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A NOTE ON CASSIRER'S
I. THE
DEVELOPMENT
OF
PHILOSOPHY
OF LANGUAGE*
OF LANGUAGE
PSF, I, 1-51.
512
513
514
CASSIRER'SPHILOSOPHYOF LANGUAGE
515
freelyin the particularformsand laws of expression,it starts fromdogmatic assumptionsregardingthe relationbetween "archetype" and "reproduction," "reality" and "appearance," "inner" and "outer" world.
The questionmustratherbe whetherthese distinctionsare not determined
through
art, through
languageand through
myth,and whethereach of these
formsmust not draw its distinctionsaccordingto different
perspectives,
and consequentlyset up different
dividinglines.16
a basic formof
Language is forCassirera "Grundform
des Verstehens,"
knowledge,and since he emphasizesin the PSF that such a formcan only
be characterizedand understoodin its own and peculiarterms,it is easy
to see why he embarkedthereon a study of grammarsand linguisticresearch.In the PSF Cassirerholds,in line withphilosophicalidealism,that
the distinctionbetweenessence and formis merelya methodologicalabstractionand that both concepts,essenceas well as form,have one and the
same referent.
Applyingthisto languagehe says:
Here again that relationbetween"essence" and "form,"whichis expressed
in the old Scholasticdictumformadatesse rei,is confirmed
also forlanguage.
Epistemologycannotanalyzethesubstanceand formofknowledgeintoindependentcontentswhich are only outwardlyconnectedwith one another;
the two factorscan onlybe thoughtand definedin relationto one another;
and likewisein language,pure, naked substanceis a mere abstraction-a
methodologicalconceptto whichno immediate"reality,"no empiricalfact
corresponds.17
I, 123.
I, 278.
18 This is the
implicationofall commentson languageexamplescitedin the PSF.
19 PSF, I, 278.
17 PSF,
516
yearslaterin theEssay.
discussedlanguagetwenty
word-meanings
fora theory
ofindividual
a) TheProblem
ofthesignificance
forentirespeech
of knowledge.-If
languagesare matricesof knowledge
as Cassirerassumed,thequestionariseswhatand howmuch
communities,
mustwe knowabouta languagein orderto haveaccessto theessenceof
that
in thatlanguage?Can a grammar
thatis beingmanifested
knowledge
worldof
is written
in a Europeanlanguagegiveus a clueto theintellectual
the peopleswho speakKlamath,Baikiri,Ewe, an Eskimolanguage,an
thus
Athapascanlanguage,Mande, Nuba?22Is not our information,
neededforthe
constructs
bythetheoretical
gathered,
likelytobe distorted
means
How muchdo we knowaboutthelinguistic
writing
ofa grammar?
at thedisposalofa peopleafterwe have learnedthattheirlanguagehas
20Essay, 126ff-
21 Cf. Essay 128 if. The concretelanguage examples are crowdedinto the last
threepages of the chapteron language. Nevertheless,the earlierviewpointthat
(Weltansicht)has not
everylanguageis the mark of a peculiar world-perspective
been completelyeradicated.'Cf. 120.
22 Languagesfrequently
quoted in the PSF.
517
no one word for our word W or that in theirlanguage only one word is
used forourwordsW1,W2, W3 ... W.?23 What do we knowabout a people's
language when we hear that a certainmetaphoris used in a contextin
whichwe apparentlydo not use a metaphor?24
These types of statement
are fartoo particularistic,
too incoherent,too much out of contextto give
us a comprehensive
idea of a people's linguisticways and means towards
expression.From the propositionthat language and knowledgeconstitute
an entityit need not followthat individualwords correspondto specific
"units" of knowledge,nor that we can learn somethingabout knowledge
by simplydiscussingthe meaningof a word. There is no cogentreason to
assume that the grammarian'sarticulationof the stream of speech is
coterminouswith an articulationof knowledgeor the intellect.We may
thinkof languageas "path-finder"forknowledgewithouteitherhavingto
assume the distinctionbetweenbeing and form(whichwas so odious to
Cassirer),or that an inspectionof wordswill introduceus to the natureof
cognition(an assumptionwhichinvolvesseveraldifficulties
to be discussed
presently).If -we choose to believe in such a thingas the "genius" of a
language (in the sensein whichthe idealistsfromHerderto K. Vosslerhave
used the word),25then we must at least admit that nothingshort of a
completemastery-an actual "living in the language"-will reveal to us
thatgenius.An armchairknowledgeofone or anotherisolatedlanguagefact
about someremotelanguage,presentedto us in the drab garbofa grammar
writtenin Germanor English,is as likelyto give us a feelingforthe "spirit
23 This typeofstatement
thePSF: theBaikirihave no generic
is foundthroughout
wordforeitherparrotor palmtreebut namesforeveryindividualspecies ofparrots
or palmtrees(258); on the otherhand,theyhave onlyone wordforthe Germanich,
meines,das ist mein,das gehoert
mir,etc. (221); the old Egyptianwordkod stands
forthe mostvariedconcepts:to makepottery,to be a potter,to form,to create,to
construct,to work,to draw,to navigate,to travel,to sleep; also in a nominalsense:
circle,ring (256); there
likeness (Ebenbild),picture,simile,likeness(Aehnlichkeit),
are 5744namesforthe camel in Arabian (258), yet not one of these gives a general
biological concept (Essay, 135. ApparentlyCassirermisunderstoodhis source; see
Das Kamel, Kais. Akad. d. Wiss. Phil.-Hist. KI., Wien 1855f.
Hammer-Purgstall,
vols. VI & VII, p. 10).
24 Instancesaboundthroughout
thePSF: insteadofthe Germanwordshinterand
vor,the Mande people have wordsmeaningthe "back or buttock" and "eye" respectively;theirwordforthe Germanauf means "neck;" in means "belly." (157).
actuallymeans "a man
The wordwhichcorrespondsin Eskimo to our word twenty
is completed" (i.e. all his fingersand toes have been counted) (184). In MalayoPolynesian languages the phrase fivehorsesmeans literally "horses, five tails;"
fourstonesmeansliterally"stones,fourroundbodies," etc. (190).
in the
26 In the PSF Cassirer uses W. v. Humboldt's terminnereSprachform;
if
Essay he speaks of the "spiritof language." The termsappear to be synonymous
we mayjudge by thecontext.
518
RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
in a cake
ofthephysicalelements
contained
ofa language"as knowledge
stages.
intermsofdevelopmental
volumeofthePSF languageis discussed
however,
thathe does not believe
Timeand again Cassireremphasizes,
the idea
and he rejectstherefore
thatlanguagesdevelophomogeneously,
by
ofa phylogenetic
arrangement
oflanguagesas forinstancesuggested
In everylanguage,he holds,featuresrepresenting
a
AugustSchleicher.27
lowstageofdevelopment
maycoexistwithfeaturesthatmaybe charace.g.,is "primitive"
"advanced."28
ThusGerman,
terizedas developmentally
classification2
initsgender
but"advanced"incertainaspectsofitsvocabuThe citingofoneand thesamelanguagein different
is not
contexts
lary.30
in itselfmethodologically
unsound.Whatis considerably
moredisturbing
is the fact that Cassirerdrewhis examples,illustratingone and the same
process,froma greatnumberofunrelatedlanguageswithouteven choosing
languagephenomenathathave a commonfunctionaldenominator.Let one
example of the procedurestand for many:
To illustratean assumed evolutionfroma primevalstage of mimesisto
fromthefollowing
a finalone ofsymbolization,3'
Cassirerquotesexamples
unProto-Germanic,
languages:Kawi, Siamesian,Proto-Indoeuropean,
inFr. Mueller'sGrundriss
derSprachwissenidentified
languagesdiscussed
schaft(Vienna,1876-1888),Ewe, Golo, Ethiopian,Yakuts, Ural-Altaic
languages,and Klamath.The phenomenadiscussedare onomatopoieia,
vowelharmony,
distinctions,
noun-verb
pitch-phonemes,
sound-metaphors,
ofthe phenomena
The semanticsignificance
reduplication.
agglutination,
diminuis as variedas space,time,affirmation-negation,
discussed
quantity,
hislinguistic
illustrations
to one
Had Cassirerconfined
tion-augmentation.
in
connectionwith
level of description(e.g. if all examplescited
werepertinent
frommimesisto symbolisation
theevolution
to, say,phoor to syntax)thenit mighthave beenpossible
nology,or to morphology,
of
and tenability
theusefulness
(at leastin theory)to verifyempirically
be
would
then
A basisforcomparison
conceptofevolution.
thatparticular
Cassirermakesa similarpointlater,Essay 121ff.
PSF, I, 278.
28 PSF, I, 265.
26
27
as PSP, I, 268.
519
thatshouldfollowfromthethesiscouldbe
and the corollaries
established
courseof
checkedagainstobjectivedata. Cassirerchosea lesspositivistic
forphilosoresearchbecause he consideredthemethodologicalrequirements
fromthose for empiricalsciences. In the PSF this is
phy to be different
he makesthispointquiteclear:
implicit.In theEssay,however,
of linguistictypes
The varietyof individualidiomsand the heterogeneity
lightdependingon whethertheyare looked at
appear in a quite different
viewpoint.
froma philosophicalor froma scientific
and
Yet the true unityof language,... cannot be a substantialone; it must
ratherbe definedas a functionalunity.Such a unitydoes not presupposea
languagesmayrepresentopposite
materialor formalidentity.Two different
extremesbothwithrespectto theirphoneticsystemsand to theirparts-ofspeech systems.This does not preventthemfromaccomplishingthe same
The importantthinghereis not
task in the lifeofthe speakingcommunity.
the varietyofmeansbut theirfitnessforand congruitywiththe end.3la
twoaspectsof
aremerely
thatlanguageandknowledge
andform,
declaring
itselfexempt
andontheotherhanditpronounces
oneandthesameessence,
is
which
forms-arestudied.Thisinconsistency
phenomena-in
perceivable
to
the
almost
complete
minimized
stillpresent)in theEssayowing
(though
data.
omissionoflinguistic
amongthelanguageexcommondenominator
The lack ofa functional
disproveCassirer'sviews;
amplescitedin the PSF does not necessarily
As
assumpis addedbytheircitation. longas theunderlying
-yetno weight
somevestigesof
tionsarethatanylanguagemayormaynothaveretained
inanyaspectoflanguage
maybe retained
an archaicstage;thatarchaisms
in
themselves an unpredictable
variety
behaviorandthattheymaypresent
an archaism
of whatconstitutes
decision
of appearances;and, that the
absolutely
interpretation,
onuniqueand,in a sense,arbitrary
restsentirely
anythingthat we may findin a languagecan eitherbe said to belongto an
or a late stage of development.In view of this it
early,an intermediary,
ever
to finda phenomenonthat could contradictthe
will be impossible
for
which empiricalsubstantiationis being sought,and we might
theory
81a
Essay 129f.
520
RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
to linguisticmaterial
thussave ourselvesthetroubleofstudyingor referring
in the firstplace.
is this.The scholasticmaximformadatesserei
In summary,thedifficulty
whichis so essentialin Cassirer'sphilosophywould logicallydemand that
linguisticdata always "mean" the same thing,no matterwhetherviewed
froman empirical(i.e. formal) or froma philosophicalstandpoint.If a
uninand therefore
particulararrayof linguisticfactsis incommensurable
unity
terpretableby the empiricallinguist,the doctrineof the being-form
philosophishouldautomaticallydisqualifysuchmaterialfroma meaningful
cal interpretation.
The empiricaldata workedinto the PSF add littleto
Cassirer'stheoryand this may well be the reasonforthe greatlyshortened
treatmentof language in the Essay.
languageboundaries.-Considerthe followc) Theproblemoftranscending
ofCassirer'sthought:
ingpropositionwhichis basic foran understanding
The spiritapprehendsitselfand its antithesisto the "objective" worldonly
by bringingcertaindistinctionsinherentin itselfinto its view of the phenomenaand, as it were,injectingthemintothe phenomena.32
CASSIRER'SPHILOSOPHYOF LANGUAGE
521
"knowledge-structure."
The claim that one may discover differences
in
"knowledgeof the world" by inspectingdescriptionsof languagesbecomes
a logical impossibility
if one holds at the same time that we cannot know
(erkennen)exceptin termsof [our own native]3" language. In accordance
with the argumentadvanced here it can, of course,not be demonstrated
empiricallythat Cassirerdid or did not succeed in transcendinglanguage
boundarieswhendiscussingforeignlanguages.Yet it is interesting
to note
that at least some of his discussionsare apparentlybiased by an "IndoEuropean pointofview."38as shownby the following.
In PSF I, chapterIV, Cassirerpostulatesan ubiquitoustrendtowards
generalizationof concepts.The primitivestage is characterized,he asserts,
by a proliferation
of termsdenotingseparatelyeach constituentof a given
logical categorywithout,however,having a general term which would
denote the categoryas such. In the course of linguistic(and thereforeintellectual) developmentan ever more generalizingand subsumingterminology evolves until finallythe logicalcategoryitselfis abstracted and
labelled witha term.To illustratethe early stage, Cassirercites a report
by Trumbullaccordingto whichsomeAmericanIndian Languageslack our
generalconcepts"to eat" and "to strike."37Instead of these generalconcepts veryspecificsub-conceptsare used bythespeakersoftheselanguages,
describingin greatdetail the exact modalitiesof eating and striking.ApparentlyCassirerwas not aware that the Germanwordsessenand schlagen
are not logical and all inclusive categorieseither.Essen for instance is
never substitutedforfressenor fuettern
althoughthey both referto the
intake of food.Likewisethe wordschlagendoes not includesuch activities
as peitschen,
boxen,hacken,whereasthese togetherwithschlagenmightbe
subsumed logicallyunder the categoryviolentaction upon an object,for
whichwe have no singlegeneralterm.In theseillustrationsCassirerseems
to have been deceivedby the factthat a givenconceptexistingin his own
language is lackingin manyothers.
III. CONCLUSION
522
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH
byCassireras empirical
evidence,
i.e. as corroboraPSF werenotregarded
tionofhypotheses
through
senseperception,
but werethoughtof as immediateand self-evident
manifestations
ofreason.Suchan interpretation,
whilegivinga certaindepthto Cassirer'sthought,
failshoweverto solve
thefollowing
difficulty:
Detailsofforeign
languageshaveto be learnedby
us orareknownbyus in exactlythesamemanneras certaindetailsofthe
objectiveworld.If ourknowledge
oftheobjectiveworldis actuallysubject
to and moldedby the modesof cognition
that are "builtinto" our inand if everylanguageconstitutes
tellectual
faculties,
a modeofcognition
ofits own(as impliedby Cassirerand otherphilosophers,
e.g. J. Stenzel
and W. Urban),thenit shouldbe impossible
everto knowthe objective
intellectual
essenceofan alienlanguage,particularly
whenwe knowthat
alienlanguageonlythrough
themediumofliteraltranslation
intoourown
At the timeCassirerwrotethe E8say he had by and large
language.38
abandonedthe view that everylanguagerepresents
a specificmodus
Insteadit is humanspeechas suchwhichhe nowheldto be the
cogitandi.
symbolicmediumthatis essentialforthe fullrealizationof knowledge.
The formaldetailofthismedium,
however,
he no longerregarded
as particularly
relevantto a theoryofknowledge.
If ourknowledge
offoreign
languagesis thesameinnatureas ourknowlaboutlanguagessuchas the
edgeoftheobjectiveworld,thenspeculations
about a naturalphePSF assumethe characterof workinghypotheses
nomenonso thatthe references
to concretelanguageexamplesbeginto
verification
ofan evidenceforsuchhypotheses.
appearas empirical
Under
thesecircumstances
it becomesreasonable
to questionthelogicalsoundness
andinthisconnection
hisprocedure
ofCassirer's"methods
ofverification,"
and interpreting
data mustbe earnestly
forgathering,
arranging,
linguistic
criticized
froman empirical
pointofview.
ofunrelated
Whilethereseemedtobe a needtopointoutthata collection
is no evidenceforany hypothesis
requotationsfromvariousgrammars
the argument
that
of language,certainly
function
gardingthe cognitive
data in thePSF areunproductive
doesnotat thesametime
thelinguistic
of the symbolis a great
of a philosophy
denythatthe basic conception
has
to epistemology.
thenatureofthiscontribution
contribution
However,
in the philosophical
literature
to need any
been dealt withsufficiently
further
confirmation
here.
ERIC H. LENNEBERG.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY.
38 The difficulties
posed in thisconnectionby the processoftranslationhave been
discussedin detail in my article "Cognitionin Ethnolinguistics"Languagevol. 29
(1953)pp. 463-471.