Myers v. US 272 U.S.

52
Facts:

On July 21, 1917, Myers was appointed by President with the advice
and consent of the Senate (Sec. 6 of the Act of Congress) as Postmaster
of the first class at Portland, Or. for a term of four years.
On January 20, 1920 (2+ years after), Myers' resignation was
demanded and he was removed from office by the order of the
Postmaster General, acting by the direction of the President.
Of which the Senate did not consent to the President's removal of
Myers during his term.
After which Myers protested to the Post Office Department and, three
months before his four-year term expired, having pursued no other
occupation and derived no compensation for other service in the
interval, began suit in the Court of Claims for salary since removal.

Issue:
1. WoN the President has the exclusive power of removing executive
officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate?
Ruling:
1. Under Sec. 6 of the Act of Congress appointing Myers it states that
"Postmasters of the first, second and third classes shall be appointed and
may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or
suspended according to law". Of which the court of claims ruled that it is
unconstitutional in its attempt to make the President's power of removal
dependent upon consent of the Senate.
This Court has recognized (United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483) that
Congress may prescribe incidental regulations controlling and restricting

the heads of departments in the exercise of the power of removal; but it has
never held, and could not reasonably hold, that the excepting clause
enables Congress to draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to
remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power. To do this
would be to go beyond the words and implications of that clause and to
infringe the constitutional principle of the separation of governmental
powers.
The Senate did not consent to the President's removal of Myers during his
term. If this statute, in its requirement that his term should be four years
unless sooner removed by the President by and with the consent of
the Senate, is valid, Myers is entitled to recover his unpaid salary for his full
term, and the judgment of the Court of Claims must be reversed.
But the Government maintains that the requirement is invalid for the reason
that, under Article II of the Constitution the President's power of
removal of executive officers appointed by him with the advice and
consent of the Senate is full and complete without consent of the Senate.
The President is empowered by the Constitution to remove any executive
officer appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and this power is not subject in its exercise to the assent of the Senate,
nor can it be made so by an act of Congress. If the President had no
power of removal save by consent of the Senate, it is an attempt to
redistribute the powers and minimize those of the President. Hence, the
removal of Myers by the President without the Senate's consent was legal,
and the judgment of the Court of Claims against the appellant was correct,
and must be affirmed.
It is a canon of interpretation that real effect should be given to all the
words of the Constitution.