Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Company
("Springfield"),
appeals
from
jury
verdict
49 U.S.C. 20109.
We affirm.
I.
On October 6, 2011, Springfield reported a leak of
hydraulic
fluid
Protection.
to
the
Maine
Department
of
Environmental
employee of Springfield.
which
depends
on
Worcester's
contention
that
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is whether that motion tolled the clock for filing the notice of
appeal.
Worcester contends that the clock was not tolled because
there was no "order disposing of" that new trial motion.
do not agree.
2014.
But we
18, 2014, the District Court held a telephone conference with both
parties regarding the motion for a new trial.
On that call, in
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THE COURT:
Okay. So that's decided as of
today, and clocks are running.
Then, that same day, an electronic entry was entered on the docket
noting: "ORAL WITHDRAWAL of: . . . MOTION for New Trial by
SPRINGFIELD TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY."
The District Court's verbal ruling on the motion to
withdraw left no pending motions remaining before the District
Court, and -- as the District Court stated -- began the clock
running on the time to appeal. Thus, there was an "order disposing
of" the motion, and so the clock for filing the notice of appeal
was tolled.
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(quoting
Henry
Campbell
Black,
Treatise
on
the
Law
of
relies
on
arguing
to
the
contrary,
Worcester
appeal on the same day that they filed a notice of withdrawal and
thus before the district court had a chance to respond in any way
to the notice of withdrawal.
In this case, by
Springfield
49 U.S.C. 20109(e)(3).
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It does not
The
The District
Court took this standard from Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56
(1983).
See id.
1985).
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administering
the
FRSA.
See
49
U.S.C.
20109(d).
The
2014 WL 6850019, at *3 (Nov. 20, 2014); see also BNSF Ry. Co. v.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, 816 F.3d 628, 642 (10th Cir. 2016).1
And
(1st Cir. 2015); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944).
Congress made clear that a primary purpose of the FRSA
was that "[l]aws, regulations, and orders related to railroad
safety
practicable."
by
--
as
shall
be
nationally
49 U.S.C. 20106.
Springfield
argues
we
uniform
to
the
extent
--
adopting
in
each
The Tenth Circuit has also applied the Smith standard when
evaluating a punitive damages award under the FRSA, although the
standard was apparently not disputed in that case. See BNSF, 816
F.3d at 642.
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to
effectuate
Congress's
evident
Rather, in
preference
for
Id.
"punitive damages in tort cases may be awarded not only for actual
intent to injure or evil motive, but also for recklessness, serious
indifference to or disregard for the rights of others, or even
gross negligence."
Id.
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is mistaken or that the common law was different at the time that
the FRSA was passed.
Springfield's
contention
that
adopting
uniform
i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2245-46 (2011) (relying on the
common law to determine the standard of proof required to show a
patent's invalidity); Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs,
Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994)
(looking to the common law to determine the meaning of the term
"burden of proof" in the Administrative Procedure Act); id. at 282
(Souter, J., dissenting) (same).
uses a common law term and does not otherwise define it, it is
presumed
that
definition."
Congress
intended
to
adopt
the
common
law
2015) (quoting United States v. Patterson, 882 F.2d 595, 603 (1st
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Cir. 1989)); accord Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724
(2013); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163 (1st Cir. 1997).
Springfield argues that even if the common law might be
relevant
in
defining
which
types
of
damages
constitute
the
Cf. Microsoft
Corp., 131 S.Ct. at 2245-46; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("I do not
understand Justice Brandeis's statement in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
that 'There is no federal general common law,' to deny that the
common law may in proper cases be an aid to or the basis of decision
of federal questions." (internal citation omitted)); Sony BMG
Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 515 n.27 (1st Cir. 2011)
("Congress
is
presumed
to
legislate
incorporating
background
that
the
Supreme
Court
looked
to
the
common
law
in
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Accordingly, there
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