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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11872
December 1, 1917
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant-appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of September 22, 1914,
in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them to
keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and to pay the costs of the suit.
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, the complaint was amended by
being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu.
The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and
sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as
her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of
Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which hereditary portion
had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of
Margarita Espiritu; that, about the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently
succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their
mother, for the sum of P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and
Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half of the
land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-fourth of said land , to the
plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the
two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum;
and that Luis Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked
that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective
shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the
shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita Espiritu,
together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay
the costs of the suit.
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying each and all of the
allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land, the subject-matter of the complaint, had
an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc,
the plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis
Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of
seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his capacity as
administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375
the remainder of the said land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the
maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being still insufficient the successively borrowed from
said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May 17,1910, the plaintiffs,
alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the
notarial instrument inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying said sale
under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by their father
Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis
Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which they
acknowledged having received from the aforementioned purchaser. In this cross-complaint the defendant alleged
that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the
sum of P1,000 had been caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be
rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and, besides, to pay
said intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged against them.
In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth, and in special defense
alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in the cross-complaint the plaintiffs were still
minors, and that since they reached their majority the four years fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had
not yet elapsed. They therefore asked that they be absolved from the defendant's cross-complaint.

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After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the judgment aforementioned, to which
the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the case and a new trial. This motion was overruled,
exception was taken by the petitioners, and the proper bill of exceptions having been presented, the same was
approved and transmitted to the clerk of this court.
As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on May 17, 1910, on the ground
that they were minors when they executed it, the questions submitted to the decision of this court consist in
determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and therefore incapable of selling their property on
the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3; and in case they then were such, whether a person who is really and truly
a minor and, notwithstanding, attests that he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and within legal
period, ask for the annulment of the instrument executed by him, because of some defect that invalidates the
contract, in accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the restitution of the
land sold.
The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by composition with the
State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot of the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan,
containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59 centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that,
upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita,
and Luis; and that, in the partition of said decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as
containing forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita, in equal shares.
Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz, had by this husband five children, Maria Consejo,
Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death of their mother in
1896 inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the land described in the complaint.
The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of two-fourths of the land left
by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land described in the complaint, and which, they stated, amounts to 11
hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim the defendant excepted, alleging that the land in question comprised
only an area such as is customarily covered by 21 cavanes of seed.
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother conveyed by actual and
absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now on litigation, or an area
such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and that, on account of the loss of the original of said
instrument, which was on the possession of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the
revolution, the protocols or registers of public documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao
Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of the
interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own name and
those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein set forth that it
was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made by his aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis
Espiritu in 1894.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower Wenceslao Mercado,
according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part,
or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, to the said
Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of the land in question a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make
in order to obtain funds with which "to cover his children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, having
died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together with their sisters Consejo and Paz,
declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the required legal status to contract, executed and
subscribed before a notary the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the
land, effected by their deceased mother for the sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission and authorization,
they sold absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase
price, the land described in said instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area equal
to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of
Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on the south by those of Luis Espiritu, and
on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground that on the date of its
execution they were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the further reason that the deceased purchaser
Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for the execution of said deed.
As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (plaintiffs were born in Apalit) that the
baptismal register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost or burned, the witness Maria
Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which she testified had been kept and taken care of
by her deceased father Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff
Domingo Mercado was born on August 4, 1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness

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corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal registration certificate of said Domingo Mercado,
of the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years old, whereby it would also be
appear that Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May 17,1910, when the instrument of
purchase and sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of age.
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her brother and sisters removed to
Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the
administration of the property left by his predecessors in interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother
Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B, pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears that the latter was then already
23 years of age; that she did not know why her uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the
deed of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had pledged the land to her uncle
Luis Espiritu.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu who directed the
cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her sister Victoria Espiritu, who added that her
nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, she did not know just how long, under the control of Luis
Espiritu.
Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his wife and to his sister-in-law
Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the land allotted to the aforementioned Luis and
Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in
spite of its being high land and of inferior quality, as compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still
larger in 1914, when the said two sisters' share was 764 cavanes.
Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for the defendant. He
testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado; that the grantors of the
instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other
contracting parties, after it had been read to them and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of
them who did not understand Spanish. On cross-examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of age
and began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a young maiden, although she had not
yet commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all this took place about the year 1898, for witness said that he
was then [at the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.
Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the latter, testified that
Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes, and after its owner's death, was under witness' administration during
to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products yielded by a portion of this land, to wit, an area such as is sown by
about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land;
and that, after Margarita Espiritu's death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another portion of the
land, containing an area of six cavanes of seed and which had been left by this deceased, and that he held same
until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu.
The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified that the plaintiff Domingo
Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased father, about the year 1909 or 1910, and used to go
back and forth between his father's house and those of his other relatives. He denied that his father had at any time
administered the property belonging to the Mercado brother and sisters.
In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified that he mediate in several
transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When shown the deed of purchase
and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with its contents. This same witness also testified that he
mediated in a transaction had between Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in
which the former sold to the latter a parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of the
deed of sale he could identify this instrument were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so, for no instrument
whatever was presented to him for identification. The transaction mentioned must have concerned either the
ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or pledge of the other
parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the private
document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco
for the purpose of requesting him to draw up any document whatever. She stated that she saw the document Exhibit
3 for the first time in the house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which occasion and while said
document was being signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto whose names appear
therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house, because he had sent for her, as well as her brother and sisters,
sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied ever having been in the house of her brother. Luis
Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of
her brother.
lawphi1.net

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The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed
fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in the document Exhibit 3, executed on
May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother and the sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz and,
Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the certainty of the previous sale which their mother, during her
lifetime, had made in behalf of said purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao
Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan;
and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum of P400, by
virtue of the contract made with him, they declare having sold to him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the
land, waive and thenceforth any and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum constitutes the just price of the
property.
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the parcel or portion of land
that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors' mother in favor of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their
uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or mortgage of the remainder of said land, an area
of six cavanes, made with the same purchaser, at an increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an
aggregate sum of P3,000, decomposed as follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors' father; and
the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed to her brother Luis
the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs' widowed father mortgaged or pledged
the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it
is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, which was assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous
contracts, and the totality of the land, consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely
and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no conclusive proof in the record that
this last document was false and simulated on account of the employment of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or
deceit, in the procuring of the consent of the vendors who executed it.
Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates, Exhibits 1 and 2,
and taking into the account the relationship between the contracting parties, and also the general custom that
prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in the price of the sale or of
the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned, without proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to
hold, in view of the facts hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to
forge or simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has held in the capacity of owner by
virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May, 1901, according to the
contract of mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes.
So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or intestate estate is in lawful
possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of seed, by virtue of the title of
conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and, in consequence of the contract of pledge or
mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area
containing 6 cavanes of seed.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownership was conveyed to
the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed,
they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the return of the sum which their deceased
father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under security of the pledged property; but,
after the execution of the document Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said
parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of
final and absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.
Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made therein, is of the nature of a public
document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter, even against a
third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)
The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife Margarita Espiritu sold said
parcel of land which she inherited from her father, of an area of about "15 cavanes of seed," to her brother Luis
Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May 25,1894 an instrument that disappeared or was
burned and likewise recognizing that the protocols and register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were
destroyed as a result of the past revolution, at the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to
give the testimony recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had occurred, and in so
doing he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he had
personal knowledge of said sale, he himself being the husband who authorized said conveyance, notwithstanding
that his testimony affected his children's interest and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits that might be
produced by said real property.

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The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of the plaintiffs, Consejo
Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this document is false, and it does not appear to have
been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs' father, there is no legal ground or well-founded reason
why it should be rejected. It was therefore properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth.
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that, on the date of May 17,
1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they were minors, that is, they had not yet attained the age of 21
years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo
Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified copies were presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did the
plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of
age when they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A,
notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proof of the dates of
births of the said Domingo and Josefa.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to, it cannot be gainsaid
that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it, and on
that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid a sale that is considered as limited
solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600
received by him as a loan from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been
lawfully sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors who
pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves
from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of
Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser
from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical
rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868,
and March 1, 1875.)
With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis Espiritu who took out
Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on April 13, 1910, causing the age of 23 years to be entered
therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of May 17th of the same year; and the supposition
that he did, would also allow it to be supposed, in order to show the propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C
was taken out on February 14, 1914, where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of
age, for both these facts are not proved; neither was any proof adduced against the statement made by the plaintiffs
Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they executed it, they were already
of legal age, and, besides the annotation contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true
ages was introduced.
Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it cannot be concluded that the
plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they executed the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and
actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a result of the execution of said document, inasmuch as
the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother, Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21
cavanes of seed, did not occasion any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the
document Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the land in order to secure
the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to P600 so as to provide for
certain engagements or perhaps to meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the
statements made by their father himself, they received through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed,
which passed into the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have accrued to them from the
sums of money received as loans; and, finally, on the execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs
received and divided between themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000 received by Margarita
Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs,
makes all together the sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land containing 21
cavanes of seed, and is the just price of the property, was not impugned, and, consequently, should be considered as
equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value of said land.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been refuted, and
deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record, we should, and do hereby, affirm
the same, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
itc@alf

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But in order to avoid misunderstanding, I think it well to indicate that the general statement, in the prevailing opinion
to the effect that the making of false representations as to his age by an infant executing a contract will preclude him
from disaffirming the contract or setting up the defense of infancy, must be understood as limited to cases wherein,
on account of the minor's representations as to his majority, and because of his near approach thereto, the other
party had good reason to believe, and did in fact believe the minor capable of contracting.
The doctrine set forth in the Partidas, relied upon by the supreme court of Spain in the cases cited in the prevailing
opinion, is substantially similar to the doctrine of estoppel as applied in like instances by many of the courts in the
United States.
For the purposes of convenient comparison, I here insert some citations of authority, Spanish and American,
recognizing the limitations upon the general doctrine to which I am inviting attention at this time; and in this
connection it is worthy of note that the courts of the United States look with rather less favor than the supreme court
of Spain upon the application of the doctrine, doubtless because the cases wherein it may properly be applied, are
much less likely to occur in a jurisdiction where majority is reached at the age of 21 than a jurisdiction wherein
majority is not ordinarily attained until the infant reaches the age of 25.
Ley 6, tit. 19, Partida 6. is, in part, as follows:
If he who is minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five years of age,
and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law
he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should no (3) afterwards be released from liability on
the plea that he was not of said age when he assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps
the deceived and not the deceivers.
In the glossary to these provisions of the Partidas by Gregorio Lopez, I find the following:
(1) De tal tiempo. Nota bene hoc verbum, nam si appareret ex aspectu eum esse minorem, tunc adversarius non
potest dicere se deceptum; imo tam ipse, quam minor videntur esse in dolo, quo casu competit minori restitutio, quia
facta doli compensatione, perinde ast ac si nullus fuiset in dolo, et ideo datur restitutio; et quia scienti dolus non
infertur, l. 1. D. de act. empt. secundum Cyn. Alberic et Salic. in l. 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. adde Albericum
tenentem, quabndo per aspectum a liter constaret, in authent.sacramenta puberum, col. 3. C. si advers vendit.
(2) Engoosamente. Adde 1. 2. et 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. Et adverte nam per istam legem Partitarum, que non
distinguit, an adultus, vel pupillus talem assertionem faciat, videtur comprobari dictum Guillielm. de Cun. de quo per
Paul. de Castr. in 1. qui jurasse. in princ. D. de jurejur. quod si pupillus proximus pubertari juret, cum contrahit, se
esse puberem, et postea etiam juret, quod non veniet contra contractum quod habebit locum dispositio authenticae
sacramenta puberum, sicut si esset pubes: et cum isto dicto transit ibi Paul. de Cast. multum commendans, dicens,
se alibi non legisse; si tamen teneamus illam opinionem, quod etiam pupillus doli capax obligatur ex juramento, non
esset ita miranda dicat, decissio; vide per Alexand. in dict. 1. qui jurasse, in princ. Item lex ista Partitarum expresse
sentit de adulto, non de pupillo, cum superius dixit, que paresciere de tal tiempo: Doctores etiam intelligunt de adulto
11. dict. tit. C. si minor. se major. dixer. et patet ex 11. illius tituli. Quid autem dicemus in dubio, cum non constat de
dolo minoris? Azon. in summa illius tit. in fin. Cynus tamen, et alli, tenent oppositum, quia dolus non praesumitur, nisi
probetur, 1. quotiens, s., qui dolo, D. de probat. Et hoc etiam vult ista lex Partitarum, cum dicit, si lo faze
engoosamente: et ita tenent Alberic. et Salicet. in dict. 1. 3. ubi etiam Bart. in fin. Si autem minor sui facilitate
asserat se mojorem, et ita juret, tunc distingue, ut habetur dict. 1. 3 quia aut juravit verbo tenus, et tunc non
restituitur, nisi per instrumentum seu scripturam probet se minorem; et si juravit corporaliter, nullo modo restituitur, ut
ibi; et per quae instrumenta probentur, cum verbo tenus juravit, vide per Specul. tit. de restit, in integr. s. quis autem,
col. 4. vers. sed cujusmodi erit scriptura, ubi etiam vide per Speculatorem aliquas notabiles quaestiones in ista
materia, in col. 5. videlicet, an praejudicet sibi minor ex tali juramento in aliis contractibus, et tenet, quod non; et tenet
glossa finalis in 1. de aetate, D. de minor. in fin. gloss. vide ibi per Speculat. ubi etiam de aliis in ista materia.
In the decision of the supreme court of Spain dated the 27th of April, 1860, I find an excellent illustration of the
conditions under which that court applied the doctrine, as appears from the following resolution therein set forth.
Sales of real estate made by minors are valid when the latter pretend to be twenty-five years of age and, due to the
circumstances that they are nearly of that age, are married, or have administration of their property, or on account of
other special circumstances affecting them, the other parties to the contract believe them to be of legal age.
With these citations compare the general doctrine in the United States as set forth in 22 Cyc. (p. 610), supported by
numerous citations of authority.
Estoppel to disaffirm (I) In General. The doctrine of estoppel not being as a general rule applicable to infants,
the court will not readily hold that his acts during infancy have created an estoppel against him to disaffirm his
contracts. Certainly the infant cannot be estopped by the acts or admissions of other persons.
(II) False representations as to age. According to some authorities the fact that an infant at the time of entering
into a contract falsely represented to the person with whom he dealt that he had attained the age of majority does not
give any validity to the contract or estop the infant from disaffirming the same or setting up the defense of infancy

7
against the enforcement of any rights thereunder; but there is also authority for the view that such false
representations will create an estoppel against the infant, and under the statutes of some states no contract can be
disaffirmed where, on account of the minor's representations as to his majority, the other party had good reason to
believe the minor capable of contracting. Where the infant has made no representations whatever as to his age, the
mere fact that the person with whom he dealt believed him to be of age, even though his belief was warranted by the
infant's appearance and the surrounding circumstances, and the infant knew of such belief, will not render the
contract valid or estop the infant to disaffirm.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27710

January 30, 1928

ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is alleged that Isidro
Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in question and that the plaintiff is the sole
and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards the said land. This being so, the
fundamental question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the land in question to the
defendants.
The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated July 17, 1922. The
plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation made upon his mother
Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with imprisonment. While the
evidence on this particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is
vitiated to the extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it,
was a minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land
in question.
What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second husband Vicente Lagera,
having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which, according to
Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to the testimony of Paula Prado, was P150, and Genoveva Muerong having
learned later that the land within which was included that described in said Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued in
favor of the plaintiff's father, of which the latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the
land.
At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the requisites prescribed by law
for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the provisions of section 50 of Act No. 496, bind the land and would only
be a valid contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the register of deeds to make the proper
registration, inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of
the document Exhibit 1 alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less, if it is taken into
consideration, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.

8
As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215),
wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not
applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to
the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment
of the document.
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her son in 1992 as the
price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given by the defendants to the alleged
vendors in said year, but that the sum of P663.40, which appears in the document Exhibit 1, is arrived at,
approximately, by taking the P150 received by Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at
the rate of 50 per cent annum, then agreed upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the sate of
Exhibit 1.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness Paula Prado was the
only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by that of the defendant Genoveva Muerong who,
moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of the land in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in
the record to award the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without any express
findings as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439

July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured
her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence
adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to
pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a
special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a
separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

9
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula
Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal
her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After
her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on
Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October
1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez
streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus,
in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of
Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon
application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for
the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (CassoCervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it
is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished
from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated
from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the
death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep.
242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those
inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life
and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they
would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of thespes hominis that
was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art.
2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award
of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that
the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet
despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion,
the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His
only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for

10
P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record,
was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife
has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary
concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his
wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases
he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also
his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to
warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of
the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their
information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN,plaintiffsappellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison
Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order
denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was
averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

11
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that
the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given
birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given
by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of
the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the
said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally
represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to
the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40
prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time
it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of
the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa,
in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna
doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de
aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1
Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim
that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

12
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for
damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was
doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39110

November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by
her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the
first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand
pesos as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant
to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of
the three the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of
the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child
and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other
respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the
relief sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael
Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three years,
and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own
right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was
accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of
twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and

13
amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on
June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy,
and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to christen
the baby. This note was as follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and
Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the
situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the
baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time
expected, and all necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend
Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in
Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551
Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses,
including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated
and, when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to
another woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant,
who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of
Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the
letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the
meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the
acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived,
becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not
different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific
name. Only the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral
evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before us are not
legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well
founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer
to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for
christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia,
Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this
point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference
to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the
writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J)
written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged her to take good care of herself and
of junior also.

14
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the
acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or
may be made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this
point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one
document, supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the
case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padreand the other letters suffice to connect
that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the
writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be
indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had
been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and
that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco,
under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the
conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case
that the defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the
facts found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied
a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a
year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning
her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The
circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word
"continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status shall
continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal of the
plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia
Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary
to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the
defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance which the
trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court
of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will
require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia has expressly
acknowledged his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his; and secondly, that said child
has enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural son of said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia,
justified by his acts, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.
The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.
Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, reads as follows:

15
Sabado, 1.30 p. m. 14 febrero, 1931
Rev. PADRE:
La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se de a la criatura.
(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA
Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia to plaintiff-appellee
Antonia L. de Jesus prior to the birth of the child contain the following expressions:
Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: "No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el de junior tambien no lo manches. A
cuerdate muy bien Toni que es por ti y por junior volvere alli pronto. ..."
Exhibit G. Feb. 24, 1931: "Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? . ..."
Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: "Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y come tu mucho. ... ."
Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: "Cuidate bien y junior tambien . ..."
Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.
Maresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.) commenting on said article, says:
Con arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion acerca de si es posible admitir por otro medio la
prueba de la paternidad natural. Entendemos que no, porquel el articulo es terminante y la intencion de la ley mas
terminante aun. Se establecio en la base 5.a que "no se admitira investigacion de la paternidad sino en los casos de delito, o cuando exista
escrito del padre en el que conste su voluntad indubitada de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando medie posesion de
estado", y esto mismo es lo que se ordena en el presente articulo.

No puede, pues, prosperar la demanda para obligar al padre al reconocimiento de un hijo natural, aunque solo se
limite a pedir alimentos, si no se funda en el reconocimiento expreso del padre hecho por escrito, en la posesion
constante de estado de hijo natural o en sentencia firme recaida en causa por de delito violacin, estupro o rapto. El
escrito y la sentencia habran de acompaarse a la demandada, y no puede admitirse otra prueba que la conducente
a justificar que el escrito es indubitadamente del padre que en el reconozca su paternidad, o la relativa a los actos
directos del mismo padre o de su familia, que demuestren la posesion continua de dicho estado. Para la prueba de
estos dos hechos podran utilizarse todos los medios que permite la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, debiendo el juez
rechazar la que por cualquier otro concepto se dirija a la investigacion de la paternidad.
xxx

xxx

xxx

En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase presente que no basta hacerlo por incidencia;
es indespensable que se consigne en el escrito la voluntad indubitada, clara y terminante del padre, de reconocer
por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con este fin, como se ordena an la base 5.a antes citada, de las aprobadas por la
Ley de 11 de mayo de 1888; de suerte que el escrito, aunque contenga otros particulares, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por objecto el
reconocimiento deliberado y expreso del hijo natural. No llena, pues, ese objecto la manifestacion que incidentalmente haga el padre de ser hijo natural suyo la
persona a quien se refiera, y mucho menos el dar a una persona el titulo y tratamiento de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin embrago, en cada caso decidiran los un
modo suficientemente expresivo la paternidad, servira de base para acreditar, en union con otros datos, la posesion contante del estado del hijo a los efectos de
este articulo, y con arreglo a su numero 2.

16
Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity (Borres and Barza vs. Municipality of Panay, 42
Phil., 643; Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only exceptions to this rule are those established in
article 135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the first of which is that the father may be compelled to acknowledge his
paternity, "When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he expressly acknowledge his paternity." The writing that
is required by said provision must be complete in itself and by itself, and must contain all the statements that are
necessary to constitute a full and clear acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, in order that it may
serve as a basis for compelling him to acknowledge said child should be afterwards deny his paternity. If several
writings put together, each not being complete in itself, should be necessary in order to obtain a full and complete
expression of acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, the general prohibition to investigate paternity
would be violated.
By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the others to the herein plaintiff-appellee,
Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader cannot ascertain which is the "creature that is coming on June", which the defendantappellant, Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to the priest is his, nor who is the "junior" that he
recommends to said Antonia L. de Jesus to take good care of, as there is nothing in anyone of said letters from
which it may be inferred that Antonia L. de Jesus was enciente at the time, that the "junior" was the being she was
carrying in her womb, and that it was the "creature that is coming in June." To connect all these facts it was
necessary to prove that Cesar Syquia had had illicit relations with Antonia L. de Jesus, that as a result of such
relations the woman became pregnant, and that she gave birth to a boy in June 1931. All this certainly constitutes an
investigation of the paternity of Cesar Syquia of said child outside of the documents, which is prohibited by law.
Either taken alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J, Exhibit C is insufficient to constitute a
"indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia, in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco,"
as required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant father,
justified by the conduct of the father himself or that of his family.
The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J and the following facts,
as found by the lower court in its decision:
Cuando la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el demandado Cesar Syquia llamo a su
comprovinciano Dr. Crescenciano Talavera, medico que entonces ejercia su profesion en la Ciudad de
Manila, para que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese efecto llevo a la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus
acompaado del Dr. Talavera al Hospital San Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el 17 de junio de
1931 asistida por dicho Dr. Talavera, que firmo el certificado de necimiento Exhibit E.
Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael Loanco, el demandado estuvo viviendo con este y con la
demandante Antonio L. de Jesus en la casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines, Manila, entregando a dicha
demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el pago del consumo de gas y luz electrica, habiendo
firmado el contrato para el suministro del fluido electrico en dicha casa.
Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence the purpose of showing that Ismael Loanco has enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a natural child, because being of prior date to the birth of said child they can
not be considered as direct acts of Cesar Syquia showing possession of the status of natural child, as no human
being can enjoy such possession until he be born with legal capacity for acquiring civil rights (Infante vs. Figueras, 4
Phil., 738; Granados vs. Leynes, G.R. No. 31224, promulgated September 9, 1929, not reported).

17
It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to be given to the child Ismael when it was
baptized, so that the name of its mother, Loanco, had to be given to it.
The facts which were found by the court below to have been proved by the testimony of the witnesses during the
trial, are not sufficient to constitute the uninterrupted possession of the status of Ismael Loanco as natural child of
said Cesar Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:
In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:
. . . Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by Don Telesforo, we find that he visited the
mother of the plaintiff; that he paid money for her support; that he paid money for the support of the plaintiff; that he
hold one witness that the plaintiff was his son; that the plaintiff called him "Papa," and that Don Telesforo answered to
this designation; that when the plaintiff visited Don Telesforo he kissed his hand; that Don Telesforo wrote letters to
him; that he paid his fees for instruction in school, and secured him a position in a commercial house.
xxx

xxx

xxx

All these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff possesses continuously the status of a natural
child. They may have a tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the father of the child, but that it is not sufficient. It
is not sufficient that the father recognize the child as his. By the express terms of article 135 that recognition must
appear either in writing, made by the father, or it must appear in acts which show that the son has possessed
continuously the status of a natural child. No recognition by the father of the child which comes short of the
requirements of these two paragraphs is sufficient. It must appear that it was the intention of the father to recognize
the child as to give him that status, and that the acts performed by him were done with that intention.
Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain says:
En la sentencia de 5 de junio de 1906 declarase que para justificar la posesion de estado de hijo natural se requiere
que los actos sean de tal naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el convencimiento de la paternidad, la voluntad
ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal en las relaciones sociales y de la vida, y esto no accidentalmente, sino
continuedamente, porque en tal supuesto los actos tiene el mismo valor que el reconocimiento expreso.
lawphil.net

En el mismo criterio restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907, que estima que el hecho de que dos nodrizas
criaron a otros tantos nios, sufragando el gasto el demandado, quien ademas iba a casa de la demandante, los
besada, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para los mismos el mayor cuidado; el de que subvenia a las necesidades de
la madre y de los seis hijos que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales se llamaba como el padre; y el de que los
porteros de la casa donde vivio la actora sabian que el finado visitaba a esta, se lamentaba de la mucha familia que
tenia y era tenido en el concepto publico como padre de los menores, no son suficientes para fundar la declaracion
de paternidad, pues no es legal confundir actos que puedan revelar mas o menos la presuncion o convencimiento
en que una persona este de su paternidad con relacion a hijos naturales, con los que demuestren su proposito de
poner a estos hijos en la posesion de tal estado.
It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that the herein defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia
cannot be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son because there exists not an
indubitable writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of said child, and because the said child
has not enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the said
defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of his family, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

18
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is
aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to
prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item
no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition,
private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for
the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and
canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven"
months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that
it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995.
The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20,
1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office
on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her
intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her
six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme
Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election
in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of
another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now
filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest,
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up
with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after

19
the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency
requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was
a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment
should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual
and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she
stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always
intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her
memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has
been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of
Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced
that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to
allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim
and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the
Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite
aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not
cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked
was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly
of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is
devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case
ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced.
The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election,
or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections."
The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the
instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential
deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be
elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those
intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely
affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds
of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to
prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before
this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in
her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further
buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she
can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different
documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of
August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx

20
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not
complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile"
which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.
(Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not
Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood
is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit.
Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila
where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa
as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She
could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she
claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because
she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to
her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She
registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of
Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such
place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus
manendi withanimus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that
she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of
such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of
residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the
election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since
childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte
for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent
registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter
Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may
be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte.
But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in
Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six
months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:

21
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new
substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting
the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the
canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of
Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified
into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at
the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period
mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of
settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with
the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution
reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended
for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required
by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position,
has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of
domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence
and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken
up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be
to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is
thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile,
but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile
for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without
intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As
these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

22
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein
to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected
does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other
election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed
beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt
to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my
question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same
point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather
than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in
the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the
original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987
Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same
meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual
stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the
same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of
actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry
for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's
claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The

23
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing
than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second
Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when
(petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila."
The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place
where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959,
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her
husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter,
she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served
these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the
confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by
the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in
which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his
family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as
an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and
that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is
to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his
ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his
professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is
not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in
national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin
has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence
of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in
the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the
place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner
was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we
lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from
high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected

24
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in
San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and
filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a
minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political
power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by
appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part
of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew:
the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did
not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her
residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly
lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction
between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110
of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino,
writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between
a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent
of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female
spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo,
podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais
extranjero.

25
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it
refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by
the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall
transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only
once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept
of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify
the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin).
This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of
actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and
wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render
mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account
the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in
or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live
together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we
shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is
synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a
consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at
other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can
have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in
place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is
that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an ironclad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our
jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such
that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons,
revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held
that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the
marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new
residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to
live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held
that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo45 the
Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights
at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the
other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to
enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the

26
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree
for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by
imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be
procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted
to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife
was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The
decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar
to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by
process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do
so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from
the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for
the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would
be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to
that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by
virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem
here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac,
Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming
that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was
actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a
result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To
underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence
has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and
spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights
in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code)
and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the
rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired
a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of
law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot,
Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home
in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences"
following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile.
Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to
her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to
assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new
one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her
husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are
persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim
of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

27
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions
were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article
VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to
be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute
had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory
provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court
inMarcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the
reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days
within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which
may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or
some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the
period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision
within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident
that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under
Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate
has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were
flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including
the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual
what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the
past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the
residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike,
for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in
Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and
thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of
choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice,
as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By
contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article
110 of the Civil Code provides:

28
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the
husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the
wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to
promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail." 5 In
accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso
facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause
her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile
of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which
case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile
even if it is different. So we held in de la Via, 6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their
husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will
change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband
in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during
her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed
by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also
because they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and
established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and
throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has
been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they
lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was
elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and
Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the
Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did
not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her
own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what
she believes or intends." 7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President
Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of
thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily
relying on American authorities. 8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of
her husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is
based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law
identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own
separate and apart from him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first
reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the
desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law." 11 The presumption that
the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its
extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the
1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It was
unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide
in CJS 13and AM JUR 2d 14 are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917 15 and
1938, 16 or before the time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation
movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with genderbias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 18 struck a big blow for women equality when it declared
as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate
administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant
changes both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering

29
the rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus
Juris Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has
been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law
theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the
law." 19 In publishing in 1969 theRestatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law
Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of statutes and court
decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister." 20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common lawthat
demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this
common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil
Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth
Romero, cited a few of them as follows: 21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For
instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than
from her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-inlaw, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support
their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for objecting, this is
within the discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of
the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced
spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the
husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as
the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways
specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which
amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent
without just cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in
common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not
leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to
engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly
bind the partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the
legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality
between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect
which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities. 22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-based
privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family property,
whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint parental authority over their
minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint responsibility for the support of the family; 25 the
right to jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation,
business or activity. 27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the
exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid
and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible
with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together,
former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse
to live with her husband, thus: 28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible;

30
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they
have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated his wife
roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and at the
same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the
husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his
rare lectures after retirement: 29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive
control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the
husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties
and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the
family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family.
(Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by
the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her
dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by
Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving
it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary
determination of her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due
process and equal protection of
law. 30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's domicile even
beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the
objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous
fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that the
State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II
provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving
our women the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her
Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that
petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no
domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This
stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil
Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the
fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released
from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased
husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The
law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put
the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor
reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban
domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent
COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied by
President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the
Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte,
even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did
not permit and allow me.

31
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment
on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban
City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial
grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us
the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis,
Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his
letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered
properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered
properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take
over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the
necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted
to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose,
Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in
1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred
her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First
District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than
complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995
elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented
petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of
her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration
Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in thedistrict in which the
candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's
statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also
resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte,
hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also
presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No.
8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding
the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was
corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, 33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item
No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a
matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC, 34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of candidacy
presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid.The amendment of the
certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law,
and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as
evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2)
brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of
Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private
respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to
represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.

32
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will
show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as
the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she
averred: 36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious. When respondent
(petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in
the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter
stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's
affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of
her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create
another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new
district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner
now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with
respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest,
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion, 37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the
Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident
of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the
Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South
Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . .
Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First
District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the
Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736
(December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed
"Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed
a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from
the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a
voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a "Decision," penned
by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the
Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is
annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the
Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and
Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious
discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic
violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and
discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one
Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret
the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested.
Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she
cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

33
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The
election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while
private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the
overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot
frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a
rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between
women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by
redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally
tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of
advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of
yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against
married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the First
Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or
habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home
(28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like
reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong
Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of
origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally
dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it
maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected
and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the
person (28 C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one called
domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile oranimus non
revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by
operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence,
ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent
and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public
respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by
ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently,
public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places as
conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions,
though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent
Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her
domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a
domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her
husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite
untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos
Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her
husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and
obligations to one another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral
duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as
the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and

34
unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any
meaningful purpose.

It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death
without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to
disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s.
The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his
residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at
298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an
acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid
of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her
domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence
requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the
Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties
forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the
Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San
Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate 2 and
resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed
by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6). 3 It was in the
same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order
to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it
quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the
cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to
disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San
Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It
appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably
stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for
Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her
proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has
been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting
stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and
canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the
COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she
persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass
should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly
over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation
should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given
to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat. 1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is
important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had
resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived
at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her
from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at
this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by
operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the
other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the
domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased
husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly
go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.

35
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the
family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying
the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of
her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To
answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile.
Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time.
Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as
defined by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the
conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according
petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the
human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a
relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three
centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our
shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the
Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the
husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to
make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before
us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of
the wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few
exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the
law; 6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. 7 As regards
the property pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence
may the mother assume his powers. 8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms,
practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the
husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral
relatives within the fourth degree. 9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife
exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to
its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the
liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of
her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage
loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in
his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental
authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until
the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in
the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish
"conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N.
Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist
movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines
bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . .
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the
CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and
the freedom to choose their residence and domicile."14 (Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the
country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality
between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights" 16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men." 17

36
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory
provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the
grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now giventhe
right jointly to fix the family domicile; 18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family
is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration and the enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly; 20 the father and mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemancipated common child 21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law
popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act" 22 Among the rights given to married women
evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under
the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans
and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other
travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to
respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full
participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member
of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too
keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be
accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper places
under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights
to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and
social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their
husbands but must retain the same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the
departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but
exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt
acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time
when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of
the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and
render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A
compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well
become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect
and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These
provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the

37
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to
the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law
ofcandidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the
COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. The
issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least
inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long
established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion,"
are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term
"residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties
may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil
law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a
natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule
is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226
SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as
used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. .
. . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must
be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of
discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since
become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not
the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the
number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of
which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its
particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be
required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of
authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory
pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to
the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx

38
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases
of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than
seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an
election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation
of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific
instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it
should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such,
should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument,
nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio
vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]),
and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo
vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211
SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs.Comelec was a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official
leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warrantopetition, can replace
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of
votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985.
In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer
won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote.
(Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case
of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v.Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members
of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.)
another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the
Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of
a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on
the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition forquo
warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the

39
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the
COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement
to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's
qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166).
There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo
warranto proceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of
the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or
conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is
also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from
his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)
68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed
acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualifiedfrom continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number
of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided
shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to
avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

40
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and
Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material
representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on
the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the
position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10)
months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its
resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis
of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false representations as to
material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important
to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a
person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from
holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives
is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the
allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy
with regard to their citizenship, 1 age, 2 or residence. 3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the
qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests 4 or quo
warranto proceedings 5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before electionthe
qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his
eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why
it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been
voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. 6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. 7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in
their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges"
under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the
results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the
same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any
inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided
for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such
an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which

41
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C,
2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings,
as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the
Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from
continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either
from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed
in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of
ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this
sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of
the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or
offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation
and prolonging the election protest," 8 through the use of "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the
purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's
qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming office even though in
end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action forquo
warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to
elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition
must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C,
2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI,
17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on
alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such
candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its
proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the
HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring
petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District
of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the
disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision
itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy,
the Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous
with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases 1where significantly
the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if
the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.

42
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase "a
resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that
he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the
luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the
minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his
domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his
domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different
districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus
non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires
to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must
in allsituations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite
Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in
Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not
versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of
the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from
high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City.
In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House
of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a
voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted
and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the
election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of
Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for
Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A,
Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the
Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that
she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been
a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein
are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
ELECTION: ________ Years SevenMonths
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

43
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by
the duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate) 2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her
disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the
constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is
disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte)
immediately preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important
issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1,
1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238
that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of
a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84
O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision
quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final
judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that in all
situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the
jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a
candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt
is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the
highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning
candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of
votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not reexamine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.

44
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim
the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected
representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion
drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner
in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and
which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a
legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school
there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of
law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a
Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace
in San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and
also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, ever
abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all
elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu,
Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed
to have been merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated
that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in
Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's
Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San
Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose
she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided
in that municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she
sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the
original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading
"SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency
requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence and
domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of
international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our
jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial
and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable from
her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its
permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in
American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin,"
constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place. 1 In
the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.

45
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice,
and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the second
is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a
wife arising from marriage, 3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin
can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or
American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu,
Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new
domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or
misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her
residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will
or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice. 5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in
Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of
choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we
note the majority's own submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether
what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of
law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by
her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the
object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E.
Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections, 7 and advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile
at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part
to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the
provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to
her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I
find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time,
and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own
admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner
retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a
reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law. However,
we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after
the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile
of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the
ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some
difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the
former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original
domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same
as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy,
unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only
because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that
theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained another
domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this
reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since
it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.

46
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she
entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her
acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary andlegal abandonment
of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination
of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she
lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was
simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended
animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect her
own domicile, 9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In
the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that
of her husband and will continue after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family
domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never
exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long
prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that
has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and
established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material
in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her
having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the affairs
of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched
in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the
majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely,
as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and,
unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically
reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is
a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her
pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the
original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These
considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly
on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be
brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs.
COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly,
jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion
in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division
and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse
thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts
which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of
residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood
facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has
abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary
evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not
Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of
choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then
disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding
to the contrary would be arbitrary.

47
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman
(later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a
person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the
wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code,
her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said
Article reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is
empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in
the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But
because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it
impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be
exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the
wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a
suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of
her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the
sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by
changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer
the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court
shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have
multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the
spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of
the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the
majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by
law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own
domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12,
27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she
exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62,
45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death
which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were
their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in
San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In
her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she
indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in that
place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her
own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "reregistered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of
Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn
statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit
"C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit
"E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit
"A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit
attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her
"domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did she
inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's
Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this

48
uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that
forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and
that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue
studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or
domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to
any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational
activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national
police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of
original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the
exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to
consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of
origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her
Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban
City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to
return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code.
Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively
establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new oneanimo et
facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest
mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the
certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound
and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the
truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue
has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner
could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority
opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time
of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil
Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to
acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own
domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the
residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike,
for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in
Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and
thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of
choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice,
as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By
contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article
110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the
husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the
wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to
promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail." 5 In
accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."

49
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso
facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause
her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile
of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which
case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile
even if it is different. So we held in de la Via, 6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their
husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will
change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband
in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during
her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed
by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also
because they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and
established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and
throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has
been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they
lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was
elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and
Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the
Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did
not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her
own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what
she believes or intends." 7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President
Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of
thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily
relying on American authorities. 8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of
her husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is
based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law
identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own
separate and apart from him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first
reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the
desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law." 11 The presumption that
the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its
extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the
1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It was
unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide
in CJS 13and AM JUR 2d 14 are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917 15 and
1938, 16 or before the time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation
movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with genderbias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 18 struck a big blow for women equality when it declared
as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate
administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant
changes both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering
the rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus
Juris Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has
been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law
theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the
law." 19 In publishing in 1969 theRestatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law
Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of statutes and court
decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister." 20

50
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common lawthat
demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this
common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil
Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth
Romero, cited a few of them as follows: 21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For
instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than
from her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-inlaw, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support
their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for objecting, this is
within the discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of
the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced
spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the
husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as
the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways
specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which
amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent
without just cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in
common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not
leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to
engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly
bind the partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the
legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality
between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect
which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities. 22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-based
privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family property,
whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint parental authority over their
minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint responsibility for the support of the family; 25 the
right to jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation,
business or activity. 27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the
exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid
and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible
with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together,
former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse
to live with her husband, thus: 28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they
have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated his wife
roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and at the
same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).

51
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the
husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his
rare lectures after retirement: 29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive
control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the
husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties
and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the
family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family.
(Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by
the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her
dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by
Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving
it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary
determination of her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due
process and equal protection of
law. 30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's domicile even
beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the
objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous
fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that the
State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II
provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving
our women the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her
Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that
petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no
domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This
stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil
Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the
fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released
from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased
husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The
law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put
the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor
reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban
domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent
COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied by
President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the
Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte,
even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did
not permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment
on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban
City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial
grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to

52
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . ..
to make them livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col.
Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte
residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends
to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may
also cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it
shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to
take over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not
reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City
where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I
transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when
PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed
that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994,
she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of
Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First
District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8,
1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented
petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of
her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration
Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in thedistrict in which the
candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's
statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also
resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte,
hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also
presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No.
8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding
the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was
corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, 33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item
No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a
matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC, 34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of
candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate
invalid.The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the
election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be
used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone
on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her
original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless
contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify
petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will
show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as
the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she
averred: 36
xxx xxx xxx

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10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious.
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but
of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent
(petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual
residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's
(Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with
other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa
out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such
bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for
the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent
(petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an
honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion, 37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo)
wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register
thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the
petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the
Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New
Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G.
Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District
of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of
the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec
Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the
proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner
(Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing
that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure
that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to
run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a
"Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set
aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to
register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any
case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious
discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any
hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will
allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating
light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different"
Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested.
Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she
cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

54
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The
election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while
private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the
overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot
frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a
rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between
women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by
redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally
tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of
advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of
yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against
married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the First
Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or
habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home
(28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like
reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong
Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of
origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally
dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it
maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected
and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the
person (28 C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one called
domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile oranimus non
revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by
operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence,
ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent
and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public
respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by
ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently,
public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places as
conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions,
though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent
Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her
domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a
domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her
husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite
untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos
Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her
husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and
obligations to one another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral
duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as
the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and

55
unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any
meaningful purpose.

It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death
without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to
disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s.
The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his
residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at
298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an
acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid
of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her
domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence
requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the
Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties
forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the
Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San
Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate 2 and
resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed
by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6). 3 It was in the
same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order
to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it
quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the
cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to
disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San
Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It
appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably
stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for
Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her
proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has
been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting
stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and
canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the
COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she
persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass
should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly
over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation
should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given
to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat. 1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is
important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had
resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived
at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her
from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at
this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by
operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the
other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the
domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased
husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly
go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.

56
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the
family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying
the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of
her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To
answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile.
Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time.
Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as
defined by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the
conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according
petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the
human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a
relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three
centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our
shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the
Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the
husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to
make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before
us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of
the wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few
exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the
law; 6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. 7 As regards
the property pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence
may the mother assume his powers. 8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms,
practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the
husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral
relatives within the fourth degree. 9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife
exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to
its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the
liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of
her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage
loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in
his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental
authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until
the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in
the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish
"conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N.
Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the
feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the
instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less,
declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with
regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and
domicile."14 (Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the
country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality
between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights" 16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men." 17

57
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory
provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the
grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now giventhe
right jointly to fix the family domicile; 18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family
is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration and the enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly; 20 the father and mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemancipated common child 21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law
popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act" 22 Among the rights given to married women
evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under
the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans
and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other
travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to
respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full
participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member
of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too
keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be
accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper places
under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights
to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and
social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their
husbands but must retain the same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the
departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but
exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt
acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time
when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of
the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and
render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A
compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well
become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect
and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These
provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be

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chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to
the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law
ofcandidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the
COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. The
issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least
inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long
established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion,"
are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term
"residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties
may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil
law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a
natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule
is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226
SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired,
however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave
abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since
become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not
the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the
number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of
which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its
particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be
required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of
authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory
pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to
the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

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BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give
priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision
shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections
shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific
instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it
should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such,
should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument,
nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio
vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]),
and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo
vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211
SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs.Comelec was a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official
leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of
the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740)
decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the
votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were
all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by
eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the
earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio
v.Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with
Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and
Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another
took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.)
There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental
idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of
a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the

60
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on
the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition forquo
warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the
COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement
to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's
qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166).
There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo
warranto proceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of
the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or
conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is
also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from
his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)
68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed
acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualifiedfrom continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number
of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided
shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

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(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to
avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and
Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material
representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on
the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the
position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10)
months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its
resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis
of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false representations as to
material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important
to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a
person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from
holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives
is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the
allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy
with regard to their citizenship, 1 age, 2 or residence. 3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the
qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests 4 or quo
warranto proceedings 5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before electionthe
qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his
eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why
it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been
voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. 6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. 7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in
their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges"
under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the
results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the
same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any
inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.

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Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided
for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such
an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C,
2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings,
as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the
Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from
continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either
from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed
in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of
ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this
sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of
the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or
offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation
and prolonging the election protest," 8 through the use of "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the
purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's
qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming office even though in
end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action forquo
warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to
elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition
must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C,
2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI,
17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on
alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such
candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its
proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the
HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring
petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District
of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the
disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision
itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy,
the Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives

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unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous
with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases 1where significantly
the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if
the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase "a
resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that
he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the
luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the
minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his
domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his
domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different
districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus
non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires
to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must
in allsituations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite
Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in
Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not
versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of
the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from
high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City.
In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House
of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a
voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted
and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the
election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of
Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for
Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A,
Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the
Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that
she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been

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a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein
are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
ELECTION: ________ Years SevenMonths
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by
the duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate) 2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her
disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the
constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is
disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May
1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately
preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important
issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1,
1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238
that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of
a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84
O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision
quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final
judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that in all
situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the
jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a
candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt
is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared

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disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the
highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning
candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of
votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not reexamine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim
the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected
representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion
drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner
in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and
which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a
legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school
there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of
law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a
Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace
in San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and
also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, ever
abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all
elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu,
Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed
to have been merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated
that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in
Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's
Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San
Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose
she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided
in that municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she
sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the
original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading
"SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency
requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence and
domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of
international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our

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jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial
and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable from
her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its
permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in
American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin,"
constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place. 1 In
the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice,
and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the second
is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a
wife arising from marriage, 3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin
can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or
American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu,
Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new
domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or
misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her
residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will
or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice. 5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in
Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of
choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we
note the majority's own submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether
what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of
law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by
her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the
object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E.
Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections, 7 and advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile
at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part
to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the
provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to
her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I
find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time,
and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own
admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner
retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a
reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law. However,
we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after
the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile
of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the
ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some
difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the
former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original
domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same

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as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy,
unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only
because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that
theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained another
domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this
reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since
it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she
entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her
acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary andlegal abandonment
of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination
of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she
lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was
simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended
animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect her
own domicile, 9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In
the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that
of her husband and will continue after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family
domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never
exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long
prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that
has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and
established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material
in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her
having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the affairs
of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched
in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the
majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely,
as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and,
unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically
reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is
a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her
pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the
original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These
considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly
on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be
brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs.
COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly,
jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion
in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division
and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse
thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts
which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of
residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood
facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.

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The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has
abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary
evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not
Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of
choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then
disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding
to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman
(later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a
person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the
wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code,
her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said
Article reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is
empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in
the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But
because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it
impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be
exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the
wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a
suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of
her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the
sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by
changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer
the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court
shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have
multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the
spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of
the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the
majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by
law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own
domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12,
27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she
exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62,
45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death
which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were
their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in
San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In
her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she
indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in that
place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her
own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "reregistered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of
Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn
statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit

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"C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit
"E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit
"A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit
attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her
"domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did she
inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's
Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this
uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that
forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and
that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue
studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or
domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to
any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational
activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national
police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of
original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the
exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to
consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of
origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her
Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban
City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to
return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code.
Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively
establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new oneanimo et
facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest
mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the
certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound
and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the
truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue
has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner
could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority
opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time
of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil
Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to
acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own
domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.