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CALALANG vs.

WILLIAMS
70 pHIL 726
Facts:
In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public Works, with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of Public
Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal drawn
vehicles in certainstreets in Manila.
Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issues:
Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative
powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands
but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close
them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a
national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the
exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,


G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications that animaldrawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of th
e provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and re
gulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval
of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an

unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the

existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi


estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.

Case Digests: Labor Law

CALALANG v. WILLIAMS, 70 PHIL 726, GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940


FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The
Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules and regulation.
As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but
of the riding public as well.
ISSUE: Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice? What is Social Justice?
HELD: No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. Persons and property may
be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated.
Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema Lex.(Justice
Laurel)

Salus Populi est Suprema Lex - The welfare of people is the supreme law

AGABON vs. NLRC, November 17, 2004

By Atty. Golda Benjamin

Facts:
Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were cornice installers of Riviera Home Improvements, a company
engaged in the business of selling ornamental construction materials.

They were employed from January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999, when they were dismissed
for abandonment of work.

The Agabons filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA, who ruled in their favor.
The NLRC reversed on appeal. The CA sustained the NLRCs decision

The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding of abandonment, and claiming
that the company did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

Issue: WON the Agabons were illegally dismissed

Held: NO

Ratio:
Substantive due process (EEs must be dismissed for just or authorized cause): SC upheld the
finding of abandonment, because the act of the Agabons in seeking employment elsewhere
clearly showed a deliberate intent to sever the ER-EE relationship.

Procedural due process (for just cause, there must be a written notice informing him of
grounds for termination, a hearing or opportunity to be heard, and a final notice of termination
stating the grounds therefor): There was no due process because ER did not send the requisite
notices to the last known address of the EEs. ER only gave a flimsy excuse that the notice would

be useless because the EEs no longer lived there. This is not a valid excuse, they should have still
sent a notice as mandated by law.

For not sending the requisite notices, the ER should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process.

Agabon vs. NLRC / Riviera Home - GR No. 158693 Case Digest


FACTS:

Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum board and cornice installers from
January 1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was decided in their favor by the Labor
Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the NLRC contending just cause for the dismissal because of
petitioners abandonment of work. NLRC ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not
entitled to backwages and separation pay. The CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal
because they have abandoned their work but ordered the payment of money claims.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

RULING:

To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also
enjoins the employer to give the employee the right to be heard and to defend himself.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.
For a valid finding or abandonment, two factors are considered: failure to report for work
without a valid reason; and, a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship with the
second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be
deduced that the employees has no more intention to work.

Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due
process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an
indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil Doctrine of the Belated Due
process Rule.

Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not for any of the justifiable or authorized by
law. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify
the dismissal but the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory
rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay
later which we sought to deter in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees rights warrants the
payment of nominal damages.

AGABON VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION


G.R. No. 158693. November 17, 2004
Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and
installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioner Virgilio Agabon and Jenny
Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they
were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
decision because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work and were not entitled to
backwages and separation pay. The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was
not illegal because they had abandoned their employment.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Held: The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs
to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and
instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did
not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the
law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it should be held
liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
When the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or
render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of
his statutory rights.

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