Greek Philosophy Moral and Political Issues 26th ICOP English Speakers

GREEK PHILOSOPHY
AND MORAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES
I O N I A P U B L I C AT I O N S : A J O I N T P R O J E C T
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND
INTERNATIONAL CENTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE
GREEK PHILOSOPHY
AND MORAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES
EDITED BY
MARIA ADAM & MARIA VENETI
ATHENS
2015
2015 INTERNATIONAL CENTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE & KB
Copyright 2015:All rights reserved. No parts of this book may be reproduced in any form or
by any electronic or mechanical means including information storage and retrieval systems
without permission in writing from the publisher except by a reviewer who may quote brief
passages in a review.
National Library Publication Data

a. Philosophy b. Greek Philosophy c. Moral Issues d. Political Issues e.Greek
Letters K. f.Maria Adam g. Maria Veneti.
ISBN: 978-960-7670-80-9
CD PRICE: 20.00
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface 8
Robert E. Allinson
An Aristotelian Renaissance: Aristotelian Ethics for Today
Marianna Benetatou
A Contextual Reading of Ancient Theories
26
Sophia Boudouri
Aeschyluss Moral and Political Views in Prometheus Bound
34
Stella Chatzikou
Environmental Values in Primary Education:
Their Consideration within the Context of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics
53
Michael Cloete
Reflections on the Idea of Justice (and slavery) in Platos Political Philosophy
57
Christos C. Evangeliou
Portrait of an Athenian Gentleman: Socrates on Economics and Ethics
80
Chrysoula Gitsoulis
The Role of Reason in Grounding Moral Judgments
104
Jrg Hardy
The existential dimension of Socratic Inquiry in Platos Apology
116
Argyro Kasotaki - Gatopoulou

Reflections of some Platonic Moral and Political Ideas in relation to the
Philosophical Stance of the Founder of the Native Korean Zen Tradition Master
Bojo Jinul (1158-1210)
140
Jerzy Kosiewicz
Religious and Philosophical Determinants of Pythagoreanism
160
Frans Lohman
Hubris in Greek Philosophy, in 1914 and 2014
188
Joannis N. Markopoulos
The Concept of Good and its Priority compared to the Concept of Rightness
with regard to Techno-science and Humanism
197
Evangelos Moutsopoulos
Courses, Recourses and Opportunities in Greek Philosophy and in our Days
206
Emmanuel Perakis
The Political Views of Heraclitus from a Contemporary Perspective
212
Antonina Puchkovskaya & Valentina Dianova

The Mission of Intellectuals in the Era of Transition and the Philosophical Life 221
Thomas M. Robinson
Plato on Educating for Virtue
228
Ruth Eva Seidlmayer

Considerations on Different Approaches to the World: New Perspectives on
Ancient Skeptics and Postmodern Theory as well as the Stoics and Critical Western
238
Philosophy as Representatives of Different Approaches to the World
Ion Soteropoulos
In Our Society, is it Possible to experience Equality and Justice?
261
Helen Tatla
The Investigation of the Relation of Mathematics to Architectural Form
as a Moral/Political Enquiry; a Philosophical Discussion
282
Jonny Thakkar
Plato and Marx on Moneymaking
290
Theodora Tzanetaki
The Search for Wisdom and Unity as presented in the Philosophy
of Apollonius of Tyana
306
Maria Veneti
Moral Integrity in Platos Republic: the Example of Gyges
319
Index of names
328
PREFACE
The present volume contains studies and papers which, for the most past, were
presented at the 26th International Conferences of Philosophy of the International
Association of Greek Philosophy (IAGP) and the International Center of Greek
Philosophy and Culture (ICGPC).
The papers subsequently were revised by the authors and are now being
electronically published by Ionia Publications. The basic themes of these studies
can be grouped under the general title of:
GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES OF GLOBAL ERA.
Due the economic crisis that continues to plague the world due to its especially
adverse effects on the funding of cultural and scientific projects, it was not possible
to publish these papers separately in book form.
And yet, if the authors or any other person need to have a hard copy text, they
can simply print the relevant text by adjusting the scale to printer margins. In this
way they may have off-prints.
The value of these papers remains strong. In these papers one will find
reflections on central problems of our times, mainly on moral and political issues in
Greek philosophy, from scholars around the globe representing different points of
view and different cultural traditions. The publication of these papers, in a carefully
prepared electronic edition (book format, readable, printable and indexed),
contributes to the reduction of the economic costs of publication and helps solve a
host of other issues associated with storage, mailing, and distribution.
Our thanks go out to all who participated in these Conferences: We are
especially grateful to the Speakers who, with their papers, shed light on these
difficult subject matters, and to the Honorary Presidents of the IAGP, and to the
volunteers, and to all who contributed in any manner to the scientific, educational,
and philosophical activities of the International Association of Greek Philosophy
and the International Center of Greek Philosophy and Culture.
Robert E. Allinson
An Aristotelian Renaissance: Aristotelian Ethics for today
Abstract: Our age faces great challenges. Poverty, hunger and disease plague huge
amounts of our population; our ecosystem is in serious danger; mass extinction from
the use of nuclear weapons hangs over our heads like the sword of Damocles. While
there is no simple solution to our problems, they can one and all be traced to a lack
of individual ethical character and social, economic and political systems that all but
extinguish the possibility of the emergence and the sustainability of an ethical society.
Let us focus on one main cause that inhibits the growth and development of
moral character. Individuals cannot build ethical characters from which moral actions
flow if their dominant motivation in life is the accumulation of wealth. Politicians
cannot build ethical characters if their dominant motivation is to win and keep the
allegiance of those who will maintain them in power. The drives towards wealth
and power exact a toll on moral character. The degradation of morality in a culture
inevitably leads to a decline in cultural achievement.
The argument I would like to present is that it is only via a return to a
philosophy of action based on character development that humanity can hope to stem
the present rate of the decline of moral character. For this purpose, we can call upon
the ethics of Aristotle in particular, who articulated the concept of character building
in a most perspicacious form. In order to present Aristotles concept of character
building in a manner that most addresses todays moral decline, it would be most
efficacious to address his arguments that he constructs against one of the essential
drivers of moral decline, the profit motive. Aristotles teachings on ethics and politics
contain the most trenchant arguments that offer illumination to guide our path today
away from the accumulation of wealth towards the goal of an ethical life. While his
ethical arguments are well known, his views regarding the accumulation of profit
are not as well known. If these two viewpoints are put together, a more coherent
Greek Philosophy and Moral and Political Issues, pp: 9-25
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Robert E. Allinson
and cogent picture of Aristotles solution to todays moral and political problems
can be visualized. What is needed today is an Aristotelian renaissance. According
to the great Aristotelian scholar, Werner Jaeger, Aristotle is the only great figure of
ancient philosophy and literature who has never had a Renascence.1 But, today, we
can already see a resurgence in the interest in Aristotle.
One of the key problems that faces accounts of Aristotles ethics is that todays
anachronistic dichotomies between classifications of deontological ethics, virtue
ethics, eudaemonistic ethics and utilitarian ethics create the confusion that virtue
building ethics by itself does not possess social relevance since it is concentrated on
the development of an individuals character traits. I would like to present Aristotles
ethics in the way in which his ethics cannot be considered in its full extent without
taking into account his politics. With a complete account of Aristotelian ethics
there is no dichotomy between deontological motivations, eudaemonistic goals and
utilitarian results. With a full account of Aristotelian ethics and politics, one can best
grasp the relevance Aristotles thinking has for the solution of todays moral and
political problems.
A huge contributor to the moral and political problems of the present age
is the concept that maximization of profit is the main goal of human life. Such a
directive has many untoward consequences, the most noticeable of which are the
devastation of the planet and the huge inequalities between the rich and the poor.
The philosophies of the major ancient Greek philosophers, if adopted, could help to
alter the motivation for human life and, as a consequence, go far to save our planet
and to reduce inequalities between rich and poor. In particular, I would like to argue
that the ethics and economics of Aristotle have much to offer the present age in terms
of correcting the current emphasis on the maximization of profit. Aristotle argues
that one should orient ones life in an ethical direction that values what is right over
what is profitable. In fact, if there is profit or land ownership, Aristotle goes so far
as to say that its purpose is to enable the reality of sharing. Private property for
Aristotle exists for the sake of enabling liberality: it both offers a chance for the rich
Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development, translated with the authors
corrections and additions by Richard Robinson, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934, p. 5.
1
11
to improve morally and at the same time helps to reduce inequality by sharing. In
the course of this presentation, I would like to advance the thesis that the adoption of
the values of choosing what is moral and the value of sharing in Aristotle to replace
the maximization of profit will help to ameliorate the present world conditions of
planetary degradation and growing inequality.
The maximization of profits is taken for granted today to be the main motus
for living. To begin this presentation, I would like to start with what is not said
in Diotimas speech in the Symposium. What I would like to emphasize is that in
her discussion as to what makes life worth living, nowhere is it mentioned that one
should pursue the maximization of profits. What today is taken for granted, whether
one chooses the example of China in the East or the United States in the West, the
good life is perceived as one in which one can reach the greatest material success. In
neither of these great paragons of current civilization is it held that it is the pursuit of
beauty that makes life worth living.
Instead, the ideal of today is the Homo oeconimicus, the economic man whose
life is governed by the pursuit and the achievement of economic success. Could it
be that the reason that ancient Greek culture and ancient Chinese culture, to choose
these two examples, attained the heights of civilization that they attained because
the pursuit of profit was not considered the main motivation of living? If it were so
obvious that material gain was the main rationale for living, why is it absent from
Diotimas account? Why was it in ancient Greece that the winner of an Olympic
competition received an Olive wreath and not a gold medal and its corollary of
lucrative product endorsements?
Ancient Greek culture is a wonder to all and is considered the high water
mark of Western culture. The center of all of this was Athens and in philosophical
matters, the greatest of Greek philosophers lived there, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle,
each one of whom the teacher, in turn, of the next. Socrates thought that one did not
need profits; as he famously said, one only needed to have some coins clinking in his
pockets. One could deduce from this that Socrates did not teach that one should have
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Robert E. Allinson
no material wealth at all. But, it is obvious that he placed no great value on it. This
was characteristic of Athenian society. The Athenians were not interesting in making
profits. The Athenians looked down upon the Phoenicians because the Phoenicians
valued only money.
Everyone knows the story of Diogenes who clothed himself in a barrel and
lived in the public marketplace. Alexander was so impressed with hearing of the
courage and principles of Diogenes that the great Emperor came to visit him on a
bright, sunny day. He is reputed to have said to Diogenes to ask for anything that he
wanted and he would grant it, whereupon Diogenes reportedly answered, Please
step out of my way, you are blocking the sun.
Socrates taught that it was better to suffer evil than to produce it. If one reasoned
that profit required that in taking profit one would cause another to suffer loss, it
would follow from this that Socrates would not endorse the pursuit of unlimited
material wealth. Indeed, it would follow from this that Socrates would consider that
one should only pursue money to ensure that one could take care of ones daily needs.
Plato, famously, constructed an ideal society in which capitalism was its
engine, but which was controlled by a wise ruler who, like Socrates, was uninterested
in profits. This created a perpetual imbalance in which the ruler would be making
wise decisions to counteract the tendencies of society. In his Laws, Plato did stipulate
that no citizen could possess more than five times the amount of wealth than the
poorest citizen. The lasting legacy (in principle) of Platos wise ruler is the Supreme
Court of the United States or the Privy Council of England.
Platos counsel to the reader of his dialogues, however, is not the same medicine
that he doles out to the future citizens of his Republic. For his general reader, he
teaches that there are basically three classes of people, the lovers of wisdom, the
lovers of money or pleasure and the lovers of honor. He teaches that one should
follow the path to be the lover of wisdom. It is this choice that marks the teaching of
his student, Aristotle.
Aristotle teaches that one should pursue wisdom, but refines this notion further.
For Aristotle, pure theoretical understanding is a goal that cannot be pursued by all
human beings. For Aristotle, the performance of ethical acts could be performed
13
by all human beings. (One would naturally exclude those who were physically or
intellectually disabled). Aristotles unique and lasting creation was to put together
the Socratic and Platonic notion of the pursuit of wisdom with the notion of natural
happiness which would prove to be a unique and lasting contribution to the literature
of ethics.
It is commonly put forth that Aristotles ethics is a virtue ethics. This is
contrasted with ethics that are oriented towards right actions. For Aristotle, this is a
pseudo-distinction. One cannot build ones virtues except through performing right
actions. One performs right actions for their own sake, not for the sake of building
virtues or even building character. But, the performance of noble deeds, which is
the ultimate counsel to life that Aristotle gives, has, as its natural consequence, the
building of virtue and the building of character. This, in turn, brings happiness. One
does not act for the sake of building character or obtaining happiness. Indeed, the
purpose of political society, for Aristotle, is to create a venue for the performance
of noble actions. Political society, nay, the very definition of man as a social animal,
serves the cause of deontology. One agrees to the social contract, so to speak, in order
to make it possible to perform deontological acts. In this sense, ethics trumps politics.
Here is where Aristotle departs from his master Plato and rises to greatness. For Plato,
the state allowed for fulfillment of all, which included the pursuit of profit. Aristotle,
considered normally as the more democratic of the two, is in reality an ethical elitist.
Noble acts, just acts, are the goal for mankind. Nothing else. That happiness flows
from this is a proof for Aristotle that this is the right path for humankind to take. But,
one does not undertake such acts for the sake of the happiness that ensues. While all
human beings seek happiness, this is an ontological principle, not an ethical directive.
As a genus, happiness is what is sought, but this is not the motivation for action.
Indeed, in order to achieve the unique sort of happiness that is suitable for the human
species, one must pursue contemplative or ethical acts for their own sake. That all
human beings seek happiness is an ontological truth, not an injunction for action.
Aristotle is different from contemporary philosophers who advocate virtue
ethics, that is, an ethics that endorses the building of virtues. This is not quite accurate
for Aristotle for two reasons. First of all, he is interested in building virtues not for
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Robert E. Allinson
their own sake, but for the sake of building character. Secondly, character building is
for Aristotle, also not the end-goal, as it might be for Confucius. What is important
to recognize is that Aristotles notion of character building is intimately tied to his
idea of achieving human happiness. He thinks that building moral character can be
identified as the correct pathway to take in life because it is the only way in which the
majority of human beings can achieve happiness. While pursuing pure contemplation
may even be a better way to achieve happiness, he rules this out as a path that is not
possible to sustain for the majority of humankind. The point to emphasize is that the
performance of noble deeds is enjoined for its own sake. That it leads to happiness
for the performer is because it is a natural act for the human being; that it leads to
happiness for the performer is not the motivation for the performance. That it leads
to happiness for the performer is a philosophical argument for how happiness is
achieved: not an argument for why we should be moral (except in a secondary sense
that it is also the way in which true human happiness is gained). That human beings
gain happiness through performing moral acts is how Aristotle identifies moral
actions as natural to human beings: it is not the motivation for moral actions.
If the above argument strikes one as being too subtle, one may take the following
approach. Aristotles ethics cannot be easily classified in terms of categories utilized
today such as deontology or utilitarianism. He did teach that one should do what is
right for its own sake (deontology), but at the same time argued that by doing so and
only by doing so, one would achieve happiness. He is not an egoist, that is, one who
teaches that one should pursue happiness, but, if a label is needed, a naturalist, that is,
one should pursue what is appropriate to ones nature. If one pursues what is proper
to ones nature, happiness follows as happiness is a sign that ones nature is fulfilled.
What must be remembered is that for Aristotle, one must pursue what is
ethically right for its own sake without any other motive in mind. Then, and only
then, does happiness flow in its wake. The notion that Aristotles ethics is a selfrealization ethics or a self-actualization ethics is not exactly accurate. It is a selfrealization ethics if one realizes that the self that one is realizing is the moral self.
The contentment that follows is not that which one is seeking in or by the individual
acts performed (though it may be an overall goal of ones entire life). It is a natural
15
complement to activity appropriate to ones realized nature.

Aristotle is frequently classified today by ethicists as an eudaemonist, that
is, as standing for an ethics of self-realization or self-actualization. Probably, this
classification is derived from the way in which Aristotle constructs his arguments
in the Nicomachean Ethics. One way in which Aristotle frames his argument is the
following. He starts out by saying that all human beings will agree that the purpose
of life is to achieve happiness. He says that we must carefully consider in what
happiness consists. Ethics, for Aristotle, is the way in which humans achieve the
proper sort of happiness that belongs to human creatures. His argument contains two
threads. One thread is the attempt to show that, from the nature of human beings,
human beings cannot achieve happiness by pursuing pleasure, wealth and honor.
Thus, we already have a clue that profit making cannot be the road to happiness for
Aristotle and hence cannot be a course that he recommends.
Another thread is that in determining the end-goal that mankind should strive
for, one should choose an end-goal that is not for the sake of something else, but
that is pursued for its own sake. Otherwise, one would forever be chasing a less
than ultimate goal. Such a goal, if not stable as an end-goal, would not enable one
to achieve happiness because of its instability. One would not be able to sustain a
pursuit of it and thus would fall into unhappiness.
Aristotle makes his case in terms of combining the two threads of his argument.
The unique nature of the human animal is rational and thus it is this part of human
nature that must be exercised and fulfilled to bring true human happiness. Pleasure
taken from eating, for example, is shared with other animals and thus this would be
insufficient to produce human happiness. We must find the connection between the
highest part of human beings, our reason, and thus the unique way in which we can
achieve happiness. Otherwise, the happiness we might achieve would not be lasting
and, it would not be appropriate.
We can interpolate his arguments in this way. Money is a means to an end. It is
not an end in itself. It is pursued for what one can buy with it. Aristotle thinks that for
the most part, money would be pursued for the sake of pleasure. Pleasure, he takes
to be the condition of happiness, but not sufficient for happiness. Human happiness
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Robert E. Allinson
must be something that can last a lifetime. In his famous phrase, one swallow does
not make a summer.2 Pleasure, or creature comforts what money can buy - is not
suitable as an ultimate goal for human beings, because what it could buy would either
be ignoble - since it would be shared with the life goal of a mollusk or, it would be
meaningless, since entertainment is pursued as a relaxation so that one can refresh
oneself for fulfilling activity, not as an end in itself.3 Honor or reputation would
depend upon those who bestowed it, and thus would not be self-sustaining. Wisdom
does not depend on any outside source and thus can depend upon itself.
The pursuit of wisdom by itself can be accomplished purely through exercising
our rational nature, but such a pursuit of pure contemplation is too high a goal to set
for most human beings. We must use our rationality to conduce to human happiness
in a way that is achievable by all human beings. All human beings (assuming a normal
I.Q., level and physical health) can use their reason to make ethical choices. Thus, it
is in the area of ethics that all human beings can engage their reason. By exercising
our reason in the area of ethics, we can all achieve the kind of happiness that will be
satisfying to our human natures.
Happiness for Aristotle cannot be a passive state of mind, but must involve
action. Noble acts which are a class of actions in and of themselves are the only actions
that all human beings can sustain throughout the course of ones lifetime and are not
pursued for any other goal outside of themselves. Of course, Aristotle recognizes that
some degree of material sufficiency is necessary for lifetime happiness, so he does
not exclude this. He just does not see this as forming the main goal of ones lifetime
activities.
It may be difficult for us to understand Aristotles idea of happiness, because
it is not confined to a subjective feeling or a state of mind. Virtuous activity is for
Aristotle in the end what comprises happiness.4 While this is accompanied by a
state of mind, it is the state of mind that only attends the performance of ethical
actions. Such a state of happiness is thus defined by the activity that produces it rather
2
Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a18-19.
Nicomachean Ethics, 1176b29-37.
Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a16.
17
than by the end feeling state. While this choice may be moot whether to define
happiness by the state of mind that accompanies virtuous acts or by the virtuous
activity Aristotle chooses to define happiness by the activity so as to preclude
confusing this state of mind with similar states of mind which might arise from
very different activities. While this choice results in an awkward identification of
what we consider to be a mental state with action, Aristotle prefers this definitional
disadvantage to the more risky consequence of coming down on the side of defining
happiness as a state of mind which could be then possibly be achieved by some
other means. He does present arguments on the side of activity so as not to confuse
happiness with a state of sleep for example but, such arguments, while important,
do not entirely do away with the awkwardness of identifying happiness with action.
(For example, in the case of contemplation, it could be argued that this does not
constitute activity and yet affords happiness). Another way of attempting to sort
out this difficulty is to envision the sort of happiness that virtuous actions afford
as occurring simultaneously with the performance of the virtuous act. In this sense,
happiness cannot come into being saved at the moment of performing the virtuous
action. Happiness is the felt side of the activity performed, not a state of contentment
produced by the activity. If we understand Aristotle in this way, the happiness that is
produced by ethical acts only is felt simultaneously with the performance. It is not
a lasting state. It requires us, so to speak, to act ethically in a continuous fashion.
Happiness, in this light, is not an effect; it is the feeling side of virtuous activity.
Aristotles concept of happiness cannot be separated from his concept of ethical
action. The objection, for example, that many would bring against the notion of the
integration of happiness and ethical action is that ethical action would be undertaken
for the sake of happiness and thus would lack ethical intention. One hears such
objections in the form of, You gave that beggar money so that you could ease your
own guilt. Of course, such an objection can be countered with the answer of what
difference does it make; what matters is that the beggar received some needed money.
For Aristotle, there is another answer available. For Aristotle, there is no separation
between feeling happy and performing an ethical act. You should feel happiness when
you perform an ethical action, because ethics is the only and therefore the proper way
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Robert E. Allinson
in which all human beings gain lasting and complete happiness. Happiness is the
sign, for Aristotle, that one has performed an action appropriate to the nature of a
human being. It is a natural state and hence when nature is fulfilled, happiness must
be the result. Happiness is the crown, as he puts it, of an action. In fact, Aristotle
even says that the man who does not rejoice in ethical acts is not even good.5 How
opposite is this to Kant who thought that if one were to gain happiness from ethical
acts, such acts could not be considered moral. Confucius also thought that ethics was
natural to human beings though he did not link it with the achievement of happiness.
One might object that the above argument is flawed because Aristotle also has
said that, none of the moral virtues arise in us by nature nor contrary to nature;
rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.6 His
saying that we are adapted by nature to receive them must mean that nature intended
that the fullest development of the human being was the moral human being. But, on
the other hand, there were those whose nature was either not adapted to receive moral
virtues and thus was corrupt and not a true human nature. As the Stagirite says, But
then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and
not in things which are corrupted.7 Aristotle states that there are bad or corrupted
natures.8 In these cases, men are presumably not adapted by nature to receive moral
virtues and such persons would not be capable of enjoying the kind of happiness
that ensues from performing noble actions. The concept of corrupted natures enables
Aristotle to avoid a blanket statement about whether human nature is good or evil by
nature. In one sense, human beings are good by nature which is proved by the fact
that happiness follows from the performance of good acts. In another sense, there are
empirical examples of those for whom this is not true. In these cases, human nature
is flawed, as in the example of someone born with one arm.
There is another way in which the occurrence of evil can be explained. In a
famous passage, Aristotle states that man, when perfected, is the best of animals,
5
Politics, 1254a36-38.
Politics, 1254a40-b2.
19
but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all.9 This might imply
that a human being, brought up in a lawless or unjust society would not be capable
of receiving moral virtues. This would seemingly imply that even those human
beings whose nature was adapted to receive moral virtues would not be capable of
doing so if brought up in a context in which there were no laws and no justice.
To return to our analysis of Aristotles views on profits. If performing moral acts
is the route to human fulfillment and happiness, then making profits is, by definition,
immoral since one mans profit is another mans loss and this would therefore be the
commission of an immoral act. The implication for Aristotle would be though he
does not state this outright - that this would also be the road to unhappiness for the doer.
One could put the core of the Aristotelian argument in the following way.
If performing just actions is the goal that mankind should set its eyes upon, then
the achievement of justice must be, for Aristotle, a goal that he valued most highly.
Even though Aristotle appears to couch his argument in eudaemonistic terms, that
is, it is for the sake of individual happiness that each individual should pursue this
goal, the consequences of Aristotles individualistic goal, must be the production
of a public justice. This is the logical consequence of following Aristotelian ethics.
This consequence could not have escaped such a thinker as Aristotle, a thinker whom
for the next thousand years would be simply referred to as, The Philosopher. It
follows from this that any action or set of actions that produced injustice would not
be countenanced by Aristotle. Hence, Aristotle would not endorse profit seeking,
since profit by its very nature produces injustice, that is, it disadvantages one side of
the transaction in order to advantage the other side.
According to Sir Ernest Barker, who edited and translated The Politics of
Aristotle, Aristotle speaks out against retail trade for exactly this reason. Sir Ernests
interpretation of Aristotle is that the very idea of gaining from another man is wrong.
In Sir Ernests translation of a revealing passage in the Politics, with his accompanying
commentary, We can thus see that retail trade (which buys from others to sell at a
profit), is not naturally a part of the art of acquisition. If that were the case, it would
only be necessary to practice exchange to the extent that sufficed for the needs of
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both parties (and not to the extent of the making of profit by one of the parties at the
expense of the other).10
Aristotle regards the taking advantage of another as morally condemnatory.
In Aristotles words, There are two forms of wealth-getting as I have said; one
is a part of household management; the other is retail trade; the former necessary
and honourable; while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is
unnatural and a mode by which men gain from one another.11 For one man to gain
from another is for Aristotle a subject of moral condemnation and is unnatural!
Another line of Aristotles thinking is that the concept of the natural has to do with
limits. What is natural to Aristotle is what is limited. The acquisition of wealth by the
art of household management is limited. He is aware that in trade, in contrast, all who
are engaged in acquisition increase their fund of currency without any limit or pause.
Aristotles views of profit making bear careful analysis. The word he uses in
Greek is chrematistic which translates as the art of acquisition. He regards this as
sound when it refers to what he regards as the natural forms of acquisition that are
necessary for household and state needs and unsound when practiced for individual
purposes that exceed ones needs, i.e., profit.
Aristotle does not endorse profit from retail trade precisely because it involves
injustice to other men. For Aristotle, The natural form, therefore, of the art of
acquisition, is always, and in all cases, acquisition from fruits and animals. (This
does open Aristotle to the charge that this could involve injustice to animals).
Aristotle says that the pursuit of profit is evil. One sees Aristotles elevation of
ethical action in all activities in one particularly telling example. He endorses private
ownership which is the keynote of capitalism. But, his reason for the endorsement is
that it affords the owner the opportunity for ethical action, that is, to share.12 If there
is no private property, the owner has nothing to share and hence his or her ethical
nature is stunted. The acquisition of private property is not advocated because it is
10
Sir Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, London, Oxford New York, Oxford University Press,
1958, p. 23.
11
Politics 1258b1-2.
12
Politics, 1263a39-41; 1263b12-14.
21
the right of the individual to own or to prosper as it is for John Locke. The acquisition
of private property is endorsed because it provides an opportunity to perform ethical
actions. By the same token, the possession of money is endorsed when it is used for
liberal actions. As Aristotle says, The liberal man will need money for the doing of
his liberal deeds.13
One may argue that Aristotles identification of happiness with virtuous
activity is not compelling. In order to properly understand Aristotle one would have
to take all of his different arguments into account. No one of them by themselves
is totally convincing. But, taken together, they do make a powerful case. One must
take into account his set of arguments, borrowed from his master Plato, that a human
being cannot be content by simply pursuing a life of pleasure, for example. One must
also take into account his argument, also borrowed from his master Plato, that the
pursuit of wealth does not produce happiness, but a state of endless desires and hence
endless unhappiness. When one puts all of his arguments together, one understands
that for Aristotle, the pursuit of the proper definition of happiness not happiness
itself is the real goal. Once one understands that in which happiness really consists,
one will choose the right sort of life. Economic activity is a sub-set of ethics. It would
be perverse to attempt to define economics on its own, because all action must be
defined relative to the role that it plays in the human being achieving happiness.
Some might criticize eudaemonism as not being ethically relevant, because
one should act justly whether or not it produces happiness. It is important to keep in
mind that for Aristotle, one does not act ethically because it produces happiness. Just
acts are to be performed for their own sakes; it is only when they are performed for
their own sakes that happiness is the product. Thus, ones life is oriented to acting
ethically to relieve the suffering of others.
There is also the possible objection that one should not focus on developing
moral character as this diverts one from bringing about social justice. While this is a
fine objection and every ethical theory should be challenged by alternate models the
advantage of the moral character approach is that one would naturally perform ethical
acts were one to have developed ones moral character perhaps more efficaciously
13
22
Robert E. Allinson
than if one were to be simply exhorted to be just regardless of ones inclinations.

It is even argued that focusing on ones individual character development does not
conduce to others developing their individual character development. This argument
misses the point since all individuals are being counseled to build their individual
character development and no one is omitted from this ethical counsel. Indeed, it
could be argued that if one were to pay attention to others character development, one
would neglect ones own character development and hence diminish the likelihood
of one performing ethical acts. This point may well explain the inefficacy of the
counsel of altruism. Such counsel has done little to improve the ethical condition of
humankind. If everyone is focused on improving the moral character of others, each
individual can easily avoid taking moral responsibility for ones own actions.
There is no need for a conflict between deontology, character ethics and
a concern for social justice since, for Aristotle, one builds ones moral character
only by performing just actions, and thus the debate between deontology, character
building and a concern for social justice is a pseudo-conflict. One must bear in mind
that one performs just acts only for their own sake, not for the sake of building
moral character or achieving social justice. The building of moral character and the
achievement of a just society is the consequence of deontology, not the motivation.
In the end, one must also remember that arguments of philosophers in general
and Aristotle is no exception, when they bear on the subject of ethics, are prescriptive
and not simply descriptive. They cannot be totally convincing as logical arguments
on their own. The philosopher wishes that such arguments will persuade others to
become more ethical in their intentions and actions. But, such persuasion does not
carry the force of compulsion. It is still a choice. And, such arguments are designed
to set a goal for humanity to follow, not to convince by unassailable logic that such
a choice must be followed.
Aristotles idea of morality, in which the Golden Mean does figure, advocates
a middle path, rather than an extreme. This is true except in the case of goodness,
in which case, there is no problem in extremes. However, Aristotle does say that for
total happiness, material welfare must be secured so he does not rule out material
well being. Wealth for Aristotle should be limited to what is necessary to run ones
23
household. An excess of wealth over this, is to his mind, unnecessary.14 The current
notion of the maximization of profits would be an anathema to Aristotle.
My late friend and colleague Robert Solomon once wrote, Aristotle despised
the financial community and more generally, all of what we would call profit seeking.
He argued that goods should be exchanged for their real value, their costs including a
fair wage for those who produced them but he then concluded, mistakenly, that any
profit (that is, over and above costs) required some sort of theft (for where else could that
surplus value come from) All trade, Aristotle believed was a kind of exploitation.15
It is not clear why Solomon interjected the adverb mistakenly in his
exposition. The real question Aristotle was raising was, where does value come
from? While economists today would criticize the concept of real value, saying
that value is simply determined by supply and demand, Aristotles point is that value
should be related to costs and labor, not market forces. The problem of leaving value
at the mercy of market forces is that it will be determined inequitably.16
The only way to accomplish Aristotles goal in economics would be to
introduce a value based economics which, while not explicitly adopted by Aristotle,
is consistent with his general outlook for human motivation. Human motivation,
for Aristotle, should be guided by moral acts and just acts. Thus, to extrapolate an
economic theory for planetary action from Aristotle, we may say that action that
produced goods and services that were for the good of all and did not create disvalue,
would fall under the general category of moral actions.
So, while Aristotle argues against the pursuit of wealth unlike his master Plato
who countenances it for the merchant class wealth, that is, benefit that is enough to
take care of ones physical needs, must come from somewhere. For Aristotle, it must
come from plants and animals. It follows that the making of money, so long as it is a
secondary aim, is not irrelevant as a life goal. Making money morally, that is, without
taking advantage of another, would be the key as Aristotle speaks out against profit.
14
Robert C. Solomon, Historicism, Communitarianism and Commerce, Peter Koslowski (ed.),

Contemporary Economic Ethics, Berlin: Springer, (1999), p. 119.
15
16
Cf., Robert Elliott Allinson, Circles within a Circle: The Condition for the Possibility of Ethical
Business Institutions within a Market System, Journal of Business Ethics 53: 17-28, 2004.
24
Robert E. Allinson
It should be noted that, Aristotle, as over against Socrates, does endorse having more
than minimal material needs met.
Apart from its needs for liberality, money making for Aristotle is a kind of
necessary evil, not a good in itself. Consider his statement, The life of moneymaking is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is not evidently the good
that we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else.17
The main lesson is for society. A society that is geared towards moral
development would be a different sort of society than a society that is geared towards
GNP. The proper society is for Aristotle the only way in which ethics can be realized.
Aristotles views cannot be identified with the idea of producing GNH or gross
national happiness. That would be to put the cart before the horse. Society is for the
sake of providing a venue to perform noble actions. That is its entire reason for being.
Happiness is the result of that. If one puts happiness first, one might easily lose the
point that happiness is only achieved through the performance of noble actions.
Character building is, for Aristotle, a means to an end. The end is not
the development of ones individual character. The end is the performance of
that character in society. Creating a moral character is a better way to ensure the
production of moral action than to simply counsel humans to perform noble acts.
That is why it is difficult to classify Aristotle as simply a deontologist (do what is
right), a utilitarian (do what produces the consequence of the greatest happiness for
society) or a virtue ethicist (build up your moral virtues). In his scheme of things,
it is only by being a deontologist that one can become a virtue ethicist. One recalls
his famous saying, One becomes just by performing just acts.18 And, it is only in
the performance of these acts that one achieves human happiness. Otherwise, one
creates an unethical society, of man pitted against man. And, such a society, in turn,
makes individual ethics difficult to practice. Such a society cannot help but produce
economic inequality and planetary devastation. More than this, guidance by the
principle of the maximization of profit, leads to a world society in which individual
morality is qualitatively degraded. The performance of unethical acts, to invert
17
18
25
Aristotle, produces an unethical character. The more profit we seek to maximize, the
more unethical we become.
Our only hope to save the world both from injustice and ultimately, to a world
that is unsustainable, is a return to morality. Aristotelian ethics is a well thought
out approach. If the world, as a whole, could be considered a household, Aristotles
economics, literally a redundant phrase since for Aristotle economics is home
economics, there is hope for a sustainable planet. Aristotles economics, an economics
guided by ethical principles and especially the ethical principle of justice, offers a
way out for our world which is spiraling out of control. The European Renaissance
was, as we know the second highest water mark reached by Western civilization.
It was, as we know, a renaissance of Greek culture. What is appropriate today is a
renaissance of ancient Greek thought, in particular Aristotelian ethics and economics.
Our global community, our global home, needs Aristotles home economics. We are
ready for a renaissance of Greek ethics and economics to set our world on the right
course to individual morality and global sustainability. Greek philosophy, far from
being a luxury of the thinker, is a necessity to save our world today.
References
Allinson, R.E., Circles within a Circle: The Condition for the Possibility of Ethical
Business Institutions within a Market System, Journal of Business Ethics, 53
(2004), 17-28.
Barker, E., The Politics of Aristotle, Oxford University Press, London 1958.
Jaeger, W., Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development, Clarendon
Press, Oxford 1934.
Solomon, R.C., Historicism Communitarianism and Commerce, in Koslowski, P.,
(ed), Contemporary Economic Ethics, Springer, Berlin 1999.
Dr. Robert E. Allinson
Professor of Philosophy
Soka University of America
USA
Marianna Benetatou
Abstract: Recasting and contextualizing are two important flexions undergone
by ancient theories or concepts during the process of studying them in correlation
(contrast included) with some alien subject-matter. Highlighting one theory by
another involves a complex mental geometry including modernization of vocabulary,
malleability of the subject-matter, intentionality of the comparativist and relation
to his/her vision of reality. A critical attitude perceives the limits of its own
comprehension by integrating them in the comparative process.
Neo-Daoism has greatly been influenced in respect to vocabulary, style and
overall purpose by its contact with ancient Greek philosophy, particularly with
Platonic ontology. Aristotelian and Confucian ethics briefly sketched in the paperconstitute another promising field of comparative reading.
Introduction
Reading the comparative strategies of authors from various backgrounds
provides the necessary scope in order to reflect on the constant flexions brought
about by the comparative process. The subject-matter, thus, becomes malleable
and compatible. By flexions I mean the process of highlighting some aspects of the
examined theories and downplaying others. However, such flexions do not appear
randomly. They rearrange the subject-matter according to a pattern observable in most
comparative studies. The recurrence makes flexions interesting as a philosophical
phenomenon determining a new style of philosophical discourse. Epistemologically,
we can speak of a comparative effect. It rises from the interaction of alien theories
with the philosophers project to find a meaning in a prima facies diverse material.
The subjectivity of the comparativist is pivotal in the process. The first step consists
27
in establishing a connection between the texts under study. The connection may take
the form of positive convergence or correlation, etc, or it may consist in contrasting
even conflicting views. It goes without saying that the comparativist does not act like
a puppeteer, moving the material according to a personal sense of what ought to be
a comparative process. A large part of ones determinism comes from culture and
ones own idiomatic conceptual pattern. The representation of reality, of values and
expectations either individual or collective equally determine the flexions at work in
a comparison.
Contextualization
The most salient feature of the process is perhaps contextualization. It may be
observed under two aspects.
The first aspect concerns the process of modernization of the theories under
scrutiny. By its very nature, comparative philosophy involves an important context in
order to render its subject-matter readable and intelligible. Already ancient theories
have to be rendered in a contemporary to the author vocabulary. Intellectual habits
and cultural premises are mobilized even without the consensus of the comparativist.
Usually, a third standpoint explicitly acquires the status of a standard, as for
example, modern scientific theories of various fields. By that endeavor, the need to
comprehend the interaction of the present with the past is brought to the foreground
of the philosophical discourse.
Formally, recasting affects the style and purpose of the compared theories.
For instance, a conventional distinction between ancient Chinese and ancient Greek
philosophy consists in stressing the practical nature of the first in contrast to the
theoretical nature of the second. In Confucian and Daoist context, philosophical
discourse is supposed to convey a practical learning. The reader, disciple or adept
may put it in practice or, at least, get motivated to follow it in ones personal lifestyle
and eventually influence the inner circle of the family and the outer circles of friends
and acquaintances. By a rippling movement, the beneficial influence of Confucian
or Daoist model of humanity, their values and moral teachings may reach society at
large, the state and even the world.
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Marianna Benetatou
Contemporary scholarship of ancient Greek philosophical tradition has

remained largely untouched by the contextualization trend. Theories are systematically
rendered in a nineteenth century conceptual frame. Abstraction of reasoning and
introspective proclivity is favored, as well as an overall theoretical model, aloof from
concrete situations. In consequence, it is easy to contrast Chinese and ancient Greek
philosophy on the grounds of philosophy of life versus philosophy of knowledge. The
contrast leads to the common sense question: What is the use of truth without practical
application? Inversely, what is the validity of practical learning without veracity?
Contextualization may well entail a second aspect. It determines the creative
process of mutual understanding of geographically remote but historically close
intellectual traditions. As we shall discuss later, Confucianism, for instance, may
contribute to understand the dynamic nature of ancient Greek virtue theory. It may
well be that the comparativist approach better explains the original intention of the
philosophers than the introvert commentarial tradition of Christian morality and later
the rationalist moral theories of the Enlightenment.
I shall discuss the recasting effect by reference to hermeneutics and ethics.
Hermeneutics
Daoist hermeneutics is a good example of the recasting effect. Traditional
Daoist texts present a specific structure. They start from a general statement about
the state of wu, lit. no, preceding the state of you, lit. to have. You unfolds motion
by the interplay of yin and yang. The ten thousand things are further transformed
by the interaction of the five phases (wu xing). The text usually goes on to list the
benefits obtained by quieting the spirit and calming the heart/mind. This inner state
is expressly considered to realize on the human level the state of the primordial
indeterminateness or of the beginning of Heaven and Earth.
A good example, but not the only one, is the first stance of the Laozi, well
known to everybody. After the general statement about the ineffability of constant
Dao and of constant name, the text goes on to declare wu as the beginning of
Heaven and Earth and you as the mother of the ten thousand things. Therefore,
-it enchains without transition- some people constantly dwell in wu while some
29
constantly dwell in you (Laozi, 1). The pattern is taken up by the majority of Daoist
commentators. Ge Hong (284-344? C.E.), famous theoretician and alchemist, begins
his treatise, the Baopuzi, by a concise version of the same motive. That which is
Dark is the primordial ancestor of Nature and the Great Forebear of the myriad
different [things] (1) Xuan is pregnant with the primordial One, universally casts
the identities of Yin and Yang and breathes out the breath of the great beginning. From
the One a hundred million substances have been formed (6). Therefore, where
Xuan is happiness is unceasing, where it withdraws, spirits depart and substances
become fragments (10).1
Ge Hong directly enchains the states of wu, here rendered by primordial
indeterminateness xuan, and you, here rendered by oneness yi, with happiness and
unhappiness. Such references can go on and on.
These examples let us think that a Daoist Classic usually suggests a model
in order to guide the adept through the different stages of self changing from an
ordinary mortal being to an immortal sage. Destined to serve as guideline, it is both
concise and allusive. Therefore, only the well versed adept or the one progressing
under the guidance of an experienced teacher may fully comprehend its meaning.
The difficulty resides less in the abstruseness of the ideas and more in the adepts
level of self cultivation. Self cultivation endows him/her with the necessary spiritual
awareness in order to internalize the teaching.
Concomitantly, a Daoist text does not give a description or an account of
objective reality. It expresses neither the authors viewpoint nor his/her ideas on
specific philosophical issues. It is not intended to transmit factual information or
data, does not engage in a rational inquiry of man and the universe and does not
express personal positions. It constitutes a model carefully interwoven in a highly
codified language. Therefore, hermeneutics do not consist in a verbal account, but in
the ability of the adept to self changing according to his/her spiritual level. The text
serves as a metaphysical vademecum. 2
1
Translated by Ji Zhang, One and Many. A Comparative Study of Platos Philosophy and Daoism
Represented by Ge Hong, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2012, pp. 1-2.
Historically Ge Hongs religiosity had driven him to compose the Baopuzi as the apologetics to
30
Marianna Benetatou
Contextualization often consists in recasting classical theories in the Platonic

ontological mould. For instance, two contemporary scholars, Ji Zhang and Xing
Lu 3 borrow heavily from ancient Greek jargon and style in order to present Daoist
classics as a contemporary answer to Greek metaphysics.
For Plato, realities are plural ideas-the immaterial causes according to
which physical things are made. For Ge Hong, the ultimate reality is Dao, and the
world is relational to Dao. From Dao the myriad things derive, and to Dao realities
will return. The former is causal, whereas the latter is relational .This ontological
difference underlines two contrary worldviews (Ji Zhang, One and Many, p. XIV).
The author now proceeds to present Laozis and Ge Hongs poetic stances as
the Daoist counterpart of the Platonic ontological argument. Compared with the
Greek One and Many debate, which mainly takes the form of logic, the Daoist One
and Many represented by Ge Hong is presented in the form of poetry. But beyond the
difference of genres, there is philosophy. The OM argument is analogically put as a
genealogical unfolding of life from one ancestor to many progeny (Ibidem, p. XV).
Furthermore, the intentionality of the comparativist is clearly expressed in the
project to correlate old and new, Daoism with modern scientific theories, particularly
the supersymmetry theory of cosmology. This is a daring project which transforms
its basic material in various ways.
First, the cosmogonical pattern of ancient Daoism is correlated with ancient
Greek ontology, particularly with Platonism. As previously underlined, the correlation
is made possible by an equivalence of vocabulary wu as no being and you as being.
Thus, the content can undergo the process of comparison.
The second step concerns both form and purpose. Texts from different
conceptual traditions are treated as conceptually compatible. Laozi is presented as
a philosopher in the Greek style. He examines different ideas, rejects or accepts
defend the quest for immortality to the face of Confucian criticisms, to justify Daoism as a valid path
to attain truth, and to systematize popular devotions by laying down key doctrines (Ji Zhang, One and
Many. A Comparative Study of Platos Philosophy and Daoism Represented by Ge Hong, University of
Hawaii Press, 2012, pp. 7-8).
3
Xing Lu, Rhetoric in Ancient China, Fifth to Third Century B.C.E. A Comparison with Classical Greek
Rhetoric, University of South Carolina Press, 1998.
31
theories and proceeds to advance his worldview in a poetic mode. In the process, the
practical significance of the cosmogonical process is downplayed.
The relation between something and nothing [you and wu respectively]
is not a subject negation, but a subject correlation. Ge Hong uses two words to
express the correlation: the word Xuan (the darkness) and the word Yi (the oneness).
They designate the not-being of Dao and the being of Dao respectively, or more
Platonically Xuan is transcendent in the darkness of the night sky; the oneness of Qi
is immanent in creation. Compared with Plato, who dichotomizes being and not
being, Ge Hong mainly treats them as partners (Ibidem,
Finally, the comparative study turns to modern scientific theories in order to
find corroboration for the validity of classical Daoism. Change is the fundamental
reality. And change is closely associated with the origin of matter. Subatomic changes
reveal what matter is. From the alchemical perspective, the most fundamental may
be neither a form of matter physically substantial and mathematically calculable nor
a numerical unity after all. It could be intrinsically dark, like Ge Hongs Xuan, and
as infinitely formless as Zhuangzis nothingness. The universe could have emerged
out of darkness and formlessness. Within the formless dark there rests its external
reality in the mode of changing formlessness into matter-form unity, namely Qi. This
ontological One keeps expanding. The primordial changeability is still present in the
universe and still engaged in the making of the many (Ibidem, pp. 265, 266).
The author goes on to correlate Ges cosmogony with the supersymmetry theory
of physics (p. 267). The theory tries to formulate a general theory which explains both
quantum particles and the theory of relativity. Matter and force, particularly gravity,
are unified with the other fundamental forces. The theory works on the hypothesis
that every matter particle has a shadow or dark matter particle (superparticle) which is
currently undetectable. And Ji Zhang comes to the conclusion that: The partnership
between particles and superparticles has a comparative similarity with the Daoist
relational ontology between something and nothing (p. 269).
The compatibility with modern science is supposed to confer an indisputable
truth to the old sayings. The practical significance of the teaching is transposed from
personal cultivation of the adept to a new conceptual pattern for science. The adept is
32
Marianna Benetatou
here replaced by the scientist and the quest for immortality and harmony by the quest
for a theory based on Daoist tenets.
Aristotelian and Confucian Concepts of Virtue
The second instance of observing the recasting effect concerns ethics. I shall
discuss it briefly in respect to Confucian ethics. The comparison with the Aristotelian
theory of virtue and of supreme good has become a locus classicus of comparative
studies. I shall take the issue to an altogether different ground. Aristotelian and, by
that matter, ancient Greek ethics may profitably be clarified by a close study along
with Confucian ethics. The co-reading does not intend to establish correlations or to
recast theories. It proposes to clarify the nature of Aristotelian virtue theory. In fact,
Aristotelian ethics have greatly been obscured by Christian morality and later by
the general tendency of the Enlightenment to rationalization. Both have interpreted
ancient ethics as consisting mainly in the inner moral disposition. Good intention,
says Kant, is morality. Therefore, we cannot know for sure who and what is moral,
because the outward expression of the inner disposition may be faltering, weak, or
inefficient.
Aristotle speaks of virtue as disposition (hexis), i.e. a permanent tendency to
think, speak and act in tune with the time and circumstances and in good measure
according to reason. Virtue needs validation by its external effects, including
moderate personal behavior and the multifaceted benefits for friends, family and the
city. Confucian ethics, based on humane and appropriate behavior, may contribute in
reconsidering the importance of action versus inner disposition in Aristotelian ethics.
Classic and Hellenistic philosophers hardly envisage virtue as a psychological
instance, externalized in moral action. Virtue is rather a constant power or aptitude to
do what is right. Aristotelian virtue brings about harmony in whatever it is involved
with. It is not just the intention of doing the good; it is inseparable from the aptitude
to realize the intention by the appropriate actions.
Conclusions
Recasting and contextualizing are the two major methodological tools of
33
the comparativist. Trying to understand the old by the new in a historical reading
may operate major modifications, such as enriching the old texts with an innovative
intentionality, selecting what corresponds to our vision of reality, renovating
vocabulary and, by that matter, ideas in the light of our representation of the world.
The comparison between theories of different intellectual traditions may be
stimulating, but involves also some dangers. The most common consists in trying
to find similarities and contrasts. I think that this stage is amateurish and highlights
mainly the comparativists wishful thinking.
The most promising issue is without doubt to open new perspectives and new
fields of investigation by means of the comparative process. For instance, think
conjointly of the possible and not only of the real in Platonic and Daoist philosophy.
Or again the practical significance of virtue in Aristotelian ethics highlighted by
Confucian ethics.
Finally, many concepts may be creatively elucidated by a correlative reading.
I gave an example in respect to Daoist cosmogony, Platonic ontology and modern
supersymmetry theory.
It may well be that the correlative reading, notwithstanding various intellectual
traps, comports the best option for a multifaceted reading of the past in the light of
the present.
Dr Marianna Benetatou
Lecturer of Comparative Philosophy
Beijing University
Athens
Sophia Boudouri
Political and Ethical Views of Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound
Abstract: The great tragic poet Aeschylus creates his works in order to, among
other things, educate Athenian citizens. That is why his words and statements have
the character of practical philosophy and ethics. Thus, in his Prometheus Bound,
he articulates very important thoughts and views about political and ethical life of
people who live in political communities. In that work, Aeschylus condemns every
possible form of tyranny (even the form of rule exercised by Zeus the monarch), and
rightfully assumes that every new rule shows its character and, since it is tyrannical,
is very harsh and cruel so as to preserve its unity. Zeuss tyranny is a bad form of
rule and generally unscrupulous tyranny is a hateful state, without friends and is
instead surrounded by cliques and flatterers. In that state violence, corruption, fraud,
arrogance, hubris, injustice and treason prevail. Against tyranny rises the titan, the
giver of light and philanthropist Prometheus who, apart from other things, symbolizes
the beings that can prosper and create only in the regime of freedom, e.g. where there
are responsible governments. Such an environment promotes the virtues of freedom,
opposition to violence, trust, gratefulness, philanthropy, courage and justice. It is
important and specific that, in the tragedy, these ideas are not posed in a simply
theoretical manner, but are convictions-messages intertwined with and embodied in
life and actions, and are represented through the actions of the protagonists and other
characters that make up this tragedy.
1. Introductory Remarks
In the present paper I focus my attention to Aeschylus work Prometheus
Bound and more specifically to the ethical and political conceptions of the great
tragic poet. Therefore, first, I note the passages with primarily ethical and socialpolitical significance, I analyze their contents and further emphasize Aeschylus
35
views on the value of democracy (as the political system that assigns responsibilities)
and his condemnation of willful tyrannical rule, or the uncontrollable governing of
one person.
Viewed from this perspective, Prometheus Bound is, among other things, a
dramatic work with ethical and political content.
2. Remarks
The rich mythological material on the clash of the Titans and generally between
different deities that is already given in Homer and mainly in Hesiod (Theogony)
naturally influences Aeschylus thought (but also that of other tragic poets) and is
doubtlessly present in Prometheus Bound.1 It has been clearly and amply noted that
the mythology about the clash, the overturning and succession of the situations in
In the past there were doubts whether Prometheus Bound is a genuine work of Aeschylus. One of
the main reasons was the image of Zeus that Aeschylus creates in his work. For this, see Albin Lesky,
History of Ancient Greek Literature (Greek translation by A.Tsopanakis, Salonica 1990, p. 354 and
367-369) and P.E. Easterling and B.M.W. Knox, History of Ancient Greek Literature (Greek translation,
Papademas Publications, Athens 1999, p. 384-386).
If we accept the genuineness of the work (as does Gilbert Murray, with whom I agree), then the problem
arises as to the place this work has in relation to the other six preserved works by Aeschylus. Was it
written in the end or at the beginning of his writing life? Taking as a fact that Orestia premiered around
458 BC, and bearing in mind the image of Zeus in that tragedy, my estimate is that Prometheus Bound
(and generally Prometheus) might be a very early work, especially if one takes into consideration its
political, ethical and theological dimension.
It is more reasonable to assume that Aeschylus writes Prometheus Bound early and in that period creates
the image of Zeus as a new totalitarian and cruel tyrant in the sense that every new rule (as the only
rule) is usually very harsh and cruel in the beginning, and that it slowly begins to soften later on, after
it has established itself. It would be unreasonable to suppose that, otherwise respectful Aeschylus (who
generally accepts Hesiods cosmogony and his views about gods), decided towards the end of his life
to consider Zeus as hard, monarchic and cruel tyrant. On the other hand, if Aeschylus in other works
of the (lost) trilogy came to form a different, softer image of Zeus, then one cannot exclude the later
chronology of the work.
It is also noteworthy that in verses 848-874 of Prometheus Bound Aeschylus announces that which he
dramatizes in The Suppliants, which shows that Prometheus Bound precedes The Suppliants, which is
considered to be an early work.
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Sophia Boudouri
the world of deities has anthropological (social) and political significance,2 but it first
acquires a dramatic form and artistic expression in Aeschylus.
The Plot3 of Prometheus Bound makes the conflict between deities visible,
but does not reveal the deeper reasons for the clash, which are related to the way
in which Zeus exercises his power. That happens through the adaptation of the
mythological material within the tragedy (and indeed at its beginning), which is done
in an exquisite manner and with an unprecedented creativity so as to render the work
a great artistic and dramatic creation.
Of course, the value of a tragedy is assessed with respect to the effect it has and
the results it achieves in the soul of the normal spectator. It is, therefore, appraised
on the whole, from the commencement of the performance until its end. However,
in every tragedy (including Prometheus Bound) there are some crucial moments of
intensification of the tragic momentum, which moments, taken on the whole, show
the greatness of the work.
In Prometheus Bound these moments are the following:
a. The initial appearance of Prometheus together with Violence (), the
Power () and Hephaestus, who enchain him and bind him to the
rock of Caucasus.
b. The bold statements spoken by the titan Prometheus in the dialogue he
has with the Chorus, where he vehemently attacks Zeus.
c. The moment when Prometheus, at first indirectly, reveals that he knows
the secret of the demise and the end of Zeus rule.
d. The appearance on the stage of Io, who is also one of Zeus victims, and
e. Certain lyrical verses of the Chorus of the Oceanides that lament the
sufferings of Prometheus, sympathize with the titan and take his side.
In the first passage, which contains verses 1-35 and 36-87, the Power (K)
2
See, among others, K. Boudouris, Lectures in Political Philosophy (in Greek), Athens 1984, p. 43.
The Plot is the following:

.
3
37
converses with Hephaestus (while Violence remains mute and unaffected). This
dialogue shows that disobedience to power is indeed harshly punished when the ruling
tyrant is new and self-willful. However, the crack in such power is immediately made
visible when Hephaestus says he would rather not practice the art of blacksmith
for then he could avoid this unpleasant work, e.g. the nailing of Prometheus to the
rock of Caucasus. Therefore, he acts against his will and mourns the fate of the
titan but cannot do otherwise because he cannot ignore the order of the father of the
gods (Zeus), since anyway nobody is free to do whatever he wants, except Zeus.
In addition, Hephaestus says that Prometheus exceeded some limits with his action
and because of that, according to Hephaestus, is not entirely innocent. Thus, the
conversation acquires depth and the dramatic effect intensifies.
The relevant passages are the following:
a. Prometheus Bound,1-35
POWER:
Weve come to the ends of the earth,
to Scythia, barren and deserted.
Now, Hephaestus, carry out the orders
of your father Zeus: shackle our criminal
here to this towering cliff, in unbreakable
chains made of adamant. He stole your flower,
the shining fire of creativity,
and gave it to Man. This was his crime:
he must pay the penalty to the gods
and learn to love Zeuss tyranny
instead of his absurd devotion to Man.
HEPHAESTUS
Power and Force, youre perfect representatives
for carrying out the orders of Zeus:
nothing is beyond you. I cant bring myself
to chain a relative by force to this icy cliff,
but I have to do this since I know well. Its no
38
Sophia Boudouri
light offense to disobey commands from Zeus.
To Prometheus
Wise son of Themis who advises well,
with both of us unwilling, I must chain you
to this rocky cliff in bronze fetters which
no one can release, where you will never hear
the voice of Man, nor see his shape, but the
sun will beat down mercilessly, withering
your fair skin. You will be happy when Night
in her starry robes will hide the suns bright rays,
but they will return at dawn to melt the frozen dew.
Every day your cares will weigh you down,
for the man to release you is not yet born.
Look what you earned for loving Man too much;
you were a god who defied gods and gave
gifts to Man, far beyond what they deserved.
So you are posted to guard this joyless cliff,
upright, sleepless: you cant bend your knees.
You will shed many a useless tear, and cry out
your sorrow, but Zeus has a heart of stone,
like all tyrants who just have come to power.4
b. Prometheus Bound, 45-69
HEPHAESTUS
I curse my skill. My craft is a heavy burden.
POWER
Dont despise your craft! Its clearly not to blame
for this present problem.
HEPHAESTUS
I wish someone else were chosen to do this.
Prometheus Bound, Preface, Notes and Translation by Marianne McDonald, 2008.

POWER
We all have to obey orders, except
the god who rules: for no one is free but Zeus. 50
HEPHAESTUS
What were doing proves it; youre right.
POWER
Hurry and put the chains in place. You dont want
our father to see you wasting time.
HEPHAESTUS
Here are his handcuffs and chains. Are you blind?
POWER
Put them on and use your strength to hammer
them into the cliff; make sure hes secure.
HEPHAESTUS
There. Im at it. He cannot escape without help.
POWER
Drive them in deeper. Make sure everything is tight,
Hes very clever at wriggling out of trouble.
HEPHAESTUS
That arms secure; he wont escape those chains.
POWER
Secure this one too: he has to learn hes nothing
by comparison to Zeus, for all his cleverness.
HEPHAESTUS
Hes the only one who can criticize my work.
POWER
Now drive this stake of adamantine
right through his chest with all your force.
HEPHAESTUS
Oh, Prometheus, I weep for your sufferings.
39
40
Sophia Boudouri
POWER
Wingeing again? Pitying Zeuss enemies, are you?
Youd better watch out for your own day of suffering.
HEPHAESTUS
You see a sight that calls for tears.5
c. Prometheus Bound ,144-193
CHORUS
I see you, Prometheus.
I fear for you. I see
Through a mist of tears
Your wasted body,
Fettered and hanging
On this cliff.
New gods run Olympus now;
Zeus secures his unlawful power
By new laws; he obliterates
What once was mighty.
PROMETHEUS
I wish Zeus had thrust me below the earth,
Into the bottomless pit of Tartarus,
Beyond Hades that welcomes the dead.
Although he fasten me brutally
With unyielding chains,
At least no god, or any other might come
To gloat over me; then I would not
Have to endure the scorn of my enemies
As I do now, hanging here, a plaything of winds.
CHORUS
What god is so cruel
Prometheus Bound, Preface, Notes and Translation by Marianne McDonald, 2008.

As to rejoice at what you suffer?
Who does not sympathize with you except Zeus?
But he nurses his anger in his inflexible mind,
While he oppresses the offspring of Uranus;
He will not end this
Until his heart is satisfied,
Or someone by some clever trick
Overthrows his adamantine rule.
PROMETHEUS
There will come a time, although Im
Tortured, constrained by strong chains,
When this Leader of the Immortals
Will need me to reveal the new plot
To deprive him of both rule and honors.
But he will get nothing from me.
No honeyed words or charms,
Nor grim threats will pry out
This secret until he releases me
From this savage bondage
And makes reparation
For all the abuse Ive had to suffer.
CHORUS
Youre a bold one, and
Are not subdued by your bitter pain,
But you speak a bit too freely.
Fear pierces my heart
And I am afraid what will happen to you.
Into what harbor
Will you steer your ship
To end your voyage of pain?
The child of Cronus is stubborn
41
42
Sophia Boudouri
And his heart knows no sympathy.
PROMETHEUS
I know how cruel Zeus is,
And how he holds justice fast in his fist,
But one day his thoughts will soften,
When he is broken by my secret.
When his blind rage calms down, 190
He will rush into my willing arms
To welcome his newfound friend.
d. Prometheus Bound 735-751
PROMETHEUS
.Doesnt it seem to you that the lord of the gods
is excessively cruel in every way? For
this god not only wanted to lure her into sexual
union, but then damned her to wandering.
Poor girl, you have found yourself the suitor
from hell, and the story you have heard was
only the beginning of a long tale to come.
IO
Io moi moi, e e!
PROMETHEUS
What? Moaning again? What are you going to do
when you hear all that lies in store for you?
CHORUS
You dont mean to say that theres more suffering to come?
PROMETHEUS
An unimaginable stormy sea of torture!
IO
Why should I continue to live? Why dont
I throw myself from this jagged cliff, so that,

crashing to the ground, I make an end to
all my troubles? Its better to die once,
than live an entire life suffering torment.6
e. Prometheus Bound,397-435
CHORUS
I mourn your grim fate, Prometheus.
Tears flood from my eyes
To moisten my cheeks with
Their flowing stream. 400
Zeus rules tyrannically.
Making up his rules as he goes,
Scornfully lording
His might over
The older gods.
The whole earth groans and weeps;
Lamented is the splendor of your
Former honor,
Honor that was yours
And your brothers. 410
All those
Who live in holy Asia
Share your suffering;
They add their tears to the lament
As do those who live in Colchis,
Amazons, fearless in battle,
And the many Scythians
Who live in that far-flung place
Next to the Maeotic Lake.
And the war-seasoned flower of Arabia,
6
Prometheus Bound, Preface, Notes and Translation by Marianne McDonald 2008.
43
44
Sophia Boudouri
Who live in a lofty city
In mountains near the Caucasus
A fierce army that thunders its war cry
In battles with sharpened spears.
Only one other Titan have I seen,
A god suffering
In relentless constraint,
Atlas, the strongest of all,
Who holds the heavens on his back
And groans.
The falling waves shout out their splashing lament;
Black Hades answers by rumbling
Deep under the earth,
Rivers with clear-flowing streams
Moan as they pity your pain.7
These passages (as well as other) show that, as he uses and represents the
mythological material in Prometheus Bound, Aeschylus deepens and talks about
issues that on one hand refer mainly to the world of gods (and the relationships
among gods, divinities and men), but on the other hand his aim,8 as has already been
said, can only be to show what could happen primarily in the world of men; since,
apart from other things, Prometheus is exactly that one Titan that cares about the
good of man (it is about Prometheus philanthropic trope). Basically, in this work
Aeschylus contemplates about the structure of tyrannical rule, about the clashes of
the gods, about the relationship between gods and men (abut the erotic relationships
among gods and men) and generally poses ethical, political and theological questions
(which also as such have crucial ethical significance).
7
8
Prometheus Bound, Preface, Notes and Translation by Marianne McDonald 2008
For the description of how Aeschylus relates the two worlds and connects the events in the world of
gods with the world of men, see Anthony J. Podlecki, The Political Background of the Aeschylian Tragedy, second edition, Bristol Classical Press 1999, p. 21-22: action on the human plane is paralleled by
causation on the divine.
45
3. Political and ethical questions and problems in Prometheus Bound

The political and simultaneously ethical (or in reverse, ethical and
simultaneously political) issues that are posed in Prometheus Bound are
the following:
1. What is the structure of a new uncontrollable tyrannical rule?
2. How is such a rule preserved?
3. What are the tools and means used by such a rule?
4. What is its relationship towards those who disagree with it?
5. What ethical and other related questions emerge in the tragedy through
the relationship between Zeus and Prometheus, and what is Aeschylus
view of the ruler of the gods in Prometheus Bound, but also what is
generally the order of things in the world of gods and of men.
Zeus as the new ruler9 in the world of gods imposes himself through power
(kratos) and violence (bia). Thus also in the case of Prometheus Bound he imposes
with his kratos (with his personal strength) and with crude power (bia) he imposes,
with the help of Hephaestus, the punishment on the titan Prometheus for stealing fire
from the world of gods and giving it to men. Zeus, as the only powerful, is a rough
monarch,10 unrelenting, hard, merciless, unadvisable,11 and he himself believes, just
as all other kinds of tyrants, that his power is unshakeable and eternal.12 This belief,
as the absolute emotional stability and certainty, is necessary to secure the power and
to prevent the development of subversive forces in its very core.
That is why Prometheus, who rebels against the will of Zeus and acts in favor
of men, on one hand becomes the philanthropist but at the same time becomes the
enemy of Zeus, because Zeus must necessarily secure the order and punish the guilty
ones.
Prometheus, as the only real sage,13 has a certain inside knowledge that eternal
The tragedy refers precisely to the situation that emerged in the world with the new rule of Zeus (Prometheus Bound 145 and 96. Zeus is the new leader).
10
Op. cit., 324.
11
Op. cit., 953.
12
Op. cit., 955-956.
13
Op. cit., 946.
46
Sophia Boudouri
preservation of power of only one person cannot endure; for, as had been prophesized
already by Thetis, who possesses deeper knowledge of the way how institutions work
and what is going on in the world of gods (for example, the events that led to the
overturning of Cronus), no tyrannical power is eternal, and that the rule of Zeus is
bound to end. Therefore, there exists an irreconcilable conflict between Zeus and
Prometheus.14 There is a relentless conflict of the wills of two divinities of different
class, with each of them being convinced that his view is the right one. As we have
said, this situation conceals a number of political and ethical problems.
The position of Zeus is obvious and seems right: there cannot be more than
one will in the world of gods (this follows from Homers Iliad as well15), because
that would be the beginning of the dissolution of the unity of the primary ruler. But
why does Prometheus insist on his own view? What does the philanthropic trope of
Prometheus imply? Is his position such that it could be described, in contemporary
terms, as moral egoism? Prometheus does not seem to strive for his own benefit. He
willfully pursues something that has no advantage for him personally but for another
being, for man. Thus Prometheus is not a moral egoist but a divinity with a different
view about the kind of relationship that should exist among gods as well as gods and
men. He is an enlightened spirit that looks at the world with a different view, since
it seems he has thought long and hard about the ethical aspects of relations between
beings in divine and human world.
However, the central question seems to be the following:
Who and how eminently decides in the world of gods? Can anyone disobey or
cancel the will of Zeus?
Aeschylus strongly emphasizes through the words of Hephaestus and
Oceanus16 that Zeus is a new ruler (tyrant, king) and hence appears to believe that the
irresponsible authorities, those that are not accountable to anyone, necessarily allow
14
Op. cit., 543.
15
The Iliad, B, 204-206:

,
,
, .
16
Prometheus Bound 35 and 309-310.
47
no room for doubt or disagreement regarding their will and their decisions.17
It is also obvious that, in Prometheus Bound, there still is no direct reference
to the power of the many, there is just an indirect insinuation when the Chorus speaks
about the irresponsible authority of Zeus18 and shows its sympathy for Prometheus.
The authority in the world of gods is, therefore, only one. It is the rule of Zeus,
which is a harsh tyranny, overweening and unjust administration, and consequently
merciless punishment is imposed on anyone who disagrees with it. It is not a just rule
for other beings. The Chorus of the Oceanides sympathizes with Prometheus and
indeed considers Zeus decision unjust. It is clearly stressed that Prometheus suffers
unjustly19 and that Zeus has no philanthropy.
On the other hand, with fire,20 the gift from Prometheus, men acquired great
power and thus it seems that Prometheus benefited them excessively (e.g. beyond
measure21), as Aeschylus says clearly. Therefore the philanthropic way of Prometheus,
even though it does not allow us to pronounce him an ethical egoist, still with the
excess of certain limits shows that his action is not completely irreprehensible or in
principle totally acceptable. Thus the clash of two deities acquires depth and intense
dramatic character.
So the problem eventually becomes theological of sorts, in the sense that the
question as to how much and to what degree other gods (goddesses and titans) have
the possibility to decide, to act and work freely. The prevailing conception is that Zeus
is only free22 and he has the power over gods and men in all the issues that concern
wider relations of articulation and ordering of the situations in the world, while other
gods, as entities par excellence, certainly have the possibility to act according to
17
This might leave open the possibility that, at some other stage of the gods rule, things could change
and his rule could acquire higher value and become softer.
18
Prometheus Bound 324.
19
Op. cit., 1093.
20
Op. cit., 544.
Op. cit., 30 (pera dikes) This note, as a detail, surely creates dramatic tension in the work. Thus the
clash of deities acquires meaning and the drama becomes more interesting, given the religious beliefs
of that era. Similarly, when Hephaestus says that he is executing Zeus orders involuntarily, reveals the
tension of action from the beginning.
21
22
Op. cit., 50.
48
Sophia Boudouri
their own will but do not have the freedom to take decisions of wider significance.
For example, Prometheus acted voluntarily and committed offence.23 After all, if he
hadnt decided by himself and of his own volition to steal fire, it would have made no
sense to impose any punishment on him.
The clash of the wills of two divine entities intensifies the dramatic effect of
the tragedy, and even more so by the prophecy of Thetis (known to Prometheus) that
the rule of Zeus will some day come to an end. The hope of at least late change of
situation strengthens the titans determination to endure the torture ordered by Zeus.
Apart from that, Prometheus indeed accuses Zeus of lack of trust, ingratitude
and ungratefulness. The relevant passage is the following:
My mother Themis, or Gaia (she has
many names) foretold to me (and not just once)
how the future would turn out, and the victory
would come from strategy, not from force. I explained
this in detail to the Titans but they rejected
my whole plan. From all the choices left, I thought
it was best that I and my mother go
over to Zeuss side: we were willing and
he willingly welcomed us. So because
of my advice, the dark depths of
Tartarus hide old Cronus along with
his allies. Zeus owes me for his being
king of the gods, and you see how
he pays me back with evil. This is
a tyrants disease, not to trust his friends24
23
24
Op. cit., 265-266.
PROMETHEUS
Not yet is fate destined to bring that about,
but only after years of my collapsing
under torture will I be released from my chains.
Art is never as strong as Necessity.
CHORUS
49
(Prometheus Bound, 210-225)

Similarly, Prometheus accuses Zeus of inhumanity and ascribes to him the will
to exterminate men and create (sow) a new kind.25
Again, apart from the image of Zeus as harsh and unjust tyrant who is the only
one allowed to act freely, while all the other gods submit themselves to him, there is
another idea of Zeus that shows that he is not the absolute lord of everything, since
above im there are the three Moires, the Anangke (Necessity, which follows from the
decisions of Moires) and the Erinyes (as sort of executive instances). The relevant
passage is the following:
PROMETHEUS
Not yet is fate destined to bring that about,
but only after years of my collapsing
under torture will I be released from my chains.
Art is never as strong as Necessity.
Who determines Necessity?
PROMETHEUS
The three fates, and the
who never forget.
CHORUS
Is Zeus weaker than they are?
PROMETHEUS
He cannot escape what is destined to happen.
CHORUS
What is destined for him, except eternal rule?
PROMETHEUS
Im not going to tell you this: dont ask again
25
Prometheus Bound 231-233. This readiness of the new tyrant of the gods shows exactly the high
mindedness of his thought, his arrogance and hubris, of course according to human measures and also
in line with the classical Greek model of keeping measure in everything.
Regarding Zeus willingness to destroy mankind, it is notable that today certain people (technologists
and scientists) through their excess their arrogance and hubris aim at destruction of man as such (that is,
pursues the change of the very being, of nature of man). For this see the views and aims of the members
of the Edge group on the Internet (www.edge.org). Needless to say, they present a threat to every form
of humanity and to the survival of humankind itself.
50
Sophia Boudouri
CHORUS
Who determines Necessity?
PROMETHEUS
The three fates, and the Furies who never forget.
CHORUS
Is Zeus weaker than they are?
PROMETHEUS
He cannot escape what is destined to happen.
CHORUS
What is destined for him, except eternal rule?
PROMETHEUS
Im not going to tell you this: dont ask again26
These verses show that Aeschylus, that fighter for freedom, doesnt seem to
escape the fetters of necessity to which even Zeus has to submit. The Fate (Moira)
seems to be (or to function as) the explanatory principle that can easily justify
anything that escapes human understanding, rationality and responsibility.
Another point with social and ethical significance is the passage where
Prometheus talks about Heras envy towards persons (women) that compete with her
and her grudges about the erotic adventures of gods with the mortals, such that of
Zeus with Io (Cf. Prom. Bound 735-745).
Even the Chorus, upon hearing about the suffering of Io and what Prometheus
sympathetically predicts for her, says the following words, which reveal the opinion
of people about transgressions and erotic escapades of gods:
CHORUS
He was wise, wise was he,
Who weighed this problem in his mind
Before he spoke this wise saying:
To marry ones equal is best by far.
26
Prometheus Bound, 511-520,
51
A man who labors should not marry above his station,

Either those puffed up with wealth,
Or those who boast about their birth.
Never, never,
Lady Luck, will you see
Me taking Zeus as my bedmate.
Nor would I marry a bridegroom that descends from heaven.
I am terrified by this maiden without her mate,
Io, reaping Heras hate that forces her
Into cruel and endless wandering.
I do not fear
Mating with equals,
But I fear the burning desire of a god
Casting his glance on me, one I could not escape.
Its a war thats no war at all; an unfavorable favor;
I dont know what would happen to me,
Or how to escape
Zeuss crafty designs.27
4. Concluding remarks
These passages (but other as well, such as 149-151, 186-187, 216-225) display
the enlightened thought of Aeschylus, the commander from the battle of Marathon
with great character, the titan poet, who recognizes the importance of gratitude,
trust, philanthropy, courage and justice for the ethical and political life of men.
The opposite characteristics, such as ungratefulness, lie, inhumanity, lack of trust,
treachery/treason, vindictiveness and injustice that Prometheus ascribes to the new
tyrant Zeus are not becoming of gods28 and in any case, when they prevail in the
world of men, dissolve the tissue of the political community.
27
Marianne McDonald, Prometheus Bound, Preface, Notes and Translation, 2008, 888-906.
28
Op. cit., 34.
52
Sophia Boudouri
Such views as disapproval of Zeus and the new gods are remarkable but
they would probably for him personally, e.g. for the man Aeschylus (just like
the Prometheus), be extremely dangerous and fatal, if Aeschylus hadnt been the
Marathon warrior and if Eumolpides hadnt intervened on his behalf.29
Based on what he says in Prometheus Bound, we could say that Aeschylus
attempts, in a way similar to Xenophanes, to perform a kind of cleansing of divinity
(but of the situation of political community as well) when he clearly blemishes the
attitude and the views of gods allied with Zeus on account of their unethical life
and emphasizes how dangerous it is to have closed groups (cliques)30 with a leader
endowed with the powers of a tyrant. In that case the other gods (titans) or men
who are not members and do not submit to the clique consequently either suffer or
become slavish servants.
Aeschylus sincere belief though is that no tyranny is permanent or legal,
that not every authority (only as a dynamic form of power) is validated. The legal
and proper form of government and exercise of power is the responsible authority,
that is the one that is accountable to political community, such as democracy, which
must unite power with justice (as Solon had already pointed out)31; and it is obvious
that this is not the case with Zeus in Prometheus Bound. Besides, Prometheus as a
rebel, the giver of light or the carrier of fire, is the symbol of culture and progress of
political community, as is emphatically stressed in many passages of the Prometheus
Bound (430-470).32
29
See the modern Greek translation of Prometheus Bound by Takis Barlas, Papyrus Pablications, p.4
30
Prometheus Bound, 120.
31
Solon, frag. 36, 16.
32
It is of great importance that the central Hall of Athenian Academy of Arts and Sciences is decorated
with paintings depicting the myth of Prometheus.
Dr. Sophia Boudouri

Lecturer in Philosophy
University of Peloponnese
Athens
Stella Chatzikou
Environmental values in primary education:
Their consideration within the context of Aristotelian virtue ethics
1. Introduction
The environmental values in Primary School text books are recorded and
critically discussed in this work within an Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian context
of value. The recorded values are environmental values referring to the ecological
care, sensitivity, responsibility and equilibrium, as well as to the respect of the ecosystem, the love of the environment and the environmental harmony and beauty.1
The critical discussion of the above mentioned environmental values within an
Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian context enables their correlation to the key-terms
of the Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian ethics. Thus, special reference is made on the
basic terms of virtue and practical wisdom, mean and eudaimonia, which must be
conceptually redefined and reinterpreted according to the contemporary framework.
A conceptual distinction between sustainable and evergreen development is also
made within this context.
Finally, an emphasis is placed on the correlation of the environmental
values, in the school text books, with some new virtues, appearing in literature on
environmental ethics, within a neo-Aristotelian context.
2. The environmental values within the context of an Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian
virtue ethics
According to Aristotle, moral virtue, which is the mean for the achievement of
the final end of human eudaimonia (NE 1177a-2) and is connected to the virtuous act,
is a characteristic involving choice and it consists in observing the mean relative to
1
The environmental values presented in this paper are from the Thesis of Mrs Styliani Chatzikou, Environmental Terms and Values in School Text Books of Primary Education, School of Primary Education,
Faculty of Education, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 2013.
54
Stella Chatzikou
us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such a man of practical wisdom
would use to determine it (NE 1106b36-1107a-2). So, moral virtue presupposes
prudence (practical wisdom), and prudence requires the existence of moral virtue
(NE 1144b30-32).
The environmental problem, with its enormous catastrophic effects on the
whole planet, would not have happened, and have been so rapidly enlarged, if
mankind had shown prudence (practical wisdom); this very Aristotelian cardinal
intellectual virtue, that can be possessed and strengthened, according to Aristotle
(see Nicomachean Ethics),2 with teaching (NE 1103a14-16).
Beyond the correlation of the environmental problem, with the education
and with the Aristotelian concept of prudence, as it is stated above, the teaching
and understanding of the environmental values of care-conservation and ecological
equilibrium within an Aristotelian context of virtue ethics, with the central
corresponding virtues of prudence, moral virtue and mean can now be advocated.
Within this Aristotelian context, the cultivation of virtue can lead us to a profound
feeling of identification with the natural world that surrounds and includes us, and
thus to the environmental value of care-conservation of this surrounding world.3
The value of environmental sensitivity could be here added, as it could also be
cultivated in the ground of the above mentioned central Aristotelian virtues and
education. The ecological responsibility could also be viewed, within the context of
full consciousness of the conditions of our acts, which could be considered, for this
reason, and according to Aristotle, as voluntary (NE 111a22-24).
Furthermore, concerning the Aristotelian conception of virtue, according to
the Alastair MacIntyre (After Virtue4) there is a link between facts and values, that
implies also that there is a relation between is and ought (something that is dropped
2
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Vol. 7-9, Kaktos Publications, Athens 1993.

See Warwick Fox, Deep Ecology and Virtue Ethics (transl. in Greek), in: K. Boudouris (ed.), Philosophy and Ecology (in Greek), Ionia Publications, Athens, 1999, pp. 145-152.
4
See, as an indirect reference, Andr Luc Maintenay, Green Ethics and Green Faith: An Exploration
of Environmental Ethics and Spirituality in a Technological Age, PhD. Thesis, Centre for the Study of
Religion, University of Toronto, 2008.
http://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/17319/1/Maintenay_Andre_L_200811PhD_Thesis.pdf
(accessed 05.04.2014).
3
Environmental values in primary education
55
out by the positivists5). This state of affairs shows that human existence as a part
of nature must take in to consideration the human good and happiness, as well as
what is the good of nature.6 Nature as such has a fundamental value that must be
recognised and cultivated from the educational point of view even in the primary
school education.
Since, according to Aristotles view, the end of all human beings is eudaimonia,
it is implied that by this statement the philosopher is taking in to consideration the
happiness and the unhappiness of the descendants (NE 1100a 18-21). In todays terms,
Aristotle seems to talk about a sustainable kind of eudaimonia that is reffering to the
future generations. This view can only be supported by a sustainable and evergreen
development regarding the natural resources.7
Finally, within a neo-Aristotelian context, but also on the ground of a reinterpretation of the basic virtue ethical concepts, such as prudence and humility
(proper humility), Rosalind Hursthouse suggests, for the support of her doctrine of
the green belief, the putative virtue of being disposed to feel the emotion of wonder,
concerning the greatness of nature, and the virtue of being able to recognize the intrinsic
value of nature and to feel respect for nature.8 These new virtues are directly related to
the values of environmental harmony and beauty, the respect of the eco-system as also
the love of the environment, that were also recorded in the primary school textbooks.
3. Environmental values in primary school education
The values that are recorded, and show, in some cases, a metaphysical
character,9 are:
5
See Konstantine Boudouris, The Ethical, Political and Metaphysical Causes of Environmental Crisis
(in Greek), in: K. Boudouris (ed.), op. cit., pp. 45-60, and particularly p. 51.
6
See Andr Luc Maintenay, op. cit., pp. 82-84.
7
For a semantic distinction of these two terms, J. N. Markopoulos and Styliani Chatzikou, personal communication, March 18, 2013. This distinction is also cited in Styliani Chatzikou, Thesis 2014, op. cit.
8
See R. Hursthouse, Environmental Virtue Ethics, in: Walker, R. L. and Ivanhoe, P. J. (eds.), Working Virtue, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 155-171. Moreover, J. N. Markopoulos, Biotechnology and a New Approach to a Theory
of Values, in: Thomas Potthast and Simon Meisch (eds.), Climate change and sustainable development: Ethical perspectives on land use and food production, The Netherlands, Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2012, pp. 407-412.
9
See Konstandine Boudouris, Nature, Metaphysics and Ecology (in Greek), in: K. Boudouris (ed.),
Ecological Values, Athens 2002, pp. 44-60.
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Stella Chatzikou
the ecological care-conservation (44.5%),

the environmental sensitivity (16.5%),
the ecological responsibility (15%),
the respect of the eco-system (8.2%),
the love of the environment (5.5%),
the ecological equilibrium (5.5%), and
the environmental harmony-beauty (4.8%).
On this basis, and on the basis of all the environmental values recorded in each
school grade, these values appear with special emphasis in the two last primary school
grades, more emphasized in the 5th and the 6th grade (29.4% and 21%, respectively),
but less in the 1st and the 2nd grade (5.14% and 9.8%, respectively). Both in the 3rd and
the 4th grade, the environmental values are equally present (17.3%). In other respects,
an unequal distribution of the values has been noted in the various school grades.
The teaching of the above mentioned values in primary school education
apparently aims to the pupils awareness in respect to these environmental issues.
And as we refer to this educational end, we enter the wider conceptual framework of
teleology, and, thus, we are more specifically connected to Aristotelian philosophy,
and more precise to Aristotelian ethics. As already mentioned, the incorporation and
discussion of these values, indeed, can be attempted within this Aristotelian and neoAristotelian context.
Bibliography
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Kaktos Publications, Athens, 1993.
Boudouris K. and Kalimtzis K (ed.), Philosophy and Ecology, Vol.I, Ionia
Publications, Athens, 1999.
Boudouris, . (ed.), Ecological Values (in Greek), Athens, 2002.
Walker R .L. and Ivanhoe P. J. (eds.), Working Virtue, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK,
2007.
Stella Chatzikou
Post-Graduate Student
University of Nicosia
Serres - Greece
Michael Cloete
Abstract: Platos idea of justice is grounded in a division of labour that acknowledges
difference emanating from individual capability, structurally deployed for the good
of the political community as a whole. To this end, he advances the idea of doing
ones own business as the condition of the possibility of justice in the ideal state.
Central to the political economy of the Platonic state is an exclusionary philosophical
conception of reason that seriously undermines Platos idea of justice, especially
when taking into account the question of slavery. In this paper, I seek to establish
an alternative approach to the Platonic idea of justice, one that takes into account
the fact that (in the real world) difference is more often than not, a structural
consequence of historical and social injustice.
1. Introduction
Platos allegory ()1 of the cave (Republic 514a-520a) is a much celebrated
narrative of philosophical wisdom. In more conventional accounts of the allegory,
the philosopher is portrayed as a hero or heroine who, against all odds, overcomes the
limits and restrictions of his or her existential conditions in the quest for (and ultimate
discovery of) true knowledge of the essential nature of reality (being). Following
the discovery of the Good as the transcendent source (and the condition of the
possibility) of reality and truth, Platos philosopher is expected to return to the cave,
duly charged with the responsibility of creating a just political community among
citizens who may (or who may not) quite understand the nature and legitimacy of the
philosophers authority as political leader of the state, but who are all, nonetheless,
The Greek work () is more accurately translated as image or picture (Allen, 2010, p.30).
In more recent English translations and discussions of Book 7 of Platos Republic, however, the word
allegory has assumed more conventional status (Kahn, 2006, p.130). In this article, I will adhere to
the more conventional usage.
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Michael Cloete
equally committed to the same political goal of a just society albeit from different
social positions.
In contrast to the more conventional version, I seek to establish an interpretative
perspective that foregrounds the institution of slavery as an invisible precondition
(a pre-text) for the philosophical possibility of reason-in-the-state. While it is true
that Plato clearly presented his ideal state as a moral-political indictment of (and a
radical alternative to) the city-state of classical Athens (500300 BC), his failure to
question slavery as a social institution - beyond its inappropriateness for his fellowGreek (male) citizens - should make the philosopher wonder why he continues to
enjoy such celebrity status in contemporary philosophical discourse.
While clearly embracing the slave-as-metaphor as the unquestioned other of
his philosophical conception and defense of political freedom, there is no compelling
evidence to suggest that Plato either questioned or criticized the historical institution
of slavery in ancient Greece in general or classical Athens in particular. According to
T.E. Rihll, A huge array of extant sources demonstrates clearly that slaves were an
integral part of ancient Athens, and scholars regularly refer to classical Athens (rather
than ancient Greece) as one of the only five genuine slave societies in world history
(2011, p.48). In this regard, one could with some justification be accused of forcing
an anachronistic reading of Plato, one that ignores the hermeneutical imperative
to read his texts from a perspective that demonstrates an historical awareness of
the Greek philosophers cultural embeddedness in a slave society that hardly had
any reason to question human enslavement on moral grounds. Peter Hunt correctly
asserts, however, Even the bugbear of anachronism will not silence the insistent
questions (2011, p.23).
Slavery (as a metaphorical device) has impacted not only on Platos
philosophical conception of reason-in-the-state, but also on the subsequent
development of the European philosophical-political tradition in which the idea of
freedom has been central to the universalistic understanding of the human subject,
defined as an autonomous, rational-moral agent. In spite of its universal appeal,
however, the philosophical defense of human freedom as a universal principle has
invariably been articulated in mutually exclusive (antithetical) terms of the self
59
and the other, us and them. In the context of Platos political philosophy, the
primary form of mutual exclusion is articulated from the perspective of the freedom
of the Greek (male) citizen, on the one hand, and the unfreedom of the slave, on the
other. The image of the slave provides in this context the paradigmatic counter-point
(of otherness) to the normative criteria of human freedom and human dignity as
epitomized for Plato in the image of the ( average) adult (male) Greek citizen.
The general failure to question the impact of the Platonic philosophical
distinction between slavery as a metaphor, on the one hand, and slavery as an
historical-political reality, on the other, on the subsequent development of Western
philosophy has resulted in a general philosophical tendency to view the other as
an ahistorical construct. This has provided the conceptual grounds for the rational
justifications of various forms of structurally imposed conditions of human inequality
to the disregard of various counter-claims regarding the immoral nature of such
justifications.
A primary objective of philosophical thinking is to guard against the
uncritical (dogmatic) acceptance of taken-for-granted assumptions, preconceptions
and prejudices in the philosophical pursuit of truth. The philosophical pursuit of
truth is rendered trivial, however, when the experience of the other is reduced
and restricted to the philosophical language and conceptual horizon of the master.
The uncritical and dogmatic application of the European epistemological paradigm
within the colonized world of the non-Western other has, therefore, proved to be
problematic, especially when the other is denied the possibility of the historical, the
political and the philosophical as the normative-conceptual grounds for determining
his or her own human-being-in-the-world. The general skepticism regarding the
possibility of philosophical thought in cultural traditions other than the Western
tradition thus provides the philosophical basis for reframing the question of justice.
In the history of Western philosophy (as in the history of Western civilization),
the existence of the slave (as the other) has served as confirmation and justification
for the superiority of the Western mind as a global phenomenon in a colonial
context. In this regard, Walter D. Mignolos (2011) comments regarding the darker
side of the civilizational history of the West are worth noting:
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Michael Cloete
The Dark Age in Europe was the period between the white
columns of Greeces Parthenon, the blue and sunny skies of Mediterranean
Rome, and the light, of course, of the Enlightenment. But if that darkness
was recognized by European men (sic) of letters, one of its darker sides,
slavery, was not acknowledged as such, but portrayed as bringing light
and civilization to the colonies, as a necessary step towards progress and
civilization and good business for merchants from Portugal, Spain, France
Holland and England. After pondering these issues I realized that
the image of Africa as the Dark Continent is indeed one of the many
hypocrisies of Western modernity (2011, p.xix).
While much has been written of Platos theory of justice - either in praise or
in condemnation of it - there have been relatively few attempts to give voice to the
prisoners within the Platonic cave. While I am well aware that Platos allegory of the
cave is an epistemic representation of the human condition, aimed at portraying the
extreme difficulty (indeed, impossibility) of human enlightenment with regard to the
Form of the Good, the humanistic foundation of the allegory (despite its idealistic
and utopian character) hardly inspired Plato to question political slavery on ethical
grounds. The intellectuals of ancient Greece, as Thomas Wiedemann points out,
were not thinking about slavery so much as using the concept slavery to think
with (cited in Hunt, 2011, p.23. Italics in original).
If one could reconstruct the Platonic text in such a way that the philosophers
resist the urge to exit the cave - and be required instead to turn their gaze towards
their fellow-cave dwellers with a view to engaging (dialogically) with the latter as
(potentially) transcendent sources of truth - instead of delusional and misguided
beings - what would such an encounter produce? If one could, furthermore, have
Platos philosophers in the cave proceed from the perspective of a commonly shared
humanity (that finds expression within a dialogical space of mutual respect) - beyond
the more conventional master-slave dialectic as the legitimizing foundation of the
respective social statuses of the free citizen and the slave in the Greek political
community - what would the nature of that dialogical exchange be?
61
In this paper, I attempt to deal with the above questions from a perspective
that seeks to demonstrate the extent to which contemporary philosophical debates
are still indebted to a philosophical legacy, conceptually based on the Platonic
(hierarchical) division between the Greek (male citizen) and the non-Greek (slave
other). In response to that legacy, I want to inquire specifically into the possibility
of establishing the basic conditions for reframing the question of justice from an
ethical perspective that seriously takes into account the voices and experiences of
those people condemned (in the words of Franz Fanon) to the zone of non-being
(1967, p.10), the so-called wretched of the earth (Fanon, 1963).
2. The Idea of the Good
Platos political philosophy - and in his conception of justice in particular - is
grounded in a dualistic ontology of the human condition. This ontology is vividly
articulated in the allegory of the cave (Republic 514a-521a), where Plato projects an
image of human society in which the majority of human beings are held in a state of
perpetual bondage. In the allegory we witness a group of people, chained down to
the floor of a dimly lit cave, with their eyes fixed on the wall in front them, ignorant
of the fact that the images that they see and the sounds that they hear originate from
the activities of another group of people located just behind them, who are constantly
moving back and forth in front of an ever-burning fire. There are also the exceptional
few who are considered to be potentially capable of freedom from bondage, through
the gift of philosophy. We accordingly witness the potential philosophers slowly
freeing themselves from their chains and, as the make their way towards the exit of
the cave above, they make the important discovery that the sun is the true source of
all life and light.
The role of philosophy in society is clearly defined when Plato instructs the
philosopher to return to the cave below in order to enlighten and liberate their former
fellow-prisoners from a life of ignorance, symbolized by images of semi-darkness
and fleeting shadows. Plato is fully aware that the returning philosophers message
will not be well received because he/she now speak of things that their former fellowprisoners could not even begin to understand. In fact, says Plato, the philosophers
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Michael Cloete
message would be regarded as the irrational mutterings of an insane person. Platos

anticipation of the derision and hostility of the cavedwellers towards the philosopher
returning to the cave is certainly worth noting:
[Would] he not provoke laughter, and would it not be said of him that
he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was
not worthwhile even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay
hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up,
would they not kill him? (Republic 517a).
The centrality of the sun as the source of all life and light in the allegory
provides for the possibility of a dualistic metaphysical system of appearance and
reality (being and becoming), which in turn provides the epistemological framework
for the postulation of the Idea (Form) of the Good as the condition of the possibility
of knowledge of reality and truth. As Plato puts it:
[The] reality, then, that gives [its] truth to the objects of knowledge
and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of good,
and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in
so far as knownBut as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration
it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are
the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being
like the good but to think that either of them is the good is not right. Still
higher honor belongs to the possession and habit of the good (Republic
508e-509a).
It is important to emphasize that the striving for knowledge of the Idea of
the Good is not merely an epistemological exercise. Knowledge of the Idea of the
Good also has significant practical (moral-political) implications, especially with
regard to the creation of a political community inspired by the idea of justice. Given
the fundamental importance of knowledge of the Good within the context of the
political community, Plato then issues the following challenge, [In] a matter of this
quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow blindness and obscurity in those best
63
citizens to whose hands we are to entrust all things? (Republic 506a). The answer to
this question provides the key to the Platonic idea of justice.
3. The idea of justice
In Platos political philosophy, the possibility of justice is closely related to
the idea of a political community in which the common good provides the normative
framework for two fundamentally interrelated goals; namely, social cooperation and
personal self-realization. The act of balancing these two goals in the political life of
the community (around the idea of justice) is the primary concern of the political
philosopher.
For the ancient Greek philosophers and Plato in particular, the idea of
unity (or harmony) was valued above all else. In this regard, Alvin W. Gouldners
contextualization of the idea of unity is worth noting:
[For Plato]the gravest danger in Greek society is social disunity.
The facts of Greek history appear to document this conclusion so thoroughly
that the meaning of Platos diagnosis may seem self-evident while efforts
to clarify it may appear correspondingly pedantic. Yet these are only
appearances, for there are many kinds and degrees of disunity and unity.
There is the unity of the pile of sand and the unity of the organism; there is
the unity of the like-minded and the unity of those who need one another;
there is the unity of equals and the unity of the artisan and his (sic) tool.
That Plato decries disunity and desires unity is unmistakable: but what kind
of unity does he seek? (Gouldner, 1965, p.206).
In his reflections on the nature and possibility of justice, Plato was particularly
determined to refute the powerful argument put forward by Thrasymachus (Republic
338a338e) - still popular today especially with Marxist scholars - that the idea
justice is but an ideological smokescreen aimed at concealing the will-to-power
as the true motive of all political action; it is merely the legal codification of the
economic interests of the ruling class of the day. In challenging this argument, Plato
offers an alternative account in which political morality is construed as a unifying
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Michael Cloete
and healing force in a world constantly threatened by political conflict and violence.
The Idea of the Good - conceptualized as the transcendent, divine source of all life
provides the normative foundation for the possibility a political community inspired
by the idea of justice.
In Platos Republic (368c-376c), we are given the outline of an ideal state
whose political economy is based on a structural division of labour. This structural
division takes the form of a hierarchy made up of three separate classes and identified
(in order of ascendency) as follows: (1) the workers (who must serve the economic
interests of the community), (2) the military class (who must protect the community
from external threat and internal disunity), and (3) the ruling class of politicalphilosophers (who must ensure the that state is run in the interest of justice insofar as
each class is functionally empowered towards promoting the good of the community
as a whole). In Platos ideal state, the structurally divided classes must be not be seen
as separate entities, but rather as organically connected and equally committed to
the idea of justice in the form of doing ones own business (Republic 433b).
The justification for the tripartite division of the political economy, under the
political leadership of the philosopher, is explained in terms of a myth, a noble lie
(Republic 414b- 415c) in which the origins of human life are traced back to three
different metals located in the bowels the earth those metals being gold, silver and
bronze. The soul (or mind) of each individual will bear a trace of only one of these
three metals. The individuals with bronze (and they will always be in the majority)
are destined for the role of ordinary workers in the community. Those with silver
are destined to serve in the military. Those blessed with gold are destined for the role
of political leadership (the philosopher-kings, in Platos language). In the myth,
gold is associated with the presence of philosophical reason and wisdom gifts that
will enable the possible application and consolidation of justice in the state.
This controversial myth provides the context for an even more controversial
claim made by Plato:
Unless either philosophers become kings in our state or those
whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy
seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things,
65
political power and philosophical intelligence there can be no cessation

of troubles for our state, nor, I fancy, for the human race either (Republic
473d -e).
From the perspective of the structural division of specialized labour,
specifically tasked with serving the interests of the community as a whole, Plato
accordingly asserts that justice in society amounts to doing ones own business
(Republic, 433b). By this he means that each person must be allowed to contribute
to the good of the community on the strength of his or her natural ability. Plato thus
asserts, Each one man must perform one social service in the state for which his
nature was best adapted (Republic 433a).
The Platonic idea of justice, in the form of a structurally divided political
economy that draws on the natural capabilities and endowments of the individual is,
of course, a very attractive idea. At a certain level, it appeals to an intuitive sense of
fairness (not to mention, common sense), especially when those natural abilities
and endowments are viewed from the perspective of the common good. In this
regard, the ahistorical (utopian) self-understanding of the Platonic state, based on the
natural ability of the individual has served as a constant frame of reference across
many centuries of political thinking. When Platos legacy of natural ability as the
cornerstone of justice is viewed from the perspective of the others, however, those
whose naturally ability has been called into question, and therefore excluded from
qualification as political animals in society, the natural (in)ability of the individual
assumes a very different significance. It is noteworthy, for example, that the founding
principles of the modern Western liberal state are rooted in values of individual
autonomy and the individuals natural ability to function successfully in a highly
competitive environment. In this context, success and achievement are defined
from within the overarching normative horizons of the capitalist project of wealth
accumulation and profit-making (at home) and colonial expansionism (abroad). Given
the historical reality of racial injustice, however, liberal justice requires a colourblind society that leaves the past behind in the form of historical forgetfulness
(or historical amnesia) as the only effective means of coming to terms with the
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Michael Cloete
past (Habermas, 1989). The liberal states commitment to justice in a colour-blind

society thus renders it structurally blind (and therefore, morally indifferent) to the
fact that conditions of human inequality are more often than not a direct consequence
of historically based power and privilege, not natural (in)ability.
A common future based on justice is only possible when the historical
complicity between power and privilege of the past has been fully addressed in a
moral vocabulary that resonates with the historical experience and the historical
consciousness of the other. This is perhaps why Fanon is highly skeptical of the
philosophical privileging of the mind in Western metaphysical thinking variously
illustrated, for example, in the writings of Ren Descartes ([1637] 1968), Immanuel
Kant ([1781] 1965) and G.W.F. Hegel ([1807] 1977). From Fanons perspective
(which is that of the colonial experience organized around the central idea of race),
the black body of the oppressed must serve as the inescapable point of departure in
debates and projects that seek to reframe (and reclaim) the denied/distorted humanity
of the black person living in societies with a history of white supremacy. Fanon
declares, O my body, make of me always a man who questions! (Fanon, 1967,
p.232). Fanons critique of Western metaphysical thinking in which the modern
subject is portrayed as de-racialized, de-sexualized and gender-neutral
philosophical mind is put into perspective by Mignolo when he writes:
What calls for thinking is the body, rather than the mind, and the
questions that Fanons Black body asks are not prompted because the body
is Black, but because Black bodies have been denied or [have had their
Humanity questioned ] in the imperial rhetoric of modernity (Mignolo,
2011, p.xxiv).
The simultaneous affirmation and denial of the humanity of the other
provides the context for exploring the political philosophy of the Greek city-state in
which the slave is at once present and non-present, visible and invisible.
4. The political philosophy of the Greek city-state
In the Greek philosophical mind, the political community is the only domain
67
that can ensure the possibility of being-human-in-the-world. A fundamental

element of Platos political philosophy is the idea that being-human-in- the-world
is inseparably connected on moral grounds to the possibility of a dignified life (and
death) in the political community. This idea is especially well illustrated in the Crito,
where Socrates is given cause to reflect on the possibility and implications of escaping
the death sentence imposed on him as a consequence of having been found guilty of
corrupting the minds of the young, and of believing in deities of his own invention,
instead of the gods recognized by the state (Apology 24b-28a). Socrates friend,
Crito, tries to persuade him to exercise his constitutional right to avoid the death
penalty by going into exile. Socrates response to Critos suggestion takes the form
of an imaginary debate between himself and the constitutional laws of Athens. In this
debate, Socrates defends a fundamental moral principle, namely, that the purpose
of the Athenian constitution is ensure harmony and stability within the political
community, which means that (from a constitutional perspective) the interests of
the state must always take precedence over the interests of the individual. The laws
enshrined in the Athenian constitution are there to protect the political community
from a state of anarchy (Crito 50a-d). If the laws of the state are perceived to be
unjust, however, the onus is on the individual to persuade the political community
(through public debate) to change the laws in the interest of justice. If the individual
fails to persuade his accusers of the injustice of the laws, however, he must suffer the
consequences of his failure to do. Socratess failure to convince his accusers of his
innocence thus meant that he had to accept the death sentence as an expression of
the political will, as manifested in the constitutional laws of Athens. Life and death
can only assume human significance and meaning within the political community
(polis), an idea that provides the basis for the following challenge put to Socrates by
the laws of Athens:
Do you intend, then, to avoid well-governed states and the higher forms of
human society? And if you do, will life be worth living? (Crito 53c-d).
From the Socratic-Platonic perspective, death within the political realm of
Athens is a fate infinitely more preferable to life in exile, since the latter is associated
with the non-political and therefore the non-human. Aristotle puts forward a similar
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Michael Cloete
argument when he says, A man who cannot live in society, or has no need to do
so because he is self-sufficient, is either a beast or a god; he is no part of the state
(Politics 1253a).
For the ancient Greeks the most fundamental ontological category of
separation is between the human and the non-human. In the political realm this idea
finds expression in a hierarchical social structure that identifies the free, civilized
Greek (male) citizen as the frame of reference for determining the normative criteria
for the possibility of being-human-in-the-(Greek) world. At the other extreme of
the human spectrum we find the uncivilized, barbaric (non-Greek) person. Situated
in-between these two extremes we have the Greek female and the Greek child. In this
social chain of being, the ontological status of the slave is equivalent to that of a nonperson (a beast of non-reason and, therefore, a beast of burden). Aristotle puts the
norm of Greek aristocratic-patriarchal supremacy into perspective when he writes,
Silence is a womans glory the child is an imperfect human being the virtue of
the slave is relative to his master.slaves are more in need of instruction than are
children (Politics 1260a).
While the political economy of Platos state may be defended on the grounds
of a meritocracy that acknowledges difference in the form of individual potential,
capacity and capability as the enabling condition for the possibility of justice in the
state, from an historical perspective, however, the flourishing of the Greek political
community is organically and structurally linked to the invisible presence of the
victims of Greek colonial conquest, those enslaved communities confined, in the
words of Karl Marx, to the subordinate role of a speaking implement (Marx, 1976,
pp.303, n 18). In this regard, Mavis Campbell (1974) has correctly argued that for
both Plato and Aristotle:
[Slavery] was more than just an isolated social phenomenon, but
rather intrinsic to the form and purpose of being. Slavery was as natural
as other relationships of superior over inferior, such as soul over body,
reason over passion, intellect over appetite, farther over children, men over
animals and so on (Campbell, 1974, p.284) .
69
Societies that are founded on the principle of inclusion-exclusion (whether in

the form of race, class or gender) invariably seek to justify exclusionary institutions
and practices by radically calling into question the humanity of the excluded other
as a fellow-human being. In this regard, Platos philosophy has certainly played
its part in naturalizing the inferiority and invisibility of the other by failing to
recognize and acknowledge the historically contingent conditions (of systemic
relations of power and domination) that invariably accompany the possibility (for
some) to say, I am we are at the expense of the other.
5. Slavery and the law
There can be no disputing the historical fact that the institution of slavery was
a basic element of ancient Greek civilization. This is a fact that most scholars are not
too comfortable with, given their high regard for the philosophers of ancient Greek
society According to Moses. Finley, We condemn slavery, and we are embarrassed
for the Greeks, whom we admire so much; therefore we tend to underestimate its role
in their life, or we ignore it altogether, hoping that it will quietly go away (1981,
p.111).
Given his determination to create a harmonious political community based on
sound economic principles, one is somewhat surprised that Plato did not consider
the Greek practice of slavery as a potential threat to the political stability of the
state. In this regard, Plato was a product of his times. Like most Greeks, he simply
took slavery for granted. Alvin B. Gouldners questioning of the nature of Platos
intellectual achievements in the face of slavery is certainly worth noting:
That Plato takes slavery as a given cannot be repeated too often; this
limits the range and penetration of his diagnosis of the Hellenic communitys
problems; this cramps the character of the remedies he proposes for them;
and indeed this cripples his conception of the very role of reason itself
in society. If there is anything that hobbles his sociological analysis, it
is his inability to be more, not less, of a utopian, and to expose slavery
to systematic examination. Plato simply cannot imagine a world without
slaves (Gouldner, 1965, p.243).
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Michael Cloete
The intellectual nature of the Greek world has been quite remarkable for its
endless debates and radical questioning of traditional ideas and institutions. Such
debates included questions of a religious nature, ethical values, political systems,
the economy, the family and the question of private property (Finley, 1981, p.105).
According to Finley, when it came to the question of slavery, however, not even
a great mind such as Platos could prove to be an exception. As he puts it, Plato,
who criticized society more radically than any other thinker, did not concern himself
much with the question [of slavery] in the Republiceven there he assumed the
continuance of slavery (Finley, 1981, p.105).
Finleys criticism of Platos acceptance of slavery needs to be weighed up,
however, against the historical fact that the latter was fully aware that the slave in
classical Athens enjoyed a right to protection from abuse, a right that was entrenched
in the Athenian constitution. In terms of this constitutional right, the Athenian slave
(or citizen) was legally entitled to take action against a slave-owner, should the latter
be suspected of having indulged in extreme forms of cruelty, whether in the form
of severe physical punishment, abuse or murder. According to Rihll (2011, p.51),
although slave-owners in classical Athens had complete freedom in law and custom
to treat slaves as they wished, they were, however, subject to two basic restrictions.
The first restriction originated in the so-called hubris law that was introduced by
the great law-giver, Solon2. This law prohibited indiscriminate forms of punishment
and abuse of a slave. In the event of punishment, there had to be absolute certainty
that the person being punished was indeed a slave. It must be borne in mind that
it was difficult in the classical period to distinguish (purely by means of physical
appearance or behavior) between a Greek citizen and a slave. For the Greek citizen,
the distinction between a slave and a free citizen could only be made on moral grounds.
While the hubris law may anachronistically be viewed as a benign or compassionate
form of legislation aimed at protecting the slave from arbitrary and indiscriminate
abuse, its true rationale at the time, however, was the moral improvement of the
Solon (circa 638 BCE558 BCE) was a central figure in the birth of Western democracy, He was
regarded by his contemporaries and later generations, including Plato (Protagoras, 343a), as one of the
Seven Wise Men of Ancient Greece, given his ground-breaking achievements and contributions as a
political leader, a law-giver, an economic reformer, a poet and a philosopher.
71
Greek citizen. Violent outbursts of anger and aggression were frowned upon at
the time and were generally viewed as a violation of the cardinal Greek virtue of
moderation. The worse fate that a free citizen could suffer was that of being mistaken
in his identity for a slave and consequently being (mis)treated or punished as a
slave. According to Rihll, Hubris was a deliberate physical or verbal abuse on
someones status. Charging a man with committing hubris was glossed as treating a
free man as a slave. It was a criminal offence carrying the death penalty (2011, p.54).
The second restriction affecting the treatment of the slave emanated from a
religious source and was primarily concerned with the need for spiritual purity as
a means of entering the realm of the holy, the pious and the divine. Thus we find,
for example, in the dialogue, Euthyphro, where the discussion is focused on the
question of holiness (or piety), clear evidence of Platos sensitivity to the judicial
system that prevailed in Athens at the time. In the dialogue, Euthyphro (a priest)
sets out to have his father prosecuted for allegedly murdering his own slave. One
soon discovers, however, that the real motive behind Euthyphros action was not
one of pity or compassion for the murdered slave; his action was motivated, instead,
by the desire to prove that he (unlike the general run of men) possesses accurate
knowledge of things divine (Euthyphro 5a). According to Rihll (2011, p.51), a
general belief prevailed among the Greeks at the time that the killing of another
person (including a slave) would result in religious pollution which would in turn
anger the gods. In this context, divine punishment for religious pollution would be
the destruction of the entire community (slaves as well as free citizens). One could
therefore reasonably assume that the real motive for Euthyphros action could well
have been a fear of religious pollution and that his decision to prosecute his father
was but a ritualistic act of the Greek moral tradition, aimed at preventing the possible
destruction of the community as a whole. As Euthyphro puts it, The pollution is the
same if, knowingly, you associate with such a man, and do not cleanse yourself, and
him as well, by bringing him to justice (Euthyphro 4c).
The laws of Athens dealing with the institution of slavery were designed
primarily to protect and serve the political interests of the free citizen. While Plato
offered his Republic as a utopian alternative to the existing political life of the Greek
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Michael Cloete
city-state, not even the idealistic character of that revolutionary text could give
him cause to reflect (idealistically) on the historical institution of slavery. In his
choice of the utopian-form as the medium of expression and textual design of the
Republic, Plato was well aware that this medium would give him complete freedom
to challenge, question and (theoretically) overturn all forms of traditional cultural
and political practices that he may have considered to be morally objectionable
and unjust. But as Peter Hunt argues, It is striking, however, that the overturning
of an institution [slavery] that we find so objectionable was not a major aspect of
Greek utopian thought (2011, p.39). While we may commend the Republic for the
radical stand that the author adopted on many important issues (private property, the
autocratic rule of the philosopher-kings and -queens, the structure and role of the
family, the question of justice, which he defined as minding ones own business
for the good of the community as a whole), we are disappointed by the fact that Plato
did not have more to say either in justification or condemnation of slavery. But there
was no pressing need for him to take a stand on or against slavery. Like most of his
intellectual contemporaries, Plato simply took slavery for granted.
6. A philosophy of slavery
Behind Platos acceptance of slavery is an implicit philosophy in which reason
determines the status of the individual in society. Throughout his texts, he contrasts
the ideal of intellectual and moral-political autonomy to counter-images of the slave,
whose alleged inferiority is unquestioningly accepted as a direct consequence of
his or her lack of reason. In his epistemological theory, Plato is constantly seeking
to identify and demarcate the possibility and limits of reason from a hierarchical
perspective that distinguishes between reason-as-logos, on the one hand, and doxa,
on the other hand. On this approach, logos accounts for the ability to give an account
of something on rational grounds in the form of rational speech (or discourse).
Doxa, by contrast, is the product of uninformed reason and is, therefore, restricted
to the epistemically inferior realm of mere opinion (or conventional thought),
where dogma, indoctrination and false consciousness account for the prevalence of
unsubstantiated, unjustified and uncritically accepted claims to knowledge. Logos
73
presupposes the epistemic possibility of true knowledge, the possession of which is

the privileged monopoly of the rational mind of the free man; while the alleged
deficit (or deficiency) of reason is associated with the slave as metaphor.
In the history of Western philosophy, the fundamental ontological distinction
between those who possess reason and the others (who do not) has provided the
normative grounds for defining the question of justice from a perspective that has more often than not - assumed the superiority of the Western mind. In this regard,
the Kenyan philosopher, D.A. Masolo, does well to remind us of the historically
divisive nature of the Western philosophical conception of reason, which he describes
as, A value that is believed to stand as the great divide between the civilized and the
uncivilized, the logical and the mystical (Masolo, 1994, p.1).
Gregory Vlastos (1941) has provided us some important insights into the
influence of slavery on the development of Platos philosophical conception of
reason. He draws our attention, for example, to Platos tendency to compare the
philosophical spirit of logos to a medical doctor who must not only be focused upon
curing a patient, but also equally focused on establishing whether the patient is indeed
capable of understanding the scientific origins of his or her medical condition. The
doctors confirmation of the patents capacity for logos (for reason) will determine
the nature of his or her approach to the treatment of the particular patient. When
dealing with a servant or a slave, the doctor neither gives the servant any rational
account (logos) of his complaint, nor asks him [or her] for any; he gives an order
based on empirical belief (doxa) with the air of exact knowledge, in the insolent
manner of a tyrant, then jumps off to the next ailing servant (Vlastos, 1941, p.289).
Vlastos explains the philosophical implications of Platos metaphor of the doctorpatient relationship as follows:
[Plato] thinks of the slaves condition as a deficiency of reason.
He has doxa, but no logos. He can have true belief, but cannot know the
truth of his belief. He can learn by experienceand external prescription
But he can neither give nor follow a rational account. He is therefore
susceptible to persuasion. This is not evidence of reason, but the reverse.
Nous is unmoved by persuasionThe weakness of doxa, even of true
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Michael Cloete
doxa is that it can be changed. Only knowledge is stable for he who
knows has direct contact with the immutable Forms. This is what the slave
lacks. His experience cannot yield true knowledge. In all matters, he is
therefore, unconditionally subject to his intellectual superiors (Vlastos,
1941, pp.289-90).
Platos epistemology is dismissive of true belief (or true opinion) as the

final resting ground of our knowledge claims. He compares the epistemic condition of
true belief to that of a runaway slave (Meno 97e-98a). Without the epistemological
foundation of true knowledge of the Forms, true belief is an unreliable source of
knowledge, comparable metaphorically to the condition of a slave desiring to escape
from bondage. As Plato puts:
True opinions are a fine thing and do all sorts of good so long as they
stay in their place, but they will not stay long. They will run away from
a mans mind; so that they are not worth much until you tether them by
working out the reason. That process is recollection. Once they are tied
down, they become knowledge, and are stable. This is why knowledge is
more valuable than right opinion. What distinguishes one from the other is
the tether (Meno, 97e98a).
It is interesting to note that when Platos Socrates introduces the theory of
recollection in the Meno, an uneducated slave is drawn into the discussion to
validate the theory in question (Meno 82a-85c). What is one to make of this apparent
anomaly that stands in such stark contrast to the unequivocal acceptance of slavery
in the classical Greek community? One could account for this apparent anomaly by
arguing that Plato is merely using the slave to demonstrate the universal significance
of the deductive form of reasoning, One could argue, furthermore, that the fact that
the slave is incapable of giving an account of his own use of deductive reasoning
is merely meant to demonstrate the validity of the Platonic epistemic distinction
between true belief and the Platonic Forms (or Ideas) - and thus emphasize the
foundational role played by the latter in the production of true knowledge. This
75
line of reasoning is highly plausible, but when we consider the fact that the other
interlocutors in discussion of the recollection theory - (Meno and Anytus)3 - are
themselves incapable of accounting for the existence of their true belief, despite their
status as educated people in the dialogue, then one is challenged to reflect on the
true purpose of the slaves inclusion in the discussion. What is striking in this context
is Platos apparent acceptance of the universal nature of reason and rationality and the
rational subjects universal potential and capacity for knowledge. On one level, the
slaves potential for reason is neither minimized nor excluded from the philosophical
process of reasoning. On another level, however, even if the slave is accepted into the
community of philosophers, the terms of his acceptance are still dictated and imposed
by the (Greek) master of philosophy. The formal constraints, scope and content of
the conversation are determined by the master. The language of discourse is that of
the master. The epistemically privileged position of the master thus determines the
condition of possibility of the dialogue and the triumph of his truth.
In the Platonic dialogue, the presence of the slave merely serves to validate
the assumed universal validity (and hence epistemic priorities) of the masters
philosophy. The actual (historical) experience of the slave is dismissed as irrelevant
in the universal context of Greek philosophy. The consequent silencing of the
slave thus represents a philosophical miscarriage of justice insofar as the (universal)
idea of reason as central to the definition of philosophy-as-discourse, remains the
product of reason in history (Hegel, [1837] 1953). Platos failure to recognize and
acknowledge reason as a normative idea that includes all human beings as potential
knowers of the truth (in terms of their own experience) implies that, from the
perspective of the enslaved community, his epistemology is but the product of mere
convention (doxa).
7. Concluding remarks
Whether used as a metaphorical device or cited as an unfortunate historicalpolitical phenomenon, the condition of slavery has accompanied the inception and
3
Meno was a prominent Thessalian and a member of the political aristocracy. He was also a follower of
the great Sophist teacher, Gorgias. Anytus was a prominent Athenian politician.
76
Michael Cloete
development of Greek philosophy. This should give us reason to reconsider the

philosophical implications of Alfred North Whiteheads well-known claim that,
The safest general characterisation of the European philosophical tradition is that it
consists of a series of footnotes to Plato (1979, p.39). Whiteheads claim could with
some justification be challenged by Naomi Zacks counter-claim when she writes:
Beginning with Plato, Western moral philosophy seems to have been
elitist on exactly those grounds that later came to be the grounds of modern
race, with its attendant white racial supremacy. So why should intellectuals
who are people of color make use of a system of thought that was used to
exclude people of color from the goods of human life? (Zack, 2011, p.xviii).
The mutual co-implication of freedom and slavery can be traced back to the
ideas of the ancient Greek philosophical community. The historical-philosophical
condemnation of those who have inherited the sphere of the non-philosophical
(and therefore non-human status) in ancient Greek society has been an important
constitutive element of modern Western philosophical discourses of enlightened
reason, and the attendant progressive ideas of human freedom and equality. Implicit
in those discourses is the ontological idea of non-being, invisibility, irrationality and
inferiority of the less than human other as the enabling condition for the possibility
of Western philosophical reason.
Platos philosophy has been the subject of many contraversial debates over the
4
years, but the one thing for which we will always be in his debt is his insistence on
dialgue as the only authentic medium for the exchange of philosophical ideas from a
universalist perspective. Unfortunately, Platos overemphasis on the role and status
of the rulers (the philosopher-kings and -queens) has clouded his moral judement
of the ethical significance of the ruled, thus compromising his idea of justice as an
expression of the good of the community as a whole.
If the Platonic dialogue could be reframed from a philosophical perspetive that
acknowledges the other as an equal then we will certainly have taken an important
See Karl Poppers The Open Society and its Enemies (1966) for - what remains to this day- one of the
most controversial and challenging engagements with Platos political philosophy.
77
step towards realising that the universal significance of philosophy can never be
defended on ethical grounds if the the voice of the other has been systematically
excluded. The pursuit of truth and justice are inextricably linked to the historical
experience of (and encounter with) the other as the condition of the very possibility
of philosophy itself. Listening to the philosophical voice of the slave - as the voice
of the other - provides a normative basis for reconsidering the question of justice
as an historical possibility, given the fact that the fundamental sense of justice of
the other is rooted in the historical memory of (real) past injustices rather than an
ahistorical recollection of Ideas.
References
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Aristotle, Politics and The Athenian Constitution, Translated by J. Warrington,

Everymans Library, Dent, London, 1959.
Campbell, M., Aristotle and Black Slavery: A Study in Race Prejudice, Race, XV(3)
(1974), 283-301, Available at: http://rac.sagepub.com/content/15/3/283.refs.
html [Accessed 1 September 2014].
Descartes, R., Discourse on Method and the Meditations, Translated by F.E.

Sutcliffe, Penguin Books, Middlesex, [1637] 1968.
Fanon, F., The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin Books, Hammondsworth, Middlesex,
1963.
Fanon, F., Black Skins,White Masks, Pluto Press, London, 1967.
Finley, M.I., Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, Chatto & Windus,
London,1981.
Gouldner, A.W., Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Orgins of Social Theory,
Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, London, 1965.
Habermas, J., The New Conservatism, Translated by S. Nicholsen, MIT Press,

Cambridge, MA, USA, 1989.
Hegel, G.W.F., Phenomelogy of Spirit, Translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, [1807] 1977.
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Hegel, G.W.F., Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of

History, Translated by R.S. Hartman, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc,

Indianapolis, [1837] 1953.
Hunt, P., Slaves in Greek Literary Culture, in Bradley, K ., Cartledge, P., (eds),
The Cambrdige World History of Slavery: The Ancient Mediterranian World.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp.22-47.
Kahn, C., Plato on Recollection, in Benson, H.H., (ed), A Companion to Plato.
Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA, USA, 2006, pp.119-32.
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York, [1781] 1965.
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London, 1976.
Masolo, D.A., African Philosophy in Seach of Identity, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington and Idianapolis, 1994.
Mignolo, W.D., The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial
Options, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2011.
Plato, Euthyphro, in Hamilton, E., and Huntington, C., (eds), The Collected

Dialogues of Plato:Including the Letters, Translated by L. Cooper, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA, [1941] 1961, pp.169-85.
Plato, Crito, in Hamilton, E., and Huntington, C., (eds), The Collected Dialogues of
Plato. Princeton University Press, Princeton , NJ, USA, 1961, pp.27-39.
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of Plato, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA, 1961, pp.353-84.
Plato, Republic, in Hamilton, E., and Huntington, C., (eds), The Collected Dialogues
of Plato, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,USA, 1961, pp.575-844.
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Dialogues of Plato, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA, 1961,
pp.308-352.
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Rowan and Littlefield Publishers. Inc, Lanham, Maryland, USA, 2011.
Dr. Michael Cloete

Department of Philosophy, Systematic and Practical Theology
University of South Africa (Unisa)
South Africa
Abstract: Xenophons Economicus is more than a Socratic dialogue on economics
as the title may suggest. It begins as a typical dialogue between Socrates and his
friend Critobulus, son of Crito, on the science (episteme) or the art (techne) of
the household management oikos in the original sense of the Greek term, which
included the house and its internal furniture (oikia), as well as the external property,
the estate. However not far into the conversation, in a move that reminds us of Platos
Symposium, Xenophon presents Socrates as willing to reveal to his interlocutor
what he had heard about estate management from an Athenian gentleman named
Ischomachus, who had the reputation of being a paragon of virtue, approaching the
ideal of the kaloskagathos.
My purpose in this paper is to concentrate on the second half of the dialogue
in order to show that the authors intention in this arrangement was to praise farming
as a noble way of making a honest living, and of training the soul to acquire all the
virtues of an excellent man and citizen.
I
Xenophons Economicus is more than a Socratic dialogue on economics as
the title may suggest. It begins as a typical dialogue between Socrates and his friend
Critobulus, son of Crito, on the science (episteme) or the art (techne) of the household
management (oikos) in the original sense of the Greek term, which included the
house and its internal furniture (oikia), as well as the external property, the estate.
However, not far into the conversation and in a move that reminds us of Platos
Symposium, Xenophons Socrates is willing to reveal to his interlocutor what he had
heard about estate management from an Athenian gentleman named Ischomachus,
81
who had the reputation of being a paragon of virtue, an embodiment of the Hellenic
ideal of kaloskagathos.
My purpose in this paper is to concentrate on the second half of the dialogue in
order to show that the authors intention in this arrangement of the work was to praise
farming as a noble way of making an honest living and of training the soul to acquire
the virtues of an excellent man and citizen. Thus it will become clear that Socrates,
under the mask of Ischomachus, would seem to suggest that ethical excellence is the
presupposition of economic success for a manager of an extensive estate or a state,
and even of military success for a military commander, like himself.1
II
As presented by Xenophon in the beginning of this dialogue, Socrates wanted
to know from his friend Critobulus whether the name economy (oikonomia), like
the names of medicine or carpentry, names a branch of scientific knowledge
(episteme) or artistic skill (techne), and if so what would be its function (ergon).
Critobulus response to this was, Well, I suppose that the business of a good estate
manager (oikonomos) is to manage his own estate well. (Econ. 1.2)2
Upon further questioning by Socrates, he clarified that, if someone knows
how to manage an estate, he can manage any estate, not just his own, and in the
process make some good money (misthophorein).3 But what exactly is the meaning
of estate (oikos), the good management of which would make the good manager,
and how does it differ from house (oikia), to which it is etymologically connected.
Socrates would like to know this and presses for a definition. It turned out that all
the possessions of a person, whether inside the house or outside, and whether in
1
As we will see, in the mind of Xenophon, the author of the Anabasis, success in any collective effort
involving multiple people depends on the ability of the persons in leadership positions to motivate the
rest of the crowd.
The translation, which will be followed here unless stated otherwise, is that of E. C. Marchant, in The
Loeb Classical Library, G. P. Gould, ed., Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992.
3
This term too refers to the role of the hired labor or the mercenary, of which he had personal experience,
as one of the ten thousand Greeks who took part in the expedition of Cyrus the Younger against his
brother, Artaxerxes.
82
the same city or a different one, are all part of the oikos in the broad sense of the
word, assuming that one knows how to make good use of them as chremata (useful
things) rather than just ktemata (possessions). From this conception it follows that
horses and sheep, or even gold and silver are not of any use to someone who does
not know how to benefit from them and therefore causes harm to himself, as for
instance when he invests in an expensive courtesan in order to get much pleasure out
of this transaction, and in the process he injures his health of both body or soul. On
the other hand, there are men who know how to make use even of their enemies and
get profit from this source too. For example, clever people can get rich as a result of
a war which, for others, may be disastrous (Econ. 1.13-24). At this point Critobulus
raises a challenge to Socrates thesis that knowledge is the key of how to turn ones
possessions into useful tools of prosperity:
Yes, so far so good, Socrates. But sometimes we come across persons
possessed of knowledge and means whereby they can increase their estates
if they work, and we find that they are unwilling to do so; and consequently
we see that their knowledge profits them nothing. What are we to make of
that? In these cases, surely, neither their knowledge nor their property is
wealth. (Econ. i.16)
He also assures Socrates that he is not speaking about slaves, as Socrates might
suspect, but about free men of the highest lineage (eupatridae) who, precisely
because they do not have any masters above their heads, become lazy and make no
use of their estates and their skill and know-how. Thus provoked Socrates expressed
his moral indignation against idleness and false pleasures, which seem to have
captivated their pitiful victims, and treat them worse than slaves:
What, no masters over them, when, in spite of their prayers for
prosperity and their desire to do what will bring them good, they are
thwarted in their intentions by the powers that rule them?
And who, pray, may these unseen rulers be?
No, not unseen, but open and undisguised, surely! And very vicious
rulers they are too, as you yourself might see, if at least you regard idleness
83
and moral cowardice and negligence as vice. Aye, and then there is a set
of deceitful mistresses that pretend to be pleasuressuch as gambling and
consorting with bad companions; even the victims of their deception find as
time goes on that these, after all, are really pains concealed beneath a thin
veneer of pleasures, and that they are hindering them from all profitable
work by their influence over them. Yes, they too are slaves, and hard
indeed are their masters: some are in bondage to gluttony, some to lechery,
some to drink, and some to foolish and costly ambitions. And so hard is the
rule of these passions over every man who falls into their clutches, that so
long as they see that he is strong and capable of work, they force him to pay
over all the profits of his toil, and to spend it on their own desires; but no
sooner do they find that he is too old to work, than they leave him to an old
age of misery, and try to fasten the yoke on other shoulders. Ah, Critobulus,
we must fight for our freedom against these tyrants as persistently as if
they were armed men trying to enslave us. Indeed, open enemies may be
gentlemen, and when they enslave us, may, by chastening, purge us of our
faults and cause us to live better lives in future. But such mistresses as these
never cease to plague men in body and soul and estate all the time that they
have dominion over them. (Econ. i.18-23)4

Critobulus, who had listened to Socrates long speech without interruption,
expressed his satisfaction, especially with the call to arm to fight for our freedom
against these tyrants, but he decided to change the subject at this point. He said that
he considered himself and Socrates as men with sufficient self-control (enkrateia)
as to avoid becoming victims of those harsh mistresses mentioned and berated
by Socrates above. If only Socrates could give him some good advice of how to
increase his estate, he should not worry that his friend may not be able to follow his
advice. Critobulus believed perhaps correctly that neither of them was a slave to their
passions and appetites; but he also believed, certainly falsely, that neither of them had
The diatribe against vice echoes Prodicus famous story of Heracles in the cross-roods. (Memorabiia,
II. i. 21-33)
84
enough wealth and both were in need of more money.

Socrates objected to Critobulus second assumption and said that he did
not need more money. Given his modest needs, he was sure that he had more than
enough, in contrast to his friend who would always need more money, though he
had a hundred times more than himself. The reason for this was that his fiend had
acquired certain expensive habits, such as, offering large sacrifices, entertaining
many strangers, giving expensive dinners to his friends, making costly contributions
to the state, etc. Looking at his predicament, Socrates would feel pity for his friend,
but he found it ironic that Critobulus, nevertheless, would like to have his advice as
to how to increase his estate and his wealth, instead of following Socrates example
by reducing his need for more money.5
Responding to Critobulus complaint that Socrates refused to help a friend
in need by giving him advice, Socrates agreed to point out for him certain helpful
observations from his life experiences: I saw that those who follow these pursuits
carelessly suffer loss, and I discovered that those who devote themselves earnestly
to them accomplish them more quickly, more easily and with more profit. I think
that if you would elect to learn from these, you too with Gods favor would turn out
a clever man of business. (Econ 2.18) Socrates proceeded to teach his friend by
giving specific examples: Some men invest large sums to build useless houses, others
with much less accomplish more; some crowd the houses with costly furniture and
implements which they cannot use when they need them, because of the disorder
inside the expensive house; some have difficulty keeping their servants even if they
tie them down, but others manage to have very loyal servants who will never leave
their masters; although they cultivate the same kind of land, some famers starve to
death, while other prosper; some have been ruined by keeping horses, while others
have been profited by them; some treat their wives as partners in life and increase
their estates, others neglect to treat them well and are ruined by them; this important
point is further elaborated by Socrates as follows:
5
This Socratic lesson on virtuous economics is worth keeping in mind for thoughtful men. Instead of
looking for more and more money to satisfy unnecessary desires and needs, one ought to try to lessen
these desires and needs.
85
I will introduce Aspasia to you, and she will explain the whole
matter to you with more knowledge than I posses. I think that the wife
who is a good partner in the household contributes as much as her
husband to its good; because the incomings for the most part are the
result of the husbands exertions, but the outgoings are controlled
mostly by the wifes dispensation. If both do their part well, the estate
is increased; if they act incompetently, it is diminished. (Econ. iii.15)6

Critobulus agrees with Socrates on this point and on his further suggestion that
he should not engage in every art or craft in order to increase the estate by all means.
He should avoid, e.g., the so-called illiberal arts, because of their bad influence on
both the bodies and the souls of the workers but, more importantly, because: They
leave no spare time for attention to ones friends and city, so that those who follow
them are reputed bad at dealing with friends and bad defenders of their countries.
In fact, in some of the states, and especially in those reputed warlike, it is not even
lawful for any of the citizens to work at illiberal arts. (Econ. iv. 2-3)7
This been so and given that no one can learn or excel in all arts and sciences
they would have to sort out the best of them. In that case, they should probably
imitate the Great King of Persia, who recommended as best for free men, the arts
of war and agriculture. The art of war evidently had made the Persians the masters
almost of the whole world; but their Kings paid special and even personal attention
to the cultivation of the land too, and the fair distribution of taxes to the workers of
the land.8
The King, we are told, was always following the same effective method by
praising and rewarding generously those of his civil archons and military commanders
who had met or exceeded his expectations, while demoting and penalizing the ones
who had fallen short of it. Xenophon reports that Cyrus, after a splendid ceremony
This is another valuable lesson of Socrates about household management. More on this we will find
later, in the discussion of Ischomachus and his wife.
7
8
On this see also Aristotles Politics, Book II.
At this point, Xenophon took the opportunity to express his admiration of the Persian Kings, especially
Cyrus the II, whom he had served together with ten thousand Greeks as mercenaries.
86
at which he had given precious gifts to those who had distinguished themselves as
warriors and those who excelled as cultivators of the land, he declared: I myself
deserve to receive the gifts awarded in both classes; for I am the best at stocking
land and the best at protecting the stock. (Econ. Iv.16)9 This is the same Cyrus who
had told an admiring visitor, the Spartan Lysander, that himself had drown some of
the straight lines and measured some of the distances between trees, and even had
planted some of them with his own hands, invoking the god Mithra and confessing
that: I swear by the Sun-god that I never yet sad down to dinner when in sound
health, without first working hard at some task of war or agriculture, or exerting
myself somehow. (Econ. iv.24) To this Lysander, laconically, replied: I think you
deserve your happiness, Cyrus, for you earned it by your virtues. (Econ. iv.25)
Here, Xenophon put in Socrates mouth a wonderful eulogy of the art of
agriculture as the most befitting to a free man and most benefiting the men engaged
in it, as regards the body, the soul and the estate, providing them with the means
by which they live their lives with enjoyment and serve even the gods as civilized
people. Socrates is able to sum it up thus: To me indeed it seems strange, if any free
man has come by a possession pleasanter than this, or has found out an occupation
pleasanter than this or more useful in winning a livelihood. (Econ. v.11)
Furthermore, the land yields all its fruits to hard work, which makes the body
strong and, at the same time teaches farmers a sense of justice by giving more to those
who work harder and take better care,10 as well as a feeling of needed cooperation to
accomplish important communal goals. Most importantly, agriculture also provides
a forum for men to excel and take command in the same way as war does, of which
Xenophon had a personal experience and could put it thus:
Moreover, husbandry helps to train men for cooperative effort. For
men are essential to an expedition against an enemy, and the cultivation of
the soil demands the aid of men. Therefore nobody can be a good farmer
9
As a sign of Cyrus virtue, Xenophon mentions the devotion of his solders to him, to the extent that
there were no defections from his army, and that so many were willing to dye over his dead body at
Kounaxa. (Econ. Iv.18-19)
10
Of course, like Aristotle and Plato, Xenophon here and elsewhere was a proponent of the proportional
justice.
87
unless he makes his laborers both eager and obedient; and the captain
who leads men against an enemy must contrive to secure the same results
by rewarding those who act as brave men should act and punishing the
disobedient.11 And it is no less necessary for a farmer to encourage his
laborers often, than for a general to encourage his men. And slaves need the
stimulus of good hope no less, nay, even more than free men to make them
steadfast. It has been nobly said that husbandry is the mother and nurse of
the other arts. For when husbandry flourishes, all the other arts are in good
fettle; but whenever the land is compelled to lie waste, the other arts of
landsmen and mariners alike well-nigh perish. (Econ. v. 14-17)
Although Critobulus seems to share Socrates enthusiasm in praising the
blessings of agriculture, he does not fail to raise a common concern that the farmer
is in the mercy of the elements and the weather which is unpredictable and can
frustrate all good efforts. Hailstorms and frosts, droughts and floods, and deceases
of plants and stock can bring disaster even to the best and most industrious farmers.
In response to this, Socrates can only remind Critobulus that the gods are in control
always, both in times of war and in times of peace. Prudent men should not forget
this and should always start any work by praying and sacrificing to the gods asking
for help and favorite signs. The farmers, no less than the warriors, are facing constant
battles, and they need to have the gods on their side. At this point a recapitulation is
attempted of the steps which they had made so far in their search for the meaning of
oikos and oikonomia, and its function as a practical science or art, with emphasis on
the conclusion which they reached:
We came to the conclusion that for a gentleman the best occupation
and the best science is husbandry, from which men obtain what is necessary
to them. For this occupation seemed to be the easiest to learn and the
11
Therefore nobody can be a good farmer unless he makes his laborers both eager and obedient; and
the captain who leads men against an enemy must contrive to secure the same results by rewarding those
who act as brave men should act and punishing the disobedient. This statement sums up Xenophons
theory of house management and, in general, men management, and their connection to virtue, to the
ability of the leader to motivate and lead his subordinates to success.
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pleasantest to work at, to give to the body the greatest measure of strength
and beauty, and to leave to the mind the greatest amount of spare time
for attending to the interests of ones friends and city. Moreover, since the
crops grow and the cattle on a farm graze outside the walls, husbandry
seemed to us to help in some measure to make the workers valiant. And so
this way of making a living appeared to be held in the highest estimation
by our states, because it seems to turn out the best citizens and most loyal
to the community. (Econ. vi.8-10)12

Once again Critobulus agreed with Socrates that indeed the getting of a living
from agriculture is in the highest degree honorable, good and pleasant (kalliston,
ariston, ediston); but he would like to know the reason (aitia), as to why some
farmers are so successful that husbandry yields them all they need in abundance, and
others are so inefficient that they find farming unprofitable. His insistence on this
point of etiology was not theoretical but rather practical, in order that we may do
what is good and avoid what is harmful. (Econ. vi.11)
III
It was at this crucial point of the dialogue that Socrates expressed his wish to
reveal the conversation he had with an Athenian gentleman, by name Ischomachus,
who had acquired rightfully the reputation of being a man of complete virtue (kalos
kai agathos), an honor which Critobulus confessed to desire too.13 Socrates reveals
that when he heard that the name of gentleman (kalos kai agathos), was applied
to Ischomachus by men, women, citizens and strangers alike, he decided to meet
him, if possible. So, when he saw the gentleman one morning siting at the cloister
of Zeus Eleutherius apparently at leisure, Socrates approached him and asked him
these pointed questions:
Why sitting still, Ischomachus? You are not in the habit of doing
Socrates praise of agriculture and its multiple benefits would have pleased the farmers and Founding
Fathers of the United States of America, especially Thomas Jefferson, who connected it with the love
of liberty as well.
12
13
I long to deserve this title myself. (Econ. vi.12)
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nothing; for generally when I see you in the market-place you are either
busy or at least not wholly idle. True, and you would not have seen me so
now, Socrates, had I not made an appointment with some strangers here.
Pray, where do you spend your time, said I, and what do you do
when you are not engaged in some such occupation? For I want very much
to learn how you came to be called a gentleman,14 since you do not pass
your time indoors, and your condition does not suggest that you do so.
(Econ. vii.1-2).
Ischomachus response to the Socratic (and flattering question), how you came
to be called a gentleman, was a gentle smile and an expression of ignorance of such
thing. In his dealing with other Athenians, especially those who change him to an
exchange of property, he does not hear them addressing him by such honorable name.
At any rate, Socrates observation that he did not spend his time in the house was
correct. He explained further that there was no need for him to stay indoors because,
as he put it, my wife is quite capable of looking after the house by herself. This
statement prompted more questions from Socrates, who wanted to know whether the
gentleman had trained his wife to be so good or had she learned her household duties
from her parents. Ischomachus had another smile here with Socrates innocence, if he
believed that a fifteen year old girl would have known much more than to control
her appetites.15
The rest of the narrated dialogue between Socrates and Ischomachus is on how
the latter trained his wife to take good care of the duties inside the house, and the
training of his foreman to take care of the duties outside the house, the management
of the estate. Responding to Socrates questions, the Athenian gentleman would
outline the course of lessons, which he gave to his newly-wed wife to make her a
worthy partner in his life-journey.
Gentleman translates here the Greek expression , literally beautiful or noble
and good.
14
15
For this and for her knowing of how to turn wool into cloth, he gives credit to her parents. The rest
was due to his manager skills and his training of his wife to assume the responsibility of cooperative
leadership of the oikos.
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This part of the dialogue can be seen either as an idealized relation between a
husband and wife of an Athenian household or as a patronizing Athenian male trying
to subdue and domesticate his young and innocent wife.16 In either case it is worthy
to follow up the course of lessons closely, because it can teach much of what does it
take to maintain a functioning and successful household in ancient or modern times.
Following the sensible rule that one ought to begin every important work in
war or peace by appealing to gods, Ischomachus invited his newly-wed wife to a
common sacrifice and prayer that, as he put it gently: I might really teach as she
learn what was best for us both. (Econ. vii.7) This emphasis on union and common
interest would become the main theme of the entire course of lessons. The first lesson
was his effort to explain to his young, inexperienced, and anonymous wife the reason
of their union in matrimony. Since this was an arranged marriage, he tells her that
her parents had chosen him of all Athenians, and he had chosen her from all the
maidens of that large city, because both were looking for the best partner (beltiston
koinonon) of the newly established household (oikos) and for the children, their
common good (koinon agathon), when they arrive in their time. Then he comes to
the main point of having everything in common as a married couple, their common
stock which would need their common care:
For I am paying into the common stock all that I have, and you have
put in all that you brought with you. And we are not to reckon up which of
us has actually contributed the greater amount, but we should know of a
surety that the one who proves the better partner makes the more valuable
contribution. [For] discretion, both in a man and a woman, means that
their possessions shall be in the best condition possible, and that as much as
possible shall be added to them by fair and honorable means. (Econ. vii.13)

This is a great lesson for any partnership, especially for a successful marriage.
For instance, Michel Foucault, in History of Sexuality, vol. 2, The Use of Pleasure, (1985) considered
this exchange between Ischomachus and his wife as a fully developed treatise on marriage, the Classical
Greece left us, p. 152. For more extensive commentaries, see also, L. Strauss, Xenophons Socratic
Discourse: An Introduction to the Oeconomicus, (Ithaca: Cornel University, 1970); and S. Romeroy,
Xenophon, Economicus: A Social and Historical Commentary, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
16
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The evaluation of the contribution of each partner would not be judged at the end
by the amount one put into the cooperative, but by the quality of the one who would
be proven the better partner in managing the common stock. It is also very good to
want to improve and increase the estate over time instead of trying to keep it in the
same condition as was received from family inheritance. No surprise then, that the
young wife got the meaning of the lesson and eagerly and lovingly responded to her
husband/teacher saying: How can I possibly help you?, and And what do you see
that I can possibly do to help in improving our property? Having thus motivated
his wife/student and partner in life, Ischomachus is ready to reveal to her the great
lesson of the division of labor which is necessary for the good management of the
large estate and therefore sanctioned by the gods and the laws of the state. He told
her that she will be the queen of their house, while he will be taking care of the estate
outdoors:
And since both the indoor and outdoor tasks demand labor and
attention, God from the first adapted the womans nature, I think, to indoor
and mans to the outdoor tasks and cares. For he made the mans body and
mind more capable of enduring cold and heat, and journeys and campaigns;
and therefore imposed on him the outdoors tasks. To the woman, since he
has made her body less capable of such endurance, I take it that God has
assigned it the indoor tasks. And knowing that he had created in the woman
and had imposed on her the nourishment of the infants, he meted out on her
a larger portion of affection for new-born babies than to the man. And
just because both have not the same aptitudes, they have the more need of
each other, and each member of the pair is the more useful to the other, the
one being competent where the other is deficient. And as the God has
made them partners in their children, so the law appoints them partners
in their home. And besides, the law declares those tasks to be honorable
for each of them wherein God has made the one to excel the other. Thus,
to the woman it is more honorable to stay indoors than to abide in the
fields. If a man acts contrary to the nature God has given him, possibly
his disobedience is detected by the gods and he is punished for neglecting
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his own work or meddling with his wifes. (Econ. vii.22-32).
One can guess that many feminists and proponent of same-sex marriage would
have possible objections to these sensible suggestions and justifications of timetested traditions of monogamous and heterosexual marriages. The good thing in this
connection is that the wife of Ischomachus had no such post-modern objections and
concerns. She clearly understood it as a commonsense arrangement and moved on
to ask about the specific tasks which her role as the queen of her house implied for
her. Her husband explained to her that, imitating the bee-queen, she should remain
indoors herself, but send out those servants whose work is outside; supervise those
servants whose work is indoors; receive the incomings from the fields; distribute as
much as necessary and store the rest carefully; make sure that the wool is turned into
clothing; see to it that the dry corn is in good condition for providing food; and above
all care for the servants who may be ill. This last duty may be an unpleasant and
thankless job, but is necessary for the well-being of the household as a whole. To the
husbands surprise, the wife responded in hearing this last of her duties in this way:
Oh no, it would be delighting assuming that those who are well cared for are going
to feel grateful and be more loyal than before. (Econ. vii37).
This student impressed even Socrates by her capacity to learn and get at the
heart of the matter. Her comment was followed by a delightful exchange between
husband and wife, each trying to present the others contribution as more important;
the wife saying modestly that she would have nothing to guard and take off, unless
the husband brought something in, and the husband insisting that his bringing in
things would mean nothing, unless a good wife could take good care of them and
preserve them or use them with measure as they were needed. One would wish that
more married couples had this kind of discussions and disposition toward each other.
At any rate, Ischomachus proceeded to enumerate more duties and certainly more
pleasant for his wife. He noted that if she performs these new duties with care, she
will have not only loyal servants, but also will probably turn her husband into her
willing servant, and the her conventional master:
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But I assure you, dear, there are other duties peculiar to you that are
pleasant to perform. It is delightful to teach spinning to a maid who had no
knowledge of it when you received her, and to double her worth to you;
to take in hand a girl who is ignorant of housekeeping and service, and
after teaching her and making her trustworthy and serviceable to find her
worth any amount; to have the power of rewarding the discreet and useful
members of your household, and of punishing anyone who turns out to be a
rogue. But the pleasantest experience of all is to prove yourself better than
I am, to make me your servant; and so far for having cause to fear that as
you grow old you may be less honored in the household, to feel confident
that with advancing years, the better partner you prove to me and the better
housewife to our children, the greater will be the honor paid to you in our
home. For it is not through outward comeliness that the sum of things good
and beautiful is increased in the world, but by the daily practice of the
virtues. (Econ. vii.41-43).
Well, who said that the Greeks could not be romantic and diplomatic at the
same time! Every husband-to-be should take lessons from this Athenian gentleman
or the Athenian general, if we assume that Ischomachus here expresses Xenophons
thinking and feeling on this matter. Be that as it may, the first set of lessons about
partnership and leadership are thus brought to a conclusion. The next lesson relates
to the value of order in the arrangement of the house for its efficiency and use. The
occasion for this lesson appeared when the husband asked for some implement
and the wife, not being able to provide it on time, blushed from shame and looked
confused and upset. Instead of shouting at her or blaming his wife for this mess,
Ischomachus, like a true gentleman, takes the responsibility upon himself by saying
that it was his fault that he had not told his wife where to place this tool, when he
handed it over to her in the first place.17
Then he proceeded to give her a lecture on order (taxis) and its importance
17
If Athenian gentlemen were even half as good husbands as Xenophons portrait of Ischomachus
suggests in these lines, this alone would provide sufficient justification of the greatness of Athens. It is
94
for human life, giving as examples the chorus of dancers dancing in unison; a well
disciplined and ordered army; a warship moving orderly; or a Phoenician merchant
ship, which was well stocked in an orderly fashion, so that order could be maintained
even in a storm. In addition to its utility order can add an aesthetic value to things
ordered, even to such things as shoes, clothes and bed sheets. The important point
here is to have for each kind of thing in its proper place, just as you must specify the
meeting place with precision if you do not want to miss your important appointment.
Together with his wife then, they reviewed the layout of the house and designated
special places for the furniture and different kinds of household implements, the
details of which we may skip. The moral of the lesson on order was that they, as
Master and Mistress of the household, had more responsibility than their servants in
taking care of their own possessions. That the lesson too was learned well is evident
from the wifes last comment, which Socrates took as indicative of her masculine
mind: Just as it naturally comes easier to a good woman to care for her own
children than to neglect them, so a good woman finds it pleasanter to look after her
own possessions than to neglect them. (Econ. ix. 19)18
Prompted by Socrates next comment that he would derive much more pleasure
by seeing a living womans virtue than by contemplating a fair womans portrait
painted by Zeuxis own hand, Ischomachus proceeds to report on the next and last
lesson on cosmetics. One day he noticed that his wife had put up heavy make-up
(she had rubbed in white lead in order to look whiter than she is, and alkanet juice
to heighten her rosy color of her cheeks; and she was wearing boots with high soles
to increase her height), so he approached her and asked gently:
Tell me, my dear, how should I appear more worthy of your love as
a partner in our goods, by disclosing to you our belongings just as they are,
without boasting of imaginary possessions or concealing any part of what
we have, or by trying to trick you by an exaggerated account, showing you
surely an encomium of Athens by an Athenian who passed many years of his life in exile from the city,
which he apparently loved all along.
To grasp the full meaning of this comment, one should keep in mind that it is made by a fifteen year
old girl, who has not get become a mother to her children. Yet, she knew the difference between a good
and a bad woman.
18
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bad money and gilt necklaces and describing clothes that will fade as real
purple?
Hush, pray dont be like thatI could not love you with all my
heart if you were like that!
Then, are we not joined together by another bond of union, dear, to
be partners in our bodies?
The world says so, at any rate.
How then should I seem more worthy of your love in this partnership
of the bodyby striving to have my body hale and strong when I present
it to you, and so literally to be of a good countenance in your sight, or by
smearing my cheeks with red lead and painting myself under the eyes with
rouse before I show myself to you and clasp you in my arms, cheating you
and offering to your eyes and hands red lead instead of my real flesh?
Oh, she cried, I would sooner touch you than red lead, would sooner
see your own color than rouge, would sooner see your eyes bright than
smeared with grease.
Then please assume, my dear, that I do not prefer white paint and
dye of alkanet to your real color; but just as the gods have made horses
to delight in horses, cattle in cattle, sheep in sheep, so human being find
the human body undisguised most delightful. Tricks like these may serve
to gull outsiders, but people who live together are bound to be found out,
if they try to deceive one another. She gave up such practices from that
day forward and tried to let me see her undisguised and as she should be.
(Econ. x. 3-9)
This lesson too has not lost its value millennia later and could help improve
the lives of many couples by making them more simple, more honest and more open
and true to them. But the Athenian gentleman went further with his wise advice by
suggesting to his good wife to be active around the house, instead of being sitting
around. Movement is good for the health of the body and the supervision can be
good for the soul and mind, besides increasing the productivity of the household as
96
a whole. Socrates is impressed by Ischomachus success in training his wife, praises

him for this achievement, and tells him that he would be delighted to hear from him
the specific works which would justify his honorable title of the gentleman (kalos
kagathos).
IV
In this way, Socrates ironically suggested that himself may learn how to
imitate Ischomachus and become thus worthy of this good title, if his poverty is not
an insuperable obstacle for such development, and if wealth is not a prerequisite
for Kalokagathia. Noticing Socrates irony, the Athenian gentleman accepted the
challenge to reveal the principles he had followed in his ordered life beginning with
the gods first and going through the tasks of the typical day:
I begin by worshiping the gods, and trying to conduct myself in such
a way that I may have health and strength in answering to my prayers,
the respect of my fellow citizens, safety with honor in war, and wealth
increased by honest means. For I would fain honor the gods without
counting the cost, Socrates, help friends in need, and look to it that the
city lacks no adornment that my means can supply.All these things hang
together, so far as I can see. For if a man has plenty to eat, and works off
the effect properly, I take it that he both insures his health and adds to his
strength. By training himself in the arts of war he is more qualified to save
himself honorably, and by due diligence and avoidance of loose habits, he
is more likely to increase his estate. (Econ. xi. 8-9).

Then he described for Socrates a typical days work for an Athenian gentleman
like himself. He would get up early in the morning and go to the city for any business
there, or to catch them in, if he needed to meet anybody at home. If no such business
was going on in the city, then he would take a long walk to the estate, walking behind
the horse which would be led by a servant for him. Upon getting to his destination,
he would inspect the workers in their seasonable work giving any directions for
improving the work done there. Then he would ride on his horse back, as if it was
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a real war situation, going up the hills, and down the valleys, always careful not to
harm the horse. This exercise been over, he would allow the servant to lead the horse
back to the house stable, while he again would walk on foot or run for more bodily
exercise. Arriving at home he would take his shower and have his light lunch, eating
just enough to get through the day neither empty-bellied not too full.
Socrates expressed his admiration for the gentleman who, by these daily
sensible activities, could take care simultaneously of his health and strength, prepare
himself and his horse for war, and increase his wealth virtuously. He would have
thought he deserved the honorable title kalos kagathos, but instead of such honor
most of the time he hears complains and slanders from his fellow Athenians, forcing
him to spend time in improving his ability to prosecute and to defend himself in
court if need be. Very sensibly though, he believed that the best defense is not to do
any injustice to anyone, and to even benefit as many as possible. As for prosecution,
he said that he pays attention and takes note of those who would do wrong to many
individuals and to the state, while doing no good to anyone. He practices these
abilities by listening to some servants accusing or defending themselves in his
presence; by praising or blaming someone among his friends; or by playing the peace
maker between friends who quarrel over something. At a court-martial or in a jury,
he would argue pro or against someone depending on whether he believed that the
citizen was unjustly blamed or unjustly honored. He admitted though that his wife
was the toughest judge, especially if he ever tempted to tell a lie, because of his
inability to make the worse cause appear the better. (Econ. x1.26)19
At this point Socrates expressed his polite concern that perhaps he is taking
too much time of a very busy man who had also the duty to protect his reputation
of being a true gentleman (kaloskagathos). Ischomachus assured him that the estate
runs efficiently even in his absence by his bailiff or manager (epitropos), whom
he has trained for the job by passing on to him his knowledge of how to run the
estate successfully with loyalty and dedication to him and his interests, which he has
secured by rewarding him with gifts and good things to have and enjoy. Then the
We may recall that this was the specialty of the Sophists, and one of the un-official charges against
Socrates. See on this, my Socratic Apolologies and Socratic Lessons, Phronimon, vol. 12, no. 2 (2011).
19
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following exchange takes place between the two friends:

But, now, if he is loyal to you, Ischomachus, will that be enough
to make him a competent bailiff? Dont you see that though all men,
practically, wish themselves well, yet there are many who wont take the
trouble to get for themselves the good things they want to have?
Well, when I want to make bailiffs of such men, of course I teach
them also to be careful.
Pray how do you do that? I was under the impression that carefulness
is a virtue that cant be taught.20
True, Socrates, it isnt possible to teach everyone you come across
to be careful.
Very well; what sort of men can be taught? Point this out to me, at all
events. (Econ. xii.8-11)
Ischomachus proceeded to identify the ones whom you should not even try
to teach this virtue, carefulness. They are: the hard-drinkers, sluggards, and the
incontinent in matters of sex. The next step would be to supervise their work, examine
it carefully and be prepared to reward and praise work well-done, while punishing
carelessness wherever you find it. For, as the saying has it, the eye of the master
fattens the horse; that is, the presence of the master would make the servants do
their best to please him and be rewarded. Having thus secured the most able and loyal
candidates for the manager job, he would proceed to teach him what needs to be done
at the farm, the whens and hows, and above all how to rule over the other servants,
and to be able to motivate them to do their best. Here again Socrates expressed his
doubt whether such training was possible, that is, to train men to be rulers of men.
He thought that such a thing was not possible. This challenge gives Ischomachus the
chance to elaborate on his effective method of reward and punishment in training in
general, and especially how it differs when it is applied to men and to other animals:
And men can be made more obedient by word of mouth, by being
shown that it is good for them to obey. But in dealing with slaves the
20
In Meno, Socrates had argued that virtue in general, not just carefulness (epimeleia), cannot be taught.
99
training thought suitable for wild animals is also very effective way of
training; for you will do much with them by filling their bellies with the
food they hanker after. Those of an ambitious disposition are also spurred
on by praise, some natures being hungry for praise as others for food and
drink. Now these are precisely the things that I do myself with a view to
making men more obedient; but they are not the only lessons I give to those
whom I want to appoint my bailiffs.21 I have other ways of helping them on.
For the clothes that I must provide for my work-people and the shoes are
not all alike. Some are better than others, some worse, in order that I may
reward the better servant with the superior articles, and give the inferior
things to the less deserving. For I think it is very disheartening to good
servants, Socrates, when they see that thy do all the work, and others who
are not willing to work hard and run risks when need be, get the same as
they. For my part then, I dont choose to put the deserving on a level with
the worthless, and when I know that my bailiffs have distributed the best
things to the most deserving, I commend them; and if I see that flattery or
any other futile service wins special favor, I dont overlook it, but reprove
the bailiff and try to show him, Socrates, that such favoritism is not even in
his interest. (Econ. xiii. 9-12).
Here Xenophon has hit on the most basic principle of motivation and success
in a competitive economy, the differential treatment of workers, whether servants
and solders, or free men and managers. After all this instruction and training, one
might think that the outcome would be the perfect management, but the Athenian
gentlemen believes that all would be in vain, unless his man has also learned to
respect justice and keep his hands off the property of his master. To accomplish this
he has to appeal to certain maxims of the famous Athenian lawgivers, Solon and
Draco, to remind them that: Thieves shall be fined for their thefts; anyone guilty
21
The Greek word here is epitropos, meaning the foreman, supervisor or manager, the one authorized
to do a task.
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of attempt shall be imprisoned if taken in the act.22 Ischomachus, however, makes it

clear that he would prefer the law of the Persian King in this regard, because it pays
attention in the rewarding the upright more than just the punishing the wrongdoer.
The effect of this tactic is, as he put it:
Thus, seeing that the honest grow richer than the dishonest, many,
despite their love of lucre, are careful to remain free from dishonesty. And
if I find any attempting to persist in dishonesty, although they are well
treated, I regard them as incorrigibly greedy, and have nothing more to
do with them. On the other hand, if I discover that a man is inclined to be
honest not only because he gains by his honesty, but also from a desire to
win my approbation, I treat him like a free man by making him rich; and
not only so, but I honor him as a gentleman. For I think, Socrates, that the
difference between ambition and greed consists in this, that for the sake of
praise and honor the ambitious are willing to work properly, to take risks
and refrain from dishonest gain. (Econ. xiv. 8-10)23.
V
At the end, Socrates is impressed by the clarity of Ischomachus thinking and
the effectiveness of his method in identifying and training some servants for the
duties of the estate manager. The rest would be for him to teach the actual art of
agriculture, that is what kind of work is to be done at what time and in which way to
bring the desired results with the help and favor of the gods. But this art is the most
philanthropic, in the sense of being most kindly and easy to learn, besides being as
he had already shown, the most useful, pleasant, honorable and dear to gods and
men. Every man, even Socrates, knows a good deal of the art of farming, without
being aware of the fact, and he can learn much upon seeing how it is done or hearing
from those who know already. There is no need for us here to follow all the steps and
22
This would mean that not only the act of theft, but even the intension is punishable, which may be
Draconian.
23
This is another good criterion to differentiate the more liberal and noble natures from the more slavish
ones.
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stages (quality of land, seeds, weather, etc.), through which the Athenian gentlemen
took Socrates to show him his knowing of this art. At the end of the process, Socrates
is able to say to his teacher regarding the art of agriculture:
But now that you have undertaken to question me in particular, my
answers, you tell me, agree exactly with the views of a farmer so famous
for his skill as yourself! Can it be that questioning is a kind of teaching,
Ischomachs? The fact is, I have just discovered the plan of your series of
questions! You lead me by paths of knowledge familiar to me, point out
things like what I know, and bring me to think that I really know things
that I thought I had no knowledge of. You have convinced me that I
understand agriculture, though I know that I have never been taught this
art.24
I told you a while ago that agriculture is such a humane, gentle art
that you have but to see her and listen to her, and she at once makes you
understand her. She herself gives you many lessons in the best way of
treating her. For instance, the vine climbs the nearest tree, and so teaches
you that she wants support.
How is it then, Ischomachus, if the operations of husbandry are so
easy to learn and all alike know what needs be done, that all have not the
same fortune? How is it that some farmers live in abundance and have more
than they want, while others cannot get the bare necessities of life, and even
run into debt? (Econ. xix. 14-18)25
The answer to the last question, according to the Athenian gentleman, is not
24
It is delightful to see here Ishomachus practicing the Socratic method on Socrates, apparently without
realizing it, not in order to prove to him that he thinks that he knows things that he does not know, but
rather ironically, that he knows things that the thought he did not know! In other words he is presented
here in a role similar to that of the student of Diotima in Platos Symposium, or even better that of the
slave-boy in the dialogue with Meno!
25
In light of the debt crisis in Greece and Europe, this particular lesson would seem very timely indeed
and worth learning and practicing it. But will the Greeks and other Europeans recover their lost love of
work in agriculture?
102
lack of knowledge, but lack of attention or proper caring (epimeleia), for land, as
all men know, responds to good treatment, and besides, to a careful man, who
works strenuously at agriculture, no business gives quicker returns than farming.
My father taught me that and proved it by his own practice. (Econ. xx. 22) He
proceeded to elaborate on his fathers tactics in buying and selling land, by which he
proved to be truly a lover of agriculture (philogeorgos). Socrates then brought up
the maxim: All men naturally love whatever they think will bring them profit, and
congratulated his interlocutor, for you stated that husbandry is the easiest of all arts
to learn, and after hearing all that you had said, I am quite convinced that this is so.
(Econ. xx. 29)
At this point, the Athenian gentleman acknowledged that there is something
common but intangible in all these arts, agriculture and economics, as well as the
arts of war and politics, that is, the aptitude for command, the ability to lead, (to
archikon einai). This quality enables some men to motivate others to do the hard
work willingly and with joy. But this, in the final analysis, is not something that it
can be taught. It is a touch of the divine that goes beyond the human. Let us close
our discussion with these inspired words put by Xenophon in the mouth not of his
beloved Socrates, but of Ischomachus, the Athenian gentleman par excellence, who
exemplified in his eyed the classical Hellenic ideal of the man of perfect arte, the
Kalos kai agathos aner:
But if in the sight of him [the master or leader] they bestir themselves,
and a spirit of determination and rivalry and eagerness to excel falls on
every workman, then I should say: this man has a touch of the kingly nature
in him. And this, in my judgment, is the greatest thing in every operation
that makes any demand on the labor of men, and therefore in agriculture.
Mind you, I do not go so far as to say that this can be learnt at sight or at
a single hearing. On the contrary, to acquire these powers a man needs
education; he must be possessed of great natural gifts; above all, he must be
a genius [theion genesthai]. For I reckon this gift is not altogether human,
but divinethis power to win willing obedience: it is manifestly a gift
of the gods to the true votaries of prudence. Despotic rule over unwilling
103
subjects they give, I fancy, to those whom they judge worthy to live the life
of Tantalus, of whom it is said that in hell he spends eternity, dreading a
second death. (Econ. xxi. 10-12) 26
26
At these two important points that the ability to lead will be giving to him who has educated himself
in virtue, and that the tyrannical rule over unwilling subjects will have the dreadful fate of Tandalus,
Xenophon was in agreement with the other two great Socratic philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. The
Hellenic Gods favor only those who do their best to excel and distinguish themselves as Honer, the
primordial teacher of the Hellenes had said: !
Dr. Christos C. Evangeliou

Towson University
USA
Chrysoula Gitsoulis
Introduction
We expect reliable moral judgments to be based on sound moral standards
(principles/rules) -- standards that are unambiguous and can withstand close
scrutiny and rational criticism. But what, precisely, makes a moral standard sound
or acceptable? Who decides this? How are moral standards constructed? Or, more
importantly, how should they be constructed? And how should they be used in moral
reasoning?
For moral realists like Russell Shafer-Landau (2004), this question
is misleading, because moral standards are not constructed; instead, they are
discovered. As he puts it: When moral skeptics ask where moral truths come from,
the answer neednt be: us. The answer just might be: moral truths come from
moral principles, which themselves are true provided they correctly describe the
nature of the moral world. (2004, p. 89-90) According to Shafer-Landau, there are
moral truths not of our own making; they are true independently of what anyone,
anywhere, happens to think of them. These truths would exist even if there were no
human beings around to discern them. On this view, certain practices are by their
very nature wrong, and human beings discover their wrongness in the same way that
they make other discoveries about the world.
In another essay1, I tried to show that this brand of moral realism faces grave
difficulties. A central problem is the following: the standards for what count as a
correct application of moral terms like just, good, right, wrong, as conceived
by Landau, would have to issue their requirements independently and in advance of
human verdicts for an open-ended range of situations. But how is this possible?2
1
See A Defense of Moral Constructivism (2014).
As Crispin Wright (2001) points out, in his critique of meaning-Platonism.
105
Once we recognize that in many situations, positive or negative moral

predicates apply on the basis of our deciding that they do, the question arises: How
should these decisions be made? What canons of reasoning should they respect? If
moral standards are not discovered, but instead created, how are they created, or
rather, how should they be created? And how should they be applied to particular
cases? I feel the Socratic Method (the method that Socrates employs throughout the
Platonic Dialogues in reasoning about moral matters) provides us with a useful way
of answering these questions, as illustrated by at least one area where it has been
fruitfully applied: moral debates that arise in legal reasoning.
Let me illustrate this method with a simple example. In Platos Republic Book
I, 331c, the character Cephalus states that:
Justice is speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred.
We can take this to be a moral standard or principle that is offered by Cephalus
concerning the nature of justice. But, Socrates asks, what if a sane man lends a
weapon to a friend and wants it back when he has gone mad? Would it be just to
return the weapon to the madman? And would it be just to always speak truthfully to
such a man? These questions give us reason to doubt that the moral principle offered
by Cephalus is universally applicable. Cephalus must now either:
1) Discard his general principle in search of a better one;
2) Modify his general principle (by, e.g., restricting its scope). In this case,
he must offer a non-ad hoc explanation for why the principle fails to
apply to the case at hand (e.g., returning a weapon to a madman); or,
3) Explain why, contrary to our intuitions, the principle really does apply
to the case at hand (i.e., Show that it really is just to return a weapon to
a madman and always speak truthfully to such a man).
In contemporary moral discourse, this procedure is referred to as the method
of reflective equilibrium (a term introduced by John Rawls), but it is, in essence, no
different from the Socratic Method. The method of reflective equilibrium3 consists
3
As defined By Norman Daniels in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Reflective
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Chrysoula Gitsoulis
in working back and forth between our moral judgments about particular instances/
cases and moral principles/rules/standards, revising any of these elements wherever
necessary (by addressing questions such as (1) (3)) in order to achieve an acceptable
coherence (i.e., equilibrium) among them (i.e., among the general statements (moral
standards/principles), and among their relationship to particular cases). This process
is nicely exemplified in legal reasoning. In striving after coherence, we may modify
prior beliefs, or add new ones (just as judges do in legal settings). In practical
contexts, this kind of deliberation may help us arrive at a conclusion (which I will
call a considered moral belief) when we are caught in a moral dilemma.
Of course, in reality, a variety of sources influence the moral standards that
guide our decision-making processes: our early upbringing, our friends, and our
cultural environment (books, movies, music, etc.), among other things. In normative
ethics, the central question is not how we come to have the particular standards that
we do (a descriptive question), but whether they are good standards to live by (a
normative question). It is this normative question that will concern me here.
In what follows, I will examine some common ways in which people derive,
or claim to derive, their moral principles:
1) the law
2) religious codes
3) conscience
4) intuition
5) majority opinion
and will point to inadequacies with each of these means of grounding our moral
principles. (Note that that what I have in mind with regard to (1) is blind acceptance
of the law.)
In contrast with all the previous proposals, I defend the view, in a sequel to
Equilibrium, (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2013/entries/reflective-equilibrium/>. An alternative account, as noted by Daniels, retains the importance of revisability and emphasizes the positive role of examining our moral intuitions, but rejects
the appeal to coherentism in favor a treating our intuitive moral judgments as the right sort to count as
foundational, even if they are still defeasible. I will discuss some problems with this alternative in the
next section.
107
this paper, that a more reliable place to ground our moral standards is in our reasongiving activity. On this view, unlike (5) above, it is not mere collective opinion that
should serve as the ultimate basis of morality, for collective opinion may be a product
of narrow-mindedness, selfishness, emotion, gut reaction, ignorance, prejudice,
personal or social preferences, and other forms of sloppy thinking. Rather, the
standards that we bring to bear on our moral debates should be a product of critical
reflection, rational scrutiny, deliberation, dialogue, and debate -- all the ideals of
Socratic cross-examination (elenchus). They should be arrived at coolly, rationally,
impartially, with conceptual clarity, and with as much relevant information as we can
reasonably acquire4. In so far as the judgments about any particular case are arrived
at in this way, we can regard them as provisionally established, in the sense that they
have the highest degree of acceptability or credibility for us.
Inadequate ways of grounding moral standards
A. The Law
In most countries there is a strong correlation between what islegaland what
is morally right. However, it should be clear that the law is not the best test for
determining whether an act is morally right or wrong.
To begin with, the law cannot cover all possible human conduct, and in many
situations it is too blunt an instrument to provide adequate moral guidance. The law
generally prohibits egregious affronts to a societys moral standards and in that sense
is the floor of moral conduct, but breaches of moral conduct can slip through cracks
in that floor. (Shaw & Barry 2013, p. 8)
Moreover, and more importantly, there are, on the one hand, acts that are, or
were, illegal but morally right. For example, helping a Jewish family to hide from
the Nazis was against German law in 1939; women were not allowed to vote in the
US until 1920; it was illegal for blacks to marry whites in most parts of the US until
1967. Today there is no doubt that abolishing these laws was the morally right thing
to do.
I borrow this expression from Tom Regan, though he uses it in a different context in (2004), Defending
Animal Rights, Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 2001, p. 45.
4
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Chrysoula Gitsoulis
On the other hand, there are acts that are, or were, legal but morally wrong.
For example,5 it is legal to watch a toddler drown in water 1 foot deep, it is legal to
be a deadbeat parent, it is legal to abuse people mentally. But clearly this behavior
is morally wrong.
In sum, the legality/illegality of an action does not guarantee that it is morally
right/wrong. It all depends on how the law is arrived at a point I amplify on in the
sequel to this paper.
B. Religious Codes
Can our moral standards be founded on religious belief? Any religion provides
its believers with a worldview, part of which involves certain values, codes of conduct,
and commitments. Many people believe that moral principles must be grounded on
these codes of conduct. One problem with adopting this view, which also arose for
using legal codes as moral standards, is that the moral instructions of the worlds
great religions (even more so than legal codes) are general and imprecise. They do
not relieve us of the necessity to engage in moral reasoning ourselves. Indeed, even
members of the same faith often disagree on moral matters. (As noted by Shaw &
Barry 2013, p. 10-11)
For example, many religious codes state that it is wrong to kill. Yet practitioners
of those religious codes disagree among themselves over the morality of:
fighting in wars
capital punishment
killing in self-defense
slaughtering animals
abortion
infanticide
euthanasia (doctor assisted suicide)
allowing foreigners to die from famine because we have not provided
them with as much food as we might have.
5
Some of these examples are drawn from http://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/1q6afg/

whats_the_most_morally_wrong_yet_lawfully_legal/
109
honor killings
capital punishment by being stoned to death
The religious codes of the Bible, to take on example, do not provide
unambiguous solutions to these moral problems, so even believers must engage in
moral reasoning if they are to have intelligent answers.
Moreover, religions differ in their moral beliefs, so if one attempts to justify
what makes an act right or wrong in terms of his religious beliefs, that will only persuade those who already agree with [his] particular interpretation of [his] particular
religion. (Shaw and Barry 2013, p. 10-11)
C. Conscience
Some people hold that our conscience should guide our moral decisionmaking. We have all felt the pangs of conscience when we violate the principles we
choose to live by. But what exactly is conscience and how reliable a guide is it?
In psychological discourse, the term conscience is often used to refer to
the feelings that arise from what Freud termed the superego. Superego refers
to the subconscious source of ones sense of requirement, and guilt at the emotional
level. The superego, of course, is not literally a little voice inside us. According to
Freud, the superego was formed by our early upbringing. Most of us, when we were
very young, were punished if, e.g., we did not tell the truth, or return things to their
rightful owner. By contrast, when we spoke truthfully, and behaved kindly, we were
rewarded, with praise, maybe even hugs or candy. Seeking reward and avoiding
punishment motivated us to do what was expected of us. Gradually, the demands
of our parents and other authority figures the sources of reward and punishment
-- became internalized as an authority over (super) the conscious self (ego). When
we did something forbidden, we would feel vaguely that our parents knew what we
did even when they werent around, so that we would experience the same negative
feelings as when scolded by them the first stirrings of guilt. (Shaw & Barry 2013,
p. 14). By the same token, even in the absence of explicit parental reward, we would
feel a sense of self-approval about having done what we were supposed to have
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done. And this is how our conscience is believed to have evolved through the
internalization of the moral instructions that we were raised on.
As adults, this process is replicated at a level where the authority figure is
a group that we belong to, including the society in which we live. People allow
their socio-cultural world views and assumptions, including the circles they associate
with, to govern much of their behavior. For example, many professionals behave in
ways that are generally acceptable in their work circles. To deviate from the norm
would invite disapproval and sometimes derision especially from [ones] superiors.
Those who dare to swim against the current create ripples and sometimes risk getting
drowned by the waves. 6 So most people tend to go with the flow.7
Now that we have some idea of how conscience evolves, throughout the course
of our lives, let us turn to the question of how reliable a guide it is. People often say,
Follow your conscience or You should never go against your conscience. Such
advice is not very helpful. Indeed, it can sometimes be bad advice. Why?
When we are genuinely perplexed about what we ought to do, we are trying
to figure out what our conscience ought to be saying to us. Hence, to be told that we
should follow our conscience is no help at all. (Shaw & Barry 2013, p. 15)
Moreover, it may not always be good for us to follow our conscience. It all
depends on what our conscience says.
On the one hand, sometimes peoples consciences do not bother them when
they should, either because: (1) they didnt think through the implications of what
they were doing, or (2) they failed to internalize strongly enough the appropriate
moral principles, or (3) they were not taught the appropriate moral principles (parents
and other sources of authority are not always reasonable or rational).
On the other hand, a persons conscience might disturb him about something
that is perfectly all right. Because the sources that lead to the development of our
conscience -- such as parents or social conventions -- are not always reasonable
6
As Halimah Said puts it. Source: http://www.thesundaily.my/news/299403
As Grisez (1983) points out: to the extent that we identify ourselves with a group, to that extent we
make its demands our own; to the extent that we dont wholly identify with a group, to that extent we
feel its demands to be impositions. Even in the latter case, though, the demands may be accepted as the
price of belonging.
111
or rational, the pangs of guilt we occasionally feel by transgressing the dictates of

conscience are not necessarily our best moral guide. It all depends on the forces that
shaped the development of our conscience. As adults, we are morally independent
agents: we are able to reflect on and understand the moral lessons we were taught
by our parents, peers, and society at large, and refine and modify the principles we
follow. And arguably, this sort of deliberation is necessary to determine if what we
were taught is something we should act on.
D. Intuition
Some people hold that our intuitions about what is right or wrong should serve
as our moral standards. This view is known as moral intuitionism. But what exactly is
an intuition? On most accounts, it is something that is revealed in a moment -- not as a
developing piece of analysis and deliberation, but automatically and instantaneously,
like a gut reaction. Accounts differ, however, over the more precise nature of our
intuitions.
On some accounts, an intuition is a cognition of a mind-independent nonphysical truth, which we discover through a special intuitive faculty in the mind,
different from all the other faculties. In my brief critique of moral realism above, I
tried to explain why this thesis is defective. Note that though this view is commonly
associated with Plato (referred to as Platonism), it is a distorted representation of
how, according to Plato, we acquire moral knowledge. Moral knowledge, for Plato, is
not an instantaneous effortless achievement, as this oversimplified picture suggests,
but a product of intense education and years of training in Socratic dialectic (crossexamination), which only few are capable of.
On other accounts, an intuition is not a perception of a mind-independent nonphysical moral truth, so no special faculty is needed to put us in contact with it.
Rather, an intuition is what 18th century English and Scottish philosophers called
a built in moral sense. These philosophers argued that our built in moral sense
creates positive feelings of approval toward benevolent acts and negative feelings of
disapproval toward evil acts. David Hume, in particular, likened our moral sense to
our aesthetic sense: our moral sense enables us to perceive (get a clear impression
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Chrysoula Gitsoulis
of) the wrongness of an act (e.g., seeing puppies being kicked for fun), just as our
aesthetic sense enables us to appreciate beauty in things we see -- faces, artworks,
landscapes, etc. Only someone the equivalent of a colorblind person would fail to
recognize that certain acts are morally wrong. Hume emphasized that our moral
intuitions are derived by sentiment, not reason. We attain moral knowledge by an
immediate feeling, not by a chain of argument and induction. (Hume 1777/1960,
p. 2) Now, Hume may be correct on how most of us actually derive our moral intuitions
namely, from our feelings, not from reason. But the question I am concerned with
here is: Should we derive them this way? Should our moral standards be grounded
on mere feelings of right and wrong? Here, Hume makes a strong pronouncement:
Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to
any other office than to serve and obey them. (Hume 1739-1740/1969, p. 462)
But this recommendation has obvious difficulties. Different people have
different feelings about what is right or wrong. Some people feel, and indeed claim
that is it is just intuitively obvious, that employees have a moral right to their jobs
-- an entitlement to be fired only with just cause; that people have a right to their
property, and can do anything they want with it; that people have a right to medical
care when ill; others disagree with all this. The moral: what feels right or seems
intuitively obvious may not be the most reliable guide in moral decision making.
Even moral principles that feel or seem intuitively obvious have to be examined
critically.
E. Majority Opinion
Some people believe that the standards of morality should be grounded on
majority opinion. The problem with this proposal is that, looking back over history,
we can find numerous situations where the majority approved of practices that we
now deem to be wrong for example, slavery or racial segregation. Because various
groups within society have self-serving interests, which are not always reasonable or
fair, and because individuals themselves often desire what serves their own interests,
and not the interest of their community, it seems wrong to say that what society as a
whole says is good or right is good or right.
113
Another problem with this proposal, which also arose for taking the dictates of
conscience to serve as our moral standards, involves the phenomena of groupthink,
which was recognized as early as Plato as a problem for Athenian democracy. Almost
all groups, including society as a whole, require conformity from their members, but
in extreme cases the demand for conformity can lead to what social psychologists
call groupthink. Groupthink happens when pressure for unanimity within a highly
cohesive group overwhelms its members desire or ability to appraise the situation
realistically and consider alternative courses of action. (Shaw & Barry p. 20) The
desire for the comfort and confidence that comes from mutual agreement and
approval leads members of the group to close their eyes to negative information, to
ignore warnings that the group may be mistaken, and to discount outside ideas that
might contradict the thinking or the decisions of the group. (Shaw & Barry p. 20)
Since individuals in the group tend to self-censor thoughts that go against the
groups ideas and rationalize away conflicting evidence, and the group as a whole
may implicitly or explicitly pressure potential dissenters to conform (be a team
player), groupthink can lead to irrational, sometimes disastrous decisions, and it has
enormous potential for doing moral damage. (Shaw & Barry p. 20) Witness the trial
and death of Socrates.
Perhaps both of these problems can be overcome if we insist that agreement
be more widespread, i.e., we might insist that social consensus, not merely within a
society, but across most societies, should serve as the standard of right and wrong
for any given society. But cant consensus across societies be mistaken? There was,
after all, a time when people across most societies saw nothing wrong with slavery.
If they were wrong, according to what standard were they wrong?
We might try making the agreement even more widespread: social consensus,
not only across societies, but across time, will serve as our ultimate standard of right
and wrong. Collective agreement that remains stable over time, one might say, is
the standard by which we will test the morality of our practices. The common rules,
habits, and customs that have won social approval over time are the just or right
ones. This would block the slavery objection, because most people today agree that
slavery is wrong. But there is at least one problem with this proposal: new laws
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Chrysoula Gitsoulis
are constantly being debated, especially in light of new technologies (e.g., Should
we ban cloning? genetic engineering? stem cell research? Etc.). We cannot wait for
decades or centuries to go by to figure out whether these practices are right or wrong
we need to know NOW!
References
Baronett, Stan (2012). Logic, Oxford University Press.
Gitsoulis, Chrysoula. A Defense of Moral Constructivism, Proceedings of the 2013
Conference on Philosophy Today, Sponsored by the Council for Research in
Values & Culture, and the School of Humanities, Xian Jiaotong University.
(forthcoming, 2014)
Harman, Gilbert and Thomson, Judith Harvis. Moral Relativism and Moral
Objectivity (Blackwell Publishing Co., 1996).
Hume, D. (1960). An enquiry concerning the principles of morals. La Salle, IL: Open
Court. (Originally published in 1777)
Hume, D. (1969). A treatise of human nature. London: Penguin. (Original work
published 1739-1740)
McGinn, Colin. Wittgenstein on Meaning (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984)
Shafer-Landau, Russell, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (Oxford Press, 2004)
Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: McGraw Hill, 2003),
ch. 2.
Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press, 2004)
Shaw, William and Barry, Vincent. Moral Issues in Business (Wadsworth, 2013), ch. 1.
Stace, W.T., Cultural Relativism Versus Ethical Absolutism in P. Davis (ed.),
Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Columbus: C. E. Merrill Publishing
Company, 1973)
Timmons, Mark (2012). Basic Moral Concepts in Conduct and Character: Readings
in Moral Theory, Wadsworth.
115
Wright, Crispin, Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgensteins Philosophical

Investigations (Harvard University Press, 2001)
Wright, Crispin, Rule-Following without Reasons: Wittgensteins Quietism and
the Constitutive Question in John Preston (ed.); Ratio XX (4), 2007. [Page
reference are to the PDF online version of this article.]
Dr. Chrysoula Gitsoulis

Adjunct Assistant Professor
Department of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences
City College, City University of New York
USA
Jrg Hardy
The Existential Dimension of Socratic Inquiry in Platos Apology1
In Platos Apology Socrates invites and exhorts his fellow citizens to lead an
examined life. Socrates defends his own activity of questioning and examining
by claiming the god commanded him to live the life of a philosopher, to examine
myself and others (Apology 28e4-6). Asking questions and examining beliefs he
cannot abandon, for an un-examined life is not worth living (Apology 37e3-38a7).
For Socrates, seeking knowledge about human well-being is not just an activity
within life but rather a way of living. Socrates not only examines his own and others
beliefs, but he examines the way people live. What could it possibly mean to examine
a way of living? The two crucial elements of the examining life that Socrates has
in mind are, as I take it, taking care of the soul and taking care of thoughts, which
Socrates elucidates both, in the Apology and the Theaetetus.2
Socratic Eudaimonism
In Platos Apology of Socrates and Platos Socratic dialogues Socrates develops
a theory of happiness (eudaimonia), which we may call Socratic Eudaimonism.3 A
person leads a successful life, if she finds herself in a good state of the soul (arte /
virtue), i.e. in a state of the soul that is constitutive of happiness (eudaimonia). For
a good state of the soul (virtue) is what brings about good and beneficial actions.
A persons soul is in a good state, if she possesses all the virtues constitutive of

1
In this paper, I use materials from my commentary on Platos Laches: Hardy 2014.
Caring () is a recurrent theme of the Socratic dialogues, cf. Heitsch 2004: 187 ff.
I call those dialogues Socratic in which Platos protagonist Socrates and his interlocutors pursue
questions of the form: what is X? Among them are the majority of the early dialogues as well as some
of the middle period, such as the Republic and the Theaetetus. For recent scholarly discussions of the
chronology of the Platonic writings, see Nails 2002 and Erler 2007: 2226.
The Existential Dimension of Socratic Inquiry in Platos Apology
117
happiness, including the knowledge about good or bad actions, i.e., the knowledge
about human well-being (cf., e.g., Laches 199d4-e1, Gorgias 507b8-c7).4
Socrates and his interlocutors discuss the questions how one should live,
what exactly constitutes virtue, how one can bring oneself into such a state and how
one can possibly help others in cultivating a good state of the soul.). Socrates does,
however, not only pose questions - he also holds some strong and far-reaching theses
about virtue and the successful life, such as this one: I do know that it is evil and
disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey him who is better than I, whether he be god
or man (Apology 29b6, translation Fowler, Cambridge 1966). (For Socrates theses,
see Appendix II below.)
When we want to pursue good and beneficial actions, we needabove
all action-guiding knowledge about human well-being. This becomes clear, for
instance, in the Laches. In the Laches Socrates interlocutors deliberate about good
education for their adolescent sons and ask Socrates for counsel on activities that
could contribute to their sons education. Socrates reminds his interlocutors that the
question of the right education is a critical one, which can only be addressed on the
basis of knowledge (Laches 184d5e9). For this reason one needs, first of all, to find
out what a good condition of the soul is, before one can even envisage providing
counsel on pedagogic matters (Laches 190b7c3): Socrates: Then isnt it necessary
for us to start out knowing what virtue is? Because if we are not absolutely certain
what it is, how are we going to advise anyone as to the best method of obtaining it?
Laches: I do not think that there is any way in which we can do this, Socrates. What
Socrates says here about the precondition of pedagogic counsel holds true across all
conduct: if you want to put the people whose lives you influence by your actions in
a good (or better) position (and not impair their successful lives), then you should
know what you are doing and thus also know (as far as possible) what constitutes
a good life, i.e. one desirable to all. Obviously, this concerns ones own life, too. If
you want to lead a successful life, you will have to pay attention to the fact that, with
4
The meaning of the term arete in Plato is expounded in Stemmer 1998. For the Socratic-Platonic
idea of a good, successful life (eudaimonia), see Blner 1997: 1127, Hardy 2010, 2011, 2014 and
Penner 2005, 2006.
118
Jrg Hardy
regard to your own pursuit of happiness, many actions that, at first, seem
desirable under given epistemic conditions might turn out, in the light of
careful and precise deliberation, to be not desirable at all and hence
once you have come to know thisyou no longer wish to perform them.
Whoever embarks on answering the questions Socrates poses will, according
to Nicias in the Laches, at any rate deliberate about her way of life. Nicias reports
that whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and associates with him in
conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something
quite different in the first place, keep on being led about by the mans arguments
until he submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present
manner of life and the life he has lived hitherto. And when he does submit to this
questioning, you dont realise that Socrates will not let him go before he has well and
truly tested every last detail. I personally am accustomed to the man and know that
one has to put up with this kind of treatment from him, and further, I know perfectly
well that I myself will have to submit to it. I take pleasure in the mans company.
(Laches 187d6188a3, transl. Sprague, Cambridge, Ind. 1997). Nicias knows that a
conversation with Socrates always results in the interlocutor giving an account of his
way of life (answering questions about himself concerning both his present manner
of life and the life he has lived hitherto) and Socrates will not let him go before he
has well and truly tested every last detail.
Socrates seems to assume that if one seriously and carefully deliberates what
exactly a good state of the soul is, one will also work on yourself the way that one
is able to improve ones own character, i.e., to develop a good, beneficial state of
the soul (Apology 39d3-8). This is the existential dimension of Socratic inquiry as
becomes clear in Platos Apology of Socrates.
Human wisdom in the Apology
In the Apology Socrates explains the human wisdom needed for examining
beliefs. At the very beginning of his speech, Socrates tells the jury that aside from
the official prosecutors there is another, larger and even more dangerous group of
accusers against which he had to defend himself, namely against the anonymous
119
rumours about him, which had been doing the rounds for a long time. These rumours
had arisen because Socrates was said to be, from the point of view of many of his
fellow men, in possession of knowledge he withheld from others, and this had earned
him the reputation of being a wise man. Socrates sets out to refute this prejudice and
thus expounds the human wisdom, which he shares with all other human beings:
What has caused my reputation is no other than a certain kind of
wisdom. What kind of wisdom? Human wisdom, perhaps. ... I shall call
upon the god of Delphi as witness to the existence and nature of my
wisdom, if it be such. You know Chaerephon. ... He went to Delphi at one
time and ventured to ask the oracle ... He asked if any man was wiser than
I, and the Pythian replied that no one was wiser ... When I heard of this
reply I asked myself: Whatever does the god mean? What is his riddle?
I am very conscious that I am not wise at all; what then does he mean by
saying that I am the wisest? For surely he does not lie; it is not legitimate
for him to do so. For a long time I was at loss as to his meaning; then I
very reluctantly turned to some such investigation as this; I went to one
reputed wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I could refute the oracle
and say to it: This man is wiser than I, but you said I was. Then, when
I examined this man ..., my experience was something like this: I thought
that he appeared wise to many people and especially to himself, but he was
not. ... So I withdrew and thought to myself: I am wiser than this man; it
is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he
knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither
do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that
I do not think I know what I do not know. After this I approached another
man, one of those thought to be wiser than he, and I thought the same thing,
and so I came to be disliked both by him and by many others. After that I
proceeded systematically. ... And by the dog, men of Athensfor I must
tell you the truthI experienced something like this: in my investigation
in the service of the god I found that those who had the highest reputation
were nearly the most deficient, while those who were thought to be inferior
120
Jrg Hardy
were most knowledgeable. ... As a result of this investigation, men of
Athens, I acquired much unpopularity...; many slanders came from these
people and a reputation for wisdom, for in each case the bystanders thought
that I myself possessed the wisdom that I proved that my interlocutor did
not have. What is probable, gentlemen, is that in fact the god is wise and
that his oracular response meant that human wisdom is worth little or
nothing, and that when he says this man, Socrates, he is using my name as
an example, as if he said: This man among you, mortals, is wisest who,
like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is worthless. So even now I
continue this investigation as the god bade meand I go around seeking
out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think
he is, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise.
(Apology 20d6-23b7, transl. Grube, Cambridge, Ind. 1999)
Chairephon has put the question to the oracle of Delphi whether there was
any human being wiser than Socrates. The oracle replied to him that nobody was
wiser than Socrates. As Socrates himself believes he is far from wise, he wishes
to understand and to refute the oracle, and so he wants to find out who is really
knowledgeable. Socrates is surprised to learn that wisdom is not to be found at
all where it is most expected, namely with experts in their respective fields. The
experts he questions possess a good deal of knowledge, yet they also lay claim to
knowing things they do not know after all. The experts seem to be wise without really
being wise. What they lack is second-order knowledge about the epistemic status of
their own beliefs. They are not aware of what they know or do not know. It is this
knowledge that Socrates claims for himself. He calls it human wisdom, as opposed
to a perfect knowledge, which only the gods possess.
Human wisdom, moreover, is (limited) knowledge about the things of real
import, namely wisdom, truth and virtue / the best possible state of a soul, as Socrates
will make explicit in Apology 29d230a7. Socrates has no doubt that the oracle has
mentioned his name merely as an example of human wisdom, which is available to
all those who know what they know and what they do not know. This is Socrates
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understanding of the oracle and this explains indeed why Socrates examines his own
and others beliefs the way he does in Platos dialogues.
Three epistemic levels: perfection, the quest for knowledge, ignorance
In the Apology Socrates distinguishes three epistemic levels and two attitudes
towards ones own beliefs (which are also mentioned in comparable form in the
Lysis, in book V of the Republic as well as the Symposium):5
Perfection: if somebody knew precisely what is valuable and important in life,
then this person would possess perfect knowledge and would have no need to search
for knowledge (cf. Symposium 204a-c). But only gods possess perfect knowledge.
Seeking knowledge: a person who gives an account of herself and examines
her beliefs wishes to know what she knows or does not know. The examining attitude
towards ones own beliefs is the philosophical attitude, the quest for knowledge (Lysis
218a-b, Republic V, 474c475b, Symposion 203d204b). Successful examination of
ones own beliefs leads to the kind of knowledge Socrates calls human wisdom in
the Apology (20d8), which is, at any rate, a second-order knowledge of the epistemic
status of certain beliefs leading in some cases to justified beliefs, which remain in the
soul in the sense of Meno 98a5-6. Giving an account of oneself goes hand in hand
with the endeavour to become as good as possible (Apology 29b30b, 36cd),
that is, with the concern for ones own soul. On closer inspection, it is therefore an
attitude towards oneself which has been reflected on overall.
Ignorance: someone who does not examine her beliefs is someone who seems
to be prudent, but in fact is not (Apology 21c8-d1, Lysis 218a2b6). Ignorance is
avoidable lack of knowledge. An ignorant person does not (or not to a sufficient
degree) examine her own beliefs, and is, unknowingly, in a state that is not beneficial.
Giving an account of oneself is at work on the level of seeking knowledge.
To examine beliefs successfully requires the capacity as well as the motivation to
do so. Those who seem to be wise without actually being wise are mostly lacking in
5
For the following, cf. Hardy 2010, 2011 and 2014 for further references and comments.
122
Jrg Hardy
motivation to examine their beliefs. For this reason they claim knowledge they do not
in fact possess. Remarkably, it is the experience of ignorant experts which has taught
Socrates which kind of knowledge he possesses and how he is to understand the
oracles verdict that he is the wisest of men (Apology 21a23a). He counts among
the wisest of men because he does not claim to know what he does not but knows
what he knows and what he does not know. He possesses this knowledge because he
examines his beliefs and thus employs the second-order knowledge, which is also, at
least in principle, available to his interlocutors.
Socratic midwifery in the Theaetetus
A counterpart to the elucidation of human wisdom in the Apology is the
passage in the Theaetetus where Socrates describes his activity of questioning and
examining as an art of midwifery (Theaetetus 149a1-151d6).
The most important task of Socratic maieutics consists in distinguishing true
thoughts from ostensible thoughts (Theaetetus 150a9-b4, b9-c3). Socrates appeals
to his interlocutors own thinkink; he appeals to his epistemic autonomy. He wants
to make them recognise what they know or do not know about the question What
is F?.6 In the Theaetetus he discloses two secrets of his art. He asserts that he is not
pregnant with wise thoughts, is nobodys teacher, but rather cares of the thoughts of
his interlocutors by letting them discover many beautiful things within themselves
(150d7-8). Socrates self-portrait in the Theaetetus contains two remarkable details.
One is Socrates claim that he possesses the unfailingly reliable skill to examine the
beliefs of his interlocutors. The other is his initially inconspicuous remark that he
possesses his maieutics only in secret (149a7).
Let us turn first to the methodical infallibility Socrates claims. In the Theaetetus,
he says that the god forbids him to allow an imposture or to destroy the true (151d23 transl. Fowler 1921). Admittedly, Socrates does not merely invoke the task (the
divine instruction) but also his own capacity or skill which allows him to examine
the thoughts of his interlocutors in a way that is without fault, fosters truth and avoids
6
In the same manner the author Plato seems to address the thoughts of his readers with the literary form
of his dialogues. For more on this, see Blner 2007: 248-253 and Hardy 2014: 46-53.
123
falsity. Hence he encourages his interlocutor Theaetetus in the eponymous dialogue

to speak his thoughts openly and rely on Socrates to bring to light the possible truth
of his, Theaetetus, thoughts with the help of the god. The objective of the Socratic
questions consists in answers to What-is-F-questions that are correct and sufficient in
form and content, i.e. explanatory definitions (see, for example, Laches 191d1e11).
The knowledge expressed in an appropriate definition of F is the aim of a Socratic
investigation. In the beginning there are beliefs or beliefs that take on the role of
hypothetical definitions.7
While Socrates is not pregnant with his own thoughts insofar as he cannot
provide sufficient answers himself to the What-is-questions he poses. However, if
Socrates, with help from the god, does not accept any false answer, and does not
reject any correct answer, then he will have, at any rate, the capacity to examine
without fail the formal correctness of the suggested definitions. Hence he possesses
the corresponding knowledge of the formal properties of definitions and the formal
properties of the forms, that is, the objects of the Socratic definitional questions.
When Socrates explains both the objective of his questions and the method
by which they are answered without prescribing the final answers to his questions
himself, he wants his interlocutors to find out for themselves what they know or
do not know about the matter in hand. That is the aim and the possible outcome
of Socratic maieutics (Theaetetus 210b11c5) and thus also for the account which
Socrates exhorts his interlocutors to give of themselves and their beliefs (logon
didonai). What Socrates interlocutors know or do not knowthat is what they
are to learn. For this reason Socrates does not prescribe answers to their questions.
7
Socrates explains the multistage process of examining beliefs in detail in the Meno and in the Republic,
cf. Hardy 2011: 71-106 and 2014: 191-213. A precise analysis of the Socratic method can also be found
in Stemmer 1992: 72115. Perfect knowledge is knowledge of forms. Ontologically Plato characterises
the objects of definitional questions as spatially, temporally and qualitatively unchangeable objects.
Epistemologically speaking the forms are the objects of exact, perfect knowledge. On this, see Hardy
2005, 2011a: 71106 (with references) and Rowe 2007. In the Theaetetus (201c202d) Socrates
describes the imperfect, fallible, yet nonetheless justified knowledge of a given state of affairs as an
opinion connected to an explanation (logos). There, he also considers the above characterisation as a
possible definition of knowledge and discusses possible objections to such a definition (cf. also Hardy
2001: 217301).
124
Jrg Hardy
When Socrates asks questions of his interlocutors and criticises the answers they
provide he appeals to their understanding and their knowledge. There seem to be
three objections against this hermeneutic thesis: Socrates puts the questions into the
mouths of his interlocutors which they should ask. He criticises the answers they give
and, as mentioned before, advocates theses, which his interlocutors are to agree to on
the strength of their own pursuit of happiness. However, all this is compatible with
the Socratic aspiration merely to help his interlocutors develop their own thinking.
If one of Socrates interlocutors takes his questions seriously, he will direct his
attention and his epistemological interest to a eudaimonically relevant topic. If he
takes seriously the criticism to which Socrates subjects his answers, he will adopt the
attitude of seeking knowledge and will be able to improve the epistemic status of his
beliefs or beliefs.8
While Socrates interlocutors are not capable of answering the Socratic Whatis-F?-questions adequately, they nevertheless make progress throughout the dialogue.
They acquire true beliefs of certain particular cases of F and they gain above all
second-order knowledge of the warrant of their claims to knowledge. Although many
of his interlocutors, such as those in the Laches (187e6-188c2) and also Glaucon
and Adeimantus in the Republic, hold Socrates questioning and examining in high
esteem, Socrates says that he possesses his maieutic skill only in secret (Theaetetus
149a7). Do his interlocutors not know that he takes care of their thoughts? Probably
so at least at the beginning of a dialogue with Socrates. His interlocutors only
understand what Socrates does while examining their beliefs once they have come to
understand themselves what it means to take thoughts seriously.9
Socrates concepts of knowledge
What kind of knowledge is gained in a Socratic investigation? It is true,
Socrates refutes every answer his interlocutors suggest as a definition of F. For even
8
For the objective of the Socratic mission of questioning and examining, see Benson 2000: 1731,
Brickhouse / Smith 1991, 1994, Hardy 2011a: 3557 and Taylor 2014.
Sedley 2004 suggests a detailed alternative reading of Socratic maieutics and is of the view that Plato
himself, in his role as author of the Theaetetus, is basically the only real addressee of the Socratic art.
125
complete knowledge of F, which would be expressed in an acceptable definition of

F, is a kind of perfect knowledge, which can be approximated at best. However,
successful examination of beliefs leads to second-order knowledge as well as a
first-order knowledge in the form of reasoned beliefs concerning the objects of the
Socratic What-is-F?-questions. When you are examining your beliefs you ask yourself
whether a certain belief has been formed under the best possible epistemic conditions,
before confirming or revising the relevant belief. Socrates demonstrates how this
is done at every turn in Platos dialogues. Second-order knowledge and reasoned
beliefs are the first result of deliberating about ones beliefs: once one has examined
a given opinion successfully one knows whether one has formed this opinion under
the respective best possible epistemic conditions and one has therefore considered
every relevant and available logical as well as empirical reason, which speak for or
against the opinion in question. If one knows that, one can again deliberate the state
of affairs underlying the original belief, form a new, if need be better justified, belief
the same state of affairs and thus confirm, revise or abandon altogether the original
belief. Most of all, the examination of beliefs enables us to overcome previous errors.
Let us consider an example from the Laches: the question what courage is,
is initially answered by Laches with the suggestion that somebody courageous
possesses wise perseverance. Socrates asks Laches whether he also implies that
every courageous act is praiseworthy, pointing out that not everyone who acts with
wise perseverance also acts praiseworthily. If every courageous act is praiseworthy,
but not everyone who acts with wise perseverance also acts praiseworthily, then not
everyone who acts with wise perseverance is as such courageous. Laches recognises
the incompatibility of these three beliefs and revises his original suggestion of what
courage is (192c-d). The second result of the successful examination of a belief is a
knowledge of the first order in the form of those beliefs which Socrates characterises
in the Meno (97d98a) as true, tied down beliefs that remain in place, and in the
Republic (534b-d) as beliefs (explanations) that stand up to examination. Beliefs of
this kind we may call justified and available beliefs. One has a justified and available
belief, if one has carefully considered all known and relevant empirical and logical
reasons that support or weaken a given belief.
126
Jrg Hardy
In Platos dialogues Socrates operates with two different concepts of first-order

knowledge. Knowledge in a narrower (and very demanding) sense he characterises
as knowledge one possesses, if one knows precisely what F is and (hence) is able
to give a complete definition of F. This knowledge is perfect, no longer amendable.
Socrates describes as knowledge in a wider (and less demanding) sense the true and
justified beliefs (in the sense explained above) of certain properties of F. Such beliefs
are fallible knowledge, albeit the best possible knowledge in each case. They take
the form of justified beliefs, which are always connected to a corresponding secondorder knowledge. Such knowledge is acquired by successfully giving an account we
held to account for and defend. Given an account of our beliefs in the Socratic sense
turns a person into the autonomous author of her beliefs.
Socrates appeals to the understanding of his interlocutors. One has only really
understood what one has understood oneself. Only our own understanding gives us
real knowledge. Knowledge acquired in ones own right can be shared with others
and answered for together. That is what Socrates is trying to show. Plato provides
the appropriate literary form for the Socratic maieutics.10 It is precisely the dialogue
form that affords Plato the possibility to stage and illustrate an attitude of affirming or
rejecting the Socratic arguments. In the Theaetetus (150d151b) Socrates describes
two opposing reactions by his interlocutors: he who commits himself to giving an
account will discover many wise thoughts within himself. Others have turned their
backs on himand that is to say on the accounting no longer taking care of their
own thoughts, and hence ceased to make progress in the quest for knowledge.
If Socrates aspiration to convince his interlocutors of certain propositions, is
consistent with his maieutics, then he appears to assume that his interlocutors can
agree with these propositions on the grounds of their own deliberations, just as he
understood what the Delphic oracle had said, namely that he was the wisest of men,
10
Michael Frede 1992: 219 describes the central philosophical message of the Platonic dialogues as
follows: The dialogues are supposed to teach us a philosophical lesson. But they are not pieces of
didactic dialectic with Plato appearing in the guise of the questioner. A good part of their lesson does
not consist in what gets said or argued, but in what they show, and the best part perhaps consists in the
fact that they make us think about the arguments they present. For nothing but our own thought gains
us knowledge.
127
as meaning that the oracle had presented him as an example for everyone who is as
wise as he is, namely as an example of someone who knows what he knows and what
he does not know (Apology 23b). In other words: even when making points on his
own behalf Socrates is still appealing to the autonomous thought of his interlocutors.
Let us return to the Apology.
Caring for the soul in the Apology
Having explained human wisdom in the Apology Socrates weighs the
possibility of the jury acquitting him, if he in future eschews to seek truth and
knowledge. He declares to the jury that, in the interest of his fellow citizens, he can
never abandon his way of living:
Men of Athens, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey
the god rather than you, as a long as I draw breath and I am able, I shall
not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to
point out to any one of you whom I happen to meet: Good Sir, you are an
Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both
wisdom and power, are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as
much wealth, reputation and honours as possible, while you do not care
for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your
soul? Then, if one of you disputes this and says he does care, I shall not
let him go at once or leave him, but I shall question him, examine him
and test him, and if I do not think he has attained the goodness that he
says he has, I shall reproach him because he attaches little importance to
the most important things and greater importance ... both individually and
collectively. (Apology 29d230a7)
Socrates is convinced that every human being should be concerned primarily
with insight and the best possible state of his or her soul because one can only derive
benefit from the use of conditional goods such as wealth and esteem if ones soul is
already in a good state. When Socrates encounters someone who claims to take care
of his own good psychic state, he puts him to the test. But how do you determine
128
Jrg Hardy
whether someone looks after the good state of his or her soul?
What Socrates has in mind with his exhortation to take care of ones soul is, as
I take it, the fact of shared aspirations, requirements and values. When we claim to
be able to perform something successfully or to have experienced success in doing
something, we claim to have exercised a certain skill successfully and achieved
something in this manner. That is the case, if one has met the requirements that are
commonly placed on the successful exercise of a certain skill and the corresponding
achievements. The demands and requirements we place on the exercise of our own
beneficial skills express common values. We share them with other people because
we assume that they, too, consider the successful or at least promising execution of
their beneficial skills to be valuable.
In the case of beliefs this is about epistemic requirements. If you claim to
know that something is the case, then you assert the claim to have exercised your
cognitive capacities successfully, to have met the requirements which you place on
the successful formation of an opinion and to be able to justify your beliefs to other
people, that is, to be able to demonstrate that you have good reasons to believe that
something is the case. The same is true, according to Socrates, of the claim to take
care of the good state of ones own soul. Whoever holds that he is taking good care of
his soul is also claiming to fulfil the common requirements of a successful life in his
public and private actions, for example, by being good at his profession, assuming
public office or bringing up his children, and to be able to demonstrate that to others.
Now, if someone asks what he should do, and hence is not sure whether he really
takes care of his soul in a beneficial manner, then he will expect that he may be wrong
in his beliefs of what constitutes a successful life and will want to know whether
certain actions which he deems attractive are in fact worth pursuing.
General, supreme goals
Socrates describes happiness as the common objective of all human activities
(Gorgias 467e468c, 499e, Republic 505de). That something serves the end of
happiness is therefore precisely the information by which the inquiries after the
reasons for our decisions and actions reach an endpoint (Symposion 204e205a).
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Happiness as Socrates views it is, as I take it, to be understood in the sense of general,
supreme goals of actions. We always pursue goals with the individual actions we
have deliberated about beforehand, goals that are, among other things, general
and of a high priority to us. A general and surpreme goal is one which we consider
particularly desirable for certain reasons, one we aspire to for the same reasons and
therefore decide in favour of the respective actions that will serve this purpose. If
I go for a 5 kilometre run every morning, I pursue the universal goal of staying
healthy with each particular action of this kind. Other people may pursue other goals
with the same kind of action: someone might run 5 kilometres a day because she is
training to run in a marathon, which in turn serves her universal aim of testing the
limits of her personal physical capabilities. If we have to choose between alternative
actions, we will take a decision from the perspective of a general, supreme goal to
the action, which will best enable us to reach that goal. If I decide to give money to
charity, money I might otherwise spend travelling round the world, then I treat the
goal of helping others with priority over the goal of experiencing new countries and
their cultures, even though I also find the latter highly desirable. Socrates attaches
a higher priority to the aim of obeying the Athenian laws than he attaches to other
aims when he decides against a possible flight from prison, preferring to answer the
charges brought against him. Of course one can conduct certain actions for their own
sake, such as playing chess, the lyre or the saxophone. In these cases it is precisely
the exercise of these actions for their own sake that is a paramount aim. We can
distinguish two kinds of general, surpreme goals. These two are goals of content and
goals of modality. General, surpreme goals of content are, for example, goods such
as health, wealth, beauty and esteem, as Socrates occasionally lists them. It goes
without saying that individuals have different notions of happiness and thus pursue
different general goals. There are, however, also goals we pursue when we want to
do something successfully and therefore try to exercise certain capacities in the best
possible manner. Let us call such goals general, supreme modal goals. Both kinds
of goals are usually pursued together. Yet we can distinguish both kinds of goals
this way: when pursuing a goal of content, we want, first and foremost, to generate
(or avoid) a state of affairs, while when pursuing a modal goal we want to exercise
130
Jrg Hardy
a certain capacity and thus do something in a successful manner (or at least in a

manner that promises success). If the successful exercise of certain capacities is a
necessary condition for accomplishing goals of content, then it will also be true that
the successful exercise of these capacities is a supreme modal goal.
In Platos dialogues Socrates, I believe, wants to demonstrate that everybody,
when they pursue happiness, pursue three general, supreme modal goals. These three
are: (i) the best possible knowledge of each given situation, (ii) action governed by
knowledge and (iii) just, that is, moral action. In other words: we wish to exercise
our judgement in such a way that we know the relevant state of affairs. We want to
exercise our capacity to desire something in a manner in which we let our desire be
determined by the (best possible) knowledge concerning beneficial actions. In our
actions we also want to take account of other peoples interests that are relevant to
their happiness. Whenever we take care of ourselves and a good, beneficial state of
our soul, we strive, above all, for the successful and best possible exercise of these
capacities.
At first glance, our interest in exercising successfully the first two of
the capacities mentioned seems to be self-evident. When Socrates reminds his
interlocutors that they must not neglect these capacities his concern is for a particular,
by no means self-evident, diligence and precision in thinking. If we examine our own
beliefs and intentions rigorously and accurately, we will become aware of countless
possible interferences or impairments to successful and beneficial judgement and
desire, distractions we can avoid on our own. Successfully giving an account of
oneself preserves a person from non-beneficial exercise of their souls capacities. In
the Meno Socrates says explicitly that the properties of the soul are used in a really
good way only in conjunction with knowledge: And in brief, all the undertakings
and endurances of the soul, when guided by wisdom, end in happiness (eudaimonia),
but when folly guides, in the opposite?So it seems (Meno 88c14, transl. Lamb
1967). A virtue is used in a good, beneficial way, if one conducts those actions which
one deems good, i.e. beneficial, according to the best available knowledge and
eschews those actions of which one knows that one does not know with sufficient
accuracy whether they are actually good or bad. By contrast, if a person performs
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an action without the best possible knowledge, or even against her better judgement,
she does not exercise a virtue. When Socrates, paradoxically, seeks to convince
his interlocutors of the idea that they have certain interests which are constitutive
of happiness, he assumes that some of his interlocutors do not know that certain
actions are indeed in their own interest. That is particularly true of just, moral action.
Socrates is convinced that human beings can attain their own general, supreme goals
only if they resepct each others happiness-conducive interests. This is why a good
life is a just life, as Socrates aims to prove in the Republic (I 343a1-354c3, IV 441c9
- V 449a6, IX 580c9-592b6, X 612a8-614a4).
Giving an account of oneself in the manner of Socrates, as we said earlier,
has a eudaimonistic task: the concern for a good state of the soul. If it can bring us
closer to our goal, then the happiness-relevant account is an examining interaction
with our own volition. It is true, that desires cannot be examined in the way beliefs
are examined. Desires have no truth-conditions but conditions of satisfaction. Yet
we can examine the beliefs on desirable things. We can also, on a second-order
level of volition, explicitly approve or disapprove of the conjunction of opinion and
desire, which forms a certain intent. This occurs whenever we ask ourselves whether
the conditional goods such as wealth, esteem, health and technical skillswhich
Socrates occasionally mentions when talking about the fact that every person wants
to obtain certain goods on account of his pursuit of happinessare actually beneficial
and worthwhile for us under certain circumstances. In the Laches Socrates says that
a person whose soul is overall in a good state is able to attain good things, that is,
various goods (Laches 199d4-e1, cf. Meno 78c15). If someone believes that it is
good and desirable to attain a certain aim, then she will want to do what will let her
attain that aim. Actions are the result of beliefs that are linked to desires. One might
object that this is a modern view which Plato does not share. But that is not true. If
virtue is what brings about good actions, it is the source of thinking and wanting
(boulesthai) as it becomes perfectly clear in the Meno and Gorgias. When Socrates
courageously helps his comrade Laches in a battle, he does not merely think that it
is right to pursue certain courageous actions, but he also wants to that because he
acts. If a person has successfully examined her beliefs on possibly desirable actions,
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Jrg Hardy
then she will know (in the sense of best possible knowledge of a given situation) that
a certain course of action is indeed what she wants to do for the sake of her pursuit of
happiness. In other words: Socratic accounting turns a person into a self-determined
agent of her considered intentions.
Conclusion
Socrates recommends an examined life, but to the important questions, which
constitute a successful life, we will never find final answers and the collective
accounting never attains its final aim. Does that make the Socratic idea of an examined
life illusory? It should not come as a surprise us that the interlocutors of the Platonic
dialogues fail to reach conclusive answers to Socrates questions. First of all, life
is an extremely complex business and pondering on it is literally a life-long task.
Secondly, the successful life is not a fact, which we might be able to discover without
thinking about ourselves and the way we live. For both these reasons it is hard to
imagine somebody managing to find, as it were, a definitional formula for happiness
that would convince everybody. Likewise it should not come as a surprise that in
many of Platos dialogues not even two interlocutors agree on a certain conception of
happiness. According to Socrates, there are, however, some elementary beliefs about
a successful life which all humans can agree on because of their own deliberation
about things of great importance to themselves.
In the Platonic dialogues Socrates starts from the assumption that every person
wants her life to succeed and therefore wants her soul to be, overall, in a good state
that allows her to realise her basic pursuit of happiness. A person is in that state when
she possesses the action-governing knowledge through which she can successfully
direct the use of her own mental capacities, namely the virtues she possesses.
Socrates interlocutors agree to these premises. Some of them indeed lay claim to
such knowledge, others at least aspire to it and for that reason seek out Socrates for
guidance. Nobody wants to think of himself as someone who wants to do something
without knowing whether he has good reasons for doing it. Now Socrates wants to
show his interlocutors that you are only capable of performing desirable actions, if
you know, as accurately as possible, which actions are really desirable, if you let your
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desires be governed by (the best possible) knowledge and not want to infringe the
interests of others relating to their happiness. Once you know that you have to pursue
these three general, supreme modal goals for the sake of your pursuit of happiness,
you will have the explicit desire to pursue these goals.
Socratic aspires to the self-image of his interlocutors as rational people who
want to act with knowledge (cf. Euthyphro 4e45a2, 15d4e2). We do not take any
step without believing that we know what we are doing. We examine our beliefs
and desires because we know that we are fallible in our spontaneous beliefs about
desirable actions but never want to err. If you know that you are fallible in your
knowledge of what is actually good (for yourself and others), then you should
consider your own actions with such precision and diligence that you at least avoid
those mistakes that actually can be avoided by your own precise and careful thinking.
Socrates wants his interlocutors to appreciate and take seriously their thoughts as the
result of their own cognitive proficiency. Socratic midwifery is a particular concern
for thoughts. Everybody can do for themselves, on their own responsibility, what
Socrates does when he cares of the thoughts of others. After all, the capacity to take
thoughts seriously counts as human wisdom, which Socrates has in common with
others. If you take your thoughts seriously, you will also take responsibility for the
consequences your decisions have for the lives of others. For this reason decisions
should always be grounded in (the best available) knowledge (Laches 184d5e9).
Taking thoughts about life seriouslythat is among the things we can learn from
Socrates.
Appendix I: the modus operandi of Socratic investigations
The aim of a Socratic question of the form What-is-F? is an explicit definition,
with explanatory power. The answers his interlocutors give to Socratic questions of
what something is are therefore examined by Socrates as hypothetical definitions. It
is true that Plato does not possess the modern concept of an adequate definition. But
many dialogues, such as the Laches, make fairly clear that an acceptable answer to a
What-is-F?-question, for Socrates, is an explicit definition. Thus Socrates enquires in
the Laches whether every case of the definiendum courage does in fact fall under the
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Jrg Hardy
respective suggested definiens (and vice versa) and whether one understands by what
is called F, for example courage or speed, in each case exactly what the content
of the definiens is, hence what is, in each case, under discussion as information about
what something is.
A definition consists of a definiens and a definiendum. The definiendum the
set of all things falling under the definiens, such as every case of a courageous
character trait or a courageous action. The definition contains a universally quantified
proposition or several universally quantified propositions about the definiendum.
The definiens of an explanatory definition of F mentions the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the state of affairs F to obtain, such as the conditions for courageous
acts. To know what something is means to know under which conditions a certain
state of affairs obtains. In the Euthyphro, which is about the definition of piety,
Socrates characterises the object of the corresponding definitional question as that
which is always the same with itself in every pious (or not pious) action (5c8d6).
That means: with a general term F, such as the general term pious, we refer not
only to a particular or an event, such as a specific act of piety, but we also always
refer to the same general state of affairs, the form F.
A precise expression of an explicit definition takes the form of a universally
quantified, biconditional proposition: for every X, X has property F, if and only if
X possesses the properties {E1, , En}. In Platos dialogues definitions generally
are expressed in the form of a simple declarative sentence, such as courage is wise
perseverance, in which the place of the grammatical subject is taken by that noun
which designates the thing that is to be defined, while the place of the predicate
is taken by the definiens. In an adequate definition definiens and definiendum are
extensionally and intensionally identical. The extension is the set of all particulars
and instances which fall under the definiens. It is this set that Socrates means when
he talks of what is the same in all instances of courage in the Laches. The intension
is the informational content of the definiens propositions; it is what one knows of a
state of affairs F, if one understands the meaning of the definiens propositions. Both,
extension and the intension of the definiens, are intended when in the Laches Socrates
poses the question regarding courage what faculty is it, the same whether in pleasure
135
or in pain or in any of the things in which we said just now it was to be found, that
has been singled out by the name of courage (Laches 192b). To understand the
meaning of a proposition (or assumption) entails knowing its truth-conditions. If
we understand the meaning of a definiens and thus know the truth-conditions of the
propositions contained therein, then we also know the conditions for the correct use
of the corresponding predicate, that is, the general term F. A definition of F is, in
this respect, an elucidation of the term F, which usually occurs as an independent
lexeme and plays the role of attributing a certain property to a particular, such as in
the sentence Person P is courageous.
A definition of F also states the necessary and sufficient conditions of a certain
obtaining state of affairs (or a certain situation) to which the definition of F applies.
The particular states of affairs or situations which fall under the definition of F are
instances of F. The object of a definition, however, is a universal state of affairs to
the extent that a definition does not refer to a specific situation as such but rather
states the conditions for a specific situation having the property which every situation
of that kind, i.e. every instance of F, possesses (compare, for example, Laches
198c9199a9). The definitions Socrates is discussing with his interlocutors are the
object of a common quest. The interlocutors examine whether a suggested definition
encompasses (and explains) every instance of F. In doing so they sometimes hit upon
new properties of F or instances of F, which they have not considered previously.
Therefore it is possible that the interlocutors, while examining a suggested definition,
not only change the definiens, that is, the description and explanation of a state of
affairs F, but also redetermine the reference of F.
In examining of a suggested definition the interlocutors invoke two intellectual
operations: on the one hand they test whether certain instances of F give any
indication what the universal F is and on the other hand whether a certain particular
is indeed an instance of F. In both cases they start from a twofold hypothesis: to
begin with they assume the universal F in question possesses certain properties and
ask whether a possible instance of F has all these properties. They also assume that
certain cases are indeed instances of F and ask whether the definition of F covers
these cases completely. Thus the interlocutors in the Laches examine, for one thing,
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Jrg Hardy
whether actions by which a person faces a danger with wise perserverance show
that courage consists in doing exactly that in every case. For another, they examine
whether the behaviour of soldiers, who fight with superior technology and in superior
numbers with wise perseverance against their opponents, really count as courageous.
To be precise, two questions are being discussed simultaneously here: what is F?
and: is this particular X an instance of F? Hence it is possible both to describe and
accurately describe the (possible and actual) concrete instances of F and to correct, as
appropriate, the respective suggested definitions in the examination of hypothetical
definitions.
Socrates attempts, by means of these two intellectual operations, to establish
a deliberative balance between plausible, explanatorily powerful (hypothetical)
definitions and universally accepted beliefs regarding concrete instances of F, such as
undisputed cases of courageous acts. The suggested definitions which are examined
in the Platonic dialogues are of the following form: for every X: X has the property
F, if and only if X has the properties {E1, , En}. An example is a definition of
courage from Laches (192b-d): it is true of every person that she is courageous, if
and only if she faces a danger with perseverance and her conduct is both wise and
praiseworthy. Let us construe two examples: if a person is courageous, if and only if
she faces a danger with perseverance and her conduct is both wise and praiseworthy;
and if every person who undergoes prolonged medical treatment faces a danger with
perseverance (the danger arising from her medical condition) and this conduct is both
wise and praiseworthy, then everybody who undergoes prolonged medical treatment
is courageous. And if a captain undertakes a dangerous voyage from Venice to Cyprus,
steers the ship with nautical prudence and his seafaring is praiseworthy (for example
because he gets Othello to Cyprus), then he acts courageously. From the definitional
principle mentioned above another principle is derived which Socrates often applies
in refuting definitions: if there is at least one X that, while possessing some, does not
possess all of the defining properties F {E1, , En}, then it is not the case that every
X has the property F. Socrates employs this principle together with the logical rule
of the reductio ad absurdum, combining two contradictory assumptions about the
respective definiendum, to which his interlocutor agrees, and then deducing that the
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suggested definition is false.

The discussion between Socrates and Laches contains two examples that fit
this model of refutation (192b193d). Laches first suggestion for a definition runs
like this: it is true for every person and every action that a person is courageous,
if and only if she faces danger with (and because of) perseverance. If an action is
courageous, it is praiseworthy, too. But some of those actions are not praiseworthy.
Therefore it is not the case that every person is courageous when she faces a danger
with perseverance. The second, revised suggestion says that a person is courageous,
if and only if she faces a danger with wise perseverance. But some of those actions
are (again) not praiseworthy. Therefore it is not true that every person is courageous,
if and only if she faces a danger with wise perseverance.
Appendix II: Socratic Eudaimonism
In the Platonic dialogues Socrates defends the following theses:
(1) All human beings want to lead successful lives and therefore pursue
happiness (eudaimonia).
(2) If you lead a successful life, then your soul is in an overall good state, and
you are therefore capable of performing good, beneficial actions (e.g.
Laches 199d4e1, Gorgias 507b8c7).
(3) If your soul is in a good state that is constitutive of happiness then you
possess every particular virtue (Laches 199d4e1).
(4) If your soul is in good state, then you also possess knowledge of good
and bad things, that is, knowledge about human well-being that governs
your actions (Laches 199d4e1).
(5) Anyone whose soul is in a good state willideallynever act against
their better judgement (Protagoras). Such a condition of the soul is an
ideal state that we can merely approximate to.
(6) We bring our souls into a good state that is conducive to happiness by
a complex form of given an account of ourselves (Laches 187e188a).
In this sense a successful life is an examined life (Apology 38a, 41bc).
(7) All things that can be used in a good, happiness-conducive way can also
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Jrg Hardy
be used in a bad way that impairs happiness. Those in an overall good
state of their soul know how to use conditional goods, such as wealth,
esteem or technical skills in a good way that contributes to happiness
(e.g. Euthydemus 279a282a, Charmides 174cd, Meno 87d88c,
Gorgias 460ac). The same holds for a persons mental capacities (Meno
88c6d1).
(8) A successful life is a just (moral) life. If we want to conduct a successful
life, we also want to lead our life in a just way and respect other peoples
happiness-conducive interests (Republic I 343a1-354c3, IV 441c9 - V
449a6, IX 580c9-592b6, X 612a8-614a4).
References
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Dialogues, Oxford.
Blner, N. 2007. Schrift(kritik), in: Schfer, Chr. (Hg.): Platonlexikon.
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Hardy, J. 2001. Platons Theorie des Wissens im Theaitet, Gttingen.
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mit Sokrates, Gttingen.
Hardy, J. 2011b. The knowledge about human well-being in Platos Laches, in:
King, R. and Schilling, D. (eds.): How should one live? Comparing Ethics in
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Ancient China and Greco-Roman Antiquity, Berlin .

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Dr Jrg Hardy
Professor
Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in Bioethics
University of Mnster
Germany

Reflections of some Platonic moral and political ideas upon the philosophical stance
of the founder of the native Korean Zen tradition Master Bojo Jinul (1158-1210)
Abstract: The disappointment from the deep secularization and the vast mingling of
the Buddhist hierarchy in the imperial court during a period of social, political and
religious turmoil in the Korean Goryeo dynasty, near the end of the 12th century,
urges Korean Zen master Bojo Jinul to found a prototype of a Buddhist community
in the mountains, isolated and far away from the corrupt political mechanisms of
religious centers of power. The goal of this community of departure was, on the
one hand, moral practice and common toil of all members, on the other hand the
possibility that they could harmoniously combine the practice of silent philosophical
techniques with the gradual theoretical cultivation of the mind through the study of
sacred Buddhist texts.
This paper seeks to present the philosophical characteristics of this original
Korean community of monks under the prism of the relevant characteristics of the
Republic of Plato, because in the two formations (in Jinul and Plato) the approach
towards the truth through ethical and spiritual perfection of man is the ultimate task
for all members of the communities. Finally, it seeks to find points of approach and
differentiation of the ontological, epistemological and ethical principles of original
Korean Zen philosophy in relation to those of platonic philosophy.
Keywords: Bojo Jinul, Korean Zen, Mind, Good, truth, sudden enlightenment,
gradual cultivation, enlightenment, Platonic Republic.
In the Chinese files of Ta-Hui1 it is mentioned that Zen is found not in the
1
Ta - Hui was a Chinese monk that lived at the end of the 11th century and was a follower of the Chinese
school of Zen, Lin Chi. He rejected the method of long and silent meditation as heretic and dangerous
Reflections of some Platonic moral and political ideas upon...
141
plain of silence nor in the plain of bustle. Buddhist Zen (Seon in Korean) is and is
not a philosophy; it can be categorized as an anti-philosophy that does not interpret
the world, life and means of existence but employs a transcendental experience and
an ethical manner or exercise that both aim to perfect man through two procedures,
a physical act, the sitting concentration, and a psychic and spiritual position, the
acceptance of unity in all antithesis and compassion for every being that suffers
because of the divisive margins and antitheses that lead it to constant loss and
eventually death.
Korean Zen schools of thought all are theoretically based on the dogmatic and
soteriological innovations of Chinese Buddhism as it was developed mostly under
the Tang dynasty (618-907). During this period Buddhism reached its spiritual peak
in the whole of China and was spread out through Korea. During this period many
monasteries are founded in mountainous regions of Korea and two different forms
of Buddhism arrive from China: the first, a theoretic type that focuses on careful
studying of Buddhist texts and spoken teachings; the other is the experiential Zen
Buddhism, that focuses on immediate and experience-based enlightenment through
practical meditation and non-verbal sitting meditation2.
Due to the sensitive geographic position of the country and the constant
invasions from foreign intruders, Buddhism as common religion in Korea developed
a particular way of co-existing with political power from its roots. Especially under
the Silla and early Goryeo dynasty (10th-11th century) Buddhism had the full support
of the royal court as it was the most common religion with a unifying ethos that, on
the one hand, brought the masses together for common goals and ethical practices,
for man. He vigorously supported the dialectic method of education with examination of the kongans
(irrelevant dialogues) between Buddhist teachers and students, along with the use of the Hwadu technique, the concentration of the mind in the examination of only one important sentence or word of the
kongans during meditation, for an effective introspection and clearing the mind of thoughts. See also Yu
Chung-Fan, Ta hui, Tsung-hao, and Kung-an Chan, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 6, 1979,
p. 211-235.
Zen is the Mind of the patriarchs of Buddhism, while theory is the words of Buddha. This opinion
is the combination of the two contrary dogmas of meditation, as proposed by Jinul. See also Kang Kum
Ki, Bojo Jinul, His Life and Thought, Bulil Publishing Co, Seoul, 2013, p. 81.
142
and on the other hand legalized and strengthened the power of the rulers of the Three
Early Kingdoms.
The Korean monk Bojo Jinul lived in the late 12th century and devoted his
whole life to being a monkshood and Zen from a very young age. His biographers
inform us that he was a lonely spirit and did not study at the foot of an enlightened
teacher, an unusual fact in the world of Zen. He took his own, isolated path to
studying the Chinese Buddhist texts while he vigorously practiced meditation as he
tried to perfect the Koran Zen technique. However, since he lived near the western
border of the country, he followed closely the evolution of Chinese Buddhist thinking
and the strict way of practicing Zen in Chinese monasteries; he studied the only
available original sources: the sutras and the archives of the Zen masters that where
collected in the Buddhist canons (tripitaka).3 His despise of the addictions to worldly
experts, consistent with the principles of Buddhism, brings the young Jinul in a direct
conflict with the Buddhist high priests of his time, who were deeply connected to
the royal powers and spiritually decadent. Disgusted by the secularization of the
Buddhist priesthood, the decadence of the ethical principles of the religion and the
insistence of the masters on chasing power, wealth and personal fame, he decides
to retreat to the mountains of Korea, abandoning the bright career in the Buddhist
hierarchy that his success in the Buddhist brotherhoods exams ensured. Along with
a few friends that shared his ideas, he founded a unique Buddhist community, which
he called Community of Spiritual Concentration (Samadhi) and Wisdom (Prajna),
with the purpose of restoring the authenticity and authority of the orthodox Buddhist
ethos.4 The requirements that Jinul enforces for participants in the community were
not based on religious or official and formal statements, but on the true desire of
a man to abandon the world of delusions and live in harmony according to virtue
and truth. In his early work Encouragement to Practice in 1190, Jinul states in
the founding declaration: We will come together and we will denounce fame and
3
Under the Goryeo dynasty, the effort of recording the 88.000 wooden boards with the Buddhist Canons
was completed in Korea (Tripitaka Koreana).
Buswell, E. R, he Korean Approach to Zen- The Collected Works of Chinul, University of Hawaii
Press, Honolulu, 1983, p. 21.
4
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profit and we will remain isolated in the forests of the mountain. We will organize a
community with the purpose of persistently cultivating spiritual concentration and
wisdom through worship and chanting to Buddha5, and through common work, so
each one of us can complete the duty that has been bestowed upon him and develop
his self-nature in all situations. We vow to pass our whole life free from entanglements
and to follow the higher pursuits of accomplished men and authentic adepts.6 This
community was organized first in the year 1190 as a convent on the Palgon mountain
and later on the Songgwang mountain as a vaster community of monks and believers
in Zen, which functioned as a prototype for the formation of the rules of Korean Zen
monkhood that are true today.
Jinuls philosophy combines in practice the fundamental principles of Zen with
the metaphysical philosophy of Hwaeom7, and helps in formulating the comparative
and practical orientation of Korean Buddhism8. The originality of the comparative
philosophical thought of Jinul is due to the fact that he turns the Buddhist experience
towards human existence as well as the practices of social life, studying and applying
in unison the preexisting and contrary Buddhist techniques of Zen monkhood and
theoretical Buddhism, which eventually has led to the internal Buddhist schism in
his time9. By remaining faithful to the orthodox Zen spirit, Jinul studied in depth
5
In the Admonitions to Beginning Students and the Compact of the Samadhi and Prajna Community, Jinul mentions the typical practice of morning and evening Buddhist ritual which monks are
required to attend praying and burning incense. See also Ven. Jeon, Ho-ryeon (Haeju) Elements of
Hwaeom Faith and Philosophy in Korean Buddhist Ritual Invocations: Emphasis on the Main Hall
Liturgy, International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture, vol. 9, September 2007, p. 43.
Chinul, Bojo, Collected Works, Translation, Annotation, and Introduction by Robert e. Buswell, JR,
Collected Works of Korean Buddhism, Vol. 2, Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism , Korea, June 2012, p.
118-119 in http://international.ucla.edu/media/files/02_Chinul_web-y0-bnm.pdf
Chinese philosophical school under the Tang dynasty (600-700 A.D.) that focused on the concept
of communion, the theory of the unity of absolute and relative in the teachings of Avatamsaka Sutra.
See also Shim, Jae-ryong. Korean Buddhism - Tradition and Transformation, Jimmodang Publishing
Company, Seoul 1999, p. 135.
7
Shim, Jae-ryong. Korean Buddhism- Tradition and Transformation, p. 171-182.
The configuration of the tradition of Zen through the characteristic Chinese approach to Buddhism
within the simple everyday things and in contact with nature, created great opposition to the existing doctrinal schools of theoretical Buddhism, which are originated directly from Indian thought and
9
144
the work Platform Sutra of the sixth Zen patriarch Huineng, the comments of the
Avatamsaka Sutra and the Ta-hui archives and thus he managed to balance between
the philosophical formulation of sudden enlightenment and the gradual cultivation
of the mind with an harmonious and parallel use of both techniques and so to verify
that the silent practice of Zen is the mind of Buddha, transferred mentally to the
enlightened Zen patriarchs, while the sacred texts, the sutras, are the words of
Buddha10. At the core of Jinuls philosophical thought is the achievement of human
enlightenment and the possibility of seeing the unspoiled and true nature of human
existence through sudden enlightenment and liberation of the clouded mind.
Jinuls philosophical positions that concern the understanding of truth and the
virtue of communal life seems to mirror many of Platos philosophical principles,
mostly those presented in the Republic.
A first observation of common ground can be made for the two philosophical
thoughts is that the possibility of harmonious social life can be achieved via the
initial choice to remove oneself from the worldly-secular environment and to
denounce injustice. This environment blocks ones path towards knowledge of the
truth. Another related element is the choice to live with others in an ideal social
environment that assists enlightenment and shines in the path towards the truth. This
option of departure is, according to Jinul, twofold. On the one hand, as an external
distancing from relating to things in constant wear and, on the other hand, as an
internal acceptance of the lack of knowledge of man and of the knowledge of the
truth of an eternal and absolute Being. This departure is a philosophical stance
that leads to a kind of philosophical death in relation to the known world, without
however denying life in the true world. But for Plato the political choice to depart
from a decadent democracy that maintained its personality-based tendencies that has
characterized by abstract and otherworldly forms of expression. The conflict between the old Buddhist
doctrinal schools and the schools of Zen first in China and later in Korea was bitter. At the end of Silla
dynasty during the 10th century nine different schools of Zen (the nine sects of the mountains) had
been created and they were opposed by numerous doctrinal schools of Buddhism. See also Kusan Sunim, The Way of Korean Zen, Weather Hill, Tokyo New York 1985, p. 10-14.
Boeb Joeng, The Mirror of Zen The Classic Guide to Buddhist Practice by Zen Master So Sahn,
Sambhala, Boston and London, 2006, p. 10-11.
10
145
led to the criminal behavior of the Thirty Tyrants, along with the demagogy that led
to Socrates death, was also a form of a rejecting political choice and a somewhat
philosophical death in relation to the corrupt and unjust world of this time. But this
rejecting choice becomes decidedly positive as a life stance when a mans soul enters
the intelligible world of the Forms (Ideas) which can be achieved after constant
cultivation of virtues and education inside a fair, theoretical political system in the
ideal republic. Plato admits that it is difficult to enforce this republic system due to
the inherent weaknesses of human nature11, but it can be used as an ideal pattern, one
for just people always to look at.12
The difficulty in expressing the true in the physical world and the real world
also applies to the wonderment about truth, according to Bojo Jinul. The religious
decision Jinul made to depart from the environment of a corrupt and fully worldly
religious hierarchy, which had lost its spiritual and educational goal, was more a
soteriological than a political or moral choice13. Considering the true and absolute
Mind as one and the same as the true nature of all human beings and the Pure Land
of Buddhist tradition, Jinul comments on a traditional sacred text, the Vimalakirti
Sutra, and says the following: the land of Buddha (of the absolute Mind) becomes
pure and clean according to the purity and cleanliness of every (human) mind14.
According to Jinul, individual nature becomes purified and free only when, with the
cultivation of the virtues of self-dominance and wisdom, the self is distanced from
11
Hard in truth it is for a state thus constituted to be shaken and disturbed; but since for everything that
has come into being destruction is appointed not even such a fabric as this will abide for all time, but it
shall surely be dissolved, and this is the manner of its dissolution. (Plato, Republic 546a).
12
For I think that it can be found nowhere on earth. Well, said I, perhaps there is a pattern of it
laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen
But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being. The politics of this city
only will be his and of none other. (Plato, Republic 592b)
13
Buddhist ethics bears no resemblance to known categories of ethics as it considers that all differentiation leads to falsehoods. On the problem of ethics in Zen, see Park, Y.J. Wisdom, Compassion, and Zen
Social Ethics: The Case of Jinul, Seongcheol, in http://www.buddhism.org/board/read.cgi?board=BuddhistStudies&y_number=44
14
B. Jinul, Doctrine of the Samadhi and Prajna Community. See also Kang Kum Ki, Bojo Jinul, His Life
and Thought, Bulil Publishing Co, Seoul, 2013, p.165
146
phenomena and empties from all dualistic thoughts that cloud the viewing of the
truth and the alignment to the absolute and true Mind, inside which the concepts of
differentiation and contrast are without meaning15. Thus the departure from the world
is not different from an arrival into the world, according to Jinul, because the highest
truth of Buddhist philosophy lies beyond the human experience of any change, even
death16. Therefore, if the achievement of an intelligible paradigm of the true world is
considered to be ideal, as Plato admits, this achievement in the Buddhist philosophy
of Jinul is only contrary to the interpretation of the physical human mind and not to
the manner in which the truth is experienced in the true Mind, where differentiation
is considered to be delusions. So the same is true of the real and dying world, if
considered through the true Mind17. Only those Zen believers who have a fully
enlightened mind and have seen the truth can attain this knowledge, and these are the
only people that will not hesitate to return to the dying world to improve it, exactly
as required to do the philosophers in Platos Republic, the only elite of knowledge
who can govern properly18.
15
For Indian Buddhist theory of the mind see also Coseru, Chr. Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) in:http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/mind-indian-buddhism/
16
The physical death of Buddha lead Buddhist theologians to believe that he was the historical reincarnation of the absolute truth. See also Shim Jae-ryong, Korean Buddhism Tradition and Transformation, Jimoodang Publishing Company, Seoul, 1999, p. 192-193.
17
The lack of divisions and contradictions within the true Mind is inherited as tathagata within every
living being. This potential heritage of the completely non-dualistic similarity (suchness) of all living
beings exists as a storehouse of wisdom and virtue (the Chinese interpretation of tathagata) or as a
fetus of wisdom and virtue (the Indian interpretation of tathagata) within the phenomenal world.
Chinul, Bojo, Collected Works, Translation, Annotation, and Introduction by Robert e. Buswell, JR,
Collected Works of Korean Buddhism, Vol. 2, Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism , Korea, June 2012, .
207 http://international.ucla.edu/media/files/02_Chinul_web-y0-bnm.pdf
Also see Boeb Joeng, The Mirror of Zen, Sambhala, Boston and London, 2006, p. 130.
18
in our states or those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophic
intelligence, while the motley horde of the natures who at present pursue either apart from the other are
compulsorily excluded, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, for our states, nor, I fancy,
for the human race either. Plato, Republic, 473d.
147
However, the choice of departure from corrupt public life does not signify
a rejection of social life and a secluded way of life or an encouragement to reject
social life in any of the two philosophers paradigms of departure. On the contrary,
both suggest an awakening of the sense of community and faith in the creation of a
new, exemplary social life; the Republic in Plato and the ideal Samadhi and Pranja
Society (Mental Concentration & Wisdom) in Bojo Jinul19. Through participation
in the communities, both philosophers believe that man can know and cultivate
his true self, that one can overcome the darkness and the falsehood of the world of
the senses, the distractions and the injustices that are caused by them; that one can
be educated in cultivating his psychic capabilities and virtues and finally gain the
potential for understanding the truth and experience an harmonious life with others.
The achievement or not of this potential depends on education and the training, and
the effectiveness of the training reflects the quality of political/social life20.
The education of citizens in the ideal Platonic republic are based on learning,
practice and cultivation of the particular and special psychic virtues of man, with
the goal of understanding the truth and living in personal and political harmony.
In the work of Plato, psychic harmony, similarly to the body harmony, is defined
as the state of the soul when it possesses health and beauty while at the same time
maintaining its proper place in hierarchy according to the norm of virtue21. The virtue
of the republic reflects the virtue of the citizens that make it up, according to Plato;
only continuous cultivation of virtue can make a citizen happier in the Republic. The
ideal republic of Plato embodies the four fundamental virtues22 of the three social
classes that cultivate the parts of the soul; wisdom, that comes from the potential for
proper judgment by the philosophers, the bravery that comes from the courage of the
19
Jinul interprets the meanings of the words Concentration and Wisdom in the absolute way that the
Chinese traditions of Zen does; Samadhi as the essence of self and Pranja as the action of the essence of
the Mind. Wisdom without meditation could lead to falsehoods and meditation without wisdom could
increase worry, usan Sunim mentions. See Kusan Sunim, The Way of Korean Zen, Weather Hill, Tokyo
New York, 1985, p. 61.
20
Plato, Republic 435e, 445c-d and 544d-e.
21
Vlastos, G. Platonic Studies, Educational Institute of the Bank of Greece, Athens, 2000, p. 173.
22
Plato, Republic, 427e.
148
guards that salvage the city-state, and the prudence that comes from controlling the
urges and desires of the working class. Finally justice is the common virtue of all
citizens, on which the ideal republic can be built and brings harmony in the republic
only when each citizen is doing his/her job, when each man works on his own23
The final path towards the Good is gradual, it requires faith in the potential to free
oneself from the world of falsehoods and faith in justice. Practically this faith is
cultivated by rejecting greed, by developing common ownership and love for the
commonly beneficial, respect towards the abilities of both genders, education in
solidarity, acceptance of the different virtues that allow men to achieve friendship
and by the escalating knowledge of the form of the Good, the absolute truth and the
unborn and immortal principle of all beings, in which all beings take part. The initial,
sudden awakening from the falsehood of the world of senses, the continued practice
of virtues and the gradual cultivation until one achieves the goal of understanding the
truth are, according to Plato, a matter that only involves the soul and its relation to
the world with the beings and Forms (Ideas). The Platonic conception of the soul is
such that sees the soul as having the potential to view the unalterable world of Forms
that are lit by the Form of the Good (Idea of Agathon), which defines all ethical ideas,
gives them value and meaning as their ultimate goal. The Platonic soul is related to
mental functioning24 in the same way that the eye is the organ of sight, but needs light
in order to see. In a similar manner, the mind needs the truth that originates from
the Idea of the Good in order to understand. However, not all people can manage to
reach the same level of thought, as they have not reached the same level of psychic
cultivation. Thus, the issue of seeing the truth in Platonic philosophy is an issue of
constant and specialized education of the soul in a well-ordered, stable and justly
governed republic. This is why the duty of enlightened men is to surpass the fear of
returning to the world of ignorance and to govern as philosophers, with altruism25.
23
This, then, I said, my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice this principle of doing
ones own business. (Plato, Republic, 433b)
24
25
Plato, Republic, 526b.
You have again forgotten my friend, said I, that the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing
and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion, and requiring them to impart
149
The education of men in Jinuls community is based on the original theoretical

principles of Zen, and on the triad of education-practice-understanding. The goal of
the communal living is, in the beginning, to awaken the mind from the false world
of senses and to take full responsibility for oneself and his spiritual development
through constant meditation, practice and communal work, as well as through
constant studying of the sacred texts. In his work Advice for Novice Students26,
Jinul sets the basic rules of behavior for laymen and monks that want to be part of the
community; the main characteristics are constant and studious meditation, silence,
trying to behave in an modest way, rejecting wealth, comfort and lust, respect for
elders and polite behavior between members of the community, attending religious
ceremonies and recollecting the name of Buddha27. Education in Jinuls community
corresponds to the Buddhist spiritual tradition of Zen meditation. However, after
carefully studying the teachings of Chinese Hwaeom Buddhism and his own three
forms of awakening, Jinul, with an unusually open mind, formed a set of three
individual choices of practice during meditation, relevant to the spiritual potential of
each man28, which are the following: 1) the practice of ethical temperance for novice
students and the vast majority of students of Zen29; 2) the practice of strengthening
faith through the study of the teachings of Buddha for intellectual students that have
spent years meticulously studying sacred texts and 3) the silent practice of Hwadu30
to one another any benefit which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself
creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a
view to using them for the binding together of the commonwealth. True, he said, I did forget it.
Observe, then, Glaucon, said I, that we shall not be wronging, either, the philosophers who arise
among us, but that we can justify our action when we constrain them to take charge of the other citizens
and be their guardians.(Plato, Republic, 519e-520a)
Buswell, E. R, he Korean Approach to Zen. The Collected Works of Chinul, University of Hawaii
Press, Honolulu, 1983, p. 135-139.
26
Ven. Jeon, Ho-ryeon (Haeju). Elements of Hwaeom Faith and Philosophy in Korean Buddhist Ritual
Invocations: Emphasis on the Main Hall Liturgy, International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture, vol. 9, September 2007, p. 33-59
27
28
Kang Kum Ki, Bojo Jinul, His Life and Thought, Bulil Publishing Co, Seoul, 2013, p. 148.
29
Dharma Talks: Jinul Meaning of maintaining Samadhi and Prajna equally, Buddhist eLibrary in
http://www.buddhism.org/board/read.cgi?board=Dharma_Talks&y_number=12&nnew=2
30
Zen meditation technique with full and continuing concentration on a phrase or a word from a kongan.
150
for advanced students31. Following simple ethical guidelines, one manages to initially
control the body32 and its desires as well as to restrict reactions by speech, so as to
weaken the interest for sensory experience. Interest focuses only on ones internal self.
Gradually, the mind is educated to stay calm and concentrated on his own, through
meditation. This evolution stops the force of ignorance and addiction that block the
mind from striving to satisfy its needs and gradually frees it from them. This focused
mental force is now focused on the internal research of the self and Buddha, as well
as the meaningful relationship between them. This quest develops the wisdom that
leads to the discovery of the true nature of ones self, which is the nature of Buddha.
A necessary requirement for the human mind to turn to wisdom is the moment of
sudden enlightenment. The concept of sudden enlightenment is not just a point of
temporal priority for Jinul but a mental basis for the minds further development. In
his work Complete and Sudden Attainment of Buddhahood, Jinul states that the
human experience of Zen awakening through everyday practice is what the Hwaeom
teaching defines as the understanding of the suchness of all levels of reality, from the
reality of material and things to the reality of total unity of everything through the
nature of the true self, in other words, the nature of Buddha33. Sudden enlightenment
is, on the one hand, the capacity to suddenly realize that there is no difference between
The hwadu technique balances wisdom and concentration during meditation. See also Park Sang-bae
On the Religiosity of Hwadu Meditation, at http://ftp.buddhism.org/Publications/IABTC/Vol06_01_
Sung-bae%20Park.pdf
31
The meditation techniques are inspired from the Ta-Hui archives. See also Kang Kum Ki, Bojo Jinul,
His Life and Thought, Bulil Publishing Co, Seoul, 2013, p. 75.
32
The physical body is referred to in Jinuls work Secrets of the Cultivation of Mind as a ghost, as it
is subject to wear and death. However, while commenting on the Avatamsaka Sutra, he characterizes it
as a mirror of wisdom. Buswell says that the way the physical body functions is considered by Jinul
to be a way to reveal the actions of the essence of the true Mind, which cannot be dominated, does not
wear or change. See also Buswell, E. R, he Korean Approach to Zen- The Collected Works of Chinul,
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983, p. 56-57.
33
Whether it is the water at the beginning of the river or the water at the end, it is still all the one nature
of water. Whether it is the causal Buddha or the fruition Buddha, it is of one nature: Buddhahood Chinul, Complete and Sudden Attainment of Buddhahood. See also Buswell, E. R, he Korean Approach to
Zen- The Collected Works of Chinul, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983, p. 207.
151
the true nature of beings and the true nature of Buddha and on the other hand, the
realization that the darkening of the mind, as well as its enlightenment come from the
same source, the initially clear nature of the true Mind34. The true Mind (Dharma)
in Jinuls work Straight Talk on the True Mind is described as still, timeless, full
and at the same time as empty of any form, unchanging, immortal, bright, clean and
glorious35. In this nature of the divine and stable essence of the Mind, that is also
considered to be the beginning and source of nature, the sacred energy of the Mind
lies (Dharmakaya), and that appears as a function of unobstructed flow of essence
in harmony with the conditions of all events and beings. The ultimate and shapeless
Mind is the cause of all forms. The relationship between essence and energy of the
true mind is described by Jinul as the relationship between water and waves, as
there are no waves without water and there is no water without waves. This nature
of the Mind is, in its essence, the non-dualistic nature of Buddha. This shapeless
and empty thing, as Jinul describes it in his work Secrets for the Cultivation of
Mind, is not the sense or the knowledge or the wisdom of true enlightenment, but
something that can see, hear, feel and know things as energy; it can take any form and
differentiate its relation to external conditions; this is the seal of the nature of Buddha
in every being and mans initial mind36. Absolute faith in the value of the true Mind
in every being and in nothing else that may exist outside of it37, this is the personal
liberation of enlightenment38: Following the torrent and, at the same time, knowing
34
Park, Y.J. Wisdom, Compassion, and Zen Social Ethics: the Case of Jinul, Seongcheol, in http://
www.buddhism.org/board/read.cgi?board=BuddhistStudies&y_number=44
35
36
37
Chinul notes that besides the true Mind there is no Buddha nature that one can obtain. See Chinul,
Bojo, Secrets of Cultivating the Mind, Chinul, Bojo Collected Works, Translation, Annotation, and
Introduction by Robert e. Buswell, JR, Collected Works of Korean Buddhism, Vol. 2, Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism , Korea, June 2012, p. 206 in http://international.ucla.edu/media/files/02_Chinul_weby0-bnm.pdf
38
Shim, Jae-ryong. Korean Buddhism - Tradition and Transformation, Jimmodang Publishing Company, Seoul 1999, p. 135-139.
152
nature you will be free from any joy or sorrow, Jinul reassures, as the energy of the
individual mind is not blocked by various tasks, and is not divided from the pure and
enlightened energy of Buddha. However, this enlightenment does not automatically
remove passions and the energy of old tasks that remain rooted in human nature. The
simultaneous cultivation of Shamadhi, the meditation and stabilization of the mind
towards inner peace, and Prajna, the wisdom and constant alertness of the mind,
functions gradually as a combinatorial method of two harmoniously opposite spiritual
tools that eliminate passions and dependence and the ignorance they cause, but also
help in maintaining peace and alertness of the mind until complete enlightenment.
The criterion for true enlightenment is the complete emptying of the mind from
personal thoughts, emotional dependence and ties, and from every attempt to think
and feel boundaries, in other words the realization of the totality of everything39. This
realization is the achievement of wisdom; when the pinnacle of wisdom is reached,
it breeds in enlightened men compassion for fellow men40 (who remain tethered to
the darkness and the suffering of ignorance) and leads them to abandon the peace of
Nirvana and return to the world in order to help all suffering beings. This is a choice
of utmost self-sacrifice that takes form in the life of the Bodhisattva41.
The Platonic idea of the Good, as the Mind in Zen, are not spoken but only
shown, as the language of life cannot fully define the true essence of intelligent beings.
This is why Plato speaks of the Good with metaphorical imagery, such as the Sun,
the Line and the Cave. Similarly, in his work Secrets for the Cultivation of Mind,
Jinul describes the four natural elements, earth, water, fire and wind, that make up the
human body and the human nature of the mind, dharma, as images in a mirror and as
39
Dharma Talks: Jinul Golden Teaching of the Mind Cultivation Buddhist eLibrary in http://www.
buddhism.org/board/read.cgi?board=Dharma_Talks&y_number=7&nnew=2
Wisdom and compassion (karuna) are referred to by Jinul as the two wings of Buddhism; wisdom is
considered to be a result of sudden enlightenment, and compassion the product of gradual cultivation.
See also Park, Y.J. Wisdom, Compassion, and Zen Social Ethics: the Case of Jinul, Seongcheol, in
http://www.buddhism.org/board/read.cgi?board=BuddhistStudies&y_number=44
40
Bodhisattva (Bodhi= enlightened + sattva= to be) is a Sanskrit Buddhist term to describe exceptionally enlightened individuals who have reached the state of Buddha but reject nirvana out of compassion,
are reincarnated and return to the world to help the suffering people.
41
153
reflections of moonlight on water, to speak of the absolute Mind. Also, he compares

the progress of man that goes through all the steps of spiritual enlightenment and
cultivation towards knowing the truth, with the stages of a human embryo that may
grow up to become a saint42. Zen philosophy traditionally rejects language as a means
to attain the truth and this is at its most extreme in the case of the Hwadu technique
of meditation. This technique requires complete concentration of the mind on small
phrases or singular words from some kongan, a dialogue with unexpected and
revolutionary responses by Zen masters to their students, that aim to surprise logic
and cultivate doubt in a way that speech run out and language reaches its limits43.
It seems that the clear images of the Platonic metaphors and the dark
calling44 of the kongan technique of Jinul reach a penultimate transcendental point
of interpretation beyond language. In other studies of Jinul on the need for a parallel
development of sudden enlightenment and gradual cultivation of the mind with the
ultimate goal of viewing the truth we can notice reflections of the mental degrees of
knowledge of the Good from the Platonic imagery of the Cave, the Line and the Sun,
Press, Honolulu, 1983, p. 144-146.
42
43
Buswell mentions that the technique of Hwadu is considered necessary, mostly at the highest levels
of spiritual development, as the teachings are then not enough to involve the mind in different mental
forms, even though it is very useful in the early stages of training as it pushes the mind to the edge of
its function. The Hwadu technique starts a dialogue between teacher and student at the point beyond
which speech exhausts itself. This technique purifies and frees the mind from all mental remnants, as
Jinul mentions in his work Answering questions about observing Hwadu. It functions as a purification device for knowledge and understanding, either through understanding the meaning of a word
or clearing that meaning, without the logical explanation for its use, as a word without taste. With
this method, one can understand without using ones intellect, so the logical function is blocked and the
path to doubt is opened. As doubt spreads, the search for mental limits widens and in the end, all binary
thoughts are blocked. Finally, this fundamental activating consciousness is revealed as the functional
cause of deluded mind and of the separation of subject-object that pushes man into ignorance and desire;
through this revelation man not only realizes the source of the problem of duality but also, its resolution.
See also Buswell, E. R, he Korean Approach to Zen- The Collected Works of Chinul, University of
Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983, p. 67.
44
Ven. Song chol, Echoes from Mt. Kaya, Selections on Korean Buddhism, Changgyonggak
Publishing CO, Seoul 2013, p. 95.
154
which Zen students similarly go through during meditation. Just as in the Platonic
Republic the enslaved are awakened, break their chains and gradually exit the cave
and realize their potential to look at the true world, Zen students in Jinuls Buddhist
community are initially awakened suddenly from their ignorance regarding their true
nature, gradually cultivate their mental abilities so they can free themselves from
dependence and false dualistic concepts of the world and finally to see in themselves
the suchness of the nature of all beings, which is the nature of Buddha. Jinul talks
about four cognitive stages45 of a Buddhist monk in his path towards grasping reality
and realizing mental enlightenment, which show remarkable similarities with the
stages that the enslaved go through in the Platonic cave and are related to the imagery
of the Line. These stages are: 1) Initial state of ignorance (seeing shadows, ghosts
and reflections). The dualistic way of thinking that senses cause and the image of the
physical body provide false images of the nature of the self and of the mind. It is related
to the Platonic stage of illusion or imagination (eikasia), where the shadows, ghosts
and reflections dominate; it is characterized by an initial form of confused knowledge
that leads to delusions. 2) Stage of faith and understanding. With trust in the pure and
original nature of the mind and to the potential to awaken it from ignorance is born
a form of primary knowledge and a realization of the delusions.46 Faith strengthens
the idea that, despite the current and continuing misled state of man, he is a perfect
Buddha with the potential to attain wisdom and compassion; that all the changes and
differentiated forms exist in the true nature of Buddha47. With the sudden awakening,
man can reach very quickly and with little effort a first enlightenment, even without
his spirituality being highly developed. However, to achieve full enlightenment, the
gradual cultivation of the mind through constant practice and study of the sacred
Press, Honolulu, 1983, p. 62-71
45
In his work Secrets for the Cultivation of the Mind Jinul specifies that after the first enlightenment,
man has to become the guard of his mind until he reaches full enlightenment. See also Buswell, E. R,
he Korean Approach to Zen- The Collected Works of Chinul, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu,
1983, p. 69-70.
46
47
Chun, Jung-won. Jinuls View of Practice, International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture,
February 2012, Volume 18, p. 113-33.
155
texts are necessary, as the passions and the dependencies they cause still exist. It
relates to the Platonic stage of belief (pistis), where the trust in reality of the image
and the real dimensions of objects leads to the formation of primary knowledge
(doxa), without the enslaved still out of his chains. 3) The stage of the empty mind48.
The initial, sudden enlightenment, in combination with gradual cultivation, lead
the mind to a first viewing of its true nature and the gradual release of man from
dependence. A constant mental control of reality through the ablative practice method
of Hwadu cleans the mind from its mental content and brings calmness. It relates to
the Platonic stage of intellect (dianoia), where the practice of logical thinking based
on abstract mental objects, hypotheses, images, physical diagrams and mathematical
logic remove cognitive doubt. 4) Final stage of full enlightenment and ultimate
realization. The complete conceptualizing blankness of the mind is attained and
produces a lack of mirroring of phenomena in the mind. The identity of the mind
and its undifferentiated ontological essence leads to equal outlook or outlook of
the one characteristic of beings (suchness, thusness), meaning the knowledge of the
primordial and true essence of the one way of existence of all beings. The viewing
of truth is no longer connected to the cultivation of concentration and wisdom, as
there is no more need for an effort to rid oneself from dependence from the dualistic
experienced world. Mental freedom opens the path to the visionary transference of
the knowledge of truth. Mental control is now only done through the eye of the soul,
48
Buswell mentions that the cultivation of the empty mind or non-mind is a method for advanced
students, based on the later teachings of Zen masters. In Jinuls work Awakening of Faith he explains
that the differentiation of objects understood through cognition multiplies gradually due to one;s everyday experiences and leads the deluded individual to generalize a sense of mental contact and his mental
perceptions in antithetical and varied constants, that seem real due to their usefulness in the perceived
world with its vast space of experience. So, ones initially neutral perception is crystallized in understanding and desire of things; the pleasant ones cause dependence and greed, the unpleasant ones cause
hatred. The blankness of the mind relates to the identity of the mind and the undifferentiated ontological
essence of all beings (suchness) which is very difficult to explain to western thinkers, as the concept
is destroyed by the way that consciousness functions with logical thought that forms the sense of fragmented reality. This is why the blankness of mind in Zen remains as a thought devoid of thoughts or
non-thought. See also Buswell, E. R, he Korean Approach to Zen- The Collected Works of Chinul,
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983, p. 69-70.
156
the insight. This final stage relates to the final Platonic stage of thought of Forms
(Ideas) and dialectic speech (noesis). The science of dialectics uses hypotheses that
can be doubted and retracted, therefore they need to be adequately and truthfully
explained. Cognitive functions are freed from the senses and does no longer use
images, but Ideas. Knowledge now reaches the unconditioned principle49, the Idea of
Good, which cannot be sensed either by the mind or the senses, because there are no
external criteria to assure as that we are near or far from the Good. This can only be
controlled by the eye of the soul, somehow the insight50.
Considering that the two philosophical schools of thought are similar in the
theoretical way that they approach the potential for knowledge of the truth and the
practical way that defines as common moral duty the eradication of injustice that
causes a lack of harmony and suffering, there is another common element in the
way that leading members of both communities, the philosopher-kings in Plato
and the Buddhist masters in Jinul, are assessed on whether they have achieved full
enlightenment. The transcendence of the condition of personal completion and bliss
and the return to the world of ignorance in the Republic is stated as a duty to abandon
the joy of the true world of knowledge and the undertaking of just governance of the
republic with a spirit of generosity. Similarly, in Bojo Jinuls Buddhist community,
the love that sacrifices itself, that does not follow as a feeling of completion after
wisdom, but is identical to the wisdom attained at full enlightenment and thus does
not divide the ego from others and does not stand still at the plain of personal pleasure
and static bliss, but functions as compassion within this peace, leads the Buddhist
masters to act spontaneously as Bodhisattva.
From the aforementioned ascertainments we are led to certain comparative
points in the philosophical ideas of Plato and Bojo Jinul regarding the potential
49
For the unconditioned character of the Form of Good see also Plato, Republic 510b and 511b.
As the intellect (noesis), which is anchored in the soul, leads to knowledge of the Forms, the theory
of the Form of Good is directly related (either as memory (anamnesis) or as participation (methexis) or
imitation (mimesis) to the faith of souls immortality and preexistence, so the Form of Good is presented
as a transcendent power which cannot be described, only experienced. For faith and the difference from
the concept of certitude in Plato see G. Vlastos. Platonic Studies, Educational Institute of the Bank of
Greece, Athens, 2000, p. 300-303.
50
157
for knowing the true self through cultivating virtue and wisdom in environments
of social co-existence, the Republic in Plato and the community of Shamadhi and
Prajna in Bojo Jinul:
1) The external behavior of human being within a community is a
manifestation of the internal life of the true self, the soul, and
respectively the virtues and ethical quality of the city/community reflect
the virtues and the ethical quality of the citizens.
2) The initial need to distance oneself from corrupt social living because of
self-awakening leads not to a desperate choice of departure from public
life, but to a positive effort to improve the individual way of being and
wellbeing of the community by common faith and action within an ideal
community paradigm.
3) The cultivation of psychic virtues is attained gradually by education in
the understanding of truth and with belief in the potential to surpass
ignorance and delusions within a republic/community that has a just and
virtuous government, depending on the potential of each member.
4) The potential for enlightenment of the mind and viewing of the truth is
achieved in a transcendental way, in relation to the truth of an unchanging
being of entirety, and brings harmony and completion to personal and
communal life.
5) The acceptance of undertaking of leadership responsibility by philosophers
and spiritual masters with their return to the terrible world of ignorance
is the only criterion to verify the viewing of the truth, and as such it is
the highest moral duty that aligns theory and practice. The acceptance
of political governance and spiritual guidance are necessary acts without
ulterior motives and with a sacrificial intent, in order to achieve bliss for
mankind.
158

Bibliography
Sources
Chinul, Bojo. Collected Works, (Translation, Annotation and Introduction by E.

R. Buswell), Collected Works of Korean Buddhism 2, http://international.ucla.
edu/media/files/02_Chinul_web-y0-bnm.pdf
Plato, Republic (Introduction, Translation and Annotation by I. N Gryparis)
Zaxaropoulos.
Bibliographical references
Boeb Joeng, The Mirror of Zen The Classic Guide to Buddhist Practice by Zen
Master So Sahn, Sambhala, Boston and London, 2006.
Boudouris, . Platonic Philosophy, Athens, 1974.
Buswell, E. R, he Korean Approach to Zen- The Collected Works of Chinul,
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983.
Chun, Jung-won. Jinuls View of Practice, International Journal of Buddhist
Thought and Culture, February 2012, Volume 18, 113-33.
Kang Kum Ki, Bojo Jinul, His Life and Thought, Bulil Publishing Co, Seoul, 2013.
Kusan Sunim, The Way of Korean Zen, Weather Hill, Tokyo New York, 1985.
Shim, Jae-ryong. Korean Buddhism- Tradition and Transformation, Jimmodang
Publishing Company, Seoul 1999.
Ven. Jeon, Ho-ryeon (Haeju). Elements of Hwaeom Faith and Philosophy in
Korean Buddhist Ritual Invocations: Emphasis on the Main Hall Liturgy,
International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture, vol. 9, September
2007, 33-59.
Ven. Song chol, Echoes from Mt. Kaya, Selections on Korean Buddhism,
Changgyonggak Publishing CO, Seoul 2013.
Vlastos, G. Platonic Studies, Educational Foundation of National Bank, Athens, 2000
Yu, Chung-Fan. Tan Hui, Tsung-hao, and Kung-an Chan, Journal of Chinese
Philosophy, vol. 6, 1979, 211-235.
159
Websites
Dharma Talks: Jinul, Meaning of maintaining Samadhi and Prajna equally, Golden
Teaching of Mind Cultivation Buddhist eLibrary http://www.buddhism.org/
board/read.cgi?board=Dharma_Talks&y_number=12&nnew=2
Coseru, Chr. Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/win2012/entries/mind-indian-buddhism/
Ven. Jinwol, Ganhwaseon in Korea: From a Seon Practitioners Perspective, http://
www.undv.org/vesak2012/iabudoc/03JinwolFINAL.pdf
Park, Y.J. Wisdom, Compassion, and Zen Social Ethics: the Case of Jinul, Seongcheol,
http://www.buddhism.org/board/read.cgi?board=BuddhistStudies&y_
number=44
Park, Sung Bae. On the Religiosity of Hwadu Meditation, http://ftp.buddhism.org/

Publications/IABTC/Vol06_01_Sung-bae%20Park.pdf
Dr. Argyro Kasotaki-Gatopoulou

Assistant Professor
The Greek Studies Department
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
Seoul-Korea
Jerzy Kosiewicz
The anecdote about Pythagoras contained in Ciceros Tusculan Disputations1
1
In my discussion of the issues and questions contained in the anecdote about Pythagoras, I will use
Marcus Tullius Ciceros more elaborate and reliable account, as translated by C. D. Yonge (Cicero, V,
8-10; 1877, pp. 165166) and as analyzed by Juliusz Domaski (1996, pp. 34). The shortest version of
the anecdote is presented by Diogenes Laertius in Lives of Eminent Philosophers (translated by R. D.
Hicks, Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 1, 7-9; 1925b, pp. 327329).
In Yonges translation, the anecdote is presented as follows:
Pythagoras is reported to have gone to Phlius, as we find it stated by Heraclides Ponticus, a very
learned man,and a pupil of Plato, and to have discoursed very learnedly and copiously on certain
subjects with Leon, prince of the Phliasii; and when Leon, admiring his ingenuity and eloquence, asked
him what art he particularly professed, his answer was, that he was acquainted with no art, but that he
was a philosopher. Leon, surprised at the novelty of the name, inquired what he meant by the name of
philosopher, and in what philosophers differed from other men; on which Pythagoras replied, That the
life of man seemed to him to resemble those games which were celebrated with the greatest possible
variety of sports and the general concourse of all Greece. For as in those games there were some persons
whose object was glory and the honor of a crown, to be attained by the performance of bodily exercises,
so others were led thither by the gain of buying and selling, and mere views of profit; but there was
likewise one class of persons, and they were by far the best, whose aim was neither applause nor profit,
but who came merely as spectators through curiosity, to observe what was done, and to see in what
manner things were carried on there. And thus, said he, we come from another life and nature unto this
one, just as men come out of some other city, to some much frequented mart; some being slaves to glory,
others to money; and there are some few who, taking no account of anything else, earnestly look into the
nature of things; and these men call themselves studious of wisdom, that is, philosophers: and as there it
is the most reputable occupation of all to be a looker-on without making any acquisition, so in life, the
contemplating things, and acquainting ones self with them, greatly exceeds every other pursuit of life.
(Cicero, V, 8-10; 1877, pp. 165-166)
The anecdote about Pythagoras is presented by Juliusz Domaski as follows:
In his account of the anecdote, Diogenes Laertius writes that:
Sosicrates in his Successions of Philosophers says that, when Leon the tyrant of Phlius asked him who
he was, he said, A philosopher, and that he compared life to the Great Games, where some went to
161
highlights and outlines (implicitly and explicitly) the directions and the religious,
cultural, and ethical determinants of a philosophical approach that facilitate the
understanding and organization and bring meaning to life in the Pythagorean
community. This article, however, does not attempt to characterize the complex
history of this specific movement, both social and philosophical in its nature, nor
does it address its more or less essential manifestations; likewise, it does not provide
any in-depth analysis of its religious or ethical principles, nor does it discuss the main
aspects of the Pythagorean philosophy2. None of these is the primary objective of this
compete for the prize and others went with wares to sell, but the best as spectators; for similarly, in
life, some grow up with servile natures, greedy for fame and gain, but the philosopher seeks for truth.
(Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 1, 7-9; 1925b, pp. 327-329, translated by R. D. Hicks).
On a side note, Sosicrates mentioned in the quotation is known as Sosicrates of Abdera, a historian of
the 2nd century CE.
It should also be noted that there were 16 individuals by the name of Heraclides. In his Lives of Eminent
Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius presents 14 of them (V, 6, 93-94; 1925a, p. 547). Elsewhere in this
extensive monograph, he also mentions Heraclides of Tarsus, the Stoic (VII, 1, 121; 1925b, p.225), and
Heraclides the Skeptic (IX, 12, 16; 1925b, p. 527).
The person referred to in the above statements is probably Heraclides of Heraclea Pontica, the author of,
inter alia, a historical work entitled On the Pythagoreans (V, 6, 88; 1925a, p. 543).
Juliusz Domaski, in turn, presents the anecdote about Pythagoras as follows:
Heraclides of Pontus reports, writes Cicero further, that the Tyrant of Phlius Leon, amazed by
Pythagoras wisdom, asked him of his profession. To that Pythagoras relied that he had none, but that he
was a philosopher. Again amazed by the novelty of the name, Leon asked him what it meant. Pythagoras
replied with a metaphor. Human life, said he, is like the Panhellenic games in which three categories
of people participate: those who come there to sell or to buy; and those, least numerous and noblest of
all participants, who seek neither fame nor fortune, but who content themselves with watching what is
going on there. In like manner, Pythagoras continues, we, the philosophers, have come from another life
to this one, not for fame or money, but in order to search persistently for the nature of things, that is the
reality itself (Domaski, 1982, pp. 3-4).
In the present text, I will refer to relevant content of the discussed anecdote on the basis of the texts
translated by C. D. Yonge and J.Domaski.
There is a widely shared opinionas in J. A. Philip (1966), C. H. Kahn, (1974, pp. 161185), G. S.
Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield (1983, pp. 40-73), W. Burkert (1985a, pp. 276-304; 1985b, pp.
305338), J. P. Anton (1992, pp. 2840), T. M. Robinson (1992, pp. 171-181), N. P. Nilsson, or other
experts in the Pythagoreanismthat:
Pythagoras occupies a place in the history of philosophy; he fills an equally notable place in the
2
162
Jerzy Kosiewicz
contribution. Indeed, the issues in question have already been explored thoroughly
and to the extent sufficient for the purpose of this presentation. Its main focus is
on the exegesis of the content of the anecdote about Pythagoras, its aspects and
implications, and corresponding references to certain messages of Pythagoreanism.
The religious and cultural context of human life
In the account of a conversation held with Leon, prince of Phliasiian
anecdote popularized in the antiquity by Cicero (V, 8-10; 1877, pp. 165-166)
Pythagoras says that the life of man seemed to him to resemble those games which
were celebrated with the greatest possible variety of sports and the general concourse
of all Greece (V, 9; ibid., p. 166). Diogenes Laertius writes that in his conversation
with the tyrant of Phlius, Pythagoras compared life to the Great Games (Diogenes
Laertius, VIII, 1, 1-8; 1925b, p. 327). Juliusz Domaski, who also refers to this ruler
as the tyrant of Phlius (and follows Diogenes Laertius in this, which is insignificant
for the construal of the anecdote as presented in the following), writes that in his
conversation with the tyrant, Pythagoras said that Human life resembles the
Panhellenic games (Domaski, 1996, p. 4). In these three accounts of Pythagoras
statementas provided by Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, and Juliusz Domaskia
reference is made to major ceremonial events, i.e., to religious ceremonies with
diverse overtones, both nationwide and local3.
They were dedicated to various gods of the Pantheon and focused on sports,
competition in arts, etc. Usually of mixed nature, they also addressed a specific artistic
form, such as theater, as was the case with the games held at Athens, a biennial event
associated with the cult of Dionysus.
history of religion. In him the sense of formal law was strongly developed that when he discovered the
regulatory of the mathematical laws of number he laid them down as the basis of existence. In religious
matters his school was a sect which taught a new doctrine of the greatest importance, the transmigration
of souls (Nilsson, 1952, p. 201).
In Diogenes Laertius, life is compared to Great Games (VIII, 1, 7-8; trans. by R. D. Hicks, 1925, p.
327). In Cicero, these are referred to as games celebrated with the general concourse of all Greece
(V, 8-10; trans. by C. D. Yonge). For J. Domaski, these Great Games, games, and general
concourse of all Greece are analogous to Panhellenic games.
163
The comparison quoted in the above distinguishes and elevates human life
to an extreme and provides it with a sacred dimension marked by a confessional
overtone (rather than a nonconfessional, abstract, or transcendental one)that is,
the highest of all cultural values known to ancient Greece. This leads to a specific,
sublime responsibility and to many important duties of both social and soteriological
nature.
For Pythagoras, those were not only unique, festive events, but also a
particularly important mission: a kind of ritual, or a quasi-ritual, saturated with three
main duties, obligations of a threefold nature: a) to the gods, b) to other people, and
c) to knowledge and wisdom, which would be treated as analogous concepts until
Aristotles times. Whereas the first and the third obligation are of a vertical nature,
the second obligation is a horizontal one.
Firstly, the entire life, from conception to death, should take this particular
form of activity: a constant evidence of religious duties being fulfilled; a form of
worship; a thanksgivingmore or less inspired, but always consciousfor the gift
of life, for the way this gift is experienced by the individual and by the community.
Indeed, as indicated by the comparison, life is a temporary and more or less important
component of this Panhellenic event, which is of paramount importance for the
entire Greek world (i.e., splendid and ceremonious all-Greek games) both from an
individual and a general, or social, point of view.
These specific forms of worship include a vertical and a horizontal orientation.
The former is a bottom-up relation and points toward the nonmaterial world, toward
the Olympic and religious sanctity, and it pursues a direct relationship of man to God.
The latter has a horizontal overtone, associated with the location of the individual
within the culture and society. Its religious obligations (duties to the gods) are
fulfilled indirectly, through activities performed by the individual for the benefit of
other people in his or her closer or more distant circle.
Secondly, in the aforementioned anecdote, Pythagoras distinguishes three
categories of participants of the Great Games (Hicks translation), the general
concourse of all Greece (Yonges translation), or the Panhellenic games
(Domaskis description), i.e., three groups of persons attending the event.
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Jerzy Kosiewicz
He states that:
there were some persons whose object was glory and the honor of
a crown, to be attained by the performance of bodily exercises, so others
were led thither by the gain of buying and selling, and mere views of
profit; but there was likewise one class of persons, and they were by far
the best, whose aim was neither applause nor profit, but who came merely
as spectators through curiosity, to observe what was done, and to see in
what manner things were carried on there(Cicero, V, 8-10; 1877, p. 166,
Yonges translation).
Similar content and sense is present in the translation by Domaski, who

writes that the games were attended by
those who seek there awards and fame; those who come there to sell
or to buy; and those, least numerous and noblest of all participants, who
seek neither fame nor fortune, but who content themselves with watching
what is going on there (Domaski, 1996, p. 4).
The latter kind is referred to by Pythagoras as philosophers.
Diogenes Laertius, in turn, recounts that :
Some went [there] to compete for the prize and others went with
wares to sell, but the best as spectators; for similarly, in life, some grow up
with servile natures, greedy for fame and gain, but the philosopher seeks
for truth. Thus much for this part of the subject (Diogenes Laertius, VIII,
1, 7-8; 1925b, pp. 327-329, Hicks translation).
I will begin by addressing the first two groups of people, which play an
important role in the society. The fact that philosophers are the best, or, in the
present case, the noblest of all suggests that they stand out above those others who
are also better (good) and noble. In fact, Pythagoras does not undermine the nobility
(and goodness) of the first two categories of participants. He simply emphasizes that
philosophers are the best, the noblest. Were there no other noble (good) people, there
165
would be no way for the best and noblest to come into existencethey would simply
form a group of noble (good) people. There would be no comparative group available
to which to relate the nobility (goodness) of philosophers and thus to identify and
describe their uniqueness and superiority, if any.
The nobility of those with wares to sell {(Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 1, 7-8;
1925b, p. 329; Hicks translation), those who come to sell or buy (Domaski, 1996,
p.4), those led by the gain of buying and selling (Cicero, V, 9; 1877, p. 166, Yonges
translation), or greedy (Diogenes Laertius, 1925b, p. 329, Hicks translation), is
one that makes their role ancillary to the society, especially in a democratic state.
They are essential for the proper functioning of such state, not only in an economic
sense. They provide for themselves and are no burden to others. They also provide
for their family members, if any. They pay their taxes, lower or higher, depending on
their income scale. By providing the necessary resources and acting as politicians,
they therefore contribute to the development of civilization and culturethat is, to
the development of religion, art, urban agglomeration, agrarian and military systems,
internal security, and the like. There is no doubting the noble foundation of their
activities (unless depraved). What determines their behavior is the source and the
sacred overtone of their lives, their duties to others and (indirectly) to divine beings.
There are also those whose object Pythagoras believes to be glory and the
honor of a crown (Cicero, V, 9; 1877, p. 166, Yonges translation), in other words,
those who seek awards and fame (Domaski, 1996, p. 4), who grow up with servile
natures, greedy for fame (Diogenes Laertius, VIIII, 1,7-8; 1925b, p. 329, Hicks
translation). Their nobility encompasses a pursuit of immortality and memorability4
so laudable, for example, for Plato (Symposium, XXV-XXVIII; Plato, 2012)which
4
In his statements concerning madness, inspiration, or a divine spark, Plato argues that these provide a
stimulus for the creation of great works that ensure immortality to their authors. Immortality in this case
does not refer to endless existence of man as a corporeal, psychic, and social being, or to their possible
creative activities even past their biological death. He uses the term immortality to describe constant
and everlasting memory of both the author and his oeuvre. This, according to Plato, applies to works
that feature an inalienable, unique, and imperishable value, that is, to ones that, as he believes, would
always raise interest and would live forever, regardless of the developments in the society. On a side
note, such a maximalist viewwhich refers to objective, necessary, common, and constant affirmation
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Jerzy Kosiewicz
may be ensured, among other things, by success in the Panhellenic games in sports
and art. Awards and fame come as a confirmation and evidence of unique talent,
which is borne under such influences as:
a) an inspiration, or divinatory or prophetic madness sentaccording to Plato
(Symposium, 244d-e; Phaedrus 265b-c; Plato, 2012, pp. 230-231 and 251)by
Apollo. In this case, Plato makes areference to Socrates second speech and Socrates
subsequent remark on madness, which, contrary to the one produced by human
illness (Phaedrus, 265b-c; Plato, 2012, p.251), is produced by a divinely inspired
release from normally accepted behavior (Phaedrus 265, b-c; Plato, 2012, p. 251).
Platoin his Symposiumalso attributes divinatory madness to Eros. In
this case, he makes a reference to the argument presented by prophetess Diotima, a
woman of Mantinea (Plato, XXII, D-E; 2012, p.185), who believes that Eros work
is giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul (Plato, XXV, B; 2012, pp. 190).
of the same values (for example, ones marked by emotional overtones)may cause reasonable doubts,
though not in the case of Plato.
Furthermore, Plato also believes that multigenerational immortality may also include parents,
who would survive in the memory of their descendants, and that the knowledge of ones own ancestors
would not fade away.
The notion of immortality is, in my opinion, more appropriate for broadly defined works of
excellence or genius and their authors rather than for parents of biological children. In the second case,
even multigenerational memorability connected with ones ancestor is a fairly rare phenomenon.
I believe that the term immortality as used by Plato is not a very felicitous one in the discussed
context. Indeed, there is no way to tell in an irrefutable, generally applicable, and necessary manner
which work would acquire that status and whether any trace would ever be left by it. In this case, we
could quote, for instance, an argument concerning the cosmogonical or cosmological nature of the
future of our planet, solar system, or galaxy, whose existence must, in a perspective, come to a close.
Memorability is a more suitable term in this case. In Polish, one of its equivalents is wiekopomno
(memorability that survives for centuries). In the present case, it suggests that the value and memory of
great works and ancestors may last for ages. The actual number of centuriesa few or a few hundred
does have to be narrowed down. In principle, it stretches infinitely, as the duration or possible closure of
such memorability cannot be predicted. Nonetheless, to apply this notion both in general and to human
works is a much more balanced and prudent approach: it does not suggest immortality in its ultimate
meaning, i.e., Platos. This is how I apply the term wiekopomno in my studies of Platos texts in which
the discussed form of immortality is characterized. I do not therefore treat the terms immortality and
memorability as analogues.
167
She also counts him among the

messengers who shuttle back and forth between [god and mortal],
conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men they bring
commands from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices. Being in the
middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to all.
Through them all divination passes, through them the art of priests in
sacrifice and ritual, in enchantment, prophecy, and sorcery. Gods do not
mix with men; they mingle and converse with us through spirits instead,
whether we are awake or asleep (Plato, XXIII, E 203; 2012, p. 187).
b) Dionysos inspired religious madness (Plato, Phaedrus, 244, E; 2012,
pp.230-231 and 251), inspiration () of the mystic (Plato, Phaedrus, 244, E; 2012,
p. 251), which initiates or arouses deeper religious needs, stimulates the pursuit of
further initiations, provides access to the highest divine arcane. It gives, says Plato,
prophecies and takes refuge in prayers to the gods and in worship,
discovering mystic rites and purifications that bring the man it touches
through to safety for this and all time to come. So it is that the right sort
of madness finds relief from present hardships for aman it has possessed
(Plato, Phaedrus, 244e; 2012, pp.230-231).
c) creative inspiration induced by the Muses (Plato, Phaedrus, 245; 2012,
p. 251). In his discussion of the four kinds of madness as presented in Socrates
second speech, Plato says that
Third comes the kind of madness that is possession by the Muses,
which takes a tender virgin soul and awakens it to a Bacchic frenzy of
songs and poetry that glorifies the achievements of the past and teaches
them to future generations (Plato, Phaedrus, 245; 2012, p. 231).
This type of both creative and artistic work is inspired not only by the Muses,
but also by the mysteries and carnivalesque processions, pageants, and other forms of
worship of Bacchus. For example, winning theatrical (drama) competitions dedicated
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Jerzy Kosiewicz
to Dionysus brought the winners awards and fame of both artistic and religious
nature. Such competition was in fact an evidence of both religious worship and
soteriological motivation. Similarly, during the Panhellenic games, athletes aspired
to provide a proof of their ability to outperform other competitors in a specific form
of cult, a proof of the precedence of their title to divine honors and salvation over the
others. A pursuit of glory and honor, immortality and memorability, is clearly a noble
and laudable phenomenon in this context.
d) love madness inspired by Aphrodite and Eros, which causes human
beings to seek specific immortality (in the Platonic understanding), not only
through procreation, but also through different forms of activity in such fields as
art, agriculture, economy, politics, and warfare. This includes philosophical activity,
which, according to Diotima, is inspired by Eros, the patron of philosophers, whom
she also counts among these. Eros seeks knowledge and wisdom (N.B., these being
two concepts that would be treated as analogues until Aristotles times). She says that
Eros (Love) is in love with what is beautiful, and wisdom is extremely beautiful. It
follows that Love must be a lover of wisdom (Plato, Symposium, XXIII, B-C; 2012,
p. 188). His goal, in turn, is giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul (ibid.,
B; p. 190).
In Socrates second speech, Plato also argues that creative madness is not
something to be ashamed of or worthy of blame (Plato, Phaedrus, 244, C; 2012, p.
230), that it is always given as the gift of the god (Plato, Phaedrus, 245, B; 2012,
p. 230), and he concludes his argument on some of the fine achievements () that
are due to god-sent madness (Plato, Phaedrus, 245, B; 2012, p.231) by stating that
this sort of madness is given us by the gods to ensure our greatest good fortune
(ibid). He further argues that should anyone come to the gates of art or any other
illustrious and memorable creative activity and expect, say,
to become an adequate poet by acquiring expert knowledge of the
subject without the Muses madness, he will fail, and his self-controlled
verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have been driven out of
169
their minds (Plato, Phaedrus, 245; 2012, p.231)5.

In this respect, he acknowledges that madness (mania) from a god is finer
than self-control of human origin, according to the testimony of the ancient language
givers (Plato Phaedrus, 245, B; 2012, p. 230).
We must not have any fear on this particular point, then, adds Plato with
regard to madness, and we must not let anyone disturb us or frighten us with the
claim that you should prefer a friend who is in control of himself to one who is
disturbed (Plato, Phaedrus, 245, B; 2012, p.231). Clearly, what he means by being
disturbed is to yield to a divine spark, to supernatural inspiration that may produce
outstanding works, leading to immortality or (merely!) memorability (see note 4).
Thirdly, Plato was clearly aware of the implication contained in the recounted
second speech of Socratesand understood its intended message, it being both his
own and Socrates, his undisputed philosophical authority. Indeed, he experienced
this divine madness himself, inter alia, in the form of a philosophical mission, his
continuation of the philosophical method indicated by Pythagoras: a nonempirical,
intuitive, speculative, and contemplative one. The evidence of this inspired state of
disturbance or adivine spark of creative madness is, among others, the immortality
to use Platos own termof the great Athenian and his work.
Pythagoras notes that those best as spectators (Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 1,78; 1925b, p.329) are philosophers and seek for truth (ibid), that their business is to
5
In the Polish version of this article, I introduced three changes to the existing Polish translation of this
fragment (L. Regner, 1993, p. 28):
a) I replaced the term pieniarz (singer) with poeta (poet), and
b) I replaced the term pieniarstwo (art of singing) with poezja liryczna (lyrical poetry).
This amendment of the Polish translation was suggested to me by the English translation of
Platos works in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (eds.) (1987). The Collected Dialogues of Plato
Including the Letters. Princeton: Princeton University Press. It was preceded by my consultation with
several translators and Greek philosophers, my colleagues of the International Association of Greek
Philosophy, during the 23rd World Congress of Philosophy held in Athens in August 2013. They
concluded that what had been meant by Plato was to be understood as lyrical poetry rather than the
art of singing in general. It should be noted here that spiritual art of singing, i.e., ancient Greek lyrical
songs, was also a form of divinely inspired art.
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Jerzy Kosiewicz
earnestly investigate, look into, and experience the nature of things (Cicero, 1877,
p.166, Yonges translation), and that they are therefore studious of wisdom (ibid.).
He also indicates that they are the noblest of all participants (Domaski, 1982,
p.4) of the said games. He refers to them as pursuers of wisdom, i.e., those who
not only content themselves with watching what is going on there, but who come
from another life to this one, () in order to search persistently for the nature of
things, that is the reality itself (ibid).
This idea finds a continuation in Platos Republic, where he says that only
a philosopher is able to acknowledge the cognitive value, or the real nature of
observation of what goes on around him. He says that only the philosopher can
know how sweet it is to contemplate the truth (Plato, 1942, p.308). He emphasizes
that a statement by a philosopher, though rooted in intuition, is true by necessity as
it is made by someone who uses reason for the pursuit of wisdom (ibid.) What a
philosopher refers to is a reality from another life (Domaski, 1982, p.4), from
another life and nature (Cicero, V, 9; 1877, p.166); his intention is to fathom its
conceptual, supernatural characteristics. Plato adds here that the philosopher,
in constant companionship with the divine order of the world, will reproduce that
order in his soul and, so far as man may, become godlike (Plato, 1942, p.204). He
emphasizes philosophers constant passion for any knowledge that will reveal to
them something of that reality which endures for ever and is not always passing into
and out of existence (Plato, 1942, p.186).
Cognitive intuition as a foundation for consideration of the reality
In the aforementioned anecdote, Pythagoras challenged and rejected empirical
investigations regarded by others as a primary and basic method of research in
philosophy. He negated the downright empiricism typical of the first philosophers
of nature. Instead, he opted primarily for an intuitive method. As a result, he built
another vertical system, different in terms of content from the existing ones, of man
vs. the world of abstractions. It referred to atranscendental and nonreligious context
of justification, to the order of numbers (geometry and arithmetic)such as one
(related to oneness), ten, and tetractys (also known as fourness)and finally to
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cosmogony, cosmology (Kosiewicz, 2011, pp. 158-167), and music (Bourodimos,

1992, pp. 70-89), which were founded on this order.
Through this method, a philosopherthat is, one with a Pythagorean
backgroundwas able to fulfill his cognitive mission: to investigate the nature of
things, that is the reality itself.
A note should be made here that the understanding of the concept of nature in the
first philosophers was very broad, its later derivatives being the concepts of substance
and attributes, of form and matter. In Thales and Anaximanders considerations on
nature, the nature of things did not, however, mean the same as nature. These
concepts were by no means analogues. For instance, Thales maintained that water has
its own nature, characterized by its initiative to transform in an instant (Krokiewicz,
1995, p. 75). Thus, he argued, water has an abstract attribute that cannot be perceived
by senses, unless by its result, i.e., the effect of this initiative. Anaximander, in turn,
was of the opinion that nature, i.e., the cosmos, has an infinite (apeiron) nature,
an undefined principlewith no beginning or end, immutable, indestructiblefrom
which emerges the universe of things characterized by quality and quantity and
perceptible for the senses. This vastness, indefiniteness, and principle, i.e., the nature
of things, is what Pythagoras understands as reality itself: an abstract world, a
world of numbers, the true origin of things that exist physically, that is, of nature.
The latter is for him less real, or it is a reality of a different kind, inferior to what
he describes as the reality itself, which is only accessible through extrasensory
perception, intuitively and contemplatively.
Only a Pythagorean philosopher (Pythagoras, his followers, and others
that refer to this philosophy) is capable of such perception. Only a Pythagorean
philosopher comes from another life to this one (Domaski, p. 4), from another
life and nature unto this one (Cicero, V, 9; 1877, p. 166).
This arrival and the corresponding division into this one and another life
(Domaski, p. 4) or this one and another life and nature (Cicero, p.166) should
not be taken literally. Indeed, a philosopher does not arrive from another life or
another life and nature understood as an earlier life led in some other supernatural
place, an environment of transcendental beings. This is where heor actually only
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his mind, his intuitionoriginates to a certain extent. This is where he is suspended,

in a speculative, intuitive sense. Furthermore, only a Pythagorean philosopher is able
to get to know this abstract reality. Like the Kantian subject, he is situated in between
two worlds:
a) a noumenal world (other ideal world), and thereforefrom Pythagoras
perspectivethe real one; and
b) a phenomenal world (this physical world that is available through
the senses). The Pythagorean philosopher, acting as a social leader in
this life, seeks to provide advice and assistance to other individuals in
their understanding of the phenomenal world by means of the other
worldthat is, by reference to its mathematical capabilities. This was
primarily the case of individuals based in Pythagorean enclaves or in
groups (larger or smaller communities) that functioned under their
philosophical, ethical, religious, and political leadership.
Philosophy and religion as components of creative dynamism
The aforementioned vertical system is so rationally sophisticated that it seems
to be completely independent of religious beliefs, i.e., independent of the vertical
system characterized by emotional overtones as discussed earlier.
Yet it should be noted with regard to the cognitive mission, or in other words,
the philosophical mission, that:
a) firstly, it originates in religion because the essential and necessary
condition for its existence is life and lifes religious background;
b) secondly, it also seeks emancipation of its foundations (mathematical
knowledge) and results, especially those marked by ontological,
cosmogonical, and cosmological overtones (Bourodimos, 1982, pp.7089).
It should also be noted that this emancipation is of a superficial nature. What
is shown by its results is that the determinants of a philosophical activity are in
fact of strictly origin-related character. This means that philosophy is atestament
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to ceremoniousness, to an origin-related sacralization of needs, aspirations, and

results of their implementation, which appear in a life that is genetically (originally)
marked by religious values and standards of soteriological ethics. In the context of
its fragmentary distinctiveness (that is, its fragmentary approach), this emancipation
manifests itself as one of strictly cognitive, rational nature. In this case, the context
of justification is based on the assumption of the existence of transcendental being or
beings (of a nonconfessional origin).
This approach is in opposition to the theoretical and emotional (religious)
foundation of the anecdote, which is rooted in the area of religious transcendence6.
This means that all human activityfrom the point of view of its origin, i.e., from
the point of view of the message conveyed by the anecdote about Pythagorasis
marked by confessional overtones, even if various parts of philosophical creation
are fully rational, their background being, for example, mathematics (which leads
to a philosophy of mathematics).From the point of view of the whole, however, its
overtone is by definition religious and soteriological, as shown by the reference to
the Panhellenic games (Domaski, p.4) or the general concourse of all Greece
(Cicero, V, 9; p.166).
The above is, in a sense, related to the dyadic composition of the opposites
characteristic of Pythagoreanism, such as one and many, the end and infinity. It is
also reflected in the dispute concerning the ambiguity of the Pythagorean philosophy.
It was represented on one hand by Aristotle, who emphasized the duality of a specific
theory of being, and on the other hand by the writer Alexander Polyhistor, also known
as Alexander of Miletus, who argued in his Philosophers Successions (1st century
BCE) that the Pythagorean ontology showed some principles that were typical of a
monistic concept of being.
6
From the ontological point of view, I distinguish between transcendental being and transcendent
being. The term transcendental being refers to abstract beings and ones that are external to the world
of nature. Such beings show properties of a non-confessional nature.
Transcendent being, in turn, in my understanding of the term, refers to ideal, abstract beings that, as
above, are also external to material beings. Their properties are of a religious origin. The purpose of this
note on my understanding of both concepts is to avoid ambiguity. I have in fact encountered diverse, or
even mutually exclusive, definitions of the two.
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Both in this dispute and in the reception of the Pythagorean philosophy (in
general terms), there is no way for two components of any contradiction to exist
separately as autonomous, qualitatively separate beings, but they must exist together
(Krokiewicz, 1995, p. 98). Jointly, they form a whole, an internally diversified
oneness. In the case of the dispute discussed in the above, we are dealing with two
mutually exclusive points of view without which no controversy arises, and neither of
which overcomes the other. In the second case, in turn, the first of the opposites, the
religious principle, preponderates over the other, a rationally determined philosophy.
This notwithstanding they do form a whole, an internally diversified (as in the case
of the dispute) oneness.
In this concept of social, individual, religious, and philosophical life,
the confessional sacred determines cultural properties and strictly cognitive
or philosophical inquiries. It sets the rules for a society. It emphasizes that the
philosophical activity of the individual is also a form of activity marked by asceticism
with religious overtones. The pressure of the lifes contradictory values releases
energy, i.e., dynamism It becomes the driving force behind religious and philosophical
(rational and irrational) activities and creation. The opposition of contradictions
triggers a common cultural dynamism that is necessary for the development of
religion and philosophy.Therefore, considerations on duality or monism became
less important, as without one of the components of a specific oppositional pair,
the creative dynamism disappears (it is annihilated). The latter is needed for the
development of each of the components and becomes even more important in view
of their interdependence, which stimulates creative activity.
Philosophy as a pursuit of wisdom
Pythagoras defined philosophers as those who pursue wisdom. Therefore, a
certain essential resemblance may be identified between the methods and objectives
of philosophy in Pythagoras, Pythagoreans, and Pseudo-Plato, and, accordingly, also
in Socrates and Plato (Robinson, 1992, pp. 182-188) and their followers.
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1. Approaches to wisdom
Considerations on philosophy shouldas required by the focus of the
presented contributionbe preceded by references to three approaches to (or three
components of) the definition of wisdom that is similar to Platos views and was
developed by Pseudo-Plato and is similar to Platos views. He equates it with the
concept of knowledge. This is what he believes:
a) The first approach contained in the definition of wisdom indicates that
wisdom is non-hypothetical knowledge (Pseudo-Plato, 414, B; 1973, p. 156)7.
In his analysis of this approach to wisdom, Juliusz Domaski says that It is
absolute knowledge (), that is, knowledge distinguished by its certainty, and at the
same time, one that focuses on something certain, consistent, absolute (Domaski,
1996, pp.5-6).
In the light of the discussed component of the definition, Pythagoras and his
followers also pursue knowledge distinguished by certainty (not relativity)which,
in their case, is based on mathematics (it is, indeed, of absolute, non-hypothetical
nature). For the Pythagoreans, wisdom is therefore absolute knowledge, one that
addresses something certain, consistent, absolute (Domaski, 1996, pp.5-6) and
not something relative. The supernatural world of numbers, mathematical laws, and
their magic and causative power does not, according to the Pythagoreans, give rise
to any doubt. Indeed, numbers are immutable and perfectnonhypothetical and
absolute.
b) In the second approach, wisdom is knowledge of what always exists
The first part of Pseudo-Platos definition of wisdom is worded as follows: (sophia), wisdom:
non-hypothetical knowledge (Pseudo-Plato, 414, B; 1973, p. 156).
It should be noted here that Pseudo-Plato presents one comprehensive definition of wisdom,
though he does so in three approaches. In the Polish translation by Leopold Regner, it is numbered 93
(Pseudo-Plato, 414, B; 1973, p.156). It may be divided into three components, which in turn may be
referred to as, accordingly, the first, the second, and the third definition. Jointly, these are presented
by the philosopher as follows: (sophia), wisdom: non-hypothetical knowledge; knowledge of
what always exists; knowledge which contemplates the causeof beings (Pseudo-Plato, 414, B; 1973,
p.156).
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Jerzy Kosiewicz
(Pseudo-Plato, 414, B; 1973, p. 156). Domaski indicates that, according to PseudoPlato, wisdom is connected with what is always there, i.e., with knowledge the
subject whereof is eternal (Domaski, 1996, p.6)8.
The world of Pythagorean abstract beings has always existed and is eternal.
Knowledge thereof results from mathematical inquiries and, at the same time, from the
philosophy of mathematics, which in consequence means the philosophy of cosmos.
A side note should be made here that the Pythagorean mathematical knowledge was
divided into four branches: geometry, arithmetic, music, and astronomy.
c) The third part of the definition of wisdom says that wisdom is knowledge
which contemplates the cause of beings (Pseudo-Plato, 414, B; 1973, p.156). In
Pythagoras philosophical principles, wisdom (that is, knowledge) is of strictly
intuitive nature. Let it be remembered that a Pythagorean philosopher comes from
another life to this one (Domaski, p.4), from another life and nature into this one
(Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, V, 9; 1877, p.166). His knowledge is saturated with
inquiries originating in mathematics, whichaccording to Domaski, who makes
a reference to the third approach in the definition of wisdomis a prerequisite for
theoretical knowledge of the cause of beings (Domaski, 1996, p.6)9. Reference is
made in this case, inter alia, to creative properties of 10 and tetractys, also known as
fourness. Therefore, wisdom is unmediated knowledge resulting from nonempirical
perception of beings, i.e., from mathematical abstraction, which is the real and actual
cause of the world accessible only to the minds of Pythagorean philosophers.
2. Approaches to philosophy
It is also clear that the Pythagorean concept of philosophy accords not only
with Pseudo-Platos understanding of wisdom, but also with the approaches to
philosophy formulated in the latters triadic definition of philosophy (which may be
In reference to the second definition of wisdom in Pseudo-Plato, Juliusz Domaski concludes that it is
knowledge of what is always there (), that is knowledge the subject whereof is eternal (Domaski,
1996, p.6). In Pseudo-Plato, the second definition of wisdom is worded as follows: (sophia),
wisdom: () knowledge of what always exists (Pseudo-Plato, 414, B; 1973, p.156).
In reference to the third component of the definition of wisdom in Pseudo-Plato, Juliusz Domaski
concludes, It is a theoretical knowledge of the cause of beings. He also adds that in reference to the
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related to Platos views):

a) The first part of his definition of philosophy says that philosophy is adesire
of knowledge of what always exists (Pseudo-Plato, 414, B; 1973, p. 156). In
Domaskis studywhich is a reference to, or an interpretation of, Pseudo-Platos
argumentphilosophy is, in turn, a want of knowledge of what is always there
and a pursuit of such knowledge (Domaski, p.6)10. Pythagoras approach to
philosophy shows that, like Socrates and Plato, he regards it as a process of constantly
approaching wisdom. Indeed, as a fullnessthat is, unconditionally, without being
gradually approached or delved intoit is only accessible to gods. This is the
point made by Diotima during the famous symposium debatethat is, during the
described philosophical dispute of contradictory and complementary arguments
concerning Eros and his numerous cultural functionswhen she says that, unlike
Eros, none of the gods loves wisdom or wants to become wisefor they are wise
(Plato, Symposium, XXIII, 204; 2012, p. 188).
Platos Republic contains two references to the concept of philosopher, i.e.,
the lover of wisdom (Plato, 1942, p. 178)11, which seem to contradict the view
anecdote about Pythagoras, that it is a direct perception of being (Domaski, 1996, p.6). In PseudoPlato, the third approach in the definition of wisdom is worded as follows: (sophia), wisdom:
() knowledge which contemplates the causeof beings (Pseudo-Plato, 414, B; 1973, p. 156).
The first component of Pseudo-Platos definition of philosophy is worded as follows:
(philosophia), philosophy: desire for the knowledge of what always exists (Pseudo-Plato, 414, B;
1973, p. 156).
It should be noted here that Pseudo-Plato presents one comprehensive definition of wisdom, though he
does so in three approaches. In the Polish translation by Leopold Regner, it is numbered 94 (PseudoPlato, 1973, p.156). It may be divided into three components, which in turn may be referred to as,
accordingly, the first, the second, and the third definition. Jointly, they are thus worded as follows:
(philosophia), philosophy: desire for the knowledge of what always exists; the state which
contemplates truth, what makes it true; cultivation of the soul, based on correct reason (Pseudo-Plato,
414, B; 1973, p.156).
10
11
I am referring here to Book V of Platos Republic, where Socrat argues in his conversation with
Glaucon that the man who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and throws himself into acquiring it
with an insatiable curiosity will deserve to be called a philosopher (Plato, 1942, p.178). Philosophers
are indeed those whose passion it is to see the truth (ibid.). On a side note, this concept of truth
shows an ontological approach, it refers to a supernatural world, i.e., to a world of eternal ideas and the
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discussed above, though this is nothing but superficial antagonism. What Plato says
is that the genuine lover of knowledge cannot fail, from his youth up, to strive after
the whole of truth (Plato, 1942, p.187) and corroborates immediately: I perfectly
agree (ibid.) He also says: So the philosopher, with his passion for wisdom, will be
one who desires all wisdom, not only some part of it (Plato, 1942, p. 178).
This passion for/desire ofwhich, also in view of Pythagoras intended
meaning, may also be treated as a want ofdoes not, however, exclude a pursuit.
Indeed, in this case a want of (passion for/desire of) is a prerequisite of a pursuit,
i.e., of a gradual fulfillment of the relevant cognitive objectives. The accomplishment
of such objectives may lead to setting of further steps involved in gaining knowledge.
A note should be made here that the possibility to equate the notions of passion
for/desire of and want of is corroborated by the alternative translations of the
above quotation concerning the lover of wisdom, i.e., the philosopher. Domaski
translated it as follows: What can be said of a philosopher is not that he only wants
some portion of wisdom and no other, but that he wants all wisdom (Domaski,
1996, p. 5).
In general, Platos statement (regardless of certain differences between
the translations presented above) has a psychological overtone; it rather shows a
maximalist attitude of philosophers toward their vocation. It shows that, in spite
of being aware of their own limited cognitive capacity and the one inherent to
human nature as such, they make efforts to go beyond it. It also applies to Plato.
His philosophical development was indeed of gradual nature: he engaged in more
and more disputes and wrote more and more dialogues, some of which were also
intended to recount such disputes. In those dialogues, he solved more and more
philosophical problems, but never claimed that his knowledge had reached the level
of divine wisdom. On the contrary, he quotes Diotima, without coming into dispute
with her, that no god loves wisdom () and no one else who is wise already loves
wisdom (Plato, Symposium, XXIII, 204; 2012, p.188). Only those who want to be
wise love wisdom. No wonder, then, that aphilosopher in pursuit of wisdom wants
Demiurge and of the abstract being in the form of matter (it being first or prime or metaphysical matter
used by the Demiurge as the creator to construct the nature, to create the cosmos).
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all wisdom, wisdom in its fullness. Should he attain it, he would cease to be a
philosopher, as, according to Diotima, no one who is wise already loves wisdom
(ibid.). Nevertheless, this is what he wants: wisdom as a fullness that never comes
within human capabilities, for wisdom as a fullness is unattainable even for the
wisest philosopher. After all, it must be remembered that there is no going beyond the
Socratic level of knowledge, referred to in the famous maxim of the great Greek
that is, knowledge of the fact that one knows nothing.
b) In the second approach to philosophy contained in Pseudo-Platos definition,
philosophy is the state which contemplates truth, what makes it true (Pseudo-Plato,
414, B; 1973, p. 156). In Domaskis studywhich hardly differs from the one quoted
in the abovephilosophy is atheoretical habitus which addresses what is true and
how it is true (Domaski, 1996, p.6)12. It refers predominantly to abstract beings
whose existence is confirmed by Pythagorean intuition. The truth in this case is of
ontological nature (not semantic or classical, i.e., one that originates from Aristotle);
it applies predominantly to existent ideal beings. The quality of truthfulness and
realness, i.e., the truthfulness of existence, applies to numbers. Hence what we are
dealing with here is a typical example of idealistic realism. How these beings are
true is, in turn, demonstrated by the Pythagoreans, who ascribe to themi.e., to their
forms of existence and interdependence, systems, rules, and lawsspecific features
and capabilities.
What are also true, though not ideal, are material beings, as indeed their
existence is determined by the activity and function of numbers; they depend on the
principles of geometry and arithmetic. This refers to nature founded on qualitative
and quantitative properties, which are generated by nothing else other than numbers.
The latter are, at the same time, inseparable components of nature, just as form (in
addition to prime matter) is the component of the Aristotelian substance (i.e., of
things). How the material being is true, in turn, is demonstrated by the Pythagorean
through references to, inter alia, cosmogony, cosmology, music, and the philosophy
The second component of Pseudo-Platos definition of philosophy is worded as follows:
(philosophia), philosophy: () the state which contemplates truth, what makes it true (Pseudo-Plato,
414, B; 1973, p. 156).
12
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Jerzy Kosiewicz
of cosmos (marked by aprioric and empirical overtones). Numbers are what ensure both
their formal and material basis. Both things and abstract (extrasensory) beingssuch as
metaphysical matteroriginate from nothing else than the tetractys. Other numbers (i.e.,
other than fourness and ten) are the source of its qualitative and quantitative properties.
c) The third part of the definition of philosophy says that philosophy is
cultivation of the soul, based on correct reason (Plato, 1997, p. 1683; Pseudo-Plato,
414, B; 1973, p. 156). Domaskis study, in turn, shows a fairly significant difference,
with far-reaching anthropological consequences, which are in line with the principles
of the philosophy of man both among the Pythagoreans and Plato, influenced by the
Orphic vision of man. Domaski says that the third definition describes philosophy as
treatment or therapy of the soul based on righteous reason (Domaski, 1996, p.6).
For the Pythagoreans, philosophy is also an essential form of a therapy of the soul 13
(N.B: the soul and mind are, according to them, a system of numbers). Philosophy leads
to cognitive perfection of the soul and, along with other religious and cultural forms
of activity, allows its purification and salvation. According to Plato, this therapy is of
strictly cognitive (i.e., philosophical) nature. It is a perfection of knowledge pursued
to the maximum extent, i.e., to the best of a specific individuals ability. Reaching this
optimum successfully, if at all, allows the human soul to be liberated from the fetters
of physicality. In both cases, the therapy of the soul is of a soteriological nature. In
the Pythagoreans, it is a soteriology marked by religious and philosophical overtones;
in Plato, it is a soteriology of aphilosophical nature. The therapeutic measures
may also be regarded as ethical activity: a manifestation of soteriological ethics.
Pythagorean philosophy as a triadic system
Epistemologically the Pythagorean philosophy features the properties of a
triad. This, however, does not apply to ontology. In a sense, it may be associated with
Hegels triad, though only to a strictly limited extent, both in terms of the content
and of the form. In this case, epistemology comes to the fore, given that without
The third component of Pseudo-Platos definition of philosophy is worded as follows:
(philosophia), philosophy: () cultivation of the soul, based on correct reason (Plato, 1997, p.1683;
Pseudo-Plato, 1973, p.156).
13
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philosophical inquiries it would be impossible to:

a) prove the reasonableness of the research method, i.e., of the specific
methodology characteristic only of the Pythagorean philosophy;
b) explore, prove, explain, and understand the ways or forms of
existence and manifestation of the two worldsthe abstract
world and the material world, that of numbers and that of nature.
Epistemology is based predominantly on intuition, that is, on direct cognition
(athesis). It is essential for the Pythagorean philosophys ability to prove the existence
of mathematical beings, which are, inter alia, the cause of existence and function of
the cosmos.
What results from the principles of the intuitive method is an empirical method
(an antithesis) that addresses the view of nature as a being accessible to the senses.
What is produced by the application of both the intuitive method (which is the
thesis in this case) and the opposed experimental method (which is the antithesis)
is, inter alia, a philosophy of the cosmos as a synthesis of the both. It enables the
explanation and understanding of the principles and results of cosmogonical inquiries
of intuitive nature and of cosmological research showing some characteristics of
mathematics and natural sciences and implicit influences of inductive logic. Hence,
the Pythagorean epistemology is a triadic system: it features a thesis, an antithesis,
and a synthesis.
The Pythagorean ontology as mentioned in the above assumes that there is
a world-in-itself: an ideal, perfect, and abstract world that gives rise to one that is
phenomenal, qualitative and quantitative, material and mutable. What also belongs
to the supernatural world is the matter generated by 10 or by tetractys, also known
as fourness. No classical, Hegelian triad is available in the present case as what
we are dealing with in the Pythagorean ontology is either a) a monism (Alexander
Polyhistor), or b) an ontological dualism (Aristotle).
The ontological monism mentioned above fails to meet the formal requirements
necessary to fall within the context of the categories typical of a Hegelian triad: it
lacks a thesis, an antithesis, or a synthesis. In the second case (i.e., of the ontological
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dualism), the third component is missing, which prevents the discussion of what and
why the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis are. What we are dealing with in this dualism
is, to use Hegelian terms:
a) a possible thesis concerning abstract beings;
and
b) an instant form of antithesis, i.e., an antithesis in the form of matter
accessible for the senses, which includes immanently embedded and
necessary numbers (meaning that they are an indispensable component
of each and every thing).
Identification with philosophy as a life mission
From the point of view of the aforementioned anecdote, a Pythagorean
philosopher would not practice any profession, unlike the sophists, for instance, who
would be teachers, tutors, and philosophersall at the same time. He would conduct
nonprofit studies in mathematics, including arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and
music; his interests would also include some aspects of practical ethics. His only
job would be to view and explain what was going on around him. He would pursue
wisdom on a nonprofit basis. What would distinguish him would be an ability to
contact, or stay in, another life and nature, and an ability to view this life from
a point of view, or in the context, of an intuitively cognized abstraction marked by
arithmetic and geometric overtones. Characterized by unique cognitive capabilities,
by philosophical and mathematical madness, he would treat his life as autotelic: as a
mission to cope with. Its goal would be to explain to others and let them understand
the meaning of this life, as embedded in its ecological and social niche. As shown
by the anecdote about Pythagoras, he would have been aware that he was the one
designated for this task. Such pursuit of wisdom and sharing of knowledge, acquired
through ascetic efforts were the fulfillment of his vocation, of the mission he wished
to carry out.
In view of this, the philosophy he would deal with is treated as a manifestation
and confirmation of ones identity. The philosopher would identify both with the
source of his cognitive inspiration and with the results of the nature of things, that
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is the reality itself.

Inspired by a divine spark, philosophy arises from what Plato perceives as
an intuitive unity with Eros; it is a form of message originating in transcendence. It
inspires directly a specific philosopher: Eros goal is giving birth in beauty, whether
in body or in soul (Plato, 2012, Symposium, XXV, 206, B; pp. 190). Through
parthenogenic fertilization of a beautiful soul, the philosopher became pregnant,
stigmatized by creative madness marked by a cognitive overtone. He was then able
to give birth to other works, which served as a manifestation of his necessary pursuit
of wisdom.
The portion of knowledge acquired by them became an immanent component
of their personality, anchored in ideal being, in wisdom as afullness, which gods do
not have to improve as they already have it. Only a philosopher man and philosopher
Eros will always pursue wisdom. Pythagorean philosophers, as well as Socrates,
Plato, or Pseudo-Plato and their ancient followers, who come and draw their cognitive
abilities from another life and nature, identify themselves with what they possess;
they identify themselves which what each of them has individually come by and
holds: with their acquired knowledge, i.e., with the unique and inalienable property
of an individual who constantly communes with, desires, and pursues wisdom.
Pythagorean philosophers also identify themselves with the divine element thereof.
They take efforts and search persistently for the nature of things, that is the reality
itself (Domaski, 1996, p.4); they earnestly look into the nature of things (Cicero,
V, 9; 1877, p.166), as contemplating things, and acquainting ones self with them,
greatly exceeds every other pursuit of life (ibid.).
Having concluded that their philosophical, religious, ethical, and social
views were reasonable, Pythagoras and his followers became convinced that these
were not merely to be shared with, but to be forced upon other people. So they did
promulgate their ideas in smaller or larger communities. They implemented their
own social principles only under their own leadership. Even if driven by noble and
laudable intentions, they denied others any participation in the development of moral
principles and the philosophical content. This led to antagonisms in the societies
controlled by them and even to armed conflicts and a grave crisis of Pythagoreanism
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as a sociopolitical movement in the 5th century (Boudouris, 1982, pp. 49-69)14.

Though the nonprofit vocation for a pursuit of wisdom did not die completely, the
Pythagoreans had to abandon political measures of its promulgation to the general
public.
In addition to Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, Socrates also identifies
himselfclearly in a direct (i.e., nonrelative) mannerwith the concept of
philosophy treated as both a contemplating thought (inspired from the outside) and
a contemplated thought (the product of a philosophers creative activities). Ultimate
identification with his own political views (see Apology in Plato, 2012, pp.21-46)
is what Socrates understands to be a fulfillment of the principle that says that virtue
is an absolute value, not a relative one and that, contrary to what was argued by
Protagoras and other sophists inspired by the latter, it has no relative properties.
Like the Pythagoreans, Socrates was convinced that his vocation was to
propagate philosophical views. In doing so, however, he used other, nonpolitical
methods, based only on maieutics, elenctics, and protreptics. He was in contact with
the daimn (also referred to as daimonion or Eros). The latter prompted him with
suggestions concerning moral choices. Socrates shared his reflections with others.
Like in the case of Pythagoreans, however, it was not a professional activity. He
believed that, just as for love or friendship, no fees should be charged for the teaching
of philosophy.
This approach to the explanation of the sources of philosophy and human
conduct was abandoned by medieval philosophers (Hodot, 1983, p.ix). The medieval
14
Adam Krokiewicz writes that Pythagoras had been convinced thatin order to succeed in the
propagation of the new cultural mission of man, carried out for the sake of humankind on the basis of
the principles of Pythagorean life and the corresponding social order desired by himit was necessary
to take control over people. Following a successful defense of Croton against overwhelming forces of
the Sybarites, the Pythagoreans ascended to leading positions in Croton and other Greco-Italic cities
(Krokiewicz, 1995, pp.92 and94).
Pythagoras believed that the prerequisite for a ruler to wield power was to possess solid
knowledge and the most precious moral virtues.
In time, Pythagoras school became a powerful political order which trained the superiors
and had its obedient followers in many Italic cities, which gave it the ability to resolve
issues of importance for them as if over their citizens heads (Krokiewicz, 1995, p.94).
185
scholasticism was reduced to the level of liberal arts. No more the art of the arts, it was
treated as a liberal artthe highest among these. The title of the science of sciences,
it was believed, belonged to Christian theology (Domaski, 1983, pp. 25-26).
A return to philosophy treated as a mission and full identification with ones
views did not take place until the age of the Renaissance. It is exemplified by Giordano
Brunos approach, featuring the most appropriate Socratic concept of philosophical
identity. It also objectivized a categorical imperative that called for preaching of
philosophical truth (which, in his case, also involved cosmology and panpsychism)
until the very end, even in the face of death.
References
Anton, J.P., The Pythagorean way of life: Morality and religion, in Boudouris, K.
(ed.), Pythagorean philosophy, International Center for Greek Philosophy and
Culture, Athens, 1992, 28-40.
Boudouris, K., The Pythagorean community: Creation, development and downfall,
in Boudouris, K. (ed.), Pythagorean philosophy, International Center of Greek
Philosophy and Culture, Athens, 1992, 49-60.
Bourodimos, E., The mathematics of music as number and harmony of reality and
being, in Boudouris, K. (ed.), Pythagorean philosophy, International Center
for Greek Philosophy and Culture, Athens, 1992, 70-89.
Burkert, W., Mysteries and asceticism, in Greek religion, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, 1985a, 276-304.
Burkert, W., Philosophical religion, in Greek religion, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1985b, 305-338.
Cicero, M.T., Tusculan disputations (C.D. Yonge, trans.). Harper, New York, 1877.
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers (R.D. Hicks, trans., vol.1,
Heinemann, London, 1925a.
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers (R.D. Hicks, trans.), vol. 2,
Heinemann, London, 1925b.
Domaski, J., Metamorfozy pojcia filozofii., Polska Akademia Nauk, Instytut
186
Jerzy Kosiewicz
Filozofii i Socjologii, Warszawa, 1996.

Hamilton, E., & Cairns, H. (eds.), The collected dialogues of Plato including the
letters. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987.
Hadot, P., Preface to the Polish edition, in Domaski J., Metamorfozy pojcia
filozofii Polska Akademia Nauk, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii, Warszawa,
i-xii, 1996.
Kahn, C.H., Pythagorean philosophy before Plato, in A.P.D. Mourelatos (ed.), The
Pre-Socratics: A collection of critical essays, Anchor Press, Garden City, 161185, 1974.
Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E. & Schofield, M. Pythagoras on Samos, in The Pre-socratic
philosophers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, 40-73.
Kosiewicz, J., Ancient Greek and Copernican philosophy of the cosmos from the
point of view of Kant and Nietzsche, in Philosophy, Art and Technology,
Studies in Greek Philosophy - Series. International Center of Greek Philosophy
& K. B, Athens, 158-167, 2011.
Kosiewicz, J., Philosophy in the crucible of etymology: Madness and cognition,in
S.Boudouri and K.Kalimtzis, Issues in Human Relations and environmental
Philosophy, Ionia Publicatons, Athens 2014, 176-211.
Krokiewicz, A., Zarys filozofii greckiej. Od Talesa do Platona. Arystoteles, Pirron i
Plotyn, Fundacja Aletheia, Warszawa, 1995.
Nilsson, N.P., History of Greek religion, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952.
Philip, J.A. Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism, University of Toronto Press,
Toronto, 1966.
Plato, The Republic of Plato (F.M. Cornford, transl.), Oxford University Press,
London, 1942.
Plato Phaedrus (L. Regner, trans.), PWN, Warszawa, 1993.
Plato, Definitions (D.S. Hutchison, trans.), in Complete works (J.Cooper & D.S.
Hutchinson, eds.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1997, 1677-1686.
Plato, Apology (C.D.C. Reeve, trans.), in C.D.C. Reeve (ed.), APlato reader. Eight
essential dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2012, 1-46.
Plato, Phaedrus (A. Nehamas & P. Woodruff, trans.) in C.D.C. Reeve (ed.), A Plato
187
Reader. Eight essential dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2012, 213-226.

Plato, Symposium (A. Nehamas & P. Woodruff, trans.) in C.D.C. Reeve (ed.), A Plato
Reader. Eight essential dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2012, 157-208.
Pseudo-Plato, Alkibiades I i inne dialogi oraz definicje (L. Regner, trans.) PWN,
Warszawa, 1973.
Robinson, T.R., The Pythagorean way of life, in Boudouris K. (ed.), Pythagorean
philosophy, International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, Athens,
1992, 171-181.
Robinson, T. R., The Pythagoreans and Plato, in Boudouris K. (ed.), Pythagorean
philosophy, International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, Athens,
1992, 182-194.
Professor Dr. Jerzy Kosiewicz

Department of Philosophy and Sociology
Josef Pilsudski University of Physical Education in Warsaw
Poland
Frans Lohman
Abstract: This paper looks at the meaning of hubris in Greek Philosophy and finds
that a modern equivalent of some of the features of hubris can be found in Narcissism.
In the year that the world commemorates the first centenary of the start of the Great
War (1914-1918), several hubristic elements can be found back in both the culture
and the personalities of that time. The question then is raised how this concept may a
predominant one in our global era of 2014.
Greek Philosophy and Moral and Political Issues of our Global Era. As this
is the title of our conference, it seems appropriate to take a look first at what is
happening in our global era at this time. In this year of its centenary we are invited
to reflect upon the greatest catastrophe the Western World has experienced in the last
hundred years: the Great War 1914-1918 and wonder if such a calamity can happen
again.
In studying the literature of the run-up of this conflict (Clark, Tuchman,
Hastings), one finds either openly or covertly - hubris1 as one of the contributing
factors. However, as MacDowell (p.14) observes, this best known Greek word
Hubris in modern times may not have the same meaning as it had to the people in
ancient Athens. Hence it makes sense to consider this concept in its original Greek
context.
The fullest account of this important moral and social concept has been
provided by N. R. E. Fisher in his (1992)HYBRIS: A Study in the values of honour
and shame in Ancient Greece.His study has then been supplemented and corrected
1
The spelling of the word can be either hybris or hubris; the latter is preferred in most cases.
189
by Douglas L Cairns - Hubris, Dishonour and Thinking Big. Both studies form the
basis of this presentation.
Plato (Fisher, pp. 491/492) uses the term in four interrelated meanings.
Religiously: firstly Hubris as a matter of obedience to the gods; secondly, sexually as
self-indulgence in illicit sexual acts; thirdly in legal terms, when the need for social
order is not respected; and fourthly psychologically - an emphasis on the internal
struggle of each individual to ensure the victory of the Good/Better with the help
of those mechanisms such as education, the law and parental pressure. Here too the
identification of Hubris along with adikia and impiety as the major forces seeking
to destroy the soul, enables Plato more effectively to argue that indulgence in all
manner of pleasures dishonours the soul.
Fisher bases his own definition on Aristotle. In his Rhetoric II (1378b2335).
Aristotle deals with the emotions. The most important of those is orge, anger, a
complex emotion which involves pain caused by the fact that somebody else has
been slighting or humiliating me undeservedly (oligoria); this can happen through
contempt (kataphronesis), spite (epereasmos) or thirdly by Hubris, which is then
defined as follows:
The man committing hubris also slights: for hubris is doing and
saying things at which the victim incurs shame, not in order that one may
achieve anything other than what is done but simply to get pleasure from
it. For those who act in return for something do not commit Hubris, they
avenge themselves. The cause of the pleasure for those committing hubris
is that by harming people they think themselves to be superior (that is why
the young and the rich are Hybristai; they think they are superior when
committing Hubris). Dishonour is characteristic of hubris and he who
dishonours someone slights him, since what has no worth has no honour,
either for good or for bad. That is why Achilles says when angry: He
dishonoured me; for he has himself taken my prize, and keeps it (Iliad
1.356) and He treated me as if I were a wanderer without honour (Iliad
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Frans Lohman
9.648=17.59), since he is angry for those reasons.
Based on Aristotles definition, Fishers central thesis is this: the essence

ofhubrisis the deliberate infliction of dishonour and shame upon others. So it seems
that hubris in its original form is what the Germans would call Schadenfreude, or in
Anglo-Saxon culture: the pleasure of kicking a man when he is down.
Fisher discusses this concept in various instances in Greek literature. From
a psychoanalytic point of view his study of Sophocles Oedipus Rex (verse 876)
is particularly interesting as the question is here raised if hubris causes tyranny or
the other way around. The link between hubris and power is most relevant and will
return in our further reflections (Fisher, pp. 329ff.)
However, Cairns finds that Fishers theory is deficient in two aspects. His
meticulous analysis of texts makes us aware that first of all the person who commits
Hubris does not always need a victim. But secondly and more importantly there is
another aspect of hubris that Fisher has overlooked and which was earlier recognised
by MacDowell: Hubris as having energy or power and misusing it out of a feeling of
self-indulgence. In that sense Cairns feels that the honour of an individual is being
affected by this selfish and overindulging behaviour. It is this sensation of Thinking
Big that is here recognised as a major element in the concept of Hubris. Hubris then
can be identified as an act of inflicting dishonour, resulting from an inflated ego,
typically arising from an arrogant overvaluation of ones own status and importance.
Here we see how in Greek literature the basis is found of a further development
of the term, which in our days is very much identified with - and even has become
a synonym for - Narcissism. Narcissism is a well known phenomenon for clinicians
- especially psychoanalytic practitioners - and defined as an excessive interest in or
admiration of oneself and ones physical appearance, an extreme selfishness, with a
grandiose view of ones own talents and a craving for admiration and power, lack of
empathy, a self-centredness arising from failure to distinguish the self from external
objects. From a psychodynamic point of view, narcissism is based on a poor, not
nurturing relationship with an Object, which for all of us is a parental figure.
The narcissist has an inflated ego, basically because he is so empty, lacking in
191
nurturing in his past. He acts above his station, does not keep to the laws of natural
or divine justice, he does not know himself. Man may be the measure of things, but
he who does not know his own measure, acts irresponsibly. The narcissist suffers
hubris. Although narcissism always has been a major concept in psychological
circles, a further analysis of this condition has been provided in the 1970s, both in
psychological terms by Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut, as well as in sociological
context by Christopher Lash.
Although we should not confuse pathological narcissism with every form of
Hubris and narcissism, it is clear to see that there is an overlap between the two. It is
hence not surprising that today hubris and narcissism are closely connected, albeit
that the modern meaning is less related to the original Greek issue of shame and is
more connected to the issue of thinking big.
In addition to the philosophical foundation of hubris/narcissism there is also
a mythological connection. We know that Narcissus was conceived out of a one
night stand of the nymph Liriope with the river god Cephisus. One night stands are
of course a poor basis for sound personal relationships. Narcissus hence rejected the
approaches of Echo. When Nemesis, the goddess of Revenge and of righteous anger
of the gods at human presumptions (Howatson, p.381), hears about this she punishes
Narcissus by having him mirroring his face the water in the process producing
the first recorded example of making a selfie (the present fashion of selfie could
well be seen as illustrating a narcissistic culture). This mirroring eventually leads to
Narcissus demise: an act of a narcissist is deemed to end up in tears2.
Armed with this philosophical and psychological knowledge of the concept,
we are now making a jump of more than two millennia and find ourselves in the
world of 1914. It is interesting to note that the year of the start of the First World
War also sees the publication of Sigmund Freuds first meta-psychological paper, On
Narcissism. Had he seen many narcissists around, not only in his practice but in his
culture? Had he maybe recognised narcissism in himself?
2
An alternative explanation - perhaps more psycho-analytical can be found in the suggestion that
Narcissus went to the river to find his long lost father, the rivergod, in an attempt to identify with him.
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Frans Lohman
It is not difficult to find examples of public powerful figures in the run-up to

the catastrophe of 1914, who had some Hubristic or narcissistic streaks.
There is Kaiser Franz Joseph in Vienna who cancelled the election of
Cardinal Rampolla as pope in 1904 as this man had objected to the
Christian funeral of the crown prince Rudolf after his suicide and
murder of his mistress in Mayerling.
In the UK a ship was built, called after the Titans, which - so it was
believed - even God himself could not sink. So there were not enough
life boats for all. Nemesis came in the form of an iceberg.
There is Queen Victoria who thought that a marital union between her
eldest daughter Victoria and the future German Kaiser would guarantee
the greatness of her own Empire. Little did she know that her daughter
would reject his first born, Wilhelm, on account of his deformity, leaving
him self-centred, power-mad individual, who as a twenty centurys
Themistocles in no time wanted to build a navy that would equal that of
his British cousin.
There was Winston Churchill, who drove his boss Prime Minister
Asquith to despair by claiming more than half of the time in cabinet
meetings.
There was also the French future minister of War, Eugne Etienne,
who upon the suggestion that French soldiers should change their red
trousers for a more camouflage cried out: Never The pantalon rouge,
cest la France! (Tuchman, p.55).
And then what to think about the official military philosophy of the
French army: The offensive alone is suited to the temperament of
the French soldier --- we are determined to march straight against the
enemy without hesitation (Tuchman p.51)
And then we think about the hundreds of thousands British who joined
the Army enthusiastically, overconfident that they would be back before
Christmas. Or the German crowds celebrating prematurely victory
before the leaves were falling of the trees as their Kaiser had promised.
193
And the French, dancing on the Champs Elisees, according to Levin

(p.28) in itself an example of hubris.
So there may be many more examples of hubristic behaviour, but the main
question is of course, was there a common denominator in the Zeitgeist or general
philosophy of those days that fosters Hubris. In my view, there is a potential tendency
of Hubris or overconfidence in Henri Bergsons lan vital. At the same time there
are elements in Nietzsches philosophy of the Superman that (maybe mistakenly)
makes people think that it is OK to go over the top (the expression is cruelly identical
to the destiny of thousands of soldiers). Freuds postulation of the pleasure principle
and the Eros-drive may have contributed to the over-optimism of the pre-war years.
It was only after the war that Freud could go beyond the Pleasure Principle and came
up with the Thanatos drive, which had been proposed three-quarters of a century
before by Arthur Schopenhauer.
Let us now look at the century that has passed since the catastrophic year
1914. In the aftermath of the Great War people thought that this would have ended
all wars, but within twenty years the world was back at war, this time influenced
by a man whose biographer, Ian Kershaw, aptly identified his life as Hubris &
Nemesis. In Russia, the war ended with the creation of the Soviet Union, based on
the philosophy of Karl Marx. This philosophy was in sharp contrast to the capitalist
and free enterprise philosophy of the Western World, in particular the USA. However,
hubristic overindulgence on the stock-market caused the crash of 1929 and the Great
Depression of the thirties. After WWII, which made a mockery of the Hubristic belief
that the 1914-18 conflict would be the end of all wars, the Bretton Woods conference
and the Marshall-plan helped the economic recovery of Europe, together with the
new political institutions such as the United Nations and some European Treaties
which eventually have resulted in the European Union. Militarily these movements
were underpinned by NATO. In the eastern part of Europe similar movements were
seen in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, under the fear of nuclear cloud, peace
at least globally was maintained.
In the mean time we see that it seems that in Europe the wish to become a better
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Frans Lohman
functioning common market has created by many the dream of a federal Europe.
Rather than slowly and carefully facilitating this process, against the expressed
advice of many economists, politicians in power pressed for the idea of a common
monetary union (Bootle, Soros). So the euro was created in order to keep Europe
glued together. The European commission received the Nobel Prize for Peace for
having evaded war on this continent. And indeed there has been no military war, but
the euro has created an economic split between the haves and the have-nots, which
in some cases might bring people to the brink of civil war. What to think about the
unemployment rates among youngsters especially in Spain and Greece (well over
25%). Those jobless may feel abandoned in a hopeless isolation and one is reminded
of Tacitus: solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant - they created a desert and called it
peace.
The classical example of hubris is the story of Icarus who fixed his wings
with bee-wax and was warned by his father not to fly to high to the sun and not too
close to the water, so avoiding extremes. He did not listen and flew too close to the
sun (Petit & Bollaert). It may well be that the euro is the bee-wax that was meant
to keep Europe together. In the mean time, it seems that politicians seem unable to
compromise between extremes (Left-Right; Inflation-Deflation; Investing-Saving;
Saving-Exploiting our Natural Resources, especially fuel). Participation and interest
in the democratic process by the common citizen has reached a low point and has
created a void, likely to be filled by autocrats (see also Peter Mairs study).
In December 1996 the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan,
addressed investors capacity for self-delusion how do we know when irrational
exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to
unexpected and prolonged contradictions. Since then the word irrational exuberance
has become a euphemism for economic hubris. After the world economy was at
the brink of a catastrophic meltdown whereby the Depression of the thirties would
be an easy ride in comparison, the USA and UK started with quantative easing
(QE) which is a euphemism for printing money. Of course this was needed in the
immediate aftermath of the cash crisis to stimulate the economy, but six years later
this is still going on, mainly to the benefit of banks. Even at a reduced rate, called
195
tapering, the USA gives $ 45bn a month to this process. Hence that the debt of that
country is about $17 trillion and rising. An astronomical amount, which eventually
has to be paid back, but how and by whom?
In the mean time, the USA and UK were involved in the dual wars of Afghanistan
and Iraq. According to the press (The Daily Telegraph, 28/5/14) the director of the
Royal United Service Institute, Prof. Michael Clarke, sees a conspiracy of optimism
that produced both a political and military hubris that gave UK forces to do too
much with too few resources, costing the war in Afghanistan the UK 29bn. As Liam
Halligan recently observed, the turmoil in Iraq following the allied invasion of 2002
and the danger of further dwindling oil supplies might mean that QE will be kept
on the go This money printing business is a tale (like the middle East carve up) of
hubris and political skulduggery. As the new president of the European Commission
is reported to have said: Important decisions should be taken in dark and secret
rooms when it becomes serious, you have to lie (Quoted from M. Persson)
Concluding this analysis, it is my impression that there is unfortunately a high
level of narcissistic hubris in our society, its leaders and in our fellow human beings.
There seems enough Hubris indeed to expect that the goddess Nemesis is waiting in
the wings to take revenge.
References
Bootle, Roger (2014) The Trouble with Europe. London: Nicholas Brealey.
Cairns, Douglas L (1996) Hubris, Dishonour and Thinking Big, Journal of Hellenic
Studies 116 (1996) 1-32.
Clark, Christopher (2012) The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to War in 1914.
Penguin Books.
Fisher, N. R. E. (1992) HYBRIS: A Study in the values of honour and shame in
Ancient Greece.Warminster: Aris & Phillips
Gims, Christian (2014) Narcissists most likely to end up in Power, BI Norwegian
Business School. The Daily Telegraph, 1/7/2014)
Greenberg, J. & Mitchell, S. (1983) Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
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Frans Lohman
Halligan, Liam: Twitter@liamhalligan (8/6/2014)

Hastings, Max (2013) Catastrophe: Europe goes to War. London: William Collins.
Howatson, M.C. (1989) The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature. Oxford
University Press.
Kernberg, O. F. (1977) Why Some People cant Love: Interview with Lynda Wolff.
Psychology Today (7/1997)
Lash, Christopher (1979) The Culture of Narcissism. American Life in an Age of
Diminishing Expectations. London: W.W.Norton.
Levin, Bernard (1985) From the Camargue to the Alps. Chichester: Summersdale
Publishers Ltd.
MacDowell,D. M.(1976). Hubris in Athens.Greece & Rome 23:1431.
Mair, Peter (2013) Ruling the Void The Hollowing of Western Democracy. LondonNew York: Verso.
Pfeffer, Jeffrey (2010) The narcissistic world of the MBA student. The Financial
Times 8 November, 2010.
Persson, Mats - telegraph.co.uk/personal view.
Petit, Valrie & Bollaert, Helen. Flying Too Close to the Sun? Hubris Among CEOs
and How to Prevent it. Journal of Business Ethics. Jul2012, Vol. 108 Issue 3,
p. 265-283.
Soros, George (2014) The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival?
New York: Public Affairs.
Tuchman, Barbara (1962) The Guns of August. DELL-Books.
Dr Frans Lohman
Visiting Senior Fellow
School of Psychology
University of Lincoln (UK)
The concept of Good and its priority compared to
the concept of rightness with regard to techno-science and humanism
Abstract: The transition from ancient Greek thought, and the basic concept of Good,
to modern thought and the concepts of rightness, scientific knowledge and truth,
constitutes a radical change of a cultural paradigm, painful consequences of
which we all dramatically experience today. In this work, an effort is undertaken to
highlight and promote the priority of Good compared to the concepts of rightness
and knowledge, especially regarding techno-science and humanism. In this respect,
the ancient Greek concept of a good life focusing on the fact that it must not
remain unexamined, that virtue is the knowledge of the good, that should be no gap
between beings or facts and values, and that the Aristotelian theoretical life is the
ultimate end for humans is highlighted in this work, compared to contemporary
postmodern significance of the meaning of life. A significance that, due to the
arrogant suzerainty of techno-science, and the materialistic, utilitarian, technocratic
and ethically relativistic framework that is formed by the uncontrolled development
of bio-informatics, bio-cybernetics considering the contemporary efforts for our
transformation to man-machine hybrids (Cyborgs) and neurosciences, seems to
lead mankind to rough and fully dangerous pathways, where humanism and human
values will be replaced by barbarism and a universal disdain of human life and its
values.
1. Introduction
The transition from ancient Greek thought, and the basic concept of Good, to
modern thought, that recognizes the priority of the concepts of rightness, scientific
knowledge and truth, constitutes a radical change of a cultural paradigm, a reversion
198
of the ancient Greek worldview completed by modern West-European, positivistic,

individualistic and utilitarian view, the painful consequences of which we all
experience today.
The capital issue that here arises refers to the question that asks when and
through which characteristic ideological and scientific stages the concepts of rightness,
utilitarian scientific knowledge and truth began to be placed within a constantly
rising and strengthened context of a utilitarian subject-centered epistemology and
philosophy of science in front of the concept of Good, at least in the way that this
concept was understood in the framework of the classic ancient Greek ethics.
The present paper aims to highlight, first, the main ideological stages that
briefly refer to the utilitarian, materialistic worldview of the roman philosophy, the
Augustinian utilitarian epistemology, the scientific revolution of the 17th century and
the Enlightenment of the 18th century, the positivistic and neo-positivistic currents of
modern era as well as the post-modern utilitarian, pragmatist thought.
On the basis of this historical and epistemological review that also constitutes,
at the same time, a through the ages evaluative consideration of the ideological and
epistemological development, and also indicates the complete reversion of the ancient
Greek cultural paradigm, as it is undertaken by the modern relativistic, utilitarian,
technocratic and pragmatist paradigm the ancient Greek concept of Good life
is then put in front, compared to its post-modern signification; a signification, that
with the uncontrolled development of techno-science leads mankind to the disdain of
human being and to barbarism.
2. The ancient Greek cultural paradigm
The concept of Good, and consequently of Good life, holds a very important
evaluative position in the classic ancient Greek thought; the first place, I would argue.
More specifically, Socrates in the origins of ethics and epistemology, in the
European area and the West-European civilization identifies virtue with knowledge,
that constitutes the foundation of all the separate virtues. In particular, in the field of
ethical philosophy, moral virtue is the knowledge of the Good.
Especially in Socratic philosophy, knowledge has not only a theoretical
The concept of Good and its priority
199
significance but also a practical one, since it is directly related to a knowledge that
is also directly linked with right action, which surely will be grounded on virtue
and the knowledge of the Good. But this knowledge, with the priority of Good over
rightness, is also a self-knowledge1 that can be gained with philosophical reflection,
and can lead to eudaimonia.
So, it is not surprising that Socrates approached virtue and the knowledge of
the Good in a utilitarian aspect, signifying, yet, knowledge with an intellectually
more substantial and absolute meaning that cannot be only gained by experience but
needs also the right method. Under this aspect, as knowledge is raised to the highest
level for the view of the supreme Good, man can now be mainly engaged in the
caring of his soul, acquiring also, in this way, a normative principle for a Good life
that will aim at the final end of human eudaimonia. On my view, it could be claimed,
at this point, that while Socrates epistemology is mainly object-centered, his ethical
philosophy is mainly subject-centred.
Platos philosophy is also focused on knowledge that leads to virtue, and is
also a presupposition for right action. But this knowledge, that is the knowledge of
the really real, is directly related to the Platonic concept of idea, and more precisely
to the knowledge of the idea of Good.2 His metaphysically grounded idealistic
philosophy is, thus, far apart, as any other philosophy can be, from materialism and
positivism, and is not related to the concept of subject at all.3
It is also here important to be noted that the soul of the virtuous and just man,
of that man that Plato looked for, would be constantly erotically attached to the
pursuit of the Good.4 Moreover, the Pythagorean, in its essence, necessity for rulers to
For these Socratic positions, see indicatively, W. K. C. Guthrie, Socrates (in Greek), transl. by
Tasos Nikolaidis, 2nd ed., E.I.N.B. (M.I.E.T.), Athens, 1991, and especially here pp.179-211. Also, W.
Windelband H. Heimsoeth, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (in Greek), Vol.A, transl. by N.
M. Skouteropoulos, 3rd ed. E.I.N.B. (M.I.E.T.), Athens, 1991, and especially here pp.90-96.
1
See, indicatevily, W. Windelband H. Heimsoeth, op. cit., pp.124-125.
See H.Heimsoeth, Die sechs grossen Themen der abendlndischen Metaphysik-und der Ausgang des
Mittelalters (in Greek), transl. by M. Papanikolaou and Th. Samartzis (ed.), University Editions of
Crete, Herakleion, 2012, p.200.
Plato, The Republic (505d11 e506a3), intr.- transl.- com. By N. M. Skouteropoulos, 9th ed., Polis,
200
deepened into the study of numbers, not for using this knowledge as merchants or
pedlars, but on war, as well as in order to facilitate the soul to change from becoming
to truth and essence.5
Here also, Platonic utilitarianism aims at something more deeper and
substantial, entirely differing from contemporary calculative and extremely superficial
utilitarianism, as it is established by classical utilitarianism, and as it is later changed
into the pragmatic utilitarianism of modern and post-modern era.
According to Aristotle, the determined presence and priority of the Good is
also included in his philosophy, since moral virtue aims at the final Good of human
eudaimonia, which is the final end of our actions (Nicomachean Ethics 1177a 2).6
However, this eudaimonia is not experienced on the basis of an extreme individualism,
but seeking the common Good it is interwoven with the eudaimonia of the entire
society.
Especially important is the discussion that take place within the framework
of contemporary philosophic thought about the dependence of the structure of an
ethical theory on the way that rightness is linked with the Good, and more specifically
about the order of the logically defined priorities, in ancient Greek virtue ethics,
and not only there, that seems, according to the majority of the philosophers, to
follow the sequence Good, virtue, right conduct.7
3. The reversion of the ancient Greek cultural paradigm and its transition to the
paradigm of the New Ages and the contemporary technological age
One of the basic, in my opinion, philosophical research problems with a
Athens, 2006. Also, K. Boudouris, Greek Virtue Ethics, in The Moral Philosophy of the Greeks (in
Greek), K. Boudouris (ed.), Athens, 1996, p.18., and Th. Pelegrinis, Dictionary of Philosophy, Hellinika
Grammata, Athens, 2004, pp.1122-1126.
Plato, The Republic (525b11- c6), op. cit. intr.-transl.-expl. Comm. by. N. M. Skouteropoulos, 9th ed.,
Polis, Athens, 2006.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Vol. 7-9, intr.-transl.-com., Philological Group Kaktos, B. Mandilaras
(ed.), Kaktos, Athens, 1993.
G. Santas, Is Aristotles Ethics a Virtue Ethics? (in Greek), in D. Z. Andriopoulos (ed.), Aristotle.
Social Philosoph - Ethics-Politics-Aesthetics-Rhetoric, G. Arabatzis (ed.), Papadimas Publ., Athens,
2003, pp. 126-165.
7
201
strong epistemological and practical interest, as well as with an interest concerning

the philosophy of science is to determine the time periods and the ideological stages
that are characterized by the transition of the priority of the Good, as this concept
was understood by ancient Greek virtue ethics, to the priority of rightness, utilitarian
scientific knowledge and truth, within a constantly growing and strengthening context
of a utilitarian subject-centred epistemology and philosophy of science.
A number of different approaches in literature try to give their own answer
to this basic problem. I argue here, that the starting-point of this complete, today,
reversion of the ancient Greek cultural paradigm is actually given by the appearance
of Roman civilization, that is characterized not by an original philosophical thought
but rather by an actual copy of the ancient Greek philosophy, which Roman culture
now adapts to the materialistic, utilitarian worldview of the Roman Imperium and to
its regal, dominating predispositions of its pragmatic politics. This is one of the main
reasons that together with the pompous Roman attitude and contact, the various
imperial orgiastic perversions and the unique monstrous barbarism of Colosseum
that can not allow me to accept the term Greek-Roman civilization, as valid.
Other views, also sufficiently grounded, consider the Augustinus utilitarian,
positivistic philosophy as the starting stage for a utilitarian epistemology that
with its corresponding ontological and ethical dimensions will later lead to the
development of technology.8 As it is characteristically noted:
This epistemological position () signifies () the end of an era and
the beginning of a new. In this new era, philosophy seems to be gradually
separated () from the fundamental love of wisdom. Knowledge is not
any more a dynamic of relationships, directness of experience, or view
of the soul, a universal fact of an amorous approach to truth, indefinable
adventure of freedom and existential self-end for man () Knowledge is
now definitely connected with the need of a utilitarian result, it changes to
a utilitarian object that is now subjugated to the demands of self-certainty
Christos Giannaras, An Introductory Draft to Philosophy (in Greek), Ikaros Publ., Athens, 2013,
pp.129-141.
202
and well-being of the individual.9
On a philosophical level, the remarkable entrance of the individual in the

epistemological process, and the turn of the attention from the object to the subject is
continuing and has substantially established by the Kantian subjectivist idealism, that
surely appears within the epistemological, socio-political and ideological, framework
of the Enlightenment. The enlightened turn to a subject-centered philosophy, and to
a utilitarian and instrumental logos in spite of its very positive socio-political and
scientific contribution doesnt play, any more, a unifying role, as it is strongly
oriented towards the tendency of the individual (subject) to dominate over nature
and its laws.10 So, in contrast to ancient Greek logos, and the fundamental position of
pure intellect and theory, that reflects itself, and of the knowledge of the supreme
Good, logos in the New Ages and the Enlightenment prefixes Descartes cogitatio
(that means conscience in general) and Kantian good will over the theoretical power
of intellect and knowledge.11
Especially the rapid rise of natural sciences (scientific revolution) and
the subsequent current of empiricism in the 17th century, but also later, after
Enlightenment that prefixes also, as above mentioned the useful knowledge and a
subjectivist view the currents of positivism (19th century) and neo-positivism (early
20th century) contribute also, with their epistemological strength, to the acceptance
of an empirical, positivistic worldview. There is indeed an epistemological and
empirically interwoven thread that starts from the scientific revolution of the 17th
century and ends at scientism of 20th and 21st century and in the technocracy as it
is expressed by techno-science. Within this context, the main, basic values that
science and techno-science must incorporate and promote are mainly or exclusively
instrumental and epistemic values.12 Thus, it is obvious that this modern and post9
Op. cit., p.140.
J. N. Markopoulos, A Scientific Culture or Rather a Culture of Science? (in Greek), in The

Philosophy of Culture, K. Boudouris (ed.), Ionia Publications, Athens, 2006, pp.120-126.
10
11
12
H. Heimsoeth, op. cit., pp.333-338.
J. N. Markopoulos, Science and Ethics. Introduction to the adventure of a through the ages bilateral
relationship (in Greek), University Studio Press, Thessaloniki, 2014.
203
modern logos, oriented towards usefulness and empirically grounded, prefixes, on

an epistemological as well as ethical level, scientific knowledge and truth as also
the scientifically grounded rightness of action and the relativity of values over the
priority of the Good as it is expressed in classic ancient Greek epistemology and
ethics.
The priority that contemporary thinking and doing preserves for the technoscientific useful knowledge and the subsequent, scientifically grounded right action,
in contrast to the priority of the Good with the simultaneous acceptance of the
divorce between is and ought, facts and values, and, consequently, science and
ethics, and, thus, and of the disdain of humanities creates finally a clear positivistic
and usefulness oriented context, which dangerously obstructs the confrontation
with the contemporary bioethical issues that arise from the rapid and uncontrolled
development of techno-science.
So, the handling of genes and the intervening techniques, of genetic
engineering, on the hereditary substrate can lead besides the plausible beneficial
effects on human life (negative eugenic) to dangerous and irreversible violations
of natural order, and all these within socio-political, economic and ideological frame
work that will not be determined, as previously mentioned, by good considerations,
intentions and practices, but rather by a clear utilitarian context of market oriented
transactions.13 Similar dangers, with their own unsolved difficulties, rise also
due to the rapid and socio-political uncontrolled development of the science and
technology of bio-informatics and bio-cybernetics, as well as of the neuro-sciences
and neuro-technologies or even of the technologies of nano-bio-informatics with
the implantation, in the human body, nano-machines, the interaction of living cells
with nano-materials, for the production of artificial tissues (tissue engineering) or the
construction of bio-hybridic electronic circuits.14
13
J. N. Markopoulos, The Ethical Dimension of Pre-Socratic Natural Philosophy and Bioethics, in

Festschrift in honour of Prof. Konstantine Boudouris, E. Maragianou (ed.), Ionia Publications, Athens,
2004, pp.299-306.
14
Klaus Mainzer, Die Wirklichkeit und Ihre Spiegelung in wissenschaftlichen Daten Von
Erkenntnismodellen zur Innovationsdynamik der Wissenschaft, in Gottfried Magerl, Heinrich
Schmidinger (eds.), Ethos und Integritt der Wissenschaft, Bhlau Verlag, Wien, 2009, pp.45-66.
204
These contemporary human efforts that constitute a modern hubris, and

a dangerous signification of life, will lead mankind, with our mutation into manmachine hybrids (Cyborgs) to rough and fully dangerous pathways, where humanism
and human values will be replaced by barbarism an a universal disdain of human life
and its values. I argue, that the attitude we are going to show concerning this issue
will be of decisive value for answering the question whether we are remain a human
society or we will be led to a phasistic finally society of hybrid existences and
mixed systems.15
References
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Vol. 7-9, intr.-transl.-com., Philological Group
Kaktos, B. Mandilaras (ed.), Kaktos, Athens, 1993.
Boudouris, . (ed.), The Moral Philosophy of the Greeks (in Greek), Athens 1996.
Giannaras Christos, An Introductory Draft in Philosophy (in Greek), Ikaros Publ.,
Athens, 2013.
Guthrie, W. K. C., Socrates (in Greek), transl. by Tassos Nikolaidis, 2nd ed., E.I.N.B.
(M.I.E.T.), Athens, 1991.
Heimsoeth, H., Die sechs grossen Themen der abendlndischen Metaphysik-und der
Ausgang des Mittelalters (in Greek), transl. by M. Papanikolaou, Th. Samartzis
(ed.), University Editions of Crete, Herakleion, 2012, p.200.
Markopoulos, J. N., Thoughts and Reflections. Sparks for speculation and exercises
of critical thinking, University Studio Press, Thessaloniki, 2011.
Markopoulos, J. N., Science and Ethics. Introduction to the adventure of a
through the ages bilateral relationship (in Greek), University Studio Press,
Thessaloniki, 2014.
Plato, The Republic, intr.- transl.- com. N. M. Skouteropoulos, 9th ed., POLIS, Athens,
2006.
J. N. Markopoulos, The Ethics of Science (in Greek), in Thoughts and Reflections. Sparks for
speculation and exercises of critical thinking, University Studio Press, Thessaloniki, 2011, pp.60-63.
15
205
Windelband, W.- Heimsoeth, H., Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (in
Greek), Vol. A, transl. by N. M. Skouteropoulos, 3rd ed. E.I.N.B. (M.I.E.T.),
Athens, 1991.
Dr. Joannis N. Markopoulos

Professor of Technological and Philosophical
Consideration of Techno-Science
School of Primary Education
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
Thessaloniki, Greece
Courses, recourses and opportunities in Greek philosophy and in our days
Abstract: A cyclic conception of time has prevailed in ancient Greek philosophy
and since the Renaissance. History constitutes the highest expression of the human
dynamics. As a universal being, humankind is processing towards the completion of
its presence in the universe, thanks to its ever growing dynamics. Historical continuity
does not suffer any pressure due to the discontinuity slipped into it through the kairic
intrusion of the human factor; on the contrary, it admits of a restructuring on behalf
of the human imposition upon time.
In order to meet the roots of the cyclic conception of time in Greek

philosophy, one has to consider the Empedoclean notion of interchange between the
two antagonist cosmic principles: love (philotes) and inimity (neikos), the former
grouping the dispersed cosmic elements and the latter dispersing them 1according
to a very special process. They act alternatively, like the alternation of the day and
the night. Whereas the force exerted by philotes gradually diminishes before being
annulled at the end of the period of its prevalence, the force exerted by neikos grows
in intensity until it reaches its own peak.2 Then, from diminishing to growing, a
moment arrives, undoubtedly minimal, but nevertheless real, at which the forces
exerted by either principle are equilibrated and an equilibrium and a stability, be they
precarious are installed between them at the level of cosmic functionality, before
one of them, following its pre-established course, gradually seizes the totality of
the object of its activity, while the other provisionally ceases to influence the object
in question, i.e. the four cosmic elements, before taking again advantage of it at a
1
Cf. Emped. fr. A 28 (D.-K.16, I, 288, 2); fr B 17 (I, 312, 16-17); fr. B 20 (I, 318, 18-21).
Simplicius, Phys., 160, 26 (D.-K.16, I, 320, 16), calls neikogeneis the effects of neikos on the cosmos.
207
minimal moment once more fixed in advance. There undoubtedly exists a precise
opportune moment, which is, no doubt, unique and irrepetible each time, within
every phase of this process.
Although the incompleteness of Empedocles fragments does not allow a
full understanding of the core of his thought as far as the alternation of the cosmic
principles, Plato has been able to take advantage out of the Agrigentines cosmological
teaching. Indeed, an alternation similar to that of the opposed rival Empedoclean
principles is conceived by the founder of the Academy and incorporated into the
myth which closes his dialogue the Politicus3. According to this myth, the universe is
compared to a huge sphere which is supposed to be suspended thanks to an extremely
fine cable, from a point out of the cosmic space4, so that, due to the inequality of
their proportions the enormous sphere rotates around its axis (that prolongates the
fine cable which acts every time as a spring being torted and distorted), at a very low
speed, alternatively in one direction, then, in the opposite one. Such a mechanism
entails, at a certain moment, a further retardation of the spheres rotation in one
direction, then its complete stop, even again at a minimal moment which has been
prepared along the lasting phase of rotation, due to the more and more strong torsion
of the string.
The complete stop of the rotation is not a fortuitous one. On the contrary,
it is predictable and even preceded by foreboding signs, among which a series of
troubles causing catastrophes on the surface of the sphere which obeys to its power of
inertia, without Plato mentioning what does happen within the sphere itself. One will
only keep in mind that, at the very moment when the action of either opposed force
apparently faints out, the other one starts manifesting itself. Let us add that, whereas
such a violence is exerted, according to Plato, at a cosmic and cosmological level5, a
quite different situation results at the biological level envisaged in Platos Timaeus6
3
Cf. Plat., Politicus 269cff
Cf. P.-M. Schuhl, Sur le mythe du Politique, Revue de Mtaphysique et de Morale, 36, 1932, pp. 52 ff.
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, La conception de la violence chez Platon, Violence et coexistence humaine.

Actes du IIe Congrs. Mondial de lASEVICO (1992). Montral, d. Montmorency, 1994, pp. 47-60.
Cf. Tim., 80b, Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Mouvement musical et psychologie dans les derniers dialogues
de Platon, Musique et philosophie, Actes du Colloque de Dijon (1983), Dijon, Soc. Bourguignonne de
208
where, e.g. the sounds that come to re-enforce those which have preceded them into
the human body and which are fading, reach them, in order to form and realize,
jointly with them, a pre-established harmony. What has to be recorded, this time
again, in the myth of the Politicus is the opportune character of the motions stop
that renders such a stop a moment almost lacking duration, though being an optimal
minimum within which another optimal minimum may be included, and so on; i.e.
a durational zone at the limit of its creation. At its own level, human consciousness
is asked to proceed to the fruition of such a situation by preceding the events, i.e. by
actualizing an eventuality.
Both these examples of opportune alternation constitute but two cases among
numerous others within Greek philosophy. In all of them two rival causes meet
at an opportune moment. Such a dynamistic occurence whose various models of
alternation remain the particular expressions of the respective intentional dynamics
implied by the consciousness. Ever since Empedocles and Plato, under various
forms, the notion of opportune moment at the junction of two alternate principles, or
even of two alternate phases of the same process, has been envisaged as exerting an
impact upon human intelligence and, consequently, upon human actions. Everything
in these examples denotes that either alternate principle, during its retreat, gets
ready to intervene again, thus creating a new opportunity to be fruitioned by the
consciousness.
The notion of such an exceptional opportune moment has become salient in all
philosophies which have been inspired by the Greek conception of a cyclic structure
of time7, starting with the Stoics8 who have definitely coined it as such. Epicurus
stresses the importance of the opportune moment as well9. The Greek conception
of time and especially of historical time as a cyclic one is stressed by the historian
Polybius of Megalopolis, who declares that historians play the role of prophets of
Philos., 1985, pp. 3-14.

7
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Variations sur le thme du kairos, Paris, I.P.R.-Vrin, 2002, passim.
Cf. Zeno, SVF, I, 26, 11 and 15; Cleanthes, ibid., I, 106, 33.
Cf. J.-M. Gabaude, The Rationalism of Epicurus (in Greek), Athens, Academy of Athens 2009, pp.
33, 36-38, 139
9
209
future events10, i.e. that history repeats itself under the principle of causality (similar
causes produce similar effects). In the same spirit, Diodorus Siculus states that
historians are ministers of provenance.11. Due to Christianity, the Greek conception
of cyclic historical time gave place to a quite different scheme during the Middle
Ages. Joachim de Flores and Gerardo di Borgo San Donnino pretended that the Old
Testament corresponded to the era of the Father, the New Testament to the era of the
Son and that the period after 1260, would correspond to the era of the Holy Ghost12.
This ternary consideration of time, that may be expressed by a broken straight line,
has, to some extent, inspired Hegel13 and the Hegelians of all denominations and,
above all, Auguste Comtes positivistic view of the three states which humankind has
gone through along its history14.
The cyclic conception of historical time was rediscovered by Gianbattista Vico
thanks to the Renaissance, when Greek letters became notorious again15. Vicos theory
of spiral courses and recourses in history has heavily influenced his contemporaries
and their descendants. Even Hegel and his school adopted a combination of the circular
scheme depicting historical time and of the linear conception thereof, by considering
a helicoidal course twisting along a rectilinear temporal axis. As for Nietzsche, he
started by playing with the alternate notions of the Dionysiac and the Apollonian,
pushed the idea of historical cyclic time to its extreme limits and consequences by
conceiving the notion of constant eternal return16. One might also represent such a
combination by a spiral from the center of which an infinite number of rays would
emerge, each one of them corresponding to a particular synod of almost repeated
historical events. Of course a serious objection to such an idea of repeated events may
be raised in the name of the strict unicity of what each time occurs within the frame
of history. However, the terms almost repeated accurately apply to the similarity of
10
Cf. Polyb., Univ. Hist., 5.35.6.2; 6.3.2.2; 23.5.8.1.
11
Cf. Diod., Sic., Hist. Bibl., 1.1.3.1.
12
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, The Scholastic Thought, 2nd ed., Athens, Grigoris, 1978, pp. 63 ff.
13
Cf. Idem, Historicisme. de Hegel, Atlantida (Madrid), 9, 1974, pp. 43-52.
14
Cf. A. Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, Paris, 1830.
15
Cf. G. B. Vico, Opere, Bari, 1914-1941, t. 3, Scritti storichi, t. 4, Scienza nuova.
16
Cf. F. Nietzsche, Glory and Eternity, chap. 2.
210
events belonging to a given factual category. Crises, for instance, be they economical
cultural or political, almost periodically affect a given society which, in turn, may
face or even surpass them more easily, according to the degree it is aware of its own
past17. Arnold Toynbee has proven that two slightly or totally different civilizations
may coexist within a temporal frame, since the slow extinction of the one coincides
with the slow emergence of the other. No better application of the Empedoclean
idea of alternation nor of the idea of the minimal opportune moment filling the gap
between two successive principles could have been proposed18.
The whole historical process of humankind may be compared to the unfolding
of a musical fugue which comprises the main theme, its full exposition, the antitheme, divertimenti followed by their recurrence in various keys, the preparation
and the formalization of the stretto, its solution and the epilogue. Such a musical
form may be indefinitely repeated. The historical process, then, is but a polyphonic
structure. Within such a structure, other secondary structures are included, thus
expressing the coexistence of a continuity within a discontinuity19. The intentionality
of the consciousness, as well as the kairicity, i.e. the search of opportune moments,
a search through which the intentionality manifests its activity by seeking after the
fruition of the historical reality, have found in the fugal historical model their most
accurate expression. The same model assures the interpretation of the acceleration
and retardation of historical time, of the creation of historical crises, and of their
solution as well.
All these facts become obvious in our days, provided one considers them in an
adequate way. History constitutes the highest expression of the human dynamics. As
a universal being, humankind is processing towards the completion of its presence
in the universe, thanks to its ever growing dynamics. Historical continuity does not
suffer any pressure due to the discontinuity slipped into it through the kairic intrusion
of the human factor; on the contrary, it admits of a restructuring on behalf of the
17
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Philosophical suggestions, Athens, Academy of Athens, 2013, pp. 143-156.
18
Cf. A. J. Toynbee, A study of history, London, Macmillan, 1934-1939, in 6 vols. Cf. the abridgement
of vols. 1-4 by D.C. Somerwell, Oxford. Univ. Press, 1947
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Reflets et rsonances du kairos, Athens, Academy of Athens, 2010, pp. 19-24.
Cf. Idem, Valences de laction, Athens, Academy of Athens, 2012, pp. 170-172.
19
211
human imposition upon time. Finally instead of being the big looser of his dramatic
struggle against a constraining historical process, and thanks to his freedom which
allows him, through the potency of kairicity, to restructure the world, man becomes
the definite winner of the compulsion prevailing in the world, since he himself results
as the creator and the disposer of his own fate20.
20
Cf. Idem, Philosophy of Kairicity, Athens, Kardamitsa, 1984, p. 204.
Academician
Academy of Athens
Greece
Emmanuel Perakis
The political views of Heraclitus from a contemporary perspective

Pre-socratic philosophers were not indifferent to the problems of human society.
We cannot formulate a complete, systematic understanding of the political and
anthropological philosophy of the Presocratics, for we are limited by the state of
the surviving fragments. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern the political and
anthropological problems they were concerned with. Philosophers of the Archaic
period, such as Pherecydes of Syros, the Seven Sages (including Thales of Miletus and
Solon of Athens), Anaximander, Pythagoreans, Xenophanes, Alcmaeon, Parmenides,
Empedocles and Democritus were concerned, directly or indirectly, with politics1.
The same is the case with Heraclitus of Ephesus.Although metaphysics and ontology
were the main themes of his thought, as we can see in his surviving fragments, there
are also some fragments and additional information from other sources revealing
a concern with politics. In these fragments emerges his interest for some kind of
politics governed by reason and this will be the main subject of this paper.
Although he did not have an active political role, Heraclituss heritage as a
member of the royal family of Ephesus invariably lead to him on politics. It is said
that he was the eldest son and heir to the throne of Ephesus and ceded his rights to his
youngest brother Ermodorus. Probably the reason why he retired from active politics
was that he was not satisfied with the political practice of his fellow-citizens. The
absence of reason was more than obvious in the political practice of Ephesians and
he was not willing to make compromises on that.As a result his relations with his
fellow-citizens were not good, as we can see in fragments 121 and 125A, in which
Heraclitus clearly employs subtle and reproachful irony towards the Ephesians2. For
1
On the political views of the Presocratic philosophers, see K. Boudouris, Presocratic Political
Philosophy, Ionia Publications, Athens 1991.
Fr. 121: ,
, ,
213
some reason unbeknownst to us the Ephesians exiled, his brother Ermodorus and
this instilled rage in Heraclitus, for he deeply appreciated his youngest brother.He
thought his fellow-citizens were politically impotent and he ironically advised them
to let children govern the state, as even children would be better than they were.He
thought that Ephesians could not tolerate a man of value and thats why they exiled
his brother.
There is much evidence from ancient sources that Heraclitus political thought
must be of a broader scope than what is prima facie evident.Diogenes Laertius in his
Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers says that Heraclitus book On nature was
divided into three parts, on the universe, on theology and on politics3. The division
must not have been by Heraclitus himself, but Diogenes description is evidence of
the fact that politics had a more important place in Heraclitus thought than what is
immediately discerned in the surviving fragments. Diogenes Laertius also informs
us that Diodotus, a scholarof the Hellenistic period4, said that Heraclitus book was
a guide for the balance of human life that his book had political aims and what he
said on nature was only assisting his main aim. Given that Diodotus was not only
(The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown man of them, and leave
the city to beardless lads; for they have cast out Hermodorus, the best man among them, saying, We
will have none who is best among us; if there be any such, let him be so elsewhere and among others.
All the fragments of Heraclitus are translated by J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, A. and C. Black,
London 1920). Fr. 125a: , <,> ,
(May your wealth not let you down, Ephesians, that you might be convicted of being scoundrels).
3
Diogenes Laertius,Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers,Oxford University Press, Oxford 1964,
, 5-6: ,
, (As to the work which passes as his,
it is a continuous treatise On Nature, but is divided into three discourses, one on the universe, another
on politics, and a third on theology. English translation by Robert Drew Hicks, Lives and opinions of
eminent philosophers, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1925).
Diogenes Laertius, Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers, Oxford University Press, Oxford
1964, , 12: (A helm unerring for the rule of life) 15:
,
(It is not a treatise upon nature, but upon government, the physical part serving merely for
illustration. English translation by Robert Drew Hicks, Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers,
Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1925).
214
Emmanuel Perakis
an eminent scholar but had obviously studied Heraclitus work carefully and was
moreover held in high regard by Diogenes Laertius, there is a strong precedent to
take his view seriously5.
It is noteworthy that his phrasing in some of his metaphysical and ontological
theses is political(divine and humanlaw,justice and injustice,war andstrife,free
men andslaves).He begins with the familiar (originally from what is found in his
soul, then to what is found in the state) and from here begins to clarify what happens
in the world6.Heraclitus was trying to conceive of human environment holistically,
that is both his natural environment and the social environment as a whole7.
The fragments of Heraclitus which are relevant to politics are few and this
obscures our view of his political thought.The notion that Heraclituswas an enemy
of democracy (that, in contrast with his innovative and charming metaphysics and
ontology, Heraclitus was an aristocrat, holding the majority of the people in contempt)
has led to the vulgate view that as a political thinker he was arrogant and this in turn
has diverted attention away from his political philosophy8.
Against these dominant views on the subject, Professor Gregory Vlastos has
proposed a more careful study of Heraclitus political philosophy, based on Diogenes
Laertius and other ancient sources, rejecting the view that he was an enemy of
democracy and emphasizing the political significance of the terms and
in his work. Professor Konstantinos Boudouris approach to his political philosophy
is connected with some key concepts of Heraclitus philosophy constructing
a dialectical view of politics. Such an interpretation, though not obvious in his
surviving fragments, can offer a satisfactory explanation and consistency within
his philosophy.According to this view, equality and meritocracy, the many and the
5
See K. Boudouris Heraclitus and the dialectical conception of politics,Greek Philosophical Review,
4, 12 (1987), pp. 272 and Ionian Philosophy, I.A.G.P., Athens 1990, p. 40.
Ibid, p. 266 and 34.
See K. Axelos, Heraclitus and philosophy (in Greek), Exantas Editions, Athens 1986, p. 190:
Heraclitus was neither an exclusively natural philosopher nor an exclusively political philosopher.As a
thinker he embraced with his look both nature and the city in their primitive unity.
7
See T. Veikos,The Presocratics, O.E.D.V., Athens 1985, pp. 93, J. Kordatos,History of ancient Greek
philosophy, Karavakou Publications, Athens 1946, p. 63.
215
worthy should be correlated as opposites, which are useful in a states life and in
accordance with the whole spirit of Heraclitus philosophy9.
Reason10is at the heart of Heraclitus philosophy.We may distinguish the
following meanings of the term reason: (i) as simple speech, (ii) as the common
reason of the soul, (iii) as the common reason of the people or the city or of
everything11.These senses are all united by the notion of reason as the law governing
the universe and the world. It also governs human affairs and the way society works.
Therefore, deep knowledge of reason is something necessary for a politician.
Fragments 101, 45 and 115 refer to the soul12.For Heraclitus, our soul is the
first element of the universe we should know, as it is the essence and the centre of
our inner world, even if we will never have a complete knowledge of it.Knowledge
of our soul, self-awareness, is the starting point of our knowledge of the universe.
But if our mental experiences are not correlated with those of others, nothing can be
established. The means of this correlation is the common reason, meant as language,
9
K.Boudouris,Heraclitus and the dialectical conception of politics,Greek Philosophical Review, 4,

12 (1987), pp. 256-7 andIonian philosophy, I.A.G.P., Athens 1990, pp. 24- 25, 39.
Fr. 1:
,
,
,
(Though this Word is true evermore, yet men are as unable to understand it when
they hear it for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in
accordance with this Word, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of
words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each thing according to its kind and showing how it is
what it is. But other men know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what they do
in sleep).Fr. 2: (, )
(Though the logos is common, the many live as if
they had a wisdom of their own).
10
11
K.Boudouris, Heraclitus and the dialectical conception of politics,Greek Philosophical Review, 4,

12 (1987), pp. 272 andIonian philosophy, I.A.G.P., Athens 1990, p. 41.
Fr. 101: (I searched myself). Fr. 45:
(Traveling on every path, you will not find the
boundaries of soul by going -- so deep is its measure).Fr. 115: (The
logos of the soul is increasing itself).
12
216
Emmanuel Perakis
a presupposition for the proper understanding of our mental and external reality. Selfawareness leads us towards common reason, language, as the logical and unifying
force of a political society. Self-knowledge and language lead us to the knowledge of
civil society, which has some features in common with the universe13.
Reason determines the functioning of a political society and knowledge of this
can lead us into its deeper structures, consequently directing effective action for the
benefit of the majority of the citizens. Being rational is what makes a political man
able and worthy.Heraclitus regrets that only a few people have knowledge of reason
in all of its forms. Although people are able to learn about the common reason14, they
live in their own world.Such people are unable to be politically active in an effective
way.The main reasons for this incapacity are the forms of life in the society they live
in (for which they are not responsible) and their lifestyle, which is their choice and
for which they are responsible15.
Against those people, the many, there are a few wise people who know reason
and the way things work16. These people are obviously better at thinking rationally
and therefore at proposing good laws.These wise people being deeply rational are
able to give some part of the power of reason, the divine law, to the conventional
human laws17. It is important to notice the dependence of human laws on the divine
13

12 (1987), pp. 258-60 andIonian philosophy, I.A.G.P., Athens 1990, pp. 26- 8.
Fr.113: (Thought is common to all).Fr. 116:

(Recognizing oneself and being of a sound mind are for all men).
14
15

12 (1987), pp. 263-4 andIonian philosophy, I.A.G.P., Athens 1990, pp. 30- 1.
Fr.41: , , (Wisdom
is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things). Fr. 112:
, (Thinking well
is the greatest excellence; and wisdom is to act and speak what is true, perceiving things according to
their nature).
16
Fr. 114: , ,

(Those who speak with understanding must hold fast
to what is common to all as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are
fed by the divine one. It prevails as much as it will, and suffices for all things with something to spare).
17
217
law and thus on universal reason.This is the only way to correlate human laws with
the divine law, that is to say via reason for the benefit of the city18.The laws of the
cityare very important19, even if this is not as obvious as the importance of reason,
which exists independently of our will.Laws are human products that, in order to be
effective, should be created by the few rational wise people20.
Many think that Heraclitus is an enemy of democracy, an authoritarian, as he
thought that people should obey the ruler even if it be by violence.The fragment
in question (33) should not be taken at face value. It merely points out the need of
discipline and order in the life of the state21. Heraclitus regrets that most people are
not rational and disapproves of the tendency of the majority to be convinced by
populist orators, impressed by their speeches, without carefully examining them and
thus distancing themselves from the dictates of reason.
Heraclitus distaste for the type of populism that causes a temporary pleasure
to people and then leads them to destruction is clear. Populist views are very weak.It
should be noticed that Heraclitus does not despise democracy, if we define it as the
form of government in which the majority of the people adopt the right laws.He hates
mob-rule, which is the decline of democracy, in which the majority of people adopt bad
laws22.Heraclitus considers that the governing system of Ephesus is not democratic,
but mob-rule and this is what he criticizes.People who do not understand reason are
misled by populist politicians and adopt bad laws with disastrous consequences.
Heraclitus feels bad in such a state, because aristocracy, which he favours,
18

12 (1987), pp. 264-5 andIonian philosophy, I.A.G.P., Athens 1990, p. 32.
Fr.44: (The people must fight for its law

as for its walls).
19
Fr.33: (And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one). . 11:

(Every beast is driven to pasture with a blow).
20
Fr.104: ;
, (For what thought or wisdom have they? They follow
the poets and take the crowd as their teacher, knowing not that the many are bad and few good).Fr. 49:
, (One is ten thousand to me, if he be the best).
21
22
Aristotle,Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1957, D, 2.29 to 33.
218
Emmanuel Perakis
seems to be out of fashion23.Within such a mob-rule Heraclitus dreams of a state in

which people are prudent.He dreams that people will not be misled by the speeches
of populist politicians to make disastrous decisions.He dreams of a political
societyin which right political decisions will be taken with caution and prudence, in
harmony with the divine law, reason.This could be done either if people follow the
advice of the few wise or otherwise by gaining wisdom and knowledge of reason for
themselves, which is very difficult, and therefore Heraclitus considers aristocracy as
the best form of government.
In fragment 49 Heraclitus offers the concept of merit against the concept of
equality (unfortunately we could not say that all people are equal in terms of merit), as
absolute equality might become levelling having disastrous consequences.Heraclitus
dreams of a state in which there is a dialectical harmony of equality and meritocracy.
In such a state people adopt the right laws led by the worthy for their own profit(
). The many and the few here are a contrariety, a confrontation of
dynamic states of affairs.This concept is in accordance with Heraclitus concept of
war24. War and strife are natural and fair phenomena in the world.Opposing forces
dominate everywhere, so the world is not static.Everything is subject to dynamic
change.Even the concept of justice becomes relevant when considered against
injustice25.
Justice is both strife and keeping measure, law and order.Justice in a state
is a dynamic relation of opposing forces, which is determined by the laws.Law is
the distribution of common reason in favour of the public interest and justice is the
23
K.Axelos,Heraclitus and philosophy, Exantas, Athens 1986, pp. 193-197.
[24]Fr.53: , ,
, (War is the father of all and the king of
all; and some he has made gods and some men, some bond and some free).Fr. 80:
, , (We must know that war
is common to all and strife is justice, and that all things come into being through strife necessarily).Fr.
8: ( )
What opposes unites, and the finest attunement stems from things bearing in opposite directions, and all
things come about by strife).
24
Fr.23: , (They would not have known the name of justice

if these things were not).
25
219
dynamic rearrangement of the political affairs.This rearrangement is dependent on

the measure dictated by the common reason. Opposing forces are always changing
in the world.In a political society the most powerful out of the opposing forces
prevails without eliminating its rivals.Nevertheless even the defeated force
may gain something else26 andthis is what happens in the state which Heraclitus
dreams of.People are convinced by the wise few, they adopt and defend right laws
contributing to the good of the state and thus they benefit themselves27.
Our view on the political thought of Heraclitus is not complete because only
some fragments of his work survive.Nevertheless his thought is still relevant.His
dialectical view on the world is intrinsically similar with his dialectical view on
politics.Despite the social and political differences of ancient and modern times
human nature remains the same.Most people are unable to undertake deep thinking
on nature, the world and politics in order to achieve alignment with the universal
reason which connects everything. Human passions and weaknesses do not easily
allow people to have a wider view on life and this is something that Heraclitus met
and fought with in his times and still exists to this day.The depth of his thought, his
emphasis on the importance of reason, his dialectical view on the world, politics and
justice, his aversion to populism that affects the majority of people even today, his
demand for meritocracy in politics for the benefit of the majority of the people and his
respect for the divine law can be useful for those dreaming to harmonize with reason
at all of its levels and embrace his ideals. Despite the differences between ancient
and modern societies Heraclitus calling to hear the dictates of reason governing
everything is still relevant and universally valid even today, since no appeal to the
citizens of the world can make sense without reference to reason, the rationality that
is common to all humans.
References
Aristotle,Politics,Oxford University Press, Oxford 1957.
26
K.Boudouris,Presocratic political philosophy, Ionia Publications, Athens 1991, pp. 84-5.
27
Thucydides,History, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1942, 2,65.
220
Emmanuel Perakis
Axelos, K.,Heraclitus andphilosophy, Exantas, Athens 1986.

Boudouris, K., Heraclitus and the dialectical conception of politicsGreek
PhilosophicalReview,4, 12 (1987), pp. 255-275.
Boudouris, K.,Ionianphilosophy,I.A.G.P., Athens 1990.
Boudouris, K., Stability and political change in K. Boudouris (ed.), Politics and
thepolitician,I.A.G.P., Athens 1990, pp. 20-36.
Boudouris, K.,Presocratic politicalphilosophy,Ionia Publications, Athens 1991.
Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy, A. and C. Black, London 1920.
Diels, H., Kranz, W.,DieFragmentederVorsokratiker,Weidman, Dublin-Zurich 1966.
DiogenesLaertius, Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers,Oxford University
Press, Oxford 1964.
Diogenes Laertius, Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers, translated by Robert
Drew Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1925.
Farantos, G., The political philosophy of Heraclitus,Parnassos(1982), pp. 54-111.
Farantos, G.,Heraclitus and the dialectical philosophical thought, Aichmi
Publications, Athens1984.
Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E., Schofield, M., The Presocratic philosophers,Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 1983.
Koufopoulos, T.,The Dark.Notes forHeraclitus,Athens 1993.
Kyriazopoulos, S.,Heraclitus,Ministry of Culture and Sciences, Athens 1973.
Lambridis, H.,Heraclitus,Clio, Athens 1991.
Lesky, A.,History of ancient Greek literature, Kyriakidis Publ., Thessaloniki 1990.
Roussos, E.N.,Heraclitus.The fragments, Karavias Publications, Athens 1971.
Russell, B.,A history of western philosophy, Allen and Unwin, London 1961.
Sinclair, T.A,A History of Greek political thought, World Pub. Co., Cleveland 1968.
Spyropoulos, N.,Heraclitus, Greek Publishing Company, Athens 1948.
Thucydides,History,Oxford University Press, Oxford 1942.
Emmanuel Perakis
Dr of Philosophy
Athens

The Mission of Intellectuals in the Era of Transition and the Philosophical Life
Abstract: This article is focused on the problem of the role of intellectuals in the
modern age. In this article you may find the retrospective view on the intellectual
phenomenon, from its roots which can be found in Platos philosophy in which a
problem of a true philosopher has been raised, as well as the arguments of modern
philosophers such as Max Weber, Michel Foucault, Alexander Kozhev, Immanuel
Wallerstein on problems and goals which intellectuals have been facing during the
20th and 21st centuries, as well as a point of view on the importance of the role of
intellectuals in the era of transition. One of the key aspects is the philosophical issue
of the mobility of modern geoculture, which is determined by the precariousness of
the system and by the so-called era of transition or crisis of the modern worldsystem. In the era of transition the role of intellectuals who are able to interpret
correctly the social reality is highly increased.
The sixth book of Platos dialogue Republic develops the conversation on the
role of philosophers in the city-state. In this book, it is declared that in the city-state
a true philosopher whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will
be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure1.The
philosophers by having their Platonic kind of education and an understanding of the
forms will facilitate the harmonious co-operation of all the individuals in the citystate (). This philosopher must be intelligent, reliable, and willing to lead a
simple life. However, these qualities rarely manifest on their own, and so they must
be encouraged and supported by a well-structured system of education that aims
and leads to study of the Forms and the Idea the Good. This ideal state, so to say, is
1
Plato, The Republic 485d10-e5 (transl. by Benjamin Jowett).
222
governed by philosophers who bring up, through education, the younger generation,
issue laws and judge them.
So it is important to underline that Plato was the first to state the problem of the
role or mission of a true philosopher in political reality, however the problem of the
role or the mission of intellectuals was raised centuries later. The term intellectual
itself occurred during 1890 in connection with the protest campaign against the French
government in the case of Captain Dreyfus. After mile Zolas well-known letter I
accuse, a number of famous professors, writers and students signed the petition
requiring the revision of Dreyfus sentence. The published manifesto received the
name Protest2. One of the main opponents Maurice Barres renamed the petition
A protest of intellectuals. From this point on, the term became common, albeit with
a derogatory tone at first.
At approximately the same time, closely-related concepts entered the sociocultural and philosophical discourse. At the end of the 19th century, Friedrich
Nietzsche wrote his work Thus spoke Zarathustra3, in which he put forward an idea
of a new type of human being surpassing contemporaries in moral and intellectual
qualities. Such a type of person received the well-known name the bermensch or
in the English translation the superman. Nietzsche proclaims that the bermensch
would be a creative subject, possessing a strong will directed on surpassing the
usually valuable conventions accepted in modern society. These kind of persons
would be independent of authorities and absolutely free.
Later Arnold J. Toynbee raised quite a similar problem in the multivolume work
A Study of History4. According to the English historian, society can be divided into
two categories: the active creative minority which finds solutions to civilizations
challenges, and the inert majority, which follows this minority. The author of
the concept postulated that the creative minority is in charge of the future of the
2
Jennings J., Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France since the Eighteenth
Century, Oxford University Press, 2011, 440-507.
Nietzsche F., Thus spoke Zarathustra, transl. by Thomas Common. Michael Scott Studios, 2009.
Selections from Chapter The Higher Man, 319-322, 329-332.
Toynbee A. J. Study of History. Abridgement of Volumes I-VI//By D. C. Somervell. London; New

York; Toronto, 1946. Selections from vol. III, The Growths of Civilizations, 241-242, 245, 363-365.
civilization to which it belongs. The creative minority opens potential possibilities
of culture5, however their work could be useless if the inert majority doesnt follow
these pioneers. In it, the scholar sees the main problem which costs the life of many
civilizations.
In the Russian tradition the question of history makers was reflected, in
particular, by the concept of a passionarity introduced by Russian philosopher Lev
N. Gumilev6.
Throughout the 20th century the concept of the intellectual became a subject
of many disputes. Such debates were offered by Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault,
Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Alvin W. Gouldner, Jrgen Habermas, etc.
Within the last 150 years, intellectuals have continued to fight for the freedom
of self-expression generally in two ways. These ways have taken form respectively
in two main political positions. The first position consists of the hypothetical division
of science (the sphere of truth) and politics (the sphere of values). From this point
of view, the only position for the intellectual should be the position of political
neutrality. As we know, Max Weber held this opinion7. The supporters of so-called
valuable neutrality seek truth in all its forms, which inevitably isolates them from
activities of the state, church, and society, while also bringing them into conflict with
the existing order of things. The other position, on the contrary, consists of political
involvement and active participation in political life as opponents to a ruling party
and government.
In this case we can refer to Foucault, who wrote: It seems to me that the
political involvement of the intellectual was traditionally the product of two different
aspects of his activity: his position as an intellectual in bourgeois society, in the
system of capitalist production and within the ideology it produces or imposes
[] and his proper discourse to the extent that it revealed a particular truth, that it
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from

http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/601310/Arnold-Toynbee
6
7
Gumilev L.N., Ehtnogenez i biosfera zemli, jris-Press, 2014, 73-85.
Weber M., The Methodology of the Social Sciences//The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality// Translated
and Edited by Edward A. Shills and Henry A. Finch. The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois. 1949, 1-49.
224
disclosed political relationships where they were unsuspected8. He continued: The

intellectual spoke the truth to those who had yet to see it, in the name of those who
were forbidden to speak the truth: he was conscience, consciousness, and eloquence9.
Thus we see that this French philosopher postulated the problem of the intellectual as
an opponent to political establishment.
There is also another point of view provided by the Russian philosopher
Alexander Kozhevnikov (or Kozhev). Alexander Kozhev was born in 1902 in
Moscow. He came from a rich, cultured family with extensive political connections.
In 1919 Kozhev left Soviet Russia and moved to Germany where he started studying
philosophy at Heidelberg University10.
Alexander Kozhev sees the role of the intellectual in promoting the stabilization
of the homogeneous state. Kozhev made a distinction between the position of the
philosopher and the position of the wise man11. The philosopher is aiming passionately
to absolute knowledge, to love of truth and sophia. The ideal of absolute knowledge
can be realized, according to Kozhev, only on the condition of mutual recognition
of all people. In other words, the philosopher strives for self-sacrifice and revolution
for the sake of the state in which universal recognition becomes reality. The wise
man is the one who has already met the desire of revolutionary changes; this is the
philosopher living in post-revolutionary, post-historical society. The wise man needs
not to bring about a new revolution, but to carry out the program of revolution which
has already taken place. In other words, the wise man is engaged in the management
of the post-revolutionary state of affairs. He becomes an official or, using the term
introduced by the philosopher Julien Benda in his well-known book The Treason of
the Intellectuals12 a clerk of this post-revolutionary state. And, being the clerk, the
Foucault M., Deleuze G., Les intellectuels et le pouvoir, Larc, no.49 (second trimester, 1972),
3-10; English translation: Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault and
Gilles Deleuze, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F.
Bouchard (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 4.
8
Ibid., 7.
10
Rutkevich, . M., Alexandre Kojeve, russkij filosof , Chelovek. (1997), 5, 90-92.
11
Kozhev . teizm i drugie raboty//Tiraniya i mudrost (1954), Praksis, Moscow. 2006, 323-387.
12
Benda J. The Treason of the Intellectuals. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969. Selections
wise man has to realize the purposes proclaimed by revolution, namely the universal
and homogeneous state in which everyone is equally recognized. As Kozhev says,
in a post-historical situation the philosopher can strive only for the personal success,
which is the expression through the release of books or, as today, through media
presence. On the contrary, the wise man seeks for concrete, practical achievements13.
After he formulated his understanding of the post-revolutionary intellectuals
role, and after the end of World War II Kozhev has started working as this kind of
clerk, representing France in various international institutions.
One of the key aspects of modern world is the philosophical issue of the
mobility of modern geoculture, which is determined by the precariousness of the
system and by the so-called era of transition or crisis of the modern worldsystem. In the era of transition the role of intellectuals seems to be the interpretation
social reality and this kind of activity is highly increased. The problem of a changing
world-system in relation with the mission of intellectuals was described in one of the
article14 written by American scholar Immanuel Wallerstein. In the article The Role
of an Intellectual in an Age of Transition he is trying to underline the importance of
being an activist and taking part in politics, instead of taking the Webers position of
ethical neutrality. Wallerstein writes: What we mean by an intellectual is someone
who devotes his/her energies and time to an analytic understanding of reality, and
presumably has had some special training in how best to do this15.
To conclude, we need to mention that the world as we knew it has changed.
Today we are facing challenges, which influence the whole humankind. That is why
in my point of view the problem of the mission of the intellectuals in the era of
transition is one of the crucial issues in the philosophical discourse. The different
opinions and points of view on the problem, mentioned above, show the complexity
of the problem and provide even more questions, such as: Is the philosopher a
from Chapter 3, The Clerks The Great Betrayal, 4347, 6771, 151153.
13
Kozhev . teizm i drugie raboty//Tiraniya i mudrost (1954), Praksis, Moscow. 2006, 323-387.
14
Wallerstein I., The Role of an Intellectual in an Age of Transition, Opening Presentation at UNESCO
Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge Global Research Seminar, Knowledge Society
vs. Knowledge Economy: Knowledge, Power, and Politics, Paris, 8-9 December 2003, 2-24.
15
Ibid., 21
226
particular example of an intellectual or the most prominent one? What is the place of
a philosopher in our world or state? What challenges can we as philosophers respond
to? What is the mission of the philosopher today?
In answering these kind of questions I would like to refer back to Plato who
stresses the importance of the philosopher in political society by saying until
philosophers are kings, [] and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and
those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled
to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils, nor the human race, as
I believe, and then only will this our state have a possibility of life and behold the
light of day16. On the other hand Plato recognizes the difficulty of having and finding
real philosophers in political society, in contra-distinction to the sophists, and so he
writes: having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher,
is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men17. It is true, its difficult to meet
perfection in the ordinary state of affairs, however as intellectuals and philosophers
we can at least try to lead a philosophical kind of life and by having good education
we have the responsibility to understand and analyse the view concerning the
modern world in this age of a deep crisis, and to make plausible statements clarifying
the chaotic processes that are taking place today and to envisage, as far as possible,
a better state of affairs for the social and political reality, i.e. a state that sees the
world moving in a just and a more egalitarian direction. And for this kind of task we
certainly need philosophy, and the development of the practice of philosophing in a
free and democratic social world.
Bibliography
Benda J. The Treason of the Intellectuals. New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1969. Selections from Chapter 3, The Clerks The Great Betrayal, 4347,
6771, 151153.
Foucault M., Deleuze G., Les intellectuels et le pouvoir, Larc, no.49 (second trimester,
1972): 3-10; (English translation: Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation
16
Plato, Republic 473b11-e5, (transl by Benjamin Jowett).
17
Ibid., 491b.
between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, Language, Counter-Memory,
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977)).
Gumilev, L.N., Ehtnogenez i biosfera zemli, Izdatelstvo: jris-Press, 2014, 73-85.
Jennings J., Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France
since the Eighteenth Century, Oxford University Press, 2011, 440-507.
Kozhev ., teizm i drugie raboty//Tiraniya i mudrost (1954), Praksis, Moscow.
2006, 323-387.
Nietzsche F., Thus spoke Zarathustra, transl. by Thomas Common. Michael Scott
Studios, 2009. Selections from Chapter The Higher Man, 319-322, 329-332.
Plato, The Republic, (transl. by Benjamin Jowett),
Rutkevich, . M., Alexandre Kojeve, russkij filosof Chelovek, 1997, (5), 90-92.
Toynbee A. J. Study of History. Abridgement of Volumes I-VI//By D. C. Somervell.
London; New York; Toronto, 1946. Selections from vol. III, The Growths of
Civilizations, 241-242, 245, 363-365.
Wallerstein I., The Role of an Intellectual in an Age of Transition, Opening

Presentation at UNESCO Forum on Higher Education, Research and
Knowledge Global Research Seminar, Knowledge Society vs. Knowledge
Economy: Knowledge, Power, and Politics, Paris, 8-9 December 2003, 2-24.
Weber M., The Methodology of the Social Sciences//The Meaning of Ethical
Neutrality// Translated and Edited by Edward A. Shills and Henry A. Finch.
The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois. 1949, 1-49.
Antonina Puchkovskaya
PhD student
&
Valentina Dianova
Professor
Institute of Philosophy
Saint-Petersburg State University
Russia
Thomas M. Robinson
Abstract: This paper will talk about the centrality of virtue ethics in Plato, and the
importance of its inculcation, whether in the paradigmatic society of the Republic or
the second-best society of the Laws. A particular study will be made of the notion,
expounded in detail in both dialogues, that one is always better off being just than
unjust, and an analysis will be made of three possible ways in which, in the Laws, the
Guardians of the Laws might be thought to have understood the useful fiction that
might be needed to inculcate this notion:
1. They know that what they are saying is false
2. They suspect that what they are saying is false even though it is in fact true
3. They suspect that what they are saying is false and it is false.
I argue that the second of these possibilities is the one which Plato has in mind,
provided one takes what is suspected to be false as an instance of suppositional
protasis, i. e., something useful as a hypothesis, but, like Wittgensteins ladder,
discardable once it has served its purpose.
A virtue ethic, or more precisely a total virtue ethic, for both the state as
a whole and each and every one of its citizens, is, as is well known, very much the
goal of the Republic and the Laws. But what exactly does Plato mean by virtue? This
may seem too obvious to be worth further investigation; he has, after all, the whole
of Greece on his side when he himself accepts as virtues the four great virtues Pindar
speaks of: wisdom, justice, self-control and valor, and he accepts them explicitly in
both the Republic and the Laws. But Platos view of what constitutes virtue (almost
certainly following a view held by Socrates) is still a peculiar one, and needs to be
examined if we are to understand exactly what he means by saying that the goal of a
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good society is the production of a virtuous citizenry.

As it happens, he tells us with some precision what he means by virtue in
the closing pages of Republic 1, and all turns on his commitment to the functionality
of things. Assuming (and it is huge assumption, greatly criticized since Darwin in
particular) that all things in the world (including ourselves) have a function, he tells us
that the function of a thing is what it does uniquely or best (353a). So the function of
a pruning-knife is to prune fruit. That is what it does best. The function of eyes is to
see. That is what they do uniquely. And so on. As for human beings, our function will
be what we do uniquely in the world of living things, and that is, exercise intelligence
and accept moral responsibility for actions done or contemplated.
Virtue is the excellence with which anything performs its function. So a
pruning-knife with a sharp cutting edge has virtue; a pruning-knife with a blunt
edge does not. A war-horse that consistently gets its rider into and out of battle in
safety has virtue; one that fails to do this does not. And so on. Put differently, the
virtue of a thing is its efficiency at doing what it is unique-or-best at doing. In
other words, virtue is, for Greeks, at base an efficiency word. To us this is likely
to sound strange, since we have learnt to distinguish we think the two concepts
virtue and efficiency. The idea that a virtuous person might be someone who is
good at something we will be inclined to think bizarre; is virtue supposed to be a skill
of some sort?
The answer, however, paradoxical as it may seem, is for Plato Yes! This
is precisely what Plato has in mind when he is forever comparing human virtues
to excellence in the skills involved in other crafts, such as farming, seamanship,
weaving, and the like. A virtuous person is someone especially good at achieving the
goals he is uniquely equipped to achieve, and these can be summed up as operating
with maximum intelligence and responsibility in that most important of all human
contexts - the state, the polis. A person claiming to be good who is not also a good
citizen has not maximized his full potential, and must forgo any claim to be just as
good, just as virtuous (in the Greek sense) as the person who is a good citizen. As
Pericles famously put it: [Thuc. 2. 40]: This is a peculiarity of ours: we do not say
that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we
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Thomas M. Robinson
say that he has no business here at all!1

To call virtue, therefore, the objective of society is to say that societys aim
is to produce citizens who operate at the highest level of intellectual and
moral efficiency they are capable of in achieving the goals of that higher
organism, the state, of which they are parts, in the way that eyes and hands
operate for the similar good of that higher organism of which they are parts,
the body.
Music and the arts are of value as didactic tools in the inculcation of virtue,
he says in both the Republic and Laws. Any pleasure they give will be a pleasure
recognized as acceptable pleasure by the virtuous (especially the most virtuous of
all, in the Repubic the philosopher-rulers and in the Laws the Guardians of the Laws)
as a feeling of pleasure over something appropriate, such as a drama which shows
how a temperate and just person is fortunate and happy, or how an unjust person,
even if he is richer than Croesus, is a pitiable creature, and his life miserable (Laws
660e). Waxing even more eloquent, the Athenian goes on to say that, were he himself
a legislator, he would inflict a penalty little short of the death penalty on any person
heard to maintain that there are wicked men who have a pleasant life, or that one
course may be advantageous and profitable but a different course more truly just
(662b-c).
We are looking here at what seems to be a re-statement of the basic contention
of the Republic, and that is, that the just person is in all circumstances no matter
how painful - better off than the unjust. Or are we? Platos next words are important.
Having emphasized his own certainty (663d) that the unjust life is more dishonorable,
more despicable and more truly unpleasant than the just one (ibid.), he goes on: Even
had this not been the casecould a legislator of even moderate merits, supposing him
to having ventured on any fiction for the sake of its good effect on the young, have
devised a more useful deception (pseudos lysiteles) than this, or one more potent to
induce us all to practice all justice freely, and without compulsion?.... [A] youthful
mind will be persuaded of anything, if one will take the trouble to persuade it. Thus
1
Translated by Rex Warner
231
[the legislator] need only tax his invention to discover what conviction would be
most beneficial to a city, and then contrive all manner of devices to ensure that the
whole of such a community shall treat the topic in one single and selfsame tone, alike
in song, in story, and in discourse (663d-664a).
The point could not be clearer: while Plato himself is convinced of the validity
and soundness of his theory of justice, he is aware that the selling of it to others
might have to involve a legislator in yet another noble act of deception (gennaion
pseudos), this time one broader in scope than the one mentioned in the Republic,
where all that was at issue was how to keep the various groups in society happy in
their particular stations. Now his entire theory of justice-as-beneficial is at issue,
and his conviction of the usefulness of another piece of fiction to help transform it
from theory to reality is apparent. As he so directly puts it, A youthful mind will be
persuaded of anything, if one will take the trouble to persuade it (664a).2
It will have been noticed that I translate pseudos (in both the Republic and
here in Laws 2) as act of deception, not lie (the more common translation). Platos
point, as I understand it, is that, while his theory of justice-as-beneficial is both
valid and sound, it will only be understood by most people, and more importantly,
understood in such a way that they will be induced as a consequence to live truly just
lives, if it is conveyed to them in a form other than direct statement. The deception
(pseudos) in question lies in the fact that people are being induced to accept as fact
what is in reality fictitious; the usefulness of the deception is that the fiction masks
both an invaluable fact the nature of justice-as-beneficial, and a noble objective
the building of a truly just society.
But is that all there is to it? Is Plato merely saying that certain truths are so
counterintuitive that to most people they can only be conveyed in fictional form of
some sort? Not quite, I think. The full version of what he is saying seems to be as
follows:
1. My theory of justice-as-invariably-beneficial is both valid and sound.
So any workable manner of conveying it to the citizen body, even a
fictional one that finishes up being accepted as fact, is acceptable.
2
On persuasion in the Laws see Mayhew 2007, 2008, Morrow 1953, Schuetrumpf 2007, Stalley 1994.
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Thomas M. Robinson
2. Even if the theory were (per impossibile) false, the benefits of its
inculcation by fictional techniques would still make such techniques
defensible, given the nature of the society which would be the result.
But both statements are problematic. If what Plato says about justice is certain
(663d), educational techniques based upon the possibility of its falseness could be
used by three imaginable types of educator:
1. Educators who know that Platos theory of justice is false
2. Educators who suspect that the theory is false even though it is true
3. Educators who suspect that it is false and it is false.
However, Plato had already said that his theory is certain, so no educator can
possibly say that he knows that it is false. Hence the first supposed possibility is a
non-possibility, as evidenced both by Platos own theory of knowledge (at any rate
as expounded in pre-Theaetetus dialogues) and by his assertion that the king and
the more senior of his appointed Guardians of the Laws will be precisely persons of
knowledge (632c): non-facts cannot be known by anybody, and the putative falsity
of Platos theory of justice is, in the eyes of Plato himself at least, one such non-fact.
The second half of the third supposed possibility, which repeats the possibility of
the theorys being false, must also be discarded, on these same grounds. The second
possibility, by contrast, looks to be a real one if we read Platos protasis to mean If,
for the sake of argument, we imagine my theory of justice to have been false. Let us
call this the argumentational use of if.
My language is new here, so let me explain myself. For Wittgenstein, there are
intellectual ladders which, having served their purposes, can safely be discarded.
Though in themselves often over-simplified or even without a basis in either logic or
fact, they can still be very useful as a device for understanding.3 But Plato was onto
the same point long before Wittgenstein, as a passage in the Timaeus makes clear. At
28a he claims that anything the Demiurge fashions in view of a forever unchanging
3
For an evocative work on the topic see Perloff 1996.
233
model (paradeigma) is beautiful, whereas anything he fashions in view of a model

that has been begotten will not be beautiful. Then at 28c he asks the specific question:
After which of the two models did the maker fashion the world? Was it the one that
does not change and always stays the same or the one that has come to be? (tr. Zeyl).
The dichotomy is certainly useful for purposes of establishing, by what looks like an
argument, some higher truth, but of the two supposed possibilities only one, it turns
out, is a genuine one, since the other, as he puts it cannot even be stated to be the
case without blasphemy (29a). It is, in other woods, merely a pseudo-possibility,
like the later pseudo-possibility (Laws 663d) that his theory of justice-as-invariablybeneficial might ever turn out to be considered false by persons selected by the rulers
as educators. Each, having served its purpose to highlight a higher truth (in the case
of the Laws, the truth that his theory of justice-as-invariably-beneficial is valid and
sound, and that his educators will invariably know this), can then be safely discarded.
At this point, even in just the second book of the Laws, we are already, it
appears, into a world different in many ways from the world of the Republic, and I
should like to end my remarks on it with a brief discussion with Plato on the matter,
particularly his views on the importance of virtue.
...................................................................
Reader. What happened, Plato? Why this sudden interest in law? You got along fine
without it in your Republic.
Plato. I didnt need it. But it has to be talked about in detail if I want to start discussing
a society which is actually realizable with the flesh-and-blood material available, one
which unlike Kallipolis is bound to have antisocial and criminal activity within it.
Reader. So thats why you wrote the Laws?
Plato. Thats right. I wanted to look at the best society I could imagine which is
populated by real people, and what sort of laws would be needed to best govern them.
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Thomas M. Robinson
Reader. But you still have as your goal the most virtuous society possible?
Plato. Of course. Why should that change?
Reader. Some might say, Why shouldnt it change? Surely a more natural goal for
society is the maximization of the wealth of its citizens, or of the opportunities of its
citizens, or of the freedoms of its citizens. Or something of that order. Why should a
state care about the virtue of its citizens, as long as they obey the laws?
Plato. Your use of the word maximization is a bit of twentyfirst century jargon Im
not used to, but let me try it out anyway. As I understand the word virtue, it is precisely
a word of maximization - in the sense that a virtuous person is one who attempts to
do to the maximum degree what he is best or uniquely equipped to do. And since
he is uniquely, among all living things, equipped to exercise intelligence and moral
responsibility, those are the two areas in which he will be able to demonstrate virtue.
Reader. I think a lot of people would consider that a very private view of what
virtue is private in fact to you and Socrates and very few people else. But even
if you are right, surely there is lot more to living in a good society than that. What
about the idea that the goal of society is to maximize opportunities of citizens for the
accumulation of wealth or property, or to maximize individual freedoms?
Plato. Im not sure that what Im saying is as incompatible with such goals as you
think. None of those goals, I would argue, is achievable without a citizenry possessed
of basic thinking skills and a basic commitment to civic law and order rather than the
law of the jungle. Its just practicality, just efficiency, if you like; societies couldnt
survive without a large majority of the population being intelligent and responsible
agents.
Reader. So you would be happy to call thinking skills and a moral sense a necessary
condition - to use our modern jargon - of a well-functioning society?
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Plato. Certainly. One has to use ones thinking skills and moral sense with regard
to something, naturally, and it precisely such things as trade and commerce and the
accumulation of wealth that occupy the attention of a great number of people.
Reader. So to continue with modern jargon the possession of thinking skills and
a moral sense is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a well-functioning
society?
Plato. What an excellent way of putting it! I wish Id thought of the phrase myself.
Reader. But somehow all those thinking skills and moral sense need to be fully
aligned with the overall goals and the overall good of the state?
Plato. Absolutely. Arms and legs achieve their own health in achieving the overall
good of the body. And the state is an organism of the same type.
Reader. But is it? Why do we have to believe that this metaphor is appropriate?
An arm, its true, cant function as an arm without being part of a body; its not a
biological entity in itself. But human beings are biological entities in themselves, and
can and do survive all over in very small groups, sometimes a cluster of just a few
families, with no need for a state and all its trappings.
Plato. True. And no metaphor is perfect, of course; it invariably fails to describe
every detail. But I challenge you to come up with a better one. My book the Laws is
about a functioning state, not a cluster of families, and the biological metaphor seems
to me well fitted to describe it.
Reader. But is it? Many would say it founders on the reality that citizens are individual
biological substances, not parts of some other, bigger, quasi-biological substance.
Plato. But surely you are describing exactly what I am saying? The state is not a
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Thomas M. Robinson
biological entity, true, but it does, if functioning rightly, operate in a way very like a
biological entity. So when you used the word quasi-biological you were right. And
a human being who is very much an individual substance as such can quite easily,
given appropriate civic education, operate as a part of the larger whole that is the
state in such a way as to help achieve the maximum potential of the state in achieving
his own maximal potential as a person.
Reader. I think many people would find this a very optimistic view of things.
Plato. Would you prefer a pessimistic one?
Reader. Plenty of people would, I think. Though most of them would be inclined to
say realistic rather than pessimistic.
Plato. You mean people like Thrasymachus and Callicles?
Reader. And others. Not all your critics are sophists. But thats another topic. And we
are running out of time. Can we continue the discussion after this paper?
Plato. Absolutely. Ill see you at the coffee-break.
References
Mayhew, Robert, Persuasion and compulsion in Platos Laws, Polis, 24 (2007),
91-111.
Mayhew, Robert, Plato Laws X, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008.
Morrow, Glen R., Platos Conception of Persuasion, Philosophical Review, 62,
1953, 234-250.
237
Perloff, Marjorie, Wittgensteins Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the
Ordinary, Chicago: University Press, 1996.
Schuetrumpf, E., Ethos in persuasion and in musical education in Plato and Aristotle,
in David C. Mirhady, ed., Influences on Peripatetic Rhetoric. Essays in Honor
of William W. Fortenbaugh, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007.
Stalley, R. F., Persuasion in Platos Laws, History of Political Thought, 15, 1994,
157-177.
Thomas M Robinson
Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto
Honorary President IAGP
Canada
Ruth Eva Seidlmayer

Considerations on Different Approaches to the World:
New Perspectives on Ancient Skeptics and Postmodern Theory as well as
Stoics and Critical Western Philosophy as Representatives
of Different Approaches to the World
Abstract: This paper deals with typical heuristic patterns that shape and categorize the
relationship between thought and action. It supports the thesis that the debate between
Stoics and Skeptics possesses the paradigmatic structure of a particular type of conflict
that can also be found in other conflicts, e.g. in the discussion between postmodernist
and critical western philosophy.
The Stoics and both the Pyrrhonian and Academic Skeptics disputed how and
if indicators for a good life could be identified. At first glance, these indicators were
negotiated in the context of truth. Yet and this is the fundamental thesis of my paper
these epistemic concepts are closely connected to a type of behavior or action in the
sense of attitude. My thesis is that the pattern of thinking in dogmatic terms leads the
Stoics to an outward approach of action. Arguably, the Skeptics suspension of judgment
is connected to an inward approach that is contingent on an individualistic concept of
truth. These two approaches materialize in the different positions found in the wellknown Sorites paradox. I claim that these systematic tendencies are paradigmatic not
only for ancient philosophy, but that they can also be identified in modern philosophy.
In order to support my thesis, I will update the two approaches with the paradigmatic
debate on feminism between postmodernist theorists like Judith Butler and critical
western philosophers such as Seyla Benhabib and Martha Nussbaum. This debate was
hot particularly in the 90s and continues to be highly disputed today. Focusing on
the relation between the ancient Skeptic and postmodernist approaches, I will apply the
structure of the different Approaches to the World to contemporary debates and show
that doing so may provide some insight into these seemingly paradoxical debates and
Considerations on Different Approaches to the World
239
also creates more possibility for action.

In the following I will present to you a short outline of my argumentation: (1)
As a first step, I will outline these ancient philosophical models on an epistemic level
and pinpoint the consequences at the level of action in order to deduce two types of
Approaches to the World. This heuristic tool allows a wider scope of possibility for
thought and action. The opposing views adopted by the Stoics and the Academics in the
discussion of the Sorites paradox emphasize my interpretation of two different tendencies
of thinking and living. In a second step (2), I aim to transfer the results obtained in the
study of both the ancient debate and the Sorites to todays philosophy in order to delineate
systematic relations that the Skeptic and postmodernist philosophical approaches have
in common. Not only do the two theories share the rejection of dogmatism, but they also
share a common emphasis on the present while being confronted with similar criticism.
Lastly (3), I will draw a short conclusion.
1) The Ancients
a) The Epistemic Level
The varying concepts of truth are based on the question of how truth is determined.
The theories differ: Truth is either considered to be complete or non-complete and
varying. They also differ as to whether they posit that truth can ever be complete. In the
beginning of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus illustrates this and I believe he makes
a good point (Sextus PH I 2). A further aspect is the question of where truth originates:
Does truth stem from the individuals own experience? If so, it would be internal, which
opposes an external understanding of truth. The external concept of truth would then
refer to a greater, long-lasting principle that cannot at all be affected by human action.
The ancient debate reflects two opposing points of view: a subjective attitude and
an objective one. The following paragraphs present these different perspectives on an
epistemic level in the debate between Stoics and Skeptics in order to apply them to the
action level in a second step.
i) The Stoics understand truth as an external principle. This principle the Logos
was imagined as something that permeates all existing things. Therefore, all that exists
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Ruth Eva Seidlmayer
is part of this external truth. The Logos can only be realized by the objects it consists
of. The Stoic concept of truth is that it is clearly and distinctively recognizable. Truth is
complete and distinctly graspable (katalptos).
ii) In contrast to this understanding, the Academic Skeptics even refused the
possibility of a certainty of truth. According to the Skeptics, things are merely reasonable
(eulogon (Arkesilaos)) or plausible (pithanon (Karneades)). According to the Academic
Skeptics, reasonable or plausible means to be convinced within a situation and to
be convinced solely from the point of view of the individual. Plutarch responds to the
criticism of the incapacity to act by stating that even the simplest actions, such as leaving
a room without running into a wall or heading for the bath and not for the mountains,
involve beliefs based on situational plausibility:
But how is it that someone who suspends judgment does not rush away to
a mountain instead of to the bath, or stands up and walks to the door rather
than the wall when he wants to go out to the market-place? Do you ask
this, when you claim that the sense-organs are accurate and impressions
true? Because of course, it is not the mountain but the bath that appears a
bath to him, not the wall but the door that appears a door, and likewise with
everything else. (Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1122e = LS 69A)
The individual situation and what seems to be convincing are not connected.
According to the Academic Skeptics, truth was therefore not a concept that included the
individuality of a situation, but one that referred to a specific context.
iii) Similar to the Academics, Pyrrhonian Skeptics criticized the possibility and
existence of dogmata. Not only did they refuse the distinct existence of truth and dogma,
they also rejected the Academic conviction that there is absolutely no truth as being
dogmatic (Sextus PH II 79). By contrast, the Pyrrhonian teaching aimed for a permanent
suspension of judgment (epoch) (Diogenes Laertios 9.61-62). In their opinion, the absence
of judgment results from the failure of dogmatism (Sextus PH I 26-27). The Pyrrhonians
were convinced that truth lay in perception and specific context. Sextus Empiricus states:
When we say that the Sceptic refrains from dogmatizing we do not use the term dogma,
[sic] as some do, in the broader sense of approval of a thing (for the Sceptic gives assent
241
to the feelings which are necessary results of sense-impressions () (Sextus PH I 13).

The conviction that truth is something perceivable by the senses yields to the practice
of suspension of judgment and the indifference to tranquility (ataraxia). Therefore,
Pyrrhonian philosophy is a kind of lifestyle: The perpetual search for truth implies a
way of life (agog) (Sextus PH I 2). Pyrrhonian truth never seems to be complete and is
therefore constantly in progress.
As a result it can be stated and this is the first thesis of the paper that the
debate between Stoics and Skeptics can be characterized, on the one hand, as the Stoics
lasting, objective concept of truth and, on the other, the Skeptic concept of a subjective
truth: As a result and this is the first thesis of the paper we can characterize the debate
between Stoics and Skeptics as follows: On the one hand are the Stoics with their lasting,
objective concept of truth and on the other is the Skeptic concept of a subjective truth in
which the Academics posit an unconnected and momentarily valid concept of truth and
the Pyrrhonist the concept that truth is experienced and in progress.
Usually, the different approaches are merely understood as conflicting opinions.
Only rarely are these opinions considered systematic with regard to the activity they
determine or even each other. Moreover, the structure of conflict also seems paradigmatic
for contemporary debates.
b) The Level of Action
One thing must be kept in mind: The philosophical systems of both the ancient
Stoic and Academic philosophers as well as the Pyrrhonian Skeptics had a tremendous
effect on the Good Life. For a long time, this connection was overlooked in western
philosophy. Instead, western philosophy concentrated on the opposition of pure reason
and practical reason as well as on the concept of ideas. It was not until the 19th century
that this epistemological divide was overcome, at least in western philosophy, such as in
Nietzsche or pragmatism.
The outline of the debate between Stoics and Skeptics exposes two main concepts
within the philosophical debate. They appear to be connected with two tendencies: how
perspectives are taken and life is lived. With regard to these different perspectives, the
ancient opposing positions appear as contradictory positions when applied to practical
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life:
i) The Stoics are concerned with the good life of the individual. However, this
good life is realized by an abstract, rational and general principle: the Logos. Yet this
principle does not result in passivity at all, but rather in the attempt to realize external
truth in the community: The fact alone that so many historical figures are classified as
Stoics speaks volumes. Hence, being geared towards an external reasonable principle
leads the Stoics to active action. The outward-focused perspective changes the manner
in which individuals act in society.
ii) Instead, both skeptical schools reject dogmatism and certainty in their striving
to become content individuals. This attitude leads them to act differently within their
community and within their institutions. The restraint of judgment means to act according
to the context of a specific situation. At the same time, integration within social structures
was rejected. Its significance becomes apparent in the anecdote of the Academic Skeptic
Kleitomachos. After the demolition of his hometown Karthago, Kleitomachos addresses
its enslaved inhabitants. In this message, he advised them to remain restrained in their
judgment and not to mourn their demolished Karthago (Cicero Tusc. Disp. III 54). The
minor importance of institutions for the Academics is obvious from anecdotes like this
at least in the eyes of some contemporaries. As Richard Bett points out: the followers of
the Academic school were not social reformers (Bett 2010: 192).
iii) Something similar can be said for the Pyrrhonian Skeptics: Due to their
rejection of general values, the Pyrrhonian Skeptics could not be seen as social reformers
either. The relativity of truth according to ones own perception makes it difficult to act
with each other in order to collaborate in creating of the conditions of living. In both
skeptical schools, the individual is at the heart of truth and action. It seems as if the
Skeptics goal is self-fulfillment. This is a second conclusion: Stoic thinking leads to
action in society while the inner-focused Skeptics retreat into the realm of the private.
This can be understood as an inward approach (Skeptics) as opposed to an outward
approach (Stoics).
These approaches on the level of action are connected with their epistemic
approaches and this connection does not seem to be coincidental. Therefore, a
category is needed which reaches beyond the narrow meanings of perspective,
243
attitude or interest. I propose to call this correlation Approach to the World. It

is the responsibility of philosophy to analyze structures as well as design categories
in order to understand the issues at hand. Nevertheless, the task of developing
categories including my own category of Approach to the World does not
claim to be latent and omnipresent. Instead, it can serve as a tool, a heuristic tool,
which can be used in different contexts if required. Applying such heuristic tool
to different circumstances and historic situations broadens the space of thought.
c) The Sorites Paradox as a Paradigm for the Different Tendencies to Think and live
a life
By using examples from the Sorites for these different Approaches to the World,
we can take a closer look at the significance of these different points of view. It should
also be taken into account that both of the approaches adopted by the Academics and
by the Stoics in the discussion of the Sorites are formulated from different theoretical
standpoints and that they are pragmatic and useful in the sense Dewey.
The Sorites paradox constitutes a standard problem in the debate between Stoics
and Academic Skeptics. It was like a secret weapon for the Skeptics against the Stoics
claim that it is possible to clearly classify things. Not only do the philosophical positions in
the ancient debate become increasingly concrete on the basis of the Sorites, contemporary
positions gain concreteness also as Colyvan and Weber point out (Colyvan/Weber 2012:
311). One can find a good depiction of the Sorites in Galen:
Wherefore I say: tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
Thereupon you say No. Then I say: what do you say about 2 grains? For it is
my purpose to ask you questions in succession, and if you do not admit that
2 grains are a heap then I shall ask you about 3 grains. Then I shall proceed
to interrogate you further with respect to 4 grains, then 5 and 6 and 7 and 8;
and I think you will say that none of these makes a heap. Also 9 and 10 and
11 are not a heap. For the conception of a heap which is formed in the soul
and is conjured up in the imagination is that, besides being single particles
in juxtaposition, it has quantity and mass of some considerable size... I
for my part shall not cease from continuing to add one to the number in
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like manner, nor desist from asking you without ceasing if you admit that
the quantity of each single one of these numbers constitutes a heap. It is
not possible for you to say with regard to any one of these numbers that
it constitutes a heap. I shall proceed to explain the cause of this. If you
do not say with respect to any of the numbers, as in the case of the 100
grains of wheat for example, that it now constitutes a heap, but afterwards
when a grain is added to it, you say that a heap has now been formed,
consequently this quantity of corn becomes a heap by the addition of the
single grain of wheat, and if the grain is taken away the heap is eliminated.
And I know of nothing worse and more absurd than that the being and
not-being of a heap is determined by a grain of corn. And to prevent this
absurdity from adhering to you, you will not cease from denying, and will
never admit at any time that the sum of this is a heap, even if the number of
grains reaches infinity by the constant and gradual addition of more. And
by reason of this denial the heap is proved to be non-existent, because of
this pretty sophism. (Galen, On Medical Experience 16.1-17.3 = LS 37E)
The argument of the paradox does not depend on the narrative about the heap
and the grain. It has also been represented in the depiction of a hairy or bald person,
for example. But the Sorites is always concerned with particles that are added to or
subtracted from a quantity (Psellos, Stoici paralogismi 9-14).
It seems obvious: removing a single grain, just one particle, from a large quantity
of grains does not change the status of the heap. The proportion of the single grain is too
small in relation to the whole complex. At the same time, we must acknowledge that the
idea of a heap is related to a large and specific amount of grains. It must somehow be
possible to identify the point at which a single grain that is added to an amount of grains
changes the balance from amount of grains to heap. Defining the threshold value in
order to justify the term heap is the object of the discussion.
This is the issue Galens speaker notices: And I know of nothing worse and more
absurd than that the being and not-being of a heap is determined by a grain of corn. So
what is actually the problem?
245
As we have already argued, the Stoics support the principle of

bivalence and thus the categories of truth: true and false. Deviating
ideas of truth are excluded. This is precisely the question that arises in the
Sorites. The Skeptics apparently used the Sorites as a model for vagueness.
The Stoics thus had to answer the questions in the Sorites with no endlessly
in order to support the principle of bivalence. To avoid such a never-ending regression,
the Stoic Chrysippus recommends: if it seems to be right to answer yes, one should
answer yes. If it does not seem to be right to answer yes, one should not answer
yes (Williamson 2005: 20-22). The Chrysippean silence follows from this idea
(Williamson 2005). Here, two different kinds of thinking or as we have called them
Approaches to the World collide thus hindering communication and leading to silence.
The incompatibility of the different epistemic positions becomes obvious in the
proverbial Chrysippean silence. When there is nothing left to say, that speechlessness
allows room to think about the systematic reasons for speechlessness. If the attempt
to communicate does not resonate within the conversational partner, this may be an
indication of systematic differences. Therefore it may be necessary to integrate different
contexts of communication breakdowns, as I will do later, in the course of updating the
systematic structures of postmodern and critical theory debates.
Back to the Sorites. It is actually difficult to identify the moment in which a number
of corns turn into a heap. The Academics point out a problem that the Stoics have
difficulties handling: vagueness. But vagueness does not have to be a problem in itself.
The Chrysippean silence mentioned above is just one possible way of dealing with the
vagueness in the Sorites. I see three more possibilities which are connected in a sense:
i) the reformulation by means of a binary predicate, ii) the localization of the aspects on
different numerical levels, and finally iii) understanding and comprehending the paradox
as different perspectives.
i) It is obvious to reformulate the Sorites paradox by using a binary predicate that
allows us to determine the relation of the status of a specific number of grains at one
moment to a later status. The former larger number of grains could be described as is
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Ruth Eva Seidlmayer
more heap than as opposed to the latter number from which one grain was taken away.
However, this solution is not convincing at all. In respect of the category of quantity,
the argument cannot be sufficient when applied to other categories like the shape or size
of single grains. Due to this one-dimensional perspective, the solution to the Sorites by
means of a binary predicate is not on the whole convincing (Blau 2008: 193; Schne
2012: 76).
ii) There is another approach that has a similar starting point, but emphasizes
something else. It comprises a change in perspective, the focus of which moves from
the full unity of the heap to the single particle of grain. Wondering about the number of
grains and heaps, hairy and bald heads or the first red in violet these are all questions
that address the relation of particles to the whole. The confusion regarding the different
levels that lead to the paradox in the Sorites was already discovered by Galen:
Just as the whole of the art (ars) consists of more than one
experience (plures emperiae), thus each of these experiences, in turn,
consists of many experiences. But the question on how many it rests does
not allow of a definite answer (indeterminabilis) and is subject to the kind
of puzzle some call a sorites. (Galen, Subfiguratio empirica 3, 46-47)
As a matter of course, Galen notes that every science consists of many experiences
(emperiae) which means that every experience consists of many subtler experiences that
can also be broken down similarly (Hlser 1987: 1753). Although Galens explanation
is not a solution to the paradox, it offers a method of dealing with it and is not concerned
with finding a solution for vagueness. For Galen this is exactly the inherent structure and
methodology of science.
iii) The last proposal for dealing with the paradox does not refer to vagueness.
Like Galen, the approach accepts different levels in the Sorites paradox and proposes a
change of perspectives not just in an extensive descriptive observation but also from the
specific point of view of the whole and the particle itself. In my opinion, moving from
the full descriptive observation in order to emphasize the specific aim of a particular
perspective is pivotal not only in dealing with the Sorites, but also for discovering what
I call Approach to the World in this paper.
247
Instead of perceiving the identity of a complex as dependent on the addition or

removal of a particle, this approach asks about the particle itself. The relevant question is
whether this single particle is part or not part of the greater unity (Buddensiek 2006: 66-68).
The former question in the context of the Sorites (Are n+1 grains a heap?) has been
reformulated. The questions this theory poses are: Is grain no. 1 part of the heap?
Is grain no. 2 part of the heap? And what about grain no. n+1? The emphasis has
changed due to a shift in the point of reference. While the old way of questioning
include an idea about the nature of the heap, the new way of questioning brings with
it the idea of the particle. From the starting point of the single particle, it is not difficult
to draw conclusions as to its position in the greater context of the heap. The single
particle is a part of the greater structure if and only if it shares the independence of
the superordinate structure (Buddensiek 2006: 67). As Psellos states, Alexander of
Aphrodisias already proposed something similar between the 2nd and 3rd century C.E.:
Alexander of Aphrodisias dissolved [it, the Sorites E.S.] naturally
and well () saying that the fraudster (the one who presents the
paralogism ()) asks what comes into being ( )
in breadth ( ) in a narrow manner (). Since not simply
the single grain fills the corn-measure but that one which was add
() to others ( ). (Psellos, Theologica 3, 153)
Alexander calls attention to the contradiction between the rough determination of
the heap and the accurate definition of the grain. At least in Psellos report, a deviation
from the starting point derives from its specification. Alexander carries out the switch of
perspective as he starts from the single grain: the switch from broad (plats) to narrow
(stens) can be seen as the change of perspectives from the complex to the particle.
Two things can be learned from these approaches to the Sorites: 1. Facing the
problem of vagueness means either to take it seriously; as we have seen Galen supports
a relaxed relationship to vagueness. Or 2. the problem has to be reformulated in such
way, that it does not have to deal with fuzziness. This solution may be traced back to
the importance of expressing something concrete (heap or not-heap?) about an object.
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Ruth Eva Seidlmayer
For me, both options seem appropriate as regards their specific aim. Vagueness is not
problematic per se. It is not necessary to reject it in every case (Heidemann 2007: 355).
From the self-relating perspective of the particle, it makes sense to reject the sharp
borders of the complex. Skeptical reasoning offers statements for particular situations
for a particular individual. What is reasonable or plausible is only possible within this
limited context. By contrast, the Stoics need to make proclamations regarding the
vagueness of certain things seems to arise from an interest in comprehending something
completely in order to adopt and/or alter it.
In this approach, the Sorites paradox becomes a model for different Approaches
to the World. Various theoretical positions become visible as regards their effects on
the level of action. Understanding the Sorites in this sense can also clarify the relation
between opponents in other debates. Newer feminist discussions such as those between
the postmodernists and critical western philosophy make these approaches obvious.
2) Updating the Sorites
This section deals with the possibilities that arise from applying the
previous conclusions to potential systematic relations between Skeptic
and postmodernist thought. As far as I know, the significance of skeptical
considerations for postmodernist philosophy has not been analysed to date.
With reference to gender theory, I will show that (a) the skeptical rejection of dogmatic
terms can be connected to Judith Butlers performative view on gender. (b) Both
approaches share the systematic base of a specific understanding of a present situation.
(c) Furthermore, there are parallels in the criticism against Academic and Pyrrhonian
Skepticism and against Butler as she is considered pars pro toto for postmodernists. The
charge comprises a lack of capacity to act (politically) due to the suspension of terms
and judgment.
The aim of the paragraph is to show that just as in the debates concerning the
Sorites the different Skeptic and postmodernist concepts of (political) action on the
one hand and those of Dogmatists and western critical theorists on the other hand oppose
each other. This results from the different Approaches to the World as described in the
analysis of the Sorites above.
249
(a) Criticism by Judith Butler and the Ancient Skeptics on Dogmatic Terms
Stoic dogmatism and the principle of bivalence being closely connected to it
reminds one of the typical conceptual dualism criticized by feminist theory as a product
of patriarchal thinking. Criticism is often directed at the term woman. However, as
Nancy Fraser points out, the discussion on dogmatic positions and essentialist values
of the term woman is equivalent to the complications surrounding every term. The
feminist debate is representative for central aims of the philosophical discourse between
postmodernists and critical western philosophers (Fraser 1991: 174). In a general
statement, Judith Butler says: The real resists symbolization (Butler 1995: 207).
The next paragraph deals with this mechanism in relation to feminism in terms
of a paradigm. Within feminist debates, the dispute regarding the deconstruction of the
biological sex is paradigmatic. Judith Butler defends the thesis that not only gender but
also physical sex is a social construct against claims that sex is static and innate. For
Butler, the biological sex: is an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through
time. It is not a simple fact or static of a body, but a process whereby regulatory norms
materialize sex and achieve this materialization through a forcible reiteration of those
norms (Butler 1993: 1-2). With her performance theory of sex, Butler contrasts a
performative term against distinct concepts.
Similar to Butlers position on social deconstruction, the Pyrrhonian view
that an experienced truth is in progress moves away from constant dogmata and thus
towards repetition, the progress and the performance of experience. This is particularly
emphasized by the important role of feelings which are necessary results of senseimpressions (kata phantasian katnankasmena path) (Sextus PH I 13) for the
concept of truth. Furthermore, in his introductory words of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism,
Sextus departure from distinct and dogmatic concepts is concisely illustrated:
The natural result of any investigation is that the investigators either
discover the object of search or deny that it is discoverable and confess
it to be inapprehensible or persist in their search. So, too, with regard to
the objects investigated to have discovered the truth, others have asserted
that it cannot be apprehended, while others [the Pyrrhonian Skeptics E. S.]
again go on inquiring. (Sextus PH I 1-2)
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Ruth Eva Seidlmayer
The short comment notably expresses the feeling of unease towards the alleged
discovery of a truth that is not consistent with the way things actually are. Similar to
Butler, the Pyrrhonian as well as the Academic Skeptics set themselves apart with their
criticism of the Stoics and by diagnosing the descriptive categories and essentialism as
not being suitable for the realities of reality (Long/Sedley 1988: 265). The Skeptics
rejection of essentialist positions is related to the rejection of dogmata.
(b) Importance of the Present and Synchronous Terms
The rejection of dogmata goes hand in hand with the rejection of the possibility
of diachronic concept formation. According to Sextus a Pyrrhonian Skeptic this is
obviously applicable to phn (expressions): They are clearly connected to specific context
(Sextus PH I 201). Similar to Butlers concept of the performance of terms, emphasis
is put on repetition, on the very moment, on the present. The performance of terms, i.e.
the repetition of terms in different contexts as opposed to categories that are established
earlier, is of particular significance. Due to the progress of repetition, a shift in terms
takes place and becomes predominant. With the rejection of distinct terms, postmodern
theorists not only speak of the death of the subject, but also of the death of history.
They reject metanarratives, e.g. historical materialism, just as the Skeptics do not accept
the Logos as a principle that is both long-lasting and true. While the Stoics orientate
themselves around the Logos, what is seen as truth by the Skeptics arises instead from
the experience, from a single moment.
The manner in which the Academics regarded logical determinism might also
satisfy postmodernist theorists. Butlers arguments support performance theory with
future effect where she substantiates a capacity to act (Butler 1997: 269). Karneades
liberation of the individual via logical determinism takes a similar path as he argues
against causal determinism:
Here is his [Karneades] inference: If all things come about through
antecedent causes, all things come about through interconnexion in a
natural chain. If that is so, all things are the product of necessity. If that is
true, nothing is in our power.
But there is something in our power (Est autem aliquid in nostra
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potestate). But if all things come about through fate, all things come
about through antecedent causes. Therefor it is not the case that whatever
happens happens through fate. (Cicero, De fato XIV 31-32 =LS 70G)
The assumption that something is embedded in both a greater linkage of fate and
complete causality ends with logical determinism. The reason behind the things that
happen lie within will itself (Long/Sedley 1988: 467). Karneades thus discovered the
autonomy of will with all its powerful implications regarding freedom of action and
personal responsibility in a given situation (Long/Sedley 1988: 467). The importance that
is attributed to a present situation can be found not only in postmodernist philosophical
projects, but also among the ancient Pyrrhonian and Academic Skeptics. For Seyla
Benhabib, this perverted the postulated death of history in favor of a metaphysics of
presence (Benhabib 1991: 145-146).
In terms of the short moment of the present, of ones own power and of the
power of decision despite structural involvement and causality in the repetition of
performance both Butlers position and that of the Academics are very close. It is
not surprising that these positions are often denounced for the incapacity to act. In the
following I will examine the criticism that these two attempts are confronted with.
(c) Update ex negativo: Similarity of Criticism
At the center of the criticism against Butler and the ancient Skeptics is the incapacity
to act due to the suspension of judgment and due to indifference and deconstruction
of terms one can rely on. The rejection of norms leads the ancient dogmatist to the
conclusion that they...
... tear out the very tools or equipment of life, or rather they actually ruin
the foundations of the whole of life and rob the living being itself of the
mind which gives it life, so that it is difficult to speak of their rashness
(temeritas) as the case demands. (Cicero, Academica II 31 = LS 40N)
Katja Vogt terms this animal charge, which is directed at the Academics, and
even more intensely plant charge, which is directed at the Pyrrhonists (Vogt 2010: 166).
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Ruth Eva Seidlmayer
It means the reduced capacity of simply reacting as is the nature of animals or to vegetate
like plants. This lack of capacity to act that is caused by the strong orientation around
the self leads Andreas Sommer to the following opinion: This form of conservativism
is already typical to ancient Pyrrhonism: There are never sufficient grounds to decide
in favor of that which is new and to ones change actions. Therefor one stays with
the old not by conviction but in order to avoid the decision (Sommer 2007: 21).
The criticism of the incapacity to act is directed at Judith Butler as well as Michel
Foucault (for instance by Charles Taylor); at least at the level of political action. Among
others, Martha Nussbaum attacks Butler. Nussbaum blames Butler for the state of
todays feminism. In her eyes, contemporary feminism is often limited to cultivating a
subversive language use instead of actually changing the heteronormative conditions in
the society (Nussbaum 1999: I). In order to deconstruct the object of reference, namely
the female body, in the context of the feminist movement, Butler produced a moral
passivity (Nussbaum 1999: IV).
Seyla Benhabib also criticizes postmodernist feminism: if feminists support
the conviction that there is no such thing as the subject women, no criticism of the
historically developed patriarchal structures would be possible. Not even philosophy
would exist. If this were so, not only feminists, but postmodernist theorists in general,
would risk their ability to criticize and formulate normative claims (Benhabib 1993).
Evidently, there are two fundamentally different approaches to feminist philosophy
and the feminist concept of the ability to act: Butler and postmodernist philosophy are
found on the one side of the spectrum, whereas Nussbaum, Benhabib and others are
found on the other. According to Nussbaum and Benhabib, the reference to a fixed
essentialist and descriptive term is the precondition for political action and the ability
to criticize as well as to draft ones own utopia. Because Butler has deconstructed these
reference points, they believe that the capacity to take political action has been damaged.
Whereas for Butler, the clear reference term is not sufficient for political action at all:
I would argue that any effort to give universal or specific content to the
category of women, presuming that that guarantee of solidarity is required
in advance, will necessarily produce factionalization, and that identity as
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a point of departure can never hold as the solidifying ground of a feminist

political movement. (Butler 1991: 160)
Butler rejects finite terms such as women and feminism in favor of open
and wide terms. The open term should prevent the fragmentation of feminist discourse.
Because: Paradoxically, it may be only through releasing the category of women from
a fixed referent that something like agency becomes possible (Butler 1991: 160). In
Butlers view, only by means of deconstructing the reference point woman does the
possibility for political action arise and thus create space for the unspecific in which the
undetermined is possible. It is the defect, the deviation in performance, which turns the
subject into a political actor (Mills 2003: 268).
Upon closer examination of the ancient Skeptics, it becomes clear that denouncing
the approach on the basis of the incapacity to act amounts to nothing as does the criticism
against Butler: The Academic Karneades pushes even more the responsibility and free
will of the individual with logical determinism. And the Pyrrhonists withdrew from
public life and found their ataraxia even more so in the context of private action and
experience. As we have already seen, neither the Academics nor the Pyrrhonist can be
considered social reformers. However, one cannot speak of a general incapacity to act.
At the same time, the Academic and postmodern basis for action remains: Similarly to
the manner in which the Academics react to the criticism with their concept of something
being situationally plausible and reasonable, the postmodernists counter by basing their
arguments on the situational and contextual narrative. Local situational narratives can
reflect on constructs and are said to be completely sufficient for the critical examination
of society and for the capacity to act politically (Benhabib 1991: 144).
As we now know that a capacity to act actually exists, which was predominately
oriented around the individual and practiced in private, the charge of an incapacity to act
actually turns out to be about the lack of an outward-focused capacity to act. Apparently,
both philosophical attempts address a common problem: What was rejected by the
Skeptics as dogmata, is expressed in Butlers (as well as Foucaults) thinking as power
structures. As they are unchangeable, external social structures, they both contribute to
shaping people and making them who they are. The answer that lies within both attempts
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Ruth Eva Seidlmayer
that of the ancient Skeptics and that of the postmodernist theorists which is the retreat
into the individual; a sphere lying beyond structures and dogmata where a person can
become self-fulfilled.
By contrast, Benhabib and Nussbaum cannot accept this inward-focused process
of self-fulfillment as political action. On the condition that the terms are clear, they and
the Stoics consider action and political progress to always be outward-focused. While
the first group focuses on the single grain or particle, the second group focuses on the
heap in its unity. It is obvious that we are confronted with two different attempts in
respect of the capacity for political action. I am convinced that they refer to different
Approaches to the World.
(d) Foucaults Care of the Self
It is of great benefit that Michel Foucault expresses his opinion about the
situation in the Roman Empire, the Stoa and implicitly also about the Skeptics
in one of his later works The History of Sexuality. The Care of the Self (1984). The
portrayal of morals and conventions he draws of Roman society is an alternative draft
to modern western society. He is fascinated by the use of sexuality as a technique for
social control and believes the root lies in Christianity. This is why his focus lies on
Roman society before Christianity. For Foucault, pre-Christian society is monolithic
contrary to the society shaped by Christianity. That is why the ancient culture remains
relatively undifferentiated. Moreover, he had not yet understood the continuity of
ancient culture into a Christian culture. What we call Christianity did not just emerge
and replace something else, but developed with and within that which preceded it.
Foucault is not known for his precise historical analysis. However, in his
reconstruction of the philosophical teaching in The Care of the Self, we may learn less
about historical debate, but instead do learn more about Foucaults own way of thinking.
On the basic thesis of this paper, we can get an idea of whether Foucault could make any
use of having a common interest, a common Approach to the World as the Skeptics do,
attributed to him.
Foucault describes the period of the Roman Empire as being particularly
255
influenced by the Skeptics (Foucault 1986 [1984]: 9) and the rise of a strict morality. The
culture, as Foucault presents it, oscillated between the dutiful performance of social roles
that were proclaimed by the Stoics on the one hand and the increase and enforcement of
individualism on the other.
Foucault does not provide any sources to support this observation. But he clearly
perceives a contrast between the integration in the political and social framework which
he ascribes to the Stoics are integrated and the emerging individualism. According
to him this individualism was often misunderstood as a kind of smug self-content.
At first glance, the cognitive interest to comprehend why sexuality is subordinated to
strict morality seems to be met. However, Foucault goes beyond that and offers deeper
insight into this ancient individualism (Foucault 1986: 42). He notices three aspects of
individualism: 1. individualistic attitude, 2. positive valuation of private life and finally
3. intensity of the relations to self. He comes to the conclusion that the Care of the Self
is not so much a morality as anticipated by the Christians for controlling the excess, but
that it is an art of existence. According to Foucault, the idea behind the art of existence
is the pure enjoyment of oneself (Foucault 1986: 238): the good life.
This outline of the ancient crisis of subjectivation (Foucault 1986: 95) shows a
framework in which the subjects fluctuate between a universal form and a complete
supremacy over itself (Foucault 1986: 238-239). It is no coincidence that the two
aspects of the Sorites can be found in Foucaults analysis. In addition, as regards the
intellectual game of the Sorites, it makes a decisive difference to be a part of the greater
unity or to be the single individual instead. Even though it is not possible to deduce a
clear position between the Stoics and Skeptics from the Foucauldian reconstruction of
ancient philosophy, it is worth noting that Foucault worked on precisely this problem
the crisis of subjectivation and that he defends it against an ignorant and selfish
individualism which in turn makes his own philosophical position obvious.
He defends the Hellenistic and Roman moral practice of Care of the Self against
an appropriation by the Christians as well as against the Stoic disciplining of the self.
And thus he attributes the particularly different self-concepts to the Christians and the
ancient philosophers (Foucault 1986: 144). This may already count as an affirmative
reference to the ancient practice Care of the Self. In an interview shortly before his
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Ruth Eva Seidlmayer
death, he takes a clear position on the techniques of the self and explains that the
Care of the Self is a practice of freedom (Foucault 2005: 276). This is where the
political dimension emerges: The Care of the Self amounts to a release of the self
(Foucault 2005: 277). As can be found in the works of Butler and the ancient Skeptics,
the starting point of this method lies in the individual. The fact that the content is so
close to the skeptical approach is lost in Foucaults reconstruction of the ancient debate
as it does not contain sufficient differentiation regarding this aspect. Due to the clear
dichotomy between antiquity and Christianity, it can be overlooked that Foucaults
philosophical attempt is highly compatible with the intentions of the ancient Skeptics.
3) Conclusion
My reconstruction of the ancient debate leads to the conclusion that different
epistemic concepts are connected with different implications at the level of action. This
combination of theory and practice is even more convincing because it was postulated
by the ancient schools themselves.
The first paragraph showed that the debate between Stoicism and Academic and
Pyrrhonic Skepticism can be conceptualized along the thin line of a lasting and objective
concept of truth as represented by the Stoics as opposed to a subjective situational
concept of truth as held by the Skeptics. The aim of my research is to show that these
patterns are influenced by peoples attitudes. I argued that the Stoics refer to a pattern of
thinking in objective, clear and distinct terms which lead them to an outward approach
to action. Meanwhile, the two groups of Skeptics tended towards an inward approach,
which is connected to their concept of truth that is dependent on the individual. With
the term Approaches to the World, I introduced a new category in order to provide a
better description of the intercorrelation of epistemic concepts and action. The result
of the historical analysis of the two tendencies to think about issues which are also
connected with tendencies to live life could be better understood if they were applied to
the Sorites paradox. This well-known paradox becomes relevant where vague predicates
are concerned. My reconstruction is less an attempt to offer a solution to the paradox, but
presents different ways of handling it. The positions the Academics and the Stoics adopt
in the debate about the Sorites underline my thesis: The Stoics argue on behalf of the full
257
unity of the heap, whereas the Academics begin with the single particle instead. These
positions seem to represent the two tendencies of their Approaches to the World which I
have laid out in the historic reconstruction of the philosophical debate.
One aim for developing the category Approach to the World, which was
developed on the basis of the dispute between the Stoics and Skeptics and is also
illustrated by means of the Sorites paradox, was to apply it to contemporary debates.
There are good reasons to think about systematic connections between modern thinkers
like Judith Butler or Michel Foucault and the Skeptic approach to thought and action.
In the second paragraph, I updated these reflections on Approaches to the World with
modern philosophy. In applying that analysis, the focus lay on linking Judith Butler
as a representative of postmodern thought to the Academic and Pyrrhonian Skeptics.
The aim was not to show that both philosophical schools are identical. The subject of
investigation was rather a delineation of similar argumentative structures whereby Butler
and the ancient Skeptics break away from dogmatic Stoic thinking as well as patriarchal
and distinct terms based on a similar interest and criticism of similar problems. Both
Sextus Empiricus and his constant search for truth as well as Karneades in the context
of logical determinism are compatible to Butlers concept of performance and perhaps
to postmodern positions in general. What they all have in common is the importance of
the individual or even the disentanglement of the individual disentanglement from the
single situation following from the performance and thus the disentanglement of ones
own will from the causality of the fatum. In addition, the similarity of content between
ancient dogmatic thinking and western critical theory was clearly illustrated by means of
applying ancient philosophy to modern philosophy.
It may also be of great value to regard these different approaches as useful and
embedded in the context of their specific aim. These different aims could be characterized
as objective and outward as regards the subjects behavior towards the community or
inward and close to the subject in its individual position. That these positions can also
be understood as corresponding is a progressive conclusion and opens up new fields of
research.
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Ruth Eva Seidlmayer
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the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary, Cambridge University
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Galen, Subfiguratio empirica, in Galen, Three treatises on the nature of science,
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Gautier, P. (ed.), Michaelis Pselli theologica, Vol. 1, Teubner, Leipzig 1989.
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Mutschmann, H. (ed), Sexti Empirici opera, Vol. 1. Teubner, Leipzig 1912.
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Commentaries on Aristotles Sophistici Elenchi: A Study of Post-Aristotelian
Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies, Brill, Leiden 1981, 111-112.
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Foucault, M., Die Ethik der Sorge um sich als Praxis der Freiheit, in Foucault, M.,
Analytik der Macht, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 2005, 274-300, previously
published as Lthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la libert in
Concordia. Revista international de filosofia, 6 (1984), 99-116.
Foucault, M., The history of sexuality, Vol. 3: The care of the self, Translated by
Robert Hurley, Pantheon Books, New York, 1986.
Heidemann, D., Der Begriff des Skeptizismus. Seine systematischen Formen, die
pyrrhonische Skepsis und Hegels Herausforderung, de Gryter, Berlin et. al.
2007.
Hossenfelder, M., Einleitung in Sextus Empiricus and Hossenfelder, M., Grundriss
der pyrrhonischen Skepsis. Mit einer Einleitung von Malte Hossenfelder,
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1985, 9-88.
Hlser, K., Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker. Neue Sammlung der Texte mit
deutscher bersetzung und Kommentaren, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart
1987.
Long, A. and Sedley, D., The Hellenistic philosophers. Vol. 1 Translations of the
principal sources with philosophical commentary, Cambridge University
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Ruth Eva Seidlmayer
Press, Cambridge et al., 1988.

Mills, C., Contesting the political. Butler and Foucault on Power and resistance, in:
The Journal of Philosophy, 3 (2003), 253272.
Nussbaum, M. C., The professor of parody, in The New Republic Online (1999),
http://www.tnr.com/index.mhtml).
Schne, T., Was Vagheit ist, Mentis, Paderborn 2011.
Sommer A., Die Kunst des Zweifelns. Anleitung zum skeptischen Denken, Beck,
Mnchen 2007.
Vogt, K. M., Scepticism and Action in Bett R. A. H., (eds.): The Cambridge
Companion to Ancient Skepticism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
et al., 2010, 165-180.
Williamson, T., Vagueness, Routledge, New York 2005.
Ruth Eva Seidlmayer, MA.

PhD Candidate
Goethe University Frankfurt
Germany
Ion Soteropoulos
In Our Society, is it Possible to Experience Equality and Justice?
Courtesy of Salvador Dali: Melting Time

Abstract: In this research paper, we will defend the following thesis: that insofar
as our finite society is conditioned by linear time expressing the relationship of
inequality, contradiction and violent conflict among beings, unity, equality and justice
are impossible, or, if you prefer, approximate, apparent, or incomplete. We may then
conclude that harmony and justice are possible or complete if, and only if, we, the
humans free ourselves from linear time, which is the source of all contradictions.
What is the origin of linear time? Our assumption is that linear time is the
product of our brain, which perceives, through its finite individual senses, the
multiplicity of the world as succession and conflict and devoid of unity. Real and
definite solution to the problem of inequality and violence in society, however,
may be achieved if we radically transform our finite individual senses into infinite
universal senses that are capable of perceiving the unity of our infinitely diverse and
fragmented world.
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Ion Soteropoulos
How can we accomplish such an astonishing feat? The answer lies in elevating
our finite brain from the biological level, where it is a collection of low-frequency
nerve cells that operate on a positive time scale, to the quantum level, where it is an
assembly of high-frequency fundamental particles that operate on a zero time scale.
We contend that in the deepest recesses of its physical reality, our actually finite brain
becomes an infinite brain in possession of infinite universal senses that perceive the
multiplicity of the world simultaneously as a harmonious whole. Only an actually
infinite brain can access the cosmic end () and supreme good of human society,
which is unity, equality, justice, and free energy ensuring the continuity of our life
and motion within the infinite universe.
Linear Time as the Source of Contradiction

As long as we are finite beings conditioned by linear time, we are programmed
to cease our life and motion: that is, to die. We die by aging, illness, or violent
conflict. If we die by violent conflict, for example by killing ourselves or someone
else, there can be no supreme good; no ethical act of unity, equality, and justice; and
no continuity of our life and motion in space-time.
For the Kantian skeptics the supreme good, -which we assimilate here with
unity, equality, and justice ensuring the continuity of our life and motion- though
an impossible thing, has a regulative power that controls our problems -that is, our
contradictions, conflicts, inequalities and errors that result injustice- without solving
them.
This regulative power, however, is a delusion in the face of the impossibility of
obtaining a real solution to our problems and the necessity of, in fact, maintaining our
problems as insoluble. Indeed, insofar as each solution may remedy a problem, the
violent conflict, for example- and not the cause of the problem, which is Euclidean
time, it is inevitable that each solution will generate a new problem, a new conflict,
such that in our time-conditioned society, the cause and the number of unsolved
conflicts remain constant, despite progress in our society.
Moving indefinitely from conflict to conflict, our ever-changing society is not
263
only unable to propose any lasting solution to the problem of conflict; worse, it is
unable even to attempt a solution. The reason is that our finite society, conditioned
by time, must generate violent conflicts and die. It follows, then, that the solution of
the problems of conflict, inequality and injustice is complete and real if, and only if it
is entirely different and independent of their cause, which is linear time. Otherwise,
any solution remaining within the program of linear time is illusory and, inexorably,
leads our time-conditioned society to collapse.
Let us present the above argument in terms of the ancient Greek problem of
motion from a to b of the Euclidean unit distance ab.1 In this case i) a designates the
observable state of minimum justice -a state characterized by maximum injustice,
which we assimilate with unregulated injustice- and that we call the problem; ii)
b designates the ideal and real state of maximum justice -a state characterized by
minimum injustice- which we call the solution; and iii) an designates our finite timeconditioned society indefinitely progressing towards the solution b and characterized
by the observable state of partial, apparent or false justice, which we assimilate with
regulated injustice.2
1
For a mathematical and geometric presentation of the problem of motion, see also my recent book
Metaphysics of Infinity: The Problem of Motion and the Infinite Brain (Lanham: University Press of
America, 2013).
By justice we mean the state of dynamic balance produced when different things a b are equal,
simultaneous or coexisting according to logos, or reason, regardless of their difference. We write
therefore:
(a b) (a = b),
in which designates non-identity or difference and = designates identity, unity, equality, and
simultaneity. Different things thus form both a plurality and a unity, that is to say, a unified plurality,
which constitutes a complex whole -a community of things that obey the same principle despite their
difference, called common universal principle.
Different things a, b are equal because difference is a symmetric relation between things:
(a b) (b a) (a = b).
When different things are equal, they obey a common universal principle and conversely when different
things obey a common universal principle they are equal. It follows that the state of justice is also a state
governed by a common universal principle.
Injustice is the interruption of equality, symmetry or simultaneity. It is produced when different
things a b are perceived as being unequal, non-simultaneous or non-coexisting , that is to say, as being
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Ion Soteropoulos
In relative and apparent terms, any recession of an from a necessarily involves

an increase of justice in proportion to its distance from a. In absolute and real terms,
however, we do not have any increase of justice. Indeed, no matter how close to the
ideal state b is the approaching an, an must be always, through its finite variable n,
at an infinite distance from b, for the analytic principle of inequality and linear time
such as an < b to be unambiguously satisfied and the analytic and time-conditioned
foundation of our progressing finite society to be unambiguously conserved.3
Ultimately, our progressing society an, having as it does an incomplete, apparent
justice or a regulated injustice, is as far off from its solution b as is the first hierarchical
society having a minimum justice or an unregulated injustice a, which is a maximum
injustice. This means that not only is our progressing society an incapable of reaching
its final state of maximum justice b, which is true justice; even worse, it is incapable
of moving beyond its initial state of minimum justice a.
Progression from a to b on the Euclidean unit distance ab is therefore
impossible because our advancing finite society an can neither reach a definitive
solution of its problem nor even attempt any solution whatsoever! In fact, because
contradictories existing successively:
(a b) (a < b),
in which the sign designates therefore; and the sign < designates inequality (less /more), inclusion
(contained part/containing whole, implication (if/ then)) and succession (before/ after).
Taking into consideration the above, we claim that injustice is the interruption of logos or reason
and the breakdown of a common, universal principle that generates the state of anarchy.
Different things are erroneously perceived as unequal and hence as contradictories generating anarchy
and injustice, whereas in reality and seen from a higher dimension, they are equal and hence coexisting
opposites obeying a common, universal principle that generates justice.
The relation of inequality between different things such as an < b states that an is less than b and that
b is greater than an. It is also an expression of linear time order, which states that an is before or earlier
than b and that b is after or later than a. Inequality is an asymmetric relation that interrupts the symmetry
and justice between things. The natural philosopher and medical theorist Alcmaeon of Croton (6th -5th
century BCE) called monarchia (DK, fragment 4) the inequality between opposites in which one of the
opposites predominates over the other generating thereby imbalance and illness. On the other hand he
called isonomia, the law of equality and balance of opposites that generates health (See comments on the
medical theories of Alcmaeon in Aristotles Metaphysics, traduction J. Tricot, Librairie Philosophique J.
Vrin, Paris, 1986, A, 5, 25, Note 4, p 46).
3
265
each solution generates a new problem, our society an moves tautologically from
problem to problem without being able to break the problem barrier an and effectively
move to the solution b. Ultimately, because our finite society an is constrained by the
arrow of Euclidean time, it must eventually exhaust its limited free energy through
its indefinitely regressing problems and die.
Taking into consideration these reflections, we contend the following: Any
increase of justice through the external transformation of our institutions is an illusion
insofar as we do not free our society from Euclidean time -the source of all conflicts,
contradictions, errors, inequalities, and injustices in our observable.
The Perceptual Origin of Euclidean Time:
The Neural Perception of Our Finite Brain Generates Euclidean Time
What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our
method of questioning. (Werner Heisenberg) 4
Our fundamental assumption here is that Euclidean time is not an essential
principle of our real physical world but instead an accidental principle of our
analytic, conflicting mode of perceiving the physical world. The origin of Euclidean
time is perceptual. Indeed, we assume that our finite brain at rest is a collection of
low-frequency nerve cells (retinal cells) that perceives only a finite part of light of
wavelength l. This finite observable part of light travels forwards through empty
space at the unique, constant and finite speed c, which we take as a finite unit: c =1.
The finite observable speed of light creates, in turn, a time delay between any two
points of space a and b that renders their communication retarded and erroneous
involving a loss of information. For example, it creates a time-delay between here
and out there -between our finite brain here, which we designate by a, and the distant
object out there, which we designate by b, such that our finite brain a perceives the
distant object b as being either before or after itself and hence either as it was in the
past or will be in the future and not as it is now. We call observable or sensible object
4
See Heisenberg Werner, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science, George Allen
Unwin Ltd, London, 1971, p.57
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Ion Soteropoulos
the object observed as it was in the past or will be in the future, and real physical
object the thinkable (intelligible) but unobservable object as it is now.
Given the fact that our finite brain experiences the manifold a and b successively
as contradiction or conflict, we are then led to the following inequality and time order,
which rules our finite observable world generated by our finite perception of things:
a < b.
1.
either b < a or
Now, the time-delay between a and b caused by the finite observable speed
of light obliges us to epistemologically divide the object, universe or world into
conflicting parts -into the i) observable (sensible, phenomenal, apparent) world,
which we designate by an and assimilate, because of its dependence on our timeconditioned finite brain, with our finite brain a such as an = a and the ii) real, physical
world independent of our finite brain, which we designate by b.
In turn, we define the real, physical world b as the sum total of its infinite
number of parts and we locate it on the limiting boundary b of a unit sphere of center
a and radius ab. On the other hand we define the observable world a as the finite
observable part of the real, physical whole produced by the selective influence of our
finite brain on the real world -for example on the real speed of light. We locate this
observable world a at the center a. Fig. 1, below, is a one-dimensional representation
of the spherical physical whole.
Fig. 1
267
The observable world a is apprehended by our brains faculty of finite individual

sensibility, which is the faculty of sensing an arbitrarily selected (focalized) part
of the real physical world to which we assign the forward sense (arrow) of linear
time. The physical world b is apprehended by our brains faculty of infinite universal
reason (infinite nous, intelligence, mind), which is the faculty of thinking of the
physical world in itself free of linear time. Therefore, we assimilate the real, physical
world with Platos eternal intellectual (ideal) world, or with Kants noumenal world,
to which our infinite mind has immediately access.
This mental direct access to the physical world happens because the physical
world possesses the property of self-containment, that is, of self-replication and thus
is both a containing whole and a contained part, both outside our finite brain as a
containing infinite whole and deeply inside the matter of our finite brain as a contained
infinite mind. This means that our infinite mind does not represent the real physical
world; rather it is the physical world because it replicates the physical world.5 This
explains why laws produced by our infinite mind are valid for the real physical world
and vice versa: Our infinite mind and the real physical world are equivalent despite
their different aspects and spatial inner /outer positions with respect to our brain.
Because the real physical world contains more information and free energy
than does the observable world, which is the observable part of the real physical
See the cosmological and epistemological theories of Ionian-Greek (for example Anaxagoras, Melissus,
etc) Indian (Hinduist, Buddhist, etc), and Iranian (Zoroastrian) thinkers at the dawn of philosophy
and religion from 1500 BCE to 500 BCE. They identify our infinite mind or nous () with the
real physical world or universe, which they consider to be an infinite whole. According to infinite (or
transfinite) mathematics (see Galileo, Bolzano, Cantor, Dedekind, etc) the property of the infinite whole
is self-containment or self-replication: that is, the power to replicate itself within any of its proper parts,
for example within our brain, where it becomes an infinite mind. The infinite whole is self-replicated
in all scales (see the Pythagoreans, who divided the infinite whole into an infinite number of infinite
wholes). The self-replication of the infinite whole implies the equality of the infinite whole with any of
its proper parts and distinguishes it from the finite whole, which is unequal to any of its proper parts.
There is an immense literature concerning the mathematical and philosophical theory of infinite wholes,
which is impossible to cite in this brief article. Nevertheless we cite as a classic reference Cantors
major work Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers in which he shows that
the infinite whole is equal to any of its proper parts.
5
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Ion Soteropoulos
world, we have the following inequality and linear time order that rules our observable
world:
2.
b>a,
in which b designates the information and free energy content of the real
physical world, and a designates the information and free energy content of our
finite brains observable world.6
The above inequality states that the information and free energy content of
the physical world -defined as the sum total of an infinite number of parts- is greater
than the information and free energy content of our observable world -defined as the
partial sum of a finite number of parts- and that the observer-independent physical
world is chronologically, ontologically and epistemologically prior to the observerdependent observable world, which is an inexact representation of the real physical
world.
As a matter of fact, the positive time difference b - a > 0 measures the
error, entropy, or loss of information, energy and justice that the process of
inexact representation and delayed (not-instantaneous) communication involves.
If b designates the state of complete and true justice that characterizes the perfect
(complete) society replicating the timeless physical world, and a designates our
indefinitely progressing society an characterized by the state of incomplete, apparent,
false justice or regulated injustice, we obtain then the positive time difference
b - an > 0 that measures the loss of (true) justice from which our society suffers. This
loss of justice is infinitely small in relative terms and infinite in absolute and real
terms.
Thus, when we experience the real physical world with our finite brain, we lose
the information and free energy of the physical world in agreement with the second
law of thermodynamics, which is the thermodynamic expression of Euclidean time.
The loss of information and free energy produces in turn violent conflict and injustice
We call error or anthropocentrism the imperceptible selective influence exercised by our finite brain
on the real physical world through its finite individual perception of things. This constraining influence
reduces the timeless physical world into the time-conditioned observable world containing less
information and free energy than the physical world. The real physical world is not the same before and
after the brains finite particular perception of the world.
269
in our finite societys observable world. Per contra, when we do not experience the
physical world, there is no loss of its information and free energy and no production
of violent conflict and injustice.
One of the questions we will attempt to answer in this paper is how to experience
the physical world without any loss of information and energy, and therefore
independently of Euclidean time, regarded as the source of loss of information,
energy and justice.
*
If linear time is order according to succession, and if succession is impossible
coexistence and simultaneity, then beings that cannot coexist and be simultaneous in
space are necessarily contradictories existing successively in time. Therefore, linear
time expresses the contradiction, incompatibility, and violent conflict among beings.
For example, we saw that our finite brain, which detects uniquely the finite observable
speed of light, perceives the different parts a and b, as contradictory opposites that
cannot coexist in space and hence exist successively in time in conformity with the
analytic principle of inequality and linear time order -namely either as a < b or as
b < a , either as progressive linear time (increasing information and energy content)
or as regressive linear time (decreasing information and energy content).
Because inequality and linear time generate the hierarchical order of
comparison and subordination between opposites, where one of the opposites
prevails over the other to cause the state of imbalance and injustice -namely the state
of monarchia- hierarchical linear time is necessarily the source of injustice in our
time-conditioned society.
Now the kind of space in which inequality and injustice occur is Euclidean.
Indeed, different points a b on the Euclidean line E do not coincide because they are
unequal. They are unequal a < b because they are at unequal distance from the same
common point a.
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Ion Soteropoulos
Fig. 2
Indeed, if the distances aa and ab are unequal, that is, aa < ab, and if we divide
the terms of the inequality of distances by the same positive term a, we obtain the
inequality of points:
a < b. We write, then:
3.
aa < ab a < b,
in which is a sign of implication signifying therefore. The formula 3
shows us that the analytic principle of inequality and linear time order expressed
through the above asymmetric order is a Euclidean principle that rules any two points
a, b on the Euclidean line E.
As we clearly see, the logic of the Euclidean observable space is analytic. If
any two points a, b are different, then their coincidence, unity or equality is impossible
in Euclidean space:
4.
a b (a = b),
where () is the sign of negation, or impossibility.
The above formula expresses the reduction of the difference or opposition
between any two points a, b into an impossible unity, which we call contradiction. It
verifies the analytic principle of contradiction, which stipulates that nothing is both a
and b. In fact, no sense organ can tell us that a thing possesses simultaneously opposite
determinations a and b.7 Similarly, if the points a, b correspond to things, then the
analytic principle of contradiction states that the unity, simultaneity or coexistence of
opposite things is an impossibility. Thus, what the analytic principle of contradiction
-regarded as an abstraction of the finite sense organ- does, essentially, is to reduce
7
See Aristotles Metaphysics, G, 1010b, 15-30.
271
the opposition or difference between any two points a, b into a contradiction, that is
to say into an impossible coexistence and unity.
Because the contradictories a and b necessarily succeed in time such that a is
either before or after b, either less or greater than b, and that b is either after or before
a, either greater or less than a, we can then rewrite the formula 4 as follows
5.
(a =b) (a < b ) + (b < a),
in which + is the sign of disjunction signifying either/or.
Finally, if the original definition of Divine Logos is the Heraclitean unity
of opposites, then by prohibiting this unity of opposites the analytic principle of
contradiction essentially denies Logos and affirms the A-logon, which is the
impossible unity, equality, and coexistence of opposites. This impossible coexistence
of opposites means the impossibility to form a real community of things that
immediately communicate, and therefore the necessity of having a succession of
isolated things -the individuals- deprived of unity and immediate communication and
which the mathematicians call collection or aggregate. This aggregate, constrained
by linear time and verifying analytic principles of organization, is in a chaotic state
of violent conflict and injustice, which in our observable world appears regulated,
whereas in reality, it is, as we have shown, unregulated!
It has now become clear to us that to experience unity, equality, and justice
in our society, we must change not our external institutions but instead our neural
perception of things, which is finite, analytic, and generates Euclidean time. In fact,
we have argued that our finite brain at rest is a collection of low-frequency nerve
cells that function in a finite manner and perceive uniquely a finite part of lights real
speed. This finite observable speed c = 1 reduces the difference and distance between
any two points a, b of space into a relationship of contradiction or succession that
defines linear time and rules our observable world.
If our neural perception of things operating on a positive time scale 0 < t
(where positive time t is any time greater than 10-19s) reduces the natural spatial
relation between coexisting points into an artificial constraining time relation
between contradictory points, then how can we perceive the world itself -the real
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Ion Soteropoulos
physical world- free of perceptual reduction and corruption?8 Can we perceive

without effecting on the world a net change, which we interpret, depending upon the
case, as loss of information, energy and justice?
Our answer is yes, in conformity with the Gnostic tradition of the first rationalist
philosophers -the Indo-Iranians, the Ionian Greeks, the Pythagorean philosophers- of
humanity ranging from 1500 to 500 years BCE.99
The Solution within Our Brain for a Transformed Experience of the Observable
World
In the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen
with an effort;
and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things
beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible
world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual
(Plato, The Republic10)
We have argued that if our brain perceives through its low-frequency nerve
cells, it is finite and analytic and generates a time-delay and conflict between any
two spatial points a and b, for example between here and there, between our finite
brain here and now and the distant object out there; or, to put it another way, between
our societys observable world of minimum justice and the real physical world of
According to physicists (see Max Tegmark The Importance of Quantum Decoherence in Brain
Processes) neural de-coherence introducing a time delay between different spatial points a b appears at
a time scale, which is greater than 10-19 s.
Their proto-rationalist philosophies had a Gnostic basis in the sense that they all believed that the
ultimate end (t) of human existence is to attain the level of completeness that the real physical
universe has. Because the complete ( ) is the eternal and ageless, that which is free of linear
time regarded as the source of contradiction and corruption (physical and ethical), it follows that the
ultimate end of human existence is freedom from linear time. This in turn will lead humanity to the state
of supreme good, which is unity, equality, justice and free energy ensuring the continuity of our life and
motion within the infinite physical universe.
See Plato, The Republic 517b7c3 (translated by Benjamin Jowett, Kaye Dreams Novel Art, New York,
2009, p. 415).
10
273
maximum justice. As a finite brain composed of low-frequency nerve cells, we

tautologically move from finite experience to finite experience generating Euclidean
time and conflict without being able to break the barrier of finite experience and
effectively move beyond. Thus, we cannot obtain an infinite experience that will
enable us to perceive the unitary physical wholeness of our infinitely fragmented
world (agnostic conclusion of the Kantian type).
However, if we change the definition of our brain and say instead that it
is composed of smallest or zero volume particles, called fundamental particles
(singularities) that possess infinite frequency and energy and operate on zero time
scale t =0 (where zero time is any time less than 10-19s), then our brain indeed has
the power to perceive the world completely and spherically -that is, as an infinite
physical whole. 11
This spherical perception, which we call infinite universal perception or
absolute perception, is independent of the sense organ and hence of the nerve cell.
In fact, absolute perception is grounded in these smallest particles or singularities,
which are not nerve cells of particular sensation but rather singularity cells of
universal sensation. Because the physical world taken as an infinite whole is selfreplicated in every singularity, each singularity contains the physical worlds infinite
totality of information and free energy. The brain which knows how to extract this
infinite information and energy stored in the smallest unit of volume, we call infinite
brain endowed with the power of spherical perception. For example, an infinite brain
extracting information and energy from its singularities would have the power to
experience directly the real speed of light, taken as an infinite unit and defined as the
complex product of infinite and zero speeds, or as the complex product of infinite
frequency and zero wavelength: c = f = x 0 =1.12 Absolute perception is true and
11
If the frequency f of a wave is proportional to its speed v and inversely proportional to its wavelength
l, in conformity with the formula f = v/l, then the zero volume particles (singularities) emitting waves
of zero wavelength that travel at the finite unit speed of light c =1, necessarily have infinite frequency
and energy.
If the finite unit speed of light c = 1 has wavelength equal to zero, then in function of the formula f = c/l its
frequency f is infinite or highest. If the frequency f is infinite and the wavelength is zero, then according
to the formula c = fl, the real speed of light is not the finite unit c = 1, but the infinite unit c = fl = x 0 = 1.
12
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Ion Soteropoulos
unerring because it is free of the constraining influence of the finite perceiver over
the object.
The experience of the real speed of light of wavelength l= 0 abolishes the timedelay between any two spatial points a and b -for example, between our brain a here
and now and the distant object b out there. The infinite brain immediately perceives
the distant object without loss of information and free energy, and without error.
This means that the infinite brain perceives the distant object as it is now, which we
called real physical object, and not as it was in past or will be in the future, which we
called observable object. Because the infinite brain observes the real physical object
in itself, we conclude that the observable object is the real physical object, that the
observable world a and the real physical world b are equivalent
6.
a = b,
and have the same information and free energy content. This means that
absolute perception is the same before and after perception, that absolute perception
does not produce any net change on the real physical world, such as reducing it
into an observable world possessing less information and less free energy. Absolute
perception is therefore unerring perception free of corruption -free of the second law
of thermodynamics generated by our neural perception of things.
In what kind of space do unity, equality and justice occur? Our answer is in
non-Euclidean space or, more exactly, in spherical space. Indeed, if we project the
unequal points a < b of the straight line E on the limiting boundary b of a unit sphere
of center a and radius ab, then the unequal points become equal because they are
equidistant from the same (common) point a. Thus, if the distances aa and ab are
equal, that is, aa = ab, and if we divide the terms of the equality of distances by the
same positive term a, we obtain the equality of points: a =b. We write, then:
7.
aa = ab a =b.
In figure 3, we see a one-dimensional representation of this unit sphere taken
as the geometric figure of the real physical whole:
275
Fig. 3
The limiting boundary b, which partially encloses the open Euclidean line
E in order to transform it into the radius of a sphere, is a limiting point of zero
radius and infinite curvature. Cosmologists call this a singularity. The singularity
is not only the geometric point that unifies any two distant points a, b, and which is
manifested logically and physically as the synthetic equivalence principle, but is also
the smallest particle in which the infinite totality of information and free energy of
the physical world is stored and out of which everything is composed.
Because on the sphere any two different points a,b coincide, that is, are united
and equal, they form a community of points governed by the synthetic principle
of equivalence. According to this principle everything is a complex whole ab that
possesses both opposite determinations a and b, and any two different things a, b
are equal and coexisting parts of a complex whole ab whose ratio a /b is equal to 1:
8.
ab = a/b =1.
If we negate both opposite determinations a and b, we obtain the synthetic
principle of the included third, according to which everything is an impartial and
indeterminate whole a b -a nothing that possess neither the determination a nor the
determination b.
If all equivalent points of a sphere are complex indeterminate wholes possessing
simultaneously all determinations and no determination, then ultimately the sphere is
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Ion Soteropoulos
a complex, indeterminate whole composed of complex indeterminate wholes. This

is not a Russellian paradox according to which the whole of wholes which are not
members of themselves is both a member of itself and not a member of itself, but
instead a coincidence or unity of opposites that reveals the complex nature of the
sphere taken as the geometric figure of the real physical whole. The self-referring
and self-penetrating sphere belongs to the second-order logic, which far from being
paradoxical is the real Logos of the physical world -the physical Logos (
o)- whose nature is synthetic and infinite.
The transformation of our neural perception of the physical world into a
singularity perception that reconciles our finite brain with our infinite mind, or to
put it differently, our brains finite perception with our minds infinite reason, will
ultimately enable us to experience the real physical world in its unified wholeness
free of contradiction, inequality, and injustice. It will enable us to experience our
indefinitely accelerating and violent society an = a deprived of unity and justice as
a complete constant and harmonious society b endowed, with unity, equality and
maximum justice similar to our real physical universe. It will finally enable us to
experience the real community of beings connected logically and physically by
the synthetic equivalence principle and geometrically by the limiting pointthe
singularity comprising everything, if taken as a unifying whole and principle, and
comprised in everything, if taken as a fundamental or smallest particle.
We will then definitively call this real community of beings kosmia polis
(kosmopolis) or, better, to use Platos own term, kallipolis (beautiful city), the unified
and just society replicating the kosmos, for what else is beauty (kallos) than proportion,
equality, and the unity of opposites, which Plato identifies with Intelligence, Love,
and Justice and which he considers as societys supreme good.
The Cosmic Road Map to the Supreme Good
anything which is coming into being is incomplete, and is in progress
toward its principle(Aristotle, Physics13)
Where are we now?
13
See Aristotle, Physics 261a13( translated by Robin Waterfield, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996,)
277
In relative terms, we are at the fixed center a of the real physical universe,
represented by the infinite sphere whose radius r is of infinite size and its limiting
boundary b is of zero size and infinite curvature. At the center a, our society appears
finite and time-conditioned and has the lowest level of being characterized by
minimum speed, energy, information, and justice.
The finite society is composed of finite observers with finite brains. The
finite brain at rest is a collection of low-frequency nerve cells that operate on a
positive time scale t > 0 (where positive time is any time greater than 10-19s) and
detect lights observable speed c taken as the finite unit c = 1. The finite speed
of light, in turn generates a time delay between any two points of space a, b that
transforms their relationship of coexistence into one of succession, contradiction,
and conflict in agreement with analytic principles of organization. The succession of
points constitutes an aggregate whose chaotic multiplicity of points lacks unity and
reciprocal contact, and each point is an isolated individual perceived from a unique
angle at one time and from different angles at different times.
Thus, the finite brain perceives the limiting boundary b of the eternal, infinite,
physical universe having the highest level of being as if it were the ultimate past or
the ultimate future of the center (here and now) a, whereas in reality b is simultaneous
with a.
This observable part of the physical universe is a Euclidean plane an containing
galaxies, which, under the eccentric force of repulsion, accelerates away from
the center a and towards the boundary b. Indeed, the speed of its acceleration v is
proportional to the galactic planes distance d from the finite observer at the center a
in conformity with the Hubble law
v =kd, where k is the Hubble constant of proportionality roughly equal to
3104 m/s/1022m.14
Because our finite society is constrained by linear time -the source of all
contradictions- it is an akosmos polis devoid of its supreme good and contradicting
the infinite and timeless Kosmos.
14
See Heidmann Jean, Extragalactic Adventure: Our Strange Universe, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, London, 1982, p. 62.
278
Ion Soteropoulos
Where are we going?

Similar to the accelerating Euclidean plane an, our finite society and brain
accelerate away from the center a (here, now), which is the state of lowest being
(the problem), and orient themselves towards the limiting boundary b of the infinite
physical universe, which is the state of highest being characterized by the realization
of the supreme good (the solution). The state of lowest being has minimum speed,
energy, information, equality and justice, whereas the state of highest being has
maximum speed, energy, information, equality, and justice, all of which constitute
different determinations of the supreme good possessed by the perfect body: the
perpetually living infinite physical universe.
Progression is the term for this acceleration from the lowest state of being to
the highest. The driving force of our progressing society is the desire (love) for the
supreme good whose gravitational manifestation is the centric force of attraction
pulling our progressing society at the center a towards the limiting boundary b.
The topos of the supreme good is the physical universes self-replicating
limiting boundary b existing at a maximum distance from us, outside and inside our
finite brain. This limiting boundary b is regarded from the chronological perspective
as the ultimate origin or end of the physical universe; from the ontological perspective,
it is our finite brains fundamental reality. The limiting boundary b is also the topos
where linear time -the source of all contradictions- is annihilated, bodies move at the
real speed of light c = 1= x 0, and in a general manner every unit quantity of a given
kind is an infinite unit, which is the product of infinite and zero quantities, or which
is the same, is the product of infinite and zero magnitudes without contradiction or
paradox (see Figure 4).
279
Fig. 4
The center a is the place where society is finite and time-conditioned and has
the state of minimum justice and zero speed, or of partial justice and indefinitely
accelerating speed. The limiting boundary b is the place where society replicates the
infinite and timeless Kosmos and has the state of maximum justice and highest speed
equal to the real speed of light c = 1 = x 0.
The method for attaining the supreme good is not the indefinite transformation
of our institutions: rather, it is, the change of our individual perception, which is
neural, into a universal perception, which is independent of our nerve cells. In fact,
it is impossible for our indefinitely progressing finite society an to reach the state of
supreme good on the limiting boundary b of the physical universe unless we assume
that each finite brain of the society is already relative to its fundamental reality -its
smallest constituents of matter- a kosmios nous ( o) or infinite brain-mind
endowed with universal perception.
The change of the nature of perception is accomplished by elevating our finite
brain at the center a to the level of its fundamental reality on the limiting boundary
280
Ion Soteropoulos
b of the physical universe where it becomes a kosmios nous thinking and perceiving
universally through its smallest constituents: the fundamental particles (singularities)
of zero volume and infinite curvature. Thus, the self-replicating limiting boundary
b of the physical universe is both the boundary of the greatest containing whole (in
the macrocosmos) enveloping everything and the boundary of the smallest contained
part (in the microcosmos) existing in everything.
The infinite brain-mind is the body endowed with a universal (impartial and
spherical) perception of things. It perceives the diversity of beings as unity and
community and each point of the community of points as a communicating universe
having different determinations simultaneously. But how can our brains lowfrequency nerve cells access their smallest constituents and benefit from their highest
infinite frequency, energy and unity in a stable state and in a room temperature
without undergoing disintegration by fire?
When we have the answer, we will have acquired the supreme power of
universal perception, that which enables us to perceive the hidden unity of things
lying beneath the surface (Heraclitus).15 We have then attained the state of highest
being characterized by the realization of the supreme good in the real community
of beings composed of infinite universal observers. We call this real community
kosmia polis (kosmopolis), because it replicates the Kosmos, or, kallipolis (Plato)-a
beautiful, harmonious and perpetually living city free of linear time.
References
Aristote, La Metaphysique, traduction par J. Tricot, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin,
Paris, 1986.
Aristotle, Physics, translated by Robin Waterfield, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1996.
Cantor George, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers,
Dover Publications, New York, 1968.
See Kirk, Raven &Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1988, Chapter: Heraclitus, p. 192.
15
281
Kant I., Critique of Pure Reason, Everymans Library, London, 1991.

Kirk G., Raven J. &, Schofield M. The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1988.
Plato, The Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett, Kaye Dreams Novel Art, New
York, 2009.
Heidmann Jean, Extragalactic Adventure: Our Strange Universe, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
Heisenberg W., Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science, George
Allen & Unwin, London, 1971.
Tegmark Max, The Importance of Quantum Decoherence in Brain Processes,
arxiv:quant-ph/9907009V2 10 Nov. 1999.
Ion Soteropoulos
Independent Research Philosopher
Apeiron Centre
Paris, France
Helen Tatla
The investigation of the relation of mathematics to architectural form
as a moral and political enquiry. A philosophical discussion
1. Introduction
This paper focuses on a critical evaluation of the implications for architecture
of the implementation of mathematical principles as an expression of the ideal of
democracy within Western culture. Classical Greek architecture on the basis of the
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle will be examined on the one hand and Modern
architecture on the basis of Jurgen Habermas defense of the democratic ideal on the
basis of the concept of communicative action on the other.
2. Democratic values and their relation to form in classical Greek architecture
It is important to our argument to go to the origins of the democratic foundation
of the Classical polis and investigate its interference with architectural form. Hence,
a philosophical investigation of the role of mathematics as a formative factor in the
Classical Greek temple with reference to the concept of democracy as an expression
of justice within the Classical city-state, will engage us next.
In Plato and Aristotle alike, the finite nature of the particulars caused their
eternal and immutable principles, the ideas, to be connected with numbers. The
identification of measure and proportion with the essence of things, or with beauty
and truth, or with the Idea of the Good, is basic to the Platonic conception of the ideas
and their relation to the sensible world.1
Aristotle says that Plato distinguishes between causative numbers which are
intelligible and cause being and generation, and sensible numbers which exist in
the corporeal world.2 It is obvious that, due to the transcendent character of the ideas,
1
Plato, Statesman, 283b-285b (transl. H. N. Fowler), The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann
Ltd, London, 1952 (c/1939).
2
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 990a30 (transl. H. Tredennick), The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1933.
The investigation of the relation of mathematics to architectural form...
283
causative numbers do not exist as such in the corporeal world, but only in the
form of sensible numbers. But while Plato assumes that measure and proportion
are absolute and universal, Aristotle asserts that they are absolute within the limits
of each eidos. Nevertheless, these two contradictory views appear to have been well
combined in practice.3
On the other hand, the Classical polis was a divine and universal entity, ordered
by god and human reason. Within its milieu, nomos was man-made and intelligible
in principle. Although it was conceived by the first legislators (Draco late 7th c.,
Solon early 6th c. and Cleisthenes about the end of the 6th c. B.C.) as relative and
subject to change, it was considered, until the mid-fifth century at least, as sacred and
immutable in practice. Almost as a rule, changes were introduced through legislation
by decrees. In parallel to nomos, the Homeric, god-given themis survived under the
name of thesmoi. Thesmoi dealt mainly with religious matters. In the philosophical
field, the resolution of the two, apparently contradictory aspects of the identity of
polis was achieved through metaphysics.4
As the symbol of polis, the temple expresses in principle its ideal of justice. In
parallel to the universal and immutable character of the nomos of the polis, the form of
the temple originating in the Homeric past, was accepted as sacred and unchangeable
throughout the Classical period. Minor changes only, analogous to legislation by
decree, were accepted in order to express analogous changes in the political identity
of the city-state. Every change in the form of the temple indicates a closer approach
to the idea of polis as such. Measure and proportion refers to the concept of justice
according to the man-made law of the democratic city-state.5
3
See Aristotles objection in: op. cit., Metaphysics, 987b30-988a5.
Gregory Vlastos, Solonian Justice, in: Classical Philology, 1946, Vol. 41, pp. 73-8. See also discussion in: G. Glotz, La cite greque, ed. Albin Michel, Paris, 1928, pp. 134-6; see also: Werner Jaeger,
Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1946 (c/1933 in German), p.111. For the
difference of meaning between the political and the social see: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition,
The University of Chicago Press, 1958, pp. 23-29.
For an extensive discussion on the expression of justice by the form of the Classical Greek temple, see:
Helen Tatla, Idea & Freedom: The search for form in Classical Architecture and the Modern Movement,
284
Helen Tatla
The concept of individual freedom as was ensured in the political field by

the Solonian Justice, underlies the form of the temple through demands for selfsufficiency of the whole and of the parts within the whole. Representing the political
order, the conceptual order of the temple predescribes the causal relation between
its parts in such a way as to ensure the individual character of each, by connecting it
into an ordered whole in intelligible terms. Thus the essence is translated into matter
through a process controlled by the intellect as Aristotle states.6
This evolution is ultimately controlled by the essence, as becomes clear with
the case of the columns, for instance, which throughout antiquity remained much
thicker than what needed in terms of structural strength. The self-sufficiency of the
parts is actually achieved through the overcoming of a mere expression of their
material function. The flutings, for example, release the column from its material
existence, while the tapering stresses its individuality by manifesting an active
response to the supportive function. Under the process of individuation, the strong
tapering of both shaft and capital which attached the column to the stylobate and
the architrave rather than stressing its individual character was progressively
reduced and modified. This aimed to emancipate the column from the stylobate and
the architrave, and, in this sense, lead to maximum active participation between the
parts of the temple. In architecture, as in the political field, this was achieved only
about a century after Solons laws.
In the late sixth century, with Cleisthenes reforms, through which political
justice was emancipated from the morality as was expressed by the solidarity of the
family, a real harmony between individual liberty and equality of the citizens front
of the law, was accomplished.7 The causal relation that underlies the process towards
individual liberty in the Solonian Justice, gave its place to a dialectic relation between
Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. Of Edinburgh, 1989, publ. in: www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/6988; see chapters
1 & 2, in particular.
6
Op. cit., Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1034a23-b2. Aristotle suggests that the autonomous existence of
things is approachable to us only through its corporeal exposition of the nature of hermeneutic knowledge is undertaken byHans-Georg Gadamer in: Truth and method, Sheed and Wand Ltd, London, 1975
(transl. from: Wahrheit und Methode, J. C. B. Mohr, Tubingen, 1960).
E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1951, p. 35.
285
free individuals interacting on equal terms within the political realm of the polis.
As far as the Classical temple is concerned, equality built upon dialectics, far
from being a frozen and superficial relation, is essential and creative. The fact that
temples of different size do not follow a uniform scale, but differ from each other
in the relation of their parts for instance, shows the essential character of equality
based on a dialectic relation of the constituent parts. Regularity and individual liberty
develop in parallel for a certain period. Diversity in the same or between different
temples still prevents equality, far from resulting in a meaningless typification.8
From the second half of the fifth century nevertheless, the gradual split
between human and divine morality resulted in the growth of plurality and regularity
in the form of the temple. The increasing demand for equality in the realm of the
polis was transferred to architecture as an increasing trend towards regularity.9 The
temple of Aphaea at Aegina built about the turn of the sixth century belongs to the
first of the temples that clearly aim at simple relations of parts. At the same time,
the tapering of the shaft and the capitals are much more geometrical and reduced
in comparison to earlier temples, in favour of the manifestation of the individual
character of the columns.10 It seems that the evolution of the temple upwards,
towards the achievement of the ideal of justice, gradually turns into an opposite
kind of evolution away from the idea. The Classical period, that is to say the fifth
century B.C., could be characterized as the transitional period. The Parthenon could
be considered as a representative of the climax of the transition, by being the closest
to the ideal of the corporeal manifestation of the polis, showing the unity between its
political and religious aspects, and, at the same time, indicating the overestimation of
the aesthetic aspect of the temple as an expression of power and wealth at the expense
of morality and politics in the traditional sense. The Parthenon itself shows some of
the first instances of plurality in form, by its wealth of sculpture which was alien to
the traditional Doric simplicity, and by being the first temple which combined both
the Doric and the Ionic orders.
8
Op. cit., Helen Tatla, p. 57.
Ibid., pp. 59-60.
10
See discussion in: J. J. Coulton, Greek Architects at Work, Granada, London, 1977, p. 123.
286
Helen Tatla
Summarizing our discussion concerning democratic values and the form of

the Classical temple we can argue that democratic values intervene in the idea of the
already existing Classical temple and operate mainly as regulators of the relations
between parts, while they stimulate a process towards increasing geometrical
abstraction. This implies that in practice the idea of the Classical temple is always
subject to change without losing its eternal and immutable character. There is a second
point of view however, which indicates that democratic values play a secondary role
in relation to the idea of the temple which comes from tradition. In this case the
form of the temple as a metaphysical entity comes from the past and the emphasis
on the mathematics of its form is of a minor importance. In both cases however, the
interfering of democratic values affects the mathematics of the form of the temple.
3. Habermas, Democracy, Architecture
In the contemporary era, Juergen Habermas insists on the universal validity of
the norm of communicative action. Aiming to defend democracy against manipulation,
Habermas distinguishes between values and norms and attributes a minor role to
values. He insists that they have no universal validity since they are socially produced
and can vary following social, political, religious or other imperatives. The norm of
communicative action requires us to defend our values in a rational discourse.11
Applying this to architecture, we could consider architectural reasoning as the
outcome of a rational communication involving the architect and society. It deals with
values which have survived the communicative action and thus been legitimized.
Communicative action as the generative rational procedure underlying the
conception of a work of architecture implies for Habermas an immanent criticism
that far from opposing to the Modern as Postmodern architecture would probably
suggest - it provides it with the means of a continuing existence. Thus for Habermas
the values which a work of architecture has to express, should be the subject of a
constant legitimizing action within a rational communicative framework.
Habermas conceives of communicative action as a universally valid norm
Juergen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, (transl. Thomas MacCarthy), Beacon Press
1984 (c/ 1981 in German).
11
287
pointing to the quintessence of democracy. However, as Hilary Putnam argues,

rational discourse has the need of categorical imperatives in order to operate; hence
there is always a danger of authoritarianism hidden behind its normative character.12
In architecture in particular, the ideal of a never ending rational interaction is related
by Habermas to Euclidean abstraction and Gestalt forms on the one hand as well as to
the fulfillment of functional needs on a rational basis on the other. We argue here that
from a Habermasian point of view, abstract geometry organized in Gestalt wholes
along with rational functionalism represent normative and, in this way, unnegotiable
principles of any communicative action in architecture. Defending democracy against
manipulation Habermas gives a minor role to values which can vary following social,
political, religious or other imperatives. However, this results to the undermining of
communicative action and, in the end, of democracy itself.
In his essay Modern and Postmodern architecture13, Habermas rejects
Postmodern architecture in all its expressions neo-historical, stage-set ultramodern, vernacular vitalistic in favour of a critical continuation of the Modern.
He states:
Modern architecture is still the first and only unifying style since
the days of classicism. It has developed out of both the organic as well
as the rationalistic origins of a Frank Lloyd Wright and an Adolf Loos,
and flourished in the most successful work of a Gropius and a Mies van
der Rohe, a Le Corbusier and an Alvar Aalto. It is the only architectural
movement to originate from the avant-garde spirit ; in other words it
became classic itself and set the foundations of a tradition that from the
very beginning crossed national boundaries.14

When Habermas defends Modern against Postmodern architecture, his
approach is in fact formalistic in the sense that rational discourse is ensured by
12
Hilary Putnam, The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy, Harvard University Press, 2002. See chapter
7: Values and Norms, pp. 111-134 in particular.
13
Juergen Habermas, Modern and Postmodern Architecture, incl. in: Neil Leach ed., Rethinking Architecture, Routledge & New York, 1997, pp. 227-235.
14
Ibid., p. 228.
288
Helen Tatla
Euclidean geometry and organic wholes. It seems that the normative character of
the communicative action he proposes, by imposing its own mathematics on form,
in fact restricts or even suspends the procedure of form generation as an outcome of
the communicative action. Is in this case any space left for values to interfere in the
genesis of form?
By rejecting an instrumental architecture which would impoverish cultural life,
Habermas focuses on normative rationality as a force of social change. He objects
to the generation of form from function, in the sense proposed by Bruno Taut in his
motto What functions well looks good.15 He also keeps a distance from Adornos
distinction between the work of art that functions within itself and the use-object
that functions for exterior purposes.16 He writes:
The term functionalism incorporates certain key notions-principles for
the construction of rooms, for the use of materials and methods of production and
organization. Functionalism is based on the conviction that forms should express
the use-functions for which a building is produced. But the expression functionalism
also suggests false concepts. If nothing else it conceals the fact that the qualities of
modern buildings result from a consistently applied autonomous system of aesthetic
rules.17
He suggests that modern architecture owes its form to constructivism, which
followed the experimental attitude of the avant-garde painting. In fact, three groups
are considered by Habermas as those which faced the problems set by cubism: Le
Corbusier and the purists, constructivism related mainly to Malevich, and De Stijl
related to Theo van Doesburg, Mondrian and Oud.18
In fact, focusing on purism, constructivism and De Stijl, Habermas adopts
the rejection of cubist distortion and collage/montage principles, in favour of the
universal validity deriving from the Platonic origin of the pure geometrical solids
combined with an abstract Euclidean conception of space.19 The fact that the synthesis
15
Ibid., p. 232.
Ibid., p. 231.
17
Ibid., p. 231.
18
Ibid., pp. 231-2.
16
19
See for instance: Kenneth ]\, Modern Architecture. A Critical History. Thames & Hudson Ltd, London, 1980, pp. 143ff, 152ff, 167ff.
289
of form becomes a well organized whole can be related to the Gestalt psychology
which had much to share with the matters which the artists and the architects of the
period dealt with.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, it seems that Habermas position suggests a reverse attitude
towards architectural form in comparison to the approach to Classical architecture
described previously: in Classical architecture values which originate in tradition
come first as a form generator, while democracy as a dialectic relation between
equals founded on reason (in its ideal conception), is expressed by the pre-given
architectural form through minor changes affecting the relation of parts and the
whole and aiming to more abstraction. Habermas starts the communicative procedure
which he proposes from the second part: Democratic values baring a normative
character are expressed by regular geometrical solids and organic wholes. Functional
imperatives follow.
This, however, generates a series of questions concerning Habermas position.
Why, opposing to Habermas, not start without defining the categorical predicates
of a democratic architecture in a normative and unchangeable manner. What does
individual freedom, equality in front of the law or rational discourse really mean?
Is democracy a harmonic and ideal situation or a never ending strife of man to live
in dignity on the basis of a rational discourse? Why not leave space for instance to
values as otherness, respect to nature or tradition or, express an opposition or a doubt.
In fact openness can ensure the democracy of the procedure. On the other hand, we
should not forget that architecture is essentially an art, which implies that, after all,
the question always turns to be what form and back again what does this form
mean. The openness of this procedure is what guaranties truth. Not the opposite.
Dr Helen Tatla
Architect
Associate Professor
of Technological and Educational
Institute of Athens
Athens
Jonny Thakkar
Abstract: The idea that Platos Republic can help us think about contemporary
political life might seem implausible. In this paper I work to dislodge that view by
showing that aspects of the Republic can help us to understand aspects of Marxs
critique of capitalism, and a fortiori our own world. The obvious objection to this
project would concern anachronism. Yet Marx himself credits Aristotles account
of perversions in the teleology of exchange with a major role in his own thinking;
insofar as this is true, understanding Aristotles account will help us to grasp at
least one part of Marxs critique of capitalism. But Marx thinks that production is
more important than exchange, all things considered. I show that Platos account of
moneymaking in production is congruent with Marxs. Even if we cannot trace any
direct influence, unlike with Aristotle, reading Capital in light of the Republic can
nonetheless be illuminating in much the same way as reading it in light of Aristotle
is widely acknowledged to be.
1. The idea that Platos Republic can help us think about any of the political
issues of our era might justifiably raise eyebrows. The Republics political philosophy
is apt to strike us as impossibly alienan ideal at once infeasible and undesirable.
Plato seems to assume a political unit much smaller than those with which we are
familiar, certainly no larger than the Athens of his day and possibly smaller (432bc). In contrast to our faith in democracyat least in theory if not in practicePlato
advocates a strict division of citizens into three part (classes) with clear hierarchies
in education, work, status and power. Both of the top two classes are to live without
family and property and therefore arguably without the private sphere privileged
in liberal thought and liberal modernity. And at the top of the tree sit philosophers,
291
of all people. It seems reasonable to conclude that there is simply no way in which
Platos Republic can help us think about contemporary politics. I do not agree with
that conclusion. On the contrary: in this paper I want to argue that Plato can help
illuminate Marxs critique of capitalism.
2. There is one obvious objection to the thought that Plato can help illuminate
Marxs critique of capitalism: Plato wrote a long time ago. He had no knowledge of
modern life and therefore no knowledge of capitalism and a fortiori no knowledge of
capitalism. This objection obviously relies on the suppressed premise that capitalism
is a modern phenomenon. One might conceivably respond by challenging that
premise, pointing out that ancient Athens was a fulcrum for Mediterranean trade, and
arguing that such a level of commerce deserves the name capitalist. This proposition
bears thinking about for two reasons. First, we should indeed keep in mind that the
Republic was written against the background of, and in opposition to, a society that
was not only democratic (as is often remarked) but also commercial to what was
(or at least might plausibly have seemed to be) an unprecedented and unparalleled
degree. The text begins, of course, with Socrates walking down to the Piraeus, the
Athenian port and therefore its commercial centre, and engaging in conversation
with Cephalus, a real-life figure who was basically an international arms dealer.1
Second, the question as to whether Athens might have been capitalist forces us to
confront a difficulty with the term capitalist. The term will only be of analytical
See Debra Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics (Hackett Pub
Co Inc, 2002). For a provocative reading of the Cephalus scene, see Cephalus, Odysseus, and the Importance of Experience, the third chapter of C.D.C. Reeve, Blindness and Reorientation: Problems in
Platos Republic (Oxford University Press, 2012). On the Piraeus, see J. H. Croon, The Encyclopedia
of the Classical World. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 1535-6: It was the Athenians
famous victory at Salamis that enabled the development of Piraeus into a commercial as well as military harbour facility. A century later, Isocrates hailed its creation: for Athens established the Piraeus
as a market in the centre of Hellasa market of such abundance that the articles which it is difficult
to obtain, one here, one there, from the rest of the world, all these it is easy to produce from Athens
(Panegyricus 42). For a more general account of how the phenomenon of money may have shaped
Greek philosophy, see Richard Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy
(Cambridge University Press, 2004).
1
292
Jonny Thakkar
or explanatory value to the degree that we can give it some kind of stable meaning.
For whether or not Nietzsche is right that only terms without a history can be given
a definition, it does seem that usages of politically charged terms are too varied and
too vague for scholarly purposes. The only way to be absolutely clear about what we
mean in such cases will be to stipulate, to fix terms by fiat, even if only in a temporary
and revisable manner. Capitalism is no exception.
3. My claim is that Plato can help illuminate Marxs account of capitalism.
That simplifies things. Or at least it would, were it not for the fact that Marxs account
is itself composed of many different strands. When we think of Marxs account
of capitalism we tend to think of a system of exploitation whereby the propertied
bourgeoisie exploiting the propertyless proletariat by extracting surplus value during
the production process. With respect to this understanding of capitalism there is
obviously a radical difference between the ancient and modern worlds. Certainly
Marx thought so. In the Communist Manifesto he claims that the history of all
hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles, but he is equally adamant
that the nature of these struggles changes throughout history. Whereas in Ancient
Greece exploitation was direct, involving (not only, but crucially) masters and
slaves, citizens and non-citizens, men and women, in the modern world it is veiled
by the laws of the production process. And while Plato does abolish property for his
guardians and auxiliaries, this has to do with avoiding corruption rather than putting
an end to exploitation. What of the other strands? Moishe Postone has argued that
Marx provides an account of a dynamic whereby under capitalism a contradiction
emerges between the growing redundancy of human labour due to productivity
gains and the need to work ever more intensely due to the system of value, with
the consequence that possibilities for human flourishing are at once thrown up and
frustrated, while lived experience becomes ever faster.2 Plato would obviously have
had nothing to say about the operations of that dynamic. A different strand concerns
the emergence of mystifications in society, the systematic (and largely unconscious)
2
Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marxs Critical Theory
(Cambridge University Press, 1996).
293
production of ideational distortions and misunderstandings which Marx diagnoses,

from religion to the commodity fetish. Some sort of comparison with Platos noble
falsehood might be possible here, but it would most likely be facile and misleading.
I would like to focus on a strand that was highlighted by Georg Lukacsalthough I
make no effort to follow Lukacs own account of itnamely the idea of capitalism as
a system whereby society is increasingly structured by the commodity form.3 Im
not going to argue that this is the primary or fundamental strand in Marxs work or
in Capital in particular; it may be, but that is not relevant here. The point is just that
it is a strand that can be cleanly isolated from the other strands such that we can use
it to give the term capitalism a clear sense; that it has clear value for anyone trying
to grasp the present; and that Plato can help us grasp it.
4. In Volume One of Capital, Marx distinguishes two kinds of exchange,
simple and capitalist. Simple exchange has the form C-MC: one useful item (C)
is sold, i.e. converted into money (M), in order that another (C) can be bought.
Capitalist exchange has the inverse form, as it were, namely M-C-M: money is
converted into a useful item only for the sake of acquiring more money. Note that any
given transactionthe purchase of a drill, for examplemight fit into either pattern.
The point is to isolate the two forms of exchange analytically. They are differentiated
by their teloi. In simple exchange, money is a means of satisfying human needs
or producing use value; in capitalist exchange the satisfaction of human needs is
simply a means of generating more money or exchange value.
The simple circulation of commoditiesselling in order to buyis a
means to a final goal which lies outside circulation, namely the appropriation
of use-values, the satisfaction of needs. As against this, the circulation of
money as capital is an end in itself. (253)4
This is roughly speaking one half of one strand within Marxs Capital. Later
3
Georg Lukcs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (The MIT Press, 1972).
Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1 (Penguin Classics) (Penguin Classics,
1993).
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Jonny Thakkar
on well see what the second half of that strand looks like, and how it allows us
to grasp something about capitalist society in general. But for now let us pause in
order to remind ourselves of something that is commonly recognized among Marx
scholars, namely that everything so far derives from Aristotle.
5. In Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that in order to
flourish humans require external goods such as money, good looks and fortune
(although these are less important than virtuous activity in accordance with right
reason). The art of property acquisition (kttik) has clear value both for individual
households and for the community at large, he says in the Politics: it secures some
of the goods (chrmatauseful things) necessary for the good life. Understood like
this, mind you, riches are mere tools (organa). They should be pursued only to the
degree that they contribute to human flourishing.5 Yet out of this natural practice
of property acquisition there can arise a perversion, Aristotle observes: the idea
of a moneymaking as an end in itself and hence as a distinct craft (chrmastik)
unregulated by our real needs.6 What makes this perversion possible, on Aristotles
account, is the nature of exchange. Exchange, however healthy, will always require
us to use a given good not as the good that it itself is, but as equivalent to other
goods. For example, although the primary or proper (oikeios) use of a shoethat
for the sake of which it comes into beingis to protect the feet, in barter a pair of
shoes might be used as equivalent to, say, half a pillow. In order to make exchange
more convenient, Aristotle hazards, humans begin to use one particular commodity,
such as silver or gold, as a general measure of the exchange-value of other goods.
This commodity becomes the currency (nomisma).7 And it is at this point that the
possibility of perversion arises, because it now becomes possible to think of currency
as wealth itself. This is mistaken, conceptually speaking, because even the richest
man can still die of hunger; properly understood, riches constitute wealth just to the
extent that they help us achieve the good life.8 But apart from being a mistake, it also
5
Aristotle, Politics (Hackett Publishing Company, 1998)., 1256b27-40.
Ibid., 1256b40-1257b40.
Ibid., 1257a6-14, 1257a32-41.
Ibid., 1257b8-31; Aristotle uses the Midas legend as a figure for this thought.
295
perverts exchange itself. For if property acquisition becomes decoupled from the
requirements of household and political management, it becomes a craft unto itself.
Even if it makes use of the same articles as natural property acquisition, it disciplines
them towards a new telos: accumulation. The means has become the end. And as an
end in itself, the acquisition of money becomes a boundless task.
6. Aristotles account of the craft of moneymaking (chrmastik) is obviously
the basis of Marxs account of capitalist exchange as I have briefly stated it, from the
notion of use-value versus exchange value to the reversal of priority between those
dimensions and the consequent limitlessness of moneymaking. (Marx also follows
Aristotles account of the origins of money, as had Adam Smith before him.9) Marx
acknowledges the debt, calling Aristotle the greatest thinker of antiquity, the
great investigator who was the first to analyse the value-form, like so many forms
of thought, society and nature, and citing him repeatedly.10 But what is crucial for
present purposes is not so much the influence that Aristotle actually had on Marx
both directly and via Adam Smithas the fact that Marx took him to have uncovered
the basic structure of capitalist exchange even though he lived in Ancient Greece.
7. This ought to strike us as odd. Marx does not think Athens was a capitalist
society; he takes capitalism to be a modern phenomenon. Nor does he think Aristotle
was a prophet; he takes all thought to be bound to its time. His claim is that by paying
attention to certain nascent elements in his own society, connected with the rise of
commerce, Aristotle was able to isolate a form that would achieve its full importance
only with the advent of capitalism properand thereby to provide more insight into
the present, in some ways, than many modern theorists. By providing an account
9
On this topic see Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, 60, and Spencer Pack, Aristotle,
Adam Smith and Karl Marx: On Some Fundamental Issues in 21st Century Political Economy. As Pack
notes, Smith had rather less time for Plato than he did for Aristotle, claiming that the latter appears to
have been so much superior to his master in everything but eloquencesee Adam Smith, History of
Ancient Logics and Metaphysics, The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam
Smith, Vol. III, 122n.
10
See Marx, op. cit., 151, 152 and 532.
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uncluttered by all the other strands that go to make up modern capitalism, in other
words, Aristotle can as it were hold everything else constant in order to expose the
basic structure of moneymaking exchange. Not only that, but Aristotles very surprise
at this form of exchange, his dismissal of it as a mistake or a perversion, perhaps even
something like an illness, itself reveals something about the modern world. The word
miser, which denotes someone devoted to accumulation, derives from the Latin
word meaning wretched or miserable. If we no longer view moneymaking as
fundamentally wretched, it is because we have become inured to it; and if we have
become inured to it, it is because it is part of the very fabric of our society. Aristotle
gives us a vantage point from which to see this. To sum up, then, although Aristotles
analysis is no substitute for a theory of modernity, it can both inform and animate
such a theory. In principle there is no reason why something similar couldnt be true
of Plato. But first let us return to Marx.
8. At this stage it will help to extrapolate from Marxs own presentation in
order to think alongside him, as it were. The phenomenon of capitalist exchange is
of interest to Marx because it opens out into a vision of society more generally. From
the fact that the circulation of money as capital is an end in itself Marx concludes
that the movement of capital is therefore limitless (253). Whereas simple exchange
is in principle finite, since human needs only stretch so far, when accumulation
becomes an end in itself the process of exchange is freed from such constraints. Now
when exchange becomes unbounded we can infer that it will become increasingly
important in structuring social life. This is so for two reasons. First, rather than the
market being a location bounded in space (the marketplace) and time (Thursday
afternoon, say), for a pure accumulator it will be a permanent condition. Instead
of leaving the marketplace when his needs (say for wood or flour) are met, he will
remain until there are no more gains to be made through trade. Second, when our
accumulator does finally leave the domain of circulation, his activities will still be
structured (or mediated) by the goal of accumulation. He will deploy his productive
capacities, for example, alongside his capital (M), with the aim of producing goods
(C) that can be sold at market so as to augment his stock of capital (M). It is at
297
this point that goods become commodities in the full sense, the sense in which we
can speak of the commodity form. They are now produced as commodities, as
bearers of exchange-value rather than use-value. So the logic of pure accumulation
affects the teleology of production, as it were; insofar as a societys production is
under the control of pure accumulatorsthat is, of capitaliststhe end result will be
commodities. And at this point we have arrived at the notion of a capitalist society
one in which capitalist logic governs not only exchange but also production.
9. Marx draws on Aristotle, not Plato. Yet Aristotles critique of the craft
of moneymaking (chrmastik) clearly follows on from his teachers critique of
moneymakers (chrmatistai) as pseudo-craftsmen in Book I of the Republic. The
point isnt that Plato got there first or even that he said it better. The point is that what
Plato says is different to what Aristotle says, and that when you put the two together
you have something like two sides of Marxs coin. Aristotle focuses on exchange;
Plato focuses on production.
10. Is a doctor in the precise sense, Socrates asks Thrasymachus, a moneymaker or someone who treats the sick? (341c). Thrasymachus concedes that the
true doctor is not a moneymaker. This is puzzling. Why cant doctors treat the sick
and make money? Must a true doctor really sacrifice himself for his patients with
no reward? The distinction becomes clearer if we attend to what follows. Socrates
explains that he means to isolate the property in virtue of which we can appropriately
call someone a particular type of craftsman (341c-d). His hypothesis is that each craft
aims to provide a distinct good, and that aim is what distinguishes it from other crafts.
The craft of navigation, for instance, aims at making us safe while sailing (346a).
This is not to say it provides no other benefits: sailing may be good for ones health,
for example. But the reason why sailing is not medicine, no matter how good it is
for the health, is that health is not what it aims to produceit is only an incidental
benefit (346b). The notion of aim is a little vague but we can make it more concrete
by thinking in terms of standards of success and failure: if a navigator fails to become
healthy during a voyage, he has not thereby failed qua navigator; if his boat runs
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Jonny Thakkar
aground, he has. A true craftsmanthe craftsman in the precise sense, the craftsman
qua craftsmantherefore deliberates in light of standards of success internal to
his craft, and hence with an eye to the benefit which that craft characteristically
produces, its function. Now Socrates argument with respect to moneymaking is that
wages stand to medicine as health stands to navigation: they amount to an incidental
benefit that plays no role in making medicine what it is, and hence plays no role in
the deliberations of a true doctor. Socrates accepts that a true doctor can also seek
wages, but denies that he does so qua doctor. Insofar as an individual aims at earning
wages, he thereby engages in a distinct craft, namely wage-earning (misthtikos;
346a-347a).11 Hence the doctor in the precise sense is no moneymaker.
11. At this stage an objection might arise. For Socrates point has been limited
to craftsmen qua craftsmen, rather than qua human beings. But why should anyone
engage in a craft in the first place? On this point Socrates says something that might
seem to negate his previous position. Given the contrast between a true doctor and a
wage-earner, we might expect Socrates to enjoin altruistic self-sacrifice on the part of
individualsdoctors living off alms and such like. In fact, however, Socrates accepts
that people will in fact require wages to motivate them to engage in a given craft
(347a). But if this is the case, why then isnt moneymaking the master craft standing
above all particular crafts? After all, a craft can incorporate subordinate crafts. The
craft of shoemaking can include the craft of lace-cutting, for example, insofar as
the latter is disciplined towards the former and hence guided by its standards of
success. But if we engage in medicine for the sake of money, isnt medicine simply
a subordinate activity within the master craft of moneymaking? And doesnt that
destroy the distinction between doctors and moneymakers?12
11
There is a real question as to whether wage-earning can in fact count as a craft, given Socrates
apparent understanding of crafts: it does not seem to be set over some object that is deficient, unless
that object is ones wallet; and if it belongs to some other type of craftin particular, one that benefits
the craftsmanthen Socrates argument against Thrasymachus will fail. See Rachel Barney, Socrates
Refutation of Thrasymachus, Gerasimos Santas, The Blackwell Guide to Platos Republic (Blackwell
Guides to Great Works) (Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 52.
12
Allan Bloom raises a somewhat similar objection. See Plato, The Republic of Plato: Second Edition
299
12. Now Plato does seem to equate the vast majority of actual craftsmen with
moneymakers. In Book IV, for instance, he speaks of someone who is by nature a
craftsman or some other kind of moneymaker, as if the two are equivalent (434a).
Yet he is certainly at pains to deny that one particular type of craftsmanthe ruler
is a moneymaker, and I see no reason why the same should not hold for all true
craftsmen, whether or not any currently exist.13 The key is to distinguish between
moneymaking and wage-earning. For strictly speaking the argument outlined in the
previous paragraph established that craftsmen are all wage-earners, not that they are
all moneymakers. And Socrates goes on to argue that money is just one form of wage.
A second kind of wage is honour: someone who becomes a doctor out of the desire for
honour is therefore an honour-seeker, not a moneymaker. The final kind of wage is
more complicated. Socrates frames it as the avoidance of a penalty or a punishment,
but also as the best peoples kind of wages (347a). The best kind of people are
motivated to rule, for example, by the fact that their not doing so would lead to
disasterspecifically, the disaster of lesser people carrying out the task (347c).14
13. Socrates stops here because his dispute with Thrasymachus has centred
on ruling. But his argument would seem to extend to other crafts besides ruling.
Every doctor is a wage-earner before he is a doctor; yet different kinds of people
seek different kinds of wage. Some pursue medicine for money; others pursue it for
honour; but the best pursue it because they dont want lesser people to carry out the
task. This might seem like a strange motivation at first, but on reflection it makes
perfect sense. A society is a cooperative scheme that comes about in order to satisfy
our needs. The scheme will work betterand our needs will be better satisfiedto
(Basic Books, 1991), Interpretive Essay, 332-333.
13
One might object that the ruler is not a craftsman: his activity is only analogous to that of a craftsman.
But this is textually inaccurate, since Plato does speak of ruling as a craft in Book VI (500d). It is important to distinguish between those times when Plato is speaking of craftsmen as a distinct class within
Kallipolis (specifically the one lacking wisdom and courage) and those times when he is thinking of
crafts as structured activities aiming to produce particular goods.
14
In principle they may still receive money and honour, it seems to me; the point is only that this does
not guide their deliberations.
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Jonny Thakkar
the degree that each performs the task for which he is best suited. The best kind of
people are therefore motivated to engage in a particular craft by the desire to see
citizens deploy their talents appropriately within a division of labour constituted for
the sake of the common good. And when these are the wages in question, there is no
conflict between being a wage-earner and being a true craftsman.
14. But the corollary of this proposition is that neither moneymakers nor
honour-seekers can be true craftsmen. For if one craft is engaged in for the sake of
another, the subsidiary activity will be governed by standards of success derived
from the master activity. This is harmless in the case of lace-cutting and shoemaking.
But where moneymaking or honour-seeking is the master craft, the subsidiary craft
is likely to be distorted.15 The goal of medicine is to restore the patient to health. But
what if an opportunity arises for the doctor to enrich himself at the expense of the
patient, for example by prescribing needless and dangerous surgery? Qua doctor,
he should resist; qua moneymaker, he should accept; qua honour-seeker, he should
weigh the prestige that might be gained through additional wealth against the chances
of incurring dishonour by getting caught. What this example shows (on Platos
account) is that the money-maker and the honour-seeker can only ever masquerade
as, or imitate, doctors: benefitting the patient can only ever be an incidental goal to
them, pursued just insofar as the incentives line up advantageously. The standards of
success guiding their activity are not essentially related to social needs, and that is
what differentiates them from true craftsmen. Just as a sailor produces health only
incidentally, so they produce use-values only incidentally. If honour or exchangevalue could be realized through products that imitate use-values without actually being
use-values, that would be just fine. But this means that their products will themselves
be use-values only incidentally. At bottom they will be imitation goods.
15
Plato might think of moneymaking and honour-seeking as pseudo-crafts, but we can ignore that
complication here since pseudo-crafts presumably retain the same subordinating structure as real crafts.
In PCT I discuss pseudo-epistemai in light of J. C. B. Gosling and Plato, Plato (the Arguments of the
Philosophers) (Routledge, 1984).
301
15. I switched to the terminology of use-value and exchange-value in that

last paragraph in order to show just how easily Platos account of moneymaking
production dovetails with Marxs account of capitalist production. To a capitalist in
the precise sense, Marx thinks, the specific purpose that a product serves, its usevalue, is immaterial. If it were possible to go from M to M without passing through
C, the capitalist would.16
As the conscious bearer [Trger] of this movement, the possessor of money
becomes a capitalist. His person, or rather his pocket, is the point from
which the money starts, and to which it returns. The objective content of
the circulation we have been discussing the valorization of value is
his subjective purpose, and it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever
more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving force behind his operations
that he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified and endowed
with consciousness and a will. Use-values must therefore never be treated
as the immediate aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit on any single
transaction. His aim is rather the unceasing movement of profit-making.17
And just like Plato, Marx believes the teleology of production will affect the
ontology of the product.
16. On my reading Marx retains the Platonic-Aristotelian idea that the being of
As a matter of fact Marx thinks the M-M pattern does play a role in capitalism, as the form of finance
capital. But he insists that finance capital is necessarily secondary to productive capital, since real value
can only be added in the labour process.
16
Capital, Vol. One, p. 254. The same thought is also expressed at p. 739: Except as capital personified,
the capitalist has no historical value It is only to this extent that the necessity of the capitalists own
transitory existence is implied in the transitory necessity of the capitalist mode of production. But, in so
far as he is capital personified, his motivating force is not the acquisition and enjoyment of use-values,
but the acquisition and augmentation of exchange-values. See also p. 92, I do not by any means depict
the capitalist and the landowner in rosy colours. But individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they
are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers [Trger] of particular class-relations and
interests, and pp. 179, 342.
17
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a craft object depends on its form and function.18 A genuine shoe comes into existence
for the sake of protecting feet. This function determines what the shoe is: to use a
shoe as a shoe is to wear it.19 And the genuine shoemaker will obviously bear this in
mind when making his product: the partsleather, laces, wood, rubber, etc.will be
organized towards the end of satisfying the human need for foot protection. So even
if this shoe appears as an exchange-value when on the marketplace, i.e. as worth half
a pillow or ten dollars, the product is at bottom, in its very being, a good or use-value.
It would not be what it is if its form and function were different. In capitalism, on the
other hand, goods come into being for the sake of augmenting a stock of capital,
and their form is dependent on that function. Even if a commodity has to appear as
a use-value to attract a buyer, it is at bottom an exchange-value. The standards of
success that guided its production were those of profit, not use. And only as such does
it become a commodity in the precise sense, in Marxs view.20 So a commodity in the
precise sense is essentially an exchange-value, and only accidentally a use-value or
good: it comes into being for the sake of augmenting a stock of capital, not for the
sake of satisfying a human need.
17. But this ontological shift is not simply a reversal of priority between
18
See Marxs account of the labour process: [The worker] sets in motion the natural forces which
belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature
in a form adapted to his own needs At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had
already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only
effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [verwirklicht] his own purpose in
those materials (ibid., 283-4).
19
20
Politics, I.IX, 1257a.
See especially Capital, Volume One, 148-154. It is perhaps unfortunate that Marx doesnt give us a
different term for the simple-exchange form of commodity, where the use-value dimension is dominant.
In my explication I have simplified by equating exchange-value and what Marx calls value: strictly
speaking, exchange-value is itself a surface phenomenon that both expresses and veils a deeper dimension, value, where that amounts to what we might call labour-time-value. So the two dimensions
are not in fact use-value and exchange-value, but use-value and labour-time-value. But although this
complication is crucial for understanding many aspects of Capital, including the notion of exploitation
as the extraction of surplus value, it only serves to cloud the aspect that I am bringing out here.
303
the two dimensions, as if they could be considered independently of one another.

When exchange-value becomes the dominant dimension of a commodity, this shapes
the use-value dimension as well. This is because a given object is produced as a
commodity. Just as the genuine shoemaker has to bear in mind the function of shoes
when making his product, so the capitalist producer has to bear in mind that what
he is producing is a commodity, something whose function is to augment capital.
To do so it needs a buyer. It must therefore at least appear to be a good, whether
by satisfying or creating needs.21 But a commodity is not defective qua commodity
if it fails to satisfy any real needs, so long as it finds a buyer. This is not to say
that a commodity will never satisfy real needs, any more than a craft product will
necessarily do so. The point is simply that a commodity in the precise sense does
not, at base, even aim at being a real good. And yet it must endeavour to appear
as one. A commodity in the precise sense therefore masquerades as, or imitates, a
real good. For all other things being equal, this logic will influence choices made
during the production process, in terms of both material and form. To sum up,
then, insofar as commodities satisfy social needs, they will do so only haphazardly,
as an accidental by-product of their essential goal, which is to make money.
18. All this, needless to say, sounds just like Platos critique of moneymaking
in production. Just as Marxs view of the perversity of capitalist exchange might
be thought of as fundamentally Aristotelian, then, so his view of the perversity of
capitalist production might be thought of as fundamentally Platoniceven if there
is no reason to suppose any causal connection in the second case. Insofar as we
wish to bring out and dwell on that particular strand, whether theoretically or for the
purposes of practical politics, Plato can help us in much the same way as Aristotle
can. He allows us to view the phenomenon in isolation from various confounding
factors, and hence to get clear on its fundamental logic. Not only that, but he allows
us to see it in all of its strangeness.
21
On want creation in capitalism, see ibid., 201: Perhaps the commodity is the product of a new kind
of labour, and claims to satisfy a newly arisen need, or is even trying to bring forth a new need on its
own account.
304
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Croon, J. H. The Encyclopedia of the Classical World. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
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Gosling, J. C. B. Plato (the Arguments of the Philosophers). Routledge, 1984.
Greco, Anna. On the Economy of Specialization and Division of Labour in Platos
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Lukcs, Georg. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. The
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Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1 (Penguin Classics).
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Nails, Debra. The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics.
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Pack, Spencer. Aristotle, Adam Smith and Karl Marx: On Some Fundamental Issues
in 21st Century Political Economy. Edward Elgar Pub, 2010.
Postone, Moishe. Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marxs
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Plato. The Republic of Plato: Second Edition. Basic Books, 1991.
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Popper, K. The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol.1: The Spell of Plato. Princeton
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Reeve, C.D.C. Blindness and Reorientation: Problems in Platos Republic. Oxford
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Santas, Gerasimos. The Blackwell Guide to Platos Republic (Blackwell Guides to
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Jonny Thakkar
Cone-Haarlow-Cotsen Fellow
in the Society of Fellows in the Liberal Arts
Lecturer in Humanities and Philosophy
Princeton University
Theodora Tzanetaki
The Search for Wisdom and Unity as presented
in the Philosophy of Apollonius of Tyana
Abstract: This paper is dealing with the philosophy of the Neo-Pythagorean
philosopher Apollonius of Tyana (1st century A.D.). In his philosophy, we notice a
clear influence, not only from Stoicism, Gnosticism and Hermetism, but also from the
ascetic way of life practiced many centuries earlier by Pythagoras and his disciples.
The basic element of this philosophy is the multidimensional relation between
man and the cosmos that is founded on a special relation between man and the divine.
In his attempt to reveal, activate and experience his inner powers, the philosopher
turns to the divine powers. This does not originate from any dogmatic religious
teaching, but is an expression of mans request for wisdom and unity, which in our
modern times is more vital than ever before. This request can be fulfilled because the
divine principle can be found within man himself. In this philosophy, God is not a
concept, but an experience that comes to fulfill the philosophers deep desire.
According to our interpretation, in the philosophy of Apollonius of Tyana,
contemporary man can find answers to fundamental matters of life. This is a practical
philosophy that gives an answer with regard to the destination of those who seek
self-knowledge and a close connection between themselves and the cosmos. This
philosophy has the elements of applied ethics as its aim is to prepare man to face
his challenges, to find solutions to his problems and to co-exist with the totality in
harmony.
The moral character of Apollonius teachings is founded on the need to reinforce
the inner power of man through practices which help him to realize his unlimited
inner powers. These practices support him in his effort to unite with the divine power,
to feel his divine self, to become a master and a healer so as to solve every problem
that tortures man as well as to enlighten the path that leads to eudaimonia.
The Search for Wisdom and Unity in the Philosophy of Apollonius
307
Consequently, as in the teachings of Apollonius of Tyana the request of

contemporary man for wisdom and unity is fulfilled, the real purpose of philosophy
is met: freedom from passions, which lead to the spreading and domination of forces
of power and authority. From this perspective, we consider that this philosophy can
provide solutions to all the social, political and personal ends that contemporary man
faces.
The development of scientific research in modern times has led to the

intervention in the genome, the use of stem cells, the genetic modification of
products, the cloning of multi-cellular organisms and many other revolutionary
methods in contemporary science. However, the economic crisis of the 21st century
has shown that the remarkable achievements in the fields of science and technology
have not been placed at the service of humanity. The focus of contemporary man is
on the production of an abundance of goods at the expense of his real need, which is
happiness. As a result, the most vital problems of society remain unsolved.
The philosophers are called to take a stance regarding the choices contemporary
man has made in order to improve his living conditions, by considering why the
means that humanity has developed to achieve happiness have proved ineffective.
Daily we are reminded of the paradox of this discrepancy between technological
progress and happiness by the protests of people globally, demanding the protection
of human life and the environment. These demands stem from the need for a balanced
relation between man and nature, society, others and himself. This lack of balance
leads us to the conclusion that contemporary man has not found the answers to the
most fundamental matters of life.
In our point of view, this is due to the fact that mans primordial request for
wisdom and unity, which in our modern times is more vital than ever before, remains
unfulfilled. Contemporary mans real need is to know and see himself in such a
way so as not to feel separate from the other beings and act from a perspective of
differentiation. The ultimate aim is for him to obtain wisdom and become aware of
his unity with the universe, so that the conflicts and feelings of separation can be
308
Theodora Tzanetaki
overcome and the opposing parts of the self be integrated into a whole.
Consequently our purpose in exploring moral philosophy is to find an answer
with regard to those who seek self-knowledge and a close connection between
themselves and the cosmos. This perspective leads to the Pythagorean and NeoPythagorean philosophy, where one encounters a multidimensional relation between
man and the cosmos that is founded on a special relation between man and the divine.
In his attempt to reveal, activate and experience his inner powers, the philosopher
turns to the divine powers. This does not originate from any dogmatic religious
teaching, but expresses the universal request for wisdom and unity. This request
can be fulfilled because the divine principle can be found within man himself. In
this philosophy, God is not a concept, but an experience that comes to fulfill the
philosophers deep desire.
Specifically, in the process of our research we encountered the NeoPythagorean Apollonius of Tyana who lived and taught during the 1st century A.D. In
his philosophy a clear influence can be noticed, not only from Stoicism, Gnosticism
and Hermetism, but also from the ascetic way of life practiced many centuries earlier
by Pythagoras and his disciples.
In the Pythagorean teachings the term philosophy denotes the devotion to a way
of life that can lead to wisdom, which is perceived as a state of eudaimonia. This is
confirmed by Iamblichus, who states that Pythagoras was the first who denominated
philosophy and said that it is a desire and love of wisdom and that wisdom is the
science of the truth which is in beings. Pythagoras stated that beings are immaterial,
eternal natures and alone possess an efficacious power, while the rest of things are
only homonymously beings and are so denominated through the participation of
real beings. These are the corporeal and material forms, which are generated and
corrupted and are never true beings. Wisdom is the science of the real beings and
not of those which are only homonymously beings. When the corporeal natures are
compared with the universal ones, they can neither be the objects of science, nor
admit of a stable knowledge because they are infinite, incomprehensible by science
and cannot be described properly by definition. They cannot be the objects of science
because of their nature. Therefore, there can be no desire for science which has no
309
subsistence, but rather for the science of the real beings, which exist with invariable
permanency and are always consubsistent with a true appellation1.
According to this reference, only wisdom is acceptable as a science because
only wisdom examines the real beings. Further, it is this science that brings man in
contact with his divine nature, the daimn. In this particular science, supersensory
beings, such as the daimn, have a decisive role as they contribute to the cultivation
of supernatural powers, which make transcendence possible, the way in which the
sages differ from the rest of the people. With their special abilities, they delve into
the study of those beings which are recognized as real, that is to say, the immaterial
and eternal and not the rest of things, which are only homonymously beings. Hence,
wisdom is the science of the real beings.
Consequently, in the Pythagorean teachings, wisdom becomes identical with
eudaimonia as the one who obtains the knowledge of the beings is eudaimn; in other
words, one coexists harmoniously with ones divine nature. The exceptional abilities
of the sages indicate that, if man comes in contact with the divine, the possibilities
offered become endless. For those who are eudaimnes anything is possible because
they act from a privileged state of being, where space and time are transcended. This
unique state liberates from ignorance, oblivion and mortality. Access to this huge
breadth of knowledge becomes possible through daily practice, which activates the
divine within. According to our research, the Pythagoreans employ such kinds of
practices.
The following reference by Empedocles gives us information which helps us
form an idea of how a Pythagorean exercise of recollection was performed. According
to this reference, Pythagoras was a man who obtained a wealth of spiritual knowledge
and who was capable of any kind of wise actions because with all the powers of his
mind he could easily see everything that had happened in ten and even twenty past
lives when he desired it2. To denote the powers of Pythagoras mind, Empedocles uses
Cf. Iamblichi De Vita Pythagorica Liber, Edidit Ludovicus Deubner (1937), Editionem addendis et
corrigendis adiunctis curavit Udalricus Klein, In aedibus B. G. Teubneri, Stutgardiae, 1975, 29. 159,
23 160, 11, pp. 89-90. See also ibid., 12. 58, 20 59, 22, pp. 31-32.
1
Cf. Porphyrii, De Vita Pythagorae, Recognovit Augustus Nauck, In aedibus B. G. Teubneri, Lipsiae,
1860, 30, 1-8, p. 26. Cf. also Iamblichi De Vita Pythagorica Liber, op. cit., 15. 67, 23-4, pp. 37-38.
310
Theodora Tzanetaki
the old term prapides, which literally refers to the diaphragm3. This term also denotes
the relation between mind and body since during the expansion of the diaphragm the
breath is regulated and/or stopped4. Thus, there is a connection between breathing and
mind. It is possible that the use of this word by Empedocles indicates that man can
attain wisdom through practices where the breathing plays a significant role. In the
above extract Empedocles refers to the Pythagorean exercises of recollection, during
which the ones who are practicing are in full control of themselves, either by simply
observing, extending or even interrupting the breathing: the key that opens the gate
to the world of wisdom. This is also confirmed by another of Empedocles references,
where he again uses the word prapides to denote and emphasize the purpose of the
Pythagorean exercises of recollection, which is wisdom: Happy is the one who has
obtained a wealth of divine wisdom and unhappy is the one who doubts the gods5
In these exercises referred to by Vernant to illustrate the relation between the
expansion of the diaphragm and the powers of mind, one can see, according to him,
a yoga-type technique, which is also founded on the control of ones breath. In his
opinion, the ability of the magi6 to free the soul from the body was part of a deliberate
journey (peripeteia) of the soul, which began in the Other World and was completed
with the soul having collected knowledge of the past from there. This journey appears
as a process that leads to a state of ecstasy. Further, it becomes more intellectual, as
these practices are disseminated to the philosophers by the magi and appears as a
spiritual exercise or melet. This combines the effort of recollection, the purification
of the soul, the separation of the soul from the body and the escape from the flow of
time by approaching the truth7.
3
Cf. Louis Gernet, Anthropologie de la Grce antique, Franois Maspero, Paris, 1968, p. 425. Regarding
the term prapides cf. also Lexicon of Presocratic Philosophy, Research Center for Greek Philosophy at
the Academy of Athens, Athens, 1994, entry , p. 338.
4
Cf. Jean Pierre Vernant, Mythe et pense chez les Grecs, Franois Maspero, Paris, 1965, p. 66.
Cf. Empedocles, , H. Diels - W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Erster Band,
Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Zrich/Berlin, 1964, B. Fragmente 132, 5-6, [354. 355 K., 342.
343 St.], Clem. Strom. v 140 (II 420, 28 St.), p. 365.
Vernant refers to the earliest sages, whom he calls magi, distinguishing them from the philosophers.
Cf. Jean Pierre Vernant, Mythe et pense chez les Grecs, op. cit., p. 85.
311
At this point, Vernant makes a subtle distinction between the practices of

the magi and the Pythagorean exercises of recollection. In the first case, there is an
emphasis on the ecstatic dimension, while in the second case, there is an emphasis
on the intellectual dimension. In our opinion, Pythagoreanism is definitely related to
the practices that lead to ecstasy. For this reason, we think that a distinction between
the practices of the magus and the philosopher, at least in the case of Pythagoras and
Apollonius of Tyana, results from a more rational point of view. This explanation
is crucial because, according to the position in this study, these two belong to the
category of philosophers that promoted their inspired ideas maintaining a total
balance between the magic and the intellectual dimension of the spirit.
This view is supported by Iamblichus who states that Pythagoras, during a
voyage, remained in one and the same unmoved state for two nights and three days,
neither eating, nor drinking, nor sleeping, unless perhaps as he sat in that firm and
tranquil condition, he might sleep for a short time unnoticed8. A letter from Apollonius
of Tyana to the philosopher Euphrates leads us to the assumption that such kinds of
practices are not unknown to him. In this letter it is referred that Apollonius never
came out of his house9. According to Euphrates, he was never seen moving any part
of his body. Apollonius response to this is that his soul is what is always in motion10.
Apollonius of Tyana, just like Pythagoras, is referred to as having exceptional
abilities and employing practices which emanate from a deep knowledge of a mystic
nature. According to Eusebius of Caesarea, Hierocles, prefect of Bithynia, admired
Apollonius and attributed his miracles to divine and mystic wisdom11. In the work
entitled Book of Wisdom and Prudence Resulting from the Practices of Apollonius of
Tyana, Apollonius appears as a aster who addresses his disciple in order to reveal to
him his knowledge, the mystery of wisdom12. Wisdom is characterized as a mystery,
8
Cf. Iamblichi De Vita Pythagorica Liber, op. cit., 3. 16, 1-7, p. 12.
Cf. Robert J. Penella, The Letters of Apollonius of Tyana, Lugduni Batavorum E. J. Brill, Netherlands,
1979, 8, (1) 25, p. 36. This is also referred to in two other letters by Apollonius of Tyana. ibid., 43, 17,
p. 54 and 66, 24, p. 72.
10
Ibid., 8, (1) 26-27, p. 36.
11
Cf. Eusebii Pamphili Contra Hieroclem Liber, PG XXII, 797, 10-11.
12
Cf. F. Nau, Apotelesmata Apollonii Tyanensis, Patrologia Syriaca, Pars prima, Tomus secundus,
312
Theodora Tzanetaki
which means that the disciple is initiated by his Master. It has to do with a special
kind of discipleship, where the guiding role of the Master is not simply educational
in the common sense of the word, but is a many-sided initiation practice that brings
forth and helps develop all the potential abilities in the disciple. Thus, the Master
leads the disciple to the mystery of wisdom by giving him specific instructions.
Etymologically, the word mystery () comes from the verb (my),
hich means close and refers mainly to the closed lips and eyes13. The etymological
origin of this word helps us to better understand the nature of the teachings of
Apollonius of Tyana. In order for the disciple to be initiated, it is necessary that he
changes his life completely. The main requirement for initiation is to keep his eyes
and lips closed. By following the instructions of the Master, the disciple, according to
our interpretation, has to close his eyes and turn his attention in a different direction.
In this way, his eyes are no longer turned towards the external world, but are focused
within. As he now sees himself in a completely new way, a new world reveals itself
shedding light on his mystic relation with the cosmos. He no longer perceives things
in the usual way, but learns to feel and understand them in the light of wisdom.
In order for the disciple to enter the world of wisdom, he first has to be tested
in the practice of silence. This refers to the five years of silence that Pythagoras
imposes on his disciples14 and Apollonius of Tyana on himself15. In the rituals
performed by Apollonius of Tyana at sunrise, only those who have kept silent for
four years can be present16. When the philosopher Euphrates accuses him of speaking
briefly only saying a few words, Apollonius answers him that this happens because
Ediderunt Firmin-Didot et Socii, Instituti Francici Typographi, Parisiis, 1907, fol. 36r, 1-3, p.
1372. Cf. also Fransiscus Boll, Ps.-Apollonius Tyaneus de horis diei et noctis, Catalogus Codicum
Astrologorum Graecorum, VII, In Aedibus Henrici Lamertin, Bruxellis, 1908, [F. 72.] 1-5, p. 175.
Cf. Dmtrakou D., , Volume 6, Proodos . . . ., Athens,
2000, entry , p. 4829. Cf. also Henry George Liddell-Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, entry , p. 1157.
13
14
Cf. Iamblichi De Vita Pythagorica Liber, op. cit., 17. 72, 4-8, p. 41.
15
Cf. Philostratus, The Life of Apollonius of Tyana, Edited and Translated by Christopher P. Jones, The
Loeb Classical Library, Volume I (Books I-IV), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
London, England, 2005, Book I, 14.2, p. 62.
16
Ibid., Book I, 16.3, pp. 68-70.
313
he cannot be completely silent17. Apollonius considers that the best of men are those
who express themselves in a very concise manner18 because loquaciousness entails
many blunders, while silence is safe19. In this philosophy, silence and closed eyes are
inseparably connected because silence enhances the effort to turn inwards and gain
self-knowledge. The philosopher keeps silent. In order to receive the new knowledge,
he re-examines all of his ideas, beliefs and prejudices. From this perspective, silence
represents the promise of a purifying process of introspection and listening, during
which the meaningless is left behind so that space is created for the substantial. When
practicing silence, the philosopher learns to control his impulse to speak because
what matters now is to understand who is the one speaking and if he has something
essential to say. He acknowledges the power of speech and the responsibility for
how and for what purpose he uses it. Control of speech demands control of thoughts
and feelings. The practice of silence balances them, purifies them and enables the
philosopher to go beyond them. From this perspective, silence can be perceived as
a state of inner stillness. However, it is necessary to point out that this stillness is
not a passive attitude or an escape from worldly matters. On the contrary, it is a
mental state that the philosopher gradually reaches. As a result, his unlimited inner
powers are activated, developed and placed at the service of humanity. His way of
life becomes extremely dynamic and creative.
Thus, the philosophy of Apollonius of Tyana demands a different way of
approaching things. It is about a different way of life and in order to enter this new
mystic world one has to change completely. With this understanding of life, he will
know his new and real self. However, few are ready to receive this new knowledge
and to love it so much as to undergo the required preparation forever leaving behind
the common way of life. The above mentioned are supported by the following
definition of wisdom in the work entitled Book of Wisdom and Prudence Resulting
from the Practices of Apollonius of Tyana: wisdom is unknown to most of the people,
it is inconceivable and apocryphal20.
17
Cf. Robert J. Penella, The Letters of Apollonius of Tyana, op. cit., 8, (2) 6-7, p. 38.
18
Ibid., 94, 9, p. 86.
19
Ibid., 93, 6, p. 86.
20
Cf. F. Nau, Apotelesmata Apollonii Tyanensis, op. cit., fol. 36r, 3-4, p. 1372. Cf. also Fransiscus
314
Theodora Tzanetaki
Wisdom is the mystic knowledge of the seasons, the years, the hours of the
day and night as well as specific names and their effects. This knowledge concerns
practices called apotelesmata. By means of these practices the sage acquires the
ability to influence all that is created by God on earth21. Apotelesma, therefore, is not
only of an ethical but also of an ontological and cosmological nature as it signifies
the unity between God, cosmos and man. Wisdom is the mystic knowledge of the
meaning of time as it manifests in nature through the alternation of day and night,
seasons and years. It becomes clear that it is about knowledge of nature. This is also
confirmed by the reference in the text to all that is created by God on earth. Here,
nature is revealed to us as a creation of God. The mystery of wisdom originates from
the Creator and for this reason the Master reveals that the knowledge was given to
him by God. Consequently, it is not about human knowledge, but divine. It is the
knowledge that is given to the Master by God. It is the knowledge that is intended
for man and he will obtain it if he follows the guidance of the Master. Therefore,
what pleases the gods is not the offering of sacrifices, but the acquisition of wisdom22
because communication between man and the divine is only possible through the
divine in ourselves, which is the mind23.
The wisdom of the Master is more valuable than gold and precious gems. It
is the knowledge that human nature does not remain here, but is bound for another
world24. His faith in the potential of human nature is not limited to the promise of
life after death. His words clarify the nature of his knowledge, which is not limited
to the polarity between life and death. He is eager to relieve his disciple of all his
dogmatic beliefs, the ones that confine the mind to the worldly or heavenly paradise.
Wisdom transforms the life of the disciple forever. The Master initiates him into
a new life leading him from the darkness of ignorance to the light of knowledge.
Boll, Ps.-Apollonius Tyaneus de horis diei et noctis, op. cit., [F. 72.], 5, p. 175.
Cf. F. Nau, Apotelesmata Apollonii Tyanensis, op. cit., fol. 36r, 3-7, p. 1372. Cf. also Fransiscus
Boll, Ps.-Apollonius Tyaneus de horis diei et noctis, op. cit., [F. 72.], 4-9, p. 175.
21
22
Cf. Robert J. Penella, The Letters of Apollonius of Tyana, op. cit., 26, 13-14, p. 46.
23
Cf. Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicae Praeparationis, Libri XV, E. H. Gifford, Tomus I, Oxonii E
Typographeo Academico, 1903, IV, p. 150, 13 c 5-d 2, pp. 194-195.
24
Cf. Fransiscus Boll, Ps.-Apollonius Tyaneus de horis diei et noctis, op. cit., [f. 74.], 5-7, p. 180.
315
The world of wisdom is beyond the opposites of life and death, where all dualism
ceases and unity becomes an experience. This is also confirmed by the letter where
Apollonius of Tyana says that there is no birth and no death of anything except in
appearance only because what appears to be birth is the passage from pure substance
into nature and likewise, what appears to be death is the passage from nature into
pure substance. Consequently, nothing ever comes into existence or is dissolved. It
is merely visible and subsequently invisible; visible due to its material density and
invisible due to the tenuity of its substance. Substance always remains the same
and changes only in regard to its state of motion or rest. Further, the philosopher
introduces us to the concept of unity by saying that change does not occur from
without, but by a conversion of the whole into its parts or of the parts into the whole,
a conversion made possible by the unity of the All25.
When the philosopher experiences his unity with every form of life and with
the divine creative power, he recognizes that a miracle is nothing more than the
manifestation of his innate ability to contribute in his own way to the forming of
reality. As a result, he becomes exceptionally creative as he obtains powers that
enable him to convey his knowledge and create new masters. Consequently, the
wisdom revealed to the Master by God is then given to the disciple. The Master
possesses qualities that he has acquired as a result of his contact with the divine.
In this sense, as he has discovered how to connect with the powers that led him
firmly on the way towards wisdom, he attempts to create a new Master personified
in his disciple. Partaking in the birth of a new power in this special way, the Master
becomes one with the divine power from which he has come.
The life of the sage is dedicated to the divine because that is the only source
of power. With the gift of power in his hands, he serves the others both as a master
and a healer. For example, Flavius Philostratus states that when Apollonius of Tyana
was an adolescent, he settled in the sanctuary of Asclepius in Aegae, Cilicia. When
the god Asclepius said to a priest that he was pleased to cure the sick with Apollonius
as a witness, many people from Cilicia and the surrounding regions began to arrive
25
Cf. Robert J. Penella, The Letters of Apollonius of Tyana, op. cit., 58, (1) 8-13 (2) 14-16, p. 66.
316
Theodora Tzanetaki
so as to meet him26. When the plague threatened Ephesus, the inhabitants sent a
deputation to Apollonius asking him to act as a physician of their misfortune as
no remedy before had sufficed to contain the pestilence27. On the epigram found
in Mopsuestia in Cilicia (3rd-4th century A.D.), it is written that Apollonius of
Tyana had a beneficial effect on people by undoing their faults and relieving their
sufferings28. Surely there are many differences of opinion concerning the missing
sections and the interpretation of this inscription29. However, everyone agrees that
the epigram sheds light on the therapeutic character of the sages activity. Apollonius
ability as a physician is also referred to in one of his letters to Euphrates30, and in
another letter, he shares Pythagoras view that medicine is the most divine enterprise.
For this reason, it is necessary to care for the soul along with the body since a living
being cannot be in good health when its better part is ailing31.
If a man keeps company with a Pythagorean, he will receive great benefits, such
as knowledge about making laws, geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, harmonics, music,
medicine and all forms of godly divination. In addition, there are more noble benefits:
high-mindedness, magnanimity, nobility, tranquility, piety, true understanding of the
gods and the daimones as well as their friendship, self-sufficiency, zeal, frugality,
limitation of ones needs, keen perception, agility, easiness of breathing, a good
complexion, health, fortitude and immortality32. ccording to our interpretation, it
becomes clear that Apollonius philosophy has the elements of applied ethics as its
aim is to prepare man to face his challenges, to find solutions to his problems and to
co-exist with the totality in harmony. The moral character of Apollonius teachings
is founded on the need to reinforce the inner power of man through practices which
help him to realize his unlimited inner powers. These practices support him in his
26
Cf. Philostratus, The Life of Apollonius of Tyana, op. cit., Book I, 8.2, p. 48.
27
Ibid., Book IV, 10.1, p. 338.
28
Cf. SEG 36 (1986), n 1244.
Cf. Maria Dzielska, Apollonius of Tyana in Legend and History, LErma di Bretschneider, Roma,
1986, pp. 64-73.
29
30
Cf. Robert J. Penella, The Letters of Apollonius of Tyana, op. cit., 8, (2) 4, p. 38.
31
Ibid., 23, 2-4, p. 46.
32
Ibid., 52, 2-8, p. 62.
317
effort to unite with the divine power, to feel his divine self, to become a master and a
healer so as to solve every problem that tortures man as well as to enlighten the path
that leads to eudaimonia.
From this perspective, we consider that the philosophy of Apollonius of
Tyana can provide solutions to all the social, political and personal dead ends that
contemporary man faces. As it responds to his request for wisdom and unity, it fulfills
the real purpose of philosophy: freedom from passions, which lead to the spreading
and domination of forces of power and authority. Philosophy does not serve the
interests of the system as its aim is to create free men, who do not confuse the purpose
of education with the interests of the state, morality and religion33. Hence, Apollonius
of Tyana, quoting Plato, says that virtue has no master34. The philosopher has been
liberated from envy, maliciousness, hatred, the urge to slander and hostility35. He is
now free36.
Bibliography
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Astrologorum Graecorum, VII, In Aedibus Henrici Lamertin, Bruxellis, 1908.
Eusebii Pamphili Contra Hieroclem Liber, Patrologia Graeca, XXII, Migne J.-P. G
ed., Lutetiae Parisiorum 1857-1866.
Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicae Praeparationis, Libri XV, E. H. Gifford, Tomus I,
Oxonii E Typographeo Academico, 1903.
Iamblichi De Vita Pythagorica Liber, Edidit Ludovicus Deubner (1937), Editionem
addendis et corrigendis adiunctis curavit Udalricus Klein, In aedibus B. G.
Teubneri, Stutgardiae, 1975.
Nau F., Apotelesmata Apollonii Tyanensis, Patrologia Syriaca, Pars prima, Tomus
secundus, Ediderunt Firmin-Didot et Socii, Instituti Francici Typographi,
33
Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, PUF, Paris, 1991, pp. 120-121.
34
Cf. Robert J. Penella, The Letters of Apollonius of Tyana, op. cit., 15, 21, p. 42.
35
Ibid., 43, 18-19, p. 54.
36
Ibid., 43, 19-20, p. 54 and 28, 24, p. 46.
318
Theodora Tzanetaki
Parisiis, 1907.
Penella Robert J., The Letters of Apollonius of Tyana, Lugduni Batavorum E. J. Brill,
Netherlands, 1979.
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Jones, The Loeb Classical Library, Volume I (Books I-IV), Harvard University
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1986, J. C. Gieben, Publisher, Amsterdam, 1989.
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aedibus B. G. Teubneri, Lipsiae, 1860.
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Deleuze Gilles, Nietzsche et la philosophie, PUF, Paris, 1991.
Dmtrakou D., , Proodos . . . ., Athens,
2000.
Diels H. - Kranz W., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Erster Band, Weidmannsche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, Zrich/Berlin, 1964.
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Bretschneider, Roma, 1986.
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Lexicon of Presocratic Philosophy, Research Center for Greek Philosophy at the
Academy of Athens, Athens, 1994.
Vernant Jean Pierre, Mythe et pense chez les Grecs, Franois Maspero, Paris, 1965.
Theodora Tzanetaki
Doctor of Philosophy
University of Athens
Greece
Maria Veneti
This paper examines the relationship between justice and human morality and
the meaning of moral integrity by selectively focusing on Platos Republic as its
object of reflection and discussion, and especially on the Republics second book.
There Plato employs one of his most famous myths, the myth of the ring of Gyges, in
order to clarify the nature of justice and its relationship to the essence of man.
In the first books of the Republic Plato holds the view that justice constitutes a
being which affects the human soul in a special way since it is capable of ensuring
the unity of the person, on the one hand, and what could be described as the persons
moral integrity, on the other. As a state of doing ones own business and not being
a busybody1 or of rendering to each his due,2 justice incorporates the already
established pre-Socratic beliefs on Dike, which was first seen as God-given and
was later associated with the domain of political rightfulness until it was eventually
identified with the state of political society which is entangled with the concepts of
governance according to good laws, equality of all before the law, equality of all
in freedom of speech, civic equality, and the value (or virtue) of man.3 Homeric
man already strove to avoid hubris and to render to each his due, and in this way he
participated in Dike. Later Hesiod, Solon, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Aeschylus, and
Protagoras established the foundations of Dike as a social virtue and paved the way
for the Platonic view of the just and the unjust man.
Before referring to the Platonic notion of justice and moral integrity, it is worth
1
Republic 433a.
Republic 331e.
K. Boudouris, Justice and morality, in K. Boudouris (ed.), On Justice, Greek Philosophical Society,
Athens 1989, p.75. Herodotus had already used the term justice to denote not only what ought to be
done because it is the right thing but also the avoidance of greed and even the moral quality of man
(ibid., p.75)
3
320
Maria Veneti
dwelling a little on the ideas of Democritus given that this pre-Socratic philosopher
describes the just man in a way quite similar to that of Plato. More specifically,
Democritus argues that the just man should never do wrong not because he is
motivated by the fear or shame of being found out but as a matter of self-respect.4
Democritus criterion for ensuring propriety and justice is an early form of moral law
that refers to the human conscience and is not directly associated with any social or
legal provisions. The philosopher expresses the sense of moral interiority through
the term self-respect (), which was mentioned above. He claims
that man should set an inner moral law, a recommendation that is striking both in
terms of the innovative way it is formulated and in terms of its style. Thus happiness
or blessedness (), which is the aim of human life for Democritus too, is
not based on material possessions but on the quality and the properties of the soul.
Moreover, he writes, the soul is the dwelling-place of the guardian spirit ()!
The soul is happy when man is preoccupied with just and lawful works and thus feels
cheerfulness () according to Democritus expression.5 The cheerful man6
is the desirable type of man according to the philosopher, and he is distinguished for
his spiritual virtues rather than the material goods in his possession. In addition, the
virtuous life is associated for Democritus with the avoidance of want and excess,
in other words it reflects and expresses moderation. Moderation offers stability and
wisdom to the human mind and is associated with intelligence and balance which
are virtues and properties that certainly engender a good mood, that is, the familiar
cheerfulness.7
In the second book of the Republic, Glaucon and Adeimantus reformulate the
4
DK, Democritus fragment 164: One must not respect the opinion of other men more than ones own;
nor must one be more ready to do wrong if no one will know than if all will know. One must respect
ones own opinion most, and this must stand as the law of ones soul, preventing one from doing anything improper.
DK. Fragment 174: But the man who neglects justice, and does not do what he ought,finds all such
things disagreeable when he remembers any of them, and he is afraid and torments himself.
DK. Fragment 174: The cheerful man, who is impelled towards works that are just and lawful, rejoices by day and by night, and is strong and free from care.
DK. Democritus fragment 3: The man who wishes to have serenity of spirit should not engage in
many activities
321
question of justice by asking Socrates to answer in a satisfactory manner whether

justice is good for its consequences or for its own sake. Glaucon initially speaks about
three classes of goods: firstly, the things which are good for their own sake, secondly,
the things which are good both for their own sake and for their consequences, and
thirdly, the things which are desirable only for their consequences.8 Socrates and
Glaucon agree that justice belongs to the second class of goods, the fairest one,
meaning that it is desirable both for its own sake and for its consequences.9 From a
moral point of view Socrates argument could be characterized as either deontological
or consequential. From a purely deontological perspective, Socrates should classify
justice in the first class of goods but this line of argument doesnt seem to interest him.
As Julia Annas rightly notes, Plato has no terms that answer happily to the notions
of moral duty and obligation (therefore) Plato is so clearly not a deontologist.10
Justice is not good for its own sake. On the other hand, Platos reasoning is not
aimed at articulating the consequentialist argument either since, even if justice
results in happiness, Socrates is not quite interested in the consequences of justice,
otherwise he would have included justice in the third class of goods. Thus neither
the deontological nor the consequentialist view are sufficient for interpreting Platos
argument because justice is admitted to belong to the second class of goods, those
which are good both for their own sake and for their consequences. The inclusion
of both perspectives into the same argument is unparalleled in the history of moral
philosophy considering that even today moral philosophers choose one of the two
forms of argumentation the deontological or the consequentialist or attempt to
harmonize the two by choosing to apply them at different levels.11 In this way, they
aim at a kind of compromise between the two arguments. Socrates, however, argues
that justice is good both for its own sake and for its consequences, that is to say, he
divides his aim into two parts, distinct from each other, which are not supposed to
8
Republic 357a-d.
Republic 358a.
10
11
See. J. Annas, An Introduction to Platos Republic, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981, p.61-62.
For example, a rule utilitarian may hold that all that is relevant to the rightness of actions is good
consequences, but that these consequences must include some states of affairs which a deontologist
would claim had value in themselves. (Julia Annas, ibid., p.85)
322
Maria Veneti
clash with each other in practice. The inclusion of the nature of justice and of its
consequences into a single proof is one of Platos significant contributions to moral
argumentation to this day.
Glaucon and Adeimantus next try to prove the superiority of injustice. But
if the superiority of injustice cannot be proven, then Plato seems to think that there
is enough room (in the course of the dialogue) for emphasizing the superiority of
justice.12 The question then is as follows: Is it a good thing to commit injustice
in some cases? Yes, everyone admits, but to suffer injustice is much worse. The
argument is examined from two aspects, both in terms of the outcomes-rewards of
justice and injustice and also in terms of the force exerted by these two powers on the
soul of man. First of all, it is noted that justice is simply the lesser evil, a compromise
struck among inherently unjust people because they feel insecure in the thought that
others may commit injustice against them and such a prospect annoys them. Thus
they realize that justice offers social stability and allows them to live in peace without
fearing an imminent punishment for their injustices. In short, they agree on what
Thrasymachus had already admitted: that they have a greater stake in justice rather
than injustice. And that stake is guaranteed by laws.
However, if it were possible for our unjust actions to remain unseen, if through
some magic trick we could commit injustice without being perceived by anyone,
wouldnt we gladly commit injustice after all? This question creates considerable
tension and leads to a critical point in the dialogue when Plato resorts to his favorite
method of myth in order to delve into the heart of the matter. The myth invoked here
speaks about the feat of a humble shepherd, Gyges,13 who used to pasture his flock
in the estate of the king of Lydia until, after an earthquake, he discovered suddenly
a ring with the magic power to render invisible the person who wears it if he turned
the collet of the ring toward the inner side of hand. Gyges quickly wears the ring,
renders himself invisible and enters the palace where he murders the king, marries his
wife, and usurps the throne. Thus from a shepherd he turns into a king without ever
12
13
Republic 358e-359b.
Republic 359c-360d. For the references of ancient writers to Gyges and his ring, see N. Skouteropoulos, Platos Republic, Polis, Athens 2002, p.792.
323
being punished for his crimes, and this example certainly shows that if someone can
evade punishment, then he shall undoubtedly commit unjust actions, Glaucon says,
and he even claims that it is possible for an unjust man who succeeds in appearing
just to experience no trouble in his soul and to die as a peaceful and happy man.14
Then Adeimantus takes his turn to speak and stresses all the benefits of justice, and
especially the rewards we earn when we do the right thing.15 A good reputation,
social rank, a good name, or even a good marriage are some of the benefits that
someone can earn if he grows up obeying his parents who are accustomed praise the
various virtues, including justice. And if a certain person is pious, then the gods will
reward him in Hades. Therefore displaying a feigned propriety should be enough in
order to lead an honourable life, pretending to be a just person. At this point justice
becomes simply a matter of appearance.
However Socrates final answer will not be given here. Based on passages
in the subsequent books of the Republic, we can draw the conclusion that Platos
thesis is roughly as follows: a man should choose to lead a just life even if this is not
perceived by other people or even by the gods. He should therefore practice justice
for the sake of justice. At the same time, however, the practice of justice ensures the
unity and moral integrity of his person and amounts to a necessary precondition for
happiness.
Socrates knows very well that justice falls into the second class of goods but it
is not easy to prove this thesis. First of all, all that has been mentioned above does not
imply that Platos argument is utilitarian because in that case justice would belong
to the third class of goods, that is, those that are valuable for their consequences. In
order to eliminate utilitarianism from his argument, Socrates must exclude at least
some of the rewards of justice, and in fact he does exclude those that could be termed
as conventional rewards. These may be glory, honours, and social rank, and they
amount to aftereffects that are associated more with social conventions rather than
with the nature of justice itself. If, for example, we compare justice with health,
then what health offers us is very valuable in terms of its physical aftereffects but
14
Republic 362b-c.
15
Republic 363a-367e.
324
Maria Veneti
it doesnt take the form of a socially instituted prize which we could try to earn by
going on a diet, for example! Thus justice is a more complex case than health, since it
is possible for a person to pretend to be just in order to earn certain rewards, whereas
he cannot pretend to be healthy, as it were. Socrates however wants to prove that it
is good for us to be just even if we are punished for our attitude and, conversely, that
we should not be unjust, even if we earn all kinds of imaginable rewards. Socrates
role becomes especially difficult when he has to demonstrate that it is not worth
being unjust even if you wear Gyges ring. In other words, he has to make clear
to his interlocutors that there are reasons that can convince even Gyges to become
a just person and to throw away his ring! This requires an internal elaboration on
the nature of goodness at a higher level of analysis which combines the assessment
on the benefits of injustice with the moral assessment on justice and comes to the
conclusion that justice is the supreme good.16
The answer comes late in the Republic toward the end of the text, and more
precisely in the 10th book when the question of rewards returns, and the answer there
is closer to common sense. In other words, Plato allows the just man to earn the
reputation that he reasonably expects as the text suddenly comes to the conclusion
that the just man is the biggest winner both in this life and in the afterlife. Platos
argument, spread out in eight books, arrives at the same point that Socrates wanted
to demonstrate from the beginning (that we should be just in every case, even if
injustice may never be revealed), but does so in a way that common sense would
never do, as Annas notes,17 by attempting to merge extreme hypothetical cases with
situations that occur in our everyday life. But the problem for moral philosophy is
whether an extraordinary example can offer answers for ordinary cases of justice or
injustice. Even if we prove that Gyges should be a just person, what is that supposed
to mean? Would the same also hold true in the case of Mr. X, who could never find
himself in the same position as Gyges?
The tenth book briefly closes the subject through the path of metaphysics,
more specifically through the concept of the immortality of the soul: at the end of the
16
Plato, The Republic, trans. N. Skouteropoulos, Polis, Athens 2002, p.793.
17
See Annas, ibid., p.92-93.
325
Republic the soul never decays. The best state of the soul that Plato can think of is
the state of unity, and what destroys unity is injustice. The unified soul, which cannot
be marked by diversity, because it would succumb to decay, confronts injustice as
the only decaying factor. The worldly phenomenal diversity of the soul, which was
the subject of the preceding books, is due either to the corporeal properties or to the
effects of this decaying world. This is distinct from the true, immortal soul, which
falls in love with knowledge and wisdom and, in this sense, cannot but be just in
order to preserve its unity and its integrity!18
In all of the preceding books (from second to ninth) Plato had discussed the
tripartite division of the soul (the logical, the spirited, and the appetitive parts),
arguing that justice should be the concern of all the parts of the soul. Thus Plato
now either identifies the soul with its logical-intellectual part or invents another
metaphysical entity which precedes and follows the purely human one. Whereas the
justice of the just man required practical wisdom for its realization, combining the
three parts of the soul according to the principle of doing ones own business, he
now suddenly introduces the question of rewards in this life and in the afterlife,19 an
argument which is associated not only with the immortality of the soul but also with
Platos special insistence on its unity. In short, in the tenth book, Plato argues through
another myth, the myth of Er, that the rewards of justice are eternal because the gods
love the just men, and even when the latter do not pursue them, the gods offer these
rewards to them in any case both in this world and in the afterworld. The unjust man
now resembles an arrogant runner who is ultimately revealed to always lose the race,
perhaps because he cannot perceive the benefits that accrue through knowledge of
the justice of the immortal soul.
Ultimately the question of whether justice is valuable or not for its own sake
and also for its consequences is treated in various ways throughout the course of the
dialogue. While Socrates in books two to nine defends the thesis that justice is good
for its own sake, being a factor of mental harmony and happiness, he returns to the
question of rewards in the tenth book by arguing that justice works in our personal
18
Republic 611e
19
Republic 612a-614a
326
Maria Veneti
interest or at least that this is usually the case. But personal interest was not the
interlocutors initial concern, and in fact it could be said to undermine the main effort
of proving the value of justice for its own sake. The myth of Er can be interpreted in
multiple ways. It is conceivable that Plato wants to increase the scope of justice by
viewing it as part of the operation of the cosmos or the effect of divine action on the
worldly and accidental human nature, so that its rewards may simply be the means
of securing the cosmic or divine order. This is a very widespread interpretation of the
myth of Er, although there are counter-arguments. The emphasis given by Socrates
on our choices shows that leading a good or a bad life is our reward for what we
know or do not know concerning the human being. Being aware of the essence and
depth of the various ways of life, the just man consciously chooses to lead a just life
because it offers him internal harmony, balance, and happiness. Thus the effects of
the just life come from the very nature of justice and not from the opinion of others
or from social conventions, since these may be wrong or unjust. In fact, the good that
results in this way is part of the concept of justice and not of any rewards of a social
nature.
In conclusion, justice in the Platonic text is closely related to the morality
of the person because the just man fashions his soul in such a way as to lead a
just life and not simply commit a just act from time to time.20 This means that the
moral life is superior to other ways of life and is valuable for its own sake, even
though that does not exclude the possibility that society (or even the gods) may
offer certain rewards to the just man given that the support of just behaviour is a
necessity for human polities, that is, for men in their worldly state. In its inner core
the soul is good and untouched by decay, and this means that it is just. Justice thus
becomes an unconditional principle which ensures the moral integrity of the person.
In this way the foundations are in place for a purely moral way of life which recalls
Kierkegaards thesis on the purity of the heart,21 in other words, the supremacy of
20
See K. Boudouris, ibid., p.77: Only if someone has irrevocably decided to lead a moral life, then he
should lead the life of a just man.
S. Kierkegaard, Purity of heart, in R. Bertall (ed), Kierkegaard Anthology, Harper and Brothers
1938, p.270-281.
21
327
love as the only value that safeguards the unity and the moral integrity of the person.
However, the connection between Love and Justice requires the pre-acceptance of an
ought which is associated with the concept of the soul in Christianity and ends up
undervaluing justice in favour of Love.22
Furthermore, the priority of justice over other moral values is also stressed by
Kant who renders the person an end in itself in his effort to establish the transcendental
subject as a free being which realizes itself through the moral law.23 According to Kant,
but also Rawls, the moral subject as an autonomous being can set aims and select
different attitudes and ways of life. The primacy of moral life, the priority of the unity
of the person and the pre-eminence of the value of justice are common assumptions
held by the three philosophers, although they do not understand the unity and the
constitution of the person in the same way. Both Kant with his transcendental subject
and Rawls with his a priori constitution of the subject24 maintain what I would call an
otherworldly metaphysics. Plato, on the other hand, attempts to connect the unity
of the person both with the metaphysics of the person and with the worldly states of
life. The human being according to Plato is not a purely metaphysical entity. That is
why the philosopher does not deny the significance of mental states, corporeal effects,
ideological obsessions, social conventions, habits, and needs in the formation of the
person. Thus the long excursus of Gyges argument in the text of the Republic cannot
but link two worlds, the phenomenal and the ideal, the worldly and the metaphysical.
We ought to admit that the attempt is successful, even if we should understandably
overlook some of the philosophers exaggerations or disavowals in certain parts of
the text of the Republic.
22
See K. Boudouris, ibid., p.80.
23
Imm. Kant, Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, transl. by Paton, New York 1956, p 119.
24
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 129
Maria Veneti
Dr of Philosophy
Athens
Index of names
A
Aalto A. 287
Abdera 161
Achilles 189
Adam M. 34
Adeimantus 124, 320, 322323
Adorno Th.W. 288
Aegae 315
Aeschylus 3452, 319
Afghanistan 195
Africa 60
Alcmaeon 212, 264
Alexander of Aphrodisias 247
Alexander of Miletus

SeeAlexander Polyhistor
Alexander Polyhistor 173, 181
Alexander the Great 12
Allen D.S. 57, 77
Allen G. 265
Allinson R.E. 5, 925
Amazons 43
Anangke 49
Anaxagoras 267
Anaximander 171, 212, 319
Andriopoulos D.Z. 200
Annas J. 321, 324
Anton J.P. 161, 185
Anytus 75
Aphaea 285
Aphrodite 168
Apollo 166, 209
Apollonius 306318
Arabatzis G. 200
Arabia 43
Arendt H. 283
Aristote 280
Aristotle 925, 3233, 5356, 67, 77,
8586, 163, 173, 179, 189190,
197, 200, 204, 217, 219, 237, 264,
270, 276, 282284, 290, 294295,
297, 301, 303304
Arkesilaos 240
Artaxerxes 81
Asclepius 315
Asia 43
Aspasia 85
Asquith, Prime Minister 192
Athens 58, 67, 7071, 9394, 120, 127,
162, 188, 212, 291, 295
Augustinus 201
Axelos K. 214, 218, 220
B
Bacchus 167
Barker E. 1920, 25
Barlas T. 52
Baronett S. 114
Barres M. 222
Barry V. 107110, 113, 114
Benda J. 224, 226
Benetatou M. 5, 2633
Benhabib S. 238, 251254, 258259
Benson H. 124, 138
Benson H.H. 78
Bergson H. 193
Bertall R. 326
Bett R.A.H. 242, 258, 260
Blau U. 246, 259
Index of names
Bloom A. 298
Blner N. 117, 122, 138
Boeb J. 158
Bollaert 194
Bollaert H. 196
Boll F. 312, 314, 317
Bolzano B. 267
Bootle R. 194, 195
Borgo San Donnino G. 209
Bouchard D.F. 224, 227
Boudouri S. 5, 3452, 186
Boudouris K. 36, 5455, 56, 158, 184,
185, 187, 200, 204, 212, 214217,
219, 220, 319, 326327
Bourodimos E. 171172, 185
Bradley K. 78
Brickhouse T.C. 138
Brill E.J. 318
Buddensiek F. 247, 259
Buddha 141154
Burkert W. 161, 185
Burnet J. 213, 220
Bury R.G. 258
Buswell E.R. 142143, 146, 149151,
153155, 158
Butler J. 238, 248250, 252253,
256257, 259
C
Cairns D.L. 189190, 195
Cairns H. 169, 186
Callicles 236
Campbell M. 68, 77
Camus A. 223
Cantor G. 267, 280
Captain Dreyfus 222
Cartledge P. 78
Caucasus 37, 44
Cephalus 105, 291
329
Cephisus 191
Chaerephon 119120
Champs Elisees 193
Chatzikou S. 5, 5356
China 11, 141
Chinul B. 143, 151, 158
Chrysippus 245
Chung-Fan Y. 141
Chun J. 154, 158
Churchill W. 192
Cicero M.T. 160187, 185, 242, 251
Cilicia 315316
Clark Ch. 188, 195
Clarke M. 195
Cleanthes 208
Cleisthenes 283284
Cliffs E. 291
Cloete M. 5, 5779
Colchis 43
Colyvan M. 243, 259
Common Th. 227
Comte A. 209
Confucius 14, 18, 26, 3233
Cooper J. 186
Cooper L. 78
Cornford F.M. 186
Coseru Chr. 146, 159
Coulton J.J. 285
Crito 67, 80
Critobulus 8085, 8788
Croesus 230
Cronus 41, 46, 48
Croon J.H. 291, 304
Croton 184, 264
Cyrus 81, 8586
D
Dali S. 261
Damocles 9
330
Daniels N. 105106
Darwin Ch. 229
Davis P. 114
Dedekind R. 267
Deleuze G. 224, 226, 317, 318
Delphi 119120, 126
Dmtrakos D. 312, 318
Democritus 212, 320
Descartes R. 66, 77
Dewey 243
Dharma 152
Dianova V. 6, 221227
Diels H. 220, 310, 318
Diodorus Siculus 209
Diodotus 213
Diogenes 12
Diogenes Laertius 160162, 164165,
169, 185, 213214, 220, 240
Dionysus 162, 167168, 209
Diotima 11, 101, 166, 168, 177, 179
Dodds E.R. 284
Doesburg Th.v. 288
Domaski J. 160165, 170171, 173,
175180, 183, 185186
Draco 283
Dzielska M. 316, 318
E
Easterling P.E. 35
Echo 191
Egypt 36
Eleutherius 88
Empedocles 206208, 210, 212, 309
310
England 60
Epafos 36
Ephesus 212, 316
Epicurus 208
Er 325326
Index of names
Erinyes 49
Erler M. 138
Ermodorus 213
Eros 166, 168, 177, 183184, 193
Etienne E. 192
Euclides 263265, 269, 273, 275,
277278, 287288
Eumolpides 52
Euphrates 316
Europe 60, 101, 193194
Eusebii Pamphili 317
Eusebius of Pamphilia 314
Euthyphro 71
Evangeliou Ch.C. 5, 80103
F
Fanon F. 61, 66, 77
Farantos G. 220
Fate 50
Finch H.A. 223, 227
Finley M.I. 6970, 77
Fisher N.R.E. 188190, 195
Flores J. 209
Force 37
Foucault M. 90, 221, 223224, 226,
252257, 259
Fowler H.N. 117, 122, 282
Fox W. 54
Frampton K. 288
France 60
Fraser N. 249, 259
Frede M. 126, 258
Freud S. 191, 193
G
Gabaude J.M. 208
Gadamer H.G. 284
Gaia 48
Index of names
Galen 243244, 246, 258
Galileo G. 267
Gautier P. 258
Gernet L. 310, 318
Giannaras Ch. 201, 204
Gill Ch. 139
Gill M.L. 139
Gims Ch. 195
Gitsoulis Ch. 5, 104115, 114
Glaucon 124, 146, 149, 177, 320323
Glotz G. 283
Gorgias 75
Goryeo 140142
Gosling J.C.B. 300, 304
Gould G.P. 81
Gouldner A.W. 63, 69, 77, 223
Gramsci A. 223
Great King of Persia 85, 100
Greco A. 304
Greece 101, 160, 163, 173, 194, 228,
292, 295
Greenberg J. 195
Greenspan A. 194
Grisez G. 110
Gropius W. 287
Grube G.M.A. 120
Gryparis I.N. 158
Gumilev L.N. 223, 227
Guthrie W.K.C. 199, 204
Gyges 319327
H
Habermas J. 66, 77, 223, 282, 286289
Hades 40, 44, 323
Hadot P. 184, 186
Halligan L. 195, 196
Hamilton E. 78, 169, 186
Hardy J. 6, 116139
Harman G. 114
331
Hartman R.S. 78
Hastings M. 188, 196
Hegel G.W.F. 66, 75, 7778, 180182,
209
Heidemann D. 248, 259
Heidmann J. 277, 281
Heimsoeth H. 199, 202, 204, 205
Heisenberg W. 265, 281
Heitsch E. 116, 139
Hellas 291
Hephaestus 3647
Hera 5051
Heraclea Pontica 161
Heracles 83
Heraclides 160161
Heraclitus 212220, 271, 280, 319
Hermes 36
Herodotus 319
Hesiod 35, 319
Hicks R.D. 160162, 164165, 185,
213, 220
Holland 60
Homer 35, 46, 283, 304, 319
Hong G. 2931
Hossenfelder M. 259
Howatson M.C. 191, 196
Hlser K. 246, 258, 259
Hume D. 111112, 114
Huntington C. 78
Hunt P. 58, 60, 72, 78, 192194
Hurley R. 259
Hursthouse R. 55
Hutchison D.S. 186
I
Iamblichi 317
Iamblichus 308309, 312
Icarus 194
Io 36, 42, 50
332
Iraq 195
Ischomachus 8081, 8889, 9193, 96,
98, 100101
Ivanhoe P.J. 55, 56
J
Jaeger W. 10, 25, 283
Jefferson Th. 88
Jennings J. 222, 227
Jeon H. 143, 149, 158
Jinul B. 140159
Jinwol 159
Joeng B. 144
Jones Ch.P. 312, 318
Jowett B. 227, 272, 281
K
Kahn C. 78
Kahn C.H. 57, 161, 186
Kaiser Franz Joseph 192
Kalimtzis K. 56, 186
Kallipolis 233, 276, 299
Kang K.K. 158
Kant I. 18, 66, 78, 172, 186, 202, 262,
273, 281, 327
Karneades 240, 250, 253, 257
Karthago 242
Kasotaki - Gatopoulou A. 6, 140159
Kernberg O.F. 191, 196
Kershaw I. 193
Kierkegaard S. 326
King R. 138
Kirk G. 281
Kirk G.S. 161, 186, 220
Kleitomachos 242
Knox B.M.W. 35
Kohut H. 191
Kordatos J. 214
Index of names
Korea 140159
Kosiewicz J. 6, 160187, 186
Koslowski P. 23, 25
Koufopoulos T. 220
Kounaxa 86
Kozhev A.

SeeKozhevnikov A.
Kozhevnikov A. 221, 224225, 227
Kranz W. 220, 310, 318
Krokiewicz A. 184, 186
Kum Ki K. 141, 145, 149150
Kusan S. 158
Kyriazopoulos S. 220
L
Laches 131, 137
Lady Luck 51
Lambridis H. 220
Lamb W.R.M. 130
Laozi 29
Lash Ch. 191, 196
Leach N. 287
Le Corbusier 287288
Leon 160161
Lesky A. 35, 220
Levin B. 193, 196
Liddell H.G. 312
Liriope 191
Locke J. 21
Lohman F. 6, 188196
Long A. 250251, 258259
Loos A. 287
Lukacs G. 293
Lukcs G. 304
Lu X. 30
Lysander 86
Index of names
M
MacCarthy Th. 286
MacDowell D.M. 188, 190, 196
MacIntyre A. 54
Maeotic Lake 43
Magerl G. 203
Maintenay A.L. 5455
Mainzer K. 203
Mair P. 194, 196
Malevich K. 288
Mandilaras B. 204
Mantinea 166
Maragianou E. 203
Marathon 5152
Marchant E.C. 81
Markopoulos J.N. 6, 55, 197205
Marx K. 68, 78, 193, 290305, 304
Masolo D.A. 73, 78
Mayhew R. 231, 236
McDonald M. 38, 40, 4344, 51
McGinn C. 114
Meisch S. 55
Melissus 267
Meno 75, 101
Michel A. 283
Midas 294
Mignolo W.D. 59, 66, 78
Miletus 212
Miller A.V. 77
Mills C. 253, 260
Mirhady D.C. 237
Mitchell S. 195
Mithra 86
Mohr J.C.B. 284
Moires 49
Mondrian P. 288
Mopsuestia 316
Morrow G.R. 231, 236
333
Mourelatos A.P.D. 186
Moutsopoulos E. 6, 206211
Murray G. 35
Muses 167
Mutschmann H. 258
N
Nails D. 139, 291, 304
Narcissus 191
Nau F. 313314, 317
Nehamas A. 186187
Nemesis 191192
Nicholsen S. 77
Nicias 118
Nietzsche F. 186, 193, 209, 222, 227,
241, 292, 318
Night 38
Nikolaidis T. 199, 204
Nilsson N.P. 161162, 186
Nussbaum M. 238, 252, 254, 260
O
Oceanides 36, 47
Oceanus 46
Odysseus 291
Olympus 40
Oud 288
P
Pack S. 295, 304
Palgon 143
Papanikolaou M. 199, 204
Park S.B. 159
Park Y.J. 145, 151152, 159
Parmenides 212
Pelegrinis Th. 200
Pellegrin P. 139
Penella R.J. 313317, 318
334
Penner T. 117, 139
Perakis E. 6, 212220
Pericles 229
Perloff M. 232, 237
Persson M. 195, 196
Petit V. 194, 196
Pfeffer J. 196
Pherecydes 212
Philip J.A. 161, 186
Philostratus 312, 315316, 318
Phliasii 160
Phlius 160, 162
Piraeus 291
Plato 1113, 21, 23, 26, 30, 33, 5780,
86, 101, 104105, 111, 113,
116159, 175, 177178, 180, 183,
186187, 189, 199, 204, 207208,
221, 227237, 267, 272, 276,
280283, 290305, 317, 319327
Pleket H.W. 318
Plutarch 240
Podlecki A.J. 44
Pontus 161
Popper K. 76, 78, 304
Porphyrii 318
Porphyrius 309
Portugal 60
Postone M. 292, 304
Potthast Th. 55
Power 3640
Prince Rudolf 192
Prodicus 83
Prometheus 3452
Protagoras 319
Psellos M. 244, 247, 258
Pseudo-Plato 174177, 179180, 187
Puchkovskaya A. 6, 221227
Putnam H. 287
Pythagoras 160184, 199, 212, 267,
Index of names

272, 308310, 316
Pythian 119
Q
Queen Victoria 192
R
Rachels J. 114
Raven J. 281
Raven J.E. 161, 186, 220
Rawls J. 105, 327
Reeve C.D.C. 186187, 291, 304
Regan T. 107, 114
Regner L. 169, 175, 177, 186, 187
Rihll T.E. 58, 7071, 78
Robinson R. 10
Robinson Th.M. 6, 161, 228237
Robinson T.R. 174, 187
Rohe M.v.d. 287
Rome 60
Romeroy S. 90
Roussos E.N. 220
Rowe D. 123
Rudebusch G. 139
Russell B. 220
Russia 193
Rutkevich A.M. 224, 227
S
Said H. 110
Salamis 291
Samartzis Th. 199, 204
Santas G. 200, 298, 304
Sartre J.P. 223
Schfer Chr. 138
Schilling D. 138
Schmidinger H. 203
Schofield M. 161, 186, 220, 281
Index of names
335
Schne T. 246, 260

Soteropoulos I. 7, 261281
Schopenhauer A. 193
Soviet Union 193
Schuetrumpf E. 231, 237
Spain 60, 194
Schuhl P.M. 207
Sprague R.K. 118
Schumpeter J. 295, 305
Spyropoulos N. 220
Scott R. 312
Stace W.T. 114
Scythia 37
Stalley R.F. 231, 237
Scythians 43
Stemmer P. 117, 123, 139
Seaford R. 291, 304
Stojanovi S. 258259
Sedley D. 124, 250251, 258259
Strauss L. 90
Seidlmayer R.E. 7, 238260
Stroud R.S. 318
Sextus Empiricus 239241, 249250,
Sunim K. 144, 147
257259
Sutcliffe F.E. 77
Shafer-Landau R. 104, 114
Sybarites 184
Shaw W. 107110, 113, 114
Syros 212
Shills E.A. 223, 227
T
Shim J. 143, 146, 151, 158
Silla 144
Tacitus 194
Simplicius 206
Ta-Hui 140, 150
Sinclair T.A. 220
Tang 141, 143
Skouteropoulos N.M. 199200, 204, 322 Tantalus 103
Smith A. 295, 305
Tarsus 161
Smith N.D. 124, 138
Tartarus 48
Smith N.K. 78
Tatla H. 7, 282289
Socrates 1113, 24, 67, 80103, 105,
Taut B. 288
111, 116139, 138, 169, 174, 177, Taylor Ch. 139, 252
184, 198, 228, 234, 297299, 319, Tegmark M. 272, 281
321, 323324, 326
Teubner B.G. 309, 317318
Solomon R. 23
Thakkar J. 7, 290305
Solomon R.C. 25
Thales 171, 212
Solon 52, 70, 212, 283284, 319
Thanatos 193
Somerwell D.C. 210
Theaetetus 123
Sommer A. 252, 260
Themis 38, 48
Song 158
Themistocles 192
Songgwang 143
Thetis 46, 48
Song V. 153
Thomson J.H. 114
Sophocles 190
Thrasymachus 63, 236, 297, 299, 322
Soros G. 194, 196
Thucydides 219, 220
Sosicrates 160187
Timmons M. 114
336
Titans 35, 44, 48, 192
Toynbee A.J. 210, 222, 227
Tredennick H. 282
Tricot J. 264, 280
Tsopanakis A. 35
Tuchman B. 188, 192, 196
Tyana 306
Tzanetaki Th. 7, 306318
U
UK 194195
Uranus 41
USA 11, 193195
Wolff L. 196
Woodruff P. 186187
Wright C. 104, 115
Wright F.L. 287
X
Xenophanes 52, 212
Xenophon 8081, 8587, 93, 99, 102
103
Y
Yonge C.D. 160165, 170
Yu c. 158
Veikos T. 214
Veneti M. 34, 7, 319327
Vernant J.P. 310311, 318
Vico G. 209
Violence 3637
Vlastos G. 7374, 79, 147, 156, 158,
214, 283
Vogt K.M. 251, 260
Zack N. 76, 79
Zalta E.N. 106, 146
Zalta N. 159
Zeno 208
Zeus 3452, 88
Zeuxis 94
Zeyl 233
Zhang J. 2930
Zola E. 222
W
Walker R.L. 55, 56
Wallerstein I. 221, 225, 227
Walzer R. 258
Warner R. 230
Warrington J. 77
Waterfield R. 280
Weber M. 221, 223, 227
Weber Z. 243, 259
Whitehead A.N. 76, 79
Wiedemann Th. 60
Williamson T. 245, 260
Windelband W. 199, 205
Wittgenstein L. 115, 228, 232
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GREEK PHILOSOPHY

AND MORAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES

2015 INTERNATIONAL CENTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE & KB

National Library Publication Data

Argyro Kasotaki - Gatopoulou

Antonina Puchkovskaya & Valentina Dianova

Ruth Eva Seidlmayer

An Aristotelian Renaissance: Aristotelian Ethics for today

An Aristotelian Renaissance: Aristotelian Ethics for today

An Aristotelian Renaissance: Aristotelian Ethics for today

complement to activity appropriate to ones realized nature.

Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a18-19.

Nicomachean Ethics, 1176b29-37.

Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a16.

An Aristotelian Renaissance: Aristotelian Ethics for today

Nicomachean Ethics, 1099a17-18.

Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a25-27.

An Aristotelian Renaissance: Aristotelian Ethics for today

Politics, 1263a39-41; 1263b12-14.

An Aristotelian Renaissance: Aristotelian Ethics for today

than if one were to be simply exhorted to be just regardless of ones inclinations.

An Aristotelian Renaissance: Aristotelian Ethics for today

Robert C. Solomon, Historicism, Communitarianism and Commerce, Peter Koslowski (ed.),

Nicomachean Ethics, 1096a5-7.

Nicomachean Ethics, 1105a16-17.

An Aristotelian Renaissance: Aristotelian Ethics for today

A Contextual Reading of Ancient Theories

Contemporary scholarship of ancient Greek philosophical tradition has

A Contextual Reading of Ancient Theories

Contextualization often consists in recasting classical theories in the Platonic

A Contextual Reading of Ancient Theories

A Contextual Reading of Ancient Theories

Political and Ethical Views of Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound

The Plot is the following:

Political and Ethical Views of Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound

Prometheus Bound, Preface, Notes and Translation by Marianne McDonald, 2008.

Political and Ethical Views of Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound

Prometheus Bound, Preface, Notes and Translation by Marianne McDonald, 2008.

Political and Ethical Views of Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound

Political and Ethical Views of Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound

Prometheus Bound, Preface, Notes and Translation by Marianne McDonald 2008.

Prometheus Bound, Preface, Notes and Translation by Marianne McDonald 2008

Political and Ethical Views of Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound

3. Political and ethical questions and problems in Prometheus Bound

Op. cit., 324.

Op. cit., 953.

Op. cit., 955-956.

Op. cit., 946.

Op. cit., 543.

The Iliad, B, 204-206:

Prometheus Bound 35 and 309-310.

Political and Ethical Views of Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound

Prometheus Bound 324.

Op. cit., 1093.

Op. cit., 544.

Op. cit., 50.

Op. cit., 265-266.

Political and Ethical Views of Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound

(Prometheus Bound, 210-225)

Prometheus Bound, 511-520,

Political and Ethical Views of Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound

A man who labors should not marry above his station,

Op. cit., 34.

Prometheus Bound, 120.