Caitlyn McBride

Final Policy Paper

December 11, 2015
POLS 3455 Prof. Maness
MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:

Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation

Caitlyn McBride
December 11, 2015
Protecting Russian Influence and Regional Stability in Central Asia

In Russias resurgence to international super power status, it must seek to defend its
influence in post-Soviet space. Traditionally, Western interests in the Baltics, Eastern Europe, and
the Caucasus have challenged Russias spheres of influence in those regions. As a result, over the
past decade Russia has faced an expanding NATO and EU, employing coercive tactics to preserve
as much Russian support as possible. Meanwhile, China has taken over as Central Asias largest
trading partner, growing from $1.8 billion in 2000 to $50 billion in 2013 almost entirely without
complaint. (Farchy, 2015) Granted, Russia has maintained political and military influence in the
region. However, as economics and politics are inherently intertwined, China may be increasingly
inclined to blur these unspoken lines of influence. In addition, the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), a longstanding regional organization, has become increasingly inefficient over the
past decade while Russias latest attempt to control the economic landscape of post-Soviet space,
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), has yet to impress.
Instead, Russia needs to direct its attention towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), a multilateral framework that has the potential to create a strong Central Asian bloc. This
established organization is approaching the same type of pivotal point that triggered the decline of
the CIS. With a strong commitment, Russia can guide the organization through a transition into a
strong regional institution. In doing so, Russian-Sino cooperation will reach a new level and
stability in Central Asia will be maintained. Additionally, the SCO preserves Russian influence.

To date, both Russia and China have pursued bilateral agreements rather than operating
through the SCO. This lack of coordination is beginning to endanger the unspoken deferral of
security and political issues to Russia and must be corrected in order to cement Russian influence
in the long term. With a unified Central Asian bloc, supported by a Russian and Chinese
partnership, US interests in the region can be effectively managed and counterbalanced.
As former members of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan have a long history of close integration
with Russia. Today, these states serve as an important buffer between Russian borders and the
instability and extremism overrunning much of the Middle East. Russia still maintains a strong
military presence throughout Central Asia, especially along the Afghanistan border. According to
Stephen Blank, the primary concern in Central Asia is stability so that the power vacuums and
failed states of the Middle East do not spill over into this buffer reason. (Blank, 2011) Therefore,
even if economic influence is diminished, military and political power remain salient to Russia in
the interest of preserving stable states and securing Central Asias porous borders.
As demonstrated by the substantial increase in trade, Chinas economic investment in
Central Asia is substantial. In his analysis of Chinese influence in Central Asia, Alexander Cooley
concludes that China is shifting from a external commercial partner to a more comprehensive
provider of collective goods. (Cooley, 2015) These collective goods include roadways,
emergency funding packages, pipelines, and other infrastructure. Importantly, new pipelines have
diversified Central Asian distribution channels, ending the complete reliance on Russia. As Russia
knows well, control over pipelines can prove to be a valuable political tool.
As economic initiatives continue, it is important to examine possible Chinese intentions.
China has already championed its New Silk Road policy, using Central Asia to develop a transit

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route connecting China to Europe. (Inozemtsev, 2015) However, there are possibly other motives
driving additional investment in infrastructure and stability within the region. The Economist
argues that Chinas interest in Central Asia is driven by its desire to stabilize its own western
province, Xinjiang. (The Economist, 2013) Additionally, Elena Holodny discusses the possibility
that as demand for cheap Chinese goods from developed countries like the US begins to plateau,
it must seek new markets like Central Asia. (Holodny, 2015) Both of these motives will help frame
negotiations with China and the SCO in more than just pure economic terms. It is plausible that
concern for separatism in its own province would lead to Chinese security concerns in the region
and that in developing a market for its own goods will drive China to steer Central Asia away from
developing its own manufacturing sector.
The involvement of the United States in Central Asia is largely related to its operations in
Afghanistan, for which it developed a military presence and logistical support system throughout
Central Asia. Considering this lack of direct interest in the region, US interests now are focused
on pushing the Central Asian states towards multivector policies so that neither Russia nor China
can claim complete dominance. (Rywkin, 2013) Additionally, if the Central Asian states employ
multivector strategies, then they will be open to working with the United States on an as needed
basis, keeping American influence alive in the region. Overall, the issue is not very salient to the
US as its involvement in Afghanistan tapers down.
Despite US doubts surrounding SCO prospects and currently pursues bilateral agreements,
Charles Ziegler argues that there is support for overall regional integration because the US wishes
to avoid a single sphere of influence in the region. (Ziegler, 2013) Therefore, if Russia is able to
work with China and the Central Asian states to create a more effective organization, it is likely
that the US will work within it as a gateway to the region. As full members of the SCO, this would

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give Russia and China input concerning US actions in the region while creating opportunities for
additional cooperation. In 2009, SCO led a conversation involving the US and Afghanistan on
narcotics control. (Ziegler, 2013) This is an example of one of the many Central Asian issues that
can benefit from US cooperation.
As sovereign entities, the Central Asian states themselves must receive consideration in
Russias strategy. The region is landlocked, making its member states inherently reliant on
neighboring countries for various resources and transit routes. (Fatima & Zafar, 2014) For a long
time, this meant reliance on Russian pipelines and resources. However, much like any independent
nation, the Central Asian states are beginning to diversify their relationships. This explains various
concurrent initiatives involving Russia, China, and, to a lesser extent, the US.
In order to develop as a region, the states will need to agree upon common values and
develop a regional identity. (Dadabaev, 2014) Russia would benefit by capitalizing on growing
popular discontent and weariness concerning Chinas influence within the Central Asian countries
by helping the states establish an identity that supports Russia. According to Jamie Coomarasamy,
Central Asian citizens have avoided creating cultural ties with China, however the ties between
Central Asia and Russia are well established. (Coomarasamy, 2014) Central Asians are very
familiar with Russia and many are reliant on Russia for their income. This is particularly true in
Tajikistan, where around 47% of GDP comes from remittances sent from migrant workers in
Russia. (Coomarasamy, 2014) Russia can capitalize on this reliance and familiarity to shape
Central Asias vision so that it aligns with its own. In doing so, it will create strong ties between
the people of the nations, which is particularly important when integrating economically and
socially. However, it must act quickly as China has stepped up education initiatives, making
progress in normalizing Mandarin as the regional language of choice. (Coomarasamy, 2014)

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In terms of intra-regional problem solving, the Central Asian States have many areas of
potential cooperation. According to Kubicek, these problems primarily include the environmental
degradation of the Caspian and Aral Seas, water resource management, and security concerns.
(Kubicek, 1997) However, complicating the potential for cooperation is the domestic vitality of
the states themselves. In order to begin to develop through regionalization, states must be strong
and relatively developed, otherwise cooperation with other states will have a difficult time finding
its way to the top of individual state agendas. (Kubicek, 2009) Therefore, there must be a defined
effort to help the states develop domestically coupled with wider regional initiatives.
This will also help to counter the growing perception that the SCO is merely a vehicle for
Chinese expansion and not about helping other member states. (Dadabaev, 2014) This perception
is part of the growing anti-Chinese sentiment held by many citizens in the Central Asian States.
Russias increased involvement in the SCO will help to refresh its image as a regional institution
that drives development with regional long term interests at heart.
The (CIS), created in 1991, includes the Central Asian states in its membership. However,
after over twenty years in operation it has little to show for meaningful integration of post-Soviet
space, reinforcing Kubiceks analysis that although an effective shock absorber for newly
independent states immediately following Soviet dissolution, there has been little movement
towards regional integration. (Kubicek, 2009) This is partly due to the failure of the post-Soviet
space to define a coherent identity or set of objectives that enjoys support from all the member
states. Kubicek also theorizes that many of the states are avoiding a return to Russian dominance,
around which they were historically integrated. (Kubicek, 2009) It is also difficult to join all of the
post-Soviet states under a unified identity that is not related to Soviet roots. Rather than pursue the
development of a regional identity for post-Soviet space, Russia has preferred developing bilateral

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relations with each state. So far, this has been reasonably effective and allows for more flexibility
in addressing specific issues with individual states. However, with the diminishing advantage in
the Central Asian region, Russia must shift its efforts in order to preserve influence and to keep
from getting pushed out of the region by China.
Only recently coming into full force, Russias attempt to integrate post-Soviet space is the
EEU. The EEU has its roots in agreements tracing back to the turn of the century and intends to
create the type of economic integration that the CIS has failed to achieve. Kyrgyzstan is a founding
member and Kazakhstan has begun considering membership. Despite Russian intentions to use the
EEU to reunite post-Soviet space into a single economic area, Pantucci implies that initial negative
indicators of economic benefit are not enough for the weaker Central Asian states to give up
coveted sovereignty. (Pantucci, 2015) Without a greater representation of the region, the EEUs
potential economic impact is severely limited.
In the EEU and its preceding organizations, member countries have failed to realize
expected economic benefits due to the weakened Russian economic position. (Pantucci, 2015)
China is Central Asias largest trading partner and regardless of official statements of policy
deferral in the area, Russia will eventually see its security and political influence wane as countries
become less economically dependent on them. As China pursues its New Silk Road initiative
and spends billions of dollars in the region, it is only natural that it seeks to protect its investments.
Without economic policy coordination between Russia and China in Central Asia, the
states are able to effectively utilize the multivector approaches encouraged by the US against the
major powers. This results in lost leverage over the states, increasing their ability to act
independently. In the case of Turkmenistan, this resulted in a loss for Russia. As Blank explains,
after China financed a new pipeline moving East-West, Turkmenistan was able to demand price

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increases from the Russian government and then successfully pivoted to China after the Russian
connection was terminated. (Blank, 2011) Regardless of which state physically damaged the
pipeline in 2009, the result was that Turkmenistan had gained enough independence from Russia
to pursue its own interests.
As discussed, the CIS was never able to pivot from a supporting organization, helping to
set the newly formed post-Soviet states on their feet, towards an integrative regional organization.
Additionally, the EEU, even though it is still new, is falling short of expectations and participation.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has the potential to overcome the shortfalls of these
organizations and help position Russia to maintain its long term influence in Central Asia.
The SCO has a strong membership base that includes all of the Central Asian states, plus
major stakeholders like Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. However, in order for it to be effective,
Russia must begin to utilize the framework to pursue initiatives within the region. Currently, it
relies on bilateral agreements and, on several occasions, has opposed Chinese attempts to
implement programs through the SCO. (Cooley, 2015) China remains serious in its commitment
to the region and has since pursued the very same projects outside of the organization. In order to
avoid the EEU coming into competition with Chinese-led economic policy, a matchup that, at this
rate, Russia and the EEU will lose, Russia must shift its effort towards the SCO where it can engage
and formally partner with China.
Even though there is a lot going on between Russia and the West these days, it must divert
more resources towards Central Asia and China. For the New Silk Road, Russia should be a
major partner and participant. Pipelines, railways, and trade on its way to Europe should travel
through Russia. It is the most stable partner for such an investment, yet it is losing out to Central
Asian countries that are more eager to link themselves to China economically. (Inozemtsev, 2015)

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Strengthening relations with China will act as a balancing maneuver against the West. China has
made it clear over recent years that it intends to expand economically into Russias traditional
sphere of influence in Central Asia, therefore Russia must take them seriously.
Improving the region with economic investment has the potential to bring stability to the
area and turn the nations into even more productive members of the global economy. Russia has
historically wavered in its identity not being entirely Western or Eastern. The SCO presents an
opportunity for Russia to bring its two identities together, build a Russian-influenced regional
identity for Central Asia, and create a lasting partnership.

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Works Cited
Adnan, M., & Fatima, B. (2015, Jul/Dec). Strategic and Economic Interests of Pakistan and India
in Central Asia. South Asian Studies (1026-678X), 30(2), 187-200.
Blank, S. (2011, Sep/Oct). Challenges to Russia in Central Asia. American Foreign Policy
Interests, 33(5), 209-221.
Cooley, A. (2015, March 18). Chinas Changing Role in Central Asia and Implications for US
Policy: From Tading Partner to Collective Goods Partner. Prepared Remarks for
Looking West: China and Central Asia U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission. Retrieved Dec 2015, from
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cooley%20Testimony_3.18.15.pdf
Coomarasamy, J. (2014, Spring). China's Westward Pivot: What It Means for Central Asia and
Russia. Mediterranean Quarterly, 25(2), 48-60.
Dadabaev, T. (2014, January). Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Regional Identity
Formation from the Perspective of the Central Asia States. Journal of Contemporary
China, 23(85), 102-118.
Farchy, J. (2015, Oct 14). Chinas Great Game: In Russias backyard. Financial Times.
Retrieved Dec 2015, from http://on.ft.com/1QtqP8p
Fatima, Q., & Zafar, S. (2014, Jul-Dec). New Great Game: Players, Interests, Strategies and
Central Asia. South Asian Studies (1026-678X), 29(2), 627-655.
Holodny, E. (2015, Jun 21). PAX MONGOLICA: The underlying reason why China is going
after Central Asia. Business Insider. Retrieved Dec 2015, from
http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-wants-central-asia-and-its-not-just-about-russia2015-6
Inozemtsev, V. (2015, Sep 2). Putin Is Waking Up From Chinese Pipe Dream. The Moscow
Times. Retrieved from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-is-wakingup-from-chinese-pipe-dream/529287.html
Kubicek, P. (1997, June). Regionalism, nationalism and realpolitik in Central Asia. Europe-Asia
Studies, 49(4), 637-656.
Kubicek, P. (2009, February). The Commonwealth of Independent States: an example of failed
regionalism? Review of International Studies, 35(S1), 237-256.
Pantucci, R. (2015, October). China and Russia's Soft Competition in Central Asia. Current
History, 114(774), 272-277.
Rising China, sinking Russia. (2013, Sep 14). The Economist. Retrieved Dec 2015, from
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21586304-vast-region-chinas-economic-cloutmore-match-russias-rising-china-sinking
Rywkin, M. (2013, Sep/Oct). RussianAmerican Rivalry in Central Asia. American Foreign
Policy Interests, 35(5), 265-271.
Ziegler, C. (2013, May/June). Central Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and
American Foreign Policy. Asian Survey, 53(3), 484-505.

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