CCS indefinite detention AFF

- 1ac

Plan
The United States Congress should curtail topically
relevant indefinite detention to cases involving persons
arrested and/or captured outside of the territory of the
United States

Terrorism Adv
Initially note the President will never choose to use
detention authority for domestic captures but keeping
the option available ensures confusion and the
misperception that it is a realistic option
Robert M. Chesney, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Governance Studies @ Brookings and Benjamin
Wittes, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies @ Brookings, Protecting U.S. Citizens Constitutional Rights

13

During the War on Terror, Testimony To Congress, May 22 nd 20

,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2013/05/22-war-on-terror-chesney-wittes

Congress should put this issue to rest at last by clarifying that neither
the AUMF nor the NDAA FY12 should be read to confer detention authority over
persons captured in the United States (regardless of citizenship). The benefits of
keeping the option open in theory are slim, while the offsetting costs are
substantial. We say the benefits are slim chiefly because the executive
branch has so little interest in using detention authority domestically.
The Bush administration had little appetite for military detention in such cases all along,
preferring in almost all instances involving al Qaeda suspects in the United
States to stick with the civilian criminal justice system . The experiment of
military detention with Padilla and al-Marri did little to encourage a different
course, given the legal uncertainty the cases exposed. That uncertainty has, in turn,
created an enormous disincentive for any administrationof whatever political
stripeto attempt this sort of detention again. A de facto policy thus developed
in favor of using the criminal justice apparatus whenever humanly possible
for terrorist suspects apprehended in the United States. And whenever
humanly possible turned out to mean always; while military detention
may remain potentially available as a theoretical matter , it is not
functionally available for the simple reasons that (i) executive branch
lawyers are not adequately confident that the Supreme Court would affirm its
legality and (ii) in any event, they have a viable and far-more-reliable alternative in
the criminal justice apparatus. In September 2010, the Obama administration made
this unstated policy official, announcing that it would use the criminal justice
system exclusively both for domestic captures and for citizens captured
anywhere in the world. In a speech at the Harvard Law School, then-White House official John Brennan
stated: it is the firm position of the Obama Administration that suspected
terrorists arrested inside the United States willin keeping with long-standing
traditionbe processed through our Article III courts. As they should be. Our
In our view,

military does not patrol our streets or enforce our lawsnor should it. . . . Similarly, when it comes to U.S. citizens
involved in terrorist-related activity, whether they are captured overseas or at home, we will prosecute them in our

To put the matter simply, military detention for citizens or for

terrorist suspects captured domestically, was tried a handful of times early in the Bush
criminal justice system.

the strategy was abandoned; it has been many years since there
was any appetite in the executive branch under the control of either partyfor trying it
again; and it has for some time been the stated policy of the executive
branch not to attempt it under any circumstances. We do not expect
any administration of either party to break blithely with the
consensus that has developed absent some dramatically changed
circumstance. The litigation risk is simply too great, and the criminal justice
systems performance has been too strong to warrant assuming this risk. But
ironically, even as this strong executive norm against military detention of
domestic captures and citizens has developed, a fierce commitment to this type of
detention has also developed in some quarters. The fact that the norm
against detention is not currently written into law has helped fuel
this commitment, enabling the persistent perception that there is
greater policy latitude than functionally exists. The result is that every time a
major terrorist suspect has been taken into custody domestically in recent yearsthe
arrest of Djokhar Tsarnaev is only the most recent example the country
explodes in the exact same unproductive and divisive political
debate. To caricature it only slightly, one side argues that the suspect should
have been held in military custody, instead of being processed through the
criminal justice system; it decries the reading of the suspect his Miranda
rights; and it criticizes the administration, more generally, for a supposed
return to a pre-9/11 law enforcement paradigm. The other side, meanwhile,
defends the civilian justice system, while also demanding the closure of
Guantnamo and attacking the performance of military commissions for good
measure. This kabuki dance of a debate is not merely a matter of rhetoric .
Separate and apart from the U.S. citizen detention language we described above, in the course of
producing the 2012 NDAA Congress also explored the option of
mandating military detention for suspects (citizen or not) taken into custody within the
administration;

United States. The administration resisted these efforts, and the resulting language in conference committee ultimately
stopped far short of requiring military detention. The administration further softened the effects of that language,

which brings us back to

our point: there is a big gulf between the real, functional state of
play (in which the criminal justice system provides the exclusive means of
processing terrorist suspects captured within the United States ) and the
perception in some quarters that military detention remains a viable option,
perhaps even a norm, for domestic and citizen terrorist captures. That gulf
has real costs. Most obviously, it generates significant political friction every
time a major terrorist arrest happens in the United States . It increases the apparent
moreover, through its subsequent interpretation of the new language. All of

political polarization of an area that should be above politicsand in which the counterterrorism reality is far less

And it reinforces the

perception that domestic military detention remains a viable option ,
needlessly alarming those who fear it and needlessly misleading those who wish to see it.
The resulting confusion fuels sharp debate over something that is no longer
meaningfully an option in functional terms. That debate even spills over at times into litigation,
polarized than the inter-branch relations over the issue would suggest.

most notablyand disruptivelyin the context of the Hedges case in New York (in which journalists and activists
persuaded a district judge to enjoin enforcement of detention authority, despite the utter implausibility of the claim that
they might be subjected to it).

Extradition Link
This perception results in real consequences - The threat
that the US is willing to violate article 6 of the US-EU
Extradition treaty vis--vis the NDAA guarantees terror
suspects wont be extradited to the United States
undermining the ability of the US to bring them to justice
Stacy K. Hayes. INTERPRETING THE NEW LANGUAGE OF THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT: A POTENTIAL BARRIER TO THE EXTRADITION
OF HIGH VALUE TERROR SUSPECTS, 58 Wayne L. Rev. 567, Summer 20 12

Article 6 most closely parallels U.S. Constitutional Amendment V in providing

for the right to a fair trial and due process of law for the criminally charged .
n42 Article 6 includes inter alia the right to a fair trial [*574] by an independent and impartial tribunal, the
presumption of innocence, that legal assistance will be provided in the event the accused cannot afford to
defend himself, and the right to examine the evidence against him. n43 Modern extradition cases
demonstrate that the American view on capital punishment, and whether such punishment amounts to
inhuman and degrading (or cruel and unusual) punishment, differs greatly from the European view so

To date, Article 6 and whether or not American

courts provide a fair trial has not proven to be a barrier to extradition
because European courts are persuaded that American courts offer more
than adequate due process for those on trial . n44 Military tribunals
however, present a different concern. Tribunals pose a threat to
extradition in that terror suspects may claim Article 6 violations, arguing that
a trial by military tribunal deprives them of due process and denies them a
right to a fair trial. D. Do Military Commissions Violate Article 6? The past decade
highlighted the difficulties of achieving success within the military
commission process and cast a dark shadow of doubt [*575] as to their efficacy.
n45 The examples of al-Fawwaz and the other terror suspects currently
fighting extradition demonstrate that the European community expects
assurances that the United States will try these suspects in regularly
constituted courts and not by military commissions. n46 The past ten years
have produced no evidence that the European community will now be more
comfortable with trial by military commission than it was before . n47 It is safe to
assume that if the United States wants to extradite these terror suspects, it will
have to provide the same assurances, namely a promise of trial by regularly
constituted courts with no prospect of the death penalty and avoidance of detention
by the military. Military commissions have a long history in the United States, reemerging at the
much so that it is a barrier to extradition.

forefront of the political landscape after the September 11th terrorist attacks when President George W.
Bush deemed terror suspects enemy combatants to be tried by military tribunals instead of in civilian
courts. n48 The prosecution of these cases was soon mired in protracted legal challenges, and in 2006,
President Bush signed the Military Commissions Act (MCA) to authorize and establish procedures for
military tribunals in response to the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. n49 Following
Hamdan, pro-military tribunal advocates fought hard to pass legislation limiting terror suspects solely to
military tribunals, arguing inter alia that federal law enforcement and criminal procedures were inadequate
to garner much needed intelligence from detained suspects and that the American public would not stand
for terrorist trials in civilian courts that are essentially in their own backyards. n50 Those opposed to

limiting terror suspects to military [*576] tribunals encompassed a wide variety of groups including law
enforcement officials, human rights advocates, academics, and legal professionals. n51 Law enforcement
argued primarily that such a limitation would burden the United States unnecessarily in the fight against
terrorism; a fight that should use all available assets, including the FBI and intelligence agencies. n52
Human rights advocates, academics, and legal professionals argued that in fighting the war on terror, it
was critical the United States abide by its long-standing commitments to due process of law and to
international humanitarian law, such as the Geneva Conventions. n53 In 2009, President Barack Obama
signed into law a revised version of the MCA intended to address concerns that the 2006 MCA ran afoul of
the Geneva Conventions and the U.S. Constitution. n54 However, even with these revisions, the 2009 MCA
failed to bring the military tribunal system into compliance with international human rights law. n55 For
instance, the 2009 MCA did nothing to revise the controversial Section 7 of the 2006 MCA, which means
Section 7 continues to strip the federal court system of its capacity to review petitions for writs of habeas
corpus. n56 Unsatisfied that the 2006 and 2009 MCAs went far enough, and despite the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in Hamdan, some conservative members of Congress continued to fight to limit trials of
terror suspects exclusively to military tribunals, thereby cutting the judiciary entirely out of the terror
suspect trial loop. n57 Meanwhile, the federal courts spent the [*577] past decade successfully trying and
convicting hundreds of suspects, n58 perhaps demonstrating the irrational fear of the pro-military tribunal
advocates that those who have their day in court may not be convicted. In addition to these convictions,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to four Guantanamo cases, subsequently finding in favor of the
detainees, n59 thereby demonstrating the full range of the federal court system. On December 31, 2011,
these failed attempts to limit trials to military tribunals finally met measured success when President

Subtitle D of the NDAA, entitled

"Counterterrorism" includes long-sought-after provisions designed to limit
terror suspect trials to military tribunals, effectively by-passing the federal
court system. n61 In particular, Sections 1021 and 1022 address the authority
and action required by the U.S. military to detain terror suspects indefinitely
pending disposition under the law of war. n62 Even with the success of passage, these
provisions were modified enough from their original hard-lined proposals to
result in merely codifying existing practices under the 2001 Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF) and the 2006 and 2009 MCAs. n63 As this Note reveals, these
modifications are crucial because they allow the United States to continue
to provide assurances necessary to secure the extradition of known
terrorists. Viewed another way, this codification greatly hampers both federal law
enforcement and the Obama Administration in their respective roles in the
fight against terrorism, making it more difficult for the United States to
treat terror suspects on a case-by-case basis. In order to bring some of
the most sought-after terrorists to justice, the United States must continue to
provide and uphold assurances to her European allies that the terror
suspects being extradited to the United States will not be subjected to
inhuman or degrading treatment and will be given a fair and impartial trial.
Without these assurances, the U.K. and Europe will not likely [*578] extradite
the currently detained high-value terror suspects to the United States. 1. The
Obama signed the NDAA into law. n60

Procedural Shortcomings Amount to a Lack of Due Process, and the 2009 MCA Falls Short in Correcting
Deficiencies As mentioned earlier, the Obama Administration sought many changes to the highly criticized
2006 MCA. But even with the 2009 modifications, the use of military tribunals under the MCA and AUMF
still fails to meet international human rights standards for a fair and impartial trial, most notably because
of the lack of independence and impartiality. n64 The importance of a tribunal being independent and
[*579] impartial is such that it "requires that judges be both de facto impartial and independent as well as
appear to be impartial and independent." n65 Two more glaring deficiencies in military tribunals include
the lack of the presumption of innocence and denial of access to the writ of habeas corpus. In Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (CSRT), which are precursors to a detainee's trial by military commission, instead
of a presumption of innocence favoring the defendant, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
government's evidence. n66 CSRTs provide a rebuttable presumption that the government's evidence
submitted to determine whether the detainee is an enemy combatant is genuine and accurate. n67 To
date, detained persons held in the United States have relied on habeas corpus to show that their detention
is not in accord with due process, n68 but this important check still does not exist for detainees held under

U.S. control outside of the United States. n69 Other procedural deficiencies with the military commission
process include deprivation of the right to counsel (particularly in the beginning stages), the right to be
informed (with most restrictions to information surrounding classified information, with classification being
determined by the prosecution), the right to be present (the prosecution may exclude the detainee from
his own hearing for reasons of national security, as determined by the prosecution), the requirement for
equality (detainees are usually denied requests to call witnesses and in 89% "of the tribunals, no evidence
whatsoever was presented on the detainee's behalf"), and the admittance of coerced evidence. n70 The
2009 MCA made slight improvements to some of these deficiencies by stating that "the defense shall have
a reasonable opportunity to obtain witnesses and evidence," and by entirely barring the "use of statements
obtained through cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." n71 However, the new witness and evidence
requirements of the 2009 MCA fall short of meeting the requirements of equal opportunity among the
parties. In addition, the bar to improperly obtained statements [*580] does not apply to former CSRTs. n72
Ensuring due process, access to counsel, and access to all proceedings and all evidence are critical
guarantees that must be provided to offer a fair trial. n73 As it stands, military commissions, despite some
marked improvements, are not likely to meet the standards necessary to establish the right to a fair trial
as set forth in Article 6 of the Convention. 2. European Court Insight on Article 6 Compliance What are the
expectations of the European Court relative to Article 6 compliance? In twenty-two years of jurisprudence
handed down from the European Court since Soering, the court never found an expulsion, until 2012, that
violated Article 6 despite the claim's repeated assertion. n74 As Soering established, the European Court
demands a showing of a "real risk of a flagrant denial of justice" to invoke a claim under Article 6. n75 This
means that the claimant must meet a higher burden under Article 6 than Article 3; but in "assessing
whether this test has been met, the Court considers that the same standard and burden of proof should
apply as in Article 3 expulsion cases." n76 The court stated that the Article 6 test is a "stringent test of
unfairness" and that a "flagrant denial of justice goes beyond mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in
the trial procedures such as might result in a breach of Article 6 if occurring within the Contracting State
itself." n77 In defining flagrant denial of justice, the court noted that it is: Synonymous with a trial which is
manifestly contrary to the provisions of Article 6 or the principles embodied therein. Although it has not yet
been required to define the term in more precise terms, the Court has nonetheless indicated that certain
forms of unfairness could amount to a flagrant denial of justice. These have included: conviction in
absentia with no possibility subsequently to obtain a fresh determination of the merits of the charge;
[*581] a trial which is summary in nature and conducted with a total disregard for the rights of the
defence; detention without any access to an independent and impartial tribunal to have the legality of the
detention reviewed; and deliberate and systematic refusal of access to a lawyer, especially for an
individual detained in a foreign country. n78 On January 17, 2012 in Othman (Abu Qatada), the court
determined that evidence obtained by torture would amount to a flagrant denial of justice invoking Article
6. n79 The court went further to state that similar considerations may apply in a case that presented
evidence obtained by other forms of ill-treatment that fall short of torture as well. n80 In addition to the
guidelines for Article 6 that Othman now provides, the European Court previously made clear that the
guarantees of a right to a fair trial apply to all types of judicial proceedings, even those deemed
administrative. n81 Moreover, the court has stated that special proceedings, such as military court-martial,
may "be subject to Article 6 scrutiny because of the serious criminal nature of the crime with which the
defendant had been accused." n82 Thus, it is safe to assume that military tribunals, as well as their
administrative precursors, CSRTs, are very likely to amount to a flagrant denial of justice under Article 6. III.

Understanding how the European Court

views Article 6 compliance and the current perceptions of the U.S. military
tribunal system, one can surmise that the European Court is likely to block
extradition if a suspect will face trials in a military tribunal. Current cases demonstrate how [*582]
terror suspects have successfully employed Article 3 to deter extradition , and
forecast the future use of Article 6. n83 These cases indicate that it would be wise for
the United States to continue to grant assurances that terror suspects will not be
at risk of the death penalty, military detention, or trial by military commission. How
the U.S. government interprets and applies the language of the NDAA,
specifically Sections 1021 and 1022, n84 will prove pivotal in the fight to win
extradition of these known terror suspects and ultimately bring them to
justice. A. Recent Extradition Cases Recent cases of terror suspects invoking Article 3 to fight extradition
Analysis of How the NDAA Affects Extradition

to the United States exemplify how the European Court may respond to Article 6 claims. These cases
provide insight into how the United States should proceed with regard to statutory interpretation of the
NDAA, particularly when requesting extradition of terror suspects. 1. Al-Fawwaz, Bary, and Eidarous Have
Successfully Thwarted Extradition Since 1998 Using Article 3 Three terror suspects, who were arrested in
London in the late 1990s, have successfully fought extradition for over a decade using Article 3. Khalid al-

Fawwaz, alleged not only to be an al-Qaeda member, but also one of Osama bin Laden's key lieutenants,
n85 was indicted for the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa which killed 224 people and injured
more than 4,500. n86 Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Eidarous, both alleged members of Egyptian Islamic
Jihad, operated alongside al-Fawwaz in the London al-Qaeda cell, n87 and were subsequently arrested "on
an extradition warrant following a request from the United States" in 1999 for their involvement in the
bombings. n88 For several years, al-Fawwaz, Bary, and Eidarous successfully fought extradition through a
[*583] series of appeals within the U.K. n89 In 2008, the U.K. Secretary of State issued warrants for their
extradition to the United States, finding that the U.S. government met the prima facie case and provided
reliable assurances. n90 Thus, the men would not be at "risk of the death penalty, indefinite detention or
trial by a military commission." n91 Eidarous was diagnosed with advanced cancer, put on house-arrest,
and subsequently died in 2008. n92 In 2009, al-Fawwaz and Bary began their final appeal against the 2008
findings of the Secretary of State, with the British High Court of Justice finding no breach of Article 3, and
al-Fawwaz's claim for breach of Article 6 unsubstantiated. n93 They soon appealed to the European Court

If the United States does not uphold the original

assurances provided in 2004, the European Court could deny extradition of
these long-sought-after terror suspects, destroying an otherwise perfect record
of honoring the assurances the United States has provided to the U.K. and
her European allies. The implications would disrupt the ultimate goal of
bringing wanted terrorists to justice . It is imperative that the United States
maintain the assurances as provided in 2004 and demonstrate that the new
statutory language of the NDAA does not impede the President from dealing
with each terror suspect case on an individual basis and as necessary to
continue to effectively fight the war on terrorism.
and the case is still pending. n94 [*584]

Use of detention authority hinders effective intelligence

gathering and extraditions internationally recent history
proves.
Hathaway, et al, 13
[Oona (Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law,
Yale Law School); Samuel Adelsberg (J.D. candidate at Yale Law School);
Spencer Amdur (J.D. candidate at Yale Law School); Freya Pitts (J.D. candidate
at Yale Law School); Philip Levitz (J.D. from Yale Law School); and Sirine
Shebaya (J.D. from Yale Law School), The Power To Detain: Detention of
Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38,
2013]

Many key U.S. allies have been unwilling to cooperate in cases involving
law-of-war detention or prosecution but have cooperated in criminal
prosecutions. In fact, many U.S. extradition treaties, including those with allies
such as India and Germany, forbid extradition when the defendant will not be
tried in a criminal court.252 This issue has played out in practice several times. An alShabaab operative was extradited from the Netherlands only after
assurances from the United States that he would be prosecuted in criminal
court.253 Two similar cases arose in 2007.254 In perhaps the most striking
example, five terrorism suspectsincluding Abu Hamza al-Masr, who is
accused of providing material support to al-Qaeda by trying to set up a

training camp in Oregon and of organizing support for the Taliban in Afghanistan were
extradited to the United States by the United Kingdom in October 2012.255 The extradition was made on
the express condition that they would be tried in civilian federal criminal courts rather than in the military
commissions.256 And, indeed, both the European Court of Human Rights and the
British courts allowed the extradition to proceed a ctions offered by the U.S.
federal criminal justice system and finding they fully met all relevant
standards.257 An insistence on using military commissions may thus hinder
extradition and other kinds of international prosecutorial cooperation, such
as the sharing of testimony and evidence.

The threat is not hyperbole the EU has already denied

extradition on the basis of indefinite detention
Peter Margulies of the Roger Williams School of Law, Peter Margulies on
the NDAA and Extradition, December 2011,
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/peter-margulies-on-the-ndaa-andextradition/

making military prosecution the rule and Article III courts the exception
would ramp up anti-extradition efforts in Europe and elsewhere . Extradition to
face criminal charges in Article III courts already faces severe obstacles, as the United
Kingdom case of Abu Hamza demonstrates. Abu Hamza, whom the US has charged
with recruiting terrorists for Al Qaeda, has argued that the United States would impose a
prison term disproportionate to his crimes and that confinement in a supermax facility
Even more seriously,

would violate the European Convention on Human Rights bar on inhuman and degrading treatment. In
Babar Ahmad v. UK, the European Court of Human Rights held that Abu Hamza and others had raised
serious questions on the legality of their extradition. Even after significant procedural reforms and the
recent installation of the widely respected General Mark Martins as head of the prosecution office at the

transnational tribunals will probably view military commissions as

offering fewer procedural rights and stiffer sentences than Article III courts.
This will make extradition an even tougher sell in those tribunals, whose
commissions,

jurisprudence has developed as a push-back against Bush administration policies such as coercive

Particular countries,
such as Germany, go even further, expressly barring extradition when the
defendant faces trial in an extraordinary court or for a purely military
offense. Arguments that military commission jurisdiction fell within either or
both of these bars may take years to resolve. Moreover, advocates for these
detainees and others have mobilized substantial political support in Britain
against extradition. Opposing extradition is already the cause du jour for some European
celebrities. Political opposition will strengthen if military commissions became the rule, rather
than the exception. In some cases, American investigators may not even be able to get
their foot in the door of the cell of a detainee held abroad when military commissions
are the norm. As Assistant Attorney General Monaco suggested at last weeks ABA conference, the
specter of military commissions may shut off access to suspected terrorists,
and may hinder real-time information- sharing by our allies. Prompt detection
interrogation implemented in the immediate aftermath of September 11.

and investigation of terrorist plots could be the NDAAs unintended first

casualty.

Countries would literally have to let these terror suspects

go
David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the U.S.
Department of Justice
from March 2009 to March 2011, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism
Tool, 6/15/2011 http://jnslp.com//wp-content/uploads/2011/06/01_DavidKris.pdf

These concerns are not hypothetical. During the last Administration, the United
States was obliged to give assurances against the use of military
commissions in order to obtain extradition of several terrorism suspects to
the United States.190 There are a number of terror suspects currently in
foreign custody who likely would not be extradited to the United States by foreign
nations if they faced military tribunals.191 In some of these cases, it might be
necessary for the foreign nation to release these suspects if they cannot be
extradited because they do not face charges pending in the foreign nation.

This will make Europe a safe-haven for terrorist

operations
Daniel J. Sharfstein, Associate, Strumwasser & Woocher, Santa Monica,
California, European Courts, American Rights: Extradition and Prison
Conditions, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. 719, Spring 20 02

The "vast majority" of people suspected of

involvement in the September 11 terrorist attacks have been arrested or are
being sought overseas. n13 Although the United States has [*725] actively bypassed formal
extradition with secret, informal procedures in numerous cases of suspected terrorists, n14 the war on
terrorism shows unequivocally what has become increasingly true over the
past two decades: that extradition is an essential tool for prosecutors in
the United States. The rising tide of people and goods across borders and
the ascendance of global technologies such as the Internet have blurred the line
between domestic and international criminal enforcement. From terrorism to
drug trafficking to price fixing, multinational conspiracies have taken root in the fertile soil of an eversmaller world. n15 For technology-driven crimes such as telemarketing fraud, international
boundaries often separate [*726] perpetrators and victims. n16 Even when criminals
A. The Increasing Importance of Extradition

live in the same country as their victims, more

fugitives from justice have managed to flee

across national borders. n17 Since the Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs was
created in 1979 to facilitate and rationalize extradition procedures, n18 the number of extradition requests

American
policy makers had emphasized the rising threat of international crime and the
crucial role of extradition in fighting it. n20 In October 1995, President Bill Clinton
issued Presidential Decision Directive 42, ordering U.S. government agencies to intensify
international crime-fighting efforts, and in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he urged
"every country" to endorse "a declaration which would first include a no
sanctuary pledge, so that we could say together to organized criminals,
terrorists, drug traffickers and smugglers, you have nowhere to [*727] run and
nowhere to hide." n21 In an October 1997 memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys, Attorney General Janet
Reno praised federal prosecutors for "going the extra mile" to obtain the international extradition of
fugitives. "Your need to obtain the international extradition of fugitives [is] more
important than ever," she wrote. n22 Six months later, a report developed by the Departments of
made and received by the United States has skyrocketed. n19 Well before September 11,

Justice, State, and Treasury outlined a comprehensive strategy to fight international crime. In a chapter
entitled "Denying Safe Haven to International Criminals," the report described how the Departments of
State and Justice were aggressively renegotiating extradition treaties to "seek[] the broadest possible
extradition obligations . . . ." n23

This makes terrorism in Europe inevitable

David B. Rivkin, Jr., Associate Fellow of The Nixon Center and Lee A. Casey, partner in the Washington,
DC office of Baker & Hostetler LLP., A House Divided? War, Extradition, and the Atlantic Alliance, PART II,

02

The National Interest, October 9th 20

, http://nationalinterest.org/article/a-house-divided-warextradition-and-the-atlantic-alliance-part-ii-2137?page=1

Indeed, one can argue that, given the nature of this conflict, law enforcement operations have become just

The current idiosyncratic European attitudes do

more than just impede the U.S. ability to successfully prosecute this conflict;
they pose a major threat to European security as well. To the extent that
European attitudes towards extradition remain unchanged while the U.S. continues
to uproot various terrorist support structures around the world, Europe might well become a
magnet for Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and its terrorist allies. This is, in fact, a
perennial feature of warfare; when a success by one side on a particular front causes the enemy
to shift his resources to the less well defended areas. Unrealistic European law-enforcement
attitudes may well make European capitals more attractive to terrorists than
the warrens of Mogadishu or the slums of Sudan . In fact, recent investigations
by German and Dutch authorities have already uncovered dozens of Al-Qaeda
cells and demonstrated that many of the September 11 operatives spent
considerable amounts of time in Europe.
another version of low-intensity warfare.

A European safe-haven allows terrorists to target the

United States
Julia C. Whitehair, Master of Arts in Security Studies graduate thesis, A
PLACE TO HIDE: POPULAR SUPPORT AND TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS, Nov 19 th
2010,
http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553428/Whit
ehairJuliaC.pdf?sequence=1

Given U.S. efforts to shut down traditional safe havens and the attention given in recent years to

United States and Europe, policymakers likely will have to

confront questions about safe havens within healthy states . Terrorism experts
and policymakers with counterterrorism portfolios have already raised Europe as a
persistent source of terrorism targeting the United States. Michael
Scheuer in his testimony before members of Congress called the European Union the
earths single largest terrorist safe haven and a major, consistent, and
invulnerable source of terrorist threat to the United States .5 Former Director of
Central Intelligence Porter Goss in 2005 and former U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Ambassador Harry A. Crumpton in 2006 testified about the persistent threat to
the United States from terrorists based in Europe .6 Senators Lieberman and Collins of
homegrown terrorist cells in the

the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs spoke of an increase in homegrown
terror cells and attacks with roots in the United States.7

European terrorist attacks on American targets ensure

massive retaliation
VOA (Voice of America), US Concerned with Islamic Extremism in Europe,
October 31st 2009, http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/319848.html
The State Department's coordinator for counter-terrorism, Henry Crumpton, told the Senate Foreign

Washington has good reason to worry about Islamic

extremism in Europe, following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. "The
terrorist cell that conducted the 9/11 attacks did much of its planning from a
base in Europe," said Henry Crumpton. "Five years later, and despite many counter-terrorism
successes, violent Islamic extremism in Europe continues to pose a threat to the
national security of the United States and our allies ." Recent incidents in Europe linked
Relations Committee,

to Muslim extremists include bombings in Madrid and London. In his testimony, Assistant Secretary of State
Daniel Fried said the majority of Western Europe's more than 15 million Muslims are moderate. But he said
he believes Muslims in Europe find Islamic extremism increasingly attractive because they are alienated
from European societies in which they live. "Many marginalized Muslims, who cross the threshold into
extremism, seem to be driven by a sense of spiritual alienation," said Daniel Fried. "They're less concerned
than were their parents with economic survival in Europe. Many of Europe's second and third generation
Muslims seem to long for spiritual fulfillment." Disaffected Muslims, especially young people, showed their
numbers in protests last year in France. Fried adds that he believes many of Europe's Muslims who feel
marginalized do not find their needs met in local, mainstream institutions. "Foreign financiers and religious
activists, often from abroad, fill this spiritual vacuum, by building local mosques, and supplying them with
extremist imams," he said. "Disconnected from often tolerant traditions of their families' original

homelands, these Muslims are susceptible to foreign propaganda, and sermons that preach narrow and
hateful interpretations of Islam." Although these officials devoted most of their testimony to discussing
integration problems that exist in Europe, Senator George Allen indicated one reason why this is also an

there are
implications for the United States," said Senator Allen. "The United States and
Europe enjoy an open travel arrangement, making it simple for anyone
carrying a European country's passport to come to the United States on a
day's notice. Thus, how Europe handles this issue is important for our own
homeland security." Robin Niblett, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a public
policy organization, said terrorists do not have to come to the United States to do
damage to U.S. interests. "Muslims, extremists, do not need to travel to the United States to be
able to undertake attacks," said Robin Niblett. "They can take on American targets in
Europe. They can take American targets in Iraq. In essence, they are getting their fill of
attacking America, and proving they can, without having to come over here ."
important issue for the United States. "While it may not be so obvious, though,

Meanwhile, Niblett says, he is worried that the level of frustration and alienation in many of the Muslim
communities in Europe is still strong and, therefore, dangerous. "The

risk of another terrorist

attack is real," he noted. "If another attack happens, the backlash will be
severe. Even without another attack, levels of alienation are going to continue, and removing them will
be a long process." Niblett says he believes this process of dealing with Islamic extremism in Europe is just
beginning. And, he adds, Western governments are not, in his words, "totally in control of the agenda to try
to resolve it."

Independently Europe is a prime location for terror cells

to construct a nuclear weapon multiple reasons
Charles Ferguson, scientist-in-residence based in the Washington DC office
of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies, The threat of nuclear terrorism in Europe, 02-06-20 04,
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-06-02-ferguson-en.html

A nuclear terrorist act anywhere is a nuclear terrorist act everywhere . In

particular, a terrorist-detonated nuclear weapon in a European city will impact on American security.
Conversely, a terrorist-constructed crude nuclear bomb exploded in an American city will have
repercussions for European security. Nuclear weapon explosions are the most devastating form, or face, of

The four recognized faces of nuclear terrorism are : Terrorists

could seize an intact nuclear weapon and bypass its security features, thus activating it.
Terrorists could acquire, through theft, purchase, or diversion, weapons-usable fissile
material (either highly enriched uranium or plutonium) and build a crude nuclear weapon, or improvised
nuclear device (IND). Terrorists could attack or sabotage nuclear facilities , such as
commercial nuclear power plants or research reactors, to cause a release of radioactivity. Terrorists
could acquire and release radioactive materials, such as commercial radioactive sources
nuclear terrorism.

used in medicine, research, and industry, to fuel radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) one type of which
is popularly known as a "dirty bomb," or release radiation through other mechanisms, such as radiation

While most terrorist groups are not

motivated to unleash nuclear terror, at least one terrorist network - al Qaeda - has
expressed strong interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction . Al Qaeda
emission devices. Understanding Nuclear Terrorists

operatives and their brethren in like-minded organizations have spread their web across numerous
countries. According to a January report by The Observer ,

Islamic militants have built up an

extensive network in Europe since 11 September 2001, using Great Britain

as a logistical hub and nerve center. In recent years, Islamic extremists have expanded
eastward into Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania. Terrorist cells have become
rooted in Austria, France, and Germany and have recruited new members in
these and other countries. Intelligence officials have warned that labeling all of these
groups as al Qaeda misses the complexity behind the terrorist network . While
most of the cells follow a similar agenda as al Qaeda, few directly hold their
allegiance to this organization. The current focus on Islamic extremist groups
should not blind us from seeing other terrorist organizations that would covet
nuclear means of destruction. For example, Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic cult with no ties to
Islamic extremism, sought out nuclear weapons and released deadly sarin gas in a 1995 chemical attack in
the Tokyo subway system. Despite the growth of terrorist cells in Europe, one must not assume that they
will ultimately go nuclear. Climbing the escalation ladder to acts of nuclear terror requires leaping over
several barriers. Regardless of the nuclear terror act under consideration, the terrorist group must be
motivated to conduct extreme levels of violence and to venture into unconventional methods of attack.

While a terrorist organization with a well-defined constituency would most

likely not want to alienate its constituency with a nuclear act, groups that
have weak or non-existent ties to constituencies would not face as many
moral or political constraints. For example, the Chechen rebels, a national-separatist group,
depend strongly on their supporters within Chechnya. In contrast, the character and agenda of
al Qaeda, a political-religious terrorist network, make this organization
apparently less concerned about directly harming constituents. The final
barriers for a terrorist group to cross are technical in nature . The group would
have to acquire the nuclear assets. If the group decided to attack a nuclear power plant, it
would have to identify a vulnerable nuclear facility. The organization would have
to develop or hire the skills needed to build and detonate a weapon or to
sabotage a nuclear facility. Finally, the group would have to be able to deliver the
attack without being detected during the development or completion phase.
Vulnerable Nuclear and Radiological Assets in Europe Tactical nuclear
weapons: Though intact nuclear weapons tend to be well-guarded, some are more susceptible than
others to falling into the hands of terrorists. Most experts believe that portable so-called
tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are more vulnerable to terrorist seizure than
are strategic nuclear weapons. TNWs are designed for nuclear-war fighting or battlefield use. As such,

they tend to be more portable than their strategic cousins. In Europe, concerns over loose
nuclear weapons have focused on the thousands of Russian TNWs that are in various physical conditions
and under varying security storage and use. The United States also maintains about 150-180 TNWs in
about six NATO countries. While European politicians want to keep the issue of NATO's nuclear weapons
out of public view, they need to take steps to reassure Russia that nuclear arms will not be deployed in
new NATO-member states. This confidence building measure could serve as a way toward achieving more

Of the two types of

weapons-usable nuclear material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) poses the
greatest concern, because it can be used in the simplest nuclear bomb - a gunopenness about how to improve the security of Russian TNWs. Uranium:

type device - to produce a high-yield explosion. Most weapons experts agree that a well-funded terrorist
group could build a gun-type bomb, which simply slams two pieces of HEU together inside a gun barrel.

Research sites in
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia have
HEU, supplied mostly from Russia. Over the past several years, experts have warned
that HEU from these sites could find its way to terrorists . The December 1994 seizure
The major barrier to stopping construction of such a device is access to HEU.

of almost three kilograms of weapons-usable HEU in the Czech Republic highlighted this danger. Since the
fall of the Soviet Union,

there have been many incidents of illicit trafficking of

nuclear and radiological materials in Central and Eastern Europe and the newly
independent states. Many more incidents could be happening than are being detected. Fortunately, efforts
to secure and repatriate HEU from vulnerable sites in this region have begun. Since the summer of 2002,
the United States, Russia, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), partner governments, and nongovernmental organizations, such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, have conducted three successful
missions - Belgrade, Romania and Bulgaria - to secure HEU at research sites and to repatriate it to Russia.
But more needs to be done, since about 20 additional research sites, each containing enough Russianorigin HEU for at least one bomb, still exist. Some of these sites are located in Central and Eastern Europe.

Within the past few years, the European Union has commissioned two
studies to determine the effectiveness of the existing regulatory practices
concerning the life cycle of radioactive sources . The first study examined the controls
within the EU itself and found that radioactive materials management varied across the EU. The report
underscored the risk posed by some 30,000 disused sources that are in
danger of becoming orphaned, that is, of falling outside of regulatory
controls. On the heels of that study, the EU investigated the regulatory practices in the Czech Republic,
Radiation:

Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, states that were being considered for early admission to the EU.
The EU study concluded that these states have regulatory controls that meet the general standards found
throughout the EU. While the results of these pre-11 September reports are by and large encouraging, it
should be noted that they focused on safety considerations and did not examine details of security
procedures. Nuclear power plants: Well-designed nuclear power plants employ defense-in-depth safety
features. To release radioactivity from a nuclear plant, terrorists would have to destroy or disable multiple

Central and Eastern Europe contain many Sovietdesigned nuclear power plants that do not meet Western safety standards . For
safety systems. Unfortunately,

example, early Soviet-designed models lack an adequate emergency core cooling system and containment
structure, and have an inadequate fire protection system. Such reactors operate in Bulgaria, Slovenia, the

While these reactors have engendered

discussion regarding safety and security, attacks and sabotage against
research centers - where security procedures tend to be less rigorous than at commercial plants have been overlooked. Many research reactors are located at universities
in or near major urban areas. While the inventory of radioactivity in a typical
research reactor pales in comparison to the large quantities of lethal fission
products within a commercial reactor, release of radioactivity from research
sites could suit nuclear terrorists' purposes.
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia and Lithuania.

This ensures great power wars that culminate into

extinction
Robert Ayson, July 2010, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the
Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of
Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place,

there are reasons to

wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in
the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would
would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed,

come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in
significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance
alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be
admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at
their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state

But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate
nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an
act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading
to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the
states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted
possessors themselves.

during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a
catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and
early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable
amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a
massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well
be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem
unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too
responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well.
Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was
thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if
for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a
particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris
resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it
detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the
explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a
terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling
out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in
Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and
possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear
Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons
relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers,
would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would
only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or
China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem
at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a
period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures
that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?

Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil

might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided)
confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion
during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the
U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed
forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In
such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against
the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might
mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly
nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to
preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would
probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed
earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against
the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially
the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and
potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps
not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the
terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen
insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost
certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter
found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act
of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear
terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to
Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim
one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would
happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some
reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might
it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances
of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the
world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously

modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to
use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the
chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear
terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear
threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing
for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently
strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United
States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear
weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps
even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of
thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is
subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of
alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters.
How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russias use of nuclear weapons,
including outside Russias traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would
Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed

In the
charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack,
how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other
major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase how dare
they tell us what to do immediately springs to mind. Some might even
go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the
terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint
likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur?

Allied Co-op Link

Domestic detention undermines our allies willingness to
cooperate on terrorism
Chesney 13 - Professor of Law at the University of Texas School of Law
and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution
Robert Chesney, PROTECTING U.S. CITIZENS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
DURING THE WAR ON TERROR House Hearing, 5/22,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg81173/html/CHRG113hhrg81173.htm
Mr. Chesney. Thank you, Ranking Member Conyers. I'll take those in reverse
order. I'm going to start with the noncitizens question. I do agree, as I said,
before that we should not draw distinction here between the citizens and the
noncitizens captured within the United States, a few reasons for that. One is,
I'll begin with the idea that part of why we would want to resist as a general
proposition military detention for domestic captures is a deep tradition of not
having the military be in the lead when it comes to domestic security when
that can be avoided. There are some circumstances, obviously, the Civil War
and a few other examples, where that's not the case. But, generally speaking,
we have this tradition. Insofar as having a lead role for military detention
when some terrorists may be captured within the United States is possible,
well, that is going to have consequences for other things the military may
need to do to be prepared to execute of role. And they will be in that position
and incentivized to take on certain activities as long as they've got some lead
role. And if noncitizens are that lead roll, there you have it. Secondly, when
we distinguish between citizens and noncitizens, it's alarming to our allies.
Now, here I'm not talking about international law professors, people who do
what I do in other countries, and so forth; I'm talking about t he security
officials in the U.K. and elsewhere who become greatly alarmed and have
difficulty and more friction in their cooperation with us insofar as we claim
authorities that are differential between our citizens and theirs. It's not a
dispositive point, but it's a consideration that has security implications.
Most importantly, the legal uncertainty that I described and the policy
considerations that my colleague Mr. Wittes described, they are applicable on
the citizens and the noncitizens capture fronts. Now, the legal uncertainty is
less dramatic with respect to noncitizen captures, but if I'd had time, I would
have explained how greatly divided the courts were in the case of Ali al-Marri,
who was your prototypical noncitizen al-Qaeda sleeper agent. The courts
were very torn up about that. So why don't I stop there and just say one quick
thing, which is that I don't agree that the armed conflict with al- Qaeda ends
when we leave Afghanistan in terms of an overt, big- footprint deployment.
We've made clear in the papers and elsewhere, we're going to continue to
exercise force in support of counterinsurgency and other and other efforts
and counterterrorism in Afghanistan beyond 2014. That doesn't make it an
endless war. It's a war with defined enemies; it's not a war with terrorism, as

the Administration for both parties have is said in the past. It's a conflict with
al-Qaeda and its associated forces.

The plan is a critical step for reviving allied terrorism

cooperation
Atwood et al 9
J. Brian Atwood served as Under Secretary for Management in 1993 and as
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development
from 1993 to 1999. Harry G. Barnes, Jr. served as Ambassador to Romania
from 1974 to 1977, Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of
Personnel in the Department of State from 1977 to 1981, Ambassador to
India from 1981 to 1985, and Ambassador to Chile from 1985 to 1988. F. Allen
Tex Harris retired after serving with the United States Department of State
for thirty-five years, including Foreign Service posts in Argentina, Australia,
South Africa, and Venezuela. Mr. Harris is a past President of the American
Foreign Service Association. Samuel F. Hart served as Ambassador to Ecuador
from 1982 to 1985 John L. Hirsch served as Ambassador to Sierra Leone from
1995 to 1998. Genta Hawkins Holmes served as Ambassador to Namibia from
1990 to 1992, Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of
Personnel for the Department of State from 1992 to 1995, and Ambassador to
Australia from 1997 to 2000. Gilbert D. Kulick served as a Foreign Service
Officer from 1966 to 1989, retiring as Deputy Director of Southern Africa
Affairs. L. Bruce Laingen served as Ambassador to Malta from 1977 to 1979
and Charges DAffaires in Tehran from 1979 to 1981. Elijah Parish Lovejoy IV
served as a consular officer at the Bridgetown, Barbados Embassy from 1997
to 1999. Laurence E. Pope served as Associate Coordinator for Counterterrorism from 1991 to 1993, Ambassador to Chad from 1993 to 1996, and
Political Advisor to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, from
1997 to 2000. Paul K. Stahnke is Minister Counselor, retired. Among other
posts, he was Counselor of Mission at the United States Mission to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris from 1978
to 1982, and Permanent Representative to the United Nations ESCAP
(Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific) from 1982 to 1988,
while also serving as Economic Counselor in the United States Embassy in
Bangkok during the same period. Alexander F. Watson served as Ambassador
to Peru from 1986 to 1989, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent
Representative to the United Nations from 1989 to 1993, and Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs from 1993 to 1996, Amicus
Brief, Al-Marri v Spagone, Jan 28, 2009,
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/20090128.Alm
arri.v.Sapgone.Amicus.Brief-Former.U.S.Diplomats.pdf
We, the amici curiae lending our names in support of this brief, have all been
in the diplomatic service of the United States. Some have been ambassadors
or foreign service officers; others have had appointments at senior levels in
the Department of State or in the other agencies of the United States

Government dealing with international relations. All are retired from public
service. It is not our purpose to argue the merits of the parties respective
legal positions in this case. Rather, we hope to expand on their presentation
and what the Court may consider in its decision by setting forth our collective
professional experience as to the significance for American diplomacy and
international relations of the holdings of the court below. We understand that
in the case below, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that Congress, in the Authorization for Use of Military Force ( AUMF),
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), vested the Executive with the power
to seize individuals residing in this country , even Americans, and detain them
indefinitely in military custody without criminal charge or trial based solely on
a determination by the Executive that the individual planned to engage in
terrorist activities. We also understand that the procedures for determining
whether such detentions are justified are at best murky and leave uncertain
the potential scope of the exercise of this unprecedented executive authority.
We profess no special expertise in these issues from a constitutional
perspective. However, our professional experience convinces us that
American diplomatic credibility and effectiveness in many areas of
international relations suffer greatly from the widely shared perception that
the United States has abandoned the rule of law and lost its bearings with
regard to its traditional bulwarks against the unchecked authority of its
government to seize and detain its residents without criminal charge or
trial. The Petitioner here, who was lawfully residing the United States with his
family while pursuing a masters degree, was arrested at his home in the
middle-American city of Peoria, Illinois, and has been held within the
territorial boundaries of the United States for the better part of eight years
without criminal trial or any currently pending criminal charges. The
Petitioner alleges that, during this period, he has been held in solitary
confinement, held nearly incommunicado, and subjected to abuses that have
never previously been tolerated in the modern American penal system. One
hallmark of a dictatorship is the governments assertion of a right to
arrest and indefinitely imprison anyone within its borders, citizen or noncitizen, without criminal trial or charges, and to confine such individuals in
harsh and inhumane conditions. Aside from undercutting our ability to
exercise moral suasion against such regimes, a decision upholding such a
claimed right by the United States Executive will ill-serve our country as
we seek to restore our international reputation and to obtain more
cooperation from our allies in combating terrorism, in supporting our
efforts in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in dealing with the IsraeliPalestinian conundrum. Our professional experience informs us that the
United States faces an international credibility gap resulting from a do as I
say not as I do foreign policy that placed perceived threats to American
security as the paramount ethic above its once venerated respect for
freedom from unjustified restraints on liberty. Indeed, in its prosecution of the
war on terror, the United States has largely dispensed with its most valuable
diplomatic asset its values and adopted a duplicitous stance that exempts
our country from the same standard to which we expect others to adhere. We

have come to believe, in our representation of this country to other nations,

that those nations are more willing to accept American leadership and
counsel to the extent that they see us as true to the principle of freedom
under the law. Yet, the evidence is clear that the world has taken notice of,
and reacted negatively to, our governments increasing willingness to
dispense with first principles of individual liberty. The State Department Legal
Advisor in the previous Administration has acknowledged Guantanamos
disastrous impact on our foreign relations, calling it a huge black eye for the
United States an albatross round our neck.3 The group Human Rights
Watch now lists Petitioners detention as an enemy combatant in annual
reports detailing world-wide human rights abuses.4 The group specifically
warns of the increasing danger of U.S. policy in applying war-time powers
against its residents and the perilous path upon which the U.S. has
embarked. As elaborated in its 2004 World Report: The U.S. Government
asserts that its treatment of al-Marri is sanctioned by the laws of war (also
known as international humanitarian law) . But the U.S. government is
seeking to make the entire world a battlefield in the amorphous, ill-defined,
and most likely never ending war against terrorism. By its logic, any
individual believed to be affiliated in any way with terrorists can be
imprisoned indefinitely . The laws of war were never intended to undermine
the basic rights of persons, whether combatants or civilians, but the
administrations rereading of the law does just that.5 Before the House
Subcommittee on International Relations, a former Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, testified that current U.S.
policy detracts from our long term diplomatic goals in that it needlessly
antagoniz[es] our allies . [and] unwittingly diminish[es] our capacity for
exceptional leadership to address the global human rights challenges
ahead.6 Petitioners detention is specifically cited as an example of a
practice that encourage[s] other countries to commit similar abuses in the
name of fighting terrorism and [as] undermin[ing] our ability to protest when
they do.7 The double standards of the U.S. approach to human rights abroad
and at home with regard to Petitioner, as well as Guantanamo, present an
insurmountable challenge to our diplomatic mission. This is so because our
most effective diplomatic weapon our nations moral standing is lost when
our government holds itself to a different standard than it would have other
countries apply. Consider that the United States Department of State provides
an annual report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations offering a full and complete report
regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights for
essentially all countries in the world.8 Among the offenses against
internationally recognized human rights acknowledged and reported by the
State Department are instances of arbitrary arrest or detention and denial
of fair public trials precisely what has happened to the Petitioner here.9
Petitioner has been held without criminal trial or legal justification for nearly
eight years. He also alleges that he was held for periods as long as sixteen
months incommunicado, when his family was denied access to see him, as
were his attorneys. Petitioner further alleges that he was interrogated

repeatedly in ways that bordered on torture, including sleep deprivation,

painful stress positions, extreme sensory deprivation, and threats of violence
or death.10 Compare this treatment with the further State Department report
on human rights abuses in Iran, one of the most notorious totalitarian
regimes in the world. For Iran, the State Department catalogued as human
rights abuses the fact that: Detainees often went weeks or months without
charges or trial, frequently were denied prompt contact with family, and often
were denied access to legal representation for prolonged periods .[M]any
detainees were held incommunicado . In practice there was neither a legal
time limit for incommunicado detention nor any judicial means to determine
the legality of the detention .11 This same State Department report on
human rights abuses for Iran also describes common methods of prisoner
abuse includ[ing] prolonged solitary confinement with sensory deprivation,
long confinement in contorted positions, [and] threats of execution if
individuals refused to confess .12 The United States has historically been
viewed as a beacon of light for its commitment to a basic tenet of AngloAmerican law that no one may be subjected to indefinite detention without
charge, and that the conditions of justified confinement shall be humane. In
our professional experience, we have found our commitment to these
fundamental precepts of human dignity to be the strongest asset of American
diplomacy. The admiration and respect for this nation abroad is a function of
our own commitment to liberty under law and we have led the world in this
cause. When our nation is perceived as applying these principles selectively,
or ignoring them all together, our voice abroad is not only weakened but our
adversaries are also emboldened to conduct the very type of treatment
against which we have historically rallied. For example, explaining the
detention of militants without trial, Malaysias law minister said that the
practice was just like the process in Guantanamo Bay.13 Egypt has also
moved to detain human rights campaigners as threats to national security, as
have Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Burkina Faso.14 Russia, in its recent
campaign in Georgia and brutality in Chechnya, has also heralded the war on
terror as its primary justification. As we argued in our brief amici curiae in
Boumediene, it is not just dictatorial regimes that have commented with
scorn on our practices with regard to terror detentions. Our allies and the
broader global community have grown increasingly impatient with the
willingness of the United States to dispense with its traditional principles with
regard to its indefinite detentions of enemy combatants.15 While most of
this criticism has been aimed at Guantanamo Bay, Petitioners detention
serves to amplify the chorus of world disapproval. This is because much of
the prior Administrations position on Guantanamo related to the fiction that
the conduct there was justified because the detentions were occurring in
Cuba and not within the territorial limits of the United States. While that
technical distinction was lost on most, any persuasive effect that it did have
is obliterated by the fact that Petitioners arrest and confinement have all
occurred within the United States. Reversing the tide of negative sentiment
against the United States and garnering the support of our allies has never
been more critical than at this moment in history when a new

Administration has come to power and seeks to gain traction in its various
diplomatic efforts. President Obama has signed executive orders for the
closure of the Guantanamo prison and for a change in course with regard to
its practice of detention of enemy combatants. The Presidents orders
represent a genuine step toward renewal of our countrys image in the
world;16 but the international goodwill inspired by his actions will quickly
dissipate if we nonetheless insist on exercising the right to arrest and
imprison without charge people legally within our own borders. In the case
of some sixty individuals who have been declared non-combatants but are
still being held in U.S. custody, the cooperation of our allies is particularly
critical because many of these individuals face the risk of persecution if
returned to their home countries.17 At least one close ally has already
refused to accept exonerated detainees, and our ability to convince others to
join us in finding a solution to this conundrum remains an open question that
is no doubt hampered by the continued detention of Petitioner and others
similarly situated to him.18 Our professional experience tells us that the first
step in repairing our relationship with our allies and restoring American
diplomatic credibility in the world at large is to renew our singular
commitment to due process, the rule of law and human dignity without
regard to the perceived justifications for dispensing with them. As former
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated shortly before the attacks of
September 11, 2001: One of the most dangerous temptations for a
government facing violent threats is to respond in heavy-handed ways that
violate the rights of innocent civilians . We have found through experience
around the world, that the best way to defeat terrorist threats is to increase
law enforcement capacities while at the same time promoting democracy and
human rights.19

Allied cooperation solves all internal links to global

terrorism
Terkel 4 - researcher @ the Center for American Progress
(Amanda, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/08/b165288.html)
Our credibility at home and abroad has never been lower. With no weapons of mass destruction found in
Iraq, horrific abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, and no foreseeable end game for the U.S. in Iraq, most are hesitant to trust the Bush
administration. A June 2004 poll by CBS News and The New York Times reported that 79 percent of the national adult population
believed that Bush was either hiding something or completely lying in his statements about the war. The story abroad is hardly
better. In a March 2004 Pew survey of European and Middle Eastern countries, a majority in seven of the eight nations surveyed
believed U.S. and British leaders lied about the Iraq war. Why

is credibility so important? The conventional wisdom

focuses on credibility for credibility's sake, but misses the real point: the war on terrorism cannot be won if
the rest of the world mistrusts the United States. At the start of the war on terrorism, the Bush
administration sent a clear message to the world's nations: "You're either with us, or against us." After three years, it appears that
far too few are with us. While America must always stand up for itself, we

can neither protect nor defend

ourselves if we continue to go it alone. Without meaningful and sustained international
cooperation, we can neither fight terrorism effectively nor win. Here's why: Securing
the world's ports. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is designed to place customs inspectors in ports
worldwide in order to pre-screen 70 percent of U.S.-bound cargo. Only a few of the 20 planned ports worldwide have entered the
program. The

current list of CSI participants is heavy on ports in Europe and Asia, but lacks any

ports in the Middle East and includes only one in Africa. The United States needs to work
with the entire international community to quickly expand this program to reduce the huge
vulnerability of the world's ports. Controlling proliferation. The Aspen Strategy Group
recently concluded that the threat of a nuclear attack is much greater than the public realizes. Only eleven nations have committed
to a version of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), aimed at stopping shipments of weapons of mass destruction worldwide.
The 9/11 Commission called for participation in PSI to be extended to non-NATO countries, specifically Russia and China. To
interdict a ship, the United States must secure permission from the flag state of the vessel in question or the state whose coastal
waters are being used for navigation. Otherwise, a United Nations Security Council resolution is needed. U.S.

credibility is
key to convincing more nations, particularly those in Africa and the Middle East, to participate
in the PSI or to gain support within the Security Council. Rooting out terrorists. The war on terrorism involves not only
preventing terrorist attacks before they occur, but also rooting out terrorist sanctuaries around the world. The 9/11 Commission
Report writes that the United States must "reach out, listen to, and work with other countries that can help." While

the
administration has formed a relationship with Pakistan, it must also work with other weak
states that are havens for terrorists, such as Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia . Disrupting
terrorist financial networks. Small amounts of money can fund devastating attacks.
Since 9/11, $200 million in terrorist assets has been seized, mostly from abroad, but the seizure rate has dramatically slowed. A
new multilateral initiative led by the United States is needed. According to the 9/11 Commission,
"multilateral freezing mechanisms now require waiting periods before being put into effect, eliminating the element of surprise
and thus virtually ensuring that little money is actually frozen." As a result, "worldwide asset freezes have not been adequately

Breaking up terrorist communications.

Terrorists continue to use both low- and high-tech communications. Recent raids by Pakistan unearthed
the information that terrorists had been monitoring U.S. financial institutions. The United States needs intelligence
from other nations. Monitoring Osama bin Laden's low-tech means of communicating from hiding such as putting a
message on the back of a donkey requires knowledge from other nations. Sharing the burden. The United
enforced and have been easily circumvented."

States currently has 19,000 troops in Afghanistan, but NATO's International Security Force Assistance is providing only 6,536,
including contributions from the United States. In Iraq, the U.S. has received little international help in footing the $144.4 billion
bill. The

less credibility the United States has, the less the international community will want to
work with us, and the more we will have to pay. The president states, "We are fighting this evil [terrorism] in
Iraq so we do not have to fight it on the streets of our own cities." But every day, we do have to fight it in our own cities, as well
as in Afghanistan, Syria, the Philippines, Algeria, and Indonesia. We cannot go it alone. Cooperation

need our credibility intact to secure it.

matters and we

Domestic Intel Link

Perceptions of procedural justice are key to local

cooperation
Tyler et al 10
(Tom, Stephen Schulhofer, Aziz Huq, University of Chicago School of Law,
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 296, LEGITIMACY AND
DETERRENCE EFFECTS IN COUNTER TERRORISM POLICING: A STUDY OF
MUSLIM AMERICANS)
Our principal findings are as follows. We find a robust correlation between
perceptions of procedural justice and both perceived legitimacy and
willingness to cooperate among Muslim American communities in the
context of anti-terrorism policing. We find little evidence that evaluations of
either the severity of terrorist threats or of police effectiveness play a
significant role in determining willingness to cooperate. We further find that
religiosity, cultural differences, and political background have at best weak
connections with cooperation. These results suggest the importance of
procedural justice considerations in the design of anti-terrorism policing
strategies concerning Muslim Americans within the United States.

Domestic indefinite detention alienates allies and

collapses local intel gatheringkey to solve terrorism
Nachman et al 9
David E. Nachman, Counsel of Record, Bradley T. Meissner, Emily T. Wright,
Muslim Advocates, The Sikh Coalition, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, Japanese American Citizens League, and South Asian Americans
Leading Together, Amicus Brief, Al-Marri, January 2009
Sacrificing The Rule Of Law Alienates Domestic Communities And
International Allies Whose Help Is Needed. Detention without charge or
trial not only is ineffective in actually identifying terrorists and preventing
terrorism; the departure from the rule of law that it signals may actually
undermine law enforcements efforts in this vital area. The governments
ability to instill trust in, and foster relationships with, key communities is
vital to its public safety mission. See, e.g., Police Executive Research Forum,
2 Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law
Enforcement: Working with Diverse Communities 26 (2004) (Diverse
communities . . . may well be willing to work with investigators who they
believe will respect their privacy, their traditions and act responsibly to keep
terrorists out of their communities.); Nicole J. Henderson et al., Vera Inst. Of
Justice, Law Enforcement & Arab Community Relations After September 11,
2001: Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty 17 (2006) (quoting one police

chief as recognizing that [T]he collection of intelligence will come from the
community. So a relation of trust and confidence with the [Arab
American] community is important . . . . We cant afford to alienate them.
Otherwise, we cut off our sources of information.); Threat of Islamic
Radicalization to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 3 (March 14, 2007) (written
testimony of Daniel Sutherland, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security) (hereinafter Sutherland Testimony) (We
believe that a critical element of our strategy for securing this country is to
build a level of communication, trust, and confidence . . . .). The arrest and
indefinite detention of persons outside of the ordinary criminal process ,
particularly when perceived to be based on the ethnic or religious orientation
of the detained, will hinder terrorism prevention efforts because it sends a
message that law enforcement has targeted a whole community as alien or
suspect. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953, 986 (2002).
Sending that message cannot help but alienate members of the targeted
community, rendering them far less likely to assist law enforcement in their
efforts to identify true perpetrators. Id.; see also Kalhan et al., supra, at 101
02 (Alienated communities are also less likely to cooperate with law
enforcement, depriving the police of information and resources that can be
used to combat terrorism.). The consequences can be serious, considering
that these communities could be particularly helpful to law
enforcement in its terrorism-prevention work . This erosion in the trust
and confidence of immigrant communities was precisely what the widespread
detention of Muslim, Arab and South Asian citizens, aliens and immigrants
achieved in the aftermath of September 11. [T]he nationalitybased
information and detention sweeps of the past two years have taken a serious
toll on immigrant communities in the United States. Arab and Muslim
organizations describe the chilling effect that these programs have had on
community relations . . . . [T]hese blanket immigration measures have
alienated the very communities whose intelligence and cooperation is needed
most. Lawyers Comm. For Human Rights, Assessing the New Normal, Liberty
and Security for the Post-September 11 United States 31 (2003) (hereinafter
Lawyers Comm. Report). Similarly, Vincent Cannistraro, former Director of
Intelligence Programs for the National Security Council under former
President Reagan, has written that the Justice Departments detention of
thousands of immigrant Muslimsthe policy of shaking the trees in Islamic
communities alienates the very people on whom law enforcement depends
for leads and may turn out to be counterproductive. Vincent Cannistraro,
The War on Terror Enters Phase 2, N.Y. Times, May 2, 2002, at A1; see also
Harris, supra, at 93334 (noting that the investigation of now-convicted
terrorist suspects began based on tips contained in a community members
letter to the FBI).26 As has occurred elsewhere, moreover, harsh and
overbroad detention policies in particular, and a perceived abandonment of
the rule of law in general, are likely to aid extremists by facilitating
recruitment of the disaffected. See Hearing before S. Select Comm. on

Intelligence, 111th Cong. 7 (Jan. 22, 2009) (statement of Dennis C. Blair,

nominee for Director of National Intelligence)

This internal link is based on robust evidence empirics

prove successful local intelligence can disrupt terror
infrastructures
Innes 6 senior lecturer in sociology at the University of Surrey
(Martin, Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community
Intelligence and Democratic Policing, The ANNALS of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 2006; 605; 222 DOI:
10.1177/0002716206287118)
The empirical data informing this article were collected between January
and March 2005 as part of a research project examining the effectiveness of
the U.K. police in collecting and handling community intelligence from
minority groups3 and young people in respect of several different issues
including terrorism. Interviews were conducted with police officers from three
police force areas pur- posively sampled to enable comparative analysis of
how different organizations were dealing with similar intelligence issues. The
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London was selected because it is the
largest police organization in the United Kingdom and has a national
responsibility for counterterrorism. The sec- ond force located in the north of
England was representative of the circum- stances of many midsized U.K.
police forces and had recent experience of dealing with significant public
disorder between ethnic communities. The third police force area in the south
of England was chosen to explore the issues being con- fronted by small
forces in managing community intelligence.4 A total of twenty-six
semistructured interviews were conducted with police officers and staff
working with intelligence on counterterrorism issues at central and local
levels.5 This included the force intelligence directors responsible for
managing the intelligence systems in northern and southern forces and
officers with national responsibilities in the MPS. Officers who either were
working with Special Branch or had done so recently were part of the sample
in the three forces.6 Of particular interest though for the concerns of this
article was the inclu- sion of specialist officers from two units in the
Metropolitan Policethe Muslim Contact Unit and the Strategic Contact Unit.7
The officers in these recently established units focused upon working with
particular community groups to manage their concerns. In addition, the head
of the National Community Tension Team (NCTT) was interviewed. NCTT is a
central policing unit working with all forces to monitor intercommunity and
intracommunity tensions nation- wide. As such, it has a key role in managing
postincident responses to any major threats to public order, including
terrorist incidents at home and overseas. Six interviews were also
conducted with members of the public who had previously provided
intelligence to police on activities of concern, capturing an often over- looked
dimension in discussions of police intelligence. The Social Organization of

Counterterrorism Counterterrorism work has prospective and retrospective

aspects. The prospective precrime aspects are performed on an ongoing
basis and are designed to prevent, deter, and disrupt the activities of those
thought to be involved in activities related to terrorism.8 Involving
surveillance of and inter- ventions against people directly involved in groups
supporting terrorist action, it also increasingly encompasses measures taken
against the support infrastructures for such groups, particularly targeting
their financial resources (McCulloch and Pickering 2005; Levi and Gilmore
2002). This is part of what Thacher (2005) dubbed the offender search
strategy of counterterrorism.

recruitment Link

Only Congress solves The executive will never use

indefinite detention domesticallyleaving the option
available creates the misperception of support for
domestic military capture
Chesney and Wittes, 13 (Robert Chesney, Professor of Law at the
University of Texas School of Law and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the
Brookings Institution, and Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow at the Brookings
Institution, Protecting U.S. Citizens Constitutional Rights During the War on
Terror, 5/22/13 http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2013/05/22war-on-terror-chesney-wittes)
What Should Congress Do? In our view, Congress should put this issue to rest
at last by clarifying that neither the AUMF nor the NDAA FY12 should be read
to confer detention authority over persons captured in the United States
(regardless of citizenship). The benefits of keeping the option open in theory
are slim, while the offsetting costs are substantial. We say the benefits are
slim chiefly because the executive branch has so little interest in using
detention authority domestically. The Bush administration had little appetite
for military detention in such cases all along, preferring in almost all
instances involving al Qaeda suspects in the United States to stick with the
civilian criminal justice system. The experiment of military detention with
Padilla and al-Marri did little to encourage a different course , given the legal
uncertainty the cases exposed. That uncertainty has, in turn, created an
enormous disincentive for any administrationof whatever political stripeto
attempt this sort of detention again. A de facto policy thus developed in favor
of using the criminal justice apparatus whenever humanly possible for
terrorist suspects apprehended in the United States. And whenever humanly
possible turned out to mean always; while military detention may remain
potentially available as a theoretical matter, it is not functionally available for
the simple reasons that (i) executive branch lawyers are not adequately
confident that the Supreme Court would affirm its legality and (ii) in any
event, they have a viable and far-more-reliable alternative in the criminal
justice apparatus. In September 2010, the Obama administration made this
unstated policy official, announcing that it would use the criminal justice
system exclusively both for domestic captures and for citizens captured
anywhere in the world. In a speech at the Harvard Law School, then-White
House official John Brennan stated: it is the firm position of the Obama
Administration that suspected terrorists arrested inside the United States will
in keeping with long-standing traditionbe processed through our Article III
courts. As they should be. Our military does not patrol our streets or enforce
our lawsnor should it. . . . Similarly, when it comes to U.S. citizens involved

in terrorist-related activity, whether they are captured overseas or at home,

we will prosecute them in our criminal justice system. To put the matter
simply, military detention for citizens or for terrorist suspects captured
domestically, was tried a handful of times early in the Bush administration;
the strategy was abandoned; it has been many years since there was any
appetite in the executive branchunder the control of either partyfor trying
it again; and it has for some time been the stated policy of the executive
branch not to attempt it under any circumstances. We do not expect any
administration of either party to break blithely with the consensus that has
developed absent some dramatically changed circumstance. The litigation
risk is simply too great, and the criminal justice systems performance has
been too strong to warrant assuming this risk. But ironically, even as this
strong executive norm against military detention of domestic captures and
citizens has developed, a fierce commitment to this type of detention has
also developed in some quarters. The fact that the norm against detention is
not currently written into law has helped fuel this commitment, enabling the
persistent perception that there is greater policy latitude than functionally
exists. The result is that every time a major terrorist suspect has been taken
into custody domestically in recent yearsthe arrest of Djokhar Tsarnaev is
only the most recent examplethe country explodes in the exact same
unproductive and divisive political debate. To caricature it only slightly,
one side argues that the suspect should have been held in military custody,
instead of being processed through the criminal justice system; it decries the
reading of the suspect his Miranda rights; and it criticizes the administration,
more generally, for a supposed return to a pre-9/11 law enforcement
paradigm. The other side, meanwhile, defends the civilian justice system,
while also demanding the closure of Guantnamo and attacking the
performance of military commissions for good measure. This kabuki dance of
a debate is not merely a matter of rhetoric. Separate and apart from the
U.S. citizen detention language we described above, in the course of
producing the 2012 NDAA Congress also explored the option of mandating
military detention for suspects (citizen or not) taken into custody within the
United States. The administration resisted these efforts, and the resulting
language in conference committee ultimately stopped far short of requiring
military detention. The administration further softened the effects of that
language, moreover, through its subsequent interpretation of the new
language. All of which brings us back to our point: there is a big gulf between
the real, functional state of play (in which the criminal justice system
provides the exclusive means of processing terrorist suspects captured within
the United States) and the perception in some quarters that military
detention remains a viable option , perhaps even a norm, for domestic and
citizen terrorist captures. That gulf has real costs. Most obviously, it
generates significant political friction every time a major terrorist arrest
happens in the United States. It increases the apparent political polarization
of an area that should be above politicsand in which the counterterrorism
reality is far less polarized than the inter-branch relations over the issue
would suggest. And it reinforces the perception that domestic military

detention remains a viable option, needlessly alarming those who fear it and
needlessly misleading those who wish to see it. The resulting confusion fuels
sharp debate over something that is no longer meaningfully an option in
functional terms. That debate even spills over at times into litigation, most
notablyand disruptivelyin the context of the Hedges case in New York (in
which journalists and activists persuaded a district judge to enjoin
enforcement of detention authority, despite the utter implausibility of the
claim that they might be subjected to it).

Extradition Adv

Scenario 1 - terror
*this is the same as the Extradition link on the terror
adv

Scenario 2 - Relations
Extradition fights ensure the irrelevance of NATO
David B. Rivkin, Jr., Associate Fellow of The Nixon Center and Lee A. Casey, partner in the Washington,
DC office of Baker & Hostetler LLP., A House Divided? War, Extradition, and the Atlantic Alliance, PART II,

02

The National Interest, October 9th 20

, http://nationalinterest.org/article/a-house-divided-warextradition-and-the-atlantic-alliance-part-ii-2137?page=1

many questions have been asked about the long-term

viability of the U.S.-European partnership . By leading the NATO intervention in Bosnia and
Since the end of the Cold War,

Kosovo - a venture where no vital U.S. interests were implicated, but where the Europeans strongly

the U.S. has demonstrated that

maintaining NATO solidarity remained a key American policy priority. Europe
has yet to respond in kind. The best argument of the die-hard Atlanticists has
been to claim that the current discord is attributable to the lack of any
serious threat facing this partnership in general, and NATO in particular. By
implication, if and when such a threat arose, Cold War levels of solidarity
would reemerge. The events of September 11 certainly qualify as such a
threat, but whether that solidarity will reappear remains to be seen. At this time, however, the
only major contribution most of the European governments are likely to be
asked for will be law enforcement cooperation, including the arrest and
extradition of suspects to the United States. If Europe cannot do this much ,
even when there are no insurmountable legal obstacles, then the Atlantic Alliance has
been already beset with irreconcilable differences . Even if it endures, it
would become more of an irrelevant debating club than the West's premier
security instrument. Our European allies should grasp what is at stake here;
clamored for joint U.S.-European involvement -

the U.S., for its part, should appreciate the fact that the fundamental issues of principle are implicated,
rather than just a series of specific narrow policy disputes, and therefore speak clearly and forthrightly to
the European elites and publics. Candor and sustained engagement, rather than diplomatic politesse,
offers the only hope of closing this rift.

These fights will supersede durability and alt-causes

David B. Rivkin, Jr., Associate Fellow of The Nixon Center and Lee A. Casey, partner in the Washington,
DC office of Baker & Hostetler LLP., A House Divided? War, Extradition, and the Atlantic Alliance, PART II,

02

The National Interest, October 9th 20

, http://nationalinterest.org/article/a-house-divided-warextradition-and-the-atlantic-alliance-part-ii-2137?page=1

In past extradition-related disputes with the United States, Europe's leaders

have generally gotten their way. American prosecutors have agreed , in individual
cases, not to seek the death penalty. But such agreements are highly unlikely
(almost unthinkable) with respect to Al-Qaeda's leadership. (If Osama bin Laden
surrendered to one of the European police authorities tomorrow, the ensuing extradition fight would be

Although few ordinary Americans care

much about the issues that regularly bedevil trans-Atlantic relations, such as
bitter and cause enormous damage to the Alliance.)

banana imports, anti-trust issues, or global climate change, virtually all care
deeply and passionately about the war on terrorism. By more than a two-thirds
majority, they support the use of military commissions and capital punishment. The Bush Administration is

The value to
the United States of allies who coddle, even based on sincerely held beliefs, unlawful
combatants who seek to destroy this country will be eventually questioned.
serious about winning the war on terrorism and making Lincoln's words come true again.

History is on our side past extradition fights have tanked

relations the impact will only grow larger in terrorism
cases
Kyle M. Medley, associate in the New York office of Barger & Wolen. Mr. Medley is a litigator with
experience before numerous state and federal courts, RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES: THE WIDENING OF THE ATLANTIC: EXTRADITION PRACTICES BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE*, 68 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1213, Summer 20

03

extradition helps countries avoid international tension and diplomatic

crisis. n42 One case in particular exhibits how the extradition battle over fugitives can
cause foreign relations between the U.S. and other nations to deteriorate. In
1997, Benjamin Sheinbein was suspected of the killing and gruesome dismemberment of an
acquaintance in Maryland. n43 [*1221] Sheinbein fled to Israel three days after the body was found.
Finally,

n44 Because Israeli law forbids extradition of any of its citizens for any crime, Sheinbein argued that he
was an Israeli citizen. n45 Although Sheinbein claimed Israeli citizenship through his father who was in fact

Israeli courts nonetheless refused to grant his extradition to the

U.S. n47 The American government fiercely responded to the extradition refusal. Robert Livingston,
Chair to the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Committee , for
instance, threatened to cut off Israel's $ 3 billion American aid package unless
an American citizen, n46

Sheinbein was extradited to the U.S. n48 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright personally contacted Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and asked for his "maximum cooperation" with extraditing Sheinbein.

These efforts were for the murder of a single person. In the wake of the
thousands of people murdered in the World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist
attacks, tensions will undoubtedly increase between the U.S. and nations
reluctant to extradite.
n49

NATO solves nuclear war

Brzezinski 09 [ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, 2009, U.S. National Security
Adviser from 1977 to 1981. His most recent book is Second Chance: Three
Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower, September 2009 - October
2009, (Foreign Affairs, SECTION: Pg. 2 Vol. 88 No. 5, HEADLINE: An Agenda for
NATO Subtitle: Toward a Global Security Web, p. Lexis)]

ADJUSTING TO A TRANSFORMED WORLD

Nato today is without

a doubt the most powerful military and political alliance in the
world. Its 28 members come from the globe's two most productive,
technologically advanced, socially modem, economically prosperous,
and politically democratic regions. Its member states' 900 million people account for
AND YET, it is fair to ask: Is nato living up to its extraordinary potential?

only 13 percent of the world's population but 45 percent of global gdp. NATO'S potential is not primarily
military. Although nato is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes predominantly from

Nato's real power

derives from the fact that it combines the United States' military
capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political
and economic weight (and occasionally some limited European military forces). Together,
that combination makes nato globally significant. It must therefore remain
the United States, and that reality is not likely to change anytime soon.

sensitive to the importance of safeguarding the geopolitical bond between the United States and Europe as

The basic challenge that nato now confronts is that

there are historically unprecedented risks to global security. Today's
it addresses new tasks.

world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism 0^ a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by
the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansrve imperial power. The

the world, increasingly connected and economically

interdependent for the first time in its entire history, is experiencing intensifying
popular unrest made all the more menacing by the growing
accessibility of w eapons of m ass d estruction - not just to states but also,
potentially, to extremist religious and political movements. Yet there is no effective
paradox of our time is that

global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity's recent political awakening.
The three great political contests of the twentieth century (the two world wars and the Cold War) accelerated the political awakening of
mankind, which was initially unleashed in Europe by the French Revolution. Within a century of that revolution, spontaneous pop- ulist political
activism had spread from Europe to East Asia. On their return home after World Wars I and II, the South Asians and the North Africans who had
been conscripted by the British and French imperial armies propagated a new awareness of anticolonial nation- alist and religious political
identity among hitherto passive and pliant populations. The spread of literacy during the twentieth century and the wide-ranging impact of
radio, televisin, and the Internet accelerated and intensified this mass global political awakening. In its early stages, such new political
awareness tends to be expressed as a fanatical embrace of the most extreme ethnic or fundamentalist religious passions, with beliefs and
resentments universalized in Manichaean categories. Unfortunately, in significant parts of the developing world, bitter memories of European
colonialism and of more recent U.S. intrusion have given such newly aroused passions a distinctively anti-Western cast. Today, the most acute
example of this phenomenon is found in an area that stretches from Egypt to India. This area, inhabited by more than 500 million politically
and religiously aroused peoples, is where nato is becoming more deeply embroiled. Additionally complicating is the fact that the dramatic rise
of China and India and the quick recovery of Japan within the last 50 years have signaled that the global center of political and economic
gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific.

And

of the currently leading

global powers - the United States, the eu, China, Japan, Russia, and India - at least two, or perhaps
even three, are revisionist in their orientation. Whether they are "rising peacefully"
(a self-confident China), truculently (an imperially nostalgic Russia) or boastfully (an assertive India,

they all desire a change in

the global pecking order. The future conduct of and relationship
among these three still relatively cautious revisionist powers will further intensify the
strategic uncertainty. Visible on the horizon but not as powerful are the
emerging regional rebels, with some of them defiantly reaching for
nuclear weapons. North Korea has openly flouted the international
community by producing (apparently successfully) its own nuclear weapons and also by profiting from their dissemination. At some point, its
unpredictability could precipitate the first use of nuclear weapons in
anger since 1945. Iran, in contrast, has proclaimed that its nuclear program is entirely for
peaceful purposes but so far has been unwilling to consider consensual
arrangements with the international community that would provide
credible assurances regarding these intentions. In nuclear-armed
Pakistan, an extremist anti-Western religious movement is
threatening the country's political stability. These changes together reflect the
despite its internal multiethnic and religious vulnerabilities),

waning of the post-World War II global hierarchy and the simultaneous dispersal of global power.
Unfortunately, U.S. leadership in recent years unintentionally, but most unwisely, contributed to the

The combination of Washington's arrogant

unilateralism in Iraq and its demagogic Islamophobic sloganeering weakened the unity
of nato and focused aroused Muslim resentments on the United
States and the West more generally.
currently threatening state of affairs.

And independently US-EU relations access every impact

Stivachtis 10 Director of International Studies Program @ Virginia
Polytechnic Institute [Dr. Yannis. A. Stivachtis (Professor of Poli Sci @ Virginia
Polytechnic Institute & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from
Lancaster University), THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,
The Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010, pg.
http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlanticstudies/78.html]

There is no doubt that US-European relations are in a period of transition , and

that the stresses and strains of globalization are increasing both the number and the seriousness of the
challenges that confront transatlantic relations. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War have added

international terrorism, the

nuclearization of North Korea and especially Iran, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), the transformation of Russia into a stable and cooperative member
of the international community, the growing power of China, the political and
economic transformation and integration of the Caucasian and Central Asian
states, the integration and stabilization of the Balkan countries, the
promotion of peace and stability in the Middle East, poverty, climate change,
AIDS and other emergent problems and situations require further cooperation
among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels. Therefore, cooperation between
the U.S. and Europe is more imperative than ever to deal effectively with
these problems. It is fair to say that the challenges of crafting a new relationship
between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more
regional than global, but the implications of success or failure will be global.
significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same time,

The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis, despite efforts to improve it since the Iraq War. This is not to
say that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before the war. Actually, post-1945
relations between Europe and the U.S. were fraught with disagreements and never free of crisis since the
Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11,
the U.S. and Europe parted ways on issues from global warming and biotechnology to peacekeeping and
national missile defense. Questions such as, the future role of NATO and its relationship to the common
European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), or what constitutes terrorism and what the rights of
captured suspected terrorists are, have been added to the list of US-European disagreements. There are

if European leaders conclude

that Europe must become counterweight to the U.S., rather than a partner, it
will be difficult to engage in the kind of open search for a common ground
than an elective partnership requires . Second, there is a risk that public opinion in both the
two reasons for concern regarding the transatlantic rift. First,

U.S. and Europe will make it difficult even for leaders who want to forge a new relationship to make the
necessary accommodations. If both sides would actively work to heal the breach, a new opportunity could

A vibrant transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only

if both sides make the necessary political commitment. There are strong reasons to
be created.

believe that the security challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more shared than divergent. The most
dramatic case is terrorism. Closely related is the common interest in halting the spread of weapons of
mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea. This commonality of threats is clearly
perceived by publics on both sides of the Atlantic.

Solvency - 1ac
Plan is a no-cost option for Congress The Executive
wont use the detention war power for domestic captures
but keeping the option legal makes the perception of its
use alive
Robert M. Chesney, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Governance Studies @ Brookings and Benjamin
Wittes, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies @ Brookings, Protecting U.S. Citizens Constitutional Rights

13

During the War on Terror, Testimony To Congress, May 22 nd 20

,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2013/05/22-war-on-terror-chesney-wittes (BJN)

First, a
review of the relevant case law suggests that the Supreme Court as currently
aligned would probably not approve the use of long-term military detention under
color of the Authorization for the Use of Military force (AUMF) with respect to a United States
citizen detainee who was arrested by law enforcement authorities within the
United States. Whether it would approve detention for a non-citizen captured
within the United States is also in doubt, though the matter is less clear in that setting.
Second, current criminal justice authorities provide ample grounds for
ensuring the incapacitation of such persons in most foreseeable instances.
There is little if anything to be gained for the executive branch in gambling
with the domestic military detention option, which would carry significant
litigation risk and guarantee divisive political friction. Third, although the
Bush administration did use military detention for domestic captures in two
instancesone involving a citizen, another a non-citizenit typically relied on the criminal
justice system instead. Indeed, in the case of the citizen detainee, it eventually
backed away in the face of a looming judicial reversal. The Obama administration has
stayed this course, taking similar action with respect to the domestic non-citizen detainee in
military custody. Today it is highly unlikely that an administration of either
party would attempt to use these authorities again. Fourth, because
these options nonetheless have not formally been foreclosed in law,
there are periodic surges of interest in them by both political
supporters and opponents. Supporters demand their use in cases like that of
the Boston Marathon bombing. Opponents, meanwhile, have gone to court to
seek injunctive relief against law of war detention authorities based on
speculative fears of military detentions that will not take place. All of this is
disruptive, undesirable, and unnecessary. Based on these observations,
we therefore recommend that Congress codify in statute todays practical
status quo. That is, Congress should state explicitly that detention authority
under the AUMF and the NDAA does not extend to any persons captured
within the territory of the United States. We provide a more expansive discussion of these
We would like to make four major points today, points which lead to a single recommendation:

points below, in two parts. The first part outlines the legal context against which these issues arise today.

The second discusses the practical and policy consequences of leaving the current status quo uncodified in
statute and explains our recommendation for legislation.

Interpreting the NDAA to exclude domestic captures is

critical to extraditions
Stacy K. Hayes. J.D. Candidate Wayne State University, INTERPRETING THE
NEW LANGUAGE OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT: A
POTENTIAL BARRIER TO THE EXTRADITION OF HIGH VALUE TERROR
SUSPECTS, 58 Wayne L. Rev. 567, Summer 2012

Assurances that Include a Guarantee of a Right to Fair Trial Are Key to

Achieving Extradition On the surface, the new statutory language in the
NDAA does not pose any problems to the United States continuing to provide
assurances to her European allies that terror suspects will receive humane treatment and a fair trial.
But it remains imperative that the current and future administrations
understand that affording anything less than a fair trial to these terror
suspects in the federal justice system will likely result in terrorists evading
justice altogether. The U.S. government should not underestimate its
allies' doubt regarding the fairness of the military tribunal system ,
C.

substantiated or not, when evaluating whether to provide and uphold assurances that terror suspects will go to trial in

It is clear that the European approach to

human rights, even as it affects extradition, includes the right to a fair trial
that does not include trial by military tribunal. n131 As history demonstrates, "the right to
a fair trial is one of the most litigated of all human rights. It is also perhaps
one of the most important because without it a violation of a human right is
unlikely to be remedied in domestic procedures. " n132 Moreover, many international cases
regularly constituted courts to ensure their extradition.

have highlighted "the importance of independence and impartiality" as a key feature of a fair trial. n133 For instance,

the European Court in Weeks v. United Kingdom noted that the most important,
fundamental feature of court is the "independence of the executive and of
the parties involved." n134 As one scholar noted in Lamy v. Belgium, "the European Court of Human Rights
noted that a fair hearing is not possible when detainees are denied access to those documents in the investigation file
which are essential to effectively challenge the lawfulness of [one's] [*591] detention." n135 And more recently, the U.K.
House of Lords stated in A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department that "neither the common law . . . nor
international human rights law allows indefinite detention at the behest of the executive, however well-intentioned." n136

the hotly contested and highly publicized deficiencies within the military
commission process certainly create, at the minimum, the appearance that a
fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal will be incredibly difficult to
obtain for any terror suspect extradited to the United States without the assurance of
trial by a civilian court. Additionally, the promise of indefinite detention until the end
of hostilities will likely bolster claims of Article 3 violations and add to the
likelihood of Article 6 claims. Either one can work to the disadvantage of the
United States as it seeks to bring to justice those terror suspects who await
extradition from the U.K. and Europe. Thus, the current administration should set a strict plan to
Thus,

execute the waiver in all cases regarding extradition from America's European allies. Doing so will make the waiver the
norm rather than the exception. Regular use of the waiver will override the presumption in favor of military trials that
Section 1022 n137 creates and take the political aspect out of any future executive decision to provide a waiver. IV.
Conclusion

The right to a fair trial is one of the most expansive and complicated

of all the human rights protected under international law . n138 And even though
individual countries bear the burden to defend their citizenry against terrorism, "in cases where action is being taken
against terrorism, states must ensure that international human rights norms are respected. The foremost role of
international human rights in cases involving terrorists is the protection of the accused terrorist's human rights." n139

With this in mind, the United States should interpret the NDAA to provide
assurances to the U.K. and her European allies that all extradited
terror suspects will defend their case in regularly constituted courts
and will be detained in civilian criminal facilities without threat of the death penalty.
In doing so, the United States will signify support for the rule of [*592] law as it
seeks to defeat terrorism. Moreover, and perhaps equally important, this continuation of
assurances will demonstrate that the United States stands with her allies in
the protracted struggle against terrorism.

The idea that we have to keep the option of military

detention available is an outdated view of law
enforcement Current criminal trials provide ample
security and even if it could technically be better to use
military detention it wouldnt be used
Robert M. Chesney, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Governance Studies @ Brookings and Benjamin
Wittes, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies @ Brookings, Protecting U.S. Citizens Constitutional Rights

13

During the War on Terror, Testimony To Congress, May 22 nd 20

,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2013/05/22-war-on-terror-chesney-wittes

It is certainly possible that we will one day again confront a case in which strong
evidence exists that an individual member of an AUMF-covered group poses a
huge threat within the United States, but in which the evidence supporting this
view is either too sensitive to disclose or inadmissible for any of several reasons. In such a
situation, legislation prohibiting the military detention of suspects captured in the
United States in theory could precipitate an outcome like the one that Comey feared in
2002. From that perspective, the option of at least attempting to sustain
military detention, despite the legal uncertainty we described above, would
be attractive. For a variety of reasons, however, we believe that situation is
far less likely to develop today than it was in 2002. Law enforcement
practice has improved substantially in this space. The FBI and Justice Department
have developed significant expertise in handling suspects like Padilla. And as
we mentioned before, one of the reasons the information developed against Padilla
was unusable by Comey was that it had been obtained by the CIA using
highly-coercive means; those means are no longer in use . None of this eliminates the
possibility of a case like Padillas developing in the future, of course, but it does suggest that such

such a situation has not arisen since the earliest

years of the war on terror. Aside from a Padilla-like scenario, a ban on military
detention in domestic capture scenarios thus would foreclose no course of
action that is realistically available to the executive branch at this stage given its
own preferences. It would, rather, merely codify the existing understanding
reflected in executive branch policy and practicepolicy and practice reinforced
scenarios are unlikely to arise. Indeed,

over the years by well-informed expectations about the likely views of the justices on the underlying legal
issues. Adopting such a change, it is worth emphasizing, would run with the grain of Americas traditional

There have unfortunately

been times in our nations history when it has been necessary and proper for
the military to play such a role. It is far from clear that this is the case today,
however, given the demonstrated capacity of the criminal justice system in the
counterterrorism context. In the final analysis, we conclude that the manifest legal
uncertainty and political friction overhanging the domestic military detention
option entail costs that, in our view, outweigh the hypothetical benefits of continuing
to leave that option open as a statutory matter. We therefore favor legislation that would
clarify that military detention in counterterrorism under the AUMF is not
available with respect to any persons--whether United States citizens or
aliens--arrested within the United States.
wariness when it comes to a domestic security role for the U.S. military.

Case debate

Terror

Yes EU Terror
High risk of EU terror
Stratfor 8-19-13, European Jihadists: The Continuation of a Historical
Trend, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/european-jihadists-continuationhistorical-trend

As new intelligence emerges -- whether the threats are legitimate or not -European authorities will intensify counterterrorism efforts and immigration
controls in an effort to thwart possible attacks. But given the large and
growing Muslim population in Europe and the ease of travel throughout the
Continent, preventing all attacks will not be easy. Analysis The El Mundo
article identified the Syrian rebel group Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar (Army
of Emigrants and Helpers), formerly known as the Muhajireen Brigade, as a
group that many foreigners join. Created in summer 2012 by foreign fighters
and led by Chechens, the group has recruited foreign participants from all
over the world and merged with two other Syrian rebel factions, the Khattab
Brigade and the Army Muhammad, in February. According to the Chechen
news agency Kavkaz Center, the group consists of roughly 1,000 fighters and
has led assaults in the Syrian provinces of Aleppo, Latakia and Idlib, among
others. National Origins In April of this year, EU Counterterrorism Coordinator
Gilles de Kerchove estimated that some 500 European citizens were fighting
in Syria, most of them from the United Kingdom, France and Ireland. A survey
by the International Center for the Study of Radicalization at King's College
London found that up to 600 Europeans from 14 countries, including Austria,
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany, have participated in the
Syrian conflict since it began in early 2011, representing roughly 7 to 11
percent of the total number of foreign fighters in Syria. The study showed
that the largest contingent of foreign militants -- somewhere between 28 and
134 -- came from the United Kingdom. (The number of foreign fighters could
be higher considering that many likely cycled through the fighting arena and
returned home in a very short time.) Though no one knows the exact number
of foreigners fighting in jihadist militant groups, reports occasionally surface
about foreigners killed in action in Syria, Somalia, Libya and Yemen, among
other countries. In March, for example, a Swedish man known by the nom de
guerre Abu Kamal As Swedee and a Danish man known as Abdul Malik alDinmarki, both members of the Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar, were
reportedly killed in suicide bombings in Syria. The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy and Flashpoint Global Partners conducted a joint study this
year that monitored extremist Internet sites and analyzed the national origins
of 280 foreign fighters reported to have died fighting alongside rebels in Syria
between July 2012 and May 2013. The study found that 60 of those killed
came from Libya, 47 came from Tunisia and 44 came from Saudi Arabia. The
death toll also included single fighters from countries such as Denmark,

France, Uzbekistan, Ireland, Morocco, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Jihadists Back Home Muslim communities have existed in
Europe for centuries, but guest-worker agreements and relaxed immigration
policies in the 1960s brought waves of Muslim immigrants from Turkey into
Germany, from Algeria into France and from Pakistan into the United
Kingdom. EU cross-border travel restrictions are minimal, and some European
authorities try hard not to disturb Muslim communities in hopes that inaction
will safeguard Europe against attacks by radicalized Islamists. Compounding
the problem is that returning jihadist fighters are more often than not
European citizens and are usually not caught by standard immigration
controls. Hence, it has not been difficult for European Islamists to receive
support from people and groups in the Middle East and North Africa largely
undetected. Those connections can then be used to attempt to carry out
terrorist attacks inside Europe. Below are some of the most recent attempted
and successful attacks involving European jihadists: March 2013: A Belgian
federal police counterterrorism force conducted a felony car stop that led to a
shootout and the death of Hakim Benladghem, a French citizen of Algerian
descent. Benladghem was known to have received training as a paratrooper
with the French Foreign Legion. Police discovered a cache of weapons and
explosives in his apartment and believed Benladghem intended to carry out
an armed assault in Europe. August 2012: Spanish and French police foiled
an al Qaeda plot by two Chechen men, Eldar Magomedov and Mohamed
Ankari Adamov, and a Turk named Cengiz Yalcin. Their alleged plan was to
drop improvised explosive devices from paragliders onto British and U.S.
targets in Spain, France and elsewhere in Europe during the London
Olympics. All three suspects were said to be al Qaeda operatives who had
received training in Pakistan. July 2012: A Swedish national of Lebanese
descent, Abu Abdurraham, plotted to blow up a U.S. passenger jet during the
London Olympics. Abdurraham was believed to have converted to Islam in
2008 and was recruited for the operation in a terrorist training camp in
Yemen. March 2012: A French-Algerian man named Mohammed Merah shot
and killed a rabbi and three children outside a Jewish school in Toulouse,
France. A week before the attack, Merah targeted a group of French
paratroopers, killing four. He reportedly targeted army personnel because of
his involvement with unknown militant groups in the war in Afghanistan. In
France and the United Kingdom, the threat posed by radical Islamists has
become an important public issue, making both countries hesitant to supply
weapons to Syrian rebels in spite of their earlier moves to end an embargo on
such support. Both countries are also well aware that the large Muslim
enclaves spreading throughout the Continent provide attractive havens for
European jihadists who have received training in places such as Pakistan,
Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen and North Africa. These communes provide
effective environments for radicalization because of their relative isolation
and the cultural and religious bonds they provide to largely disenfranchised
immigrant populations. Since the outbreak of instability in North Africa and
extended fighting in Syria, the fear of attacks by nationals returning to
Europe after fighting abroad has become widespread. It is a concern not only

for France and the United Kingdom, both of which have sizable Muslim
populations and have already seen terrorist attacks, but also for countries
such as Denmark and Sweden, the latter of which is often portrayed as a
positive example regarding the acceptance of immigrants. Another Look at
Immigration Policies With border controls inside the European Union largely
abolished, radicalized Islamists can easily threaten multiple countries, making
collaboration among EU members more important. At the beginning of
August, nine EU countries, including France, Belgium, Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Germany, Poland, Italy, the United Kingdom and Sweden, called
on the EU Parliament to support the establishment of a European database of
airline passengers who enter and leave the European Union. While most EU
countries already collect such data, it is not shared because the European
Parliament is concerned about infringing upon privacy rights. In order for EU
members to better address the threat of jihadist attacks at home, security
along the bloc's borders will likely be tightened. This will affect not only
potential terrorists but also other Muslim and European travelers. This could
add pressure on countries such as the Balkan states -- many of which are not
part of the European Union, though they border EU territory and reportedly
have seen extensive outflows of fighters to Syria -- to increase their overall
security efforts. Western European countries will probably provide aid in the
form of money, personnel and hardware to those that need it. In many
European countries, immigrant populations are already under the spotlight
because of rising unemployment. Right-wing parties, such as the National
Front in France and the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, which are already
gaining popularity in light of the European economic crisis, will fuel the fear
that European jihadists will return from the battlefield to perpetrate attacks in
Europe. This could lead to more criticism of European Muslim communities for
their lack of integration. Rising unemployment, combined with the threat of
returning jihadists, only increases the pressure on European governments to
tighten immigration policy. Europe's Jihadist Outlook Despite the large
number of European Muslims who have received training overseas and fought
in places such as Somalia, Libya and Syria, few have actually conducted
attacks after returning to Europe. Still, in an era when jihadist ideologues are
urging individual jihad in the West, these trained individuals do pose a very
real threat. One problem is that the manner in which fighters are recruited
from Europe or elsewhere is inconsistent from one place to another and
difficult to track. As a result, it is hard to determine who might carry out a
terrorist attack, what type of attack it could be and where it might occur. This
problem is compounded by many others, including the grassroots strategy
propagated by al Qaeda and the difficulties of disrupting terrorist training that
occurs abroad. Problems specific to Europe include the historical Muslim
presence in the Continent and the relative ease of cross-border European
travel. Authorities will continually be challenged in their efforts to thwart
terrorist attacks, not only in Europe but anywhere there are vulnerable
targets as well.

2AC A2: Al Qaeda Weak / No Terror

Prefer the magnitude of our impacts because probability
can change overnight
Carafano,09 [JamesJ.expertindefenseandhomelandsecurityattheHeritageFoundation,AssistantDirector, Kathryn
andShelbyCullomDavisInstituteforInternationalStudies andSeniorResearchFellow, DouglasandSarahAllisonCenterfor
ForeignPolicyStudies WorstCaseScenario:Dealingwith WMD MustBePartofProvidingforCommonDefenseJune
29, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/upload/AR05.pdf]

It Can Happen Here The arguments against preparing for these dangers offer cold
comfort. Arguing, for example, that WMD attacks may be high consequence but low
probability makes little sense. There is no way to establish probability because there is no
predictable data set to measure. The style of terrorist attack often turns on the choice of tactic and the terrorists who
choose WMD; probability can go from zero to certainty overnight. Playing the odds on such
threats is the worst kind of Russian roulette, particularly when looking at the cost of losing.
By one estimate, the cost of recovering from a nuclear attack on New York City could equal the
U.S. GDP. Nor does it make much sense to argue that terrorists will adopt simpler means
or that enemy states can be easily deterred by the U.S. nuclear arsenal . Terrorists have
already gone the WMD route. The Rajneeshee cult in Wyoming in 1984 launched a biological warfare attack. In 1995,
the Aum Shinrikyo hit the Tokyo subway with poison gas. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, letters laced with anthrax began appearing in
the U.S. mail. Luckily,

these efforts were neither very sophisticated nor well organized. Next
time, we might not be so lucky. Likewise, the U.S. nuclear deterrent has not dissuaded North Korea or Iran from
pursuing very aggressive nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

*2AC A2: No Nuclear Terror

Nuke terrors likely

Theft possible Russia transports nukes all the time.

Loose nuclear material is available
They dont need much they could create a crude improvised device that triggers our impacts

Neely 3/21/13, Meggaen Neely is a research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues. MAR 21, 2013, Center
for Strategic & International Studies, Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear
Terrorism, http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrence-nuclear-terrorism, jj

Theriskthatterroristswillsetoffanuclearweapon onU.S.soil isdisconcertinglyhigh.

While a terrorist organization may experience difficulty constructing nuclear weapons facilities, thereis
significantconcernthatterroristscanobtainanuclearweaponornuclearmaterials . The
fearthatanactorcouldstealanuclearweaponorfissilematerialandtransportittothe
UnitedStateshaslongexisted. It takes a great amount of time and resources (including territory) to
construct centrifuges and reactors to build a nuclear weapon from scratch. Relativelyeasily
transportablenuclearweapons, however, presentoneopportunity toterrorists. For
example, exercisessimilarto the recentRussianmovementofnuclearweapons from
munitionsdepotstostoragesitesmay proveattractivetargets. Loose nuclearmaterials
poseasecondopportunity. Terroristscouldusethemtocreateacrudenuclear
weapon similartotheguntypedesignofLittleBoy. Itssimplicity twosubcriticalmasses

ofhighlyenricheduranium maymakeitattractivetoterrorists. Whilesuchaweapon

mightnotproducetheimmediatedestructionseenatHiroshima, theradioactivefallout
andpsychologicaleffectswouldstillbedamaging. Thesetwoopportunitiesforterrorists
differfromconcernsaboutadirtybomb,whichmixesradioactivematerialwith
conventionalexplosives. According to Gary Ackerman of the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, the number of terrorist organizations that would detonate a nuclear
weapon is probably small. Few terrorist organizations have the ideology that would motivate nuclear
weapons acquisition. Before we breathe a sigh of relief, we should recognize that this only increases the
signal-to-noise ratio: many terrorists might claim to want to detonate a nuclear weapon, but the United

Transportablenuclear
weaponsandloosefissilematerialsgrantopportunitiestoterroristswithnuclearpursuits .
States must find and prevent the small number of groups that actually would.

How should the United States seek to undercut the efforts of the select few with a nuclear intent?

A2: ISIS cant get nukes

ISIS is likely to acquire nuclear weapons
Farhan 14

Ahmad, Afghan Analyst and Commentator, Sharnoffs World Views, The World Must Prevent
ISIS from Obtaining Pakistani Nukes, http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/isis-pakistani-nukes-419/

The global leaders certainly understand that the extreme threat to global
security is the risk that terrorists could get a hold of nuclear weapons and
start new terrorism. Although world leaders especially Americans hold several
international conferences on addressing this immediate and extreme threat,
there is no guarantee that terrorist organization such as ISIS wont acquire
nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda struggled for several years to obtain nuclear and
chemical weapons but they failed. However, ISIS is much stronger than AlQaeda and was able to hold some sort of chemical weapons in Iraq which
they used against the Kurds.

Stolen radioactive material from Iraq by ISIS could be

used for WMD
Moftah 14

Lora, New York Reporter and Journalist, International Business Times, Does ISIS Have A
Nuclear Weapon? Islamic State Supporter Claims Militants Have Dirty Bomb, http://www.ibtimes.com/doesisis-have-nuclear-weapon-islamic-state-supporter-claims-militants-have-dirty-1731890

Islamic State group has reportedly developed a nuclear weapon made from
radioactive material stolen from an Iraqi university, according to a militant
who claims insider knowledge. Hamayun Tariq, a British ISIS member now
based in Syria, claimed on social media that the group obtained the uranium
from Mosul University and now possesses a dirty bomb that it is now
considering detonating in a public area. If true, this would confirm fears
voiced by Iraqs United Nations ambassador back in July following the seizure
of 40 kilograms of uranium compounds from Mosul University. In a letter to
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon dated July 8, ambassador Mohamed Ali
Alhakim warned that these materials can be used in manufacturing weapons
of mass destruction, according to Reuters. "These nuclear materials, despite
the limited amounts mentioned, can enable terrorist groups, with the
availability of the required expertise, to use it separate or in combination with
other materials in its terrorist acts," said Alhakim.

Isis is in possession of WMDsincludes Biological,

nuclear, and other radioactive weapons
Withnall 15 (Adam Withnall, 6-10-2015, "Isis has now seized enough
radioactive material to build a 'dirty bomb', Australia warns,"
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isiss-dirty-bombjihadists-have-seized-enough-radioactive-material-to-build-their-first-wmd10309220.html, Date Accessed: 7-3-2015)

The Isis militant group has seized enough radioactive material from
government facilities to suggest it has the capacity to build a large and
devastating dirty bomb, according to Australian intelligence reports. Isis
declared its ambition to develop weapons of mass destruction in the most
recent edition of its propaganda magazine Dabiq, and Indian defence officials
have previously warned of the possibility the militants could acquire a nuclear
weapon from Pakistan. According to the Australian foreign minister, Julie
Bishop, Nato has expressed deep concerns about the materials seized by Isis
from research centres and hospitals that would normally only be available to
governments. The threat of Isiss radioactive and biological weapons stockpile
was so severe that the Australia Group, a 40-nation bloc dedicated to ending
the use of chemical weapons, held a session on the subject at its summit in
Perth last week. This is really worrying them, Ms Bishop said in an interview
with The Australian. Julie Bishop, Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs When
they swept across territory in Syria and Iraq, she said, the insurgents did not
just clear out the cash from local banks. Last week Ms Bishop spoke at the
Australia Group meeting about fears Isis was weaponising poisonous gases
such as chlorine. And speaking to The Australian, she confirmed that the
concerns she was raising stemmed from reports filed by the Australian
department of defence as well the foreign office. The growing concerns about
Isiss development of weapons of mass destruction come at a time when
experts fear the militant group will be more active than ever to mark the
start of Ramadan and the one-year anniversary of its declaration of a
caliphate. Isis said it was changing its name to Islamic State following the
first public address by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Mosul on 29 June
last year, and the US-based Institute for the Study of War has noted that the
group usually reserves its major operations to coincide with the Islamic holy
month.

ISIS is financially capable of obtaining nuclear weapons

Fox 15

ISIS magazine, FOX News Insider, ISIS Magazine: Terror Army Could Buy Nuclear Weapon From
Pakistan, http://insider.foxnews.com/2015/05/26/isis-magazine-terror-army-could-buy-nuclear-weaponpakistan

An article in the official magazine of ISIS claims that the terror army has the
financial wherewithal to purchase a nuclear weapon, possibly from corrupt
officials in Pakistan. The article in Dabiq was written last week under the
name of British photojournalist John Cantlie, who's been held by ISIS for the
last two years. If a nuclear weapon cannot be obtained, the article suggests
ISIS look into procuring a few thousand tons of ammonium nitrate explosives.
Meantime, new photos show the terror army's rapidly growing arsenal of
guns, ammo and explosives, seized when Iraqi forces fled Ramadi. Brian
Kilmeade discussed these troubling developments with Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer,
senior fellow at the London Center for Policy Research. Shaffer said the
nuclear threat from ISIS is "very real," adding that al Qaeda went down this
path years ago. Shaffer said al Qaeda was only one-tenth as smart as ISIS
and about one one-hundredth as well financed. He argued that if Iran obtains
a nuclear weapon, it's going to cause proliferation throughout the Middle

East, increasing the chance that ISIS can get a nuclear device. "They're
available. Last time I checked on the black market, these things run about
400 million dollars per warhead. So, ya know, it's there," said Shaffer. He
agreed that ISIS will only have more money flowing in if they continue to
control territory in Iraq and Syria and can tax and extort the local populations.
Reports last summer estimated that ISIS had amassed around $2 billion in
assets.

A2: alt causes

A2: Alt Cause Death Penalty

Death penalty not a deterrent to extradition

Daniel J. Sharfstein, Associate, Strumwasser & Woocher, Santa Monica,
California, European Courts, American Rights: Extradition and Prison
Conditions, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. 719, Spring 20 02

Soering has not had a chilling effect on the extradition process ;

When faced
with a Soering-type situation, American prosecutors simply make assurances
that they will not seek the death penalty . n79 As a result, Jens Soering is serving
two life sentences in Virginia. Likewise, Charles Short, whom the Netherlands
initially refused to extradite, faced a court martial and is imprisoned in [*744]
the United States. n80 Because only a trivial number of extraditions involve
capital offenses, prosecutors seldom have to make Soering-type
assurances, and neither international criminal enforcement nor capital punishment is ever much
[*743]

the United States makes and receives more extradition requests than ever before. n78

affected. Death penalty exceptions to extradition have emerged less as a repudiation of the rule of noninquiry than as an easily decided formal issue--similar to dual criminality--that is routinely incorporated into

Soering merely adds a low procedural hurdle in a small subset

of cases. Given the level of critical interest devoted to the case, its impact on American
practices and policies has been eerily slight.
treaties. n81

But even though the death penalty hasnt deterred

extraditions the precedent makes other challenges more
likely to succeed
Daniel J. Sharfstein, Associate, Strumwasser & Woocher, Santa Monica,
California, European Courts, American Rights: Extradition and Prison
Conditions, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. 719, Spring 20 02

Terrorism, alien smuggling, white collar frauds, drugs, and computer offenses: The international character

If
Soering has had little effect on the death penalty in the United States, it is nonetheless
a precedent that gives extradition defendants in each of the above scenarios a
plausible basis for staying in Europe. Even though the European Court and all Council of
Europe member nations have an interest in not making it too easy to avoid extradition , the success
of such challenges may well hinge on a series of thorny factual questions , such
of a broad range of crimes will increasingly confront law enforcement agencies in the coming years.

as a fugitive's gender, age, n219 and physical and mental health, including history of sexual abuse, as well
as the actual prison conditions in the jurisdiction that is charging him or her.

Even claims that

may prove ultimately unsuccessful could incur high enough transaction

costs to push prosecutors to make generous plea offers in exchange for
voluntary repatriation.

A2: alt cause - drones

International actors care more about detention than
drones for legitimacy
John Bellinger 13, partner in the international and national security law
practices at Arnold & Porter LLP in DC, Adjunct Senior Fellow in International
and National Security Law at the CFR, "Peter Baker on Mounting Criticisms of
Obama Administration CT Policies", February 10,
www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/peter-baker-on-mounting-criticisms-of-obamaadministration-ct-policies/
One of Bakers more interesting observations and one of the first times I have seen this in print, although it is a
subject of some discussion among Bush Administration officials is

that civil liberties groups have taken it

easy on the Obama Administration: For four years, Mr. Obama has benefited at least in part from the
reluctance of Mr. Bushs most virulent critics to criticize a Democratic president. Some
liberals acknowledged in recent days that they were willing to accept policies they once
would have deplored as long as they were in Mr. Obamas hands, not Mr. Bushs. We trust the
president, former Gov. Jennifer Granholm of Michigan said on Current TV. And if this was Bush, I think
that we would all be more up in arms because we wouldnt trust that he
would strike in a very targeted way and try to minimize damage rather than contain
collateral damage. Presumably for the same reason, European governments, who were
unrelenting in their criticism of Guantanamo and other Bush Administration
counterterrorism policies, have simply looked the other way as most of those same policies have continued (or,
in the case of drones, dramatically increased). One does wonder whether the Nobel Prize Committee is suffering
from at least a modicum of buyers remorse. As the Obama Administration begins its second term, the big question
now is whether the domestic and international criticism will snowball and, if so, how the
Administration will respond.

A2: alt cause - NSA

NSA scandal wont taint relations---even if its never
ending
David Francis 11/4, The Fiscal Times, "Why Europe Won't Punish the U.S.
over NSA Scandal", 2013, www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/11/04/WhyEurope-Won-t-Punish-US-over-NSA-Scandal
At this point, the National Security Agency spying scandal seems never-ending. Its been
ongoing since June, when the first of Edward Snowdens stolen documents was made public. Each time it
appears to be dying, another round of documents appear and the scandal lives on.
The latest series of leaks is perhaps the most serious. Less than two weeks ago, on the eve
of a European Union summit in Brussels, reports emerged that the NSA had been spying on European leaders, including
German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

The outcry from the German public and politicians

continues to this day. German officials have demanded and been granted meetings with high-level Obama
administration officials to complain about the spying and Merkel called President Obama to voice her displeasure with the
practice. Hans-Christian Stroebele, a legislator for the Germany's opposition Greens party, said that Snowden might be
called to testify in a German investigation into NSA practices. "He made it clear he knows a lot and that as long as the
National Security Agency blocks investigations, he is essentially prepared to come to Germany and give testimony, but

anger has
been expressed around the European continent. Some are saying that
irreparable damage has been done to the relationship between the United States and its
European partners. But is this truly the case? Expressing anger over NSA
practices is one thing; actually making policy changes because of
the behavior is entirely another. A close examination of statements made
by European officials shows their tone softening. There is not likely to be
any long-term fallout in two key areas: economic negotiations over a $287 billion
EU/U.S. trade pact are going to continue, and intelligence is still likely to pass back and
forth across the Atlantic. The only real damage has been to the standing of the United States with the
the conditions must be discussed," Stroebele, who met with Snowden in Russia last week, said. Similar

European public and fringe lawmakers.

Backlash is short term and wont effect intel coop

Francis 13 (David Francis is national correspondent for The Fiscal

Times, 11/4/2013, "Why Europe Wont Punish the U.S. over NSA Scandal",
finance.yahoo.com/news/why-europe-won-t-punish-101500877.html)
Similar anger has been expressed around the European continent. Some are
saying that irreparable damage has been done to the relationship between
the United States and its European partners. But is this truly the case?
Expressing anger over NSA practices is one thing; actually making
policy changes because of the behavior is entirely another. A close
examination of statements made by European officials shows their tone
softening. There is not likely to be any long-term fallout in two key
areas: economic negotiations over a $287 billion EU/U.S. trade pact are going
to continue, and intelligence is still likely to pass back and forth across the
Atlantic. The only real damage has been to the standing of the United
States with the European public and fringe lawmakers. 1) Economic
cooperation. There are growing concerns that the European Union could make

it tougher for private businesses to operate in Europe. According to reports,

some European lawmakers are considering suspending the Safe Harbor
agreement that allows American firms to process European personal data,
effectively ending the ability of companies like Apple to sell their products in
Europe. But the cornerstone of EU/U.S. economic ties is the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership, a deal currently being negotiated.
According to a study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the agreement
would increase trade between the partners by $120 billion within five years.
At the same time, it would add some $180 billion to U.S.-EU gross domestic
product. After the initial reports on U.S. snooping, some European lawmakers
called for the EU to abandon the deal. But the economic reality in the
European Union makes this impossible. The euro zone s struggling to grow,
and Europe needs the help more than America. Estimates put forth by the
European Commission suggest a new trade pact could increase annual GDP
by 0.5 percent in the EU and 0.4 percent in the U.S. by 2027. Even Merkel
dismissed any thought of abandoning the deal, saying on Friday, Maybe the
talks are more important right now considering the current situation. 2)
Intelligence sharing. Reports out of Germany indicate that Berlin and
Washington are set to sign an agreement forbidding espionage against one
another some time next year. This agreement would go a long way
toward placating Germany anger. But each side will not stop sharing
intelligence. Numerous reports indicate that the German foreign intelligence
service uses NSA information to track terrorist on German soil. In fact,
authorities have used this information to foil attacks in Germany. The same
kind of exchange is also set to continue among other NATO allies. All partners
share information that could be used to prevent attacks. Some former
European intelligence officials have even admitted that European NATO
members also spy on the United States.

No impact to NSAreforms solve, blowback is only

rhetorical
Josh Gerstein, Politico, 10/26/13, NSA disclosures put U.S. on defense,
dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=0A829B73-DCF3-4A66-9221C8EEDDEE02F7

and if foreign intelligence services rein

in their cooperation. Another potential outcome: President Barack Obama may decide to
pledge to stop spying on certain targets, like close allies, or for certain purposes, like gaining
The impacts could be felt by the U.S in diplomatic circles

advantage in diplomatic negotiations. The real question is whether the administration here feels
constrained not just to review our collection, but to start to constrain it to be able to contain the diplomatic
fallout, said Zarate, author of Treasurys War. If were really going to constrain what were doing, that

Obama already seems to be moving in

that direction. After fielding angry complaints from German Chancellor Angela Merkel about
alleged NSA monitoring of her cell phone, Obama pledged to stop such activity , even as he
to me is a long-term implication of all of this. Indeed,

demurred publicly about whether it had taken place. The president assured the chancellor that the United
States is not monitoring and will not monitor the communications of the chancellor, White House press

secretary Jay Carney told reporters Wednesday. Geiger said Friday that Merkel seemed genuinely disturbed
by the alleged tapping of her phone. Chancellor Merkel was really upset, Geiger told POLITICO. The
reaction was absolutely un-normal for her. Shes always very calm. Geiger said that before recent reports
he would have dismissed as nonsense the idea that the U.S. would try to listen to Merkels phone. You
have to divide between friends and enemies, he said. This kind of behavior regarding friends is not
acceptable. Still, some former U.S. officials said they were surprised by Obamas public pledge to Merkel,
since it is likely to generate pressure from other foreign leaders for similar assurances. French President
Franois Hollande told reporters Friday hed received a similar assurance from U.S. officials. They told us it
was in the past and now theres a will to organize things differently, Hollande said, according to the
Associated Press. Obamas pledges, if broadened to other nations or less senior officials, could create
complications in situations where the U.S. suspects foreign government officials could be complicit in
wrongdoing. However, Harman said she believes it would be reasonable for Obama to limit diplomatic
spying in order to preserve cooperation with the U.S. internationally on issues like terrorism. I commend
the president for saying we need to review this. I think there should be a line, she said. Its important
in our interconnected world for leaders of countries to trust each other. Harman, now head of the Wilson
Center, also stressed that NSA anti-terror surveillance is often used by foreign countries to head off attacks

the NSA revelations have roiled U.S.

ties with partners around the globe, but disputed the seriousness of the setbacks .
We have diplomatic relations and channels that we use in order to discuss
these issues that have clearly caused some tension in our relationships with other nations around the
on their soil. The White House acknowledged this week that

world, Carney said. But Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes downplayed that tumult. I dont
think you can say theres been some across-the-board impact on American foreign policy. I think its been
very unique to some circumstances, Rhodes said Thursday at a conference sponsored by Reuters. While
there are no legal limits on the NSAs collection of communications by foreigners outside the U.S. who lack
a U.S. green card, former senior intelligence officials said there are political constraints decisions not
to undertake certain work because it could irritate allies or is seen as unsavory. National Security Agency
director Gen. Keith Alexander hinted this week that such moves have already been made and there may
be more to come. Were taking this beating in the press because of what these reporters are putting out
Would I stop doing any of that surveillance? Alexander said in an interview with a Defense Department
blog. Well, theres policy decisions that policymakers can do, but nobody would ever want us to stop
protecting this country against terrorists, against adversary states, against cyber. The NSA director, who
has been unflappable in public during the storm and genial with journalists, sounded increasingly
frustrated with the serial disclosures. I think its wrong that that newspaper reporters have all these
documents, the 50,000 whatever they have and are selling them and giving them out as if these you
know it just doesnt make sense, Alexander said. We ought to come up with a way of stopping it. I dont
know how to do that. Thats more of the courts and the policymakers but, from my perspective, its wrong
to allow this to go on. With the government shutdown out of the way at least until January, the NSA story
seems likely to jump back into Washington headlines in the coming weeks. Anti-surveillance protesters are
planning a march and rally in the capital on Saturday. Congress is turning its attention back to the issue,
too, with a House hearing set for next week and Senate panels likely to take up reform legislation soon.
Outside panels are grinding away on the issue as well. The surveillance technology review group Obama
announced in August is set to produce an interim report in mid-November. And next week the separate
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is set to have an all-day public hearing on potential reforms.

Not all intelligence veterans believe the current outcry over U.S. intelligence gathering will
last. This will not be permanent damage, said John McLaughlin, a former CIA deputy
director now at the School of Advanced International Studies. Everyone is going to seek to put
this behind us. Like many colleagues, McLaughlin charged that much of the global outrage
especially that from political leaders is contrived. This is what governments have
done since biblical times, he said. It reminds me of the line in Casablanca about there being
gambling going on in the casino.

NSA scandal is no big deal---wont harm relations

Bernd Riegert 10/25, DW's Europe correspondent in Brussels, "Opinion:
Much ado about nothing?", 2013, www.dw.de/opinion-much-ado-aboutnothing/a-17184229

Spying among friends is not unusual

lack of EU unity means the US will not face serious consequences.
The
monitored chancellor and her aide force the American bad guys
to
impose a code of conduct on the intelligence services it's a scenario that's
likely to remain in the realms of fiction what will happen in reality? The
chancellor and the French president will meet their American counterpart
and
establish some
transparency There will not
be
any publicly negotiated agreements on what intelligence agencies on both
sides of the Atlantic are allowed to do.
Furthermore, the French and German leaders do not speak for
the European Union. There is no joint European stance, only a vague
declaration
It merely states that the Americans are
good friends, and notes that there is concern - without criticizing

The main reason for this is that European secret

services
benefit from the spying activities of the NSA
No
one wants to endanger cooperation
just because the
chancellor's insecure private mobile phone may have been tapped
Cameron
prevented tougher wording on the EU
statement
The EU has no authority - it's every country
for itself The fuss in Brussels is
hypocritical. Now that a top
politician is personally affected, delegations are being dispatched
Yet it
was already established months ago that US intelligence services snooped on
millions of European citizens
The chancellor ignored the problem
for far too long - until she was directly affected
Intelligence
service experts know perfectly well that the European services also
spy
To prevent terrorist attacks, American and European
services then share their findings
Trust has been lost, and must be won back , said
top EU politicians
This is a rather naive notion: it is
hardly news that agencies are also active in friendly states. Instead,
European leaders should be worrying about what potential opponents
are spying on
This could really cause damage What insight can the US
glean by listening in on Merkel's partisan small talk
The comments
made by
Obama on his last visit to Germany are
closer to the
truth if he wanted to know what Merkel was thinking, he'd simply give her
a call, not ask the NSA. Merkel's mission won't harm ties The E
U
will not cancel the agreement to share
data
nor will it
suspend talks
This is the right decision, as such a drastic reaction
really would do lasting damage to relations with the US
- but spying on the head of a government is taking things a step too far. However, DW's Bernd Riegert believes

It's the

stuff spy thrillers are made of: Merkel and Hollande on a secret mission in the capital of the most powerful man in the world! What did Obama know? When did he know it? And why did he do it?

- who are in fact their friends -

But

. So

for the talks

planned at this week's EU summit,

they will try to

degree of

, however,

That goes against the nature of the beast. The purpose of an intelligence service is to do things that are

illegal in the country it's targeting.

the delegates at the summit spent hours wrestling with.

, let alone making

accusations.

Europe not responsible for Merkel's mobile

, and thus many governments,

and CIA.

aimed at preventing potential danger

. British Prime Minister David

, whose intelligence services cooperate particularly closely with the US,

. EU member states regard spying as a sovereign national matter.

also somewhat

to a friendly nation.

in Germany, France and elsewhere.

herself

Not a big surprise

, snoop and wiretap abroad, among both friends and foes.

: after 9/11, a liaison office was established outside Paris for precisely that purpose. The exchange allows the agencies to

circumvent legal barriers they may be subject to in their own countries.

and many

Merkel

in Brussels. Friends shouldn't be spied on.

, like China, Iran and

Russia,

in Europe.

on her CDU party phone?

US President Barack

probably

: that

uropean

a large amount of banking

nion

collected via SWIFT,

on a free trade agreement.

. On their "mission impossible" in Washington, Merkel and

Hollande should urge Obama to reduce the NSA's activities to a reasonable scale.
Eavesdropping on Merkel, if it in fact happened, was superfluous.

NATO

A2: NATO Sucks

NATO still relevant----military and commerce
Charles A. Kupchan 13, D.Phil from Oxford in International Affairs,
Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown, Whitney H. Shepardson
Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 3/6/13, "Why is NATO still
needed, even after the downfall of the Soviet Union?,"
http://www.cfr.org/nato/why-nato-still-needed-even-after-downfall-sovietunion/p30152
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an international military alliance that was created to
enable its members (the United States, Canada, and their European partners) to counter the threat posed

Alliances usually come to an end when the threat that led to their
formation disappears. However, NATO defies the historical norm, not only
surviving well beyond the Cold War's end, but also expanding its membership
and broadening its mission. NATO remains valuable to its members for a number of
reasons. The expansion of the alliance has played an important role in
consolidating stability and democracy in Central Europe, where members
continue to look to NATO as a hedge against the return of a threat from Russia. In this
respect, NATO and the European Union have been working in tandem to lock in
a prosperous and secure Atlantic community. Meanwhile, NATO has repeatedly
demonstrated the utility of its integrated military capability. The alliance used
force to end ethnic conflict in the Balkans and played a role in preserving the
peace that followed. NATO has sustained a long-term presence in Afghanistan,
helping to counter terrorism and prepare Afghans to take over responsibility for their own security. NATO
also oversaw the mission in Libya that succeeded in stopping its civil war and
removing the Qaddafi regime. All of these missions demonstrate NATO's
utility and its contributions to the individual and collective welfare of its
members, precisely why they continue to believe in the merits of membership.
by the Soviet Union.

NATO solves multiple scenarios for war

Chicago Council 12, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a
nonpartisan thinktank, Dr. Lisa Aronsson, Head of the Transatlantic
Programme at the Royal United Services Institute, PhD in International
Relations at the London School of Economics, and Dr. Molly ODonnell,
teaches public policy and international affairs courses at DePaul University
and at the University of Illinois at Chicago, "Smart Defense and the Future of
NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century?,"
3/30/12,
www.thechicagocouncil.org/userfiles/file/NATO/Conference_Report.pdf
A new transatlantic bargain has direct implications for NATO s vast but critical
agenda. First, with the continuing drawdown in Afghanistan, NATO must prepare anew for
serious Article 5 threats and challenges. This does not mean a return to Reforger exercises
or Cold War mind-sets, as the current and future threats to NATO member states are, for the most part,

This centurys Article 5 threats will be manifested

by ballistic missiles originating from thegreater Middle East, coercive Russian
energy threats and Arctic resource claims, challenges in cyberspace from a
variety of sources, and, in the near future, challenges posed to the alliances space
capabilities , which are increasingly vulnerable and upon which the alliances militaries (and societies)
very different from those of the past.

are ever more reliant.1 Thus, the focus of NATO exercises and training to strengthen interoperability for
contingencies in Europe should emphasize needed defenses against these new types of threats. This
means, for example, increasing NATOs capability for cyber defenses and planning for contingencies that
feature coercive Russian oil and gas supply measures and militarized Arctic resource grabs. For Article 5
threats to members security originating from outside of Europe, i.e., from the greater Middle East,

NATO

will need to continue to exercise its naval, air, and ground forces for expeditionary
operations. No-fly zones, naval blockades, precision air campaigns, and selected
ground operations will continue to be required for contingencies that unfold in
the context of the Arab Awakening and by the range of threats posed by Iran. Of course, just
as in previous decades, the United States should retain a core role in the alliance for
the full range of such Article 5 operations. This fundamental element of the bargain will not
change, for when Europes vital interests are threatened from within Europe or beyond, so
too are those of the UnitedStates. Second, as stated above, the relative role of Europe in nonArticle 5 operations will of necessity increase. However, with austerity afflicting defense budgets on both
sides of the Atlantic, there is no thought that Europe will all of a sudden increase its inventories of the
types of critical and expensive military assets that the United States maintains in disproportionate
numbersC4ISR assets, targeteers, logistics, and other enabling capabilities.2 The United States will need
to continue to provide those capabilities when such assets can be made available. But the days when the
United States provided the preponderance of the assets of all types for operations that do not involve
Article 5 are over. The United States will support such European-led NATO operations when it deems them
in its interests to do so and when such assets are available, but this support will no longer be automatic or
comprehensive. Third, the plug and play command

and control structure that has

brought NATO through the Cold War and a range of post-Cold War contingencies continues
to be highly valuable and very relevant to todays security challenges. NATO
should sustain this core framework at all costs, as its value endures and enables new
partnerships. Fourth, NATOs approach to partnerships in recent years has proven prescient, but much
more needs to be done, and with some urgency. The greater Middle East is in turmoil and will likely remain
so for a generation as the Arab Awakening plays out across the entire region. Surely the alliance should be
prepared for demanding contingencies that affect very important or even vital interests of NATO member
states. Moreover, the possibility of a crisis or conflict with Iraneither before it acquires nuclear weapons
or aftermust be taken seriously. Such a conflict would from its very outset directly affect NATO members,
including Turkey, but also the United States and other NATO members whose national forces are hosted in
significant concentrations in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (particularly Qatar, UAE,
Bahrain, and Kuwait). For example, an Iranian ballistic missile in flight will be picked up by U.S. and Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) radars, and depending on its arc and range, by NATOs missile defense radars

a single Iranian
ballistic missile in a Gulf crisis will lead almost automatically to Article 5
consultations, if not operations, by the alliance. All of this means that the time for
NATOs political timidity in the face of such realities is over. With some alacrity NATO should
in Turkey and NATO members shipborne radars in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus,

work out a robust partnership arrangement with the newly prominent GCC as a group and with the
countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) individually. There is much to do. The focus should be
security cooperation with MENA partners and strengthened interoperability with the GCC in air defense;
naval operations; missile defense; coalition air operations; and command, control, and communications.
Where possible, Turkey should play a leading role in the alliances efforts. The key partners at this point, if
current events and the Libya operation are ion, are likely to be Qatar and the UAE, but there will be
others.Finally, NATO cannot ignore the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions. Our globalized
world means that significant economic disruptions in Asia almost instantly affect Europe and North
America. The

melting Arctic ice cap means that an increasing amount of maritime traffic
from Asia will transit northern European waters on its way to distant ports. New, critical sea lines of

communication will need to be patrolled; new patterns of international maritime activity will begin
to form. NATO needs to be readyto be thinking, talking, and at some point, planningfor these
geostrategic changes occurring due to the most rapid shift of economic and political power in history.
NATO should begin by initiating a consultative forum for Asian partners that are interested in a dialogue as
well as develop means to enhance their interoperability with the alliance through joint exercises. The most
likely initial partners should include Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. NATO itself
should begin to devote a portion of its own deliberations to Asian security matters. This is not to suggest
that NATO begin Article 5 planning for China-Taiwan scenarios or for the Korean peninsula. But NATO should
begin talking about Asian security, amongst its own members and with key Asian partners who share the
values that animated the formation of the alliance in 1949. For if the next century features the rise of Asian

will be incumbent upon the United States, Canada, and

Europe to strive to the greatest extent possible to ensure that the new global order reflects
transatlantic values. The transatlantic partnership can have a bright and
robust future, even in the face of a newarray of threats and challenges to the
security of alliance members. Just as it has done before, the adaptable Atlantic partnership will
powers to the apex of global power, it

need to evolve once more to address a new international landscape. The broad strategic interests of the
Atlantic community are in greater convergence than ever before, but divergences in capabilities and
regional priorities require an adjustment to the transatlantic bargain to ensure that the partnership
remains as relevant in the future as it has been in the past.

A2: Regional Institutions check

NATO still has role in defending Euro/Global regions,
regional security institutions dont fill in
Younghoon Moon 12/29/12, MPA candidate (2014) Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, "The Future of NATO," Harvard
International Review, http://hir.harvard.edu/mobile-might/the-future-of-nato?
page=0,2
NATO has a role to play in the twenty-first century. Europes security is far from
assured even in its own neighborhood, and, until the European Union begins to take a more
active role in its own defense, NATO remains the only force that can provide that
security. Europes relationship with Russia is unlike Europes relationship with the Soviet Union, but
Russias hostility to the newly installed defense system in Europe and opposition to
former Soviet states signing the North Atlantic Treaty means that the Alliance
will be vital for defending Europes security interests. Whether NATO can play a global
role is less certain. In the long run, the regionalization of the international security system will continue.
Just as it does not make sense for the African Union to dispatch a military force to Kosovo, NATOs out-ofarea missions will be less justifiable in the future, since the Alliance is dominated by Western countries.

At the present moment, however, there are areas where NATO can have a global
impact. Other regional bodies lack its ability to enforce security in their own
regions. Such is the case with the African Union, which requested assistance
from NATO in conducting its anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. At the same time, if
support for military intervention does not come from other quarters, few alternatives to NATO
remain when a humanitarian operation under the auspices of the United
Nations is called for. Given these circumstances, whether NATO can be a serious
contender in the post-Cold War order depends on how well it is financially and materially
equipped. Military alliances have a comparative advantage over unilateral or ad
hoc solutions: they come with ready-made command structures, encourage
pooling of resources, confer greater legitimacy, and lessen the burden of
each member.

Extradition

A2: Extradition Inevitable

A2: case turns

A2: future pres circumvent

No link -- Obama wont use indefinite detention on US

citizens
Future presidents wont either --- record of criminal justice system robust

Byman and Wittes, 2013 (June 17th, Daniel, professor in the Security
Studies Program at Georgetown University and the Research Director of the
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. and Benjamin, Senior
Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, the Editor in Chief
of the Lawfare blog, and a member of the Hoover Institutions Task Force on
National Security and Law Brookings, Tools and Tradeoffs: Confronting US
Citizen Terrorist Suspects Abroad,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/07/23%20us
%20citizen%20terrorist%20suspects%20awlaki%20jihad%20byman
%20wittes/toolsandtradeoffs.pdf)
Yet military detention has notat least not so farproven an attractive
alternative to the criminal justice system for handling U.S. citizens. The
reason is that, particularly as a longer-term proposition, its advantages fade
and its disadvantages become acute. The Obama administration has said
flatly that it will not use military detention for citizens. 109 And while a
subsequent administration might revisit this judgment, the record of the
criminal justice system has grown strong enough that there might not exist
cause to do soat least not until a highly dangerous suspect falls into
American custody and authorities find that they cannot make a case against
him.

Add-ons

Interbranch Conflict Add-on

Extend Chesney Congressional action is key to prevent
interbranch conflict over detention policy -- Solves
extinction
Linda S. Jamison, Deputy Director of Governmental Relations @ CSIS,
Spring 1993, Executive-Legislative Relations after the Cold War, Washington
Quarterly, v.16, n.2, p. 189
Indeed there are very few domestic issues that do not have strong international implications, and
likewise there are numerous transnational issues in which all nations have a stake.

Environmental degradation, the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction,

population control, migration, international narcotics trafficking,

the spread of AIDS, and

are circumstances

the deterioration of the human condition in the less developed world

affecting all corners of the globe.

Neither political isolation nor policy bifurcation is an

option for the United States. Global circumstances have drastically changed with the end of the
Cold War and the political and policy conditions that sustained bipartisan consensus are not
applicable to the post-war era. The formulation of a new foreign policy must be grounded in
broad-based principles that reflect domestic economic, political and social concerns while
providing practical solutions to new situations. Toward a cooperative US Foreign Policy for the

If the federal government is to meet the new international policy

challenges of the post-cold war era, institutional dissension caused by partisan competition
and executive-legislative friction must give way to a new way of
business. Policy flexibility must be the watchword of the 1990s in the foreign
policy domain if the United States is to have any hope of securing its
interests in the uncertain years ahead. One former policymaker, noting the
1990s:

historical tendency of the United States to make fixed attachments, has argued that a changing
world dictates policy flexibility, where practical solutions can be developed on principles of broad-

Flexibility, however, will not be possible

without interbranch cooperation. The end of the Cold War and the new single-party
based policy objectives (Fulbright 1979).

control of the White House and Congress provide a unique opportunity to reestablish foreign
policy cooperation. Reconfiguring post cold war objectives requires comprehension of the
remarkable transformations in world affairs and demands an intense political dialogue that goes
beyond the executive branch (Mann 1990, 28-29).

Human Rights Leadership Add-on

Bringing US in line with other detention practices
internationally restores US human rights leadership
Mark H Gitenstein 9, Retired American politician who served as the United States
Ambassador to Romania, Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform, November 3,
Book, p. 35-36
Second, perhaps the

biggest U.S. deviation from the norm lies in the extraordinary manner in which
the previous administration made U.S. counterterrorism rules, giving rise to the possibility
of virtually unlimited executive authority with respect to detention, surveillance, and even
torture. No other country, however permissive the authority that it grants its security services, comes even close.
Bringing the United States into line with other democracies, in other words, will involve a
strange combination of tightening rules, relaxing rules, and insisting on the conventional order in which rules get made.
Reform on those fronts will help to restore the moral credibility of the United States
with regard to human rights. U.S. alliances with each of the eight nations surveyed here will prove
essential as the country continues to combat jihadist terrorism. To be sure, there will be many situations in which U.S. rules
protect civil liberties more robustly than do those in other democracies, as well as some situations in which the unique U.S.
counterterrorism effort which operates throughout the world as a kind of hybrid encompassing military action, covert operations, and
criminal justice procedures requires powers that many countries do not need or claim for themselves. Thats okay. Democracies can take
different approaches without being less democratic.

Human rights cred solves global war

William W. Burke-White 4, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special
Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton
University, Spring 2004, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, p. 279-280
This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion
of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by
suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and
their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to
U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger
the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military
action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period [*250] indicates that
states that systematically abuse their own citizens' h uman r ights are also those most likely to
engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights
records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights
can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy
appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international
aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of
such acts of aggression. n2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a
powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between
national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the
prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters
some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent
through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current

government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through

the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of
human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a
mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

EU Terrorism Bad Pakistan Add On

EU terrorism spurs Pakistan strikes and geopolitical
meltdown
Tony Karon, Wednesday, Oct. 06, 2010, Why a Terrorist Strike on Europe Risks Geopolitical
Meltdown, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2023847,00.html, jj

Why a Terrorist Strike on Europe Risks Geopolitical Meltdown

Bad as they are, right now, relations between the U.S. and Pakistan could get
a whole lot worse if a feared Mumbai-style terrorist plot materializes in
Europe. One reason for the fraying of ties is the dramatic escalation in the Obama Administration's
drone war in Pakistan's tribal areas. September saw more missiles fired from drone aircraft than any month
on record, purportedly aimed at disrupting possible terrorist attacks planned for European cities fear of
which has also prompted travel alerts by the U.S. and allied governments. And the campaign has not
relented. Pakistani officials claim that eight suspected militants of German citizenship were killed in a
drone strike on a Waziristan mosque on Monday. The drone attacks have fueled outrage on Pakistan's
streets, and presumably within its armed forces too. The anger has only grown with news of Pakistani
soldiers killed as the U.S. pursues Afghan Taliban fighters fleeing into Pakistan (last Thursday, such a chase
resulted in the death of three Pakistani soldiers). Pakistani authorities appeared to be sending out a
warning by closing their Khyber Pass border with Pakistan, choking off the main supply line to the NATO
mission in Afghanistan. And militants kept up their own retaliation on Wednesday by destroying NATO-

tensions could rise from both ends,

should a successful attack be staged in Europe . Explaining the recent terrorism-threat
alerts and travel advisories announced for European cities, security officials have been widely
quoted in the media suggesting that intelligence points to a coordinated
attack, originating in Pakistan, that would see gunmen deployed to wreak
havoc on the streets of major European cities in the way that they did in the
Indian city of Mumbai two years ago . Drone attacks have reportedly been stepped up in the
hope of disrupting that plot, allegedly revealed by a captured German of Afghan descent. Following
the Mumbai massacre, carried out by the Pakistan-based jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, the U.S.
had to work hard to restrain India from retaliating by bombing facilities in
Pakistan used by the various Kashmir jihadist groups long cultivated by
Pakistani intelligence mindful of the danger that such an action could
provoke a war between the nuclear-armed neighbors . But if Western cities
were the target of a successful strike, it would be NATO that would be under
pressure to respond. Indeed, according to Bob Woodward's book Obama's Wars, Obama's National
contracted fuel trucks for the sixth time in a week. But

Security Adviser General Jim Jones told Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari that if Faisal Shahzad (the
Pakistani-American sentenced to life imprisonment in New York City on Tuesday) had succeeded in his
attempt to bomb Times Square last year,

the U.S. "would [have] been forced to do things

Pakistan would not like." Woodward wrote that retribution would entail the bombing of "up to 150
known terrorist safe havens inside Pakistan." If Jones' warning, as reported by Woodward, is to be taken

it's not hard to deduce that a series of attacks in Europe that emanate
from Pakistan would force a similar response.
seriously,

Causes US China War

Webster G. Tarpley 11, Ph.D., US, Pakistan Near Open War; Chinese
Ultimatum Warns Washington Against Attack,
http://tarpley.net/2011/05/21/us-pakistan-near-open-war-chinese-ultimatumwarns-washington-against-attack/

China has officially put the United States on notice that Washingtons planned
attack on Pakistan will be interpreted as an act of aggression against Beijing .
This blunt warning represents the first known strategic ultimatum received by
the United States in half a century, going back to Soviet warnings during the Berlin crisis of
1958-1961, and indicates the grave danger of general war growing out of the
US-Pakistan confrontation. Any Attack on Pakistan Would be Construed as an
Attack on China Responding to reports that China has asked the US to respect Pakistans
sovereignty in the aftermath of the Bin Laden operation, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu
used a May 19 press briefing to state Beijings categorical demand that the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Pakistan must be respected. According to Pakistani diplomatic sources cited by the Times of

China has warned in unequivocal terms that any attack on Pakistan

would be construed as an attack on China . This ultimatum was reportedly delivered at the
India,

May 9 China-US strategic dialogue and economic talks in Washington, where the Chinese delegation was

Chinese warnings are

implicitly backed up by that nations nuclear missiles, including an estimated
66 ICBMs, some capable of striking the United States, plus 118 intermediaterange missiles, 36 submarine-launched missiles, and numerous shorter-range
systems. Support from China is seen by regional observers as critically important for Pakistan, which is
led by Vice Prime Minister Wang Qishan and State Councilor Dai Bingguo.1

otherwise caught in a pincers between the US and India: If US and Indian pressure continues, Pakistan can

Dont think we are isolated, we have a potential superpower

with us, Talat Masood, a political analyst and retired Pakistani general, told
AFP.2
say China is behind us.

Global nuclear war

Hunkovic, 09 American Military University (Lee, The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict, http://www.lampmethod.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf)

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to
escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries
other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan,
both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into
the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the
global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant
members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that
they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive
expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could
in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to

contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale
conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or
militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this
scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be
considered in this study.

Democracy add-on
The plan is key to global democracy
Cheyette 2011
(Cara M. Cheyette, JD, MPH, and lead author and reporter, June 2011, Punishment Before Justice:
Indefinite Detention in the US, Physicians for Human Rights,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/indefinite-detention-june2011.pdf)

Indefinite detention is an unconstitutional practice that represents a

regrettable continued departure from the United States traditional respect
for the rule of law, and constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment for
those who have already been subjected to torture or other ill-treatment.
Continued disregard for the rule of law must finally end for the United States
to reestablish its global moral authority and democratic legitimacy .

<<insert democracy impact>>

T Blocks

Detention = Surveillance
Detention is surveillance US law confirms
USSC 11
United States Sentencing Commission, 2011 FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL: CHAPTER FIVE - DETERMINING THE SENTENCE; PART F SENTENCING OPTIONS, http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2011/20115f12
"Home detention" means a program of confinement and supervision that
restricts the defendant to his their place of residence continuously, except
for authorized absences, enforced by appropriate means of surveillance by
the probation office. When an order of home detention is imposed, the
defendant is required to be in his place of residence at all times except for
approved absences for gainful employment, community service, religious
services, medical care, educational or training programs, and such other
times as may be specifically authorized. Electronic monitoring is an
appropriate means of surveillance and ordinarily should be used in
connection with home detention. However, alternative means of
surveillance may be used so long as they are as effective as electronic
monitoring. 2. The court may impose other conditions of probation or
supervised release appropriate to effectuate home detention. If the court
concludes that the amenities available in the residence of a defendant would
cause home detention not to be sufficiently punitive, the court may limit the
amenities available. 3. The defendant's place of residence, for purposes of
home detention, need not be the place where the defendant previously
resided. It may be any place of residence, so long as the owner of the
residence (and any other person(s) from whom consent is necessary) agrees
to any conditions that may be imposed by the court, e.g., conditions that a
monitoring system be installed, that there will be no "call forwarding" or "call
waiting" services, or that there will be no cordless telephones or answering
machines. Background: The Commission has concluded that the
surveillance necessary for effective use of home detention ordinarily
requires electronic monitoring. However, in some cases home detention
may effectively be enforced without electronic monitoring, e.g., when the
defendant is physically incapacitated, or where some other effective means
of surveillance is available. Accordingly, the Commission has not required
that electronic monitoring be a necessary condition for home detention.
Nevertheless, before ordering home detention without electronic monitoring,
the court should be confident that an alternative form of surveillance will
be equally effective. In the usual case, the Commission assumes that a
condition requiring that the defendant seek and maintain gainful employment
will be imposed when home detention is ordered.

Surveillance is detention
Lubman 14

Stanley, Legal Analyst, Wall Street Journal, Arrested, Detained: A Guide to

Navigating Chinas Police Powers,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/08/12/arrested-detained-a-guide-tonavigating-chinas-police-powers/
If a suspect is placed under surveillance in a designated residence, the
police must notify family members about the fact that their relative has been
taken into custody. They are not, though, required to state the location
or charges involved. Although it was originally considered as a form of bail,
this form of surveillance has become an extraordinary form of de facto
extended detention, as described by Joshua Rosenzweig and his co-authors
in a chapter in a recent book.

Detention is systematic observation of US persons (also

says they document that shit)
North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearing No Date
LOCAL CONFINEMENT FACILITIES; SECTION .0100 - DEFINITIONS AND
APPLICABILITY FOR JAILS, http://reports.oah.state.nc.us/ncac/title%2010a
%20-%20health%20and%20human%20services/chapter%2014%20%20director,%20division%20of%20health%20service
%20regulation/subchapter%20j/subchapter%20j%20rules.html
SECTION .0600 - SUPERVISION 10A NCAC 14J .0601 SUPERVISION (a)
Officers shall make supervision rounds and directly observe each inmate
in person at least twice per hour on an irregular basis. The supervision rounds
shall be documented. If remote electronic monitoring is used to supplement
supervision, it shall not be substituted for supervision rounds and direct
visual observation. (b) In addition to the supervision rounds required in
Paragraphs (a) and (c) of this Rule, each jail shall utilize one or both of the
following methods of supervision: (1) Direct or remote two-way voice
communication with all confinement units. (2) Visual contact either through
direct observation or by means of electronic surveillance with all
confinement units. (c) Officers shall directly observe, at least four times per
hour, inmates who display the following behavior: (1) physically hitting or
trying to hit an officer; or (2) being verbally abusive; or (3) stating he will do
harm to himself; or (4) intoxicated, as determined by a score of .15 on a
breathalyzer or displaying slurred speech or smelling of alcohol or inability to
control body movement; or (5) displaying erratic behavior such as screaming,
crying, laughing uncontrollably, or refusing to talk at all. In addition to
displayed behavior, a previous record of a suicide attempt or a previous
record of mental illness shall warrant observation at least four times per
hour. (d) Officers shall remain awake at all times. (e) Officers shall not be
assigned other duties that would interfere with the continuous supervision,
custody or control of inmates. (f) Female officers shall be on duty when
female inmates are confined. (g) The sheriff or the administrator of the
regional jail shall develop a contingency plan for the supervision and control
of inmates during an emergency, and that plan shall provide for the ready

availability of extra personnel. (h) Inmates shall not be allowed to supervise

or assume any control over other inmates.

Surveillance Includes Detention

Includes prisons or detention centers
Torpey 7 - CUNY Graduate Center (John, Through Thick and Thin:
Surveillance after 9/11 Contemporary Sociology, volume 36, n 2,
https://www.academia.edu/2796689/A_Symposium_on_Surveillance_Studies
What is surveillance? The term evokes suspicion and opprobrium because it
suggests a violation of our autonomy, our freedom to move about and to do
as we wish, and this indeed it doesin the putative interests of public order,
commercial transparency, and personal security. Students of surveillance
often make a distinction between visible and invisible formsthe possibility
that my keystrokes are being recorded as I write this, for example, as
opposed to the readily identifiable security cameras that have become
increasingly ubiquitous features of everyday life, at least in the richer parts of
the world. One might, however, make a further distinction between thin
and thick forms of surveillance. Thin surveillance monitors our movements,
our business transactions, and our interactions with government, but
generally without constraining our mobility per se. Thick surveillance, on the
other hand, involves confinement to delineated and often fortified spaces, in
which observation is enhanced by a limitation of the range of mobility of
those observed. There tend to be significant differences in the social groups
supervised by the two forms of surveillance. Although today everyone is
subjected to thin surveillance to some degree, it disproportionately affects
the non-poor, whose actions and transactions must be facilitated as well as
regulated. Access to certain spaces may be limited by thin means that
require the wherewithal or the proper identity, to be sure, but departure from
those spaces is normally voluntary and at the pleasure of the person in
question. In contrast, thick surveillance disproportionately affects the poor,
because it is they who are disproportionately institutionalized; the element of
free movement characteristic of thin surveillance is sharply reduced, if not
eliminated altogether. Thick surveillance occurs in prisons, military brigs,
POW and refugee camps, and similar environments. Probation, parole,
surveillance via electronic tracking devices, childrens welfare agencies,
boarding schools and the like comprise thin variants of thick surveillance.
They do not necessarily restrict movement, but they may do so, and in any
case they involve a more evident narrowing of freedom than thin surveillance
does. While those subjected to thick surveillance are also subject to the thin
variety, they are less likely to be exposed to thin surveillance than the nonpoor because their meansand hence their actions and transactions tend
to be more limited. In short, supervision and confinement by the state tend to
be much more immediate realities for these groups than they are for the nonpoor, whose actions and transactions tend more routinely to be outside the
purview of the statebut under that of commercial surveillance schemes.

Surveillance is broad includes detention

Odoemelam 15 - Chika Ebere Odoemelam is with University of Western
Ontario, London,
Ontario, Canada (Adapting to Surveillance and Privacy Issues in the Era of
Technological and Social Networking International Journal of Social Science
and Humanity, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 2015, http://www.ijssh.org/papers/520H140.pdf)
V. TYPES OF SURVEILLANCE The advent of advanced forms of technology has
made our lives more prone to public scrutiny today, in the 21st century. The
concept of a surveillance society whereby our everyday private lives are
being monitored and recorded by the authorities is no longer news. Since the
September 2001 terrorists attack in the United States, the assault on our
privacy by security agents using sophisticated surveillance programs or
privacy-invading devices has been a constant presence in the news media.
The availability of wireless communications, computers, cameras, sensors,
GPS, biometrics, and other technologies is growing silently in our midst.
According Christopher Parsons (2011) [10], When we send messages to one
another online, when we browse web pages and send e-mail, our
communications are typically unencrypted, that is, they are in a form that can
be easily read. Because our communications are unencrypted, everyone
who uses online technology or other forms of communications is vulnerable
to surveillance. Our online and offline communications are constantly being
monitored and are under surveillance by the appropriate authorities. As a
result, it is possible for our privacy to be violated without our consent
because of our reliance on technology. There is a huge privacy issue in
relation to digital and other forms of communications all over the globe,
especially when telecommunications companies install equipment that could
be used for covert surveillance and even modification of our
communications. Moreover, various forms of surveillance abound that could
be blamed for bringing our lives out of the private domain and into the public
sphere. These forms of surveillance include. A. E-mail Surveillance This is
related to the monitoring of both encrypted and unencrypted electronic
messages or communications of individuals by government agencies. The
government does this by ordering Internet Service Providers (ISP) to inspect
their user's communications data, both encrypted and unencrypted.
According to the New York Times (June 16, 2009) [11] article, The National
Security Agency is facing renewed scrutiny over the extent of its domestic
surveillance program, with critics in Congress saying its recent intercepts of
the private telephone calls and e-mail messages of Americans are broader
than previously acknowledged, current and former officials said. The above
statement suggests that we are living in a surveillance society, and that the
challenges society will face in adapting it as a way of life are enormous and
potentially overwhelming. B. Telephone Tracking Surveillance The recent
claims that US intelligence agencies have been monitoring the mobile phone

conversations of German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, as well as those of over

seventy million French citizens, is a strong example of telephone
surveillance. According to an article, Der Spiegel (2013) [12] reporting on
information obtained from former NSA worker Edward Snowden, Merkel's
mobile number had been listed by the NSA's Special Collection Service (SCS)
since 2002 and may have been monitored for more than 10 years. This
information makes it obvious that the surveillance business observes no
boundaries and a respects no individual. In surveillance, everybody is a
suspect irrespective of one's position in the society. Surveillance is sometimes
carried out by tapping the targets' communications with high-tech
surveillance equipment, thus threatening their right to privacy as guaranteed
by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Disclosures of this
nature will continue to raise fundamental questions around the world about
how to effectively protect our privacy and our personal data from
unauthorized surveillance. For instance, if companies are handing over
customer data or access to their equipment without authorization, those
businesses may well have broken the law by violating the privacy of their
customers. C. Other Forms of Surveillance According to Christian Fuschs
(2010) [13], other forms of surveillance include: 1) Scanning the fingerprints
of visitors entering the United States. 2) The use of speed cameras for
identifying speeders which involves state power. 3) Electronic monitoring
bracelets for prisoners in an open prison system. 4) Scanning of Internet and
phone data by secret services. 5) Usage of full body scanners at airports. 6)
Biometric passports containing digital fingerprints. 7) CCTV cameras in public
places for the prevention of crime and terrorism. 8) Assessment of customer
shopping behaviour with the help of loyalty cards. 9) Data collection in
marketing research. 10) Assessment of personal images and videos of
applicants on Facebook by employers prior to a job interview. 11) Passenger
Name Record (PNR) data transfer in the aviation industry. 12) Corporations
spying on employees, or union members.

Systematic observation of persons includes detention

Wang 11 PhD, Vice President for Information Services and Chief
Information Officer for the RF
(Hao, Protecting Privacy in China, p. 27)
Surveillance is defined as the systematic investigation or monitoring of the
actions or communications of one or more persons. Traditionally,
surveillance has been undertaken by physical means, such as
guarding prisons. In recent decades, it has been enhanced through image
amplification devices such as high-resolution satellite cameras.6"1 Most of
them are readily available in China today. However, some of them are also
privacy invasive. They render current Chinese legal protections seriously
inadequate. These devices may include: (I) microphones or listening devices
that can be concealed; (2) miniature tape recorders; (3) hidden cameras such
as cell phone cameras; (4) hidden monitors that operated by remote control;

(5) infrared devices enabling photographs to be taken at night; (6) miniature

transmitters; and so on.

Incarceration is surveillance (not very good)

Flores No Date
Jerry, Ford Foundation Fellow and UCs Post-Doctoral Fellow and Assistant
Professor, Caught Up: Girls, Surveillance and
Wraparound Incarceration, http://sociology.ucsc.edu/colloquium/20142015%20flyers/flores-april09.pdf
Caught Up follows the lives of 50 Latina girls in El Valle Juvenile
Detention Center and Legacy community school located 40 miles outside
of Los Angeles, CA. Their path through these two institutions reveals the
accelerated fusion of California schools and institutions of confinement. For
example, the connection between both of these sites is a concerted effort
between Legacy Community School and El Valle administrators to provide
young people with wraparound services. These well-intentioned services are
designed to provide youth with support at home, at school and in the actual
detention center. However, I argue that wraparound services more closely
resemble a phenomenon that I call wraparound incarceration, where students
cannot escape the surveillance of formal detention despite leaving the
actual detention center. For young people in Legacy School, returning to El
Valle became an unavoidable consequence of wraparound services.

Surveillance = Law Enforcement Investigations

Surveillance refers to any method of investigation carried
out by law enforcement officials
Simmons 13 Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State
University
Ric, PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: ENDING
THE ZERO-SUM GAME: HOW TO INCREASE THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Spring 2013,
Lexis
n13 Throughout this Article I will use the word "surveillance" to cover any
method of investigation carried out by law enforcement officials, from
accessing a Department of Motor Vehicles database to wiretapping a
telephone to strip-searching a suspect. This rather awkward terminology is
required because the term "search" has a very particular meaning in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as a method of surveillance that implicates the
Fourth Amendment to the degree that it requires probable cause or a
warrant. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).

AT Surveillance = Acquisition/Collection
Indefinite detention is intelligence gathering
Goodman 9
Ryan, Professor of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Harvard Law School,
Harvard Law, Rationales for Detention: Security Threats and Intelligence
Value,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanSecurityThreats
andIntelligenceValue.pdf
a joint report by UN human rights officials concerning Guantanamo concludes
that the objective of the ongoing detention is not primarily to prevent
combatants from taking up arms against the United States again, but to
obtain information and gather intelligence on the Al-Qaeda network.

More evidence its the primary purpose

Goodman 9
Ryan, Professor of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Harvard Law School,
Harvard Law, Rationales for Detention: Security Threats and Intelligence
Value,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanSecurityThreats
andIntelligenceValue.pdf
Professor Marty Lederman, a leading expert on US detention policy since
September 11, summarizes his view of the overall scheme: Unlike in past
conflicts, when the purpose of detention was incapacitation of actual
combatants so that they could not fight against us, the dominant purpose
of this detention regime is intelligence gathering.37

Ext Indefinite Detention = Intel Gathering

Indefinite detention is intelligence gathering
Goodman 9
Ryan, Professor of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Harvard Law School,
Harvard Law, Rationales for Detention: Security Threats and Intelligence
Value,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanSecurityThreats
andIntelligenceValue.pdf
A remaining question is whether the United States can detain individuals, on
a long-term or indefinite basis, for the purpose of gathering intelligence.
Before analyzing that question of law, first consider the record of US
detention practices following September 11. The government has used
intelligence value as a ground for initial internment decisions, as well as for
denying release. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee
Affairs Professor Matthew Waxman recently wrote: Intelligence gathering
through questioning of those in custody constitutes a nother important reason
for detention in warfare, and especially in fighting terrorist networks.24 With
respect to the global sphere of operations, the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field
Manual states that information gathering provides a reason for detaining two
classes of individuals: (1) persons who have engaged in, or assisted those
who engage in, terrorist or insurgent activities and (2) persons who have
incidentally obtained knowledge regarding insurgent and terrorist activity,
but who are not guilty of associating with such groups. 25 Notably,
information gathering appears to be an independent basis for detaining the
first category of individuals even if they no longer pose a security threat.26
However, for the second category, the Counterinsurgency manual states:
Since persons in the second category have not engaged in criminal or
insurgent activities, they must be released, even if they refuse to provide
information.27 It stands to reason that individuals in the first category could
be denied release if they refuse to provide information. As another
component of global operations, President George Bush announced that
under the CIAs secret detention program [m]any are released after
questioning, or turned over to local authoritiesif we determine that they do
not pose a continuing threat and no longer have significant intelligence value.

Indefinite detention is intelligence gathering

Goodman 9
Ryan, Professor of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Harvard Law School,
Harvard Law, Rationales for Detention: Security Threats and Intelligence
Value,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanSecurityThreats
andIntelligenceValue.pdf

Three arguments might be raised to support the legality of US practice. First,

the Geneva Conventions contain no express prohibition on the use of
detention for intelligence-gathering purposes. Second, detention is permitted
if obtaining the relevant information serves an imperative security interest.
Third, if a State has the authority to detain an individual until the cessation of
hostilities, the State has the prerogative to release her earlier if she provides
valuable intelligence information.

Indefinite detention is intelligence gathering

Goodman 09
Ryan, Professor of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Harvard Law School, Harvard Law,
Rationales for Detention: Security Threats and Intelligence Value,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanSecurityThreatsandInte
lligenceValue.pdf

Finally, the implications of allowing intelligence value as an independent

ground for long-term or indefinite detention are intolerable. Doing so might
permit the confinement of individuals, such as the children or other family
members of combatants, who have no engagement in hostilities but have
personal knowledge about the combatants. It might also permit the
confinement of innocent detainees who do not have information themselves
but are held as bargaining chips to coerce other individuals to provide
information. And, a further implication is suggested by the declaration of
Admiral Jacoby. He argues that the intelligence cycle is continuous. This
dynamic is especially important in the War on Terrorism. There is a constant
need to ask detainees new lines of questions as additional detainees are
taken into custody and new information is obtained from them and from other
intelligence-gathering methods.

2ac biopower k
The negatives failure to acknowledge that detention as
surveillance results in the manifestation of the state of
exception
Zimmer 15
Catherine, Associate Professor in the Film and Screen Studies Program, p. 54,
New York University Press, Surveillance Cinema, Google Books
Beyond the fact that such films evidence the popular resonance of the
hiopolitical formulation of power embodied by the current U.S. president,
their narrative organization must be taken into account to fully understand
the relevance of torture-porn film to Agambens argument that the state of
exception tends increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of
government in contemporary politics31 The zones of indistinction that
characterize and manifest the state of exception are essential to the current
practices of torture employed by the United States, exemplified by the
detention center for suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay and the
designation of CIA black sites within other nations. These literal zones of
indistinction where torture occurs are inseparable from the state of
exception around surveillance introduced in the U.S. by the Patriot
Act, and thus represent a correlation between the form of surveillance tropes
in torture narratives and the very real ways surveillance and torture are tied
together within current legal and political discourses. The Patriot Act, passed
by the United States Congress in 2002 (as well as the more recent National
Defense Authorization Act for 2012) is primarily known for its creation of an
extralegal space for an expansion of surveillance and detention, and is cited
by Agamben as exemplary of the state of exception.32 The discursive
production of the already ambiguously situated political/legal Patriot
Act in the service of the (now endless) state of exception known as
the war on terror ends up also producing indistinction between the
space of extralegal surveillance and the production of suspects
without legal rights, targeted for indefinite detention and torture. Just
as the torture serves to resolve and repeat the zones of indistinction
produced by surveillance within the cinematic narratives under discussion, so
the designation of suspects for detention and torture by the Patriot Act
produces a justification for the surveillance that has designated them as
suspects in the first place. The zones of indistinction, both narratively and
politically, demonstrate that the ambiguities produced by surveillance do not
serve to undermine the logic of the use of torture, but create a space where
torture is what makes sense out of the system.

***Standards

2ac Limits Bad

Prevents holistic education
Miller 98
Professor of Philosophy, George D, Negotiating toward truth: the extinction of
teachers and students, Google Book
Compartmentalization prevents students from seeing the whole. When
students are given only a focalized view of reality, then they become more
alienated . I would like to expand on this alienation. The alienation arises, on
the one hand, from drawing solutions from this compartmentalized solutions
that do not work. Education fails to develop holistic perspectives on issues.
Secondly, compartmentalized education retards solidarity. We only see our
neck of the woods. We don't see how our neck of the woods interacts with
other necks of the woods and how the necks of the woods are similar.
Compartmentalized learning narrows perspectives .

Critical thinking
Miller 98
Professor of Philosophy, George D, Negotiating toward truth: the extinction of
teachers and students, Google Book
The fact that the oppressed cannot perceive themes does not mean that
themes are absent. It only means that the themes are deeply suppressed by
the oppressors. The banking concept of education allows for only a
fragmented perspective on reality. Critical thinking grasps
interconnections and the whole. We know by understanding the
relationship between the whole and the parts. This understanding illuminates
limit-situations.

Kills aff innovation

Stockton College 82
Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, Mission Statement,
http://intraweb.stockton.edu/eyos/page.cfm?siteID=124&pageID=36
At Stockton we seek to help our students develop the capacity for continuous
learning and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances in a multicultural
and interdependent world by insisting on breadth, as well as depth, in our
curriculum. We believe that the breadth inherent in an interdisciplinary
approach to liberal education both prepares students for inevitable career
changes, and enriches their lives. We insist on excellence in teaching and
dedication to learning. These, indeed, are the guiding principles of our
mission. Moreover, we recognized a responsibility not only to transmit

received ideas to our students but to participate in the development of new

ideas. Accordingly, we encourage continuous research, learning, and
professional development for our faculty and staff. Quality academic
programs are best created, developed, and maintained by a high degree of
faculty and student responsibility for, and participation in, the educational
process. For that reason, the College is committed to faculty-wide
involvement in general education and in teaching such academic skills as
writing, quantitative analysis, and logical reasoning. Breadth, then, is not only
a desirable outcome for our students, but a requisite for the faculty who
teach these students. To teach beyond the traditional bounds of ones area of
formal expertise, across disciplinary lines, and to interrelate the traditional
disciplines, requires and extraordinary effort from faculty. It is imperative that
the executive administration and the trustees provide the resources and the
atmosphere, which will make such exceptional effort both possible and
appreciated. Our insistence upon breadth of education for all students does
not preclude an emphasis on depth of study in the major disciplines but
rather, supplements it. Our academic programs must offer students a real
understanding of the ideas and methods of their disciplines, including those
most recently developed. Exposure to many disciplines and intensive
investigation of one discipline should prepare graduates to move into
appropriate fields of employment, or to continue with graduate academic or
professional study. At Stockton we believe that co-curricular activities
complement the academic curriculum and, along with classroom education,
help students develop the capacity for making intelligent choices. While we
offer students assistance in and out of the classroom, we emphasize and
encourage student initiative in their co-curricular life, and responsibility for
their education. We value diversity and the differing perspectives it brings.
Accordingly, we are unequivocally committed to implementing the principles
of affirmative action in the composition of our student body, faculty, and
staff. Just as students must receive an education that is sufficiently broad to
permit flexible response to changes in society, so too the College must be
able to change and adapt to differing circumstances and needs in our society.
In order to best fulfill our mission, we must all recognize the limitations of our
resources, and respond by a prudent and flexible allocation of those
resources.

1ar Limits Bad Aff Flex/Creativity

Broad topics key to aff flexibility and creativity
Herbeck and Katsulas 85
Dale A. Herbeck and John P. Katsulas, Debate Coaches and Graduate Students
at the University of Iowa, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC
ASSOCIATION, Winter 1985, p. 143
Broad topics allow the affirmative flexibility in selecting a case. Such topics encourage the
affirmative to investigate the entire problem area. Furthermore, broad topics prevent stagnation. If
debate was held on the same few cases round after round, all participants would lose interest.
Debates would degenerate into mindless and repetitive brief reading contests. As Nadler (1982) notes, it
seems that broad interpretations of resolutions offer a pragmatic benefit to the debate community
as an escape from the boredom that debating a few cases over and over can lead to (p. 5). A
broader topic allows for new ideas, while at the same time encouraging debaters to seek out new case possibilities.

1ar Limits Bad Participation

Small topics kill the activity
Herbeck and Katsulas 85
Dale A. Herbeck and John P. Katsulas, Debate Coaches and Graduate Students
at the University of Iowa, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC
ASSOCIATION, Winter 1985, p. 143
Broad topics allow the affirmative flexibility in selecting a case. Such topics encourage the
affirmative to investigate the entire problem area. Furthermore, broad topics prevent stagnation. If
debate was held on the same few cases round after round, all participants would lose
interest. Debates would degenerate into mindless and repetitive brief reading contests. As Nadler
(1982) notes, it seems that broad interpretations of resolutions offer a pragmatic benefit to the debate
community as an escape from the boredom that debating a few cases over and over can lead
to (p. 5). A broader topic allows for new ideas, while at the same time encouraging debaters to seek out new case
possibilities.

2ac/1ar AT Jursidcition
Not a jurisdiction voter
Murphy 90
Thomas L., former director of forensics @ the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas, Argumentation and Advocacy, Spring 1990, Vol. 26, Issue 4,
Assessing the jurisdictional model of topicality, EBSCO Host
The jurisdictional model for deciding issues of topicality is not as simple as it initially appears.
When a model applied to debate is created through an analogy, as the jurisdictional model is, it is
important that the specific parts of the analogous model be examined as well as the reasons for the
appropriateness of the analogy. Subject matter jurisdiction, as one such model, is clearly inappropriate for
debate practice given the vague political character of debate resolutions as compared to jurisdictional
statutes. While legal judges have the advantage of specific laws and cases construing those laws,
debate judges isolated within the debate round have only their speculations over the
boundaries of debate resolutions. The procedures used for challenging personal jurisdiction might prove workable
for debate. However, current debate practice oversimplifies the procedural nature of the topicality
argument to the detriment of affirmative teams because negative teams incur no risk in arguing
topicality. Jurisdictional concepts of special appearance and waiver might provide a check for negative abuses in this area.
While no person would argue that debate practice should incorporate every part of every applicable model, judicial or legislative,
relevant portions of those models should guide debate practice where needed. Topicality is one such area.

DA Blocks

Biz-Con DA

Econ Add-On (for EU rels adv)

U.S.-E.U. cooperation is the key force driving the
economic relationship
Mix 2015(Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, 2-3-15, The United
States and Europe: Current Issues, Congressional Research Service,
http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf)
The United States and the European Union have the largest trade and
investment relationship in the world. The relationship generates
approximately $5 trillion annually in total commercial sales and provides up
to 15 million jobs in the United States and Europe.30 Merchandise trade
totaled approximately $787 billion in 2013. U.S. and European companies are
also the biggest investors in each others markets . Since 2000, 56% of U.S.
global investment has gone to Europe. In 2012, more than 70% of total
foreign investment in the United States (approximately $1.9 trillion) came
from Europe. The total assets of European affiliates in the United States were
approximately $8.7 trillion in 2012, and U.S. corporate assets in Europe
totaled over $13 trillion. With the United States and the EU together
comprising approximately 50% of global gross domestic product (GDP) by
value and 40% in terms of purchasing power parity, the transatlantic
economic relationship is also the worlds most influential in terms of shaping
standards and regulations. Historically, U.S.-EU cooperation has been the key
force driving efforts to liberalize world trade.

Rider DA

Ex-Im Bank Good

Passage good failure to reach a deal hurts small
business and U.S. growth
Arensmeyer 6-22
John, Reporter, The Hill, Long-term reauthorization needed for Export-Import
Bank, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/245571-longterm-reauthorization-needed-for-export-import-bank
Fulton is not alone. If Congress fails to reauthorize the Ex-Im Bank, more than
$34 billion in exports will be lost this year, tens of thousands of workers
engaged in the exporting business could be laid off, and several thousand
exportersmostly small business ownerswill take a substantial financial
loss, as will the suppliers who make or grow the products being exported.
Failure to pass a long-term reauthorization of the Ex-Im Bank would be
damaging to the economy and place an unfair burden on small business
owners like Jenny Fulton and other hard working exporters. Its time for
Congress to find a permanent fix for the Ex-Im Bank so small businesses can
have the certainty they need to continue brokering deals with foreign
countries that bolster our economy here at home.

Politics

Link Turn
Bipartisan support to end domestic indefinite detention
Sibilla 12
Nick Sibilla, graduated from the University of Pittsburgh with BAs in Political
Science and Religious Studies, Bipartisan effort to ban indefinite detention,
amend the NDAA, May 18, 2012, http://www.constitutioncampaign.org/blog/?
p=7479#.UsHmOfRDtpU
Democrats and Tea Party Republicans are advocating a new proposal to ban
indefinite detention on American soil. After President Obama signed the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) last year, anyone accused of
being a terrorist, committing any belligerent act or even providing
material support, can now be detained indefinitely by the military without a
trial. This includes American citizens. Fortunately, a bipartisan coalition is
working to stop the NDAA. Congressmen Adam Smith (D-WA), a Ranking
Member of the House Armed Services Committee, and Justin Amash (R-MI),
who Reason magazine called the next Ron Paul, have sponsored an
amendment to the latest defense authorization bill, currently on the House
floor. If adopted, the Smith-Amash Amendment would make three significant
changes to the NDAA. First, it would amend Section 1021 (which authorizes
indefinite detention) to ensure that those detained will not be subject to
military commissions, but civilian courts established under Article III of the
Constitution. As Congressman Smith put it, this would restore due process
rights. Second, the Smith-Amash Amendment would ban transfer to military
custody: No person detained, captured, or arrested in the United States, or a
territory or possession of the United States, may be transferred to the
custody of the Armed Forces for detention Finally, their amendment would
repeal Section 1022 of the NDAA, which mandates military custody for those
accused of foreign terrorism. Both Smith and Amash have criticized the
NDAA. Amash blasted the NDAA as one of the most anti-liberty pieces of
legislation of our lifetime. In a letter urging his Republican colleagues to
support the amendment, Amash writes: A free country is defined by the rule
of law, not the governments whim. Americans demand that we protect their
right to a charge and trial. Meanwhile, in an interview with The Hill, Smith was
concerned about the potential abuses of power: It is very, very rare to give
that amount of power to the president [and] take away any persons
fundamental freedom and lock them up without the normal due process of
lawLeaving this on the books is a dangerous threat to civil liberties. The
Smith-Amash Amendment is expected to be voted on later this week. So far,
it has 60 co-sponsors in the House. Meanwhile, Senators Mark Udall (DCO) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) have introduced a similar bill in the Senate. To
stop the NDAA, the Bill of Rights Defense Committee is coordinating
grassroots action all across the country, including a model resolution to
restore due process and the right to trial. In addition, our partners at the
Tenth Amendment Center have developed a range of model legislation to

preserve liberty, ranging from ending local compliance with the NDAA to
nullifying the act. Together, both organizations published a joint op-ed
supporting the Smith-Amash amendment in the Hill yesterday, mere hours
before Federal District Judge Katherine Forrest enjoined the NDAAs military
detention provisions.

Link Defense -- PC
Obama wont fight the planNDAA proves
Elsea 13
Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, July 25, 2013, Detention of U.S.
Persons as Enemy Belligerents, Congressional Research Service,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42337.pdf
In signing the 2012 NDAA into law, President Obama stated that his
Administration does not intend to detain indefinitely U.S. citizens
pursuant to the detention authority in Section 1021.318 However, given that
the conflict may last beyond his term and that the 2012 NDAA appears to
mandate at least temporary military detention for some non-U.S. citizens, it is
possible that the Supreme Court has not issued its last word on enemy
combatants and preventive detention as a means to prosecute hostilities
authorized by the AUMF. Lower courts that have addressed questions the
Supreme Court left unanswered have not achieved a consensus on the extent
to which Congress has authorized the detention without trial of U.S. persons
as enemy combatants, and Congress has not so far clarified its intent. If
Hamdi stands for the proposition that U.S. citizens may be detained under the
same circumstances that make noncitizens amenable to law-of-war detention,
regardless of location, then the Guantanamo cases may provide sufficient
legal precedent for detaining similarly situated persons within the United
States. If, on the other hand, historical precedent has any bearing on the
interpretation of the state of the law and authorities regarding detention of
U.S. persons under the law of war, as preserved by Section 1021(e) of the
2012 NDAA, it seems difficult to conclude that the AUMF should be read to
imply the authority to detain such persons unless they are part of the armed
forces of a belligerent party to an armed conflict. Congress has on occasion
exercised the authority to permit the detention of civilians without trial based
on the risk they are deemed to pose to national security, but if a declaration
of war alone has not sufficed to trigger that authority, it seems unlikely that
an authorization to use force would be presumed to confer it.

Elections

Non-UQ: Hillary going to lose

Clinton Bound To LoseMany Reasons
McArdle 15 (Megan, Columnist for Bloomberg News, bachelors from
UPENN and MBA from University of Chicago, Hillary Clinton Isnt Inevitable)
She's old. There, I said it. Hillary Clinton is going to be 69 on Election Day
2016, (very slightly) younger than Ronald Reagan was when he was elected.
We can argue that this is not fair, but fair or not, it's going to matter. Her
opponent -- any opponent -- is going to look young and vigorous next to her.
And I suspect that it matters more for a woman than for a man. If you think
that discrimination against older workers is real, you have to think this is
going to be a factor. Her age is a risk for another reason: People in their late
60s and early 70s are vulnerable to health events. Now, calm down, I'm not
saying that Clinton is likely to die on the trail; I'm sure she has top-notch
doctors and her life expectancy is, I am pleased to say, at least another 15
years. But say she has a burst appendix, as happened to my mother at that
age; she'll be off the campaign trail for a minimum of a month. And a burst
appendix is only one of the many non-life-threatening things that hit older
people harder than the young, from pneumonia to shingles. Obviously, these
things could happen to any candidate, but they are more likely to happen to
Clinton than to her opponent. And if one does, it will not only hurt her
campaigning, but it will also plant questions in voters' minds about her
physical ability to do the job. There is, of course, a possibility that she could
drive turnout among older voters. But I'm sort of skeptical. My mother, aka
the Swing Voter, says she knows she would no longer have the physical
stamina to be president, and that actually biases her against Clinton. I've
heard the same from several other 70+ folks. 2. It's not clear how far she'll
outperform Barack Obama with women. Clinton beat Rick Lazio in 2000 by a
shocking percentage among women -- 20 points. But that's in New York state,
where there are a lot of unmarried women (married women actually lean
Republican). And Obama already carried women 55 to 60 percent in 2012.
Realistically, how much higher can she drive that percentage, or turnout
among women voters? Moreover, there are trade-offs: Democrats
outperformed among women, but they underperformed among men. Clinton
seems to be planning a platform heavy on items designed to appeal to
female voters, such as paid family leave. But these actually appeal to a pretty
narrow segment of the population -- young single women, and those with
small children -- where Democrats already do really well. There's the risk that
these gain her voters among folks who are already strong Democrats while
costing her votes in segments she needs to pick up. Especially since any
serious promise of these things is going to have to come with a plan for
paying its hefty price tag. 3. I doubt she'll replicate Obama's turnout among
black voters. Obama brought a lot of black voters to the polls for the same
reasons that Catholic voters, especially Irish Catholics, lined up around the

block to vote for Al Smith and John F. Kennedy. The first president from a
group that has historically faced discrimination is naturally going to drive
higher turnout among that group, but that doesn't mean they'll keep turning
out in the same numbers (or even for the same party -- 20 years after JFK, a
lot of Irish Catholics were voting Republican). I expect that blacks will
continue to be a strong constituency for Democrats in years to come, but I
doubt they will come to the polls for Clinton in the same way they did to vote
for the first black president. That means she has to make up those votes
elsewhere. 4. The Emerging Democratic Majority is questionable. Chait thinks
it still holds; I'm skeptical, mostly because I don't believe in permanent
coalitions. The bigger your coalition, the bigger its internal tensions.
Coalitions can collapse suddenly and without warning -- who in 1976 would
have predicted 1980? 5. There's a real risk of another recession. The last
recession ended in 2009. Yes, the recovery has been unusually anemic, but
that's no guarantee that another recession will wait longer to arrive -- FDR
ended up with a baby recession in 1937. There are all sorts of reasons we
could have another recession: Oil prices could go back up, the Fed could
decide it has to start tightening, or, well, any of the other mysterious things
that cause recessions could come into play. If there's another recession after
years of meh growth, Clinton is not going to be president. Even if she does
get in, odds are high that an ill-timed recession will deny her a second term.
6. She's not a particularly good candidate. She has never won a tough
election. In fact, she's only won in deep blue New York, which is not exactly
playing against the varsity. On the stump, she has nowhere near the appeal
of her husband, or Barack Obama. She's a totally fine speaker, but she is not
inspiring, and she does not come off as warm; her tone ranges from "well
coached" to "annoyed." You might call her the Mitt Romney of the Democrats.
7. All the Clinton baggage is going to come back to haunt her. Americans love
their presidents ... in retrospect. Even George W. Bush is starting to attract
some warm, fuzzy feelings for his foray into painting and his admirable
determination not to go around trying to conduct shadow policy debates. All
the things we hated about the Clintons, from the financial scandals to the
pardons, have faded into distant memory. As soon as Hillary Clinton goes on
the stump, however, we'll start having flashbacks. Indeed, with the e-mail
mess, they have already started. 8. Unlike fine wine, presidential parties do
not age well. There's evidence that voters get sick of the ruling party after a
while and want a change, even if things seem to be doing OK. Now, we don't
have that many elections to go by, as this just covers the postwar period. The
theory could be wrong. But it makes a certain amount of sense: The longer a
party has been in office, the staler its ideas seem, and the more time there
has been for scandals to accumulate. And in Clinton's case, she comes
prepackaged with scandals of her own. It's just less motivating to turn out for
your party's third presidential term than it was for the first, when your base
was fired up and a substantial number of independents were sick of the party
in office. 9. Obama's approval ratings do not make for long coattails. In the
last four years of his presidency, Bill Clinton's approval ratings averaged over
60 percent. Nonetheless, his not-particularly-appealing VP barely fought the

election to a statistical draw. Obama, meanwhile, has struggled to break 50

percent. Maybe those ratings are going to shoot up for the last year, but
that's going to take some shooting to get Hillary Clinton into "inevitable"
territory.

A2: Nate Silver Ev

Silver does NOT say Hillary is ahead
Silver 5/12 (2016 1:32 PM MAY 12, 2015 There Is No Blue Wall By NATE
SILVER http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/there-is-no-blue-wall/)
If you were browsing campaign coverage at this point in advance of the 1992 election, youd be reading a lot about the Republicans impregnable red wall. OK it
wouldnt have been called the red wall (the association of Republicans with red states and Democrats with blue states came about more recently). But youd have been
reading a lot about Republicans supposed lock on the Electoral College. The argument was something like this. During the past six presidential elections, from 1968
through 1988, 21 states voted Republican every time. These included almost all states in the fast-growing West most importantly, California and its trove of electoral
votes along with some wealthy, suburban states (Illinois, New Jersey and Virginia) and a couple of traditionally Republican states in New England (including Vermont).1
silver-blue-wall-chart-1 Together, these states accounted for 191 electoral votes. They werent quite enough to clinch victory for the Republicans, the argument went, but
they put the GOP at a substantial advantage. The Democrats, whod won only the District of Columbia every time, had to win more than three-quarters of the electoral
votes from the remaining, competitive states. You probably know what happened next. In 1992, Bill Clinton won nine Republican lock states, containing 118 of the red
walls 191 electoral votes, en route to a 370-168 overall Electoral College victory. Four of the GOP lock states California, Illinois, New Jersey and Vermont havent
voted Republican since. Democrats obliterated the red wall. silver-blue-wall-chart-2 Nowadays, of course, its become common to hear talk about the blue wall the set
of 18 states that, along with the District of Columbia, have voted for the Democrat in each of the most recent six presidential elections, from 1992 through 2012. Together,

Many pundits, ignoring the lessons of history, claim the blue

wall or some close variation of it puts the Democratic nominee (likely Hillary
Clinton) at a substantial advantage for 2016. The error that these
commentators are making is in attributing the Democrats recent run of
success to the Electoral College. In fact, the Electoral College has been a minor factor, if its helped Democrats at all, and one
they represent 242 electoral votes.

probably best ignored until the late stages of a close presidential race. But wait. Wasnt Barack Obamas margin in the Electoral College in 2012 332 electoral votes, to
Mitt Romneys 206 awfully impressive given that he won the popular vote by only a few percentage points? Actually, it was pretty much par for the course. The nature of
the Electoral College is to accentuate small margins in the popular vote; Obamas electoral vote tallies have been fine, but historically ordinary. In the chart below, Ive
plotted the past centurys worth of presidential elections (from 1916 to 2012). The horizontal axis shows the Democrats margin of victory or defeat in the popular vote and
the vertical axis how many electoral votes he received. (Totals are prorated to 5382 electoral votes, the current total.)3 Then Ive drawn an S-shaped curve to show the
long-term relationship. silver-blue-wall-chart-3 Based on the past centurys worth of data, youd expect a Democrat who won the popular vote by 3.9 percentage points
as Obama did against Romney to win about 330 electoral votes. That pretty much exactly matches Obamas 332. And youd expect a Democrat who won the popular
vote by 7.3 percentage points, as Obama did in 2008 against John McCain, to claim about 380 electoral votes. Obama won 365 that year instead. By comparison, when

all
theyre really pointing out is that Democrats have had a pretty good run in
presidential elections lately. And they have, if you conveniently draw the line
at 1992 (it doesnt sound so impressive to instead say Democrats have won
five of the 12 elections since 1968). During that time, Democrats have won four elections pretty clearly, lost one narrowly and
F.D.R. won the 1944 popular vote by 7.5 percentage points, he won the Electoral College 432-99. So when commentators talk about the Democrats blue wall,

essentially tied the sixth. This has been evident from the popular vote, however. The one time the Electoral College really mattered that was 2000, of course it hurt
the Democrats. Republicans, in all likelihood, would have won by similar Electoral College margins if theyd done as well as the Democrats in the popular vote, casting all
sorts of cracks in the blue wall. Suppose, for instance, that Romney, rather than Obama, had won the 2012 election by 3.9 percentage points. What would the map have
looked like? silver-blue-wall-chart-5 It would have looked pretty red. A 3.9-point Romney victory represents a 7.8-point swing from the actual result. So if the swing were
distributed uniformly, Obama would have lost every state that he won by 7.8 percentage points or less. That means hed have lost three blue wall states Minnesota,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin along with Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio and Virginia. An alternative technique is to assume that some states are
more elastic than others, meaning that they contain more swing voters and are more responsive to national trends. Based on our previous calculations, for instance, New
Hampshire is relatively elastic its vote swings a lot whereas Georgia (where there are a lot of black voters and a lot of conservative whites and not many voters in
between) is less so. But running the calculation that way changes the outcome of just one electoral vote. Romney would have narrowly won the rural, 2nd Congressional
District of Maine, which like Nebraska awards one electoral vote to the winner of each congressional district, in addition to his other spoils. That would have put Romney on
332 electoral votes exactly the total that Obama finished with, as it happens. Where youd see more evidence of an impregnable blue wall is in the event of an
extremely lopsided election. Suppose that Democrats had lost the 2012 election by 18.2 percentage points, as Walter Mondale did to Ronald Reagan. In 1984, Mondale
won only 13 electoral votes 10 from his home state of Minnesota, plus D.C.s three. In contrast, I estimate that a Democrat losing by that margin now would still carry
states totaling 104 electoral votes: California, New York, Maryland, Vermont, Hawaii, and D.C. Thats a reflection of the fact that the country is far more geographically
polarized than it once was. But this cuts both ways. If Obama had won by Reagans 1984 margin, Republicans would still have won Texas, Tennessee, Alabama, South
Carolina, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kansas, Mississippi, Utah, Nebraska,4 West Virginia, Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming for 136
electoral votes. Neither partys slate is close to a majority, however, and they mostly offset each other. (In the chart below, Ive run this calculation for all possible
outcomes, up to a 30-point win for either party.) silver-blue-wall-chart-4 What about in the event of an extremely close election, instead of a lopsided one? Another election
as close as 2000, for instance? Obama would probably have won such an election in 2012. My method has him winning the Electoral College 285-253 in the event of an
exactly tied popular vote, for instance. But it would have had to be very close indeed. If Obama had lost the popular vote by just 1 percentage point, for instance, I have
him losing the election 279-259, as highly elastic states like New Hampshire and Colorado would have fallen out of his column. The net impact of this is minor. Our Election
Day forecast in 2012 estimated that there was about a 5 percent chance that Obama would win the Electoral College but lose the popular vote (and about a 1 percent

So if you want to argue that Hillary Clintons chances of

winning the popular vote next year are 50 percent but that her Electoral
College chances are more like 53 percent or 55 percent instead, go ahead
thats probably about what the blue wall amounts to . (And even that
advantage is tenuous, possibly reflecting Obamas superior turnout operation
in swing states an edge that Clinton might not replicate.) Hey, look: I can get carried away, too.6
chance that Romney would do so).5

might or

If the 2016 election turns out to be close, well be sweating the small stuff by October and November. The difference between a 50 percent and a 55 percent chance of

. But for now? The

Electoral College just isnt worth worrying about much . If you see analysts
talking about the blue wall, all theyre really saying is that Democrats have
won a bunch of presidential elections lately an obvious fact that probably
doesnt have much predictive power for what will happen this time around. Im
not saying Clinton is doomed. Rather, I think the fundamentals point toward her chances being about 50-50, and I wouldnt argue
victory for Clinton or Marco Rubio or whomever because of Electoral College dynamics will seem like a pretty big deal

vigorously if you claimed the chances were more like 60-40 in one or the
other direction. But Clinton is no sort of lock, and if she loses the popular vote
by even a few percentage points, the blue wall will seem as archaic as talk
of a permanent Republican majority.

Too soon
Too early to predict the elections
Kelly 15 Nora, staff correspondent at National Journal, May 28th, 2015,
National Journal, It's Way Too Early to Bet on 2016 Polls. Just Look at the Past
Few Presidential Races, http://www.nationaljournal.com/2016-elections/it-sway-too-early-to-bet-on-2016-polls-just-look-at-the-last-few-presidentialraces-20150528
It's Way Too Early to Bet on 2016 Polls. Just Look at the Past Few Presidential
Races.At this point in the 2008 and 2004 presidential election cycles, Hillary
Clinton was winning among Democratic voters The pollsters at Quinnipiac said it best: "There are five leadersor
no leaders" in the race for the 2016 Republican nomination. The university's latest presidential poll, released Thursday, shows that no candidate is commanding the 16strong GOP field, with the "top" five contenders polling at 10 percent each. Five candidates fit squarely within its 3.8-point margin of error. And twoGeorge Pataki, who
announced his bid Thursday morning, and Rick Santorum, who entered the race Wednesdaydon't even register. This year, a poll like this could really matter: Candidates'
numbers will determine who takes the stage at the first two GOP debatesputting a premium on high name recognition early in the race. But in a typical election cycle, a

which candidates were

the frontrunners among their own party's voters at around this point in past
election cycles18 months away from the actual election. We checked out data from each presidential contest going back to 2004 and included polls
within a four-week period of May 28 each year. May 2011: Mitt Romney The 2012 election cycle was the debut of a new kind of Republican presidential
resounding "meh" from Republican voters at this point in the game wouldn't be a crushing blow. We took a look at

primary, with an unusual number of candidates rotating through the spotlight. Though a portion of the contenders drew support from the toddler-aged tea party, in late
May 2011 the leading contender was none other than mainstreamer Mitt Romney. He took in 17 percent of the vote from Republican and Republican-leaning voters in a

Sarah Palin came in two points behind the future nominee, and behind her three candidates
Ron Paul, Newt Gingrich, and Herman Cain"essentially tie for third," according to Gallup's analysis. Santorum, who
May 26, 2011 Gallup poll. But Romney's lead wasn't definitive.

went on to win 11 primaries and caucuses in the 2012 cycle, merited just 2 percent of the votewell within the four-point margin of error. So did libertarian Gary Johnson,

Mike
Huckabee was quasi-leading the GOP field in an April CNN poll. The 2008 primary cycle was murky 18 months out. In May and June 2007, former New York City
mayor Rudy Giuliani led the Republican pack, according to two CNN/Opinion Research Corporation polls. But it was only by two percentage points, in a poll
who floated the idea of running again in an interview last month. And 2012 was a fickle cycle: Before he dropped out of the race in early May 2011,

with a five-point margin of error. In May, Giuliani's support among registered Republicans stood at 25 percent, with Sen. John McCain in second place. By June, Giuliani's
standing rose to 30 percent, while McCain dropped a percentage point behind former senator Fred Thompson, who came in at second with 19 percent. On the Democratic
side, things were a little easier to parse:

In the May CNN/ORC poll of registered Democrats, Hillary Clinton beat Barack Obama by 14 points,

with 38 percent of the vote. By the next month, they both took a statistically insignificant hit: Clinton came in with 35 percent of the vote, and Obama took in 23 percent.
Both polls had a 4.5-point margin of error. In a Quinnipiac Poll released June 11, 2003, the then-senator beat out nine of her fellow Democrats at 40 percent. Former
senator Joe Liebermanwho was the vice presidential nominee in the 2000 cyclecame in second with 16 percent. And future presidential nominee John Kerry came in at
a paltry 8 percent, two points behind third-place former congressman Dick Gephardt. Take Clintonwho two days before the poll's release said she had "no intention" of
runningout of the equation, and the numbers don't radically change: Support for Lieberman gets a six-point bump, and Gephardt and Kerry snag an additional 7
percentage points each. None of the those top candidates, though, beat out incumbent George W. Bush among Democratic, Republican, and independent voters. Clinton
and Lieberman merited 40 percent in their respective fictional contests with Bush (who came in at 53 percent in both). And in a then-hypothetical Kerry-Bush race, the
numbers widen a bit: Bush again took in 53 percent of support, while Kerry came in at 37 percentabout 11 points behind his real popular-vote result in the 2004 election.
Correction: An earlier version of this story misidentified Joe Lieberman as the vice presidential nominee in the 2004 cycle. He was the VP nominee in 2000.

Link Defense
Hillary has taken a stance in on surveillance already
Seitz-Wald Alex 15 (05/07/15 05:49 PM, Seitz-Wald covers Hillary
Clinton and the Democratic side of the 2016 presidential race in Washington,
DC. Before joining MSNBC, he was a reporter at the National Journal and
Salon., Hillary Clinton endorses NSA reform bill,
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/hillary-clinton-endorses-nsa-reform-bill)
On the same day a federal court ruled against the National Security Agencys
bulk collection of telephone data, Hillary Clinton joined the White House in
endorsing a bill to roll back mass surveillance. Congress should move ahead
now with the USA Freedom Act a good step forward in ongoing efforts to
protect our security & civil liberties, Clinton wrote on Twitter Thursday.
RELATED: Appeals court rules NSAs phone data collection program illegal
The USA Freedom Act would end the NSAs bulk collection of data under the
Patriot Acts controversial Section 215. The section is set to expire June 1
unless Congress takes action, and momentum is building around the rollback
measure. The bill passed the House Judiciary Committee with a lopsided 25-2
vote, while a Senate version was recently introduced by a bipartisan group of
lawmakers, led by libertarian Republican Mike Lee and senior Democrat
Patrick Leahy. However, a similar bill failed in Congress last year and
opposition from hawkish Republicans in the Senate will likely force supporters
to secure at least 60 votes as a means of overcoming a filibuster. The White
House also threw its support behind the bill this week. White House press
secretary Josh Earnest has called bill commonsense reform and wrote on
Twitter Thursday that President Obama thinks Congress shld pass USA
Freedom Act. Some civil libertarians say the bill doesnt go nearly far
enough, however, claiming that it only scratches the surface. Earlier
Thursday, a federal court in New York ruled that the NSAs bulk data
collection under Section 215 is illegal. It was the first such ruling and could
set an important precedent. RELATED: Snowdens guide to how the NSA sees
your sexts Clinton left the State Department before NSA leaker Edward
Snowden made the agencys snooping a major political issue. But she has
been asked about bulk collection since and tried to find a balance between
defending the agencys work and acknowledging the concerns of many
Americans, especially in the Democratic base. In April of last year, Clinton
said Snowdens leaks likely helped intentionally or unintentionally
terror groups. I have a hard time thinking that somebody who is a champion
of privacy and liberty has taken refuge in Russia, under Putins authority, she
added, referring to Snowden. When asked about the NSA during an
appearance in Silicon Valley this year, Clinton called for reform. Well, I think
the NSA needs to be more transparent about what it is doing, sharing with
the American people, which it wasnt. And I think a lot of the reaction about
the NSA, people felt betrayed, she told Re/Codes Kara Swisher at a tech
conference.

Hillary is against indefinite detainment

Greenwald 12 Glenn Greenwald, 20 November 2012, Glenn Greenwald is
a fomer columnist on civil liberties and US national security issues for the
Guardian. An ex-constitutional lawyer, he was until 2012 a contributing writer
at Salon, US battles Iraq and Afghanistan over detention without charges,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/nov/20/iraq-afghanistandaqduq-indefinite-detention
For several decades, the US government - in annual "human rights" reports
issued by the State Department (reports mandated by the US Congress) - has
formally condemned nations around the globe for the practice of indefinite
detention: imprisoning people without charges or any fixed sentence. These
reports, said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her preface to last year's
document, are grounded in the principle that "respect for human rights is not
a western construct or a uniquely American ideal; it is the foundation for
peace and stability everywhere." That 2011 report condemned numerous
nations for indefinite detention, including Libya ("abuse and lack of review in
detention"), Uzbekistan ("arbitrary arrest and detention"), Syria ("arbitrary
arrest and detention"), and Iran ("Authorities held detainees, at times
incommunicado, often for weeks or months without charge or trial").

Not an election issue

Surveillance wont matter to the election
Kleinman 15 Alexis Kleinman, 03/16/2015, Deputy Managing Editor,
Impact & Innovation at Huffington Post. Americans Don't Care Enough About
NSA Spying To Protect Themselves, Survey Says,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/16/american-privacysurvey_n_6878764.html
We all know that the American government (specifically the National Security
Agency and the FBI) is reading our emails, listening to our calls and watching
what we look at online. Apparently we don't care enough to do anything
about it. The Pew Research Center surveyed 475 U.S. adults between
November and January about their views on privacy and discovered that
Americans (thankfully) know that government surveillance exists. Almost nine
out of 10 people surveyed said that they have heard something about
government surveillance. Fifty-six percent said they have heard "a little"
about it and 31 percent have heard "a lot," according to Pew's survey,
released Monday. Eighty-two percent of people think it's acceptable "for the
American government to monitor communications from individuals suspected
of terrorist activities," and only 40 percent think it's acceptable for the
government to monitor communications from American citizens. Fifty-seven
percent think that's unacceptable. Americans may be disapproving, but
they're not all that concerned. Only 17 percent reported that they were "very
concerned" about government surveillance, while 35 percent were somewhat
concerned, 33 percent were not very concerned and 13 percent were not at
all concerned. Just because people think it's wrong doesn't mean they're
sitting awake at night worrying about it, clearly. Pew asked the 87 percent of
people who said they were aware of government surveillance if they had
changed their behavior to protect their own privacy, and only 34 percent of
people said they had taken any action. Of those who have made a change,
here's what they've changed:

Link is inev
Hillery will inevitably have debates about indefinite
detainment
NEWELL 15JIM NEWELL MAY 6, 2015, Politics writer Salon, Democrats
protect Hillary plan: How the DNCs thin debate schedule hands Clinton the
advantage,
http://www.salon.com/2015/05/06/democrats_protect_hillary_plan_how_the_d
ncs_thin_debate_schedule_hands_clinton_the_advantage/
The Democratic National Committee finally announced its preliminary
schedule for Democratic presidential debates on Tuesday. It will sanction six
(6) debates beginning this fall. Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South
Carolina will each get one, with two more to be determined by some sort of
geographical YOLO algorithm. The DNC will also adopt the RNCs enforcement
mechanism: Any candidate or debate sponsor wishing to participate in DNC
debates, must agree to participate exclusively in the DNC-sanctioned
process, the DNCs statement reads. Any violation would result in forfeiture
of the ability to participate in the remainder of the debate process. Six
debates, meaning Hillary Clinton will interact with her challenger(s) and
the media for a grand total of six to nine hours over the course of the
primary process. Any participation in black market debates will result in
indefinite imprisonment in Debate Gitmo. For whom is this a favorable
schedule: Hillary Clinton or the field? Lets compare the reactions from the
Clinton campaign and the campaign-in-waiting of one of her few likely
challengers, Martin OMalley. From that fount of terse, occasional decrees, the
Hillary Clinton Twitter feed: And from Team OMalley: If Governor OMalley
decides to run, we will expect a full, robust, and inclusive set of debates
both nationally and in early primary and caucus states, said OMalley
spokesman Lis Smith. This has been customary in previous primary seasons.
In a year as critical as 2016, exclusivity does no one any favors. Six is a
compromise between the number of debates the Clinton campaign would
prefer, which is zero, and the number her challengers would prefer, which is
infinity. That the Clinton campaign appears satisfied with this compromise
and OMalleys campaign does not indicates that the Clinton got the better of
this negotiation. Makes sense. Its not unfair to describe the Democratic
National Committee as an informal adjunct of the Hillary Clinton campaign.
She is the establishment front-runner the most establishment-y frontrunner there has been in the modern era in either party, really and the
Democratic National Committee is quite literally the Democratic Party
establishment. For all the public comments the DNC will issue about how its
hoping for an open, competitive, democratic nomination process, its job is to
protect Hillary Clinton from being unduly tarnished ahead of the general
election. I write none of this with malice. Its just the way things are! And
given the way things are, if, say, Bernie Sanders gave Hillary Clinton a run for
her money or even took the nomination, DNC Chair Debbie Wasserman
Schultz would have a heart attack. In its statement the DNC writes that a six

sanctioned debate schedule is consistent with the precedent set by the DNC
during the 2004 and 2008 cycles. Well, not really. There were north of 10
debates in the 2004 cycle not all DNC-sanctioned, but this was before the
DNC penalized candidates for appearing in non-sanctioned debates. And in
2008 there were 27 Democratic debates, according to National Journal. (OK,
27 debates was a bit much. One moment I distinctly remember was the
weekend before the New Hampshire primary. The candidates debated
Saturday night and again on Sunday morning. Ruining everyones goddamn
weekend! Sheesh.) Six debates is not many debates and serves to the
challengers disadvantage. Its not that Hillary Clinton is a poor debater. It
was actually one of her strengths against Barack Obama in 2008. I doubt she
is terrified of Bernie Sanders or Martin OMalley. But she doesnt want to give
them any oxygen, either. Her challengers will benefit naturally from exposure
on the same stage as Hillary Clinton. And the exclusivity clause is to prevent
Martin OMalley, Bernie Sanders, Jim Webb and whoever else from holding
their own gathering in some college dorm room and asking WHERES
HILLARY? SHES AFRAID. Its good that the Clinton campaign will at least do
these six debates, since it was reportedly considering not debating at all at
one point. But the DNCs plan still favors Clinton, and Wasserman Schultz will
face pressure to add extra debates if this competition gets closer than
expected.

Terror DA

2ac
Heres more evidence Obama will never use indefinite
detention without trial on American citizens Boston
bombing proves
Rosenberg, 2013 (April 21, Carol, a senior journalist, currently with the
McClatchy News Service. A military-affairs reporter at the Miami Herald, since
January 2002 she has reported on the operation of the United States'
Guantanamo Bay detention camps, In 2011 she received the Robert F.
Kennedy Journalism Award for her nearly decade of work on the Guantanamo
Bay detention camp. , Miami Herald: Boston Marathon bombing suspect:
enemy combatant or common criminal?,
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/21/3357293/criminal-orcombatant.html#storylink=cpy)
But, once it was clear that Tsarnaevs health delayed those interrogations,
Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., waded in and invoked his role writing the law
that lets the Pentagon try alleged terrorist by military commission. He urged
the Obama administration to declare the suspected teen terrorist an enemy
combatant, a technical term for a war prisoner and subject him to
Guantnamo-style, FBI and CIA interrogation. Once the interrogators had
extracted any al-Qaida or other conspiracy secrets, Tsarnaev could get a
lawyer, Graham argued, while federal prosecutors build a case against for
trial in federal court because hes a U.S. citizen. A citizen can be an enemy
combatant, the senator said on CNNs State of the Union,invoking the
category of detainee at the U.S. base in Cuba. He is not eligible for a military
commission trial. It should be a federal trial. He had the support of fellow
Republican senators Kelly Ayotte of New Hampshire and John McCain of
Arizona, who in a joint statement with Rep. Peter King, R-N.Y., didnt outright
advocate sending Tsarnaev to Guantnamo, just giving him the same status
as indefinite detainees there. A U.S. Justice Department official
characterized it as throwback thinking to the Bush administration. The
American Civil Liberties Union called the idea unacceptable. And Sen. Dianne
Feinstein, D-Calif, chair of the Senate intelligence committee, called it
lamentable. I very much regret the fact that there are those that want to
precipitate a debate over whether hes an enemy combatant or whether he is
a terrorist, a murderer, et cetera, Feinstein said on Fox News Sunday, calling
the proposal unconstitutional. ACLU Executive Director Anthony Romero
said Sunday that the suspect should be charged as a criminal before
federal courts and granted all protections given to criminal defendants.
Throughout the weekend, Tsarnaev was unable to speak. He was sedated and
held under close guard at Bostons Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
since his capture Friday night following several shootouts, reported to be
intubated, in serious condition. Only two Americans have been held as
enemy combatants, Grahams recommended course of action, since the Sept.

11, 2001 attacks: Jose Padilla, who was captured on American soil, like
Tsarnaev. He was held for more than three years at a Navy brig before he was
charged, sent to Miami and convicted of terror conspiracy charges. Hes now
in federal prison. Yasser Hamdi, who was captured in Afghanistan, brought
to Guantnamo then held in Navy brigs in Norfolk, Va., and Charleston, S.C.,
before he was sent to his parents in Saudi Arabia in exchange for renouncing
his American citizenship. John Walker Lindh, who was captured in Afghanistan
around the same time as Hamdi, was never taken to Guantnamo, never held
in the U.S. as an enemy combatant. Instead, he faced federal trial in Virginia,
pleaded guilty to aiding the Taliban in exchange for a 20-year sentence. On
Sunday, a Justice Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity
because he was not authorized to discuss the case publicly, said the White
House was not considering enemy combatant status for Tsarnaev, whose
elder brother was killed in a shootout with police. The official called the
younger, surviving suspect a naturalized American. Reports said he became
a citizen on Sept. 11, 2012. While the Bush administration chose to process
certain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, the official said, Obama has
made clear that this administration, as a matter of policy, will not
authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American
citizens, regardless of their place of capture.

Using civilian courts harmonizes our counterterrorism

efforts with Europe. Statistical evidence proves they are
more effective
Getreuer, 13 (April 30th, Melanie, Global Security Threat Analyst,
Thomson Reuters, Small Business Administration, Office of Disaster
Assistance, University of Wisconsin-Madison Political Science Department
Christian Science Monitor: Why civilian courts are best for terror trials,
especially Boston bombing suspect,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0430/Why-civiliancourts-are-best-for-terror-trials-especially-Boston-bombing-suspect)

Europe has increasingly combated terrorism through the criminal justice

system, significantly expanding laws for arresting, trying, and detaining
terrorism suspects. The Tsarnaev trial may therefore help to harmonize US
counterterrorism efforts with those of our closest international
counterterrorism partners, while also allowing America to more effectively
participate in the global counterterrorism conversation. The US Justice
Department has proven both remarkably efficient and effective at putting
terrorism on trial. As research by NYUs Law and Security Center shows, the
Department of Justice has averaged about 30 terrorism indictments a year
since 2001. (The exception to this statistic is from 2009-2010 when, on the

heels of increased law enforcement sting operations and a renewed focus on

extremists associated with the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, rates nearly
doubled.) Most of those trials have proceeded without the use of classified
evidence, and over half have involved American citizens. Like Tsarnaev, 60
percent of these American defendants had no direct affiliation with a terrorist
organization. In choosing to charge Tsarnaev with using a weapon of mass
destruction, the surviving Boston Marathon bombing suspect falls under an
infrequently used, but widely interpreted terrorism statute. Just 25 of all
domestic terrorism cases since 2001 have involved a WMD charge. Yet the
penalty has been leveled at an infamous group of confirmed and would-be
terrorists, including September 11s 20th hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui,
shoe bomber Richard Reid, and Najibullah Zazi, the individual who plotted to
plant bombs in the New York City subway system. Almost all terrorism trials
since 2001, whether of domestic or international defendants, have also
ended in convictions. In fact, with a conviction rate of nearly 90 percent, it is
almost certain that if Tsarnaevs case continues to the jury stage, he will be
found guilty. That it will reach that point, however, is itself not guaranteed:
Some two-thirds of all terrorism cases have ended in guilty plea agreements.
While this is lower than the overall percentage of federal cases that end in
plea agreements, coupled with the strong case against him, it suggests that
the Tsarnaev trial may at least be very short.

<<insert international coop k2 solve terror>>

use of indefinite detention and military commissions

undermines effective intelligence gathering and
extraditions internationally recent history proves
Hathaway, et al, 13
[Oona (Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law,
Yale Law School); Samuel Adelsberg (J.D. candidate at Yale Law School);
Spencer Amdur (J.D. candidate at Yale Law School); Freya Pitts (J.D. candidate
at Yale Law School); Philip Levitz (J.D. from Yale Law School); and Sirine
Shebaya (J.D. from Yale Law School), The Power To Detain: Detention of
Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38,
2013]

Many key U.S. allies have been unwilling to cooperate in cases involving
law-of-war detention or prosecution but have cooperated in criminal
prosecutions. In fact, many U.S. extradition treaties, including those with allies
such as India and Germany, forbid extradition when the defendant will not be
tried in a criminal court.252 This issue has played out in practice several times. An al-

Shabaab operative was extradited from the Netherlands only after

assurances from the United States that he would be prosecuted in criminal
court.253 Two similar cases arose in 2007.254 In perhaps the most striking
example, five terrorism suspectsincluding Abu Hamza al-Masr, who is
accused of providing material support to al-Qaeda by trying to set up a
training camp in Oregon and of organizing support for the Taliban in Afghanistan were
extradited to the United States by the United Kingdom in October 2012.255
The extradition was made on the express condition that they would be tried
in civilian federal criminal courts rather than in the military commissions.256
And, indeed, both the European Court of Human Rights and the British courts
allowed the extradition to proceed actions offered by the U.S. federal criminal
justice system and finding they fully met all relevant standards.257 An
insistence on using military commissions may thus hinder extradition and
other kinds of international prosecutorial cooperation, such as the sharing of
testimony and evidence.

Link Turn
Indefinite detention of domestic captures hurts our ability
to fight terror
Eviatar, 11 (12/14, Daphne, Senior Counsel in Human Rights Firsts Law
and Security Program A Bad Day (and New Year) for U.S. National Security,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daphne-eviatar/a-bad-day-and-new-yearfo_b_1149504.html)
FBI Director Robert Mueller just this morning told the Senate that he fears the
proposed law will create confusion over who has authority to investigate
terrorism cases. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the National Defense
Authorization Act will restrain the Executive Branch's ability to use "all the
counterterrorism tools that are now legally available" and "needlessly
complicate efforts by frontline law enforcement professionals to collect
critical intelligence concerning operations and activities within the United
States." Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has written that it
"would introduce unnecessary rigidity at a time when our intelligence,
military and law enforcement professionals are working more closely than
ever to defend our nation effectively and quickly from terrorist attacks." Still,
ignoring the advice from his most senior federal military and law enforcement
professionals, President Obama is expected to sign the 2012 law, according
to his senior advisors. The concerns aren't limited to federal officials. Earlier
this week the 20,000-member International Association of Chiefs of Police
wrote to Congress expressing concern that the law could "undermine the
ability of our law enforcement counterterrorism experts, in particular those
involved with Joint Terrorism Task Forces, to conduct effective investigations
of suspected terrorists." A bipartisan group of 26 retired generals and
admirals recently wrote that the legislation "both reduces the options
available to our Commander-in-Chief to incapacitate terrorists and violates
the rule of law" and "would seriously undermine the safety of the American
people." The U.K. and Germany have said they won't share intelligence or
turn over suspected terrorists to the U.S. if they know they'll be headed to
indefinite military custody. And that's just the national security concerns.

Indefinite detention does not thwart terrorism

McAuliff 11 (Michael Mcauliff, 12-12-2011, "Ex-Admiral: Indefinite
Detention Is A Win For Terrorists,"
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/12/indefinite-military-detentionformer-admiral_n_1144121.html, Date Accessed: 7-3-2015)
To Ret. Adm. John Hutson, who was Judge Advocate General of the Navy from
1997 to 2000 and is dean emeritus of the University of New Hampshire

School of Law, the idea that the United States is chipping away at one of its
fundamental principles of civilian law enforcement is a win for terrorists. The
enemy is just laughing over this, because they will have gotten another
victory, Hutson told The Huffington Post. Therell be one more victory. There
wont be any bloodshed or immediate bloodshed, theres not a big explosion,
except in a metaphorical sense, but it is a victory nonetheless for the enemy.
And its a self-inflicted wound. Besides Hutsons 28 years in the military
justice system, he counted himself a conservative and Republican who
didnt vote for a Democrat for dogcatcher until he became worried about
the direction of the country and backed Obama in 2008. He thinks Obama
should be very concerned about the detainee provisions, and explained why
passage of them would be a victory for terrorists, who he argued cannot beat
the United States on the battlefield. Instead, he said terrorists have to focus
their attacks and violence on getting the United States to beat itself. And
infringing on its own liberties is a step in that direction, he said. In this war,
the enemy doesnt have to win, Hutson said. They can cause us to do
things we wouldnt otherwise do, such as indefinite detentions, in the name
of fighting a war, he said, noting that the country has already subjected
itself to invasive scrutiny that would not have been tolerated before Sept. 11,
2001. In the case of the defense bill, the detention provisions would raise key
questions about basic legal concepts that have long underpinned guarantees
of freedom in America, including the habeas corpus right to contest being
jailed and the Posse Comitatus Act passed after the Civil War to limit the
militarys role in law enforcement. As it turns out, our enemies greatest
weakness is that they are bereft of ideals, he added. If we can maintain our
ideals, our sense of justice, in the face of this, we can win. What the enemy,
what the terrorists want to do because they know they cant beat us
militarily [is] they can try to change us. They can cause us to become more
like them, and for them, thats victory. The reason why, he argues, is that if
the United States cannot portray itself as the holder of loftier ideals, then it is
much harder to convince the rest of the world to stay on its side and its
harder to fight wars because even allies are less cooperative. Whos going to
surrender to the United Sates if they think theyre going to be detained
indefinitely without a trial? Is anybody going to give up? he asked. Whos
going to say, You know, maybe the United States isnt as bad as we think it
is, and maybe its al Qaeda and the Taliban who are the bad guys, and Im
going to side with the good guys?' Its going to cost lives. he said, its
going to cost a way of life.

A2: military courts k2 terror

Civilian courts are far superior --- proponents of military
tribunals underestimate benefits this answers every
warrant in their cards
Byman and Wittes, 2013 (June 17th, Daniel, professor in the Security
Studies Program at Georgetown University and the Research Director of the
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. and Benjamin, Senior
Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, the Editor in Chief
of the Lawfare blog, and a member of the Hoover Institutions Task Force on
National Security and Law Brookings, Tools and Tradeoffs: Confronting US
Citizen Terrorist Suspects Abroad,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/07/23%20us
%20citizen%20terrorist%20suspects%20awlaki%20jihad%20byman
%20wittes/toolsandtradeoffs.pdf)

Criminal prosecution is, by far, the best option for neutralizing terrorist
suspects when it is available. The Obama administration, in fact, takes the
position that it is the only means by which it will process those terrorist
suspects it manages to capture. As White House terrorism adviser John
Brennan put it in a speech at the Harvard Law School, when it comes to U.S.
citizens involved in terrorist-related activity, whether they are captured
overseas or at home, we will prosecute them in our criminal justice system.
102 In terms of sheer numbers, as our earlier survey shows, criminal
prosecution has been the workhorse instrument for handling U.S. citizens who
have joined overseas jihadist groups. The reason is pretty simple: the
advantages to domestic criminal prosecution as a counter-terrorism
instrument are considerableand gravely underestimated by those who
insist on giving primacy in counterterrorism to military detention and trial. In
general, prosecuting terrorists garners more legitimacyboth overseas and
domesticallythan the use of other counterterrorism instruments,
particularly for long-term detention or incapacitation. This approach raises
the fewest civil liberties concerns and is therefore strongly endorsed by
human rights groups. And it raises the fewest concerns among allied
governments as well. The criminal law is a stable system, one whose rules
have not changed dramatically over the past decade. A terrorist who is
convicted and locked up pursuant to a prison sentence is very likely to remain
in prison for the duration of that sentence; whereas terrorists held by allied
governments might be released by those governments. In addition, the U.S.
military has faced great political and legal pressures to free detainees held
for long periods in U.S. military custody. The criminal justice system, like a
Hellfire missile launched from a drone, thus has great capacity for
neutralizing terrorists; but unlike drone strikes, it neutralizes them in ways

that generate maximal societal acceptance. The legitimacy of criminal

convictions is rooted in the care, the adversarial process, and the multiple
layers of independent review our criminal process involves. Using the courts,
with the constitutional protections and due process they promise the
accused, is much more likely, though by no means certain, than any other
means of neutralizing terrorist suspects to avoid mistakesat least to avoid
those mistakes injurious to the accused. As with detention under the laws of
war and targeting with lethal force, criminal prosecution takes the suspected
terrorist off the streets and can oftenthough not alwaysfacilitate
interrogation for intelligence purposes, as some of the cases described above
illustrate. Critics of the use of the criminal justice system for counterterrorism
cases often worry that it impairs intelligence gathering, particularly when
suspects shut down and stop speaking after being read their Miranda rights
or are otherwise informed of their rights to counsel and to avoid selfincrimination. The reality is far more complicated. While there are times when
criminal proceedings encourage silence, they can also producethrough the
plea bargaining processhighly cooperative arrangements between suspects
and authorities. As former Assistant Attorney General David Kris explained in
a speech at the Brookings Institution in 2010, The criminal justice system
has worked as what the Intelligence Community would call a Humint
collection platform. The fact is that when the government has a strong
prosecution case, the defendant knows he will spend a long time in prison,
and this creates powerful incentives for him to cooperate with us, Kris said.
In Kriss account, cooperating criminal justice suspects have provided
intelligence on Al Qaeda phone numbers and email addresses, recruiting
techniques, finances, and tradecraft. They have revealed the locations of
terrorist training camps and safe houses, as well as the locations of senior Al
Qaeda leaders. And they have compromised communications methods and
security protocols. They have named operatives involved in past attacks
and planned future onesand they have given up plots. Kriss implicit point,
that the criminal justice system has unique and powerful coercive capacities
with intelligence implications, is an important one that is often overlooked
both by civil libertarians and by enthusiasts of military authoritiesboth of
whom tend to see it as a system built around fairness to the accused and
lacking in the coercive dimensions of military and intelligence detention. To
be sure, the justice system does not permit waterboarding (though neither
does the CIA any more), and it does require the involvement of lawyers and
all sorts of other protections for the accused. But it also permits forms of
coercion that the military system precludes. Military interrogators, for
example, are not allowed to threaten detainees. 104 FBI agents routinely
threaten suspects with long-term prison sentences, and can sometimes even
hold over their heads the possibility of indicting family members; as Kris
points out, these can be powerful levers to induce cooperation.

CP Blocks

FISA

Reform fails
FISA will keep on rubber stamping, empirics prove
Clarke 14 (Conor Clarke, J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School 2015, Stanford
Law Review, Is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Really a Rubber
Stamp? Ex Parte Proceedings and the FISC Win Rate, Published 02-28-2014,
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/foreign-intelligence-surveillancecourt-really-rubber-stamp-ex-parte-proceedings-and-fisc-win)
A striking feature of proceedings at the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) is that the executive always wins. Between 1979 and 2012 the
first thirty-three years of the FISCs existence federal agencies submitted 33,900 ex
parte requests to the court.[1] The judges denied eleven and granted the
rest: a 99.97% rate of approval. This win rate, enviable even to the
Harlem Globetrotters, is almost always interpreted as evidence that that the
court is failing to do its job. In the media, in legal scholarship, and in Congress, there is
a widespread sense that a court in which the executive always wins can be
nothing more than a rubber stamp.[2] That perception is now helping fuel legislative
reforms. Both the House and Senate are considering bills to reform the FISC.[3] In January
2014, President Obama added wind to their sails by endorsing a proposal to let outside

in a nod to the fact that FISC skepticism

runs deep, the President expressed openness to working with Congress on a
broader set of changes at the court.
advocates appear before the court.[4] And,

Seriously though, the FISA court is a complete joke and

will always find a loophole, history proves this to be true;
reforms simply wont work
Greenwald 13 (Glenn Greenwald, ex-constitutional lawyer and a former
columnist on civil liberties and US national security issues, The Guardian, The
bad joke called 'the FISA court' shows how a 'drone court' would work,
Published: 05-03-13,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/03/fisa-court-rubberstamp-drones)
an investigation by the US Senate , conducted by the Church Committee,
uncovered decades of serious, systemic abuse by the US government of its
eavesdropping powers: listening in on the telephone calls of civil rights
leaders, reading the mail of political opponents, spying on anti-war groups.
The supposed lesson learned from this was that political leaders will inevitably
abuse their surveillance powers if they are permitted to exercise them in the dark and without
meaningful oversight. The "solution" was the enactment of a law - the 1978 Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (Fisa) - that made it a criminal offense for
government officials to eavesdrop on the electronic communications of
Americans without first obtaining a warrant from the newly created Fisa court.
From the start, the Fisa court was a radical perversion of the judicial process.
It convened in total secrecy and its rulings were classified . The standard the
In the mid-1970s,

government had to meet was not the traditional "probable cause" burden imposed by the Fourth
Amendment but a significantly diluted standard. There was nothing adversarial about the proceeding: only

the Justice Department (DOJ) was permitted to be present, but not any lawyers for the targets of the
eavesdropping request, who were not notified. Reflecting its utter lack of real independence, the court
itself was housed in the DOJ. And,

and was totally predictable, the court barely ever

rejected a government request for eavesdropping. From its inception, it was
the ultimate rubber-stamp court, having rejected a total of zero government
applications - zero - in its first 24 years of existence, while approving many
thousands. In its total 34 year history - from 1978 through 2012 - the Fisa
court has rejected a grand total of 11 government applications, while
approving more than 20,000. Despite how obedient and compliant this court always was, the
Bush administration decided in late 2001 that it would have its National Security Agency (NSA) intercept
the calls and emails of Americans without bothering to obtain the Fisa court approval required by the
criminal law, claiming - with a straight face - that complying with the law was "too cumbersome" in the age
of Terrorism. Once this lawbreaking was revealed by the New York Times in late 2005, the response from
the DC political class was not to punish the responsible government officials for their lawbreaking, but
rather to enact a new law (called the Fisa Amendments Act of 2008) that, in essence, simply legalized the

That new Fisa law vested vast

new surveillance powers in the US government to spy on the communications
of Americans without the annoyance of obtaining permission from the Fisa
court. It requires warrants from the Fisa court only in the narrowest of
circumstances: the ones most susceptible to abuse. Although candidate
Obama pretended to have serious concerns about the law (when he voted for
it) and vowed to rein in its excesses, his administration last year demanded
the renewal of this law with no reforms, and Congress, on a fully bipartisan
basis, complied. One of the provisions of the new Fisa law requires the DOJ
annually to disclose to Congress the number of eavesdropping applications it
files and the number approved and rejected by the Fisa court. Earlier this week,
warrantless eavesdropping scheme of the Bush administration.

that disclosure was provided to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid for the year 2012, and this is what it
reported: Let's repeat that: "of

1,789 applications, the FISA court did not deny any

applications in whole or in part ." What fantastic oversight (1789 is, ironically, the year the
Constitution was ratified). The court did "modify" 40 of those applications - less than
3% - but it approved every single one. The same was true of 2011, when the
DOJ submitted 1,676 applications and the Fisa court, while modifying 30, "did
not deny any applications in whole, or in part". What makes all of this worse is just how
extreme the US government is "interpreting" - i.e. distorting - its eavesdropping powers under the law. Two
Democratic Senators, Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, have been warning for years that the Obama
administration is exploiting these laws in ways far beyond what the public knows or what a reasonable
reading of the laws would permit. One of the nation's most knowledgeable surveillance experts, Julian
Sanchez, has documented - citing the writing of a former Obama lawyer - documented that the law is used
to target even "an American citizen located within the United States, and no court or judge is required to
approve or review the choice of which individuals to tap": exactly the type of warrantless surveillance we
were all told this law would prohibit. And yet, the Fisa court - even for those narrow set of cases where a
warrant is required - continues as it always has: rubber-stamping virtually anything and everything the
government wants to do. There are many reasons that explain this judicial obeisance. Part of it is fear and
abdication of duty: no federal judge wants to be the one who rejects a surveillance request from the
government only to have the target perpetrate an attack, even though federal judges are immunized with
life tenure from such political pressures so that they can apply the law and provide a real check on
government conduct. Part of it is nationalistic delirium: federal courts in general have been disgracefully
subservient to the Executive Branch every time they utter the word "Terrorism" since 9/11. And part of it is
just the nature of persuasion: even the most mediocre lawyers can convince someone of almost anything if
they have no opposition and can unilaterally select and depict all facts without challenge. The entire
process, though depicted as some kind of check on Executive Branch behavior, is virtually designed to do
the opposite: ensure the Government's surveillance desires are unimpeded. These shockingly lopsided
statistics attest to the success of this design. This is significant not only because it means there is no real
check on the government's surveillance power, even as they exercise those powers in much broader ways
than most people suspect. It's also significant in light of recent calls that a "drone court" be created that

would provide for a similar process for the president's desire to target for execution people who have been
charged with no crime. The New York Times Editorial Page has been advocating this for years. The
rationale offered is the same as what was used to justify the Fisa court: the President needs some check on
who he targets, but requiring that he charge the person he wants to kill with a crime and convict them in a
real court is too cumbersome. Therefore, this reasoning goes, a "drone court" modeled on the Fisa court is
the happy medium: he'll have some constraints on his power to kill whomever he wants, but its secretive,
one-sided process and lowered levels of required proof will ensure the necessary agility and flexibility he
needs as Commander-in-Chief. As the NYT Editors put it: the drone court "would be an analogue" to the
Fisa court whereby: "If the administration has evidence that a suspect is a terrorist threat to the United
States, it would have to present that evidence in secret to a court before the suspect is placed on a kill
list." But does anyone believe that a "drone court" would be any less of a mindless rubber-stamp than the
Fisa court already is? Except for a handful of brave judges who take seriously their constitutionally
assigned role of independence, the vast majority of federal judges are far too craven to tell the president
that he has not submitted sufficient proof that would allow him to kill someone he claims is a Terrorist. The
fact that it would all take place in secret, with only the DOJ present, further ensures that the results would
mirror the embarrassing subservience of the Fisa court. As former Pentagon chief counsel Jeh Johnson put
it in a speech last month discussing this proposal: "Its proceedings would necessarily be ex parte and in
secret, and, like a FISA court, I suspect almost all of the government's applications would be granted,
because, like a FISA application, the government would be sure to present a compelling case. So, at the
same time the New York Times editorial page promotes a FISA-like court for targeted lethal force, it derides
the FISA court as a 'rubber stamp' because it almost never rejects an application. How long before a 'drone
court' operating in secret is criticized in the same way?" Precisely. But like the Fisa court, such a "drone

Just imagine how creepy and tyrannical it

is to codify a system where federal judges - in total secrecy and with only
government lawyers present - issue execution warrants that allow the
president to kill someone who has never been charged with a crime. It's true
that the president is already doing this, and is doing it without any external
oversight. But a fake, illusory judicial process lends a perceived legitimacy to his execution powers that
court" would be far worse than merely harmless.

is not warranted by the reality of this process. Worse, it further infects the US judiciary with warped,
secretive procedures more akin to a Star Chamber than anything recognized by the US Constitution.
Beyond that, it takes a program that is now seen as a radical presidential power grab - Obama's kill list -

It's one
thing to have a secret court that lends a veneer of legality and legitimacy to
the government's rampant spying behavior. It's quite another to have one
that authorizes the government to kill people who have never been charged
with, let alone convicted of, any actual crime. But it's a rather powerful reflection of how
and legitimizes and entrenches it by making both the Congress and courts cooperative parties.

warped our political culture has become that a secret, unaccountable, one-sided "court" is being widely
proposed to issue execution warrants, and that this is the "moderate" or even "liberal" position. How
anyone could look at the Fisa court and want to replicate its behavior in the context of presidential
executions is really mystifying.

Counter Plan cannot solve aff, having it go through the

FISA court is so ineffective and does not come close to
curtailing surveillance
Eichelberger 13 (Erika Eichelberger, a reporter for Mother Jones
Washington bureu, Mother Jones, FISA Court Has Rejected .03 Percent Of All
Government Surveillance Requests, Published: 06-10-2013,
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/06/fisa-court-nsa-spying-opinionreject-request)
After last week's revelations extensive National Security Agency surveillance of phone and internet

President Barack Obama made it a point to assure Americans that,

not to worry, there is plenty of oversight of his administration's snooping
programs. "We've got congressional oversight and judicial oversight," he said
Friday, referring in part to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) , which
communications,

was created in 1979 to oversee Department of Justice requests for surveillance warrants against foreign

But the FISC has declined just

11 of the more than 33,900 surveillance requests made by the government in
33 years, the Wall Street Journal reported Sunday. That's a rate of .03
percent, which raises questions about just how much judicial oversight is
actually being provided. "The FISA system is broken," Marc Rotenberg, executive
director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, told the Journal. " At the point that a FISA
judge can compel the disclosure of millions of phone records of US citizens
engaged in only domestic communications, unrelated to the collection of
foreign intelligencethere is no longer meaningful judicial review ."
agents suspected of espionage or terrorism in the United States.

ICJ

Solvency Take-outs
Solvency Takeout - This counterplan is literally impossible
for two reasons the court only accepts cases, not
random plans, and the United States doesnt accept
compulsory jurisdiction from ICJ
de Zayas 2005
(Alfred, J.D. (Harvard), Dr. phil. (Gttingen), member of the New York Bar, former Secretary of the Human
Rights Committee and Head of the Petitions Unit, visiting professor of law, University of British Columbia
and of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, March 2005, Human rights and indefinite
detention, International Committee of the Red Cross,
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_857_zayas.pdf)

the International Court of Justice accepts cases referred

to it by States seeking adjudication of a particular dispute; the Court does so
also on the basis of a general declaration of recognition of its jurisdiction , and
when States accept the Courts jurisdiction in the text of a specific treaty.
Some States, however, do not accept the compulsory ipso facto jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice, including the United States of America.
When the latter appears before the ICJ, it is usually by virtue of a treaty
provision requiring the settlement of disputes by the ICJ, such as the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, to which the United States is a party. This was the case in the 31
Under Article 36 of its Statute,

March 2004 judgment in Mexico v. United States, with respect to Mr Avena and 50 other Mexican nationals,
in which the ICJ found that the United States had violated the said Vienna Convention.

Solvency Takeout - The United Nations prioritizes other

issues over detention no enforcement and no solvency
Schaefer and Bolton 2009
(Schaefer, Brett D., Brett D. Schaefer is a Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory
Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. and John R. Bolton is an American lawyer and diplomat who has served
in several Republican administrations. ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the Search for
Alternatives. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.)
Thus, the Vienna Declaration stated that the U.N.'s development agenda to eliminate poverty should be
treated "on the same footing" as the preven- tion of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and summary executions.

the U.N. as an organization does not believe that some rights are
more important than others. Instead of focusing its efforts on the most
important and fundamental civil and political rights -such as the rights to
choose one's government, enjoy equal status and protection under the law,
or be free from arbitrary execution, torture, and arbitrary detention-the U.N. system
spends an inordinate amount of resources on promoting cer- tain "rights"
listed in the lntemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
such as the "right to an adequate standard of living" and the "right to health."
In other words,

While the lCliSCR is part of the so-called lntemational Bill of Human Rights-consisting of the ICIZSCR, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its
optional protocols-it should be secondary to prevention of arbitrary death, detention, torture,
and other grievous violations of human rights. Yet, the official policy of the Ll.N. system is that lCl-ZSCR
principles such as the "right to work," "right to an adequate standard ofliving," and "right to health"

have

equal standing with the fundamental civil and political rights protected by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The U.N. system fails to recognize that
without the institutional guarantees pro- vided by civil and political rights -an
independent judicigry, the rule of law, and representative govemment- all
other rights are essentially unen- forceable . That is, a population may possess
some ethereal "right to health," but that right is likely unattainable without an
accountable government and accessible iudiciarv.

Perm
Perm Perm do both solves best decisions made by
international courts still need to be enforced by Congress
Hathaway, McElroy & Solow 2012
(*Oona A. Hathaway, **Sabria McElroy & ***Sara Aronchick Solow, *Oona Hathaway is the Gerard C. and
Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and both founder and director of the Center for Global
Legal Challenges at Yale Law School. **Yale Law School, J.D., 2010; C. LaRue Munson Prize for excellence in
work on cases in the Law School Clinical Program; Yale Morris Tyler Moot Court Competition, Finalist (Fall
2008), ***Law clerk for the Honorable Anthony J. Scirica on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
Spring 2012, International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in US Courts, Yale University,
http://www.yjil.org/print/volume-37-issue-1/international-law-at-home-enforcing-treaties-in-us-courts)

A deep puzzle lies at the heart of international law . It is law binding on the
United States, and yet it is not always enforceable in the courts . One of the
great challenges for scholars, judges, and practitioners alike has been to make some
sense of this puzzlesome might call it a paradoxand to figure out when
international law can be used in U.S. courts and when it cannot . The Supremacy
Clause in the U.S. Constitution would seem to solve this puzzle. It says, after all, that Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
supreme Law of the Land. Yet early in the countrys history, the Supreme
Court distinguished between treaties equivalent to an act of the
legislatureand therefore enforceable in the courtsand those the
legislature should executemeaning they could not be enforced in the
courts until implemented by Congress and the President. Thus began a cottage
industry devoted to determining when international law was enforceable in
the courts.

Theory
Theory The counterplan is unfair and a voting issue:
Real World: They entirely misunderstand the premise of the ICJ. The ICJ is a
court that judges a dispute between two consenting conflicting parties
thats de Zayas 2005. The counterplan suggests we just propose our plan to
the ICJ and see what they do. Thats not their job, and the United States
would never actually do that.

Moving Targets: The outcome of the counterplan is never a stable advocacy which
hijacks our ability to generate offense.
Predictability: There are infinite actors that the United States could ask for approval of
the plan. That makes Affirmative ground unstable and unpredictable.
Fiat Delay: This makes it effectively a delay counterplan which means the affirmative
can never win the debate because theyll lose timeframe uniqueness questions.
Fairness: Vote Aff on this - well grant them the right to counterplans and even PICs, but
consultation counterplans are uniquely bad.

ESR

Doesnt solve
The CP is the squo but it doesnt solve
Elsea 13 (Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, July 25, 2013, Detention
of U.S. Persons as Enemy Belligerents, Congressional Research Service,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42337.pdf)

In signing the 2012 NDAA into law, President Obama stated that his
Administration does not intend to detain indefinitely U.S. citizens
pursuant to the detention authority in Section 1021.318 However, given that the
conflict may last beyond his term and that the 2012 NDAA appears to
mandate at least temporary military detention for some non-U.S. citizens, it is
possible that the Supreme Court has not issued its last word on enemy
combatants and preventive detention as a means to prosecute hostilities
authorized by the AUMF. Lower courts that have addressed questions the Supreme Court left unanswered have not
achieved a consensus on the extent to which Congress has authorized the detention without trial of U.S. persons as enemy combatants, and
Congress has not so far clarified its intent. If Hamdi stands for the proposition that U.S. citizens may be detained under the same
circumstances that make noncitizens amenable to law-of-war detention, regardless of location, then the Guantanamo cases may provide
sufficient legal precedent for detaining similarly situated persons within the United States. If, on the other hand, historical precedent has any
bearing on the interpretation of the state of the law and authorities regarding detention of U.S. persons under the law of war, as preserved by
Section 1021(e) of the 2012 NDAA, it seems difficult to conclude that the AUMF should be read to imply the authority to detain such persons
unless they are part of the armed forces of a belligerent party to an armed conflict. Congress has on occasion exercised the authority to permit
the detention of civilians without trial based on the risk they are deemed to pose to national security, but if a declaration of war alone has not
sufficed to trigger that authority, it seems unlikely that an authorization to use force would be presumed to confer it.

Huge solvency deficit the president will always attempt to overdetain only a narrow definitional criteria via the plans STATUTE
solves
Waxman 09, Matthew C. Waxman*, * Associate Professor, Columbia Law School; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on
Foreign Relations; Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, 2009 Journal of National Security
Law & Policy 3 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 1, Article: Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom?,
Lexis, jj

Historically, detention practices - especially those viewed as overbroad - have

sometimes proven counterproduc-tive in combating terrorism and
radicalization, and consideration of administrative detention's strategic utility
should weigh these dangers. The British government learned painfully that
internment of suspected Northern Ireland terrorists was viewed among
Northern Irish communities as a form of collective punishment that fueled
violent nationalism, and detention helped dry up community informants.
n118 And in Iraq and Afghanistan, though exceptional cases because combat
still rages there, detention has played an important role in neutralizing
threats to coalition forces but has also contributed to anti-coalition
radicalization, especially when perceived as being
applied overbroadly. n119 Overbroad de-tention sweeps risk further
radicalizing and alienating communities from which terrorists are likely to
emerge or whose assistance is vital in penetrating or discerning extremist
groups. n120 Moreover, several influential studies of counterterrorism strategy have emphasized the need to target coercive
policies (including military and law enforcement efforts) narrowly and

precisely to avoid playing into al Qaeda propaganda efforts to aggregate local

grievances into a common global movement. n121 Official U.S. military
doctrine now cautions about similar risks in setting up detention systems in
battling insurgencies. n122
[*27] Narrow definitional criteria can therefore help in mitigating an
Executive's propensity to over-detain. Ob-servers from both the right and the
left worry correctly that in the face of terrorist threats the Executive is likely
to push detention powers to or even past their legal outer boundaries in order
to prevent catastrophe as well as head off accu-satory political backlash for
having failed to take sufficient action. n123 These are fundamentally policy
problems, not legal problems, and will require sound Executive judgments no
matter what the legal regime looks like. But once the role of detention is
firmly situated in a broader counterterrorism strategy that seeks to balance
the many competing policy priorities, a carefully drawn administrative
detention statute might help restrain this propensity toward short-term
overreach with long-term strategic drawbacks.

Doesnt solve -- Signal

Doesnt solve international signal
Rao 12 (Neomi Rao is Assistant professor, George Mason University School
of Law
Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch Is a
They, Not an It
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Rao_MLR.pdf)
Given all of the attempts at coordination, one might assume that the President would prefer greater control over the
bureaucracy. Indeed, a

system in which there is only imperfect coordination and ongoing

competition has significant costs. It can result in instability and uncertainty and the
possibility that dissenting views will persist within the agencies, making it difficult for the
President to implement his chosen policies. Domestically, bureaucratic competition may allow
for flexibility, but also the possibility of confusion and the opportunity for powerful agency
interests to proceed in a manner contrary to the Presidents directives. Overseas, displays
of intra-governmental disputes may make it difficult for the President to credibly commit
to compliance on behalf of the United States.

Congress k
Congress key to solve legal uncertainty and political
friction
Chesney & Wittes 13 Prof of Law @ Texas School of Law & Sr. Fellow
@ Brookings
Protecting U.S. Citizens Constitutional Rights During the War on Terror,
Robert Chesney, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2013/05/22war-on-terror-chesney-wittes
Aside from a Padilla-like scenario, a ban on military detention in domestic
capture scenarios thus would foreclose no course of action that is realistically
available to the executive branch at this stage given its own preferences. It
would, rather, merely codify the existing understanding reflected in executive
branch policy and practicepolicy and practice reinforced over the years by
well-informed expectations about the likely views of the justices on the
underlying legal issues. Adopting such a change, it is worth emphasizing,
would run with the grain of Americas traditional wariness when it comes to a
domestic security role for the U.S. military. There have unfortunately been
times in our nations history when it has been necessary and proper for the
military to play such a role. It is far from clear that this is the case today,
however, given the demonstrated capacity of the criminal justice system in
the counterterrorism context. In the final analysis, we conclude that the
manifest legal uncertainty and political friction overhanging the
domestic military detention option entail costs that, in our view, outweigh the
hypothetical benefits of continuing to leave that option open as a statutory
matter. We therefore favor legislation that would clarify that military
detention in counterterrorism under the AUMF is not available with respect
to any persons--whether United States citizens or aliens--arrested within the
United States.

Congress is key to the perception of commitment to rule

of lawkey to the whole aff
Maxwell 12 (Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S.
Army, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html, Winter 2012)
The weakness of this theory

is that it is not codified in U.S. law; it is merely the

extrapolation of international theorists and organizations. The only entity under the Constitution that
can frame and settle Presidential power regarding the enforcement of international norms is Congress. As
the check on executive power, Congress must amend the AUMF to give the executive a statutory
roadmap that articulates when force is appropriate and under what circumstances the President can
use targeted killing. This would be the needed endorsement from Congress, the other political branch of government,
to clarify the U.S. position on its use of force regarding targeted killing. For example, it would spell out the limits of
American lethality once an individual takes the status of being a member of an organized group. Additionally,

statutory clarification will give other states a roadmap for the contours of

what constitutes anticipatory self-defense and the proper conduct of the military under the law of war. Congress should also
require that the President brief it on the decision matrix of articulated guidelines before a targeted killing mission is ordered.
As Kenneth Anderson notes, [t]he point about briefings to Congress is partly to allow it to exercise its democratic role as the
peoples representative.74 The desire to feel safe is understandable. The consumers who buy SUVs are not buying them to
be less safe. Likewise, the champions of targeted killings want the feeling of safety achieved by the elimination of those who
would do the United States harm. But allowing

the President to order targeted killing without

congressional limits means the President can manipulate force in the name of national security
without tethering it to the law advanced by international norms. The potential consequence of such unilateral
executive action is that it gives other states, such as North Korea and Iran, the customary
precedent to do the same. Targeted killing might be required in certain circumstances, but if the
guidelines are debated and understood, the decision can be executed with the full faith of the peoples representative,
Congress. When the decision is made without

Congress, the result might make the United States feel safer,
but the process eschews what gives a state its greatest safety: the rule of law.

Congressional action is key to legitimacy for public and

international cooperation
Wainstein 9/18/13
Kenneth L. Wainstein is the Sheila and Milton Fine distinguished visiting fellow
at The Washington Institute, focusing on counterterrorism issues, a partner
with the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham, and Taft, LLP, The Heritage
Foundation, September 18, 2013, "The Changing Nature of Terror: Law and
Policies to Protect America",
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/the-changing-nature-ofterror-law-and-policies-to-protect-america
Call for Congressional Action
While it is important that the Administration undergo this strategic
reorientation, it is also important that Congress participate in that
process. Over the past 12 years, Congress has made significant
contributions to the post-9/11 reforms of our counterterrorism program. First,
it has been instrumental in strengthening our counterterrorism capabilities.
From the Authorization for Use of Military Force to the PATRIOT Act and its
reauthorization to the critical 2008 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, Congress has repeatedly answered the governments call for
strong but measured authorities to fight the terrorist adversary. Second,
congressional action has gone a long way toward institutionalizing
measures that were hastily adopted after 9/11, and is creating a lasting
framework for what will be a long war against international terrorism. Some
argue against such legislative permanence, citing the hope that todays
terrorists will go the way of the radical terrorists of the 1970s and largely fade
from the scene over time. That, Im afraid, is a pipe dream. The reality is that
international terrorism will remain a potent force for years and possibly
generations to come. Recognizing this reality, both Presidents Bush and
Obama have made a concerted effort to look beyond the threats of the day
and focus on regularizing and institutionalizing our counterterrorism
measures for the futureas most recently evidenced by the Obama
Administrations effort to develop lasting procedures and rules of

engagement for the use of drone strikes. Finally, congressional action has
provided one other very important element to our counterterrorism initiatives
a measure of political legitimacy that could never be achieved through
unilateral executive action. At several important junctures since 9/11,
Congress has considered and passed legislation in sensitive areas of
executive action, such as the authorization of the Military Commissions and
the amendments to our Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. On each such
occasion, Congresss action had the effect of calming public concerns and
providing a level of political legitimacy to the executive branchs
counterterrorism efforts. That legitimizing effectand its continuation
through meaningful oversightis critical to maintaining the publics
confidence in the counterterrorism means and methods that our government
uses. It also provides assurance to our foreign partners and thereby
encourages them to engage in the operational cooperation that is so critical
to the success of our combined efforts against international terrorism. These
post-9/11 examples speak to the value that congressional involvement can
bring to the national dialogue and to the current reassessment of our
counterterrorism strategies and policies. It is heartening to see Members of
Congress starting to ratchet up their engagement in this area. For example,
certain Members are expressing views about our existing targeting and
detention authorities and whether they should be revised in light of the new
threat picture. Some have asked whether Congress should pass legislation
governing the executive branchs selection of targets for its drone program,
with some suggesting that Congress establish a judicial process by which a
court reviews and approves any plan for a lethal strike against a U.S. citizen.
Others have proposed legislation more clearly directing the executive branch
to hold terrorist suspects in military custody, as opposed to in the criminal
justice system. While these ideas have varying strengths and weaknesses,
they are a welcome sign that Congress is poised to become substantially
engaged in counterterrorism matters once again.

Only statutory restrictions are perceived

Chesney et al 13 Robert Chesney, American lawyer and Professor of
Law at Texas School of Law, Jack Goldsmith, Matthew Waxman, Benjamin
Wittes, Real Clear Politics, 2-25,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/02/25/is_the_war_on_terror_law
ful_117146.html
Third are the international costs of a renewed AUMF. This is a complex issue.
As a general matter a renewed and clarified AUMF especially one that (as
we propose below) articulates the U.S. view of international law would
contribute to the development of opinio juris under customary international
law. So too would the reaction to the new AUMF. That reaction depends on the
details of the legislation. To the extent that the legislation is seen as
constraining the president in meaningful ways and in hewing to
accepted international law, it would be viewed in a positive light
internationally. To the extent that it is seen as making permanent an

indefinite and geographically limitless war or in stretching international law, it

would be viewed in a negative light internationally among NGOs and allied
governments. And of course both reactions are likely to some degree. The
attempt to mitigate a negative reception abroad (and, in some quarters, at
home), is one reason why we recommend below that any statutory reform
in this area should emphasize compliance with jus in bello and jus ad bellum
as well as the limited rather than unlimited nature of the authorization
(conceptually and temporally). We recognize that the United States
interpretation of some international law self-defense and law-of-war
authorities is broader than our allies interpretation; legislating such
limitations thus will not end debate. Nevertheless, acknowledging clearly that
U.S. operations are to be conducted within, rather than beyond, traditional
legal frameworks is an important step in mitigating friction with our
allies, and prudent use of these legal authorities will be important in
persuading allies that the U.S. position is a reasonable one.

Congress key to check the president

Colby P. Horowitz 13*, * J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law, FORDHAM LAW
REVIEW, CREATING A MORE MEANINGFUL DETENTION STATUTE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM HEDGES V.
OBAMA, http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol_81/Horowitz_April.pdf, jj

Congress has an important role in determining the scope of the Presidents

war powers. This is particularly true in the area of executive indefinite
detention, where there is a high risk for abuse if left unchecked. In section
1021 of the NDAA, Congress failed to define or limit the Presidents detention
authority. Section 1021 repeats the executives interpretation of detention
authority verbatim, and it fails to clarify any important terms. A new
congressional detention statute is necessary to provide clear and meaningful
guidance to both the President and the courts.

Congress key to democratic legitimacy and preventing future

vacillation in executive policy
Benjamin Wittes 9, senior fellow and research director in public law at the Brookings
Institution, Stuart Taylor, an American journalist, graduated from Princeton University and
Harvard Law School, Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform, November 3, Book,
p. 329-330
While President Obamas policy makes a clean break with the Bush record, it actually does not effectively answer the question of how best to
handle this group. Indeed, the new

policy seems likely to fail on both a substantive and a procedural level.

rule is unstable because it can so easily be
changed at the whim of the president, whether Obama or, perhaps, a successor more like Bush.
An administration down the road that wanted to resume waterboarding could rescind the current
order and adopt legal positions like those of the prior administration. Unless the Obama administration and Congress
hammer out rules that provide interrogators with clear guidance about what is and is not
allowed and write those rules into statute, the United States risks vacillating under the
vagaries of current law between overly permissive and overly restrictive guidance. The general goals of
First, it goes too far by banning all coercion all the time. Second, the

new legislation should be threefold: To make it a crime beyond cavil to use interrogation methods considered by reasonable people to be
torture. The torture statute already does that to some degree, but the fact that it arguably permitted techniques as severe as waterboarding
suggests that it may require some tightening. The key here is that the statute should cover all techniques the use of which ought to prompt
criminal prosecution. To subject CIA interrogators in almost all cases to rules that, without relaxing current laws ban on cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment, permit relatively mild forms of coercion that are properly off limits to military interrogators. To allow the
president, subject to strict safeguards, to authorize use of harsher methods short of torture (as defined in the revised criminal statute) in
true emergencies or on extraordinarily high-value captives such as KSM. Only

Congress can provide the

democratic legitimacy and the fine-tuning of criminal laws that can deliver such a
regime. Only Congress can, for example, pass a new law making it clear that waterboarding or any
other technique of comparable severity will henceforth be a federal crime. Only Congress can offer clear assurances to operatives in the
field that there exists a safe harbor against prosecution for conduct ordered by higher-ups in a crisis in the genuine belief that an attack may
be around the corner. Only

Congress, in other words, can create a regime that plausibly turns away from
the past without giving up what the United States will need in the future.

AT: Follow On
No follow on
Lemieux, 11 [Scott, assistant professor of political science at the College
of Saint Rose, Checks and Imbalances, http://prospect.org/article/checksand-imbalances]
Surprisingly, it's not that the president has systematically ignored or
overridden Congress. In fact, the presidency has become the dominant warmaking power precisely because this is how a majority of legislators
want it. The president initiated major wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq
(twice), and in all of these cases -- sometimes before the fact, sometimes
after -- Congress has passed the buck, delegating to the president the
power to authorize force rather than declaring war itself. Senators and
congressmen and women are similarly happy to pass on the blame when
things go bad. Hillary Clinton's assertion that her vote for the 2002
authorization for President George W. Bush to use force in Iraq was not an
authorization for the preemptive war Bush actually fought is an instructive
illustration of how Congress tries to have it both ways. Even courts have
found that Congress has abdicated its power to the executive. In his famous
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, a case that involved
President Harry Truman's seizure of steel mills during the Korean War, Justice
Robert Jackson noted that the Court "may say that power to legislate for
emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself
can prevent power from slipping through its fingers." Statutes passed
by Congress matter only if Congress asserts its power in showdowns with the
president. Generally, it hasn't. As Posner and Vermuele point out, Congress
has occasionally reacted after the fact to presidential abuses of power. The
post-Vietnam War Powers Resolution, for example, only authorizes the
president to send troops abroad for up to 60 days without congressional
approval. But these legislative exercises have been toothless, if not dead
letters. Without any enforcement mechanism, the War Powers Resolution and
other congressional acts are essentially symbolic. More recently, the reaction
to the airstrikes against Libya is quite typical: Individual legislators may
grumble, but there's no legislative action.

Links to Politics
2009 proves the CP links to politics
Fisher, 13 --- served four decades in the Library of Congress as senior
specialist in separation of powers at the Congressional Research Service and
specialist in constitutional law at the Law Library (7/1/2013, Louis, The
National Law Journal, Closing Guantanamo
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/GuantanamoNLJ-2013.pdf))

On January 22, 2009, on his second day in office, Obama issued Executive
Order 13492 to close the detention facility as soon as practicable, and no
later than 1 year from the date of this order. Remarkably, no one in the
administration seemed to warn him of the political risks . Transferring terrorist
suspects to the United States was immensely controversial. The
administration needed to first meet with lawmakers, learn about their
concerns, fashion a reasonable compromise and locate a secure facility on
the mainland to house the detainees. It failed to take any of those steps. If
Obama had asked Congress to help create a legislative framework for the
closure, progress was possible. The executive order was the type of
unilateral action that backfired on George W. Bush.

CP links to politics more

Billy Hallowell 13, writer for The Blaze, B.A. in journalism and broadcasting from the College of Mount Saint
Vincent in Riverdale, New York and an M.S. in social research from Hunter College in Manhattan, HERES HOW
OBAMA IS USING EXECUTIVE POWER TO BYPASS LEGISLATIVE PROCESS Feb. 11, 2013,
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/11/heres-how-obamas-using-executive-power-to-bylass-legislative-processplus-a-brief-history-of-executive-orders/

In an era of polarized parties and a fragmented Congress, the opportunities

to legislate are few and far between, Howell said. So presidents have
powerful incentive to go it alone. And they do. And the political opposition
howls. Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., a possible contender for the Republican
presidential nomination in 2016, said that on the gun-control front in
particular, Obama is abusing his power by imposing his policies via
executive fiat instead of allowing them to be debated in Congress. The
Republican reaction is to be expected, said John Woolley, co-director of the
American Presidency Project at the University of California in Santa Barbara.
For years there has been a growing concern about unchecked executive power,
Woolley said. It tends to have a partisan content, with contemporary complaints coming
from the incumbent presidents opponents.

Legitimacy add- on
Internal processes destroy legitimacy
KentRoach13,ProfessorofLawandPrichardWilsonChairofLawandPublicPolicyattheUniversity
ofToronto,editorinchiefoftheCriminalLawQuarterly,Managingsecrecyanditsmigrationinapost
9/11world,Ch8inSecrecy,NationalSecurityAndTheVindicationOfConstitutionalLaw,ed.David
Cole,FedericoFabbrini,andAriannaVedaschi,googlebooks

Secret evidence is used by the US military and the CIA in decisions about
targeted killing. Attorney General Holder has stressed that the evidence
supporting such decisions is carefully reviewed within the government and
has argued that the process satisfies due process because due process need
not be judicial process.11 The problem with this approach is that it requires
people to trust the government that the secret evidence has been thoroughly
tested and vetted even though the executive has an incentive to err on the
side of security. In contrast to the Israeli courts, American courts have taken a
hands-off approach to review of targeted killing.12 The Israeli courts have in
one prominent case reviewed targeted killings and have stressed the
importance of both ex ante and ex post review within the military and
involving the courts.13 To be sure, Israel has not gone as far as the United
Kingdom in giving security cleared special advocates access to secret
information, but it has provided a process that goes beyond the executive
simply reviewing itself. The Obama administration does not seem to think
that anyone could seriously challenge the legitimacy of their attempts to
keep strategic military information behind targeted killings secret. In a sense,
this is a return to a Cold War strategy where the need to preserve secrets
from the other side was widely accepted. What has changed since 9;11,
however, is that terrorism as opposed to invasion or nuclear war is widely
accepted as the prime threat to national security. Terrorism is seen by many
as a crime and the use of war-like secrecy is much more problematic in
responding to a crime than to a threat of invasion or nuclear war. Hence, the
legitimacy of the USs use of secrets to kill people in its controversial war
against al Qaeda has been challenged. It may become a liability in the USs
dealings with the Muslim world.

Legitimacys the fundamental internal link to effective

hegemony---power distributions perceived as illegitimate
are the most likely causes of great power war
MarthaFinnemore9,professorofpoliticalscienceandinternationalaffairsatGeorgeWashington
University,January2009,Legitimacy,Hypocrisy,andtheSocialStructureofUnipolarity:WhyBeinga
UnipoleIsntAllItsCrackedUptoBe,WorldPolitics,Volume61,Number1

Legitimacy is, by its nature, a social and relational phenomenon. Ones

position or power cannot be legitimate in a vacuum. The concept only has
meaning in a particular social context. Actors, even unipoles, cannot create
legitimacy unilaterally. Legitimacy can only be given by others. It is conferred

either by peers, as when great powers accept or reject the actions of another
power, or by those upon whom power is exercised. Reasons to confer
legitimacy have varied throughout history. Tradition, blood, and claims of
divine right have all provided reasons to confer legitimacy, although in
contemporary politics conformity with [End Page 61] international norms and
law is more influential in determining which actors and actions will be
accepted as legitimate. 9 Recognizing the legitimacy of power does not
mean these others necessarily like the powerful or their policies, but it
implies at least tacit acceptance of the social structure in which power is
exercised. One may not like the inequalities of global capitalism but still
believe that markets are the only realistic or likely way to organize successful
economic growth. One may not like the P5 vetoes of the Security Council but
still understand that the United Nations cannot exist without this concession
to power asymmetries. We can see the importance of legitimacy by thinking
about its absence. Active rejection of social structures and the withdrawal of
recognition of their legitimacy create a crisis. In domestic politics, regimes
suffering legitimacy crises face resistance, whether passive or active and
armed. Internationally, systems suffering legitimacy crises tend to be violent
and noncooperative. Post-Reformation Europe might be an example of such a
system. Without at least tacit acceptance of powers legitimacy, the wheels of
international social life get derailed. Material force alone remains to impose
order, and order creation or maintenance by that means is difficult, even
under unipolarity. Successful and stable orders require the grease of some
legitimation structure to persist and prosper.10 The social and relational
character of legitimacy thus strongly colors the nature of any unipolar order
and the kinds of orders a unipole can construct. Yes, unipoles can impose
their will, but only to an extent. The willingness of others to recognize the
legitimacy of a unipoles actions and defer to its wishes or judgment shapes
the character of the order that will emerge. Unipolar power without any
underlying legitimacy will have a very particular character. The unipoles
policies will meet with resistance, either active or passive, at every turn.
Cooperation will be induced only through material quid pro quo payoffs. Trust
will be thin to nonexistent. This is obviously an expensive system to run and
few unipoles have tried to do so.

K blocks

Security
The plan is in the direction of the altwe break down securitization
of detention
Hafetz 12

Jonathan
*, * Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, March 20,
2012, Columbia Law Review Sidebar, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 31, ARTICLE: MILITARY DETENTION IN THE
"WAR ON TERORISM": NORMALIZING THE EXCEPTIONAL AFTER 9/11, Lexis, jj

The decision to address terrorism through a war paradigm may

represent the most significant change in U.S. national security policy
in the decade following 9/11. While the United States still selectively treats terrorism
as a criminal law enforcement matter, n1 it has developed an alternative, militarybased approach, rooted in the language and logic of a global armed
conflict against al Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations
(otherwise known as the "war on terror"). This war paradigm, adopted by the Bush administration, has largely been
continued by the Obama administration. It has been endorsed by Congress and sanctioned in many respects by the

Treating terrorism through the frame of armed conflict has

affected various areas of national security policy, but none more
deeply than the detention and prosecution of terrorism suspects.
courts.

Before 9/11, federal criminal prosecution represented the exclusive

method for the long-term incapacitation of terrorism suspects in U.S.
custody. n2 Since 9/11, the United States has established an
alternative [*32] system of military detention and prosecution. Although
this alternative system is most commonly associated with the detention center at Guant[#xE1]namo Bay,
it is not confined to any specific prison facility, and includes individuals held by the United States at
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan as well as prisoners previously detained in secret CIA "black sites." n3

Among the features that distinguish this system from the criminal
justice system are fewer procedural safeguards afforded to
detainees, the significantly lower evidentiary burden imposed on the
government, heightened secrecy, fewer constraints on
interrogations, more limited judicial review, and the open-ended
nature of the confinement itself. n4

Terror is not a social construct

Bendle 08, Mervyn Bendle is a senior lecturer in history and communication at James Cook
University in Townsville. The Australian, September 22, 2008, Radical pacifists deny a murderous reality,
Lexis, jj

IT was an eventful week in the war on terror. It began with the

conviction of key members of the Benbrika Muslim terror cell in Victoria, whose
plans for mass murder included using huge bombs in ``an attack
that would kill 1000 people'', at railway stations, Crown Casino, and
football matches, including the 2005 AFL grand final. And it ended with the Marriott

Hotel in Islamabad in flames, devastated by a huge truck bomb .

Gruesome images showed emergency workers struggling around a
gaping crater and through the ruined building, helping maimed
survivors soaked in blood, dazed, confused and in pain . People on the
upper floors, trapped by flames, were forced to leap to their deaths .
At least 60 people were reported dead and 200 injured , with possibly
many more buried under the debris. Such sinister and tragic episodes are all
too common reminders of the extreme levels of destruction planned
and executed by modern terrorist organisations . They remind us of the demands being
made on Australian troops serving in Afghanistan, and Iraq where, as major-general Jim Molan, chief of operations of coalition forces in Iraq in
2004, observed, ``I saw evil in a form I had not seen anywhere else, and values that are inimical to everything that has shaped our society

Yet one can only wonder what those engaged in critical

terrorism studies make of these events. For these postmodernists
reality is a social construct and terrorism not primarily as an act of
murderous violence in the real world, but a signifier in a discourse .
In their journal, terrorism is described as ``a myth and an object of
fear'', ``a negative ideograph of Western identity'', used to ``induce
powerful emotions'', ``encourage moral panics'' and even to decide elections in the US and Australia. Do such
theories help produce graduates at the Australian Defence Force Academy, ``who approach issues with an open mind, in a critical
spirit'', as a senior academic at the ADFA insists, or are they just ``unmitigated rubbish'' and ``naive
in the extreme'', as Molan has observed?
since the Enlightenment.''