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Can I intervene?
The agency account was first articulated by Von Wright (1971) and was later developed and
defended by Menzies and Price. Both these theories formulate their position more or less as
following:
“An event A is a cause of an distinct event B if and only if it holds that for an agent to make happen
A will be an effective means to bring about B.”
Let us first note a number of properties of this definition. First of all, it is a reductive analysis: Both
Von Wright and Menzies and Price suggest that causation can be explained in more basic ontic
notions, in this case 'bringing about'. As it has been discussed whether this is a real reduction, a lot
of philosophers argue that it is an important virtue for a causal account to be reductive. More
strongly, philosophers have argued that a non-reductive account of causation will be uninformative
(Woodward, 2008).
Second, it is clear that an agent is incorporated within the account. Menzies and Price argue that this
is an intuitive way of looking at causation (Menzies & Price, 1993): when we think of causation, it
is often in terms of us being able to manipulate a certain situation. When for example I would like
to get a nail into a piece of wood, I try to cause the nail entering the wood and I could swing a
hammer onto the nail to let it enter the wood.
Third, as Julian Reiss (Reiss, 2007) articulates, this account stresses the importance of the relation
between experiments and causation. When I experiment, we try to hold all things equal except one
value and try to find out whether we can manipulate the other. So, manipulability is at least a
characteristic of both experiments and causation, according to these theories.
Fourth, these accounts focus on a conceptual and a semantic analysis of causation. They try to
describe what we describe when we are talking about causation. However, Menzies and Price their
claim is stronger, as they state that causation is a secondary quality of the world (Menzies & Price,
1993).
Fifth, and this distinguishes the account by Von Wright from that of Menzies & Price, Von Wright's
account is only fit for pure deterministic systems, where Menzies & Price choose an agent
probability account (Reis, 2007). For them, an event is a cause when it, when produced by an agent,
would heighten the chance for the effect to occur. This addition takes into account the problems
raised against systems aimed at deterministic accounts.
The accounts by both Von Wright and Menzies and Price are far more elaborate than only this
definition. It will be more illustrating to look at their counterarguments against the attacks launched
against their accounts. As the Menzies and Price is the more mature one, I will show the arguments
against their particular account.
Clausule M2 refers to the third argument against the agency account: we only capture a particular
interference when whether only that interference changes (the 'ceteris paribus'-condition). Clausule
M1 and M3 make sure that we have no outside interference and M4 ensures that the error-variable
is left alone.
Summary
Although it seems to be that the interventionist can argue that a non-reductive account of causation
can be insightful, there are still some problems left for the interventionist account, especially in
fine-tuning the necessary conditions for an intervention such that it doesn't have problems with
some cases in which especially condition M2 isn't necessary. It does solve the main problems with
the agency account, especially the anthropocentric nature and related extreme claims regarding the
nature of causation, however.
Bibliography
Menzies, P. (2009). Counterfactual Theories of Causation. In E. N. Zalta, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 .). Retrieved from
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/causation-counterfactual/.
Menzies, P., & Price, H. (1993). Causation as a secondary quality. The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 44, 187-203. Retrieved from
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/44/2/187.pdf.
Reiss, J. (forthcoming). Causality, an opiniated introduction (pp. 1-66). Rotterdam, 2007.
Woodward, J. (2008). Causation and manipulability. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-mani.