The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the

Postcommunist World
Author(s): Michael McFaul
Source: World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Jan., 2002), pp. 212-244
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054183
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THE FOURTH WAVE OF

DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP
Transitions
Noncooperative
Postcommunist World

in the

ByMICHAEL McFAUL*

transition from communism in Europe and the former Soviet

led to democracy.
Since the crumbling
THE Union has only sometimes
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in
new states have abandoned
communism.
1991, twenty-eight
mostly
But
Czech
Estonia,
Latvia,
only
eight?the
Republic,
Hungary,
entered
Poland,
Slovenia,
and, just last year, Croatia?have
Lithuania,
new
of
the ranks of liberal democracies.
The
post
remaining majority
are various

communist

states

transitional

regimes.
some states abandon

did

Why
ers turned
One

to authoritarian

shades

of dictatorships

communism

rule?Why

are some

or unconsolidated

for democracy,
states stuck

while

oth

in between?

that answering
these questions
should be easy for
coun
in two dozen
science.
Simultaneous
change
regime
in
similar
but
moving
beginning
roughly
places
along very
over ten
the perfect data set for
trajectories
years?provides

would

political
tries?all
different

think

new
and developing
about regime
hypotheses
on the
a finite set of
Clear
with
variation
variable
change.
dependent
seem to offer a
to iso
would
variables
unique
laboratory
independent
a decade has
late causal patterns. Yet although
since
the
passed
collapse
of European
communism,
regime
theory
regarding
development
testing

extant

theories

change has barely advanced. At the beginning

Przeworski
a "dismal
*

pointed
failure"1

of the 1990s Adam

to the
to
inability
predict communism's
collapse
of political
science. Ten years later the paucity

as
of

on earlier drafts of this article, the author is

to
grateful
George Breslauer, Daniel
Bunce, Timothy Colton, Thomas Carothers, Kathleen Collins, Larry Diamond,
Jeffrey
Plattner, Vladimir
Laitin, Marc
Herbst,
Popov, Philip Roeder, Alex
Terry Lynn Karl, David
Lisa Mclntosh-Sundstrom,
Celeste Wallander,
Stoner-Weiss,
Sokolovski,
Joshua Tucker,
Kathryn
reviewers.
and three anonymous
Elizabeth Wood,
1
"The 'East' Becomes
the 'South'? The 'Autumn of the People' and the Future of East
Przeworski,
ern
Europe," PS: Political Science and Politics 24 (March 1991), 20.
For comments

Brinks, Valerie

World Politics

54 (January 2002),

212-44

THE

FOURTH WAVE

for regime patterns

plausible
explanations
stands as an even greater indictment.
an argument
to
This
article proposes
world.

postcommunist

213

in the
postcommunist

world

in the
explain regime changes
the argument
actorcentric
endorses
wave of democ
analyses of the third

Although
that have dominated
approaches
some of the central
it also
of the ear
ratization,
challenges
hypotheses
lier literature concerning
the relationship
between mode
of transition
an
set of causal
and resulting
The
article
offers
alternative
regime type.

can account for both out

to new
r?gime
regime that
and dictatorship.
transitions
These
from commu
comes?democracy
are so different
nist rule to new regime
from
the
third wave
types
not even
democratic
in the 1970s and 1980s that
transitions
should
they
from

paths

ancien

be grouped under
a fourth wave of
A
tion

the same rubric.2 Instead,

decommunization

regime change?to
democracy
claim of the earlier literature was

central

triggered

and

dictatorship.
that the mode
of transi

was
the resulting
that de
regime type. It
hypothesized
as a result of transitional
in
which
the
moments,
emerged

influenced

mocracy
balance

of power between
and opponents
of the authoritar
supporters
ian regime was
and
also
uncertain.
Because
neither
side
relatively equal
use of force,
had the capacity to achieve
its first preferences
the
through
the sides opted to negotiate
with
their op
arrangements
power-sharing
which
ponents,
called "pacts,"
transition were

outcomes
second-best
for both. Often
represented
these power-sharing
arrangements
negotiated
during
as a set of checks and balances
then institutionalized
in

the new

ideas, norms, and beliefs played little

Significantly,
transition
and hence
the famous
notion
theories,
a
a
that
democrats."
country could become
"democracy without
as most
not
in
This
is
obvious
the
world,
pattern
postcommunist
even the
not
transitions
did
and
postcommunist
produce
democracy,
successful democratic
transitions
did not follow the
pacted path. To the
was
it
situations
of
distributions
of power
that pro
contrary,
unequal
duced the quickest
stable transitions
and most
from communist
rule. In
or no

democracy.
role in these

countries
orientation

it was the ideological

balances
of power,
asymmetrical
of the more powerful
the type
party that largely determined

with

2
the postcommunist
transitions occurred within the time span typically referred to
Chronologically,
as the third wave of democratization.
some
The wave metaphor,
however, connotes
relationship be
tween cases that is only
to
in
Transitions
Southern
present.
weakly
democracy
Europe and Latin
America
did not cause, trigger, or inspire communist
regime change. The temporal proximity of these
cases was more accidental
than causal. As explored
in detail in this article, however,
the fact that
Southern European
and Latin American
transitions occurred first had significant path-dependent
for how we conceptualized
and explained the postcommunist
transitions. On waves, see
consequences
Samuel Huntington,
versity of Oklahoma

The Third Wave: Democratization

Press,

1991).

in the Late Twentieth

Century

(Norman: Uni

WORLD POLITICS

214
to emerge.

of regime
democrats

in countries

therefore
Democracy
emerged
a decisive power
advantage. And

hence

where

institutions

enjoyed
or checks and balances
of power
did not result from compro
sharing
mises between
the ancien r?gime and democratic
but rather
challengers
to
if
chose
the
democrats
them.
implement
emerged
only
hegemonic
a
in
in
countries
which
dictators maintained
decisive power
Conversely,
advantage,

dictatorship

countries inwhich
and

emerged.

this alternative
as follows.

communist

regime change
of the transitions
literature

theory

the noncooperative
communist
world,
mode
of transition
derscores

the weak

and resulting
resemblance

or absence
tion: the presence
West.
Section V concludes.

post
tenets

same time it un
type; at the
this relationship
and causal
IV exam
transitions
literature. Section
regime
between

structures

in Section

outlined

factors must

of territorial

II. To

account

to the equa
to the
and proximity

be added

disputes

to Regime Change

Approaches

I. Cooperative
invisible

for explaining
approach
I outlines
the basic
Section

III illustrates
the analytical power of
change. Section
in the post
for
model
regime change
explaining
the strong causal relationship
between
highlighting

in the earlier
identified
patterns
ines cases that do not fit the theory
for these anomalous
cases, two more

Inert,

were

from the analysis of the Latin

that emerged
cases. Section
II contrasts
this ear
European
a
of regime
with
emergence
noncooperative

and Southern

lier cooperative
of regime

two extremes

than producing
stale
relatively
equal. Rather
to
such situations
and pacted transitions
democracy,
world
resulted in protracted
confrontation,
yield
unstable
and autocracies.
partial democracies

mate, compromise,
in the postcommunist
ing unconsolidated,
This
article explores

model

these

was

its challengers

American

In between

the distribution of power between the old regime

do not make

democracies

or

dictatorships.

such as economic

cultural
development,
People
institutional
influence
the for
and historical
influences,
arrangements
mation
and power, but ultimately
these forces have
of actors' preferences
into human action. Individuals
and
causal significance
only if translated
do. Structural

factors

are
they make
especially
outcomes
result from similar

the decisions
vergent

The
theories
first

important
structural

for explaining
contexts.

how di

importance of agency has for decades figured prominently

of democratization.

refocused

Dankwart

the lens of inquiry

Rustow's

on actors,

1986 study edited by Guillermo O'Donnell,

seminal

and then

article

in

in 1970

the four-volume

Philippe Schmitter, and

THE FOURTHWAVE
Laurence

Whitehead,
as the central

elites

vision within
tion, while
establishes

the mode

of transition

resurrected
Rule,
school posits that di

Authoritarian

groups
to influence

these

intellectual

the course
tracks were

of regime change.3
laid down,
they have

framed

in

aside alter
regime change, pushing
levels
of
No
theories, metaphors,
analysis.4
single theory of
nor has an actorcentric
transition
has been universally
recognized,
several hy
of
democratization
been
formalized.5Nonetheless,
theory
of
have
wide
the postu
potheses
gained
acceptance.6
Strikingly, many
large
native

the thinking

the type of regime

that then
as real actors with
autonomous

and

are constructed

Elite

measure

from

drivers of regime change. This

the ruling class begins
the process of political
liberaliza
state and
between
elites
from
interaction
strategic
society

emerges.
causal power
Since

Transitions

215

about

and

are very similar to institutional

arguments
in the positivist
rational choice theorists working
lates

being generated
tradition.

by

3
and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Con
Guillermo
O'Donnell
clusions about Uncertain Democracies, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1986); John
University
and Michael
and Breakdowns," Ameri
Transitions
Burton, "The Elite Variable inDemocratic
Higley
can
in Latin
Sociological Review 54 (February 1989); Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization
America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and theMarket: Po
litical and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University
in Scott Mainwaring,
and
of Transition,"
Guillermo
O'Donnell,
Press, 1991); idem, "The Games
in
eds., Issues inDemocratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies
J. Samuel Valenzuela,
Ind.: University
of Notre Dame
Press, 1993); and Josep
(Notre Dame,
Comparative
Perspective
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Strategic Transitions: Game Theory and Democratization
see Youssef Cohen, Radicals,
to democratic
breakdown,
2000). On an elite-centered
approach
in Latin America
and the Collapse ofDemocracy
The Prisoners Dilemma
Reformers, and Reactionaries:
Colomer,
Press,

in
of Chicago Press, 1994); and Juan Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium,
(Chicago: University
the series by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown ofDemocratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns
Press, 1978).
University
Hopkins
4
In the postcommunist
world
the phenomenon
in question might be more appropriately
labeled
revolution or decolonization,
rather than democratization.
Illuminating
adaptations of these alternative
include Vladimir Mau and Irina Starodubrovskaya,
The Challenge ofRevolution: Contempo
metaphors
(Oxford: Oxford University
Lieven,
Press, 2001); and Dominic
rary Russia inHistorical Perspective
The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2001).
Empire:
5
and theMarket
Przeworski's
(fn. 3) comes the closest. See also Cohen
(fn. 3); and
Democracy
Colomer
(fn. 3).
6
of strategic theories of democratization
do not universally recognize a single
Because proponents
to argue with
In
it
is
the
last
decade
difficult
many scholars have added useful
theory,
transitology.
to the earlier canons of transitology.
theoretical caveats and important definitional
Space
adjectives
limitations do not permit discussion of all these innovations and nuances. Instead, the focus here is on
a
the set of the core principles
that defines this literature as paradigm in the study of regime change
summarizes: "The 'transitions literature,' as this current work has come to be
today. As Ruth Collier
the founding essay by O'Donnell
and Schmitter
known, has as its best representative
(1986), which
established a framework that is implicitly or explicitly followed in most other contributions. Without
one could say that certain
and Schmit
emphases within O'Donnell
denying differences and subtleties,
ter's essay have been selected and elaborated by other authors so that it is possible to aggregate various
and in broad strokes map out a basic characterization
and set of claims in this literature
contributions
as awhole"; Collier, Paths towards
Democracy: The Working Class and Elites
ernAmerica
Press, 1999), 5.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University

inWestern Europe and South

216

WORLD

In their quest to refute

nize very few
prerequisites

structural

recog
approaches,
transitologists
as identified
for democracy.
one,
Only
by
is salient: elites must have a common
of the
understanding
of the state in order to
with crafting new rules for gov
proceed

Rustow,
borders
erning
butions

POLITICS

contri
theoretical
this, one of the principal
on the third wave
concerns
the causal

state.7 Beyond
of the literature

this

success
to the mode
in determining
of transition
relationship
assigned
more ambitious
to
ful and unsuccessful
transitions
The
have
democracy.
even traced a causal
the mode
of transition
between
and
relationship
the type of democracy,8 on the basis of temporal path dependence?that
at certain critical
the course of regime
choices made
influence
junctures
as
formation.
and
The model?especially
by O'Donnell
developed
Schmitter,

Karl, Huntington,
actors in the
choice-making

and Przeworski?identifies
transition

drama:

four

soft-liners

sets of

and hard

and
the ruling elite of the ancien r?gime, and moderates
to the ancien
modes
of
the challengers
among
r?gime.9Many

liners within
radicals

can result from the

of these actors. Most
strategic interaction
the soft
has
been
democracy
by imposition?a
path inwhich
prevalent
set
terms
the
of transition?but
liners from the ancien r?gime
pacted
transition

transitions
outcome

have

received

ismost

the most

likely when
the transition

that navigate
is not pacted,
transition

theoretical

soft-liners
from

it is more

attention.

and moderates
to

10A democratic
enter

into pacts
n
If the

democracy.
dictatorship
to fail.12 In the earlier
likely

transi

7
Dankwart
Toward a Dynamic Model,"
Rustow, "Transition to Democracy:
Comparative Politics 2
a second
the decline of a land
precondition,
including Karl, have highlighted
(April 1970). Others,
in Social Origins ofDictatorships
and De
based aristocracy, an idea first discussed by Barrington Moore
countries had land-based aristocracies,
mocracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). Because few communist
in this article.
this variable is not discussed
8
in Southern and East
Karl (fn. 3); Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, "Modes of Transition
ern
(May 1991); idem,
Europe, Southern and Central America," International Social Science Journal128
and Risks," inMichael
Klare and Daniel Thomas,
"Democratization
around the Globe: Opportunities
and Carol Sklalnik Leff,
World Security (New York: St Martin's
Press, 1994); and Gerardo Munck
Politics 29
in Comparative
"Modes of Transition
and Democratization
Perspective,"
Comparative

1997).
(April
9

has different and more numerous

liberal reformers, and
Huntington
categories?"standpatters,
and revolutionary extrem
democratic
reformers in the governing coalition, and democratic moderates
and Schmitter labels. See Hunt
ists in the opposition." But there are close parallels to the O'Donnell
ington (fn. 2), 121.
101 am grateful to Terry Karl for this observation. On "transition from above," or "transformation,"
as the most common mode of transition to
see Karl (fn. 3), 9; and
(fn. 2), 124.
democracy,
Huntington
11
and 1993); and Colomer
O'Donnell
and Schmitter
(fn. 3,1991
(fn. 3); Karl (fn. 3); Przeworski
a pact is not a necessary condition for a successful democratic
transition, it enhances
(fn. 3). Though
the probability of success.
12
In facilitating
the transition to democracy, pacts can also lock into place specific nondemocratic
of liberal democracy over time. See Terry Lynn
in turn may impede the consolidation
practices, which
of California Press, 1997),
Karl, The Paradox ofPlenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States
(Berkeley: University
chap. 5.

THE

FOURTH WAVE

217

to
transitions were considered most
revolutionary
likely
outcomes.
nondemocratic
As
defined
O'Donnell
and
produce
by
be
Schmitter,
pacts are interim arrangements
democracy-enhancing
tween a "select set of actors" that seek to "(1) limit the
agenda of policy
tions

literature

choice, (2) share proportionately in the distribution of benefits, and (3)

restrict

the participation
are critical
components

of outsiders

in decision-making."13

that limit the agenda reduce uncertainty

Agreements
ultimate
intentions. A pact "lessens the fears of moderates
be overwhelmed

All

three

for success.
about

actors'

that they will

which will
imple

radical, majority
triumphant,
If
property
changes."14
rights, the territorial
integrity of
are threatened
a
the state, or international
alliances
by
revolutionary
force from below,
then the hard-liners
in the ancien
roll
r?gime will
wave
back democratic
of democratization
in Latin
the
gains.15 During

ment

by

drastic

in the 1970s and 1980s, the simultane

Europe
of
economic
and
institutions
renegotiation
political
rarely occurred,
the
because
the property
transition,
"during
rights of the bourgeoisie
are inviolable."16 The
and political
reform was con
pursuit of economic

America

and Southern

ous

sidered
contested

and destabilizing.17
dangerous
issues in which
the stakes

reversible
actors

are more

likely
are issues with

than

More

generally, negotiations
are indivisible
or the outcomes

to generate
divisible

irreconcilable
stakes

and

over
ir

among
preferences
reversible
outcomes.18

the former issues off the table was

keeping
Consequently,
essential
of a successful
transition.
component

an

considered

Second, sharing proportionally in the distribution of benefits resulting

outcomes.
both sides with positive-sum
regime change provides
that may even include institutionalizing
nondemocratic
Trade-offs
prac
written:
stick.
Daniel
has
tices are critical to making
As
Friedman
pacts
from

transitions increase democratic stability by encouraging

Negotiated
interests

to

compromise

on

such

basic

issues

as to whether

new

important

democratic

in

stitutions should be parliamentary or presidential, when to schedule the first free

13
O'Donnell
and Schmitter
(fn. 3), 41.
14
Daniel Friedman,
after 1989: Pact
Transition Theory
"Bringing Society Back into Democratic
and Regime Collapse," East European Politics and Societies 7 (Fall 1993), 484.
Making
15
O'Donnell
and Schmitter
(fn. 3), 27.
16
"Some Problems
in the Study
Ibid., 69. See also Huntington
(fn. 2), 170; and Adam Przeworski,
to
of the Transition
in Guillermo
O'Donnell,
Democracy,"
Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence White
Rule: Comparative Perspectives
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
head, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian
Press, 1986), 63.
University
17
and Robert Kaufman,
"Economic Adjustment
and the Prospects for Democ
Stephan Haggard
and Kaufman,
(Princeton: Princeton Uni
eds., The Politics ofEconomic Adjustment
racy," in Haggard
versity Press, 1992).
18
"CivilWar Settlement:
See Elisabeth JeanWood,
1999).
script, New York University, August

Modeling

the Bases

of Compromise"

(Manu

WORLD POLITICS

218
"even

to

and whether

elections,
the

interest

score." Without

groups

can

have

grant

clemency

or
to
abusers
attempt
rights
fundamental
issues, powerful
to cooperate
the new democratic
with
to human

on

compromises
less incentive

such

regime.19

no side achieves
outcome
in pacted
transi
its optimal
although
over
the
nondemocratic
all
sides
achieve
relative
tions,
past. From
gains
are cen
and agreements"
this perspective,
compromises,
"negotiations,

Thus,

tral to making

democracy.20

Finally, these theorists have emphasized the need to limit the role of
the masses

in the negotiation
transitions
process. Pacted
masses
must
the
there
affairs; mobilized
party. Jacobins
spoil
is less
fore be sidelined,21 for if they are part of the equation,
democracy
radicals

and

are elite

no stable political
likely to result.22As Karl posited in 1990: "To date,

in which mass actors

transitions
has resulted from regimes
democracy
over traditional
have gained control even momentarily
ruling classes."23
to
in capitalist
In successful
transitions
from dictatorship
democracy
more
must not
trade unions,
the left, and radicals
countries,
generally
a
role in the transition
process
major
play
in the new political
system that eventually

and then only

a limited

role

emerges.24

Limiting the agenda of change, dividing the benefits proportionally,

radicals
and marginalizing
nents of a successful
pact.

elites to materialize

and the masses

But what

causes

are considered
pacts

in the first place? Though

between

key compo
moderate

not always explicitly

answer

this question
the
stated, analysts of the third wave
by examining
and challengers.
of power between
the challenged
balance
Negotiated
are most
is
the distribution
of power
transitions
likely, they find, when
19
Friedman
20
21Huntington

(fn. 14), 483.

(fn. 2), 164.
onDemocratic Transitions
(Berkeley: Univer
Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay
sity of California Press, 1990).
22
to this argument
include Elisabeth
Jean Wood,
Important
challenges
Forging Democracy from
in South Africa and El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Below: Insurgent Transitions
Press,
Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consol
2000); Grzegorz
of Michigan
idation in Poland, 1989-1993
Press, 1999); Nancy Bermeo,
(Ann Arbor: University
and Conflict during the Democratic
Confrontation
Transitions,"
Comparative
"Myths ofModeration:
Brazil (Oxford: Oxford University
Politics 29 (April 1997); Alfred Stepan, Democratizing
Press, 1989);
and Collier
(fn. 6).
23
Polit
"Will More Countries Become Democratic?"
Karl (fn. 3), 8. See also Samuel Huntington,
ical Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984), 6.
24
inMyron Weiner
and Ergun Ozbudin,
eds.,
Theory,"
Myron Weiner,
"Empirical Democratic
Countries (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1987), 26; and J.
Competitive Elections inDeveloping
to Democracy,"
in Transitions
"Labor Movements
Samuel Valenzuela,
Comparative Politics 21 (July
the dangers of an
in democratization
underscores
1989). Even a study devoted the role of the workers
society. See Dietrich Rueschemeyer,
Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens,
overly mobilized
and Democratic Change (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1992), 271.
Capitalist Development

THE

219

FOURTH WAVE

up the results of their multivolume

study,
equal. In summing
assert that
is
and Schmitter
"political democracy
produced
and dissensus
rather than by prior unity and consensus."25
by stalemate
same claim in his
Roeder
makes
the
analysis of postcommunist
Philip

relatively
O'Donnell

"The more

transitions:

heterogenous

in

objectives

and the more

balanced in relative leverage are the participants

Przeworski
power

are most

the more

outcome
to be a
likely is the
sides realize that they cannot
that provide partial victory
they settle for solutions
a stale
for both sides. Democratization
requires

process of constitutional
design,
democratic
constitution."26 When
prevail unilaterally,
(and partial defeat)
mate?"a
prolonged

evenly

in the bargaining

extends
likely

both

inconclusive
struggle."27
to
the argument
posit that uncertain balances
most
to
the
democratic
arrangements:
produce

and

of
"If

everyone is behind the Rawlsian veil, that is, if they know little about
democratic
their political
strength under the eventual
a
maximin
institutions
that introduce
solution:
opt for
ances

and maximize

lently, make
opinion."28

the political

influence

insensitive

policy highly

all
institutions,
bal
checks and

of minorities,

to fluctuations

or, equiva

in public

and
the probability
of compromise,
of power create uncertainty.
itself as the primary
the strategic process

enhances

Uncertainty
equal distributions

relatively
This
approach
emphasizes
causal variable
successful
transitions.29 As Roeder
argues:
producing
not
it
is
of
col
the
because
the
emerges
"Democracy
object
politicians'
it is a practical
lective ambition
but because
among politi
compromise
It is
cians blocked
from
their particular
achieving
objectives."30
not the actors and
of the strategic
the dynamics
situation,
their preferences,
that produce or fail to produce democracy. As Levine
sums up: "Democracies
fear among
emerge out of mutual
excellently
as the deliberate
outcome
of
concerted
commit
rather
than
opponents
therefore

ments

to make

democratic

processes
evolutionary
radical revolutionary

work."31 Moderate,
arrangements
for
democratic
emergence;
good
are considered
bad. Cooperative
bar

political
are considered

processes

25
O'Donnell
and Schmitter
(fn. 2), 167.
(fn. 3), 72. See also Huntington
26
inHarry Eckstein,
State-Centered
Roeder, "Transitions from Communism:
Approaches,"
eric Fleron, Erik Hoffman,
andWilliam
eds., Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet
Reisinger,
sia? (Lantham, Md.: Roman and Littlefield,
1998), 209.

Fred
Rus

27Rustow(fn.7),352.
28
87.
Przeworski
(fn. 3,1991),
29
Roeder
(fn. 26), 207.
30
Authoritarian
Ibid., 208. See also Philip Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet
Regimes," Post-Soviet
10 (January 1994), 62; and Colomer
(fn.
3).
Affairs
31
to Democracy,"
World Politics 40 (April 1988),
Daniel H. Levine, "Paradigm Lost: Dependence
379.

WORLD POLITICS

220

democratic
do
institutions;
processes
gains produce
noncooperative
cannot be dictated;
it emerges from bargaining."33
not.32 "Democracy
set of arguments
accounts
This
of
has a close affinity with positivist
institutionalism
The

crafting
game, inwhich

that have emerged

from
institutions
of new democratic

cooperative
is framed

in the negotiation
setde for second-best

may
outcomes

both

outcome

preferred

an

represent

but

from

over

the

status

of rules plays
institutions.35
These

also emphasize
institutional

emergence
from new
emerge

sides

improvement
the crafting

tainty during
or liberal
ficient

game
theory.34
as a
positive-sum
not obtain their most

bargain

the importance

arrangements.
that provides gains

II.A Noncooperative

Model

quo

that nonetheless

for both

sides. Uncer

role in producing
ef
positive
to institutional
approaches
of shared benefits
Above

all

else,
for everyone.

that result
institutions

of Transition

to democratization
offer a useful
cooperative
approaches
of postcommunist
for explaining
transformations
starting
point
cause
in
this
Actors
did
and
part of the world,
regime changes
regimes.
to
transi
of
the
because many
them claimed
be building
democracy,

Actorcentric,

literature offers a useful

starting point and appro
transitions.
for
Moreover,
language
analyzing
postcommunist
priate
tran
in
the
of
the
democratic
many
region studied previous
challengers
as models
sitions
for their own countries.
Some
(especially
Spain)
tions

to

third-wave
Rustow's
transition

democracy

world.
do indeed apply to the postcommunist
hypotheses
on territorial
as a
for
democratic
prerequisite
emphasis
clarity
consensus
is still salient. Though
about borders was not nec

in the communist
liberalization
world
essary to begin political
processes
a democratic
and some transitions
have continued
along
trajectory
of major
all border
without
issues, the resolution
sovereignty
settling
32
See Hardin's
review and then rejection of this approach in Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitu
tionalism, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
33
Przeworski
90.
(fn. 3,1991),
34
and the Royal Fiscal Policy dur
Hilton Root, "Tying the King's Hands: Credible Commitments
and Society 1 (October 1989); Kenneth
ing the Old Regime," Rationality
Shepsle, "Discretion, Institu
in Pierre Bourdieu
and James Coleman,
eds.,
tions, and the Problem of Government
Commitment,"
:
Social Theory for a Changing Society (Boulder, Colo. Westview
Press, 1991); Douglass North and Barry
and Commitment:
The Evolution
of Institutions Governing
Public Choice
"Constitutions
Weingast,
"
in Seventeenth-Century
Journal ofEconomic History 49 (December 1989); Kenneth Shepsle,
England
no. 2
"Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal of 'Politics 1,
on Positive Political
(1989); James Alt and Kenneth
Economy
(Cambridge:
Shepsle, eds., Perspectives
of Democracy
"The Political Foundations
Press, 1990); and Barry Weingast,
University
Cambridge
and the Rule of Law," American Political Science Review 91 (June 1997).
35
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, The Reason ofRules (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,

1985),

30.

THE
was a
precondition
Three
multiethnic
region.
to
and Yugoslavia?had

for new

contests

221

FOURTH WAVE

states?the

in most
of the
regime emergence
Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia,
or autocratic
before
democratic

collapse
regimes could consolidate.
Further
of the third-wave
application

distort

rather

than

however, begins to
hypotheses,
this fourth wave of regime change. Most
raises real
of nondemocracies
questions

illuminate

the preponderance
importandy,
about why postcommunist
transitions
should be subsumed
under the
at all. In addition,
third wave of democratization
the causal pathways
in the fourth
of the third wave do not produce
the "right" outcomes
wave transitions
from communist
transitions
rule. Imposed
from above
in the former

not
produced
partial
transitions?the
revolutionary

communist

world

It is instead

dictatorship.

but
democracy
tran
mode
of

sition thought to be least likely to facilitate democratic outcomes by

third-wave
mated

democracies

transitions?those

democracy-enhancing
instead
rope?have
the autocratic
causal

the most
have actually produced
stable and
in the postcommunist
world. Balanced,
stale
most
to facilitate
the emergence
of
likely
in
American
and
Eu
Latin
Southern
pacts

theorists?that

consolidated

paths

led to unstable

in the
postcommunist
and
negotiation,
crafting,
variety

prominently.
postcommunist
a minor
only

world,
role in explaining

in the

world.

In all three of these

successful

of change fre
The danger of multiple
agendas
in the earlier literature on democratization
has not

quently
trumpeted
seen clear
empirical
crumbling
economic

and

regime change.
on the
earlier, third-wave
agenda of change,
the agenda-limiting
function
of pacts because
they
and political
reform could not be under
that economic

presupposed
taken simultaneously.

communism

the democratic

limits

regarding
celebrated

analysts

of both

did not feature

compromise
to
in the
transitions
democracy
the three components
of successful pacts played

Even

First,

regimes

confirmation

the political
of communism
occurred
bundled

in the postcommunist
and the economic
so

world.

Because

and because

the
and

dicted

rapidly, sequencing
political
had pre
Thus,
although many
change proved
impossible.
at the
of eco
that the reorganization
of the decade
beginning

nomic

institutions

not
tries

necessarily
that moved

achieved

would

turned

undermine

the fastest

the greatest

success

on

that has
transitions,
the contrary, those coun
have also
transformation

democratic

out to be the case.36 To

economic

in consolidating

democratic

institutions.37

36
was Przeworski
The most theoretically
(fn. 3,1991).
rigorous prediction of failure
37
in Postcommunist
Transi
"Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform
Joel S. Hellman,
and Edda Zoli, "Does
tions," World Politics 50 (January 1998); Jean-Jacques Dethier, Hafez Ghanem,

WORLD POLITICS

222
Second,

the literature

on

pacts

assumed

that

of transi

the benefits

tion had to be divided and shared. In the postcommunist world, how

of the contentious
ever, many
are
or retained; there
destroyed
are few stable
there
Likewise,
a market
mand
and
economy

issues were

not

easily divisible.
Empires
of third ways.38
models

are no successful

a com
between
midpoints
over borders
In
negotiations
economy.39
has been
distribution
of benefits
the
region,

or economy
type in this
in favor of one
skewed
highly
ical institutions

resulted

or efficient

side or the other. Even

in skewed

distributional

over
polit
to the win

battles

benefits

ners and did not

arrangements.
benefit-sharing
compromise,
produce
were
actors
in
different
from
those scripted
these
dramas
the
Third,
Similar to earlier,
of democratization.
for leading roles in earlier models
between
soft-liners
and
there were divisions
transitions,
in the ancien r?gime, but the splits played a much
less sig
hard-liners
and mobilization
the degree
of cooperation
nificant
role.40 Instead,
was more
while
the
divides
between
moderates
within
salient,
society
noncommunist

and radicals were

less apparent.41 The

in the third wave were

mocratization

mass

actors

so

instrumental

to de
damaging
in its successes
in

the fourth wave.

for a successful pact?a
condition
the single most
important
as a causal
not
of power?did
balance
figure prominently
in the
in the postcommunist
world. As examined
for democracy

Fourth,
stalemated
force
next

section,
small subset

tion
power

from
pacts produced
of successful
democratic

stalemate

played
transitions. The
was

that most

a role
mode

in only a
of transi

an imbalance

democracy
frequently
produced
to the ancien
in favor of the democratic
challengers

of

r?gime. Rev

the Economic Transition? An Empirical

Facilitate
Study of Central and Eastern Europe
Democracy
and the Former Soviet Union"
Bank, June 1999); EBRD, Transition Report 1999:
(Manuscript, World
and Development,
Ten Years ofTransition (London: European Bank for Reconstruction
1999), chap. 5;
and Anders Aslund,
of the Former Soviet Bloc (Cambridge:
Building Capitalism: The Transformation
Press, 2001).
Cambridge University
38
in Stephen Krasner, ed., Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Po
See the cases discussed
litical Possibilities
Press, 2001).
(New York: Columbia University
39
To be sure, market economies have incorporated aspects of the command economy such as state
over time but without
the basic tenents of capital
undermining
ownership and state control of prices
some command economies
ism. Likewise,
such as China have introduced market reforms gradually,
the command economy. The dispute over slavery is another instance
but the process has undermined
a
that advocated slavery and those that
in which
solution benefiting both sides?those
compromise
difficult to find.
did not?was
40
a central role in all the post
one reformist from the old regime, Mikhail Gorbachev,
plays
Only
communist
transitions, since his reforms in the Soviet Union produce the opportunity for liberalization
or new
in cases of de
is no similar person or parallel dynamic
in every country. There
dictatorship
and Southern Europe.
in Latin American
mocratization
41
van deWalle, Democratic
is made inMichael
Bratton and Nicolas
A similar argument
Experi
ments
Press,

inAfrica: Regime
1997), 198-200.

Transitions

in Comparative

Perspective

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

THE FOURTHWAVE
olutionary
communist

movements

from

below?not

223

elites

from

above?toppled
institutions. As feared
regimes
on democratization,
masses
these mobilized
did often
by earlier writers
confrontational
such
and
but
tactics
tactics,
pro
employ
uncooperative
events such as
moted
rather than impeded democratic
change. When
or street demonstrations
was
elections
proved that the balance of power
on
in the
their will
antidemocratic
favor, they imposed
opposition's
and created

new democratic

in the new
the old regime acquiesced
no power to resist.
had
they
Not all transitions
from communism
resulted in democracy,
however.
A second mode
is when
of transition
the distribution
of power favors
elites.

rulers

Communist

democratic

from

rules because

the rulers of the ancien

r?gime,

that results

configuration

in autocracy.

As is the case with the first path just described, the stronger side dic
tated

em
in this situation
of the game. Only
the stronger
or reconstituted
ideas and preserved
authoritarian
to situations
Like
the first path, and in stark contrast
in

the rules

braced

autocratic

institutions.

of power was
relatively
equal, these imposed
a new
transitions
from above reached
rather quickly.
In
equilibrium
are
as
as
these
consolidated
the
liberal
democ
many cases,
regimes
just
the distribution

which

racies.The logic of this kind of regime transition has no parallel in the

third-wave

literature,

since

regime

change

from

dictatorship

to dicta

torship (albeit different kinds of dictatorships) was not part of the de

mocratization

research

agenda.
In a third mode
of power
of regime change, when
the distribution
was more
outcomes
in
the
of
the
range
equally divided,
postcommunist
than liberal democracy. These
world has been wider
strategic situations
or pro
to
leading
partial democracy,
to either
violent
confrontations
leading
partial
or
a
transition
A
democracy
resulting from
partial dictatorship.
pacted
new
can
of
distribution
between
the
old
and
the
power
relatively equal
at least one
in
be identified
transition,
postcommunist
possibly
as
in
countries
well.
But
other
with
and
Moldova,
Mongolia
perhaps
have

produced
pacted
tracted and oftentimes

transitions

similar power distributions such as Russia orTajikistan did not produce

pacts

or liberal democracies.
to

their will

Instead, opposing
until one side won.

forces
The

in these

countries

result of this mode

impose
fought
at best, civil war at worst.
of transition was partial, unstable
democracy
can
of power should not
conflict
result from equal distributions
That
be surprising. Analysts
of the third wave focused on the successful cases
cases. If all
of democratization
and deliberately
ignored unsuccessful
are
transitions
into the analy
stalemated
brought
undergoing
the causal influence
of this mode
of transition
becomes
sis, however,

countries

WORLD POLITICS

224
less clear. Angola,
between
resulted.

stalemate
instance, has for decades
experienced
no
to
transition
has
but
powers,
democracy
competing
pacted
can
to
but
negotiate,
Equal distributions
compel both sides
for

can also tempt both sides into

that they can prevail over
they
believing
in his analysis of inter
As Geoffrey
their opponents.
concluded
Blaney
two nations
national
armed conflict: "War usually begins when
disagree
on their relative
wars
cease
na
when
and
the
strength
usually
fighting
same could be said about
tionals agree on their relative strength."42 The
a
confrontation
and reconciliation
between
forces within
competing
domestic

during periods of revolutionary

change when
to
in the interna
domestic
the anarchy
approximate
anarchy begins
tional system. In earlier analyses of democratization,
gener
uncertainty
polity,

especially

ated by relatively balanced

forces facilitated

the emergence

of

In this reformulation,
institutions.
this same uncertainty
the
effect?conflict.
the two other tran
produced
opposite
Conversely,
sition pathways
certain distributions
had more
of power and therefore
much
less confrontation.
democratic

In the

three modes
situations

strategic
or the other. The

of

transition

usually

just described,
noncooperative
institutions
that favored one side

produced
is the opposite
of democracy
without
demo
crats. So unlike
who
asserted
that "negotiation
and com
Huntington,
elites were at the heart of the democratization
among political
promise
one side took
in fact they were not.43 In
processes,"
imposed transitions,
more
to
craft institutions
that bene
of its
advantage
powerful
position
process

fited itself more than they benefited theweak. If the powerful adhered
to democratic
distribute
tutional
promise,

institutions
then they imposed
principles,
of the new polity. Such decisions
the benefits

were undertaken
design
or even
but
interest

that widely
insti

about

not out of
initially
obligation,
out of a normative
commitment

com
to

in democratic
If the powerful
then they
believed
democracy.
principles,
in autocratic
institutions.
democratic
But if they believed
prin
imposed
autocratic
institutions.
then
they imposed
ciples,
The

bears
logic of these arguments
accounts
distributional
of institutional
stitutions?democratic

or otherwise?is

strong

resemblance

to realist or

new in
design.44 The crafting of
framed as a zero-sum
game, in

42
The Causes ofWar (New York: Free Press, 1973), 246.
43Blaney,
(fn. 2), 165.
44Huntington
of California Press, 1990); Stephen D. Kras
George Tsebelis, Nested Games (Berkeley: University
and National
Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43
ner, "Global Communications
Press,
(April 1991);Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge
University
Institutions
1992); and Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000).

THE FOURTHWAVE
one

which
must

side obtains

its most

settle for second-best

outcome

preferred
and third-best

are not efficient

and they do not enhance

to democracies,
be stable.45 In transitions
even
ond-best
but
outcomes,
they make

225

outcomes.

and the other

side

institutions

These

of all, but they can

the losers usually obtain sec

the welfare
relative

gains
the losers' gains

over

the status

are much
to
less
quo ante.46 In transitions
dictatorship,
is not a bargain
substantial.
The
transition
but a confrontation
with
winners
is often em
and losers. Though
the social-contract
metaphor
to describe
and stability, institutional
constitutional
emergence
ployed
that maximize

arrangements
world.47

everyone's

utility

are rare in the

political

The process of creating democracy (and dictatorship) outlined here

is antithetical
third-wave

to the
and spiritual
analytic
democratization.
For democratic

thrust

of the

philosophers
stalemate,
theorists,
moderation,
negotiation,
bargaining,
mise are the stuff of successfiil democratic
systems, whereas
are

literature

on

and political
and compro
confronta

to
hegemony
approach
in
world
the
(and maybe
regime
postcommunist
change
explaining
of earlier
leaves out many
also deliberately
elsewhere)
components
is
For instance,
the design of institutions
theories of democratization.
or
either
little
power regarding
regime emergence
explanatory
assigned
it does not mat
If
the
democrats
draft
rules,
regime stability.
powerful
tion,

violence,

and

its enemies.

This

or pres
a
system is adopted or whether
parliamentary
can work
is
kinds
of
established.48
Different
system
democracy
matters most
is that
and endure equally long. What
equally effectively
are committed
to the democratic
the powerful
project.
ter what

electoral

idential

III. Causal

Paths of Postcommunist

Regime Change

for regime change offers amore

model
noncooperative
than
of
all
regime changes
postcommunist
comprehensive
explanation
tran
outlined
does the framework
by the earlier analysts of third-wave

This

alternative,

45
Douglass

North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance

(Cambridge: Cam
Press, 1990).
bridge University
46
Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political
For elaboration of this argument, see Michael McFaul,
Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 2001).
Change
47 from
"The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward aTheory of Public Bureaucracy," in Oliver
Terry Moe,
Oxford
Williamson,
ed., Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present andBeyond(Oxford:
1990).
Press,
University
48
the importance of these design choices for consolidation worldwide,
For evidence undermining
see Thorsten
"New Tolls and
Beck, George Clarke, Alberto GrofF, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh,
Political Economy: The Database
of Political Institutions"
New Tests in Comparative
(Manuscript,
World

Bank, 2000).

226

WORLD

POLITICS

at the center of
By placing power and ideas
analysis and relax
on
the
and
for a successful
ing
primacy placed
negotiation
cooperation
a
set of causal
democratic
this model
different
transition,
yields
paths
or
over the last
to either
from communism
democracy
dictatorship
sitions.

decade.
ment

distribution

of transition

later. A

distribution

of power

has helped
of power

at the mo
favoring democrats
ten years
liberal democracy
produce
of the ancien
dictators
clearly favoring
clearly

to

new forms of authoritarian

rule a decade
later. Both
r?gime has yielded
causal paths have resulted in stable regimes. In contrast, a balanced
dis
in a range of outcomes well beyond
of power has resulted
tribution
the
consolidated
literature

outcome
democracy
by the earlier actorcentric
predicted
on democratization.
to the first two causal
In contrast
paths,

countries

that experienced
ten years later.49

stable

this mode

of transition

are still
relatively

un

1 required the use of crude estimates

for
of Figure
mea
of power and the degree of democracy.
Independent
are the best immunization
sures of both variables
tautology.
against
measures
taken roughly at the same time also help com
Quantitative
the balance-of-power
axis is
tripartite
typology
parison. Consequendy,
construction

The

the balance

on the
legislative

based

elections

legislature for the immediate

states/republics
cases these were
In most
1989-92.50
spanning
islative

elections

the composition
of a
transition period, roughly

that determined

at least some
with
participation
Within
the Soviet Union most

the first multiparty

leg
from the noncommu

nist opposition.51
of these elections
took
a clear communist
in
vic
If
1990.
the
election
produced
place
spring
or
its
communist
direct
successor?with
for
the
old
tory
party
ruling
as
more
60 percent of the vote?then
the
defined
than
victory
winning
case

is classified

as a balance

of power

in favor of the ancien

r?gime.52

If

49
Such regimes may be the norm rather than the exception in the world today. See Larry Diamond,
Press, 1999).
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Democracy: Toward Consolidation
Developing
50
Steven Fish uses a similar method
of
(with slightly different results); see Fish, "The Determinants
Economic
Reform
in the Post-Communist
East European Politics and Society 12 (Winter
World,"
to these election results, but unfortunately
such data
1998). Polling data would add a nice complement
were not collected at the time.
51
In certain cases it is not so clear that the most temporally proximate election should be used, be
are coded as more
cause the results were overhauled within the next year or so. Albania and Azerbaijan
balanced cases and not clear victories over the ancien r?gime due to the tremendous change in the bal
ance of power
votes. In Albania
the parliament
elected in 1991 fell into
immediately
following first
1992 the democratic challengers (the PDS) won a two
discord. In new general elections held inMarch
the Supreme Soviet elected in 1990 voted to disband after independence
thirds majority. In Azerbaijan
(inMay 1992) in favor of a new National Assembly, which was then split equally between communists
is coded as a case inwhich
the anticommunist
and the Popular Front opposition. Georgia
challengers
to the landslide victory of Zviad Gamsakhurdia
inMay 1991.
due
support
enjoyed overwhelming
52CPSU
is not always a sufficient guide for coding "communist." In many cases
party membership
of the CPSU. Yet they are coded as anticommunist.
Popular Front leaders were still members

Partial
Dictatorships

? ?

Democracies

Armenia

Croatia

Bosnia

Czech Republic
Estonia

Herzegovina

t?

Ph

Democracies1

Georgia

Hungary
Latvia

t? O
^

Lithuania

u.

Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Tajikistan
<-m G

? S?3

.S

h
P

rt

Bulgaria

Russia

Mongolia

Ukraine

^
G

Albania

73 15
^ Ph
g

Azerbaijan
Macedonia
Belarus

Romania

Yugoslavia/Serbia

'So

Kazakhstan

t?

t?

u
t?

Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan

Moldova

Uzbekistan
PQ

Typology
a
This

Figure
1
of Postcommunist

Regimes

to include
in between
countries
somewhere
democracy
loosely
deployed
electoral
If dissected
find in this one residual category
further, one might
and
democracies,
autocracies,
democracies,
democracies,
competitive
quasi
pseudo
partial
is an
intellectual
autocracies.
the differences
task, but is both beyond
Specifying
important
see Diamond
On
the distinctions,
the scope of this paper and not central to its arguments.
label

is

and dictatorship.

(fn. 49); Jeffrey Herbst, "Political Liberalization inAfrica afterTen Years," Comparative
Politics 33 (April 2001); Steven Levitsky and LucanWay, "Competitive Authoritarianism:
Hybrid Regimes in Peru andUkraine inComparative Perspective" (Manuscript, 2001); and
David

Collier

and

Steven

Levitsky,

"Democracy

with

Adjectives:

inComparative Research," World Politics 49 (April 1997).

Conceptual

Innovation

228

WORLD

the election

POLITICS

a clear
victory

produced

for noncommunist

forces?with

victory defined aswinning more than 60 percent of the vote?then

case

is classified

in which

as a balance

neither

communist

jority

are classified

partite

typology

as countries
on

the

of power in favor of the challengers.

Cases
nor anticommunist
forces won a clear ma
with

is adapted

democracy

of power. The
tri
from Freedom
House

balances

equal

measures.53

from Below: Hegemonic

Imposition
The

Democrats

is most
in East
above
apparent
path outlined
ne
states. In some of these transitions
and the Baltic

transition

first

Central

Europe
an
role
gotiations
important
played
and impeding potential
authoritarian

was
dynamic
new societal
was

critical.

confrontation,
challengers.
It produced
were

bergis?who

in starting liberalization
processes
the dominant
rollbacks. However,
not
between
the old elite and
compromise,

In most

cases

of these

societal

mobilization

transitional

leaders?Walesa,
Havel,
of the elite and who
members

not

Lands
became

previously
actors
of their widespread
societal
support.
important
only because
new
When
the balance
of power became
actors,
clear, these
political
aided by the support of society, imposed
their will on the weaker
elites,
whether
process

soft-liners
itself was

or hard-liners,
not

always

the ancien

from

the

democratic,

the
r?gime. Though
commitment
ideological

to liberal principles held by these transition victors pushed regime

Democrats
change toward democracy.54
new
democratic
transition,
produced
was
not
transformation
revolutionary,

with

power,
regimes. The

Emboldened

the process of
of regime
process

evolutionary.55

At first glance, both Poland and Hungary

transitions.

not

by Gorbachev's

look like classic pacted

reforms

and Poland's

eco

53
Adrian Karanycky, ed., Freedom in theWorld: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Lib
how
and Transaction
erties, 2000-2001
(New York: Freedom House
Books, 2001). Freedom House,
not free.
ever, uses different labels?free,
ratings
imperfect, Freedom House
partly free, and
Though
if the degree of specificity needed is only three regime types. In contrast to the
offer clear categories,
rat
is based on assessments
from a decade ago, the Freedom House
index, which
balance-of-power
are from 2000.
ings used here
54
were these
not fascists or communists? Why
did they have soci
challengers democrats and
Why
etal support in some places and not others? The explanation cannot simply be culture, history, or loca
states also produced autocratic leaders with
tion, since much of East-Central
Europe and the Baltic
fascist ideas earlier in the century. A full exploration of the origins of democracy as the ideology of op
at this
moment
in this region is beyond the scope of this article. As a preliminary
position
particular
however, it is important to remember the balance of ideologies in the international system
hypothesis,
at the time. The enemies of communism
the challengers to
called themselves democracies. Therefore,
these regimes adopted the ideological orientation of the international enemies of
communism within
their internal enemies.
55
In an argument in the same spirit as that advanced here, Bunce prefers the term "breakage" to dis
tinguish transitions in the "east" from the bridging transitions in the "south." See Valerie Bunce, "Re
inDemocratization:
The East versus the South," Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 3 (1998).
gional Differences

THE
nomic

crisis,

FOURTH WAVE

to the Polish

challengers

229

communist

regime

initially

tip

toed toward political reform.At the beginning of the roundtable nego

the challengers
did not have a firm assessment
tiations,
distribution
between
themselves
and the ancien r?gime.
Soviet

most,

the chief

power?always
in the region?was

change

on all
revolutionary
a constant.
But the

constraint

now

a variable,
not
also uncertain. There

was
power of the democrats
mass demonstrations
and no free and fair elections
measures

of the power

balance.

Challengers

of the power
and fore

First

had been

no recent

that could

provide
to this
ambigu

responded

ity by seeking limited objectives and negotiations. The uncertainty

the balance

about

of power

to fuel unrealistic

also helped

expectations

within the Polish communist elite, who believed that they could win a
of seats

majority

were

if elections

held. The

initial

compromise

was

highly undemocratic. In the first elections in 1989, 35 percent of the

were
seats in the
Sejm
cent, for their allies.
none

Yet
tions

of the concessions

resulted

a limited

tested. Likewise,

and another

30 per

swept the elec

Solidarity
of power between
opposing
that
the compromises
undermined

the balance

seats,
apparent and thereby
from the roundtable
negotiations.

election

in which

only
portion
concession
the roundtable

Poland

never

again had
con
freely
the Polish dic

of the seats was

that allowed

to be elected

and the communists

president
institutions
security
quickly unraveled. Once
a better measure
of the balance of power between

tator, Wojciech
Jaruzelski,
to maintain
control over
the election

for the communists

stuck. After

for the contested

sides became
had

reserved

provided

clear
its challengers
and after Gorbachev
made
in Poland's
intervene
internal affairs, the democratic
new rules. In the
run the Polish
to dictate
winners
the
long
began
in
roundtable
tried but failed to restrict "the scope of representation
the ancien

r?gime
not
that he would

order

to reassure

and

traditional

dominant

classes

that

their vital

interests

in a rela
be respected."56
these events also occurred
Importantly,
was
so
not
of
time
for
the
there
short
time,
enough
pacted
tively
period
to become
institutional
arrangements
sticky.

will

more
The Hungarian
experience
but is still better understood

model

below.

opposition
Organized
in
while
than
Poland,
Hungary
in anticommunist
Membership
when
56
Karl

negotiations
(fn. 3), 11.

began.

the pacted transition

from
of democracy
imposition
was weaker
to the communist
in
regime
closely
as an

soft-liners
groups

Hungary's

reflects

the government.
in the mere hundreds

dominated

numbered

last opposition

uprising

was

in

230

WORLD POLITICS

the more
1956, compared with
in Poland
bilization
in 1980-81.

recent

experience

mo
opposition
from the an
soft-liners
with

Consequendy,
were
to craft a set of
in a much
better position
r?gime
political
reforms that protected
their interests.57 Hungarian
communist
officials
secured their preferences
the electoral
law, the creation of a
regarding
and the timing of elections.
presidency,
cien

But

these

short-term

did not

advantages

translate

into a

long-term

institutional legacy. During the turbulent months of the fall of 1989

and spring of 1990, the waning influence of communists inHungary
and in the region more

became

generally

fore the first vote inMarch

increasingly

evident.

Even

be

1990, the old Communist Party had already

a
the new Hungarian
Socialist
that occurred
Party,
renaming
in most postcommunist
countries when
elites
realized
that their
ruling
old methods
of rule were no longer viable. Yet even this recognition
of

become

the changing power distribution did not help those from the ancien
as the renamed
of the popular
party captured
r?gime,
only 8 percent
vote in the
one
vote and won
district.
party-list
only
single-mandate
won a massive
Democrats
electoral victory, an event that clearly shifted
the balance

of power

the old and the new. After

between

this vote

the

preferences of the powerful dominated all institutional changes and

quickly pushed Hungary toward liberal democracy.
In contrast

to Poland

kia, Estonia,
Latvia,
whatsoever.
pacting
was

openly

and Hungary,
in Czechoslova
the transitions
no elements
and
East
had
of
Lithuania,
Germany
the
in
mode
of
transition
these
countries
Instead,

confrontational.

The

to the ancien

challengers

r?gime

were

mass-based groups that had had limited experience in public politics

1989. Mass

before

demonstrations,
thorities?not
were

actors

strikes,
roundtable

and confrontational
and violent
discussions

moments

the

tactics

clashes with

produced
the authoritarian

in government

street
au

offices?which

in these

regime changes.
the confrontation
between
the state and

pivotal
In Czechoslovakia

was

open and dramatic.

cern the real distribution

The

leaders

of power

of the ancien

among

society
did not dis

r?gime
the country's political

forces.

An organized democratic opposition did not exist prior to 1989 but

the November
1989 demonstrations.
There
exponentially
during
never
between
the
communists
and
the
cooperative
negotiations
street leaders, and the use of force
was consid
demonstrators
against
ered.58 But pitted against a stronger force, the ancien r?gime
eventually

grew
were

57
Miklos

Haraszti,

"Decade

of the Handshake

1999), 290.
(Spring
58
The

central committee

wisely

vetoed

Transition,"

the idea on November

East European
24,1989.

Politics

and Societies 13

THE FOURTHWAVE

231

in the country, the

in
13
both
houses
of parliament.
percent
only
Party
The balance
of power proved to be firmly on the side of the anticom
were then able to dictate
to the coun
munist
challengers, who
changes
surrendered

power.

In the first free and fair elections

won

Communist

try's regime without

old communist

consulting

leaders.

In the Baltic republics anti-Soviet groups sprouted during political

liberalization in 1986-87, but elections in 1989 and 1990 were crucial
to
movements
that the
and demonstrating
anticommunist
mobilizing
favored
ancien r?gime and the challengers
division
of power between
won
In
80 per
anticommunist
the 1990 elections
the
the latter.
Sajudis
cent of the
seats for the Lithuanian
Soviet; the
Supreme
parliamentary
anticommunist
Latvian Popular Front, the Latvian National
Independ
ence Movement,
to these two movements
and candidates
sympathetic
won 79 percent of the seats in the Latvian
Soviet; and the Es
Supreme
seats
a solid
of the contested
Popular Front captured
majority
its Supreme
did not result from or trigger
elections
Soviet. These
with
the ancien r?gime about power sharing or democra
negotiations
their inde
declared
all three republics unilaterally
tization.59
Instead,
tonian

for

into a prolonged
stalemate
with Moscow.
and entered
pendence
to
the
and
soft-liners
moderates
Instead of compelling
compromise,
stalemate
fueled confrontation.
In January 1991 the Soviet government
escalated
armed
fiance

the confrontation
more

forces, killing
of the Soviet soldiers

and did not

allow

their

Latvia
and Lithuania
by invading
than a dozen people. Demonstrations
ensued.
to

leaders

assembled

People

at the barricades

Polarization

negotiate.

after the failed coup attempt inAugust

with
in de

ended

only

1991 and the subsequent col

in all three
In the first post-Soviet
elections
lapse of the Soviet Union.
no
new states, the old Communist
Party ruling elite made
significant
showings.
In all of these

cases

societal

actors

to
(to varying degrees)
ene
over their communist

committed

democratic
mies
cratic

ideas enjoyed hegemonic

power
new demo
to
this political
power configuration
impose
the
ancien
the
leaders
of
and
exclude
r?gime from the
regimes

and used

institutional
new
mented
lines. That

process.
design
rules
antiliberal
such practices

Some

of these

that restricted

could

occur

new

regimes
the franchise

further

also

imple
along ethnic
illuminates
the basic

59
a
tried to negotiate
the moderate Communist
In Lithuania
Party leader, Algirdas Brazauskas,
not distinguish
the Lithuanian
transition and even split with the Soviet Communist
Party. This did
in any appreciable way, however. In some respects, his ap
transition from that of Latvia or Estonia
was the result of
making him the result of the shifting balance of
popular mobilization,
pointment
power, not the cause.

232

WORLD

POLITICS

of all of these cases: hegemonic

dynamic
rather than pacted negotiation.

Imposition
Scholars

from Above: Hegemonic

of noncommunist
is a common

above

communist

imposition

world

transitions

of the new

rules,

Autocrats
have noted

that imposition
from
But in the post
path toward democratization.60
new kinds of
this mode
of transition
has produced

not
in Kazakhstan,
occurred
dictatorship,
democracy?as
Kyrgystan,
and
Belarus.
Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan,
The moment
of transition
from communist
rule to authoritarian
rule
for these

four Central

Asian

states

five months between August

inMoscow
coup attempt
tion of the Soviet Union

is the

same

and December

and well

defined?the

1991. Before the failed

in
1991 and the
dissolu
August
subsequent
state nor societal
in December
1991, neither

leaders in these Soviet republics had pressed aggressively for independ

ence. Nor were

elections

in 1989

and 1990 major

liberalizing

events

in

these republics. By 1991 some democratic groups had sprouted in

In the fall of 1991, however,
and Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgystan,
the distribution
still clearly favored the an
of power in these countries
ciens r?gimes.61
At

the beginning

hoped/hypothesized
to

guide

regime

change

in these

countries,

analysts

an
to
In
along
evolutionary
democracy.
path
in 1990 between
the distribution
of power
reformers
and
was
more balanced
than in other central Asian
relatively

their

Kyrgyzstan
conservatives

of

that "pragmatic" leaders from above might be able

countries

a coalition
to be elected
that allowed Askar Akaev
states, a situation
by
of reformers
and clan elites as the country's first president
in August

1990.62Akaev took advantage of the failed coup attempt inMoscow in

August 1991 to ratify his political power and legitimacy inOctober
and thus capturing
94.6 percent of the vote.
1991, running unopposed
to im
For the first years of his rule, he used his unchallenged
authority
democratic
reforms.
Democratization
from
above
plement
partial
as Akaev
stalled midway
found autocracy
through the decade, however,
more
convenient.
Like Akaev, Kazakh
Nazarbaev
president Nursultan
60
(fn. 2); and Karl (fn. 3).
Huntington
61
The leaders in these countries had to cut deals with regional leaders to maintain
autocracy, but
a
to a new regime. See
these pacts preserved
continuity with the past, rather than navigating
path
Pauline Jones Luong, "Institutional Change
for
through Continuity:
Shifting Power and Prospects
in Post-Soviet
Central Asia" (Manuscript, May 2000).
Democracy
62
Just over 50 percent of deputies in the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet supported Akaev for president, al
candidate. See Kathleen Collins,
"Clans, Pacts, and Politics:
lowing him to inch out the communist
in Central Asia" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University,
1999), 193.
Understanding
Regime Transitions

THE

233

FOURTH WAVE

tolerance
toward a free press and independent
polit
in the aftermath
ical organizations
of independence.
As he consolidated
to con
his power, however, Nazarbaev
has used his dictatorial
powers
trol the press and political
and harass nongovern
parties, rig elections,
also demonstrated

mental

In Turkmenistan
former first secretary
of the
organizations.
now
never pre
Communist
and
Party
president
Niyazov
Saparmurad
to adhere to any liberal
tended
and
instead
crafted a dicta
principles

torship based on a "cult of the individual." In Uzbekistan

and now

of the Communist

former first

Islam Karimov

secretary
Party
president
allowed only one, fixed election,
in December
he cap
1991, in which
tured 86 percent
of the vote.63 In all of these countries,
there was a
paucity of powerful
fore little in the way

at the transitional

democrats
of democratic

moment

and

there

thereafter.

practice

Belarus initially followed a similar path of autocratic imposition

from

above. Hard-liners

opposition,

Soviet,
Supreme
of the seats while
1991

strikes

Front.

Popular
the Communist
Party

the

r?gime
In the 1990

against
elections

a weak
to the

of Belarus

the Popular Front won

state demonstrated
against the

mass mobilization,
undermined

the ancien

dominated

the Belarussian

86 percent
captured
less than 8 percent.
In
April
that society was capable of

and a few months later the failed August 1991 coup

legitimacy

of the hard-liners

in power, who

had

en

the coup
leaders. A moderate,
Stanislav
thusiastically
supported
more
suc
contrast
to
the
In
benefited
from
failed
Shushkevich,
coup.
s
to
cessful transitions
first postcommunist
however, Belarus
democracy,
leader was not a leader of the democratic
but rather was a
opposition
reformer
divided

from within
elite

allowed

the system with

almost no popular following. A
vote for the
Belarus's
first postcommunist
presi

in June-July
1994,
dency,
third-wave
democratization

an
to be
cited in the
competitive,
opening
emer
literature as positive
for democratic
a democrat
an
to bubble up
for
opportunity

Instead of creating
gence.
the split in Belarus opened
from society, however,
the way for the emer
autocratic
who
Lukashenko,
leader, Aleksandr
gence of an even more
won the election. Had
a more
movement
democratic
emerged
powerful
at the time, the
have been very dif
trajectory of this transition might
ferent. The

old hard-liners

from

of Lukashenko,
moved
quickly
rule.
authoritarian
dating

the ancien
to work

with

initially wary
r?gime, while
the new leader in consoli

63
came to power before the Soviet
as a
between Uzbek
Karimov
clans. In
compromise
collapse
the period of political
Uzbekistan
years, but was over by
instability occurred in the early Gorbachev
the time of transition after Karimov had consolidated
his political power. See Collins
(fn. 62).

WORLD POLITICS

234

Protracted

Stalemated Transitions:
and Imposition
the first

Unlike

and

second

regime types,
transitions?has

predictable
stalemated

Confrontation

led to consistent,
transition
paths, which
transition
the third postcommunist
path?
outcomes
in
different
radically
produced

world:
electoral
the postcommunist
democracies
and
golia, fragile
partial

inMoldova

democracy
in Russia

and Mon
and civil

and Ukraine,

war followed by autocracy inTajikistan. Transitions

inwhich the bal

ance of power between

the ancien r?gime and its challengers was rela
and the least conclusive
the most protracted
been
have
also
tively equal
on third
earlier writers
of what
in the region?exactly
the opposite
wave

democratization

were

supposed to be most

would

have

transitions

Stalemated

predicted.

likely to produce both stable and liberal

democracies.
all the postcommunist
transitions, Moldova
may be the closest
a
Like
other
of
transition.64
every
regime change
approximation
pacted
an exogenous
shock?
in the region, the one inMoldova
began with
Of

initiated by Moscow
reforms. These
changes
liberalizing
eventu
of nongovernmental
allowed for the emergence
groups, which
one umbrella
Moldovan
the
under
consolidated
Pop
organization,
ally

Gorbachev's

ular Front (mpf). The MPF successfully combined nationalist

nationalists
that militant
themes,
ensuring
movement.
In contrast to Poland,
the anticommunist

democratic

and

did not domi

or
Hungary,
not
in
the
did
Lithuania,
support
society.
enjoy widespread
opposition
seats to the
one-third
of
the
the contrary,
the MPF won
On
roughly
a
closer
much
Soviet in the spring 1990 elections,
percentage
Supreme
to the Democratic
than to the clear
total in Russia
Russia Movement's
nate

majorities
elections
however,
cooperate

captured by popular fronts in the Baltic republics during

at the same time.65 The

were
with

not

communist

the opposition.

MPF s
stalwarts

When

opponents
but were
another

in the ancien
soft-liners

external

r?gime,
to

seeking

factor?August

1991?rocked the transition, old institutions quickly broke down, the

Communist Party found itself in disarray, and elites from both state and
to denounce
society joined
together
the communist
leaders
ence, because
were more
to Gorbachev
sympathetic

the coup
inMoldova
than

and declare
in control

independ
at the time

to the coup
plotters. While

64
a close second. See M. Steven Fish, "Mongolia: Democracy
without Prereq
Mongolia
might be
uisites," Journal ofDemocracy 9 (July 1998).
65
in Karen
in Post-Communist
"The Politics of Democratization
William
Moldova,"
Crowther,
in Russia, Ukraine,
Reactions
and Bruce Parrot, eds., Democratic Changes and Authoritarian
Dawisha
Belarus, andMoldova
Press, 1997), 293.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University

THE FOURTHWAVE

235

from the an
them, soft-liners
to craft a
cien
smooth
relatively
cooperated
to
transition
Presidential
from communism
power changed
democracy.
a very
in 1996, and the
hands peacefully
election
competitive
following
balance of power in parliament
has since shifted between
left and right
over the course of several elections. Relative
stalemate, however, has not

no formal

ever codified
pact was
MPF moderates
r?gime and

between

produced democratic consolidation. In 2000 Moldova

to alter

became the first

rules of the game of

country
postcommunist
a
its political
from a presidential
system by switching
system to parlia
con
was
not
This
mentary
democracy.
negotiated.
Highly
change
to
it
than
consolidate
democratic
served
destabilize
rather
tentious,
the fundamental

institutions.
of power be
the basic players and distribution
respects
to Gor
In response
and Russia.
them were
similar inMoldova

In several
tween

in Russia
also formed
reforms, anticommunist
political groups
into a united front?Democratic
Russia. Elec
and eventually
coalesced

bachev's

tions in 1989 and 1990 and strikes in 1989 and 1991 helped to mobi
lize mass

New
opportunities
against the ancien r?gime.
and re
action
also attracted
defectors
political

demonstrations

for nontraditional

formists from within

Boris

Yeltsin.

the old ruling elite, including most

Within

Eduard
Yakovlev,
ative interlocutors

the Soviet

importantly

such as Alexander
state, soft-liners
himself were cooper
and Gorbachev

Shevardnadze,
for Russia's democratic

challengers.

Throughout

the

fall of 1990 and spring of 1991, stalemate appeared to force both sides
toward

compromise.
from the Soviet
the anticipated
pact proved elusive. Soft-liners
to
from
Russian
and
moderates
the
government
opposition
attempted
Yet

negotiate new economic and political rules in the fall of 1990 under the
rubric of the 500-Day Plan, but they failed. Again in the summer of
1991,

they

came very close

to

implementing

another

cooperative

agree

ment, the 9+1 Accord, which delineated jurisdictional boundaries be

tween

state

Before
this
signatory
republics.
hard-liners
Soviet
however,
agreement
government
to
the negotiated
impose their pref
interrupted
path and instead tried
use of force. Their
erence for the old status quo
the
coup at
through
the central
could

and

the nine

be enacted,

1991 failed, an outcome

that in turn allowed Yeltsin
tempt in August
and to
such as the 9+1 Accord
and his allies to ignore past agreements
new
of
the
rules
the
their
ideas
about
instead
game, in
pursue
political
in the
Yeltsin's
Soviet dissolution.
advantage
cluding, first and foremost,
1991 coup attempt was, however,
wake of the August
only temporary.
to
of his reform ideas coalesced
Less
than two years later opponents

236

WORLD

POLITICS

at the bar
his regime. This new stalemate, which
challenge
crystallized
con
in
ricades again in September-October
also
ended
violent
1993,

frontation. Only afterYeltsin prevailed again in this latest standoff did

a new

he dictate
referendum.

The

democracy, which
clivities
of Russia's

set of
rules that the population
ratified in a
political
was a
to emerge
regime
subsequently
fragile electoral
not
to
be
able
withstand
the
authoritarian
may
pro
new

of
equal distribution
president.66 A relatively
a
not
its
the
old
and
power
regime
challengers
produced
path
a
that ended
of negotiated
and violent transition
change but
protracted
with
of an unstable
the imposition
electoral democracy.
a balance
the transition
from communism
with
of
Ukraine
began
between

power

ancien

between

r?gime

to that in Russia.

similar

and challengers

The failed coup of August 1991 altered the political orientations of key
in Ukrainian

players

politics.

Like

their Central

Asian

the

comrades,

leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party, headed by Leonid

Kravchuk, quickly jumped on the anti-Soviet bandwagon after the
failed

coup

champion
permitted

as a way
a
to stay in power. Kravchuk
became
In December
1991 he
nationalism
overnight.
a referendum
on Ukrainian
which
independence,
passed

attempt
of Ukrainian
This

overwhelmingly.

of elites within

reorientation

nationalist

the old

ruling Ukrainian Communist Party helped to defuse the conflicts be

tween

and foes of the ancien

friends

r?gime

that had

sparked

con

open

frontation inRussia inOctober 1993. Compared with Russia, Ukraine

a smoother

experienced

transition

from

communism.

At

the same time

the prolonged domination of the old CPSU leaders has stymied the de
cases in the Baltics
with
of liberal democracy.
velopment
Compared
won
in which
and East-Central
the
democrats
overwhelm
Europe
the new terms of the democratic
the past, dictated
ingly, broke with
polity, and
still unstable

on to
produce
and unconsolidated.

stable

is an extreme

of a violent,
equal distribution

went

Tajikistan
tion resulting

from

regimes,

example

Ukrainian

democracy

confrontational

is

transi

of power among
the
the surface the 1990 elections

relatively
forces in the country. On
political
a solid
to
ancien r?gime.
victory for the communist
produce
appeared
a
the ruling elite devel
In fact, however,
based split within
regionally
as a result of
which
then deepened
after
liberalization,
political
oped

main

Moscow's

role inTajik politics faded following the August

attempt. Thus,
civil war.
66
For elaboration,

instead

seeMcFaul

of stalemate

producing

(fn. 46), chaps. 9,10.

negotiations,

1991 coup
it produced

THE FOURTHWAVE

237

InTajikistan in the late 1980s opposition groups coalesced around a

mishmash

of democratic,
and religious
ideas. Under
the
nationalistic,
states
to
of
Khakhor Makhkamov,
the
these groups
response
leadership
in sev
and
After
swung between
cooperative
acquiescing
repressive.67

eral liberal

reforms

free expression,
lamic uprisings

the rights of social organizations

and
guaranteeing
Makhkamov
then used force to quell the so-called
Is
a
move
to
in February
unite the dem
that helped
1990,

ocratic

and religious
state and
opposition
tivated. For decades

The
strands of the opposition.
cleavage between
mo
actors was more clan based than
ideologically
the Khodjenti
with
Moscow's
clan,
support, had

challengers to Khodjenti

dominated political rule inTajikistan. When

hegemony
equal,
was

of power became more

the failed August
when
Moscow's
coup
support
the ruling elite could have opted to pact a
removed,

consolidated

especially

temporarily
transition
and

and

the distribution

after

to reestablish
auto
share power. Instead,
they pushed
an
new
in
first
election
favor
of
their
rule,
by rigging
preferred
in turn used his new office to crack
who
leader, Rakhman
Nabiyev,
down on opposition
leaders and organizations.
similar to his
However,
cratic

inMoscow,
overestimated
the power of
counterparts
Nabiyev
putschist
forces
his clan and state. Opposition
with
frustrated
lead
groups joined
ers from other,
clans to resist old guard repression. Civil war
minority
foes.68 By the end of the first year
ensued between
relatively balanced

of independence, fifty thousand people had been killed and another

was
A settlement
bro
eventually
displaced.
a new unstable
not
autocracy,
democracy.
and Tajikistan
started the transi
Russia, Ukraine,

thousand
eight hundred
kered, but the result was
Though
tion from
tween

Moldova,
communism

ancien

with

relatively

equal distributions

and

of power be
a
of
variety
of a variety of

r?gime
they experienced
challengers,
in turn influenced
the formation
paths, which
Other
of
each
type can be found throughout
regime types.
examples
the region, ranging from relatively democratic
and Mongolia
Bulgaria
transition

to the less successful

in Albania

and Azerbaijan.
to the
led
power
asymmetric
imposi
or
from below, many of the
tion of dictatorship
from above
democracy
of power are
distributions
from more balanced
that emerged
regimes
a few cases did
in
between
still unstable.
negotiations
only
Strikingly,
democratic

transitions

In contrast

to

distributions

challenged
type. The

and

a causal

challengers
play
countries most
successful

that

in determining
regime
in
liberal
democracy
consolidating
role

67
Collins
(fn. 62), 231.
68
cause gave the op
to the oppositions
Rifle Division
The defection of the Soviet 201st Motorized
access to weapons
that opposition groups in other republics did not enjoy.
position

238

WORLD POLITICS

experienced

some of the most

transitions.

confrontational

in

Countries

the distribution of power was relatively equal are neither the

which
most

successful

democracies

nor

while

the mode

of transition

does

on

the type of regime

communist
world bear
the third-wave

the most

stable
to have

appear
the causal
that emerges,

little resemblance

regimes.
a

strong

patterns
to the modalities

Therefore,
causal effect
in the post
in
identified

literature.

are the
causes of the balances of power and ideolo
underlying
that produced
these different modes
of transition?
Some contend

What
gies
that

as
of power
is best addressed
part of the outcome
than as a cause of the outcome.69 The
between
strong correlation
and regime
that deeper
structural variables
type suggests
geography
the balance

rather

the regime variance without

explain
of
balances
of power and ideologies
counting
as well
economic
Geography,
development,

might

orientation
regime type, and the ideological
of power
influenced
the particular
balances

the need

for a careful

ac

at the time of transition.

culture,
prior
most
certainly
that pro
ideologies

history,
of enemies
and

in the postcommunist
and dictatorship
world. Future
democracy
to
must
of power.
these transitional
balances
research
seek
explain
this article treats balance of power as an independent
variable
However,
duced

than as part of the

variable,
dependent
is the analytic setup of the earlier third-wave

rather

for two reasons.

First, this
this arti

literature, which
cle seeks to challenge. That
the earlier literature posited different
causal
same set of variables
from
for
the
that
suggests
hypotheses
relationships
and not tautological.
both theories are falsifiable
struc
in this article is that these
the argument
advanced
Second,
big
tural variables
specific
cases

consequences
only in historically
path-dependent
moment
transition
for all of these
The
of
settings.70

have

strategic

was exogenous
and therefore not caused
(except perhaps Russia)
friends and foes of the regime.
directly by the balance of power between
in
The
confluence
of the forces
that produced
democrats
powerful
was
autocrats
in Turkmenistan
Poland
and powerful
only causally sig
cen
moment
at the end of the twentieth
at a
in
time
nificant
unique
same
After
Poland
had
the
and
cultural
all,
tury.
religious
practices,
a century ago, but these
same location, and the same enemies
nearly the
factors

did not

interact

to

produce

democracy

then.

Imagine

even

if

69
for Outcomes
of Post-Communist
Herbert
Kitschelt,
Regime Change: Causal
"Accounting
or Shallowness
in Rival Explanations"
1999).
Depth
(Manuscript,
70
to institutional
in
The logic draws on the idea of punctuated
emergence
equilibrium
applied
to the State: Alternative
and Historical Dynamics,"
Com
Conceptions
Stephen Krasner, "Approaches
parative Politics 16 (January 1984).

THE FOURTHWAVE

239

Solidarity had succeeded in forging a pact with Polish communist au

thorities in 1981 in the shadow of Brezhnev's Soviet Union. The
to emerge would
have had more
institutional
guarantees
regime type
for the outgoing
have
the legacies of such a pact might
autocrats, while
a
for
time.
long
persisted
or
Nor do cultural and historical
patterns
prior regime types correlate
neatly
world.

in the postcommunist
the pattern
of regime variation
such as Russia
and
with
shared cultures and histories,
or Romania
and Moldova,
have produced
very different

with

Countries

Belarus
regimes
culture

since leaving communism,

like Belarus
and Uzbekistan

while
have

countries

with

erected

no common

similar

very
regimes.
or even So
of the communist
the causal significance
generally,
viet legacy is not uniform
type. The
regime
regarding postcommunist
of
within
of
the
former
Soviet
very diversity
type
regime
subregions
or
versus Armenia?calls
versus Ukraine
into
Union?Belarus
Georgia
a
of
shared communist
the causal significance
history. Con
question

More

upon closer analysis, "similar" prior regimes also look very dif
rule in communist
of autocratic
For
the degree
instance,
or
more
in
the Soviet Union
that
Czechoslovakia
closely approximated
or
Yet a decade
than that in Poland, Hungary,
Romania
Yugoslavia.
ismore
sim
in
the
Czech
after decommunization,
democracy
Republic
to
in Poland,
ilar to democracy
and
Slovenia
than
democracy
Hungary,
or even Slovakia.
in Russia, Romania,
versely,
ferent.

Decades

ment,
culture,
mocratization
explanations.
generalizations
uncover.
they

like economic
now, big structural variables
develop
and geography may correlate cleanly with patterns of de
and thereby provide more
around the world
sweeping

from

broad
for the short span of only one decade,
However,
based on deep structural causes hide as much history as

IV. Explaining

Anomalies:

Borders

and the

"West"

a causal
of power
between
balances
positing
relationship
at the time of transition
later
and regime type a decade
and ideologies
are
cases
can
not
in
There
boxes
the
but
all,
many
region.
explain many,
1 that should be empty but are
in Figure
matrix
in the three-by-three

The

model

not. Other

factors must

ure to meet

Rustow's

into the equation. First, the fail

borders for the polity can im
requisite
to the
Powerful
democratic
emergence
challengers
indefinitely.
pede
institutions
if there are
ancien r?gime may fail to establish democratic
can
over time
issues. Second,
location
border
lingering
geographic
be introduced

of defined

240

WORLD

override

the causal

ing neighboring

Disputed

influence

states

POLITICS

of the initial mode

incentives

to

join

of transition

the norm

by offer
of the region.

Borders

the analytic framework

of cases defying
outlined
greatest number
in this article are countries where
the distribution
of power was firmly in
favor of the challengers
after transition was
yet the regime that emerged

The

not

fully democratic.
and, until
Georgia,

This
list includes Armenia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina,
last year, Croatia. These
countries
share one com
in the region
that the more
successful
democracies

mon

problem
lacked?border

wars

disputes. To varying degrees,

in the 1990s in all four of these countries.

territorial
These

debates

territorial

sparked
conflicts

in turn

credentials.

The

by geogra
cases. Anti

nationalist
leaders with poor democratic
empowered
are not
actions of leaders, however,
predetermined
a role even in these
and
choice
still
Ideas,
leaders,
phy.
play
in
Soviet sentiment
fused with militant
nationalism
Georgia

Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

to

produce

1991 he became Georgia's first demo

InMay

85 percent
of the vote. But his
winning
non
movements
ideas quickly
fueled
among
separatist
war within
then
civil
the
minorities
and
Georgian
Georgian
Republic.
to the more
A change
in leadership
from Gamsakhurdia
democratic
the total collapse
and less nationalistic
Eduard
Shevardnadze
prevented
elected

cratically
nationalist

president,

some basic elements of a democratic

state and
preserved
not a new consensus
about borders, altered
regime. Leadership
changes,
course
In Bosnia-Herzegovina
the
of regime change in Georgia.
battles

of the Georgian

over borders
No

decades.

ternational

in
ethnic war on a scale not witnessed
produced
Europe
to slow the violence
democratic
leaders emerged
until
forces intervened.
Border
and ethnic conflicts
disputes

in
in
in

Croatia also helped to consolidate the political power of Franjo Tudj

man,

another

After
August

an

nationalist.

antidemocratic

ever, Croatia has moved

democratic
governance.
Armenia
has moved
initially
1991 coup

quickly

in the opposite
transition
peaceful
Armenia's

attempt,

jan over the Nagorno-Karabakh

scarce

country's
within
the armed
This

new

elite

the Armenian
former

resources
forces

in turn has

Since Tudjman's

toward European

death, how
and more
integration

direction,
away from democracy.
to
accelerated
democracy,
by the
war with Azerbai
decade-long

Republic has not only depleted the

an alternative
also produced
elite
the
that
of
embattled
challenge
republic.

but has
to

articulated

a less democratic

the leadership
regime. Under
the
of
Nagorno-Karabakh
president

of Robert
republic,

of
conception
the
Kocharian,
it forced Ter Pet

THE

FOURTH WAVE

241

to
1998. Since the palace coup and Kochar
resign in February
as
in 1998 in a rigged vote, Armenia's
ian's election
regime
president
contributed
factors
have
has become
authoritarian.
Many
increasingly
rosian

to

crisis

political

in Armenia,

the territorial

but

dispute

has been

espe

cially destabilizing.71
The

"West"

alous
mania

overachievers
comprise
to the
outlined
general model
two countries
and Bulgaria,

communism

with very powerful

anticommunist
societal

mania

of cases anom
category
a category
that includes Ro
the transition
from
started

a second

Democratic

above,
that

leaders from
mobilization

the ancien

r?gime.
the
destroyed

In Ro
ancien

r?gime but did not take the next step of filling the void with new soci
In December
etal leaders and organizations.
1989, after only two weeks
most
in
totalitarian
of popular
the
Romanian
revolt,
dictatorship?the
was
the Romanian
Nicolae
the region?collapsed.
leader,
Ceau^escu,
were no
banned.
There
and the Romanian
killed
Communist
Party
pacts,

no

perished,

no
the Ceau^escu
After
regime
compromises.
negotiations,
a
the National
Sal
however,
organization,
phantom
political

vation Front (nsf), rushed in to fill the political vacuum. Quasi dissi
allied with
and societal
leaders
poets,
initially
front had been created
clear
that
this
became
gradually
dents,

munist

officials
the

as a means
last communist

the NSF, but it

com
by former

in power. After
"people
regime, communist
apparatchiks
to democratic
and not committed

of staying

destroyed
vated by their own interests
dominated
the first postcommunist
was less dramatic
in Bulgaria,
r?gime
was

In the early 1990s

comparable.
were
manian
grim. Yet
democracy
toward consolidating
made progress

power"
moti
norms

the ancien
regime. The break with
but the resilience of the old guard
for Bulgarian
and Ro
the prospects
a decade

later, both

countries

have

liberal democracy.
countries has benefited

from prox
there is
the postcommunist
world,
and regime type.72
from theWest
at the mo
not
to theWest
does
Closeness
certainly
explain regime type
was
ment of transition. Before
Serbia's dictatorship
the fall of Milosevic,
Democratic

consolidation

in both

to theWest.
Indeed, throughout
imity
a
between
distance
correlation
positive

71

then the mili

If Armenia were not at war over Nagorno-Karabakh,
Imagine the counterfactual.
not enjoy the prominence
like
that they do and hard-liners
services would
tary and intelligence
show that "providing for
Kocharian would not have risen to power. Public-opinion
surveys inArmenia
the government
defense" is the area for inwhich
enjoys its highest approval rating. See Office of Re
no. M-13-00
of State, "Armenians More Hopeful, Despite
search, Department
(February
Killings,"
3.
11,2000),
72
See Jeffrey S. Kopstein
the Postcommunist World,"

and David A. Reilly, "Geographic

World Politics 53 (October 2000).

Diffusion

and the Transformation

of

242
much

WORLD
to Berlin

closer

cratic Belarus

POLITICS

than Georgia's
electoral
and auto
democracy,
to theWest
than semidemocratic
Russia. Over

is closer

the pull of theWest

has helped weaker democratic
transi
time, however,
success
tions in theWest
become more democratic.
Conversely,
initially
or
to
ful transitions
farther from Europe,
such as Armenia
democracy
even
success in
have
had
less
Kyrgyzstan,
consolidating.
Neighborhoods
matter.
or economic
not
It is location?and
de
education,
Christianity,
the causal push toward democracy.
velopment?that
provides
Initially
in
uncertain
and Romania
have become
regimes
Bulgaria
increasingly
more democratic
over time, as these countries have
aggressively
sought
in
Western
institutions
such as the European
Union
and
membership
NATO. Leaders

in Romania

and Bulgaria
countries
have

because both
democracy,
institutions.
these Western
now

democracy

seems

After

poised

have

a lost decade
to benefit

real incentives

a reasonable

chance

even Croatian

from European

to

deepen
of joining
and Serbian

integration.

V. Conclusion
This

article

lenges many
on
erature

has outlined

an actorcentric

of the principal
assumptions
third-wave
democratization.

occurred

at the same

changes
the causal mechanisms

at

time
were

that chal
theory of transition
of the earlier actorcentric
lit

as other

Temporally,
third-wave

these
regime
transitions. Yet

so different

and the regime types

that the postcommunist
experience may be better captured by
a different
a
and
label?the
of
fourth wave
separate
theory
regime
after
the
in
should
of
Uzbek
all,
emergence
change, (Why,
dictatorship
istan be subsumed
under the third wave of democratization})
play

so varied

the approach
in this
outlined
and the cases discussed
Furthermore,
in
article call into question
the historical
of
third-wave
transitions
place
more
the development
of theories
about democratization
generally.
from below in which
is the mode
confrontation
imposition
to the
is not a new phenomenon,
unique
postcommunist
world. On the contrary,
there is a tradition
of democratic
revolutions
some of the most
case studies in democratiza
that includes
important
tion. Certainly,
the American
transitions were not pacted
and French
were
transitions.
confrontational
armed strug
Rather,
they
protracted,
new
in which
the victors
the
rules of the game.73 In
then dictated
gles
Democratic

of transition

73
Bruce Ackerman,
We the People: Transformations,
vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press,
between
liberal and antiliberal
elites in the United
1998). To be sure, negotiations
(slave-owning)
States helped to produce partial democratic
institutions. These compromises,
however, were not ne
from the British ancien r?gime.
gotiated with moderates

THE

FOURTH WAVE

243

several

and decades-long
"transi
uncertain,
respects, France's violent,
more
tion" from autocratic
rule looks
like Russia's ongoing
transforma
tion than like
Likewise,
Spain's negotiated
externally
path.
imposed
in Germany,
such as the democratic
transitions
Aus
regime changes,
no
or
and
involved
tria,
Decolonization,
pacting
negotiation.
Japan,

which played no role in the third wave, has featured prominently

both

the fourth wave

discussed

in

In the long
to de
communism

here

and the second wave.74

stretch

of history,
the successful
transitions
from
more
like the norm, while
the pacted transitions
mocracy may look
transitions
from above in Latin America
and Southern
Europe
look more
like the aberration.

and
may

transitions with alternative

causal modes
did occur in
negotiated
Latin America,
Southern
and perhaps Moldova.
Europe, Africa, Asia,
a new historical
non
must now be
context
in
in which
They
explained
transitions
from
below
occurred
both
before
and
pacted,
revolutionary
Yet

must
seek to spec
theory
can facilitate
which
pacts
under which
pacts are inconse

next

after. The

of democratization
generation
the
conditions
under
precisely

more

ify
democratization

the conditions

and

In other words,
a
comprehensive

quential.

and fourth waves

the third

must

be fused

to

In addition, without
generate
theory
to
this
research
agency altogether,
abandoning
agenda should attempt
arrow
to
account
in
for the factors that
backward
order
push the causal
of transition.

produce different modes

sive theory of transition

of transition
should

in the first place. A comprehen

and
include both structural

therefore

cases the different

In the postcommunist
historical
most
to Soviet
influenced
the balance
responses
certainly
imperialism
friends and foes of the ancien r?gime at the time of
of power between
the democratic
United
transition.
between
polarization
Ideological
variables.

strategic

States

and

framed

the

communist

the normative

tionaries

Soviet

choices

and reactionaries.

is, communism?did
tization
that many

not

the balance

of power

and

dependent

consequences

At

about

Union

during

the

cold war

made

also

by revolu

regime change
the same time, prior regime type?that
or uniform
role in democra
the negative

play
true causal
of the
had predicted.75 The
significance
can be
moment
when
the
transition
understood
only
deeper
fully
are
causes of these modes
article has argued that
fully specified. This
at the time of transition had
path
ideologies
Yet the
for subsequent
regime emergence.

74
(fn. 2), 112.
75Huntington
Przeworski
(fn. 3,1991); Ken Jowitt, The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction
(Berkeley:
Processes
in East Cen
of California Press, 1992); and Grzegorz
Ekiert, "Democratization
University
tral Europe: A Theoretical
British Journal of Political Science 21 (July 1991), 288.
Reconsideration,"

WORLD POLITICS

244

can be determined
of these contingent
variables
only if
importance
can be measured
their causal weight
of
independently
deeper factors
cause
that
and impede democracy.76 While
democratization
theorists
have

devoted

given
The

serious

attention

to

causal links between mode

isolating
has been
much
less attention
regime consolidation,
to the causes of transition
in
the
first
paths
place.77

of transition

and

a
may
project of constructing
general
theory of democratization
causes
in Poland may be distinct
fail.
The
of
well
democratization
very
in
from the causes
in
let alone from those that predominate
Spain,
on
France. This
article's emphasis
temporal
path dependence
implies
that different

historical

democratization.

contexts
The

may

create

unique patterns
in the postcommunist
regime change
search for a general
theory of democratization
be a long one.

against
wave
of

unique

factors

for and

generated
by the fourth
world
that the
suggest
and autocratization

will

76
can become the
Every independent variable
dependent variable of another study. In journal arti
cles especially, asMichael Taylor argues, the "explanatory buck has to stop somewhere"; Taylor, "Struc
in the Explanation
of Social Change," Politics and Society 17 (1989), 199. To
ture, Culture and Action
avoid tautology and claim causal significance of more proximate variables, however, requires the re
to more important
searcher to demonstrate
that the independent variables selected are not endogenous
prior variables but rather that they have some independent causal impact.
77
Recent studies that have pushed the causal arrow back one step prior include Wood
(fn. 22); Va
lerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The
and Destruction
of Socialism and the State (Cambridge:
Design
"What Do We Know about Democratization
Press, 1999); Barbara Geddes,
Cambridge
University
after Twenty Years?" Annual Review
of Political Science 2 (1999); Alexander Motyl, Revolutions, Na
tions, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities
Press,
(New York: Columbia University
in East-Central
1999); Grzegorz
Ekiert, The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996); and Bratton and van deWalle
(fn. 41).

Europe