Ang Tang Ho

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are
vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of
the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no
authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law,
and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the
power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say
when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the
Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power
to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the
Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is
vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative
power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more
than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect,
then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the
other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act
remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the GovernorGeneral, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-187;
24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and,
under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as to their rates
of fare and freight unless protected by their charters.
The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for
the transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of the State is not void
as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to that of the State.
It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a
public utility, the State had power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates.
This was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and
empowering, a railroad commission to hear and determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The
constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned
and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry.
Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:
Regulations of railway tariffs Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. Under Laws 1887,
c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to what are
equal and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons and property by a
railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance
with the tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no issue can be raised or
inquiry had on that question.

Same constitution Delegation of power to commission. The authority thus given to

the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgement, what are
equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides
That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property
shall be equal and reasonable.
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all the
facts, to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not make
the violation of the order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was
there held
That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well settled to
require either argument or citation of authority.
The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules
and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law
already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an
authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and
reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal and
reasonable.
They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law
shall be, which would not be allowable, but have merely conferred upon it an authority
and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it,
which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has passed upon the expediency of the
law, and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted with no authority or discretion upon
these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single provision of law. It is merely
charged with the administration of the law, and with no other power.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made."
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others,
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise
of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly
be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and
provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the
judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Ynot vs. IAC

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman
of the National Meat Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos."
(Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by
what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they
alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there
is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative
powers.

Pelaez vs Auditor General

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a
valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any
policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact
that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually
unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that
"public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the
validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any
legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his
opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a
virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total
collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and
privilege of this Court to uphold.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
implies no morethan the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the
exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to
abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged
power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by
him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely
fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less
power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power

over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or
offices.