Constitutional Law. Political Law.

Effects
of Cession.
ALCANTARA v. DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS
75
PHIL
749
FACTS:
Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted
of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms
with less serious physical injuries. The
Court of Appeals modified the sentence to
an indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor
to prison correccional. Petitioner now
questions the validity of the decision on the
sole ground that said court was only a
creation of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines during Japanese military
occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance
of writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good
and
valid?
HELD:
Judgments of such court were good and
valid and remain good and valid for the
sentence which petitioner is now serving has
no political complexion. A penal sentence is
said to be of a political complexion when it
penalizes a new act not defined in the
municipal laws, or acts already penalized by
the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government but taken out of territorial law
and penalized as new offenses committed
against the belligerent occupant which is
necessary for the control of the occupied
territory and the protection of the army of
the occupier. Such is the case at hand, the
petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Effects

of Cession.
PERALTA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
75
PHIL
285
FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the
crime of robbery and was sentenced to life
imprisonment as defined and penalized by
Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the
Republic of the Philippines. The petition for
habeas corpus is based on the contention
that the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance
No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the
military forces of Japan and which is
repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines for it does not afford fair
trial and impairs the constitutional rights of
the
accused.
ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance
No.
7
valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment
valid?
3. By principle of postliminy, did the
punitive sentence cease to be valid from the
time
of
the
restoration
of
the
Commonwealth?
HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of
Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is
drawn entirely from the law martial as
defined in the usages of nations. It is merely
a governmental agency. The sentence
rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it
was within the power and competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No.
65. All judgments of political complexion of
the courts during Japanese regime ceased to
be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as
such, the sentence which convicted the
petitioner of a crime of a political

complexion must be considered as having

ceased to be valid.
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Effects
of Cession.
LAUREL
v.
MISA
77
PHIL
856

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Effects

of Cession.
RUFFY
v.
CHIEF
OF
STAFF
75
PHIL
875

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas
corpus contending that he cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized by the Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government
and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was
then suspended, and that there was a change
of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial
commander stationed in Mindoro at the
outbreak of war on December 8, 1941.
When the Japanese forces landed in
Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Mayor
Ruffy retreated to the mountains and
organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as
the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The
case at bar is a petition for prohibition
praying that respondents be commanded to
desist from further proceedings in the trial of
the petitioners on the ground that petitioners
were not subject to military law at the time
of
offense.

ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens
suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of
the
Revised
Penal
Code?

ISSUE:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military
law at the time of war and Japanese
occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?

HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of
the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government on
sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation because the sovereignty
of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred to the occupier. There is no such
thing
as
suspended
allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised
Penal Code for the change of form of
government does not affect the prosecution
of those charged with the crime of treason
because it is an offense to the same
government and same sovereign people.

HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military
jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War
(2d). The Bolo Area was a contingent of the
6th military district which had been
recognized by the United States army. The
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of
93d Article of War on the ground that it
violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the
Constitution which provides that National
Assembly may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its original jurisdiction over all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is death or life imprisonment. The
petitioners are in error for courts martial are
agencies of executive character and are not a
portion of the judiciary. The petition thus
has no merits and is dismissed with costs.

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Effects

of Cession.
CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH
75
PHIL
113
FACTS:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had as pending
civil Case initiated during the time of the
Japanese occupation. After the liberation of
Manila Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to
continue hearings on his case saying that the
proclamation of Gen Douglas MacArthur
has invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgements of the courts
of the Philippines and without the enabling
law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines under the Japanese
Respondent contends that the lower courts
have no jurisdiction to continue pending
judicial proceedings
and that the
government established during the Japanese
occupation was no de facto government.
ISSUE:
1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of
the court during the Japanese occupation
remain
good
and
valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts
and
proceedings
of
said
court?
3. May the present courts continue those
proceedings pending in said courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive
Commission was a civil government
established by military forces and thus a de
facto government of the second kind.
Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de
facto governments, which are not of political

complexion, remain valid after reoccupation.

It is presumed that the proclamation of
General MacArthur did not specifically refer
to judicial processes thus it has not
invalidated all the judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the
Japanese regime. The existence of the courts
depend upon the laws which create and
confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such
laws, not political in nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty and
continue in force until repealed by
legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the
present courts have jurisdiction to continue
proceedings in cases not of political
complexion.
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Parens
Patriae.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS V. MONTE DE PIEDAD
35
PHIL
728
FACTS:
About $400,000 were paid into the treasury
of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants
of the Spanish Dominions for the relief of
those damaged by the earthquake on June 3,
1863 in the Philippines. Upon the petition of
the governing body of respondent, the
Philippine government directed its treasurer
to turn over to the respondent the sum of
$80,000 of the relief fund in instalments of
$20,000 each. Petitioner now bring suit to
recover said amount with interest against
respondents in behalf of the various petitions
of the persons and heirs to whom the relief
was intended. Defendant contends that the
amount was given as a donation and that the
court erred in stating that the Philippine
Islands has subrogated the Spanish
government
in
its
rights.
ISSUE:
Does the government of the Philippines have
authority to file a suit against the

respondent?
HELD:
The legislature or government of the State,
as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all
charities of public nature. The court further
asserted that said amount was not a donation
and that respondent is liable for the debt
regardless of the cession of the Philippine
Islands to the United States. It is said that
there is total abrogation of the former

political relations of the inhabitants of the

ceded region, however, the circumstances
present in the case are not political in nature.
The great body of municipal law which
regulates private and domestic rights
continue in force until abrogated or changed
by the new ruler, as such, the government
has the authority to file a suit in behalf of its
people by virtue of the principle of parens
patriae.