnosed or not - and radicalisation is also threatening.
700-800 radicalized people are considered to be dangerous, 150 of which are in the psychiatric
field. We are currently developing our trade with psychiatric medicine, after years of difficulties;
(ARS) regional health agencies and physicians are aware that when someone stopped her care or
sought to escape a diagnosis while developing a religious terminology, should be given the alert.
Among the 3,600 people, patterns emerge and situations overlap, such as the fragility of minors
and the concern of parents against the conversion of a child has not changed in a Muslim cultural
environment; There have been similar cases when it studied the sects. In radicalisation, we will
simple sectarian drift to the pre-terrorisme. All cases are unique, and I recommend to meet a
person reported, when, as in the vast majority of cases, it is not in a process leading to terrorism,
which required to act in a closed environment. These interviews are not always issue favorable
because fragile profile will remain; In addition, contractors, including a psychologist, working
with us on the de-radicalization.
Mr Franois Lamy. There the territories more exposed to the phenomenon of radicalisation?
M. Jrme Leonnet. From the sample of the RT, there followed those are more numerous in the
East, in the North, Marseille, Montpellier and Toulouse that elsewhere and in particular than in
the West. The reasons are cultural, social and economic. The Department most affected by this
phenomenon is North.
I will not comment on "Molenbeek French" formula, but we work in areas where militant islam
seeks to influence the associative and economic territorial structure. In connection with our
comrades of the PJ, of the Central Directorate of the police aux frontires (DCPAF), ISB and the
gendarmerie, our operational targeted actions aimed at preventing any grip of a territory, as in
Trappes. Allat cell allows us to work with the services of the first circle; Act with the service's
treatment of intelligence and action against clandestine financial circuits (Tracfin) when
suspected criminal financing proves to be very effective.
Mr Meyer Habib in a case reported on three, estimated the final that the person is not radicalized,
but worried his family environment or professional. I focus on profiles whose delinquent past
and fragility, expressed for example on social networks by insane positions taken deserve a
follow-up probing, without exhausting the ability of RT in the treatment of simple cases, other
structures such as National Education or social agencies can manage. The FSPRT file is rich in
13 000 reports, many are followed by services that are not those of the State. At the time of the

publication of the parliamentary report on cults, it was discovered the extent of the sectarian
influence. Some of our fellow citizens are fragile, and we have to monitor their evolution, but
they will not necessarily fail over into terrorism.
The RT had a significant reinforcement phase, since the numbers rose from 1 800 to 2 600 in
three years, this increase is difficult to digest. We must indeed train people and give them clear
missions. The capacity of the service has been largely initiated by the monitoring mission of
radicalisation, which absorbs 40% of our activity against 5% there are few. This proportion is
heavy, especially when events of the agricultural malaise type or national days of action against
the Bill to work mobilize us. At a seminar of public safety, I congratulated executives 101 RT,
with more than sixty police commanders, that one can join at any time, Saturdays and Sundays
included, and who are able to speak as well as classic events radicalisation. The RT was aware of
the expectations placed in him in this sensitive area and its commitment is total. Will continue to
grow, because it refines our analysis, they wrote much, it is widely read and Exchange many
with CSB. The RT must continue to take account of the weak signals and evaluate to determine
which should be really identified the others. The LSVCC also helps SID which is located in the
front line in the fight against radical networks, including implementing Implementation of
surveillance in cases of quasi-terrorisme.
It always starts with pay modest salaries to our sources, because it is recruiting in neighborhoods
and not in terrorist networks or abroad. From the district, can sometimes be abroad; Thus, the
LSVCC is currently conducting an operation with the SID and the DGSE where a recruit in a
District project, abroad. This individual may tremendously bring to services of the first circle,
which will provide it incomparable compensation with a few tens of euros levied after his
recruitment by the LSVCCS.
Links with the DGSE are flowing through Allat and the exchanges that it maintains; I was
received by the Director-general of external security, and our two structures together lead
operational and documentary work. The RT people dealing with radicalization require a small
crop in the field of islam; There is access to many public studies on Salafism and the tablighi. On
the other hand, it is the DGSE who sent us information about the evolution of such school or
such current of thought in Egypt or Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Of the imams, as Hassen Chalghoumi warn not to install of new spheres of
influence or near currents of the Muslim Brotherhood and Tariq Ramadan to the french Council
of the Muslim faith (CFCM).
M. Jrme Leonnet. Herein lies the problem that we face with the Salafists: their speech
condemned terrorism, but it conveys the idea of another Republic. The RT attends all the
conferences and meetings of the type of the Congress of the Union of Islamic organisations of
France (UOIF) at le Bourget to understand and reflect the situation. In its most rigorous design,
the Muslim religion develops messages that, without being of a terrorist nature, seem to me not
compatible with Republican values, and the role of the LSVCC is to say and write it. Many of
the elements that we are sending irrigate the thoughts and reactions of the political authorities;
Thus, the recent remarks of the Prime Minister on the Salafists feed writings of the LSVCC and
ISB alerting on their willingness to replace the criminal code with Sharia.

Mr. Serge Grouard. Are the 3,600 people you follow reported or followed? An overall figure of
10,000 radicalized people was heard. Which follows the others and how does operate the
distribution between services? Among these 3 600 individuals, you said that 700-800 were
potentially dangerous. Police reinforce your workforce to ensure their follow-up? Is it physically
standing? Build you a permanent record of these individuals?
I agree with Mr. Meyer Habib: faced with this threat, new and massive, it fits and you do the
maximum with the resources that you are allocated. Thus, we can rest assured, but I wonder if it
is not luring. It will not happen to file and follow all potentially dangerous persons, and the
commission must consider the answers to this challenge. These numbers concern me, because he
didn't take many people to organise the killing of the Bataclan : Bataclan how lurk in this
radicalized population?
When you mentioned the relationships that you build locally to fulfill your mission, you have not
spoken of the Mayor. I was Mayor of Orleans for fifteen years and until recently: I know these
problems and the situation in difficult neighbourhoods. Some cities have implemented systems
for prevention and mediation as local councils of safety and prevention of delinquency (CLSPD)
and local treatment of delinquency (GLTD) groups that allow to go beyond contacts, because the
fundamental point lies in the follow-up. The CLSPD, which bring together the police, the Mayor,
social services and Education services, provide ongoing monitoring when they work, which is
not the case everywhere in the country. Mr Director, do you agree with me to recognize that a
link is missing locally? Indeed, your service is unfortunately not part of this local structuring - or
indirectly by the voice of the departmental Director of public safety.
Mr Director, do you not weak, but strong signals?
M. Jrme Leonnet. The FSPRT handles 13 000 reports, which corresponds to all those
identified by the UCLAT since spring 2014. The RT is the leader in 3 600 files. Other cases are
followed by security, social, associative and National Education services present around the table
of the weekly meeting, chaired by the prefect and where it evaluates and distributes profiles and
where reports on their follow-up.
The interest of this local device, embodied in the creation of the EMOPT, is to bring the prefect
to personally drive the assessment of all records of his Department. Before the spread of the
phenomenon, it was necessary to know what service dealt with question to verify that everything
was covered: there lies the added value of the EMOPT.
3 600 individuals followed by the RT do deserve any attention. About 700 to 800 the most
radical, the staff of 2 350 of the LSVCC does allow us to ensure that less than a dozen
surveillance devices active at the same time. However, monitoring is carried out also thanks to
all of the relays we have. If a radicalized person just out of prison, is close to delinquent circles
and develops a disturbing attitude which places it in the pool of 700 to 800 individuals, asked the
Rab (BAC) brigade to take home with its usual contacts to know the evolution of the person. It
also develops bells with professional or family environment systems. Recently, a woman
reported that her husband out of jail was dangerous; We have worked with it until the moment
where it was seen that could raise doubts with him. We met together and it was found that the

case of this individual was instead of medicine. It has therefore first relied on this first asset that
is contact with the person who reports a threat. The capabilities of the RT are before all dedicated
to the very serious cases, on which working with SID and the PJ.
Mr Grouard, I quite agree with your remarks on the mayors. When I get a RT Chief who took up
his post, I asked him to go to the Mayor, the most important interlocutor with the prefect and the
Prosecutor of the Republic.
Mr. Serge Grouard. It is the mayor who knows the reality, and not the prefect and the Attorney.
I have fifteen years experience of Mayor, and I can say all cases in Orleans. Compare what you
will tell the prefect and the Attorney, and you will see that my table will be much more
comprehensive!
M. Jrme Leonnet. In terms of knowledge of the territory, you are quite right, and that is why
that the contact with the municipal authority, the presence sometimes in instances of the city and
the permanent link with municipal services are so important. This applies everywhere, and I have
no examples of places where the RT would not fluid relations with the mayors. An agreement
between the Association of mayors of France (AMF) and the services of the State on the deradicalization will be signed this afternoon at Matignon, and the RT will be present. It will also
participate in the round table on the de-radicalization organized on the occasion of the next
Congress of the AMF. The Mayor is the first to report a change in a neighborhood and direct
services of RT towards any other person.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Director, the authors of the attacks from January to
November 2015 were they known territorial intelligence?
M. Jrme Leonnet. No, if this is Senthil Coulibaly had mentioned in a document of the service
as a member of a band of Essonne in the years 2005.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Leonnet, thank you for this interesting hearing.
Hearing, behind closed doors, of general Pierre Sauvegrain, Assistant Director of
operational anticipation of the national gendarmerie (SDAO), and Mr. Olivier Mtivet, his
Deputy
Report of the hearing in camera, Monday, May 23, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome the general of brigade
Pierre Sauvegrain, Deputy Assistant Director of operational anticipation of the national
gendarmerie, accompanied by Mr Olivier Mtivet, the Assistant Director.
My general, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of
inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.

We will continue with you our investigations in the field of intelligence, us interesting
cooperation between your service and other services intelligence, human and technical resources
available to you to complete your missions and reconciliations which could intervene.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if
we decide so at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in
camera will previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These
observations will be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report. I
would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is punishable by
the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code (one year imprisonment and 15,000
euros fine) any person who, within a period of twenty-five years disclose or publish information
relating to non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the
work of the commission referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
nothing but the truth.
Please raise your right hand and say: 'I swear '.
The general Pierre Sauvegrain and Mr. Olivier Mtivet successively take oath.
Our Committee of inquiry seeking answers on your part to the following questions.
How is operational anticipation (LOTRO) Branch organized at the central and local levels?
The LOTRO perceives an evolution of the threat within the territories situated in zone mounted
police?
The attacks in 2015 led the LOTRO to amend his organization?
How does the feedback of gendarmerie brigades to the LOTRO operate? What role the antennas
of territorial intelligence put in place by the gendarmerie within its territorial brigades play in
this field?
What is the State of collaboration between the LOTRO and territorial intelligence? Has changed
since the attacks of January 2015? November 2015?
What is the State of collaboration with other intelligence services, including SID and the prison
intelligence?
The LOTRO has the human and technical resources to carry out its missions?

What are the main methods of work of the personnel of the LOTRO? Have these methods
changed since January 2015? Since November 2015?
Do you think that the incorporation of the central service of territorial intelligence (LSVCCS) to
the Central Directorate of public security (UMD) remain relevant?
An information report on the resources devoted to intelligence in the "National Police" and
"Gendarmerie" programs on behalf of the Committee on Finance of the Senate by Senator
Philippe Dominati in October 2015 mentions the possibility of a rapprochement between the
SDAO and the LSVCC in the medium term. What do you think of this proposal?
What is the added value of participation by the SDAO to the unit for coordination of the fight
against terrorism (UCLAT)? What benefits the LOTRO removes?
What use does the LOTRO is of the FSPRT? What do you wear on the usefulness of this file?
I'll let you speak to a keynote presentation which was followed by an exchange of questions and
answers.
General Pierre Sauvegrain, Assistant Director of operational anticipation of the national
gendarmerie (LOTRO). Mr president, Madam and gentlemen, thank you for welcoming me in
your commission of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January
7, 2015. I am very pleased to speak to you about the activity of branch operational anticipation in
the course of the coming months to flow through the challenge posed by the terrorist threat that
our Nation faces. The threat level has in fact has never been so high, and the mobilization of all
is necessary to failure.
My opening remarks will aim to provide the most complete picture possible of the SDAO
activity, service of the second circle of intelligence in France. I will ensure above all to introduce
you to the adaptations and developments experienced by our device in recent months. My speech
will revolve around three points: first, I will present the Organization of the exercise of the
gendarmerie intelligence mission, whose the LOTRO is the key; Secondly, I will describe how to
organize relations with two key services partners, namely the central territorial intelligence
service (LSVCCS) on the one hand, the ISB on the other hand.
I will come back on the progress made in the improvement of trade through the tragedies that we
have known in 2015; on the follow-up by the gendarmerie of individuals radicalized, giving you
precise figures on the action of the police in this area; Finally in a third time, I will describe what
to study to improve the fight against terrorism.
Intelligence is a necessity for the gendarmerie in order to successfully perform its overall mission
defined in article 1er Act 2009-971 on August 3, 2009, codified in article l. 3211-3 of the code of
the defence that "the national gendarmerie is intended to ensure public safety and public order,
particularly in rural and peri-urban areas , as well as the channels of communication. It
contributes to the mission of intelligence and information of the public authorities, the fight

against terrorism, as well as to the protection of the population. She participated in the defence of
the country and the interests of the nation, including the control and security of nuclear weapons.
This need applies to RCMP given the extent of its area of competence - 95% of the national
territory and more than 50% of the population, and even more during summer tilting movements
- the metropolitan territory and in the overseas. the diversity of the territories it load;
establishment in its territories from 544 points of vital importance, civilian and military. Finally,
its involvement in the defence policy of France through its presence at the side of the armies on
theaters of operations abroad and on rights-of-way of the Ministry of defence, including the
gendarmerie specialized - the gendarmerie ensures the protection of 113 points of vital
importance within the armies-, its role in the close protection of high authorities and its mission
of protection of nuclear facilities which are the historical Foundation of the policy of national
independence.
From 2013, the national gendarmerie proceeded to two emblematic transformations. In the first
place, it has a centralized body of information processing: by Decree of 6 December 2013, it now
has a specialized structure in the treatment of the information necessary for the performance of
its tasks: operational anticipation (LOTRO) branch.
This creation was responding to two goals, the first is to allow the interface between territorial
intelligence (RT) and the national gendarmerie, without however creating a structure equivalent
to the LSVCC and even less to the ISB. I insist on this point: the device of the national
gendarmerie has no ambition to compete with other structures or to duplicate, but lead to an
essential complementarity by providing a guarantee of full coverage of the territories.
The second objective is to provide intelligence to meet the operational needs of the national
gendarmerie, like what is done in the military during the phase of preparation of the operation.
During demonstrations at this time against the law El Khomri, or those held against the NotreDame-des-Landes airport project, I'll start with my interest in opposing procedures according to
the angles of approach specific to the mission of the mounted police. In perfect complementarity
with the LSVCCS, I will especially concentrate the search for intelligence on adversity, where
mounted police will have to commit forces, in order to know precisely how our opponents should
be organised.
The creation of the LOTRO, belonging to the second circle of intelligence service has made
necessary to enable the national gendarmerie to improve the conditions for the exercise of his
mission of intelligence. Pursuant to the order of creation, the LOTRO "proposes the doctrine of
missions of intelligence within the force (...); Treaty the internal and external information to alert
the authorities, as well as the monitoring of sensitive short-term (...) situations; participates in
research, collection, analysis and dissemination information from defence, public order and
national security necessary for the performance of the tasks of the mounted police (...); ensures
the treatment of operational intelligence of public order and economic security in metropolitan
France and overseas (...) intelligence; anime or attends the interdepartmental management of
crisis with the other branches of the Directorate of operations and the use of the DGGN (...);
follows and coordinates the action of units within its area of responsibility.

Schematically, the LOTRO can be compared to a House with a "hot water system" and a "cold
water circuit. Hot water system allows the transmission of information within the function
'standby-alert' to inform the Director-general, who reports to the Minister, on the situation in the
national territory. The 'cold water circuit"dedicated to the analysis, permits of the raw data and
information before issuing the information based on a string 'anticipation and knowledge', which
has 540 analysts spread over the whole of the national territory and 170 referents in economic
intelligence. This string is articulated in levels territorial, namely cell information to the
departmental plan and intelligence in their regional offices.
The collection of information is directed by each Member under its daily missions and animated
by different levels of command, all of the device being controlled from Paris by the LOTRO.
The information is integrated into the information system is the database of public safety (OCs)
in its operation and its analysis. Global information system become powerful over time, the OCS
provides the storage and processing of information and intelligence collected by all 60 000
sensors of the gendarmerie are the departmental gendarmes. The OCs is the cement ensuring the
coherence of the gendarmerie intelligence operative and I am myself the administrator of this
database on behalf of the Director-general of the gendarmerie.
The President Georges Fenech. It is a database, not a file.
General Pierre Sauvegrain. It is a database contains four files, of which three are declared to
the CNIL. I think one that interests you the most is the 'intelligence' module, called GIPASP
(management of information and the prevention of crimes against public security).
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Why is one of the files not declared to the CNIL?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. In addition to the GIPASP, the database includes two other files:
the SIP (securing of professional interventions), and the GSI (management of requests and
interventions) file. The EVT module, meanwhile, does not personal data and is only intended to
establish statistics on phenomena observed by units (urban violence, rave party, etc.). It is
therefore not a file requiring a declaration to the CNIL.
Secondly, the LOTRO was awarded, because intelligence Act and the decree for the application
of article L.811 - 4 of the code of Homeland Security, the quality of service of the second circle
of intelligence. Since the taking effect of the Decree on 11 December 2015 2015-1639, the
LOTRO is competent for the following purposes provided for in article L. 811 - 3 of the law on
intelligence: national independence; the integrity of the territory and national defence (goal 1);
the prevention of terrorism (goal 4); Finally, the prevention of attacks on the Republican form of
the institutions, actions tending to the maintenance or reconstitution of dissolved groups, from
violence likely to seriously impair public peace (goal 5).
The action of the national gendarmerie in the field of intelligence is essential to the fulfillment of
its global mission and will be performed in complementarity with other services.

Specifically, the action of the LOTRO in the field of the prevention of terrorism comes in two
areas: firstly, the classic work of intelligence research and intelligence analysis, on the other
hand, coordination with other services.
The animation action research and exploitation of intelligence-based organization described
previously. The information is collected by operational units, integrated in the OCs, screened and
valued by analysts in the cells and offices information, operated at the level of the central level
by the LOTRO in the context in The work of research intelligence, and finally transmitted to the
partner services techniques.
The OCs is the cFavorite pieces of the architecture of intelligence that is the LOTRO. For
example, the "Rens" (intelligence) module, which had 450 sheets on individuals reported for
radicalism late 2014, now has about 8 000. This does not mean that the national gendarmerie
following 8,000 people, but that our database has 8 000 names from various sources - in passing,
I want to stress that this database should not be confused with the FSPRT.
The rapporteur. Retrieve data from the FSPRT to integrate the OCs those the gendarmerie
area? In any case, how were you able to spend 450 sheets to 8,000?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. First, the file was regularly fed over the months, partner services
that produced a lot of information, we have partially integrated. When the OCs has been
deployed as of the last quarter of 2011, we started from zero.
The President Georges Fenech. The OCs has therefore incorporated before the Decree of
creation of the LOTRO?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. That's right: we are somehow structured around a pre-existing tool.
Data acquisitions increased in volume in 2014, but obviously in 2015 that they experienced a
strong increase, and the pace does not seem to decrease in 2016. Over time, the OCs thus
becomes a more and more powerful, and personally I think it is likely that Mohamed Merah or
Yassin Salhi of the coming decade there is already.
Every year, the database increases by about 10% every month. Sheets come from the work of
analysts intelligence of the mounted police, but also to a large extent, services partners, such as
the RT.
The rapporteur. I have to tell you that our Committee is surprised at the multiplicity of the files
used different services of intelligence in France. Fact sheets produced by the RT also feed the
FSPRT?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. No, because the OCs and the FSPRT do not have the same
vocation. 8 000 entity of the GIPASP file records are all related to activities of radicalism, or are
likely to impair the public safety people.
The rapporteur. Why do you have your own file, while the vocation of the FSPRT was to
consolidate existing files to prevent 'holes in the racket', as could make the finding after the

attack of Saint-Quentin-Fallavier? By whom can the OCS file be consulted: in particular, the
prevention of terrorism (EMOPT) operational staff and the UCLAT they have access?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. Each institution, be it ISB, the RT or the national gendarmerie, has
its file, corresponding to the needs that are specific. If the FSPRT is intended to allow better
monitoring of radicalized individuals, the OCs beyond the scope of violent radicalism and
includes persons likely to undermine public safety.
The rapporteur. When our Commission moved to Marseille and Lille, the mounted police
colonels who welcomed us have talked us a lot of the FSPRT, which constitutes for them an
important tool, but they have nothing tells us of the GIPASP and the OCs. When you enter a new
record in the OCs, is it automatically transmitted to the UCLAT or the EMOPT to be integrated
with the FSPRT? If not, what is the FSPRT, which is supposed to be a consolidated file?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. The creation and the first months of existence of the FSPRT were
not easy - it is the case of most of the files - but it has now entered a phase of stabilisation. With
regard to the coherence between the OCs and the FSPRT, we currently reach a rate of
consistency in the order of 95% among individuals followed in respect of the FSPRT and the
information contained in the OCs. When it incorporated a person into the OCs, it is because it is
considered likely to disturb public order. Individuals registered to the FSPRT are, them, because
activities radicalization, and are attributed to a leader who is not necessarily the gendarmerie what justifies that we have our own file. This also isn't the only object of the OCs that primarily
concerns public safety.
The President Georges Fenech. Found so both individuals radicalised by the zadistes in the
OCs, while the FSPRT is reserved to radicalized individuals.
General Pierre Sauvegrain. Indeed, the FSPRT is the file of violent radicalisation, while the
OCs includes a wider set of profiles, and as you say, Mr president, can be found with zadistes
and thugs.
The rapporteur. Are the 8,000 people being the subject of a plug to the OCs integrated in the
FSPRT?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. They are 95% - this is the rate of consistency that I mentioned a
few moments ago.
The rapporteur. Can we therefore consider that the FSPRT is a consolidated file?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. I know that it takes time for a file is consolidated. It is not enough
to express a strong will: many actions animation and explanation on the ground are needed.
The President Georges Fenech. How many people are registered in all in the OCs?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. There are 260 000 data about, including 8 000 sheets entity person
on people radicalized or likely to be.

The rapporteur. 8 000 sheets entity person of the OCs represent a good part of the volume of
the plugs of the FSPRT, which lists for about 15,000 people.
Mr. Olivier MASRY, Assistant to the Deputy Director of the LOTRO. Under circular of
March 21, 2014, the LSVCC is responsible for centralizing the information under the dual patch
of the police and the gendarmerie. 8 000 individuals in the OCS file are not, stricto sensu, 8,000
people the mounted police area: some may be in font box but in relation to a person located in
the zone mounted police - because the file take into account knowledge networks. 8 000 sheets,
include so grey an area very important persons contained both in the FPASP of the police and the
gendarmerie GIPASP, when justified by an operational interest.
General Pierre Sauvegrain. I would point out that will have access to almost all of the
information in the GIPASP all the people having the "analyst" profile - their number has been
declared to the CNIL-, and only they: our partner services do not have access to our file.
However, information available to the various services are regularly exchanges, in work carried
out in close cooperation.
The President Georges Fenech. You seem to attach importance to the fact that the RT is not
able to directly access your file?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. I wouldn't say it like that. We first meet a requirement of the CNIL,
which does not allow free and permanent access to a file.
The rapporteur. What from an operational point of view?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. It is normal that the administrator of the OCs is the DGGN retains
control of its file: in the same way, the boss of ISB will be reluctant to offer a permanent access
to the file CRISTINA, even its closest partners. It is therefore very strict rules for access to the
OCs, even for the gendarmes serving with the LSVCCS, which can have a part of the
information in the database - based on the profile attributed to them.
The national gendarmerie permanently fixed his tracking device as radicalized reported
individuals or in the process of radicalisation in October 2015. This device is now divided into
two levels according to the degree of radicalization, and even of dangerousness of individuals
concerned. Level 1 corresponds to effective monitoring carried out in the context of current
service: for example, a gendarmerie patrol can go and see the Mayor of a municipality where an
individual radicalized, requesting confirmation of the address of the person concerned, and to
know if it is recently reported by any way whatsoever. Level 2 highlights Of the specific
techniques of collection of intelligence with regard to the sensitivity of the objective: use an
IMSI catcher, PA, interception of security, spinning, and all techniques justified by the
dangerousness of the individual.
May 20, 2016, the national gendarmerie carries out monitoring of 577 individuals radicalized in
dealing with service quality. Within this volume, it exercises effective follow-up to 322
individuals radicalized as a leader: 289 individuals are subject to first-level tracking, and 33
individuals subject to second-level tracking.

The President Georges Fenech. Among 577 radicalized individuals which the mounted police
exercises dealing with service quality monitoring, which are the 255 which it does not exercise
the monitoring as a leader?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. These persons are followed "for processing", that another service
ensuring the role of leader - SID or the RT - we were asked to perform a positive act's follow-up
to his account: for example, if the person is resident in zone mounted, we can be loaded to meet
his employer or the Mayor of his municipality. In this case, we have access to information about
this person in the FSPRT, and we concur ourselves this file information, indicating the steps that
we have performed and what resulted.
The President Georges Fenech. The number of 33 people followed at the 2 level seems low.
General Pierre Sauvegrain. The techniques developed in Work at level 2 with a relatively high
cost and our means being counted, we need to select those whose profile justifies applied to them
this level of follow-up. Furthermore, I draw your attention to the distribution of skills tracking
radicalized people: ISB keeps track of the most sensitive individuals, the RT is responsible for
monitoring of the persons whose profile is less worrying and the gendarmerie intervened to the
follow-up of cases falling within its area of jurisdiction requiring a follow-up in the normal
service framework or a lifting of doubt. The number of people that we follow at level 2 increases
from moderate but continues for three months. Finally, recent experience has shown that the
determination of a profile of dangerousness based on the only from individuals is not always
possible to anticipate on the passages to cbta.
The President Georges Fenech. If you ensure the follow-up of 577 people on 8 000 sheets
entity person constituting your database, which keeps track of the other?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. These other people are not necessarily followed: they can be
included in the file only because they are part of a network of knowledge. When Yassin Sadiki
passe l'acte to Saint-Quentin-Fallavier - a case that gave rise to the creation of the EMOPT-,
one of the first things that made the gendarmerie is to develop its network of knowledge to
identify other sensitive profiles within his entourage.
The President Georges Fenech. Your file still includes more than 7,400 people not followed.
Two things one: either these people are not radicalised, and they do not have to be included in
your file; or they are, and this would be followed.
General Pierre Sauvegrain. These persons may be followed by a service partner.
The President Georges Fenech. Without that you know?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. We know under the Exchange taking place with the EMOPT and in
departmental evaluation groups (GOL).
The President Georges Fenech. The 7,400 people that you do not follow necessarily followed
by another service?

General Pierre Sauvegrain. I am not able to answer you on this point, but I will be able to fill
me in.
Across the administrative searches carried out in zone gendarmerie under the State of
emergency, 113 were made at the domicile of individuals currently subject to effective
monitoring by the gendarmerie: 105 searches were conducted at the home of individuals subject
to monitoring of level 1, and 8 were at the home of a 2-level tracking individuals.
After discussing the work of research, exploitation and analysis of the data of the LOTRO, I now
turn to present the terms of coordination with the partners, in the particular context of terrorism.
We have daily reports of very good invoice with the RT - at central level and at the territorial
level-, formalised by a mandatory weekly meeting between the intelligence Assistant officers
(SROS) and the heads of the departmental services of the territorial intelligence (SDRT). Liaison
offices are created at all territorial levels - Department, region, area; Furthermore, RT and
mounted police are part of evaluation groups of security staffs dealing with reported individuals
as radicalized.
At the central level, the fluidity of communication between services is provided daily by
exchanges of high-level executives: thus Commissioner Olivier MASRY, who is present, ensure
exchanges of information with the LSVCCS, whereas on the basis of reciprocity, a colonel of
gendarmerie stationed at the LSVCC is responsible for a similar mission.
With regard to the ITSB, it is rendered recipient by the gendarmerie of any information relevant
to its field of competence. SID and the national gendarmerie share all the shared themes, with
directions and branches of ISB.
The President Georges Fenech. Can ISB pre-empt the information?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. ISB has a right that you qualify ' pre-emption' arising from
allocations laid down by the Decree of April 30, 2014, namely search, centralized, and exploit
intelligence affecting the national security and the fundamental interests of the nation.
Specifically, as soon as information it is concerned, we him pass this. The aftermath of January
2015, resulting in the hounding of the Kaye brothers in area police, exchanges of information - in
particular to raise doubt on possible points of fall of terrorists in Picardy - have been constant.
Relations with the UCLAT, finally, is are denser. Now, the Sub-Directorate attends weekly
meetings of assessment of the threat that organized the UCLAT.
Overall, even if things are always perfectible, I believe that we have reached a very good level of
partnership between the LOTRO and partner services are the LSVCCS, SID and the UCLAT.
Our relations with the DPSD and DRM are also satisfactory.
The President Georges Fenech. What can you tell us about what to study?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. Two subjects seem to be particularly important. The first involves
the insertion of constables within ITSB: our presence at the breast like other entities of the first

circle, the gendarmerie is favourable to detachment of gendarmes in ISB in a form that remains
to define - a liaison officer or analysts.
On the other hand, it seems to us that establish a co-piloting the LSVCC by the two Directors
General would reinforce the high level of cooperation between territorial intelligence and the
gendarmerie; in this regard, consider a new positioning of the LSVCC would improve
cooperation - already very good - between the RT and the gendarmerie.
The President Georges Fenech. It is all the more desirable when one knows that the
gendarmerie covers 95% of the territory and 50% of the population.
General Pierre Sauvegrain. Effectively. I would add that the gendarmes need to recognize
more in a device which works fine, but can still advance.
The President Georges Fenech. Because gendarmes are present within the LSVCC and vice
versa, and where you advocate a co-piloting the LSVCC by the two Directors General, shouldn't
we go after logic wishing to proceed with the merger of the two services?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. This idea is one of the recommendations of Senator Dominati. I do
not know if the term 'fusion' is really appropriate... Anyway, the missions of these two services
not lying in the same register, a merger would bring little to the LSVCC but, on the other hand,
would result in a weakening for the national gendarmerie.
The President Georges Fenech. One can speak of 'rapprochement', if you prefer.
General Pierre Sauvegrain. .. .car it will always be necessary to trace information and prepare
for operations. By merging the two services, I do not know if we would still be able to provide
these two missions as we currently do.
The President Georges Fenech. Can it not distinguish pure operational intelligence?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. I am not able to answer you on this point now: perhaps should
engage in reflection.
The rapporteur. I would like to know what was your level of information November 14, 2015,
in the early morning: in particular, were you aware of the identity of Salah Abdeslam?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. On the night of 13 to 14, we have seen the dramatic facts that from
occur, but no name has appeared spontaneously.
The rapporteur. Information that terrorists have used a car registered in Belgium had been
brought to your attention?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. Yes, but national research directive had not arrived.

M. Olivier MASRY. To my knowledge, the only document which communicated us about a car
registered in Belgium sought was an intent-the center of police and customs cooperation (CCPD)
of Tournai.
The rapporteur. When gendarmes control the vehicle of Salah Abdeslam November 14, 2015 to
nine hours ten, it seems them suspect, what justifies that they hold it half an hour - contravening
the existing legal rules even though they have no specific information. At this time, was the
LOTRO not able to transmit information about a vehicle registered in Belgium gendarmerie
brigades?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. We didn't have enough specific information to justify that we were
launching an appeal concerning a vehicle search or people to engage.
The rapporteur. Whether the need to pay special attention to vehicles registered in Belgium and
Paris toward the Belgium would it not have been useful to the present gendarmes on the ground?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. On 14 November in the morning, we have unfortunately not a
sufficient level of information to justify resort to a more important than that which has been
Artwork. We knew only the scene of the attacks and only had a beginning of non-consolidated
balance sheet. On the basis of these only information, we had implemented a neighbouring
regions gendarmerie brigades alerting device, distributed in concentric circles around Paris.
Nothing we know need to search a person or a particular vehicle.
The rapporteur. To you other services they had collected this information during the night?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. I am not able to answer you on this point.
The rapporteur. Can you tell us why you made the choice to not search the home of all 33
people followed by the gendarmerie at level 2?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. Actually, only 8 searches were conducted at the home of these
people. Firstly, we do not want to unnecessarily give warning when the elements of the
investigation did not. On the other hand, I remind that the administrative search is the
responsibility of the prefect, and that in this area the gendarmes and police officers make
proposals which are not necessarily monitored.
The rapporteur. You have indicated that 544 points of vital importance, civilian and military,
were located within the territorial jurisdiction of the gendarmerie. In the spring of 2015, several
flights were committed in arms and ammunition warehouses, which has highlighted failures in
the supervision of some sites - an internal audit to the armies even made on this point.
Monitoring of these sites responsibility for to the mounted police?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. The custody of deposits - I mean to physically ensure surveillance is not our responsibility. On the other hand, we have the responsibility of knowing what is
happening in their environment if they are located in areas under our jurisdiction, which was the
case of the filing of Miramas, where munitions were stolen in July 2015.

The rapporteur. Is custody of such filings ensured by the army?

General Pierre Sauvegrain. Yes, by the direction of the protection of facilities, resources and
activities of defence (DIPD) - in any case not by the gendarmerie.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Miramas site was not guarded by the army, but by contractual personnel!
General Pierre Sauvegrain. Perhaps the army she had subcontracted this mission, I am not able
to answer you.
The President Georges Fenech. Since how long have you 540 analysts that you mentioned, and
there among them specialists Arabists and experts in the world of islam?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. We can consider that I have these personal since the beginning
because if the mounted police was not structured around a branch in 2013 - structuring has been
that late 2013, beginning 2014-, analysts, they were already there at the departmental and
regional levels: it only remained to implement a leader to coordinate their actions.
Having two personnel Arabists (two on the 30 analysts from Headquarters) - unfortunately
scarce - to branch represents a considerable advantage.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Two Arabists for ten million Muslims, it is little! You have a beautiful
room for improvement!
General Pierre Sauvegrain. We do not have to follow all the Muslims of France! In any case, I
live with modest numbers attributed to me, although I would love to be able to have a greater
number of Arabists.
I will have more difficult to give figures for the local plan. I know that the antenna departmental
territorial intelligence of Meru has an Arabist, in the person of a truly remarkable polyglot
Adjutant. It must be recognized that in the knowledge of the Arabic language and Islamic
culture, we have a margin of progression.
The President Georges Fenech. This could therefore be part of developments that you
recommend?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. It is certain that the ability to more quickly understand some
messages, including those conveyed by internet, facilitate us the task.
M. Jean-Michel Vel. Can you inform us on the budgetary means available specialized structure
is the LOTRO, including staffing and training?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. The human resources of the LOTRO are counted: I have the central
plan of approximately 75 personnel and I me based 540 analysts I have mentioned previously.

Intelligence, the budgetary resources available to us are the responsibility of the regions of
mounted police. Own, I'm not the budget Manager, and our branch has a modest budget. With
regard to equipment, the gendarmerie has been set EUR 78 million, of which EUR 69.4 million
in commitment authorizations and EUR 54.2 million in payments under the plan anti-terrorism
gendarmerie (flat) implemented Work after the attacks of January 2015. This includes arms and
means of intervention, as well as one million euros for the command of the air forces of the
gendarmerie. More specifically, it has affected 1.5 million euros, of which EUR 0.7 million in
appropriations for payment, to the means of observation and judicial search - drones, cameras,
cloud - ballistic analysis and 6.2 million euros, including 6 million euros in commitment
authorizations and EUR 2.5 million in payment appropriations, to means of capturing data and
location in relation to the law on the intelligence.
M. Pierre Lellouche. If you wanted to summarize your role in a sentence, would it be correct to
say that it is to back up the information in the fight against terrorism, from 95% of the territory
and 50% of the French population?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. This proposal drew some amendments from me, Mr Turmes. If
50% of the population lives in the area of competence gendarmerie, a part of the persons
concerned may be followed by other services. Thus, when ISB follows a radicalized, she's not
going to stop to the fact he works or resides in zone mounted police; Similarly, the RT has
national jurisdiction, extending also in mounted police zone. We have to be contributors to the
title of intelligence, along with other services - starting with the RT, since the LOTRO was
created as part of the 2013 reform to provide a functional link with the RT. The responsibility
that you have raised is therefore shared with the LSVCC and ISB, in a device where the
responsibilities of the different services are highly nested.
M. Pierre Lellouche. If you add up your gendarmes, police of territorial intelligence and those
of ISB, how many staff are assigned to counterterrorism outside large urban areas?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. If one is very precisely to the notion of counterterrorism, we can
already count 540 analysts I mentioned. In Lotro, followed by level 2 will not necessarily made
by analysts. By mounted police, asked rather to units specialized, called groups, observation and
monitoring, to perform certain tasks - I am thinking particularly of the spinners.
With regard to the national police, I don't have the latest figures, but I believe that we currently
have 2 300 to 2 400 FTES allocated to the fight against terrorism within the LSVCCS. I don't
know all the figures relating to CSB, these being classified. In all, three intelligence services of
the Ministry of the Interior that you have cited, these are a few hundreds or even thousands of
people that contribute to the fight against terrorism.
The rapporteur. For ISB, about 3,600 people are allocated to the fight against terrorism.
M. Pierre Lellouche. How do you explain one view from one day to the next that about twenty
young people of the municipality of Lunel are parties in Syria and Iraq war? To were you
informed before that this information be revealed to the public?

General Pierre Sauvegrain. We have not discovered the overnight Lunel was a land of
departure to Jihad: the gendarmes and territorial intelligence had traced the information jointly.
Antennas of territorial intelligence have been located there very early, as well as two constables
seconded to employment with the head of the departmental service of territorial intelligence,
stationed at the gendarmerie of Lunel but with the exclusive mission to collect information from
the population to detect radicalized individuals.
M. Pierre Lellouche. When has this measure been taken?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. In the year 2015, after the events that occurred in January. Among
the reinforcements of staff allocated to the gendarmerie, 150 FTES were divided into three
groups of fifty constables called to take up their posts in 2015, 2016 and 2017. On the annuity of
2015, two gendarmes were collected for use in Lunel.
M. Pierre Lellouche. I do not understand how one can hope to collect intelligence by sending
for this two gendarmes in uniform workplace Salafist or cryptosalafiste, in the suburbs of
hatches, Arab and Muslim Lunel or Grenoble, where everyone knows and speaks a mixture of
french and Arabic.
The rapporteur. To complete this question, I would ask you, as I did to the LSVCC, if you have
the financial means to pay sources for.
General Pierre Sauvegrain. Contrary to what one might believe, the uniform is not always an
obstacle to the floor: some people more readily trust a man in uniform than another in civilian
clothes.
That said, the men assigned to territorial intelligence antenna (ART), including in Lunel, work
undercover.
The President Georges Fenech. With cars trivialized?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. Of course. That said, should not be too many illusions:
cryptosalafistes that you mention generally have a great ability to detect the police and
gendarmes, even when they change in civilian clothes.
M. Pierre Lellouche. What is the function of the two Arabists of the LOTRO?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. These are analysts.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Is there, within the gendarmerie, a program of learning Arabic and the
counterterrorism training?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. There are military certificates of languages and we have a training
facility where our staff learn Arabic. In addition, they receive operational training in useful in
counter-terrorism techniques (shadowing, etc.).

M. Pierre Lellouche. You set up such institutions would be helpful?

General Pierre Sauvegrain. This could be useful provided they greatly exceed the framework
of the mounted police, i.e. If it was to all of the services: not only the police but also ISB and
territorial intelligence services. Moreover, I would remind you that police are in principle
required to know that from the bottom spectrum of radicalism, i.e. of less sensitive cases provided, of course, individuals who will move to the Act in the coming years may very well be
located at the bottom of the spectrum at the moment.
With regard to sources, we don't currently have that in the judicial field. In the field of the
administrative information this device is under construction.
The rapporteur. You could therefore pay your sources and integrate them into your file?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. The very principle of the sources is to pay them. Currently,
LOTRO has no attributed sources, but this is part of the yards remaining to drive.
The rapporteur. Is it ever that your police are unable to gather information, owing to the lack of
financial means for this?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. As you certainly know, there is a high porosity between sometimes petty crime - crime and terrorism. It happens so that, in the context of a judicial
investigation of a case of narcotic drugs and organized crime, a source provides investigators
with intelligence services of fight against terrorism. That said, the capacity may soon have the
LOTRO itself through sources is very interesting.
The rapporteur. In the context of social crisis, leading many events in the country, what are
your priorities? Is surveillance of radical islam the same part than usual among all of your tasks
at this time?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. Certainly, one does that pass one priority to another: at the
moment, for example, we are very busy with the thugs who are on the margins of the protests
against the law El Khomri, as well as the actions of blockade of refineries and fuel depots. That
said, about eighteen months ago, i.e. before the attack against Charlie Hebdo, I started to
dedicate staff monitoring of radicalisation, which do this, and are exempt from this occupation
only in extreme emergencies - at the moment, despite the news that I have just mentioned, they
are still assigned to their usual mission.
The rapporteur. What percentage of the SDAO activity would you rate the fight against radical
islam?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. I would say that this represents 35% to 40% of our activity.
M. Pierre Lellouche. And in terms of personnel?

General Pierre Sauvegrain. In terms of personnel, it would be a little less, even if the treatment
of radicalism remains the priority of the LOTRO. This represents ten FTES.
M. Pierre Lellouche. If I understand correctly, a hundred of your agents are currently allocated
to combating radicalisation and jihadism?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. I said that the 35% to 40% represented the share of our business,
and not that of the workforce involved in this mission. On 75 FTES that account the SDAO, a
dozen staff are assigned full-time to the fight against radicalisation.
The rapporteur. Analysts do not depend on the branch?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. No, they depend on their Commander of group or region, and 30%
to 40% of their time use are currently devoted to the fight against radicalisation.
M. Pierre Lellouche. They are therefore not trained specifically for this task?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. No, basically, this mission only takes up one-third of their days.
M. Pierre Lellouche. According to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, our
country is in war against jihadism. Is it possible to know how many officers of the gendarmerie
are devoted exclusively to this war? You have begun to tell us that you had a staff of 540 staff,
before you correct this figure to 75 personal, then ten - supported, it is true, by other personnel
who are not specifically trained for this mission. I want to know what is our strike force in the
war that we are currently undertaking: boils down to ten people, including two speak Arabic?
General Pierre Sauvegrain. It is this if we look exclusively at the LOTRO full-time
equivalents.
The President Georges Fenech. Gentlemen, thank you for your interventions that have been
rich in lessons.
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Olivier de Mazieres, responsible for the operational staff
of prevention of terrorism (EMOPT)
Report of the hearing in camera, Monday, May 23, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, we now welcome the prefect of
Mazires, responsible for the operational staff of prevention of terrorism (EMOPT).
Mr Reeve, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of
inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We will continue with you our investigations in the area of intelligence, we coordinate services,
means you have and the respective roles of the EMOPT and other coordination structures.

The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the
functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if
we decide so at the end of our work.
I said that accounts of the hearings which will take place behind closed doors will be first
transmitted to people heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will be
submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I recalled that in accordance with the same article, "is punishable by the penalties provided for in
article 226-13 of the penal code (one year imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine) any person who,
within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish information relating to the non-public
work of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the
commission referred to this information."
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
nothing but the truth. Please raise your right hand and say: 'I swear '.
Mr. Olivier de Mazieres oath.
Mr Reeve, your hearing is eagerly awaited by our Committee of inquiry, since that you run this
new unit in coordination with the Minister of the Interior. Many issues revolve around the
EMOPT and its file, FSPRT - file of the alerts for the prevention of terrorist radicalization.
Can you give us your mission, and means you have to fill?
What is the purpose of the FSPRT? Has the creation of this file produced concrete results?
Could you explain the distribution of roles between the unit for coordination of the fight against
terrorism (UCLAT) and the EMOPT in the management of the FSPRT?
What are the services or authorities that feed the FSPRT? How many names appear to date?
What is the proportion of persons listed in the FSPRT monitored by the intelligence services?
How to explain that the National Directorate of intelligence and investigation (DNRED) has no
knowledge of the existence of this file?
But before addressing these issues, I let you speak for a keynote presentation.
M. Olivier de Mazieres, responsible for the operational staff of prevention of terrorism
(EMOPT). Let me begin with a few quick words to put into perspective the creation of the
operational staff of the terrorism prevention.
What was the historical context? This institution was created 1St July 2015, on the basis of a
statement of the Minister of the Interior. This statement was not only to create the staff, since it

completely redefines the follow-up of persons radicalized on the national territory by entrusting
to the prefects of Department a lead role in this area.
If I talked about historical context, this is because it is located in the days that immediately
followed the case of Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, which took place June 26, 2015, during which an
individual, M. Salhi, beheaded his employer, engaged in a photographic staging, then attempted
to detonate by hitting gas tanks in his company. Indeed, it appeared that this individual had been
spotted by services several months previously, while residing in the Doubs dpartement, that it
was then moved in Isre, and it had been lost by the services on the occasion of this movement.
In response to this case, and in a more general way, the Minister of the Interior therefore wished
to review the Tracker of the radicalized on the national territory, inter alia to ensure traceability.
The primary objective of this reform is to ensure that each of marked individuals as radicalized
and likely to spend to a violent action is supported and followed by a service leader well
identified, and where appropriate by cotraitants services.
The second objective is to provide, first and foremost to the political authority, a possible most
complete mapping of radicalisation on the french territory. Previously, this was not the case since
radicalized individuals could be tracked by the services of information, or a follow-up at the
local level. Finally, a third component existed already at the beginning of the month of July
2015: the national platform, which enables alerts, either by phone or by internet and which is
managed by the UCLAT.
It was, above all, to set up an Organization closer to the ground, allowing a flow of information
and a follow-up work decompartmentalization between services. It is a Copernican revolution for
many of them, starting with SID, who had not necessarily used to share its objectives with the
prefects or other services in the territory.
This method of sharing information is based on two main tools:
First tool: departmental evaluation groups. It is a structure which brings together all the services
that have to deal with the problem of radicalized around the prefect, and under his presidency,
likely to take violent action. So gather around the table: the representative departmental or
interdepartmental of Homeland Security, the departmental or regional judicial police, the
representative of the national gendarmerie and the representative of the territorial intelligence. In
practice, over the months, other services were eventually aggregate to the first circle. I think
mainly the prison administration and the protection and security of defence (DPSD) branch.
These evaluation groups meet at a weekly rate to review all the people reported in the
Department and to update their information. When they are new entrants, it determines the leader
service that is responsible for monitoring.
Second tool: an accessible national application, like all security applications of the Ministry of
the Interior, under the gate, CHEOPS, and called the FSPRT. I will detail a little later that
contains this file, since it is actually the point hard our Organization, and the main support of our
action.

In this context, I have the honour to lead since mid-July is somehow the head of this national
organization's network. In reality, there are three floors: dpartement prefects, which I have
already spoken; the prefects of areas of defence, to which one entrusts a supervisory role, where
appropriate allocation of additional resources, especially in small departments, and determination
of priorities to the area or such or such component region area; and a national level, with the
staff.
According to letter of mission that was entrusted to me by the Minister on October 12, 2015, the
role of staff is to "ensure the effective and consistent operative character, propose axes of effort,
and notify the Minister. In this context, we are organised into three divisions.
First pole: the "quality monitoring" file. I have a small team of five people, whose job it is to
analyze this file every day, to ensure that it is regularly updated and that the information
contained therein are trustworthy, especially when people are in a situation of mobility, from one
Department to another or a defence to another area. We find there the initial operative of SaintQuentin-Fallavier.
The work of these people is also to extract from the data contained in this file, a form of
radicalisation mapping: mapping geographic but also in terms of risk and priority threat. We are
particularly vigilant on trades that is termed 'sensitive', what I call the "business risk". Indeed,
some individuals, which are contained in this file, have professional activities in the transport
sector, public services, companies in the broad sense (industrial, strategic) and a somewhat more
circumscribed area but we are very careful: private security companies.
Second pole: territorial support. It's to move on the ground, in an approach to explanation of
motivation and belief: dialogue with the prefects. framing of local organizations; recall national
priorities; sending positive messages to services on the ground, so they have feedback on their
work and go into account that it is not absorbed in a black box but that it is instead analyzed and
used at the national level; Finally, collection and dissemination of good practices.
Third pole: links with national sensors. We have developed relationships with public actors as
private which, in their field of activity, can be sensors reporting, or vulnerability.
In the public sector, it will clearly be the general Secretariat of defence and national security
(SGDSN), given its jurisdiction on points of vital importance; It can also be the servant of
defence and security (HFDS) of the Ministry of ecology and development, including on the
whole of the Seveso sites, nuclear power plants and the transport of dangerous substances; It is
also the DPSD, since there is a phenomenon of radicalization within the armed forces, which
must be taken into account; It is the prison administration I mentioned earlier; It is finally the
national Council's activities private security with respect to the security guards.
It can still be private or semi-public partners: SNCF, RATP, EDF, RTE, Air France or Aroports
de Paris. I can, if you wish, develop working arrangements which have been developed in place
with these different institutions.

Finally, we are led to participate in some interdepartmental work. I think today the working
groups by the SGDSN in the reform of the screening.
What are the specificities of the staff? So, I'll answer your question on the articulation with the
UCLAT.
First, the staff is attached to the office of the Minister and therefore belong to any of the large
branches. Composed of way inter-office, it consists of twelve people: in addition to its leader and
an Assistant, five pairs who come respectively from the ITSB, of the central service of the
territorial intelligence, the Central Directorate of the judicial police (DCPJ), the prefecture of
police of Paris and the national gendarmerie. This fact is characteristic to be headed by a prefect,
emanating from any of these directions. It is of course permanent frames.
These specific characteristics of the EMOPT are as many differences with the UCLAT: it is
attached to a branch, although it has important link with other services work, has no such
structure interdepartmental, and is headed by senior police officer.
There are two key crossings with the UCLAT:
First of all, it is the UCLAT which provides direction for the implementation of the FSPRT. I
insist on this point. You kindly say in your introductory remarks that the FSPRT was the
EMOPT file, but this was not quite true, even if the staff is one of the major users. This is due to
historical reasons, I could develop.
Of course, we are working closely with the UCLAT. For example, in the movements that I made
and upwelling from the prefectures and local actors, we suggest changes in the file. These are
taken into account by the unit which then asked the it Department that handles applications for
security of the Ministry of the Interior, the STSISI, to somehow 'in music. On April 12, was
launched the V8 file, which itself had been put for the first time in application October 15, 2015.
This latest version is particularly important because it includes a large number of requests for the
prefects and local users, in particular to enhance the usability of the tool.
Furthermore, the UCLAT is the Manager of the national platform of appeal, the national Centre
for assistance and prevention against radicalisation (CNAPR), which is one of the sources which
can supply the file and which must be taken into account by the prefects at the local level.
Thus, Loc Garnier, Chief of the UCLAT, and myself are in almost daily contact. Sometimes we
move us together on the ground, even if it is less the cFavorite pieces of craft of the UCLAT than
that of the EMOPT - but when I hold the meetings which I know that they will have a technical
aspect very pronounced, especially on the file, I offered to accompany me. Similarly, I associate
systematically the UCLAT at conferences I organize with the prefects of zone - I will make
another one this week in the presence of the Director of cabinet of the Minister.
Now let us focus on the FSPRT, as you hoped, Mr president.

First of all, a few figures. On the day as we speak, the FSPRT, which has four essential articles,
contains approximately 13 000 active reports, a very large majority is taken into account by a
leader.
There are also reports under evaluation: this concerns individuals who come to be reported,
including by the platform of appeal, but are not yet certain of the reality of their radicalization.
Make sure that it is not slanderous, error or misinterpretation. This field work is usually done by
the territorial intelligence.
Finally, hundreds of reports are either standby, is closed. These two close enough articles are
related to individuals considered that they no longer pose a danger today. We have the right to
retain in the database for five years.
You asked me on the distribution of labour between services.
The main burden is to territorial intelligence for 30% of individuals, and the prefectures for 30%
also. Are then concerned homeland security, the prefecture of police, the national gendarmerie
and the judicial police.
How is the distribution? The top of the spectrum is almost the simplest idea: it relates to persons
identified as having a high level of risk, which will be homeland security.
The bottom of the spectrum, which has the weakest signals, mainly supported by the prefectures.
This means that these individuals subject to social treatment or para-social in the framework of
prevention cells, which usually meet on a monthly basis in the prefectures. I will return on the
articulation between prevention and police action, because it is very important to emphasize the
continuum between the two.
The difficulty lies in the middle of the spectrum where individuals that can pick up both social
work and police work, who can pass the low signal to the signal quickly. This was the case of
Yassin Salhi, who had originally spotted because he frequented mosques Salafists and attended
radicalized sermons. He was similarly of Ayoub El-Karadeniz, the author of the attack lack of
Thalys.
Today, and this is one of our major concerns, we must ensure that monitoring weighs not
exclusively on territorial intelligence, homeland security, and the prefectures: the gendarmerie
must assemble in power apparatus. In order to ensure an effective follow-up and reduce "the
holes in the racket", the workload should be better distributed.
I mentioned the "business risk": hundreds of sheets concern persons who exercise sensitive
occupations or have access to sensitive audiences, and several dozen have already been the
subject of measures of interference. They are mostly individuals who exercise regulated
professions on which it is possible to implement a withdrawal of accreditation, professional card,
card clearance or access. This is true, for example, for private security agents, for people
working in areas of restricted airports or claiming to have access to nuclear facilities.

Geographically, the majority of the individuals concerned are concentrated in four major regions:
the le-de-France. Languedoc-Midi-Pyrnes; Auvergne-Rhne-Alpes; and Provence Alpes Cte
d'Azur.
The number of taken into account in the departments is highly variable, but there is today no
Department, no area in the territory which has no person entered on its sector.
Half of the departments have 41 reports or less. It is interesting because it means that in those
departments can provide very fine control of the monitoring.
I come to areas at risk.
The departments that have the highest ratios are concentrated in high-density urban areas.
There are also relatively ratios in a little less dense departments from the urban point of view, but
which are often located in the sphere of attraction of large urban centres.
This is the case also in certain rural areas, often in old industrial basins.
Why these areas at risk and this location? It is not for me to deliver a University on this topic
vision - even if the lack of thoughts of this nature and research in this area. One can nevertheless
discern a few dominant traits.
First, there are historic sites somehow, marked by anticipation of the Salafist practice and
support for Jihad.
Sometimes, and it is still more frequently the case, the phenomenon is linked to the existence of
leaders proselytes.
Finally, there are small rural communities, composed of people who want to isolate themselves,
usually around a leader, and "get in the shade" - if one can consider that Artigat, Arige is a
shaded area - according to a strategy eventually quite analogous to that of a portion of the ultra
left.
Here, Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the key points of the presentation that I wanted to
make.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Mr Reeve, in November, the EMOPT already existed and
the FSRPT was in power: the perpetrators of the attacks of November 13 were in the FSPRT
file?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. No, they were not. The reason is simple, and I should perhaps have
started there: the FSPRT feature, implemented July 1er , has no justification in the territorial
anchoring of radicalized people. Clearly, it follows that persons who are located in the national
territory.

The rapporteur. And once they have left the national territory?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. Then, they fall under the jurisdiction of ISB, if any of the DGSE. But
as you have well understood, the feature that I supervise relies on the prefects. For me, what
counts is to ensure that a radicalized individual who is present in the national territory is well
taken into account in a Department, under the auspices of a prefect and a service leader. As soon
as he goes abroad, or even on combat zones, it can remain, as I indicated you, five years in the
file. We have so many cases.
Persons residing for a long time abroad are not listed in the file, which is however the case of
individuals referred to as "recently gone abroad".
The rapporteur. You planned a such topic?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. There's an open field in the file. It is therefore possible, when you
enter or update the specifications of an individual, to mention that he went abroad. Some leave
for several months, for example to the Morocco, Algeria or Egypt. If they are well taken into
account by a service, it will integrate intelligence within the FSPRT.
The rapporteur. The FSPRT and the EMOPT are the Ministry of the Interior. Where our
amazement when we heard members of the DNRED does all of part of the inner circle of the
intelligence community, to see that they are not aware of the EMOPT and had no access to the
FSPRT - without wanting to overwhelm them, of course.
Wouldn't be interesting to have a consolidated file, scaling of the intelligence services, including
the first circle? Customs, for example, has an intelligence service, has probably information that
could be useful. Would it not make sense to climb a higher level and go beyond internal
intelligence at the Ministry of the Interior?
UCLAT, national coordinator of intelligence, EMOPT: we have the feeling of a superposition of
structures, a set where everyone does everything, without knowing to what each actually.
Without wanting to offend you, one has the impression that the EMOPT has been created
because the UCLAT was misplaced within a Directorate-General and that no structure was
directly connected to the Minister. Should it not have been rather move the UCLAT, give it an
important role? Or will give additional powers to the national coordinator of intelligence, for
example capacity of the UCLAT and the EMOPT?
More generally, should it not exceed the single framework of the Ministry of the Interior, even if
I know that the last national Council of intelligence, the Minister of the Interior - and thus the
ITSB - was leader in the fight against terrorism at the national level?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. If acting of the association to the approach of services not covered by
the Ministry of the Interior, the decree in Council of State, October 30, 2015 redefines content
and access of the FSPRT - a first decree, issued March 15, 2015, had created the file. Initially, it
was created to meet the needs of the UCLAT, and record the signalants and reported them who
use the national platform to appeal. When the new feature that I described to you has been

implemented July 1er , was modified content and access of the FSPRT to a file for use by the
EMOPT and local actors. This resulted in the Decree of October 30, 2015.
It plans to open the file access to other players that the services of the Ministry of the Interior:
the DGSE, the prison administration and the DPSD. The hypothesis of an extension of the access
outside the administrations under the Ministry of the Interior is therefore already planned. More
recently - but I leave my skills as this falls within the UCLAT-, I noted that the prison
administration had accepted the principle to access this file, use it and possibly be a source of
power. Admittedly, posed by the issue of radicalization among the prison population of
extremely strong way. Moreover, the keeper of the seals launched a few weeks ago a mission to
examine to what extent the means of prison intelligence could be improved.
I guess ultimately the DPSD could do the same approach, insofar as it is very often associated
with the departmental level, at least in the departments to strong military presence in the weekly
evaluation group chaired by the prefect.
Regarding the National Directorate of research and investigations customs, not only, I can see no
downside to this approach, but I would find that benefits. For don't hide you nothing, I have a
meeting on 7 June with some of its representatives to introduce the feature that we put in place.
The rapporteur. So they know you?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. It seems that Yes. So much better elsewhere than in my previous
assignment in Corsica, I was led to work with them. I have to commend the remarkable work of
the DNRED, holding to its investigative means, but also to the quality of his men. In any case
even if this service does not access the file today, it is likely to be associated with local labour. Is
nothing that representatives of the regional directors or interregional customs are involved, as the
DPSD and prison administration, evaluation groups President prefects in the border areas or
elsewhere. It is possible, without any need to change the FSPRT. This file, I would insist, is a
tool: it is not any reform of July 1St .
At end, an interdepartmental approach would be relevant? Of course, and I would see only
advantages. Since ten months that the EMOPT exists, our work consisted of priority to
encourage the good practices and information exchange, and closer liaison between the services
of the Ministry of the Interior. The level of involvement of the CSB and the central Service of
the territorial intelligence, whose role was deep enough cause- such as the police, even if it's in a
different way - has been outstanding.
Regarding the possible overlap of the structures, I'll let you two answers.
The first is that in this case, I remain in my place: the Minister of the Interior has decided to
create an operational staff of prevention of terrorism, and has done me the honour of appointing
me to the head of this device. I have no political legitimacy to decide how should be organized
administration. Therefore, if the Government considered that there was a place for the EMOPT
and for the UCLAT, I acknowledge. Moreover, and quite honestly, there's enough work for

everyone. That we provide is 100% and as regards the activity of the UCLAT, I do not have the
feeling that it chme nor.
CFavorite pieces of our trade, to the EMOPT, it is the territorial local network and, in particular,
the link with the prefects. In this regard, returns that I leave me thinking they are satisfied to have
a referent identified, to which they can trace back their wishes, their requests for arbitration, and
reports that they are the problem.
The rapporteur. The UCLAT presented the same type of description and analysis that you. It is
obvious that you do not chmez given the State of the threat in our country. It is not to accuse
you: you have a prominent role, that we do not underestimate. So far, should not been give
additional means the UCLAT, or even move? Yet once, I still do not understand, and this is not
absence held hearings in the province and here, who does what on the FSPRT file. I do not see
why two structures manage the same file.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. Resume the role of each.
For the EMOPT: Track individual persons radicalized on the territory; Verify that these persons
are taken into account and when they move, their follow-up continues. make sure, when they
present risk factors aggravated due to the profession they exert, the audiences to which they have
to do, their psychiatric history or sports at risk that they practice, they are actually taken into
account and followed individually. If the UCLAT has told you that she does this job, I would be
very surprised, since it is ours.
The rapporteur. Nevertheless, I do not see why it could not do so.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. I was going to come to the second part of my answer.
Why are there two structures, and why entrusts are not all the same structure work, regardless of
its name and its composition? Again, it is a choice that is under the political authority.
I simply drew attention to the conditions for success of such a merger or such simplification. I
see two absolutely major: firstly, the structure in question must be linked to the Minister, to the
cabinet of the Minister, and not integrated in one of the branches, for an obvious reason that I did
not need to develop; Secondly, it must be interdepartmental, and each actor must find its place
and its role.
We cannot achieve the decompartmentalization of the operation between the services and the
flow of information cFavorite pieces of the reform of July 1er , if the entity in charge of the
structure is headed by the representative of one of the actors of this Exchange services.
The President Georges Fenech. The EMOPT is not completely inter-service as the DGSE is not
included in the pairs.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. It belongs to the Ministry of defence. We are inter-service within the
Ministry of the Interior.

The President Georges Fenech. The DGSE, major player, is not part of your services. You
have explained that the perpetrators of the attacks of November 13, be it Abaaoud, Memoo or
others, were not in your file, since you do not save those who are abroad or gone abroad.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. Absolutely.
M President Georges Fenech. There is therefore a problem.
The rapporteur. When some individuals go abroad, do you pass information to DGSE?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. The link with the DGSE reports to ISB. It is she who is responsible for
work on persons abroad.
The rapporteur. Suppose that an individual listed in the FSPRT, and followed by the LSVCC
leaves the national territory. How will transmit the information to the DGSE to avoid "holes in
the paint?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. This will be done through the file. When an individual goes abroad,
the information is brought to the knowledge of the departmental Directorate of internal security,
in the context of the departmental evaluation unit I mentioned earlier and dates via the internal
security branch.
I understand very well your approach, which is a matter of common sense and that is to imagine
a single great service interdepartmental who would be responsible for the follow-up of all the
people radicalized, both domestically and externally. I have no judgment to bear on the subject.
I'm just saying that this is not the mission of the EMOPT, which must, however, ensure that
people thought they are radicalized and that they can take a moment-violent action or another
national territory are well taken into account.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Reeve, you rest assured our Committee of inquiry by
referring to the meeting which will be held next week with the DNRED - I recall that she told us
not to be aware of your service, and you are not sure that it has access to your file.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. I badly expressed: the Decree provides access to a number of services
but all are not yet activated. The prison administration has committed approach to its centrally the UCLAT may confirm it to you because it is she who is the manWork on the subject. For the
rest, are the opportunities afforded by the text.
The rapporteur. Why other services not seized not this possibility?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. It must ask the UCLAT.
The President Georges Fenech. The UCLAT works with you, non?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. The direction of application of the FSPRT, it is the UCLAT. I'm just a
user of the file. It is therefore not my to include technical file changes - even I can make

suggestions - or to decide who will get there or not. Similarly, need to someday change the
Decree, it is its direction of application will take the decision.
The rapporteur. You say be a simple user. But when creating the file, where therefore the tables
have been filled? Within the EMOPT or the UCLAT? Trade unions have complained with regard
to the mobilization of the workforce.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. They were jointly completed because it is to create a tool pooling
sources which until then were not articulated between them: lists of individuals from ISB or
LSVCCS, or even identified as field work, persons reported under the national appeal run by the
UCLAT platform.
Thus, each has contributed even if, then, the work of fusion, correction, reliability of data,
duplicate elimination, was operated by the EMOPT.
The rapporteur. Has this file evolved since its inception?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. The work I am talking about you was conducted between July and late
September 2015.
The rapporteur. Was created from additional entries? Sports clubs, etc.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. You want to talk about the topics?
The rapporteur. Yes.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. Of course...
The rapporteur. How many are there topics today? A quarantine?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. More than that.
The rapporteur. It was conducted this increase at the request of the EMOPT?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. Yes.
The rapporteur. So you're not that user: you are also prescribing.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. As I said, we have asked of the evolutions of the file, whether its
content or access rights, prior to the launch of version 1. Since then, we have never ceased to
claim others, which are taken into account by the UCLAT and the STSISI to evolve yet this tool,
which meets today fewer problems of ownership and technical difficulties. It is in any case the
feeling that I get when I move in the departments.
Mr. Serge Grouard. How was the FSPRT? I understand that it had sought to bring together
scattered data. Technically, is it a new file or an old file has that evolve in feeding it differently?

Whatever it is, we do not understand important services in the field of intelligence there have
still not access, more than six months after its creation. Is this due to a computer problem?
Secondly, do you not think that it would be sensible to is hang up the Ministry of finance
services, such as TRACFIN and the DNRED?
Thirdly, I have heard that the DPSD, that I know well, was involved in groups of departmental
evaluation (GOL) as necessary. Is - to have information on the people who come to recruitment,
or soldiers?
Fourthly, when I was Mayor between 2001 and 2015, I had the opportunity to make reports - and
I still have some names in mind. So I think that in some cases, and in some cases only, the
participation of the Mayor to the departmental evaluation groups could be interesting. It would
allow to circulate information that intelligence might not have. I am thinking signals low or
moderately low, middle or bottom of the spectrum.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. On access to the file: to my knowledge, and even if I'm not in charge
of the maintenance of the device, it has no computer problems - the UCLAT may be confirm
you.
Whether to associate the services of the Ministry of finance, I will not elaborate on the first part
of my reply, you already know: the decision is political authority.
The second part of my answer will reflect a personal opinion: I had the opportunity when I was
in Corsica, to work on the coordination of a number of services; However most active both in
this area were the direction of tax services and TRACFIN. I am therefore misplaced to say that I
see no interest to combine services that both have this power of investigation and this specialty,
which we know that it is essential for individuals who interest us. In fact, the channels of funding
are one of the means of access to networks, including high crime and radicalisation.
The DPSD participate in the detection of individuals radicalized at the time of recruitment, or
those who are already within the armed forces? The two. This is mainly to ensure a link between
the services of the type 'homeland security' or 'territorial intelligence' which will follow the
individual when it is outside the barracks, i.e. in his private activity, and when it is within the
barracks. Some individuals who adopt behaviors, or even very radicalized positions in the private
sphere taken, may be blameless in the barracks. But the DPSD can also identify individuals
during recruitment. On the other hand, can advise individuals who applying to a military job, and
who were also spotted.
I would add that the DPSD also plays an important role with regard to the former military.
Indeed, it is sometimes useful to know what was the military past of an individual and what
elements can be drawn. There are a number of persons with a military past in the radicalized
population.
Finally, the participation of elected representatives is essential. The situations are different, and
approaches that have the elected officials of radicalisation are also. The communities are more or

less affected by the phenomenon. I have in mind the large communes of the Paris region,
including those of the small Crown. I think it is relevant enough to develop a device of the type
departmental evaluation group chaired by the prefect, with a focus on such or such municipality
particularly struck by the problem. In this case, obviously, should involve the Mayor. This
however requires a number of conditions that you imagine: that elected representatives have a
sustained interest in this issue, and that all the guarantees of privacy data.
Today, information or alerts are traded informally between the prefect and the mayors of large
cities or between their immediate collaborators, directors of cabinet, for example. It would be
interesting to have a structure specifically dedicated in some municipalities particularly affected.
Our device is still young. That is why, Mr president, when I speak of inter-service, can interpret
it as a first step towards an inter-Ministry. But it was already necessary to build this set within
the Ministry of the Interior.
Similarly, the GOL may have to expand. One can imagine a system in concentric circles, with
limited sessions and plenary sessions. We know, for example, that in some departments, the
Prosecutor of the Republic participates in the departmental evaluation unit; in others, it is less. It
is, again, a possibility of evolution and expansion of the device.
The rapporteur. Are persons subject to a plug S - S13, S14 or S15 - all registered to the
FSPRT?
In addition, the Minister of the Interior communicates regularly on 1 800 individuals - those who
are on the spot, those who have ambitions of departure, those who have returned. Included in the
file?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. All S records are not in the file. And for cause because, as you know,
some S records are not related to radicalisation. In addition, the S is a "doorbell", is a tool of
police, including used to identify an individual who attempts to cross borders. It does not, on its
own, the inclusion in the roster as radicalized can take violent action.
The rapporteur. And plugs S13, S14, S15?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. All S records are not in the FSPRT. At the time of the constitution of
the file, the services that are the main creators of plugs S, mainly homeland security, territorial
intelligence, the SR or the Prefecture of police, indeed fueled the file with individuals which they
considered that the combination of their radicalisation and their dangerousness justified the
inscription. They have somehow made a presorting. If such were not the case, we would be
beyond 13 000 individuals, the number of returns S is clearly higher.
As the "returnees" and the flimsy, they appear in the FSPRT since it is people who are on the
national territory. They are thus followed such services to national jurisdiction under the aegis of
dpartement prefects.

The rapporteur. Imagine a fitch individual S, which is not in the FSPRT and changing of
Department, whereas it was followed initially by a service. It is exactly in the same situation as
before the creation of the EMOPT. How the risk of losing its trace is less important today?
The President Georges Fenech. This is the case of Yassin Sadiki.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. Yassin Sadiki would have featured in the FSPRT, at least I hope...
The rapporteur. You say that it was for each prescriber of a plug S service to appreciate the
opportunity to include the individual in the FSPRT. But it is not known how changing the
individual. What happens if it is not integrated in a centralized file? I wonder.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. The individuals identified, by definition, are not followed by a service.
That is also why there are subject to a sheet, but no technical or operational work more advanced
service...
The President Georges Fenech. This can also be the case.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. Yes. The sheet allows to have an escalation at the time where the
person will be checked at a border crossing, for example.
Individuals enrolled in the FSPRT are not exclusively on the basis of an information sheet. It is
necessary that there are other aggravating factors. Similarly, all S records are not in the FSPRT,
and you can find in the FSPRT of individuals who are not registered S.
The rapporteur. I have trouble to understand the logic: we will register in the FSPRT a kid of
sixteen, that parents have reported as radicalized via the Green issue but not one that makes the
object a S plug for radical islam?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. First, the sixteen-year-old girl will appear in the FSPRT on the basis of
an assessment of local services which will confirm its danger and its radicalization.
Also, suppose an individual followed by services, and spotted at the exit of a place of prayer
Salafist. It is observed and photographed in this context. Seen speak out of the office with a
dozen people who are not known by the services. Per, for safety, if they manage to identify the
individuals with whom their objective spoke, services will then create S cards to learn the day
where, during a check, information them will be remounted as such. This does not mean the ten
individuals in question posed a danger as they are likely to take violent action at one time or
another.
Sheet S is a tool of police monitoring among others, but which may be relatively light in the
sharpness of the transmitted signal. In this case, it is a precaution, a "Bell" that is put in place.
The rapporteur. The same argument applies to the FSPRT: it concerns people who will not
necessarily pass to the Act, and are not necessarily being tracked in real time.

Mr Olivier de Mazieres. You are absolutely right. You touch there a major point: how to
determine which persons will enter the FSPRT and what other will depart? There's no recipe.
Initially, certain services, including prefects, have asked if I could provide them a grid. There
are. The Interdepartmental Committee for the prevention of delinquency (ICPD) and the
UCLAT, inter alia, have developed a tool to cross a number of indices.
Must be a beam of concordant indications, a test taken alone is not sufficient necessarily to
determine the entry in the file. I know, it's not very intellectually satisfactory. But in fact, this is
how it works. The only plug S is not enough. And then basically there's the intuition of the
policeman. These are those who are going to have to make the assessment of the individual on
the ground, at most, with knowledge of its environment, which will determine whether or not, it
should be entered in the FSPRT.
For my part, and this is the advice I gave all my colleagues, I refuse to get into what I consider as
falling under the operational police work. I am not concerned to know what is the nature of
surveillance or monitoring they operate on an individual. I trust them, as assessment.
Operative implemented since 1St July however generated an improvement: the decision has
become collegial. Again, it is in the context of the evaluation group, under the auspices of the
prefect, that we reviewed each situation and it determines whether or not the individual should be
integrated into the FSPRT. This allows to have upon him a more objective assessment, thus more
reliable.
However, you are absolutely right, there is no unstoppable criteria - except of course for those
who are high risk and as such internal security.
The rapporteur. How much do you think people followed by the CSB, but who are not enrolled
in the FSPRT?
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. I have no sales, but I have the weakness to consider all those who
present a real danger and are followed as such by the ITSB to appear in the file. There is less
doubt for individuals who are objectives of Homeland Security - insofar as there is no ambiguity
on their danger - for the bottom or the middle of the spectrum. At the limit, the problem is more
problematic for persons taken into account by the territorial intelligence. It is for them that the
assessment cannot be only extremely circumstantial, and it must be admitted, subjective.
Our job is to try to anticipate the danger of an individual. It has already been criticized to have
enrolled 13,000 people in the file, including some with no criminal record and who are, at this
point, only a social work. We have yet makes them enter into the FSPRT because we anticipate
that escalates. Yet again, there is a share of subjectivity that must be borne.
Mr. Serge Grouard. Individuals who may be indicated by the prison administration, cannot be
included in the file since, until now, the prison administration did not participate in the device.

Mr Olivier de Mazieres. Yes and no. Indeed, in almost all cases, the prison administration is
associated with labour leading the field under the auspices of the prefects. It may therefore
reflect the degree of radicalisation of individuals. Above all, there is an exchange of very fluid
information between the police and the prison administration, including on the dates of liberation
of individuals. This plays to the prisoners for acts of terrorism or condoning of terrorism or
common law, but who themselves are radicalized in prison. The prison administration says these
cases services so that they are taken into account at the time of their release. This exchange of
information technique works well.
The President Georges Fenech. In conclusion, perhaps it would be useful to incorporate into
departmental evaluation groups on which you rest much, not only the DNRED and CFO, insofar
as economic crime and money laundering are linked to terrorism, but still the Attorney who, with
its services, has a global vision.
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. There is a point on which I went very quickly: there are in each
Department, next to the weekly assessment group, a cell of prevention. This oldest feature,
introduced in April 2014, worked on social and para-sociale, and treaty, inter alia, persons listed
in the FSPRT at the bottom of the spectrum.
These cells of prevention are systematically co-chaired by the prefect and the Prosecutor of the
Republic. Police services - at least the territorial intelligence, sometimes the internal security and
the gendarmerie - attend the two instances. There are also judicial protection of youth (PJJ),
national education...
The President Georges Fenech. But they have nothing to do with intelligence!
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. That is why it separates the two instances. But it is necessary to
establish continuity between the two, since it was found that the passage of a weak signal in a
strong signal could be done very quickly. And as you noted, there are within the FSPRT persons
who, for now, is that of the "low signal".
The President Georges Fenech. If the PJJ is introduced in this departmental evaluation group,
more person will say nothing!
Mr Olivier de Mazieres. It is not this. I just wanted to tell you that other services are in the
loop, but in a different structure from that of GOL.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Reeve, thank you for your participation in our work.
Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Patrick Calvar, Director-general of the internal security (CSB),
accompanied by Ms. Marie Deniau, head of cabinet
Coaccount made the hearing behind closed doors, on Tuesday, May 24, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Mr. Director general, we met you, the rapporteur and myself,
last week in your premises for a preliminary exchange on this hearing. Thank you for having
responded to the request of our Committee of inquiry.
We will continue with you our investigations in the field of intelligence, engaging the State of
the terrorist threat and responses that you are able to provide. We have taken knowledge of the
content of your hearing by the Committee on national defence and the armed forces as the latter
has decided to publish the report. In this regard, your hearing is essential for our work. Addition
questions we have on the attacks from January to November last, this will be an opportunity to
ask you about the means implemented in Work on the adaptation of techniques and procedures to
the needs and services to both internal and international and mainly European level cooperation.
Your hearing, because of the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us,
takes place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the
Assembly. Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958
relating to the functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in
whole or in part, if we decide so at the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings
which were held in camera are first transmitted to people heard in order to collect their
comments. These are submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I indicated that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, shall be punished by the
penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who, within a period of
twenty-five years, disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a commission of
inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this
information.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
nothing but the truth.
Mr. Patrick Calvar and Ms. Marie Deniau successively take oath.
We have many questions to ask, and firstly on the intensity of the threat that weighs on the
France, but also questions about SID, on the feedback that you could achieve on the attacks of
2015. We will examine you then on the perpetrators of these attacks, including Samy Sumbua
and Ismal Omar Mostefa, without forgetting Abdelhamid Abaaoud. Finally, we will ask for
pieces of information on the strategy of the ITSB, especially with the use of the new FSPRT file
- about which we ask ourselves many questions: the answers that we got this morning by visiting
the unit for coordination of the fight against terrorism (UCLAT) having not fully convinced us-,
as well as the tools used and the means at the disposal of the ISB and Finally, on international
cooperation.
Mr. Patrick Calvar, Director-general of the internal security (CSB). Before entering the
heart of the matter, I would like to quickly remind you of the considerable progress made in
France since 2007 in the field of intelligence, including the various structural reforms but also
legislative and methodological changes.

I will just mention them; they will be the subject of questions, where appropriate, on your part:
-October 2007: creation of the parliamentary delegation for intelligence (DPR);
-2008: white paper on defence and national security intelligence is a strategic mission within the
State, and the national plan of orientation of intelligence (Particulates) is created;
-July 2008: creation of the Central Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI), merger of the
direction de surveillance du territoire (DST) and part of the Central Directorate of General
information (DCRG), Directorate-General of the national police (DGPN); creation of the service
of General information - now deleted;
-July 2009: as part of the military planning law, the concept of defence and national security
takes into account intelligence as a strategic function of the State - knowledge and anticipation;
-July 2010: creation of the Academy of intelligence;
-March 2011: law orientation and programming for the performance of internal security
(LOPPSI 2), whose full title is devoted to intelligence, in particular to the protection of its
agents;
-2013: implementation Work strategic directions of December 2013 in the programming law
military white paper; expansion of the powers of the parliamentary delegation for intelligence;
integration of the commission of audit of special funds within the DPR;
-April 2014: establishment of the Directorate General of internal security (CSB), followed by the
creation of the central service of territorial intelligence (LSVCC);
-July 2014: creation of an inspection of the intelligence services (ISR);
-July 2015: enactment of the intelligence, which entered into force in October 2015.
French intelligence therefore experienced a revolution in recent years, both on the political and
legal, but also structural plans. At the same time, the penal code and the code of criminal
procedure have been the subject of past reforms or in progress, that it is not for me to discuss you were able to meet with members of the judiciary, including the Paris Prosecutor's office.
What is ISB, its creation responded to the urgent need in France of an actual service of internal
security, during natural of the DGSE outdoors, in the image of what exists in our major foreign
partners with whom we cooperate. Indeed, it was appropriate that the new service can be
assigned missions very precise - to avoid hitting us some pitfalls as in the past-, the service of the
fundamental interests of our country, with precisely described and controlled powers, the vote on
intelligence Act in having constituted the culmination.
Among the cardinal missions of the ITSB, the counter-terrorism prominently, of course, but it
cannot ignore other forms of threats aimed at the France and its interests, such as espionage - evil

endemic, insensitive, but oh how devastating in a world where the major powers engaged in a
fierce fight to preserve their leadership on the political economic, military, industrial. Result
from this mission not only the protection of our economic interests in a highly competitive
world, but also the fight against proliferation or cyber, cyber attacks representing a new risk that
continues to grow; In short, everything that the State needs to protect the fundamental interests of
the nation.
With regard to its means, ISB now has more than 3000 agents, including 73% of active officers
of the national police, 16% of administrative officials and 10% of contract. These figures take
into account recruitment already made since the implementation in The work of the three
recruitment plans decided by the Government, knowing that term, in 2018, with the completion
of these plans, the total strength of the ITSB will be over 4000 agents, at 68 per cent of active
officers of the national police, 14% of administrative officials and 17% of contractors. In other
words, growth in staff, over a period of five years, will be close to 40%. Also, I let you imagine
the difficulties we are facing in recruitment, training, professionalization and loyalty.
It also means a precise definition as part of a strategic plan for increasing power of our needs,
implementation of career paths; in a few words, this implies a very fine our human resources
management, not to mention the major challenge which is to work together staff from various
backgrounds and for some to high professional culture.
What are the main challenges of the ITSB to definitively become the expected security service?
The first is technical: it can now ignore the advent of digital and its implications on our modes of
inquiry; We have therefore recruited and continue to recruit engineers and technicians; I will
come back by referring to the fight against terrorism.
The analytical challenge, then: the complexity of the problems and threats treated requires us to
resort to non personnel of the police national but specialized in economics, finance, or even other
more operational areas, such as psychologists and linguists.
The last challenge is legal: Act on intelligence, indispensable tool for our action and that the
legitimate, led us to form more than 2,500 staff in its development in Artwork.
To conclude the section, I would remind you that SID has a jurisdiction, like many other of our
partners, unlike what can be read here or there - I am thinking, inter alia, Norwegians, to the
Swedes, Danes, the Austrians.
Last point: we have national coverage and are present in seventy-nine departments as well as in
overseas. We finally have representations abroad where our officers have only mission is to
ensure cooperation with local intelligence and security services.
With regard to the fight against terrorism, it seems to me be clearly expressed before the national
defence and armed forces in the preparation of the findings that we establish in the current state
of the information we have on the State of the threat.

ISB has for mission to act preventively in order to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; in
case of commission of violent acts, it supports the structures of the judicial police. This means
that ISB collects intelligence and then, in the event of specific elements, denounced the facts to
the Prosecutor of the Republic in Paris and running, under the rule of law, the instructions in
order to neutralize the groups or individuals involved in terrorist projects. Thus, since the
beginning of the Syrian crisis, we prevented 15 projects of violent actions and arrested more than
350 people.
We also in An administrative strategy whereby we propose including measures of expulsion,
assignment to residence, withdrawal or non-renewal of passport, etc.
More than two-thirds of our capabilities are devoted to the fight against terrorism. For this
purpose, are mobilized: the Parisian branch specialized in material, all the officials of our
territorial settlements, our physical and technical monitoring capabilities, not to mention our
judicial branch and its provincial offices.
Our first priority is to gather intelligence for the purpose of action. The collection is carried out
through three main modes: human, technical, and by national or international cooperation.
Contrary to some commentators advised, we prefer no way over another. There is intelligence
and regardless of the manner in which it is obtained, knowing that then need to analyze it, so
prioritize it and then exploit it. There is no noble and other services that would be less: there are
specialized services that have more means and which is the main occupation. Finally, in a string
of intelligence, what counts above all is the complementarity of services, to avoid blind spots,
and their coordination.
I will not dwell on human intelligence, wouldn't it to clarify that it is particularly difficult, as you
can imagine, to find volunteers for us help in travelling in Syria, Iraq or Libya - and one could
cite other theaters of operations. We Thus work primarily on our territory. Please be aware that
we have teams trained in the recruitment and monitoring of human sources, that in a legal and
ethical framework specific. We do not hesitate to work in partnership, particularly at the national
level.
Technical intelligence is a major challenge today. We face on a daily basis with the problem of
encryption, the proliferation of the means of communication, to the masses of data we may
collect. This is the reason for which we operate the permanence of leaps, especially with our
main partner, the DGSE. It is, in this case, to be the most effective possible and not duplicate, not
to mention that these investments are very heavy on the financial plan. We rely on intelligence
Act and we are looking for big data tools (megadonnees) which should facilitate the work of
investigators, aware that we are that digital progress constitute a veritable cultural revolution
which, incidentally, marks and mark the whole of society. I imagine that your different visits to
the United States and Israel will show you the importance of the technical intelligence and how
much a part of the comments are totally offset from reality.
Encryption is certainly a question that only major international conventions will solve, the
borders of the States is now often ineffective to attach under the Act.

In the context of our cooperation at the national level, it is for us to be closer to our various
partners, starting with the national police and the national gendarmerie. This has resulted in the
establishment of the central office and offices zonal binding, but also in the context of the
operational staff of prevention of terrorism (EMOPT), by the strong involvement of the prefects.
We need to detect weak signals and then ensure that cases are tracked, even if, because of their
number, all may not be subject to the same process taking into account of the resource. The
fluidity today is total.
Our other partner is the DGSE: since March 2014, we have a common ITSB-DGSE in LevalloisPerret cell, following all the folders of terrorism in real time, the DGSE agents with means of
access to their databases to accelerate and facilitate exchanges and assessments.
To improve operational action, we created in June 2015, at Levallois, an inter-service cell,
known as cell Allat, which includes representatives of the six services of the first circle - DGSE,
Directorate of military intelligence (DRM), protection and security of defence (DPSD)
Directorate, national intelligence and investigation (DNRED), TRACFIN (information
processing and action against clandestine financial circuits) and CSB - as well as representatives
of the central of territorial intelligence (LSVCCS) service and the Directorate of intelligence of
the prefecture of police (DRPP). They also have access to their databases - condition sine qua
non to be effective. In this cell, asked stakeholders, guides the research, it prioritizes and, where
appropriate, on deconflicte. All services manifested their satisfaction to participate in the
operation of this cell.
The question arises why we welcome not, tomorrow, the prison intelligence, since the middle of
the prison is for us a concern.
International cooperation, for their part, are before any of the DGSE and ISB. We have an
imperative need of the help of our partners, in the same way that we inform them of what we
collect and that concerns them. Unlike ideas spread here or there, cooperation is total and fluid.
What are the differences between legal systems which may sometimes give this impression whether good or bad-faith - lack of communication.
In Europe, there is the counter-terrorism group (GAT) which brings together all EU security
services to which must be added those of Norway and Switzerland. Within this organization, we
have specialized groups particularly as regards the Syrian-Iraqi area.
I shall conclude my remarks indicating avenues of improvement.
First, it is necessary that we have more information upstream to anticipate attacks. The
functioning of the Belgian network showed us how he was in contact with its sponsors, receiving
instructions and practical tips. Technical surveillance must help us once encryption problems
will be overcome in whole or in part.
The second track concerns the Schengen file: it is necessary that all Member States shall enter in
this file persons suspected in one way or another to the terrorism-related activities. We are, for
our part, registered more than 9,000 people, what then is to be regularly cited about our S plugs,

which are simply a means of investigation, one indicator among others, allowing a better
assessment of the individuals concerned.
Still on the subject of the Schengen file, the identities were, today, more significance due to the
random checks and increasing possibilities of falsification. Also it is now appropriate to
introduce systematically the elements of biometrics, including the possibility of crossing of files,
including Eurodac to asylum-seekers.
Regarding Passenger Name Record (PNR) and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP):
how long did take to adopt the first? And what about the second?
For what is metadata, such as our American and British partners, the question arises of the
relevance of the separation between intelligence and the judiciary, as it is to analyze and cross
him. Americans and Britons, including together them for operational purposes while our law
does not allow. This is damaging to the action of anticipation.
In the same vein, must wonder about the retention periods of the data collected under the law
pertaining to intelligence. Once destroyed, they are more usable in court even though they could
be used as evidence subject to produce the support.
Finally, regarding the status of the human sources and Pentiti, should better protect, until the
exemption, in some cases, from criminal liability. Should we not also, as in the United States,
have a real power of "horse-trading" with people indicted in order to get them to actually
cooperate?
I say, finally, that the safest States have never been able to prevent the commission of violent
activities. The real question is to know what is the price that society is willing to pay for more
security, although the latter will never complete. Be aware that in my service, each attack is lived
as a failure; but should one to conclude, as one often has the impression that this is not the
disease that kills, but the doctor must be killed?
The President Georges Fenech. Thanks for this presentation. Let's start by mentioning the
attacks in January and November 2015 and their authors, in an attempt to better understand how
they have escaped surveillance. It would be interesting if you could explain the role of SID who
becomes pilot of intelligence in France.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. We are driver of the fight against terrorism as the country is concerned.
Our interests are also hit around the world, and there, they are our friends from the DGSE who
are concerned. But on the national territory, indeed, we focus all of the information to be able to
act.
The President Georges Fenech. What are the perpetrators of the events of January and
November 2015 that had never been monitored by CSB in the past?

Mr. Patrick Calvar. Coulibaly. His case was handled by our colleagues of the judicial police
and no evidence was suspect that the person, at least to our knowledge, was involved in terrorist
activities.
Kaye brothers, meanwhile, we knew them, and they made the subject of a lengthy monitoring even if it was difficult to know which of the two had gone to the Yemen. I would remind you
that the means we have at the time were very simple: telephone tapping, monitoring physical and
data connection. We had no way of intrusive information to act.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Do you confirm that monitoring of the Kaye brothers has
not been discontinued? A press release of the National Commission of control of interceptions
(CNCIS) security, including diffuse through Mr. Urvoas, then member of the CNCIS, denied that
wiretaps have stopped at his request from the summer of 2014.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. The CNCIS has played no role in the matter. Claims were also not only my
service but also the DRPP. No evidence did establish a terrorist activity on the part of the
brothers Kaye.
I remind you that we now have a quota limited security interceptions, interceptions whose
operation involves ways. We are dealing with people experienced in hiding and who are fully
aware of our means of action - they simply read different newspapers that constantly flaunt them
in broad daylight, which does not facilitate our task... This is why intelligence Act was for us an
important step since now, we can use much more intrusive means: we can address the computer,
entering homes to trap them. During any search, in any area of common crime, you will find
several communication media, several telephone chips, or even several boxes. We find, in the
light of the ongoing investigations, we go to the cFavorite pieces of the system, i.e. enter
premises where people that we monitor, which is not easy since we act in hostile environments.
Then, if we have human sources, we are able to anticipate. We must then protect their criminal
future and their physical future.
Still, I stress, the CNCIS has played no role in the matter.
Mr. Georges Fenech. The rapporteur is right to recall this controversy, also public, as JeanJacques Urvoas which, at the time, as a parliamentarian, was part of the CNCIS, clearly denied
that it had refused the extension of surveillance of the Kaye brothers. The judgment of this
monitoring well was decided by the services for the reasons you indicate?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Yes. And we have never questioned the CNCIS.
The rapporteur. It is the press who started this rumor.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Indeed, it is the press.
The President Georges Fenech. You put an end to this monitoring because your quota of
security interceptions?

Mr. Patrick Calvar. Tapping were interrupted because they did nothing after two years
monitoring for one and one for the other.
The rapporteur. Since the attacks of January 2015, have your tapping practices changed? Do
you tend to extend wiretapping?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. No, we strive above all to prioritize the information reaching us, the ideal
being to use much more intrusive methods permitted by law on intelligence. Without wanting me
to my duty counsel, should explain to me why it cannot prevent numbers of people continue to
commit a robbery or drug trafficking. However there is obsession with our shortcomings - the
rest we do not deny.
You should know that we do not necessarily have useful intelligence and more the person is
dangerous, less we will have this information to enable us to intervene. Where the requirement
for us to have the means to conduct computer attacks or, otherwise, to enter homes to determine
the activities of monitored individuals.
M. Pierre Lellouche. If you could have, at the time, apply more intrusive methods that now
enables you to act on the information, do you think that you would have read the signals emitted
by the brothers Kaye? With the resources you have today, do you think to be better able to
monitor this type of individuals?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Yes, we are in a much better position than to anticipate.
The President Georges Fenech. Samy Sumbua, Member of a club's shooting of the national
police, auditioned by the DCRI in October 2012. This year, it is placed under judicial control and
fails in a departure for the Syria project. He succeeds finally in September 2013 accompanied by
Ismal Omar Mostefa. How this start he made possible? Why was it the object of supervision on
the part of the intelligence services?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. You touch there pointing a problem for us very important. You have just
mentioned that we had stopped Samy Sumbua, subsequently referred, indicted and placed under
judicial supervision. Now we can implement Works no technique of information about an
individual indicted so that the rights of the defence is not violated. We cannot act in this
circumstance: it's a blind spot.
It belongs to a judicial review to allow monitoring of the person concerned.
The President Georges Fenech. Judicial review means the cessation of monitoring by the
services.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Yes, and it is a real problem that we have raised repeatedly. We can no
longer monitor or intercept the most dangerous people once they are put in review, at least, if
they are involved in another project, that for another investigation. Except in the latter case, they
disappear so for us the landscape.

The rapporteur. How much do you think the number of individuals in this situation, namely
individuals that you have watched and which escape you due to be indicted?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. All those who are put in review and under judicial supervision.
The President Georges Fenech. Omar Mostefa was indicted and therefore "relevant"; you have
not less expertise in judicial police, you are investigating service: a kind of co-saisine you can't it
continue to monitor put someone under investigation?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. No. Once an individual is indicted, continue to monitor would be to impair
the rights of the defence, and we can therefore absolutely not intervene. We intervene upstream
with all the means that we are granted under the terms of Act concerning the adaptation of justice
to developments in crime, called Perben II law, as judges entrust us to them.
M. Pierre Lellouche. That said, any good terrorist must request to be indicted.
The President Georges Fenech. It is a shame indeed. What solution do you, recommend Mr.
Director general, to remedy this anomaly?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. It is necessary to provide for measures to control judicial which are very
strong and applied to the letter. It must be made if, at one time or another, these people here don't
realize at the police station to point as is expected, an immediate reaction is considered. Samy
Sumbua could leave as soon as he was able to escape his judicial review.
The President Georges Fenech. His accomplice, said Omar Mostefa, was not indicted, he was
the subject of a plug S and he was able to leave french territory.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Either, but was checked at the exit from the territory? Take the example of
the entourage of Chung: he went by car in Spain where he took a flight to the Turkey. How do
you prevent people to come and go freely as they are not judicially sought and therefore are not
the subject of a warrant?
The rapporteur. What was the level of monitoring of Memoo? Was it in your viewfinder? Was
it part of priority individuals?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Not directing the investigation, numerous details remain me unknown; but
all monitored individuals are not 24 hours a day.
The rapporteur. Was Omar Mostefa the object of surveillance before 13 November?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. No. Today, more than 800 people intend to go to Syria; However my
service has 3,500 of which many are not involved in the operative part. In addition, it must be
aware of a reality: it does not enter the cities like this. Implementation Work of the measure on
the ground is not as simple as that.

Mr Franois Lamy. We can see retrospectively the existence of cells, and that those whose
members have committed attacks or which are the subject of an important monitoring all have a
link.
I remember that as of 16 November, the press has been able to describe Abaaoud, designated as
the likely sponsor, to decline any pedigree and so forth. Which brings me to ask you if you
establish a hierarchy among the hundreds of people that you monitor. In addition, did you, prior
to the attacks, flowcharts published then by the press on the links between cells?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. It was SID who reported the danger of Abaaoud in the summer 2015,
indicating that this individual was involved in many projects aborted. It was after the attack on
the Thalys. We knew full well that Abaaoud had played a role in several cases, and we have
therefore reported. Then, the problem is simple: Abaaoud is in Syria. We know that he wants to
act but how do I block it? I return, therefore, to what I quickly mentioned: making identity
checks is more meaningless; paper products of quality, it is necessary to have use of biometrics.
The attacks of November 13 project is designed in Syria, the team consists in Syria and logistics
is provided in Belgium. Members of the commandos will arrive by various roads which some are
unknown; and those that we know are borrowed by migrants. But if you query on these routes,
individuals at random, they will be Iraqi and all that they say will appear natural, especially if
they say come from a place controlled by Daech - that is where they will lie if they belong.
Absence of upstream, the interviewed individuals will therefore not necessarily suspicious.
They then gather in Belgium, will lease their vehicles and their apartments; and they plan on the
national territory the eve of hitting us. Explain to me how block Abaaoud when it is found in
Greece, subject of a survey - for the attacks foiled in Verviers?
Therefore, a very significant investment is needed in information upstream. I think encryption
and decryption, because let us not forget that we have in front of us of true professionals. Then
arises the question of entry into Europe and controls to be carried out.
Finally, there is much to do with logistics: once arrived, it takes these people of weapons and
explosives. If these can be composed from crafts by artificers of quality it buy weapons. Now
that Europe is doing to combat arms trafficking? What is Europe doing to deter people from
selling weapons?
Therefore, I do not see how the domestic services could neutralize Abaaoud before it is done,
when much even we had identified him through all criminal investigations and intelligence. And
I do not throw the stone to my classmates of external services: the situation is complex enough
that we are not able to solve all the problems.
M. Christophe Cavard. I'm afraid to have misunderstood your remarks about prison
intelligence: you would be willing to integrate it into the first circle?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Breast cell Allat, we have the DRPP and TRS - personnel that are part of
the second circle. If we create a prison intelligence service, it will have its place.

M. Christophe Cavard. Very well.

Some, the president has alluded, consider ISB as the main actor of domestic intelligence, trying
to use the complementary nature of the different services. You said before the Defence
Committee - I have carefully read the record of your hearing - that coordination between your
service and the DGSE has never been as good. Is it a technical cooperation, another form of
cooperation - I think field intelligence, on some theatres as the Libya, where we find more great
world to inform us?
Another passage of your hearing marked me, where you talk about 400 children who are in Syria
with their family, born to french parents and who are ultimately for us, a real potential danger.
How do you intend to deal with this issue?
Therefore, arises the question of human resources, which I discussed with the representatives of
your service in the area where I am elected: how to organize intelligence territorially and with
whom? Who evaluates the top of the spectrum and the bottom of the spectrum, in other words,
how one decide that so-and-so will be more particularly followed by your services and such
other will be supported by other services?
Some local politicians, who feel disadvantaged, are trying to make the link between prefectures
and your services. How to ensure, according to you, that everyone takes his part in territorial
intelligence? It is not with a workforce of 3,600 people or, tomorrow, nearly 4,500 people, that
you will manage to do a specific job, in our towns, our villages, our neighborhoods.
M. Pierre Lellouche. If I take the example of Omar Mostefa and the return of Abaaoud, we are,
in essence, in a catch twenty two situation (hopeless situation), to speak as the Americans: If the
person is under investigation, it cannot be placed on listening; If it is not judiciarise, subject to a
simple plug S, you cannot prevent it from leaving the territory. and if it is identified as a threat
but that this person is outside the territory, you cannot prevent it from returning. I see only a
solution: either you have the legal authority to intercept people that you have registered, which is
currently not the case...
Mr. Patrick Calvar. So, if we have an administrative authorization.
M. Pierre Lellouche. I wanted to say that you are beautiful to listen to such individual, the
information that the subject of an information sheet cannot be immediately transmitted at a
border post that does not exist since there is no national boundaries. Can also, the system work if
the information according to which a person is being monitored is communicated to border
crossings that it will therefore recreated.
I present tomorrow, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, a report on the Bill, passed by the
Senate, authorizing approval of the agreement on the technical site of the Agency for the
operational management of information systems on a large scale within the area of freedom,
security and justice, in other words, a text concerning the three networks that exist and both of
which are planned. It is a real mess: these networks are very incomplete, they are not really
interconnected and they are different from one State to the other!

However, to make this system work, I repeat, and so you know which leaves France and which
fit, do we, you need to restore the national controls with automatic, immediate communication to
restored border posts, information that an individual is put under surveillance? For example, the
plugs S are transmitted or not to the Schengen system? You do not pass them?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. If.
M. Pierre Lellouche. You pass them, but are they operating?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. We have communicated more than 9,000 names to the Schengen file. Rest,
as I pointed out, the identity does not necessarily mean much: you think although Abaaoud was
not walking with his name identification documents. I stress, we wish the systematization of
biometrics. Should then be cross national files and incorporate base Eurodac and the basis of
asylum-seekers. If we are not taking this step, we'll go ahead of problems.
The S card system is applied in each country; then, is based on national law, except if a judicial
procedure is on our territory, which case we may request assistance, but, yet again, as a judicial
inquiry is not open, we do not have coercive means. I repeat, the key, is the use of biometrics.
The controls within the Schengen area are random, they may not be systematic. Abaaoud should
circulate through papers which permit without too many problems, and even if he had been
arrested, yet had he taken that there are fingerprints and be cross with all databases.
You remember the individual who wanted to stab a police officer at the police station of the
XVIIIe district? It was told Moroccan and Iraqi, finally Tunisian. He had been arrested in
Germany and Luxembourg for common law offences. I remember very well that, while her
mother spoke on television saying that the police had killed his son, a part of our partners
thought always it was a Moroccan while we had confirmation by Tunisians themselves that he
was Tunisian national.
We proceed to the consultation of certain databases, but the various national laws do not always.
Take the example of the S cards: some security services are in the legal inability to create. This is
what we need to change. The problem for Europe is not the cooperation between different
intelligence services but its ability to have a criminal law about the same everywhere.
The DGSE and ISB are integrated into a bilateral structure. We share all our information in real
time. Depending on the case, one or the other service plays the role of pilot depending on
whether the individual concerned is in France or abroad, but our policy remains that of the
judicial dismantling. The real difference with past practices is that both directions are, I stress,
fully integrated. All means are implemented Work to take into account the people that we know
that they target the french soil. Everything goes very smoothly between the two services.
I come to the question of Mr. Cavard on children. The figures I have given you are probably
below the reality. Honestly, I do not know how we will do. Remains that we do not sufficiently
aware of this phenomenon. Many children were born there and have no legal existence. Those
who are now about ten years of age are true Street dangers. Even ignoring their involvement in

terrorist organizations, we must wonder about their psychological state. Therefore, we do with,
which means that we are still far from being out of this crisis.
Another point: If we are not territorial reform to consolidate our resources to strengthen our
projection capabilities, it is because we expect that our colleagues from the territorial intelligence
should be able to cover the entire spectrum of weak signals, which does not prevent that we
communicate. The EMOPT represents 14,000 people and my service, which is located at the top
of the spectrum, gathers some 4,000; Therefore, we are forced to set priorities.
I return to the case of Brussels: these people spoke very clearly but anyone intercepting their
communications. and even though we have intercepted, it is not sure that we would have been
able to decipher them. It's real soldiers - we have changed size.
M. Christophe Cavard. You said, before the Defence Committee, had no cell organized in
France.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. I said that there's no cell in France linked to that of Brussels.
M. Christophe Cavard. You have sounded the alarm. Therefore, what the terrorist risk in
relation to the holding of the Euro 2016?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. The organization which, today, is planning attacks on European soil is
formed by professionals who come from Islamic circles but also the Baathism of Saddam
Hussein, namely officers totally broken underground and, in the past, have already demonstrated
their know-how.
About Brussels, I stated that it was waterproof and cell had no logistics on the french territory,
which means nothing as there is no cells in France. It must be understood that we are dealing
with a compartmentalized, hierarchical organization. They know very well that they have in front
of them very strong powers.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. You explained before the Defence Committee that the France would be the
most targeted country by terrorist actions from the Middle East. At least this is what I saw in the
press, because I have not yet read the report which was carried out of your hearing. Why are we
so most targeted? What, according to you, because we would have carried out an adventurous
foreign policy in the Middle East over the past decade? There was a "blessed" time where they
were Americans, possibly the British, who were at the top of list and we subsequently. Or even
the fact that we are suddenly moved top wishes to domestic policy - I think related affairs in the
Islamic veil, to accusations of Islamophobia?
Even if, after the attacks of the month of November, we we thought well that we were targeted, I
confess that your statement surprised me. However you did not say why we were the first
targeted country.

Mr. Patrick Calvar. The geopolitical situation of the region concerned facilitated the arrival of
foreign fighters, including a number of French. Now more there of French who go there, more
can be expected in return to be threatened.
M. Pierre Lellouche. And the Levant.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Without seeking to go further, I note that we are in the front line; but I
believe that if we limit ourselves to a safe response, we'll right into the wall.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Should we therefore consider a redesign of our foreign policy?
The President Georges Fenech. I am afraid that this question does not concern the Director
general of internal security.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Mr president, we have the chance to ask the Director-general, who said
that we were the first threatened. However, for my part, I do not know why. Mr. Calvar has
expertise that I did not, nor some of us, and I want to know what he really thinks. I am not only a
citizen but I'm also parliamentary, so I have to report to my fellow. Why are we the first targeted
and what to do to not be? Should we intervene to a lesser extent in Syria and Iraq? Should we go
on hunting against ambient Islamophobia?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Targets are multiple and terrorists strike there where it is easiest. The
British are probably also threatened that we, except that it is much more difficult to plan and to
act on their territory since it is an island and that it is very complicated to get a weapon to the
United Kingdom. Rest that if you watch the video's claim of the attacks of November 13, it ends
with images of Big Ben and David Cameron, the message being: you arrive! Terrorists, I stress,
there are hitting wherever they can, forts of the skills they have. With respect to the France, one
must add what is happening in the Sahel-Saharan Strip.
On the Syrian-Iraqi theatre, they want all members of the coalition. Russians risk, after the end
of the Syrian-Iraqi conflict, paying very much the return of peoples of North Caucasus and even
some former republics of the Soviet Union.
M. Pierre Lellouche. There are at least 5,000.
The President Georges Fenech. To return to the perpetrators of the attacks in the month of
November, you were the Greek authorities notified of the localization of Abaaoud in January
2015 in Athens? It was just before the assault on the cell of Verviers. The Greeks have informed
the Belgians who, in return, have not informed them it of the assault, and the Greeks were
particularly up against the absence of this feedback.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. I am unable to respond to you. Remains that if the Greeks had informed
US, this remains a matter between Greek and Belgian services.
The rapporteur. In January 2015, Abaaoud was therefore not identified by you.

Mr. Patrick Calvar. Abaaoud was known since it appeared on all videos. We knew full well
what he was interested when he was in Syria, but the lack of knowledge that we had in January
2015 its of us terrorist plans was not a priority. We have enough french nationals who, since the
Syria, want to hit us, or projecting our territory of people, either by appealing to friends who live
here, not we be concerned directly from cells in Belgium or in other countries, since we could
not establish connections.
The rapporteur. Memoo, Sumbua and Abaaoud in addition, other individuals involved closely
or from afar to the attacks of November 13 escaped your radar?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. There were many people in this case: the Iraqis...
The rapporteur. I thought french nationals.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. There were three, including Memoo and Sumbua. The others lived since
their childhood in Belgium so we had no reason to take them into account, unless you have
information that they were likely to come on our territory.
The rapporteur. The question everyone is asking is whether the individuals of your services,
and of the Belgian services are managed to get out of the radar screens or not. We encountered
difficulties in the supervision of these individuals?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. We had no reason to monitor these people there. Abaaoud started to be a
real problem for us since we were able to determine that he was involved in many concrete
projects for us.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Do you mean that it was in fact for the DGSE's deal with the Belgian cell?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. No, the supervision of the Belgian cell, is the work of the Belgians.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Of course, but if the Belgian services obtain information about the cell and
which concern the France, they will transmit them to the DGSE and not to you.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. To us also.
The rapporteur. In fact, the only problem that you have encountered, and you well explained,
concerns the Kaye brothers.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Attacks in the month of January 2015 have been designed here and by
people who lived in France. The investigation will perhaps bring clarification on this point, but
between the stay to the Yemen and the transition to action, far too many years have passed.
Coulibaly, him, is claimed by the Islamic State and the other two to Al-Qaida in the Arabian
peninsula (AQAP). It is concluded that it is here rather dealing with people who have met and
together carried out a project. We must ask ourselves on the reasons why we are not identified
and therefore for which we were not able to neutralize them, even if, unfortunately, we cannot
prevent everything.

The rapporteur. Surveillance of individuals failed on the french side?

Mr. Patrick Calvar. Which, today, has information at Raqqah?
The rapporteur. The DGSE.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Foreign intelligence services, actually, but with what means? What is
known of what happens at Raqqah? That is the problem. It comes back to the question of
technical intercepts, encryption, human sources...
Mr. Patrice Verchre. We find, since the attacks of 2015, that more and more security officers
are employed by private companies, the police cannot be everywhere. Many security agents will
still be hired on the occasion of the Euro 2016 and including to enclose the fan zones. Check you
thus recruits, passes you on their behalf, knowing that security companies will play a very
important role and that they often recruit, is very well known to black?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. We carry out audits once the lists are made available to us. To handle the
most complicated situations are those that existed before the period - hirings, applications not
deductions, layoffs. We do not only bound controls to the Euro, the fan zones and security
companies who are charged, we do also as it is sensitive business. We will have to find a way to
guarantee freedoms while ensuring safety; remains to be seen what price we are willing to pay.
Assignments to residence, the administrative searches, screenings are the measures subject to
review by the courts because the consequences are heavy.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Between those who want to leave and those who want to go back, how
much do you think the number of French problem for the security of the country?
Then, and I asked the same question to the Minister of the Interior just now, is reasonable for
your purposes, to gather under the Eiffel Tower, for a month, 92 000 spectators before large
screens and behind a fence, with alcohol,-I refer here to the Parisian area fan?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. The greatest threat is represented by people who fought, who were trained
in Syria and Iraq, such as those who attacked the Bataclan, who were in France on 13 November.
These are leading the terrorist actions of magnitude. There are 400 or 500. Nevertheless, we must
no longer think in terms of French or persons resident in France but francophones. Thousands of
Tunisians, thousands of Moroccans and Algerians can be projected onto our territory. Most
importantly, let us not forget the lesson of November 13: two Iraqis out of nowhere were part of
the commando. Therefore, it is very difficult to answer specifically your question. This is the
most dangerous threat.
Then, other groups, such as those formed by the brothers Kaye and Coulibaly, are capable of
committing actions of magnitude.
Finally, a whole class of individuals would act but do not have the means. Some might go
beyond where they are from backgrounds of delinquency and conduct low-intensity, certainly,
but which are nevertheless inherently minds.

In total, we follow about 2,000 people. My concern is that I have no visibility on from
francophones in North Africa which, through alliances linguistic and operational forged there since they fought together-, may engage in a project or be appointed to be part of the same
project.
The rapporteur. You mentioned earlier the figure of 4,000 people and here that of 2,000 people.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. The figure of 4,000 people concerned the EMOPT; I refer here to the hard
point: between those who are in Syria, those who returned and those who would like to reach,
we reach the figure of 2,000 individuals.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Besides North Africans.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Altogether.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Which include many Tunisians.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. There are many, in fact.
M. Pierre Lellouche. How much are, 5 000 about?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. It is very difficult to say.
With regard to the fan-zone, it has the advantage to be able to control those who will enter.
Remains that there are still areas to hit. Be they cafes or other public places, the targets are not
lacking.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Would you have persisted to organise Euro 2016?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Should absolutely not yield. I think that we will win against terrorism; on
the other hand, I am much more concerned about the radicalization of society and the
background movement which leads him. This is what worries me when I talk to all my European
colleagues: we will have, at one time or another, to allocate resources to deal with other
extremist groups because the confrontation is inevitable.
The President Georges Fenech. You want to talk of the extreme right and the extreme left?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. The ultra left is in a different logic. You will have a confrontation between
the ultra right and the Muslim world not the Islamists, but the Muslim world.
The President Georges Fenech. Specifically, let's come back to the object of the commission of
inquiry, i.e. the means of the State.
We want you to do us part of your analysis on the coordination of intelligence in France. The
UCLAT depends on the Director-general of the national police and therefore escape the
interdepartmental coordination. It is also the case of the EMOPT, created by 2015 by the

Minister of the Interior and directly attached to his office. The UCLAT administers the FSPRT
file; the EMOPT ensures the continuity of the monitoring of radicalized individuals. In addition
to these structures, there is a coordinator at the Elysee. One wonders if there is not a layer too,
and if the coordination of intelligence is well insured. Could we not imagine, for the top of the
spectrum, as did the Americans, a common database that can be shared by all stakeholders in the
fight against terrorism? With us, sharing information is not total through a single file, it being
specified that the FSPRT is a trace file, traffic and that it is not fuelling by the EMOPT. It is you
who, in reality, are leader of intelligence in France. Could not the UCLAT take a higher
dimension? That is what justifies the existence of the EMOPT, in the end, as it directly exposes
the Minister of the Interior since directly to him?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. The UCLAT has an interdepartmental function; It brings together every
week people from all the ministries concerned - national defence, economy and finance, to which
can be added the prison intelligence - and its role is to assess the threat. The FSPRT is in charge
of the processing of the reports provided by the national centre for assistance and prevention of
radicalisation (CNAPR) and on the other hand by the assessment panels which are under the
direction of dpartement prefects the EMOPT, for its part, perfectly her role which is to ensure
the follow-up of weak signals and that each actor took into account its objectives.
The President Georges Fenech. Could the UCLAT not have to do?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. It will take you to speak with the Minister.
The President Georges Fenech. You could position the UCLAT for this purpose rather than
have two structures.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. It was to send a strong message after all these events: that of the total
involvement of the Ministry of the Interior and therefore prefects. Also the EMOPT meets this
need. I am not sure that the UCLAT could fulfill this mission less than reposition.
The President Georges Fenech. It is this. Wouldn't have been simpler to do so? In any case the
question arises.
In addition, you is the FSPRT this really useful?
The rapporteur. In this regard, the set of targets, some 2,000 people you mentioned, are
registered to the FSPRT? The same subject plug S?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. All the people that we are a plug S. Also any police service, gendarmerie,
customs, in short all who have access to the file of wanted persons (FPR), can know in real time
that such individual is followed by our service. In addition, I insist on the fact that each sheet
indicates the action. We have approximately 11 000 sheets S terrorism-related.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you use the FSPRT?

Mr. Patrick Calvar. The FSPRT is the way for us to discuss permanently with our colleagues
from other services to assess cases of which we have not detected the danger. On the other hand,
can surrender to another service such cases deemed less dangerous after evaluation.
The rapporteur. All of your targets included in the FSPRT file?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. The largest part.
The President Georges Fenech. Not all?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Most of our targets are.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you apply article L. 851 - 2 of the code of Homeland
Security, on the follow-up in real time to a list of individuals?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Yes. The law is very precise: the measure provided for in this article
cannot be applied to a person at the same time, motivation, precise, can relate to this person and
to the extent of making a terrorist threat.
The President Georges Fenech. Specifically, technically, how does this happen?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. We have a request about an individual and, choosing among the techniques
which we hope the implementation in Work, we call for the application of article L. 851 - 2 of
the code of Homeland Security as of the intelligence Act, specifying what we have on the person
concerned and which are a potential threat terrorist on the territory.
The rapporteur. The vote of the law on the intelligence had estimated to 3,000 the number of
individuals to be monitored closely. Where are we?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. We monitor hundreds but, once again, have it that we justifiions the
existence of a terrorist threat and that we make a request for each individual. In addition, I recall
that this measure can be applied only for two months and that at the end of this period we must
apply for its renewal and thus show that indeed, threat there. If we have found nothing, there is a
chance so that the measure can be extended. In this regard, we have a relationship of very great
confidence with the national commission of control of intelligence (CNCTR) techniques which
proves very benevolent services while being in his role of absolute control of the administrative
legality of putting in The work of intelligence techniques.
M. Christophe Cavard. You have explained earlier that the terrorists were very coordinated, but
what about the intelligence services? During your hearing by the Defence Committee, when you
talk about the attack in the Thalys, you indicate that the individual share of Spain, travelled in
Germany and then in Belgium, and you declare: 'we lose therefore his trace since we no longer
have any reason to do. If I well translate your remarks, you lose its trace because it is no longer
on the french territory. What should be put in place for a better coordination of the intelligence
services of different countries?

Mr. Patrick Calvar. I, in fact, stated that we had never been able to establish the presence of the
person concerned on the national territory and that, as a precaution, we had issued a sheet to the
case where it would be subject to scrutiny. This test took place a year later in Berlin, while he
was on a flight to Istanbul. We have immediately made contact with the Spaniards, since he
previously lived in Spain, asking them if they were informed and if they knew the whereabouts
of the person concerned. They said he was in Belgium and that the Belgians were informed of his
presence in Brussels. Only, and I return to what I stated in my introductory statement, some
services do not have the ability to list their goals in the Schengen file. This is the case of the
Belgian State security; and this inability is legal: it is not a police service. Yet again, if our trade
with certain foreign services are very fluid, there is no harmonisation of the European system. It
is from there that come problems. Must be in a control, the customs, the police or the
gendarmerie could escalate information in real time to a single service able to evaluate it. This is
why I took the example of the Thalys: we did not know Karadeniz; It is reported by the Spanish;
It reappears in Germany; We are told that he is in Belgium - and since the Belgium that it will
rise in the train it will attempt to attack passengers.
The President Georges Fenech. At the beginning of our work, the victims and their lawyers
spoke ahead a report drawn up by the DCRI in 2009 referring to a project to attack the Bataclan.
They added that by 2015, the judge Trevidic received Farouk Ben Abbes, indicted, information
which refers to an attack against a theatre project. The victims ask insistently why hotel owners
have not been informed of these threats. The Paris Prosecutor, when asked, refers to the
confidentiality of the investigation, considering also that it does not belong to the judge to give
this information. As the Minister of the Interior, it considered that it was not his area of expertise.
Can you yourself provide us answers on this point?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. You just tell me that the Prosecutor of the Republic did not respond...
The rapporteur. I think he has instead referred the ball in your direction.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. I will answer you clearly trying to respect the confidentiality of the
investigation. Farouk Ben Abbes is located at the junction of two different folders, one linked to
the project of attack of 2009 against the Bataclan and one related to the death of our young
compatriot Ccile Vannier during the attack in Cairo the same year.
Farouk Ben Abbes was arrested a first time in Belgium - country of nationality - because he is
suspected of belonging to a chain of dispatch of fighters in Iraq. A dismissal will be pronounced
and it will therefore not be prosecuted. He then settled in Egypt from where he left for Gaza.
There, he entered in connection with an extremist movement and he will regain the Egypt in
2009, where it will be found carrying a USB key containing documentation on the manufacture
of explosive devices. Passed by one of the underground tunnels, he was arrested and
interrogated. A third-party service will declare that the Egyptians would have obtained the
confession of the person concerned that he was commissioned to carry out an attack in France,
and which could be the Bataclan, organizing - hotel we are in 2009 - galas of charity for the
benefit of the Israeli army then engaged in operation "cast lead".

Never the Egyptians have responded to any request for assistance and brought no concrete
evidence in this regard. However, when Farouk Ben Abbes was released, after passing by the
Belgium where he was again interrogated, he travelled to France where he was arrested, indicted
and imprisoned. All investigations from thence did not connect it to this pseudo-projet which is
unclear, again, whether it existed or not - is known strictly nothing, the Egyptians had never
given, I repeat, nothing. Justice could therefore conclude that a dismissal, regardless that it had
fully done its job, up to request and obtain his incarceration.
Case Ccile Vannier is any and concerns an attack in Cairo. We want to bind Farouk Ben Abbes
via of the witnesses who then will not recognize. The statement here is not complete. The person
concerned was recently placed in custody in this context.
Remains that all elements that may advance the investigation, if they exist, are in the hands of
the Egyptian authorities. Also, today, nothing linking Bataclan and Vannier, of 2009, Affairs and
the attacks of November 13, 2015. Some people will tell you however that in Egypt he met
brothers Clain. But the Clain brothers were in no way affected by what was happening in Gaza,
and as for the attack that caused the death of Ccile Vannier, the Clain had already returned since
long in France when it was committed.
Therefore we cannot establish a link between what happened in 2009-2010 and what happened in
2015, why do you want that there was a direct information managers or owners of the Bataclan ?
Nothing, absolutely nothing to indicate that there is a link. Justice perfectly did his job. Farouk
Ben Abbes was jailed for a long enough period, investigations all-out have been conducted and
no evidence to corroborate this possible connection; In addition, I repeat, we got no response to
the requests for international assistance to the Egyptian authorities. Unknown therefore up to the
fact that the person concerned could, one day or another, take the remarks attributed to him.
M. Pierre Lellouche. I would like to ask you about the possible escalation of attacks that would
be brought to a 'non-standard' level, with the use of radiological weapons combining fissile
products from hospital, such as cesium-137, cobalt-60, or chemical weapons that we find that
they are now used each week in Syria by both parties to the conflict - the manufacture of this
type of weapons in Mossul reached an alarming stage. However, before that we encourions the
risk of an attack with such weapons, we must prepare to improvised explosive devices
(Improvised Explosive Device - IED) and the stuffed Rams cars with explosives, used there daily.
How do you envisage the gradation of the threat?
Then, during my conversations in Israel, I realized that it had changed the Organization of the
Ministry of the Interior, just as the Americans have created the Department of Homeland
Security (Department of Homeland Security). This commission could ask the question of
whether to change the style of the Ministry of the Interior to the French, dealing with
decentralization, territorial communities at the same time that security and the fight against
terrorism. I see well, for my part, a Department of Homeland Security, and a Department of local
communities - as is now the case, therefore, among the Israelis and Americans. I think that this
type of institutional change is necessary and that the next presidential campaign should be the
occasion to ask this kind of question.

Mr. Patrick Calvar. You will recall that in the past, had been updated projects to recover in the
bins one set of radioactive products of hospital origin and whose Assembly would have enabled
the creation of a bomb sale. It stopped later, at the United States, an individual who had designed
such a project. It is a project that the Islamists have always had in mind. In addition, the armed
Islamic Group (GIA), at the same time, conducting research on ricin. Up using this biological
agent, kill many people at the same time, it was to create a panic effect smearing with ricin the
handles on the doors of vehicles so that the thus contaminated people die. The media effect
would have been disastrous. Other research on the subject have been conducted in the Pankisi
Valley in Georgia, and then in the North of the Iraq. The Islamists have so, I repeat, always
marked their interest in this type of weapon.
The difference with today is that they acquired on the subject a quasi-industrial capacity. In any
case, they recovered what had Saddam Hussein's army or the army of Bashar Al-Assad and they
do not hesitate to use it on the ground. If they have the opportunity, they will export these
weapons. The real difficulty for them is to do so, particularly because of the dangerous nature of
the goods in question. Also, for the time being, they remain basic attacks, and like you, I am
convinced they will move to the stage of trapped vehicles and explosive, and that thus they will
rise in power.
The President Georges Fenech. Is it a conviction or well do you use on specific hardware
elements, clues?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. First, he should remember that this is what we experienced in 1986 and
1995: it comes to conventional procedures. Then, they end up projecting commandos whose
mission will be to organize terrorist campaigns without necessarily going to attack with death to
the key. To do this, need them the artificers and organise all logistics, i.e. settling our territory,
acquire all products...
M. Pierre Lellouche. You remember the flight of the army depot of Miramas, last year? Arms
and explosives have disappeared. Do you know where they are?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. No. But they can, anyway, make bombs in an artisanal way, by purchasing
for example ammonium nitrate. Remember 1995. The worst disaster was averted thanks to a
timer (timer) failed: Jewish school in Villeurbanne, a car bomb with 100 kilograms of explosives
jumped at a time, unlike what had been programmed, was not that of the release of the children.
Otherwise, it would have been a massacre.
We know very well that they will resort to these procedures: they have seen the effects of a
massive operation. What has happened in Belgium is the result of the fact that, stuck, they could
no longer engage in multiple actions. But again, as soon as they will be projected on our territory
of the artificers, they can avoid sacrificing their fighters while creating the maximum damage.
Then, you will understand that, on intelligence, I cannot answer you.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Obviously.

The President Georges Fenech. But your analysis is based about the same intelligence?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Yes. This is not new.
The President Georges Fenech. We well believe.
The rapporteur. I return to the files. We feel that there are many in the fight against terrorism,
each with his own - the gendarmerie, the territorial intelligence, the ISB with filename
CRISTINA (centralisation of domestic intelligence for the security of the territory and national
interests)... Would it not be possible to have, in the future, a common file, to the living room,
which can be used by all the services? A little the vocation of the FSPRT but it is very confined.
We have seen this morning at a demonstration of the latter, and it seemed pretty convincing
while we were initially, enough criticism. What is your opinion on the creation of a Super?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. All individuals that we are enrolled in the RPF which they appear with a
plug S. Therefore services that want to approach us to learn can do.
The rapporteur. Hence that you don't pay not in the FSPRT all items in your possession?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. It is clear that we are not certain elements: we indicate only that it's goals
that we take into account and we must protect the information and the source of the information
since it is a file of sovereignty - we are bound by the confidentiality of national defence.
The rapporteur. We made two trips in the province, in Lille and Marseille, where we could
meet your colleagues for which intelligence - they have stated us quite explicitly - the FSPRT is
not very functional, instead of the gendarmes and territorial intelligence who find it useful. Do
you confirm that plastic your service help more that he is assisted by the FSPRT?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. It was necessary to convey the message that everyone was concerned and a
few so-called experts.
The rapporteur. You are therefore not in favour of, as I understand it, for reasons of
confidentiality, to the establishment of a larger file, shared with other services than those inside.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. If we share information with customs services, with TRACFIN under cell
Allat. Thus, have the 2 000 names that I have previously mentioned been disseminated to all the
services of the first circle.
The rapporteur. This is not at all what we had understood, if I may say so. Can you explain
briefly what is the Allat cell? We have the impression that the six services of the first circle, plus
one or two others are in the same room and that, basically, when service is information about an
individual claimant, each service searches its database.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. We, at the outset, given all the names - the 2 000 concerned by Syrian-Iraqi
dies - so that they are screened by each service.

The rapporteur. Specifically, what is the frequency of meetings of the Allat cell?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. It is a permanent cell and representatives of the departments concerned are
in the same room. For example, if one of them declares interest in Untel, we refer to a driver and
each brings him then its competition.
The rapporteur. Do you consider that the Allat cell as the cell Hermes obtain tangible results?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Yes of course. Allat cell is the instance of operational coordination. All
information are directed to the service driver to load for him to then pursue the matter with its
means.
The rapporteur. This therefore meets on a daily basis. Those who drive it work full time?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. They work full time and can be mobilized 24 hours a day in times of crisis.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you tell us a word of the counter-terrorism group (GAT)?
The rapporteur. And what is the difference between GAT and the club of Bern?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. The club of Bern, is something else: it does not always include the same
actors and deals with more issues of sovereignty, of espionage. The GAT, meanwhile, brings
together all of the security services of the Member countries of the European Union as well as
those of the Switzerland and the Norway. Certain working groups of the GAT are specialized,
for example in the Syrian-Iraqi problem.
Exchange within this group is done in real time. All personal information shall be communicated
between services. Operations can be mounted between services in a bi configuration or
multilateral. The GAT is an operational. During extended sessions, are invited the European
Coordinator for the fight against terrorism, Gilles de Kerchove, the representative of the Director
of Europol.
The rapporteur. You mentioned 4 414 agents which will compose your service in 2018, of
whom 17% of contract. Encounter problems of recruitment, training, retention? Other
intelligence services made us part of the lack of Arabists among their agents; What in ISB?
Do you have difficulties in paying your human sources?
Finally, on the night of 13 to 14 November 2015, you identified the links of terrorists with the
Belgium?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. We have no major problems with recruitment in the direction where many
are tempted to join us. The problem is more to determine what we need then to organize career
paths. Finally, it is to make people work in synergy and not in opposition.
To answer your second question, we have no problem to finance the human sources.

The rapporteur. Like other services, you compensate sources?

Mr. Patrick Calvar. Of course.
The rapporteur. Some "experts" in the media considered that we had sacrificed human
intelligence for the benefit of technical intelligence. You said that we must not oppose. However,
during our visit in Turkey, the importance of the human sources of the DGSE marked us. What
for your service?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. ISB has a very large number of human sources.
The rapporteur. Also, can we indicate in the report that, from your point of view, we have not
sacrificed human intelligence for the benefit of technical intelligence?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Indeed!
The rapporteur. This is important, because we have heard much.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Supposedly I am a veteran of the cold war and, for those who do not know,
I would remind you that I dedicate myself to counter-terrorism since 1993. I became an
aficionado of new technologies - even though I have no technical degree in the field. In reality,
no matter the method with which you get intelligence. What matters then is your ability to
analyse it and exploit it.
It is no less true that it cannot, today, do not take into account the evolution of the digital. We
must therefore invest in the material. You will see that the ongoing evolution will tomorrow lay
numerous problems democratic both will widen the already large gap between political and
administrative elites and the scientific elite. It is not the speed at which will progress - even if the
advances of medicine, for example, give us an idea. You'll see that the changes will be profound.
But, yet once, no, we don't sacrifice absolutely not human intelligence, even though, in some
areas, you will have great difficulty to have. Similarly, he must anticipate interception and
decryption. We, one day or the other, a tussle with operators and not only American - the main
network operators used by the terrorists, Telegram, is Russian. I give no figures, of course, but I
can assure you that we are conducting many operations with human sources. Only, we prefer
privacy, because of our culture of secrecy.
With regard to the night of 13-14 November, we immediately pointed the responsibility of finger
Abaaoud.
The rapporteur. But, at 9: 10 pm, the mounted police control Salah Abdeslam. The Mounties
feel something and they hold it a little. He had no, this morning of 14 November, a problem of
transmission of information? Could we not detain Salah Abdeslam in knowingly?

Mr. Patrick Calvar. No, Salah Abdeslam was reported as belonging in the middle of the crime
but with no connection to terrorism. The gendarmes had therefore no objective reason to think
that he could have a link with what happened in Paris the day before.
On the other hand, we have very close relations with the Belgians with which we cooperate for
many years.
The rapporteur. I come back number of Arabists, your service is missing it?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. This question is starting to become a concern for us, because we encounter
difficulties in empowerment: as a security service, we are very careful not to be penetrated. We
must therefore find new formulas to be able to hire people whose we are some loyalty.
The President Georges Fenech. On legalization, what are the criteria according to which you
consider that it is better to get out of the closed environment and law? It asked the Paris attorney
who explained to us that the relationship was quite good between his prosecution and your
service. The question about if should not detach permanently to officials of the ITSB to antiterrorism Prosecutor, the Prosecutor replied that such action seemed unnecessary.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. We regularly meet representatives of the Prosecutor's office to discuss the
State of the threat. The decision of the prosecution is taken in common, unless we got with a
turn-key file. Still, I stress, that our relations with the Paris Prosecutor's office are very close.
The rapporteur. With regard to what you said earlier, from the implementation review...
Mr. Patrick Calvar. It is the law.
The rapporteur. Specifically, do you think, therefore, that we must continue to deepen your
work to avoid the initiation of judicial proceedings?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. No, never. And you should know that the initiation of judicial proceedings
may present great advantages: thanks to home searches, you can enter in the cFavorite pieces of
the problem.
The rapporteur. Conversely, after the attacks, have you not wanted to judicialize too early?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. No. We treat information in the immediate aftermath.
The rapporteur. For you, in January and November 2015, he missed something?
The President Georges Fenech. I conclude this issue. Remember that the Prime Minister
himself, after the attacks, had stated that there had necessarily been faulting, apparently objective
judgement. Terrorists are passed to the Act in full Paris, causing the largest number of deaths
since the release on our soil. What is your feeling when you read all these press articles about
"the failure of intelligence", which call into question the work of our services? Do you think that
this is a trial of intent, an injustice? Or is it, in fact, do better?

Mr. Patrick Calvar. Any attack is a failure because we could not prevent it.
The President Georges Fenech. There is no such thing as zero risk.
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Then, should be organised - what you do here - the feedback without
partisan or polemic spirit to try to understand what has worked, what has less market, in short, to
achieve a sort of autopsy.
However we are systematically confronted with unfounded attacks, documented and illintentioned. Some, of course, pose real questions and it is normal that, in a democracy, be aware
and trying to make progress.
2015 attacks represent a global intelligence failure.
Need to pay close attention to the fact that young, in my service, live very badly that can leave
families imagine that their loved ones died because of incompetent. Must be wondering about the
ability of resilience of the society. That appeals to you as politicians and which also concerns us:
we are supposed to be responsible for everything. And if you create a climate of anxiety and fear
in the services, it is very dangerous: one might be tempted by the headlong or abdication. This is
not the case today, but staff need a bit of support even though, I repeat, an attack is a failure and
even if so, we have to ask ourselves about the reasons why we could not prevent it.
I return to my image: one has the impression that this is not disease need to heal but the doctor
must be killed. It is the physician to better train knowing, as you pointed out, that there is no such
thing as zero risk.
Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. Do you think that should create a body assessment and intelligence
policy, or even an independent authority that would cause still further reflection?
Mr. Patrick Calvar. Intelligence gained democratic letters of nobility. Intelligence Act gave
legitimacy to the action, the parliamentary delegation for intelligence exercises its control, as
well as the commissions to which you belong.
We, for our part, tend to overlap structures, to call them into question, to change the procedures.
Nevertheless, I repeat, we have achieved a true revolution since 2007.
I do not believe in the idea of an independent commission. In France, we have the delegation of
parliamentary intelligence, independent by nature because it is not the Executive and it control of
the legislature on intelligence. We probably went far enough in the reform and its
implementation in Work, which is continuing, is far from being completed. Do not want to
permanently unravel what exists.
Then, whenever something happens, should carry out an analysis, I stress, non-controversial or
partisan. However there are a little hard to do in this country.

In the future, should be to bring together the academic world of the operational world. Indeed,
the difficulties we are experiencing will not be resolved by the only safe means, also need to put
around the table of figures from horizons very different so their dialogue emerges a common
vision.
Thirty-nine years now that I have this job: I think Europe is in very great danger; It does not
collect the rise of anger and we see not coming confrontation between communities which may
be brutal.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you Mr. Director general.
Hearing, behind closed doors, Mr. Louis Gautier, Secretary-General of defense and
national security (SGDSN)
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Wednesday, may 25, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We have the pleasure of welcoming, this afternoon, Mr. Louis
Gautier, Secretary general of defence and national security (SGDSN), accompanied by colonel
Herv de Courrges, Advisor for the protection and the safety of the State, colonel Gwnal
Jzquel, Adviser for institutional relations.
Mr Secretary general, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our
Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7,
2015. We already heard many representatives of the armed forces, and we will hear next week
the Minister of defence. I recall that the SGDSN is a service of the Prime Minister who is the
head of Government in the exercise of its responsibilities for defence and national security. It has
since 2009, in accordance with the white paper on defence, extended missions, especially
Security. We'll ask you including your mission of operational coordination and the means
implemented in Work to secure the territory.
Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, this hearing is held
in camera. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly. Nevertheless,
pursuant to section 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning of the
parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at
the end of our work. I said that the summary records of the hearings which were held in camera
are first transmitted to people heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will
be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report.
I would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is punishable by
the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who, within a period of
twenty-five years, disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a commission of
inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this
information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Mr. Louis Gautier oath.

Our questions can be grouped under three chapters respectively to the Sentinel operation,
operational coordination and the current threat.
First of all, we would like to know which presided over the launching of the Sentinel operation.
How many interventions military of the operation they carried out during the year 2015? How
many times have they made use of their weapon to fire?
How do the coordination of the operation with the internal security forces?
What are communication tools, as well as command and planning tools? What joint exercises
have been made?
What operational balance you draw the operation? What is the added value of the armies in the
securing of the national territory?
How do you explain that the evening of November 13, troops deployed in Paris have had so little
operational information? How to improve the sharing of this information?
Wouldn't have been more appropriate to create 10,000 additional positions for the benefit of the
national gendarmerie, for example?
What are the possible ways of improvement? Could the know-how of the military be better used?
Is the operation called to register in the long term?
What are the precise rules of engagement of the soldiers of the operation and how do differ from
those of the internal security forces? What are the specific instructions given to military?
Finally, what follow-up had been given to your report of 17 February 2016 on the commitment
of the armed forces within the national territory and its twenty-two recommendations?
Mr. Louis Gautier, Secretary-General of defense and national security. As you pointed out,
Mr president, the role of the Secretary-General of defense and national security is a global
architect for security, his skills in this area having been consolidated in 2009 in the context of the
developments after the white paper of 2008. It also plays an operational role in the areas of
computer security, with the security of information systems (ANSSI) National Agency, and
Government transmission, with the Government transmission Centre (CTG). Since this year, the
interministerial control group (ICG) is organically attached to the SGDSN. For the rest, the
essence of its mission is to prepare and to follow the decisions taken at the governmental level by
the Prime Minister on national security and defence and the national security and Defence
Council chaired by the head of State. In the year 2015, this Council has been activated on several
occasions, particularly in the context of the follow-up to the decisions taken after the attacks.

The postulates of this evolution were bolstered by the crisis of the year 2015. Indeed, in 2012,
with case Merah, threats and the dimension of the aftershocks were still homeland security
agenda. On the other hand, from 2015, after the attack on Charlie Hebdo and theHypercacher
and especially after the bombing of the Bataclan, the response of the State, be it at the
international level - strikes on Raqqah - or national - deployment of the operation Sentinel,
intelligence sharing and coordination of intelligence within separate departments strings - shows
well need a response to nationwide face a threat which had evolved and now matters of national
security.
This threat, you know, is characterized by the number of people to watch I think to those who
may be tempted to commit terrorist acts or join theatres of conflict-, by erasing the border
between national security and homeland security - through these networks and these sectors, the
theatres of conflict have an echo on the national territory which can be targeted - and by the
passage l'acte. In the past, our country has often faced the threat of terrorism, and perhaps, in
the years 1970 or 1980, supporters of some extreme ideological causes were they in thousands.
But the current situation differs from those that we have known in that it is characterized by the
hardening, the frequentation of theatres of conflict, accustomed to violence, the brutalisation,
Faculty of passage l'acte of radicalized people. We must therefore avoid not only that people
don't join the theatres of conflict or pass to the Act, but also those who have been in contact with
an ideology and violent individuals not to engage them also in a terrorist spiral.
There is also a militarization of actions: use of weapons of war at the Bataclan, Kamikaze
attacks in Brussels... And other types of threats are referenced in a sufficiently accessible
literature, especially on the internet, so that one alarm. During these actions, the aim was not
only to exploit vulnerabilities in our security system, but also to saturate intervention and rescue
devices. It is thus up to the SGDSN practice a systematic audit of all security devices taking
account of the changing of the threat, and therefore to study the hypothesis of scenarios that
would be worse still: multiple attacks, drones used for terrorist purposes, the explosive attack
coupled with the dispersal of chemical products, etc.
Facing this threat which seeks the country as a whole, as evidenced by numerous alerts or attacks
that we have experienced - I am thinking in particular what happened to Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, we had to conduct a systematic review of our devices, as well as our means of intervention and
rescue. The year 2015 was thus mainly devoted to anticipation, adaptation measures, to the
increase in resources and the improvement of the training of personnel. This question is
obviously central. It is, alas, not possible, against this type of threat, risk, particularly due to the
phenomenon of auto-radicalisation. However, we would be failing in our responsibilities if we
do not realise a systematic audit of our safety devices. This is why the SGDSN has revisited
throughout the year 2015, the great organization of the response of the State frameworks.
Among these, I think obviously the Vigipirate plan, which showed its strengths, in terms of
reactivity and mobilization of all the ministries, but he has found very quickly in a situation of
thrombosis. Also think we, taking into account the legislative changes that you are adopting to
what must be the next plan after the State of emergency. Operation Sentinel, for its part, was
triggered to respond to a need, but also to a request for the protection of our fellow citizens, some

communities are directly threatened. We have also improved the functioning of the interministerial crisis unit and safety device of the so-called activities of vital importance.
Regards Vigipirate, the difficulties we have been facing are explained by the fact that we were
forced to maintain in the long term a posture "attack alert" that initially involved a very strong
mobilization of security forces all but over a limited period. In fact, the previous plan - and that
is what inspires my reflection - linked too narrowly posture of Vigipirate and staffing levels,
particularly because it was direct with the operational contracts conformably armies and a very
strict quota, in white earlier books, of the workforce that the armed forces should deploy in the
territory to protect the population : 1010 men, permanently, only.
On the other hand, in France, unlike what is happening abroad, different postures come
immediately, on the basis of a planning crisis, legally binding measures. Thus, the information
indicating that the threat remained at its maximum, we have extended the attack alert posture,
which had been conceived as the maximum deployment of staff. However, very quickly, we had
to waive all coercive measures applicable in the context of this posture.
I would remind you that, after the attacks against Charlie Hebdo and theHypercacher, the
SGDSN transmitted to the cabinet of the Prime Minister, who also often quoted him, in July, a
document entitled "The same day", which was considering the measures that should be taken
immediately in the event of major attack. It is these measures which included the rest the State of
emergency, which were applied: crisis cell, activation of the cell of the victims, etc.
If acting operation Sentinel, the deployment of these troops was first within the scope of the
emergency, the needs or requests for protection. Then, in the year 2015, the response has been
organized and streamlined. When we wonder about the relevance of this device, I have two
responses. First, one may wonder, said the Chief of staff of the armed forces, that our fellow
citizens would have thought armies if, in such a context, it had not deployed more troops on its
territory to ensure their protection? The second response is based on an international comparison:
all countries rely on reinforcing capabilities that are armed. Moreover, ourselves have always
done, in the past. Vigipirate is not a recent document: it was developed in the early 1980s - a
time where conscription allowed to more easily involve the army in missions of public service and active for the first time at the time of the Gulf war.
Why turn to the military? Because, in contrast to the internal security forces, which are
necessarily distributed throughout the territory, the armies have the possibility of mobilizing
forces greater than the thousand men, which is the regimental level. The volume of troop
strength of the intervention of the gendarmerie and CRS units is of the order of hundreds. By
comparison, the flexibility of command that offers this exceptional deposit - backed in addition
to a structure, the army, with tens of thousands of men - is the look a determinant.
On the other hand, it is a very specific mission. Concerns were expressed thereon, but within the
framework of work carried out during the year 2015, we have translated that operation Sentinel
was well to use armies for a mission of protection and not for a mission of maintaining public
order or judicial police. And it was right - while other ideas were present at the beginning of the
reflection - to stick to this fairly restrictive design whereby the armies on requisition of civilian

power - Minister of the Interior or prefects - are involved in support of the internal security
forces.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. In this connection, we've been tagged by the hearing of the
Sentinel operation members who were in the vicinity of the Bataclan on the evening of
November 13 - but we will return. You say that armies should be exclusively used for protection.
However, it seems to me that, in your report of evaluation of operation Sentinel, you advocate to
equip military handguns. Can you enlighten us on this point?
Mr. Louis Gautier. The report sticks to the logic of the requisition and the mission of
protection. However, in the framework of this mission, members may find themselves in
emergency situations that involve responses. It is heard the most difficult point to set - this will
return the rest to their training and the need to clarify the rules of engagement and the mandates
of the armies. Initially, it was intended not to modify the military equipment, complicating their
training. Currently, officers and NCOs have a loaded handgun. Need to provide also the corporal
or master corporal that guides a team of three military? The issue has not been finally decided,
but it seemed to us that it should be studied, because, in certain situations, including selfprotection, handgun can be more easily employable as a FAMAS.
The rapporteur. You mentioned the use of handgun only if response. In no case the military of
the Sentinel operation cannot be first responders?
Mr. Louis Gautier. I was going to come. In our report, we advocated a degree of harmonisation
of rules on criminal liability to the military, gendarmes and police officers - the rest is the
solution which has been retained by the legislature. It is indeed possible that, in certain situations
- which were specified after an interdepartmental working under the State Council and voted by
Parliament-, the military must intervene to stop an imminent danger or its repetition, and not
simply in self-defence, case which had initially justified an extension of endowments in
handguns.
Regarding Sentinel, there were two phases of reflection in the conduct of interdepartmental
work. The first phase is that of an internal settling for the armed forces. For them, it came to an
almost historical upheaval, since, because of the operation Sentinel, the national mission,
compared to external operations, found a prevalence that she no longer had for twenty years. By
2015, 8,000 were deployed on the national territory for Sentinel, more than in external
operations. When considering the evolution of military doctrine, there are armies, apart from
deterrence mission, is in the external projection, which implies a reduction of their footprint
because of the downsizing, from the end of conscription and the creation of defence bases. Army
finds, with operation Sentinel, a sort of territorial footprint, an anchor, a contact with the
population, which tended to disappear.
This reappropriation, which was especially essential for army - and who was able to debate,
some fearing that the mission of domestic protection the distracts from its other missions,
including external - this reappropriation, as I said, first found a balance between the three armies.
In fact, the air force and the Navy continued to fill daily mission of securing the territory through
the protection of maritime approaches and aviation security. It had feared, at the outset, that this

causes disruption, including doctrinal, but an effort of internal work for the armed forces allowed
to find a form of consistency. Certainly, the mission of protection of the national territory is
present in all white papers, but she became of de facto residual since because of the format of the
army and of the withdrawal of its territorial presence, the latter was less called to participate in
missions of public service in the years 1970 or 1980.
The question then arose whether, in the bosom of the armies, a number of units, regiments,
should specialize in the accomplishment of this mission. The answer was negative, although in
fact, some units were more contribution than others. It was a temporary situation, as the rise of
the format of the army would allow to find a form of harmonisation. Also is the trade-offs that
have been made were, it seems to me the good: it was decided that the operation of territorial
protection is accomplished in turn by the units, so that military will integrate it their other
missions, including that of outdoor projection.
Let us not forget that, in the context of its external interventions, army often ensures the
protection of populations, with also the same reservations about the use of weapons. Thus army
made the choice, out of favor homogeneity, considering that the FAMAS, the stick and tear
bomb were sufficient equipment. Then it evolved, considering - initially, I repeat, for reasons
related to self-defence - that handguns staffing could be useful; We followed him in this
evolution. Then arises the question of the involvement of the military intervention as that first
come - I will come back.
From the attack of the Bataclan, the questions related to the use of the Sentinel operation - I
think the presence military to secure Saint-Denis or near Bataclan - come mainly from the
Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, a reflection on the means of Homeland Security led Bernard
Cazeneuve to announce a major reform with regard to intervention forces in April. We have
indeed learned from the attack of the Bataclan that face the modes of action of terrorists we
didn't have the preparation time, so if we want to save as many human lives as possible, should
be the means of action who arrived first on the scene are involved first, regardless of the string of
belonging or the territorialisation. Where the need to be able to send very promptly, in any part
of the territory, a force capable of intervening and formed for this: RAID, GIGN, bis, but also the
tray and monitoring and intervention of the gendarmerie (PSIG) platoons.
Therefore, the question of whether and how the military could intervene. This item was
discussed very recently with the GIGN and commando marine about maritime terrorism. In this
case, the logic is that the forces that are in a situation of reactivity can intervene, arbitration
being made by authorities of Security - Minister of the Interior and prefect - which will take
account of the territorial or port area. So, we are working so that the reactivity can be densified
up according to the available forces.
Mr Franois Lamy. In my last budget report on the army, which dates back to the month of
October, i.e. before the attacks of November 13, I wondered about the usefulness of the Sentinel
operation. even today, I'm stumped. Certainly, we can say that the buildings protected by the
army have not been the targets of attacks, but nobody is able to demonstrate that the military
presence was deterrent. Moreover, the intelligence services have not warned us of a project of
attack to such and such religious establishment. Whatever it is, can say, in the light of the ratio

between the number of the forces mobilized in the context of this operation and usefulness,
should be back in power so that each resume its role, especially since, according to the Chief of
staff of the armed forces, other external operations could be currently engaged lack staff.
I heard your arguments, Mr Secretary general, but the armies are in a situation which lead them and yourself also incidentally - to Remanufacture the doctrine. You thus explained us that the
army found its footprint, so that a rebalancing was operated with the Navy and the air force. But
these theories were designed after the deployment of 10,000 troops on the ground. What would
be the added value of the armies if new attacks occur? I do not see. On the other hand, I know
what is the purpose of the military to wage war - indoors or outdoors-, which is still their real
job.
Mr. Louis Gautier. I remember a point, that of the reversibility of the devices. As I have
indicated, the armies are the only to quickly generate a workforce important forces, for the
protection mission. If you push your reasoning to the absurd, there is therefore nothing to oppose
emergency, because, if it had established positions of gendarmes or police officers, should have
been, given the organisation of their careers, gradually spread and dilute across the territory. Or
so he would have had to create mobile gendarmerie and CRS units loaded exclusively those
missions, which would not make sense.
Mr Franois Lamy. Or a specially dedicated to the protection force.
Mr. Louis Gautier. But if this monotonous task, repetitive - I shall return on his interest-, is
bearable by the armies, it is precisely because it is not the only one: a soldier can get in New
Caledonia, spent four weeks in Paris or Lyon in posture Vigipirate, and then returning to Mali.
Initially, it has obviously ready for the most pressing, because in such situation, the State shall be
able to allay the concerns of the population. The Sentinel operation so was a way to respond to
this expectation - anyway, as there was no other. Then, we adapted the device: is better for one
soldier, make dynamic guards or the area around airports perimetrage. Using private security
companies can also convince some site managers to develop means of self-protection. In any
case, let's not forget one thing: these military - and seen well today - are the forces of police and
gendarmerie, which must also prepare the Euro and ensure public order. The idea remains so that
the army is a force of action, support.
On the other hand, one can imagine that, in a hurry, the protection of a border, a roadblock or
crowd filtering can be assured by the military, without changing so far their powers or skills: this
does not imply that they are running a judicial mission. I take an example. If we want to achieve
a sorting at the entrance of a demonstration by asking the people who go there to present proof of
identity, the military can ensure that those who refuse to submit this title will not pass. They can
serve as a support in this type of mission which is usually based only on the security forces. In
addition, it always comes back to the armed forces, because they have a number of ways equipment, projection capability, logistics - to intervene in the fight against terrorism, but also
disaster - seen at the Germanwings plane accident.
The judgment of the deflations increases the ability of the army to complete all his missions, not
only the fight against terrorism, but also public service missions, which had become more and

more problematic, including disaster. Retrospectively, provided in improving the use and to have
better specified its missions - the dynamic guards rather than the static guards - found a
justification for the use of the armed forces on the national territory. Of course, one can say that
this justification is supplied ex-post, including doctrinal. But why complain since consistency is
found? Anyway, it was necessary to provide an answer in a hurry. Interdepartmental work helped
consolidate this decision and better still adapt the employment of military forces in support of the
internal security forces.
M. Christophe Cavard. With regard to the role of the armed forces in the general scheme, I
would like you to give us your views on the coordination of the orders. We know that the
military are acting only on the orders of their superiors. However, on an operational theatre, may
be present officers of police or gendarmerie.
My second question relates to your missions. You mentioned a reflection on the different types
of possible attacks: chemical attacks, raids... The device all it seems you suitable for these risks I am thinking particularly rail transport?
Finally, with regard to secrecy, certain notes are currently accessible only to a certain number of
staff authorized. However it seems necessary, in some cases, to fluidify the information.
M. Philippe Goujon. There is a feeling that the use of police and gendarmerie and military
forces under the different plans forces has reached its maximum. This situation is certainly not
sustainable, especially if the State of emergency is maintained and that the terrorist threat
persists. Do you not need to establish different levels of mobilization?
In regards to the Sentinel operation, is military armaments it perfectly suited to missions of static
guard in town? Indeed, I note that in Paris, half of the guards are still static.
Finally, during the Euro 2016, numerous surveillance missions will be agents of private security,
even if the national Council of private security (CNAPS) activity has made this out of more or
less unpleasant comments. Now it happens that, at Olympics London, private security agents
were totally failed, so that they had to be replaced urgently by the military - 3 000 or 4,000 men
have been mobilized. This type of solution is envisaged where private security officers would be
unable to properly complete their tasks during the Euro?
Mr Franois Lamy. I would like to complete my question, because I have not totally satisfied
with your reply, Mr Secretary general. It is indeed logical that, in a hurry, the political authorities
have responded to the concern of the population by launching operation Sentinel. But what about
fifteen months after? The device has certainly evolved: he uses a little less men. However,
armies have re-manufactured a doctrine retrospectively. In this regard, the Chief of staff of the
armed forces is not quite the same thing as you: according to him, intervene in Central Africa or
Libya and monitor a synagogue, it is the same profession. However this is not true. I also seem to
remember that at the time of conscription, they are called who watched over the airbases and
buildings.

I come to my question. We know that the threat level will remain high for years, or even
decades. If, tomorrow, a new series of bombings occurs, the French expect policy makers will do
something more. However cannot it. Moreover, they will eventually wonder about the
effectiveness of the presence of the military if they realize that this presence does not prevent the
commission from attacks. The decision is political, but should we not consider switching to a
particular time of one device to another in order to restore the armed forces - which, incidentally,
will have seen reduce deflation of their workforce - the opportunity to concentrate on their other
missions?
Mr. Louis Gautier. I will respond first to Mr Lamy. What was meant, it seems, the Chief of
staff of the armed forces, is that, from a military point of view, the nature of the mission is its
preparation are the same, that it protects an Orthodox Church in a Kosovo Albanian area or a
synagogue in Paris. In fact, the military also perform and they are trained, the missions of
protection in outdoor operation.
On the other hand, on the reversibility, we agree. Our desire is not to keep systematically 10,000
troops on the ground. Moreover, at certain times during the year 2015, we are redescendus below
this figure, to allow soldiers to regain a bit of availability. However, this depends in part on the
political assessment of the threat. However, currently, it is that, given the return of individuals
with known neither intentions nor the relay in Europe, this threat remains serious. In addition, the
circumstances are unique as we prepare to host the Euro 2016. The difficulties have always
existed in this area. It is also for this reason that it has removed the colors associated with the
different levels of the Vigipirate plan, because, when it could be Scarlet red, it still raised a
political fix. In any rate, the judgment of the deflations has decided to give himself flexibility
upwards.
We could not go further, you say. If! If the situation required, I don't see why we don't
mobiliserions 15,000 troops, for example, as part of operation Sentinel. Of course, this would
imply capability arbitrations at the highest level. But the protection is a task of the armed forces
among others, and there is no indication that it is capped at what is now provided in the contract
of employment protection of armies.
If the situation required, should modify the contract. This means, however, that other operations
or missions could not be ensured as they are today.
Operation Sentinel is now calibrated at 10,000 men, which allows both to ensure the mission
with desirable reversibility, as it is defined on the national territory, maintain forces of
sovereignty and ensure external operations.
The rapporteur. If we were, would we be able, in the present state of our forces, to speak
tomorrow in Libya?
Mr. Louis Gautier. It is true that we are currently going through a period of tension linked to
the operational activities conducted on external theatres and the national territory. If the France
was expected to attend another operation, choices would be required - but it is always the case.
Please bear in mind that the format of the armies as it was planned in programming was

considering the disappearance of 19 000 staff! If the decision had not been taken to lighten the
deflations and to increase the staffing of the army, including the land action force, which must be
at term 10,000 men, the constraint would be extremely strong and would degrade the other
missions. Such was not the case, since the modification of the operational contract of protection
leads to a revision of the format of the armies.
I turn to other issues. I shall give you a chart that traces all the measures taken from 2012 and
after 2015 in various areas. I think, for example, the issue of the drones, screening or Seveso
classified vital points, which the Prime Minister has just decided to increase the perimeter. The
maritime domain was a blind spot for the protection. Controls were therefore organized,
including searches of vehicles on ferries to Corsica, the Algeria or England. This work is carried
out in all areas, including in rail transport referred Mr. Cavard. Then, trade-offs are necessarily
returned. But what is not acceptable, it is that such a diagnosis is not done, that faults have not
been identified and filled when it is possible.
We do this work based on the reports and information that we transmit intelligence on the nature
of the threat. Regarding the chemical threat, it is the responsibility of the SGDSN to ensure the
implementation of the interdepartmental protection agreement. We have thus passed its
emergency orders, corrected a number of situations, energized the various chains: civil
protection, health services, equipment of intervention forces... This work can be very substantial,
but it is our responsibility to do so in a systematic way.
At least benefit us, in France, of planning tools. In addition, this category a little except that form
the operators of vital importance, which does not exist in other countries, allows us to have
relays favored with the SNCF, Aroports de Paris, EDF, etc. We can, through senior officials
defence and security present in the major departmental chains, diagnosis with operators and
manufacturers and discuss with them their level of protection and its possible strengthening. In
the field of air transport, for example, we occupied with the Directorate General of civil aviation
(DGAC), control of incoming flights and securing of airports in countries which are popular
tourist destinations of the French. In the year 2015, adaptations have been sought in all major
sectors.
In addition, you mentioned, intaglio, the issue of resilience and prevention. The SGDSN is in end
of chain between Governments and governmental policy level. Plan Vigipirate destined for
prefects, that is very good, but since the attacks of the Bataclan, applications call extremely
concrete answers. Seen recently, for example, when some principals have wondered whether to
continue to impose on pupils smoking outside the premises. We have responded quickly to these
demands, including by launching campaigns - displaying, distributing guides... - even if, initially,
this led to a number of questions. The directors of theatre, cinema, school or sports association
leaders who made the request to the State. We are answered, SGDSN and GIS together.
The threat is likely to persist for several years. It therefore involves learning by our citizens to
the appropriate reactions and gestures which save. Furthermore, our warning systems dated back
to the 19th century. So we are creating, with the Directorate-General for civil protection, a
mobile application that will allow to those who have downloaded you about, crisis or emergency,
where it should not go, what is the metro line that must not borrow, where are the nearest

hospitals, etc. All this seems to meet the expectations of the population. It is also important that
the threat can be reported. But we know well that, as in radicalization, upwelling of low signals
passes through the training of those who are at the end of string.
On the other hand, the British, I remember that they have faced for many years with the Irish
terrorism, have maintained an equivalent device in operation Sentinel they call Opration
Temperer and which mobilizes 5 100 soldiers for a period of at 14 days. Almost all countries
use their armies to deal with exceptional situations and lighten the work of the security forces.
As for the rescheduling of the plans, we strive to ensure that the Vigipirate plan new formula
takes the relay of the State of emergency, taking account of the recent change in our law - I think
the Act on intelligence or that concerning the action of the police force. This plan will include
three postures: a posture of vigilance and a posture of enhanced vigilance - all of which have two
intended to be permanent and for which levels of military deployment must not be frozen, so as
to allow the reversibility - posture 'Emergency attack' or 'Alert attack', which must be momentary
and allow to impose, for a short period of time a series of coercive measures. At the time of the
assault of Saint-Denis, for example, "Warning attack" posture meant inter alia that traffic could
be interrupted and that extra-curricular activities were prohibited.
How better to coordinate the orders? This issue has been the object of a double reflection. Within
the Ministry of defence, first of all. I recall in effect that, if the planning of the mission of the
Sentinel operation and its objectives is defined by the Ministry of the Interior and the prefect of
area planning of its means, for its part, is staff. Therefore always arose, especially in Paris, the
issue of adjustment between its two chains of planning in order to improve the adequacy between
the missions and the means. Thus the prefect of police of Paris proposed a system of
sectorisation, Islanding, which served to reduce the workload of the military of about seventy
static guards.
The first work was done, I said, within the armed forces. Indeed, in the context of the former
mission of protection, the need to involve the ranks of middle management was not sufficiently
perceived. For lieutenants and captains, their place in the cFavorite pieces of the mission was
unclear: the patrol is led by a corporal or sergeant and contact with local elected officials, the
prefect or the Commissioner of police is taken by a senior officer. It has therefore been decided and I think that the general work you will confirm this-to re-engage the heads of proximity, so as
to better train them in the mission, to better the rules of engagement and to involve them more in
the field. Thus, they are the ones that now take contact with the home site managers and police
stations or gendarmerie brigades.
M. Christophe Cavard. Let me interrupt you. We heard the military that, the evening of
November 13, were present near the Bataclan. Their officer - through which you speak - visited
place de la Rpublique to try to control a little bit better what was happening. But he told us that
the orders were over his head.
Mr. Louis Gautier. You are absolutely right. That is why, throughout the year 2015, we worked
on the experience feedback. Yet once, the Sentinel operation was triggered in the emergency,
and we found defects. This is precisely what the Chief of staff of the army intends to remedy by

restoring this intermediate hierarchy that was inadequately involved and integrated into the news
channel. It is very important to restore the good level of contact with executives in the follow-up
to those missions. It was also necessary to solve other problems, much more concrete. For
example, communication systems were not interoperable; measures have therefore been taken
also in this area. It is partly the responsibility of the SGDSN to show dysfunctions and the
problems encountered, as soon as possible make the appropriate solutions.
M. Christophe Cavard. I would like to hear you on the issue of secrecy. In fact, a number of
people involved, including members who are on the ground, do not have access to certain
documents that could be helpful.
Mr. Louis Gautier. There are several types of information. Field intelligence must be protected
but is not intended to be classified; I think the access plans, for example. On the other hand,
information about the State of the threat or the existence of a network will remain always
confined to those who have reason to know. But then again, the intermediate strings are
important, because soldiers who are on the spot must be able to understand the mission entrusted
to them, including the reasons for which such site must be the subject of protection. On the other
hand, in the emergency alert information must flow between captains and police commissioners,
including. This, what feedback the Bataclan and the onslaught of Saint-Denis which we have
learned. Things were necessarily difficult, because when you get pregnant, you insulate
responsibilities. What is important is to fill the gaps once they were identified. On the side of the
army, the decision that has been taken is the right. As the interdepartmental decisions concerning
such communications, they were also taken. Furthermore, problems, internal to the armies,
transport, self-protection or hosting soldiers are about to be resolved.
The President Georges Fenech. Everything you said is very useful, but to be very practical, I
would like to return to the presence of the force sentry at the Bataclan. The police of the BAC
have told us that they had found themselves under heavy fire from one of the three terrorists who
was armed with a Kalashnikov, impasse Amelot. Only with handguns, these police officers failed
to support this exchange of fire. They then went spontaneously to members of the force sentry
who were present to ask them to intervene, and even, because they have received a negative
response to the first request, to lend them their weapons, which was also denied. Certainly, the
military did that to enforce the regulations. But one can imagine that the military force, which is
equipped with adequate weapons, could neutralize the terrorist.
Feedback did evolve the doctrine on this point? What will happen today?
Mr. Louis Gautier. This subject is more complex: who gave the order? What are the rules of
engagement? What was the responsibility? Firstly, we have responded to a critical issue, since,
previously, the law authorized the military to use his weapon when he was in a situation of selfdefence. On this point, the doctrine has evolved and the right also. Then, the question of the rules
of the fire and commitment: that is the military hierarchy to fix precisely, according to the
conditions and circumstances. Finally, the order of fire can be given only by the civil authority, a
police Commissioner, for example, has no other means at its disposal or if it considers, in a
situation of extreme urgency, that it must act immediately. You understand how these issues are
sensitive.

If one looks at the statistics of other countries, one realizes that in France, and it is happy, the
tradition that prevails in use of weapons allowed to greatly limit the number of burrs. Need to
find a balance, and this balance, it is necessarily found on the ground.
The President Georges Fenech. Is the reflection underway on this topic?
Mr. Louis Gautier. Yes, it is being developed. It is up to the military authorities to explain more
precisely the rules for opening fire and, in a given situation, it is up to the civil authority,
including to the prefect, to define an exact framework, given the circumstances, giving
permission to such and such to open fire. Now, this framework is the same, in an emergency, for
the forces of customs, police or gendarmerie. The criminal code applies to all equally.
M. Christophe Cavard. To be precise, if pulled him, the sergeant who is on the spot does not
expect an order: response - but in this case, it was outside the Bataclan. The BAC, them, police
have decided, without having received the order to intervene also inside the room. The military
are not, unless the hierarchical authority of the army gives them order. If I understand you
correctly, a police Commissioner could ask the military of the Sentinel operation to accompany
him inside the Bataclan. Is this good?
Mr. Louis Gautier. If the civil authority required military force and sent this order by the
military channel and the police chain, this happen as well.
The President Georges Fenech. The prefect was unreachable at this time!
Mr. Louis Gautier. A reflection is under way on this subject. The interdepartmental instruction
on the commitment of the armed forces on the national territory (IG 10100), which concerns the
use of armies on the national territory, will be entirely redesigned this year, taking account of the
conclusions of your inquiry. Instructions to prefects are also being developed at the Ministry of
the Interior to clarify the terms, conditions and the framework in which military force should be
required.
The President Georges Fenech. How quickly can this development be finalized?
Mr. Louis Gautier. It is a matter of weeks. I remind you that the rules of engagement of fire, for
a military, fall within its chain of command. The military are a protection force. The question is
very difficult, because it must be very careful in the way we fix things. An assessment is made in
the emergency, which can be very special because of the exceptional circumstances. But the rule,
and it is important that it be accurate and safe, is that intervention forces are internal security
forces. It is only in very exceptional circumstances and rules of engagement of fire that were
specified by the military hierarchy that things happen.
The rapporteur. Imagine that soldiers of the Sentinel force encounter, during a dynamic guard,
to a terrorist operation, in a supermarket for example. Are they involved? Today, the answer is
no. That is contemplated in this regard in reflection which is ongoing?

Mr. Louis Gautier. Things are complicated. Ministerial direction and the IG 10100 must
minimize the zone of uncertainty and clarify the rules. In an emergency situation, should also
measure the risks posed by the intervention of persons who are not prepared.3 because this is not
their mission. This is why I refer, in this regard, exceptional circumstances and the urgency.
The rapporteur. I do not understand what use has the Sentinel operation, if to lighten the work
of the police and gendarmerie and to reassure the population, which is certainly not negligible. In
fact, today, not only the military may not be first responders, but they are potential targets, as
demonstrated especially in Nice in January 2015 - from which the interest, as you watch it in
your report, to replace the static guards by dynamic guards. I therefore remain puzzled.
Since the launch of the Sentinel operation, how many times the military who participate have
they made use of fire and have made outstanding operations, such as arrests?
Mr. Louis Gautier. I understand that you insist on these issues. But you will agree that when
one has the responsibility to lay down rules on such important matters as, cannot let glide an
ambiguity. The appreciation is largely linked to the circumstances. I'll take an example. In
medicine, a classic emergency context, seeking to save one who is the most evil in point; in a
situation of war, seeks to save one who has the greatest chance of escape. In what medical ethics
manual is - this written?
The rapporteur. To use your example, all those that we heard, be they Samu or BSPP, have told
us that they had found themselves in an emergency of war and that they are were adapted.
Mr. Louis Gautier. My responsibility is to ensure the determination of standards, you ask me to
describe what might be the exception. It is fixed by law, which provides that the use of weapons
cannot be justified by an exceptional situation, the urgency and self-defence eventually extended
to the protection of others, and that the response must be proportionate.
The rapporteur. And non-assistance to person in danger?
Mr. Louis Gautier. The rule is attached. Then, there's a declination, which imply that the
military, such as police officer or Constable, aware that its use of the weapons should be
restricted and that there is the certainty that it will not aggravate the situation by conduct which
is not responsible for or sufficiently pondered.
The President Georges Fenech. I believe, having worked on the text in the Committee on laws,
that the framework of self-defence has been expanded to prevent further action. It seems to me
that that Act, which relates the police, should apply also to the Sentinel force. Do you agree on
this point?
Mr. Louis Gautier. Work that we will do from the rule of the law is to recall the rules of
engagement, the piping, reporting, and then to consider under what circumstances the opening of
fire is possible and which directs.
The rapporteur. Can you tell us how many times the fire was used by the Sentinel force?

Mr. Louis Gautier. I'll check, but to my knowledge, this is not happened, apart from once in
self-defense, in Valencia.
The President Georges Fenech. Should we draw a conclusion?
Mr. Louis Gautier. I mean an underlying criticism, which would be that the mere presence of
the Sentinel force is not sufficient. But this presence is deterrent, as at the Bataclan the entry of
the police Commissioner was a decisive element. It cannot be said that the military presence has
no interest in itself.
Yet once, this work will be done from the existing law. But the problem remains that of
"weighing" of the order given by those who will find themselves in these situations. Set them too
broadly, is to take the opposite risk: I can't establish a typology of cases where the opening of
fire would be automatic. The intervention itself, I repeat, must not compromise the operation.
The logic is thus sending rather the GIGN, RAID or bis, if they are available immediately, rather
than first come.
The President Georges Fenech. Do you know the new doctrine defined by the Minister of the
Interior on the first responders about the PSIG-Sabre and the tray, although this is not their
primary purpose. You can imagine that some of the strength of the Sentinel force could be
trained to be the first responders.
Mr. Louis Gautier. The Minister of the Interior gave the response forward, relying on the title
of the intervention capacity, internal security forces, which is consistent with their mission. The
rule is that they are police forces, particularly because they will have been formed, which must
take place. The military cannot only in an absolute emergency. Things were still relatively
specified: primo-interveners forces are internal security forces. Newcomers, if it comes to
military, police or customs officers, not be required to intervene and to open fire only in very
exceptional situations.
The President Georges Fenech. What was not so far...
Mr. Louis Gautier. Indeed. But now, the law permits since the insertion in the criminal code of
an article 122-4-1, by the law of 3 June 2016.
Mr Franois Lamy. A dynamic patrol force Sentinel located facing the Bataclan at 9:28 pm,
November 13 in the evening, would not intervene. It would have called his superiors, police. Can
be understood. But if this situation happened again tonight, no one would understand. It is true
that the terrorist act is difficult, if not impossible to define. But nobody will not admit that,
passing in front of a stage where terrorists are killing civilians, a patrol does not engage the fire. I
do not think a specialized workforce, but soldiers who also are spoken in Mali and elsewhere and
who are trained to make war. I understand that there are risks and that it does not fire at the
FAMAS as it draws to the handgun, although the security forces have been equipped with assault
rifles.

The President Georges Fenech. Mr Secretary general, if the Commissioner of the BAC had not
intervened on its own initiative in the Bataclan - so that the doctrine is to wait for the specialized
forces-, we would have perhaps had more, hundred dead since he killed one of the three
terrorists...
Mr. Louis Gautier. I repeat, the primary responsibility of the patrol who would be on the spot
would be to inform the authorities and seek an instruction or an order, they are given by their
superiors or the civil authority.
The rapporteur. I would like us to address another issue. The analysis which is contained in
your reports are powerful, particularly with regard to the threat and his anticipation. However,
the fight against terrorism (UCLAT) co-ordination Unit and the national coordinator of
intelligence also play this role. Would it not make sense to load a single instance, the SGDSN for
example, this cross-sectional analysis?
Mr. Louis Gautier. An important effort has been made in the field of the coordination of
intelligence. As representatives of the nation, you are probably sensitive to what I say. Long ago,
our Republican organization, security and intelligence, searched for duplication, for having the
certainty of redundancy, and the barrier, to prevent overflow. Or the fight against terrorism
involves a decompartmentalisation, on the one hand, in the field of intelligence, including by
making work more closely the services and, on the other hand, that of internal security, by
facilitating links between the police, the gendarmerie, the RAID, the GIGN and possibly the
military. It is therefore necessary to rethink things, without however necessarily go against
making the specificity and the profession of each services. Thus, in legal terms, information must
remain polarized, on one side, on the national territory, and on the other, on international issues.
Terrorism, requires that these services work better together, through liaison officers, cells
analysis and processing and databases. Means were allocated for this purpose. What it takes is
still improving intelligence analysis capacity and the processing of certain data that alerts are
faster. Also - it is part of the experience feedback - best partner services which may collect
intelligence in the territorial plan and incorporate the prison intelligence.
Regarding the assessment of the threat, we do a job of back-office. We have indeed access to
almost all sources of intelligence, so we offer to the political authorities, in weekly summaries, a
good knowledge of the general threat, that allows to inform decisions and promote awareness of
officials, for example the network of senior officials of defence and security, the nature of the
threat. Furthermore, the areas very operational, the logic is that of containment and strings are
necessarily "verticalisees". A great mix of information is therefore impossible. Moreover, it is
not even the role of the national coordinator of intelligence, that is there to inform the President
of the Republic. The operational detail is the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior, the
Prosecutor of the Republic or the judges. Our role is that of a back-office that delivers an
assessment of the threat, without of course compromising information elements and thus harm an
investigation or the hunt carried out by an intelligence service.
The rapporteur. A few months ago you made a report which concluded the need to legislate on
the issue of the drones. However you probably could read in the press what were potential targets
contained in the computer by Salah, targets corresponding to a list prepared by the Directorate of

military intelligence (DRM) in January 2015. It was so learned that he envisaged including drone
attacks. Do you consider that we are adequately prepared in this matter? Drones represent an
imminent threat?
Mr. Louis Gautier. My job requires that I am worried and vigilant. This is why we quickly
before us the question of UAVs, which we had perceived dangerousness, beyond the
provocations or demonstrations which we have seen - I think the overview of nuclear power
plants. Thanks to you, when the law was finally adopted, we will have the most advanced
legislation in this area. Orders including to better distinguish use harmful, but unintentional,
malicious use. In addition, the SGDSN is operator in this field. Indeed, it lacks control of large
interdepartmental security programs, to secure a public order, maintain in France of industrial
interest in these issues... Therefore, we have funded a number of studies on the drones that have
been conducted by CS and Roboost companies, as well as by the Office national d'Etudes et de
recherches arospatiales (ONERA). Thus, demonstrators will be deployed during the Euro,
which provide integrated solutions ranging from detection to jamming systems. It is an
operational emergency programme: we launched studies last year.
We must, in addition, take into account, especially in Paris, a risk of interference, because the
Bourget and Roissy airports are close. If a drone appears, warning system must also be
developed to ensure that airports platforms are immediately warned. We are obviously very
careful such threats, but, unfortunately, the evil ingenuity of terrorists is limitless...
Whatever it is, on this subject, we play a pioneering role in a European Group that brings
together the Denmark, the Netherlands, the Germany and Great Britain. We would also like to
adopt legislation in this field at European level.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, Mr Secretary general.
Hearing in camera, Mr. Bernard Bajolet, Director general of external security (DGSE)
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, on Tuesday, May 24, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Mr. Director general, thank you for having responded to the
request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means Work by the State to combat
terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We will continue with you our investigations in the area of intelligence, we now concerning his
shutter. Your hearing is essential for our work in this regard. Addition questions we have on the
attacks from January to November last, this will be an opportunity to ask about the State of the
threat, how it implemented Artwork and adaptation techniques and procedures, and on both
internal and international cooperation between services at levels.
Due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, this hearing is held
in camera. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly. Nevertheless, in
accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning of the
parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at

the end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will
previously transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. These observations will
be submitted to the commission, which may decide to State in his report. I would remind you
that, in accordance with the provisions of the same article, 'is punishable by the penalties
provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code (one year imprisonment and 15,000 euros fine)
any person who, within a period of twenty-five years, disclose or publish information relating to
non-works of a commission of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the
commission referred to this information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet oath.
Our questions will focus on the attacks of January and November 2015, on the situation in the
Levant and on cooperation.
The perpetrators of the events of January and November 2015 were known to the DGSE? They
had been monitored in the past?
What were the actions undertaken by the DGSE after the commission of the attacks in January
and November 2015? The DGSE had information about the relatives and friends of the
protagonists?
After the commission of the attacks of November 13, 2015, has the DGSE been recipient of the
share of foreign intelligence services for information about the members of the terrorist
commandos?
What are the main conclusions of the feedback that you made after the attacks from January to
November 2015?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet, Director general of external security (DGSE). The DGSE has several
peculiarities. First of all, it is an integrated, service which brings together intelligence human,
technical and operational capabilities. Operational intelligence is that we do not get from
sources, but that we will pick up directly with your bare hands, somehow. We also have a
capacity of interference. Obstruction is not necessarily to eliminate individual, but to prevent an
action. These interventions are not only carried out by the Directorate of operations, but they can
also be given by the Directorate of intelligence, for example bringing a case to court, by stop
individuals, by arresting by the Navy or a foreign Navy boat carrying of drugs or weapons. These
actions can take very different forms. We can also provide support to the French armed forces or
foreign services for a particular action.
In a service like mine, human intelligence is supported by technical intelligence. Thus, several
agents in approximation of the technical direction based research officers or analysts in each
office of the Directorate of intelligence. Conversely, human intelligence supports technical
research and operational capabilities. It is very important for technical intelligence, access to

certain networks abroad: it is through human intelligence or operational that we are able to make
the mapping. That is why, in some countries, we have capabilities of very large services, such the
National Security Agency (NSA), do not have.
In addition, our technical resources are shared and made available by other french intelligence
services. In practice, this translates into positions deported from other services, especially the
branch of Homeland Security (CSB) and the Directorate of military intelligence (DRM).
The President Georges Fenech. That is what the DGSE knew of the perpetrators of the events
of January and November and their entourage? Have you had information from foreign
intelligence services?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. I don't want to be too specific. We knew many of the perpetrators of the
November attacks. We followed in particular, since the month of January 2015, the Abaaoud
network, in conjunction with a project of attack of the "group of Verviers. We have helped
Belgian counterparts in thwarting this attack. As you know, Abaaoud was able to escape. If we
have not seen him out of Syria, we learned, in cooperation with ISB, its presence on french soil
after the attacks of November 13. We believe that this may have contributed to prevent another
wave of attacks, but we could unfortunately not prevent those from November 13.
The role of my service is detecting upstream, abroad, the attacks on french soil, and we then
work collaboratively with CSB, which is leader in relation to the threat to the french territory.
The people we follow travel between Europe and jihad areas, Syrian-Iraqi, Libyan, or other. It
was intelligence not purely exterior or purely domestic, which brings to a close interweaving of
the two services.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Our commission of inquiry visited in Turkey and Greece.
The Greek services told us that Abaaoud had been identified and located in January 2015. At the
time of the assault in Verviers, it was in Athens, but Belgian services with whom they were in
association only warned them that twenty minutes before the assault, and he was therefore able
to escape. Are you aware of the presence of Abaaoud in Athens at this time there?
After the assault of Verviers, it is not known what becomes Abaaoud. Were you able to follow
its track and locate? How to explain that sometimes incognito on our territory, while for ISB and
for you, it represents a priority target with regard to its involvement in the cell of Verviers, in the
attempted attack in the Thalys and Villejuif?
You say that you know many of the perpetrators of the attacks, in addition to Abaaoud. Have you
encountered any difficulties with the Belgians? We lost track of other individuals? Why, while
we know these people, have we missed?
Mr. Alain Marsaud. You say that you follow Abaaoud: what is this mean?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. We perfectly know the dangerousness of the character and knew that he
had this type of projects. All means have been established Work: human, technical resources,
and cooperation with partners. This cooperation has never been we default, even with regard to

the Belgians. Belgians have capabilities that are theirs, but their good will and professionalism
are not in question. We knew therefore that Abaaoud had returned to Syria, but we have not seen
him out. We found his mark shortly after the November 13 attack. It was then located and
neutralized.
The difficulty we face is that these terrorists are broken underground and make use very
conservative, very parsimonious, the means of communication: phones are used that only once
communications are encrypted and we can not always decode them. In addition, for their
projects, should be human sources directly in contact with these terrorists: However these
networks are very segregated, they can receive instructions of a general nature, but then have a
certain autonomy in the implementation in The work of the mission entrusted to them. This all
means is that, despite the mobilization of human and technical sources of services, a number of
individuals can escape us.
The President Georges Fenech. The Greeks had located it.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. After the fact. It did not it was in Athens at the time when he was there.
The rapporteur. If, since the day of the assault in Verviers, Greeks launched an operation where
they had located the Abaaoud phone: he escaped them for a few hours.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. It is always easy to tell certain things retrospectively. The Belgians were
not supposed to know that Abaaoud was in Greece and had therefore no reason to prevent the
Greeks. I do that formulate a hypothesis, I do not know what it really is, but at the time where we
committed an operation such as the Belgians launched in Verviers, the number of stakeholders
that it prevents is not infinite, for obvious reasons of confidentiality. Should always be carefully
what is said afterwards.
The rapporteur. Despite the technical difficulties that you mention, you are not entirely
destitute for the supervision of these individuals. But we have to understand that Abaaoud, which
is a priority target of your services, can enter our territory without no one is aware.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. We follow a large number of individuals: we know they are dangerous
and that some projects - but this does not mean that we will be able to Trump. These individuals
traveling under false identities, following extremely complicated routes and have a degree of
autonomy in their actions. Therefore, when even we know that an attack will be committed,
though even it knows the name of the terrorists, we cannot always prevent it if one ignores the
place and date.
This explains some failures, because the attacks of November 13 are obviously for me a failure. I
said, my service's role is to detect and impede the threats abroad and is the national territory - we
work then in cooperation with CSB-, or our interests abroad. But, often, we detect without being
able to interfere. Attacks such as those of November 13 mark of foreign intelligence failure: they
were planned outside our borders and organized in Belgium, i.e. in the area of competence of the
DGSE. They also probably represent a failure for the domestic intelligence, insofar as they have

occurred on our soil, although the commando had no basis in France - but other schemes may be
considered, which would play sleeper cells on french soil.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for your frankness. It is the first time that a head of
Department acknowledged this failure of our services. Moreover, it is not pejorative to recognize
that there was a flaw.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. I did not say that there was a fault, Mr president. After an attack, we
experience feedback. One could speak of fault if, going up the sequence of events, we find that
we have that we have not properly exploited, or information which would be unnoticed among
many others. We have done this work in a honest and rigorous way, and we have not discovered
ex post facto of elements to suggest that we could avoid these attacks.
This does not mean, however, that we have no lesson events. I will not explain to you that we
could avoid these attacks if we had had more resources: we have those that we requested,
although it will take several years to implement Artwork. After such attacks, we wonder what we
can do to improve our technical intelligence capability and human, to reduce the probability that
something escapes us. This is what we do every day, and we have learned the consequences of
the attacks in January and November 2015.
Mr. Meyer Habib. What is the difference between a fault and a failure? You say that it would
have been a flaw if you had not used the information you have. But do not have certain
information you should have have can also be a flaw.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. Even with the means available to the United States, we would not
necessarily better. This is not a question of means. Simply, we are not infallible. The goal is to
reduce the probability that we let pass an incident.
When attacks take place in Bamako, Ouagadougou or Grand-Bassam, it is also a matter of great
frustration for my service. We have a strong cooperation with these countries, we are heavily
implanted, we support them and help them. Still don't regret no French victim, attacks are
victims among our allies, undermine, can destabilize them. Our role is also to prevent these
attacks.
But we must put this in relation to successes which, by definition, you do not have knowledge,
since it attacks that we have prevented. Since January, 2013, my service has contributed to the
design, planning and conduct of sixty-nine of obstruction of the terrorist threat: twelve helped
avoid attacks against french interests abroad, six of the projects of attacks likely to strike
Western interests - because they have not taken place and that we did not know if they were
specifically We cannot know if there were French victims - and fifty-one operations have taken
place in order to reduce the terrorist threat, i.e. stop people, foil projects or incapacitating
terrorists. These operations have taken place in the following areas, in descending order: subSaharan Africa, the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, the Horn of Africa, the Syria, Europe, the Libya
and the Egypt.

For making these same figures from a different angle, our role was to convey information to our
partners to enable them to thwart the attacks in twenty-nine case, and in forty operations, we
have directly contributed to the establishment in Work of these. Sometimes the sources were
only human sources, but most often, information were technical and human sources.
The President Georges Fenech. When you talk about 'put terrorists out of action', do you mean
physically eliminate?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. For us, putting incapacitating means counteract by arrests or other means.
We intervene in support of the French armed forces and our coalition partners. We provide
information to the coalition, including what we call points of interest. We have provided both for
the Iraq for Syria, very many points of interest, which are then operated and supplemented by the
Directorate of military intelligence.
We increased the pace and intensity of our operations, including the action service. It is used to
the full of its capabilities on these different theatres.
To return to lessons learned from the attacks, we are not left of zero. For several years,
particularly since the years 2010, cooperation with the DCRI become ISB is enhanced. But we
have moved to an additional stage after the attacks in the month of January 2015, since we have
a cell inserted into the ITSB, at Levallois, led by a very high level of my service framework. This
cell, which includes agents of the Directorate of intelligence and technical direction, has access
to databases of my service and can therefore provide real-time ISB colleagues all the elements
they need.
My service strategy is the strengthening of cooperation and full transparency with CSB. Our
cooperation has reached an unprecedented level, the objective that I shared with Patrick Calvar is
even more ambitious but, despite this, cultural differences, differences in method and approach
remain. The rapprochement of cultures is also not say their merger: each of them has its merit, it
is not desirable to make them disappear. But this relationship has not yet reached a degree of
irreversibility. My goal is to anchor it in the long term.
The collaboration between the DGSE and ISB is supported by cell Allat, which contains, in
addition to these two services, the other four of the first circle, plus two so-called services
"second circle", namely the territorial intelligence (SRT) and the Directorate of intelligence of
the prefecture of police of Paris (PP). Like what we did with CSB, each participating service
must have access to its databases. It is the added value. These two cells, which are installed in
contiguous locations, help to give unprecedented fluidity in exchanges of information between
the services. The risk of fault due to information that was not provided one service to another is
significantly reduced.
This enhanced cooperation can be improved, but it is a silent revolution underway, which has
more value, in my opinion, these changes of organization chart who sometimes favors the socalled experts that spread in the press.

Second consequence of the attacks of November 13, we have taken a further step, in particular at
the technical level, by deciding to a much more systematic sharing of data. Until recently, they
were practically owned by each of the services, which are exchanged them only sparingly. We
moved on to another stage based on a provision of the law of 24 July 2015, codified in article L.
863 - 1 of the code of Homeland Security, which allows exchanges of data between services.
This sharing is reciprocal, with the understanding that each service intervenes in its missions.
And we remain anxious to avoid any leakage from these data: more on Exchange, more the risk
exists. There are no special protections.
On the other hand, my service is responsible for the major shared technical programmes. We
have developed tools that are ready now, and about to be used by different services. They must
allow a much more fluid management of tracking terrorists, and a prioritization, because, given
the number of cases that we must follow, it is very important to prioritise and know who does
what. We have developed these instruments to the provision of other services.
We did the same with the Directorate of military intelligence. The DRM provides information
for the attrition of terrorist groups. A working group created under the aegis of the DRM, for
targeting in Syria-Iraq zone, and we participate with other groups of the intelligence community.
M. Christophe Cavard. Mr. Director general, much is said about the Syria, the Iraq and the
African issue. I would like to know your views on the Libya. How do you in the light of the
evident destructuring of this territory? How comes the DGSE? Is in relation to other countries,
notably European?
With respect to the technical means of tracking of targets, it questioned still the means to
intercept communications by Skype in 2013. Where are the technical evolutions? One learns that
the perpetrators of the attacks are taking orders and relationships exist with their group on
combat zones.
Do you think that developments are possible, including the use of techniques such as those used
by the United States? Or do you think that, given the relationship that we have with these
countries, they may respond to commands that we spend?
You made a joint statement with M. Calvar to highlight the role of prevention. It will be
interesting to know what kind of prevention you are talking about.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. My answer on the Libya will also focus on prevention. We are fighting
against terrorism by downstream - targeted operations or attrition of the armed means, since
Daech is a terrorist plot with militarized means meeting. But, upstream, the problems are always
political, and unresolved political problems that feed terrorism.
This is the case for the Syria and the Iraq: the marginalization of Sunni Arabs since 2003 in Iraq
and over the years sixty in Syria that Daech can rely on Sunni populations that don't feel
recognized by the State. This is not an excuse, but this is the reason why cities like Mosul,
Raqqah or Sirte decision-making is difficult if one does not first solve political problems.

In Iraq, the political problem has not really been addressed. While Prime Minister Haider alAbadi tries, unsuccessfully to date, to settle the matter, but he must deal with internal or external
pressures and is not, for the moment, to integrate Sunnis in power. Some are present, but they are
not sufficiently representative. As long as this problem will not be solved, it will be very difficult
to take a Sunni city like Mosul, as they will against the population if committed troops are not in
Sunni majority.
Similarly, in Syria, the problem is not only that of the person of Bashar al-Assad, but that
whether the Government will be or not representative of the different components of the
population. As long as these problems have not been resolved, the number of terrorists will
continue to increase. Hundreds of French are currently fighting in Syria and Iraq, but think in
terms of nationality did not much sense: he would rather count the francophones, and do not
forget that the members of the commando which attacked in Paris on 13 November were not all
francophones. Even if the problem was resolved on both political and military, there would be
this crowd of jihadists, to which must be added those who returned from Syria and those who
want to go there.
The Libya represents a very different challenge: there, there is no opposition between Sunnis and
Shiites, but the tribal issues, which are no less complex. Here too, we need a Government of
national unity representing all of the Libya and there is still much to do for that to be the case.
In this country, should be especially avoided Western military intervention which would be the
best way to unite all Libyans against us. It does not mean that should do nothing, but need to act
extremely discreetly against terrorism. Political action requires a long time, while the counterterrorism action request a shorter time. For the moment, Daech is not structured, in Libya, so as
solid as in Syria and Iraq. An untimely intervention could only transform Libya in a land of jihad
more attractive. Whatever it is, we obviously have to avoid a transfer of the foreign fighters of
the Syrian-Iraqi area to the Libya.
Mr Franois Lamy. The France spoke with Syria's close relations: this was even a french
protectorate, which allowed us to be weaving networks over the years. The closure of the
Embassy was a handicap for the collection of information?
Known sponsors of the attacks in the month of January - the case of a Yemeni who reportedly
killed by a U.S. drone has been mentioned - and those of the month of November? If Abaaoud
has organized them, it is not he who made the decision to commit them.
It always evokes the thousands of French fighting in Syria or Iraq, but it's well-marked cells,
which are linked with each other through some characters: cells of Verviers, Artigat or ButtesChaumont. It is quite logical: organizing this type of attacks, to logistics, and therefore people
who know each other. Can we consider that the problem is overall series?
From your point of view, we face a war between Sunnis and Shiites that the Western world
would be a collateral victim, or is it truly a global war?

M. Guillaume ledger. Your service cooperate with the Syrian authorities to identify french
nationals involved?
Seem that legislative or regulatory provision, you have needs that have not yet been satisfied?
Mr. Meyer Habib. Terrorism is fought at the source. Countries fund, support, and shelter
terrorists, Shiites and Sunnis. I was recently having dinner with the son of the Shah of Iran, who
was in Paris. According to him, this is the Iran of the mullahs, who theorized the Islamic
terrorism. Before them, there were Libya terrorist movements: Abu Nidal, PLO and PFLP. As
long as the Iranian hegemony in the Yemen, the Lebanon and the Syria endures, the problem
cannot be resolved because of the excitement of the Saudis and other Sunni countries.
According to rumors, the bomb that exploded in the Egyptair plane was introduced at the airport
Charles de Gaulle. Do you have information about this?
You must be from the recent trip by the Prime Minister in Israel. What are your relations with
the Israeli services?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. We have no contacts with the Syrian services. The latest small contacts
we had date back to October 2013, in some incredible conditions. At this time, the Syrians
submitted the resumption of relations with the security services to political conditions. I have the
feeling that the Syrians have never made the fight against terrorism a priority.
On the other hand, there's no GSM in Daech-controlled areas, and I am not convinced that Syrian
services there have so many sources, that several people that they have released from Sednaya
prison are terrorists who have joined the al-Dhanub Djabhato and Daech. Finally, I note that
those of our European partners who have contacts with them do not seem to learn well
extraordinary information.
You should never say never, but we have doubts about the interest of such contacts in terms of
intelligence: should know, beforehand, the political counterparts that would be asked of us,
because such contacts would be manipulated by the regime.
Regarding the closure of the Embassy, it had no impact in terms of intelligence.
Human intelligence and technical intelligence always go hand in hand, and ensure that human
intelligence is still level. Technical intelligence is completeness, but it would be a mistake to
sacrifice everything to him. I have the desire to promote human intelligence, in the same way as
technical intelligence.
M. Christophe Cavard. The Russians play a role with you?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. We are cooperating with the Russians in a quite practical way.
It is true that Abaaoud was a coordinator, but not the sponsor. We know the sponsor, but I will
remain discreet on this point. We now have a good knowledge the organization chart and how

organized the so-called Islamic State, which is not a State, and which is even less Islamic. We
have made good progress on these issues, so we have an idea of the identity of the sponsor.
The President Georges Fenech. What are the aims of those who are at the head of Daech?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. Although the Shiite-Sunni substrate feeding the war, it is not the cause.
There are two rival terrorist organizations. One, Daech, currently has the wind in its sails, but do
not neglect the Al-Qaida network, which remains dangerous, as seen in the Yemen, that is
present in Syria, and strongly, in the Sahel. Al-Qaida in the Arabian peninsula (AQAP) position
to the vague desires territorial since the group virtually controlled Al Moukalla, which has been
hunted - without a fight - Arab Coalition, before moving elsewhere. Other franchisees of AlQaida have the will to establish territorial bases, but this has not materialized yet.
The objective of these groups is the global war, the establishment of Sharia law throughout the
world. They seek to create divisions in our societies, and thus to destabilize democracy, which is
their true enemy. The France is especially targeted, for two reasons. First of all, it is combat,
there where others have dropped the arm: it is fighting against terrorism in Syria, in Iraq and
elsewhere, in the saharo-Sahelian Strip; It prevented the failover of Mali and probably other
countries. That is why we are in the top of the enemies of this organization. The other reason is
the influence of the French-language component, which acts from the Syria. What is true for
Daech is also for AQAP.
The President Georges Fenech. Who dropped the arm?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. I want point person the finger, but if you look at who fights in Europe and
who does not fight, you will notice that the France had a position more committed than others.
The Americans are committed, it cannot be denied, even if the particular period they know
internally has an influence on their diplomacy and the conduct of certain Affairs.
We have 600 French fighting in Syria for jihadists. But we must expand this number to include
all francophones, take account of those who have already returned and those who want to leave.
Daech is a relatively structured organization, but groups keep a certain autonomy. We pretty
much identified with katibatwith groupings that can be done by nationality or by affinity.
Mr Franois Lamy. We see that some people connect the individual cells between them. To
constitute this cell type, it must be a common history and have a medium, as in Molenbeek, or
siblings, as for the Kaye.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. A core was active as early as the early 1990s, with the armed Islamic
Group (GIA) Algerian, the Moroccan Islamic combatant Group (GICM) or the Fighting Islamic
Group in Libya (FACI). People who had fought in Afghanistan played a role somewhat
important in these groups. The new generation, which part do jihad for various reasons, is framed
by these more experienced people who have quite a story in the jihad.

With regard to legal needs, I firstly thank the Parliament for the vote of the two very important
laws of July and November, which give a much stronger legal basis for the activity of our
services. Contrary to what I have read in the press, this does not mean that before the law, we
spied "massively the French without any legal basis. The French only that we spied were
terrorists, and we worked on the basis of a decision of the National Commission of control of
security interceptions (CNCIS). But in our legal system, the case law does not have the same
force as the law. These laws so provide a real legal security to our services. They have for
consideration of much tighter and much more extensive checks because, beyond only intercepts
of security, all techniques are now the subject of a control, which is a good thing.
These texts naturally contain imperfections, because they are the result of a democratic debate.
When you debate technical topics, the results are sometimes not completely satisfactory. But,
overall, they are very good laws. I do not think that exist elsewhere in the world as detailed and
as specific about the activity of law enforcement, including international monitoring. And
contrary to what I read, if I say that these laws are good, this does not mean that they were
dictated by the services, and this is not because the services are satisfied with these laws that they
are not good. These texts are a breakthrough because, contrary to what I read yet sometimes on
of so-called 'barbouzeries' imputed to the DGSE, it is today more imaginable that an officer of a
service like mine can act which are contrary to French law.
If the law has filled many of our needs, there is one that has not been satisfied: we need access to
some target data. However, avoid the legalization of intelligence. When the judges need
classified documents, declassification procedure is planned: opinion of the consultative
committee of the secrecy of the national defence (CCSDN) and decision of the Minister of
defence regarding the DGSE. But it is obviously necessary to use this procedure with caution,
because if intelligence was systematically relevant, this would pose a problem for our sources
and the discretion and the clandestine nature of our operations. We not instead nor would do
most anything. We must therefore work to help justice while being aware of the limitations
imposed on us also the principle of the separation of powers. Solutions are probably possible to
enable everyone to exercise at best its mission: judge for the manifestation of the truth and the
officer's information for the prevention of the threat.
Once information is relevant, it would be desirable to avoid the vacuum too much around, to the
point that it would prevent us to do our job of prevention, upstream. When a laptop or computer
is seized in a search, the case is relevant. We have no access to the digital investigation data,
what constitutes a disability. J. works in law enforcement, but we must be able to work in
prevention of further attacks, up the data contained in a phone or computer to identify members
of a specific network, who can still hit, in particular from abroad. Some of our partners in Europe
and across the Atlantic tell us that digital investigation data are an essential element of their
counter-terrorism activities: a copy of the digital data is systematically communicated to
services, with the permission of the judge.
The President Georges Fenech. This issue was raised, particularly in the fight against terrorism
(UCLAT) co-ordination Unit. We understand the importance of this brake: once information
enters a procedure, the secret of the statement prohibits services transmit anything. The
Americans and the British have lifted this obstacle. One might imagine that the Prosecutor can

ask the investigating judge, for the defence of the fundamental interests of the nation, a number
of elements in the investigation file be transmitted through other services parquet?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. How to establish this collaboration in respect of the separation of powers?
The judge shall have the power to decide.
The President Georges Fenech. Currently, the judge may not itself violate the secrecy of the
statement to which it is subject. There's an obvious legal obstacle on which it will have that our
Committee of inquiry worked.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. This situation puts ISB in a delicate position towards us DSGE, because
ISB has the jurisdiction of judicial police, but she doesn't have the right to send us this
information. However we cooperate extremely closely with ISB.
Regarding the impression of hegemony of the Iran, it also stems from the fact that, in 2003, the
reversal of the situation in Iraq has dramatically increased Iranian influence, at the point where
the major traditional leaders in the Arab world weakened: the Syria is in the State that you know,
we just talk about the Iraq, and the Egypt has experienced a situation that has marginalized it at a
time. The situation is therefore not only due to the Iran, but also to major Arab countries.
I have no information on the reasons for the crash of the Egyptair flight, and I can therefore
confirm rumors reported by Mr. Habib. I note that, before the route between Charles de Gaulle
airport and the Egypt, the aircraft had made a long journey with many stops. No indication that it
is something to Charles de Gaulle airport rather than elsewhere. At the time as we speak, no
claim no has been authenticated, which should be noted.
With regard to Israel, the Prime Minister indeed wished, among others, join in talks with the
Israeli Government. It is that patrons of the main Israeli services reported that they had not been
informed in a timely manner and were not available.
I do not know my new colleague from the Mossad. Our relationships with these services are very
professional, especially on very specific topics.
Ms. Marianne Dubois. Do you think that we have concerns to have about ramadan, which
begins very soon?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. Yes. We're still under threat, but the period of the next few weeks is
particularly delicate, because the Organization of the European Championship football and
ramadan.
The rapporteur. I would like to understand how things happen when an individual followed by
ISB moved to abroad, including for the Syria. How is the relay? What is the action of the DGSE?
How is monitored from abroad?
What is the State of your relationship with your Turkish counterparts and the other main
intelligence services?

We feel that there are many files. We had a demonstration of the FSPRT to the UCLAT. Insofar
as it is a file of the Ministry of the Interior, can you access them? Could you feed it? Do you
think it would be interesting to set up a more comprehensive file?
Finally, we wish to pay tribute to the professionalism of your staff stationed in Turkey.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. I thank you. Indeed, we have staff of very high quality at the head of this
post, and we also have a very extended in Istanbul, composed of people of first quality antenna.
With regard to the follow-up of individuals abroad, these people come and go constantly. When
we can, we strive to promote their return to France so that they can be heard by ISB.
For us, the cFavorite pieces of cooperation makes with CSB, because we are two referral
counter-terrorism services. However, other services provide us many, including to have all the
elements available to the community of intelligence on a particular individual. If you want to
know the available information on a person, including his family or friendly ties, we are sure to
have everything that is available through Allat.
There is no transfer of records between SID and we: we follow them in common. If we know
that individuals are in Syria, the DGSE will drive, but SID is always informed, as these
individuals are likely to come back.
The rapporteur. If an individual spotted by ISB moved to the Syria, how is the Division of
labour?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. If the individual is outside, it is a folder which belongs rather to the
DGSE, but continues to be followed by the CSB from the perspective of a possible return.
Working together is really essential. Things happen in a very informal manner: it is depending on
the workloads it is decided that the folder is followed by an officer dealing with ISB or DGSE.
The rapporteur. The DGSE can listen to the environment family or friendly a person in France?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. No, this is not our work. We do that if we have an authorization to
intercept. Whenever it comes to persons established on french soil, it was at ISB responsibility to
follow-up. What interests us are the communications between this person and abroad. We can get
them through our international monitoring system, and the law permits.
In this group Allat, we bring our very important archives. We are asked to screen individuals
who appear at one time or another in the surveillance of other services, which ask us if we know
these people: we then provide this type of information. We deliver also the information on the
political context. In these cells, the exchanges are highly complementary.
Counter-terrorism, international cooperation is much more systematic than in other areas. It is
limitless with Western partners, including the United States and Britain, and continental Europe
with our main partners.

We are part of the UCLAT, and we support the establishment of a common tool to various
services in charge of the fight against terrorism to share, rank and at the same time to know who
does what. Technically, such a tool of work in common is to point to better manage files.
The rapporteur. To whom would it be accessible?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. It would be accessible to other law enforcement agencies fight against
terrorism, starting with the CSB.
The rapporteur. And it would include your data?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. It would include the data that can be shared with other services at the end
of article L 863-1 of the code of Homeland Security: it is not only ours.
The rapporteur. But they would be available to the community of the first circle?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. They would be available to the intelligence community: ISB, but also to
others based on their need to know, the legal framework and our technical possibilities.
The rapporteur. Seems you ultimately not absurd to have a single database, in the image of the
FSPRT for the Ministry of the Interior?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. This is far from absurd, but this must be done under the control of the
National Commission of control of intelligence techniques (CNCTR), and within the law. For the
moment, it is question of counter-terrorism. But that is what is contemplated.
The rapporteur. Mr. Calvar expressed us his scepticism, because he feared that we would lose
in privacy.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. He is right, insofar as we can always extend the information everyone.
The need to know is a relative concept, and I would like to proceed cautiously. This is why I was
talking about the CSB, which is really our priority, but the idea is then to extend to other
services, including the Direction of the protection and security of defence (DPSD), which needs
very precise. But you need to know to stop at a certain level to preserve privacy.
Mr. Meyer Habib. In a changing world, how do you select new technological tools? Many
security companies offer their services: How do you select? It is necessarily difficult for
someone who has no technical training.
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. We simply have the best engineers, and we strive to be attractive to
ensure their services. At the same time, we must create. Do not be content to follow, so always
anticipate the new technologies. We create and develop our own systems. Of course, we are
modest in relation to the Americans, but when I'm in front of them, I do not blush. We have the
advantage of having integrated ways: the NSA has no human intelligence, and the CIA has no
technical intelligence or operational intelligence. British MI - 6 has human intelligence - it is
very good in this respect-, but want us the technical intelligence and operational capabilities. We

have the chance to have it all, but in return, our duty is to share our technical capabilities with
our partners in the French community of intelligence, and therefore to put at their disposal the
tools that allow them to have access from their offices to our capabilities.
The rapporteur. You do not use the FSPRT. Do you have links with the EMOPT?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. I know the existence.
The President Georges Fenech. Can you expand the acronym?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. I knew it, but I did make the effort to restrain him. This is an internal
structure to the Ministry of the Interior. It seemed not helpful that my service be represented.
However, our relationship with the Ministry of the Interior - not only the ITSB - is excellent.
The President Georges Fenech. When in we finished with Daech?
Mr. Bernard Bajolet. This is a long-term struggle. I was recently reading a statement of Abu
Mohamed Al-Abed, the number two of the organization. Anticipating the loss of Mosul, Raqqah
and Sirte, while we are yet far enough - even if it seems inevitable, in a deadline of a few
months-, he said that this would not prevent him to continue. It would certainly be a considerable
setback for Daech, but even if the organization is militarily defeated - which, I am convinced,
will be the case-, the threat will take another form.
We said at the time: he must deal with political problems, in our country also. It is not my
responsibility, but we all know that, to prevent the phenomenon of radicalisation, political, social
and educational measures. These are deep phenomena in our societies.
Even though same Daech will be defeated militarily, the intelligence services know that the
threat will persist for several years. The number of individuals concerned is significant. Let us
not forget that, during the war in Afghanistan, it was only a few tens - perhaps forty - french
jihadis. We are hundreds of French, to which must be added the francophones, Tunisians,
Moroccans, and those we do not know.
The resilience of the French company question. It reminds me of the 'years of lead' experienced
by countries such as the Italy, certainly completely different conditions. Should the France is
armed, morally first, to be able to fight this very lengthy.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr. Director general, we thank you.
Hearing, huis clos, Mr. Ren Bailly, Director of intelligence at the prefecture of police of
Paris (DRPP)
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, Thursday, May 26, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. We welcome this morning Mr. Ren Bailly, Director of intelligence at
the prefecture of police of Paris (DRPP).

Mr Director, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into
the means OEimplemented by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.
With you, we continue our investigations in the field of intelligence, in US interest now in his Parisian
pane. Addition questions we have on the attacks from January to November last, this will be an
opportunity to ask about the State of the threat, how it implemented OEwork and of course, the
cooperation and coordination between services.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes place
behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the website of the National Assembly.
Nevertheless, in accordance with article 6 of order 58-1100 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning
of the parliamentary assemblies, his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at the
end of our work. I said that accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will previously
transmitted people heard in order to collect their comments. The latter will be submitted to the
Commission, which may decide to State in his report. I recall that, in accordance with the provisions of the
same article, ' is punishable by the penalties provided in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who,
within a period of twenty-five years disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a commission
of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this
information .
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, nothing but
the truth.
Mr. Ren Bailly oath.
The President Georges Fenech. We have first of all general questions to ask regarding the DRPP. What
is its place in the prefecture of police of Paris? What are its links with other services - the proximity of the
Paris metropolitan area (DSPAP) Security Directorate, on the one hand, and regional Directorate of the
judicial police (DRPJ), on the other hand? What is its place in the community of intelligence and among
stakeholders in the fight against terrorism? What were the actions after the attacks of January and
November 2015? What are the main conclusions of the feedback you made after these attacks?
Then, we would like to ask you about the January and November attacks themselves. Why had
monitoring of the perpetrators of these attacks it been abandoned? The DRPP had information about
these individuals and their loved ones? Could you explain the time of flight of the Kaye brothers after the
attack of Charlie Hebdo ? The DRPP had information allowing to anticipate their flight path? How explain
also that Abdelhamid Abaaoud have not been identified before 2015 as a priority target of the french
services?
Finally, we have the strategy implementation issues
uses.

OEwork by the DRPP and means and tools that it

Mr. Ren Bailly, Director of intelligence at the prefecture of police of Paris. The issues you raise
seem a great amplitude compared to the modesty of this direction, which I would remind you the
proportions within the prefecture of police and the national police. The DRPP currently 870 officials. More
small direction of active service by the prefecture of police, it is a very old institution.
St

I wish in this regard to return on the reform of the 1 July 2008. I was at this time the last Deputy central
Director of General information. The reform of 2008 resulted in the merger of the direction de surveillance
du territoire (DST) and the Central Directorate of General information (DCRG). The acronym change
former General information of the prefecture of police of Paris (RGPP), renamed DRPP, is the only
development that has known this structure in the context of this broader reform of intelligence. All its
activities - General information, the fight against violent subversion and the fight against terrorism - have

maintained such what. I mention this point, if it seems interesting in retrospect. I was subsequently central
Deputy Director of the Central Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI) and it is June 2, 2009, I returned
to the DRPP. The bridges having been cut between the ile de la Cit and the rest of the world, I was
appointed to this position to "restore the flow." It was pretty easy to make: it was enough to indicate the
direction of the DCRI at Levallois, what we have done since June 3, 2009. When he was in other
functions, the current keeper of the seals had asked me in hearing why bridges between the DRPP and
the rest of the world of intelligence had been restored so late: I had then replied that I had arrived only the
previous day... Since then, the DRPP has kept all of its assignments. It is general information, renamed
'territorial intelligence', and homeland security. I also wanted to what acronyms concerning the themes
and the DRPP missions are modeled on those other missions at the national level.
The DRPP currently deals with three specific themes of action.
The territorial, first of all intelligence. A small reform took place in this area in September 2009 when the
city police was created. Because, as a result of the reform of 2008 with the merger of the world's
intelligence, General information had swung in another central direction: that of public security. With
hindsight, I believe personally that this was not necessarily a good strategic choice. I want proof of the
fact that, in September 2009, asked the DRPP regain on the small Crown territorial intelligence.
Therefore, three former departmental information services General (SDIG) returned into the fold and
under the authority of the Directorate of intelligence of the prefecture of police. They were then renamed
territorial intelligence of Seine-Saint-Denis, Hauts-de-Seine and Val-de-Marne. Today, the territorial
intelligence is exercised by the DRPP at the level of the agglomeration. It is almost ' a no-brainer to say
that it was necessary to do so. We cannot separate the management of the public order and other device,
the social conflicts of the three departments of the small Crown having a very significant impact on the
capital.
Branch of Homeland Security, is a small structure. Having been Director Assistant central general
information, I remember very well the volume and the territorial mesh we occupied, as well as at the
DCRI. Branch of the internal security of the DRPP, it, total consists of four sections comprising 225
persons - compared to the volume of officials that there may be at Levallois.
The fight against terrorism section is currently composed of 123 officials. This section has a lot of work for
several weeks. The specialized section in the fight against violent subversion - phenomenon that here for
several weeks, given the challenge to the draft reform of the labour code - has 31 staff members. The socalled section T3, which follows the foreign communities and all opposition movements into account 29.
T4 so-called section, specifically the institutional follow-up to the islam of France - i.e. of monitoring of
places of worship multi-transducer or serve as places of recruitment of future fighters meeting of radical
Islamists points - has 31 officials. These numbers are relatively modest. I will be able to show, if you want
to, the specific activity of these sections.
The President Georges Fenech. This is not necessary.
Mr. Ren Bailly. NLL obviously responded to the attacks of January 7, 2015 at the premises of Charlie
Hebdo as well as at the request of the authorities to expand and make more coherent action of our
service. This is reflected by our participation in many devices, strengthened coordination between us and
the Directorate of internal security (CSB) through a unit called "Occur", placed with SID, and the creation
of the operational staff of prevention of terrorism (EMOPT), in which I placed a Commissioner. I would
point out that, on the 870 officers of our direction, the body of Auditors is represented by sixteen people. It
is a ratio to remember, taking into account the volumes of employment from other directions. We
contributed to the creation and animation of the processing file reported for prevention and the
radicalisation of terrorism (FSPRT). We have created a platform dedicated to the collection and
monitoring of reports of radicalisation: it has approved telephone reports made by individuals via a
freephone number.

The rapporteur. What is the specific contribution of your platform compared to the FSPRT?
Mr. Ren Bailly. It is through this platform that we feed the FSPRT, created from scratch by 2015.
Processing of alerts and tracking of radicalisation cells created to DRPP as elsewhere have passed to sift
all reports we had received, by classifying them according to a color code - Green, orange and red.
The rapporteur. Has all of your platform powered the FSPRT?
Mr. Ren Bailly. We have everything forwarded this file, including the objectives that we were dealing
with before its creation, for several months or even several years. But we not "entering" obviously not the
FSPRT those green reports that often are due to problems of torque, otherwise the file would hardly make
sense. This cell mobilizes some 20 people as we treat the alerts in a large capital.
St

Also, since 1 January, we have reactivated the plan of prevention and fight against radical islam,
created in 2004 or 2005 before falling into disuse. I also created the first plan for the prefecture of police,
at the request of the prefect of police Jean-Paul Proust. This plan was to practice interdepartmental
control operations, involving the intelligence officers, of the judicial police, groups of regional intervention
(IRM), customs, taxes and the Union's contributions social security and family allowances (URSSAF) operations shops, bookstores and garages, be as many points of encounter or funding that may
contribute to the Islamist cause.
I hosted personally meetings of staff of security at the Parisian level with our institutional partners the
departments of Justice and Education and prison administration. The Commissioner of police also asked
me to animate at the regional and zonal levels the same meetings with our partners of the Ministry of the
Interior, the central territorial intelligence service and its representatives, the unit for coordination of the
fight against terrorism (UCLAT), the judicial police (PJ), the national gendarmerie and ISB.
That is already a part of what I wear to your knowledge, the reactivation of certain devices, besides the
follow-up of the objectives and classic work we are conducting daily since well before the attacks of
January 2015.
Finally, the State of emergency, which has resulted in a lot of work to implement has been deployed
OEimplement assignments to residence, the administrative searches and bans on exit from the territory measures that we proposed in proportions that were our investigative capacity.
The President Georges Fenech. The perpetrators of the events of January and November 2015 had
they already been under supervision of the DRPP in the past? If Yes, this monitoring has been
abandoned, and why?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Before January 2015, Said Kaye and Salim bean - contained in the 'top 10' french
representatives fighting in the Islamist ranks in the Iraqi-Syrian area - had been placed under surveillance
in 2011. These are individuals who had seemed us interesting because they frequented mosques as well
as cores of individuals that may be one day a certain dangerousness. Said Kaye and Salim bean left in
2011 for the Sultanate of Oman, which we has intrigued because it allowed them to then go to the
Yemen, that they did not have to fail to make. Said Kaye in returned a few weeks later. It has been the
subject in 2011 a security interception which contributed nothing interesting. Salim bean is remained on
area. Monitoring of Said Kaye resumed in February 2014.
The President Georges Fenech. Has it been discontinued?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Yes, because we moved on to other goals we then appeared more interesting.
Recovery in 2014, its monitoring was discontinued in June 2014 because it has been established that
Said Kaye was no longer in the Paris region but installed in Reims.

The rapporteur. In these cases, how is the link between you and ISB?
Mr. Ren Bailly. I was going to talk to you about. I would first back to explain how the link is established
with the CSB, which will help you understand the answer I'll let you then. The DRPP has a liaison officer
in Levallois, and ISB has one on its side to the DRPP. ISB has knowledge, daily and in real-time, all the
information processed, prepared and transmitted by the DRPP. We passed, between June 2, 2009 - date
of my arrival - and on 2 June 2010, from zero to 1600 or 1700 notes forwarded to ISB. Last year, we have
transmitted to it 1 662 information notes, either all our production with regard to the fight against terrorism
and the fight against violent subversion - i.e. monitoring the extreme right and the ultra left.
On the other hand, I send monthly to Levallois an exhaustive list of all our interceptions of security
regarding these two issues - the only two we have in common with CSB since we do not counterintelligence, counter-espionage or Counterproliferation. Of course, if we had information about these
areas - which is very rare - we send them verbatim to the ISB. The DRPP is totally transparent for ISB on
activity it deploys and the information it holds. Because the CSB may, at any time, ask for extensions of
these interceptions - what it does in varying proportions. The principle is that SID has access to all
extensions of interceptions it wishes to.
The President Georges Fenech. In Reims, were tapping they taken by ISB?
Mr. Ren Bailly. I'll get back. But I hope before specify you a third point. Everything about the briefing
notes that emanate from human sources processed by our services is of course sent to ISB.
I return now to the abandonment of the line in June 2014. ISB in has of course been notified. We even
had a meeting at the beginning of the month of July with our correspondents of the ITSB advised the
abandonment of this device and who were committed to take over.
The President Georges Fenech. We would like to understand why it has appeared appropriate to
interrupt these listens. Technically, it is not hearings simultaneously by an official, but tape recorded by
software that can turn without difficulty. Then weekly or monthly checks may be carried out. Why stop
these listens while Said Kaye was clearly identified? Is it due to a problem of quota of lines?
Mr. Ren Bailly. We discuss there land problems and my understanding of the profession. It is not worth
it, in my opinion, to an interception of security if it is not followed by a field work and it operates only in
terms of plays. For a long time, interceptions of security - with one exception, I could mention but which
we would go very far back - learn you little. They nevertheless tell you a few things about the life of an
individual, particularly on its venue - three-quarters of which it won't because these people are not very
reliable in this area. These interceptions allow us to hear the person. They should in my opinion be used
to initiate monitoring of land in order to see living in the individual street which you sometimes hear the
voice. This is where that proves truly the personality of a goal. When it is at home, he can tell anything.
This is maybe not even him who speaks. Things get even more complicated when it intercepts computer
data because there is even more votes. The interception of security must be to see living an individual, to
identify contacts and know its reliability if he announces to the phone a schedule of appointments.
In short, Said Kaye interception was dropped insofar as he was transported to Reims.
The President Georges Fenech. What about his brother as well as MIT Coulibaly, Samy Sumbua and
Omar Mostefa?
Mr. Ren Bailly. This is another set of individuals. We have never worked on MIT Coulibaly. He
sometimes appeared as part of our monitoring of other individuals - especially due to its sensitive
mosques attendance. He appeared on a fairly old network of Iraqi industry a decade earlier. He was also
appeared as one of the brothers Kaye, and sentenced for this with Djamel Beghal, a project of attempting
to escape to the 'star' At Ali Belkacem, artificer of the armed Islamic Group (GIA) in the 1995 attacks.

But MIT Coulibaly has not attracted particular attention. It was more the case of the brothers Kaye.
The President Georges Fenech. Fasiledes Coulibaly had already a good pedigree, given what you have
just told us.
Mr. Ren Bailly. Yes but there were many other individuals in this case some of them, in our opinion,
able to do worse than these young people.
The President Georges Fenech. Fasiledes Coulibaly therefore did not object to special supervision.
Mr. Ren Bailly. No. We have never worked on him.
The President Georges Fenech. Who did, then?
Mr. Ren Bailly. I do not know, Mr president. Section T1 has 123 staff today, but in the last quarter of
2015, she had 50 less.
The President Georges Fenech. What Samy Sumbua and Omar Memoo?
Mr. Ren Bailly. They appeared on our screens, if I may say so, in 2013. Samy Sumbua was a driver at
the RATP. His radicalization had been reported, without more. The RATP then the capital, he left for
Syria. Our monitors have therefore been interrupted Office. As Omar Mostefa, we did not know it.
The rapporteur. Samy Sumbua was reported for his radicalisation, but it was not the subject of
interceptions on your part?
Mr. Ren Bailly. No.
The rapporteur. And he was the subject of a judicial review.
Mr. Ren Bailly. I don't remember it.
The rapporteur. He was placed under investigation and was the subject of a judicial review that it has
violated. Regarding the individuals that you monitor, which are subject to judicial review and that, one
day, stop point, do you have an alert system? We can indeed see now that these individuals do not really
fulfil their obligations of judicial review and that some reports were not put together in real-time to the
intelligence services.
Mr. Ren Bailly. I don't have to remember that this type of case has involved one of our goals. However,
it happened that some of them do not go to point while they were subject to an assignment at home. But
this device was imposed that just recently, after the attacks of November 2015.
With regard to our relations with the other services of the prefecture of police, the majority of the papers
that I intended to ISB are communicated to my colleague Christian Sainte of the judicial police of the
prefecture of police of Paris (PJPP). These notes are often written very upstream, because we do not
have power judicial. I also find it very well because there is in my view - and this is a very personal
position - an incompatibility between the judiciary and the intelligence. I did however choose to always
alert the PJPP upstream services. When we work on groups and discover individuals who could engage a
few months or years later to violent actions, we gain some time by notifying our colleagues of the PJ so
they can prepare to take up certain folders, rather than passing them at the last moment reports
monitoring established five or six months previously. And this all the more the outlines of investigation
that they can give me in connection with the opening of a judicial investigation seem always quite
interesting. It won time.

The rapporteur. Did you have the elements of Abdelhamid Abaaoud?

Mr. Ren Bailly. We only knew that through the notes that had been sent to us by ISB - who, in 2015,
had send me 350. It is normal that this volume is smaller than my production, because ISB transmits me
only the notes that may interest the Paris region.
The rapporteur. Samy Sumbua was reported for his radicalisation, but was not the subject of supervision
on the part of your services. Nevertheless, it was monitored until a certain date by ISB. Did you have this
information? Do you know when ISB follows the top of the spectrum' of individuals in your field of
jurisdiction?
Mr. Ren Bailly. No.
The rapporteur. Did you Raj Kriket elements? Have you participated, with ISB, its identification and his
arrest? Have you identified, identified, and monitored Sid Ahmed Ghlam?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Regarding the information which are transmitted by the ITSB to the DRPP, I am notified
records followed by SID when we have shared objectives. ISB being advised of the investigations we are
conducting, an operational junction was established when we work on objectives also followed by this
direction. On the other hand, I am not notified of the objectives addressed by ISB, not even those who are
in the capital and the Paris region, when they are not followed by the DRPP own.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Do you find it normal?
Mr. Ren Bailly. The answer is in the question: No.
As Sid Ahmed Ghlam, we did not know it. We knew ex post that he had a quite banal radicalisation
reporting which did not deserve special attention. On the other hand, we were working at the time on
individuals who emerged subsequently as unable to serve as a logistics support - including one that held
a small automotive garage in the Val-d'Oise. He was likely one of the correspondents of Sid Ahmed
Ghlam, or perhaps one of its first logistics, since support was established a link between one of the
vehicles used by him - the Megane found in Aubervilliers - and this garage. The investigation items
handled by the judicial police and the ISB have established that it had encrypted communication systems
- Sid Ahmed Gee being student in computer science, he was very willing to use this type of device between certain objectives that we were watching in distant suburbs of Paris and this individual. But we
have never established a link between Sid Ahmed Ghlam and this person providing logistical support in
real time.
The rapporteur. You said earlier that MIT Coulibaly was not monitored by your services. SID told us the
same thing. However, from the information I have available, in Fleury-Mrogis prison, it was linked - you
pointed out - to Djamel Beghal. And the prison administration knew its radicalization. Moreover, he had
made the prison for having planned the escape of At Ali Belkacem. At one point, Chung released from
prison and is even received at the Elysee. Is there no relationship between the prison administration and
services relating to individuals?
Mr. Ren Bailly. We have fairly close relations with the prison: they are not new but they have been
reactivated. They concern the monitoring of some detainees and reports that can be communicated to us.
We have also established links between some individuals who are out of prison and others which are
enclosed. I always thought - and will continue to think long - the first terrorists to work are those that one
holds. The question you are asking is a flagrant demonstration. We do outreach meetings...

The rapporteur. The relationship therefore exists. But why, while all flashing red, MIT Coulibaly,
imprisoned for attempting to escape a prisoner of terrorism and linked to Djamel Beghal, has not
supervised on his release from prison?
Mr. Ren Bailly. I have no answer to this question, to be put to the prison administration. In a
relationship, it cannot be only one meaning of movement. We have a quite common relationship with the
prison administration. We give even awareness sessions. To encourage those of my colleagues who still
hesitate to focus on what is happening in prisons, I meet myself some detainees. Is not necessarily in my
status, but I thought good to handmade dough recently, because many indicators lead us to believe that
there is a very big activity in jails in the Paris region. The echoes we have concerning individuals who are
out of prison and are in contact with prisoners also deserve to be followed. But I do not know why the
prison administration are not alerted us - nor the DRPP ISB, with which she has contacts throughout the
national territory.
The President Georges Fenech. One may think that with the integration of the prison administration in
the intelligence community these hiatus should no longer occur.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Mr. Director, that has changed in the way you operate, between January and
November 2015 attacks and today? Listen to you, one has the impression that services are properly
segregated. You certainly managed to make sure to also work across the device, but when an individual
is in Reims, there is change in jurisdiction. The other day, the Minister of the Interior organized a meeting
place Beauvau to explain to the emergency services that they should not only change the doctrine, but
also pool their action and put an end to the competition that existed between them. Do you think that
should do the same in the intelligence community and organize a real pyramid? I have the impression
that the DRPP is limited in number of civil servants. You also explained to president Fenech earlier that
you had been obliged to stop your action on Said Kaye to grant the priority, taking into account your
means, "big fish". We understand that the impossible one is required, but how about a total redesign of
the mode of operation of the services?
On the other hand, what is your opinion concerning the Union of Islamic organisations of France (UOIF)?
Do you follow this organization?
Finally, we hear that there are 25-30% of converts among those who leave do Jihad. Did you, among
officials of phone tapping, enough officials speaking Arabic?
M. Pierre Lellouche. It appears from what you say, Mr Director, you are blatant understaffed compared
with your mission of monitoring of radicalisation in the capital and the small Crown - where are likely to
commit most of the attacks. If I have understood correctly, your service has 123 officers responsible for
combating terrorism, 29 charges of foreign communities and 31 charges of places of worship. How many
are there Muslim places of worship in Paris and Paris region? How many problem? How would you take
agents to be able to monitor them? If I compare your 123 officers number of 'clients' that were made in
Syria and Iraq and that back, I infer that you follow 10% and the remaining 90% are jumping in nature
without being monitored. Could you confirm this? And do you trust the rest of the intelligence community
to deal with these elements?
On the interceptions, what you say is struck at the corner of common sense. It takes people on the
ground, but also people capable of break into encrypted systems. Not surprisingly, experienced
individuals who return home from the Middle East say anything over the phone. There are also many
ways to use a phone with different chips. What do you do with the dark cloud and modes of
communication used by these real soldiers, seasoned with these techniques after returning from the
Middle East?
What, moreover, infiltration of circles Salafists in Paris and suburbs of Paris? Do you have to do
personal? Or do you only on the alerts that you want to ask?

I was shocked by what you said about the lack of effective coordination between the different services. If I
have understood correctly, you feed the CSB, but it lets you completely in the dark about what can
happen in Paris and Paris region in the context of its own activities. And, until now, there was a total
disconnect between you and the prison administration. Do you think that this will improve today?
Finally, who are the "thugs" and the perpetrators of violence against the police? Is it the ultra-left or a
mixture of the ultra left and radicalized in the suburbs?
Mr. Ren Bailly. If you have the impression of a separation between services, it may be that I badly
expressed. I think on the contrary that there is a total integration with regard to the activity of the DRPP in
respect of the rest of the intelligence, included ISB community. I repeat to you: we work seamlessly with
this direction.
M. Pierre Lellouche. In that sense, Yes. But in the other direction?
Mr. Ren Bailly. In another sense, I could actually benefit from information on the objectives followed by
the CSB, but I already struggling to process what I have "in-store", if I may say. I assumes that the
information could communicate us ISB on the objectives that it processes are not sufficiently mature or
not in connection with our own goals. It would therefore only information for information.
M. Pierre Lellouche. But these elements could cross with other elements in your possession on the
objectives that you follow.
Mr. Ren Bailly. ISB having knowledge of any our device, the crossing is made all naturally. I do not at
all that there is fault here - and I do not say this to try to clear this great service. Anyway, I couldn't join is
more in terms of field investigations, tracking lines or use of new techniques of intelligence.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Have your resources not increased?
Mr. Ren Bailly. If they increased. Under the plan of fight against terrorism, the Ministry of the Interior
has specifically allocated to the fight against terrorism 100 additional staff: 50 at the end of 2015, 25 in
2016 and 25 in 2017.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Are they trained in the fight against terrorism?
Mr. Ren Bailly. I have the advantage of being able to choose them. To select 50 officials that I recruited
at the end of 2015, I launched a notice of recruitment and received over 120 applications. Of course, we
choose people who have, in our opinion, police capabilities adapted to the mission that we intend to give
them. We take, for example, agents of the brigades of information of public road (BIVP) to make them do
agenda overnight, tracking, and spinners in difficult environments or sensitive geographical areas where
you can be yourself in danger.
The rapporteur. Do you recruit only police officers?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Essentially.
The rapporteur. Do you hire contractors?
Mr. Ren Bailly. The question I have been asked recently. We think, for specific areas. To answer the
question on languages spoken by our agents, it is clear that need us interpreters when our steals are
people speaking Arabic. We have them. I have an interceptions service installed today for the
handicapped, but who will soon move to a more modern platform rue du Cherche-Midi. I consider my
service of interceptions as very satisfactory. Of course, we could have more performers, but it is

necessary to maximize the usefulness of these employees and contractors. Arise, questions of financing.
Also, I forgot to tell you something. And it is rather that who should you shock and allow you to plead the
case of the DRPP: our direction for 2016 budget is 980 000 euros for 870 officials.
The President Georges Fenech. Excluding salaries?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Yes. Cannot do much with such a sum.
The rapporteur. Do you pay your sources?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Yes, but this represents little in budgetary terms. In the field of territorial intelligence
sources is funded by my own budget. It is relatively low: between 10,000 and 15,000 euros per year. In
the field of Homeland Security, sources are funded by ISB, to the tune of 30,000 euros on the year. This
budget seems ridiculous, but it is sufficient. If a source we can outsmart a very serious attack in the
capital, I know I can ask ISB to reward this source.
Again, the most dramatic aspect for the DRPP is the weakness of its budget to its missions and its
volume of officials, compared to other services.
In any case, I don't feel that there is partitioning. You seem to consider that the CSB could communicate
more with us. For my part, I find that we communicate sufficiently and the DRPP works seamlessly in
relation to this great service. This satisfies me fully and sometimes, ISB associated us with the follow-up
of certain groups of objectives. We can respond to the command but taking into account the volume of
staff available to me, we are limited and have to make qualitative choices.
Mr. Serge Grouard. What about the barrier between you and the prison administration?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Much has been said lately the inclusion of prison intelligence in the intelligence
community. I am very much in favour because it is very engaged in their mission and specific agents. It
would be good that they are really associated with the second circle from the world of intelligence, to
which we ourselves partly quartered.
The device of internal security of the DRPP deserve fully, in the same way as the small structure
TRACFIN, to be in the first circle. But I understand very well that the hybrid nature of our mission can
worry major intelligence services, wishing that the secret defence is completely guaranteed. I would
remind simply and without nostalgia, the DCRG maintained international relations and made the fight
against terrorism. However the confidentiality of its mission in a particular field posed no problem to the
rest world of intelligence. The DRPP made territorial intelligence and homeland security: in respect of the
latter, it could very legitimately participate in the first circle.
To return to your question, I think sincerely that this would be an asset to make more formal participation
of prison Intelligence operative of the second circle. Elsewhere in this title Academy of intelligence did us
the favor, in 2015, to organize the first workshop, decentralized in the second circle, on the phenomenon
of radicalisation. I have organized it in the DRPP, with thirty servants - ten of DRPP, ten of the central
service of territorial intelligence (LSVCCS) and ten of the prison administration. This session of three days
on radicalisation has been very important and very interesting, to the point that talking me again as from
one year to renew. The prison administration can no doubt provide us with more elements, provided that
she herself has the means. In addition, it can not do anything. She can do the prison intelligence, but can
have access to intelligence techniques? If it embarks on this adventure, need to strengthen significantly
its strength. I in any case found in this administration a real determination and exchanges between us are
very common. I know not why it does not told us about MIT Coulibaly. She told us about other individuals
on which we have worked.

The President Georges Fenech. We will examine. Can you answer the questions by Mr Lellouche?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Our services are indeed always understaffed. However, when they let me hear that
would strengthen in the last quarter of the year 2015, I was asked how many people wanted. However,
thick walls - to the ancestral history - of the prefecture of police of Paris, in the barracks of the city, are not
variable geometry, unlike those of the 84 rue de Villiers at Levallois. In the space I have available, I could
accommodate ten officials. I was told that I would have fifty - I didn't know where to put them. And here
finally that I will have one hundred! So I had to make camper 50 officials who arrived at the end of the
year 2015, the time to redesign all the service and the device - which had significant consequences on
the geographical positioning of these officials. Need to find them work, but also local. I said to the Minister
of the Interior that I wanted although reinforcements and that I knew very well the mission that I was going
to give them, but that I wouldn't necessarily give a computer to each of these hundred officials. I did not
neglect the technical work or searching the web dark, but I believe that conversations encrypted of MIT
Chung the week before his January 8 against the young Clarissa Jean-Philippe action and that of the next
day to the Hyper hide are still not decrypted. There is indeed a real problem.
Mr. Meyer Habib. Fasiledes Chung is arrested, three days prior to the occurrence, avenue Simon Bolivar
e
in 19 arrondissement of Paris, to sixty metres school Lucien de Hirsch, the largest Jewish school in the
capital, which is located avenue Secretan. Asked him his licence, we know it is plugged S, and it is
released, two days before he will commit a murder in Montrouge.
Mr. Ren Bailly. Don't be not overly shocked that he has been a S Plug and was released. First, it is, I
believe, the ITSB which had circulated this plug. In any case, it wasn't us. Then S sheets are only
reporting cards. These aren't records of arrest or arraignment. Specifications S of an individual is used to
instruct the intelligence services that the individual was controlled at any one time in any one place, that
he was in the company - if the work has been well done - of such or such persons, and where he
intended to go. It only serves to this. But this has at least the merit of alert in real time its diffuser. I do not
know if this has been done.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Such a situation justifies you are informed, because it happens in Paris. If a fitch
individual S is intercepted near a Jewish school, not sure if the issuer of the card was informed, but the
system should at least allow you to be.
Mr. Ren Bailly. No. 1167 S sheets issued by the DRPP are currently active. If Mr. Coulibaly was not
included among the records I had, the service that has arrested it was not to call me. On a sheet showing
the reasons for its issuance, the identity of the issuing authority and number to join with this service.
M. Pierre Lellouche. I understood it. But do you find it normal that you, patron of intelligence in Paris, do
not be recipient of interceptions of identified individuals, even if you are not sending the plug? Knowing
that there are 9 000 sheets, it can be someone arriving from another Department. If he is preparing to
target a goal in your area, you will not be aware.
Mr. Ren Bailly. No.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Is this normal?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Even I would be notified, I couldn't do anything this information if it was a goal that I do
not know. We could that bring closer us to the issuing authority to ensure that he has been warned and
for him asking why he issued this card. And, as you say, there are 9 000 sheets.
The President Georges Fenech. Could you answer the annex question which asked you about the
origin of the wreckers? Have a link with radicalisation? What is infiltration of mosques? I remind you that
you need to make the shortest possible responses. I'll be forced to leave and we have many questions to
ask you.

Mr. Ren Bailly. Regarding the urban violence, the only connection that can exist between the thugs and
terrorists is semantic and holds at the end of "radicalization" that you use.
The President Georges Fenech. This is not an Islamic radicalisation.
Mr. Ren Bailly. Not at all.
The President Georges Fenech. And what about your infiltration in Salafi circles?
Mr. Ren Bailly. I've almost mentioned just now speaking of recruitment sources, which is done only
through this device. There are hundreds of mosques in the Paris region, that I listed last year. Most of
them are far from presenting a danger and a radicality which may constitute a source of recruitment.
M. Pierre Lellouche. How many of these problem?
Mr. Ren Bailly. We are currently monitoring in less than a dozen in the capital. We made close one,
which was extremely dangerous, in Lagny-sur-Marne, at the end of a hard fight. The DRPP has
developed more than a year to get the Decree of dissolution of this mosque.
The President Georges Fenech. A year of combat against whom?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Against the law. I will make a parallel with the previous question on the Crashers. We
know very well the radical anti-establishment so-called movement that has nothing to do with
radicalization. When individuals of this movement arrived in an event, we are able, among a group of two
hundred people to identify formally more than half. But within a second when they back their hood and
they put their gas masks and their black raincoat, they all look the same and we can no longer identify
them. This is the great difficulty that we met with bans seem: even if we know that the individuals
concerned are in a demonstration, they hide and griment it impossible to identify and to associate a name
with a specific confrontation of CRS. We had a lot of luck, thanks to two officials of the DRPP having
followed this small nucleus of quay of Valmy, as we have seen in action during the aggression of the
silkscreen vehicle but there is not infiltration as we do in the mosques.
In Salafi circles and sensitive mosques, or to meeting such as restaurants and shops, we use physical
surveillance, to photographs, to the video being taken - because the law there allows us - and, above all,
we are recruiting human sources.
Mr Franois Lamy. I will not that a single general question you ask after have heard you. What added
value service territorialised as yours brings to the global fight against terrorism, which is without borders?
Wouldn't no more effective than the officials and all the resources you spend on intelligence and the fight
against terrorism are donated to the ISB in order to have a more comprehensive service?
Presidency of Mr. Meyer Habib, Vice President.
M. Philippe Goujon. God knows if I'm an ardent defender of the prefecture of police. This institution
seems adapted to the safety of Paris and the grand Paris. But since the hearing began, listening to your
answers, I find no justification for the existence of your service reform has actually saved. I understand
you want to conserve a specificity in the prefecture of police for general reasons, but your service has no
operational justification. If your service has neither means nor local or personnel - or perhaps even of
IMSI-catchers -, it is not much, because it doesn't have sufficient resources to effectively conduct the fight
against terrorism and other missions that are yours. Moreover, there are areas of shadow and the
difficulties of articulation with the SID and the prison administration. It does not, therefore, include the
existence of this extra layer, which can even lead to ignore certain situations or Miss terrorists. You aren't
even in the first circle of the intelligence community.

Your current situation so many drawbacks. What is your territorial establishment in Paris and the
metropolitan area? How do you work with local services such as the DSPAP, the regional judicial police
service (cells), the brigade research and intervention (bis) or public order and traffic (DOPC) branch? If
there are deficiencies compared to national levels, is there at least, at the territorial level, exchanges of
information that allow you to work operationally?
Mr. Ren Bailly. You ask me to justify the existence of the service that I run currently. I cannot talk about
that through the activity that we develop.
I can inform you that investigations we conducted in the context of the fight against terrorism in recent
years have enabled SID and the PJ of the 36 quai des Orfvres to dismantle terrorist networks.
I can also quote the Forsane Alizza network, we have identified in 2012 and which person was aware.
Our investigations are continuing, we noticed that he "toilait" throughout the national territory, allowing
SID to preempt that - quite normal thing - folder, law it and detain 15 individuals, including a well identified
commando who was preparing to carry out attacks in the capital and, in particular, to eliminate the Rector
Dalil Boubakeur. The facts have been established, tried and convicted.
We have recently detected another network called Sanabil - "wheat" in Arabic-, driven by an individual
which appeared already when I was in the DCRG, in the village of Artigat, which are from brothers Clain which claimed responsibility for the attacks of November 13 committed in Paris - and which generated the
young Mohamed Merah. This network has been dismantled. Its assets have been frozen, since it help
and moral support that this association claims to bring detainees are essentially dedicated to detainees
charged with conspiracy in connection with a terrorist undertaking. In short, the case is part of the DRPP
and was operated by ISB.
Here is some outstanding examples of our activities. I will not quote you, so there are many, all briefing
notes that we have written on groups engaged in the traffic of weapons and false papers and used the
terrorist cause. The invoice of all the attacks of Paris is relatively modest, almost ' as far as the budget of
the DRPP, to commit the worst atrocities in the capital since World War II. We therefore contribute despite
everything, without necessarily making publicity, to the fight against terrorism. When SID claims the
dismantling of a number of networks from 2013, I can tell you that the DRPP brought, despite its modest
means, a significant contribution. The information that we communicate daily should also be sought and
worked. I sincerely believe that we bring added value to global information held by CSB.
Mr Franois Lamy. Of course, but if your men were in ISB, they would make the same type of
information. What added value the fact that you're territorialized brings?
Mr. Ren Bailly. I you suggest another question: why is there no direction regional of the ITSB in Paris,
while there are anywhere else? DRPP, in its dimension of internal security, could very well constitute a
regional Directorate of CSB. It seems to me well that the DCRG considered the General information of the
prefecture of police (RGPP) as one of its regional directorates, which precluded not them to work or go
out of business. I would remind you - with nostalgia - the biggest terrorism cases in France - whether
Basque, of the Corsicans or Islamists - have been dismantled by General information.
Mr Franois Lamy. It was their mission.
Mr. Ren Bailly. Not the only one, it seems to me. Islam seems to me to have been a concern well
before 1994.
The rapporteur. I would like to return to the question that I asked you earlier about Raj Kriket.

Mr. Ren Bailly. I have heard following the dissemination by ISB of a briefing note which had been
alerted by a foreign service for the possible presence of Raj Kriket in France, or even perhaps in the Paris
region.
The rapporteur. At the time of the arrest, or several months before?
Mr. Ren Bailly. I think it was in January, but I'm not sure.
The rapporteur. Have you contributed to the location of this individual? It was clearly located within your
territorial jurisdiction: Courbevoie and Argenteuil, but also in Boulogne-Billancourt or Issy.
Mr. Ren Bailly. He had an apartment in Boulogne and a cache in Argenteuil.
The rapporteur. And he was born in Courbevoie.
Mr. Ren Bailly. We discovered it through the note by ISB.
The rapporteur. Last point, you mentioned earlier that you couldn't always decipher phone calls from MIT
Coulibaly. My question will be perhaps off topic, because I don't know much on the technical level, but if
one has recovered Coulibaly conversations dating from before the attacks of January 2015, it is indeed
that a service was monitoring...
Mr. Ren Bailly. No.
The rapporteur. .. .at least it could listen to these conversations retrospectively ?
Mr. Ren Bailly. I think that's actually what happened, thanks to messages sent and then stayed in
memory on phones that have been recovered.
The rapporteur. It is therefore not conversations, but "first" or messages?
Mr. Ren Bailly. These are messages. The first, is still something else.
The rapporteur. SMS was therefore recovered?
Mr. Ren Bailly. Yes, it is rather that. E-mails or on computer media. Technically, these messages have
not yet been decrypted.
M. Philippe Goujon. I ask you a topical issue. In a few weeks will be the Euro 2016, especially in Paris.
Given what we have seen a few days ago at the Stade de France - and you are not responsible - and the
installation of a fan zone accommodating 100,000 people in the Champ-de-Mars at the foot of the Eiffel
Tower, on the other hand the Belgian cell that was dismantled was objective event and that terrorists
arrested recently in Bari , in Puglia, had on them a picture of the Eiffel Tower, what is your analysis of the
threats facing this sporting event and the Champ-de-Mars fan zone ?
Mr. Ren Bailly. The information I have regarding this threat is known to everyone. I think the Euro 2016,
international forum, is a priority target of strike for Daech - who does not hide. This was revealed in some
arrests. Terrorists have already tried hitting the Stade de France. If Daech could prohibit the holding of
Euro 2016, not even by striking, he would. In addition, the games will not occur only in Paris; Daech will
perhaps tempted to do elsewhere what he can do in the capital. No service - same no major external
services - had assumed before 13 November, there would be suicide attacks, despite the many analyses.

I am very down to Earth on these issues. I trust the basic police, spinning work and surveillance. I know
that colleagues of the ITSB take into account also, but they are primarily oriented to the technique. Of
course, it takes technique, since the enemy uses it, but it will not solve everything. In the fight against
terrorism, also need us human sources, the "human dough". Turning to the threat to the Euro 2016, as in
that of 2013, we must also make appeal to his memory: as it became known, insofar as had published it a
weekly newspaper, the Bataclan wasn't a target out of the hat by Farouk, who had spoken as early as
2009. It is not strictly in the field of competence of the DRPP. In this regard, it must share with others the
duty of remembrance.
The rapporteur. Could you tell us the bottom of your thinking about the Bataclan? Paris Match has
actually published the minutes of the DCRI in which Farouk Ben Abbes cited this auditorium. But when
you say that this place is not "out of the hat", do you consider that it continues to be a permanent target?
Mr. Ren Bailly. No. I mean in terms of reflection and analysis we are so caught up in a mass of
information to sort through that, sometimes we do more to have the necessary detachment on basic
elements. Ask why the prison administration has not attracted attention to Chung, is a basic question.
Why don't we remember not that in 2009 the Bataclan was targeted while Daech, in its magazine, Dar-alIslam, had uttered some threats? I think it is interesting to remember that terrorists still write in advance
what they will do. I refer you to the numbers 4 and 5 of this review, in which Daech warned us that it
would hit shopping malls, police officers, military personnel, means of transport - it has already hit a TGV and show rooms. In short, he declined its objectives. Of course, the Euro 2016 has also targeted. The
threat to this event is therefore very strong.
Mr. Serge Grouard. What are the respective percentages of individuals of the terrorist movement known
before the attacks and was not at all or no? If I ask this question, it is about if the cracks are rather
satisfactory, or if we have to face a decoy because, despite all the work you do with your colleagues in
the other services, the mass is such that there are always individuals who pass through these cracks and
not aPriori known.
Secondly, you say that terrorists write always before they will be after. This provides a reading grid and
allows to anticipate. But if the performers do not necessarily come out all Polytechnic or other large
schools, sponsors are evidence, strategic and tactical intelligence in the strictly military sense. Will they
not justly, as advised long ago the author of a book entitled The paradox of strategy, do what is expected
of them not? Everything that is said currently about the Euro 2016 participates not a strategy aimed at us
tired that at one time or another, we baissions guard, and that attacks are then perpetrated? It seems to
me that the United Kingdom has experienced this type of scenario. Terrorists do not seek to put us on the
teeth? If, as I hope it nothing happens during the Euro 2016, may need to draw the conclusion that,
admittedly, we have been very effective, but also that another strategy is to the OEwork.
Mr. Ren Bailly. It is certain that we face, from 2015, a new form of terrorism. We had, in 1994 - 1995,
faced commandos from abroad to settle some time in hiding on the territory and hit the France. Now,
nearly three quarters of perpetrators of attacks, or even more, are nationals. Some of them, but not all,
went to attend a week of training, in the Yemen or in the Iraqi-Syrian area. This is a new form of threat
and action, which must be taken into account and which challenges.
With the exception of Sid Ahmed Ghlam and Yassin Sadiki - the author of the crime of Saint-QuentinFallavier-, individuals that have struck the country since January 2015 were virtually all known to previous
facts: not facts of radicalisation, but minor offences law, i.e. the activities instead of the police and the
fight against terrorism and the world of intelligence. We must therefore focus our attention today, a bit as
the day before yesterday but especially as tomorrow, on individuals that we monitor, we see progress and
that meet these two criteria - rogue small which are not necessarily from Seine-Saint-Denis, since the
brothers Kaye lived Hauts-de-Seine.

The rapporteur. You mentioned earlier the cell "occur. You in are an integral part in the same way as the
six other services of the first circle, as well as the LSVCCS. Is this cell functional according to you?
On the other hand, when do you consider it appropriate to switch to legal? Do you have a doctrine on the
subject?
Mr. Meyer Habib, president. I asked you earlier about the UOIF, but I didn't answer. The imams of more
moderate trend, in particular Hassen Chalghoumi, accuse us, us policies to be responsible not for
terrorism but the contents of some speech - to the more serious long term effects. Are the sermons
compatible with the Republic? We know that the direction of the UOIF does no direct danger in terms of
terrorist threat. Most dangerous is without doubt, on the other hand, long-term indoctrination which is part
of its strategy.
Mr. Ren Bailly. For answering questions on the prosecution: this is the reality principle which applies.
We do when we find that individuals that we monitor are starting to change their behaviour - and I'm not
just talking about physical attributes: those that I fear the most are those who look like me physically, and
not those who have distinctive signs. We do it whenever we feel a little cohesion between these
individuals and they are trafficking weapons or mechanical parts to retrieve money, or they take credits.
Fasiledes Coulibaly has funded its operation taking a Cofinoga credit for the purchase of an Austin to
30,000 euros, which he immediately sold 20 000 euros. This allowed him to buy a Kalashnikov and
Tokarev - but not on Bon Coin site or elsewhere on the internet. It took him out of home to meet someone
who was not necessarily an Islamist radical, and which was able to provide weapons. Once we find such
traffic, we do not seek further: we immediately send information for exploitation to the PJ or SID, then
telling us to continue our surveillance and alert them if any particular behavior is interesting to judicialize.
We are driven to a legal referral. It seems important to make very upstream, and it is why I consistently
warned the PJ's all the investigations we are conducting on potentially dangerous individuals.
Mr. Ren Bailly. The cell 'Occur' was created after November, it seems to me. It is so very recent.
The rapporteur. It was created in June.
Mr. Ren Bailly. This cell entirely gives me satisfaction: specifically established to enable much more
direct relations between all the devices involved. It me is particularly strong useful for screening - whether
in the context of the COP21 or Euro 2016 for example: without the need to grasp such or such Deputy
Director, I do appeal to the appropriate correspondent of the cell, which immediately bring me answers.
As mosques, some of them actually attracted attention. There is much less now. We know very well that
the sermons are, for several years now, totally smooth, and that this is not at all that this is happening.
The religious education of the terrorists who hit us was really close to nothingness. Coulibaly, where it
claims the attacks that he is preparing to commit, struggled even to pronounce in Arabic the name of its
leader. Of course, we must continue to monitor mosques because messages can there be disseminated including insidiously, in the long term. But in the immediate future, it is not here that lies the real threat.
Mr. Meyer Habib, president. Thank you very much, Mr. Director.

Hearing, huis clos, general Christophe Gomart, Director of military intelligence (DRM),
Ms. Lorraine Tournyol du Clos, Assistant to the Director, responsible for strategy, and
colonel Rnald Patigny, military assistant
Record of the hearing, behind closed doors, Thursday, May 26, 2016

The President Georges Fenech. We welcome lieutenant-general Christophe Gomart, Director of

intelligence military, accompanied by Ms. Lorraine Tournyol du Clos, Assistant to the Director, responsible
for strategy, and colonel Rnald Patigny, military assistant.
My general, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry into
the means OEimplemented by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We will complete our investigations in the field of intelligence, with you concerning the indispensable
contributions of military intelligence for our defense and security, and, of course, in addition to the human
and technical means available to you to complete your missions, cooperation and coordination between
your direction and other intelligence services.
The hearing, due to the confidentiality of the information that you are likely to deliver us, takes place
behind closed doors. Therefore, it is not broadcast on the internet site of the Assembly. Nevertheless, and
in accordance with article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958 operation parliamentary assemblies,
his account may be published in whole or in part, if we decide so at the end of our work. I said that
accounts of the hearings that have taken place in camera will previously transmitted people heard in
order to collect their comments. These observations will be submitted to the Commission, which may
decide to State in his report. I would remind you that, in accordance with the provisions of the same
article, 'is punishable by the penalties provided for in article 226-13 of the penal code any person who,
within a period of twenty-five years disclose or publish information relating to non-works of a commission
of inquiry, unless the report published at the end of the work of the commission referred to this
information".
In accordance with the provisions of article 6, supra, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, nothing but
the truth.
Please raise your right hand and say: "I swear."
General Christophe Gomart, Ms. Lorraine Tournyol du Clos, and colonel Rnald Patigny successively
take oath.
General, we have prepared a series of questions grouped under two chapters: the situation in the Levant
and in Libya and inter-service cooperation.
What is your analysis of the situation in the Levant and what changes have you noticed in recent months?
What is Daech today in terms of staffing, equipment and means of action? How do you rate the
effectiveness of air strikes? Have what changes you seen since their intensification in September 2015?
How do you choose your targets? What areas do you prefer? What resources do you have for this? Have
what results you achieved? What is the participation of the France in the total activity of the global
coalition? How is the cooperation with the other countries of the coalition? What are the tools or
coordination units available to you? How do the 'deconfliction' with the Russia? How is the cooperation
with Iraqi and Kurdish troops? How do the sharing of tasks with the DGSE? How do you rate your
cooperation? Could you introduce the Hermes, its operation cell, the participation of each of the services
and the results obtained? What is your assessment of the situation in Libya and what changes have you
noticed in recent months?
Regards the inter-service cooperation, what is the added value for the DRM, the cell Allat? What
contribution are you bring?
General Christophe Gomart, Director of military intelligence. Mr president, Mr President, honourable
Members, let me first tell you the honour that is mine to speak before you today.

I will focus my remarks on DRM, the means by which it implements OEwork in support of the Shamal
operation and its relationship with other intelligence services, before you prepare a statement of the
situation in the Levant.
The mission of the DRM is to provide intelligence of military interest (RIM). The RIM is the part of the
information that interested parties des forces vives - States, military or paramilitary organizations, or even
guerrilla - and the environment that are likely to impact on our forces and our vital interests. By the RIM it
is therefore to inform the decision of politicians - the Minister of defence, which DRM is the RIM Advisor and military leaders - Chief of staff (ECS), which is subject to DRM - and support our armed forces in their
manOEwork in operations and when they are preparing to be deployed.
The challenge of the DRM is to cover a broad spectrum: directly support current operations - Liza,
Cymothoe, Daman and Shamal - by participating in the design and conduct of the manOEwork forces
incurred by knowledge of the opponent - how are, how are they organized, what are their capabilities,
weaknesses?-, maintain a capacity of anticipation for planning potential operations and be vigilant on
theatres potential operating areas crisogenes - Libya, Nigeria, Ukraine, Yemen, Syria where it was
preparing to bomb end August 2013-, finally contribute to the intelligence necessary to the definition of
tools in the design of our arms and our nuclear deterrence by the knowledge of the major military powers
potentially adverse.
To perform its tasks, the DRM has today 1800 people, including a quarter of civilian personnel, spread
over three main rights-of-way: Sitemap Balard in Paris - 150 people-, Creil - 850 people - and Strasbourg
- about 150 people at the center of joint training for intelligence (CFIAR), which must be moved to Creil in
the near future. The Organization of the DRM is based on three subdirectorates - research, operations
and support, a strategy Center who works in a transverse way so as to improve the effectiveness and
relevancy of the Direction, and a centre for coordination of the intelligence cycle.
In terms of means, I have five centres of expertise: the training and interpretation Centre joint (CFIII)
imaging for the image field, the Centre training and instructions for electromagnetic emissions (CFEEE)
for the electromagnetic field, the Joint Centre for research and collection of human intelligence (CI3RH)
for human research, the Centre of geo-localized joint intelligence (IMRC) for geospatial intelligence and
the research and Analysis Centre cyber (CARC) for cyber intelligence. I put in OEwork of the collection
which are dedicated to me means: I have nine centres to intercept satellite, a boat of electromagnetic
collection, the Dupuy de Lmeregiments dedicated to human research, as the 13th parachute Dragoon
regiment, satellite observation, or light aircraft for surveillance and recognition (ALSR) that are now mostly
deployed for the benefit of the Shamal and Liza operations and combine collection of images and
electromagnetic collection capabilities. I can also dispose of the means at the disposal of the armed
forces, as the Rafale, the ATL2, vessels of the French Navy, and the regiments of transmission.
In the capabilities area, I finally want to raise on July 24, 2015 and 30 November 2015 laws relating to
intelligence. They offered to the DRM of the possibilities of use of techniques of collection of information
on the national territory under the control of the Interministerial Group control (ICG) and the National
Commission of control of intelligence techniques (CNCTR). It notably allows me to monitor
communications issued or received by targets abroad.
Following the attacks that hit our soil in 2015, it was decided to augment the DRM in the same way as
other intelligence services. With regard to DRM, strengthening staff is 432 people on the period 2016 to
2019 in the perimeter of the CEMA, and in two waves: 212 people following the attacks in January 2015
for Charlie Hebdo and 220 people, as well as additional funding, the aftermath of the November 13, 2015,
the President of the Republic decided to stabilize staffing within the armed forces while asking to continue
the efforts at reorganization to the profit of the operational forces, intelligence and cyber defence.
This budgetary effort for example allows us to develop our information and communication systems to
better share intelligence with military units that belong to the joint intelligence service but especially with

partner services of the national intelligence community, us develop additional means of processing of the
data, to develop the capacity of essential Cybernetics for the DRM , allowing us to continue to adapt to
new applications that continue to be placed on the market or to strengthen our capacity for investigation
of the Web, have ALSR in greater numbers, airplanes that we rent, armed French does not have in
heritage at the moment - the purchase of two ALSR in heritage is planned under the LPM.
I now propose to consider the way in which DRM is organized to meet the needs of the operation Shamal
in the Levant.
The crisis in the Levant tracking requires a fine approach in terms of intelligence because of the
complexity of the situation. We need to OEimplementation of adapted in order to have a stand-alone
assessment means.
Policy information of the DRM to the Levant is based on four axes: an organization optimized around a
new structure, the rising plateau, that I created in January 2015, a dense sensor device based on the
complementarity of sensors, human and technical, supplemented by means of surveillance, target
acquisition, intelligence and reconnaissance (SA2R) deployed in the field, the development of exchanges
with countries hosting detachments intelligence as well as with other partners such as the United States ,
and the work in inter-agency within the national intelligence community.
On the organizational level, first of all, DRM has implemented at the strategic level an inclusive
intelligence, structure called plateau Levant in Paris, within J2, i.e. of the intelligence bureau of the
Centre for planning and conduct of operations (CPCO), of how to improve the effectiveness of the
intelligence cycle and better meet the needs of operations. This plateau integrates in a same place, closer
to those who conduct the operations, specialists searching and mining analysts to escape the logic of silo
which prevailed previously. It allows to combine different expertise related to analysis, at the end of
targeting intelligence and the orientation of the sensors, intelligence interagency, with the Hermes cell,
which I talk, as well as a cell for coordination and analysis of electromagnetic intelligence based in Balard
and which also covers the Libya in a transverse Daech tracking logic.
This plateau has for mission to exploit information gathered in the theatre, then cross him, summarized
and disseminate them. It is also responsible for briefings to military authorities and the broadcast of
agencies military or political situation. In addition, plateau DRM supports daily operations conducted by
UNFICYP Shamal by directing research and manOEworking sensors at strategic level for the final hit with
the greatest possible accuracy the Group Daech.
It is in permanent link with the operational level located in Abu Dhabi, through an Assistant to intelligence
from the DRM, which has a structure intelligence dedicated, called "J2 Shamal" and army by staff of
armies and the DRM. This Assistant advises the Commander, coordinates the efforts of all actors theatre
- updated intelligence provided by the armed forces - and the DRM in ensuring the proper functioning of
the chain of information.
Finally, I've set up an officer of intelligence with the french general in Tampa, at the US central command
in charge of US operations in the Levant.
In terms of sensors, I has own means such as observation satellites, such as Helios and Pleiades, and
use also satellite SAR-Lupe and Italian COSMO-SkyMed. I have also a link with the U.S. National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency . Among other means, I have centres of intercepted satellite fixed all
around the world, the boat collection Dupuy De Lme, an ALSR with original image (IMINT) intelligence
capabilities and electromagnetic (ROEM), a detachment specializing in ROEM, a detachment from
theIraqi Counter Terrorism Service (ICTS) at Baghdad's Embassy in Beirut and Amman reinforcements a
Centre for research and cyber analysis (CRAC), from Creil, which including exploitation of open sources.

I also means air, land and sea has implemented OEimplemented by the armed forces and deployed near
the theater. It is for example a detachment and a C - 160G Gabriel of bays interceptions COMINT
embarked on vessels of the French Navy in Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf to an AWACS
as well as an ATL2 with communications intelligence (COMINT), and, in the field of imagery intelligence,
burst air and marine when the carrier battle group (GAN) is deployed, as well as an another ATL2 in
Jordan.
It is essential for me to combine all types of intelligence and therefore all types of sensors, remote or
proximity, in order to characterize the enemy activity.
Thus, despite control through the concealment techniques Daech towards images - Raqqah sensors, for
example, they covered the streets of bands of tissue that prevent our satellites and our reconnaissance
aircraft to see what is happening below-, a notable discipline in the use of means of communication and a
migration towards encrypted digital systems, or even wired - they take up in good old phones- , Daech is
regularly intercepted on networks V/UHF, short range, which proves the opportunity to deploy our
interdiction capabilities in this frequency range. As such, the device deployed in Kurdistan is of very great
importance because it allows to approach the front between Daech and the Peshmerga and the
information of contact in addition to the remote means.
Since the start of operations in the Levant, DRM, via its central image of Creil, CF3I, and its component
spatial optical and radar, has produced more than 2,200 cases of imagery intelligence. Similarly, the pods
for the recognition of new generation of army air and Navy allowed the realization of 5 160 image files on
the Iraq and 1 020 folders image on Syria since the beginning of the crisis.
Imagery, eavesdropping, human intelligence, or cyber helped to develop a systemic analysis of Daech
which allows to better understand the procedures of this organization in the Levant and proves valuable in
Libya. This systemic analysis has also led to the development of military targeting folders used by the
France and also by the coalition.
To meet the needs in the Shamal operation intelligence, the DRM also relies on a vast network of allies
and partners. These cooperations allow the DRM to feed its data on the enemy and have additional
information to those collected by our own sensors. Exchange of information occurs smoothly within the
coalition of countries participating in strikes against Daech. Thus, files of information for purposes of
targeting on Daech in Iraq and Syria are regularly exchanged, the DRM providing in addition a large
number of records images to the coalition, over 3,400 on the Iraq and 600 on the Syria.
The presence of inserted and liaison officers from the DRM with each of the structures of the coalition
also contributes to the free flow of information in those places for the exchange of intelligence. For
example, DRM has an inserted within the Coalition Intelligence Fusion Cell (CIFC) of the Combined Air
Operation Center (CAOC) to Al-Udeid in the Qatar. This organization produces points of situation on the
entire area of responsibility and develops objectives files in its area of responsibility in the Western Anbar.
In summary, the CIFC is the meeting point of main Five Eyes intelligence staff and allies of the CAOC. It
therefore represents a privileged place for the exchange of information and documentation of objectives.
The information made available by the France are integrated in different productions of this organization.
We have not necessarily accurate tracking.
I developed parallel bilateral discussions with some of my partners, on specific points and on the basis of
the skills developed by some countries on themes or knowledge that can be usefully exploited.
This is the case of the major partner are the United States, with which the DRM is present through its
liaison officers. I thus have liaison officers to US operational command, in Tampa, I mentioned, but also to
the United States European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, liaison officers who are integrated into
American structures and bring real added value to the exchange of intelligence.

The signature, in November 2015, special instructions with the Americans was to strengthen the sharing
of information in the fight against terrorism including. In this regard, the talks with the authorities American
have proliferated: twelve visits or receptions of high level with U.S. military partners took place between
16 November 2015 and may 11, date at which I met with the Under-Secretary of State for intelligence, Mr.
Marcel letter for the first Committee Lafayette summarizing the six months passes. Many bilateral actions
are planned for the coming months. This fits in a dynamic long-term that is already bearing fruit: overall,
the DRM is largely winning.
In parallel, specific agreements signed recently offer DRM access to lots of information in the field of
imaging and the ROEM. Today, Americans communicate us intelligence very secret defence, which was
not the case previously.
DRM is also in support of our allies on the ground, Iraqi forces, for example, it provides information in
various forms, which may be exploited for purposes of action to neutralize the enemy. Trust relationships
created allow the DRM and, beyond, to France to enjoy privileged relations with these partners, in terms
of access to field intelligence.
With regard to the Russia, Exchange tracks put in place for meetings between the Ministers of defence
and chiefs of staff of the armed forces of our two countries on certain specific subjects, such as foreign
fighters, Russian-speakers and francophones, in the ranks of Daech. There are about 4,000 fighters
speaking in Iraq and Syria - Chechens, Daghestanis... - the Russians followed closely.
The Division of tasks between the intelligence community services stems from their respective areas of
responsibility defined in the national plan of orientation of intelligence. The DRM, intelligence service of
the French armed forces, is responsible for the intelligence of military interest. Under operation Shamal, I
am, to the extent that a force is deployed, the man responsible for OEintelligence work. The DRM is in this
case referred to as "drive". It is furthermore supported the other services french, including the DGSE,
which are then referred to as "concurring".
In the aftermath of November 13, all the actors of the french intelligence constituted objectives files
allowing the President of the Republic to decide to keystrokes, 15, 16 and 17 November, on the town of
Raqqah and nearby, a result of interceptions.
In the face of the new threat posed by Daech, which blurs the distinction between internal security and
external operations, inter-service work is more indispensable than ever. Indeed, only an effective fusion of
from intelligence of the whole national community can detect upstream projects to attack the territory, our
forces or our interests abroad. Information sharing is crucial.
This issue has therefore led to the creation of two cells interagency, Hermes and Allat. On my initiative,
the first FIU interagency gathering the DRM, Directorate of the protection and security of defence (DPSD),
the DGSE, ISB, the National Directorate of intelligence and investigation (DNRED), Tracfin and the
er
command of special operations (COS), saw the day 1 October 2014. Hosted within the CPCO, its
purpose is to enrich the information necessary in the planning and conduct of operations in the Levant
area and improve the knowledge of the intelligence services in their areas of expertise around transversal
themes: Organization and activities of Daech and other insurgents.
er

Since 1 February 2016, the cell was attached chucking the Levant, to contribute as effectively as
possible to the action of the armed forces in the Levant, taking part to the collection, exploitation and
dissemination of intelligence of military interest by national partners. Hermes to decompartmentalize the
services together all areas of intelligence experts and analysts on a same theme, to strengthen synergies
and to enhance the sharing of intelligence.

Initially, the francophone foreign fighters present in the Levant were single breadcrumb for understanding
our enemy and to take action against him as part of operation Shamal, while contributing indirectly to the
defence of the integrity of the national territory. This theme remains meaningful.
However, contributions have gradually diversified, enabling a deeper understanding of the enemy, a
systemic analysis of its strengths and weaknesses as well as a study very precise objectives. If
necessary, and in accordance with the service of intelligence, it is passed to the coalition within which we
operate, particularly within intelligence for targeting purposes, as for strikes that followed the attacks of
November 13.
Reciprocal, DRM, or the coalition through DRM, passes the community intelligence product or not,
captured in theatres of operation and likely of interest, what is being done in another structure, cell Allat.
The latter, created and activated June 15, 2015, comprises altogether eight intelligence services: the six
services component the community and two other services of the Ministry of the Interior. Each service has
a permanent representative. The DRM is present through a pair of liaison officers in order to ensure a
permanent presence. This cell was operational during the attacks of Paris from November 13, 2015.
The DRM to Allat liaison officers share information of military origin and sensors only DRM. The liaison
officer should be able to specify cell Allat the sensor, the context and the conditions of collection. This
information is raw or elaborate, depending on the degree of urgency.
I thus made the reporting of radicalized French to join the national territory, including seven French back
from the Yemen in transit in Djibouti. To convey this kind of information to ISB is may then follow the
individuals if they return on our soil. I have also reported foreigners likely to lead terrorist actions on the
national territory. I'm also potentially dangerous individuals in transit in the Schengen area, a certain
individual sighted in Libya and listed as a fighter like alien who was preparing to enter french territory was
the subject of an alert to Allat. I provide also information on threats or terrorist actions on the national
territory projects, sponsored or in connection with the Shamal Theater: in 2016, nearly four actions of this
kind have been provided treatment inter-service response DRM information.
I can also provide insights via knowledge of the DRM or the provision of our sensors. This involvement
including resulted in the transmission of information on the origin of weapons, explosives, on elements of
context in Iraq and Syria. The DRM also provides support monitoring of objectives abroad or that the
assessment of sources and the reliability of the information provided. At least three sources about Daech
sites in several Syrian cities were able to be evaluated thanks to the sensor and the DRM knowledge. In
return, these exchanges allow to overlap and confirm information on theaters of operation.
The President Georges Fenech. I had not heard of the national Brazilian who was preparing to commit
attacks against the French delegation at the Olympic Games. How can you know?
General Christophe Gomart. By our partners.
The President Georges Fenech. Galileo work?
General Christophe Gomart. Not yet. I use satellites Helios, Pleiades, both civil and military, and in
terms of radar imagery, because we don't have this capability in France, the Italian COSMO-SkyMed and
the German SAR-Lupe, through partnership exchanges. It is very difficult to take the example of the Air
Egypt plane which crashed in the Mediterranean, to find elements floating on the water with optical
imaging only. Radar imagery to produce a radar echo before then applying optical imaging in a more
targeted manner. This had been the case also after the Malaysia Airlines plane crash in the Indian ocean.

Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Do you consider that our airstrikes in Syria and Iraq have concrete
effects? You have reminded our modest participation, to the tune of 5% to the international coalition.
Since November, we have however intensified our keystrokes into Syria. Do you have any figures?
Keystrokes are sufficient to eradicate Daech or well need to move to a higher stage?
Yesterday, Betty has disclosed information about the contents of the computer by Salah, which included
items on seven targets for potential attacks in France. These seven sites were out in the media in
January 2016 on France 3 France and would be derived from a work of analysis of messages on the
internet by the DRM. This leak raises the question of the role of the press. Is there a document of DRM
on these seven sites?
General Christophe Gomart. This kind of articles and stories in the media give our opponents a lot
information and, ultimately, they know us better that we know. We had a lot of evil, initially, to know what
was Daech. We have today a good vision: we know who is the head, which are intermediate leaders...
In the case of Salah Abdeslam, it is not at all a note by DRM. France 3 spoke, at the time, military
intelligence, and I was put in question. In fact, these elements are an exercise mounted by a staff in the
Southeast, where the people involved had thought to sites that could be targeted by Daech in France.
Where these seven sites, which can indeed be interesting targets. Salah Abdeslam after seeing reportage
France 3, did research on the internet about each of these sites.
The rapporteur. It is matter of a messages on the internet scan job.
General Christophe Gomart. It is in any case not the work of a professional intelligence service.
The rapporteur. There is not a DRM document that talks about these sites?
General Christophe Gomart. No.
In relation to the bombing, the coalition struck 12 685 times since the first strikes until the 6 may 2016: 8
775 times in Iraq and 3 910 times in Syria.
The President Georges Fenech. How much is a strike?
General Christophe Gomart. It depends on the type of bomb. The GBU-12, for example, a 500 pounds
with a single laser-guided bomb, costs hundreds of thousands of euros.
The rapporteur. What is the share taken by the France in these strikes?
General Christophe Gomart. The figure I have is 675 French strikes.
The rapporteur. How many in Syria?
General Christophe Gomart. I do not have the figure. If I make a shortcut, the coalition strikes in Iraq
and the Russia strikes in Syria. The coalition however much struck in Syria too, for example at Raqqah
after November 13.
M. Pierre Lellouche. How many strikes have led the Russians?
General Christophe Gomart. I don't have this information.
The rapporteur. The Russians really hit Daech?

General Christophe Gomart. Initially, the Russians have struck on the Syria to consolidate the land that
still held the armed forces of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. They hit more the free Syrian army, namely
the moderate opposition. In these areas the regime of Bashar Al-Assad fought more against the moderate
opposition against Daech, who was not present at the same locations, if to Palmyra and Deir ez - Zor on
the side of Idlib. Today, the Russians hit Daech: Palmyra, region of Aleppo, Deir ez Zor, near Raqqah and
Manbij.
You mentioned "deconfliction". There is a division between Americans and Russians to avoid planes
intersect in the air. There is not coordination within the meaning of this term in a coalition, with shared
radio frequencies and each and others do not know where and when aircraft fly, but it is still a
collaboration.
On the ground, the territory occupied by the "caliphate" is reduced, both in Iraq and Syria. Iraqi security
forces have taken several towns on the Euphrates - at their own pace. Their latest catch is the town of
Rutbah, in southwestern Iraq, which allowed to reopen the link between the Iraq and the Jordan. We
thought that the taking of Rutbah would take much longer, but Daech men have left the city to avoid
letting trap: indeed, opens Rutbah beyond the desert, and if they were gone too late, coalition aircraft
have bombed. They left behind them the merlons and traps, as well as ammunition. Special forces took
position in Rutbah and released the axis leading to the Jordan.
All of the southern shore of the Euphrates is held by Iraqi security forces. The situation is more complex
on the North Shore: Iraqi forces now targeting Fallujah, that they gave themselves 90 days to take - either
here in late August. The first battles are in their favor.
Cities located along the Tigris were gradually taken over, with the exception of the lock is Qayyarah,
South of Mosul. Daech is installed defenses in depth to prevent Iraqi security forces back towards the
North.
Mosul has two million inhabitants for an area equivalent to that of Paris intramural. All types of
populations are there: Sunni, Christian, or even Shia. We know that part of the population of the city had
tried to rise up against Daech, which is harder to populations that are under control - multiplying summary
executions - when he staggers.
Mosul, Daech men have advanced northward to attack the Kurdish peshmergas, they initially managed to
break through the lines by always using the same method: suicide vehicles are sent to explode in the
enemy lines, after which troop rushes into the breach by taking advantage of the massive shock effect.
Without the coalition strikes, Kurdish front was pressed. It is still the case: on each offensive so Daech
managed to drill a few kilometres and it is coalition strikes that prevents them to take victory. From this
point of view, these bombings are extremely effective.
In Syria, the Russians were first deployed ground-attack aircraft, the Sukhoi Su - 25 Frogfootso-called,
which stabilized the front. M. Poutine then announced that the Russian army was withdrawing, his work
being done. In reality, it has replaced its Sukhoi Su - 25 by helicopter combat and ground attack, that is
more difficult to detect because they fly under the altitude of surveillance deployed radar in Eastern
Mediterranean, sometimes in the space.
Palmyra, the Russians have built a genuine centre equipped with a field hospital, ground-to-air defenses
and guns and there have deployed advisers to the Syrian forces in the prospect to move towards Deir ez
- Zor. Curiously, this city is still holding after five years of war. The garrison of 1 500 to 2 000 men that is
has never transferred, even if it happened to him losing some ground. It is refilled by the regime by plane.
Further to the North lies the city of Aleppo, around which extends a zone Crescent that the Kurds, allied
with the regime, are trying to close - that will eventually be done, even if this urban combat is very costly
in ammunition, men and time. All groups took part in this battle: Daech, Djabhato al-Nusra, the Kurds and

the armed forces of the regime, so that all moderate opposition groups which, on the basis of their local
objectives, combine with one or the other - as the Russians find it on the ground. In other words, it is
extremely difficult to know which was bombed, Daech, Djabhato al-Nusra or other. Opponents, moderate
or not, take advantage of our ignorance - that of Westerners, but also that of the Russians - to help each
other.
In the direction of Latakia is the mountainous area of Jisr al-Choghour where the Syrian regime is
dominant to progress along the Turkish border positions and, thus, allow the Kurds to establish the link
between the townships of Afrin and Jarabulus, or a border area of eighty kilometres through which passes
the refuelling of the city of Aleppo, but also Daech and other groups fighting in the vicinity.
It is the famous Manbij pocket, which is not really a: Manbij - where French-speaking fighters - is a town in
the West of the Euphrates and North the Tishrin dam, which was taken by Kurdish troops, so that they
could cross the river - is unacceptable for the Turks. Kurds now want to take the nOEmajor road Manbij
ud - another red cloth for the Turks.
I come to the town of Raqqah, where three to four thousand fighters Daech, plus two thousand others that
may come from the outside to strengthen this position. It would take about 20,000 soldiers to take
Raqqah, given that city the balance of forces must be at least five times to be effective. Raqqah
eventually fall. At this stage, however, Daech Daech always has two capitals, Raqqah and Mosul areas,
despite the capture by the Kurds in the town of Sinjar, which cuts the logistics axis linking these two cities.
Daech men have indeed found bypasses.
Daech combat strategy relies on special forces that lie roughly on the Iraqi-Syrian border, and that can
quickly switch by road - since it is their only means of travel - from one point to another on the basis of the
opponent's weaknesses.
Whatever it is, Daech loses ground, even if it meme si ce groupe group retains actual military capabilities.
The question to ask now is: where will go foreign fighters if Daech is fully defeated in Iraq and Syria?
Libya no doubt, but also in Yemen, in Afghanistan, in Pakistan - as is already the case. The Russians tell
US: concern naturally Daech and its Russian-speaking fighters who could return to the Russian territory,
but also Libya as well as the Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghan Nangarhar province, for example - which
is the capital Jalalabad, where french soldiers - have been stationed in the wilaya of Khorasan, which is
fighting against the Taliban and who wins little by little of the land, even if it remains very modest.
We did not measure the flow of fighters from Daech, but we know for example that Chechen fighters are
in Abu Grein, in Libya. We believe there is a genuine maritime flow between Turkish ports and Libya, in
particular Misrata. In addition to its commercial port, this city is home to a metallurgical port that refuels
Daech in Libya, as well as the city of Benghazi. Buildings moisten off the coast of Misrata, unload their
cargo on coasters that reach Misrata, where smaller coasters still earn Benghazi.
Daech is very present in the South of the city of Benghazi, specifically, where are fighting the national
Libyan troops of general Haftar. At Derna, Daech departed the scene, but Al-Qaida, in particular the
Group Ansar al-Sharia, remains very present. All these people are found in the city of Sirte, the ancient
capital of Gaddafi, which marks the boundary between the Maghreb and the Mashreq. Are there therefore
ex-kadhafistes and Daech fighters which then radiate in an area fairly wide by adopting the following
strategy: take cities and destroy oil wells to prevent the national Government and the regular army to take
profits. In addition, Daech sought to settle in Tunisia, and has particularly tried to install a Caliphate in
Ben Gardane - with the support of a part of the local population. Tunisian security forces pushed the men
of Daech, a number have returned to the region of Abu Grein and Sirte.
Mr Franois Lamy. You mentioned the Russian helicopters; do we have capacity to conduct intelligence
activities, and even strikes by helicopter?

The problem of the wireframe exists in many asymmetric conflicts. How can you address them?
Finally, do you conduct programs specifically designed to identify francophone fighters on the ground, or
this task is the DGSE?
Mr. Serge Grouard. On this point, it prompted to seek specific targets and beyond our sensors, do we
have to do this to a human presence on the ground? Are operations conducted in order to eliminate
French, even french fighters?
More generally, I feel that our intelligence capability, initially limited, is gradually structured and focused.
We now have a systemic understanding of Daech, his actions and his movements, we tell you. We can
assess its strengths. I understand that it is very difficult to conduct an operation of destruction, but I still
can't give up to ask you the following question: with twenty to thirty thousand combatants, Daech does not
represent a colossal force and, most importantly, we know its procedures, even though his fighters easily
melt into the population. We nevertheless identify its movements and its axes of movement, as we have
seen on the Turkish border. Failure to destroy this force, we should therefore be able to reduce it if we
really wanted! Certainly the alliance games are constantly changing in this very complex Nebula plus
external powers. I wonder however: we made the political and strategic choice not to destroy Daech,
which can be understood to avoid its fighters swarm elsewhere, or are we afraid the quagmire without
end? Between these two hypotheses, where is the truth?
M. Pierre Lellouche. What is the State of our relations with the Syrian services? I suspect your reply, but
can you tell us since when this relationship is interrupted and it is expected in the future?
Can you explain what the agreement called Five Eyes?
What are our capabilities in cyberintelligence and penetration of Daech networks, including those
affecting the France?
What do you think happened in the Egypt Air company's aircraft?
Finally, how do you assess the implementation of Daech in France? His organization relies on three
levels, namely the authorising officer in Syria, the cell of pyrotechnicians in Belgium and small soldiers in
Paris, either command centers are being installed in Europe, and particularly in France?
General Christophe Gomart. The helicopter, Mr Lamy, is a great tool but vulnerable to fire - I ruled Malispecial operations commando when one of our helicopters are shot dead; the crew could be saved but
the driver, Commander Damien Boiteux, died. If the Russians now use more helicopters in Syria, it is
probably because they consider it more manageable than their ground attack aircraft. Helicopters,
however, do not allow to conduct intelligence activities; they may have a recognition function.
We do not bombing targeted French-speaking fighters. On the other hand, we follow their actions and
movements. If it is so difficult to target Daech, it is because its fighters melt into the population. They live
in hospitals, set up their centres of Commandments in schools. This is why the coalition bombed more
troops who are in contact with their enemy, because we are certain, then, to deal with fighters, and the
probability of error is much lower.
It is true, Mr Lellouche, that we have no relationship with the Syrian military intelligence services.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Would it be useful to restore, according to you?
General Christophe Gomart. Any dialogue is useful.

The agreement Five Eyes Associates since the end of World War II intelligence of five Anglo-Saxon
countries - United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand. This community, to which
we belong, has developed a system of interceptions deployed worldwide and exchange of raw
intelligence data, prior analysis - which reveals the limits and capabilities of each and other. If we do not
share our raw data, it is because we know our weaknesses - and our forces. The France wished to
discuss with this 'club', in order to maintain a more direct dialogue with the United States, inter alia, within
the coalition.
I come to the question of the cyberintelligence. My task is not to perform penetration, but rather to
analyze the material collected in the field - whether it's USB keys, computers, cameras or instruments of
geolocation, for example - and to search open on the internet. Without conduct penetration operations,
we therefore have a large quantity of items, as all veterans of Daech communicate, especially if they win.
Open research we drive to harvest information that we cross-reference with information from closed
sources and sensors, whereby we can a close enough picture of reality.
On the Egypt Air flight, the most plausible hypothesis seems to be that of an explosion, even if we do not
have confirmation. We participated in the search of the wreck by satellite, but the black boxes have not
yet been found. Smoke appeared in the device could be produced by a fire starting, but I don't know what
the aircraft sensors could detect at this stage. The explosive device, where applicable, could be
embedded in an airport where the aircraft made a stop before Paris.
The evaluation of the implementation of Daech in France is more the ITSB, with which it goes without
saying that I dialogue. From my point of view, there's no basis for Daech in France. During recent attacks,
orders came from Syria, as Executive Director of Homeland Security, Mr. Calvar, has perhaps told you.
The fighters that are passed to the action infiltrated several weeks or even several months. If they hit in
Brussels, it is because they have to act more quickly that they had predicted because of the arrest of
Salah Abdeslam. Remains to be seen if all these people have been found; It is quite plausible that there
are sleeper cells.
M. Pierre Lellouche. You are a member: do you think this war can be won? Has an end or risk to last for
years? Although Raqqah and Mosul are taken - still need to occupy the field, which is another epic-, the
cancer will spread. How do you see the coming decades?
General Christophe Gomart. Will it win the war in Syria and Iraq? Yes. Later, on the other hand, these
two countries will be able to establish a viable and lasting political system? Whatever it is, on the military
side, we will manage to win because the will and the means exist - even if you can still wish more planes
or drones. It will take time, however, because Daech is a resilient organization that defends itself and is
supported by part of the population. I would add that in addition to the struggle between Sunnis and
Shiites, it must also take account of the struggle between Sunnis.
The President Georges Fenech. My general, thank you.

Hearing, open to the press, Mr. Jean-Jacques Urvoas, keeper of the seals, Minister of
Justice
Record of the hearing, which was open to the press, Wednesday 1er June 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Mr the garde des Sceaux, thank you for having responded to
the request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry. We are completing our hearings with
members of the Government; you will thus succeed Mr Le Drian, Minister of defence, and
tomorrow morning, Mr Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior.

Will examine you course on the State of the law and what should wait the reforms that have
taken place recently with the Act of 13 November 2014 strengthening the provisions relating to
the fight against terrorism and that, pending promulgation, on the strengthening of the fight
against organized crime, terrorism and their financing. We are also keen to hear you on the
cooperation between justice and intelligence services, as well as on prison component, i.e.
monitoring of people radicalized in prison establishments, the role of prison intelligence and the
technical means implemented Work in these establishments: video surveillance, interference
with the telecommunications...
I recall that this hearing is open to the press and that it is therefore subject to a live stream on the
website of the National Assembly; registration will be available for a few months on the video
portal of the Assembly. I would also point out that the commission may decide to include in its
report any part of the report that will be made of the hearing. We have decided that, in a general
way and when this raises no difficulties for the heard persons or with regard to the confidentiality
of the information collected, our hearings would be open to the press, because we conduct this
investigation in a transparent manner.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the order of 17 November 1958 relating to
commissions of inquiry, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth.
Mr. Jean-Jacques Urvoas, keeper of the seals, Minister of justice, oath.
Minister, you have taken your duties January 27, 2016, following the resignation of your
predecessor. You were therefore not in function during the attacks on which focuses our
Committee. However, all the members here know you well, since you chairing then - and, since
the beginning of the legislature - the commission of the acts of the National Assembly. Everyone
knows how much you you are personally engaged in the discussion of each of the statute having
strengthened the fight against terrorism. All also know your great expertise in intelligence, since
you're the author, with Mr Patrice Verchre, a remarkable report on the subject. I would add that
you've been, as an MEP, Member of the National Commission of control of security
interceptions (CNCIS), which gave birth to the National Commission of control of
communications and intelligence (CNCTR) techniques, we have heard the president, Mr. Delon.
That is how you are familiar with the concerns of our Committee of inquiry.
But you are now responsible for a criminal policy, including in the fight against terrorism.
However, as the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister themselves made the
observation, the border between common crime and terrorism is porous: most of the perpetrators
of the attacks of 2015 had a course of offender.
I will take only one example, that of MIT Coulibaly, the author of the murder of a young
policewoman and the attack of the Hyper hide. In 2001, the Evry Court sentenced him to three
years in prison and then, the same year, to four years for aggravated flights, and it sentenced him
again in 2002. In 2004, the Court of Assizes of minors of the Loiret Department had imposed six
years in prison for robbery with weapon in a banking institution. Then, the correctional tribunal
of Paris had sentenced it in 2005, to three years for robbery and, in 2007, eighteen months for

drug trafficking. Finally, on 20 December 2013, he was sentenced to five years ' imprisonment,
but by the game's automatic sentence reductions, he found himself in freedom without
completing his sentence. What criminal policy do you intend to conduct with respect to these
repeat offenders? Some devices were reinforced by the last act that we have adopted, but we
would like to hear you on the issue of penalty reductions, which is one of the concerns expressed
by the Paris Prosecutor's office: should they apply in the same way to repeat offenders and the
offenders?
We have heard all the judicial actors: the Paris Prosecutor, the judges of the Criminal Court of
the Court of appeal and the specialized court, those of the pole of anti-terrorism statement, the
judges of enforcement of sentences and the prison administration officials. You will not be
surprised if I tell you that the question of the means of justice has returned repeatedly during
these hearings. Since you've done yourself this question a priority of your action, perhaps could
we start by addressing this topic.
I should mention that we planned to ask about other themes, including the legal means of
combating terrorism, radicalized detainees and the prison intelligence. But perhaps you could tell
us in advance the number of people who have been convicted or are in pre-trial detention for acts
of terrorism and the means that are Work in the context of their detention by the prison
administration.
M. Jean-Jacques Urvoas, keeper of the seals, Minister of justice. Thank you for your
invitation, to which I respond with pleasure. Convinced - and this surprise anyone - that the
Government must be at the disposal of Parliament, I have to be available and to answer you
accurately and useful to contribute to the reflection of your inquiry. It will certainly issue
recommendations which the Government will be even more careful that its work benefit, Mr
president, the rapporteur of your expertise on the subject. If, when I was chairing, the Law
Committee was able to work effectively, it is precisely because we have been able to ignore our
apparent differences to bring together us on the essential, and the subjects we are dealing with
today are absolutely essential.
Firstly, I want to take the opportunity of your invitation to prospect the french model for
combating terrorism and radicalisation, is too often presented as an accumulation of texts which
would be reactions to power up to the events that occur. As if we had not built a coherent and
thoughtful architecture for, if not eradicate, at least to combat these phenomena! However, there
is a french in this area, model model which entrusts to the Ministry of justice and the judicial
authority a very broad role, ranging from prevention to repression. Of course, I will answer your
questions, I believe essential, Gilles Kepel has called with a lot of relevance "prison incubator",
but perhaps should I mention previously this french model of fight against terrorism.
Until the beginning of the 1980s, the France not to was not equipped with a specific device in
this area. Certainly, a number of offences, including the bombings, were within the jurisdiction
of the Court of State security. But in defending his removal before the National Assembly, on
July 17, 1981, Robert Badinter had pointed out the difficulties raised by the existence of such a
jurisdiction - and if I mentioned, it is to underline that we have avoided, since, to fall into the
same throughout. In effect, derogating from the common law, the Court of State security

"reflected an intolerable intrusion by the Executive in the judiciary" and constituted "a
permanent political justice of exception" in which "officers judge alongside magistrates of the
civil defendants in peacetime.
The abolition of the State Security Court did not create a legal vacuum, since 75% of the
procedures that it knew were transferred to the assize courts. However, as acknowledged by
Robert Badinter in his memoirs, entitled the thorns and roses, it revealed a deficiency of the
penal code in the investigation and punishment of acts of terrorism. This is why, from 1981, due
to the strengthening of the threat, the Government has undertaken to adapt the repressive arsenal
to the needs of the fight against terrorism.
So as a result of threats made against the jurors in the trial of Carlos, Act of 21 July 1982 created
the special assize courts. Then, the law of September 9, 1986, inspired by the judges Boulouque
and Malik, a landmark first by creating what today remains criminalization pivot of the fight
against terrorism, namely the association of wrongdoers in relation with a terrorist undertaking
(TN), providing for - and I must stress the relevance of this choice - the centralisation of
prosecutions in Paris and by creating rules of procedure derogate to common law whether
custody or investigative methods. More than the right criminal himself, is indeed the criminal
procedure which, in this area, derogates from the common law.
The evolution continues with the adoption, in 1994, of the new penal code, which will enter into
force two years later. He built a device around TN, with special pursuit, instruction and judgment
rules for combating not only terrorism but also the traffic of narcotic drugs and pimping. The
criminalisation of AMT allows, thanks to its flexibility, prevent the occurrence of an attack by
allowing to apprehend, upstream, the agreement established for its preparation.
Since then, the texts have proliferated to strengthen this arsenal: laws of November 15, 2001, of
August 29, 2002, March 9, 2004, June 21, 2004, January 23, 2006, from 1St December 2008,
March 14, 2011 April 14, 2011. These texts have made adjustments of the founding act, without
changing the fundamental balances. Indeed, with the exception of the law of November 13, 2014,
which created the offence of terrorist proprietorship, the texts which I have just mentioned
indicated the rules of procedure applicable to the prosecution and punishment of such offences be it of investigative techniques, the statement, or the judgement of offences in the terrorism-,
with the constant concern to modernize and adapt the arsenal to the evolution of the threat. Who
could regretted? If we had not amended the Act of 1986, the judicial police and investigators
would be now very poor.
I do not believe, therefore, that this succession of legislative texts is an inconsistent stack. They
are, instead, in a logic that has defined several years ago, so much so that after a period of
understandable maturation, the overall architecture of the system has hardly changed.
In addition to this legal device, it should be noted the relevance of the centralization of the
proceedings to the public prosecutor of Paris and Parisian functional specialization. I stress this
point because I have read here and there, the temptation was to create a national anti-terrorism
parquet on the model of the prosecution. This is the worst ideas! Indeed, the current organisation
of the Paris Prosecutor's office is extremely relevant because it allows specialization of judges

and, thanks to the continuity of the structure, if it is one of the men serving a good knowledge of
the threat. Most importantly, this organization has allowed that, the evening of November 13, the
Paris Prosecutor's office magistrates specialising in counter-terrorism are not only magistrates
mobilized. Thus, the Attorney General of Poitiers confided to me, last Friday, during a trip in this
city, that, tonight, all the prosecution had declared available. Similarly, the Paris prosecutor said
have been able to count on all of the prosecution at his disposal.
Anti-terrorism national parquet or a national audience following the Spanish model would
deprive us of this adaptive capacity and mobilization of personnel in a crisis, as the Government,
whatever it is, could not create positions for purposes of the investigation. Because the threat is
sustainable and that human resources management is necessarily tense, our model is good.
At the same time, the safety device, such as intelligence services, police and internal security
forces, was structured to strengthen its coherence and effectiveness. The impugned specificity of
the Direction de surveillance du territoire (DST), the double jurisdiction, administrative and
judicial, was confirmed at the creation of the Central Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI),
which has succeeded, and then safety branch indoor (CSB), which is the driver in the fight
against terrorism. This specificity, which is found in few services with which CSB is to work,
has amply demonstrated its effectiveness. The system is obviously not perfect, but it would be
inappropriate to consider questioning this device of prevention and suppression of terrorism
which is firmly established.
I now question of radicalisation. It is obviously consubstantial to terrorism, but it is not the same
way against one and another fighting. The problem of combating radicalisation has indeed
appeared more recently, brutally and for a long time, and if this fight is mobilizing more
resources, it is still relatively new to the Department of justice and its officials.
I would point out in this regard that the forefront of counter-terrorism (plate 1) is translated to the
Ministry of justice, through the creation of 1 050 jobs - you measure the choice that this
represented during the lean - and 175 million excluding personal expenses allowance. FLAT 2,
provides the creation of 2 530 jobs and the granting of nearly $ 390 million of credits. These two
programs creating near 3 700 posts for the benefit of the Department of justice. With respect to
the action Plan against radicalisation and terrorism (PART), recently announced by the Prime
Minister, it will be just as positive effects, even if I am not, today, able to present them to you in
the form of statistics.
Through these means, the Department has structured policies of support of radicalized public or
in the process of radicalisation. I shall not mention of at the outset the prison administration. It is
of course legitimate that I make you accounts on this subject, on which I will be the most
accurate and comprehensive as possible - even though I know that you have already received the
Director of the prison administration, Isabelle Gorce-, but I would like to mention first of all the
action of the judicial Protection of youth (PJJ), which contributes to the support of young
audiences and may , as such, play an important preventive role.
The PJJ is in view, the 1St April 2015, a national mission of intelligence and information,
representing a network of sixty-nine pilot - I have also gathered at the school of the PJJ in

Roubaix - present throughout the territory. These referents "lacit" are designed to provide
professionals with a better understanding of these issues, in particular through a training plan,
and support institutions and services in implementing in Implementation of national guidelines
on respect for secularism - which is never acquired and must undergo special vigilance - and
neutrality, especially through the development of projects of operation. Professionals were able
to be an identification of the difficulties, establish, in a few months, a cartography of risks and
improve their assessment and their support of minors as well as support to their families. The
heterogeneity of the public leads to favouring the individualization of the support, which requires
substantial resources, which will probably have to go upmarket, because the current situation is
not quite satisfactory.
It is worth mentioning also the 'dedicated units' device - questionable expression, because it does
seem not sufficiently explicit - set up, way also very empirical, within the prison. We have little
decline in this area since the first of these units was created on January 25.
These structures relate only to remand or districts 'house arrest' prisons. They don't exist so not,
for the moment, in the penitentiaries, which is quite logical in view of the low proportion of
prisoners sentenced for acts of Islamic terrorism. Furthermore, the assignment in dedicated unit
is reserved for major men, who constitute the population statistically the most important. I would
add that persons detained and convicted for these facts are affected in Central House.
Dedicated units that include between twenty and twenty-eight seats, lie in remand and FleuryMrogis Osny, le-de-France, as well as the District of 'house arrest' penal centre of LilleAnnOeullin. Two other structures, evaluation, were created: one in Fleury-Mrogis, the other in
Fresnes. These five structures today receive sixty-six persons. Staff who is assigned is composed
of a team of settled supervisors who devote themselves fully to these structures, advisors of
insertion and probation, and a pair, formed by a psychologist and an educator, by institution.
Within these dedicated units automatically apply the principle of the individual cells and that of
the separation prevented persons and convicted persons. I would point out that any person who is
detained is supported according to the ordinary regime of detention, with the same rights and
obligations as other inmates.
It is, I stress, experimental structures that are not yet stabilized at the point of becoming a model.
Indeed, I recall they were created to meet a need, born in a House of judgment which the
Director had chosen to proceed with a group of radicalized inmates. This choice was
questionable, and legitimately discussed. Indeed, the doctrine is not the same in all countries of
the European Union with experience in this field: If the English, for example, are very reserved
on the principle of a grouping and one specialized detention, others, on the other hand, as the
Italians, seem rather receptive. In any case we considered that this experience deserved to be
attempted, as it corresponds to the need to offer support adapted radicalized people or in the
process of radicalisation and to enforce good order within the penal establishments concerned.
Indeed, originally, the grouping of these detainees had intended to prevent the spread of the
difficulties, or even their proliferation or proselytism. Today, I am not able to tell you whether it
was a good or a bad solution. I therefore hope that this experiment will continue and that it gives

rise to a robust evaluation, not - what to know if training for staff, availability guaranteed them
by the administration and the means at their disposal are sufficient.
Currently, we are focused on formalizing the framework for this experiment. This is to define a
set of tools, relying as much as possible on the know-how and professional practices. In any case
it is important - and this is one point non-negotiable - to limit the influence of these people
identified as "particularly monitored prisoners" - to borrow a category already used in our
prisons - on the rest of the prison population and to prevent the risk of disorders in detention. So
can school leaders take appropriate management measures, such as placement in solitary
confinement, individual support or registration to the directory of particularly reported detainees.
In addition to these devices, it is necessary to recognize the work done by the Prison Services
integration and probation (SPIP), both closed and open. Their knowledge of the criminal
population, their professionalism and their primary role reflect ongoing efforts to curb the
phenomena of radicalisation and to assist individuals in society. However, we have decided,
according to the announcements made in the context of the action Plan against radicalisation and
terrorism, a real assessment of the principle of these dedicated units and their operation. Such an
assessment is necessary before considering the extension of the device to a wider audience.
Furthermore - and this relates both to the direction of the prison as the PJJ and prison Services
integration and probation for support in open-, we will create, within the Department of justice, a
Scientific Committee to help us build a doctrine on the support of radicalized individuals. It will
bring together researchers, practitioners, and representatives of the various branches of the
Department. Its tasks will be to assess, coordinate and explore: assess support devices,
coordinate them to harmonize and explore new avenues.
But these evaluation efforts would be in vain if it detected not the detainees concerned; I
therefore turn to the question of prison intelligence, which is one of the important elements of the
new action plan against radicalisation and terrorism. This subject is somewhat more familiar than
others for me, because I had thought as a parliamentarian. Thank, the rest, the commission of
laws has the Department of justice in the matter of a quite satisfactory legal basis, since an
amendment to the draft law on criminal procedure has made the Office of prison intelligence a
prominent member of the second circle of the intelligence community. The Senate also followed
the Assembly on this item complementing article 727-1 of the code of criminal procedure in turn,
and the joint mixed commission has smoothed some elements of discrepancy which persisted
after the reading of the text by both houses.
To put it simply, I think that everything is to do in this area, all! The prison intelligence has
indeed no reality to the Ministry of justice today. There are tools, services, offices, personnel; so,
we have enough work. But everything remains to be defined, whether it's the way personal, the
training they need, the human, technical and financial means which should be allocated to them
or, above all, the development of a doctrine.
It happened to me, during my life of Member of Parliament, to have access, as Chairman of the
parliamentary delegation for intelligence, to documents produced by the intelligence services; so
I have a pretty clear idea of what may be one of their analyses. However, since I got my Place

Vendme features, four months ago, I never was recipient of a document on letterhead of the
prison intelligence. I have therefore never had knowledge of the reflections of this service. Not
not the personal have no envy, but since its inception, in 2002, the prison information by the
Director of the prison administration of the time, Didier Lallement, this subject has been
managed very empirically. Moreover, the threat was not as intense as that we are currently
experiencing.
Today, us responsibility to actually provide the prison administration of a specific tool. It is not
to copy what exists in an open environment, because intelligence operating in a closed
environment obviously requires different qualities. We are therefore working to build this service
with rigour and temperance, by being careful, because we are dealing here with essential things.
The President Georges Fenech. Understand you well, Minister: the Minister of justice is
recipient of the minutes?
M. the garde des Sceaux. No, I speak not of procedure.
The President Georges Fenech. The fact that you did not have such documents in hand means
so not there has not been direct contacts between prison intelligence and intelligence.
M. the garde des Sceaux. I'll clarify my remarks. I expect what is given me an analysis, for
example, the progression of the radicality inside prisons: proselytism is it proven? Some
characters become references? Are some institutions specifically affected? The supervisors
themselves - since I had been questioned on the subject to the Assembly - are in the process of
radicalization? In short, I needed an element of "prison climatology", and it seemed logical that it
is the responsibility of prison intelligence. Yet I saw nothing like. I'm not saying it's good or bad;
I note.
We must therefore continue the structuring of a central level of animation, direction, synthesis
and transmission of information, because this level is currently much too low so that we can say
the office of prison intelligence is an intelligence service.
Numbers are there, including through the dish. If it is on behalf of the personnel of the prison
administration who, at one point, discussing with the prison intelligence or were assigned this
task, marginally or full-time, one arrives at a total of 389 people. It is not worked full-time
equivalents: among these people, you can find a local delegate of prison intelligence dedicated,
for example, 10% of its time to intelligence and another who will devote 100% of his time.
Numbers are important, but they were used, for the time being, at the interregional level, and not
at the central level of the prison. Each facility thus includes a referent intelligence. It is therefore
now to create the 'head' which defines guidelines and summaries. To this end, we must continue
to recruit staff, whose quality will be crucial to enable us to achieve a qualitative leap. We thus
intend to recruit personnel from intelligence in the first or the second circle to accelerate the
transmission of knowledge. I also hope that the prison intelligence integrates the Academy of
intelligence, so that personnel are trained and part of its promotions. Finally, so that this initial
investment has effects in the long term, we need to achieve to retain such personnel. This is a

challenge within the prison. A figure reflects the volatility of its personnel: in the three years
following the release of the National School of prison administration, we lose 25% of the
workforce. We cannot be satisfied with such a finding; We must find solutions, in terms of
articles and index, but also from the point of view of the interests of the task at hand.
Inspection of the prison administration and inspection of judicial services - which will be soon
grouped together in one General Inspection of justice - conducting, within the Department, work
on the prison intelligence whose conclusions will be called me late June. We will also examine
the relationships that the Bureau must maintain with intelligence of the first and the second
circle. Currently, only two protocols were signed: one in 2012, with CSB, the other in 2015, with
the UCLAT. It seems to me necessary to conclude other with the central Service of the territorial
intelligence, TRACFIN, the Directorate of intelligence and investigation (DNRED) and even
with the DGSE. Subsequently, we will conduct a reflection on the technical tools needed
intelligence. For now, indeed, the question of the collection of the data, whether the use the IMSI
catcher or interceptions, does not arise. It will be that we will have a doctrine, training and tools.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for this presentation, Mr the garde des Sceaux.
Before leaving the floor to the rapporteur, I would like to ask a question regarding the judicial
information. Intelligence, during our work, referred to a certain blockage of investigations. In
fact, when intelligence pops up during a criminal investigation, including a statement, it is
covered by the confidentiality of the investigation, seized services, such as CSB, for example,
cannot share this information with other services - this question was asked to the Americans after
the attacks of September 11, and it was settled. Therefore, I would like to know if the Chancery
is currently reflecting on the manner, while respecting the confidentiality of the investigation, it
could avoid curb intelligence in the event of judicial investigation, which is the last straw.
M. the garde des Sceaux. This is a subject on which I am extremely cautious. The principle,
contained in the code of criminal procedure, is that the secrecy of the investigation, and it is not
to undermine it. However, I see that this raises a difficulty. On this subject as on others, I have
no taboos: I wish that the problem, considering possible solutions, protections and prohibitions.
We have created, there is little time, the separate file for Geolocation. This tool, which allows
both to act and to guarantee a number of secrets, can thrive, in principle. I add that there is
already the derogations from the principle of the secrecy of the investigation and tax procedures
training and customs - this is provided in a section of the code of Homeland Security. And,
recently, we have created the opportunity to inform Governments in the event of sexual offence.
I'm not opposed in principle to an evolution; It would be stupid and dogmatic. But I don't want to
rush: I feel that there's appetites. It even happens that applications mask weaknesses of
organization and it explains possible deficiencies by a lack of tools. Should always be 'sweeping
her doorstep' before requesting new powers. I have not received, at this point, as keeper of the
seals, an explicit request about a case where the existing law would have been a barrier to the
action of any particular service.
The President Georges Fenech. This was presented to us as a real obstacle by the officials of
the first circle. This should no doubt be the subject of reflection, and our Committee of inquiry
certainly make you proposals in this area.

M. the garde des Sceaux. As keeper of the seals, Mr president, I have never received requests in
this regard on the part of the first or the second circle services.
The President Georges Fenech. We have received it.
M. the garde des Sceaux. Where the usefulness of the separation of powers.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. In the wake of the question from Mr president, I would like
to mention Samy Sumbua course. It was auditioned by the DCRI in 2012, then was put in
consideration and placed under judicial control. However the intelligence services had to cease
monitor from its implementation review. I would like to have your feelings about such a
paradox.
In addition, MIT Coulibaly had flown for multiple stays in prison, including in Fleury-Mrogis,
where he was a neighbor of Djamel Beghal cell, and carried out wiretapping in 2010 showed that
there was a strong link between the two men. In addition, Chung was sentenced for having
planned the escape of Sman At Ali Belkacem, one of the authors of the 1995 attacks. Yet, on
his release from prison, he was monitor per person: according to intelligence that we have heard,
he did not appear on the radar screens. I would therefore like to know your feelings on the role
played by the Office of prison intelligence in 2010 and thereafter, as Coulibaly course raises the
question of the link between the prison administration and CSB.
Finally, prison intelligence staff have been widely reinforced during the year 2015. On the other
hand, I have defended, with Philippe Goujon, an amendment which has been adopted, aimed at
integrating the prison intelligence to the second circle of the intelligence community. What will
happen in this area in the coming months?
M. the garde des Sceaux. Between 1999 and 2009, Chung was sentenced six times and during
his prison wanderings, he attended five different schools: Melun, Fleury-Mrogis, Villejuif,
Orlans-Saran... Your note is quite right, Mr President; It raises the question of what is the prison
intelligence. The bureau of prison intelligence does document or feedback on the course by
Chung. Where two requirements. First, we must strengthen the link between outside and inside,
and this is why I wish that protocols be signed with all services, including the central territorial
intelligence service. It is certainly, taking into account the Division of labour agreed with the
CSB, an interlocutor of local prison intelligence delegates, but it has not standardized mutual
expectations and processes. Because information can be also prior to incarceration: when an
individual is followed, it is useful to know the prison administration.
Coulibaly course demonstrates that shortcomings on our part; We need to address them.
With regard to the prison intelligence, I am able to say that what I am able to see at the moment.
I will - and this won't surprise you - that we have a tool in this area. But I expect the results of
the work carried out by the Inspectorate, which will help us to mark out the areas on which we
need to move forward. In September, a decree must enable us to be integrated into the
intelligence community, and we should also have by the end of the year of the elements of
application arising from the amendments to the code of criminal procedure. Here in autumn or

early winter, so we'll have the resulting tool of the changes that you made to the legislative
framework. Then, we need to structure the prison intelligence. Once the tool has been built at the
beginning of the year 2017, then we can ask the question of the means.
On the other hand, I am very attentive to the issue of the break between the time where an
individual is followed by a service of intelligence in the context of an administrative procedure
and the time made the object of judicial proceedings. It cannot be, in effect, be followed to
administratively and the judicial plan for the same reason: that is the principle set by the Act on
the intelligence. This balance is the right to a fair trial. However, intelligence in question may
follow this individual for some other reason. I therefore believe that this apparent failure is not a
reality. I do not think that there is a vacuum. You know, in addition, Mr rapporteur, investigative
techniques are much more flexible in judicial and administrative matters.
The rapporteur. Sumbua was also under judicial review. Yet it found that these controls were
pretty random and that the lifts on their violation were not always well respected. Therefore,
should we not strengthen judicial review of persons indicted for conspiracy to a terrorist
organization? I would add that the Turkish information had warned the French of the passage of
the duo Memoo-Sumbua in 2013, at a time when the latter was under judicial review.
M. the garde des Sceaux. How could I answer no to your question, Mr President? If you suggest
me to strengthen the procedures for judicial review, I can only be favourable. It is a question of
will nor a question of law; It is a question of means. I am relying heavily on Parliament in this
regard.
M. Christophe Cavard. Could Minister, you take stock of the integration in the penal code for
the crime of glorification of terrorism and provocation to the commission of terrorist acts?
Specifically, people are prosecuted on the basis of this definition and what happens to them?
We know that this type of advertising is especially on the internet, and you yourself, in 2013, a
report in which you to broach the question of whether to close the sites concerned. As to
comments on social networks - Facebook, Twitter...-, if they are well the legal framework when
they are public, their status is more difficult to define when they are spoken in private
discussions. What is your Outlook on these issues?
Moreover, the Prime Minister mentioned, under the plan of fight against radicalisation, the
creation of specialised centres. These can be used in court proceedings, as is the case of the
closed educational centres, or will they welcome only voluntary individuals?
Finally, educators, social workers, as are bound by professional secrecy, wonder therefore on
exchanges that they may have with the security services, even with justice. Existing platforms
work rather well, but how can we protect these personal at the legal level?
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Cavard, we made the choice, you know, to not dwell on the
phenomena of radicalisation, which have been studied by the commission of inquiry on the
monitoring of sectors and individuals jihadists.

M. Christophe Cavard. Certainly, but acknowledge, Mr president, that it is difficult to discuss

the fight against terrorism without addressing this issue.
In conclusion, Minister, I would like to know if the prison intelligence is present within the unit
for coordination of the fight against terrorism (UCLAT).
Mr Franois Lamy. I was surprised that within the tribunal de grande instance of Paris, a single
judge of enforcement of sentences deals with all cases of terrorism, whatever. I said that at his
hearing, the judge seemed satisfied with this situation and claimed no additional means.
However, basque or Corsican terrorism and jihadist terrorism, this is not the same thing. I would
therefore have liked know your feeling on this point.
When we heard of anti-terrorist judges, we asked them if they had relations with foreign
intelligence services. But they responded in the negative. Would it not useful that these
magistrates are empowered secrecy in order to have access to classified documents and to know
what preceded the legalization?
M. Pierre Lellouche. Even if the Merah case is more serious than what it said at the time,
including after the alternation of 2012, largest attacks began in January 2015. Now you tell us,
with regard to the prison intelligence service - and it is not for me to get involved-, that the tool
will be available in the best of cases beginning 2017. Of course, we know that the very idea
prison intelligence don't excite not your predecessor, so that a work of persuasion and consensus
building were required. But it took until two years, and many dead, before we admit that it would
not be bad to monitor prisoners, the prison being, with the internet, one of the major places of
radicalisation. Is this delay reasonable from the point of view of national security? How many
cells jihadists, Kaye or Chung, will be made during these two years? Neither the Parliament nor
the Executive seem able to be at the height of the emergency. We take terrorism seriously, and it
addresses a problem now, either or expected that the tool snaps into place. Let me tell you, we
must act much more strongly!
On the other hand, the question raised by the rapporteur is fundamental. Thus, simply that a
terrorist, well-advised by counsel, himself connected on terrorist networks, braque a gas station
and be indicted to stop its surveillance by the intelligence services. It's still amazing! And how to
explain to the French that an individual under judicial supervision may report the loss of his
passport and get a new from the prefecture for Syria? These are major malfunctions! Cannot be
simply to see them, and we are counting on you, because we know that you are an effective man,
to remedy. I am myself a lawyer, Minister, and I am aware of what involves the opening of a
judicial investigation. But when you are at war, it cannot allow a terrorist to use judicial
proceedings to escape surveillance. This makes no sense and citizens may not admit it!
Finally, I heard the words of the Prime Minister about the de-radicalization device that it is
planned to create. Such devices exist, particularly in Arab countries - I myself could visit centers
of its kind in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps have you conducted a comparative study, but I was able to
observe that the de-radicalization works before conviction or detention. Once individuals are
taken in the judicial or prison machine, it is very difficult to go back. It seems to me, therefore,
that, if it is decided to make an effort in this area, should work with imams, very upstream.

The President Georges Fenech. In any case, with regard to the prison information, seems to me
response that you have made to us, Mr the garde des Sceaux, is very clear that. One can regret
the delay, but you clearly stated your willingness to create a prison intelligence tool. However, I
invite you to reread the minutes of the hearing of the Director of the prison administration: I am
not sure that we have heard the same assertion. Your position is reassuring: we still need that it is
implemented by the Ministry.
M. the garde des Sceaux. I suggest you first meet all of the questions about prison intelligence,
which is a fascinating subject. No democratic country has a prison intelligence service.
M. Pierre Lellouche. In Israel, it exists!
M. the garde des Sceaux. No! When I was Chairman of the Law Committee, I wrote to the
ambassadors of all democratic countries - United States, Israel, Australia, New Zealand... because, in this area, the benchmarking was non-existent. I was able to find a book, an academic
study, nor even an article on the subject. I did this research because I believe that, if a virtuous
system exists elsewhere, it is not useful to exhaust to invent another. Whatever it is, I would like
the responses of these ambassadors at your disposal. In some countries, there are departments,
within departments, which deal with the prison, but there is no intelligence services comparable
to what exists for domestic intelligence, or foreign intelligence. This is a new subject, we must
address and for which there's obviously a hesitation.
With regard to what is in my opinion a prison intelligence service, I consider it does not exist.
The word 'intelligence', moreover, is not defined. Act of 2009, which has linked the gendarmerie
in the Ministry of the Interior, said that intelligence is one of the prerogatives of the latter.
However I do not believe that the Director-general of the gendarmerie revendiquerait, for its
operational anticipation (LOTRO) branch, the quality of service information, simply because it's
a collection service. There is a collection of intelligence into the prison world - personnel
observe, observe, collect information-, but I do not call it intelligence. In my opinion, it assumes
a perspective, a predictive capability, an anticipation, understanding of facts which took place...
I put the professional conscience of person in question. I believe, instead, that these staff are
extremely dedicated, as they cleared a domain which is the subject of a high social expectations queries made by you exist beyond these walls. But it cannot be decreed intelligence officer: this
requires open workplace, years of expertise. In a closed environment, it should be firstly to
define what must be an intelligence officer. It is for the less delicate to appoint a supervisor,
known to inmates, prison intelligence officer.
I would prefer to present a synthesis of the prison intelligence on proselytism in prison, but I did
not. As I was not appointed to the findings, we will act in this field. We have already done a lot:
staff are present, the motivation exists, and thanks to you, the legal difficulties have been ironed
out. It now remains to act.
As the Director of the prison administration - I re-read, yesterday, the record of his hearing by
your commission of inquiry-, she talked about the problems of reporting lines. It is what it is.
When I go in the spring to a TGI, a Court of appeal or in a penitentiary, I ask how things are

going. I met recently the Director of the ITSB, Patrick Calvar, who told me that there were good
relations with its interlocutors, but gaps remain, and I believe that Isabelle Gorce was fairly
straightforward. We have much to do in this area.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. We agree with you!
M. the garde des Sceaux. Mr. Cavard asked me about the crime of condoning terrorism.
Between 13 November and the beginning of the year 2016, 472 procedures targeted the
apologists for terrorism, including 149, aimed 151 authors relate only to these facts. 71%
resulted in proceedings before the criminal courts and, to this day, 34 people have been tried, of
which 17 were sentenced to imprisonment closes.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Is Jean-Marc Rouillan among these people?
M. the garde des Sceaux. The keeper of the seals is not expressed on current affairs, Mr
Turmes.
Furthermore, no judicial website blocking was hired, even if hundreds are administratively - I
think the disruptive effect that may have these blockages. With regard to privilege, the Act of
2007 created by sharing devices, which is limited to individuals themselves subject to secrecy. I
nevertheless believe that we need to review this question, taking into account the new challenges
that we face. I have not received requests of this type, but I am not opposed in principle. Finally,
a Director of prison service has integrated the UCLAT some time ago, when Christiane Taubira
was Minister of justice, but the UCLAT is not an operational structure.
Mr Lamy, we planned to lighten the work of the anti-terrorist enforcement judge, as certain
elements, notably the apologie du terrorisme, no longer belong to its jurisdiction. In addition, a
second judge will be appointed.
The President Georges Fenech. In this connection, could you answer my question on the
automatic sentence reductions which continue to be sentenced for acts of terrorism?
M. the garde des Sceaux. This is a topic that you know well, Mr president. mentioned whenever
your Assembly has examined a bill relating to the code of criminal procedure. The issue has been
resolved: it was decided that it was not necessary to change the law on this point.
The President Georges Fenech. Terrorists will therefore always benefit from automatic
sentence reductions.
M. the garde des Sceaux. I give you the current state of the law and the position advocated by
the Government.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for the clarity of your reply, Minister.
Mr Franois Lamy. My other question was about secrecy. We have indeed noticed, when we
heard the anti-terrorist judges, that they had no regular links with the intelligence services,

including the foreign intelligence service. I know that this may be a problem with regard to the
separation of powers, but since MEPs members of the delegation to the information have access
to it, could we not empower secrecy at least some anti-terrorist judges?
M. the garde des Sceaux. Anti-terrorist judges are empowered secrecy intuitu personae.
Moreover, during the examination of the Bill on the intelligence, we had discussed the question
of whether to empower the structures of qualities, what we ended up doing. However, these
magistrates have no need to know everything.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. When I was in the anti-terrorism Prosecutor, we had a de facto clearance:
we had access to information from the intelligence services, DGSE or DST, but without going
through a system of binding clearance, which could, moreover, be considered as contrary to the
separation of powers.
M. the garde des Sceaux. I said that investigations are carried out for the clearance.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. One can imagine indeed that, if a judge is appointed anti-terrorism judge,
its hierarchy is is prior informed about its reliability.
Mr. Meyer Habib. I would like to come back to the problem of phones in prison. When I had
interviewed your predecessor on this point, she told me that more than 20,000 phones were
seized within a year, which is colossal. However it is essential that radicalized inmates convicted
for terrorism do not telephone or, if they have one, they are heard. I understand, moreover, that
certain services were outstanding phones to listen to them. Today, technologies allow to know,
for each cell, if a phone is there, and if this is the case, to listen to it. Of course, should use such a
system for all prisoners, but this is not possible, due to lack of means. However, today, we are at
war and radicalized prisoners should be a priority.
On the other hand, one day or the other, radicalized inmates who are in different 'dedicated units'
will be released. Could not impose the wearing of an electronic bracelet? I know this may be
contrary to certain principles, but do we really have the choice?
Finally, we attended, these days, on the internet, improbable anti-Semitic excesses following an
article that Martine Gozlan spent in Marianne in the latest film by Yvan Attal. Was what means
to fight against such excesses?
M. the garde des Sceaux. Regarding the jammers, there are 804 in prisons, which means that
53% of them are equipped with. However, most of these jammers technology is obsolete, since
they have been designed to obfuscate the 2G. It is therefore expected credits have been
programmed for this purpose - to buy new generation jammers. I would point out, moreover, that
the most efficient systems are installed primarily in the units dedicated that I mentioned just now,
but hardly new devices will be deployed that it will move to the 5G, and we will find ourselves
in the same situation as today ' hui.
There are several techniques of interference. We have thus experienced, Osny, a surgical
interference that can target a cell, for example. You can also install air interference, with a

central antenna, but if the establishment is located in a highly urbanized area, residents will
immediately protest.
Whatever it is, I recall that the principle is the ban on phones in prison. However there are 30
000. I also invited the two committees of the laws to accompany me while traveling so that we
know what are these phones, which are much smaller and more discrete than those that you and I
use. I discovered the technique known as the 'Big mac', which allows you to enter these phones
in prison. It is to place three or four phones between two large sponges surrounded by adhesive
tape and throw it all over the wall of the prison.
The President Georges Fenech. It is perhaps not necessary to give too many details, Minister...
M. the garde des Sceaux. All this was in the press, Mr president, and we must condemn these
practices.
We will experiment in an establishment of the Meuse, it seems to me, the equipment of each cell
of a telephone wire that can be listened. Thus any mobile phone will lose its interest to those who
want to make a legitimate use, including the maintenance of links with their families.
Furthermore, rather than scramble, it would be more useful to detect these phones. We currently
have a competitive dialogue with companies, to find technical answers to our needs in this area,
needs that we have precisely identified.
I come to the question of the chaplains. May 25, 2016, Muslim chaplains certified to intervene in
detention numbered 222 - they were 200 at the beginning of the year. Each dish has planned
recruitment capabilities. Obviously, they must be trained and we have a look at their recruitment
and their operating conditions. For example, all are not compensated to the tune of what would
be needed. However, if we succeed with them a job in the long course, do not neglect this form
of loyalty. Their training is currently provided by the interregional directorates of prison
administration.
For the rest, Mr Habib, you can share your opinion on many of the points you raised, but should
apply the Act. However, at this point, the terms and conditions to which you have referred are
not really legal.
The President Georges Fenech. It is public knowledge that the judicial authorities, including
the Prosecutor's office of Paris, but also those of Brussels, encountered difficulties due to the
relationship by the press of a number of vital information for the survey, or for the safety of the
hostages. Reflection is ongoing at the Chancery that the press be required to keep it a secret for
awhile, as is the case, it seems to me in the UK? It is a genuine aspiration of the judicial
authority, which did not hide his irritation with the elements of the investigation leaking from us.
M. the garde des Sceaux. I indeed happened to have conversations on this subject. I even read
articles referring to the reluctance of the Belgian authorities to make transfers for fear that this
causes disturbances. I also know the solutions to which aspire those wishing to remedy this
situation; I do not believe them in the State, very passable. The problem is extremely complex
and, for the moment, we have no track of response.

The President Georges Fenech. This issue seems to be really important. We the rest heard the
organs of press as well as the Supreme Council of audiovisual. Clearly, the judiciary and the
press itself are keen that at least a Charter, or a Protocol, allows to regulate their relations at
critical moments, as the information is now instantaneous and continuous. Without going back
on the facts that gave rise to this reflection, I would remind you that, in Belgium, the revelation
of information precipitated the search of Forest and therefore had an impact on the conduct of the
investigation.
M. the garde des Sceaux. Some elements should inspire us with optimism, Mr president. After
the excesses that we have found after the attack against Charlie Hebdo, the Conseil suprieur de
l'audiovisuel sent reminders 40 to order in different TV channels, which appear to have learned
the lesson, because we have not had to deplore the same excesses during the attacks of
November 13. The press has behaved indeed much less objectionable way at these events.
Nonetheless, outside periods of high-intensity, this race to the revelation can disturb the course
of the investigations, which is obviously regrettable.
The rapporteur. The Prosecutor of the Republic in Paris alerted us to the fact that it was more
and more often confronted with very radicalized minors to prisons or closed educational centres
were not the most appropriate structures. What is the reflection of the Department on the support
of radicalized minors?
Moreover, the detention of Salah Abdeslam unfolds in quite unusual conditions, since it is under
video surveillance 24 hours. What are the reasons that led you to Work this device, and it
presents all the necessary legal guarantees?
M. the garde des Sceaux. It is legitimate that you mentioned this subject, but it is very sensitive.
I indeed took the decision to place the detainee under video surveillance, first for the sake of
protection of the person itself. This video surveillance involving the registration of personal data,
I grabbed the National Commission of computing and freedoms to solicit his opinion on their
storage period and conditions of the registration. The CNIL gave a positive opinion, and I can
see also the benefits that this notice is published. I'll take the order that will give its legal basis in
this record. It must be extremely precise and surrounded by a number of safeguards. The
exceptional nature of the device is clear. The text should match both the aspirations of the CNIL
and those that fall under my responsibility.
On the issue of minors, it is a subject in the making, because, if what I read is correct, many
minors - around 400, told - present on the Iraqi-Syrian theatre are likely to come back on the
national territory. Today, only eight minors are detained for terrorism-related review layouts.
Our thinking is therefore, for the moment, embryonic on this subject. I am, for example, very
cautious on the interest of a grouping, in their case.
In addition, there is an increase of signs of radicalisation in an open environment. Nobody denies
the reality of the problem. We are therefore trying to anticipate with PJJ, who has taken many
initiatives, including in enquiring on what can be done in other countries. Many works exist,
circulating within the administration, and we try to inspire us.

Mr. Alain Marsaud. Mr the garde des Sceaux, Executive Director of Homeland Security said
the return potential, perhaps rushed, a presumably large number of individuals went to the Syria.
It would be linked to the fact that the Islamic State seen its territory shrink little by little. The
Chancery reflects a change in the legislation or new legislation more imaginative regarding these
individuals? I think also to minors. You have deleted the Correctional Juvenile Court - even
though I know that, on this point, your thinking is not far away from mine. Either. But imagine,
if you were to consider lawsuits against them, the reaction of the judge for children and children
who, in ten years, have already handled the Kalashnikov and shot their neighbours...
With regard to the major two things one: either there is nothing against them, and they vaqueront
to their occupations, either they fall within the scope of the terrorist association of wrongdoers,
but it is difficult to establish. I'll perhaps shocking, but could not imagine a similar solution to
that chosen Americans? I do not necessarily think in Guantanamo, but the Homeland Security
plans to systematically send to jail, unless they go through the 'parole' box, all who come home
from Syria - which perhaps will deter them return, the rest. Imagine another form of crime, or
crime, to "penalize" systematically individuals who returned from Syria? Admittedly, they were
able to make diving or garages or ambulance, but it is unlikely...
The President Georges Fenech. Mr Marsaud, it seems to me that, from 2012, to go on an
outdoor theatre is an offence.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Certainly, but individuals are immediately released under judicial
supervision. This isn't a real crackdown. Now it comes to protect public order.
The President Georges Fenech. What is the criminal policy in the matter, Minister?
M. the garde des Sceaux. Mr. Marsaud argues here, as he did during a recent debate, in favour
of the creation of an offence of stay. I must therefore remind him that his amendment was not
adopted, and I can only expose the arguments that I had opposed him during this discussion: my
belief - but Mr. Marsaud is a goldsmith in the matter and it is with caution that I incur the
controversy with him - is that the AMT is flexible enough to cover this type of risk.
The President Georges Fenech. I would like to clarify a point, Mr the garde des Sceaux.
Information published in the press according to which the Place Beauvau would have explained
the interruption, end of 2013 and in June 2014, the telephone monitoring were the brothers Kaye
by the fact that the CNCIS - which you were a member, as a member of Parliament - had not
authorized its extension. However you have issued a communiqu in which you have formally
denied this information. Could you confirm this before the commission of inquiry?
M. the garde des Sceaux. I did release a release, for a very simple reason: the work of the
CNCIS, like those of the CNCTR, who succeeded him, are covered by secrecy.
The President Georges Fenech. I have this release under the eyes!
M. the garde des Sceaux. I remember what I have done, Mr president. I took the position that
president Delarue had publicly expressed in a press release that it had signed: there was a

discussion in the CNCIS and we actually took the public position that you have just mentioned
and which was consistent with what we experienced.
The President Georges Fenech. Therefore, at the time, the extension of the plays of the Kaye
brothers has never been refused.
M. the garde des Sceaux. The release of president Delarue said everything there is to say about
this issue.
The President Georges Fenech. Very well. Thank you for the clarity of your reply.
M. Christophe Cavard. With regard to the centre of de-radicalization with the Prime Minister
announced the creation, those who are staying will be voluntary or they might be obliged to do
so by a judicial procedure?
M. the garde des Sceaux. The Prime Minister announced the opening, in July, a deradicalization Center. This project is under discussion: local, personal, public hosted... The
Department of justice would be concerned if this centre should accommodate people in the hands
of justice.
M. Christophe Cavard. Judges may issue an injunction to care...
M. the garde des Sceaux. For the moment, this centre would rather volunteers, and not people
in the hands of justice. I can not tell you more. On the other hand, I can tell you that 317
proceedings have been opened about return of Syria; 263 are still underway. These procedures
have resulted in implementation review of 259 people, 163 of which are in pre-trial detention.
The President Georges Fenech. Mr the keeper of the seals, the commission of inquiry you
appreciation of him have spent those two hours very rich and thank you for great clarity and
frankness of your responses.
Hearing, open to the press, Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of defence
er

Record of the hearing, which was open to the press, Wednesday 1 June 2016

The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, Minister of defence, responding to the request for
hearing of our Committee of inquiry into the means implemented in Work by the State to combat
terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We are completing our work with the hearing of members of the Government. We have just
heard the keeper of the seals and we will tomorrow hear the Minister of the Interior. With you,
the Minister for defence, we will focus on military aspects of the struggle against terrorism on
both theatres of external operations, including the conduct of the Shamal operation, in France,
with the Sentinel operation, and of course to budgetary, human and material resources made
available by the State. We will also address issues related to the role of military intelligence, and
cooperation and coordination between it and other intelligence services.

We will hear you with a.warn more interest after having auditioned officials, placed under your
authority, armed forces and the counter-intelligence. We notably received the military Governor
of Paris and the military of the Sentinel operation. but we also had the honour to audition the
general Pierre de Villiers, Chief of staff, and general Pierre Sauvegrain, Assistant Director of
operational anticipation of the national gendarmerie, and general Christophe Gomart, Director of
military intelligence (DRM).
A first series of questions will revolve around our military presence within the coalition in the
Iraqi-Syrian area including. Then, will examine you the role of the Sentinel force.
I recalled that this hearing is open to the press and subject to a live broadcast on the internet site
of the National Assembly; registration will also be available for a few months and I can tell you
that the commission may decide to include in its report any part of the report that will be made of
the hearing. We have indeed decided that somehow General and when this does not fix the heard
persons or under confidentiality raise collected information, our hearings would be open to the
press, as we conduct this investigation in a transparent manner.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958, relating to
commissions of inquiry, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth.
M. Jean-Yves the Drian, Minister of defence, oath.
Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of defence. Thank you for inviting me in your work. Before
returning to the consequences of the attacks of 2015 in terms of capacity and action, I want to
raise the previous situation to deliver remarks on the debate that had courses on counterterrorism and threats.
The terrorist threat had indeed already been identified in 2008 as 'major' in the white paper on
defence and national security. This status of the terrorist threat was confirmed in the white paper
of 2012, after discussions focusing on the reality of the weakening of Al-Qaida, on whether if the
identified threat in 2008 was still as strong. It was responded by the affirmative and that well
before Daech meteoric emergence with the taking of Fallujah, at the beginning of 2014, and
Mosul, in the spring of the same year. The gravity of the situation in the Sahel had already
widely awareness the commission white paper in 2008, and in 2012 at the time of the preparation
of the military Act (LPM) for 2013. Counter-terrorism was therefore already a priority involving
the granting of additional resources.
Therefore, when I became Minister of defence, in harmony with the recommendations of the
white paper and in pursuance of the provisions of the military programming law, before even the
events in question, I was led into a number of intelligence, particularly in material capabilitiesbuilding programmes. I therefore decided to strengthen programmes of investment, such as those
related to the drones strategy - which had given rise to lengthy discussions, and even clashes. We
thus bought drones Reaper in the United States, since ours were interim in nature. I did also enter
the programming law acquire tactical drones - now it is thing made - and taken initiatives with

the Germany, the Italy and the Spain to initiate a program to develop a new generation of drones
Europeans for the year 2025.
The need to strengthen our intelligence capabilities involved the modernisation of our
observation and interception devices in the field of satellites. The intelligence of military interest
will benefit quickly delivery of satellites CSO (optical spatial component) of the MUSIS
(Multinational Space-based Imaging System) programme, and the realization of the satellite to
listen CERES (space intelligence capacity) system which will be operational in 2020.
This increase in capability means a strengthening of the human resources was added: the initial
military programming law foresaw an increase of more than 1,000 posts attached to the Ministry
of defence, personnel directly related to intelligence or cyber defence, whether it specialists
critical to these new capabilities, linguists, interpretateurs of images, specialists in critical for
detection capabilities...
I would add that the commitment of the Ministry of defense in the fight against terrorism is also
translated, before even January 7, 2015, by an effort on the ground of the legal powers available
to the intelligence services. Indeed, the LPM's December 2013 already includes provisions
strengthening access of the intelligence services of the Ministry of defence in some files,
especially of the administrative or judicial police; It also establishes a regime of intelligence
services access to login data held by telecommunications operators, the creation in France of the
PNR (Passenger Name Record) file or even the protection of information systems of the
operators of vital importance against the cyber threat.
What I have just mentioned shows how we were already aware of the threat of terrorism, even if,
since the attacks of 2015, the situation has completely changed.
With regard to the evolution of the situation since these events, I will share several observations,
starting with the deployment of the military in the national territory, turning then to external
theatres.
Contrary to what I have read, this is not the first time that our armed forces are given missions of
protection within the national territory: it is a reality that is ancient and clearly expressed in all
successive whitepapers since 1972; It was highlighted in 2008, which creates the contract
operational deployment of 10,000 men in the territory, and consolidated in 2013. Indeed, the
three main strategic priorities of the Ministry of defence - deterrence, intervention, protection are closely complementary and protection remains first in our strategy for defence and national
security, even if the external projection has formed an axis of major effort since the end of the
cold war. Therefore, the protection of the nation against any threat of military or nature likely to
affect the continuity of institutions is undoubtedly a priority mission of the armed forces.
I mean to stress because, in scenarios of use of the armed forces that underlie the preparation of
white papers of 2008 and 2013, the risk of a combination of threats to the France or Europe, both
outdoors and inside the territory, is considered the most important and the most demanding in
terms of capacity to deploy. The events of January and November 2015 tragically reminded us
the relevance of this work of anticipation.

From the first hours of the crisis of January 7, I therefore ordered the strengthening of the
Vigipirate detachments. I would remind you that, as we were during the holiday season, the
device was activated, but not to the "limit" as involving 700 to 800 military personnel. I therefore
decided to deploy to its fullest with 1 100 personal commitment to ease the effort of the internal
security forces. It was to provide a more visible and more reassuring presence for our citizens, in
particular on transport in the cities sites.
Given's analysis of the threat, it is a decision of activation of the contract of protection itself, at
its highest level, which was taken by the President of the Republic on 12 January and to show
that we had really changed perspective, we exceed the framework of the Vigipirate device, the
Sentinel operation was decided. It was a strong political signal on the part of the Chief of the
armed forces and the Nation understood that the terrorist risk, militarized outside our borders,
could hit her in her cFavorite pieces, and that the response should be to the extent of its
dangerousness: a strong, determined and coherent response.
The mobilization of the Ministry of defence and the armed forces has been, during these
dramatic hours, copy. In less than 72 hours, indeed, 10 000 soldiers were screened throughout
our territory at the disposal of the Minister of the Interior and, through him, defence zone
prefects, for what was the first true indoor operation of the professional army. It is in this way
that the Sentinel operation has emerged: it was designed from its first hours, nor as a
complement of staff of Vigipirate, but as an operation per se of protection on our soil, in addition
to the action of the police and gendarmerie forces. It goes without saying that this military
operation fits into the manOverall work of Homeland Security led by the Minister of the Interior
and that in no case our forces cannot intervene without a requisition of the Minister or his
representative.
The extension of this first device and his organization were then confirmed by the head of State
during a Council of defence of April 2015. Facing the development of the militarized terrorist
threat, the contract of protection has been clarified and redefined, with a capacity this time
continuing to hire 7,000 men of the armed forces in the long term, and up to 10,000 for a month.
This redefinition, attached to the finding of our strained in external operations, led to the decision
to increase, compared to the forecast of the LPM, 11,000 men of the land task force (FOT),
which will rise from 66 000 to 77 000 men. On that occasion, I pointed out that it was a single
armed: we did not accept proposals for army at two speeds, one territorial, other projection,
which had been the source of too much complexity, unfairness and waste.
The Sentinel operation has since then continuously adapted, in a logic of priority protection of
people and with a willingness to flexibility and dynamization increased our devices - less static
guards and, gradually, more patrols - articulated with those of the Ministry of the Interior.
In the aftermath of the attacks of November 13, the mobilization of the armed forces is again
confirmed with the redeployment - pursuant to the new operational contract - 3,000 soldiers in
three days, including 1,000 from the two days that followed the events. There again, the
mobilization in emergency was total up to the mobilization of the military hospitals. I would like
to point out that we have, at the same time, strengthened across our national homeland security
postures, both aerial, maritime, cyber, which can equally be subject to terrorist attacks.

Such a development called a reframing of the doctrine for the employment of the armed forces
on the national territory; This is what has been done in accordance with the conclusions of the
Council of defence of April 2015, through section 7 of the updated July 25 LPM. The report on
the conditions of service of the armed forces on the national territory was presented to
Parliament and gave rise to two very rich debates, the Assembly and the Senate, March 15-16.
This report presents the overall framework in which we are conducting our internal operations
and developments experienced since the attacks of January 7. He draws the consequences of the
evolution of threats and their confrontation with the specific know-how of the professional army:
reactivity and permanent availability. centralization of the forces; Master weapons of war;
complex planning capacity and multimedia; mobility and mobility, to take only the most
prominent examples.
In addition, the report sets up the standing posture of Cyber Defence and the principles of
capability than species or health service contracts. It also gives a new impetus to the use of our
military reserves. This is all our inner protection operations field that has been revisited on this
occasion and adapted to the situation facing the country.
It also describes the legal framework applicable to the use of the armed forces on the national
territory, and in particular to the use of force by our military. As such, I would stress that the
regime of self-defence, that is, principally, governing the use of force by the police as the
military requisitioned to act on the national territory, constitutes a framework adapted to the
situation. Could such measure these past months for example in Valencia or in the
neutralization of an individual who was attacking a Parisian Office - that it allowed to take into
account the specificity of the profession of law enforcement and that he was not an inhibiting
factor in the use of weapons.
Remains that the report discussed last March by Parliament also notes the great interest that
present the provisions now contained in article 51 of the law strengthening the fight against
organized crime, terrorism and their financing, and improving the efficiency and guarantees of
criminal procedure, definitively adopted on 25 May. These provisions are intended to take into
account the special case of individuals engaged in deadly voyages, which should allow that they
may be prevented from doing even though the condition of immediacy of response which
characterises the self-defence mechanism would not be met. To put it more clearly, the
preparing
to commit others even though, at the moment where they would be put out of action, they
wouldn't be trying to threaten human lives. This new regime of criminal excuse for use of force
applies indistinctly police, gendarmes, customs officers and the military requisitioned, as to those
who are committed as part of operation Sentinel. The conditions are precise and allow to move
away any criticism of creating a any license to kill. On the other hand, it is a regime that should
avoid any unnecessary inhibition in the use of weapons and invite the judicial authorities to
continue along the path of taking account of the inevitable specificity of the use of force by the
internal security forces, whatever they are.
The President Georges Fenech. The point that you have just mentioned is very important for
the commission and I hope that we are stopped a moment.

We we are long time asked about the role of the Sentinel force on 13 November, on the occasion
of the attack against the Bataclan. Military members of this device came in reinforcement of
intervention of homeland security forces to secure the outer perimeter, but without ever engaging
the fire.
The question of better coordination of Homeland Security and the military forces, and you
mention in this regard, Minister, inhibition that prevailed previously in the use of fire.
The Minister. I instead mentioned a legal framework does not constitute a factor of inhibition,
Mr president.
The President Georges Fenech. Indeed, but I mentioned the previous situation.
I recall that one of the terrorists had opened fire, with his Kalashnikov, outside Paris, in the
Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage. Gold men of the anti-crime (BAC) brigade, arrived first on the
scene, were not equipped to respond to a Kalashnikov. Note that they will now as the Minister of
the Interior reviewed its doctrines of employment and equip and train the BAC and monitoring
and intervention of the gendarmerie (PSIG-Sabre) platoons. But at the time of the facts, the tray
could not intervene further. One of the officers called the staff of the Directorate of security of
proximity of the Paris metropolitan area (DSPAP) to ask if the military, then eight and carriers of
FAMAS, could engage the fire; It was answered in the negative: the military could that attend
and not intervene directly. The Deputy Secretary-General of the Union of the Commissioners of
the national police has even revealed that a police officer had asked a soldier to his FAMAS: he
wiped a categorical refusal.
In the light of what you just tell us about the new legal framework of article 51 of the law
strengthening the fight against organized crime, terrorism and their financing, and improving the
efficiency and safeguards of the criminal procedure, and in light of the new regime, expanded, of
self defence that applies also to the military of the army in a situation that one of Bataclan on
November 13, the military would be now obliged to engage the fire alongside the internal
security forces?
The question is very important and nagging, the victims and their families asking why the
Sentinel force, who was present, was not directly involved to the neutralization of the terrorist
who was in the Saint-Pierre-Amelot passage. The new doctrine of employment provide different
answers in the collaboration between the internal security forces and the military forces?
The Minister. The military did not intervene in the circumstances you describe, if not for a
juristic reason. I will recall the facts as they have been reported to me by the authorities military
and which I have no reason to doubt.
In all cases, it is at the request of the prefect of police - approved by the Minister of the Interior that unfold operation Sentinel units. It is in this context that some members of the 1St regiment of
hunters, located in the XIe district and are receiving an abnormal situation, have taken the
initiative to put themselves at the disposal of the internal security forces. This group of eight
soldiers so joined the sector of the Bataclan to twenty-two hours and immediately came into

contact with the police of the BAC. Throughout the evening, and in close coordination with the
Ministry of the Interior forces, placed under the authority of the prefect of police, our soldiers
helped secure the area by supporting and protecting the interventions by the security forces, but
also in bringing relief to victims.
There is only a chain of command - then as now, as tomorrow. In an outer transaction, it is
placed under the military authority; indoors, in accordance with the law, the military are instead
under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior.
Four soldiers have been positioned by the police through Saint-Pierre-Amelot to secure
specialized research brigade groups of intervention and intervention (bis). They received the oral
order to neutralize, if necessary, a terrorist who would emerge from the Bataclan.
I now specifically answer your question on the rejection of the 'loan' of the FAMAS. I recall very
strongly a basic principle: lend his weapon is contrary to all rules of engagement of our forces in
operation. Never a soldier engaged in fire - and this was the case tonight-separates from his
weapon, otherwise it is any its military gain which will be erase. I added that such automatic
weapons designed to neutralize an opponent, handle not easily - even for a professional of the
forces of order - unless being dragged.
Then, our military did not intervene inside the Bataclan because such were not orders given by
Homeland Security officials; However, I stress, it may be that a single chain of command. In
addition, these soldiers belong to the army's conventional forces, meaning that they are not
trained to interventions with hostage-taking, and it's even more true when such interventions are
not early - as is the case during external operations where interventions are carried out in
compliance with the rules of the use of force to neutralize an enemy spotted identified and
defined; context in which, often, are also of special forces with the support of conventional
forces. Thus, in Bamako, Ouagadougou or Grand-Bassam, the army special forces were
supported and secured by more conventional forces.
On the other hand, our soldiers are familiar with zone control missions, security perimeters, in
support of specialized forces, as I have just pointed out. now it is the mission that was entrusted
tonight by the competent authority, and it was important that they comply with his orders. Also
were they able, if a terrorist came out of the Bataclan, to act without hesitation and without
inhibition.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. If, tomorrow, soldiers participating in the Sentinel device
were brought to be newly-arrived on the scene of taking of hostages or a mass killing, could they
be for first responders?
The Minister. I do not exclude it. My only concern in this type of situation, it is unity of
command, otherwise we risk a very bad crisis management.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. Tonight, soldiers participating in operation Sentinel were they required?

The Minister. They were not required, but are themselves close of place, because they have
made contact with the authorities of the internal security forces who were on the spot.
The rapporteur. I return to my question: soldiers of operation Sentinel could, where
appropriate, be first responders?
The Minister. Yes, if they are in a State of legitimate defense...
The rapporteur. No, not in self-defence. For example, if they patrol and see it running people...
The Minister. This is the State of necessity which, in this case, prevails, of course. The Act lists
the cases in which they are involved: legitimate defence, necessity, deadly journey.
The rapporteur. In confined places, the armament question arises: the FAMAS is appropriate?
In a report of the secretariat-general of the defence and national security (SGDSN), declassified
at my request, dated February 17, 2016, bearing on the commitment of the armed forces on the
national territory, a reflection is advocated, on page 17, on the principle of a dual staffing: assault
rifle and automatic pistol. Arm thus systematically "at least all the team leaders [...] "would [...]
an additional possibility of graduating a possible response. What is the State of the reflection of
the Department on this double staffing?
The Minister. For interventions confined within the national territory and in the case of taking
of hostages, there are very specialized, that soldiers of the Sentinel operation can support and
secure.
With regard to armaments, I recall a major principle: that of a single army. This principle is all
the more important that, now, we face risks of mass murder. We have indeed changed registry,
including the case of Merah, since we are facing attacks commandos. The unit of the armed
forces consisting of military accustomed to intervene in external operations and internal
operations against a more militarized threat is, in a way, a good thing for the coherence of the
action, but requires the maintenance of weapons of war. We can therefore consider the
hypothesis that you mention, but basically, the handling of the weapon of war is the same
whether it's external operations or domestic operations, since it is intended to secure and support
the work of the intervention units.
Mr Franois Lamy. At the Bataclan, we both face a hostage and a mass slaughter, which is not
the same.
The Minister. Rather to a phenomenon of mass killing.
Mr Franois Lamy. Altogether. The report that you have given us on the Conditions of service
of the armed forces when they are involved in the national territory to protect the population,
accurate, pages 30 and 31, concerning the rules for use of force, that ' for soldiers engaged in an
operation inside, if strong evidence establishes that human lives are threatened, that the
implementation of the threat is imminent and that deterrence means put at the disposal of the
other military that. firearms have been exhausted or are ineffective, it is permissible to make use

of weapons to fire in self-defence and the defence of necessity as defined in articles 122-5 and
122-7 of the penal code".
Are we agreed on the fact that these conditions of employment would today allow our soldiers to
intervene immediately in a context of mass killings - in order to prevent new people from being
killed? It would, therefore, not necessary to wait that the prefect of police, for example, gives
instructions?
The Minister. The application of the text you cite goes in this direction, knowing that selfdefence does not exist only for itself, but also for others.
What matters above all, forgive me for showing me repetitive, is the unit of the chain of
command, which is not contradictory with what you say, Sir.
Mr Franois Lamy. Precisely. However found in the material some red - namely police,
certainly.
The Minister. In this case, the presence of these eight soldiers was, in a way, random. They find
agitation, visit on-site and start immediately - with reason - under the authority of the tray. It is
their role.
The rapporteur. You stress the importance, Minister, that there be only one authority. This
means, for example, that military newcomers should ask leave to intervene?
Mr Franois Lamy. This is not what the text says.
The Minister. The text just quoted Mr Lamy allows the intervention of newcomers. Again,
everything depends on the circumstances, I can't imagine all the scenarios. Remains that,
immediately after a primo-possible intervention, the military must be placed under the authority
of the Ministry of the Interior crisis cell.
Mr. David Comet. You mentioned, Sir, the manOverall work of internal security under the
authority of the Minister of the Interior, through the prefects. Could you tell us how and why the
requisitions of the soldiers of the Sentinel operation have evolved over the past months? We
have moved from a static approach to a more dynamic approach.
The Minister. The Sentinel operation has experienced two-stroke: the implementation of the
operational contract, then his deepening after the Council for the defence of the month of April
2015. It was at the beginning to reassure the population by protecting certain places, which was
done quickly at the request of the prefect of police. That extended the presence of soldiers from
operation Sentinel in France and more particularly in the Paris region, patrols were done more
dynamic, to better respond to security concerns - even though the population does perhaps not
received it immediately so -;. in fact, it was better that soldiers patrolled, except. And it is the
case of 80% of the military involved in this device in the Paris region. It took time and
demonstrate pedagogy, but this dynamic corresponds much better to the vocation of the armed
forces and gives people a greater sense of security. Euro 2016 will weigh many constraints on

the organization that the prefect of police of Paris shall implement, but it will then revert to this
good logic.
Mr Franois Lamy. When the device's operation Sentinel will stop? Can we afford to mobilize
so as many men for a long time? Certainly the soldiers engaged in this mission will alternate
external missions and protection of sites, but they were above all trained to wage war and would
be perhaps useful for a possible additional external operation, if one does not want to denude the
current external operations. Where is the reflection on this subject? There is a time referred to the
creation of a national guard, the use of the reserve... Could these forces, which are involved in
addition to the internal security forces, be replaced, ultimately for the custody of buildings, by
more specialized forces? So could our soldiers better to train and participate in interventions
corresponding to their real mission.
The Minister. The law that says? On the national territory, the armies must be able to An
operational agreement which foresees mobilisation, at least 7,000 permanently and 10,000 at
most for a period of one month, against the terrorist threat. Therefore, the Act does not end. So
must we integrate this new situation in our training systems, renewal and recruitment. This is
why land operational force will spend 66 000 to 77 000 men. And, since we must face what can
be likened to acts of war, it is necessary that these soldiers Act both in external operations
(OPEX) and in domestic operations (OPINT), and so that they acquire the skills and reflexes that
are suitable. Each domestic transaction is the subject of specialized training, even in times of
great tension, like the one we live since the events of 2015.
The recruitment of the 11,000 troops began in 2015 and continues in 2016, so that once trained
in the specific actions of OPEX and OPINT, one can consider that will be at the normal level of
task force land in summer 2017.
At the same time, I decided to strengthen reserves, which will increase from 28 000 to 40 000
men by the end of the LPM, i.e. here to 2019. The end on the 7,000 troops that includes at least
the Sentinel device, some 500 will come reserves, against less than 300 at the beginning of the
operation, and I hear that we reach the figure of 1 000 permanent attached to units. It is thus a
more global coherence leading then, possibly, to a territorialisation. In the meantime, we must
continue our efforts: discuss with professional organizations, with local communities to improve
the functioning and the commitment of this reserve. Short, the process is underway and it is
rather well received, and my desire in this matter is shared by the Chief of staff of the armed
forces: we are convinced that we will achieve the goal.
M. Christophe Cavard. The commission understands the usefulness of deployed military and
not only in a context of static, as they are likely to end up in a situation. Nevertheless in their
regard the question arises of the training. Thus, the new arrivals at the Bataclan, and which
entered, was a Commissioner of police. Imagine that newcomers are soldiers of the Sentinel
operation. Are they able to enter a place? Indeed, if, usually, he was first to set criminals, then
leave specialized teams such as the Group of the gendarmerie nationale (GIGN) intervention, it
comes here, for the new arrivals, to intervene directly. We understand that developments were
ongoing concerning the procedures, but the public might find it surprising that heavily armed
men, go to a theater and stop at the door.

The Minister. I want to repeat what I have already said: the question, for me, is not to be
newcomers, but to be primo-competent. When you are in an enclosed space, at such time, it is
better be special forces involved rather than unity of the army which has a vocation for area
securing. It is also a matter of discretion of the head, even if it is newcomers. In the context of a
foreign operation, the issue is regulated by the military command; in an indoor operation, unless
new arrivals, these are internal security forces who decide.
The President Georges Fenech. How does a new arrivals become primo-competent?
The Minister. This appreciation is equivalent to the head.
The President Georges Fenech. What head?
The Minister. The local leader, one who is on-site.
The President Georges Fenech. They should enjoy themselves if they are able to manage this
crisis?
The Minister. How do in overseas operations?
The President Georges Fenech. Except that here it is question of the national territory and
innocent people are getting killed.
The Minister. It is at this time that must be weighed if the unit has the ability to operate or
whether to wait for the guard to act.
The President Georges Fenech. Commissioner of the BAC, which is entered at the Bataclan
with his handgun is not placed this kind of philosophical question. He said: I'm police, I have a
weapon, people are getting killed, I enter. And if it is certain that it has not respected the usual
procedure, he probably saved lives.
M. Pierre Lellouche. Minister, I have a lot of respect for you and the work you have done at the
Ministry of defence. However, I am in total disagreement with you, since the beginning, about
the use of the army for missions of counterterrorism on the national territory. You are wrong. If
the Chief of staff of the armed forces and if the Chief of staff of the armies of Earth have joined
you, it is for quite other reasons that you invoke here, that is, essentially, for budgetary reasons.
Beyond these reasons of expediency, it is a foul against the army to mobilize for police missions
that do not correspond to his profession. You do not qualify, as I have heard several times in
your mouth, that the soldier who was yesterday at Gao, who is now in Kandahar and who will be
tomorrow in Syria, can also take care of the place de la Madeleine or the rue des Martyrs. This
simply isn't possible. First, if you circulate in the streets of Paris or Bordeaux, equipped for war,
deprive it yourself of operational training. Then, you assign it to a mission that it cannot fulfil.
The commission of inquiry is a very informative trip to Israel where, I believe, is experience of
combating terrorism because terrorism raged in this area even before the birth of the State. What
have we found? That the army is not the issue at all responsible: these are specialized police

forces, border guards who are struggling against terrorism. The military forces, they make war. It
is impossible to mix genres. Can only be fitted with long machine-gun soldiers in the streets of
Paris: they do that serve as targets. They are also ineffective because they are not trained to
understand a situation like those we are talking about, this is not their job, they do not have the
police instinct. You cannot ask a soldier who, tomorrow, going to make war in Gao to the police
at Roissy - it is unthinkable. Moreover, to Lod airport, in Tel Aviv, you won't see a single
soldier: protection forces are composed of plainclothes police.
In short, I repeat, you are wrong. You're depleting our army, to give impossible missions. The
solution passes through better training of basic police forces; It should also work with forces
dedicated to this type of mission. Are you studying other assumptions or you enferrez you in the
speech that the same soldier must do two totally different missions?
The Minister. We indeed disagree on this point. The operational contract is not new: it was
included in all white papers since 1972, and even if, at the time, he was wearing a different
name, in 2008 it spoke well of operational contract.
I do not see how the French could understand that our armed forces will intervene in Kidal and
not on the national territory when it is the victim of terrorist attacks. On the other hand, for your
information, the Italians, the Spanish, the British come to the same options as we - albeit with
variations in demand, mobilization, links with the Ministry of the Interior; but the options are
identical. The British even came out with us our way of acting - I had to this topic of discussion
with my counterpart Michael Fallon since the attacks. Therefore, this posture is not unique to the
France. We have just started the operational readiness, but there was an emergency! Would tell
the French if we had told them that, because of the operational readiness, we could not ensure the
safety of the national territory? If it is true that, in 2015 and 2016, this preparation has been
reduced, it is again more important, since we recruited for the goals set by the law.
I know that I then can't convince you, Mr Lellouche, but at least you will I have given an
explanation. Do not forget our strategy concerning reservations and the territorialisation from the
regiment.
The President Georges Fenech. We spent over an hour on the Sentinel operation. I propose to
take action of our forces abroad.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. How do you, Minister, the evolution of the overall cost of anti-terrorist
actions in the Sahel and in the Levant? Do you think that means committed term, suffice? I will
indeed have that we adapt our presence and our action against terrorism that avoids combat and
extends to neighbouring countries, focusing on targets that are currently little or not defended. It
will also be necessary to us to respond to catastrophic changes in the Sahel region: population
growth, economic development, and some form of radicalisation lead us to review our
procedures. How do you foresee these issues?
In addition, you mentioned the strengthening of international cooperation in intelligence, in
particular in the Levant. Our American allies have, you said during different hearings, many
abilities in this area. Here, too, can you tell us a bit more?

Mr. Jean-Luc Laurent. I return to the Sentinel operation on which, I said in a public meeting, I
remain very reserved in that it mobilizes troops for missions which should be attributed to the
forces of order and security: the military has other tasks to accomplish. However, within the
framework set and just remember, Minister, if soldiers were called to intervene further in the
case of attack, killing of mass, what means and what arrangements are planned preparedness,
training, to avoid collateral damage which could be very heavy? What new procedures can be
taken in terms of coordination? What about unity of command if the military are newcomers?
How actors coordinate their action?
From the point of view of military preparation for these new tasks assigned to the Sentinel
device, I read in the press that you had conducted an experimental operation to workout in the
Isere region. It heralds an evolution of doctrine which would define the conditions for greater
intervention of the military in the event of new attack?
Mr Franois Lamy. The armed forces have an obligation of result: to fulfill the operational
contract if the political authorities - in this case the President of the Republic - request.
The present Committee of inquiry is especially designed to make proposals in the short, medium
and long term. Would you be opposed to term, a rise of forces of security so as to reserve,
specifically, the implementation Work of the operational contract for one-off operations? It could
therefore very well understand that, in the context of major events such as Euro 2016, a Summit
of Heads of State, the tour de France, it mobilizes 7 000, or even 10,000 men, so as to ensure the
safety of operations and of boundaries.
M. Guillaume ledger. Do you, Minister, that the legal framework of intervention of the
intelligence services is now stabilized? We worked much in recent years. Emerges from various
hearings that some services are questioning their incompetence when a material is judiciarise:
the Director-general for external security (DGSE) himself told us that he questioned its ability to
respond when a person was put in consideration. Indeed, the respect for the rights of the defence
is opposed to what the intelligence services 'trace' an individual subject to a judicial procedure.
Also we are we interviewing on the existing legal framework and the possible need to establish a
regime allowing intelligence services to enter into this matter.
The President Georges Fenech. This issue is more specifically of judicial procedures and the
keeper of the seals, in which we asked the question just now. The request comes, however, also,
the DGSE who is facing a legal impediment that may constitute an obstacle to intelligence.
The Minister. Ms. Dumas asked me about costs. The updating of the military programming law
allowed an increase, on the fiscal year, from 3.8 billion euros. Then, the additional cost for the
year 2015, domestic operations was 174 million euros and 650 more EUR 450 million for
external operations. This extra cost was fully covered by the applicable year-end pooling device.
We now have the means to fulfil the commitments laid down in the first update of the LPM and
means to respect the decision taken subsequently to renounce any form of deflation of the troop.

In response to questions from Mr. Laurent and Mr Lamy on operation Sentinel, I repeat that a
systematic preparation of units intended for domestic operations is foreseen: combat readiness,
master, coolness, to the use of the weapon...
With regard to coordination: it was the first as massive operation; also it took us organize in as
concrete as the housing and food materials, but also to harmonize the command. I was able to
observe that, in the Paris region, to the direct relationship between the military Governor and the
prefect of police, much closer exchanges of command relationships of the land were added. In
Paris, we have divided the Sentinel operation in three Battlegroups in order to obtain a much
better operability. Each group is controlled by a colonel representative generally the largest unit
in the concerned territory, making it much easier to the Act of command. The group being in
relationship with the authorities of the Interior security forces nearby, all are regularly and, as
such, their complementarity is particularly effective in the already mentioned dynamics.
Mr Lamy, the Act provides that 7,000 soldiers are available continuously and 10,000 for a
month. It is obvious they are mobilized in the event of threat. The Euro 2016 was one of your
examples; I would choose for my part the likelihood of an attack that can lead us, to ensure
security, to raise the planned 7,000, or 5 000 if the threat is less. It is therefore not a strength of
permanent presence.
Mr Larriv, no echo me is currently managed by the DGSE, the DRM, nor the DPSD. On the
contrary, the existing legal framework - to which you have contributed - suits us well enough. It
is expected that all the procedures put in place so that we verify the reality and effectiveness. In
any case, for the moment, we have significantly progressed. I am convinced that many of the
attacks that have been thwarted could not have be if one had not applied some of the features
provided by the Act on intelligence.
For what concerns operation Minerva, which was held late April in the Grenoble area, it has
enabled us to test the effectiveness of a commitment coordinated by the army and the
gendarmerie for a manWork of public safety. We were able to develop procedures and modes of
action in common and develop the modalities of the operational readiness. This useful feature
will be probably followed by effect. This operation has shown in any case the agility, the
reactivity of our forces and our ability to work together.
The President Georges Fenech. We shall proceed to the Shamal operation and more generally
to external operations.
The Minister. The Shamal, to the Levant, began September 19, 2014 - before the attacks at the
request of the Iraqi Government. Our feature includes air assets such as the maritime means,
present instructors in Iraq for the benefit of the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces. The
coalition that organized the intervention in Iraq was formed at the time of the Summit of the
Organization of the Treaty of the North Atlantic (NATO) in Newport, also in September 2014.
After the attacks of January 7, 2015, the carrier battle group, with the Charles de Gaulle, was
deployed from February 23 to April 17 in the Arabian Gulf. With thirty aircraft on board, its
presence has multiplied by three french air operative involved in the Levant. Then, with the

accumulation of information on criminal networks jihadists to the departure of Syria and

destined for the France, the President of the Republic took the decision at the beginning of the
month of September 2015 to allow flights of recognition over the Syria, and, three weeks later, to
allow keystrokes.
After the attacks of November 13, 2015, the President of the Republic gave the order to intensify
strikes and plan interventions on Mosul and Raqqah within the coalition, to progressively
eradicate Daech. This is reflected, in particular for our own forces by the return of the carrier
battle group in the Arabian Gulf, in the month of November 2015 in February 2016. During this
mission, our aircraft have conducted a total of 532 outputs and up to 18 per day during the
phases of intensification, for a total of 102 strikes in Iraq and Syria against Daech, and 30
reconnaissance missions which allowed the establishment of 1,000 records of intelligence for the
benefit of the coalition.
I call your attention to the fact that the France is the only country with the United States, to
deploy all the means necessary for the operations of the coalition in Iraq, since we have both air
assets of maritime resources, intelligence and training of Iraqi forces and Peshmerga forces tools.
It is without doubt the first time that I say so, because I am careful by nature, but I believe today
that Daech is clearly on the decline. We are conducting at the moment an operation in Fallujah,
town on the Euphrates fifty kilometres south-west of Baghdad, and which should fall after battles
that are likely to be quite hard. But I recall that it was the first city taken by Daech: that is to say
the symbolic importance of the current action. The most efficient regiment of the Iraqi army trained by french instructors in the suburb of Baghdad -Iraqi ounter-Terrorism Service (ICTS), is
the manArtwork. This unit, with different supports, should return to Fallujah.
North of Iraq, we are preparing the attack in Mosul. Fighting to regain Qayyarah unfold at this
time and put the peshmergas - with training and support, among other things, french military directly faced with Daech. I had the opportunity to go on the front, there is very little time, to
realize this decisive action. Daech recedes as the successive strikes by the coalition begin to
touch this organization to the cFavorite pieces, in particular its oil resources and centres of
refinery that it could control and whose income allowed to pay foreign fighters. I was surprised
to note, during my last trip, my interlocutors evoke already after Daech. But these concerns are
new. In Iraq, Daech has lost about 40% of its territory, and this movement continues.
In Syria, the situation is more complex. A significant action is conducted at this very moment on
Raqqah; the operations take place rather well, even if the city should not be taken immediately. I
recall in passing that these winback are not simple: Mosul account still 2 million inhabitants and
Raqqah 300 000 - with many french fighters. Raqqah is the place of formation of all the terrorist
groups that might occur from the Syria. Syrian democratic forces (FDS) recently started an
operation against this city.
I particularly call your attention on the area of Manbij. Two Kurdish areas form the border with
the Turkey; one, fairly long, extends eastward and joined Iraqi Kurdistan, the other, shorter,
court to the West. Operations began two days ago in Manbij sector - where many fighters
including French - foreign, central point to close the corridor leading to the Turkey. If the

democratic forces Syrian, both Arab and Kurdish, arrive to take all of this corridor, the border
will be fully closed.
Thanks to the simultaneous actions on Raqqah, Mosul and Fallujah, to which must be added now
one conducted on Manbij, thanks to the Russian presence at Palmyra, Daech will be completely
encircled, resulting in interesting events. For the first time, my look is relatively optimistic about
the Levant.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, Mr Minister, bring us the scoop of these items of
information, because we were unaware of the State of progress of our forces in the areas you
have mentioned and which may indeed leave hope sooner or later fall Daech.
The Minister. I am nevertheless taking precautions. I usually give this kind of information to the
the defence committees of the Assembly and the Senate, usually behind closed doors. Even if
this hearing does not take place behind closed doors, I nevertheless may show me, for the first
time, relatively positive for follow-up. This means that we had to release our effort, on the
contrary, because, when Daech feels cornered, his reactions are likely to be even stronger and the
pacification will therefore not immediate. But such is the meaning in which operates the
situation, with a decrease in the number of foreign fighters - whose estimated the number, in this
area, to 15,000, while they would now only about 12,000 on some 35,000 fighters.
I turn to the situation in Libya. This territory without a unified State is the focal point of many
problems: it is both a refuge area for groups of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the
Sahel, a deployment area Daech - in Sirte in particular-, an area of trafficking and migration
crossing point. You should know that the presence of Daech in the Sirte region is significant, at
the rate of 3 500, or even 4,000 fighters, most are not passed through the Levant and that weren't
there a year ago and a half.
In addition, the political situation is complicated. The international community has designated
Mr. El-Sarraj as Prime Minister. This one has had the courage to settle in Tripoli, but he
struggles to unify politically the territory since the official Parliament of Tobruk has not invested
the Government of national unity. The international community supports the initiative,
particularly in the person of the representative of Ban Ki-moon, Mr Kbler, with whom I was
also able to speak of the situation yesterday in Paris. The difficulty is the slowness with which
Mr. El-Sarraj advance since he settled in Tripoli, however that fights take place in the is
involving the forces of the general Haftar, supported by the Egypt and the UAE, forces which are
trying to return to Benghazi to Daech and engage an offensive from the South East on the
territory for the time being held by this organization; While on the other side, the militias of
Misrata began they also military action against Daech. It is not easy to coordinate the action of
these forces that have the same opponent, even between those Haftar and Misrata, there was
tension, or exchanges of fire.
Our goal is the restoration of the Libyan State, to educate all our partners so that the Prime
Minister has the authority to coordinate the action of his country, especially on the military side.
Then, we need to contain Daech in supporting the efforts of counter-terrorism of the Egypt and
Tunisia in particular. Finally, we must try to prevent migration at risk - should not be that these

migrations enable Daech to recover militarily and financially. If it became operational, the
Sophia mission, conducted by the European Union, would be a good way to stop this process.
Concern is therefore more pronounced in this region, but solutions could stand if adventure, the
authority of Mr. El-Sarraj was respected and recognized, and efforts by some and others to this
end were successful.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, Minister, for this important information and
leaving a hope, even though, as you pointed out, should continue to exercise caution.
Throughout our work, we wondered why Western troops or, among them, the French troops did
not intervene on the ground.
The rapporteur. You mentioned that Daech had lost 40 per cent of the territory it had
conquered in Iraq. Do you have figures on Syria, where it refers to 15-20% loss?
Neither the president nor myself are members of the Defence Committee. The information that
you have given us on the Iraq and the Syria are encouraging, but do you think that the airstrikes
are sufficient to eradicate Daech? Will not have, at one time or another, to go to the ground? It is
the geopolitical complexities of this intervention... If however we remain the air strikes, what
maturity do you that we will come to grips with Daech? You indeed mentioned that more Daech
will be cornered, more this organization may hit our territory.
Then, are strikes planned in Libya? How do we prepare to deal with the concern you have made
known at the end of your remarks?
Finally, I would like to know your feelings on the functioning of the Hermes cell: is it optimal,
after a little more than a year, or are there still increase margins?
M. Christophe Cavard. I would like to ask you about the treatment of those it will not call
'soldiers', but "armed terrorists". As it does not consider these fighters like forming a regular
army, referred to other services, are they apprehended by our military soldiers, although we
consider them as terrorists?
The Minister. I will start by answering this last question. There is international law, and when
terrorists are captured by our forces, they are handed over to local authorities: they are taken
prisoner and are transferred to local courts. The only known case is that of Mali where the
president is elected by universal suffrage and where justice works, despite sometimes deadlines.
I myself realized the situation by going to Gao where were temporarily imprisoned stakeholders
and to ensure that they would be properly transferred to the bodies concerned.
I take this opportunity to answer a question that has not been put to me. I often read that we try to
take french fighters for targets, during our aerial interventions, either Raqqah, in the area of
Manbij. No. There is no prior identification: we knock the enemy Daech and whose fighters are
from all backgrounds.

I am not saying that Daech will soon be eradicated - the sequel will be even complicated; still,
for three weeks, the conjunction of events pushes us to a certain optimism.
I turn to the rapporteur's question: do not send soldiers on the ground, or in Libya or the Levant.
Our role is to ensure that the Territories concerned have forces that we train, we help to
manWork, to which we deliver possibly material; to ensure that these territories are liberated by
themselves. The previous one in Iraq has indeed not given good results and if we substituions to
local forces, it would be unmanageable. Also returns to form local and forces, by strikes as not
only to accompany their operations, but also to act preventively in destroying command centres,
training centres, places of resource - so Daech comes, if you have read the latest headlines, to
anticipate its own difficulties in his public statements, which is a great novelty.
It should be in Syria, to strengthen strikes and the accompaniment. In Libya, we are firstly the
information; then we have to answer to what the first Minister El-Sarraj asked the international
community, whether it's her safety or training of his troops; Finally, the United Nations must be
able to react quickly enough to a proposal being discussed within the Security Council proposal
launched by the France, the Germany and the United Kingdom - that is the manWork-, aimed at
ensuring that the Sophia operation, which aims to prohibit the traffic of weapons and preventing
human smugglers to trade in the Mediterranean, is possible. We are ready, for that purpose, to
enter buildings. I would add that in Libya a course very important arms trafficking across the
Mediterranean and that we must stop. There no longer our presence on the ground is not the right
solution. Unlike the Syria and the Iraq, we are dealing, in Libya, with a recognized Government,
we want to strengthen and the rest can make specific requests State itself to ensure its authority.
With regard to the operation Hermes, it works well. All our services are found to obtain
information in real time. This very useful experience had ever conducted. I had the opportunity
to visit on-site several times to see how operations were taking place, and I could see that it was
a very good system. Another merger of intelligence - DGSE, ISB and other cell-, cell Allat, it
also works fine. Between intelligence work is difficult because each has its turf, its networks, its
skills, but for myself, I found the good coordination of the three intelligence services that depend
on my authority, the novelty being the expansion of cooperation with other intelligence services,
which, honestly, is going better and better.
I would add, for which relations with the other countries intelligence that very quickly after the
attacks, we had an agreement with the United States. I can say that today ' hui reigns true
transparency, as never before, both in the field of intelligence, but also in the military. I saw
myself going in operating rooms.
The rapporteur. There is a feeling of rivalry between Al-Qaida and Daech. Therefore, Al Qaeda
- and AQIM in particular - represent for you a growing concern? Abroad are french interests
more threatened? AQIM will be, ultimately you able to hit our territory?
The Minister. We must be very vigilant. We speak more often of Daech and Al-Qaida. However
the latter is present in Syria through Djabhato al-Dhanub. Should not the withdrawal of Daech, it
feels dawn, aroused allegiances to AQIM on the part of groups that meet a different fate. AlQaida is present in Mali significantly. This network has been very affected by our operations.

Remains that, from 2013, the situation is very different. In 2013, it was an effort to transform a
State into a terrorist sanctuary, including by katibatgrouping. Thanks to the Serval operation, this
strategy has failed, allowing the restoration of democracy and the holding of elections. However,
terrorists have changed posture and we are now dealing with smaller, less militarized - groups
unlike Daech - and practising a classical with the use of suicide bombers terrorism. The
attacks of Bamako, Ouagadougou and Grand-Bassam, with regular use of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) against our own forces - three of our soldiers died recently-, showed that the
practice had changed, a practice also much harder to spot.
Under operation Bal, we have coordinated our actions against terrorism with countries of the
Sahel G5 - Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. Facing this new risk, we must
maintain a singular military effort to prevent this logic effects also unbearable than those
produced by Daech.
It should also make ensure that the Algiers political agreements which concern in particular the
armed groups signatories, namely the non-terrorist fighters, were respected part and other Malian
political authorities. These include to accelerate the implementation of the operation
"Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration" (DDR). We call permanently the parties at y
Work, otherwise one runs the risk of porosity between the signatory armed groups and terrorist
armed groups overseen primarily by the Al-Mourabitounegroup, led by an Algerian residing in
Libya, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and that is by train, with Iyad Ag Ghali, resume a form of
cooperation which seems not the most encouraging - also my feeling about this situation is more
negative.
The President Georges Fenech. We want really, Sir, to thank you have devoted us the time, we
have given all of this information that will be useful to our Committee of inquiry.
I would also like to inform you of the tribute of the commission our troops for their outstanding
work.
Hearing, open to the press, of Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior
Record of the hearing, oaction to the press, Thursday, June 2, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Minister, thank you for having responded to the request for hearing of
our Committee of inquiry into the means OEimplemented by the State to combat terrorism since January
7, 2015.
We heard yesterday the garde des sceaux and the Minister of defence, and we are completing with you
this week of departmental hearings. I said we will hear, on June 16, Madam Secretary of State aid to the
victims. We started our work by receiving victims, reflecting our interest for them. symbolically, we
conclude them around this same concern.
Minister, we already had the opportunity to hear you at the beginning of our work, March 7, and we
agreed that you return before the Board of inquiry to specifically address issues relating to intelligence.
You know we've heard officials of the different services concerned: their testimonies do not sometimes
leave of ourselves in relation to cooperation and especially the coordination between them.

This hearing will provide an opportunity for you to take first stock of the law of 24 July 2015, but it will also
allow us to take stock of the results of the fight against terrorism, on the use of the internal security forces,
and the new national scheme of intervention you have presented last April.
I would remind you that this hearing, open to the press, is broadcast live on the parliamentary channel,
and made subject to retransmission, on-line also, on the website of the National Assembly. Registration
will be available for a few months on the video portal of the Assembly, and I would point out that the
commission of inquiry may decide to include in its report any part of the report that will be made of the
hearing. We have indeed decided that in a general way, and when will this raise no difficulty for the heard
persons or with regard to the confidentiality of the information collected, our hearings would be open to
the press, as we conduct this investigation in a transparent manner.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Ordinance of 17 November 1958, relating to
commissions of inquiry, I ask you, Mr. Minister, to take the oath to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.
Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve oath.
Minister, in your first statement you could have speak at length in an introductory remarks which had
lasted for more than an hour. In the interest of our commission of inquiry, it would be desirable that we
have sufficient time after your initial presentation to address all issues. This does not prevent you
obviously develop as you want the points that you think are important.
Our Committee of inquiry reaches the end of its work, and we will give our report at the beginning of the
month of July. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the men and women who fall within your
Department, including self-denial and, sometimes, the spirit of sacrifice honor our country. I think in
particular to the Commissioner of the tray, as we heard, who did not hesitate, at the risk of his life,
November 13, 2015, to enter the Bataclan to neutralize one of the three terrorists who were there.
Mr Minister, our Committee of inquiry must establish the existence of any faults, possible malfunctions. It
is clear that no high-level official was the subject of questioning on the professional level since the attacks
of the month of January 2015. I remind you that we are talking about attacks that made one hundred and
forty-seven dead and hundreds injured on the whole of the territory during the tragic days of November
and January. We wonder if he has no responsibility, be it administrative or political, regarding what must
be called the failure of our intelligence services who were unable to prevent these events.
We owe the truth to victims, their families, and the French on the conditions in which the attacks of
January and November 2015 could be perpetrated, on what has not worked. I would remind you that on
13 November 2015, we have suffered the greatest number of victims on french soil since World War II.
We must provide answers and make useful proposals in the cross-national spirit that has been one of this
commission of inquiry since the beginning of its work. It was hosted by concern for the truth, and to
enable greater efficiency of our services in the future.
Who could claim, Mr Minister - I do not think that this will be your case-, that the attacks of 2015 are not a
collective failure, even though everyone understands in this area that there is no such thing as zero risk?
The Prime Minister himself, said January 9, 2015: "there is a flaw obviously well. When he was seventeen
dead, is that there were faults. "So, what about after the attacks of November 13 at the Bataclan, SaintDenis, and on the terraces of the cafs-restaurants in Paris?
After some two hundred hours of hearings, and travel abroad - we just returned from Israel where I know
that your services will seek effective cooperation-, our Committee of inquiry is determined to pass our
faults to sift through, and make strong proposals to remedy. Yourself, already, have started to draw the
consequences of these events, both for the new intelligence organization that with regard to the doctrines
for the use of our forces for intervention and rescue.

For better clarity of your speech, I propose to address issues relating to intelligence and the European
cooperation first. As a second step, we come to the new doctrines for the use of intervention and rescue
forces.
With regard to issues relating to intelligence, we often hear that it is easy to remake the film
retrospectively. But it is precisely our mission to try to understand what has happened. We ask a vital
question: while most of the perpetrators of the attacks from January to November 2015 were known by
our services, how could they escape all radars and commit their attacks in Paris?
You know the cases which have been submitted to us, and which are the most emblematic. Samy
Sumbua, the terrorist shot onstage at the Bataclan by Commissioner of the BAC that I mentioned,
auditioned by the headquarters of internal intelligence (DCRI), in October 2012. That year, he had been
placed under judicial control, and he had failed in a project starting to Syria where he finally went in
September 2013 with Ismal Omar Mostefa. The latter was himself a plug S, but he had been able to
leave the national territory.
Charles Kaye was arrested for having participated in industry recruitment so-called jihadist "of ButtesChaumont. He had stayed at a military camp in Iraq. He was radicalized in prison between 2005 and
2008, before reappearing, in 2013, in the survey relating to the attempt to escape from Sman At Ali
Belkacem, convicted as artificer of the bombing of the RER Saint Michel of 1995.
There is also his brother, Said Kaye, whose intelligence services knew that he went to train at the Yemen
in 2011, alongside Al-Qaeda and that he was a research since January 7, 2015 mandate.
Finally, include the case of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was able to circulate in 2015, in Europe, while it
had been located in Athens - we were able to check it on place-, just before the onslaught of the cell in
Verviers in Belgium.
Obviously, it is a failure. The great chefs of your services have said themselves during their hearings. You
have drawn the consequences immediately after decapitation perpetrated to Saint-Quentin-Fallavier by
Yassin Sadiki who had escaped any surveillance while it was plugged by General Intelligence (RG) from
2006 to 2008 to be radicalized in his hometown of Pontarlier. I believe that this is as a result of this tragic
event you took the decision to create the operational staff for the prevention of terrorism (EMOPT), on
which you may wish to bring some clarification. We have indeed discovered, during our work and our
movements in the province, the extreme complexity of the Organization of french intelligence, which can
make fear a lack of coordination or, in any case, a leakage of information.
I recall, for memory, the name of the main services that we have heard and have each their own file: the
Directorate General of internal security (CSB), the General Directorate for external security (DGSE), the
central service of territorial intelligence (LSVCCS), operational (LOTRO) anticipation of the national
gendarmerie branch, anti-terrorist branch (SDAT) the headquarters of the judicial police the Directorate of
military intelligence (DRM), the Directorate of intelligence of the prefecture of police of Paris (DRPP), and
the National Directorate of intelligence and investigation (DNRED). I repeat, all these services use their
own file - some overlap, but this is not always the case.
There are also several coordination cells that we could visit: the unit for coordination of the fight against
terrorism (UCLAT), the national coordinator of intelligence to the President of the Republic, and, now the
EMOPT, not counting cells coordinating inter-office, whether for example of cells Allat or Hermes. At the
point where we are, one might wonder whether should be a 'super-coordonnateur' to coordinate the
coordinators, both Yarrow is complex. The head of Israeli anti-terrorism we met the day before yesterday
has confessed that he knew always not today which was his interlocutor in France!
Can Minister, we continue to maintain these quarrels of chapels in France? Should we not rationalize,
and prioritize the information under a single command, as did the Americans after September 11, in

particular creating a common intelligence database. Senator Philippe Dominati, in the information report
which he dedicated to strengthening the effectiveness of intelligence in October 2015 wrote: "the outbreak
of the current administrative architecture translates into a loss of means and a risk of conflict of allocation
between services."
I give you the floor, Mr Minister, after probably being a bit long, but it was important that we share the first
results of our work.
Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior. Mr president, if I have understood correctly, you are
long in your introductory remarks, and you ask me to short in mine. I will answer questions that you have
just mentioned, and, of course, I will do it by being free of my own remarks, because I would like to report
on the activity of the services that are under my responsibility with a mind that is not quite your. You
indeed assume that there are faults, and you feel that your Committee should demonstrate. Me I assume
that only the truth counts - and I can hear the front of your commission. It's the truth, i.e. facts, that be
deduced the existence of faults, and not from gaps is presupposes, that must then articulate the facts.
I assign me this method because I have under my responsibility of services which give the best of
themselves, and I read on the activities they drive extremely approximate things. Exercise consisting of
aPriori to point faults until it demonstrated their existence is extraordinarily easy. In the responsibility
which is mine, and given the complexity of the subject that we are dealing with, I hear no, because it is
my honour and that of my colleagues, let them put in question without defending them when what is said
about them is not fair.
It is also the reason why I will employ me to meet very meticulously all topics that you mentioned, which
will allow me to put a number of facts in their place.
I already had the occasion, me with a first time before members of your commission of inquiry, March 7,
say you that it seemed to me both quite normal and absolutely healthy and necessary that Parliament can
examine in detail the action taken by the authorities against the bloody attacks of January and November
2015 both in the emergency , in the history of counter-terrorism.
There is indeed a certain naivet to consider what are the services today follows decisions taken from
2012. They are impacted by who register in time along the history of counter-terrorism, and decisions
which have been taken by all Governments, whatever their political sensitivity, which must call each to
humility.
I therefore want to thank the members of the commission of inquiry for the important work they drive, and
tell them the respect that this work inspire us. I would like to contribute to my share of as usefully as
possible, and it is in this spirit that I delivered this morning to your rapporteur, the discussion paper that
the services of the Ministry of the Interior were devoted to their "experience feedback" following the
attacks in the month of January and November 2015.
The first hearing at which you kindly invite me we had already allowed, it seems to me to clarify a number
of points concerning extremely important topics for the protection of the French against the terrorist
threat. I think, in particular, the general coordination of the means involved in the event of attack,
investigative procedures, the organisation of relief operations, or the mobilization of intervention forces.
This last topic of the rest evolved since then, since I submitted on April 19, as you know, a new scheme of
intervention forces specialized in case of terrorist attack. It aims to ensure the coherence and unity of the
forces, and especially, to allow a more rapid response, in any point of the territory, in the event of mass
killing. This is why this scheme provides in particular for the creation of new antennae of the RAID and
the GIGN to ensure optimal coverage of our territory.

After my first audition, you also, as planned, interviewed several officials of the security forces. You know
the composure and professionalism with which they reacted against exceptional events that our country
has experienced. Thank you for making them tribute. In the cOEheart of the tragedy, with women and
men under their command, they have accomplished their mission with a sense of duty that inspires me
very great gratitude and, for what concerns me, tremendous respect. I have no doubt that trade they have
had with the members of your commission of inquiry will have been placed under the sign of the same
feelings, and that they will have helped them also illuminate your reflection.
I come to the subject on which you have wanted to hear me again: intelligence policy. It is another
fundamental component of the overall policy of our country to fight effectively against the terrorist threat.
Again, it is essential for Parliament to be fully informed of the guidelines adopted by the Government in
this area.
Certainly, obviously, certain specific information regarding any particular operation, or implementation
OEimplementing any particular technique, can be publicly discussed without that we would run the risk of
losing efficiency, or even facilitate the projects of our opponents. But this principle of discretion cannot be
relied on to prevent you from considering the objectives pursued by our intelligence policy, the methods it
employs, and the resources on which it relies. The great debate which preceded the adoption of the law
of July 24, 2015 on our public policy intelligence has already allowed to engage Parliament's extremely
rich and useful discussions.
Before turning to the measures taken by the Government to allow our intelligence services to respond to
the new State of the terrorist threat, I would like to share two prior thoughts that relate one and other
efficiency which is loaned to our services. This will be a way of answering the questions you asked.
First, it sometimes seems that give rise to questions of intelligence, more than others, judgments die
based on truncated information, often wrongly interpreted, and the approximations that there all the more
interest to mention that we know that they will always collect a maximum echo in the press.
Thus, when an attack occurs, the first question posed by many observers before the conditions of this
attack have been defined is: 'Where is the fault of the services?'
To stick to the facts, the attacks of November 2015 have resulted from a coordinated terrorist, according
to the first information we have, by Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was unblinking - was therefore not French
nationality-, and who was not resident in France - he lived in Syria. This individual has taken to
accomplices of persons most of whom were, too, belgo-marocaines. Some were close to him in Syria;
they arrived in Europe by the island of Leros in Greece, where their fingerprints were taken under false
identities. Abdelhamid Abaaoud has also enlisted accomplices living in Belgium, hidden in conspiratifs
apartments where the attacks were prepared. Finally, he also found the competition of two French, Samy
Sumbua, who started in Syria in 2013 after violating its judicial control, as well as Omar Mostefa. These
two French returned in Europe under the same conditions as the other sponsors of the November
attacks, likely using false papers and crossing many boundaries.
I want to remind that branch of Homeland Security (CSB) has no mandate to investigate foreign nationals
operating abroad, all those who are familiar with these topics know. As for terrorists, including the French
Sumbua and Memoo, which crossed many countries of the European Union before committing their
crimes in France, I solemnly confirm before your inquiry that no intelligence service, or no service police
of the country in question has reported. American services, them, not have not identified them when they
crossed Central Europe, although they have very powerful means that warrant the quality of our
cooperation with them.
It is therefore for the less reductive to attribute to the french internal security services, and alone, a defect
in vigilance or clairvoyance, given the complexity of what has happened and that I have described. In
many respects, it is the absence of a European warning system and for effective coordination of

European services, I will come back at the time, which has been highlighted in last November, and who
calls extremely strong reactions and effective initiatives including the France...
The President Georges Fenech. Sir, forgive me for interrupting you: for clarity of this hearing, could we
stop on the case of Samy Sumbua, you just deal with...
The Minister. Mr president, if you wish, and for the clarity of my own remarks, I would like to be able to
go to the end of my demonstration. It would be courteous to me; I will then, of course, available to your
commission to reply to all of the questions she wants to ask. I have not at all intend to removing me...
The President Georges Fenech. Minister, I truly wish...
The Minister. .. .my connection is based on consistency, and I think that it would be quite courteous to let
me go until its completion, if you agree to abide by the conveniences.
The President Georges Fenech. Minister, it is not courtesy: it comes to this hearing with maximum
efficiency and I intend to do so. I give the floor to the rapporteur so that we can develop the case of Samy
Sumbua.
The Minister. Mr president, I myself have been president of a parliamentary Committee of inquiry, and
I've never done so, out of respect and courtesy to the interviewees.
The President Georges Fenech. Sir, since you want to have these debates, do it under the gaze of
French watching us!
The Minister. Mr president, I do not want to lead the discussions. I just want to be able to go to the end of
my speech, and when this is done, I want - this is normal, you invited me for this-, answer all your
questions and to do so in detail, question by question.
The President Georges Fenech. Me, I maintain my position, Minister. I think that it will be more useful,
since you just explain that most of the perpetrators of the attacks were not monitoring your services, but
that foreign services, immediately discuss the case of Samy Sumbua, which appeals to us.
The Minister. Mr president, I did not say this at all. I indicated that it would be wrong to blame one branch
of Homeland Security a given course carried out by the individuals involved, their origin, their nationality,
and that no intelligence service not provided us, prior to the attacks, information concerning them, while
they had crossed many countries. That is what I said exactly.
I, of course, intend to answer your questions. Anxious however to provide comprehensive information to
the commission of inquiry, and not hearing be in confusion, I ask you to have the courtesy to let me go at
the end of my remarks. If the goal is not to have a clear connection, but maintain a controversy with me,
you are wasting your time because, yet again, I am just trying to go at the end of my remarks on the
clarity of our exchanges. That said, if you want me to answer your questions and that I agree my leaves,
I'll do it willingly, but I regret it for our debates, on behalf of the principles of comity that, generally,
President for the conduct of parliamentary inquiry commissions.
The President Georges Fenech. Minister, I believe that you have not seen how this Committee worked
in a cross-national spirit. All colleagues can attest: everyone was able to speak freely with the sole
concern of truth and transparency. If it comes to reassure you, I repeat: there is no research controversy
with that either, and certainly not with you which we know perfectly the sense of responsibility and
concern for transparency. Whether it's clear!

You want to go to the end of your words; I find that it is a bit prejudicial to the interest of our trade but
since you insist, I'll let you do it. Grace, they are not too long, however, so that we can all ask you the
questions that burn us the lips for four months now that we are working.
The Minister. Mr president, all the time you ask questions because, out of respect for Parliament, I
booked my morning at this hearing so as to be absolutely complete. You have no concern to have: you
extremely precise answers on all topics that you kindly mention.
I therefore come to my second reflection on the supposed "gaps" of services. It is extremely rare that are
referred to the attacks which have not taken place, precisely because our intelligence services have
arrested those who planned them even before they can be committed. I want to on this topic provide
information about events that have occurred since my previous hearing by your Committee. I think the
arrest of Raj Kriket in Argenteuil, bringing to fifteen the number of attacks foiled since 2013 thanks to the
diligent work of our services - including seven from January 2015.
On the other hand, always since January 2015, 335 individuals involved in one way or another in
longlines jihadis were arrested by ISB. Among them, 173 have been indicted, and 130 have been jailed.
Generally, the ISB is entered, own or with judicial police, 271 court records tracking on 1 183 individuals
due to their involvement in jihadist terrorism-related activities. It is this intense activity of our domestic
intelligence services which, day after day, to prevent new attacks from being committed. It seems to me
important to never forget it.
However, this observation does not, of course, mean that our device intelligence should not be reformed,
strengthened, adapted to the evolution of the terrorist threat that has struck our country in 2015. On the
contrary, the Government is committed to act simultaneously on four grounds: the reorganization of our
intelligence services, to cover the whole of the spectrum and to better share information. the
modernization of the legal framework in which act our services against an opponent who adapts
continuously its policy and its means of action; the continued strengthening of the means of action of our
services on material and human terms, and the search for more effective coordination of special
European services as well as strengthening the instruments at their disposal.
I want today to come back to you on the main decisions taken since the beginning of the quinquennium,
and especially since January, 2015, to strengthen our domestic intelligence capabilities, whether
surveillance of the top of the spectrum", entrusted CSB, or detection of radicalisation weak signals,
decisive task returning now to the central territorial intelligence (LSVCCS) and other actors in the"second
circle ".
To give them a full and full capacity to act, and even correct some negative effects caused by the reform
of 2008, we first needed to rationalize the Organization of our services. As early as 2013, we have begun
to reform the overall architecture of our device, which relies on an extremely clear and dynamic
articulation between the "first circle" of domestic intelligence, and the "second circle" composed mainly,
with regard to intelligence services, central territorial intelligence (LSVCCS) service, the Directorate of
intelligence of the prefecture of police of Paris (DRPP) , and branch operational anticipation (LOTRO) of
the national gendarmerie.
We continue then two complementary objectives that are now fully achieved: firstly, completing the
transformation of the Central Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI) in Directorate General of internal
security (CSB), and on the other hand, and this is very important given the concerns that you expressed,
Mr president, recreate a genuine proximity open intelligence service.
On the first point, things are made since the publication of the Decree of April 30, 2014 establishing ISB
and placing it directly under the authority of the Minister of the Interior, like the other major branches
within the Department. We have thus completed reform of 2008, in its relevant aspects, to go in the
direction of stronger integration and greater cooperation between services. CSB is now a fully dedicated

player of french intelligence, placed on a par with the DGSE, and serving in defence counsel that the
President of the Republic meets regularly. Moreover, its empowerment allowed him to gain fluency in its
organization, and, thereby, efficiency in its action. It is now possible to conduct recruitment she needs,
including analysts, linguists or engineers and computer scientists.
Above all, in 2012, and it is the second pillar of our reform, the Government awarded territorial
intelligence worthy of the name, in direct contact with the root of the company developments, particularly
in the districts where will is inscrutable delinquency more porous to the influence of the jihadist networks.
This was a top priority. Driving reform in 2008 had removed General information (RG), without however
substitute a new model for the detection of weak signals. She had so weakened the possibility of
detecting these on the territories. It had reduced our capacity of intelligence in an open environment and,
thereby, our means of detection of the phenomena of radicalisation.
For the sake of clarity and to clarify our own approach, I want to go back briefly on the logic that presided
over the reform of 2008 - which led to the creation of the DCRI-, and the effects it has caused on
intelligence in the medium term.
The merger of the direction de surveillance du territoire (DST) and the RG to create the DCRI has caused
a disruption of our domestic intelligence device. It has weakened it by ignoring the specificities of these
two complementary services. Perfectly here, everyone knows that the disappearance of GR constituted
an attenuation factor. It has cut service consisting of police officers used to work in the field and to share
their information with other security services. From 2008, territorial grid provided by the RG has been
systematically reduced since they were partially absorbed into the DCRI. Several dozen of their local
offices were then closed, at the expense of intelligence in open as he practiced on the whole of the
national territory.
Outside the DCRI, whose vocation was therefore exclusively focused on threats from the "top of the
spectrum", the rest of the domestic intelligence has thus been reduced to a simple service of General
information, the Subdirectorate of General information, support, for the most part, economic and social
phenomena, and monitoring hooliganism. This service had no attribution on terrorism, or for the 'low
spectrum' or for the detection of weak signals, and it did not have the technical tools necessary for
intelligence. Access to the main files of police was even forbidden him.
The reform of 2008 was based on diagnoses which deserved to be revisited, particularly concerning the
nature and the evolution of the threats likely to hit us. We have therefore, in 2012, in the aftermath of the
attacks of Toulouse and Montauban, decided to recreate a real proximity intelligence service. Started as
early as 2012, this process resulted in may 2014, on the creation of the central intelligence service
territorial (LSVCCS), whose position has been strengthened compared to the RG. Its powers have been
widened to allow it to fully regain his skills to support the prevention of terrorism, including by upstream of
weak signal detection of radicalisation. This is the reason why its mesh has been strengthened, in
metropolitan France and overseas, to densify the network of its sensors. Similarly, we decided to develop
relays intelligence territorial in companies or brigades of mounted police and in police stations, whenever
this proves necessary.
Furthermore, to better take into account the diffuse nature of the threat of jihadist and the phenomena of
porosity between crime and terrorism, priority was given to cooperation and the sharing of information
between the various services. Coordinate more appeared as a requirement. We thus consolidated the
articulation between the "first circle" and the "second circle", which the Decree of December 11, 2015
fixed composition, mainly the LSVCC and the DRPP, the latter covering the jurisdiction of the prefecture
of police in Paris and in the Paris metropolitan area. In this regard, the unit for coordination of the fight
against terrorism (UCLAT) of course plays a decisive role for analysis and synthesis. The UCLAT is not
an "operational" service, and the exchange of information between services 'of the ground"through direct
relationships, including by the appointment of liaison and coordination offices.

Moreover, as you have said in your introductory remarks, Mr President, I made the decision, after the
drama that occurred in June 2015, Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, create an operational staff of prevention of
terrorism (EMOPT), in order to further strengthen the cooperation between the services. I want to clarify
that, without pre-creating the LSVCC, ever the EMOPT could emerge, insofar as it is based on the file's
treatment of the alerts, the prevention of radicalisation terrorism (FSPRT), largely powered by the
territorial intelligence agents.
You have asked a very important question to which I would like to provide a precise answer - this issue
was also addressed in the report of Senator Dominati. Is there too much of coordination structures?
Intelligence, there are several subjects of coordination which are not the same logic, even if in the end, all
all collected information must be assembled so that we can understand extremely fine so what happens
on terrorism.
It must analyze the phenomena of radicalisation. One can start with identified individuals, but also resort
to researchers and the University that allow to permanently have a "retro-forward" on the phenomena of
radicalisation thinking and the emergence of activities and actions of terrorist groups. The geopolitical and
international is also essential. It justified to maintain a constant relationship between internal and external
services. We must also keep track of individuals themselves. If each service followed individuals under its
jurisdiction, there was no place where all the services of the Ministry of the Interior could track individual
of each case, and exchange of information so as to identify the portion of an individual's 'down to the top
of the spectrum. We had no structure which, on the basis of this individualized analysis and exchanges,
will identify the risks attaching to any individual because of his professional activity and its relational
network.
This is the reason why I set up this device: the representatives of the major directions are found within the
staff at central. This staff is duplicated at the local level. It allows the prefect, on the basis of reports and
services carried out reports with the installed telephone platform Place Beauvau in the month of April
2014, to have an exhaustive list of people to follow, and to exchange all information available on them.
There is therefore no redundant coordination mechanism: what is geopolitical analysis, the retroprospective analysis of the phenomena of radicalisation, and monitoring individualized for each case is
entrusted to the EMOPT, and allows, in articulation with the UCLAT, place of the analysis of the
phenomena of radicalisation, perfect to have, Place Beauvau, a comprehensive monitoring. Of course,
this work we do Place Beauvau, this specific organization, which gives satisfaction to the prefects - I think
that your visits to the territories have shown - and now, services - the constitution of the file has been
difficult but, now that it is done, its operational use is extremely effective-, also allows us to facilitate our
relations with some other players in the intelligence as the DNRED The DGSE and TRACFIN.
I would like to say a word about the law of 24 July 2015 on intelligence, which gives our services a
modern and coherent legal framework adapted to new threats, the latest technological changes and the
evolution of national and international law. For the first time in the history of the Republic, this framework
sets clear rules for use of information technology in order to protect the agents that use, while
guaranteeing respect for individual freedoms. The Act thus strengthens essential devices for assessment
of the work of the services.
I would point out also to your attention, because it was a request from the Parliament, implementing
decrees have been published, almost in their entirety, very quickly, between September 28, 2015 and
January 29, 2016, for those requiring various notices. We thus can quickly begin to put into
OEimplementation of innovations such as the file of terrorist criminal record check (FIJAIT), which will be
installed early in the month of July, as we began, in a logic of decompartmentalization and information
sharing, to expand the administrative access to the treatment of criminal record as well as the connection
data for the services that needed and could not so far be accessed.

We have considerably strengthened the human resources made available to the intelligence services.
Between 2007 and 2012, the internal security services lost 13,000 jobs, and this was not without
consequences on the work of the intelligence services who have themselves lost of the substance. During
the same period, operating off title 2 loans decreased by 17%. Since the beginning of the period, we them
have increased so much, which allows to increase the strength, to equip new material intelligence
services who greatly needed, but also to modernize it infrastructures. Material, I think the device for
checking CHEOPS, used in airports, which is absolutely essential for the identification of terrorists during
their crossing of the external borders, and who had no subject investments for many years. Increases in
appropriations that I have just mentioned allow surrender to level.
From 2013, a specific plan was initiated to strengthen the staffing establishment of the ITSB, which
concerns 432 staff outside the specific plans of strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of the Interior in
the fight against terrorism. It is accompanied by a budgetary effort on credits off title 2 for an amount of
EUR 12 million per year.
The counter-terrorism plan led in January 2015 to increase this effort of 1400 jobs distributed as follows:
500 jobs in domestic intelligence, 500 jobs in intelligence territorial to restore density to our networks of
sensors, 100 jobs within the Directorate of intelligence of the prefecture of police of Paris 130 jobs in the
Central Directorate of the judicial police in the field of the fight against cybercrime. This allows to
significantly strengthen the capacity of our services in the fight against terrorism.
I also want to remind you that some of the 5 000 net job creation announced by the President of the
Republic at the meeting of the Congress at Versailles, 16 November 2015, will come to significantly
reinforce the strength of our intelligence services. They also diversify the recruitment of their staff: they
now have the possibility of resorting to contractual recruitment, which allows to enter the services of
analysts, academics who work in crossing the data in order to have a better understanding of what are
the real risks.
In terms of technological surveillance and intelligence collection capabilities, we have also made a major
effort, in the context of the investment plan of strengthening the capacity of equipment, and operation.
Under the plan of fight against terrorism by January 2015, this are EUR 233 million over three years that
have been opened, including 90 million euros for the modernization and strengthening of the
infrastructure and applications.
Before concluding, I want to say something about the debate that takes place in the press concerning the
opposition between investment in human resources and investment in technology. Some consider that we
have too much invested in this last, that we too technological information which does not produce the
results that it should due to lack of human resources; others instead believe that the training of our human
resources is aging and that we should invest more in favour of the technology. In fact, figures I just
introduce recruitment and investment for the credits off title 2 show that we invest both for one and the
other. If we do not do both at the same time, we will definitely lose in substance.
I will answer in a moment to the question that you asked me on Sumbua and Memoo's extremely
accurately, because I do not want that there is frustration, but previously, I want to raise the European
dimension of our subjects.
I showed just the complexity of the course of terrorists, and spoke of the conditions in which they were
entered in the European territory. Daech has recovered thousands of blank passports in Iraq and Syria,
and has a true factory of the false document. It is not excluded, as has already happened, that other
commandos may enter the territory of the Union European, equipped with false documents, to hit and
commit new attacks, taking advantage of migration flows and the plight of those who are persecuted in
Iraq and Syria.

Will have confirmed you the contacts your commission of inquiry has had at European level: the France
leads an extremely determined action to ensure that measures are taken, as soon as possible, in order to
avoid this, even if Europe takes too long to make decisions - and, when it has taken too long to
implement.
Firstly, it seems to us essential to put in place a powerful control at the external borders of the European
Union. This involves the rise of the European Agency FRONTEX, and it also means that when foreigners
arrive in the territory, extremely effective and solid control practiced with the systematic questioning of the
Schengen information system. This is the reason for which we requested and obtained the modification of
article 7-2 of the Schengen borders code, which now allows to consult the SIS for the citizens of the
Union who cross external borders. However, this change can be altered by the proposal of the European
Union relating to the border intelligent, input and output device, which calls for the application at all except
to citizens of the Union. We therefore complete a contradiction between what the European Union has
enacted at the request of France to amend section 7-2, and what it proposes to put in place concerning
the input-output device.
Secondly, to be queried efficiently, the SIS must necessarily be supplied by all the countries of the
European Union in the same way. Such is not the case today. The France is the country that feeds more
than SIS. If it is not powered so homogeneous and identical by the other members of the Union, his
interrogation at the time of the crossing of external borders will have no interest. Again, this will lead to
kick, faults and losses online.
Thirdly, we must connect the SIS to other criminal files and other files. I think the Galt - for Stolen or Lost
Travel Documents -Interpol, or the EURODAC fingerprint file which the regulations of the European Union
does not allow the use for security purposes. This last point is a huge problem when you know that two of
the suicide bombers of the Stade de France are entered into the Union through fingerprints taken in
Leros, asked on false passports on which they appeared under false identities. It is therefore essential to
use EURODAC for purposes of internal security, the same that it is essential that we have a task force
European composed of our top specialists in the fight against forgery, because, yet again, everything I
just said only makes sense once interviewed documents are good, and that if we can identify those who
are not - we can then neutralize the terrorists from the moment where they enter Europe.
Finally, I want to insist on the directive firearms. If we fail to amend the 1991 directive to further markings,
as well as the intensification of eradication of the weapons and the fight against the sale of firearms on
the net, the effectiveness of our action in the fight against terrorism will be burdened.
That is what I wished to say. I come to Memoo and Sumbua. It's two different cases. Although both
nationals french...
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you for this very long discussion of the ongoing reforms as well
as those past since you long recalled the circumstances of the reform of the DCRI.
In the EMOPT, we wondered if its creation was necessary, and whether it would not be better earned,
rather than adding a new structure, expand the scope of the UCLAT. You pointed out that the creation of
the FSPRT, the EMOPT file was laborious. What surprised us, is that the DNRED did even not know the
EMOPT it a months ago and that the DGSE was unable to give the meaning of the acronym.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Noted us, especially by the ITSB, that moment Samy Sumbua had
been put in consideration and placed under judicial supervision, follow-up by the intelligence services had
ceased. Is there not here a "hole in the racket?
The Minister. Should not be considered as a fault which is the application of the law. No service cannot
do anything else but to apply the legislation in force.

The President Georges Fenech. The right can have faults.

M. Pierre Lellouche. You can change the law. We are here for that.
The Minister. Absolutely. I just tell you what is the rule of the law and what I infer.
Once an individual is placed under judicial supervision, and it therefore subject to judicial interceptions, it
is not possible to proceed with administrative security interceptions. This is the result of the separation of
powers, which prevents the administrative authorities to disrupt criminal investigations. In the debate on
the 'Intelligence' law and on the State of emergency, we had endless discussions with parliamentarians of
all sensitivities, on the need for the judicial judge to keep, with regard to freedoms intrusive devices, all of
its prerogatives. Administrative police measures being considered as intrusive devices freedoms because
they operate without that are fulfilled all of the evidence that would be mobilized in a judicial proceeding, I
am not sure that a change in the law in this area can be achieved without revising the Constitution. In any
case, do not interpret the withdrawal of domestic intelligence as a flaw but as an application of the law.
The President Georges Fenech. Person has done here.
The Minister. Others have made, for example in the press.
The President Georges Fenech. Our press is free.
The Minister. This was also said by politicians.
We applied the law. When individuals posing a terrorist risk are placed under judicial control, we are more
armed to ensure their follow-up. It is undoubtedly a problem.
The rapporteur. It is paradoxical that a person under investigation for terrorism cases or more followed
by our intelligence services who are fighting against terrorism. Our Commission will make proposals in
this area.
The Minister. I indicates that the establishment of the FIJAIT will require those who are the subject of
judicial review or a sentence to report their movements. We therefore already have new resources which
will correct the imperfections of our right to party.
M. Pierre Lellouche. For a terrorist, best, finally, is to be put under investigation for the robbery of a gas
station because intelligence services stop listening to it! This subject must be treated, but there were
other dysfunction, namely that judicial review was not really insured in the case of Sumbua. While it had
stripped him of his passport, Sumbua went to report the loss of this document to the prefecture and
received an another Passport, with which he went to Syria before returning to France. That's a lot,
alongside European faults that you have quite rightly pointed. I was yesterday reporting a text on the
Schengen control measures, which are very weak, but we have 'holes in the paint' internally also.
Mr. Alain Marsaud. In proceedings for judicial review, especially in the case of obligation to point at the
police station or gendarmerie brigade, service where to point the person under investigation for terrorism
is not necessarily aware of the dangerousness of this person, who is treated as any individual under
judicial supervision of common law, and a failure to score is not always reported immediately. It should
therefore be that the dangerousness be known the place to score.
The Minister. Says Pierre Lellouche would be indeed very worrying if his passport had been rendered to
Samy Sumbua during his judicial review. Thats what I read on several occasions, while this is entirely
untrue. Sumbua has been placed under judicial supervision in October 2012 but had requested the
renewal of his passport in March. There was in March no reason not to issue his passport. I mention all

the more readily that it is a right-wing Government who was then the responsibilities. It is not permissible
to refuse a document of identity on a discretionary basis.
It must indeed, Mr Marsaud, that the communication between services be total in order to avoid this type
of malfunction. This is precisely the reason why I created the EMOPT, within which gather all those who
have to deal with the situation of each individual brought to the FSPRT, and where information flows.
The nature of terrorist activity we are facing is a very new phenomenon. I try to ensure that the cracks are
as fine as possible, so that person passes through, but this is not because trying to do the best that it is
guaranteed to always do. On the two points in question, my answer is clear: the timeline in the first case
and the device that I put in place to avoid this type of situation is perpetuated in the second.
The rapporteur. Three other issues, Minister, the first on the articulation between the UCLAT and the
EMOPT. Why have created a new structure, rather than moving the UCLAT, currently within the DGPN,
with yourself as a unit for coordination of the fight against terrorism?
During our travels to Lille and Marseille, the intelligence services, in particular the SDAO and the
LSVCCS, emphasized the usefulness and effectiveness of the FSPRT. Should we not go further? Each
intelligence service has its own file. Some feed the FSPRT, like SID, but others, including in the first
circle, feed it or don't have access. Would it not create a common basis, with different levels of clearance,
accessible to all the services of the first circle, or even to certain services of the second?
Finally, we found a strong desire of the gendarmerie to go further intelligence. The force covers half of the
territory and the population and is already part of the second circle of intelligence. Can we only consider
the creation of a Directorate General of territorial intelligence by merging the SDAO and the LSVCC? This
would, after the disappearance of the RG, Remesh the territory with territorial intelligence.
The Minister. Need to create the EMOPT because we aircraft examples of individuals from the bottom to
the top of the spectrum or vice versa including monitoring seemed to me, given the level of threat, too
random lack a method and a permanent device. The EMOPT, it is more than a structure, a method
leading all the services of the Ministry of the Interior may have to deal with the activity of individuals
radicalized or having engaged in terrorism to exchange information on a permanent basis, so that no one
escapes the radars.
Implement such a method within the UCLAT had advantages and disadvantages. The role of the UCLAT
is not individualized follow-up. We would have risked compromising his work as an analysis of the
phenomena of radicalisation and terrorism. As the topics are related, I however wished that the two work
together, and I do not exclude a term integration.
I also wished that the EMOPT look what is happening in certain professional sectors where can be
radicalized individuals. It is through its work of identifying that we could deny access to airports to a
number of individuals presenting risks. The operational interests of the EMOPT is proven.
Some services do not know the EMOPT or its acronym is not necessarily shocking. I know not all
coordination arrangements nor all the acronyms of other departments. What counts is the information
retrieved by the EMOPT to be brought to the knowledge of other departments when we are together in a
meeting. The Exchange is constant on the namespace problem. Other services are perhaps unfamiliar
with the acronym but they know the alerts.
In addition, at my request the FSPRT is accessible to certain services three weeks: the Directorate of the
penitentiary administration (DPA), the DGSE, the protection and security of defence (DPSD) branch. For
at least three weeks, these services may need to know what does the acronym.

The rapporteur. The UCLAT administers the FSPRT and the EMOPT ensures the individualized followup of persons: these are two different structures in two different places. Would it not be better earned
provide a single structure?
The Minister. This happens not so. The UCLAT provides me analysis and the EMOPT, which again once
is not a structure but a working method, gathers around Olivier de Mazieres, people from services to
ensure a continuous monitoring of individuals brought to the FSPRT. This work is relayed by the
correspondents of these services of the Ministry in the territory since since April 2014, meet regularly
around the prefects and prosecutors all the services of the Ministry for a localized follow-up. The UCLAT
and the EMOPT are not in the same premises but they gather each week around my office and myself to
aggregate all of the data. The connection is permanent.
A fusion of the files is problematic. The information we have are classified and all services are not entitled
to receive this type of information. Furthermore, the constitution of a huge file causes problems to the
Council of State and the CNIL. That said, the absence of single file does not prevent communication
between services. you mentioned the Allat cell, there are others. We made the choice of pragmatism.
The LOTRO and the LSVCC are complementary structures and we fear that a merger deprives the
gendarmerie's intelligence capacity without improving provided territorial intelligence. The LSVCC
operates information concerning all areas of institutional, economic and social life, and studied the facts
of society likely to call into question Republican values, such as sectarian and the phenomena of lower
community and identity. He centralized intelligence and directed syntheses for the benefit of
governmental and administrative authorities. In all, 200 gendarmes serving in its ranks: 40 at the central
level, 160 in local services. Under the plan of fight against terrorism, 100 soldiers will more strengthen the
LSVCC.
The LOTRO plays a central role in the management of events in area gendarmerie, through two essential
structures. The first pillar is the centre of operations and intelligence of the gendarmerie, which follows
live the set of operations conducted by the police, more than 8,000 per day, or 2.9 million per year. The
second pillar is the center of analysis and exploitation, which plays a role of anticipation. It is not
necessary to reproduce did in 2008. I want to keep all sensors opened on the national territory. What
does not introduce, as we have done, gendarmes in the LSVCCS so as to create the conditions for a
rapprochement between the structures.
M. Christophe Cavard. A turning point occurred in France in 2012, with the case Merah, then with the
year black was by 2015.
It appears from our hearings that ISB became the leader of the coordination of intelligence, at least on the
national territory. How this coordination happens concretely?
We have also alerted to the fact that white notes produced by the intelligence services are not always
forwarded to the anti-terrorism centre. Conversely, when it happens something, the pole is suddenly
bombarded with white notes. What is your analysis?
How goes the coordination of intelligence at the global and European level? The world liaison officers
meet at Europol but they treat little terrorism. Is there interest to provide a reorganization of these means
at European level?
M. Pierre Lellouche. If Sumbua has been placed under judicial control in October, he left the following
year in Syria. The Ministry of the Interior know how it went? The timeline is alter the relevance of the
question I asked on that person who reported to the monitoring of your services.
To the extent where there has been a certain tension at the beginning of the meeting this morning, I
would like to say that these are not all partisan quarrels that drive us in this Committee. We seek to

ensure our citizens security if not total less maximum, drawing lessons from the events, without political
prejudice. I am one of those who requested that work be closed, so that we can speak directly with the
decision makers and that there be no major statement about who was responsible for what. The hearing
is public and you have the right to speak forty minutes; you are also probably in your role in doing so.
You specify that you leave not flaws but facts. When a terrorist attack caused 150 deaths, it is a failure.
When the crime has been committed, the system was faulty. The challenge, in terrorist matters, is to
defeat the attacks before they occur. It is not for us to question the quality and dedication of the men
because we have instead of gratitude and respect for all those who serve our country, but, facing 147
dead, eleven attacks against France in 2015, we are entitled to ask what is wrong. You were on the
defensive, pointing the finger the Europeans or the reform of the 2008 RG.
We know that there are two forms of attacks against our country: on the one hand, there is people who
are radicalized about alone, either in prison or before their screen, and go stab a soldier or a policeman this is typically the kind of things that also occur in Israel and are very difficult to prevent - and, secondly,
complex operations unmanned by brains in Mosul Raqqah, in the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia,
with a firework somewhere in Belgium or elsewhere and footmen of the soldiers who commit attacks in
France. French services should be able to work together and with their European counterparts.
We know that some 5,000 Russians today are in Syria, Chechens, and there are Chechens in France
also. Some 5,000 citizens are in Syria or Iraq, including at least 1 600 French. Rely on the fact that our
services cannot monitor non-french citizens is not a good response; It must be able to work across the
spectrum, knowing that we will be effective at Raqqah or Mosul military, more we may see return these
people in large numbers.
Yesterday I reported, at my request, a convention on the Agency of Strasbourg which manages Eurodac,
VIS, Schengen, SIS 2, and will manage all other systems that theoretically will arrive. It does not work.
We give our cards S to the Schengen system but the other, starting with the Belgians, do not. A European
Big Bang must take place. It depends on the political will of the french government. Without control, 1.8
million people in Europe he joined last year, including terrorists who struck in France. Control systems do
not work. It is necessary, I agree with you, biometric controls. Everything is to be done but we are stalled
at the European level. It's been months I hear say that there is Frontex or SIS 2 will be strengthened, but
nothing happens. It took five years to put the NRP in place. At this rate, we will suffer many other attacks.
Apart from the fact that the coordination European must progress, questions arise also on the inner
workings of our services, due to cases concerning french citizens, such as Chung or the Kaye brothers,
people radicalized in prison, who have been reviewed and which the tapping were interrupted. Can you
afford to listen to the people? Why brothers listens Kaye have they been interrupted? If these plays gave
nothing, we wondered if it was because they were using other means of communication?
These are not political criticism, but I'm worried before the magnitude of the problem, the number of
affected people, non-existent devices in Europe and means that I find improvement on the french side.
Also the operations question arises: how to use the force, which has to use it... Is it reasonable to ask the
military to police work?
Mr. Georges Fenech. Thank you for reminding us that we are not policy in this Committee.
Mr. Meyer Habib. The work of this Commission are indeed conducted in a non-partisan spirit.
You, Mr Minister, held a meeting on 19 April at Beauvau and taken the initiative to reorganize the
services. At a first hearing, you indicated that you were favourable to a change of doctrine of intervention,
and you tried to implement, providing in particular for a maximum intervention on-site in twenty minutes.
Twenty minutes, it remains much. From the beginning of the shots at the Bataclan and the first firing of

the police, is is spent less than 15 minutes, but it was enough to make almost one hundred deaths. Could
we not predict that the first speaker has the possibility and even the duty to pull? With the war that we
know today, it must go further.
Charles de Gaulle airport is not sufficiently secure, as well as the overwhelming majority of airports in
Europe. We spent half a day at Ben-Gurion Airport. There are today at Charles de Gaulle over police and
the military, but cannot do anything against someone who would detonate themselves with a suitcase
bomb. Must be a first hermetic circle a few kilometres from the airport, with a control of all cars by men
and cameras looking at license plates.
It should also control the airport staff and catering to destination of aircraft: the poisoning of a pilot can
transform a plane into a weapon of mass destruction. Would he not also agree to consider the presence
of an undercover police officer in each plane of Air France? The terrorists of September 11, 2001 were
not armed but they hijacked planes to make real bombs.
I am member of Parliament, among other things, Franco-Turcs. Contrary to what may think Ms. Merkel, I
consider removing visas, as desired at any cost Mr Erdogan for Turkish nationals is a very bad idea.
Finally, I am concerned the doctrine of a part of the Muslim Brotherhood, as found in the Union of Islamic
organisations of France (UOIF). Even if they are not in their overwhelming majority of dangerous people,
their speech is sometimes contrary to the values of the Republic and our practice of secularism. If the
danger is not immediate, the question must still be treated now.
The President Georges Fenech. It is better, Minister, book your response on the intervention forces,
which will be the subject of a second series of questions.
The Minister. His role as leader led the ITSB to centralize information on internal security. She needs to
do is collect information from services other than those of the Ministry of the Interior. It is in this spirit that
has created the structure Allat. Suspicious movements in bank accounts, for example of consumer credit,
it can reveal, in some audiences, the intent to commit terrorist acts or a desire for departure, and
relationships with Tracfin or customs are in this very useful.
These are not services that are recipients of the white notes; they are the transmitters, destined for the
judges. When, in the context of administrative police measures, the administrative judge must assess the
relevance of these measures, services communicate him white notes in support of the action taken by the
administration.
M. Christophe Cavard. The white notes do not always succeed the judge and including the anti-terrorism
centre, we have been told. On the other hand, they happen all of a sudden during a dramatic event.
The Minister. The difficulty is that the white notes allow to communicate information on the basis of which
a decision of administrative police was taken but that the communication of certain elements can
outweigh the subsequent investigations. This is why it is envisaged in the law on intelligence specialized
training of the administrative judge of the Council of State, which will be able to know all of the
information. The administrative judge is now also demanding measures of administrative police as the
judicial judge on measures concerning individuals judicialized; you have to adapt to this jurisprudence.
It is necessary to strengthen cooperation within Europol. We delegate our best officers in this organization
and communicate all the information at our disposal to fight against international crime organizations. We
are among the European countries most prone to strengthen Europol in its role.
M. Pierre Lellouche. One of the points discussed during the consideration of the Schengen system, is
that Europol consults very little European information systems: memory, these are 740 visits per year. Is it

because these systems are not good? There is even no classification 'terrorist' within the Schengen
system.
The Minister. I will first answer your other questions.
As regards, first, the State of mind that is mine, I have never said that this Commission is pursuing
political or partisan goals, but if you explain me all that is not the case I will end up having doubts. I just
wanted to be able to go at the end of my speech because I find it useful to take advantage of these
exchanges to transmit the information available to me. I'm not at all on the defensive, but I have the
obsession of the facts because, on these very complex issues, there are too many approximations.
My position is not to say that the France has nothing to be ashamed and that everything is the fault of
Europe. I explained what we had done and to do in France intelligence, as to recruit contractors to
analyze the mass of information and gain a better understanding of the reality of the risks, an area in
which we have lots of delay. I wish just the subjects we are dealing with the real issues. In your question,
Mr Lellouche, you to have pointed to many.
The topics on which we are lagging at European level are many. On these subjects, the France is very
determined and active. It was question of control at the borders for decades, there is actually nothing
happened, but we just make a decision and we have released funds: we decided to increase FRONTEX's
budget of EUR 250 million. It was a request of the France. This is a first step but it is not enough, and that
is why I proposed to delegate 120 officers of the border police - we are even ready to go up to 200 - in
Greece, to ensure that the checks will be carried out. Great confidence does not exclude a small distrust.
I also delegate eighty people at EASO (European Asylum Support Office).
What you said about the SIS is right. We got during the penultimate JHA Council connection files: SIS,
Galt, EURODAC... We are fighting that decision be applied.
M. Pierre Lellouche. You could explain what passed to Cambrai the aftermath of the attack on
November 13, when the mounted police has stopped Abdeslam currently go up to the Belgium and
questioned the Schengen file. This shows the rout of European information systems.
The Minister. It is necessary that the Schengen Information System - I said in my introductory remarks is powered homogeneous and identical manner by all the countries of the European Union. If the file is
incomplete and that a person is not reported as a terrorist risk, consult it is pointless.
The France reports as radicalized or terrorist individuals. File gives the action to be taken and the reason
of this action, which allows to call the vigilance of control services. We feed much SIS 2, with all the
debate it on the S cards. Asked now control sheets S to the entry 'fan zones' in order to prevent people
from entering it, but if you tell someone that he subjected a S plug at the entrance to a "fan zone", you
can remove these cards because they have more interest in terms of monitoring and intelligence.
Countries who see these debates here are not encouraged to feed the SIS. It is also why the consultation
of the SIS in Cambrai does not show the terrorist character of the arrested person.
SIS 2 is powered by the twenty-six Member States of the Schengen area as well as the Romania, the
Bulgaria and the United Kingdom. The foreign fighters are specifically mentioned, through article 36-3 SIS
by intelligence data. Article 37-2 also provides an alert to the Suppression of criminal offences and the
prevention of crime, fed by the judicial services. Progress must be made in relation to the power of the
file.
Kaye brothers have been bugged as part of administrative security interceptions, authorized by the
CNCIS, some four years. These interceptions gave nothing. In light of this fact, the CNCIS has indicated,
in its last authorization, it would be the last if it was always nothing. This is what happened.

M. Pierre Lellouche. You know that our Commission has contradicted the version of Mr. Calvar on these
listens.
The President Georges Fenech. So things are clear: the CNCIS has never refused an authorization?
The Minister. Mr. Delarue is expressed on this subject. The CNCIS has not had to say no because it
indicated that this would be his last authorization if it did not get anything.
M. Pierre Lellouche. This is not a decision that the CNCIS may take. It doesn't have to control the
opportunity.
The President Georges Fenech. This is something new, and important, that you make. We have heard
yesterday the garde des sceaux yesterday and did not have this element.
The Minister. This is the information I have available.
With regard to Coulibaly, the problem, which we started to settle with the keeper of the seals, is the need
greater communication between prison intelligence and domestic intelligence. When individuals leave
prison, we should be systematically informed of what has been their behavior, so that domestic
intelligence to take the relay of prison intelligence. The insufficient coordination between the two is a fault.
The President Georges Fenech. How translates the continuity between closed and open?
The Minister. By two things: on the one hand, the rising power, desired by Jean-Jacques Urvoas, prison
intelligence and, secondly, an articulation between the Chancellery and the Ministry of the Interior
whereby the Chancery, where dangerous individuals out of prison, shall inform inside so take the relay.
And we have introduced the prison administration in local evaluation groups around what is being done
with the EMOPT, so as to streamline communication.
With regard to security at airports, we took new provisions. We have first greatly enhanced strength and
the means. Beyond mobile forces units and soldiers of Sentinel, note an increase in the number of police
at the borders, a modernisation of equipment to improve the effectiveness of the control and querying of
the SIS on the airports. We have also strengthened the means of the gendarmerie of air transport (GTA),
the jurisdiction which fall within the space tracks and control around the aircraft. It also recently allowed
us fairly quickly to the point with regard to the EgyptAir plane departing from Paris. We include a very
precise idea of people who intervened, because we have clarified everyone's skills and implemented
devices ensuring the traceability of the involvement of stakeholders at airports in order to be informed and
improve preventive devices.
The President Georges Fenech. Before addressing the question of intervention forces, we would like a
clarification. You said that by the end of the quinquennium, and adding the 900 additional posts created
as part of the plan to combat illegal immigration, it is 9,000 jobs that have been created in the police and
the gendarmerie. Yet the report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation budget is State 240 298
FTES in 2011 and 239 470 in 2015, or a reduction in the number of FTES of 828. This is not consistent
with the increases you advertise, but probably something escapes us.
M. Olivier Marleix. On the question of staffing, I gladly give you act, Minister, for your willingness to
strengthen these numbers, at least since 2015, particularly in the context of the plan of fight against
terrorism - 500 additional jobs per year over three years. However, the Court of Auditors shows that in
reality this effort is somewhat offset by some retirements more numerous than expected in the
gendarmerie - nearly 400 retirements. Regardless of your good will, especially in the year 2015 and
probably again in 2016, regardless of the particular effort made to reinforce the means of intelligence, the
overall balance of the forces of the order shows at least an inertia, a difficulty in execution. The president

has said, the Court of Auditors were in its annual performance reports, 239 470 FTES at the end of the
year 2015, while there were 240 298 in 2011. I'm talking about consumed jobs, no job ceilings. This is not
entirely consistent with the figures on which you like to communicate, have reminded us.
I would like to extend the question of the rapporteur on the reform of intelligence - "your" reform. You feel,
Sir, to be severe with your predecessors, with the exception of your immediate predecessor - caution that
I can understand. Today, the territorial intelligence service is integrated to the Central Directorate of
public security (UMD), and in our departments, territorial intelligence officials are under the authority of
the departmental directors of public security. However, with your reform of the intelligence, which is also
that of your predecessor, homeland security (CSB) branch became independent of the Directorate
General of the national police (DGPN). Formerly, the Director-general of the national police was
coordinating all the information: what you called yourself the top of the spectrum, which came from the
Central Directorate of internal intelligence (DCRI), and the bottom of the spectrum, which emanated from
the territorial intelligence services. Today, the top of the spectrum falls within CSB, and the bottom of the
spectrum of the territorial intelligence, integrated public safety service. Your reform has not created a
hiatus which justifies, finally, the creation of this operational staff for the prevention of terrorism (EMOPT),
today only able to ensure this coordination once made quite naturally by the Director-general of the
national police? I wanted some forward-looking elements on the issue. From a structural point of view,
this partitioning between SID and DGPN will it really appropriate term, when the Minister of the Interior
dealt more necessarily daily issues that concern us today?
The Minister. Sir, I will not repeat the debate we have had at the time of the review of the initial finance
law but I will send this afternoon a very comprehensive note that shows that there is no discrepancy
between the figures of the Court of accounts and mine you. Simply, credits have been transferred from
one line to the other and working on different perimeters. That is why the consolidated figures are those
you cite.
A figure will confirm our budgetary sincerity: when in 2012, you left the power, he had 500 students in the
schools of police per year - I go elsewhere this afternoon to Oissel - there are now 4 600, and one can
say the same for the gendarmerie. We have multiplied by ten the number of pupils in schools. At the end
of the quinquennium, 9 000 new posts will have indeed been created in police and gendarmerie services.
I am giving you now already a highly accurate budget document of the Ministry of the Interior, which
details the breakdown, which specifies the jobs created and executed, fiscal developments and the
credits off T 2.
ISB autonomy or not, the coordination is necessary, Mr Marleix. The regular exchange of information
between the services are actually not in the culture of the Ministry of the Interior. They are possible only
with a very tight steering, with the Organization of exchanges of information. I did not create the EMOPT
because we created the ISB. In the current context, we would have had need to organize this device to
exchange information even in a configuration like that which existed prior to the creation of the ITSB or
territorial 2008 intelligence reform. And I am absolutely convinced that the Ministers of the Interior that will
succeed me, regardless of their political sensitivity, will ensure against such a terrorist threat, that
Exchange of information is continuous and organized.
The President Georges Fenech. We arrive at issues relating to intervention and rescue forces.
We followed, from the outside, a simulation at the gare Montparnasse - you had prompted us, but we
were able to make us. You have reviewed the doctrines for the use of the first responders, including
equipping the anti-crime brigades and platoons of monitoring and intervention of the gendarmerie (PSIG)
so-called "Sabre" of material adapted to allow them to intervene immediately without waiting for the arrival
of the elite forces. What is the level of involvement throughout the territory of these forces, which already
exist but whose role and definition have changed? Why not have done earlier?

We do not really understand that the questioning of the criterion of territoriality of the three forces - BRI,
RAID and GIGN - really changes. More is the Paris BRI the only one that can intervene in its area of
jurisdiction? How will this first intervention arrange between GIGN and RAID? There is always a logic, but
what is it exactly?
Much more general, frequently asked question: could we not imagine a single elite force?
M. Pierre Lellouche. About the intervention forces, you have taken a series of decisions, the Minister,
but we would like to know what it is today with your doctrine. First of all, from the point of view of the
command system, what happens in the event of attack? There were lots of floating, November 13 service executives said learning events by listening to BFM. Is the issue resolved? We also noted, in the
beginning, rivalries between specialized intervention forces. You have probably put good order, but the
president of the commission of inquiry is extremely relevant: for more efficiency, is there not a single
force, as in other countries?
That do you, then, in what relates to the preparation of the ' basic' police forces, those who arrived
immediately and avoid a large number of dead? I would remind you that a hero has changed at the
Bataclan. Should we not create a sort of 'super-BAC' with capabilities such as to avoid a large number of
dead in the first minutes, decisive?
I come to the Sentinel operation. The least that can be said, is that the operating conditions of the soldiers
were not frankly clear, including at the Bataclan. No doubt you also set it but, as I said yesterday to the
Minister of defence, I is not less reserved for the highest point on the use of soldiers for operations of this
type: they are not made for this, it is not their job. Obviously need to reassure and take immediate
security measures, but ultimately it is not playable to use, to monitor airports or mount guard in the streets
of Paris, soldiers usually deployed in Afghanistan or Mali. They are not trained for police work. In addition,
we do not give them service: the training time of our military forces, which is so much requested, is in fact
reduced.
Furthermore, it took more than two hours or two hours and a half until relief forces intervened at the
Bataclan. The doctrine of employment relief forces will change? I know that you have many worked: today
we can be pretty sure that it is possible to enter Paris to strafe terraces and exiting without be
neutralized? Forgiveness of ask the question directly, but it is precisely these extremely shocking facts
which have occurred and which are not conceivable in other capitals. Similarly, could you respond
otherwise hostage in a welcoming public building? Saying this, I do not intend to pronounce an
indictment. It is normal that some adaptation time is necessary for a democracy in peace, when it is
confronted with such events.
This is the topic that has occupied us in recent months and that occupy you permanently. This involves
reviewing the training of men, their equipment, their command. It should no longer be possible that some
types armed with Kalashnikovs have time to kill dozens and dozens of people, before leaving the capital.
The Minister. I am very anxious to tell the truth to the French. Regardless of the Government and any
device that he OEwork, it cannot guarantee, in France or elsewhere in Europe, that one can enter a
capital with weapons. Unless you establish widespread control, this can always happen. It is important to
explain rigorously and precisely all the provisions taken to avoid that this does happen but, for my part, I
will never pretend nor before your Committee or before the French, the best precautions will bring us this
warranty. Freedom of movement prevailing in France and Europe does not control the vehicles likely to
contain weapons but less than constantly monitor all vehicles on all roads and in all the streets of the
capitals, I see not how to ensure that such events do not recur.
We resolutely combat trafficking in arms so that there are no weapons in the vehicles circulating in the
capitals of Europe; We are working and you know that I have incurred a fight within the European Union
for the amendment of directive 91/477 relating to illicit arms trafficking. We can also mobilize so that our

security forces are re-equipped, with modern means enabling them to react in case of mass murder. It is
our duty to do so, and we do. We can also develop our means of information so as to better understand
the reality of the intentions of those who enter the territory of the European Union with targets criminals,
even if we face - the truth obliges me to say, the encryption of messages, significant problem for all
intelligence services.
But I can say that the events that we have experienced will no longer occur in France or other European
countries. I don't want to lie to the French, and I am perhaps best placed to know that there may be other
attacks despite the very intense activity of services and provisions that we. We have determined,
barbarian groups who want to deliver a war at any cost and are ready to use all means of concealment to
achieve, in France and elsewhere. The principle of reality, insight, humility leads me so to say that we
must strive to what you ask, we must make utmost efforts to achieve, but I can't guarantee anything
before this Committee: do would lie and take the risk to be subsequently contradicted by the facts.
I am back on the device that we stopped. My goal is to ensure, as mass murder are possible, that the
State is organized in order to intervene as soon as possible so that the maximum of lives be spared. We
were not in a position to do so, for several reasons. Due to an underdevelopment of the PSIG and the
anti-crime brigades, which we have seen on 13 November that they are sometimes the first able to act firstly you rightly stressed the courage of the officers of the BAC. So I took steps in this direction. But I
have found in recent months, especially after the affair of the le-Saint-Denis and the serious injury
suffered by the police officer Yann Saillour from the bin of Saint-Denis, as the decisions I had made to reequip these tray and these PSIG, by changing their means of protection, their helmets, their weapons,
giving them new vehicles, allowing the boarding of the HK G36 which were in conventional budgetary
procedures, involve excessive delays. So we decided to implement the emergency procedures for all tray
and all PSIG to be equipped with new equipment before the end of this month of June most are already.
Without these facilities, newcomers were not in a situation to do the job.
I tell you an anecdote that marked me much and that pushed me to everything accelerate in the
equipment of the tray and the PSIG. When I was at the bedside of Yann Saillour, I saw one of his
colleagues, who had a bulletproof vest in a scary State. He told me: "Minister, this vest protects me
nothing, but I put it anyway because it is the only guarantee, if it happens to me something that my wife
can benefit from any planned social guidance and collect my pension." When you are Interior Minister,
you hear it, you see the level of the tray and the PSIG, fruit of years of non-investment,
underdevelopment you can decide to act very quickly to retool them.
As regards specialized intervention forces, we had two changes. To cope with a mass killer, must be a
dense network of specialised forces that can respond quickly on all of the national territory. There were
twenty-two specialized intervention units: I decided to create seven additional - four police and three
national police - so with intermediate intervention 750 units, i.e. the tray and PSIG, the whole of the
national territory is covered. It is thanks to the increase in the numbers that we have been able to take
such a measure. I proposed on the other hand either nearest force of the territory of the mass killing that
intervene. There was here a debate, resulting a total misunderstanding of the device. You have noticed
that I have placed antennas of the GIGN in font box and the RAID in zone mounted antennas. The idea is
not to hold a competition between the bis, the GIGN and RAID but make most closely concerned instead
force to intervene; It is therefore a clarification and not for an upgrade in competition, as I read it. The
objective is to have more forces, more evenly distributed on the national territory, with rules of
engagement, under the authority of the prefects of zone, enabling to work forces together, avoiding any
competition.
He is a third subject that I liked to treat. Pierre Lellouche evoked the war of fonts... I have no naivety and I
know that, despite all the energy that I deploy to make this reality belongs to the past, many will be my
successors who will continue to read articles on this topic. It is part of the culture of a House and, despite
major improvements, home will seek to keep some of this through for do not cease to be itself. May need
generations of Ministers of the Interior to change all that. Let us be humble. That I have tabled to the
forces? All have outstanding skills, but in some specific sectors some have skills that have no others - I

will no more elaborate on the issue in the context of a public hearing, but I can communicate these
elements to the commission of inquiry, subject not be published to avoid impairing the effectiveness of
our forces. So I asked a sectoral analysis of segmental these skills so that, especially in the territory of
Paris, a force can intervene rather than another if it has the requisite jurisdiction to ensure the
effectiveness of the intervention. I also liked that we can, in the case of killings and mass attacks multisite, commit all forces regardless of their geographical skills, to Paris, to avoid deaths and prevent the
perpetrators of the crimes to leave. It was the object of the operation that we conducted gare
Montparnasse. That is, very precisely and concretely, what we are doing.
Why have we not done previously? Because we had so far conducted recruitment and allocation of
budgetary resources under the budgetary procedures under ordinary law. However I couldn't spread over
the national territory of the staff that I didn't. These are the decisions of January 2015 to significant
enhancement of our workforce, height of 1,500 positions, and unblocked credits that have allowed me to
take, within a very short timeframe, of the necessary measures to effectively combat the terrorist. It is
wrong to say that these decisions are the result of a reaction of the Executive in the November bombings.
If in January 2015, and from 2012 on certain points, the Government had not taken the decision to
increase significantly the resources of police and intelligence services, I would not today be in situation to
organize things as I describe.
The President Georges Fenech. You learn something that seems to me very important, specific to
certain units, most appropriate capabilities for any type of attack. Distinctions are therefore made between
our three elite forces - I understand it perfectly.
To the Hyper hide you have mobilized the intervention force of the national police (FNIF), which allowed
the RAID to carry out the operation. Why not have done so at the Bataclan, understanding that each and
others can have specific capabilities? I do not put in question the quality of the bis, anti-gang brigade
initially, but there were 1,500 people inside the Bataclan. Why the guardianship authority - yourself, with
the police Commissioner and the Director-general of the national police - has disregarded these specific
capabilities to mobilize the FNIF?
Mr. Meyer Habib. I have well listened to you on this point, Minister, but the answer seems insufficient to
me. I make the distinction between the events of the Hyper hide - it's a hostage, not of a mass killing, and
there is a little time to wait for the arrival of intervention forces - and those of 13 November. At the
Bataclan, and the terraces of the cafes, it was an immediate massacre, which left no one second to call
bis, RAID and GIGN. Every minute passing resulted in more deaths. Most of the victims were hit in the
first quarter of an hour. In this case, there is only one solution: the first responders, which may be "base"
police, must even at the risk of their lives, assess the situation, go to contact and pull. One could also
imagine that police officers be allowed to return home with their weapon at the end of their service.
The measures you have taken are going in the right direction, but not useful as if we are not in the
presence of a mass killing.
The Minister. On these topics, let us be very precise on the conditions of law and what we do. I do not
want given the feeling in France let people get killed without reacting.
In the case of mass slaughter, tomorrow, the intervention of the forces of order must be immediate and
controlled. You never know in such cases if the perpetrator is equipped with explosives or if there is a risk
of side effects. Intervene, it is not simply pull gunmen without assessing the consequences: there is a
certain level of professionalism and specific commitment protocols; otherwise, we will add words to the
dead.
What device we recommend to address the concern that you have just expressed, Mr. Meyer Habib?
First, we organized around zone prefects and prefects of Department a very precise device that
distributes skills. The closer, who are not necessarily always armed to cope with a killing spree, i.e.

newcomers, must secure the area, assessing risk, the behaviour of people, and immediately call the anticrime brigades and the PSIG. TRAY and PSIG are positioned on the national territory so as to arrive as
soon as possible and are now equipped with means enabling them to cope, in anticipation of the arrival of
the specialized forces if their mobilisation is justified by a hostage, a risk of surattentat, etc. This is the
subject of specific protocols and involves a total operational control. I remind you, Sir, that a provision
adopted at the recent review of Bill strengthening the fight against organized crime, terrorism and the
financing thereof, defined very specifically the conditions under which police officers may engage the fire
in case of mass killing. These protective measures of the police allow them to intervene in conditions
much stronger than those which prevailed until now. These new conditions of law, the relationship
between first responders, newcomers, and specialized forces, strengthening the specialized forces and
equipment of the tray and the PSIG must meet the concern you express.
Today, a police officer who is on the site of a mass killing may, taking into account the legislative
provisions adopted, open fire to stop the killings. We remaill the territory with the establishment of the
specialized forces and we have enhanced the level of equipment. That means then "go further"?
President Fenech returned to the question of the intervention of the different forces - bis, RAID, etc. The
services of the Ministry of the Interior provided an extremely accurate chronology of the intervention. The
delay of two hours and a half does not match the reality. I don't know what your commission will be items
that we sent him. I believe that you have visited you, ladies and gentlemen, at the Bataclan, where you
could talk with those responsible for the RAID and the bis. They showed that the bis had done what she
had to do, and that, if it had been possible in the circumstances to save more lives, of course we would
have done it. Your commission is aware of all the information available to us.
Are there specialized skills that we could mobilize? Not at this occasion, but it can happen. I will not dwell
on this subject publicly but I can receive you, Mr President, Mr president-to give you specific examples
that I would ask you not to make public - disclosure would make very difficult the action of specialized
forces. Yes, each of the forces has powers that others do not have. And if these skills must be mobilised
under particular conditions of intervention, I think that it is better to block.
Given all these elements, I invited three patterns of specialized services to come see me, without the
Directors-General of the national police and the national gendarmerie, without the prefect of police of
Paris. I told them that, of course, it was possible to perpetuate the tradition of the 'war of the services', but
that the country was facing an extreme terrorist threat and that the French were expecting that the
Republic protects terrorists. As it manages to do so, they don't wonder hardly what specialized entity it will
be allowed. Our duty is not to be strong separately or to prove that it can be stronger than another: it is to
be strong together. As each of the three forces is excellent in its field, will be able to mobilize the strength
the more able to intervene in a particular context. The authorities of the Ministry of the Interior in the first
rank of which myself, must involve good strength at the right time. No matter if the case is very marginal,
it may be useful to act as well - the geographical area concerned must not ban us it.
The President Georges Fenech. I asked you about the possibility of a single force, but the rapporteur
wants to clarify the issue.
The rapporteur. Minister, you had rejected the idea of a merger of the three forces, a "great night" on the
subject. However, could we not consider such a merger in the future?
Furthermore, the coordination of intervention forces (UCOFI) unit was created a few years ago. Do you
plan to give it a greater role, for example for training? I know that there are already common training
modules, particularly between the bis and the RAID. Is a rise of the UCOFI possible to avoid this war of
the fonts we have felt?
Finally, we know that a number of exercises conducted to cope with any possible multi-attentats or mass
killings. How many were in there since November 15?

The Minister. Indeed, Mr President, the UCOFI rises significantly in power. I specifically asked him to
foreshadow the reform that I envisaged and to mobilizing the three forces, the two branches and the
prefecture of police of Paris, in such a way that the proposal has been sufficiently prepared in advance. It
is not to enact better coordination, still need to prepare it for only putting in OEwork is not a failure, in
which case everything will have been that speech or pulse short-lived. The UCOFI has been the master
ofOEimplementation of this work, the Packager and the interlocutor of the forces, to which I asked to
articulate further their missions. It is also the UCOFI that I asked to take stock, in association with the
three forces, few abilities which I have spoken. It is to make proposals so that I can make decisions. It is
not finished, but this work is progressing very significantly - not to mention that much of what I wanted to
see put inOEwork is already set in stone.
A merger of the three forces would make sense only if it allowed a general improvement over the existing.
If culture and status disparities lead to replace three forces who walk by one who does not work, the brief
pleasure of having proceeded to the merger succeed operational difficulties for eternity. The big night is
still very fashionable, it is always presented as the solution to everything. For my part, I am extremely
pragmatic and prudent. I hope that the forces can work together. To achieve this, organize them
optimally, on the national territory and in terms of skills. I wish that any conflicts cease, and I spend a lot
of energy to get the message. If it works, we will move to a higher stage, but to the current terrorist threat,
do not run the risk of finding ourselves with a single force less efficient than our three existing strengths.
My extremely pragmatic approach has been to distribute these forces to raise range giving them
equipment and additional staff, to redefine their conditions of employment, to deal with the specific
conditions of mass murder in big cities or the capital, or to carry out sectoral interventions segmented,
with the mobilization of competences. Taking into account the time of maturation of these different
subjects, certainly not me who make this merger, which may be the subject of a subsequent reform if the
conditions are met; We have already done many reforms.
Mrs Franoise Dumas. For having participated in a number of trips abroad, I can testify to the very good
appreciation enjoyed by the french services; they are often hired. Thus, in Israel, the Israeli police
services welcomed the quality of the relationships they have with our services. Somehow, it's extremely
comforting and I wanted to emphasize.
I am convinced that the prevention and the permanence of personnel are two effective tools. This is also
what we have repeated everywhere - Israel has, unfortunately, a very old experience in this field. Through
prevention, can be to the source until the facts are committed. And nothing can replace the human
relationship, whether it be information or coordination between the different services, it is more important
than technique. Similarly, the permanence of personnel in the field is an asset. You are given the means
to do so. You partly answered the questions that I asked myself about the scheme of intervention, closer
to the ground, with the tray and PSIG. What is your opinion on the level of the threat, in France and in
Europe? How do you perceive the? The French must get used to the concept of permanent risk, which
implies a greater civility on the part of all.
M. Christophe Cavard. We would like to know your feelings about sharing the management of security
with staff at private companies, particularly in the context of the Euro 2016. Operational modes of
terrorists could evolve and our services are working on this issue, but to what extent can our homeland
security rely also on individuals who, if they work very well, are not specifically trained to deal with these
threats?
On the issue of new arrivals, too rapid, direct intervention, on the theatre of terrorist acts, does not risk?
Ms. Anne-Yvonne Le Dain j.. I want to know more about the distribution of forces on the national
territory, especially in the South of the France, where serious offences were committed years ago, not to
mention the fact that many are tempted by a departure for Jihad.

M. Pierre Lellouche. A question taps me since the beginning of our work. In the United States, after the
so-called commission "of September 11", institutions have been redesigned, including the Department of
homeland security of the United States.
Our Ministry of the Interior has its history, and has all kinds of crafts. Unfortunately, we will be confronted
for decades to terrorism. The Ministry of the Interior should therefore not become the Department of
Homeland Security, leaving aside a number of more administrative tasks, which affect local authorities.
Must not evolve to focus on internal security, intelligence operations, while another instance flying
communities work, the Organization of the elections and what is, in reality, another trade? It seems to me
it would greatly benefit efficiency.
The President Georges Fenech. Minister, perhaps you can conclude by referring to security "fan
zones"?
The Minister. Firstly, the level of threat remains extremely high, given that 2,000 of our nationals are
closely or from afar, concerned by the activities of terrorists in Iraq and Syria - 1 000 went there, some
dead and others returned. Therefore, the level of the terrorist threat is highest that it has ever been.
Moreover, those who seek to hit us use means of concealment allowed by a technology that has led the
Governments of the European Union to adapt the means of intelligence but which also greatly
complicates the work of these services. I think the use of false documents and encrypted means to the
concealment by the encryption exchanges and conversations in the commission of terrorist acts, the use
of multiple chips or prepaid phones, the ability to broadcast on the internet well done propaganda which
mark the spirits. All this contributes to what the threat is high. In addition, the effectiveness of the strikes
in Syria can lead those who are stricken to want to intensify their attacks.
This higher than ever threat fully mobilizing the Ministry of the Interior. This sometimes leads me to
remind everyone to its responsibilities when comments are made on the security forces, for example in
the context of current social conflicts. I hope that the security forces are beyond reproach, and any act
which poses problem is left unaddressed, but I do not accept as long as they are the subject of
campaigns. Put to the test, they do, with the intelligence services, considerable work to ensure the safety
of the French. These are the same forces that protect public buildings and, sometimes, are responsible
for the maintenance of order; being not stretch to infinity, our people are the object of a lot of stress. In
this context, I will always try to uphold the principles of wisdom and responsibility on the excessive. This
leads me to be very stringent on each subject. If there are deficiencies among the security forces, it must
take all provisions, and the General Inspectorate of the national police (IGPN) did a remarkable job, but
the failings of some should not lead to campaigns that harm the reputation of others, who are in the first
line. It is very unfair and totally irresponsible. There too, the truth must lead to convene other arguments
and develop other discourses.
The Euro is approaching. If, on the pretext that the threat is high, we are give by ceasing to be ourselves,
then we have the victory of terrorists. No Government with the passion of the France and the Republic
would, be it right or left. But once we take the decision to remain ourselves, we must of course take all
precautions. Them 'fan zones' are secured by an exceptional mobilization of our services in a context
where they are already very busy. This means every Mayor of every city, and all of the mayors, grouped
in an association chaired by Alain Juppe. I have to present with him next week, before the commission of
the laws, the provisions we have taken with a view to securing the Euro 2016. Be aware that significant
forces will be mobilised - near 90,000, including also private security officers. The contractual clauses on
which the France is committed in 2009 will be strictly enforced. In addition to these commitments of our
country before the football extra precautions we have taken given the context. Before the commission of
the laws, I will detail the distribution of these 90,000 people between units of mobile forces and the rest of
the public security, between public and private security. I will come back on the distribution of
competences between the stages, fans zones and the rest spaces, which exerted a specific competence
of each organization and each structure.

With regard to private security agents, particularly for the Euro, 100% of precautions are taken to ensure
the effectiveness of the device and prevent its circumvention. This ensures the effectiveness of our
action, which has mobilized many ways and many services within the Ministry of the Interior.
How are the forces distributed in the South of France, madame Le Dain? I am giving you, as well as to
the president and the rapporteur, an accurate map of the distribution of the forces on the national territory.
You will then have a detailed response.
Mr Lellouche, I believe that the effectiveness of our action against terrorism depends on our ability to
ensure that the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of security but also that of the State. I mean: the
Ministry of the territorial organization of the State and an authority on it in the territories, therefore the
Ministry of prefects. These are strongly mobilized on the challenges of combating terrorism, as the
authorities of the prefectures. I will take very concrete examples: services of the prefectures that provide
control over the weapons or are responsible for the fight against identity fraud are absolutely strategic for
the fight against terrorism. The perimeter of the Ministry of the Interior may be the subject of political,
intellectual, thinking over the next years, but if you asked me my opinion at the time where I leave my
duties, I prconiserai that the Ministry of the Interior is not not just security but that of the State, including
the security of missions of the Ministry of the Interior dimension. The articulation between the place
Beauvau, prefects, the territories and territorial administration is decisive for the success of the fight
against terrorism, including civil security. The departmental services for fire and rescue (SDIS), the
military of Nogent-le-Rotrou, everything must remain in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior, with
absolute efficiency. On the other hand, I am keen that the Ministry of the Interior remains one of values
and civil liberties. Our safety action must be constantly guided by the concern for civil liberties.
The President Georges Fenech. Minister, I wish to thank you for have spent us three hours. With your
hearing almost complete our work. We still go to Washington, and hear your colleague Secretary of State
victims. Symbolically, we thought it was important indeed finish with his hearing, as thought us it was
important to begin with the victims. We have always had in mind the truth work due to the victims and the
French. Rest assured also that precision and rigour - you used the terms on several occasions - will be
the quality of the work of the rapporteur, whom I would also like to commend the dedication, and I
welcome those of all members of the commission of inquiry here. Beyond the precision and rigor, I would
ask the rapporteur, but I am sure that he will do it, to be animated by the courage and audacity, because
it comes to the security of our compatriots.

Hearing, open to the press of Ms Juliette Madel, Secretary of State responsible for
assistance to victims
Record of the hearing, which was open to the press, Thursday, June 16, 2016
The President Georges Fenech. Ladies and gentlemen, we are especially proud to receive Ms Juliette
Madel, Secretary of State for assistance to the victims.

Thank you, Madam, for having responded to the request for hearing of our Committee of inquiry
into the means Work by the State to combat terrorism since January 7, 2015.
We have heard two weeks ago the garde des sceaux, Minister of defence and Minister of the
Interior. We decided to finish with you the cycle of departmental hearings. As you know, we
started our work and heard the representatives of victims and their families, who are entitled to
any consideration of national representation. We wished to symbolically finish them and heard
the Member of Government responsible for victims, named in February. Madam Secretary of
State, we expect a return of experience from their support, a review of the role of the

interdepartmental assistance to victims - CIAV cell - and any tracks for improvement that you
would like to submit.
I recalled that this hearing is open to the press and subject to a live broadcast on the internet site
of the National Assembly; registration will be available for a few months on the video portal of
the National Assembly. I would point out that the commission may decide to include in its report
any part of the report that will be made of the hearing. We have indeed decided that somehow
General and when this does not fix the heard persons or with regard to the confidentiality of the
information collected, raise our hearings would be open to the press because we have to carry out
this investigation in any of its transparency.
In accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the commissions of Inquiry Ordinance of
November 17, 1958, I ask you to take the oath to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.
Please raise your right hand and say: 'I swear '.
Ms Juliette Madel oath.
Now, I'll let you speak to a keynote presentation which will be followed by a broad exchange of
questions and answers.
Among these issues, I can already include: support for victims of November 13 in the hours and
days that followed. the main lessons of experience feedback conducted by CIAV, after these
attacks; the role played by the guarantee fund for victims of terrorism and other offences
(ITMF); the respective roles of the Secretariat of State and the inter-ministerial follow-up
Committee of victims of terrorism in the accompaniment of the victims; the concrete actions
implemented in Work; the main innovations contained in the circular of 13 April 2016 relating to
support for the victims of terrorism; and more generally, the actions that have been undertaken to
improve support for victims.
MS Juliette Madel, Secretary of State responsible for aid to the victims. Mr president, at the
beginning of your work, you said that it was " front everything for the victims that this
parliamentary commission [had] been decided" and indeed, four months ago, you started your
work by hearing of victims and victim support associations.
I have the honour to close these hearings, and I want to pay tribute to the consistency of this
work plan. As Secretary of State for assistance to the victims, I cannot but share your concern to
rethink our attacks emergency devices, and your willingness to improve the support of victims,
as well in the urgency that going - I will return. But previously I wish to return to the balance
sheet.
Since January 7, 2015, 151 people lost their lives on french soil due to attacks - 130 November
13. This is as many victims in a year since 1945. Jessica Schneider and Jean-Baptiste Salvaing,
murdered on 14 June 2016 in Magnanville at their home before their young son are swelled the
already heavy balance sheet.

In total, these are 2 179 victims of terrorist attacks committed in France or nationals french
victims of terrorism abroad between 2015 and 2016. Hundreds of people will remain durably
marked, physically or psychologically, sometimes for the rest of their days. The balance of these
attacks is terribly heavy. Also, after an attack, after a collective accident, after a tragedy of this
nature, the State should be there to support victims in the immediate event. This is not only in
Word, but especially by concrete actions.
What victims have need the night of 13 November and in the days that followed?
In the early days, they needed: protection to ensure their safety and that of their loved ones, and
it is the job of the forces of order and the Minister of the Interior; information on the State of the
situation during the events and their consequences, and it is the job of the Prosecutor's Office; a
quick support of their State of health by rescue forces, firefighters, and hospital physicians;
immediate care and a place of psychological home, and it is the job of the Ministry of Social
Affairs and health; a rapid identification of the body, and it is the job of the judicial police, in
relation to forensic medicine. Finally, they need a word of support and humanity, and it is the
duty of all of us.
Gold, of course, on 13 November, we were not fully prepared to meet all of these needs posed by
a tragedy of unprecedented magnitude on french soil. We were totally unprepared to meet large,
legitimate expectations of victims to the public power.
And yet the French, you know, expect much of the State. This is one of our national specificities.
In such circumstances, they expect the public power that she accompanies them, that it protects,
that it guides and supports them. In any other country in the world, the State was taken to fill as
many functions in such circumstances.
That posed is that problem on 13 November, and which prevented optimal treatment of these
expectations?
The exceptional situation of 13 November forced to mobilize a variety of actors - firefighters,
doctors, police, gendarmes, psychologists, judges, associations of victims, volunteers, etc. - in a
very short time. This situation has highlighted the lack of coordination between the actors, but
also the differences in procedures.
This lack of coordination has proved particularly glaring when it came to circulate information,
leading to slow responses made to victims and relatives, or even to generate absolutely dramatic
errors. These were not so many, but they had a sounding important, and for good reason.
The president of the Republic and the Prime Minister so wanted the creation of a secretariat of
State aid to the victims, placed to the Prime Minister. This position in the cFavorite pieces of
government action allows us to build an interdepartmental policy of assistance to victims. This
means that public authorities must be able to think about the answers that must bring public
services face all the difficulties encountered by the victims during the event and then.

To properly design and organize the response to the needs, not only the victims of attacks but
also - and this is the subject of my Secretary of State of victims of collective accidents, we
must distinguish two essential moments in their careers: the emergency during the dramatic
event then followed in the days, the months and the years that follow.
Let's start by the time of the crisis.
I said, the lack of coordination was one of the November 13 key problems. How to improve the
Organization and synchronization of public actors during the event? My program was established
in two points - as details it the interdepartmental instruction on April 13, 2016: first, immediate
access to reliable information by phone or mail; then, access for victims to the appropriate staff
to respond to the first needs of victims in a single venue.
Access to reliable information is guaranteed by the opening of a number of appeal unique in the
CIAV, localized at the Quai d'Orsay. This is where that is put together all of the information
necessary for the victims. This information mainly in the identification of victims, the location of
the injured in hospitals, and the coordinates of the center of families. Access to the appropriate
staff to respond to the first needs of victims in a unique venue is essential in the first moments of
the drama.
In Paris, the families will be allowed on the site of the military school, in the centre of families. It
is a unique venue for the victims and their relatives which allows them to report, to be informed
of the situation of the person they are looking for a suitable psycho-trauma support and, where
appropriate, to provide the elements necessary for the identification of the victims - in the
context of the ante-mortem cell.
Event in the province, the prefects have identified reception centres and families - CAF - home
of the involved centres - CAI. The State secretariat for the assistance to victims will see to
sending in the province of a delegate of the CIAV team whose mission will be to assist the
prefect on all matters relating to the victims and to the accompaniment of families.
Victim assistance policy, it is also, in practical terms, after the time of the emergency, the time of
the follow-up in the days, the months and the years that follow.
After the time of the crisis, the long term.
In the days following the tragedy, the lives of victims and their families is upset, but she
continues - otherwise. Therefore, the second objective of the secretariat of State for assistance to
the victims is to ensure their good support in time, to accompany them and help them find a
balance.
In the aftermath of an attack, victims have different needs. Injured or shocked victims do not
have the same needs that victims who have lost a loved one. Besides the definition of victim is
not the same for all administrative institutions, which complicates the response by the
Government and does not help the victims to find.

Generally, victims need to understand how they will be reimbursed their expenses and
compensated, both from the point of view of costs related to their health, that of all charges
appendices. For those who are injured and disabled life changes at all in all: support their costs of
equipment to the consultations of psychologists, access to suitable housing, or even assistance
obtaining vocational training necessary for their rehabilitation and their return to employment.
The needs of the victims are, in the long term, a wide variety and require a public response that
must retain its coherence despite the multiplicity of stakeholders.
The institutional response to these new needs through the Steering, on the part of the secretariat
of State to aid the victims, of the action taken by the authorities concerned for the victims. It is in
this spirit that I chair the inter-ministerial follow-up Committee of victims.
I met him twice, and its next session is scheduled for July 4. The Monitoring Committee ensures
the continuity of the assistance given by the State, and in particular by the ministries concerned.
It ensures follow-up not only victims of November 13, 2015, but also French victims of attacks
occurring abroad. It brings together aid associations, associations of victims and victims so that
key ministries concerned: the ministries of justice, health, finance, with the ITMF, the Ministry
of defence with the ONACVG, and now, the Ministry of housing.
Monitoring of victims is also based on the treatment of special cases requiring specific
intervention. In this regard, with my team, I get victims seeking us, I'm moving to meet them and
I make sure the rules of their administrative difficulties by intervening directly when it is the
only way to unlock a situation. So, with my team, we have dealt in four months nearly eighty
situations; and for about sixty of them, we found a concrete solution.
Monitoring of victims is based, of course, on the essential action of associations of victims and
victims. The specificity of this Secretary of State is its relationship strong and intrinsic with
associations of victims and victim assistance for one simple reason: meet the needs of the
victims, it is first listen to what their representatives have to say. Indeed, because they are the
first concerned, victims participating in the policy that we are building for them. They are
waiting for specific, clear and concrete answers. So I chose a decision method that is based on
the participation of the associations to the definition of tools I want to put at the service of our
objectives.
I have thus set up a round table of associations entitled "Let's build together", which periodically
brings together all the associations of victims and assistance to victims of terrorist attacks.
Together, we have thus built a strategy for the simplification of the toolset information in the
service of the victims. It is in this perspective that I will present in preview to these associations
project of unique internet site here in mid-July.
I turn now to the identification, for my Secretary of State, five priorities, the five pillars of the
establishment of a genuine policy of assistance to victims.
My regular and daily exchanges with associations have convinced me that victim assistance
policy is based on five principles of action: an information reliable, clear and adapted to every
stage of support; support comprehensive, medical and psychological, guaranteed in time and

predictable - steps, time and timing; fair compensation and a device focused on transparency in
the relationship with the ITMF; simplification and humanization of the administrative
procedures; the support of the Nation.
First priority: reliable, clear and appropriate information
Apart from the phase of crisis, when the victims and their families must initiate administrative
procedures for asserting their rights, the information is scattered and so difficult to get, which is
not acceptable. Also we decided to put everything in Work to simplify, accompany the
paperwork, and centralize all the information available on the internet portal called 'GUIDE' information and approaches.
Second priority: a comprehensive, medical and psychological support guarantee in time.
Within the Committee interdepartmental follow-up of victims - CISV - I asked relevant
ministries, including the Ministry of Social Affairs and health, to explore all tracks to improve
support for victims, in the hospital and then leaving, both medical and psychological than
financial - support for care reimbursements. I also think the shocked victims, it means
traumatized. The psychological shocks are, you know, of several kinds: physical victims do not
have the same needs to support those who have been shocked or involved.
At the end of these first months of work and these multiple meetings with direct or indirect
victims, I could measure the importance of the support of psychic trauma in his medical,
psychological and organizational aspects.
Early on, that is, within the first 24 hours of the event, the presence of the therapist, is essential
to help the victim to think of new benchmarks. First psychologists but also of all personnel
assisting mission is ' to be there '. That is physically, not only present, but especially to be present
physically, to be available to listen to these first verbalizations of suffering which can be in some
cases massive and intrusive.
Caregivers, to which I would like to pay a tribute, are somehow "containers" of this time of
psychological crisis. I have not forgotten emergency personnel who are often, also victims of this
mental aggression. Caregivers, caregivers, rescuers must be accompanied.
And then, spent the first weeks of the attack, victims need to be helped by psychological support.
Or they themselves are sometimes isolated, lack interlocutor. Follow-up to the victims in the
long term, from the point of view of the psychological support, is still, alas, too patchy. An effort
must be engaged, particularly in the extension of the work done by medical and psychological
emergencies - CUMP cells.
At the same time, in connection with the AP - HP, I have entrusted to Ms. Franoise Rudetzki a
mission of foreshadowing and reflection on the concept of resilience. Public opinion questions
on these new approaches, cognitive, or sometimes experimental, trauma care. It was therefore
my duty to engage in reflection and research on this subject to test the robustness.

Third priority: a fair and transparent compensation

If for the victims and bereaved families, compensation cannot replace the loss of a loved one or a
trauma caused by a terrorist attack, the opacity of the process of compensation by the ITMF,
which yet remains one of the most remedial worldwide, perhaps unbearable.
Therefore, make more transparent the process of compensation. The clarification of the
compensation criteria is essential to enable the victims include evaluation of their compensation
and lift any sense arbitrary.
In addition, and this is one of the principles to which I am particularly attached, the victims and
their loved ones, whose life was turned upside down following terrorist attacks, must be
compensated to the tune of the prejudice they had suffered. It is the principle of full reparation. It
is essential to maintain this principle even if compensation expenditures should increase due to
the terrorist attacks. An inspection mission also initiated a process of reflection to maintain the
financial sustainability of the ITMF and they in all the conclusions, I will ensure that is
maintained the principle of full reparation.
Finally, beyond the compensation of victims, should be lightening the burden of administrative
and fiscal difficulties as much as possible, related to the loss of a dear victim of attack. That is
why even why we took, last month, with the Minister of finance and public accounts, and the
Secretary of State for the budget, strong tax exemption measures for the beneficiaries of victims.
Fourth priority: simplification and humanization of bureaucracy.
The days and weeks following the bombing, the administrative steps necessary for the activation
of the rights of victims and their support, must not add the hassle to pain. Nothing is more
unbearable when you suffer, that an administration complex, rigid and cold. The diversity of
stakeholders - ITMF, ONACVG, social security, etc. supposed to respond to the diversity of
rights represents a further difficulty.
That is why the simplification and humanization of bureaucracy are necessary today. Also I
decided the creation of a single window to facilitate all of the existing approaches. This single
window will be available in two ways: first one-stop digital, with the website that I have already
mentioned, which will centralize all paperwork to achieve; then one-stop territorial, with a
physical place of welcome and a refer associations, designated within each Department. These
two terms are being studied and should be implemented by the summer 2016 for the first, by the
end of the year 2016 for the second. This will allow victims and their relatives to take their steps
as they see fit, and to choose the accompanying mode they want.
Fifth and final priority: the support of the Nation
Because they have been victims of terrorism, of terrorism that found its source in a fight against
a company, a Government or a State, victims of attacks - victims simply for being there - ask
anything other than simple compensation or taking in charge: they also seek the support of the
Nation.

I have already mentioned the creation of the secretariat of State, the principle of full reparation,
tax exemptions: they are forms of solidarity of the State. We are all potentially affected by the
attacks. The status of victim of terrorist attack or collective accident is conditioned by chance, to
have been there at the wrong time. The consequences of this dramatic, cruel alea, must be shared
by the community, by the State and cannot be assumed solely by the individual.
In my opinion, we must go further. This can take many forms, beyond the official tributes. I
think so to the formalization of a national day in memory of the victims of terrorist attacks. In
any case, must be satisfied this request for support of victims and of associations.
Last fundamental element which I would particularly like: the requirement of equality.
Beyond these different applications - reliable information, comprehensive care, fair
compensation, simplification and humanization of the process and recognition of the nation - I
would like to insist on an additional requirement: equality of treatment between all victims of
acts of terrorism. There may be competition victimization.
Indeed, regardless of the attack, its media coverage or its balance sheet, irrespective of the place
of residence of the victim, the principle of equality requires us to meet the needs of the victims in
the same way, with the same support of the State. In this regard, I have prepared a circular
backed interdepartmental instruction on 13 April, complementary to the circular of the Ministry
of the Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs and health, in order to decline the national plan
at the local level of support for the victims.
I wish indeed that the Interministerial Monitoring Committee either declined in departmental
monitoring committees, so that the victims residing in the province can have a refer unique for
an instance of the State, two pillars necessary to accompany them in their efforts and unlock
possible difficulties and associative level.
In conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, I want to tell you that these issues are certainly of immense
complexity and must been apprehended for the sake of balance between formal equality and
fairness of treatment between speed of processes and customization of responses between
administrative management and human relations. It is a daily, demanding, necessary challenge
that we all face.
The work with victims and associations now allows to have a doctrine of accompaniment that
exceeds the scope of victims of terrorism. The efforts of networking and professionalization of
the actors must continue to generalize the know-how and methodology that we have acquired in
all areas of support in emergency and the duration.
To go further, new legislative provisions are necessary to give rise to a public service of
assistance to the victims, with all dimensions that include the accidents of life regardless of the
qualifiers - natural disasters, collective accidents, tragedies of a criminal nature. Because there
are naturally many commonalities between the policies of support for victims of terrorism and to
victims of other disasters. I know I can count on national representation to go further and
promote a common culture within the State aid to victims.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention and am naturally ready to answer all
questions that you may wish to ask me.
The President Georges Fenech. Thank you, Minister, for this comprehensive presentation of
the actions that you have carried out in a short time, since your Secretary of State is of recent
creation. The rapporteur and I are listening to all the work that has already been accomplished
and responding very largely or even in full, to the requests, concerns and sometimes healthy
anger of the victims who found themselves confronted to a situation in which we no were not
prepared. The important is to provide answers for the future, and the program that you call today,
with its five axes, corresponds to these needs and this expectation.
However, we would like to deepen several points with you.
Assistance to victims should the secretariat of State for not also deal with minors recruited by
Daech on social networks and which leave abroad? Even if they enter a process of terrorism, do
you think that these recruits are also victims? The parents of these young people, who live on our
territory, are taken of course. Most of the time, they had were even unaware of their
indoctrination.
Furthermore, on the occasion of our mission in the United States, we found how was decisive
speed of the relief to the victims of what could be described as genuine acts of war. But we
realized, during our work, that access to the wounded, including at the Bataclan, took awhile and
had particularly to be expected that the security perimeter has been lifted.
The United States, they have recourse to a joint body consisting of columns of assault
accompanied by doctors trained in crisis intervention, equipped and able to act. This feature
allows, and it is what particular happened in Orlando, a quick medical, decisive support for the
survival of the victims.
Madam Secretary of State responsible for aid to the victims. On minors or young adults
recruited by the sectors, it is a very recent reality in Europe, and which is not specific to the
France. Other European countries, such as England, know them also this type of manipulation on
the part of Daech.
As you know, the Government is very mobilized on this point and has implemented a plan to
combat radicalisation, which includes 80 steps. Families are often helpless, indeed, facing a
radicalization which is done on the internet, and the question of social networks is central in the
dramas that we live. The subject is not thin. Believe though that I am aware and that I invested
me, as any member of the Government, and like any french citizen.
Regarding the jurisdiction stricto sensu of the secretariat of State of the victims, I can not not
interested in producing the abomination. I asked the general secretariat of the inter-ministerial
crime prevention fund - sift - to launch new projects. It must work, interdepartmental manner on
the issue of prevention and assistance to the families. This approach is today at theFavorite
pieces of the action of the Government. It will probably take some time. You might well expect
that this isn't a shot of magic wand that can be put in place a policy to combat the phenomenon

of radicalisation. But I am obviously sensitive to the fact that minors can be victims of this type
of networks.
Regarding first aid, you first need to know that the action of firefighters and emergency
personnel has been immediate. She was engaged with the greatest determination, and even with a
share of selflessness in these dangerous areas.
I also tells you that since April 2016, doctors and civilian personnel receive special training in
this type of attack. Rescue teams, Paris NSWFB - BSPP - learn special techniques of medical
care, used on the theatres of war. You have probably heard of these American techniques called
damage control by which one sets up a number of emergency care in order to avoid that the
victim State worsens until she could reach a hospital.
Finally, intervention forces, the RAID, the bis, the GIGN, are themselves engaged in a training
with the fire brigade and ambulance work to ensure good coordination between intervention
forces and rescue forces. This coordination must be ensured at all levels of public action, on the
ground as in administrations.
Sbastien Pitrasanta, rapporteur. Minister, my first question deals with the attacks of
November 13. Initially, phone calls were managed by the Prefecture of police - this is what was
provided for in the circular. But because of the magnitude of the event, the police Prefecture
switchboard jumped four times and a number of families were able to contact the CIAV. On
Saturday afternoon, operative has switched over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That has
presided over this decision? How is it made? Have in you learned? It better to use a unique place
to receive, then treat the phone calls?
My second question, which was raised by the victims that we have interviewed, as by the press,
focuses on the unique list of victims. It would seem that today ' even today, some people wishing
to be problems. Have they they been resolved? Have you been solicited by some of them? Have
the difficulties been identified? Can you give us some specific elements on this unique list of
victims?
Madam Secretary of State responsible for aid to the victims. Mr rapporteur, there was indeed
an influx of calls, including to the Prefecture of police - more than 90,000 calls - and it was
obviously not able to respond.
What teaching is drew? Now the CIAV, which has a number of unique appeal, will technically
be in ability to respond to a flood of calls. Above all, we have collectively ensured to make since
the onset of the attack, this unique number will be displayed everywhere on all media television, internet, etc. The CIAV is equipped with the human and technical infrastructure that
will enable it to cope with a massive influx of calls. It is indeed to avoid what has happened on
the evening of November 13. Having been able to test the unique number for five fiscal years
NOVI - exercises in preparation for a large-scale attack - that we organized, I can tell you that
the system works well.

You have also asked me about the unique list of victims (LUV). It is made by section C1 of the
Paris Prosecutor's Office. It is a working document internal to the Procuratorate, which became
over time a shared tool and which gives legal rights. It has no independent legal existence.
Only direct victims are the LUV. Considered as a victim direct that was at the scene of the
terrorist attack, which has been directly exposed to the risk. There are three categories: victims
have died. injured victims and shocked victims, i.e. psychically - injured without physical
injuries but having witnessed the events and being naturally traumatised.
I agree that the definition of victims should probably be clarified. The definition of the LUV,
which is today restricted to the direct victims, does not reflect from the definition of victims used
by the ITMF that goes to the indirect victims, namely the beneficiaries of victims.
That is why, in the secretariat of State of the victims, we have initiated work to clarify definitions
and above all, to ensure that all public institutions use the same. I think, for example, to the
notion of 'victim involved', which also suffers from a lack of precision. We want to implement a
single repository to define different types of victims.
The rapporteur. The Secretary of State was asked to address cases of non-integration in the
single list of victims? How much is the number of persons on the LUV?
Madam Secretary of State responsible for aid to the victims. We have before us a few cases
of victims if surprising to not be on the LUV, we follow very accurately - I will give obviously
no name. But we're working with the utmost diligence.
I would point out that it appears on the single list of victims at the end of an investigation by the
Prosecutor's Office, which relies on documentary evidence: meeting minutes, etc. It is the
Prosecutor's Office which sets its unique list of victims, and has all the legal elements.
With regard to the attacks of November 13: at today's date, there were 1 747 victims on the last
LUV, including 130 killed, 493 wounded and 1 124 shocked.
The rapporteur. During the hearings, including SOS attacks, it was alluded to the opacity of the
system of compensation of the ITMF - that you do-it-yourself mentioned just now. How do you
envisage the possible evolution of operation?
Of course, it is always very difficult to financially evaluate the loss of a loved one. The Fund is
determined from a number of criteria. But at the end of the combination of these, e.g. losing a
companion, a companion, a husband or a wife will be better compensated than the loss of a child.
What do you think?
Could the Secretary of State move this Fund towards more transparency? You were talking about
the need for a more humane care. In fact, a certain lack of humanity could be deplored.

You want to by also simplifying administrative procedures: this is indeed waiting for the victims
and their representatives. They called our attention to the support of attorneys ' fees. What are
your feelings on the subject?
Madam Secretary of State responsible for aid to the victims. Back on the procedure for
compensation before the ITMF.
The ITMF opens issues of compensation for the direct victims, appearing on the LUV, and
indirect victims who are rightsholders and the relatives of the direct victims. Are considered
indirect victims by the ITMF: spouses, ascendants, descendants up to the second degree, the
brothers and the sObservers of the deceased; but also spouses and ascendants, descendants in the
first degree of the injured; Finally any person justifying a particular link with anyone who died or
injured. These are the eligibility criteria.
Specifically, the ITMF takes the attachment of victims that are listed on the LUV, or their
privies. But this does not prevent that anyone can enter directly the ITMF if it has not contacted
him and that she feels victim of an act of terrorism.
Once the contact is made, the ITMF pays a first provision no later than one month after receiving
the request from the victim - and after the it parsed. Then, additional provisions may be granted
on request.
The ITMF offers final compensation no later than three months after receiving the supporting
documents - medical certificates, medical reports, proof of loss of income or proof of civil status.
But for the seriously wounded or victims who have suffered psychological trauma, it takes what
is called the "consolidation" of the State's physical or psychological health. One can also speak
of "stabilisation". However this phase takes time. For example, the blast of a gunshot wound
effect may have a resonance on the consolidation of the os. The wait depends on the State of
health of the victim: one month, two months, three months, possibly much more. Thus, the
process of final compensation depends on itself the consolidation of the State of health.
You then asked the essential question of the evaluation of the injury, the victims often have the
feeling that there are two weights two measures when it comes to compensate damage. I'll be so
accurate and concrete on how the damage is assessed.
The major items of prejudice are fixed by the nomenclature Divekar, which include: health
expenditures, loss of income, the functional deficit, endured suffering, any fees resulting from
the assistance of a third person, the prejudice of affection, for right holders funeral expenses, etc.
But neither amount fixed or scale, as this would be contrary to the principle of full reparation.
The ITMF refers to the practice of the courts, and in particular to the repository of compensation
for appellate courts to estimate the damages. It sometimes is increased by the Fund, on
production of documents of expertise and analysis of the folder.
Regarding your question on the improvement of the transparency of the repository for
compensation, the Board of Directors of the ITMF is pronounced against the dissemination of

this repository. Therefore, it is not possible to communicate on the evaluation of the positions of
harm made by the Fund.
Finally, there is a supplementary lump sum compensation which is granted in respect of the
PESVT - the specific outstanding detriment of victims of acts of terrorism. This repair was
decided in 2014 by the Board of Directors of the ITMF, precisely to take account of the specific
nature of the harm suffered by the victims of terrorism. Thus, 30,000 are granted to people
injured during an act of terrorism; for relatives, the amount varies from 3 500 to 17 000 euros
depending on the relationship.
However, this type of repair, which is misunderstood by victims, raises a number of difficulties:
this is not a post of common law prejudice, its amount is relatively small and poorly explained by
the ITMF.
For the direct victims, there are those that are directly exposed to which is granted 30,000 euros,
indirectly exposed victims, receiving EUR 10 000. However this distinction is held. This resulted
on several occasions discussions within the Governing Council, and led to developments after
each attack. Subsequently, the criteria for the award of the PESVT for the direct victims have
become difficult to read. This is the reason why I think that an effort of clarification must be
engaged on the PESVT.
What are the levers for the Secretary of State on the ITMF? We have a direct role on the ITMF?
Today I have a role of action to the extent I have the responsibility to work the good coordination
of each Department represented on the Board of Trustees of the Fund. But I do not have a direct
role of pilotage. You know, the ITMF has a special legal status under private law. A mission is
nevertheless considering changes in its status.
However, I conducted several types of action to alert the ITMF on some specific cases, which
would justify the acceleration and simplification of the procedures. I'm thus answering your last
question: the Secretary of State launched a concerted action on the revision of the ITMF forms.
Must be that they are legible and easy to complete, and the victims do not have to fill several
times the same form, because it is very distressing to them. New updated and simplified forms
are online since May 20, and will be validated by the next Board of Directors of the ITMF. As
you can see, we have therefore already contributed to the simplification of the procedures.
We have also worked to improve the mail that will be sent to the victims. As soon as I was
appointed, we mobilized on this point. We have set the ITMF indicators so that each request
receives a response in a reasonable time. I am now able to tell you that by the end of the year, no
request will be left without response on the part of the ITMF.
With regard to the attorneys fees, in criminal proceedings, they are supported by legal aid - and
for the victims of terrorism, it is acquired without means. Such is not the case however when
transactional phase. Advocate before the ITMF fees cannot be supported. They can still go up to
10% of the allowance.
I hired three types of reflection to resolve this situation.

Firstly, the extension of legal aid to the transactional phase.

Secondly, the support by the ITMF attorneys ' fees. But it is necessary that they do not fit in the
reparation, because absolutely avoid the deadweight effects.
Thirdly, the support by these fees legal protection insurance. There are several instances in the
work that we do: either the uncapping a convention of support costs and fees between the ITMF,
the national Council of the bars and the insurers, on the model of collective accidents. At this
point, the work we are conducting is not yet completed.
M. Christophe Cavard. Madam Minister, cannot that rejoice in the official existence of the
Secretary of State responsible for aid to victims who, I hope, will be in the time since is
unfortunately likely to be again faced with other comparable situations. I insist on its role of
coordination and information because, in the event of terrorist attack, victims receive little secret defense, will justice gather personal or not victims to inform them. And when the attacks
take place abroad, relations with the families of the victims are even more complicated.
Do you think that the Secretary of State of the victims could play a special role in this matter?
On behalf of the Government, you may provide information directly to the victims or their
representatives, which would avoid them, which is always very unpleasant to take knowledge by
means of the press.
Furthermore, the statement of affairs of terrorism is particularly long. Of the Merah case lasted
more than one and a number of families of victims have lamented that all the time, they did not
know how the situation was evolving. Certainly, justice is doing its job and we expect the trial.
But what is your point of view on this point?
Madam Secretary of State responsible for aid to the victims. The Honourable Christophe
Cavard, it is indeed difficult for the victims to wait for the investigation to succeed. The time of
justice adds to their suffering. The victims, like us all, want to know what happened, and as soon
as possible. But I can't that remind the law and our principles, in particular the II of the
preliminary article of the code of criminal procedure which stipulates that "the judicial authority
ensure information and the guarantee of the rights of victims in criminal proceedings."
Thus, anyone other than the investigating judge cannot apply to victims to realize and tell the
elements of the survey, for reasons of principle, but also to safeguard the conduct of the
investigation in the best possible conditions. This is to avoid, in particular, that the disclosure by
others that by the judicial authority could have an impact, either on the proper conduct of the
investigation, or even on its outcome, which is to find the truth.
I admit that this is not responding to the expectations of the victims who, want to have
information. Can the State secretariat for the assistance to victims substitute for judges? The
answer is clearly no. There is no question that, even in terms of communication, that this be
expressed instead of judges.
However, there are two ways of improving things, and they are already put in place.

First, when it is civil, it has access to the folder. Therefore, during a judicial investigation,
counsel for the civil part has the same rights as the person Council implementation review. It can
obtain copies of the pleadings and transmit them to his client. This is article 114, paragraph 5 et
seq. of the code of criminal procedure. In addition, since the Act of May 27, 2014, copies may be
requested by the parties, and autopsy reports as well part of the reportable parts.
Secondly, the code of criminal procedure also provides that, for the magistrates, an information
meeting must take place every six months with victims who were constituted civil. There are ten
days, was held at the military school victims information days. The feeling was positive: the
victims appreciated to be received by the magistrates involved in the folder. In fact, six
magistrates - implying rather exceptional mobilization of resources - are responsible for these
issues of immense complexity. The exchanges were a high accuracy and victims have had the
feeling of a high level of professionalism. There were presentations very fed, sometimes two
hours, and presented the report of multiple investigations. This could only reassure victims who
had access to all information. Some questions were left unanswered, but for a simple reason:
they were not the current procedure.
At the time when these days were held, Salah Abdeslam had indicate that it would speak not,
legitimately, which sparked a huge frustration. At the end of these days, some of the victims are
in complained. Understandable, but each must also remain aware of the role of the magistrates
who, of course, cannot proceed in such a case.
I recall, for welcome, that you voted unanimously, the penal reform project, an amendment to
reduce the time from which an association can be civil, which was welcomed by associations
such as being a major step forward. Being able to be a civil party without prior delay of
constitution of an association in fact allow victims to have access to information.
The President Georges Fenech. I thank you for it. This progress, which is the result of our
work, has been brought by Mr Pascal Popelin.
M. Christophe Cavard. The president had planned as part of our work of the hearings with the
media, which may sometimes endanger those involved. Very well ourselves do not live to learn
certain information in the logs. In this case, I am more interested in items that are given in the
press without the victims or their families were aware. Certainly, the law must be respected. But,
in your role as coordination, perhaps you can collect information that can be shared.
The victims and even judges, but it is another problem - do not understand that certain
information be not given them under the pretext that they would be subject to special
arrangements and would fall within the scope of the secret. I think particularly about elements
that are in the hands of the intelligence services. Maybe the police, via the Ministry of the
Interior, could deliver to victims the information that a journalist specialist intelligence
succeeded in obtaining.
Madam Secretary of State responsible for aid to the victims. You ask a very good question,
which also has a number of implications for other elements of information, as nearby which are
found in newspapers before the identification of the bodies took place, or pictures that circulate

on the internet contrary to the dignity of the people. In short, we are talking about the freedom of
information and expression, and the large capacity of social networks to disclose everything and
anything in a quarter of a second across the planet. Faced with this, what can the State?
Firstly, with regard to information, education and investigation services, our role at all, national
representation, Government, public authority, is to say that there are only reliable information,
only true information: the word of the magistrates.
This principle is important and we must remind you, including in relations that we have with
victims. So when I get the victims, I tell them not to believe what they can read because a
number of false information circulating. It is our responsibility to give information when they are
true, that is verified, implying that all the services of the State have had time to conduct this
audit. Speed often goes hand in hand with the rumor, and the rumor is almost always wrong.
We can, however, Act.
Take first the case of a picture, or of information - true or false - hitting the dignity of victims
and circulating in the press or on social networks. I am thinking here of the photo of a relative of
a victim in the wake of the air crash of the EgyptAir plane. I contacted the concerned newspapers
and asked, on behalf of the ethics and their own ethical Charter, to remove this picture, the
principle being that any victim who does not want the picture or the name of a loved one or
disclosed (e) must be heard. We can therefore act not by coercion, because the press is free, but
with work highlighting ethics and referring journalists to their own ethics.
Furthermore, social networks are also a vector of precious information, the State secretariat for
the assistance to victims use enormously. Thus, upon the occurrence of an aviation disaster, we
can send through this telephone number for access to information. We do this naturally in
connection with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the crisis and support centre. My teams
check very concretely that the phone number works, then we immediately online on social
networks. And given the number of retweets, I think that there is a real utility. The victims and
their relatives indeed require a true and reliable information, immediately, from the first minutes
of the disaster. Therefore, social networks can also be used to strengthen the quality of the
information to which victims have access.
Finally, and finally, I launched a reflection within the secretariat of State, the deleterious impact
of traffic in the press, pictures of terrorists. I am well aware that there is, again, on the ground of
freedom of information and that the part is essential. I am not sure however it is tasteful to the
victims to see circulate everywhere on social networks and in the press photos of terrorists, their
name, their life stories even though this probably meets narcissistic needs this struck the
survivors and their families. The juxtaposition, in the newspapers, photos of victims and
terrorists much and which refer to abominable acts, does not, in my opinion, the public interest.
But we are in the field of ethics and ethics.
The President Georges Fenech. Minister, the France was shocked by the double murder of a
couple of police officers. What measures will be taken to their now-orphaned child? I believe
that it would have the status of ward of the Nation. Can you confirm it?

Madam Secretary of State responsible for aid to the victims. Mr president, this child of three
years meets all the criteria to become a pupil of the Nation. We seized the ONACVG. I add that
at the end of the attacks of 2015 and 2016, more than fifty children in total, today are wards of
the Nation.
To the secretariat of State, we immediately made contact with the family to know how we could
be useful. We are available to them to receive. I insist on this essential point: once past the early
days, when the press is focus more, this child tracking must be permanent and controlled. Even
in several months, the fate of loved ones of this couple and this boy will be supported by the
State secretariat for the victims. On the other hand, a tribute will be held in Versailles Friday, in
memory of his parents.
The President Georges Fenech. Minister, it only remains for me to thank you. We are very
attentive to the plight of victims and we can only welcome these measures that have been
announced in record time and collecting, I imagine, the consent of associations. They participate
from the rest in the decisions you make, which is very important.
Madam Secretary of State responsible for aid to the victims. Thank you, Mr President.

National Assembly