Elonis vs. U.S.

, 13-983 (2015)
Facts:
Elonis used the Web site Facebook to post lyrics containing graphically violent
language and imagery concerning his wife, co-workers, children, and law
enforcement, interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics were fictitious and that
Elonis was exercising his First Amendment rights. His boss fired him. His wife
obtained an order of protection. Eloniss former employer contacted the FBI. The
agency monitored Eloniss Facebook activity and charged him under 18 U.S.C.
875(c), which makes it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce any
communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.
Procedure: A grand jury indicted Elonis for making threats to injure patrons and
employees of the park, his estranged wife, police officers, a kindergarten class, and
an FBI Agent, all in violation of 18 U.S.C.875(c). In the District Court, Elonis, moved
to dismiss the indictment for failing to allege that he had intended to threaten
anyone. The District Court denied the motion, holding that Third Circuit precedent
required only that Elonis: intentionally made the communication, not that he
intended to make a threat. He requested a jury instruction that "the government
must prove that he intended to communicate a true threat." which was also denied.
He was convicted on the last four of the five counts. He was sentenced to 44
months in prison, and three years supervised release. He appealed unsuccessfully
to the circuit court of appeals, renewing his challenge to the jury instructions. He
appealed to the Supreme Court based on lack of any attempt to show intent to
threaten and on First Amendment rights.
Issue: Does a conviction of threatening another person under 18 U. S. C. 875(c)
requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten?
Decision: Yes, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U. S. C. 875(c)
requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten.
Reasoning: The Court held that the prosecution needed to show that Elonis
intended the posts to be threats, and therefore that there was a subjective intent to
threaten. An objective reasonable person standard does not go far enough to
separate innocent, accidental conduct from purposeful, wrongful acts. The Court
held that, in this case, an objective standard would risk punishing an innocent actor
because the crucial element that makes this behavior criminal is the threat, not
merely the posting.

Ruling of the case: The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.