INTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE

SPECIALAGREEMENT

BETWEENTHESTATEOFPALESTINE(APPLICANT)
ANDTHESTATEOFISRAEL(RESPONDENT)
TOSUBMITTOTHEINTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE
THEDIFFERENCESBETWEENTHETWOSTATES
CONCERNINGCERTAINTERRITORYOCCUPIED
BYISRAELSINCEJUNE1967

jointlynotifiedtotheCourton31July2018

JOINTNOTIFICATION
ADDRESSEDTOTHEREGISTRAROFTHECOURT:

TheHague,31July2018

On behalf of the State of Palestine and the State of Israel, in accordance with Article 40(1) of the
Statute of the International Court ofJustice,wehavethehonortotransmittoyouanoriginalofthe
Special Agreement for submission to the International Court of Justice of the differencesbetween
the Applicant and the Respondent concerning certain territory occupied by the Respondent since
June 1967, signed in The Hague, The Netherlands, on the thirtyfirst dayofDecemberintheyear
twothousandnineteen.

NabilAbuznaid,

HaimDivon,
AmbassadoroftheStateofPalestine
AmbassadoroftheStateofIsrael
totheKingdomofTheNetherlands
totheKingdomofTheNetherlands

SPECIALAGREEMENT

SUBMITTEDTOTHEINTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICEBY
THESTATEOFPALESTINEANDTHESTATEOFISRAEL
ONTHEDIFFERENCESBETWEENTHEMCONCERNING
CERTAINTERRITORYOCCUPIEDBYISRAELSINCEJUNE1967

The State of Palestine and the State of Israel (hereinafterreferredtoasPalestineandIsrael

respectivelyandthePartiescollectively),

Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning the Palestinian territory it has
occupiedsinceJune1967,andothermatters

Recognizing that the Parties have been unable to settle these differences by means of negotiation
and

Desiring further to define the issues to be submitted to the International Court of Justice
(hereinafterreferredtoastheCourt)toresolvethisdispute

InfurtherancethereofthePartieshaveconcludedthisSpecialAgreement:

Article1
The Parties submit the questions contained in this Special Agreement (together with Corrections
and/or Clarifications to follow) (the Case)totheCourtpursuanttoArticle40(1)oftheStatuteof
theCourt.

Article2
It is agreed by the Parties that Palestine shall act as Applicant and Israel as Respondent, but such
agreementiswithoutprejudicetoanyquestionoftheburdenofproof.

Article3
(a)

(b)

The rules andprinciplesofinternationallawapplicabletothedispute,onthebasisofwhich

the Court is requested to decidetheCase,arethosereferredtoinArticle38,paragraph1of
theStatuteoftheCourt.
The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, including the rights and
obligationsoftheParties,arisingfromitsJudgmentonthequestionspresentedintheCase.

Article4
(a)

All questionsofrulesandprocedureshallberegulatedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof
theOfficialRulesoftheYPLFMootCourtCompetition.
3

(b)

The Parties request the Court to order that the written proceedings should consist of
Memorials presented by each of the Parties not later than the date set forth in the Official
ScheduleoftheYPLFMootCourtCompetition.

Article5
(a)

(b)

The Parties shall accept any Judgment of the Court as final and binding upon them and
shallexecuteitinitsentiretyandingoodfaith.
Immediately afterthetransmissionofanyJudgment,thePartiesshallenterintonegotiations
onthemodalitiesforitsexecution.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed the present Special
Agreementandhaveaffixedtheretotheirrespectivesealsofoffice.

Done in The Hague, The Netherlands, thisfirstdayofSeptemberintheyeartwothousandfifteen,

intriplicateintheEnglishlanguage.

NabilAbuznaid

HaimDivon
AmbassadoroftheStateofPalestine
AmbassadoroftheStateofIsrael
totheKingdomofTheNetherlands
totheKingdomofTheNetherlands

**SPECIALAGREEMENT**
STATEOFPALESTINEV.STATEOFISRAEL
THECASECONCERNING
THEANNEXATIONOFCERTAINTERRITORYOCCUPIEDBYISRAELSINCEJUNE1967

1.

The background to thepresentcasewasoutlinedbytheInternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ)

in paragraphs 7077 of its Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion of 9 July 2004, which are reproduced
below.
70.

Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the First World

War, a class A Mandate for Palestine was entrusted to Great Britain by the
League of Nations, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant, which
providedthat:

Certain communities, formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have

reached astageofdevelopmentwheretheirexistenceasindependentnations
can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to
standalone.

The Court recalls that in its Advisory Opinion on the InternationalStatusofSouth

West Africa, speaking of mandates in general, it observed that The Mandate was
created, in the interest of the inhabitantsoftheterritory,andofhumanityingeneral,
as an international institution with an international object a sacred trust of
civilization. (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 132.) The Court also held in this regard that
two principles were considered to be of paramount importance: the principle of
5

nonannexation and the principle that the wellbeing and development of . . .

peoples [not yetabletogovernthemselves]form[ed]asacredtrustofcivilization
(ibid.,p.131).

The territorial boundaries of the Mandate for Palestine were laid down by various
instruments, in particular on the eastern border by a British memorandum of 16
September1922andanAngloTransjordanianTreatyof20February1928.
71.

In 1947theUnitedKingdomannounceditsintentiontocompleteevacuation

of the mandated territoryby1August1948,subsequentlyadvancingthatdateto15

May 1948. In the meantime, the General Assembly had on 29 November 1947
adopted resolution 181 (II) on the future government of Palestine, which
Recommends to the United Kingdom . . . and to all other Members of the United
Nations the adoption and implementation . . . of the Plan of Partition of the
territory, as set forth in the resolution, between two independent States, one Arab,
the otherJewish,aswellasthecreationofaspecialinternationalrgimefortheCity
of Jerusalem. The Arab population of Palestine and the Arab States rejected this
plan, contending that it was unbalanced on 14 May 1948, Israel proclaimed its
independence on the strength of the General Assembly resolution armed conflict
then broke outbetweenIsraelandanumberofArabStatesandthePlanofPartition
wasnotimplemented.
72.

By resolution 62 (1948) of 16 November 1948, the Security Council

decided that an armistice shall be established in all sectorsofPalestineandcalled

upon the parties directly involved in the conflict to seek agreement to this end. In
conformity withthisdecision,generalarmisticeagreementswereconcludedin1949
between Israel and the neighbouring States through mediation by the United
Nations. In particular, one such agreement was signed in Rhodes on 3 April 1949
between Israel and Jordan. Articles V andVIofthatAgreementfixedthearmistice
demarcation line between Israeli and Arab forces (often later called the Green
6

Line owing to the colour used for it on maps hereinafter the Green Line).
Article III, paragraph 2, provided that No element of the . . . military or
paramilitary forces of either Party . . . shall advance beyond or pass over for any
purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Lines . . . ItwasagreedinArticle
VI, paragraph 8, that these provisions would not be interpreted as prejudicing, in
any sense, an ultimate political settlement between the Parties. It was also stated
that the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of [the]
Agreement [were] agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to futureterritorial
settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto. The
Demarcation Line was subject to such rectification as might be agreed uponbythe
parties.

73.

In the 1967 armed conflict, Israeli forces occupied all the territories which

had constituted Palestine under British Mandate (including those known as the
WestBank,lyingtotheeastoftheGreenLine).

74.

On 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted

resolution 242 (1967), which emphasized the inadmissibility of acquisition of

territory by war and called for the Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from
territories occupiedintherecentconflict,andTerminationofallclaimsorstatesof
belligerency.

75.

From 1967 onwards, Israel took a number of measures in these territories

aimed at changing the status of the City of Jerusalem. The Security Council, after
recalling on a number of occasions the principle that acquisition of territory by
military conquest is inadmissible, condemned those measures and, by resolution
298(1971)of25September1971,confirmedintheclearestpossibletermsthat:

all legislative andadministrativeactionstakenbyIsraeltochangethestatus

7

of the City of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties,

transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the
occupiedsection,aretotallyinvalidandcannotchangethatstatus.

Later, following the adoption by Israel on 30 July 1980 of the Basic Law
making Jerusalem the complete and united capital of Israel, theSecurityCouncil,
by resolution 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980, stated that theenactmentofthatLaw
constituted aviolationofinternationallawandthatalllegislativeandadministrative
measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or
purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem . . . are null
and void. It further decided not to recognize the basic law and such other
actions by Israel that, as a result of this law,seektoalterthecharacterandstatusof
Jerusalem.

76.

Subsequently, a peace treatywassignedon26October1994betweenIsrael

and Jordan. That treaty fixed the boundary between the two States with reference
to the boundary definition under the Mandate as is shown in Annex I (a) . . .
without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military
government control in 1967 (Article 3, paragraphs1and2).AnnexIprovidedthe
corresponding maps and added that, with regard to the territory that came under
Israeli military governmentcontrolin1967,thelineindicatedistheadministrative
boundarywithJordan.

77.

Lastly, a number of agreements havebeensignedsince1993betweenIsrael

and the Palestine Liberation Organization imposing various obligations on each

party. Those agreements inter alia required Israel to transfer to Palestinian
authorities certain powers andresponsibilitiesexercisedintheOccupiedPalestinian
Territory by its military authorities and civil administration. Such transfers have
takenplace,but,asaresultofsubsequentevents,theyremainedpartialandlimited.
8

2.

The agreements between Israel and thePalestineLiberationOrganization(PLO)relevantto

this case are the IsraelPLO Letters of Mutual Recognition, dated 9 September 1993
(hereinafter Letters of Mutual Recognition) the Declaration of Principles on Interim
SelfGovernment Arrangements, signed on 13 September 1993 (often called Oslo I and
hereinafter the Declaration of Principles) the Protocol on Economic Relations (often
called theParisProtocol),signedon4May1994andtheInterimAgreementontheWest
Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed on 28 September 1995 (often called Oslo II and
hereinafter the Interim Agreement). Collectively, these agreements (along with prior
agreementssupersededbytheseagreements)arecommonlyknownastheOsloAccords.

3.

Acting under its UnitingforPeaceresolution,377A(V)(1950)of3November1950,the

General Assembly convened its Tenth Emergency Special Session concerning illegal
Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory in April 1997. The Emergency Special Session was convened following the
rejection by the Security Council, on7Marchand21March1997,oftwodraftresolutions
concerning certain Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory. In resolution
ES10/2,adopted25April1997,theGeneralAssemblyexpresseditsconvictionthat:
the repeated violation by Israel, the occupying Power, of international law and its
failure to comply with relevant SecurityCouncilandGeneralAssemblyresolutions
and the agreements reached between the parties undermine the Middle East peace
processandconstituteathreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity,
and condemned the illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the
occupied Palestinian territory, in particular the construction of settlements in that territory.
The Tenth Emergency Special Session was adjourned temporarily and has since been
reconvened 15 times, most recently in 2009. In resolution ES10/14, adopted 8 December
2003, the General Assembly requested the ICJ to issue an advisory opinion on the legal
consequences of Israels construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
Following the Courts advisory opinion of 9 July 2004, the General Assembly adopted
resolution ES10/15 of 20 July 2004. Resolution ES10/15 demanded Israels compliance
9

with the advisory opinion and called upon Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to
immediately implement their obligationsundertheQuartetPerformanceBasedRoadmapto
a Permanent TwoState Solution to the IsraeliPalestinianConflict,whichwasendorsedby
the Security Council in resolution 1515(2003)of19November2003.Israelmaintainsthat
the TenthEmergencySpecialSessionviolatesthefundamentalconditionsoftheUnitingfor
Peace procedure, and thus that its resolutions are ultra vires and constitute anabuseofthe
GeneralAssemblyspowersundertheCharter.

4.

The Declaration of Principles established the PA as an interim selfgovernment body, to

which Israel transferred or delegated certain powers and responsibilities over civil affairs
and internal security. Powers and responsibilities not sotransferredwereretainedbyIsrael
and exercisedthroughtheIsraelimilitarygovernmentanditsciviladministration.Underthe
Accords, the PAexercisesterritorialjurisdictionovertheGazaStripandcertainpartsofthe
West Bank. The PA has functional jurisdiction over the entire Palestinian population of
Gaza and the West Bank, excluding Palestinians in East Jerusalem.Inpractice,civilaffairs
and internal security in the Gaza Strip have been controlled by de facto authorities since
June2007.

5.

The Interim Agreement administratively divided the West Bank between areas under
Palestinian civil and internal security jurisdiction (Area A), areas under Palestinian civil
jurisdiction and joint IsraeliPalestinian internal security jurisdiction (Area B), and areas
under Israeli civil and internal security jurisdiction (Area C). Responsibility for external
security over the entire West BankwasretainedbyIsrael.TheInterimAgreementprovided
that, except for issues to be negotiated in permanentstatus negotiations, Area C territory
would gradually be transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction through further redeployments
of Israeli forces. The issues to be negotiated, as defined in the Interim Agreement, are
Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign
relations and Israelis and powers and responsibilities not transferred to the [PA].The
lastredeploymentofIsraeliforcespursuanttotheOsloAccordsoccurredinJanuary2000.
10


6.

Notwithstanding these administrative and jurisdictional divisions, the Declaration of

Principles and the Interim Agreement provide that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
constitute a single territorial unit, and obligate the parties to refrain from measures during
theinterimperiodwhichcompromiseitsintegrity.

7.

On 6 June 2004, the Israeli cabinet adopted a resolution authorizing the removal of Israeli
military installations and civilian settlements in the Gaza Strip, which the Israeli
government characterized as a disengagement. Regarding a future permanentstatus
agreement,theresolutionstated:
In any future permanent status arrangement, there will be no Israeli towns and
villages in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, itisclearthatintheWestBank,there
are areas which will be partoftheStateofIsrael,includingmajorIsraelipopulation
centers, cities, towns and villages, security areasandotherplacesofspecialinterest
toIsrael.
The resolution further stated that the disengagement would dispel the claims regarding
Israels responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and that it was without
prejudice to relevant agreements between Israel and the PLO. The removal of Israeli
settlements and permanent militaryinstallationsinGazawascompletedinSeptember2005.
Israel maintains that it no longer has effective control over the Gaza Strip,andthatthelaw
ofoccupationnolongergovernsitsrelationswithGaza.

8.

In June2007,interfactionalhostilitiesresultedinalossofPAgoverningauthorityoverthe
Gaza Strip to the Hamas movement, which Israel regards as a terrorist organization.
Despite several attempts at national reconciliation, the Hamas government has consistently
exercised de facto authority in Gaza since that time. In September 2007, Israels Security
Cabinet declared Gaza hostile territory. Israel maintains that it is engaged in an ongoing
armed conflict withGaza,andthatitsrelationswithGazaaregovernedbythelawofarmed
conflict.LargescalehostilitiesinvolvingIsraelandthedefactoauthoritiesinGazaoccurred
11

in 2009, 2012 and 2014, with sporadic hostilities occurring between and subsequent to
theseconflicts.

9.

Israel has been building a barrier in the West Bank and along the Green Line (hereinafter
the Barrier) since 2002. Approximately 85 percent of the Barriers route is within the
West Bank, placing approximately 9.4 percent of West Bank territory to the west of the
Barrier.TheIsraelimilitaryhasdeclaredWestBankterritorywestoftheBarrier(commonly
known as andhereinaftercalledtheseamzone)aclosedarea,whichPalestiniansmaynot
reside in or enter without a permit issued by the Israeli authorities. The ICJs advisory
opinion of 9 July 2004 found that Israels construction of the Barrier and its associated
permit regime are contrary to international law. TheCourtruledthatIsraelwasobligatedto
cease construction of and dismantle the Barrier, repeal or renounce all legislative and
regulatory acts related to the Barrier and its associated regime, and make reparation for all
damage caused by them. The Court further ruled that all States are under anobligationnot
to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the Barrier and not to
renderaidorassistanceinmaintainingthesituationcreatedbysuchconstruction.

10.

Israel has not complied with the Courts advisory opinion and denies that it has binding
legal effect.Palestinemaintainsthattheadvisoryopinionconclusivelyresolved,andhasthe
force of res judicata with respect to, certain questions of international law relevant to the
present case, including the legality of Israeli settlements in the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem), the applicability of Geneva Convention (IV) to Israels occupation since June
1967 of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, and the application
ofIsraelshumanrightsobligationstothesameterritory.

11.

The parties have conducted several unsuccessful rounds of bilateral negotiations,

sponsored by the United States and supported by the international community, aimed at
reaching an agreement on the permanentstatus issues identified in the Oslo Accords and
ending their conflict. These negotiations (which are commonly known by their location)
12

were held in 2000 (Camp David), 2001 (Taba), 20072008 (Annapolis), and 20132014.
NobilateralpermanentstatusnegotiationshavebeenheldsinceApril2014.

12.

The PLO was recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people by General
Assembly resolution 3210 (XXIX) of 14 October 1974 and was granted nonstate
observer status in the General Assembly by resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November
1974. In resolution 43/177 of 15 December 1988, the General Assembly decided that the
designation Palestine should be used in place of Palestine Liberation Organization in
the United Nations system, without prejudice to the PLOs observer status and functions.
On 23 September 2011, Palestine applied for membership in the United Nations, but the
Security Councils Committee on the Admission of New Members was unable to
unanimously recommend admission. Thereafter, the General Assembly voted inresolution
67/19 (2012) of 29 November 2012 to recognize Palestine as a nonmember state and the
PLO Executive Committee as its provisional government. On 1 April and 31 December
2014, Palestine acceded to various treaties,includingthecoreUnitedNationshumanrights
treaties. On 1 January 2015, Palestine lodged adeclarationunderarticle12(3)oftheRome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) accepting the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) over alleged crimes committed in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014, corresponding to the
start of major Israeli military operations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the
summer of 2014. Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute on 2 January 2015 and became a
statepartytotheICCon1April2015.

13.

On 6 January 2013, Mahmoud Abbas, president of the PA and chairman of the PLO
Executive Committee, issued a presidential decree calling upon the State of Palestine to
issue, as soon as practicable, national identification documents to all Palestinians
worldwide, on the understanding that such documents should be without prejudice to the
holders existing citizenship or residency rights. In early 2016, thePalestiniangovernment

13

announced its intention to issue State of Palestine passports to residents of the West Bank
andtheGazaStrip,whowerepreviouslyissuedPAtraveldocuments.

14.

Following the 1967 War, the Israeli Knesset enacted a series of measureswhichexpanded
the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem from 6.5 km2 (as the city was defined under
Jordanian rule) to 71 km2, and extended Israeli law, jurisdiction and administrationtoEast
Jerusalem. ThenIsraeli foreign minister Abba Eban maintained that the application of
Israeli law to East Jerusalem did not constitute annexation, but related to the integrationof
Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal spheres. TheBasicLaw:Jerusalem,adopted
in 1980, declares complete and united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. A 2000
amendment to the Basic Law prohibits the transfer of authority over any part ofmunicipal
Jerusalem to any foreign body except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the
Knesset.

15.

In May 2016, the Israeli government announced plans to extend Israeli law to West Bank
settlements outside of East Jerusalem. This plan was adopted intolawbytheKnesseton1
May 2017. Deputy foreign minister Tzipi Hotolevy denied that the law constitutes
annexation of the settlements. She claimed that the measure was necessary to uphold
guarantees of nondiscrimination towards all citizens under Israeli law, including residents
of the settlements. Prior to the laws enactment, Israeli citizens residing in the settlements
were, in principle, subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the Israelimilitarygovernmentin
theWestBankandthepersonaljurisdictionofIsraelicivilcourts.

16.

On 4 July 2017, the Security Council adopted resolution 2750 (2017) declaring the law
null and void, demanding its immediate rescission, and calling upon all states not to
recognize,aidorassistintheillegalsituationresultingfromthelawspromulgation.

17.

On 5 August 2017, the Security Council adopted new resolution 2755, which deplores
Israels noncompliance with resolution 2750of4July2017,declaresthattheextensionof
14

Israeli law to the settlements is tantamount to annexation, and as such, constitutes a

threat to international peace and security. Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council
inresolution2755:
Affirms the urgent need toattain,nolaterthan12monthsaftertheadoptionofthis
resolution, a just, lasting and comprehensive peacefulsolutionthatbringsanendto
the Israeli occupation since 1967 and fulfils the vision of two independent,
democratic and prosperous states, Israel and a sovereign, contiguous and viable
State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security within mutually and
internationallyrecognizedborders.
Regardingtheparametersforpermanentstatusnegotiations,resolution2755:
decidesthatthenegotiatedsolutionwillbebasedonthefollowingparameters:
borders based on4June1967lineswithmutuallyagreed,limited,equivalentland
swaps
security arrangements, including through a thirdparty presence, that guarantee
and respect the sovereignty of a State of Palestine, including through a full and
phased withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces, which will end the occupation
that beganin1967overanagreedtransitionperiodinareasonabletimeframe,notto
exceed 5 August 2018, and that ensure the security of both Israel and Palestine
through effective border security and bypreventingtheresurgenceofterrorismand
effectively addressing security threats, including emerging and vital threats in the
region
a just and agreed solution to the Palestine refugee question on the basis of Arab
Peace Initiative,internationallawandrelevantUnitedNationsresolutions,including
resolution194(III)

15

 a just resolution of the status of Jerusalem as the capital of the two Stateswhich
fulfils the legitimate aspirations of both parties and protects freedom of worship
and
thejustsettlementofallotheroutstandingissues,includingwaterandprisoners.
The resolution also looks forward to welcoming Palestine as a full Member State of the
United Nations within the timeframe defined in the present resolution. Israeli
representatives at the United Nations issued the following response to the resolution:
Israel adherestoitspositionthatthebestwaytoresolvetheconflictbetweenIsraelandthe
Palestiniansisdirect,bilateralnegotiationswithoutpreconditions.

18.

On 15 August 2017, Palestine referred an alleged crime against humanity, the crime of
apartheid, to the ICC Prosecutor under article 14 of the Rome Statute. In accordance with
the RegulationsoftheOfficeoftheProsecutorandestablishedpractice,theICCProsecutor
openedapreliminaryexaminationintothesituationon31July2017.

19.

On 1 August 2017, in response to Palestines referral of the alleged crime of apartheid to

the ICC, Israel announced an indefinite suspension of clearance revenue transfers to the
PA. Under the Protocol of Economic Relations, Israel collectstaxesonPalestinianimports
on behalf of the PA and transfers the proceeds to the PA onamonthlybasis.Asof 2017,
these clearance revenue transfers accounted for 75 percent of the PAs total revenue.Israel
has, in the past, suspended clearance revenue transfers in response to political
developments:

in August 1997, for one month, following a deterioration in the political and
securitysituation
in October 2000, for two years, corresponding to the start of the second
Palestinianuprising(intifada)

16

 in March 2006, for oneandahalf years, following Palestinian legislative

elections in which Hamas participated and won a majority in the Palestinian
LegislativeCouncil(PLC)
in May 2011, for one month, following Palestinian national reconciliation
efforts
in November 2012, for four months, following the General Assemblys
recognitionofPalestineasanonmemberstateand
in December 2014, for four months, following Palestines application for
membershipin,andreferralofallegedwarcrimesto,theICC.
During these periods, the PA resorted tohighlevelsofborrowingfrombanksinPalestine,
increasing the already high exposure of the domestic banking system to default by the PA
(which has suffered a sharp decline in foreign assistance since 2012) and its employees,
who account for 23 percent of total employment. During the 20142015 suspension of
transfers,thePAalsoresortedtopayingitsemployeesonly60percentoftheirsalaries.

20.

The loss of tax revenue forced the PA to institute extreme austerity measures, including a
30 percent reduction in the public workforce, an acrosstheboard 40 percent reduction in
salary for public employees, and drastic reductions in health, education and social welfare
spending. Various public sector employees, including teachers, police officers, and health
workers, organized demonstrations and strikes. University students and popular
committees organized protests throughout the West Bank, demanding that the PA cut
spending related to security coordination with Israel rather than public benefits. These
demonstrations,strikesandprotestsgrewinsizeandintensitythroughoutlate2017.

21.

As its fiscal crisis worsened, the PA made an emergency appeal for additional foreign
assistance. Key donors conditioned additional assistance on the renewal of
permanentstatusnegotiationswithIsrael.Thereafter,thePalestinianleadership,throughthe
United States, communicated to Israel its willingness to resume negotiations. On 15
17

September 2017, President Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu met in Amman and
announced the resumption of negotiations. The first session was held 29 September 2017
at the American Colony Hotel in Jerusalem. The Palestinian side was led by Saeb Erekat,
the PLOs secretarygeneral and its chief negotiator since the Annapolis negotiations. The
Israeli side was led by Gilead Sher, a senior negotiator in the Camp David and Taba
negotiations,andUdiDekel,IsraelsleadnegotiatorintheAnnapolistalks.

22.

In his opening remarks, Erekat criticized the suspensionofclearancetransferrevenuesand

noted the publicunrestthathadensuedfromthePAsausterityprogramme.Hesaidthatthe
negotiators were in a race against time, because if the PA collapses, so doesthelasthope
for a twostate solution. Noting that the parties failed to reach a framework agreement in
the 20132014 negotiations, Erekat said that theinternationalcommunityhasgivenusour
framework agreement in resolution 2755, so we expect to start immediately on a
comprehensive permanent status agreement based on the terms of that resolution. Dekel
gave the opening remarks for the Israeli side. He said that the terms of resolution 2755
were too vague to serve as aframeworkagreementandthatcertainofitsterms,includinga
threeyear deadline for a full and phased withdrawal of the Israelioccupyingforces,had
to be reconciled with Israeli security requirements, adding that the security of Israeli
citizens is nonnegotiable. The parties spent the remainder of the 29 September session
debating the meaning and binding nature of the parameters for a negotiated solution set
forth in resolution 2755. The parties held their second and third negotiating sessions on 3
October and 10 October 2017, but failed to make progress towards an agreement on the
parametersforfurthernegotiations.

23.

Following the 10 October 2017 negotiations, Erekat announced that the Palestinian
government was suspending negotiations until it received an affirmative commitmentfrom
the Israeli side regarding borders. Specifically, the Palestinian side demanded that Israel
recognize that resolution 2755, in providing for a sovereign, contiguous and viable State
18

of Palestine and borders based on 4 June 1967 lines with mutually agreed, limited,
equivalent land swaps, ruled out the Adumim and Ariel settlementblocsbeingannexed
to Israel. In a statement, Dekel declined to give such assurances, stating that no particular
settlement or settlement bloc annexed toIsraelinthecontextoflandswaps,includingthe
Adumim or Ariel blocs, would preclude a sovereign, contiguous and viable Palestinian
state. Noting Security Council resolution 1850 of 16 December 2008, where the Security
Council declared its commitment to the irreversibility of the bilateral negotiations, Dekel
declared that the Palestinian side has violated its international obligation to negotiate in
good faith by drawing arbitrary red lines fromtheoutset.DekeladdedthatIsraelseeks
peace and stands ready to resume negotiations. As of the date of this Agreement, no
furthernegotiationshaveoccurred.

24.

Despite the austerity measures, the PA exhausted its cash reserves byDecember2017and
was unable to secureadditionalfinancing.On1January2018,PresidentAbbasannounced
that the PLO Executive Committee had voted to dissolve the PA and to terminate the
Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement. In a communique issued by
Palestinian representatives at theUnitedNations,PalestinestatedthatitconsideredIsraelto
be in material breach of the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement through
the suspension of clearance revenue transfers, which prevented the continued existence of
the PA and its fulfillment of its obligations under the Oslo Accords. Noting that the
fiveyear interim period contemplated in the the Declaration of Principles and the Interim
Agreement was intended to end with the conclusion of a permanentstatus agreement no
later than May 1999 (later extended by mutual agreement to September 2000), Palestine
asserted thatthecontinuedapplicationoftheseagreementsinthepresentcircumstanceswas
incompatible with peremptory norms of general international law, namely, the right of
selfdetermination of the Palestinian people and the prohibition on apartheid. The
communique clarified that Palestine was not abrogating, and hereby reaffirms, the
commitments made by the PLO in the Letters of Mutual Recognition, namely, recognition
of the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security, acceptance of Security
19

Council resolutions 242 and 338 and commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict,
andrenunciationoftheuseofterrorismandotheractsofviolence.

25.

On 3 January 2018, Israeli representatives attheUnitedNationsreleasedacommuniquein

which it rejectedthePLOspurportedterminationoftheOsloAccords.Thecommunique
denied that the suspension of clearance revenue transfers entitled the PLO to terminate the
Accords. It further noted that the Accords have no provision regarding their termination,
except through the conclusion of a permanentstatus agreement, and do not provide for
denunciation or withdrawal. It added that Palestines communique had notably not
reaffirmed the PLOs commitment in the IsraelPLO Letters of Mutual Recognition to
assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their
compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators, and thus tacitly endorsed a
resumptionofviolencebyPLOfactionsagainstIsraelicivilians.

26.

On 4 January 2018, Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that, in light of the PAs
dissolution and the end of security coordinationbetweenIsraeliandPalestinianauthorities,
the Israeli Cabinet had made the decision to declarethePalestineLiberationOrganization
and the socalled State of Palestine as hostile entities and all areas formerly under
exclusive orjointPAinternalsecurityjurisdiction[AreasAandB]ashostileterritory.PM
Netanyahu clarified that these measures did notabrogateIsraelscommitmentintheLetters
of Mutual Recognition to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian
people. PM Netanyahu further stated that Israel understood Palestines purported
termination of the Declaration of Principles and theInterimAgreementasarejectionofthe
principle ofanegotiatedpermanentstatusagreement.Accordingly,heannouncedthatIsrael
would make preparations for a unilateral withdrawal from parts of the West Bank,
consistent with its security needs and realities on the ground, including already existing
majorIsraelipopulationcenters.

20

27.

On 1 February 2018, the Israeli Cabinet adopted a resolution authorizing a unilateral

withdrawal from parts of the West Bank. Under the resolution, Israel would remain in
possessionofallWestBankterritorywestoftheBarrier,includingalloftheEastJerusalem
(as unilaterally expanded by Israel in 1967), as well as the Adumim, Etzion, and Ariel
settlement blocs. Palestinian residents of these areas would receive Israeli permanent
residency and would be eligible to apply for Israeli citizenship. Allothersettlementsinthe
West Bank would be removed, and all infrastructure within the evacuated settlements,
including housing, agricultural works, quarries and industrial areas, would be destroyed.
Israel would retain a residual military presence in the Jordan Valley and wouldreservethe
right to deploy its armed forces on Palestinian territory in emergency situations. The
resolution declared that the withdrawal would dispel the claims regarding Israel's
responsibility for the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] and was
undertaken without prejudice to agreements in force between the State of Israel and the
Palestinians.

28.

On 2 February 2018, President Abbas read a statement adopted by the PLO Executive
Committee, which warned the international community to see this socalled unilateral
withdrawal for what it is: the latest chapter in Israels history of imposing facts on the
ground, facts which fly in the face of international law and foreclose the possibility of a
twostate solution. The resolution also called on the international community to prevent
Israel fromremovingordestroyinganyinfrastructurewithouttheconsentofthePalestinian
government. President Abbas warned that any removal or destruction of infrastructure
would constitute a violation of Palestines permanent sovereignty over its natural
resources,forwhichPalestinewillseekreparationinaccordancewithinternationallaw.

29.

On 15 February 2018, Kuwait introduced a draft Security Council resolution that

condemned the unilateral withdrawal as a form of annexation and imposedcomprehensive
mandatory sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII of the Charter. The resolution was
notadoptedasaresultofnegativevotesbypermanentmembers.
21


30.

On 16 February 2018, the PLO Executive Committee, in its capacity as the provisional
government of the State of Palestine, adopted a measure providing for the Palestinian
Ministry of Civil Affairs to issue State of Palestine citizenship numbers, identity
documents, and passports to any Palestinian, as defined in articles 4 and 5 of the 1968
Palestinian National Charter, upon his/her request, without prejudice to his/her existing
citizenship or residency rights, and without prejudice to the individual and collective right
of return as enshrined in General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and general principles of
international law. The decree also authorized the Minister of Civil Affairs to promulgate
any regulations necessary for this purpose. On 1 April 2018, theMinistryofCivilAffairs
inaugurated a new citizenshipregistry.ResidentsoftheWestBankandtheGazaStripwere
automatically added to the new citizenship registry and were issued State of Palestine
identity and travel documents. On 1 May 2018, the Ministry of Civil Affairs began
accepting applications for Palestinian citizenship from persons outside the West Bank and
Gaza, including Palestinian refugees in Arab host states, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and
the Palestinian diaspora. Within thefirstmonth,approximately5,000Palestiniancitizensof
Israel (of a total population of 1.658 million) applied for and obtained Palestinian
citizenship.

31.

On 17 February 2018, the General Assembly reconvened its Tenth Emergency Special
Session and adopted resolution ES10/19 (2018). The resolution declares that the illegal
occupation of Palestine by Israel and repeatedIsraelimeasureswhicharetantamounttothe
annexation of Palestinian territory constitute a breach of international peace and security
and demands the immediate and unconditional implementation of Security Council
resolution 2755 without any prevarication, qualification and modification. The
resolution further calls upon all States, in view of the threat posed to international peace
and security, to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter, and urges States to cease forthwith, individually and

22

collectively, all dealings with Israel to isolate it politically, economically, militarily and
culturally.

32.

On 20 March 2018, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security

Council, admitted Palestine as a member of the United Nations. In a speech marking the
occasion, President Abbas expressed Palestines willingness to initiate permanentstatus
negotiations with Israel on the basis of sovereign equality and theparameterssetforthby
the Security Council in resolution 2755. Prime Minister Netanyahu responded that Israel
was willing to initiate negotiations immediately, but without ultimatums, which give the
Palestiniansanincentivenottonegotiate.

33.

On 1 June 2018, Israels interior minister, Aryeh Deri, announced that the state would
initiate proceedingstocanceltheIsraelicitizenshipofpersonswhohadobtainedPalestinian
citizenship, in accordance with article 11 of Israels 1952 Nationality Law. Deri explained
that the PLO and the State of Palestine, having been designated hostile entities, were
equivalent to the enemy states designated by a 2008 amendment to the Nationality Law.
The following day, Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, a civil
rights NGO, filed a petition with the Israeli High Court of Justice, challenging thelegality
of the Interior Ministry decision and seekingapreliminaryinjunction.On5June2018,the
High Court of Justice enjoined the Minister of Interior from implementing the decision
pending a full hearing, but declined Adalahs request for an order nisi, which wouldhave
required the state to establish the legality of its decision. As of the date of this Special
Agreement, the hearing has not occurred. Since 2 June 2018, the Palestinian Ministry of
Civil Affairs has declined to receive citizenship applications from Palestinian citizens of
Israel.

34.

On 1 July 2018, the Yesha Council, an umbrella organization of municipal and regional
councils in the West Bank settlements, announced that it would hold a referendum on the
independence of Western Judea and Samaria, comprised of the seam zone and
23

settlement blocs remaining under Israeli control following Israels unilateral withdrawal
from parts of the West Bank.Thereferendumwouldbeopentotheapproximately189,000
Israeli and 57,000 Palestinian residents of the area. President Abbas condemned the
proposed referendum as illegal and called on Palestinian residents of the area not to
participate init.IsraelirepresentativesattheUnitedNationscharacterizedthereferendumas
a initiative of private citizens which the state neither supported nor endorsed. However,
Prime Minister Netanyahu observed that the referendum is a natural response by Israeli
citizens living in Judea and Samaria to the threat posed by the decision of the United
Nations to bypassbilateralpermanentstatusnegotiationswithoutpreconditions,infavorof
recognizingaPalestinianstateanddemandingthatIsraelnegotiateunderduress.

35.

The referendum was held on 15 July 2018, and 97 percent of voters cast their ballots in
favor of independence. The elected heads of thesettlementmunicipalandregionalcouncils
in the area covered by thereferendumdeclaredthemselvestheProvisionalGovernmentof
Western Judea and Samaria. The Provisional Government ratified the independence of
Judea and Samaria and voted to seek immediate integration of the territory into Israel.
President Abbas declared that Palestine denies the legitimacy of the socalled referendum
illegally conducted on Palestinian territory by and for an Israeli settler population that is
illegal present on our territory. PalestineholdstheGovernmentofIsraelresponsibleforthe
referendum, which is annexation in theguiseofselfdetermination,andwillpursueredress
inaccordancewithinternationallaw.

36.

On 16 July 2018, the Provisional Government of Western Judea and Samaria and the
Government of Israel signed an integration agreement, which was duly ratified by the
IsraeliKnesset.

37.

At the request of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, Palestine and Israel sent
their foreign ministers to New York on 20 July 2018. Israel expressed willingness to
submit the legality of Palestines termination of the Declaration of Principles and the
24

Interim Agreement to this Courts jurisdiction. Palestine insistedthatitwouldonlyagreeif

the Court were seized also of the inextricablyrelateddisputesoverIsraelsapplicationof
Israelilawtothesettlements,itscontinuedoccupationofPalestine,whetherIsraelspolicies
and practices within occupied Palestinian territory violate the norms prohibiting apartheid
and colonialism, whether the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement were in
violation of preemptory norms of international law, and the legality of the Israeli
government decision to cancel the Israeli citizenship of individuals who had obtained
Palestinian citizenship. Israel denies that any of these disputes are inextricably related to
the termination of the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement, but in lieu of
filing preliminary objections, has agreed to a consolidated adjudication of procedural
objectionsandthemeritsofthecase.

38.

Israel has been a member oftheUnitedNationssince1949.ItisapartytotheInternational

Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1979), the
International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights(1991),andtheInternationalCovenant
on Economic, Social andCulturalRights(1991).Israelratifiedthe1954Conventiononthe
Status of Stateless Persons, and has signed, but not ratified the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness. It is not a party to the 1961 Vienna ConventionontheLawof
Treaties, the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
CrimeofApartheid,ortheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt.

39.

Palestine has been a member of the United Nations since March 2018. In 2014, Palestine
acceded to the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 1961 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the 1973 International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. It became a party to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Courtin2015.Itisnotapartytothe1954Convention

25

on the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of

Statelessness.

40.

TheStateofPalestinerespectfullyrequeststheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat:
a. The extension of Israeli law to the settlements constitutes annexation and violates
Palestines territorial integrity, the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by
force,andtheUnitedNationsChartergenerally
b. The unilateral declaration of independence of Western Judea and Samaria and
subsequent integration into Israel are illegal and without effect, and therefore that
theterritoryremainspartoftheStateofPalestine
c. Palestines termination of the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement
wasconsistentwithinternationallaw
d. Israel has failed to engage in permanentstatus negotiations in accordance with the
parameters set in Security Council resolution 2755,inviolationofinternationallaw
anditsCharterobligations
e. Israels policies andpracticeswithinoccupiedPalestinianterritoryviolatethenorms
prohibitingapartheidandcolonialism.
f. Israel violated international law by adopting a government decision to cancel the
citizenship of its citizens of Palestinian nationality who acquired Palestinian
citizenship.

41.

TheStateofIsraelrespectfullyrequeststheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat:
a. The extension of Israeli law to the settlements did not constitute an act of
annexationandwasconsistentwithinternationallaw
b. Western Judea and Samarias unilateral declaration of independenceandintegration
into Israel are consistent with international law, and in anyevent,thisCourtshould
not order the retrocession of Western Judea and Samaria to Palestine against the
expressedwillofitspopulation.

26

c. Palestines termination of the the Declaration of Principles and the Interim

Agreement violated international law and justified Israels unilateral withdrawal
frompartsoftheWestBank
d. Israels willingness to engage in permanentstatus negotiations without
preconditions was consistent with Security Council resolution 2755 and general
principlesofinternationallaw
e. Israel and Palestine have an obligation to negotiate under relevantSecurityCouncil
resolutions, and Palestines conduct in negotiations held in SeptemberandOctober
2017wasinconsistentwithitsobligationtonegotiateingoodfaith.
f. Israels cancellation of the citizenship of certain nationals who acquired Palestinian
citizenship has not occurred and is not mature for judicial resolution, and in any
event, cancellation of citizenship in accordance with domestic lawiswithinIsraels
sovereignrightsandisconsistentwithinternationallaw.

27