SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 105775. February 8, 1993.]

BENITO D. CHUA, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
LABOR ARBITER BIENVENIDO V. HERMOGENES and NESTLE PHILIPPINES,
INC., Respondents.
Jose C. Espinas for Petitioner.
Siguion-Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; PROHIBITED ACTS: OBSTRUCTING
FREE INGRESS TO OR EGRESS FROM THE EMPLOYERS PREMISES FOR
LAWFUL PURPOSES; SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR.
Petitioners participation in the illegal strike and his commission of illegal acts while
the strike was in progress, i.e., he participated in the barricade which barred people
from entering and/or leaving the employers premises, had been sufficiently
established by substantial evidence, including the testimony of Mr. Maniego,
Personnel Supervisor at the Cabuyao Plant. Mr. Maniego testified, among other
things, that he was not able to report to work because of the presence of the
barricade. The law prohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing free
ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes (Article 264
[e], Labor Code). Since petitioners participation in the unlawful and violent strike
was amply shown by substantial evidence, the NLRC was correct in holding that the
dismissal of petitioner was valid being based on lawful or authorized cause.
2. ID.; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
REQUIRED IN THE DECISION THEREOF DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN
CRIMINAL; CASE AT BAR. While the criminal complaint where petitioner was
included as one of the accused was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the
Court considers that the dismissal of the criminal complaint did not preclude a
finding by the competent administrative authorities, that petitioner had indeed
committed acts inimical to the interest of his employer. In Pepsi Cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines v. Guanzon, we held that: "Private respondents guilt or
innocence in the criminal case is not determinative of the existence of a just or
authorized cause for his dismissal." This doctrine follows from the principle that the
quantum and weight of evidence necessary to sustain conviction in criminal cases

are quite different from the quantum of evidence necessary for affirmance of a
decision of the Labor Arbiter and of the NLRC.
3. ID.; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO
EMPLOYEES; WHEN AVAILABLE IN CASE THEREOF; RULE. This Court has
several times ruled that "financial assistance", whatever form it might assume, is
permissible where the employee has been validly dismissed, only in those instance
where the cause of dismissal was something other than serious misconduct on the
part of the employee or other cause reflecting adversely on the employees moral
character. Thus, in Cosmopolitan Funeral, Inc. v. Maalat, this Court clarified the
instance where "financial assistance" to an employee who had been dismissed for
cause may be awarded by the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. The Court declared. "In
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v. NLRC, (164 SCRA 671
[1988]), this Court reexamined the doctrine in the aforecited Firestone and Soco
cases and other previous cases that employees dismissed for cause are
nevertheless entitled to separation pay on the ground of social and compassionate
justice. In abandoning this doctrine, the Court held, and we quote: . . . We hold that
henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in
those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for
the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving
moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer
may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial
assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. A
contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect of rewarding
rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense . . . ." In the case at bar,
petitioners participation in the unlawful and violent strike, which strike resulted in
multiple deaths and extensive property damage, constituted serious misconduct on
his part; accordingly, the award of "financial assistance" was bereft of basis and
would moreover render the finding by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC of just or
authorized cause for termination of petitioners services merely illusory.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 10 September 1987, the Union of Filipro Employees, of which petitioner Benito
D. Chua was a member, declared a strike against the private respondent company,
Nestle Philippines, Inc. During the strike, several of the striking employees threw
stones at the trucks entering and leaving the company premises. One truck. whose
driver was rendered unconscious by a stone hitting him on the head, rammed a
private vehicle and crashed into a beauty parlor resulting in the death of three (3)
persons and extensive damage to private property.
Consequently, a criminal complaint for multiple murder and frustrated murder was
filed against petitioner and several other employees who were believed to be
responsible for the stoning incident which resulted in the deaths and property

damage. The criminal complaint was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The
strike itself was, however, declared illegal in two (2) decisions of the National Labor
Relations Commission ("NLRC") which were affirmed by the Supreme Court. 1
On 17 December 1937, the union and its striking members offered to return to work
and were readmitted by the company except sixty-nine (69) union officers and
thirty-three (33) union members, including petitioner. Subsequently, the unions
counsel wrote to the private respondent requesting the reinstatement of five (5)
employees, including petitioner. The request, however, was denied. On 5 February
1988, petitioner received a notice of dismissal from private respondent for having
participated in the illegal strike.
Two days later, petitioner initiated a complaint for illegal dismissal against private
respondent company. On 22 September 1989, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision finding that petitioner had been validly dismissed. It was held that the
evidence introduced by private respondent, in the form of the testimony of Mr.
Maniego, Personnel Supervisor of its Cabuyao Plant, that he positively saw and
identified petitioner as one of the union members who actively participated and
manned the barricades during the strike is "a concrete manifestation of an illegal act
that is frowned upon by law." At the same time, however, the Labor Arbiter awarded
petitioner "financial assistance" in the form of backwages from the time of his
dismissal (in the amount of P75,920 00) Plus separation pay equivalent to one-half
(1/2) month salary for every year of service (in the amount of
P13,376.00).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Wishing to be reinstated also, petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiters decision to the
NLRC which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, petitioner argues that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in rendering its Decision dated 18 May 1992 which
affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 22 September 1989, denying him
reinstatement though granting him "financial assistance."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner contends that no substantial evidence exists on record to support the
findings of the NLRC. We find this contention to be without merit, Petitioners
participation in the illegal strike and his commission of illegal acts while the strike
was in progress, i.e., he participated in the barricade which barred people from
entering and/or leaving the employers premises, had been sufficiently established
by substantial evidence, including the testimony of Mr. Maniego, Personnel
Supervisor at the Cabuyao Plant. Mr. Maniego testified, among other things, that he
was not able to report to work because of the presence of the barricade. The law
prohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing free ingress to or egress
from the employers premises for lawful purposes. 2
While the criminal complaint where petitioner was included as one of the accused
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the Court considers that the dismissal
of the criminal complaint did not preclude a finding by the competent administrative
authorities, that petitioner had indeed committed acts inimical to the interest of his
employer.

In Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines v. Guanzon, 3 we held that:

"Private respondents guilt or innocence in the criminal case is not determinative of
the existence of a just or authorized cause for his dismissal." This doctrine follows
from the principle that the quantum and weight of evidence necessary to sustain
conviction in criminal cases are quite different from the quantum of evidence
necessary for affirmance of a decision of the Labor Arbiter and of the NLRC.
Since petitioners participation in the unlawful and violent strike was amply shown
by substantial evidence, the NLRC was correct in holding that the dismissal of
petitioner was valid being based on lawful or authorized cause.
We disagree, however, with the award by the Labor Arbiter of "financial assistance"
to petitioner and with the NLRCs affirmance of that portion of the award. Under the
circumstances of this case, the Court considers that such award of "financial
assistance" was obviously unjustified. This Court has several times ruled that
"financial assistance", whatever form it might assume, is permissible where the
employee has been validly dismissed, only in those instance where the cause of
dismissal was something other than serious misconduct on the part of the employee
or other cause reflecting adversely on the employees moral character. Thus, in
Cosmopolitan Funeral, Inc. v. Maalat, 4 this Court clarified the instance where
"financial assistance" to an employee who had been dismissed for cause may be
awarded by the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. The Court declared.chanrobles law
library
"In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v. NLRC, (164 SCRA 671
[1988[), this Court reexamined the doctrine in the aforecited Firestone and Soco
cases and other previous cases that employees dismissed for cause are
nevertheless entitled to separation pay on the ground of social and compassionate
justice. In abandoning this doctrine, the Court held, and we quote:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
. . . We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social
justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the
reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense
involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the
employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or
financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social
justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect of
rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense . . . ." 5
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners participation in the unlawful and violent strike, which
strike resulted in multiple deaths and extensive property damage, constituted
serious misconduct on his part; accordingly, the award of "financial assistance" was
bereft of basis and would moreover render the finding by the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC of just or authorized cause for termination of petitioners services merely
illusory.

We are aware that in the instant case, private respondent did not appeal from the
decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Nevertheless, because the resolution
of the issue of the lawfulness of the award of "financial assistance" to petitioner is
essential if this Court is to render substantial justice as between the parties in this
case, this Court feels compelled to pass upon that issue and has ruled accordingly.
6
It is scarcely necessary to add that there is no legal impediment to the private
respondent making a grant on a voluntary and ex gratia basis, in any amount it may
feel appropriate, to petitioner. What the Court is stressing here is that, given the
circumstances of this case and under prevailing jurisprudence, the Labor Arbiter
and NLRC had no authority legally to compel the private respondent to pay to
petitioner the "financial assistance" which they awarded.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari for lack
of merit. At the same time, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC
in affirming the Labor Arbiters award of "financial assistance" to petitioner, the
Court Resolved to MODIFY the Decision of the NLRC of 18 May 1992 by deleting
the portion thereof affirming the award of "financial assistance" by the Labor Arbiter,
without prejudice to private respondents making a grant on a purely voluntary and
ex gratia basis, to petitioner. In all other respects, the NLRC Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169712

March 14, 2008

MA. WENELITA TIRAZONA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE EDS-TECHNO SERVICE INC. (PET INC.)
AND/OR KEN KUBOTA, MAMORU ONO and JUNICHI HIROSE, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in this Special Civil Action for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
are the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals dated 24 May 2005 and 7
September 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 85065. The appellate courts
Decision dismissed petitioner Ma. Wenelita Tirazonas Special Civil Action for
Certiorari and affirmed the Decision4 dated 30 January 2004 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 034872-03, which ruled that

petitioners dismissal from employment was legal; and its Resolution which denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Private respondent Philippine EDS-Techno Services Inc. (PET) is a corporation duly
registered under Philippine laws and is engaged in the business of designing
automotive wiring harnesses for automobile manufacturers. Private respondents Ken
Kubota, Mamoru Ono and Junichi Hirose are all Japanese nationals, the first being
the President and the latter two being the directors of PET.
On 21 July 1999, PET employed Ma. Wenelita S. Tirazona (Tirazona) as
Administrative Manager. Being the top-ranking Filipino Manager, she acted as the
liaison between the Japanese management and the Filipino staff.
On 15 January 2002, Fe Balonzo, a rank-and-file employee, wrote a letter 5 that was
addressed to nobody in particular, but was later acquired by PET management. In
her letter, Balonzo complained that Tirazona humiliated her while she was reporting
back to work after recuperating from a bout of tuberculosis. Balonzo explained that
Tirazona insinuated, in a manner loud enough to be heard from the outside, that
Balonzo still had the disease. This allegedly occurred despite Balonzos possession
of a medical clearance that proved her fitness to return to work. Balonzo thus
requested that the necessary action be undertaken to address the said incident.
Upon receiving the letter, the PET management directed Tirazona to file her
comment. Tirazona replied accordingly in a letter 6 wherein she denied the
accusations against her. Tirazona stated that her only intention was to orient Balonzo
about the latters rights as a sick employee, i.e., that under the law, if the latter
planned to resign, the company can give her separation pay. Tirazona likewise asked
for an independent investigation and threatened to file a libel case against Balonzo
for allegedly trying to destroy her reputation and credibility.
After weighing the situation, PET director Ono sent a memorandum to Tirazona,
which reads:
February 8, 2002
To: Mrs. W. Tirazona
Re: Letter-Complaint of Fe S. Balonzo
This is to advise you that Management is satisfied that you did not intend to humiliate
or embarrass Ms. Balonzo during the incident on January 14, 2002. It also
appreciates the concern you profess for the welfare of PET employees.
Nonetheless, Management finds your handling of the situation less than ideal.
Considering the sensitive nature of the issue, a little more circumspection could have
readily avoided the incident which it cannot be denied caused unnecessary
discomfort and hurt feelings to Ms. Balonzo. Certainly, you could have discussed the
matter in private and allowed her to first deliver her piece rather than pre-empt her

declaration. As it turned out, your assumption (that Ms. Balonzo would request for a
leave extension) was in fact wrong and she had a medical certificate attesting her
fitness to return to work.
Management therefore would like to remind you of the high expectations of your
position.
Management considers this matter closed, and finds it appropriate to convey to you
that it does not view with favor your notice to file legal action. Management believes
that you share the idea that issues regarding employee relations are best threshed
out within the Company. Resorting to legal action is unlikely to solve but on the
contrary would only exacerbate such problems.
We trust that, after emotions have calmed down, you would still see it that way.
(Sgd.)
Mamoru Ono
Director7
On 6 March 2002, Tirazonas counsels sent demand letters 8 to PETs business
address, directed separately to Ono and Balonzo. The letter to Ono states:
February 27, 2002
MR. MAMORU ONO
Director
PET, Inc.
20/F 6788 Ayala Avenue
Oledan Square, Makati City
Dear Mr. Ono:
We are writing in [sic] behalf of our client, Ms. MA. WENELITA S. TIRAZONA,
Administrative Manager of your corporation.
We regret that on February 8, 2002, you delivered to our client a letter containing
among others, your conclusion that Ms. Tirazona was guilty of the unfounded and
baseless charges presented by Ms. Fe Balonzo in her letter-complaint dated January
15, 2002. You may please recall that in Ms. Tirazonas letter to Mr. Junichi Hirose,
she presented point by point, her side on the allegations made by the complainant.
In the same letter, Ms. Tirazona requested for an independent investigation of the
case in order to thresh out all issues, ferret out the truth and give her the opportunity
to be heard and confront her accuser. These were all denied our client.
As a result of the foregoing, Ms. Tirazonas constitutional right to due process was
violated and judgment was rendered by you on mere allegations expressed in a
letter-complaint to an unknown addressee.
Considering the position and stature of Mrs. Tirazona in the community and business
circles, we are constrained to formally demand payment of P2,000,000.00 in
damages, injured feelings, serious anxiety and besmirched reputation that she is
now suffering.
We are giving you five (5) days from receipt hereof to make favorable response,
otherwise, much to our regret, we will institute legal procedures to protect our clients
interests.
Please give this matter the attention it deserves.

Very truly yours,

PRINCIPE, VILLANO, VILLACORTA & CLEMENTE
By:
(Sgd.)
PEDRO S. PRINCIPE
(Sgd.)
GLICERIO E. VILLANO
The letter sent to Balonzo likewise sought the same amount of damages for her
allegedly baseless and unfounded accusations against Tirazona.
Because of Tirazonas obstinate demand for compensation, PET sent her a Notice of
Charge,9 which informed her that they were considering her termination from
employment by reason of serious misconduct and breach of trust. According to the
management, they found her letter libelous, since it falsely accused the company of
finding her guilty of the charges of Balonzo and depriving her of due process.
On 26 March 2002, Tirazona explained in a letter 10 that her counsels demand letter
was brought about by the denial of her repeated requests for reinvestigation of the
Balonzo incident, and that the same was personally addressed to Mamoru Ono and
not to the company. She also reiterated her request for an investigation and/or an
open hearing to be conducted on the matter.
The PET management replied11 that the Balonzo incident was already deemed a
closed matter, and that the only issue for consideration was Tirazonas "ill-advised
response to the Managements disposition to the Fe Balonzo incident," for which an
administrative hearing was scheduled on 4 April 2002.
On 3 April 2002, Tirazona submitted a written demand 12 to PET that the Balonzo
incident be included in the scheduled hearing. She further stated that since the
management had already prejudged her case, she would only participate in the
proceedings if the investigating panel would be composed of three employees, one
each from the rank-and-file, supervisory, and managerial levels, plus a
representative from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The PET management rejected Tirazonas demands in a letter 13 and informed her
that the hearing was reset to 10 April 2002, which would be presided by PETs
external counsel.
On 10 April 2002, Tirazona and her counsel did not appear at the administrative
hearing. The PET management informed them through a memorandum 14 dated 12
April 2002 that the hearing was carried out despite their absence. Nevertheless,
Tirazona was granted a final chance to submit a supplemental written explanation or
additional documents to substantiate her claims.
Tirazonas written explanation15 dated 17 April 2002 merely reiterated, without further
details, her previous claims, to wit: that Balonzos charges were unfounded and
baseless; that she had been denied due process; and that she would not submit
herself to an investigating panel that had already prejudged her case. Tirazona also
stated that her claim for damages would be justified at the proper forum, and that

she admitted to reading a confidential letter addressed to PET directors Ono and
Fukuoka, containing the legal opinion of PETs counsel regarding her case.
After finding the explanations unsatisfactory, PET sent Tirazona a Notice of
Termination,16 which found her guilty of serious misconduct and breach of trust
because of her demand against the company and her invasion of PETs right to
privileged communication.
Tirazona then instituted with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of salaries, and damages against PET, docketed as NLRC-CA No. 034872-03.
In the Decision17 dated 22 January 2003, Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero ruled
in favor of Tirazona, holding that the latters termination from employment was illegal.
The Arbiter declared that there was no breach of trust when Tirazona sent the
demand letter, as the same was against Ono in his personal capacity, not against the
company. The decision also ruled that PET failed to discharge the burden of proving
that the alleged breach of trust was fraudulent and willful, and that the company was
careless in handling its communications. The Arbiter further stated that Tirazona was
deprived of her right to due process when she was denied a fair hearing.
On appeal by PET, the NLRC reversed the rulings of the Labor Arbiter in a Decision
dated 30 January 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated January 27, 2003 and a new one is entered DISMISSING the
complaint for lack of merit.18
Contrary to the Labor Arbiters findings, the NLRC concluded that Tirazonas
termination from employment was in accordance with law. It ruled that Tirazonas
demand letter addressed to Ono constituted a just cause for dismissal, as the same
was "an openly hostile act" by a high-ranking managerial employee against the
company.19 The NLRC likewise found that PET complied with the notice and hearing
requirements of due process, inasmuch as Tirazonas demand for a special panel
was without any legal basis. Furthermore, petitioner breached the companys trust
when she read the confidential legal opinion of PETs counsel without permission.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Tirazona was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution dated 31 May 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Complainant-Appellees Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and our Decision dated 30
January 2004 is thus AFFIRMED with finality.20
Aggrieved, Tirazona instituted with the Court of Appeals a Special Civil Action for
Certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85065.
In a Decision dated 24 May 2005, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC and ruled
thus:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the petition is perforce dismissed. 21

Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in a
Resolution dated 7 September 2005, Tirazona now impugns before this Court the
Court of Appeals Decision dated 24 May 2005, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THERE WAS BREACH OF TRUST ON THE PART OF PETITIONER
TIRAZONA WHEN SHE WROTE THE TWO MILLION PESO DEMAND LETTER
FOR DAMAGES, WARRANTING HER DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT.
II.
WHETHER DUE PROCESS WAS SUFFICIENTLY AND FAITHFULLY OBSERVED
BY RESPONDENTS IN THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER TIRAZONA FROM
EMPLOYMENT.
In essence, the issue that has been brought before this Court for consideration is
whether or not Tirazona was legally dismissed from employment.
Prefatorily, the Court notes that Tirazona elevated her case to this Court via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The appropriate remedy
would have been for Tirazona to file an appeal through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.
For a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to prosper, the
following requisites must be present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions: (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.22
There is grave abuse of discretion "when there is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law."23
The Petition for Certiorari shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration is timely filed,
the sixty (60)-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said
motion.24
On the other hand, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pertains to a Petition for Review on
Certiorari whereby "a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals x x x may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth."25

The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new
trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. 26
In the present case, the assailed Decision is the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of
Tirazonas Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Said Decision partakes of the nature
of a judgment or final order, thus, is reviewable only through an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45.
As aptly declared by the Court in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of
Appeals27:
[s]ince the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any
alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction would be
errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special
civil action of certiorari. If the aggrieved party fails to do so within the reglementary
period, and the decision accordingly becomes final and executory, he cannot avail
himself of the writ of certiorari, his predicament being the effect of his deliberate
inaction. [Emphasis ours.]
Even just a cursory glance at the issues raised by Tirazona before this Court readily
reveals that these pertain to purported errors of judgment committed by the appellate
court in its appreciation of the allegations, evidence, and arguments presented by
the parties. There is no question here of the Court of Appeals acting on Tirazonas
Petition in CA-G.R. No. 85065 without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
A review of the rollo of the Petition at bar divulges even further that Tirazonas resort
to a wrong remedy was not an innocent mistake but a deliberate choice.
On 5 October 2005, Tirazona filed with this Court a Petition for Extension of Time to
File a Petition for Review on Certiorari.28 Tirazona stated therein that she received
the notice of the Court of Appeals Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration
on 23 September 2005. Since she only had fifteen (15) days after the said date to file
a Petition for Review on Certiorari, or until 8 October 2005, Tirazona prayed for an
extension of thirty (30) days, with her counsel citing extreme pressures of work.
In a Resolution29 dated 19 October 2005, the Court granted Tirazonas Motion for
Extension. The extended period was to end on 7 November 2005. However,
Tirazona failed to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari within the said period.
Instead, she filed the present Petition for Certiorari on 5 December 2005, seventythree (73) days after notice of the Court of Appeals Resolution denying her Motion
for Reconsideration.
From the foregoing, it is fairly obvious that Tirazona was aware that she was
supposed to file an appeal through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
That she filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and only after an
inexplicably long period of time leads to the inescapable conclusion that the same
was merely an afterthought, nothing more than a desperate attempt to revive a lost
appeal.

The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action that
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal,
including that under Rule 45, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by
ones own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. 30 It also bears to stress the
well-settled principle that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. Under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f) of the Revised
Rules of Court, a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal merits an outright
dismissal.31
Tirazona, in her Reply32 before this Court, even admits that although the instant
Petition is one of special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, her petition is in
reality an appeal under Rule 45 as her petition raises pure questions of law. Tirazona
herself acknowledges the formal defects of her own Petition and attributes the same
to the haste and inadvertence of her former counsel, who allegedly prepared the
instant Petition without her participation. 33 She thus urges this Court to suspend the
application of its own rules on grounds of equity and substantial justice, considering
that it is her employment that is at stake in this case.
In this regard, it needs to be emphasized that before the Court may treat the present
petition as having been filed under Rule 45, the same must comply with the
reglementary period for filing an appeal. This requirement is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional such that failure to do so renders the assailed decision final and
executory, and deprives this Court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much
less to entertain the appeal.34 Since the instant petition was filed after the lapse of
the extended period for filing an appeal, the same should be dismissed outright.
Nevertheless, the Court finds it essential that we discuss the case on its merits,
bearing in mind that the paramount consideration in this case is an employees right
to security of tenure, and in order to provide Tirazona the amplest opportunity to
know how the Court arrived at a proper and just determination of her case.
Even if the Court were to ignore the conspicuous procedural defects committed by
Tirazona and treat her Petition as an appeal under Rule 45, it still finds that the
Petition must be denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner contends that, contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, her
dismissal from employment was illegal for having lacked both a legal basis and the
observance of due process.
In employee termination cases, the well-entrenched policy is that no worker shall be
dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due
process. Clearly, dismissals have two facets: first, the legality of the act of dismissal,
which constitutes substantive due process; and second, the legality in the manner of
dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process. 35
Under Article 282(c)36 of the Labor Code, loss of trust and confidence is one of the
just causes for dismissing an employee. It is an established principle that loss of
confidence must be premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a
position of trust and confidence. This situation obtains where a person is entrusted
with confidence on delicate matters, such as care and protection, handling or

custody of the employers property. But, in order to constitute a just cause for
dismissal, the act complained of must be "work-related" such as would show the
employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer. Besides, for
loss of confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal, such loss of confidence must
arise from particular proven facts.37
Tirazona claims that her demand letter was merely an expression of indignation by a
disgruntled employee against a director, not against the company and, by itself,
cannot constitute a breach of trust and confidence. The companys notice of charge
allegedly insinuated Tirazonas guilt in the Balonzo incident; hence, the need to
defend herself. Tirazona likewise asserts that she is an ordinary rank-and-file
employee as she is not vested with the powers and prerogatives stated in Article
212(m)38 of the Labor Code. As such, her alleged hostility towards her co-workers
and the PET management is not a violation of trust and confidence that would
warrant her termination from employment.
At the outset, the Court notes that the issues set forth above are factual in nature. As
the Court is asked to consider the instant Petition as an appeal under Rule 45, then
only pure questions of law will be entertained.39
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. 40
In the instant case, Tirazona would have the Court examine the actual wording,
tenor, and contextual background of both her demand letter and the PETs notice of
charge against her. Similarly, the determination of whether Tirazona is a managerial
or rank-and-file employee would require the Court to review the evidence that
pertains to Tirazonas duties and obligations in the company. Also, in order to
ascertain whether the breach of trust was clearly established against Tirazona, the
Court will have to sift through and evaluate the respective evidence of the parties as
well. These tasks are not for the Court to accomplish.
The Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court
are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error
or grave abuse of discretion.41
In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and
adopted as its own the latters factual findings. Long established is the doctrine that
findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are accorded with respect,
even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. When passed upon and upheld by
the Court of Appeals, they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and
will not normally be disturbed.42 Though this doctrine is not without exceptions,43 the
Court finds that none are applicable to the present case.

Thus, on the matter of Tirazonas demand letter, this Court is bound by the following
findings of the Court of Appeals:
Clearly, petitioner Tirazonas letter to respondent Ono dated 27 February 2002, as
DIRECTOR of PET was addressed to an officer and representative of the
corporation. The accusations in the aforesaid demand letter were directed against
respondent Onos official act as a representative of respondent PET. Suffice it to
stress, an attack on the integrity of his (Ono) corporate act is necessarily aimed at
respondent PET because a corporation can only act through its officers, agents and
representatives.
xxxx
A thorough and judicious examination of the facts and evidence obtaining in the
instant case as could be found in the records, would clearly show that petitioner
Tirazona has absolutely no basis for a P2 million demand, coupled with lawsuit if the
same was not paid within the five (5) days [sic] period. Her justification for the
demand of money is that she was allegedly found by the respondent PET through
respondent Ono guilty of the charges filed by Ms. Balonzo. As the records would
indubitably show, petitioner Tirazona was never charged of any offense with respect
to the Fe Balonzos [sic] incident. She was never issued a Notice of Charge, much
less a Notice of Disciplinary Action. What was issued to her by respondent Ono in his
letter x x x was a gentle and sound reminder to be more circumspect in handling the
incident or situation like this [sic]. As fully evidenced in the last paragraph of the said
letter, it states that:
xxxx
Management considers this matter closed, and finds it appropriate to convey to you
that it does not view with favor your notice to file legal action. Management believes
that you share the idea that issues regarding employee relations are best threshed
out within the Company. Resorting to legal action is unlikely to solve but on the
contrary would only exacerbate such problems.
But for reasons only known to petitioner Tirazona, she treated respondent Onos
letter as an affront to her honor and dignity. This, instead of seeking a dialogue with
respondent PET on her felt grievance, petitioner Tirazona through her lawyer sent
the questioned demand letter to respondent Ono. Suffice it to state, this act of
petitioner bared animosity in the company and was definitely not a proper response
of a top level manager like her over a trivial matter.
xxxx
In fine, the confluence of events and circumstances surrounding the petitioner
Tirazonas actions or omissions affecting her employers rights and interest, would
undoubtedly show that she is no longer worthy of being a recipient of the trust and
confidence of her employer. x x x.44
Likewise conclusive upon this Court is the Court of Appeals pronouncement that
Tirazona is in fact a managerial employee, to wit:

The records would indubitably show that it is only now that petitioner Tirazona is
asserting that she is not a managerial employee of respondent PET. From the very
start, her dismissal was premised on the fact that she is a managerial and
confidential employee, and she never denied that fact. It was never an issue at all
before the Labor Arbiter and the public respondent NLRC. Therefore, she is
estopped to claim now that she is [just a] rank and file employee of respondent PET,
especially that she herself admitted in her pleading that she is a managerial
employee:
xxxx
If the respondent Company has to protect Respondent Mamoru Ono, the
Complainant [petitioner] has also the right to be protected from the baseless
accusations of a Rank and File Employee for she [petitioner] is a part of the
management like Mr. Mamoru Ono" (par. 5, Complainants Rejoinder [to
Respondents Reply] dated 2 September 2002 (note: unattached to the petitioner
[sic]) [attached as Annex "1" hereof]. (p. 263, Rollo). 45
Tirazona next argues that she was deprived of procedural due process as she was
neither served with two written notices, nor was she afforded a hearing with her
participation prior to her dismissal.
Tirazonas arguments are baseless.
Procedural due process is simply defined as giving an opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the
essential elements of due process, and neither of those elements can be eliminated
without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.46
The employer must furnish the employee two written notices before termination may
be effected. The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought, while the second notice informs the employee of
the employers decision to dismiss him.47
It is fairly obvious in this case that Tirazona was served with the required twin
notices. The first was embodied in the Notice of Charge dated 25 March 2002 where
PET informed Tirazona that it was considering her termination from employment and
required her to submit a written explanation. In the said Notice, PET apprised
Tirazona of the ground upon which it was considering her dismissal: (1) her letter
that contained false accusations against the company, and (2) her demand for two
million pesos in damages, with a threat of a lawsuit if the said amount was not paid.
The Notice of Termination dated 22 April 2002 given to Tirazona constitutes the
second notice whereby the company informed her that it found her guilty of breach of
trust warranting her dismissal from service.
Equally bereft of merit is Tirazonas allegation that she was not given the benefit of a
fair hearing before she was dismissed.
It needs to be pointed out that it was Tirazona herself and her counsel who declined
to take part in the administrative hearing set by PET 10 April 2002. Tirazona rejected

the companys appointment of its external counsel as the investigating panels

presiding officer, because her own demands on the panels composition were
denied. As correctly held by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, Tirazonas stance is
without any legal basis. On the contrary, this Courts ruling in Foster Parents Plan
International/Bicol v. Demetriou48 is controlling:
The right to dismiss or otherwise impose disciplinary sanctions upon an employee for
just and valid cause, pertains in the first place to the employer, as well as the
authority to determine the existence of said cause in accordance with the norms of
due process. In the very nature of things, any investigation by the employer of any
alleged cause for disciplinary punishment of an employee will have to be conducted
by the employer himself or his duly designated representative; and the
investigation cannot be thwarted or nullified by arguing that it is the employer
who is accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. x x x Of course, the
decision of the employer meting out sanctions against an employee and the
evidentiary and procedural bases thereof may subsequently be passed upon by the
corresponding labor arbiter (and the NLRC on appeal) upon the filing by the
aggrieved employee of the appropriate complaint. [Emphasis ours.]1avvphi1
This Court has held that there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was
conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the
controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. 49
Tirazona in this case has been afforded a number of opportunities to defend her
actions. Even when Tirazona failed to attend the scheduled hearing, PET still
informed Tirazona about what happened therein and gave her the chance to submit
a supplemental written explanation. Only when Tirazona again failed to comply with
the same did PET terminate her employment.
As a final plea for her case, Tirazona asserts that her dismissal from employment
was too harsh and arbitrary a penalty to mete out for whatever violation that she has
committed, if indeed there was one.
Tirazona ought to bear in mind this Courts pronouncement in Metro Drug
Corporation v. NLRC50 that:
When an employee accepts a promotion to a managerial position or to an office
requiring full trust and confidence, she gives up some of the rigid guaranties
available to ordinary workers. Infractions which if committed by others would be
overlooked or condoned or penalties mitigated may be visited with more severe
disciplinary action. A companys resort to acts of self-defense would be more easily
justified. x x x.
Tirazona, in this case, has given PET more than enough reasons to distrust her. The
arrogance and hostility she has shown towards the company and her stubborn,
uncompromising stance in almost all instances justify the companys termination of
her employment. Moreover, Tirazonas reading of what was supposed to be a
confidential letter between the counsel and directors of the PET, even if it concerns
her, only further supports her employers view that she cannot be trusted. In fine, the
Court cannot fault the actions of PET in dismissing petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 May 2005 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 8-18; dated 5 December 2005.

Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Godardo
A. Jacinto and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring; id. at 20-46.
3
Id. at 47-49.
4
CA rollo, pp. 25-35.
5
Id. at 91.
6
Id. at 92-94.
7
Records, p. 62.
2

Id. at 63.
9

The Notice of Charge states:

To: Ma. Wenelita S. Tirazona
From: Management
Re: Notice of Charge
Date: March 25, 2002
This is to inform you that Management is considering your termination
from employment, for serious misconduct and breach of trust, arising
from your counsels demand letter dated 27 February 2002 x x x
wherein you falsely accused the Company of:
Finding you guilty of the charges laid by Ms. Fe S. Balonzo
Depriving you of due process
-and demanding from the Company P2,000,000.00 in damages with
threat of an inevitable lawsuit if your baseless demands are not
satisfied within five (5) days from receipt of the demand letter.
The Company finds your letter libelous. Your rash action is a serious
misconduct and an open display of disloyalty. Being part of the
management, you as an officer is [sic] required not to assert any
adverse interest against the Company. Your position demands utmost
trust and confidence. Your ill-advised action is a flagrant breach of your
fiduciary duty and is highly prejudicial to the Companys interest.
You are hereby given thirty six (36) hours from receipt of this memo to
submit a written explanation and justify why your services should not
be terminated for serious misconduct and breach of trust.
Be guided accordingly.
(SGD.) MAMORO ONO
(DIRECTOR)
Noted by:
(SGD.) Mr. Ken Kubota
President (Records, p. 67.)

10

CA rollo, pp. 64-65.

Id. at 246-249.
12
Id. at 250.
13
Id. at 251.
11

14

Id. at 253.
Id. at 242.
16
Id. at 61.
17
Id. at 95-104.
18
Id. at 34.
19
Id. at 31.
20
Id. at 42.
21
Id. at 45.
22
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Panado, G.R. No. 167118, 15 June
2006, 490 SCRA 751, 762.
23
Id. at 762-763.
24
Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 4.
25
Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
26
Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 2.
27
376 Phil. 362, 371 (1999) cited in San Miguel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 425
Phil. 951, 955 (2002).
28
Rollo, pp. 3-4.
29
Id. at 6.
30
National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27, cited in Chua
v. Santos, G.R. No. 132467, 18 October 2004, 440 SCRA 365, 373.
31
Chua v. Santos, id.
32
Rollo, pp. 121-123.
33
Id. at 122.
34
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156394, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 205,
217.
35
Shoemart, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 74229, 11
August 1989, 176 SCRA 385, 390, cited in Asian Construction And Development
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 142407, 12
March 2007.
36
Art. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER. An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
xxxx
c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative.
37
Jardine Davies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 370 Phil. 310, 318319 (1999).
38
Art. 212(m) partially states:
"Managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down
and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees.
15

39

The rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 admits of certain exceptions, though none of which are present
in the instant petition, namely: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the CA
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the CA
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions

without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the CA are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record. [Rosario v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No.
139233, 11 November 2005, citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil.
834, 846 (1998)].
40

Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA

320, 329-330, cited in Binay v. Odea, G.R. No. 163683, 8 June 2007, 524
SCRA 248, 255-256.
41

De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127857, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 325,
333, citing Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 405 (2003).
42
San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union-Alliance of Filipino
Workers v. San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 143341, 28
May 2004, 430 SCRA 193, 205-206.
43
Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.
44
Rollo, pp. 38-44.
45
Id. at 39-40.
46
Cruz v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 165586, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA
340, 351.
47
Pono v. National Labor Relations Commission, 341 Phil. 615, 621 (1997), cited in
Landtex Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150278, 9 August 2007, 529 SCRA
631, 652.
48
226 Phil. 421, 426 (1986).
49
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 87353, 3
July 1991, 198 SCRA 748, 761.
50
227 Phil. 121, 127 (1986), cited in Villanueva v. National Labor Relations
Commission (Third Division), 354 Phil. 1056, 1063 (1998).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

F-09 CASE ON STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES ----(Talosig, Dahl A.)Philippine

Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v. National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC)164 SCRA 671 (1988)
FACTS:
Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, was accused bytwo complainants of having demanded and received from
them the total amount of P3,800.00 in considerationof her promise to facilitate
approval of their applications for telephone installation. Investigated and heard,
shewas found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service. She
went to the Ministry of Labor andEmployment claiming she had been illegally
removed. Despite of her being dismissed for cause, (as contendedby PLDT) the
labor arbiter (from NLRC) in his decision ruled that the complainant (herein private
respondent)must be given one month pay for every year of service as financial
assistance. The labor arbiter finds the same asequitable, taking into consideration
her long years of service to the company whereby she had undoubtedlycontributed
to the success of the company.NOTE: Marilyn Abucay had served in the company for
10 years. Thus, she must be awarded 10 monthsseparation pay for every year of her
service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of separation pay for the private respondent is just.
RULING: NO. The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for
cause as defined therein is notentitled to separation pay. The separation pay, when it
was considered warranted, was required regardless of the nature or degree of the
ground proved, be it mere inefficiency or something graver like immorality
ordishonesty. Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in
those instances where theemployee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moralcharacter. Where the reason for
the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involvingmoral
turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may
not be required togive the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial
assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on theground of social justice. If the
employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he
isvalidly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next
employment because hethinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out.
This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to dolabor in general any good as it
will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve theprotection
and concern of the Constitution.

Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands areclean and their
motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor.
We hold that the grant of separation pay in the case at bar is unjustified.
The private respondent hasbeen dismissed for dishonesty, as found by the labor
arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself hasimpliedly admitted. The fact
that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be consideredat
all, should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she
should have strengthenedinstead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service
with the company. If regarded as a justification formoderating the penalty of
dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning
of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all
undesirabLES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162053

March 7, 2007

ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION-AFW (SLMCEA-AFW) AND

MARIBEL S. SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) AND ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January
29, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75732 affirming the decision2 dated August 23, 2002 rendered by the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 026225-00.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Maribel S. Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of private respondent
St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) on October 13, 1984. She is a graduate of Associate in Radiologic
Technology from The Family Clinic Incorporated School of Radiologic Technology.
On April 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the "Radiologic Technology
Act of 1992." Said law requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray
technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of

Radiologic Technology.
On September 12, 1995, the Assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of private
respondent SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the
requirement of Republic Act No. 7431 by December 31, 1995; otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be
transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if a slot is available.
On March 4, 1997, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a final notice to petitioner Maribel S.
Santos requiring the latter to comply with Republic Act. No. 7431 by taking and passing the forthcoming
examination scheduled in June 1997; otherwise, private respondent SLMC may be compelled to retire her from
employment should there be no other position available where she may be absorbed.
On May 14, 1997, the Director of the Institute of Radiology, AED-Division of Ancillary Services issued a
memorandum to petitioner Maribel S. Santos directing the latter to submit her PRC Registration
form/Examination Permit per Memorandum dated March 4, 1997.
On March 13, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued another memorandum to petitioner
Maribel S. Santos advising her that only a license can assure her of her continued employment at the Institute
of Radiology of the private respondent SLMC and that the latter is giving her the last chance to take and pass
the forthcoming board examination scheduled in June 1998; otherwise, private respondent SLMC shall be
constrained to take action which may include her separation from employment.
On November 23, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a notice to petitioner Maribel S.
Santos informing the latter that the management of private respondent SLMC has approved her retirement in
lieu of separation pay.
On November 26, 1998, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC issued a "Notice of Separation
from the Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective December 30, 1998 in view of the latter's refusal
to accept private respondent SLMC's offer for early retirement. The notice also states that while said private
respondent exerted its efforts to transfer petitioner Maribel S. Santos to other position/s, her qualifications do
not fit with any of the present vacant positions in the hospital.
In a letter dated December 18, 1998, a certain Jack C. Lappay, President of the Philippine Association of
Radiologic Technologists, Inc., wrote Ms. Judith Betita, Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC,
requesting the latter to give "due consideration" to the organization's three (3) regular members of his
organization (petitioner Maribel S. Santos included) "for not passing yet the Board of Examination for X-ray
Technology," "by giving them an assignment in any department of your hospital awaiting their chance to pass
the future Board Exam."
On January 6, 1999, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC again issued a "Notice of Separation
from the Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective February 5, 1999 after the latter failed to present/
submit her appeal for rechecking to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) of the recent board
examination which she took and failed.
On March 2, 1999, petitioner Maribel S. Santos filed a complaint against private respondent SLMC for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits. She likewise prayed for the
award of moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees.
In the meantime, petitioner Alliance of Filipino Workers (AFW), through its President and Legal Counsel, in a

letter dated September 22, 1999 addressed to Ms. Rita Marasigan, Human Resources Director of private
respondent SLMC, requested the latter to accommodate petitioner Maribel S. Santos and assign her to the
vacant position of CSS Aide in the hospital arising from the death of an employee more than two (2) months
earlier.
In a letter dated September 24, 1999, Ms. Rita Marasigan replied thus:
Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter of September 22, 1999 formally requesting to fill up the vacant regular position of a
CSS Aide in Ms. Maribel Santos' behalf.
The position is indeed vacant. Please refer to our Recruitment Policy for particulars especially on minimum
requirements of the job and the need to meet said requirements, as well as other pre-employment requirements,
in order to be considered for the vacant position. As a matter of fact, Ms. Santos is welcome to apply for any
vacant position on the condition that she possesses the necessary qualifications.
As to the consensus referred to in your letter, may I correct you that the agreement is, regardless of the vacant
position Ms. Santos decides to apply, she must go through the usual application procedures. The formal letter, I
am afraid, will not suffice for purposes of recruitment processing. As you know, the managers requesting to fill
any vacancy has a say on the matter and correctly so. The manager's inputs are necessarily factored into the
standard recruitment procedures. Hence, the need to undergo the prescribed steps.
Indeed we have gone through the mechanics to accommodate Ms. Santos' transfer while she was employed
with SLMC given the prescribed period. She was given 30 days from issuance of the notice of termination to
look for appropriate openings which incidentally she wittingly declined to utilize. She did this knowing fully
well that the consequences would be that her application beyond the 30-day period or after the effective date of
her termination from SLMC would be considered a re-application with loss of seniority and shall be subjected
to the pertinent application procedures.
Needless to mention, one of the 3 X-ray Technologists in similar circumstances as Ms. Santos at the time
successfully managed to get herself transferred to E.R. because she opted to apply for the appropriate vacant
position and qualified for it within the prescribed 30-day period. The other X-ray Technologist, on the other
hand, as you may recall, was eventually terminated not just for his failure to comply with the licensure
requirement of the law but for cause (refusal to serve a customer).
Why Ms. Santos opted to file a complaint before the Labor Courts and not to avail of the opportunity given her,
or assuming she was not qualified for any vacant position even if she tried to look for one within the prescribed
period, I simply cannot understand why she also refused the separation pay offered by Management in an
amount beyond the minimum required by law only to re-apply at SLMC, which option would be available to
her anyway even (if she) chose to accept the separation pay!
Well, here's hoping that our Union can timely influence our employees to choose their options well as it has in
the past.
(Signed)
RITA MARASIGAN
Subsequently, in a letter dated December 27, 1999, Ms. Judith Betita, Personnel Manager of private respondent

SLMC wrote Mr. Angelito Calderon, President of petitioner union as follows:

Dear Mr. Calderon:
This is with regard to the case of Ms. Maribel Santos. Please recall that last Oct. 8, 1999, Ms. Rita Marasigan,
HR Director, discussed with you and Mr. Greg Del Prado the terms regarding the re-hiring of Ms. Maribel
Santos. Ms. Marasigan offered Ms. Santos the position of Secretary at the Dietary Department. In that meeting,
Ms. Santos replied that she would think about the offer. To date, we still have no definite reply from her. Again,
during the conference held on Dec. 14, 1999, Atty. Martir promised to talk to Ms. Santos, and inform us of her
reply by Dec. 21, 1999. Again we failed to hear her reply through him.
Please be informed that said position is in need of immediate staffing. The Dietary Department has already
been experiencing serious backlog of work due to the said vacancy. Please note that more than 2 months has
passed since Ms. Marasigan offered this compromise. Management cannot afford to wait for her decision while
the operation of the said department suffers from vacancy.
Therefore, Management is giving Ms. Santos until the end of this month to give her decision. If we fail to hear
from her or from you as her representatives by that time, we will consider it as a waiver and we will be forced
to offer the position to other applicants so as not to jeopardize the Dietary Department's operation.
For your immediate action.
(Signed)
JUDITH BETITA
Personnel Manager
On September 5, 2000, the Labor Arbiter came out with a Decision ordering private respondent SLMC to pay
petitioner Maribel S. Santos the amount of One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P115,500.00)
representing her separation pay. All other claims of petitioner were dismissed for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioner Maribel S. Santos perfected an appeal with the public respondent NLRC.
On August 23, 2002, public respondent NLRC promulgated its Decision affirming the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter. It likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners in its Resolution promulgated on
December 27, 2002.
Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which, as previously mentioned, affirmed the
decision of the NLRC.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I. Whether the CA overlooked certain material facts and circumstances on petitioners' legal
claim in relation to the complaint for illegal dismissal.
II. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion and erred in not resolving with clarity
the issues on the merit of petitioner's constitutional right of security of tenure.3
For its part, private respondent St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) argues in its comment4 that: 1) the
petition should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration; 2) the CA did not

commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter's ruling that petitioner was
legally dismissed; 3) petitioner was legally and validly terminated in accordance with Republic Act Nos. 4226
and 7431; 4) private respondent's decision to terminate petitioner Santos was made in good faith and was not
the result of unfair discrimination; and 5) petitioner Santos' non-transfer to another position in the SLMC was a
valid exercise of management prerogative.
The petition lacks merit.
Generally, the Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of the CA particularly if
they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and are supported by substantial evidence.5 True
this rule admits of certain exceptions as, for example, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts, or the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence on record6 or are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion.7 None of these exceptions, however, has been convincingly shown by
petitioners to apply in the present case. Hence, the Court sees no reason to disturb such findings of fact of the
CA.
Ultimately, the issue raised by the parties boils down to whether petitioner Santos was illegally dismissed by
private respondent SLMC on the basis of her inability to secure a certificate of registration from the Board of
Radiologic Technology.
The requirement for a certificate of registration is set forth under R.A. No. 74318 thus:
Sec. 15. Requirement for the Practice of Radiologic Technology and X-ray Technology. - Unless exempt from
the examinations under Sections 16 and 17 hereof, no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiologic
and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from
the Board.
It is significant to note that petitioners expressly concede that the sole cause for petitioner Santos' separation
from work is her failure to pass the board licensure exam for X-ray technicians, a precondition for obtaining
the certificate of registration from the Board. It is argued, though, that petitioner Santos' failure to comply with
the certification requirement did not constitute just cause for termination as it violated her constitutional right
to security of tenure. This contention is untenable.
While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be
reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned
professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.9 The most concrete example of this would be in the field of
medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has been closely regulated by the State. It has long been
recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those
who would practice medicine.10 The same rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and xray technology. The clear and unmistakable intention of the legislature in prescribing guidelines for persons
seeking to practice in this field is embodied in Section 2 of the law:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to upgrade the practice of radiologic technology in the
Philippines for the purpose of protecting the public from the hazards posed by radiation as well as to ensure
safe and proper diagnosis, treatment and research through the application of machines and/or equipment using

radiation.11
In this regard, the Court quotes with approval the disquisition of public respondent NLRC in its decision dated
August 23, 2002:
The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are recognized as an exercise of the State's inherent police power.
It should be noted that the police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, educations, good order, safety or general welfare of the people. The state is justified in prescribing the
specific requirements for x-ray technicians and/or any other professions connected with the health and safety of
its citizens. Respondent-appellee being engaged in the hospital and health care business, is a proper subject of
the cited law; thus, having in mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter cannot close its eyes and [let]
complainant-appellant's private interest override public interest.
Indeed, complainant-appellant cannot insist on her "sterling work performance without any derogatory record"
to make her qualify as an x-ray technician in the absence of a proper certificate of Registration from the Board
of Radiologic Technology which can only be obtained by passing the required examination. The law is clear
that the Certificate of Registration cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow a person to practice
as a Radiologic Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist (Technician).12
No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of petitioner Santos was
undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute. It is undeniable that her continued employment without the
required Board certification exposed the hospital to possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to
operate. Certainly, private respondent could not be expected to retain petitioner Santos despite the inimical
threat posed by the latter to its business. This notwithstanding, the records bear out the fact that petitioner
Santos was given ample opportunity to qualify for the position and was sufficiently warned that her failure to
do so would result in her separation from work in the event there were no other vacant positions to which she
could be transferred. Despite these warnings, petitioner Santos was still unable to comply and pass the required
exam. To reiterate, the requirement for Board certification was set by statute. Justice, fairness and due process
demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had no participation or control.13
It would be unreasonable to compel private respondent to wait until its license is cancelled and it is materially
injured before removing the cause of the impending evil. Neither can the courts step in to force private
respondent to reassign or transfer petitioner Santos under these circumstances. Petitioner Santos is not in the
position to demand that she be given a different work assignment when what necessitated her transfer in the
first place was her own fault or failing. The prerogative to determine the place or station where an employee is
best qualified to serve the interests of the company on the basis of the his or her qualifications, training and
performance belongs solely to the employer.14 The Labor Code and its implementing Rules do not vest in the
Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority.15
While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it
does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.16 Labor
laws, to be sure, do not authorize interference with the employer's judgment in the conduct of the latter's
business. Private respondent is free to determine, using its own discretion and business judgment, all elements
of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be
provided by law. None of these exceptions is present in the instant case.
The fact that another employee, who likewise failed to pass the required exam, was allowed by private
respondent to apply for and transfer to another position with the hospital does not constitute unlawful

discrimination. This was a valid exercise of management prerogative, petitioners not having alleged nor proven
that the reassigned employee did not qualify for the position where she was transferred. In the past, the Court
has ruled that an objection founded on the ground that one has better credentials over the appointee is frowned
upon so long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the position.17 Furthermore, the records
show that Ms. Santos did not even seriously apply for another position in the company.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.