Control of

Group Captain Scott Miller takes a look at the capabilities, tasks

and technology vital to gaining control of the air

RIGHT: Through a
combination of advanced
sensors, extreme
performance, clever tactics
and an excellent weapons
system, Typhoon is a potent
counter to threats ranging
from slow-moving light
aircraft, all the way up to
fifth-generation, stealthy
fighters. This aircraft is
marked for 29 (Reserve) Sqn,
the Typhoon Operational
Conversion Unit. UK MoD
Crown Copyright 2012

oremost among the air power roles, control of the

air encompasses offensive and defensive activity,
the balance between the two being determined
by the prevailing situation. From the inception of air
power during World War 1, armed forces have wrestled
to control the aerial battlespace and seize freedom of
manoeuvre, while concurrently restricting or denying
it to the enemy. This control translates into the ability
to act at will, which the experience of the Wests armed
forces tells us is usually decisive.
In a contemporary context, recent experience of the
London 2012 Olympics highlights another dimension
to control of the air, which is equally necessary, but
allows a different kind of freedom of action.
The importance of controlling the air has resulted
in enormous investment in offensive and defensive
systems by first world and emerging nations in the
period since the outbreak of World War 2. For the West,
the Cold War sharpened the focus on controlling the
air, particularly by exploiting technology, in order to
mitigate the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pacts
ground forces.
The 1991 Gulf War highlighted what could be
achieved, to the point where Iraqi forces, both air and
ground, were completely immobilised and Coalition
forces could act at will. The ground action that finished
the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait, occurred at such a
pace that it is difficult to imagine it being done more
quickly or with so few friendly casualties.
In this, the 30th anniversary year of the Falklands
War, we are also reminded of the price to be paid for
not having control of the air; during that conflict the UK
suffered seven ships sunk and ten seriously damaged.
This and other recent experiences mean that the very
idea of Western countries engaging in conflict, other
than for national survival, without a high degree of
control of the air, is almost inconceivable.

Technology Race
The development of fourth- and fifth-generation
fighters, including the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault
Rafale, Saab JAS 39 Gripen, and Lockheed Martin
F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II, has resulted from
the Wests relentless drive to harness technology to
achieve control of the air. Experience in conflicts such
as those over Kosovo and Libya, and the opening
phases of the 2003 Gulf War, has underscored what
can be achieved with air power, at far lower risk

and often at lower cost than by other conventional

military means.
Perhaps unfortunately, this very success and
perceived increase in capability has led to a desire in
economically-pressed Western nations for reduced
aircraft fleets in broad proportion with other forces, as
the risk of a serious military challenge has been judged,
once again, to have receded. Of note, the US has not
cut its ability to project air power quite so severely,
as its focus shifts towards the Eastern Pacific and it
embraces the Air-Sea Battle concept.
Of course, potential opponents have not been
idle, doubtless influenced by an apparently increased
Western appetite for intervention and the central role
of air power within it. Many have sought to negate
the Wests ability to control the air, but in a manner
that suits their circumstances. Few have been able to
invest in the technology, which has, in any case, been
mostly Western dominated, or the numbers of aircraft
necessary to counter Western capabilities.

SAM Threat
However, the capability of surface-to-air missile (SAM)
technology, particularly that of Russian equipment, has
advanced rapidly, and it is accessible to a wide range
of nations. Many of the newer systems are claimed
to have capabilities against cruise missiles and lowobservable (stealthy) fifth-generation aircraft. Many
also have very long ranges and are thus capable of
affecting large amounts of airspace and perhaps of
threatening high-value airborne assets, such as tankers
or early warning aircraft, that have hitherto been
comparatively safe.
The capability of SAMs against older generation
combat aircraft is likely to be significant, and even
legacy SAM systems continue to pose a serious
threat, as evidenced by the loss of a Lockheed F-117
Nighthawk to an SA-3 Goa system over Serbia in 1999;
the SA-3 was first fielded in the early 1960s. But SAMs
do not necessarily provide a silver bullet solution.
Dense networks of SAMs have been defeated in the
past, as in the Bekaa Valley in 1982, when the Israeli
Air Force neutralised Syrias SAM capability in surprise
attacks, or over Baghdad in 2003, when Coalition
forces overwhelmed Iraqi air defences, which were at a
heightened state of readiness.
The challenge to our ability to use the air for our
own purposes has another dimension, in the use of

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AIRPOWER

the Air

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BELOW: Thanks to the

quality of its equipment
and training, the can-do
attitude of its people
and the willingness of its
contractors to go the extra
mile, the RAF was able to
deploy Typhoons to Gioia Del
Colle, for Operation Ellamy,
within hours of the call to
arms. With Advanced ShortRange Air-to-Air Missiles
(ASRAAM) underwing and
semi-recessed AIM-120
Advanced Medium-Range
Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)
on its fuselage stations, this
Typhoon is equipped to deal
with a wide range of threats,
while boasting the potential
for significant combat
persistence. Cpl Babbs
Robinson/UK MoD Crown
Copyright 2012

man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and

small arms fire to attack aircraft, particularly helicopters
and transports when they are close to operating bases
and landing points. Essentially, anyone with the ability
to target an aircraft from the ground has the ability to
contest control of the lower airspace up to the effective
operating altitude of their weapon system (as much as
10,000ft/3,048m for small arms).
Surface-to-surface fires bring another challenge, in
their ability to damage aircraft on the ground, or their
supporting infrastructure. Afghan insurgents have a
long history of inflicting attrition on the air assets of,
firstly, Soviet and, latterly, NATO Coalition air forces by
both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface fires.
While the magnitude of these losses in the NATO
campaign has not been significant, a successful
attack against a helicopter or transport aircraft full of
personnel could have serious political ramifications as
well as reducing confidence in the ability to manoeuvre
safely by air. It is no accident that Western nations and
the UK in particular, place very heavy emphasis on
Force Protection, both on platforms and as an organic
element of ground activity.
While the threat of SAMs, both advanced and legacy,
poses problems, competitors such as Russia and China
are now embracing the possibilities of low observable
aircraft. Both have produced prototype fifth-generation
fighters, in the Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA (Prospective Airborne
Complex of Frontline Aviation), and Chengdu J-20 and
Shenyang J-21/31, respectively, which are expected to
lead to operational versions in the 2017-19 timeframe.
It is expected that export variants will follow soon
after. These will undoubtedly have a credible capability,
particularly when fielded against fourth-generation
fighter aircraft, which are likely to form the backbone of
most Western air forces for the next 20 years, as well as
earlier generations of aircraft that are still expected to
have many years of service ahead of them.

Asymmetric Air Power

Another potential threat to our control of the air
arises from the ability of nations and non-state
players to use air power asymmetrically. Hezbollah
and the Tamil Tigers have both sought to employ air
capabilities without the need to match their opponents

conventional superiority in the air, using UAVs and light

aircraft, respectively.
Hezbollah has successfully operated Iraniansupplied Mohajer 4 unihabited air vehicles (UAV) over
Israel for reconnaissance and targeting. Although
these UAVs are manufactured for military use, their
technology has proliferated widely. Smaller UAVs, such
as remotely controlled, or GPS-guided model aircraft
are available to those with modest means and all but
the smallest can be weaponised or fitted with cameras.
The potency of the light aircraft threat is well
illustrated by the Tamil Tiger Air Wing attacks between
2006 and 2009. Around ten significant air raids were
mounted against Sri Lankan targets, mostly employing
civilian light aircraft adapted to carry bombs or rockets.
Attacks included offensive counter-air operations
against Sri Lankan fast jets at Katunayake Air Force
Base and a suicide raid on Sri Lankan Air Force HQ.

Olympic Challenge
There also remains the very obvious threat from
conventional terrorist use, or targeting of, civilian
aircraft. Maintaining control of the air to protect
the London 2012 Olympic Games from just such a
spectrum of threats exposed a range of challenges
that may become more common in future. This will
be especially obvious where the boundaries between
conventional military activity and civilian policing and
security are blurred.
Placing and operating large amounts of military
hardware, especially SAMs, into densely populated
parts of a major urban area (in this case London)
brought considerable complications. Setting
up control measures to allow the detection and
discrimination of potential threats within airspace
already used heavily for legitimate civilian purposes
was especially complex.
This controlling of the air is a subset of control
of the air and it places high demands on those with
responsibility for it. The ability to synchronise, direct
and deconflict in the airspace, to achieve a known
environment in which fratricide is avoided, threats are
detected, and desired effects can be achieved, is vital.
Effective battlespace management was as essential
over London, in the Olympic scenario, with large
volumes of civilian traffic mixing with military aircraft
responding to threats, as it is over Helmand, with
manned aircraft and Remotely Piloted Air Systems
operating through the same air space as rockets, artillery
shells and mortar bombs.

Air Security Plan

It is unlikely that there will be another Olympics in
London for many years, but this does not mean that
an air security plan like that employed for London
2012 is unlikely to be used again. Shortly before

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AIRPOWER
LEFT: The RAF has
considerably expanded
on the roles of its Boeing
Sentry AEW1 fleet. Although
the classic Airborne Early
Warning and Control
(AEW&C) mission, working
directly with fighters to
counter airborne threats,
remains relevant, the Sentry
is now also tasked as an
airborne communications
node and powerful electronic
support measures (ESM)
platform. SAC Stevens/UK
MoD Crown Copyright 2012

the London Olympics, the US mounted a similar

operation to protect the G8 summit in Chicago, and
the French have mounted like operations to cover
high-profile events in the recent past.
For as long as terrorists seek to exploit the media to
spread their message, the threat of terrorist attack from
the air, especially against iconic targets, will need to
be countered. Exploitation of the air in this way is not
confined to terrorists, however. There is also a risk from
attention-seekers and protestors, as demonstrated
by the Greenpeace paraglider attack on the French
nuclear reactor at Bugey in May 2012. Discriminating
protest activity from terrorist activity adds to the
asymmetric challenge.

Future Capability
Lessons learned from the London 2012 air security
plan will have utility in future work dealing with
unconventional air threats that could be employed to
circumvent our conventional control of the air.
One such example is the development of
capabilities, such as air-to-air snipers in helicopters
(hitherto used only by France), to deal with low-andslow threats. Although a new capability for the UK,
the use of existing equipment, with training for a new
role, enabled its rapid development and fielding. It is
entirely conceivable that the capability will be used
again, at home or overseas, when there is a similar
threat. SAMs were a vital component of the London
2012 air security plan and careful consideration will

LEFT: BAE Systems Taranis

is proving key technologies
for potential application to
future combat RPAS. Here
the design is mounted on
poles for radar cross section
measurements, in a series
of tests that it passed with
flying colours during summer
2012. First flight is scheduled
for 2013. Ray Troll/BAE
Systems

BELOW: There can be no

denying that Lightning II
has been subject to much
controversy through
developmental and
acquisition complications.
Nevertheless, it is likely to
mature into a warplane of
hitherto unseen capability.
BH-1, the first of the UKs
F-35B jets, was airborne for
its first flight on April 13,
2012. David Drais/Lockheed
Martin Fort Worth 2012

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have to be given to how much of our SAM capability we

need in the future, as our understanding of emerging
threats increases.
That the Wests dominance in the air seems
increasingly likely to be challenged by modern SAMs,
fifth-generation fighters and asymmetric means,
underscores the singular importance of control of the
air in the first place. It will not, therefore, be an option
for the RAF to withdraw from this arena. While some
potential threat capabilities are undoubtedly not as
potent as the sales brochure suggests, they may still
pose a serious challenge, as do many existing systems.
So how does a modern Western nation, such as
the UK, balance its difficult financial situation with
maintaining the capability to exert control of the air?
Lightning II will allow the RAF to fly and fight in a
high-threat arena, surviving not merely by its stealthy
design, but also through the enhanced situational
awareness that it will offer its pilot. And although it
is not as stealthy as Lightning II, Typhoon remains an
immensely capable platform, able to employ sensors,
shared situational awareness (SA), tactics and a highly
impressive range of air-to-air and air-to-ground
weapons to mitigate existing or emerging threats.
Surveillance aircraft, such as the Raytheon Sentinel
R1, will contribute to that SA and the ability to target
to best effect, while tankers will continue to provide
enhanced reach and, with it, the possibility of greater
coverage and wider basing options. However, the
maintenance of a technological edge will be vital to
remain credible. Indeed, it will become increasingly
important as the RAF, alongside other UK and Coalition
forces, withdraws from Afghanistan and prepares for
potential future contingency operations.

Simulation and Training

aving formed as
a British Army
unit on May 13,
1912, Number 3 (Fighter)
Squadron celebrated its
100th anniversary in 2012.
Activities marking the
event included the addition
of special markings to the
Typhoon named for OC
3(F) Sqn, Wing Commander
Dicky Patounas.
The squadrons history
includes the Sopwith
Camel; Hawker Hurricane,
Typhoon and Hunter; and
English Electric Canberra.
In January 1972 it began
a long association
with the Harrier, finally
converting from the type,
onto the Eurofighter
Typhoon, in 2006.

As well as obvious investment in platform technology,

there is also much to be gained from experimentation,
training and the development of tactics, which can
be enabled by enhanced training infrastructure.
In financially straightened times, with growing
environmental pressures and the difficulties of
training regularly for coalition activities, investment
in simulation technology may be an area that helps
maintain an edge in capability.
Savings in training flying and the ability to
synthetically link up with partners in the air, land
and maritime environments, with scenarios limited
only by the imagination, could offer a comparatively

inexpensive way to maintain high levels of capability.

Although such synthetics are unlikely to replace
live training wholly, they should allow live activity
to be focused on consolidating training that has
been comprehensively undertaken in a simulated
environment beforehand.

Remotely Piloted Air Systems

The area of RPAS is of considerable interest for future
control of the air operations. The RAFs expertise in
RPAS has been growing over a number of years, with 39
Squadrons Reaper and Predator work in Afghanistan.
RPAS may offer a range of complementary capabilities
to manned aircraft and the RAF is experimenting
through the Taranis project with BAE Systems, to
examine the possibilities of long-range, stealthy and
autonomous precision strike.
Inevitably, potential opponents will seek to harness
similar advances in RPAS and we must also set our
minds to countering similar threats in the future. In
addition, the possibility of exploiting cyber attack
against the command, control and communications
infrastructure upon which air forces and air defence
systems generally rely is a growing area of interest
and one that generates both threats and opportunity.
Operations in this domain appear likely to be a key
component in future air battles.
Mastery of the air battlespace is as important now
as ever. Perhaps the major challenge of the modern
era for Western countries is the threat posed by
complexity and the advances available to potential
opponents that threaten to match, or over-match
Western technology or tactics. Concurrent is the
challenge of the low technology threat, which
exploits the gaps left by the pursuit of high-tech
solutions to conventional warfighting problems.
Allied to this is the potential for exploitation of
the cyber space to our own ends, while protecting
against our own vulnerabilities.
Sustaining a conventional technological edge will
remain difficult and different technological pathways,
such as RPAS, will merit exploration in order to sustain
credible, affordable capabilities. Additionally, some
solutions to the low-tech threat may be found through
further development of existing equipment and tactics
at relatively low cost. Certainly, an investment in
training better, to deliver cheaper real capability, will do
much to underwrite how successful we are in the future
fight for control of the air.

3 (Fighter) Squadron Centenary

RIGHT: No.3(F) Squadrons

anniversary jet was
among the Typhoons
that operated from RAF
Northolt in the build-up to
and during the Olympics.
SAC Stewart Paterson/UK
MoD Crown Copyright 2012

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