US vs Look Chow, 18 Phil 573

Subject Matter: Applicability of the provisions of Art 2 of the Revised

Penal Code
Facts:
Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and internal
revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect
and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The defendant stated
freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with
the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his
hold had already been searched several times for opium he ordered two other
chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus
delicti.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came
from Hong Kong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and
Cebu.
Issue:
Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels
stationed in its port.
Held:
Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere possession of
a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any
of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of
this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own
nationality. However, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is
prohibited within the Philippines, in the present case, a can of opium, is landed from
the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the penal
law in force at the place of the commission of the crime. Only the court established
in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement
under an international treaty.
US v. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code
Facts:
In August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16 champagne
bottles worth 20 dollars while on board the vessel, Lawton. The counsel for
defendants alleged to the Court of First Instance of Manila that they were without
jurisdiction over the crime charged. Since it happened in the high seas and not in
the city of Manila or in the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court extends,
they asked that the case be dismissed.
Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the criminal
case theft committed on board while navigating on high seas on a vessel not
registered in the Philippines.
Held:
No. The Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high
seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. The English Rule
states that such crimes are triable in our country when crimes are committed on
board a foreign vessel sailing from a foreign port and which enters the Philippine
waters. In the case at bar, the vessel Lawton was navigating the high seas at the
commission of the crime. Given the location of the vessel at the time, such act is
not triable within our jurisdiction.
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
Doctrine: EX POST FACTO LAW
FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven
persons, believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed
by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)where the petitioner
was one of the heads. Then, in a media expose, it was said that what happened was
a rub-out and not a shoot-out. Among other issues, petitioner argues that Republic
Act (R.A.) 8249, that was enacted during his case was pending,has a retroactive
effect and is plan from the facts and was made to suit the petitioners case, thus,
making it an ex-post facto law that would affect the right of the accused to
procedural due process. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto
law that may affect the petitioners right to due process?
HELD: No.
REASONING: There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 an ex post facto law
generally provides for a retroactive effect on penal laws. However, the Court
explains, R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court defines, Penal laws are those
acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof; or
those that defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment. Republic Act 8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not
penal in character, thus, may not be considered an ex post facto law. Therefore, the
argument of the petitioner that the law in question has retroactive effect and may
affect his right to due process is wrong.
PEOPLE vs. REYES
61 PHIL. 341
Facts: The appellant and victim were having an illicit relationship. When the victim
tried to end their affair, the appellant dragged the deceased towards the streets and

stabbed her in the chest with the fan knife. The victim was said to have died from
shock.
Issue: W/N the appellant should be acquitted considering the fact that the wound
was only a slight one
Decision: No. In this jurisdiction, it is a well settled that such is not the law. A
person is responsible for the consequences of his criminal act even of the deceased
have been shown to be suffering from a deceased heart (which was not shown).
Appellants assault being the proximate cause of the death, he should be
responsible. The girl died from shock as a result of the wound inflicted by the
defendant.
There is intention in the commission of the crime because when a person who stabs
another with a lethal weapon, death could reasonable be anticipated. The accused
is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of the wrongful act.
US vs. VALDEZ
Facts: The accused was not satisfied with the slow raising of the anchor which
caused him to abuse his men with offensive language. One of the crew
remonstrated that they would be able to work better if the accused stops insulting
them. Infuriated, the accused moved towards the victim with big knife threatening
to stab him. The victim, believing that he is going to be killed, threw himself in
water and never resurface.
Issue: W/N the defendant should be liable for his crews death
Decision: Yes. The crews death was a consequence of the defendants action. If
a person against whom, a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes himself to
be in danger of death or great bodily harm, a d in order to escape jumps into water,
impelled by the instincts of self-preservation, the assailant us responsible for
homicide in case death results by drowning.
PEOPLE VS VILLACORTA
657 SCRA 270 Criminal Law Criminal Liability Proximate Cause Efficient
Intervening Cause
FACTS:
On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of
nowhere, Orlito Villacorta appeared and thereafter stabbed the left part of the body
of Cruz with a sharpened bamboo stick. After that, Villacorta fled.
Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital where he
was treated as out-patient. He was discharged on the same day but on February 14,
2002, or 21 days after the stabbing incident, he returned to the same hospital
where he was treated for severe tetanus. The next day on February 15, 2002, Cruz
died. The medical report states that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab
wound.

The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.
HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the stabbing done
by Villacorta upon Cruz. There was an efficient intervening cause which appeared
between the time of the stabbing and the time of the death of Cruz.
In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that severe
tetanus (the kind of tetanus which causes immediate death) has an incubation
period of 14 days or less. In this case, the stabbing made by Vilalcorta could not
have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days already lapsed from the time of the
stabbing until the date of death of Cruz. Something else caused the tetanus other
than the stabbing in short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less before
February 15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.
The court explained further:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victims
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time [Cruz] was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign
to the crime.
Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based on the facts. Neither is
he guilty of attempted nor frustrated murder, his intent to kill was not proven by the
prosecution.
Gemma T. Jacinto vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 162540, July 13,
2009
FACTS:
Supreme Court found an accused guilty of an impossible crime and sentenced her
to six (6) months of arrresto mayor.
Here, the accused was a collector for a company called Mega Foam Intl Inc. (Mega
Foam) and received a PhP10,000 check as payment from a Mega Foam customer.
However, instead of turning over the check to Mega Foam, the accused took the
check and had it deposited into her brother-in-laws bank account. It turns out the
the check was not funded.
Both the regional trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the accused was
guilty of qualified theft. The Supreme Court modified the judgment and ruled that
the accused was guilty of an impossible crime. According to the Supreme Court:

. . . the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the
intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by
Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused
is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega
Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently
dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was
actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to the present case.
In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latters bedroom with
bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to
him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon
review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined
and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised
Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime. . .
. . . the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be
an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent;
and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed
was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of
accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was
further explained by the Court in Intod in this wise . . .
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latters wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioners case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility
given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioners evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega
Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that
the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the
crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to
be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega
Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
Valenzuela v. People G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
Lessons Applicable: frustrated or consummated theft
Laws Applicable: Art. 6
FACTS:
May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted

outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along
North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at
the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing
an ID with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU) who hauled a push cart with
cases of detergent of Tide brand and unloaded them in an open parking space,
where Calderon was waiting. He then returned inside the supermarket and emerged
5 minutes after with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these
boxes to the same area in the open parking space. Thereafter, he left the parking
area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space
where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside
the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. As Lago watched, he proceeded to stop the taxi
as it was leaving the open parking area and asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the
merchandise but Valenzuela and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot. Lago fired a
warning shot to alert his fellow security guards. Valenzuela and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered worth P12,090.
Valenzuela, Calderon and 4 other persons were first brought to the SM security
office before they were transferred to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National
Police but only Valenzuela and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant
City Prosecutor.
They pleaded not guilty.
Calderons Alibi: On the afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club
to withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada.
As the queue for the ATM was long, he and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside
the supermarket. While they were eating, they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, so
they went out to check what was transpiring and when they did, they were suddenly
grabbed by a security guard
Valenzuelas Alibi: He is employed as a bundler of GMS Marketing and
assigned at the supermarket. He and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, had been at
the parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a
tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot causing
evryon to start running. Then they were apprehended by Lago.
RTC: guilty of consummated theft
CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected his contention that it should only be frustrated
theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to
freely dispose of the articles stolen.
ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be guilty of consummated theft.
HELD:
YES. Petition is DENIED
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and
attempted felonies.
o A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.
o It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
o It is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should

produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a:
o subjective phase - portion of the acts constituting the crime included between
the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
offender which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime
if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is
merely attempted
o objective phase - After that point of subjective phase has been breached
subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes
the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates
an initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the
offender
The determination of whether the felony was produced after all the acts of
execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the
felony.
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - ordinarily, evil intent must unite with
an unlawful act for there to be a crime or there can be no crime when the criminal
mind is wanting
In crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as a guilty mind, a
guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent and essential for criminal liability.
Statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the
mens rea of the crime is and overt acts that constitute the crime
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Elements of Theft):
1. that there be taking of personal property - only one operative act of execution
by the actor involved in theft
2. property belongs to another
3. taking be done with intent to gain - descriptive circumstances
4. taking be done without the consent of the owner - descriptive circumstances
5. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things - descriptive circumstances
Abandoned cases:
o U.S. v. Adiao: failed to get the merchandise out of the Custom House consummated theft
o Dio: Military Police inspected the truck at the check point and found 3 boxes of
army rifles - frustrated theft
o Flores: guards discovered that the empty sea van had actually contained
other merchandise as well - consummated theft
o Empelis v. IAC: Fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the felony as a consequence
cannot attribute weight because definition is attempted
The ability of the actor to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were
only momentary.
o We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was
completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the
stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop
these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage.

Theft can only be attempted (no unlawful taking) or consummated (there is unlawful
taking).
People v. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70
Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion
of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the crime
will also be guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. (Q7, 1995 Bar; Q17, 1999
Bar)
Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852
Subject Matter: Applicability of the doctrine of conspiracy under the
Revised Penal Code to R.A. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and
Children Act of 2004)
Facts:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this
union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January
12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in
conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of
Republic Act No. 9262.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of
Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in
accordance with RA 9262.
Held:
Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262
provides that the offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of
the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly
provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles developed
from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a
particular matter.
US vs LAUREL
Facts: On the night of 26 December 1909, while Concepcion Lat was walking with
his suitor Exequiel Castillo and several male friends, Jose Laurel approached and
kissed her and ran towards his house. The male companions ran after him but did
not overtook him. On 28 December when an entertainment was going on, Laurel

and Castillo gave contradicting stories as to who called who to clarify to explain
what happpened two nights ago. Suffice to say, at the ground floor where Laurel
and Castillo spoke at the distance from the others, suddenly Castillo struck Laurel
with his cane twice prompting the other to stab him with a penknife. Castillo
contended that after asking him to explain for his actions against Lat, Laurel
stabbed him and he was forced to defend himself. Castillo managed to go to a
nearby drugstore to had his wounds tended as he suffered serious injuries. Court of
First Instance found Laurel and his companions guilty of frustrated murder.
Issue: Whether or not Laurel and his co-defendants are guilty of a crime against
Castillo
Decision: Judgment reversed. Laurel and his co-defendents are acquitted. The
court is forced to think that the peron who would consider himself aggrieved at the
kiss given to LAt is her suitor Castillo. And it would appear a reasonable conclusion
that it is Castillo who was offended for the boldness of LAurels action and would
demand an explanation of the offense.The invitation coming from Castilloand by
testimonies of the witnesses that it was Castillo who provoked and commenced the
assault. A person who uses a pocketknife to seriously wound him on the head with
a cane and continues to beat him employs rational means of self defense.
PEOPLE VS CABUNGCAL
FACTS:
Narciso Cabungcal (appellant) invited several persons to a picnic in a fishery. They
spent the day at the fishery and returned in two boats. In the boat steered by the
appellant, the majority were women, among them are appellants wife and son and a
nursing child. Upon reaching a place of great depth, the deceased rocked the boat.
Appellant asked the Juan Loquenario (deceased) not to rock the boat. The deceased
paid no attention. Appellant struck him in the forehead by an oar. Deceased fell into
the water and was submerged. After a while appeared, saying that he is going to
capsize it and started to move it. Appellant struck him on the neck.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Narciso Cabungcal is exempt from criminal liability for he acted in
defense of his wife and child.
HELD:
The Appellant was acquitted and was exempted from criminal liability for he acted
in defense of his wife and child and other passengers and the means employed.
Article 11 (3): Anyone who acted in defense of the person or rights of a stranger
provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of
this article are present and that the one defending be not induce by revenge,
resentment or other evil motive.

PEOPLE vs. MOJICA

Keywords: Constabulary versus Police. Defendant was a police
threatened by the constabulary.
Issue: W/N the defendant can maintain that he killed the victim in self-defense and
that he is exempt from criminal liability.
Decision: Yes. There was no provocation on the defendants part. A policeman in
the performance of his duty must stand his ground and cannot take refuge in flight
when attacked. His duty requires him to overcome his opponent and the force he
may exert therefore differs somewhat from that which ordinarily may be offered in
self-defense. Under the circumstances, the force employed by the defendant was
reasonably necessary and that he acted in legitimate self-defense.
PEOPLE vs. DELIMA
Keywords: Escapee who was killed by a policeman while ordering the
latter to surrender.
Issue: W/N the policeman should be held liable
Decision: No. The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased
was under the obligation to surrender and had no right after evading service of his
sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which
although the policeman to resort to such an extreme means which, although it
proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstance. Policeman committed no
crime.
ALMEDA VS CA
80 SCRA 575
FACTS:
On November 29, 1996 at around 5:00 p.m. Herrera together with his nephews
Danilo Salabao and PO1 Leo Salabao arrived at Imeldas Canteen. Inside the
canteen were Vice-Governor Acosta and his companions, one of whom was Almeda
who was the Vice-Governors bodyguard. Upon the invitation of the Vice-Governor,
Herrera and his nephews joined them in a drinking session. After about an hour,
Vice-Governor Acosta and Herrera had a heated and violent altercation. Acosta
stood up and attempted to draw his gun. At that juncture, PO1 Salabao who was at
the back of Vice-Governor Acosta cocked his M-14 rifle. Almeda promptly grabbed
the barrel of the M-14 of PO1 Salabao and pushed it down. Simultaneously, Almeda
drew his 45 caliber pistol and shot PO1 Salabao in the left temple. PO1 Salabao
died.
Almeda was charged with Homicide. He invoked the defense of a stranger.
HELD:
The defense is untenable. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and
unexpected attack of imminent danger on the life and limb of a person. A
threatening or intimidating attitude per se does not constitute unlawful aggression.

The mere cocking of an M-14 rifle by the victim without aiming it at the ViceGovernor, whom the accused was allegedly protecting does not constitute unlawful
aggression. I will convict Almeda for Homicide.
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of
David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and
Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting
into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds
of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop
destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded
with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also
shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was
placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a
legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain
pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted
granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting,
defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid
trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he
allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2
months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and
property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral
damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that
he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of
the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However,
this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to
property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the
violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code
recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the
article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was
still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the
victim was the original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in

defence of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is
applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these
requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression
towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and
he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling
Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides
that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art.
539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his
possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the
case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there
was no provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405
explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not
applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not
deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was
also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and
incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay
the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity.
RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to
reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs
of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that
RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be
given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and
extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto
mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral
damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is
ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with
form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so.
Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served
more than that, he should be released.

FULFILLMENT OF DUTY
SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan and Office of the Special
Prosecutor (G.R. No/ 148431, July 28, 2005)
Facts:
Police officers CABANLIG, PADILLA, ABESAMIS, MERCADO and ESTEBAN were all
charged for the MURDER of Jimmy Valino before the Sandiganbayan. Jimmy Valino
was a detained prisoner who was escorted to retrieve the effects of the crime to the
place where he hid the same. Aboard the police vehicle, Jimmy Valino suddenly
grabbed the M16 rifle and about to jump out of the jeep. CABANLIG shouted
hoy!and without issuing any warning of any sort, CABANLIG fired at Valino, hitting
his head, left side of the chest and left lower back.
CABANLIG admitted shooting Valino during the trial. However, Cabanlig justified the
shooting as an act of self-defense and performance of duty. Nevertheless,
Sandiganbayan CONVICTED CABANLIG but acquitted his 4 companions.
Upon appeal, the SUPREME COURT eventually ACQUITTED CABANLIG
RULING 1: Because the killing was justified and that the same was done in the
fulfillment of duty
A policeman in the performance of duty is JUSTIFIED in using such force as is
reasonably (and absolutely)necessary to (1) secure and detain the offender, (2)
overcome his resistance, (3) prevent his escape, (4) recapture him if he escapes,
and (4) protect himself from bodily harm. (People v. Oanis, 74 Phil 257 [1943];
People v. Lagata (83 Phil 150 [1949]).
Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of
duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is NOT a requisite.
In People v. Delima,(46 Phil 738 [1992]) where the killing of a fugitive who lunged at
a policeman with a bamboo-makeshift lance, the SC ruled that the same was done
in the fulfillment of duty. The fugitives unlawful aggression, in that case, had
already ceased when the policeman killed him, however, the policeman's act of
shooting at him is justified because he was running away from him when he was
shot. Ordinarily, it may appear that the policeman, acting in the fulfillment of duty,
is the aggressor, but his aggression is NOT UNLAWFUL, it being necessary to fulfill
his duty. But IF the policeman was a PRIVATE PERSON, not in the performance of
duty, and the same situation was given, there would be NO self-defense because
there would be NO unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.

RULING 2: Because Cabanlig did not exceed the fulfillment of duty when he
IMMEDIATELY SHOT Valino without issuing a warning.
The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost to
the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a warning
contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the law
enforcers. In exceptional circumstances where the threat to the life of a law enforcer
is already imminent AND there is NO OTHER option but to use force to subdue the
offender, the law enforcers failure to issue a warning is EXCUSABLE.
RULING 3: Was there an OVERKILL?
There was none.
FROM SHOZ: This is one of my favorite SC cases and most of the time, Im always
using this to justify my actions. Ive been through with lots of CHR cases and I am
always asking them -- do you ever witness a shootout? Do you ever experience how
your brain runs when guns were being fired at you and youre scared that you'll die
and you can no longer see your family? Most of them deny to respond but just a
piece of advice, those CHR people, they are not our enemies.. like us, they are just
doing their job.. all they need is to know our side of the story- with evidentiary proof
of course.