International Studies of Management & Organization, 45(4): 359378, 2015

Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0020-8825 print/1558-0911 online
DOI: 10.1080/00208825.2015.1006040

PIERRE ROMELAER

AND

HANANE BEDDI

Strategy and Structure in International

Multi-business Groups
Looking beyond Global IntegrationLocal
Responsiveness
Abstract: The global integration/local responsiveness (I/R) perspective has
been used for a long time and is still today essential to the understanding of
the many models presented in the literature on multinational companies. We
deconstruct the notions of integration and responsiveness, showing how the
I/R perspective, as it is presented in the literature, is incomplete or insufficient.
We then define an approach that goes beyond this perspective and discuss its
applications and limitations.

The strategy and structure of multi-business groups are usually studied in

terms of multi-divisional (M-Form) structure (Chandler 1962). Initially,
the accepted principle was that a multi-business organization needs to
combine the centralization of strategic decision making and planning with
operational decentralization. Later research often presents the core issue
differently, emphasizing the strong relationship between diversification and
coordination costs or performance (Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson 1992;
Markides 2002; Rawley 2010; Rumelt 1982). However, some authors place
this issue in a less mechanical perspective (Mayer and Whittington 2004).
Pierre Romelaer is a professor of management at the University Paris-Dauphine,
Place du Marchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75 775, Paris cedex 16, France; tel.:
+33 (0) 6 09 25 75 90; e-mail: pierre.romelaer@dauphine.fr. Hanane Beddi is
an associate professor at the Normandy Business School, 9 rue Claude Bloch
14 052, Caen cedex 4, France; tel.: +33 (0) 2 31 46 78 78; e-mail: h.beddi@
em-normandie.fr.
359

360 ROMELAER & BEDDI (FRANCE)

Another stream of research has grown up around the question of how

multinational companies (MNCs) can be managed most efficiently, which
raises two important issues for management, specifically, location and
distance. Because markets, consumer tastes, and political and administrative
structures differ from country to country, location is important; Distance
can make it difficult for headquarters to stay informed, understand local
conditions, and maintain control of local managers. These issues are
important for both single-business and multi-business groups, as is reflected
in the literature. The former considers multi-business firms as portfolios of
activities, and the latter sees international firms as portfolios of international
subsidiaries. These perspectives have often taken divergent paths.1 However,
because many multi-business groups are also international and many MNCs
have to decide whether they want to develop around one or several business
lines, the two should be considered complementary and used together.
Our study focuses on international multi-business groups, which may have
strategic business units (SBUs) dedicated to particular products/services
scattered around the world. The goal is to make some sense of the enormous
variety of models of multi-business groups and MNCs that research has
produced over the years. A first step is to demonstrate that the subject has
been addressed on the basis of a limited number of potentially contradictory
conceptual frameworks, all of which, however, explicitly or implicitly use the
notions of integration and responsiveness (I/R). This approach would allow
us to compare models on this basis. In itself, this approach is insufficient,
first, because the I/R analysis can be seen from four different angles (see
below), and second, because approaches vary widely. This observation is true
even when models have the same position on the I/R grid, more particularly
those combining high integration and high responsiveness, which today are
considered the most advanced.
To deal with this unsatisfactory situation, we have deconstructed the
notions of integration and responsiveness. Our analysis shows that the I/R
perspective, as presented in the literature as recently as 2004, is incomplete
or insufficient for at least six reasons, as explained below. Our work aims
to provide the basis for an approach that takes the questions a little further.
Building on this extension, we can advance the I/R perspective.

The global-integration/local-responsiveness grid positioning models for

international multi-business groups
Over the past 40 years, researchers have proposed many different models for
MNC strategy and organization, reflecting divergent perspectives. The first in
the series was Chandlers (1962) M-Form, which centers on the degree of centralization in strategic decision making in relation to group diversification.

STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE IN MULTI-BUSINESS GROUPS 361

This leads to the M-Form organizational structure, in which strategic decisions are centralized at HQ and operational responsibilities are decentralized
and delegated to strategic business units (SBUs). It stands in contrast to functional structure (U-Form), in which top management is overwhelmed by
operational details. A variant of the M-Form, the centralized multi-divisional
(CM-Form) structure (Hill 1988; Hill and Hoskisson 1987; Hill, Hitt, and
Hoskisson 1992) adds selective involvement of the corporate center in SBUs,
in particular to harness synergies or to transfer competences across SBUs.
According to these authors, the CM-Form structure is appropriate for groups
pursuing policies of related diversification, and the M-Form structure suits
groups pursuing policies of unrelated diversification.
Many other models have since been developed with the aim of going
beyond the M-Form. Six of these are outlined below. The first model, the
global integration/local responsiveness grid, classifies industries and then
strategies into three categories: locally responsive, global, and multi-focal
(Prahalad and Doz 1987). Similarly, Porter (1986) took industries as the unit
of analysis, distinguishing global and multi-domestic industries (as did Yip
1989) that, respectively, lead to pure global and country-centered strategies.
White and Poynter (1990) identified intermediate strategies based on combinations of globally and locally based advantages and opportunities, leading
them to define five organizational structures. In another model, Bartlett
and Ghoshal (1989) used the notions of global efficiency, national responsiveness, and worldwide learning to distinguish between four types of MNC:
international, multinational, global, and transnational. The second model
is based on another perspective: the degree of multinationality of the firm.
Perlmutter (1969) and Heenan and Perlmutter (1979) identified four different
states of mind or attitudes from which both strategy and structure follow:
the MNC can be home-country oriented (ethnocentric), host-country
oriented (polycentric), regionally oriented (regiocentric) or world oriented
(geocentric). The third model considers the creation and leveraging of dispersed knowledge (Hedlunds 1986; 1994) and offers the heterarchy and
N-Form as more organic and decentralized, and less hierarchical than the
M-Form. Later, Doz, Santos, and Williamson (2001) presented a model also
focused on knowledge, with a structure less vertical than the M-Form, but
more structured than the N-Form. What they called the metanational corporation is organized around three tasks: sensing knowledge, turning it into
products/services, and leveraging new knowledge. The fourth model considers product diversity and the proportion of foreign sales to total sales at different stages of international expansion. On this basis, Stopford and Wells
(1972) identified four structures: worldwide product divisions, area structure,
international division structure, and global matrix structure. The fifth model
recognizes the limits of uni-dimensional structures and offers a progress
toward matrix organizations (Goold and Campbell 2003). The authors

362 ROMELAER & BEDDI (FRANCE)

argued that the organization should become a structured network to

combine product excellence, customer-group understanding and local geographical responsiveness (428). In a similar vein, Strikwerda and
Stoelhorst (2009) called for the multidimensional organization, which
differs from matrix organization by the absence of a dual reporting and
authority structure. The sixth model focuses on the involvement of HQ
and the attitude of SBUs with respect to planning and control. Goold and
Campbell (1987) distinguished three styles: strategic planning (close to
Chandlers M-form), financial control (close to Bowers model), and strategic
control. Strategic control combines features taken from Bower (1970), adds
the equilibrium between short-term financial objectives and long-term strategic views, and has each division and SBU looking after its own business.2
The only features common to all the above perspectives are the notions of
integration and responsiveness, carrying forward from Lawrence and
Lorschs (1967) seminal work on differentiation and integration. We use this
dichotomy to compare models of multi-business firms according to their
degree of global integration/local responsiveness (I/R). Figure 1 below
summarizes the results.
While Figure 1 appears to offer a simple and effective way to catch the
complexity of MNC models, we need to add that the I/R perspective itself
has been considered from four angles: (1) MNCs have to deal with both
global and local pressures (Prahalad and Doz 1987), for example, homogenization of tastes and market structures across different countries and

Figure 1. Positioning of MNC conceptualizations on the I/R axes.

STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE IN MULTI-BUSINESS GROUPS 363

improvements in transportation and communications versus local regulation

and the need to adapt products to specific demands within a country; (2) The
MNCs members, at HQ and in subsidiaries, may have to choose between listening to (and trusting) the views of HQ home-country executives, or listening to (and trusting) local managers in foreign countries: the latter may have
knowledge about clients preferences, local methods and systems, as well as
legitimacy in the local environment and connections to local authorities
(Heenan and Perlmutter 1979); (3) The centralization/decentralization
dilemma raises the issue of strategic decision making (Prahalad and Doz
1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989): global integration refers to centralized
management of geographically dispersed activities, and local responsiveness
means resource commitment decisions taken autonomously by a subsidiary (Prahalad and Doz 1987, 1415). Strategic responsibility lies with HQ
or SBUs, depending on the scope for standardization of activities or the
extent of adaptation to local conditions (Hamel and Prahalad 1983); (4)
Some activities along the value chain may be standardized or concentrated,
while others need to be tailored or dispersed, leading to Porters (1986) configuration/coordination framework. Downstream activities are linked to the
buyer and should be located in all the countries concerned, whereas upstream
and support activities can be separated from buyer localization in most
industries and can be concentrated on a few sites. Devinney, Midgley, and
Venaik (2000) later added transactional completeness, which describes pressures for internalizing or outsourcing activities along the value chain. There
is, thus, no consensus on the definitions of global integration and local
responsiveness, as already pointed out by Venaik, Midgley, and Devinney
(2004; 2005). The focus is either on the intensity of the pressures or on the
managerial responses to these pressures.
MNC models have to deal with potentially contradictory demands. The
solution adopted by many researchers is to conclude that MNCs are so complex that they should be both globally integrated and locally responsive.
According to Ghoshal and Westney, the integrated MNC is a particularly
complex organization, the different parts of which are dispersed in very different contexts that are nevertheless increasingly interconnected. Such MNCs
are internally differentiated in complex ways, yet integrated to respond to the
interdependencies across the different organizational subunits (1993, 9).
Diversified MNCs are, thus, characterized by three features: (1) multidimensionality, with multiple geographical markets, product lines, and
activities (Doz and Prahalad 1991); (2) heterogeneity resulting from differences between businesses, countries, functions, and individuals (Doz and
Prahalad 1991; Kostova and Roth 2003); and (3) interdependence between
HQ and subsidiaries, and between subsidiaries (Thompson 1967; ODonnell
2000). This complexity means that MNCs must be flexible to tackle all the
trade-offs and deal with apparently contradictory pressures (Evans and

364 ROMELAER & BEDDI (FRANCE)

Doz 1989; Frost and Zhou 2005; Kostova and Roth 2003; Malnight 2001;
Pudelko and Harzing 2008).
In addition, defining features of an MNC entails structural indeterminacy
within the diversified MNC because of the need to deal with multiple stakeholders, both externally and internally, and multiple perspectives in choices
and decisions (Doz and Prahalad 1991). This necessity leads researchers to
promote an interorganizational network perspective (Ghoshal and Bartlett
1990). The MNC is then seen as an interdependent, differentiated system
(Nohria and Ghoshal 1997). The MNC aims both to integrate all the entities
in the organization as a whole and adapt subsidiaries to the specificities of
their local environment. These models are often described as network-based
(Malnight 1996; 2001; Andersson and Holm 2010), as opposed to decentralized (high LR/low GI) or centralized (high GI/low LR).
Looking beyond hierarchical models and the I/R dichotomy, networkbased models characterized by high levels of both integration and responsiveness deserve some closer attention. They correspond to the models located at
the top right side in Figure 1, which we examine in the next section.

Globally integrated and locally responsive: Capturing the complexity

of an MNC
Contemporary research suggests that MNCs should be globally integrated
and locally responsive (Evans and Doz 1989; Paterson and Brock 2002;
Marschan-Piekkari and Welch 2004). These so-called network-based models
(all represented in the upper right side in Figure 1) include the transnational,
geocentric, regiocentric, heterarchy/N-form, the horizontal organization, the
metanational, and the multi-focal firm. They can lead up to a global
matrix, which is similar to the matrix as a structured network in Goold
and Campbell (2003). The central idea is that HQ and SBUs form a differentiated network (Nohria and Ghoshal 1994). The strategy is not centralized
or decentralized, but rather shared between subsidiaries and HQ. As
Malnight wrote, one important focus within network-based models has
been the development of distributed and specialized resource configurations,
impacting worldwide flows of products, capital, people, and knowledge
within the firm (1996, 45). Activities are distributed around the world,
which contributes to interdependence (Thompson 1967) and explains internal differentiation. In a multi-business perspective, Markides (2002) argued
that different SBUs in the same company often pursue different businesslevel strategies, which leads HQ to adopt coordination mechanisms accordingly. These approaches have identified many types of subsidiaries, such as,
for example, the local innovator, the global innovator, and the world
mandate.3 Some research has also been devoted to the roles, strategy, and

STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE IN MULTI-BUSINESS GROUPS 365

development of subsidiaries (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998; Paterson and

Brock 2002).
The main focus of these models is the development and transfer of knowledge within the MNC. Even in the multi-business literature, the center has a
crucial role in the development of processes and the structures that allow for
the sharing and transfer of core competencies across divisions (Markides and
Williamson 1996; Markides 2002). The economic rationale for the existence
of these firms is based on transaction costs theory (Williamson 1975), but this
should not mask important benefits of diversification: learning and the building of new strategic assets more quickly and cheaply than the competitors
(Markides 2002; Markides and Williamson 1994).
According to Kogut and Zander (1993), an MNC arises as an organizational vehicle for the transfer of knowledge across borders. This way of thinking has been associated with the expansion of horizontal linkages between
different MNC entities, as opposed to hierarchical interaction (Malnight
1996; ODonnell 2000; Harzing and Noorderhaven 2006).
Admittedly, knowledge transfer is especially important in the heterarchy
and the metanational models, and may be less so in others.
Looking beyond the common features we have just considered, realizing
that network models are heterogeneous in several ways is important. Some
points are present only in some of the models and neglected in others. This
is true for the culture of the managerial group, the frames of mind of individuals and small groups, the management at the regional level, the specificities
of emerging countries, the boundaries of the firm, the role of SBUs, and the
parenting roles of HQ.
Finally, structural indeterminacy is a fundamental feature of MNC models, contrasting with the neat stages of the internationalization process in
classical models (Stopford and Wells 1972; Galbraith and Nathanson
1978). The so-called Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne 1977) kept the
idea of learning as a gradual process, but insisted that this process may vary
from one MNC to another: learning influences the intensity of international
activities, which, in turn, influences learning. The authors saw learning as a
necessity to overcome the liability of foreignness: It takes learning to
understand a foreign country. Recently, the same authors centered their
latest model (Johanson and Vahlne 2009) on the liability of outsidership:
What counts is getting into the right networks, and that takes learning.
In another direction, studies of MNCs from emerging countries, both
global firms and SMEs in high-tech industries, have led researchers to question the notion of gradual learning. According to Wang and Suh, the rapid
international expansion of some MNCs is closely linked to headquarterssubsidiary relationships (2009, 453).
To sum up our reasoning so far, there seem to be only a few common
points regularly found in all MNC models: MNCs should aim for high levels

366 ROMELAER & BEDDI (FRANCE)

of both integration and responsiveness, leading to the representation of the

MNC as a differentiated system of subsidiaries. However, much recent
research still offers very heterogeneous and incomplete solutions to MNCs
dilemmas about strategies and structures.
Where can we go from here? One solution is to accept that the strategies
and structures of MNCs and multi-business groups are complex, and stop
there. We suggest another approach: We believe that we have to look at
integration and responsiveness from new perspectives, thereby avoiding
and going beyond the stumbling block of the I/R perspective.
The I/R perspective: Fundamental truth, primitive choice, and more
thoughtful views
What we have seen above is aptly summarized in the statement that the
integration/responsiveness grid has demonstrated enduring power as an
integrative way to map key managerial challenges faced by MNCs (Doz
2004, 10). However, Doz also warned that much of the use of the I/R perspective, as well as its initial formulation, implicitly emphasizes a primitive
choice,4 namely, integration or responsiveness. This primitive choice may
reflect the integration of strategic and process issues, in particular a framing
of the trade-off as an expression of relative power between country executives
and global business or function managers. According to Doz, this
oversimplifies . . . rather than grasp[s] the true trade-offs on each
dimension: uniformity vs. differentiation of offerings and local
operations on the responsiveness axis, autonomy of self-contained
units vs. strategic coordination, and operational integration of
interdependent operations on the integration axis . . . . The existence
of two separate trade-offs justifies . . . the way the grid is sometimes
more thoughtfully used. The ability to combine differentiation of
offerings and integration of operations becomes a firm-specific
organizational capability. More successful firms achieve a higher
level of both integration and responsiveness than less successful firms.5

We fully agree about the importance of the notions of integration and

responsiveness. However, with regards to the primitive and more thoughtful
views of the I/R perspective, we disagree on several points.
First, we identify the following question: is integration or responsiveness
the best, or some mix of the two, or else should both as high as possible?
This should be split into two questions. Integration and responsiveness
may have two possible meanings: They may refer either to strategy or to
power and control.6 Hence, we pose the first question, which involves strategy: Should decisions aim at optimizing the firms performance or, instead,
the subsidiarys performance? This first question leads to the second

STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE IN MULTI-BUSINESS GROUPS 367

question, which involves power and control: Should decisions for a subsidiary be made by HQ managers and staff or by subsidiary management? The
issues are summed up in Figure 2 below, which shows that the two dimensions can, to some extent, vary independently.
Figure 2 allows for four possibilities. We look more closely at two of these.
In Cell A, the firm is very much like a company owned and run by an active
capital investment fund, where the label active means that HQ imposes
strategic decisions, specific to each of its companies, and possibly intervenes
at the operational level, to some extent. An example is Global Investment
Partners, a joint venture between GE and Credit Suisse, which acquires large
utilities and boosts their performance with the (presumably superior) competency GE has built up in the management of service activities.7 It could be
said that each SBU is managed from the outside.
The situation in Cell D is close to impossible. It is hard to see how independent SBUs could spontaneously develop common objectives and strategies, have processes to adjust them, and accept a common agreement on
discipline. Even scholars who equate MNCs with networks find it unclear
how firm-level goals will arise without some hierarchy (Egelhoff 2010, 418).
What also appears from Figure 2 is that fairly extreme cases cannot work
in practice without the addition of other dimensions. For example, in Cell A,
it is hard to imagine HQ really conducting completely local optimization: HQ
decisions will be influenced by HQ managers and staff competencies, values,
culture, norms, and styles (hence, five additional dimensions). Furthermore,
it is hard to imagine that SBUs have no de facto influence if HQ depends on
local people for local information and relationships with local agents (two
dimensions). HQ may try to reduce the asymmetry of information by
employing a variety of management methods (hence, adding still more
dimensions8 to the initial I/R perspective).
Figure 2. The I/R grid for power and control and/or optimization.

368 ROMELAER & BEDDI (FRANCE)

A second point where we diverge from the I/R perspective, as presented

above, concerns the fact that it supposes that each decision must be made
by either HQ or an SBU, implying that it is not important to take the others
competencies, information, interests, objectives, and motivations into
account. Contrary to this notion, organization research shows that input
from several functions, units, hierarchical levels, analytic techniques, and
direct discussions produces superior results in strategic decision making
(Dean and Sharfman 1996; Papadakis, Lioukas, and Chambers 1998;
Elbanna and Child 2007).
This means that progress in the management of MNCs requires not only
research into whether it is better for decisions to be made by HQ people or
by subsidiary managers. What we also need is a better understanding of how
the two can cooperate. Many researchers present the I/R perspective in
terms of a binary choice between what they call either a hierarchical or
a network structure. However, each of these descriptions is incomplete.
For example, cohesion in the network is said to result from shared objectives, knowledge, culture, and vision, but nothing is said about the mechanisms that produce this cohesion (Egelhoff 2010, 417418). We need to flesh
out formulations of this kind, especially in view of the intense work a CEO
may put into the development and maintenance of a sufficient level of common vision and values (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1993), and of the constraints
HQ has to accept if it wants to create enough procedural justice to obtain
the voluntary compliance of SBUs (Kim and Mauborgne 1993).
Our third and fourth disagreements concern the contention that the I/R
perspective is powerful because it applies from the level of national economies and industries, at the most aggregate level, to the mental maps and cognitive schemes individual managers hold at the most disaggregated (Doz
2004, 10). In some sense this is true, and even tautological: by definition, each
person in a MNC works in some place (hence, there are some local considerations), and the activities of the firm transcend national boundaries (hence, a
global flavor). However, in terms of economic activities, this does not prevent
some local people from having objectives and activities that extend beyond
their local environment.
At least two cases can be considered: (1) SBUs that would like to develop a
kind of autonomous international strategy. This goal may emerge naturally
or belong to formal possibilities such as becoming an excellence center; (2)
SBUs that compete with others for activities and resources in the internal
power and control system (Jackall 1988; Becker-Ritterspach 2009).
The statements above should not be taken to mean that local thinking is
the opposite of global thinking, or that good implementers are the contrary
of company-wide entrepreneurs. These assertions would contradict Williams
(2009) who found a correlation 0.52 between global initiatives and subsidiary implementation.

STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE IN MULTI-BUSINESS GROUPS 369

When it comes to mental maps and cognitive schemes, there are many
activities where the professional milieu9 includes people and entities from
several countries. In such cases, local maps, schemes, and knowledge cannot
be called entirely local. That local maps are influenced by the local context
of their knowledge site is true (Foss, Doz, and Santos 2008), but local
individuals also refer to geographically distant people and knowledge items.
Thus, in both economic and knowledge activities, we should move on from
the notion of geographically local to the notion of cognitively/socially
connected: decision-making communities, communities of practice, and
knowledge systems are as important as groups of people in the same
country.
Our fifth disagreement is with the views that partly emanate from the I/R
perspective: HQ has a global vision and knowledge and subsidiaries have
local views and knowledge. Two arguments may support our view. The first
argument is that metanational firms are not homeless as stated in Foss,
Doz, and Santos (2008, 14). Just like national subsidiaries and national
knowledge sites, HQ is influenced by its local conditions. Although the geocentric or the metanational may be thought of as optimizing worldwide
operations, in reality the optimization is colored by the point of view of
the country of origin: Huawei, Cemex and Google are not only global, they
are also, to some degree, Chinese, Mexican, and American firms. The second
argument is that the conditions influencing local knowledge do not come
only from the country concerned. They also include the professional cultures
we mentioned above, the nationalities of the local people, and the experiences that local people have had in various parts of the firm (and outside
it) over many years. For example, French cement-maker Lafarge has a technical center in Austria where staff from fifty different countries work daily in
direct contact with subsidiaries within a thousand-kilometer radius. Could it
be said that knowledge in this unit is influenced only by the Austrian
environment? Our answer is no. We think it can be misleading to assert
thatmuch knowledge that is commercially relevant to MNCs is contextdependent and rooted in local circumstances (Foss, Doz, and Santos
2008, 9). This situation becomes true only if there are full and precise definitions of the words relevant, context, and local.
The sixth difference we have identified is with another aspect of many of
the network approaches presented above. Many models claiming that the
MNC is a differentiated network provide no detailed descriptions of activities
useful to obtain integration of the whole, to guide the firm as a whole, to conduct changes, and, when necessary, to coerce. Some of themsuch as those
concerning strategy, objectives, values, and the density of internal relations
can play an important role in achieving high integration and high responsiveness, at the same time, in a given stream of activity.10 We look at this more
closely in the next section.11

370 ROMELAER & BEDDI (FRANCE)

Moving beyond the I/R perspective: Connecting units, managing learning

and emphasizing coordination
As we have seen, the I/R perspective has great merits, but also has its dangers
if applied too crudely. In our discussion, we have also identified many
dimensions that need to be taken into account.12 To get beyond this point,
and because we cannot take all the relevant dimensions into account, we
focus on the commonsensical idea that close and continuing contacts
between subsidiaries, and between HQ and subsidiaries, can effectively
facilitate the circulation of knowledge and cross-fertilization in an MNC.
Bartlett and Ghoshal already factored this into their model, where everything
is arranged so that SBU managers play the key role in proposing initiatives.
However, it can only work if division managers make a significant effort to
create horizontal links. They provide many concrete examples of the wide
variety of task forces, teams, and committees that can be used for this
purpose (1993, 3335).13
Other research delivers a similar message, while at times showing that
some kinds of HQ initiatives can be counterproductive. For example, Lee
et al. (2008, 15) identified correlation of new-product creativity (a) with
knowledge transfer between HQ and subsidiary, and (b) with the strength
of networks between subsidiaries (0.24, 0.27, respectively), thus, adding a
vertical dimension to knowledge transfer. Martins and Eisenhardt (2010)
showed that cross-unit projects are a good way to rewire the firm, that
is, to create the necessary connections that standard structures tend to
impede or destroy. They noted that such cross-unit projects are successful
only if upper-level managers do not intervene. Ciabuschi, Martin, and Stahl
(2010) reached similar conclusions. One of the essential roles of HQ is to allocate world mandates and other decision-making roles to local units. Data
show that, beyond this point, HQ intervention has a negative effect on effectiveness ( 0.149) and a powerful negative effect ( 0.450) on efficiency (2010,
484).14 Ciabuschi, Martin, and Stahl showed that local decision autonomy
has a very positive effect (0.502, 0.366) on effectiveness and efficiency
(2010, 484). Williamss findings were in the same vein (2009, 101): the intensity of global initiatives from a subsidiary has a fairly high correlation (0.45)
with inter-unit networking. At this point, we should also mention the earlier
findings of Ghoshal, Korine, and Szulanski (1994). Their data cast some
doubt on the supposedly positive impact of subsidiary autonomy on
intersubsidiary communications and, to some extent, on HQ-subsidiary communications. By contrast, the frequency of participation in meetings, task
forces, and the like has a positive effect on both subsidiary-headquarters
and intersubsidiary communication. Hence, many results point in much
the same direction.15

STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE IN MULTI-BUSINESS GROUPS 371

We conclude that the keys to effective knowledge development and

deployment are a high level of lateral networking and high decentralization
of decision making to local units. However, we should not forget that, in
the research discussed, the effect is not always very strong and that other variables also come into play. Let us take just one example. Contrary to Martins
and Eisenhardt, Williams (2009, 101) did not focus on inter-unit projects but
on the intensity of global initiatives by a subsidiary. Four of his findings are
important for I/R issues: (1) The global initiatives of a local entity are closely
correlated with the subsidiarys strategic importance, inter-unit networking,
subsidiary learning, and shared strategic goals (0.30, 0.45, 0.68, and 0.66,
respectively); (2) Regression analysis (explaining 55 percent of variance)
shows that the global initiatives of a local entity are essentially related to
the units capacity to learn from inside and outside sources. The effects of
strategic goals shared with HQ, and trust in HQ, are the second most important factor, while inter-unit networking takes only third place; (3) The intensity of subsidiary involvement in the implementation of global initiatives is
explained by subsidiary learning and shared strategic goals, while inter-unit
networking plays no role; and (4) Global initiatives taken by a local unit
are closely correlated (0.52) with local implementation by the same unit of
other global initiatives. The opposition between company-wide entrepreneurs
and mere implementers is, thus, false. This result calls for reexamination of
the notion of different types of subsidiaries at which we previously looked.
These results suggest that inter-unit networking is a necessary part of
MNC management, but that it needs to be backed up by action to enhance
subsidiary learning and ensure a reasonable level of shared values and/or
strategic goals, as well as to build trust between HQ and subsidiaries. Kim
and Mauborgne (1993) made similar arguments: two-way communications,
HQ familiarity with local conditions, and open HQ behavior in decisionmaking processes are essential to obtain SBU managerial compliance.16 All
these considerations highlight the need to work on coordination in an
extended sensenot only through strategic planning, formal information,
and control systems, but also on the basis of mutual understanding and trust,
shared values and goals, and frequent interchange of information.

Conclusion
The I/R (integration/responsiveness) perspective is a very useful tool, allowing
us to compare nearly thirty types of organizations for multinational or multibusiness firms described in the literature. The I/R perspective also enables us
to identify commonalities and differences among recent network models.
To move a step further than the I/G grid, the analysis we conducted leads
to what we can call the strategy-power perspective, which has several

372 ROMELAER & BEDDI (FRANCE)

advantages compared to existing models: (1) it details processes and methods

with which both HQ and SBUs can contribute to decision and management:
we gathered here an extensive recollection of many elements linked to organization, information, and learning; (2) the new perspective introduces the
notion that local people present activities and mental maps that are not only
local; furthermore, HQ people are not totally global, thus considerably
enlarging the local/global debate; (3) it allows for an identification of at least
15 dimensions that should be taken into account in the management of multinational and/or multi-business groups, thus showing that researchers and
managers would run into difficulties and miss opportunities if they were to
believe that I/R considerations alone suffice to provide both an integrative
normative tool and a way to derive prescriptions for individual businesses
and companies (Doz 2004, 10). The picture that emerges is more managerial
and also more realistic than artificial models contrasting two equally inexistent pure types of hierarchical and network structures.
Our approach has several limitations. We have to accept that the complexity of MNCs has not yet been completely unraveled. While many dimensions of this complexity are presented here, many more certainly remain to be
identified and integrated into a renewed model of the management of multibusiness international corporations. Although the dimensions we mentioned
are clearly linked to elements such as strategy, power, control, organization,
information, and learning, the whole is not yet fully integrated into a comprehensive model. Future research will also tell us whether a single model can
address adequately all issues concerning both multi-business and international groups. Hence, much work remains to be done, which, as Doz
(2006) put it, is certainly an exciting agenda.

Notes
1. As illustrated in some recent publications, e.g.,: By adding an additional
geographic dimension, and by recognizing the variable relationships national
subsidiaries are likely to have both between themselves and with their multinational
centers, the international business literature is well-placed to develop a much
more differentiated and internally-complex picture of organizational structure
(Whittington 2002, 120).
2. Many attempts have been made to extend or test these models, among them
Harzing (1999; 2000), Malnight (1996; 2001), and Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995).
Some researchers focus on the industry involved as one (or the most) important factor
explaining strategy and structure. Following Devinney, Midgley, and Venaik (2000),
we do not share the determinism of these approaches and focus on MNCs rather than
industries.
3. There are many different SBU typologies, as illustrated by White and Poynter
(1984), Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), Jarillo and Martinez (1990), Gupta and
Govindarajan (1991), Roth and Morrison (1992), Ambos and Reitsperger (2004), and

STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE IN MULTI-BUSINESS GROUPS 373

Drrenbcher and Gammelgaard (2006). Many researchers have also tried to test or
compare their typologies (Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995; Harzing and Noorderhaven
2006; Paterson and Brock 2002; Taggart 1998; Tsai, Yu, and Lee 2006; and Yu 2005). A
tentative common framework was proposed by Enright and Subramanian (2007).
4. This quote and the following two are from Doz (2004, 25).
5. Close to Doz, Harzing saw that much research on MNC implicitly or
explicitly refers to a continuum of integration/coordination/globalization advantages
versus differentiation/responsiveness/localization advantages (1999, 103).
6. We thank the reviewer who suggested we also include the notion of control.
Indeed, we aim at involving both the act of deciding and being able to impose ones
views (we call this power), and the act of verifying that what has been done
conforms to what was agreed upon (we call this control). We search, then, to go
beyond only the social-psychological aspects.
7. One of GIPs investments is Gatwick Airport in the UK, acquired for US$2
billion.
8. These may concern, among other things, personal envoys, expatriates,
information systems, reporting, control, education and socialization of local people
with HQ people, regular communications between HQ and local people, scope for
subsidiary managers to discuss HQ demands (although HQ decides in the last
resort), and trust between HQ and SBUs.
9. A professional milieu may include people in several countries, with good
professionals and stars. It may also include companies active in the field, great universities and labs, well-known consulting firms, high-level suppliers, professional
journals and events, journalists, blogs, groups in social networks, and other
communities.
10. Some research refers to these coordination forces, at least implicitly. Foss,
Santos, and Doz explained that knowledge items from distant places can be combined without being transferred or shared across locations by providing relatively
similar internal contexts to the local units (2008, 9). However, the notion of context
is not developed further. Doz (2004, 1516) argued that the firm may prevent newly
created global business units from destroying local knowledge and motivation
through a re-weaving of the organizational fabric, that is, breaking monolithic
organizations into smaller [units] . . . [that use] less formal arrangements . . . such as
communities of practice and various ad hoc integration tools, around project management, quality deployment disciplines, and common platforms. Many organizational tools referred to in Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993) are similar, although they
are closely connected with other detailed roles of HQ and divisional executives.
11. There are several limitations to the use of the I/R grid not mentioned here for
lack of space.
12. We identified many other dimensions not presented here for lack of space.
Among them is the fact that I/R issues have a different slant depending on prevailing
conditions (market turbulence) or for different functions (production, information
systems) in all national cultures. Firms also have to realize that the value of innovation and of diversification is not positive and high in all sectors, in all regions,
and at all times.
13. It is interesting to note the theoretical reason given by Bartlett and Ghoshal
for these lateral relations: they are necessary because knowledge is situated in
front-line units (1993, 32). Arguments here are very close to those we saw above
in Doz (2004) and Foss, Santos, and Doz (2008), but they go even further, asserting
that lateral relations are also necessary because the firm needs vertical decentralization to create an environment in which this scarce knowledge can be developed and
applied most appropriately (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1993, 32).

374 ROMELAER & BEDDI (FRANCE)

14. Interestingly, data also show that things are not as dichotomous as might be
thought: direct HQ involvement is not the opposite of local autonomy in decision
making. The correlation is 0.25.
15. To take this a little further, research found knowledge flows in MNCs to be
positively related to the use of socialization mechanisms (Gupta and Govindarajan
2000) and the existence of close relationships among MNC subsidiaries (Szulanski
1996; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). The use of less formal mechanisms is related to a high
level of interdependencies within the MNC.
16. The results we have discussed, interesting as they are, should not lead to the
conclusion that all the questions have been answered. Some recent research with
appealing hypotheses has yielded meager results. Examples include Teigland and
Wasko (2009) and Dinur (2009).

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