1AC

Surveillance State
The war on terror has being brought to America in the form of
aerial surveillance, making Orwells dystopia a reality
Gohoshray 2013 (Saby [President, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies
Director, Research, and Compliance WorldCompliance Company]; Domestic
Surveillance Via Drones: Looking Through the Lens of the Fourth Amendment; 33 N.
Ill. U. L. Rev. 579)
A scenic drive along a picturesque highway , it is a vacation, a trip of a
Suddenly, the serenity of your surrounding is interrupted by a Hellfire missile
from a Predator drone. You are obliterated. Again, imagine you are in the seclusion of your fenced in
Imagine for a moment.
lifetime.

backyard. Lounging, barely clothed, and drenched in suntan lotion, it is your well-earned time off from work.
Suddenly, your zone of private reflection is shattered by the buzzing noise of a Hummingbird drone above. Before
you can cover up, the high-resolution zoom lens of the drone has already completed its mission--to capture multiple
images of sunbathers like yourself. This was a self-led mission by a voyeur rogue law enforcement personnel. Your

This Orwellian dystopia is no imagination. Rather, it may be coming

sooner than any of us can imagine. Welcome to the post-modern America--where society may be heading
to a fast track dissent into the abyss of limitless government surveillance. The
domestic drones have arrived, and they are almost ready to intrude upon our
sacrosanct zone of private seclusion. n2 The above scenarios are certainly not this author's
imagination. They are not bad dreams or morbid fantasies either. Instead, they are based on the
recorded incidences of killer drones wreaking havoc in the civilian communities in the
rugged mountains of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen . n3 The [*581] very same drones are
now waiting for either a legislative nod or the regulatory approval to begin hovering
over the byways and alleys of America. Yet, it seems the national discourse has not
awakened to this new reality. These drones are relatively cheap to build, remotely controlled, and
privacy is obliterated.

devoid of emotions and physiological limitations. Today's drones can both strike with deadly finality n4 and peer
deep into individual homes with see-through imaging capability, n5 high-powered zoom lenses, n6 and night-vision

This emerging new reality will soon be at the horizon of American social
landscape for various reasons. First, the public proclamation of success in containing
al-Qaeda n8 has emboldened the current administration. This has created a fertile
ground for law enforcement agencies in various states to deploy drones for
domestic surveillance. n9 Second, previously limited as an aid in border protection, n10 drones have
now become a desirable necessity for law enforcement across the nation . n11 Third,
capability. n7

despite the federal [*582] government's reluctance in allowing pervasive use for fear of aviation safety, n12 recent
presidential declarations n13 and congressional authorization n14 has brought this drone-induced Orwellian

Domestic drones have the potential to obliterate individual

privacy and transmogrify the traditional way of life. Yet, the public hue and cry is well muted.
dystopia into palpable reality.

Why? This Article examines the issue in two threads. In the first, it dissects the factors that brought us face-to-face
with this impending reality. In the second, it analyzes a set of constitutional, ethical, and philosophical reasons for
the illegitimacy of future deployment of domestic drones. Thus, this Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines the
current landscape to identify the socio-legal factors that may have contributed to the emergence of the mindset of
domestic surveillance. Identifying the post-9/11 landscape as the primary contributor to an emerging reality of a
security-centric society, this Part evaluates how jurisprudence may have attenuated the original understanding of
the Fourth Amendment, while enabling the law enforcement framework to rise above individual privacy concerns.
Part II also analyzes the reasons and societal factors that have given rise to the sociological apathy towards a

Part III examines how the current Fourth Amendment

jurisprudence can still be a viable bulwark against an all-pervasive imposition of a
drone culture. By analyzing the aspiratory dimensions of the Framers' view and evaluating the continued
growing privacy disaster in our horizon.

applicability of older cases in analogues behavior in the post-modern era, this Part identifies why an individual's
expectation of privacy when decoupled from the shaping effect of society's mass hysteria may be an objective

measure to reject drone surveillance. Part IV delves into a fundamental analysis of the impending domestic
surveillance. By combining social contract theory with the deeper liberty principles espoused by Warren and
Brandeis, this Part drives home that individuals in the contemporary American society have a fundamental right and

Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence may still be robust enough to address complexities
arising out of drone surveillance [*583] and when taken in conjunction with social
contract theory, may present a strong rationale for rejecting drones introduction at
this time.
long-standing inheritance to be secure within their private seclusion. Finally, Part V concludes that the

As police forces become increasing paramilitarized, drones will

be a critical tool to stifle and kill dissidents
Talai 14 - University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Andrew, The Fourth
Amendment and Police Discretion in the Digital Age, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 729,
Lexis/SEP)
Law enforcement agencies have begun deploying drones for routine domestic
surveillance operations, unrestrained by constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, Congress has
mandated a comprehensive integration of unmanned aerial systems into the
national airspace no later than September 30, 2015. But does the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution proscribe such drone surveillance as an unreasonable search? While this question cannot be easily answered
under conventional precedents, doctrinal inconsistency raises this Comments central question: What role will the Fourth
Amendment play in an age of pervasive digital surveillance and limited privacy rights? In the last few decades, the Supreme Court
has narrowed its vision of Fourth Amendment rights to an opaque privacy rationale. The Court has muddled doctrine and strained to
avoid difficult issues involving technological progress. A recent example of this phenomenon came in the 2012 decision, United
States v. Jones, where the Court paradoxically revived the common law trespass test for Fourth Amendment searches, as a proxy for
the degree of privacy that existed at the founding. This Comment argues, instead, for a pluralist approach to understanding
Fourth Amendment searches that wouldin addition to securing privacy and propertyproscribe any search that Copyright 2014
California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely
responsible for the content of publications. * J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, 2014; B.A.,

As such, this Comments major concern with domestic drone surveillance is not privacy. In the vast majority of
cases, police will not use drones to observe at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna
and bath.60 Although this Comment does not focus on voyeuristic or Peeping Tom drones,61 intimate privacy
concerns are relevant Fourth Amendment values that deserve protection. To be sure, one can imagine such
distasteful surveillance being used for blackmail and persuasion (among other things), even from public vantage

those privacy concerns are being trumpeted so loudly that they have
obscured another relevant problem with drone surveillancediscriminatory sorting
through discretionary law enforcement. More precisely, the fear is provid[ing] law
enforcement with a swift, efficient, invisible, and cheap way of tracking the
movements of virtually anyone and everyone they choose.62 Police, through
legislative encouragement and judicial acquiescence, now have powerunmatched
in historyon the streets of this country: a form of paramilitarized violence found
in a rapidly expanding criminal justice-industrial complex, with both ideological and
material connections to the military industrial complex.63 Drone surveillance is yet
another tool in the arsenal of police discretion, including surveillance , [*741] arrest,
[detention and] incarceration, and the use of force up to and including the authority to kill."
points. However,

This will disproportionately impact communities of color

Bernd 2015 (Candice; Proposed Rules Regulating Domestic Drone Use Lack
Police Warrant Requirement; Feb 24; www.truth-out.org/news/item/29250-proposedrules-regulating-domestic-drone-use-lack-police-warrant-requirement; kdf)
"You're

not just talking about the physical border, you're talking about an area that
encompasses many major cities that have large minority populations, and the idea that

these drones can be flown with little or no privacy protections really mean that, people, just by virtue of living in

African-American
communities could well feel the disproportionate impacts of the integrated use of
domestic drones and other surveillance in the coming years, as technologies such
as StingRay are already being used mostly in the ongoing war on drugs to track
those suspected of selling and buying drugs . The drug war has long negatively
impacted communities of color, based on racialized drug policies and racial
discrimination by law enforcement; two-thirds of all those convicted of drug crimes
are people of color, despite similar rates of drug use among whites and people of
color. These already-existing racial disparities in intrusive policing tactics and
deployment of surveillance technologies are one of the primary reasons civil
liberties experts are saying the government often gets it backward when thinking
about privacy issues: deploying intrusive technologies first, and coming up with privacy policies governing
that region are somehow accepting that they have a right to less privacy," she said.

their use afterward (when they may already be violating many people's civil rights). "What we see with StingRays is
the same phenomenon that we're seeing with [UAS], where federal agencies are using them," Guliani said. "State
and local agencies are using them. There's federal dollars that are going to buy them, and we're kind of having the
privacy debate after the fact with very little information."

Furthermore, it will further exasperate structural racism

Cyril 2015 (Malkia Amala [under and executive director of the Center for Media
Justice (CMJ) and co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network]; Black
America's State of Surveillance; Mar 30;
www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-state-surveillance; kdf)
media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations
by Edward Snowden that millions of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mothers visit from the
Today,

FBI reminds me that, from the slave pass system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow,

black people and other people of color have lived for centuries with surveillance
practices aimed at maintaining a racial hierarchy. Its time for journalists to tell a new story that
does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand that
data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually maintain
an impoverished underclass. In an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy of data
collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to collect massive
amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to this technological advance.
Concerned advocates see mass surveillance as the problem and protecting privacy as the goal. Targeted
surveillance is an obvious answerit may be discriminatory, but it helps protect the privacy perceived as an earned
privilege of the inherently innocent. The trouble is,

targeted surveillance frequently includes the

indiscriminate collection of the private data of people targeted by race but not
involved in any crime. For targeted communities, there is little to no expectation of
privacy from government or corporate surveillance. Instead, we are watched, either as
criminals or as consumers. We do not expect policies to protect us. Instead, weve birthed a complex and
coded culturefrom jazz to spoken dialectsin order to navigate a world in which spying, from AT&T and Walmart
to public benefits programs and beat cops on the block, is as much a part of our built environment as the streets
covered in our blood. In a recent address, New York City Police Commissioner Bill Bratton made it clear: 2015 will
be one of the most significant years in the history of this organization. It will be the year of technology, in which we
literally will give to every member of this department technology that wouldve been unheard of even a few years
ago. Predictive policing, also known as Total Information Awareness, is described as using advanced
technological tools and data analysis to preempt crime. It utilizes trends, patterns, sequences, and affinities found
in data to make determinations about when and where crimes will occur. This model is deceptive, however, because
it presumes data inputs to be neutral. They arent. In a racially discriminatory criminal justice system, surveillance
technologies reproduce injustice. Instead of reducing discrimination, predictive policing is a face of what author
Michelle Alexander calls the New Jim Crowa de facto system of separate and unequal application of laws, police
practices, conviction rates, sentencing terms, and conditions of confinement that operate more as a system of
social control by racial hierarchy than as crime prevention or punishment. In New York City, the predictive policing

approach in use is Broken Windows. This approach to policing places an undue focus on quality of life crimeslike
selling loose cigarettes, the kind of offense for which Eric Garner was choked to death. Without oversight,
accountability, transparency, or rights, predictive policing is just high-tech racial profilingindiscriminate data
collection that drives discriminatory policing practices. As local law enforcement agencies increasingly adopt
surveillance technologies, they use them in three primary ways: to listen in on specific conversations on and offline;
to observe daily movements of individuals and groups; and to observe data trends. Police departments like
Brattons aim to use sophisticated technologies to do all three. They will use technologies like license plate readers,
which the Electronic Frontier Foundation found to be disproportionately used in communities of color and
communities in the process of being gentrified. They will use facial recognition, biometric scanning software, which
the FBI has now rolled out as a national system, to be adopted by local police departments for any criminal justice
purpose. They intend to use body and dashboard cameras, which have been touted as an effective step toward
accountability based on the results of one study, yet storage and archiving procedures, among many other issues,
remain unclear. They will use Stingray cellphone interceptors. According to the ACLU, Stingray technology is an
invasive cellphone surveillance device that mimics cellphone towers and sends out signals to trick cellphones in the
area into transmitting their locations and identifying information. When used to track a suspects cellphone, they
also gather information about the phones of countless bystanders who happen to be nearby. The same is true of

domestic drones, which are in increasing use by U.S. law enforcement to conduct
routine aerial surveillance. While drones are currently unarmed, drone manufacturers
are considering arming these remote-controlled aircraft with weapons like rubber
bullets, tasers, and tear gas. They will use fusion centers. Originally designed to increase interagency
collaboration for the purposes of counterterrorism, these have instead become the local arm of the intelligence
community. According to Electronic Frontier Foundation, there are currently seventy-eight on record. They are the
clearinghouse for increasingly used suspicious activity reportsdescribed as official documentation of observed
behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity. These
reports and other collected data are often stored in massive databases like e-Verify and Prism. As anybody whos
ever dealt with gang databases knows, its almost impossible to get off a federal or state database, even when the
data collected is incorrect or no longer true.

Predictive policing doesnt just lead to racial and

religious profilingit relies on it. Just as stop and frisk legitimized an initial, unwarranted contact
between police and people of color, almost 90 percent of whom turn out to be innocent of any crime, suspicious
activities reporting and the dragnet approach of fusion centers target communities
of color. One review of such reports collected in Los Angeles shows approximately 75 percent were of people of
color. This is the future of policing in America, and it should terrify you as much as it terrifies me. Unfortunately, it
probably doesnt, because my life is at far greater risk than the lives of white Americans ,
especially those reporting on the issue in the media or advocating in the halls of power. One of the most terrifying

The NSA and FBI

have engaged local law enforcement agencies and electronic surveillance
technologies to spy on Muslims living in the United States. According to FBI training materials
aspects of high-tech surveillance is the invisibility of those it disproportionately impacts.

uncovered by Wired in 2011, the bureau taught agents to treat mainstream Muslims as supporters of terrorism, to
view charitable donations by Muslims as a funding mechanism for combat, and to view Islam itself as a Death
Star that must be destroyed if terrorism is to be contained. From New York City to Chicago and beyond, local law
enforcement agencies have expanded unlawful and covert racial and religious profiling against Muslims not
suspected of any crime. There is no national security reason to profile all Muslims. At the same time, almost
450,000 migrants are in detention facilities throughout the United States, including survivors of torture, asylum
seekers, families with small children, and the elderly. Undocumented migrant communities enjoy few legal
protections, and are therefore subject to brutal policing practices, including illegal surveillance practices. According
to the Sentencing Project, of the more than 2 million people incarcerated in the United States, more than 60 percent
are racial and ethnic minorities. But by far, the widest net is cast over black communities. Black people alone
represent 40 percent of those incarcerated. More black men are incarcerated than were held in slavery in 1850, on
the eve of the Civil War. Lest some misinterpret that statistic as evidence of greater criminality, a 2012 study
confirms that black defendants are at least 30 percent more likely to be imprisoned than whites for the same crime.
This is not a broken system, it is a system working perfectly as intended, to the detriment of all.
The NSA could not have spied on millions of cellphones if it were not already spying on black people, Muslims, and
migrants. As surveillance technologies are increasingly adopted and integrated by law enforcement agencies today,

racial disparities are being made invisible by a media environment that has failed to
tell the story of surveillance in the context of structural racism.

And, plans exist to weaponized police drones

Greenwald 2013 (Glenn [former columnist on civil liberties and US national
security issues for the Guardian. An ex-constitutional lawyer]; The US Needs To
Wake Up To Threat Of Domestic Drones; Mar 30;
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/29/domestic-drones-uniquedangers; kdf)
The use of drones by domestic US law enforcement agencies is growing rapidly , both
in terms of numbers and types of usage. As a result, civil liberties and privacy groups led by the
ACLU - while accepting that domestic drones are inevitable - have been devoting increasing efforts to publicizing

These efforts are being impeded by those

who mock the idea that domestic drones pose unique dangers (often the same people who
mock concern over their usage on foreign soil). This dismissive posture is grounded not only in
soft authoritarianism (a religious-type faith in the Goodness of US political leaders and state power
generally) but also ignorance over current drone capabilities, the ways drones are now
being developed and marketed for domestic use, and the activities of the
increasingly powerful domestic drone lobby. So it's quite worthwhile to lay out the key undertheir unique dangers and agitating for statutory limits.

discussed facts shaping this issue. I'm going to focus here most on domestic surveillance drones, but I want to say a

The belief that weaponized drones won't be used on US

soil is patently irrational. Of course they will be. It's not just likely but inevitable. Police
departments are already speaking openly about how their drones "could be equipped to
carry nonlethal weapons such as Tasers or a bean-bag gun." The drone industry has already
developed and is now aggressively marketing precisely such weaponized drones for
domestic law enforcement use. It likely won't be in the form that has received the most media
attention: the type of large Predator or Reaper drones that shoot Hellfire missiles which destroy homes
few words about weaponized drones.

and cars in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and multiple other countries aimed at Muslims (although US law
enforcement agencies already possess Predator drones and have used them over US soil for surveillance). Instead,
as I detailed in a 2012 examination of the drone industry's own promotional materials and reports to their

domestic weaponized drones will be much smaller and cheaper , as well as

more agile - but just as lethal. The nation's leading manufacturer of small "unmanned aircraft systems"
shareholders,

(UAS), used both for surveillance and attack purposes, is AeroVironment, Inc. (AV). Its 2011 Annual Report filed with
the SEC repeatedly emphasizes that its business strategy depends upon expanding its market from foreign wars to
domestic usage including law enforcement: AV's annual report added: "Initial likely non-military users of small UAS

." These domestic marketing

efforts are intensifying with the perception that US spending on foreign wars will
decrease. As a February, 2013 CBS News report noted, focusing on AV's surveillance drones: "Now, drones are
include public safety organizations such as law enforcement agencies. . .

headed off the battlefield. They're already coming your way. "AeroVironment, the California company that sells the
military something like 85 percent of its fleet, is marketing them now to public safety agencies." Like many drone
manufacturers, AV is now focused on drone products - such as the "Qube" - that are so small that they can be
"transported in the trunk of a police vehicle or carried in a backpack" and assembled and deployed within a matter
of minutes. One news report AV touts is headlined "Drone technology could be coming to a Police Department near
you", which focuses on the Qube. But another article prominently touted on AV's website describes the tiny UAS
product dubbed the "Switchblade", which, says the article, is "the leading edge of what is likely to be the broader,
even wholesale, weaponization of unmanned systems." The article creepily hails the Switchblade drone as "the
ultimate assassin bug". That's because, as I wrote back in 2011, "it is controlled by the operator at the scene, and it
worms its way around buildings and into small areas, sending its surveillance imagery to an i-Pad held by the
operator, who can then direct the Switchblade to lunge toward and kill the target (hence the name) by exploding in
his face." AV's website right now proudly touts a February, 2013 Defense News article describing how much the US
Army loves the "Switchblade" and how it is preparing to purchase more. Time Magazine heralded this tiny drone
weapon as "one of the best inventions of 2012", gushing: "the Switchblade drone can be carried into battle in a
backpack. It's a kamikaze: the person controlling it uses a real-time video feed from the drone to crash it into a
precise target - say, a sniper. Its tiny warhead detonates on impact." What possible reason could someone identify
as to why these small, portable weaponized UAS products will not imminently be used by federal, state and local
law enforcement agencies in the US? They're designed to protect their users in dangerous situations and to enable

Police agencies and the increasingly powerful drone industry

will tout their utility in capturing and killing dangerous criminals and their ability to
keep officers safe, and media reports will do the same . The handful of genuinely positive uses
from drones will be endlessly touted to distract attention away from the dangers they pose. One has to be
incredibly nave to think that these "assassin bugs" and other lethal drone products
will not be widely used on US soil by an already para-militarized domestic police
force. As Radley Balko's forthcoming book "Rise of the Warrior Cop" details, the primary trend in US law
a target to be more easily killed.

enforcement is what its title describes as "The Militarization of America's Police Forces". The history of domestic law
enforcement particularly after 9/11 has been the importation of military techniques and weapons into domestic
policing. It would be shocking if these weapons were not imminently used by domestic law enforcement agencies.
In contrast to weaponized drones, even the most nave among us do not doubt the imminent proliferation of
domestic surveillance drones. With little debate, they have already arrived. As the ACLU put it in their recent report:
"US

law enforcement is greatly expanding its use of domestic drones for

surveillance." An LA Times article from last month reported that "federal authorities have stepped
up efforts to license surveillance drones for law enforcement and other uses in US
airspace" and that "the Federal Aviation Administration said Friday it had issued 1,428 permits to domestic drone
operators since 2007, far more than were previously known." Moreover, the agency "has estimated 10,000 drones
could be aloft five years later" and "local and state law enforcement agencies are expected to be among the largest

Concerns about the proliferation of domestic surveillance drones are

typically dismissed with the claim that they do nothing more than police helicopters
and satellites already do. Such claims are completely misinformed. As the ACLU's 2011
comprehensive report on domestic drones explained: " Unmanned aircraft carrying cameras raise
the prospect of a significant new avenue for the surveillance of American life."
Multiple attributes of surveillance drones make them uniquely threatening. Because they are so cheap
and getting cheaper, huge numbers of them can be deployed to create ubiquitous
surveillance in a way that helicopters or satellites never could. How this works can already
customers."

been seen in Afghanistan, where the US military has dubbed its drone surveillance system "the Gorgon Stare",

That
drone surveillance system is "able to scan an area the size of a small town" and "the
most sophisticated robotics use artificial intelligence that [can] seek out and record
certain kinds of suspicious activity". Boasted one US General: "Gorgon Stare will be looking at a whole
named after the "mythical Greek creature whose unblinking eyes turned to stone those who beheld them".

city, so there will be no way for the adversary to know what we're looking at, and we can see everything." The NSA
already maintains ubiquitous surveillance of electronic communications, but the Surveillance State faces serious
limits on its ability to replicate that for physical surveillance. Drones easily overcome those barriers. As the ACLU
report put it: I've spoken previously about why a ubiquitous Surveillance State ushers in unique and deeply harmful
effects on human behavior and a nation's political culture and won't repeat that here (here's the video (also
embedded below) and the transcript of one speech where I focus on how that works). Suffice to say, as the ACLU
explains in its domestic drone report: "routine aerial surveillance would profoundly change the character of public
life in America" because only drone technology enables such omnipresent physical surveillance. Beyond that, the
tiny size of surveillance drones enables them to reach places that helicopters obviously cannot, and to do so
without detection. They can remain in the sky, hovering over a single place, for up to 20 hours, a duration that is
always increasing - obviously far more than manned helicopters can achieve. As AV's own report put it (see page
11), their hovering capability also means they can surveil a single spot for much longer than many military
satellites, most of which move with the earth's rotation (the few satellites that remain fixed "operate nearly 25,000
miles from the surface of the earth, therefore limiting the bandwidth they can provide and requiring relatively
larger, higher power ground stations"). In sum, surveillance drones enable a pervasive, stealth and constantly
hovering Surveillance State that is now well beyond the technological and financial abilities of law enforcement
agencies. One significant reason why this proliferation of domestic drones has become so likely is the emergence of
a powerful drone lobby. I detailed some of how that lobby is functioning here, so will simply note this passage from
a recent report from the ACLU of Iowa on its attempts to persuade legislators to enact statutory limits on the use of
domestic drones: "Drones have their own trade group, the Association for Unmanned Aerial Systems International,
which includes some of the nation's leading aerospace companies. And Congress now has 'drone caucuses' in both
the Senate and House." Howie Klein has been one of the few people focusing on the massive amounts of money
from the drone industry now flowing into the coffers of key Congressional members from both parties in this "drone
caucus". Suffice to say, there is an enormous profit to be made from exploiting the domestic drone market, and as

usual, that factor is thus far driving the (basically nonexistent) political response to these threats. What is most
often ignored by drone proponents, or those who scoff at anti-drone activism, are the unique features of drones: the
way they enable more warfare, more aggression, and more surveillance. Drones make war more likely precisely
because they entail so little risk to the war-making country. Similarly, while the propensity of drones to kill innocent
people receives the bulk of media attention, the way in which drones psychologically terrorize the population simply by constantly hovering over them: unseen but heard - is usually ignored, because it's not happening in the
US, so few people care (see this AP report from yesterday on how the increasing use of drone attacks in Afghanistan
is truly terrorizing local villagers). It remains to be seen how Americans will react to drones constantly hovering over
their homes and their childrens' schools, though by that point, their presence will be so institutionalized that it will
be likely be too late to stop. Notably, this may be one area where an actual bipartisan/trans-partisan alliance can
meaningfully emerge, as most advocates working on these issues with whom I've spoken say that libertarianminded GOP state legislators have been as responsive as more left-wing Democratic ones in working to impose
some limits. One bill now pending in Congress would prohibit the use of surveillance drones on US soil in the

Only the most authoritarian among

us will be incapable of understanding the multiple dangers posed by a domestic
drone regime (particularly when their party is in control of the government and they are incapable of
perceiving threats from increased state police power). But the proliferation of domestic drones
affords a real opportunity to forge an enduring coalition in defense of core privacy
and other rights that transcends partisan allegiance , by working toward meaningful limits on
their use. Making people aware of exactly what these unique threats are from a
domestic drone regime is the key first step in constructing that coalition.
absence of a specific search warrant, and has bipartisan support.

Drones remove any public anonymity and create an

omnipresent Panopticon, enabling totalitarianism
Burow 2013 (Matthew L [Candidate for JD @ New England School of Law]; The
Sentinel Clouds above the Nameless Crowd: Prosecuting Anonymity from Domestic
Drones; 39 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 443; kdf)
Walking down the street. Driving a car. Sitting on a park bench. By themselves, these actions do not exhibit an iota
of privacy. The individual has no intention to conceal their movements; no confidentiality in their purpose. The
individual is in the open, enjoying a quiet day or a peaceful Sunday drive. Yet as Chief Justice Rehnquist
commented,

there is uneasiness if an individual suspected that these innocuous and

benign movements were being recorded and scrutinized for future reference. 119 If
the "uneasy" reaction to which the Chief Justice referred is not based on a sense of
privacy invasion, it stems from something very close to it-a sense that one has a
right to public anonymity. 120 Anonymity is the state of being unnamed. 121 The
right to public anonymity is the assurance that, when in public, one is unremarked and
part of the undifferentiated crowd as far as the government is concerned . 122 That right
is usually surrendered only when one does or says something that merits government attention, which most often

But when that attention is gained by surreptitiously operated

UASs that are becoming more affordable for local law enforcement agencies, 124 "it
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices ... :
includes criminal activity. 123

'limited police resources and community hostility."' 12 5 This association of public anonymity and privacy is not new.
126 Privacy expert and Columbia University Law professor Alan F. Westin points out that "anonymity [] occurs when
the individual is in public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and
surveillance." 127 Westin continued by stating that: [A person] may be riding a subway, attending a ball game, or
walking the streets; he is among people and knows that he is being observed; but unless he is a well-known
celebrity, he does not expect to be personally identified and held to the full rules of behavior and role that would
operate if he were known to those observing him. In this state the individual is able to merge into the "situational
landscape." 128 While most people would share the intuition of Chief Justice Rehnquist and professor Westin that
we expect some degree of anonymity in public, there is no such right to be found in the Constitution. Therefore ,

with a potentially handcuffed judiciary, the protection of anonymity falls to the

legislature. Based on current trends in technology and a keen interest taken by law
enforcement in the advancement of UAS integration into national airspace, it is
clear that drones pose a looming threat to Americans' anonymity . 129 Even when UASs are
authorized for noble uses such as search and rescue missions, fighting wildfires, and assisting in dangerous tactical

UASs are likely to be quickly embraced by law enforcement for more

controversial purposes. 130 What follows are compelling interdisciplinary reasons why the legislature
police operations,

should take up the call to protect the subspecies of privacy that is anonymity. A. Philosophic: The Panopticon Harm
Between 1789 and 1812, the Panopticon prison was the central obsession of the renowned English philosopher
Jeremy Bentham's life. 131 The Panopticon is a circular building with cells occupying the circumference and the
guard tower standing in the center. 132 By using blinds to obscure the guards located in the tower, "the keeper [is]
concealed from the observation of the prisoners ... the sentiment of an invisible omnipresence."'133 The effect of
such architectural brilliance is simple: the lone fact that there might be a guard watching is enough to keep the
prisoners on their best behavior. 134 As the twentieth-century French philosopher Michel Foucault observed, the
major effect of the Panopticon is "to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures
the automatic functioning of power."'135 In Bentham's vision ,

there is no need for prison bars,

chains or heavy locks; the person who is subjected to the field of visibility of the
omnipresent guard plays both roles and he becomes the subject of his own
subjection. 136 For Foucault, this "panopticism" was not necessarily bad when compared to other methods of
exercising control as this sort of "subtle coercion" could lead people to be more productive and efficient members of

an omnipresent UAS circling above a city may be

similar to a Panopticon guard tower and an effective way of keeping the peace . The
mere thought of detection may keep streets safer and potential criminals at bay.
However, the impact on cherished democratic ideals may be too severe. For
society. 137 Following Foucault's reasoning,

example, in a case regarding the constitutionally vague city ordinance that prohibited "nightwalking," Justice
Douglas commented on the importance of public vitality and locomotion in America: The difficulty is that [walking
and strolling] are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the
Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people
the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of
dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have
encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence. 138 As Justice Douglas understood,

government surveillance stifles the cherished ideal of an American society that

thrives on free-spiritedness in public. 39 Without the right to walk the streets in
public, free from the fear of high surveillance, our American values would
dissipate into that resembling a totalitarian state that attacks the idea of
privacy as immoral, antisocial and part of the dissident cult of individualism. 140

Empirically, this has this totalitarian state will be used to

perpetuate genocide
Burow 2013 (Matthew L [Candidate for JD @ New England School of Law]; The
Sentinel Clouds above the Nameless Crowd: Prosecuting Anonymity from Domestic
Drones; 39 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 443; kdf)
29 A
mere suspicion of a UAS flying high in sky can have a chilling effect on democracy
that most Americans would consider intolerable . 230 But what about the psychological changes UASs will
This Note has explored the philosophical and psychological effects of panoptic surveillance and the need for protection.2

bring about in law enforcement? The following is an excerpt from a news report on the mindset of UAS pilots who operate military

Bugsplat is the official term used by US authorities when

humans are killed by drone missiles .... [I]t is deliberately employed as a psychological
tactic to dehumanise targets so operatives overcome their inhibition to kill .... It was
Hitler who coined this phraseology in Nazi Germany during the Holocaust. In Mein Kampf,
drones in overseas combat missions:

Hitler refers to Jews as vermin (volksungeziefer) or parasites (volksschtidling). In the infamous Nazi film, Der ewige Jude, Jews were
portrayed as harmful pests that deserve to die. Similarly,

in the Rwandan genocide, the Tutsis were

described as "cockroaches." This is not to infer genocidal intent in US drone warfare,

but rather to emphasise the dehumanising effect of this terminology in Nazi
Germany and that the very same terms are used by the US in respect of their Pakistani targets.
231 Will John and Jane Doe-the casual saunterer-become part of the next group of
bugs that must be swatted in the name of effective law enforcement? In answering that
question, we should look to the skies once again and pray to the better angels of our
nature for a worthy answer.

Plan
The United States federal government should curtail its aerial
surveillance by ruling that such searches constitute a search
within the Fourth Amendment and is unreasonable without a
warrant, barring exigent circumstances.

Solvency
Only court action on aerial surveillance solves privacy
backsliding, keeps up with technology, and provides law
enforcement with legal bright lines
Celso 2014 (Joel [JD Candidate U of Baltimore Law]; DRONING ON ABOUT THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADOPTING A REASONABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE TO PREVENT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS; 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461; kdf)
IV. ENSURING A REASONABLE FUTURE BY PREVENTING UNREASONABLE UAS SURVEILLANCE Speaking for the
Supreme Court in Kyllo, Justice Scalia acknowledged that technological advances have reduced the privacy [*489]
protections granted by the Fourth Amendment. n252 In Justice Scalia's mind, the primary issue facing the Court was
"what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." n253 Attempting to
determine how courts might decide the constitutionality of warrantless UAS surveillance of the home and its

if UAS
surveillance is not a Fourth Amendment search, then the "realm of guaranteed
privacy" referred to by Justice Scalia would not just be shrunk, but eliminated. n255
curtilage is context-dependent, and ultimately speculative. n254 As one author has noted,

Even if UAS surveillance is currently a search subject to the Fourth Amendment that status may be lost as UAS

the Fourth Amendment does not currently protect

anyone's privacy from UAS surveillance, even for extended periods, when they are
in public or other open areas. n257 To ensure that privacy will be protected from the
threat posed by UAS surveillance, a new rule should be added to current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Courts should hold that all UAS surveillance by
law enforcement constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant . n258 Under this rule,
all warrantless UAS surveillance used for law enforcement purposes such as criminal
investigation, targeted surveillance, and monitoring property or zones, would violate
the Fourth Amendment regardless of where the surveillance took place . n259 [*490]
The justification for this rule should be grounded in the unprecedented technological
capabilities of UAS and the unique threat they represent to privacy. n260 Although the
flights become routine. n256 Furthermore,

Supreme Court has heard challenges to law enforcement's use of aerial surveillance, sense enhancing devices, and
electronic tracking, it has never considered anything like UAS, which combine all three capabilities. n261
Historically, the cost of using personnel for traditional surveillance placed a practical limitation on police
surveillance which acted to protect privacy. n262 The affordability of UAS could eliminate this constraint on
excessive police presence and dramatically increase the potential for abuses. n263 In addition ,

UAS' small
size and silent operation allow them to operate in relative stealth. n264 Citizens could
be observed by law enforcement without ever knowing they were under
surveillance. n265 Although UAS are not invasive by causing "undue noise ... wind, dust, or threat of injury,"
they may actually be more intrusive than conventional aircraft. n266 Because people will not have notice of UAS'
approach or presence, they will be unable to keep private those activities which they do not wish to expose to

UAS technology has been described as providing law enforcement with

"permanent, multi-dimensional, multi-sensory surveillance of citizens twenty-four
hours per day." n268 Some have gone as far as claiming that UAS give law enforcement capabilities reserved
for deities. n269 As such, UAS present the potential for unprecedented law enforcement
abuses which would be prevented by the warrant requirement proposed here. [*491]
Not only will this proposed rule ensure that the Fourth Amendment
remains the guarantor of privacy, but it provides other advantages as well. n270 First, it draws
a bright-line rule for police who will not have to determine in advance whether or
not their actions are constitutional each time they want to use a UAS in a new
public view. n267

context, or when they are armed with a new technology. n271 Similarly, the courts will not lag behind
each new technological advance in UAS technology because a warrant will always
be required. n272 Finally, and most importantly, the rule will accomplish what current
jurisprudence cannot: it will prevent Fourth Amendment protections from being left
"at the mercy of advancing technology ." n273 The Supreme Court has established
precedent for adopting the rule proposed here. n274 In Katz, the Court shifted the basis of
finding that a Fourth Amendment search had occurred from a physical trespass to an intrusion on a reasonable
expectation of privacy. n275 In doing so, the Court demonstrated its willingness to adopt new rules to ensure that

the courts
would be acting in accordance with the precedent from Katz and would guarantee
that UAS technology remains within the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.
privacy is protected from threats posed by new technologies. By adopting the rule proposed here,

A Supreme Court ruling on aerial surveillance is uniquely key

to revitalizing 4th Amendments ability to protect privacy and
to stop the onslaught of advancing technologies
Celso 2014 (Joel [JD Candidate U of Baltimore Law]; DRONING ON ABOUT THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADOPTING A REASONABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE TO PREVENT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS; 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461; kdf)
[*493] The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has been criticized for its circular nature. n284 As long as UAS surveillance
remains sufficiently rare, an individual's expectation of privacy is considered reasonable and it is protected from government

Once UAS flights become routine, the expectation of

privacy is no longer reasonable and its protection is removed. n286 The result
becomes a "paradoxical situation in which law enforcement overreach is legitimized
once it becomes routinized." n287 This could happen as early as 2015 when UAS can be
intrusion by the Fourth Amendment. n285

fully integrated into U.S. airspace. n288 Equally disconcerting is the fact that the Supreme Court's estimation of what society
considers reasonable is not necessarily accurate. n289 Justice Scalia facetiously observed that "unsurprisingly, those "actual
(subjective) expectations of privacy' "that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable' bear an uncanny resemblance to those

poll results indicate that the

American public opposes the use of UAS for routine police work. n291 According to the Court
however, if the police used UAS to track people in public, they would lack constitutional
protection because those people have no reasonable expectation of privacy. n292
Considering these problems with the Katz formulation, some have argued that the protection of privacy,
especially pertaining to sophisticated technologies such as UAS, should be removed
from the courts and given to the legislature . n293 The problem with this solution is
that it essentially concedes that, in the absence of legislation, the [*494] Fourth Amendment
cannot protect privacy rights against the government's use of sophisticated
technologies. n294 Instead, the courts need to adopt a novel jurisprudence to
protect actual privacy expectations, rather than defer to Congress. V.
CONCLUSION Under the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, it is only a matter of
time before the Fourth Amendment will no longer be able to provide protection from
warrantless UAS surveillance, even in the home. n295 The answer to the question
posed by Justice Scalia in Kyllo should not be that technology has the power to "shrink the
realm of guaranteed privacy" to the point of elimination . n296 This is especially true
given the Court's articulated concern that it "assures preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable." n290 For example,

adopted." n297 Although the original degree of privacy is difficult to ascertain, allowing the government to
use a UAS outfitted with facial recognition software or high-powered cameras to
silently track individuals for extended periods of time without a warrant hardly
seems to qualify. n298 Equally unlikely is the idea that Congress, rather than the Constitution, was expected to be the
guarantor of privacy protections at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. n299 It is clear that the courts
need a new approach to their Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to protect privacy
from a technological onslaught. Requiring a warrant for all UAS surveillance will
ensure that even the widespread use of UAS will not erode society's legitimate
privacy expectations.

The plan solves for invasive surveillance for multiple reasons

First, requiring warrants on drones acts as a catalyst to jolt
privacy law forward
Ahsanuddin et al 2014 (Sadia - principal investigator for the report and MPAC
research fellow; Domestic Drones: Implications for Privacy and Due Process in the
United States; Sep 8; www.mpac.org/publications/policy-papers/domesticdrones.php; kdf)
Simultaneously, the IHSS survey respondents indicated apprehensiveness over any domestic drone operations: twothirds expressed concern over potential surveillance in homes or public areas; 65 percent were concerned about

The rapid pace at

which drone technology is developing, the lack of clear guidelines protecting privacy
and civil liberties, and public concern over these issues indicate an urgent need for
action in Congress and state legislatures. Privacy experts agree. In an article in the Stanford Law
Review Online, Professor Ryan Calo of the University of Washington School of Law states that drones may
be just the visceral jolt society needs to drag privacy law into the twentyfirst century. American privacy law has developed at a slow and uneven pace,
whereas technology has developed at a rapid speed. In spite of the development of computers,
safety; and 75 percent were concerned about the governments ability to regulate use.82

the Internet, Global-Positioning Systems (GPS), biometrics, gigapixel cameras, face recognition technology, and the
widespread use of e-mail and other forms of electronic communication, there has been no attendant development

Because drones threaten to perfect the art of surveillance, they make

for a good catalyst to update privacy law. The need for legislation is clear. With recent
revelations that the federal government has been conducting surveillance of the
American public on an unprecedented level , the threat that unregulated and
immensely capable technologies pose to civil liberties is profound. The law must
catch up with technology.
in privacy law.

Second, the plan grants adversarial standing, making it

possible to challenge the constitutionality of all surveillance
programs
Correia 2014 (Evan RC [JD Candidate, 2015 @ Temple]; PULLING BACK THE VEIL
OF SECRECY: STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE GOVERNMENT'S ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES; 24 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 185; kdf)
Looking back at the events of 2013, in light of the extensive legislative history of
government electronic surveillance, one can see the problems currently facing
those who seek to challenge the constitutionality of the government's activities.
While the Snowden leaks revealed the scope of some, but certainly not all, of the

government's electronic surveillance, the Supreme Court's decision in Clapper will

remain a significant obstacle for future litigants who do not have evidence of the
kind leaked by Snowden. The leak's role in the establishment of the panel and the
filing of Klayman and ACLU v. Clapper are important to the protection of privacy
rights. However, they are not aimed at fixing the underlying problem: that
government surveillance programs have been effectively isolated from meaningful
judicial review.
The only way to properly remedy the issue is to reform the system as a whole, in a
manner that would provide future litigants with the proof necessary to establish
standing and subject secret government surveillance to judicial review. This does
not mean a system that discloses classified material which could potentially
jeopardize national security. Rather, it means a system where an adversarial
process creates the proper balance between national security and the protection of
individual privacy.

Third, our precedent of the plan sets a constitutional floor for

states & municipalities, and empirically will be modeled
internationally
Rushin 2011 (Stephen [PhD student at the University of California, Berkeley,
Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program; J.D., University of California, Berkeley]; THE
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO MASS POLICE SURVEILLANCE; 2011 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y
281; kdf)
To begin with, skeptics allege that legislations can more carefully analyze a problem, investigate potential solutions,
impanel experts, and make far-reaching, nuanced policies. n362 Unlike the legislature, which may "command the
resources of an extensive bureaucracy ... a judge is generally limited to a secretary and one or two recent law
school ... [graduate clerks]." n363 Kerr has thus argued that the courts simply do not have the resources to engage
in this kind of careful analysis necessary to develop a comprehensive and responsive policy on Fourth Amendment
technologies. n364 On its face, this type of analysis is persuasive, especially considering the fact that the courts
lack the funding to do sweeping investigations into the efficacy of an emerging technology. Nonetheless, this logic
ignores a pivotal tactic used by courts in previous iterations of successful policymaking - the adoption of standards
already implemented by other institutions. n365 Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin explained that when the courts
attempted to create extensive judicial policy [*325] regulating American prisons, judges turned to the American
Correctional Association and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. n366 Indeed, "Federal judges turned to these standards
because they wanted to impose detailed, administrative-style rules of any sort but lacked the resources to design
the rules themselves." n367 Unlike the prison reform context described by Feeley and Rubin, where the courts
created extensive and detailed policy,

the judicial response I argue for in this Article does not

require extensive investigation or uniform implementation. I merely argue for a
judicially mandated floor, which establishes the minimum amount of regulation
required for surveillance technologies. Additionally, there is domestic and international
precedent, most notably in Maine, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Germany, that the courts could
use as a model to craft a broad solution. n368 Once the courts lay out a broad
policy objective, police departments and local legislatures would be incentivized to
develop their own, individual policies to implement this judicially mandated,
regulatory floor. States would be free to develop more complex, detailed, and even
more stringent protections against data collection. Some states have already done just that.
n369 This pattern can be seen in other areas of criminal judicial policymaking, such as Miranda requirements. The
Court handed down broad general requirements - departments, in implementing the Miranda decision, often went
above and beyond the Court's minimal requirements. Next, critics of judicial regulation of emerging technologies
have argued that judges are not as technically sophisticated as the legislature. Judges often "rely on the crutch of
questionable metaphors to aid their comprehension" of complex technology cases, meaning that "it is easy for

judges to misunderstand the context of their decisions and their likely effect when technology is in flux." n370 But
in the unique situation outlined in this Article, judges do not need to be experts in these technological fields to
understand the capabilities of technologies like ALPR and facial recognition software. The danger I discuss in this
article is that police will keep a digital dossier of every single person's movements. This type of monitoring would
facilitate fishing expeditions, increase the likelihood of corrupt behavior by law enforcement, and facilitate some
types of racial profiling.

There is little reason to believe that, with the assistance of

knowledgeable advocates, judges could not sufficiently understand the potential
harms posted by digitally efficient investigative technologies to develop a coherent
constitutional floor of protection. And even though the legislature has a broader
array of resources at its disposal, the legislature is an unsatisfactory avenue to
protect the unique counter-majoritarian issues at stake. Finally, some scholars have contended
that judicial regulations of [*326] emerging technologies rarely hold up in different factual scenarios. Under this
rationale, critics of this judicial response may contend that while this protection could work when applied to ALPR or
facial recognition software, it would not necessarily be a workable standard for future technological developments.
This view certainly has merit. "By the time the courts decide how a technology should be regulated ... the factual
record of the case may be outdated, reflecting older technology rather than more recent developments." n371
Stuart Benjamin has argued that "rapidly changing facts weaken the force of stare decisis by undermining the
stability of precedents." n372 This provides a forceful case against judicial micromanagement of emerging
technologies. But the judicial response argued for in this Article is sufficiently broad to avoid the predictable
antiquation of other, narrower judicial solutions - it merely distinguishes between observational comparison and
indiscriminate data collection, while broadly regulating the identification of data and interactions with private data
aggregators. The collection of extensive, indiscriminate surveillance data is a widespread, pervasive occurrence
common amongst countless investigative technologies. The development of digital dossiers is not a trending fad
that will simply disappear in the near future. We should not expect the legislature to step in and address a problem

The Court has long recognized that when

making policy in the field of emerging technologies, "the rule we adopt must take
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development."
n373 The judicial response presented does not prevent the use of surveillance
technologies for observational comparison, but merely offers a sufficiently broad
and generalized constitutional limit on indiscriminate data collection, which can be
reasonably exported and applied to future, more sophisticated technologies. Once
that may disproportionately affect unpopular minorities.

more, critics of judicial policymaking seem tacitly concerned that the limited applicability of judicial rules in the
future will weaken the force of stare decisis, thereby undermining the judiciary's legitimacy. But nothing could
further de-legitimize the judiciary more than a failure to serve its fundamental role as a protector against the
tyranny of majoritarian preferences. The courts are therefore the best-positioned actor within our decentralized
federal system to protect against the threat of extensive, indiscriminate data collection. Concerns about the
judiciary's institutional competence seem misplaced. And though the courts have limited resources, there is not
enough convincing evidence of a "judicial information deficit" n374 so as to overcome the judiciary's important role
as protectors of discrete and insular minorities.C. Re-conceptualizing the Current Privacy Doctrine in Light of the

A judicial response is a step in the right direction in

addressing the [*327] growing threat posed by mass police surveillance . But the
proposed judicial response should only be the beginning in a broader shift in our
privacy dialogue. The digitally efficient investigative state has wide-ranging social implications for the entire
Digitally Efficient Investigative State

study of privacy law. I argue that, given the mounting evidence of efficient retention of public surveillance data and
data centralization, it is finally time to re-conceptualize outdated privacy law assumptions - principal among them
the antediluvian notion that an individual has no reasonable expectation to privacy in public movements. To be
clear, I am not arguing that, descriptively, people currently have an honest expectation to privacy in public in
today's world. In the age of GPS, smart phones, Facebook, and Twitter, our socially reasonable expectation to
privacy is weaker than ever. Instead, it is time for a normative reassessment of our entire privacy doctrine. Of
course, I am not the first to propose such an argument. Professor Solove has already observed: Privacy is not simply
an empirical and historical question that measures the collective sense in any given society of what is and has long
been considered private. Without a normative component, a conception of privacy can only provide a status report
on existing privacy norms rather than guide us toward shaping privacy law and policy in the future. If we focus
simply on people's current expectation of privacy, our conception of privacy would continually shrink given the

The judiciary can and should play a

fundamental role in protecting a normatively forceful conception of privacy in all
regards. Do we reasonably expect a person to assume the risk that, every time they enter a public space, the
increasing surveillance in the modern world. n375

state can monitor their every movement with ALPR? Do we reasonably expect a person to assume the risk that the
state will keep extensive, centralized data on their movements indefinitely? Or perhaps the more important
question is should we expect individuals to completely abandon all anonymity in public? I believe the clear,
normative answer to these questions is a resounding no, and the implications of the digitally efficient investigative
state only add weight to the claims previously made by Professor Solove and others. Ultimately, this Article only
scratches the surface of the broader social implications of the digitally efficient investigative state. Questions
remain about the relative criminological benefits of observational comparison as compared to wholesale data
retention. There is an increasing need for empirical research on the effects these emerging technologies have on
individual behavior. And there is a dearth of concrete data on the extent to which law enforcement use these
technologies. I offer only a brief glimpse into this new technological order, the relevant case law, and some general

This should only be the beginning of the conversation about

the sociological, psychological, criminological, and legal impacts of the increasingly
efficient police surveillance. [*328] VI. Conclusion Neither judicial responses nor
"legislative rulemaking is ...a panacea." n376 Even if the judiciary successfully
recognizes a remedy similar to that discussed in this Article, the legislatures must
play a critical role in developing more nuanced and specific enactments to
implement this constitutional floor. The potential harms of the digitally efficient
investigative state are real. There is legitimate concern that the broad and integrated use of these
technologies can create a mass surveillance state. Central to this debate is the proper role of the
judiciary in regulating policy activity. Courts have previously relied upon an often fragile dichotomy
normative recommendations.

between technologies that merely improve police efficiency and those that offer officers a new, extrasensory ability.
For the first time,

the judiciary may be forced to limit the efficiency of law enforcement

technologies. Implicit in this action will be the recognition that sometimes improvements in efficiency can be,
quite simply, so efficient as to be unconstitutionally harmful. Unregulated efficiency can facilitate
police wrongdoing, discrimination, and calumniate political dissenters. Unregulated
efficiency in policing technology undermines central protections and tenants of a
democratic state. The relationship between efficiency of criminal investigations and privacy rights will be a
new frontier for the courts in the coming decades. Th e courts should forcefully, but prudently,
protect against the unregulated efficiency of emerging investigative and
surveillance technologies. The judicial response offered in this Article would be but one more example of
the courts exercising their proper role as a limited but effective policymakers.

This is particularly important because current counter-terror

initiatives are failing
Zenko 2015 (Micah [Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action @
CFR]; America's Virulent, Extremist Counterterrorism Ideology; May 21;
foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/21/americas-virulent-extremist-counterterrorismideology-perpetual-war-islamic-state/; kdf)
Throughout the 13-plus years of the war on terrorism, one line of effort that everyone in Washington agrees on is
the necessity to counter the ideology put forth by terrorist groups. Unfortunately, everyone also agrees that U.S.
government agencies have done a terrible job at achieving this. Sen. Cory Booker (D-N.J.) recently derided the State
Departments counter-ideology efforts as laughable compared with the propaganda of the Islamic State. Whether
termed strategic communications, counter-messaging, or countering violent extremism, there is a rare
Washington consensus that this essential task is also the one that the United States has been the worst at
accomplishing. But its not just about building a less-pathetic State Department Twitter feed. By extension,
success

mandates changing how terrorist groups think and communicate , and

influencing individuals deemed susceptible to terrorists messaging. Focusing on
terrorists ideology is attractive because it requires altering the brains of enemies and neutral third parties, while,
more importantly, requiring no change in Americas own thinking. Yet in the past six months there has been a little

The language senior officials

and policymakers are increasingly using to characterize terrorist threats and to
describe the projected length of the war on terrorism has diversified and metastasized. The
noticed, but significant, shift in Americas own counterterrorism ideology.

enemy, once identified as simply al Qaeda and affiliated groups, now includes amorphous
concepts like Islamic extremism or violent extremists. Meanwhile, any shared
understanding of when the war might end has basically vanished from public
discourse. Where there was once an aspiration in Washington to wind down the era of perpetual war, there
is now an agreement that America faces a multigenerational threat. With little
awareness of the consequences of this shift in discourse, U.S. counterterrorism ideology has become
far more nebulous, less concrete, and gradually more open-ended. The war on
terrorism is going poorly: The number, estimated strength, lethality (within countries they
operate in, not against Americans), and social media influence of jihadi terrorist groups is
growing. Yet, the same tough-sounding clichs and wholly implausible objectives are repeated
over and over, with no indication of any strategic learning or policy adjustments. If this
virulent and extremist virulent in that its poisonous and harmful and that repeatedly espousing it
ensures continued strategic failure, and extremist in that it proclaims the most extreme objectives that will never be

U.S. counterterrorism ideology goes unchecked, it will further delude

government officials and U.S. citizens into the false belief that the current courses
of action are normal and acceptable and require no modification. This latest ideological
change is most conspicuous in descriptions of who the United States is at war with . The enemy has always
been overly classified and somewhat hidden, but at least there was once a
recognized list of discrete groups. Now, the adversary is an undefined and contested
category of groups or people allegedly connected with the act of terrorism. If the
U.S. government were as imprecise with its bombs as with its descriptions of its
terrorist enemies, it would be a war crime. This matters: If you cannot name your
opponents, you certainly cannot know them, much less measure progress in
defeating them. Consider the nebulous jumble of abstract enemies that officials have pronounced. In
achieved

February, President Barack Obama said, We are at war with people who have perverted Islam and said that the
international community must eradicate this scourge of violent extremism. Similarly, when attempting to describe
the enemy, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, claimed that the United States is in a
fight against the group that has perverted Islam. In February, National Security Advisor Susan Rice contextualized
the U.S. mission as to cut off violent extremism at the knees. Earlier that month, she attempted to describe the
undefined enemy: As al Qaeda core has been decimated, we have seen the diffusion of the threat to al Qaeda
affiliates, ISIL, local militia[s], and homegrown violent extremists. Eric Holder, then the attorney general, claimed,
also in February, that the United States is simply combating the threat of violent extremism. Gen. Lloyd Austin,
commander of U.S. Central Command, said the enemy is ISIL and other violent extremist groups. Some
policymakers have been even vaguer. When asked to define the enemy, Secretary of State John Kerry said, I call
them the enemy of Islam. Lets set aside the fact that Kerry is now presuming to interpret what is legitimate faith
for 1 billion Muslims. Just who is this enemy precisely? Meanwhile, the Republican presidential candidates are
outdoing one another in blurring the enemy and exponentially expanding the number of individuals whom the
United States must defeat. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fl.) coined the Taken doctrine: On our strategy on global jihadists
and terrorists, I refer them to the movie Taken Liam Neeson. He had a line, and this is what our strategy should
be: We will look for you, we will find you, and we will kill you. Less theatrically, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) merely
pledged, We will stand up and defeat radical Islamic terrorism. Former Texas Gov. Rick Perry said, We are in the
early years of a struggle with violent Islamic extremists that will last many decades. Meanwhile, Sen. Rand Paul (RKy.), while touting his alleged willingness to name the enemy, called them radical Islam and haters of mankind.
Again, its fine, though meaningless, to talk tough, but whom are these threats being made against? The other
threatening recent shift in U.S. counterterrorism ideology relates to the end state in the war on terrorism and when

officials and
policymakers no longer pretend that the war on terrorism will ever end ; nor do they offer
any narrative for how this war would end. Rather, they are attempting to normalize the war on
terrorism as something all Americans should accept and get used to . As Defense
Secretary Ashton Carter admitted, We need to be thinking about terrorism more generally as
a more enduring part of our national security mission. This shift was crystallized in a
this might come about. Although Obama once claimed that this war, like all wars, must end,

remarkable recent observation by CIA Director John Brennan. Three years ago, Brennan, then Obamas closest
counterterrorism advisor, pledged, Were not going to rest until al Qaeda the organization is destroyed and is

eliminated from areas in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Africa, and other areas. Were determined to do that. Yet,
last month, when asked at Harvard University when the war on terrorism will end, he responded philosophically:

Its a long war, unfortunately. But its been a war that has been in existence for
millennia. So this is going to be something, I think, that were always going to
have to be vigilant about. In other words, defeating terrorism is eschatological and
eternal. Similarly, Obama and his senior aides have come to repeatedly reframe the
war in decades. The new National Security Strategy describes it as a generational struggle in the aftermath
of the 2003 Iraq war and 2011 Arab uprisings, which will redefine the region as well as relationships among
communities and between citizens and their governments. Meanwhile, Dempsey, the most senior uniformed
military official, warned of Islamic terrorism: I think this threat is probably a 30-year issue. Likewise, on Capitol
Hill, this view has become standardized. Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas) said it is a multigenerational struggle with
no cheap way to win this fight. Similarly, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) called it a generational fight for civilization
against brutal enemies. Rep. Trent Franks (R-Ariz.) went even further than Brennan, noting, Weve been fighting
this radical Islamist ideology for 1,400 years. In other words, long before the United States was even established.

What is most disheartening about this radicalized

counterterrorism discourse is that these same officials and policymakers still
pretend that these diffuse terrorist threats will be destroyed, defeated, or
eliminated. This quite simply will not happen because the United States and its
partners keep applying the same strategies and policies while foolishly hoping for a
different result. Officials claim that terrorists ideology is their center of gravity, a term the Pentagon defines
Forget who the enemy is; who is this we?

as: The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Yet, again,

because nothing has succeeded at countering that ideology, we are supposed to

become accustomed to an endless war against a nondescript concept. The only
ideology that the United States can influence or control is its own. Instead, Washington
has busied itself conflating local militancy with threats to the homeland, refusing to
identify the enemy, proclaiming tough-sounding and implausible strategic
objectives, and demonstrating no meaningful learning or adjustments over 13 years .
The lack of precision employed when defining Americas adversaries in the
war on terrorism and the absence of any end state (combined with those unachievable
objectives) comprise a dangerous and extremist set of beliefs for U.S. officials and
policymakers to hold. If the war on terrorism is really all about ideology and ideas, then the United States
should spend as much time analyzing its own ideology as it does its enemies. The emerging counterterrorism
ideology that Washington is expressing is hazardous, illusory, and sadly unchallenged.

The deference the court shows to the executive is to blame

Deeks 13 Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law
School (Ashley S., The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive
Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 Fordham L. Review, 827, 2013,
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4941&context=flr)
One of the core tenets of national security doctrine is that courts play a deeply
modest role in shaping and adjudicating the executives national security decisions.
In most cases, courts use abstention doctrines and other tools to decline to hear
such cases on the merits. When courts do hear these cases, they often issue
decisions that are highly deferential to executive choices.1 The courts behavior in
the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks largely bears this out: courts have
declined to reach the merits of almost all of the cases challenging executive policies
on renditions, detainee treatment and transfers, lethal targeting, and warrantless
wiretapping.2 And even where the courts have stepped in, they have focused on the
decisional processes that surround executive decisionmaking, rather than on the

substance of those decisions themselves.3 Some national security scholars

celebrate this state of affairs.4 In their view, courts are structurally ill equipped to
assess the executives intelligence and security calculations, which often must be
made rapidly and which carry important foreign policy implications. These scholars
also believe that the executive is far more accountable to the public than courts,
such that its decisions will be guided and tempered by the public will. Other
scholars, in contrast, bemoan the absence of courts from the playing field.5 To
them, the executive has undue incentives to emphasize security values over liberty
values, and only a vigorous judicial role can counter that. More broadly, these
scholars view robust judicial deference to the executive as weakening a critical tool
by which to inhibit a single branch of government from accruing undue power. Both
camps tend to assume, however, that the courts do play only a limited role in
executive calculations about appropriate national security policies.

Deference is to blame for the failures of counterterrorism

Cover 14 -

Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law;

Director, Institute for Global Security Law and Policy
(Avidan, Cardozo Law Review, Presumed Imminence: Judicial Risk Assessment in the post9/11 World, 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 1415, Lexis/SEP)

Arguments favoring judicial abdication because of temporary and possibly exigent

circumstances are less persuasive in light of the seeming permanence of the
terrorism threat. n274 It is hardly clear when the threat [*1454] of terrorism will
abate. While the government may no doubt be viewed as a provider of security, it is
also a protector of civil liberty. n275 Where the nation is now so fully consumed by
prevention of catastrophic terror attacks and susceptible to cognitive errors, it is
incumbent on judges in a perpetual crisis not to presume imminence but to test the
government's risk assessments.
Second, proponents argue that deference is justified in the national security arena
because of foreign and international relations , which are highly sensitive and demand
discretion from the executive branch. Roberts invoked this rationale in Humanitarian Law
Project, deferring to the government's contention that teaching peaceful advocacy to the
PKK could upset relations with Turkey.n276

If Humanitarian Law Project has a limiting principle, it would appear to be its

national security and foreign affairs context. Critical to the decision was that it
concerned material support of a foreign terrorist organization. n277 Although not situated in
the "wartime" context of several of the Court's post-9/11 decisions, n278 the rationale
for deference hinges on similar reasoning. Thus, one might expect that decisions

addressing similar communication or teaching of human rights law to

a domestic terrorist organization would come out differently. n279
But there is good reason to question the extent of this limitation. The increasingly globalized
and interconnected world raises questions about the elasticity and malleability of this theory
ofdeference in the terrorism context. The most domestic of threats may well have
an [*1455] international dimension or a foreign connection. n280 Thus, the logical stopping
place of this rationale is unclear.

Third, deference advocates argue that national security issues are of a highly
complex and classified nature, which courts are not competent to handle or assess .
Without full information about potential harms and the expertise to make risk assessments,
courts are not equipped to determine whether the government's infringement of a particular
liberty is appropriate. n281
Kennedy articulated the expertise rationale in Boumediene: in contrast to members of the
other branches, most judges do not "begin the day with briefings that may describe new
and serious threats to our Nation and its people." n282 Though the dissenters in Boumediene
criticized its employment as a rhetorical pose, n283 Roberts reified the rationale in
Humanitarian Law Project at the heart of his opinion. n284
Relatedly, deference may be rationalized because the objective in the terrorism context is
prevention, not prosecution. n285 As a result, the government may rely on intelligence
standards as opposed to those utilized in the criminal context. n286 Courts are not familiar
with the intelligence area and are therefore not qualified to evaluate the evidence that the
government may rely on.n287 Finally, deference may be urged due to the lack of precision or
quantification of likelihood of an attack. n288
[*1456] The expertise rationale ignores the fact that courts review the decisions of
experts in a myriad of highly complex subjects. n289 Judges also may be at a
greater advantage in terms of determining the accuracy of information because of
the adversarial process, which allows them to weigh contrary information that
executive officials might not have incentive to consider. n290Article III courts have,
of course, overseen scores of terrorism cases, both of domestic and international
dimensions. n291 As for the secretive nature of certain subjects, there are
procedures in place that have permitted courts to have access to classified
information. n292 Finally, specialized courts have also been created that allow for judicial
review of information with standards distinct from those in traditional Article III courts.

n293

[*1457] Concerning the lack of quantification, some scholars argue that terrorism risk
analysis can be undertaken as it is in other areas, where threats are analyzed "as a matter
of course," such as nuclear power plant accidents and environmental
protection. n294 Moreover, private entities, such as insurance companies, and various private
and governmental risk analysts commonly engage in the admittedly difficult enterprise of
predicting terrorist attacks. n295
[*1458] Deference can finally be rejected because experts are not always
right. n296 Indeed, experts are often political actors whose predictions and
assessments may be both a product of fear of blame and accountability and
objective analysis. n297 Moreover, judicial review that entails an honest discussion
of risk assessments can play an important role in a democratic society; how we deal
with the risks we face should not be left only to the experts. n298

The judicial observer effect provides a counterweight that

shifts executive decision-making towards more careful
procedures as well as rights-sensitive policies
Deeks 13 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School,
Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State

(Ashley S., The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 Fordham Law Review 2, SEP)
The observer effect provides an important counterweight to the executives instinct
to prioritize national security equities at the expense of individual rights because
the executive knows that the courts may be a future audience for its policies. A
primary reason to be concerned about allowing the executive to completely
dominate national security decisionmaking is the fear that the executive will
conduct skewed risk assessments, overstate the threat that the country faces, and
establish excessively draconian policies as a result .151 As Cass Sunstein suggests, [T]he
President has a strong incentive to take precautions even if they are excessive and even unconstitutional.152
Ensuring some level of ambiguity about whether a court will step in to review a particular policy helps counteract
that bias. Christina Wells notes that the lack of predictability regarding a courts approach . . . should force the

advance
knowledge of the existence of judicial review can force the executive to assume
some pre-decisional awareness of accountability.154 That is, when the executive
understands that it likely will be forced to explain its reasoning after the fact for
particular security policies it adopts, it will think more carefully ex ante about what
those policies should be and weigh a greater number of alternatives.155 While this
element has procedural aspects to itforcing a more careful and considered
process of adopting policyit also has important substantive effects. Assuming that
courts as a rule will favor policies that are more rights protective than those favored by the executive , this
perception of future judicial oversight will shift the substantive policy in a more
rightssensitive direction.156
executive to consider that the possibility of rigorous judicial review is very real.153 In her view,

Observer effect spills over to other executive policies,

particularly when the triggering case directly implicates
individual rights
Deeks 13 (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the
U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention,
the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence
issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with alQaeda, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes,
and Judicial Deference, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)
More systemically, the observer effect reminds the executive of the courts
presence, and so has a subtle rights-protective influence on a number of executive
policies in the wake of a triggering event. The observer effect tends to work without
regard to the subject matter of the specific case or cases on which a court is
focused. But that fact might leave categories of individual plaintiffs out in the cold in
case after case. Assume the courts are aware of and seek to foster the observer
effect in the executive. If the courts decide not to defer only in cases that do not
implicate individual rights, and decide to defer in national security cases that do
implicate individual rights, the courts might preserve the observer effect while
failing to serve their function as individual rights protectors. We might conclude that
the observer effect will have some influence in shifting national security policies
that do implicate individual rights, but those changes might be more modest and
less satisfying from a rightsprotective approach than they would be if the cases on

which the courts did not defer were individual rights cases. In short, the observer
effect produces a better second-best world when the cases in which the courts
show less deference are those that implicate individual rights.

Lastly, Justifications for maintaining the squo are wrought with

faulty logiconly increasing the amount of info available to
public can keep us safe
Scheer 2015 (Robert [Prof @ USCs School of journalism and communication];
They Know Everything About You; Nation Books; p. 208-212; kdf)
WE MUST CHALLENGE THE ASSUMPTION THAT PROTECTING national security
requires sacrificing the constitutional rights of the individual. As pointed out in this book,
the Fourth Amendment does not contain an absolute ban on searches and seizures but, rather, requires
a court-authorized warrant based on probable cause of a crime before invading an
individual's private space. All Yahoo was asking of the court was that the searches of its company's
customers meet this requirement. Instead, the government responded that the so-called War on Terrorism could not
be won on that basis, and the secret FISA court endorsed the view. As Stewart Baker, the former NSA general
counsel and Homeland Security official in the Bush administration, told the Washington Post after the Yahoo case
documents were released: "I'm always astonished how people are willing to abstract these decisions from the actual
stakes." He went on to say that "[w]e're talking about trying to gather information about people who are trying to
kill us and who will succeed if we don't have robust information about their activities. "26 As demonstrated in

there is simply no serious evidence that the mass surveillance

program initiated under President Bush provided the sort of "robust information" Baker claims
was required to identify the people "trying to kill us." Yet, as this book goes to press, we have
been presented with still another case study in the rise of a terrorist movement -the
Islamic State oflraq and Syria (ISIS), whose members are creating considerable mayhem in Iraq and Syria-for
previous chapters, however,

which the mass surveillance techniques of the NSA left us totally unprepared. They appeared suddenly, startlingly
so, these black-clad men of ISIS, beheading journalists and others27 as they formed their proclaimed Sunni

the
fearsome spectacle of a terrorist enemy drove reason from the stage and the chant
of war was in the air. The New York Times carried the text ofObama's speech to the nation on September 10,
Caliphate over a broad swath of Syria and lraq. 28 Once again, as with the al Qaeda attacks of 9/11,

2014, in which he vowed to "destroy the terrorist group."29 Defense Secretary Chuck Hegel said that ISIS poses an

all the arguments for peace and restraint

were cast aside and the defense of privacy and civil liberty seemed an unaffordable
indulgence in the rush to combat an enemy of such awesome power and mystery .
"imminent threat to every interest we have."30 Suddenly,

Lost in the moment of fear-induced passion was the fact that these men of ISIS who so alarmed us, like their cousins
in al Qaeda, were hardly unknown or mysterious beings, but instead monsters partially of our own creation. Adam
Gopnik reinforced this point in an August 2014 article in the New Yorker. "ISIS is a horrible group doing horrible
things, and there are many factors behind its rise," he wrote. "But they came to be a threat and a power less
because of all we didn't do than because of certain things we did do-foremost among them that massive, forward
intervention, the Iraq War. (The historical question to which ISIS is the answer is: What could possibly be worse than

when the public was so illserved with alarmist information about the extent of the terrorist threat-the
president was presumably in possession of that vast trove of intelligence data
collected by the NSA and analyzed with the brilliant software of the best Silicon
Valley datamining companies such as the media-celebrated Palantir. And yet there is no evidence that
this costly and intrusive effort was the least bit useful in predicting the rise of ISIS. Clearly, there is a
disturbing disconnect between the zeal with which big data is collected and the lack
of scientific precision in utilizing that data to make sound policy decisions and to
inform the public as to the necessity of action . It is also difficult to see just how that data, based as
Saddam Hussein?)"31 Now, once again-and this time as compared to 9 I 11,

it is on the minutiae of the lives of much of the world's population, is useful to an understanding of this threat. This

book explains the continued rise of a military-intelligence complex that, through the assertion of a pressing danger
to national security after 9 I 11, made an unfettered and largely unchallenged claim upon the vast amount of
private data collected in a wired world by government and private enterprises. It is a claim based on the
unquestioned assumption that what passes for military intelligence is sufficiently and uniquely productive of useful
insight to warrant the costs to our democracy as well as our federal budget, and that less invasive means of
research such as scholarship, journalism, and traditional shoe-leather spy and detective work are inherently
inadequate to the task of protecting us in a cyberworld. It is a commonly persuasive argument and difficult to
challenge given that the high-tech surveillance is cloaked in such tight secrecy. In the wake of the Snowden
revelations, when there was a much-heightened public awareness of the threat to privacy and a willingness, even

all it took was the appearance of a

renewed terrorist threat to develop anew a consensus that privacy needed to be
surrendered as an unaffordable risk to the nation's security. Just the opposite is the case.
on the part of Congress, to address the issue more vigorously,

What now passes for military intelligence is a tech -driven oxymoron that denies the place of historical
contemplation, cultural and religious study, political complexity, and ethical restraints in assessing dangers to a
nation.

Never has our nation's foreign policy been so poorly served as in the era of
the Internet, with its enormous potential to enlighten us; but the collusions of warmongering fanatics and profiteers are beyond the comprehension of even the most
powerful machines. They must not be beyond the purview of public awareness, however. A fully
informed public is the best safeguard against the hazardous foreign entanglements
that our founders warned were the main threat to the health of the republic. That is
why they enshrined the constitutional protections against unbridled government power they believed would subvert
the American experiment in representative governance. We must heed the wisdom of the EFF's senior attorney Lee
Tien, who as much as any constitutional lawyer has battled on behalf of those rights. As he summed up in an
interview: "We need to fix the national security classification system that has classified so much information that we
don't know what's going on. It's hard to know what we should do, but we should all agree that knowing what's
happening is the first step. It's dangerous to propose a solution when you don't know what the extent of the
problem is. If you asked me before the Snowden revelations, my answer would be different. There are no personal
solutions to this; there is nothing we can do individually." "This is a systemic problem," he continued. "It's an
institutional problem, it's a political problem. There can only be collective action. That's it. That means we need to

organize.
You can't have a democracy if you don't have sufficient information. We're fighting
for the soul of this democracy."
call on all of them-individuals, Internet companies, politicians, the government-to fix it, and we need to

Case Support

Privacy Advantage

Surveillance Bad Extinction

Mass surveillance causes extinction
Saul 15 (Quincy Saul is the Co-Founder of Ecosocialist Horizons and the senior
editor and columnist for Capitalism Nature Socialism, The Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse, 3/25/15, Date Accessed: 6/27/15, http://www.truthout.org/opinion/item/29664-the-four-horsemen-of-the-apocalypse)
Surveillance States: 1984 has arrived, only 30 years after Orwell predicted. The
revelations brought to us by Chelsea Manning, Julian Assange and Edward Snowden
show us a world in which everything is under surveillance. Julian Assange has
written with great eloquence about the death of civil society overseen by the
surveillance state. (1) Today in the United States alone there are more than 5 million
people working under security clearances - more than the population of Norway. The
mirror image of this army of spies is the enormous number of people in prison,
including more African Americans under state control than there were slaves prior to
the Civil War. This is the last stage of the state, the totalitarianism that is the last
gasp of every totality. The surveillance state has the capacity for not only genocide,
but also extinction: It is capable of repressing and destroying the revolutionary
movements that still have hope to fight for life. The surveillance state rides the pale
horse of the apocalypse, representing death.

Surveillance Bad Imperial Hubris

The surveillance state makes the collapse of the US likely
Scheer 2015 (Robert [Prof @ USCs School of journalism and communication];
They Know Everything About You; Nation Books; p. 176; kdf)
WE ARE A NATION THAT HAS LONG CELEBRATED DISSIDENTS throughout the world who
dare, often at great risk, to expose the secret actions and challenge the legitimacy of
repressive governments. In some cases, we even provide legal sanctuary or asylum for such people.
However, when Americans dissent in such radical ways, the opposite is often the case-they are vilified as disloyal
and as a threat to our collective security or stability. The assumption, embraced so widely, must be that our system
never requires such a fundamental challenge to its authority, as represented by the actions of a Daniel Ellsberg,

We know, however, from so many historical examplesthe Roman Empire, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union-that unchallenged authority not
only will violate human rights but also will ultimately sow the seeds of its own ruin,
increasingly blind to its own limitations and flaws . Despite our historically innovative
constitutional checks on government power, we are nevertheless always flirting with
imperial hubris. We see this clearly in the pattern of lies that defined US foreign policy after 9/11 ; it is
quite apparent that leaving those lies largely unchallenged in the name of
classification seriously weakened the position of the United States in the world.
Thomas Drake, Chelsea Manning, or Edward Snowden.

Surveillance Bad Racism

Racism must be rejected in every instance - independent
reason to vote affirmative
Barndt 91 (Joseph R. Barndt co-director of Ministry Working to Dismantle Racism
"Dismantling Racism" p. 155)
To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences, restraints and limitations, ghettos and prisons. The
prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles the
victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people separate from each other; in our separate
prisons we are all prevented from achieving the human potential God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of
color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled
power, privilege, and greed, which are the marks of our white prison, will inevitably destroy
us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not
condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom.
Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can
be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to teardown, once and for all, the walls of racism.
The danger point of self-destruction seems to be drawing even more near. The results of
centuries of national and worldwide conquest and colonialism, of military buildups and
violent aggression, of overconsumption and environmental destruction may be reaching a
point of no return. A small and predominantly white minority of the global population derives its power and privilege from the sufferings of
vast majority of peoples of all color. For the sake of the world and ourselves, we dare not allow it to
continue.

AT: Drones Not Key to Fourth Amendment

Establishing limits on drones is the only method to revitalize
the fourth amendment
San Pedro 2014 (Victoria [J.D. Candidate, Stetson University College of Law];
STUDENT WORK: DRONE LEGISLATION: KEEPING AN EYE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT'S
LATEST SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY; 43 Stetson L. Rev. 679; kdf)
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS With the ubiquity of drone licenses among American law enforcement

While
state statutes and proposed federal legislation attempt to limit law enforcement's
ability to use drones in surveillance efforts, those proposals and statutes do not
adequately address the duration of the sur-veillance or the sophistication of the
technology used by law enforcement to enhance drone capabilities . Therefore, by requiragencies, n288 the drag-net surveillance that was once a laughable concept n289 is now a reality. n290

ing a warrant and restricting law enforcement from conducting drone surveillance for a period lasting longer than
twenty-four hours, the proposed legislation will best address the issues left open by Fourth Amendment

including the exigent circumstances language into the

legislation will allow law enforcement agencies to better understand the
circumstances that would permit the use of a drone . Because the courts have addressed exigent
circumstances on numerous occasions, n291 law enforcement agencies may already have
protocols and officer training dealing with exigent cir-cumstances. R ather than drafting
jurisprudence. [*720] Further,

legislation that attempts to describe a circumstance meriting the use of a drone, n292 using the exigent
circumstances language will allow law enforcement agen-cies to comply with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
already defined by the Court. Similarly,

legislation imposing a time restriction on the dura-tion

of the surveillance will provide law enforcement agencies with a bright-line rule that
facilitates application across the board. Since the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides
that one does not have a reasonable expectation of pri-vacy from all observations of one's property, n293 this
statutory lan-guage will provide a reasonable expectation of privacy from prolonged observations of one's property.

This proposal would comply with current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence

regarding fly-over aerial observations and would also be consistent with the mosaic
theory. n294 Further, this proposal limits law enforcement's ability to use any form of drone technology. Given
that the technological advancements in this field will likely continue to progress at a rapid pace, any proposed
legislation should incorporate an objective standard defining the permissible level of technology or an outright
prohibition on the use of all drone surveillance. In this way, we can align the use of this form of technology with
Fourth Amendment protections. Rather than providing vague standards, such as technology that is not in general

this
proposal would allow law enforcement to be exempt from the warrant requirement
for exigent circumstances, while also allowing them to obtain a warrant from a
neutral and detached magistrate when law enforcement intends to conduct longterm surveillance, thereby ensuring that law enforcement agencies comply with the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and respect citizens' privacy rights.
public use, the general restriction provides a bright-line rule to law enforcement agencies. [*721] Therefore,

Warrantless drones uniquely trigger 4th amendment

backsliding
Celso 2014 (Joel [JD Candidate U of Baltimore Law]; DRONING ON ABOUT THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADOPTING A REASONABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE TO PREVENT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS; 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461; kdf)

Despite a strong argument that UAS surveillance should not constitute a search as
long as it shows nothing more or different than what is revealed by naked-eye
observation, n240 it is not clear that courts would accept technological surveillance
as an equivalent substitute for manned surveillance. n241 In fact, in holding that the use of a
camera to photograph an open industrial area is not a search, the Supreme Court emphasized that commercial
property does not have the same heightened expectation of privacy as the home and stated that "the photographs
here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns." n242 However ,

given the
expectation of privacy in the home and the Supreme Court's assertion that "in the
home ... all details are intimate details," n243 it could be that any [*488] UAS
surveillance taken through skylights, windows, or open doors constitutes a search.
n244 Finally, and most importantly, in Kyllo, the Supreme Court may have opened the door to
warrantless UAS surveillance of the home at some point in the not-too-distant
future. n245 In holding that the use of thermal imaging constitutes a search, the
Court provided an important caveat by stating that when the technology used is
available to the general public, it does not constitute a search . n246 Therefore, it
appears that the Court's bright-line rule drawn at the entrance to the home may
have been written in "disappearing ink ." n247 To date, UAS are not in general public use. n248 That
is about to change since certain government agencies are allowed to operate them, the FAA is required to fully
integrate them into U.S. airspace by 2015, and their decreasing cost makes them more widely accessible. n249
Once the use of UAS becomes commonplace, the government may be able to use them to photograph or scan the
interior of a home without a warrant, regardless of whether the information revealed could not have otherwise been
obtained without a physical intrusion. n250 Therefore ,

under the Supreme Court's current

jurisprudence, an expectation of privacy from unmanned aerial surveillance of the
home could become unreasonable, removing Fourth Amendment protections from
the place that has historically enjoyed the greatest protection. n251

AT: Drones =/= Surveillance State

Surveillance tech facilitates a surveillance state
Citron and Gray 13 (Danielle Keats [Professor of Law, University of Maryland]
and David [Professor of Law, University of Maryland]; Addressing the Harm of Total
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards; June 21;
http://harvardlawreview.org/2013/06/addressing-the-harm-of-total-surveillance-areply-to-professor-neil-richards/)//AJ
The threat posed by contemporary surveillance technologies lies in how much and
how often people are watched. Modern technologies allow observers to detect,
gather, and aggregate mass quantities of data about mundane daily acts and habits
as well as intellectual ones.66 The continuous and indiscriminate surveillance
they accomplish is damaging because it violates reasonable expectations of
quantitative privacy, by which we mean privacy interests in large aggregations of
information that are independent from particular interests in constituent parts of
that whole.68 To be sure, the harms that Richards links to intellectual privacy are
very much at stake in recognizing a right to quantitative privacy. But rather than
being a function of the kind of information gathered, we think that the true threats
to projects of self-development and democratic culture lie in the capacity of new
and developing technologies to facilitate a surveillance state.
In adopting this view, we ally ourselves in part with commitments to a quantitative
account of Fourth Amendment privacy promoted by at least five Justices of the
Supreme Court last Term in United States v. Jones .69 In Jones, police officers
investigating drug trafficking in and around the District of Columbia attached a GPSenabled tracking device on defendant Joness car. By monitoring his movements
over the course of a month, investigators were able to document both the patterns
and the particulars of his travel, which played a critical role in his ultimate
conviction. Although the Court resolved Jones on the narrow grounds of physical
trespass, five justices wrote or joined concurring opinions showing sympathy for the
proposition that citizens hold reasonable expectations of privacy in large quantities
of data, even if they lack reasonable expectations of privacy in the constitutive
parts of that whole.70 Thus, they would have held that Jones had a reasonable
expectation in the aggregate of data documenting his public movements over the
course of four weeks, even though he did not have any expectation of privacy in his
public movements on any particular afternoon.71
The account of quantitative privacy advanced by the Jones concurrences has much
in common with the views promoted by Warren and Brandeis. Specifically, the
concurring Justices in Jones expressed worry that by making available at a
relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any
person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track,
programs of broad and indiscriminate surveillance will chill[] associational and
expressive freedoms, and alter the relationship between citizen and government
in a way that is inimical to a democratic society.72 Their concerns are wellgrounded in original understandings of the Fourth Amendment.73 As Professor
William Stuntz has shown, the Fourth Amendment was drafted partly in reaction to

eighteenth-century cases involving the British governments use of general

warrants to seize personal diaries and letters in support of seditious-libel
prosecutions that were designed to suppress political thought.74 Despite these
roots, quantitative privacy is just beginning to receive recognition because it is only
now under threat of extinction by technologies like Virtual Alabama and fusion
centers.

Drones are an unprecedented threat to privacy capable of

monitoring entire cities
Rothfuss 2014 (Ian F [George Mason School of Law]; Student Comment: An
Economic Perspective on the Privacy Implications of Domestic Drone Surveillance;
10 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 441; kdf)
Introduction A sixteen-hour standoff with police began after a suspect took control of six cows that wandered on to
his farm and "chased police off his land with high powered rifles." n1 Without the suspect's knowledge, police used
a Predator drone to locate and apprehend him on his 3,000-acre farm. n2 In addition to law enforcement, anyone
may buy a handheld drone. The Parrot AR.Drone 2.0, for example, costs less than three hundred dollars and can fly
up to 165 feet from its controller while recording and transmitting live high-definition video from the sky. n3

Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) have become essential to government surveillance overseas and are
now being deployed domestically for law enforcement and other purposes . The
ability of drones to conduct widespread domestic surveillance has raised serious
privacy concerns. Both government and private actors may use drones. Given the proliferation of this new
technology, Congress has recently directed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to expedite the licensing
process and open the domestic airspace to drones. n4 Situations like the one described above will likely become
more common in the near future. n5 Domestic drones [*442] have the potential to allow the government to
effectively and efficiently monitor the activities of people across the nation. Part I of this Comment examines the
capabilities of drones, discusses currently planned drone deployments, and examines recent developments that
have brought the topic of domestic drone surveillance to the forefront of national security law discussions. This

current law does not adequately protect privacy interests from

the widespread surveillance that could result from the unrestricted domestic use of
drones. Part II discusses the sources of the right to privacy and examines the current state of the law. Part III
comment concludes that

applies an economic perspective to determine the optimal level of domestic drone surveillance that the law should
allow. This analysis is based upon a general economic model of surveillance developed by Andrew Song following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. n6 Economic analysis shows that the uncontrolled domestic deployment
of drones would lead to an inefficient and unproductive loss of social utility. Prompt legislative action is therefore
necessary to address the fundamental privacy challenges presented by the use of drones. Part IV concludes by
proposing a legal framework to balance security and other interests while safeguarding the privacy rights of U.S.
citizens. As discussed in this comment, such legislation should allow constructive use of the technology within a
framework that protects individual privacy rights. I. Background: Domestic Deployment of Drones Recent
congressional legislation has directed the FAA to expedite its current licensing process and allow the private and
commercial use of drones in U.S. airspace by October 2015. n7 The FAA has streamlined the authorization process
to "less than 60 days" for nonemergency drone operations. n8 Among other requirements, the recent legislation
directs the FAA to allow government agencies to operate small drones weighing less than 4.4 pounds. n9 The use of
drones can be expected to increase dramatically in the coming years. [*443] The FAA has already authorized many
police departments and other agencies to use drones. n10 As of November 2012, the FAA oversaw 345 active
Certificates of Waiver or Authorization that allow public entities to operate drones in civil airspace. n11 Customs and
Border Protection uses Predator drones along the nation's borders "to search for illegal immigrants and smugglers"
n12 and "the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration have used Predators for other domestic investigations." n13
Predators owned by Customs and Border Protection and based at U.S. Air Force bases have been deployed on
numerous occasions to assist local law enforcement. n14 One law enforcement agency has even deployed a drone
capable of being armed with lethal and non-lethal weapons. n15 Drones also have applications beyond government
law enforcement. Drones may be used to provide live video coverage of events without the need to use piloted
helicopters and by paparazzi chasing after pictures of celebrities and other public figures. n16 Individuals may use
drones to spy on their neighbors, to keep an eye on their children, or to keep tabs on a potentially unfaithful spouse.

n17 The possibilities for corporate espionage and the theft of trade secrets are also endless. Drones range in size
from handheld units to units the size of large aircraft and have a wide variety of capabilities. n18 Nearly fifty
companies are reported to be developing an estimated 150 varieties of drone systems. n19 Users of drones may
include the military, federal and local law enforcement agencies, business entities, and private individuals. Drones
have many diverse domestic uses including surveillance of dangerous disaster sites, patrolling borders, helping law
enforcement locate suspects, monitoring traffic, crop dusting, aerial mapping, media coverage, and many others.

Drones represent an unprecedented convergence of surveillance

technologies that could lead to increased security but could also jeopardize the
privacy of U.S. citizens. Drones may be equipped with a variety of technologies including high-resolution
n20 [*444]

cameras, n21 face-recognition technology, n22 video-recording capability, n23 heat sensors, n24 radar systems,
n25 night vision, n26 infrared sensors, n27 thermal-imaging cameras, n28 Wi-Fi and communications interception

Drones
will soon be able to recognize faces and track the movement of subjects with only
minimal visual-image data [*445] obtained from aerial surveillance. n32 Drones have the ability
to break into wireless networks, monitor cell-phone calls, and monitor entire towns
while flying at high altitude. n33 These rapid technological advancements present
privacy challenges that were not contemplated when our existing laws were
developed.
devices, n29 GPS, n30 license-plate scanners, n31 and other systems designed to aid in surveillance.

Drones create a surveillance state

Gilens 2013 (Naomi [ACLU Speech, Privacy and Technology Project]; New
Documents Reveal U.S. Marshals Drones Experiment, Underscoring Need for
Government Transparency; https://www.aclu.org/blog/new-documents-reveal-usmarshals-drones-experiment-underscoring-need-government-transparency; kdf)
The use of surveillance drones is growing rapidly in the United States , but we know
little about how the federal government employs this new technology. Now, new
information obtained by the ACLU shows for the first time that the U.S. Marshals Service has
experimented with using drones for domestic surveillance. We learned this through
documents we released today, received in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. The documents are
available here. (We also released a short log of drone accidents from the Federal Aviation Administration as well as
accident reports and other documents from the U.S. Air Force.) This revelation comes a week after a bipartisan bill
to protect Americans privacy from domestic drones was introduced in the House. Although the Marshals Service
told us it found 30 pages about its drones program in response to our FOIA request, it turned over only two of those
pagesand even they were heavily redacted. Heres what we know from the two short paragraphs of text we were
able to see. Under a header entitled Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Man-Portable (UAV) Program, an agency document
overview begins: USMS Technical Operations Group's UAV Program provides a highly portable, rapidly deployable
overhead collection device that will provide a multi-role surveillance platform to assist in [redacted] detection of
targets. Another document reads: This developmental program is designed to provide [redacted] in support of TOG
[presumably the agencys Technical Operations Group] investigations and operations. This surveillance solution can
be deployed during [multiple redactions] to support ongoing tactical operations. These heavily redacted documents
reveal almost no information about the nature of the Marshals drone program. However, the Marshals Service
explained to the Los Angeles Times that they tested two small drones in 2004 and 2005. The experimental program
ended after both drones crashed. It is surprising that what seems like a small-scale experiment remained hidden
from the public until our FOIA unearthed it. Even more surprising is that seven years after the program was

As drone use becomes

more and more common, it is crucial that the governments use of these spying
machines be transparent and accountable to the American people . All too often, though, it
is unclear which law enforcement agencies are using these tools, and how they are doing
so. We should not have to guess whether our government is using these eyes in the
sky to spy on us. As my colleague ACLU staff attorney Catherine Crump told me, Americans have the
right to know if and how the government is using drones to spy on them . Drones are
discontinued, the Marshals still refuse to disclose almost any records about it.

too invasive a tool for it to be unclear when the public will be subjected to them. The
government needs to respect Americans privacy while using this invasive
technology, and the laws on the books need to be brought up to date to ensure that
America does not turn into a drone surveillance state . All over the U.S., states and localities are
trying to figure out through the democratic political process exactly what kind of protections we should put in place
in light of the growing use of what Time Magazine called the most powerful surveillance tool ever devised, on- or

this
production from the Marshals Service underscores the need for a federal law to
ensure that the governments use of drones remains open and transparent. A
number of federal lawmakers are already pushing to bring the law up to date.
Representatives Ted Poe (R-Texas) and Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) recently introduced the first
bipartisan legislation to regulate the governments use of drones . The proposed legislation,
which is supported by the ACLU, would enact judicial and Congressional oversight
mechanisms, require government agencies to register all drones and get a warrant
when using them for surveillance (except in emergency situations), and prohibit the domestic
use of armed drones. We believe this billand hopefully a future companion bill in the Senatewill provide
offline. These debates are essential to a healthy democracy, and are heartening to see. However,

a strong foundation for future legislation protecting our privacy rights in the face of proliferating drone surveillance
and government secrecy.

Unregulated drones perfect the art of surveillance

Ahsanuddin et al 2014 (Sadia - principal investigator for the report and MPAC
research fellow; Domestic Drones: Implications for Privacy and Due Process in the
United States; Sep 8; www.mpac.org/publications/policy-papers/domesticdrones.php; kdf)
Simultaneously, the IHSS survey respondents indicated apprehensiveness over any domestic drone operations: twothirds expressed concern over potential surveillance in homes or public areas; 65 percent were concerned about

The rapid pace at

which drone technology is developing, the lack of clear guidelines protecting privacy
and civil liberties, and public concern over these issues indicate an urgent need for
action in Congress and state legislatures. Privacy experts agree. In an article in the Stanford Law
Review Online, Professor Ryan Calo of the University of Washington School of Law states that drones may
be just the visceral jolt society needs to drag privacy law into the twentyfirst century. American privacy law has developed at a slow and uneven pace,
whereas technology has developed at a rapid speed. In spite of the development of computers,
safety; and 75 percent were concerned about the governments ability to regulate use.82

the Internet, Global-Positioning Systems (GPS), biometrics, gigapixel cameras, face recognition technology, and the
widespread use of e-mail and other forms of electronic communication, there has been no attendant development

Because drones threaten to perfect the art of surveillance, they make

for a good catalyst to update privacy law. The need for legislation is clear. With recent
revelations that the federal government has been conducting surveillance of the
American public on an unprecedented level , the threat that unregulated and
immensely capable technologies pose to civil liberties is profound. The law must
catch up with technology.
in privacy law.

AT: No Weaponized
Law enforcement uses predator drones
Bryan 2014 (Thomas A [J.D. and Master's Degree in International Politics, May
2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law]; STATE V.
BROSSART: ADAPTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FOR A FUTURE WITH DRONES; 63
Cath. U.L. Rev. 465; kdf)
C. State v. Brossart: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Become Part of American Life Against the background of an
expected expansion of domestic UAV use State v. Brossart has attracted widespread media attention because it is
among the earliest and most dramatic cases involving UAV use by law enforcement [*485] officials in United States.

in June 2011 when three cow-calf pairs belonging to Chris

Anderson entered an abandoned missile site rented by Rodney Brossart. n130 After locating
the cattle on Brossart's rented property, Anderson approached Brossart and offered to remove
the cattle from Brossart's land. n131 However, Brossart told Anderson that he could not remove the
n129 The conflict arose

cattle until he paid for the damages they had done to his property. n132 Anderson then contacted the Nelson
County, North Dakota Sheriff's Office for assistance in recovering the cattle. n133 Upon learning of the
disagreement between Anderson and Brossart, the sheriff's office dispatched officers to speak with Brossart
regarding the disputed cattle. n134 During that conversation, the officers advised Brossart that they had proof of
Anderson's ownership of the cattle and offered to confirm ownership by looking at the cattle. n135 In response,
Brossart warned the officers that they would not return if they attempted to enter his property. n136 Taking this
warning [*486] as a threat, the officers asked Brossart to cooperate or face arrest. n137 Brossart ignored their
request and returned to his tractor, prompting the officers to detain him. n138 The officers then approached
Thomas Brossart, Brossart's adult son who had arrived on the scene, and requested to enter the Brossart property
to "check on the cattle." n139 Thomas advised the officers that they would not be allowed on the property to see
the cattle until they had a valid search warrant. n140 The officers then left the scene to obtain a warrant. n141

The officers obtained a search warrant permitting them to enter the rented land that
afternoon and served the warrant at the Brossart home , which was located a half-mile from the
rented land. n142 However, as they entered onto Brossart's property to serve the search
warrant, the three Brossart sons, Alex, Thomas and Jacob, rushed at the officers with guns
drawn. n143 This action resulted in a standoff between the officers and the three sons. n144
During the standoff, the police deployed an MQ-9 Predator B Drone obtained
through an agreement with [*487] the United States Department of Homeland Security.
n145 The UAV was deployed without obtaining an additional warrant , purportedly "to help
assure that there weren't any weapons [on the Brossart property] and to make the arrest safer for both the
Brossarts and law enforcement." n146 The next morning, officers entered the Brossart property to recover the cattle
and arrested three of the Brossart children after they again confronted officers. n147 The Brossarts did not learn
that a UAV had been deployed during the standoff until after their arrest. n148

AT: If you have nothing to hide

The idea that only those with something to hide should worry
trivializes the importance of privacy concerns
Scheer 2015 (Robert [Prof @ USCs School of journalism and communication];
They Know Everything About You; Nation Books; p. 81-82; kdf)
An even darker defense of the end-of-privacy doctrine had been offered a month earlier by Google's Eric

Schmidt, who impugned the innocence of consumers who worry about snooping by Google and other
companies. "If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you
shouldn't be doing it in the first place, " Schmidt stated in an interview for a December 2009 CNBC
Special, "Inside the Mind of Google."5 The ability of the fast-growing Internet data-mining
companies to trivialize privacy concerns succeeded because the target audience of
younger consumers was either indifferent to invasions of their privacy or ignorant of
the extent and depth of that data collection . It was remarkable that an American social culture that
had for so long been moored to a notion of individual sovereignty predicated on the ability to develop one's identity,

Americans had
fought and died for the right to have privately developed papers,
conversations, friendships, and diaries, especially in our homes. Yet here we were as a
society voluntarily moving so much of that into digital spaces owned and managed
by corporations we have no control over. This relinquishing of the most private
information about one's essence and aspirations became the norm in a shockingly
short period, examined only lightly and in passing. As we shared more and more with everideas, and mores in private, had, in a wink, become willing to surrender any such notion.

widening social networks, it seemed okay as long as the companies securely stored this precious data, to be used
only to enhance the consumer experience. We counted on the self-interest of the corporation not to harm us, not to
bite the hand that feeds. But the Snowden revelations changed all that by exposing how easily the government
could access-and indeed was accessing our personal info. That troubling confluence between the corporate world
and the state caught the public's attention in a way that Internet companies feared might be game changing,

Also straining global confidence

in Internet commerce was the shock of those outside the country who had bought
into the myth that US-based multinationals were international in their obligations,
but who now found them to be subservient to the whims of Washington. 6 That was a
threatening the culture of trust needed to continue gathering that data.

message that US companies, up against a saturated domestic market for their products, found particularly
alarming, since they depend on global.growth to please shareholders.

AT: Nazism example=hyperbole

The risk is real
Scheer 2015 (Robert [Prof @ USCs School of journalism and communication];
They Know Everything About You; Nation Books; p. 176; kdf)
WE ARE A NATION THAT HAS LONG CELEBRATED DISSIDENTS throughout the world who
dare, often at great risk, to expose the secret actions and challenge the legitimacy of
repressive governments. In some cases, we even provide legal sanctuary or asylum for such people.
However, when Americans dissent in such radical ways, the opposite is often the case-they are vilified as disloyal
and as a threat to our collective security or stability. The assumption, embraced so widely, must be that our system
never requires such a fundamental challenge to its authority, as represented by the actions of a Daniel Ellsberg,

We know, however, from so many historical examplesthe Roman Empire, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union-that unchallenged authority not
only will violate human rights but also will ultimately sow the seeds of its own ruin,
increasingly blind to its own limitations and flaws . Despite our historically innovative
constitutional checks on government power, we are nevertheless always flirting with
imperial hubris. We see this clearly in the pattern of lies that defined US foreign policy after 9/11 ; it is
quite apparent that leaving those lies largely unchallenged in the name of
classification seriously weakened the position of the U nited States in the world.
Thomas Drake, Chelsea Manning, or Edward Snowden.

Deference

UQ -- Deference High
Unchecked executive is leading to ineffective surveillance and drone policies that
are devoid of standards
Brand and Guiora 15 (Jeffrey S., J.D., Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law,
Director Center for Law and Global Justice, University of San Francisco School of
Law, and Amos N., Ph.D, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of
Utah, Co-Director, Center for Global Justice, The Steep Price of Executive Power Post
9/11: Reclaiming Our Past to Insure Our Future, Jan. 27, 2015,
http://www.law.utah.edu/the-steep-price-of-executive-power-post-911-reclaimingour-past-to-insure-our-future/)
Each of these accounts is connected by a common thread the exercise of
unrestrained Executive Branch power that ignores the fundamental principle that
the President and his subordinates do not have unilateral authority to surveil any
call, to engage in illegal torture, or to launch attacks almost certain to kill. Each
reflects policies that pursue national security while ignoring a fundamental truth
about our democracy: Absent appropriate checks and balances, the rule of law is
undermined and individual liberty is likely to be sacrificed. Of course, this
observation is hardly novel and has been reiterated constantly throughout the 240
year history of the Republic. James Madison articulated it in the Federalist Papers:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
handsmay justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. J ustice Kennedy
wrote about it in 2004, upholding the right of habeas corpus for Guantanamo
detainees: The Framers inherent distrust of governmental power was the driving
force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers among three independent
branches. This design serves not only to make Government accountable but also to
secure individual liberty. Americas post-9/11 response abandons this foundational
principle, ceding unitary authority to the Executive Branch, despite strong evidence
that its surveillance, interrogation and drone policies have been ineffective, counterproductive, lack transparency, and are devoid of specific standards or oversight for
their implementation.

Executive is now an imperial power without restraints from the

other branches
Huq 10 (Aziz Z., assistant professor of law, senior consultant analyst for the
International Crisis Group, researcher of constitutional design, law, criminal
procedure, and federal courts, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics),
University of Chicago Law School, cl)
It is close to a tenet of faith among constitutional scholars of diverse persuasions
that ours is a republic dominated by the executive branch.5 Economies of
bureaucratic scale, coupled with the executives primacy in responding to new
security, economic, and environmental crises, are said to have frayed the
Constitutions delicate interbranch balance of powers. As a consequence, it is
conventional wisdom that our President is now imperial, and Congress

broken.7 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeulehereinafter collectively PVare

among the most sophisticated advocates of this dictum. But with a twist. Drawing
on political science, game theory models, and the economics of agency
relationships, their book The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic
proposes that neither law nor legally constituted institutions (that is, Congress and
courts) in practice impose meaningful constraints on the federal executive. This is
so, PV say, not only in the heat of emergency but also in the ordinary run of
administration (pp 45).8 Succinctly put, their thesis is that major constraints on
the executive . . . do not arise from law or from the separation-of-powers
framework (

Deference Bad -- Goal Displacement

Deference leads to goal displacement planning is key to
preventing subordinates from undermining effectiveness by
acting contrary to executive goals
Pearlstein, 9 - Visiting Scholar and Lecturer in Public and International Affairs,
Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton University
(Deborah, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 Conn. L.
Rev. 1549, Lexis)
The new functionalists' instinctive attraction to flexibility in decision-making
rules or structures-and its corresponding possibilities of secrecy [*1602] and
dispatch-is not without foundation in organization theory. n183 Flexibility ideally
can make it possible for organizations to adapt and respond quickly in
circumstances of substantial strain or uncertainty, as conditions change or
knowledge improves, and to respond to events that cannot be predicted in
advance. n184 In a crisis or emergency setting in particular, one can of course
imagine circumstances in which taking the time to follow a series of structurally
required decision-making steps would vitiate the need for action altogether.
n185
What the new functionalists fail to engage, however, are flexibility's substantial costs, especially in
grappling with an emergency. For example,organizations that depend on decentralized decision-making
but leave subordinates too much flexibility can face substantial principal-agent problems, resulting in
effectively arbitrary decisions. The problem of differences in motivation or
understanding between organizational leaders and frontline agents is a familiar
one, a disjunction that can leave agents poorly equipped to translate
organizational priorities into priority-consistent operational goals. As Sagan
found in the context of U.S. nuclear weapons safety, whatever level of
importance organizational leadership placed on safety, leaders and operatives
would invariably have conflicting priorities, making it likely that leaders would
pay "only arbitrary attention to the critical details of deciding among trade-offs"
faced by operatives in real time. n186 One way of describing this phenomenon is as "goal
displacement"-a narrow interpretation of operational goals by agents that obscures focus on overarching
priorities. n187 In the military context, units in the field may have different
interests than commanders in secure headquarters; n188 prison guards have
different [*1603] interests from prison administrators. n189 Emergencies exacerbate
the risk of such effectively arbitrary decisions. Critical information may be unavailable or
inaccessible. n190 Short-term interests may seek to exploit opportunities that
run counter to desired long-term (or even near-term) outcomes. n191 The
distance between what a leader wants and what an agent knows and does is
thus likely even greater.

The Cuban Missile Crisis affords striking examples of such a problem. When informed by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the growing tensions with the Soviet Union in late
October 1962, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, American General
Lauris Norstad, ordered subordinate commanders in Europe not to take any
actions that the Soviets might consider provocative. n192 Putting forces on
heightened alert status was just the kind of potentially provocative move
Norstad sought to forestall. Indeed, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered U.S.
forces globally to increase alert status in a directive leaving room for Norstad to
exercise his discretion in complying with the order, Norstad initially decided not
to put European-stationed forces on alert. n193 Yet despite Norstad's noprovocation instruction, his subordinate General Truman Landon, then
Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, increased the alert level of nucleararmed NATO aircraft in the region. n194 In Sagan's account, General Landon's
first organizational priority-to maximize combat potential-led him to undermine
higher priority political interests in avoiding potential provocations of the
Soviets. n195
It is in part for such reasons that studies of organizational performance in crisis management
have regularly found that "planning and effective [*1604] response are causally connected."
n196 Clear, well-understood rules, formalized training and planning can function
to match cultural and individual instincts that emerge in a crisis with
commitments that flow from standard operating procedures and professional
norms. n197 Indeed, "the less an organization has to change its pre-disaster
functions and roles to perform in a disaster, the more effective is its disastetr
[sic] response." n198 In this sense, a decisionmaker with absolute flexibility in an emergencyunconstrained by protocols or plans-may be systematically more prone to error than a decision-maker
who is in some way compelled to follow procedures and guidelines, which have incorporated professional
expertise, and which are set as effective constraints in advance .
Examples of excessive flexibility producing adverse consequences are ample.
Following Hurricane Katrina, one of the most important lessons independent
analysis drew from the government response was the extent to which the
disaster was made worse as a result of the lack of experience and knowledge of
crisis procedures among key officials, the absence of expert advisors available
to key officials (including the President), and the failure to follow existing
response plans or to draw from lessons learned from simulations conducted
before the fact. n199 Among the many consequences, [*1605] basic items like
food, water, and medicines were in such short supply that local law enforcement
(instead of focusing on security issues) were occupied, in part, with breaking
into businesses and taking what residents needed. n200
Or consider the widespread abuse of prisoners at U.S. detention facilities such as Abu Ghraib. Whatever
the theoretical merits of applying coercive interrogation in a carefully selected way against key

intelligence targets, n201 the systemic torture and abuse of scores of detainees was an outcome no one
purported to seek. There is substantial agreement among security analysts of both parties that the prisoner
abuse scandals have produced predominantly negative consequences for U.S. national security. n202
While there remain important questions about the extent to which some of the
abuses at Abu Ghraib were the result of civilian or senior military command
actions or omissions, one of the too often overlooked findings of the government
investigations of the incidents is the unanimous agreement that the abuse
was (at least in part) the result of structural organization failuresn203 -failures
that one might expect to [*1606] produce errors either to the benefit or
detriment of security.

In particular, military investigators looking at the causes of Abu Ghraib cited

vague guidance, as well as inadequate training and planning for detention and
interrogation operations, as key factors leading to the abuse. Remarkably, "prewar planning [did] not include[] planning for detainee operations" in Iraq. n204
Moreover, investigators cited failures at the policy level- decisions to lift existing
detention and interrogation strictures without replacing those rules with more
than the most general guidance about custodial intelligence collection. n205 As
one Army General later investigating the abuses noted: "By October 2003,
interrogation policy in Iraq had changed three times in less than thirty days and
it became very confusing as to what techniques could be employed and at what
level non-doctrinal approaches had to be approved." n206 It was thus
unsurprising that detention and interrogation operations were assigned to troops
with grossly inadequate training in any rules that were still recognized. n207 The
uncertain effect of broad, general guidance, coupled [*1607] with the
competing imperatives of guidelines that differed among theaters of operation,
agencies, and military units, caused serious confusion among troops and led to
decisionmaking that it is overly kind to call arbitrary. n208
Would the new functionalists disagree with the importance of government
planning for detention operations in an emergency surrounding a terrorist
nuclear attack? Not necessarily. Can an organization anticipate and plan for
everything? Certainly not. But such findings should at least call into question the
inclination to simply maximize flexibility and discretion in an emergency,
without, for example, structural incentives that might ensure the engagement of
professional expertise. n209 Particularly if one embraces the view that the most
potentially damaging terrorist threats are nuclear and biological terrorism,
involving highly technical information about weapons acquisition and
deployment, a security policy structure based on nothing more than general
popular mandate and political instincts is unlikely to suffice; a structure that
systematically excludes knowledge of and training in emergency response will
almost certainly result in mismanagement. n210 In this light, a general take on

role effectiveness might suggest favoring a structure in which the engagement

of relevant expertise in crisis management is required, leaders have incentives
to anticipate and plan in advance for trade-offs, and [*1608] organizations are
able to train subordinates to ensure that plans are adhered to in emergencies.
Such structural constraints could help increase the likelihood that something
more than arbitrary attention has been paid before transcendent priorities are
overridden.

Deference Bad -- Secrecy

Deference leads to secrecy - prevents organizational learning
in a crisis that is essential to effective decision-making
Pearlstein, 9 - Visiting Scholar and Lecturer in Public and International Affairs,
Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton University
(Deborah, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 Conn. L.
Rev. 1549, Lexis)
2. Unity and Insularity
As the new functionalists correctly anticipate, organization theorists have also
recognized that strict bureaucratic control, intense socialization, and a highly
developed sense of organizational culture can not only make rapid action
possible, but also ensure adherence to an identified, overarching priority. n211
Indeed, it follows from the prior section that if formal rules and training are
important, some significant level of control is absolutely necessary lest one risk
effective top-down compliance.
At the same time, however, institutions such as the military (and arguably
aspects of the intelligence community) that are defined by such insular organizational cultures have
some important disadvantages. n212 The exceptional degree of control such organizations exercise over
their members has been used both to advance an organization's official goals, and to pursue the more selfserving or alternative goals of its leaders. Members' intense organizational loyalty can foster excessive
secrecy and disdain for outside expertise, inhibiting the flow of information both within and from outside
the institution, and skewing attention to organizational priorities. n213 Especially when coupled with
political incentives that impact governmental organizations, such features can limit the institution's ability
to take corrective action or learn from past organizational mistakes . n214
The post-9/11 context is rife with examples of such pathologies in organizations responsible for
counterterrorism operations. Consider the U.S. response to the anthrax mailings of late 2001, which came
at a time of already heightened vigilance against terrorist attack. After federal [*1609] investigators
concluded that the anthrax attacks were most likely launched by "U.S. nationals, almost certainly ones
with experience in and access to the U.S. biodefense program and its facilities," and after they discovered
that major U.S. biodefense facilities had been working with anthrax (including weapons-grade powder)
for decades, military and intelligence agencies continued to withhold critical information from other
federal agencies about the facilities and employees involved in such programs. This hamstrung
post-attack efforts to identify the likely source of the attack, and therefore the
likelihood of subsequent additional attacks from the same source. n215
Such behavior echoes that described by the 9/11 Commission investigators studying the
September 11th attacks themselves. n216 Among other things, investigators
concluded that one of the key problems leading to the failure to avert the attacks (despite
increasingly alarming warnings) was the dearth of information sharing inside the intelligence
and security communities. n217 Information was overly compartmentalized, "stove-piped" to too few

decisionmakers, hidden by one executive agency from another and by one branch of government from
another, and limited in its relevance and accuracy from an absence of oversight and competing analysis.
n218 Such findings also emerge from studies of the generally effective Japanese
response to the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system. Essential to the
Japanese government's response was "a willingness to prioritize cooperation
over interagency or intergovernment competition." n219 In all of these cases, it may
well be that such behavior could be addressed by different incentive structures . But in the absence
of such guidance, it was the organizations instinctive (and structural) insularity
that prevailed.

The counterproductive effect of such pathologies can infect more than just real- time
responsiveness; it inhibits error correction over time -a [*1610] feature that theorists identify
as central in explaining the success of those organizations that have operated
effectively in chronically unpredictable environments. n220 In the nuclear safety
context, for example, Scott Sagan showed that Americans had been at greater
risk than once thought from accidents involving the U.S. nuclear weapons
arsenal-threats ranging from pilot error, malfunctioning computer warnings, the
miscalculation of an individual officer, and a host of other seemingly
inconceivable mistakes n221 -in part because actors at every organizational
level had incentives to cover up safety problems, "in order to protect the
reputation of the institution." n222 While it was perhaps "not surprising that the
military commands that are responsible for controlling nuclear forces would
create a veil of safety to manage their image in front of the [P]resident, the
Congress, and the public," Sagan found that concern for the effect of revealing
mistakes skewed assessments at all levels, "influenc[ing] the reporting of nearaccidents by operators, the beliefs of organizational historians about what is
acceptable to record, and the public interpretation of events by senior
authorities." n223 Particularly in operations where failure, when it does occur,
can come at an extraordinarily high price, there is a premium on gaining (and
implementing) as much insight as possible from those failures that do occur.
n224

Deference Bad -- Exaggerates Threats

Deference is flawed- officials will overstate the likelihood of a
threat to national security and put it before liberty
Wells 04- Crowder Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at
the University of Missouri School of Law
(Christina, Questioning Deference,
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3594&context=mlr)
JB
psychological findings above suggest that substantial errors occur in risk
assessment during times of intense emotions, such as fear. Individuals are generally
likely to overestimate the probability of an event's occurrence if that event is especially
familiar or salient. The presence of an intense emotion can further exacerbate the
tendency to overestimate the likelihood of an event, either because it makes an event especially
The

available or because people begin to focus on the potentially catastrophic nature of a particularly fearful event,
essentially dropping probability out of the equation altogether.

skewed risk assessment

Social influences can reinforce this

through the phenomenon of information and reputational cascades, which can

These findings have

substantial implications for law and policy during times of crisis. First , since "[p]ublic
officials, no less than ordinary people, are prone to use of the availability heuristic," they may themselves fall
prey to skewed risk assessment. 148 To the extent that government officials often reach such
assessments after group deliberation, there is the possibility that such decisions will be skewed even
cause a widespread, though erroneous, belief regarding the likelihood of an event.

further by polarization or groupthink. Second, the public may fall prey to skewed risk assessment as a result of
private availability entrepreneurs' attempts to fan fear regarding particular threats. As the public becomes
excessively "fearful of statistically small risks," it may demand that government act to prevent that risk regardless
of the costs of regulation or the potential harm caused by regulating the risk.1 49 To the extent that reputational
pressures operate on officials, especially elected ones, they will tend to respond positively to public demands by
enacting legislative and regulatory measures regarding small-probability risks.150 Finally, the government may
itself act as an availability entrepreneur, causing the public to call for government action. Once the public's calls are
of sufficient strength, those officials can then pressure others to enact legislation or take action to further their
private agendas.

Deference Bad -- Public Hysteria/Reputation

Deference fails- the executive branch is driven by reputational
concerns and public hysteria
Wells 04- Crowder Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at
the University of Missouri School of Law
(Christina, Questioning Deference,
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3594&context=mlr)
JB
This discussion has substantial implications for the judicial deference debate. Both sides of the debate argue from fundamental
assumptions about various decision makers' capabilities, and the historical pattern above sheds light on some of those assumptions.

pattern casts doubt on judicial deference proponents' claim that

executive officials are particularly adept at making decisions involving
threats to national security. People generally are not adept at assessing risk in
times of great fear, and history shows executive officials are no different, at least
when national security decisions affect civil liberties at home. Moreover,
reputational concerns may pressure officials into catering to public hysteria . Worse,
First, that

executive officials are sometimes willing to act as availability entrepreneurs, instigating public hysteria for political ends.

Aff Solves -- Courts Balance Security/Rights

Courts shouldnt defer to the executive branch- the courts are
necessary to achieve balance between security an liberty
Cole 08- B.A. from Yale and teaches constitutional law, national security, and
criminal justice at Georgetown University Law Center
(David, No Reason To Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and
Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335) JB
argument that the executive is best situated to balance liberty and
security in emergencies fails to consider the full range of qualities that one might
want in an agency tasked to strike such a balance. The authors correctly note that the
executive has advantages in terms of speed, experience, flexibility, and access to secret information. But
while these attributes are certainly important from a security standpoint, they are
not necessarily sufficient to balance liberty against security. Precisely because we
rely so heavily on the executive to maintain our security, we should be
skeptical of its ability to give sufficient weight to the liberty side of the
balance. Just as Fourth Amendment doctrine insists on warrants issued by magistrates because we do not trust
Third, the authors'

the police, whose primary responsibility is law enforcement, to balance privacy interests fairly, so we cannot trust

This is especially true in an emergency

when the executive is under intense pressure to deliver security . As in the Fourth
Amendment setting, judicial review plays an essential role in achieving an
appropriate balance; deference to the executive undermines that role.
the executive to balance liberty and security fairly on its own.

Aff solves -- Courts Best Check Executive

Courts are the best mechanism to check the courts
Wells 04- Crowder Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at
the University of Missouri School of Law
(Christina, Questioning Deference,
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3594&context=mlr)
JB
strong argument that judicial review is generally a viable
mechanism for executive branch accountability during national security crises.197 The
judicial forum, with its fact-finding capabilities, requirements of proof, and
requirement that the government justify incursions on civil liberties, fits well within
the general definition of accountability as requiring a specific, public accounting of
one's decisions. Consistent with the psychological definition, positive or negative
consequences attach to executive officials' accounting of their behavior in the form
of a judicial ruling for or against the government.
One can make a

Growing public opposition to drones has primed the Supreme

Court to constructively use the Constitution to limit executive
abuse
Michaels 13 Staff writer specializing in immigration,
international affairs and social justice issues
("Secret Court To Review American Drone Deaths, Ignoring Civilian Casualties
Overseas," 2-18-13, www.mintpressnews.com/legalizing-drone-strikes-courts-givefacade-of-humane-policy/50345/ DOA: 7-20-13, y2k)

Legal experts remain hopeful that an emboldened Congress and U.S.

Supreme Court could challenge the illegal use of drones. It
looks like the Obama administration does not want judicial review, but if Congress puts on enough pressure I think probably there
will be such a court established. My position is that the checks and balances in the Constitution, if they mean anything, mean that
the judicial and the legislative branches should be checking and balancing the executive. That means revealing these policies that
have thus far been secret, Cohn said. President Obama agreed to hand over the White Paper, a secretive document upon which the
drone policies are based, to the Senate Intelligence Committee last week, a positive step forward clarifying the methods of illegal
surveillance and assassinations. However, it will take much more to apply sufficient pressure to actually end the use of drone

The White Paper poo-poos judicial review and says judicial

enforcement of such orders would require the court to supervise
inherently predictive judgements by the president and his
national security advisers as to when and how to use force
against a member of an enemy force against which Congress has
authorized the use of force, Cohn said. In other words, Congress does have the power to order President
warfare.

Obama to hand over documents relating to the drone program. Additionally, it also has the power to establish a viable, transparent
court capable of actually challenging the use of drones in the U.S. and abroad.

Eleven states including

Virginia, Montana, Maine, Oklahoma, Missouri, North

Dakota, Nebraska, Florida, Oregon and California have
already legislated against drone use in their airspace, a
sign that even among more conservative constituencies,
public opposition to drone use is growing. This could
bolster the U.S. Supreme Court, already capable of ruling
on the constitutionality of unmanned drone surveillance.
Previously, the U.S. Supreme Court used its power in a constructive way
by declaring wiretaps during the Bush administration to be illegal.
They really put the breaks on the worst abuses of the Bush administration. The Supreme Court
slapped down Bush administration policies four times,
saying you are not allowed to strip people of habeas corpus, you
are not allowed to set up kangaroo courts and try people for war
crimes and execute them, Cohn said. Although Guantanamo Bay
prison is still open, the Supreme Court also ruled that the prison
located in Cuba, 90 miles off the coast of the United States, is
illegal if U.S. laws do not apply.

Observer Effect Solves--Transparency

Observer effect empirically leads to greater executive
transparency and accountability
Deeks 13 (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the
U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention,
the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence
issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with alQaeda, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes,
and Judicial Deference, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)

A third type of pressure imposed by the observer effect prompts the executive to
reveal nonpublic executive policies and, in doing so, try to attest to its own
responsible behavior. Once the policies are widely available, foreign governments,
NGOs, and legal scholars can assess and debate them.112 The disclosure provides a
baseline against which courts and the public may evaluate future executive
behavior and challenge that behavior when it appears to countermand the stated
policy.113 Of course, these disclosures are self-serving; they reflect an executive
calculation that these policy revelations are likely to benefit the executives case at
a manageable cost. And not all litigation leads to disclosure: in some cases, being
sued causes government officials to be more cautious than usual about making
public statements on issues implicated by the litigation. Nevertheless, the executive
has revealed a number of policies under the influence of the observer effect. The
governments decision to reveal publicly the process by which it determines when
and how to transfer military detainees to other countries serves as an example.114
Initially, the government transferred people from Guantnamo to other countries
without publicly explaining the standards and process by which it conducted those
transfers. The government had not revealed when it sought diplomatic assurances
that receiving countries would not mistreat the detainees; when it sought security
assurances (by which a receiving country agreed to take measures to ensure that a
transferred detainee would not undertake dangerous activities); and which
government officials were involved in the process.115In addition, several cases
have prompted the government to identify which set of individuals it deems
detainable in particular armed conflicts, even though no court specifically ordered
the government to do so.

Observer Effect Solves--Empirics

Judicial constraints on executive counterterrorism empirically
lead to more rights-centered policies
Prakash et. al 10 (Saikrishna B. & Michael D. Ramsey, professors of law and
J.D. from Yale and B.A. from Stanford, The Goldilocks Executive, Texas Law Review,
cl)
But in any event, we think Posner and Vermeules examples actually prove the
opposite, illustrating constraints upon the Executive. Posner and Vermeule argue,
for example, that the Supreme Courts war-on-terror cases have not meaningfully
checked the Executive because the courts have never finally ordered anyone to be
released.100 Yet that hardly makes their case, for the question is what the
Executive would have done in a world with no judicial review of the claims of alleged
enemy combatants. The Executives goal has been to thwart attacks in the United
States and to blunt attacks on U.S. forces overseas. Given this goal, the Executives
incentive is to detain anyone (especially foreigners) who might plausibly appear to
be involved in terrorism against the United States. Members of al Qaeda and the
Taliban generally cannot vote in the United States, and the costs visited upon them
will not enter the Executives calculus. Despite this incentive to detain the enemy
indefinitely, the Executive released many suspected enemy combatants once held
in Guantanamo, some of whom have taken up arms against the United States.101
Why did the Bush Administration release detainees knowing that it was likely that
some would take up arms against the United States? We surmise it was done to
stave off judicial release orders. There is little doubt that the prospect of judicial
review and release had an in terrorem effect on the Executive Branch.

Observer Effect Solves--Balances Security/Rights

Observer effect provides a balanced approach that promotes both security and
rights

Deeks 13 (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the
U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention,
the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence
issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with alQaeda, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes,
and Judicial Deference, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)

Both of these debatesabout how extensively courts do defer to the executive on

national security issues and about how much they should deferfail to take into
account an important dynamic that should inform our views about national security
deference: the observer effect. Understanding the way the observer effect operates
should lower the temperature of the debate. The observer effect ultimately
advances all three core separation-of-powers values just discussed: protecting
individual liberty (and sustaining a more systemic balance of power), preserving
democratic accountability, and promoting efficiency and effectiveness. This is not to
argue that the observer effect allows accountability and effectiveness goals to
manifest themselves as vigorously as complete judicial deference would. Nor is it to
argue that reliance on the observer effect advances the protection of individual
rights as robustly as a total absence of judicial deference would. It is to suggest,
however, that the observer effect potentially promotes all three values at once in a
way that the alternatives do not. As a result, the current normative deference
debatewhich either favors the executives functional advantages by allowing the
executive broad discretion to navigate national security issues, or urges judicial
involvement to protect individual rights and preserve structural balanceneedlessly
frames the discussion as an either/or proposition. Instead, ample judicial deference
to executive security policiesinterspersed with occasional nondeferential decisions
can promote both sets of values simultaneously.

Observer Effect Solves-- Spillover

Court decision on national security have a wide ripple effect
that can have a powerful effect on executive policies
Deeks 13 (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the
U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention,
the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence
issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with alQaeda, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes,
and Judicial Deference, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)

In another sense, though, much of substance has been decided since 2002by the
executive branch rather than the courts. This Article illustrated an important reason
why the executives national security policies have changed significantly since
2001. Many of these changes are due not to the direct sunlight of court orders, but
to the shadow cast by the threat or reality of court decisions on executive
policymaking in related areas of activity. Court decisions, particularly in the national
security realm, have a wider ripple effect than many recognize because the
executive has robust incentives to try to preserve security issues as its sole domain.
In areas where the observer effect shifts executive policies closer to where courts
likely would uphold them, demands for deference by the executive turn out to be
more modest than they might seem if considered from the isolated vantage of a
single case at a fixed point in time. It remains critical for courts to police the outer
bounds of executive national security policies, but they need not engage
systematically to have a powerful effect on the shape of those policies and,
consequently, the constitutional national security order.

SOP Add-on

2AC
Warrants revitalizes the separation of powers
Reynolds 2014 (Glenn Harlan [prof of law @ U of Tennessee]; NSA spying
undermines separation of powers: Column;
www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/02/10/nsa-spying-surveillance-congresscolumn/5340281/; kdf)
Most of the worry about the National Security Agency's bulk interception of telephone
calls, e-mail and the like has centered around threats to privacy . And, in fact, the evidence
suggests that if you've got a particularly steamy phone- or Skype-sex session going on, it just might wind up being
shared by voyeuristic NSA analysts. But most Americans figure, probably rightly, that the NSA isn't likely to be
interested in their stuff. (Anyone who hacks my e-mail is automatically punished, by having to read it.) There is,
however, a class of people who can't take that disinterest for granted :

members of Congress and the

judiciary. What they have to say is likely to be pretty interesting to anyone with a
political ax to grind. And the ability of the executive branch to snoop on the phone calls
of people in the other branches isn't just a threat to privacy, but a threat to the
separation of powers and the Constitution . As the Framers conceived it, our system of government
is divided into three branches -- the executive, legislative and judicial -- each of which is designed to serve as a
check on the others. If the president gets out of control, Congress can defund his efforts, or impeach him, and the
judiciary can declare his acts unconstitutional. If Congress passes unconstitutional laws, the president can veto
them, or refuse to enforce them, and the judiciary, again, can declare them invalid. If the judiciary gets carried

if the
federal government has broad domestic-spying powers, and if those are controlled
by the executive branch without significant oversight, then the president has the
power to snoop on political enemies, getting an advantage in countering their plans,
and gathering material that can be used to blackmail or destroy them . With such power in
away, the president can appoint new judges, and Congress can change the laws, or even impeach. But

the executive, the traditional role of the other branches as checks would be seriously undermined, and our system
of government would veer toward what James Madison in The Federalist No. 47 called "the very definition of
tyranny," that is, "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands." That
such widespread spying power exists, of course, doesn't prove that it has actually been abused. But the temptation
to make use of such a power for self-serving political ends is likely to be very great. And, given the secrecy
surrounding such programs, outsiders might never know. In fact, given the compartmentalization that goes on in
the intelligence world, almost everyone at the NSA might be acting properly, completely unaware that one small
section is devoted to gather political intelligence. We can hope, of course, that such abuses would leak out, but they

Rather than counting on leakers to protect us, we need strong structural

controls that don't depend on people being heroically honest or unusually immune
to political temptation, two characteristics not in oversupply among our political class. That means
that the government shouldn't be able to spy on Americans without a warrant a
warrant that comes from a different branch of government, and requires probable
cause. The government should also have to keep a clear record of who was spied on, and why, and of exactly
might not.

who had access to the information once it was gathered. We need the kind of extensive audit trails for access to
information that, as the Edward Snowden experience clearly illustrates, don't currently exist. In addition, we need
civil damages with, perhaps, a waiver of governmental immunities for abuse of power here. Perhaps we should
have bounties for whistleblowers, too, to help encourage wrongdoing to be aired. Is this strong medicine? Yes. But
widespread spying on Americans is a threat to constitutional government. That is a serious disease, one that
demands the strongest of medicines.

Strong separation of powers are essential for US global

leadership
Ikenberry 2001- Professor at Georgetown University (G. John, National Interest,
Spring 2001, Lexis)

America's mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have
made it a relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized
First,

way in which U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build long-term,

governmental separation of powers creates a shared

decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of any
one leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states . An active press and
mutually beneficial relations. The

competitive party system also provide a service to outside states by generating information about U.S. policy and
determining its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of a democracy can, indeed, frustrate American diplomats

democratic institutions produce more

consistent and credible policies--policies that do not reflect the capricious and
idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat. Think of the United States as a giant corporation that seeks foreign
and confuse foreign observers. But over the long term,

investors. It is more likely to attract investors if it can demonstrate that it operates according to accepted

The rule of law and the institutions of policymaking in a

democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and accountability .
accounting and fiduciary principles.

Sharp shifts in policy must ultimately be vetted within the policy process and pass muster by an array of

Because it is a constitutional, rule-based democracy,

outside states are more willing to work with the United States-or, to return to the
corporate metaphor, to invest in ongoing partnerships.
investigatory and decision-making bodies.

Restoring legitimacy is vital to continued hegemony

Suzanne Nossel 7, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and the
Century Foundation and previously served as deputy to the Ambassador for UN
Management and Reform at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, "Going Legit",
Winter, www.democracyjournal.org/3/6507.php?page=all
Its a truism today that Americas position as the worlds superpower is shakier than it
used to be. The nations military is overstretched and unable to take on new commitments. Interest
payments on the national debt topped $400 billion in the 2006 fiscal year, threatening to
crowd out needed expenditures to sustain economic competitiveness. And Washington
has made little progress on urgent foreign policy objectives , including stabilizing Iraq, curbing
Irans and North Koreas nuclear programs, expanding global trade, and ending antiAmerican extremism in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The Iraq war has directly caused much of this damage. Financially,
it has been a huge drain: The Congressional Budget Office reported in mid-2006 that costs topped $432 billion. Militarily, it has been punishing: The
Pentagon admits that the conflict has badly stretched the Armed Forces, with 70 percent of troops scheduled to return to Iraq next year set to serve their
third tours. In human terms, the price has been high: nearly 3,000 American troops have died to date. The wars dearest casualty, however, has been to

The Iraq intervention has eroded the esteem,

respect, and trust that the United States once commanded on every continent,
hampering a host of current policy objectives and putting ambitious and important new goals out of reach.
Rehabilitating Americas legitimacy, therefore, will be essential to
ensuring that the Iraq war does not exact a permanent toll on American global influence. International
legitimacy is a measure of the acceptability and justifiability of a states actions in the eyes
of other states and their citizens. Legitimacy, a kind of moral capital, reflects a collective judgment that the assertion of power, through a
Americas international standing, specifically its legitimacy abroad.

policy or an action, is valid even if it is unpopular. After all, leadership requires taking the occasional unpopular stand; but whereas popularity is inherently

legitimacy is more enduring. It provides a

foundation for respect and understanding that can transcend short-term, conflicting
goals. Practically, when Americas purposes are well-founded, openly articulated,
and broadly consistent with its professed values, the use of power toward those
ends is generally judged legitimate. But when the United States misleads others about
its motives, acts on inadequate or selective evidence, flouts its own principles, or unilaterally
exempts itself from broadly agreed standards of conduct, its legitimacy suffers. The
ephemeral, contingent on personalities and temporary alignments of interest,

current administration has put little weight on legitimacy as a criteria for policy-making. The Iraq war, for instance, wasnt waged without regard for

international legitimacy; on the contrary, eschewing legitimacy was part of the plan. From the start, Bush Administration officials derided the idea that
American power should answer to international norms. Vice President Dick Cheney resisted calls by Secretary of State Colin Powell to bring Washingtons
case against Iraq to the UN, judging such diplomatic machinations a waste of time. The Administration even sometimes seemed to suggest, perversely,

Undoing this damage is a

precondition for setting U.S. foreign policy back on course . International legitimacy, viewed
by the Bush Administration as constraining American power, must now be recognized as an
indispensable tool for fortifying and extending it. As we look to a post-Bush foreign
policy, progressives need to recognize that a concerted effort to reconstitute
Americas legitimacy is the best way to safeguard American superpower dom
in the long term. The History of Legitimacy The increasing importance of international
legitimacy and the rise of the United States as a global power go hand-in-hand . During
that if leading European nations or the UN were involved, results would be slower and less effective.

the colonial era of great power politics, military prowess and territorial control ruled the day; countries with resources and armies did not worry much
about the court of international opinion. But after World War II, as leading nations grappled with how to administer war-ravaged Europe and Japan and how
to prevent future world wars, legitima0cy moved to the forefront. International law was expounded through treaty-based organizations like the UN, NATO,
and the Bretton Woods institutions. The dismantling of far-flung colonial empires and the emergence of the principle of self-determination helped fulfill the

The United States enjoyed a great

deal of legitimacy in the postwar period. The conservative scholar Robert Kagan argued in Foreign Affairs that U.S.
widening belief that power needed to be made accountable to peoples affected by it.

legitimacy derived mainly from the Cold War itself: Among Western European governments and publics American actions were seen as justified to face
down a totalitarian menace. While violent proxy wars in Latin America and Asia had some corrupting effects on Americas image, they did not outweigh

political scientists Robert Tucker and

Hendrickson contend that Americas legitimacy derived not from its struggle against communism per
se, but rather from the respect President Harry Truman and his successors showed for
international law and norms. The end of the Cold War scrambled the situation. On the one hand, it left the United States as the
the perception of credibility in the Cold Wars primary battleground of Europe. In contrast,
David

worlds sole remaining superpower. With liberal democracy ascendant, American valuesincluding the market capitalism that much of the world once saw
as synonymous with imperialist exploitationnow enjoyed wide acceptance in Eastern Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. With the Soviet Union gone, what
Kagan identified as the legitimizing effect of the Cold War struggle evaporated. At the same time, Americas legitimacy also came under closer scrutiny.
This imbalance led to concern over the unparalleled degree of U.S. influence over the world economy, decision-making at the UN, and oil supplies in the
Middle East. Skeptics impugned American motives and methods by pointing to examples of Washingtons hypocritical support for oil-rich oligarchies in the
Middle East, uneven commitment to global free trade, and insufficiently aggressive efforts to halt greenhouse gas emissions. The Clinton Administration
handled these concerns through balanced policies and a degree of self-regulation. It showed enough respect for the views of allies and for the UN to get
away with circumventing international rules from time to timeas when it failed for many years (due to congressional resistance) to pay its dues to the UN
or failed to ratify the International Criminal Court (ICC) . During the Clinton era, conservatives sharpened their longstanding critique of the idea that
American foreign policy needed to enjoy international legitimacy. Many of these thinkers and politicians had, during the Cold War, seen international
institutions like the UN as Soviet-influenced impediments to American interests. Now they argued that America must not be constricted by external norms
of legitimacy, particularly if legitimacy might be arbitrated by international institutions like the UN that, despite the Soviet Unions collapse, still counted
dictatorships and tyrannies among their ranks. Such an argument was implicit in Kagan and William Kristols 1996 call for a foreign policy based on
benevolent hegemonya concept that continued to animate neoconservatives through the 2003 Iraq invasion. Rooted in the Cold War experience in
which Eastern European peoples drew inspiration from Western liberal ideals, benevolent hegemony held that if the United States acted from passionate
conviction, its moral rectitude would be recognized and followed, if not immediately then in the long run. The concept of benevolent hegemony guided the
Bush Administrations foreign policy even before September 11evident, for example, in its decision in late 2001 to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. The Administration knew the action would initially be derided, but it believed that the world would come to recognize that the creation of a North

After
September 11, Bushs decision to frame the battle against terrorism as one of good
versus evil also drew on assumptions of benevolent hegemony . Bush expected that the self-evidently
American missile shield would ultimately enhance not just American security, but also the interests for peace in the world.

moral basis of the fight against al Qaeda would insulate the United States from any potential questions about the legitimacy of its actions, much as the
battle against Soviet totalitarianism had once done in many quarters. For a short time after September 11, that logic seemed to prevail broadly, uniting

while the
2001 terrorist attacks temporarily legitimized an aggressive American foreign
policy, they also emboldened the conservative critique of legitimacy itself . Conservatives
the world in swift approval for the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and other aggressive steps to clamp down on global terrorism. But

such as Attorney General John Ashcroft and his Deputy John Yoocrafted arguments on the premise that to be constrained by internationally accepted legal
constructs after the attacks would be to short-change U.S. security and abdicate Americas natural right to defend itself as it saw fit. Bush and his

supporters summoned the visceral patriotism of a wounded nation to argue that the
United States must unshackle itself from the constraints of international rules that
could tie its hands. The embrace of the doctrine of preemptive war in the 2002 National Security Strategy was a deliberate signal to the
world that the United States no longer saw itself constrained by norms of legitimacy, arrogating for itself a unilateral right with no articulated justification
as to why it alone was authorized to preempt threats with force. Thus the Administration approached the Iraq conflict with broad confidence in the
worlds belief in Americas benevolent hegemony and a dismissive attitude toward the constraints of legitimacy. Although Powell managed to convince the
Administration to make a pitstop at the UN Security Council to seek approval for its planned invasion, the UN membership (and much of the American
public) correctly suspected the decision had already been made. And indeed, when the Security Council balked at Bushs case, the Administration moved
forward anyway, constrained by neither the holes in its case for intervention nor by the worlds resistance. Washington was convinced that its rightness,
even if not ratified in advance, would be revealed after the fact. But instead the opposite happened. As Francis Fukuyama describes in America at the

, it became apparent soon after the invasion that benevolence would not
come to Americas rescue. Instead of welcoming American soldiers with sweets and flowers, Iraqi society exploded into a complex
Crossroads

civil war. U.S. forces failed to find weapons of mass destruction, debasing the wars central aim in both domestic and foreign eyes. And high-profile cases
of prisoner abuse and war crimes against civilians made a mockery of Bushs lofty vision of bringing liberty and democracy to the Middle East. Both at

home and abroad, even those who initially believed the invasion was well-intendednot just conservatives, but also many Democrats in Congresscame to

While the United States remains preeminent in its military and

economic strength, the most potent global challenges it facesnuclear proliferation,
terrorism, failed states, and the scramble for energyare not amenable to
resolution through money or firepower. They depend on Americas ability to
forge agreements, build consensus, and persuade others, all of which in turn
are contingent on whether Washington enjoys international legitimacy. A drive to restore
Americas legitimacy, then, must rest on a clear understanding of what legitimacy is,
how it is attained, and why it is useful . Bush has caricatured legitimacy as a straitjacket, a permission slip from the world.
But legitimacy has two rather more respectable sources: rules and rectitude . The first involves
feel duped. The Case for Legitimacy

authorization by a formal body or written set of laws, such as an international agreement or treaty. Acts that meet the criterion include measures taken in
self-defense against an imminent threat under the UN Charter, policies on detention that match the Geneva Conventions, and extradition agreements

rectitude, cannot be granted or taken

through any formal process; it must be earned. It revolves around the perception
that a policy or action is justified and is not as easy to come by as following a set of
prescribed rules. Indeed, codified international law is too ill-defined, incomplete, and unevenly applied to be the only test of international
consistent with the Rome Statute of the ICC. The second source of international legitimacy,
away

legitimacy. For example, when the United States has employed the technique of targeted assassinations against al Qaeda leaders, international outcry has
been muted despite the fact that such extralegal killings violate international law. Judgments of the rectitude of particular actions take account of
individual circumstances: whether an action is provoked, what alternatives were available, and whether appropriate methods were used. In the case of
targeted terrorist assassinationswhere the provocation is clear, the prospects for capturing an elusive and well-protected terrorist alive are low, and the

International legitimacywhether derived from

rules, rectitude, or bothcan be affirmed and judged in three different forums. First, standing
multilateral institutionsprincipally the UN Security Council, but also international courts or regional entities like NATO and the African
Unioncan formally ratify actions such as military interventions. Second, states can individually express their
support or acquiescence with the actions of other states . For example, when the United States, Europe, and
harm to innocents is nilthe weight of legitimacy may be on the side of the assassin.

others indicated in the spring of 2006 that they would reduce funding to the elected Hamas-led government in the Palestinian territories because Hamas
was a terrorist organization, they helped legitimize Israels decision not to turn over collected tax monies to Hamas.

Third, legitimacy

gets arbitrated by the public at large in newspapers , cafs, web sites, and street protests. Particularly in this
last form, legitimacy can sound slippery and hard to define. But the concepts elusiveness does not
diminish its importance. Liberal advocates of legitimacy need to embrace alternative sources of legitimacy when, for example,
the UN Security Council is paralyzed in the face of a threat. The United States canand shouldact alone if it must .
While the withholding of international support will suggest that others doubt the legitimacy of an action, such misgivings do notin themselvesrender the
act illegitimate. While not prohibiting action, broad international reservations should occasion a hard look at why support is not forthcoming and whether
reasonable measuresfor example, further attempts at resolution short of the use of forceare warranted. A certain measure of legitimacy will derive from
the very willingness to engage and debate where the boundaries of legitimacy lie, rather than standing aloof and claiming that such questions dont
matter to Washington. The lampooning of legitimacy by the Bush Administration, of course, has made the concept taboo in some circles. After the first
presidential debate in 2004, John Kerry was drubbed by critics for suggesting that acts of preemption should have some widely recognizable justification
(in his ill-chosen words, passing a global test). Afraid of being portrayed as weak on defense, many progressives now hedge their arguments, calling for
building support for U.S. policies and rebuilding Americas popular image, but not speaking of restoring international legitimacy. Though a worthy goal in

renewing Americas popularity is not the same as restoring its legitimacy. A

charismatic new president who traveled the world could help rebuild Americas image and favorability
ratings. A generous new foreign aid program might do the same . But, unless
accompanied by visibly increased attention to international norms , these
changes will not allay concerns over Americas motives. The crumbling of American
legitimacy has had wide ripple effects, from the spread of jihadism to the rise
of anti-American governments in Latin America to the inability of the United States
to muster UN support for an intervention in Darfur. According to the UNs special envoy for Sudan, that countrys beleaguered
its own right,

population is wary that international intervention is a first step to recolonization and has a genuine fear of the Iraq scenario being repeated. As human
rights advocate David Rieff has pointed out, even liberal interventionists clamoring to stop the Darfur genocide must confront the fact that, after Iraq, a
U.S. invasion may well be more inflammatory than pacific. Taking Legitimacy Seriously Legitimacy is not a sweeping foreign policy vision, but rather a
principle that functions like a set of guardrails to keep the country on course toward the overriding goal of sustaining American superpowerdom.

Mouthing the rhetoric of legitimacy will not help . The Bush Administrations Orwellian invocation of the language of
liberal internationalismactive promotion of freedom, human rights, and the rule of lawamid policies marked by unilateralism, preemptive force, and

In projecting the embrace of legitimacy

as a centerpiece of its foreign policy, the United States will be judged not by its
words but by its actions.
human and civil rights abuses has all but drained the meaning from those terms.

1AR Impacts

Heg prevents great power wars

Thayer 13 - PhD U Chicago, former research fellow at Harvard Kennedy Schools
Belfer Center, Political Science Professor at Baylor (Humans, Not Angels: Reasons
to Doubt the Decline of War Thesis, September, International Studies Review
Volume 15, Issue 3, pp. 396419)
Pinker is sensitive to the importance of power in a domestic contextthe Leviathan is good for safety and the decline of violence
neglects the role of power in the international context, specifically he neglects US
power as a force for stability. So, if a liberal Leviathan is good for domestic politics, a liberal Leviathan should be as well for
Accordingly, while
he

international politics. The primacy of the United States provides the world with that liberal Leviathan and has four major positive consequences for

American primacy within

the international system causes many positive outcomes for the world. The first has been
a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, US leadership reduced friction among many
states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany.
Today, American primacy and the security blanket it provides reduce nuclear
proliferation incentives and help keep a number of complicated relationships stable
such as between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and
Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened,
such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihoodparticularly the worst form
great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to
spread democracy and many of the other positive forces Pinker identifies. Doing so is a
international politics (Thayer 2006). In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies,

source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States

once states are governed democratically, the

likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because
democracies do not have clashing interests. Rather , it is because they are more
transparent, more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with US leadership. Third, along with the growth
of the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy.
With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide
network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international
property rights, mobility of capital, and labor markets. The economic stability and
prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good. Fourth, and finally, the
United States has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to also promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The
United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The
and be sympathetic to the American worldview. In addition,

US military has participated in over 50 operations since the end of the Cold Warand most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed,

There is
no other state, group of states, or international organizations that can provide these
global benefits. Without US power, the liberal order created by the United States will
end just as assuredly. But, the waning of US power, at least in relative terms, introduces additional problems for Pinker concerning the
decline of violence in the international realm. Given the importance of the distribution of power in international politics, and
specifically US power for stability, there is reason to be concerned about the future as the
distribution of relative power changes and not to the benefit of the United States.
the US military is the earth's 911 forceit serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic, and the planet's fire department.

Hegemony solves extinction

Barnett 11 - Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare
Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War
College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat (Thomas,
The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,

March 7 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadershipfatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads)
We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural
change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's
most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence . That is something to
consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale
killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some
fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing
"megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of
system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful
stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of
globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the
world has ever known . Had America been removed from the global dynamics
that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended.
Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human
civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the
world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead,
America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our nowperpetual great-power peace . We introduced the international liberal
trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was
the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy , the persistent spread
of human rights , the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy , a
roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and
persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what
It is worth first examining the larger picture:

American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global
disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up
as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force.

As

for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine
what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head . The
last great period of global structural change was the first half of the
20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across
two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive
worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude

these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent

relative drop in deaths due to war . We are clearly headed for a world
order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and
accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively
faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power , in all of
its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come . To continue the historical survey, after salvaging
Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far
more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather
than colonialism . America then successfully replicated globalization further in
East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the
Pacific Century now unfolding.

AT Hard Power Key

Material power is irrelevant---lack of legitimacy makes heg
ineffective
Mendelsohn 10 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Haverford College
and a Senior Fellow of FPRI (Barak, The Question of International Cooperation in
the War on Terrorism,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201006.mendelsohn.cooperationwarterror.html)
the United States sought to advance more than what it viewed as simply its own interest. The
has
overreached, sought to gain special rights other states do not have, or presented strategies that were not compatible with the
general design of the war on terrorism, to which most states subscribed. When it went too far, the United States
found that, while secondary powers could not stop it from taking action, they could deny it legitimacy and
make the achievement of its objectives unattainable. Thus, despite the common narrative, U.S. power
was successfully checked, and the United States found the limitations of its power , even under the Bush
Going against common conceptions, I argue that

United States stands behind multiple collaborative enterprises and should be credited for that. Nevertheless, sometimes it

administration. Defining Hegemony Let me begin with my conception of hegemony. While the definition of hegemony is based on its material aspects

hegemony should be understood as a part of a social web

comprised of states. A hegemon relates to the other states in the system not
merely through the prism of power balances, but through shared norms and a system of
the preponderance of power

rules providing an umbrella for interstate relations. Although interstate conflict is ubiquitous in international society and the pursuit of particularistic
interests is common, the international society provides a normative framework that restricts and moderates the hegemon's actions. This normative

.A
hegemons role in the international community relies on legitimacy. Legitimacy is
framework accounts for the hegemon's inclination toward orderly and peaceful interstate relations and minimizes its reliance on power

associated with external recognition of the hegemons right of primacy, not just the fact of this primacy. States recognize the hegemons power, but
they develop expectations that go beyond the idea that the hegemon will act as it wishes because it has the capabilities to do so. Instead, the
primacy of the hegemon is manifested in the belief that, while it has special rights that other members of the international society lack, it also has a
set of duties to the members of the international society. As long as the hegemon realizes its commitment to the collective, its position will be
deemed legitimate. International cooperation is hard to achieve. And, in general, international relations is not a story of harmony. A states first
inclination is to think about its own interests, and states always prefer doing less over doing more. The inclination to pass the buck or to free ride on

If a hegemon is willing to lead in pursuit of collective

interests and to shoulder most of the burden, it can improve the prospects of
international cooperation. However, even when there is a hegemon willing to lead a collective action and when states accept
the efforts of others is always in the background.

that action is needed, obstacles may still arise. These difficulties can be attributed to various factors, but especially prominent is the disagreement
over the particular strategy that the hegemon promotes in pursuing the general interest. When states think that the strategy and policies offered by
the hegemon are not compatible with the accepted rules of rightful conduct and break established norms, many will disapprove and resist. Indeed,
while acceptance of a hegemons leadership in international society may result in broad willingness to cooperate with the hegemon in pursuit of
shared interests it does not guarantee immediate and unconditional compliance with all the policies the hegemon articulates. While its legitimacy
does transfer to its actions and grants some leeway, that legitimacy does not justify every policy the hegemon pursuesparticularly those policies
that are not seen as naturally deriving from the existing order. As a result, specific policies must be legitimated before cooperation takes place. This
process constrains the hegemons actions and prevents the uninhibited exercise of power.

Legitimacys the fundamental internal link to effective

hegemony---power distributions perceived as illegitimate are
the most likely causes of great power war
Finnemore 9, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George
Washington University, (Martha, Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of
Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isnt All Its Cracked Up to Be, January, World
Politics, Volume 61, Number 1)
Legitimacy is, by its nature, a social and relational phenomenon. Ones position or power
cannot be legitimate in a vacuum. The concept only has meaning in a particular social context.

Actors, even unipoles, cannot create legitimacy unilaterally . Legitimacy can only be given by
others. It is conferred either by peers, as when great powers accept or reject the actions of another power, or by
those upon whom power is exercised. Reasons to confer legitimacy have varied throughout history. Tradition,
blood, and claims of divine right have all provided reasons to confer legitimacy, although in contemporary
politics conformity with [End Page 61] international norms and law is more influential in determining which
actors and actions will be accepted as legitimate. 9 Recognizing the legitimacy of power does not mean these
others necessarily like the powerful or their policies, but it implies at least tacit acceptance of the social
structure in which power is exercised. One may not like the inequalities of global capitalism but still believe that
markets are the only realistic or likely way to organize successful economic growth. One may not like the P5
vetoes of the Security Council but still understand that the United Nations cannot exist without this concession

We can see the importance of legitimacy by thinking about its

absence. Active rejection of social structures and the withdrawal of
recognition of their legitimacy create a crisis. In domestic politics, regimes suffering
legitimacy crises face resistance, whether passive or active and armed. Internationally, systems
suffering legitimacy crises tend to be violent and noncooperative . PostReformation Europe might be an example of such a system. Without at least tacit acceptance of
powers legitimacy, the wheels of international social life get derailed .
Material force alone remains to impose order, and order creation or maintenance
by that means is difficult, even under unipolarity. Successful and stable orders require the
grease of some legitimation structure to persist and prosper.10 The social and relational character
of legitimacy thus strongly colors the nature of any unipolar order and the
kinds of orders a unipole can construct . Yes, unipoles can impose their will,
but only to an extent. The willingness of others to recognize the legitimacy of a
unipoles actions and defer to its wishes or judgment shapes the character of the
order that will emerge. Unipolar power without any underlying legitimacy
will have a very particular character. The unipoles policies will meet with resistance, either
active or passive, at every turn. Cooperation will be induced only through material quid pro quo
to power asymmetries.

payoffs. Trust will be thin to nonexistent. This is obviously an expensive system to run and few unipoles have
tried to do so.

AT: Circumvention/Inherency

AT: Circumvention CCTV

Drones have a significant meaning to surveillance that other
things dont have
Slobogin 2014 (Christopher [Milton Underwood Prof of Law, Vanderbilt U Law
School]; Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation
Doctrine; 102 Geo. L.J. 1721; kdf)
Why has there been such a legislative flurry in connection with drones, while there
has been minimal legislative movement on fusion centers and cameras? One might
argue that drones discover more intimate information or are more "intrusive" than
these other surveillance techniques, but that is a hard distinction to accept, given
the vast amounts of data fusion centers can collect and the ubiquity of cameras.
The more likely answer is that, given their appearance and their association with
our overseas adventures, the panvasive nature of drones--even those, and perhaps
especially those, that are hummingbird-like--is dramatically obvious, whereas fusion
centers and cameras operate almost invisibly. n180
Some states will likely leave drone operation up to law enforcement as they have
with cameras, rather than require warrants or some other Fourth Amendment-type
restriction before they can be deployed. In those states, courts sensitive to political
process theory need to ensure that the legislative authorization meets not only the
legislation criterion but also the representation criterion. Of most concern in this
context are law enforcement decisions to fly drones only over certain areas--for
instance, urban centers of a city. That is the same representation issue that arises in
connection with CCTV and should be handled in the same manner.

AT: Circumvention Observer Effect

The judicial observer effect provides a counterweight that
shifts executive decision-making towards more careful
procedures as well as rights-sensitive policies
Deeks 13 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School,
Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State
(Ashley S., The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 Fordham Law Review 2, SEP)
The observer effect provides an important counterweight to the executives instinct
to prioritize national security equities at the expense of individual rights because
the executive knows that the courts may be a future audience for its policies. A
primary reason to be concerned about allowing the executive to completely
dominate national security decisionmaking is the fear that the executive will
conduct skewed risk assessments, overstate the threat that the country faces, and
establish excessively draconian policies as a result .151 As Cass Sunstein suggests, [T]he
President has a strong incentive to take precautions even if they are excessive and even unconstitutional.152
Ensuring some level of ambiguity about whether a court will step in to review a particular policy helps counteract
that bias. Christina Wells notes that the lack of predictability regarding a courts approach . . . should force the

advance
knowledge of the existence of judicial review can force the executive to assume
some pre-decisional awareness of accountability.154 That is, when the executive
understands that it likely will be forced to explain its reasoning after the fact for
particular security policies it adopts, it will think more carefully ex ante about what
those policies should be and weigh a greater number of alternatives.155 While this
element has procedural aspects to itforcing a more careful and considered
process of adopting policyit also has important substantive effects. Assuming that
courts as a rule will favor policies that are more rights protective than those favored by the executive , this
perception of future judicial oversight will shift the substantive policy in a more
rightssensitive direction.156
executive to consider that the possibility of rigorous judicial review is very real.153 In her view,

Observer effect spills over to other executive policies,

particularly when the triggering case directly implicates
individual rights
Deeks 13 (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the
U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention,
the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence
issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with alQaeda, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes,
and Judicial Deference, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)

More systemically, the observer effect reminds the executive of the courts
presence, and so has a subtle rights-protective influence on a number of executive

policies in the wake of a triggering event. The observer effect tends to work without
regard to the subject matter of the specific case or cases on which a court is
focused. But that fact might leave categories of individual plaintiffs out in the cold in
case after case. Assume the courts are aware of and seek to foster the observer
effect in the executive. If the courts decide not to defer only in cases that do not
implicate individual rights, and decide to defer in national security cases that do
implicate individual rights, the courts might preserve the observer effect while
failing to serve their function as individual rights protectors. We might conclude that
the observer effect will have some influence in shifting national security policies
that do implicate individual rights, but those changes might be more modest and
less satisfying from a rightsprotective approach than they would be if the cases on
which the courts did not defer were individual rights cases. In short, the observer
effect produces a better second-best world when the cases in which the courts
show less deference are those that implicate individual rights.

AT: Circumvention Courts No link

Executives empirically follow court decisions on counterrorism
policy
Bradley and Morrison 13 (Curtis, Professor of Law, Duke Law School, and Trevor,
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School , Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and
Legal Constraint Duke Law Scholarship Repository,
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=5451&context=faculty_scholarship)
Insisting on a sharp distinction between the law governing presidential authority
that is subject to judicial review and the law that is not also takes for granted a
phenomenon that merits attentionthat Presidents follow judicial
decisions.118 That assumption is generally accurate in the United States
today. To take one relatively recent example, despite disagreeing with the
Supreme Courts determination in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the war on terror, the Bush
Administration quickly accepted it.119 But the reason why Presidents
abide by court decisions has a connection to the broader issue of the
constraining effect of law. An executive obligation to comply with judicial
decisions is itself part of the practice-based constitutional law of the
United States, so presidential compliance with this obligation may
demonstrate that such law can in fact constrain the President. This is true,
as we explain further in Part III, even if the effect on presidential behavior is
motivated by concerns about external political Executive is particularly
responsive to the observer effect in national security because of limited court
involvement

AT: Circumvention Norm Setting

A norm need not be perfectly enforced to constrain the executive
and may be bolstered by informal enforcement
Bradley and Morrison 13 (Curtis, Professor of Law, Duke Law School, and Trevor,
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School , Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and
Legal Constraint Duke Law Scholarship Repository,
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=5451&context=faculty_scholarship)

One of the grounds of skepticism about whether the presidency is

constrained by law concerns the frequent lack of formal enforcement
mechanisms. There is an extensive jurisprudential literature on whether and to
what extent enforcement is necessary in order for norms to qualify as law.105
Modern perspectives on law, in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart, tend to de-emphasize
the importance of external enforcement and focus instead on internal perceptions, a
point we return to in Part III. For present purposes, we simply note two things. First,
a norm need not be perfectly enforced in order to constrain. Of course, as
the legal realists emphasized, one cannot get an accurate picture of the law by
looking only at the law on the books rather than the law in action.106 Our point
here, however, is simply that the lack of perfect enforcement of a legal rule does
not mean the rule does not exist, or that it does not constrain. The fact that
homicides continue to be committed in the United Statesand that not
everyone who commits such a crime is apprehended and prosecuteddoes
not remove or render meaningless the legal prohibition against homicide.
Second, enforcement need not be formal. Domestic criminal laws, of course,
are typically implemented through a range of formal enforcement
mechanisms, such as state-sanctioned incarceration. Even such formal modes
of enforcement, however, are probably enhanced by informal mechanisms
such as public shaming and exclusion. For example, the formal punishmentbased deterrence against committing an offense like embezzlement is likely
enhanced by a desire to avoid public embarrassment and a worry about the
difficulty of obtaining future employment.107 Even when the likely enforcement
mechanisms are entirely informal, we think they should count for
purposes of evaluating whether law operates as a constraint. For some
issues of presidential power, there are very few potential modes of formal
enforcement (impeachment may be the only formal mode), and the likelihood that
they would be employed to sanction any particular presidential act is generally very
low. But there may still be enforcement through informal mechanisms such
as congressional backlash and public disapproval. If those enforcement
measures are triggered or intensified at least in part by the legal status of
a norm, then we believe one can meaningfully describe them as a type of
legal enforcement. On this point it is worth noting that, outside of the area of
constitutional law, it is generally accepted that law can act as a constraint even

when it takes the form of customary norms, and even when it is subject
primarily to informal enforcement. There is a rich literature, for example, on the
customary law merchant in medieval Europe, the enforcement of which was
based heavily on reputation.108 Gillian Hadfield and Barry Weingast have recently
supplemented that literature with modeling that shows how legal norms in general
can be effective even in the absence of centralized enforcement.109 As applied to
presidential power, this analysis suggests, once again, that the interrelationship of
law and politics does not by itself negate the importance of law.

AT: Other Surveillance

Visible surveillance is a unique invasion of privacy
Friedland 14 (Steven [Elon University School of Law], The Difference
Between Invisible and Visible Surveillance in a Mass Surveillance
World, February,Elon University Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.
2014-02 )//MA
With visible surveillance, on the other hand, there is observable nonconsensual
government conduct in the private sphere, often a physical intrusion that violates
traditional notions of trespass and private property rights. When a police officer
enters a private home without permission, opens another persons laptop and
scrolls through it without approval, or follows a driver in a marked police car, the
intrusiveness is palpable. At a minimum, visible surveillance is a display of power
that can lead to embarrassment, psychological harm or anger. 59 In effect, visible
surveillance creates a visceral feeling of un-privacy. As one commentator has
noted, Unlike, say, NSA network surveillance or commercial data brokerage,
government or industry surveillance of the populace with drones would be visible
and highly salient. People would feel observed, regardless of how or whether the
information was actually used.60 Sustained visible surveillance can create great
discomfort in the surveilled. When private individuals engage in such nonconsensual
surveillance, for example, it could even become criminal, in the form of stalking.61

AT: Current Regs

Current regs have loopholes that allow for warrantless
invasions of privacy
New York Times 2015 (Editorial Board; Regulating the Drone Economy; Feb
19; www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/opinion/regulating-the-drone-economy.html; kdf)
Obamas action on drone use by government agencies is much more problematic. For
the presidents memorandum says the government should not retain
personally identifiable information collected by drones for more than 180 days . But
agencies can keep the data for longer if it is determined to be necessary to an
authorized mission of the retaining agency a standard that grants officials far too
much latitude. Moreover, the administration says agencies have to provide only a general summary of how
they use drones, and only once a year. Law enforcement agencies like the F.B.I. and local police
departments are already using drones and manned aircraft for surveillance, often
without obtaining warrants, but they have said little publicly about what they are doing with the
information collected. The use of drones is likely to grow , and the devices could become as common as
utility and delivery trucks. At the dawn of this technology, its appropriate to set sound safety and
privacy rules.
Mr.

example,

AT: FAA Solves

Those regs expand the power of the state
Fulton 2015 (Deirdre; Surveillance, Privacy Concerns Raised as FAA Gives
Domestic Drones a Nod; Feb 15;
www.commondreams.org/news/2015/02/15/surveillance-privacy-concerns-raisedfaa-gives-domestic-drones-nod; kdf)
Domestic non-military drone use took one step closer to widespread implementation
on Sunday, as the Federal Aviation Administration issued proposed regulations for small
unmanned aircraft systems in the U.S. According to an FAA press release, the rule would limit flights
to daylight and visual-line-of-sight operations. It also addresses height restrictions, operator certification, aircraft
registration and marking, and operational limits. In a blow to Google and Amazon, it does not permit drone delivery.
Also on Sunday, the White House issued an Executive Order requiring every federal agency to develop "a
framework regarding privacy, accountability, and transparency for commercial and private [Unmanned Aircraft
Systems] use" within 90 days and with an eye toward protecting personal privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

the FAA regulations and the White House order provide some basic rules of
the sky that will govern who can fly drones in the United States and under what
conditions, while attempting to prevent aviation disasters and unrestrained
government surveillance," the Washington Post declared. But civil liberties experts warned
that the FAA rules and presidential memo leave the door open for invasions of
privacy by the government and corporations. "The proposed rules do absolutely
nothing to address privacy, except perhaps require some identifying markings displayed in the 'largest
"Together,

practicable manner' such that you may be able to identify who owns the drone that is spying on you," Ryan Calo
wrote at Forbes. "I was on the conference call announcing the new rules and the Secretary of Transportation
mentioned the importance of privacy and civil liberties, but this commitment is not reflected in the proposed rules."
The Center for Democracy and Technology called on Congress to raise the bar on domestic drone standards.
"Drones have the potential for significant societal, scientific, and economic benefits, but also pose new and
intrusive privacy problems," CDT senior counsel Harley Geiger said in a press statement. "The White Houses memo
requires government agencies to enhance transparency and develop clear rules to protect the privacy of
Americans. This is an important and welcome step in advancing drone technology, while protecting civil liberties."
Still, he added, "the

White House memo itself does not establish strong privacy and
transparency drone standards for agencies, leaving it up to the agencies to develop
these standards. Because the memos requirements are not specific, the drone policies the agencies set for
themselves will be key to how individuals privacy is actually protected. Congress still has a role to play in setting
strong privacy and transparency standards for drone use." One of the most promising applications for domestic
drone use is also one of the most troubling: as an internet service platform, giving operators access to vast
quantities of data and threatening net neutrality, Drew Mitnick and Jack Bussell note at the blog for Access, a global
human rights organization focused on digital freedom. " Drones

also increase the opportunities for

governments to conduct first-hand surveillance of users electronic communications
by intercepting signals and information," they write. "Official documents demonstrate that
government agencies are already exploring aerial platforms for surveillance technologies, like Stingray technology,
which conducts bulk surveillance of user location information... The potential for drones to violate individual rights
supports the need for legislation and regulations for government uses of drones as well as commercial vehicles."

Yes Border drones

Unwarranted drones are proliferating on the borders now
Kayyali 2015 (Nadia; Secure Our Borders First Act Would Ensure Proliferation of
Drones at the Border; Feb 3; https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/secure-ourborders-first-act-would-ensure-proliferation-drones-border; kdf)
Secure Our Borders First Act Would Ensure Proliferation of Drones at the Border
Security shouldnt be a synonym for giving up civil liberties. But bills like HR 399 show that lawmakers think it is.
The

Secure Our Borders First Act is an ugly piece of legislation thats clearly intended
to strongarm the Department of Homeland Security into dealing with the border in a
very particular waywith drones and other surveillance technology. The bill appears to
have stalled in the Houseit was on the calendar for last week but wasnt voted on, and it's not on the schedule for
this week. But its not dead yet. And even if it does die, this isnt the first time Congress has tried to increase the
use of drones at the border. In 2013, the Senate passed S.744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act. The bill called for the use of drones 24 hours per day and for 7 days per week.
The House of Representatives did not pass the legislation, but the drone mandate in HR 399 is eerily similarand it
demonstrates that the idea that drones should be used at the border is persistent. The 72-page piece of legislation,
authored by Rep. Michael McCaul from Texas, gives the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) an incredibly
specific mandate. It requires DHS to gain operational control of high traffic areas within 2 years, and the entire
southern border within 5 years. Operational control means the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United
States. It prescribes exactly how that should be done, and even includes penalties for failure to do so, including
pay freezes for government officials. The bill also prescribes how operational control should be obtained. It does this
by prescribing what equipment 11 specific border points should use. At several of the points, that equipment
includes drones. Additionally, the bill includes the following mandate: The Office of Air and Marine of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection [CBP] shall operate unmanned aerial systems not less than 16 hours per day, seven days per
week. As the ACLU notes, its a little shocking that the bill includes such mandates only weeks after a damning
DHS Inspector General (DHS IG) report titled CBP Drones are Dubious Achievers. And thats just the most recent
report. In June of 2012, EFF called attention to another DHS IG report that faulted the DHS for wasting time, money,
and resources using drones that were ineffective and lacked oversight. To put it in perspective, Predator drones cost
$3,000 per hour to fly. Thats certainly part of the reason that HR 399 authorizes $1 billion in appropriations. Of
course, the waste of money in this bill pales in comparison to its potential negative impact on civil liberties .

Drones pose a multitude of privacy concerns. Drones can be equipped with, among
other capabilities, facial recognition technology, live-feed video cameras, thermal
imaging, fake cell phone towers to intercept phone calls, texts and GPS locations, as
well as backend software tools like license plate recognition, GPS tracking, and facial recognition. They are capable
of highly advanced and near-constant surveillance, and can amass large amounts of data on private citizens, which

Lest it seem
that this will only affect communities directly adjacent to the border, or individuals being
investigated or pursued by CBP, its important to note that the government considers the
border to extend 100 miles in, and CBP has certain powers to conduct activities like searches that would
can then be linked to data collected by the government and private companies in other contexts.

be unconstitutional elsewhere. Furthermore, according to documents obtained by the EFF as part of a Freedom of
Information Act lawsuit against the agency,

CBP appears to be flying drones well within the

Southern and Northern US borders for a wide variety of non-border patrol reasons.

In
fact, the documents showed that between 2010-2012, the number of missions CBP flew for state, local and non-CBP
federal agencies increased eight-fold. The silver lining? The legislation hasnt passed yet. Theres still time to
contact your elected representatives and tell them to vote no.

AT: Disads

Impact Framing

Utilitarianism Bad Privacy First

Privacy first comes before util
Salem 2014 (Jonathan [president of Arcadia Communications Lab]; The eternal
value of privacy; Sep 16; endofanonymity.com/2014/09/16/the-eternal-value-ofprivacy/; kdf)
The eternal value of privacy seems somewhat quaint or detached from our normal
conversations about privacy, which usually conflate two other topics, namely commerce
and security. The former point casts things in the light of some imagined quid pro
quo commercial transactions between monitor and individuals being watched (I get to
use a free social platform because Im actually paying for it by giving up facts about myself), and the latter
in terms of the necessity of that oversight to precluding acts of terror (if you have nothing
to hide, why are you worried that your government is watching you?). Both topics confound any
true understanding of privacy, and its fascinating how our public dialogue has come to all but rely
on one (or both) angles in which to cast engagement on it. It wasnt always like this, however. Even Wired
magazine ran a commentary back in 2006 by security expert Bruce Schneier, in which he
described the frightening future in which weve now come to live: A future in which privacy would face constant
assault was so alien to the framers of the Constitution that it never occurred to them to call out privacy as an
explicit right. Privacy was inherent to the nobility of their being and their cause. Of course being watched in your
own home was unreasonable. Watching at all was an act so unseemly as to be inconceivable among gentlemen in

You watched convicted criminals, not free citizens. You ruled your own home.
Its intrinsic to the concept of liberty. For if we are observed in all matters, we are constantly
under threat of correction, judgment, criticism, even plagiarism of our own
uniqueness. We become children, fettered under watchful eyes, constantly fearful
that either now or in the uncertain future patterns we leave behind will be brought back to
implicate us, by whatever authority has now become focused upon our once-private
and innocent acts. We lose our individuality, because everything we do is observable and
their day.

recordable. While he was talking about governmental intrusion into our lives, he could have just as easily been
describing the apolitical actions of todays leading brands (and the online services providers on which they rely). His

privacy is a subject that we much respect and understand not only before
but during any discussion of how it is affected by governance or business . Its also a
point is that

little perspective on how those opt-in mouseprint agreements that many of us sign when we agree to be watched in
order to share cat videos with one another arent just somewhat quaint, but downright scary.

Utilitarianism Bad Impacts inev

Util makes all impacts inevitable
Albright 14 Research Analyst at Freedom Works (Logan, "The
NSA's Collateral Spying," Freedom Works, 7-8-15,
http://www.freedomworks.org/content/nsas-collateral-spying)
during the course of
its ordinary, otherwise legal surveillance operations, the NSA also collected data on large numbers
of people who were not specifically targeted. The agency calls this practice incidental surveillance. I
call it collateral spying. The report found that, on average, 9 out of every 10 people spied on
were not the intended target. The NSA has the legal authority to obtain a warrant based on
In short, the report, based on information obtained by Edward Snowden, reveals that

probable cause in order to surveil an individual. No one is disputing that. But when this targeting results in collateral
spying on vast numbers of innocents, in the absence of probable cause and the corresponding warrants, that is a
major problem. The NSA has asserted that such incidental data collection is inevitable, and to a certain extent
thats likely true. It is understandable that in some situations the NSA may learn information about people other
than the direct target, but this should obviously be minimized as far as possible, and at the very least the
information should be immediately purged from government databases, not stored for years on end. In any case,

the whole situation is indicative of the agencys cavalier attitude towards individual
rights. While national security is a concern we all share, the ends do not justify the means when
those means involve violate the constitutional protections afforded to citizens by
our nations founders. It is not okay to violate the rights of an innocent in the
process of achieving a broader goal, even if that goal is noble. The way the NSA has been
behaving is Machiavellian in the most literal sense. In his 16th century political treatise, The Prince,
Niccolo Machiavelli recognized a harsh reality of politics that still plagues us half a millennium later, writing, A
prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil. Taking
Machiavellis advice as a green light for immoral behavior has been the problem with governments throughout

the founding fathers sought to avoid by setting down precise

guidelines for what the government could and could not do in the form of a Constitution.
The disregard of these rules, and the argument that there should be a national security
exception to the Fourth Amendment, undermines the entire purpose of the
American experiment, and restores the European-style tyrannies the revolutionaries
fought against.
history, a problem

AT: Utilitarianism Aff key

The aff provides the best method for comparing the
counterplan and case
Rothfuss 2014 (Ian F [George Mason School of Law]; Student Comment: An
Economic Perspective on the Privacy Implications of Domestic Drone Surveillance;
10 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 441; kdf)
B. Economic Analysis of Drone Surveillance Song's general economic model of surveillance may be applied to
analyze domestic drone surveillance. Drones provide a very effective means to accomplish widespread, general,

The optimal amount of drone surveillance will occur where the

marginal social benefit of surveillance equals or exceeds the marginal social cost or
disutility of the surveillance. n143 Therefore, the costs and benefits resulting from drone surveillance
persistent surveillance.

must be identified and analyzed. As a result of the availability of efficient widespread surveillance, increased
domestic drone surveillance will generate utility in the form of increased security from crime and terrorism.

Drones may remain airborne for long periods of time without onboard pilots and are
very efficient at providing persistent, widespread surveillance. As a result, the societal
utility and disutility caused by the drone surveillance may be compounded . The socially
optimal amount of surveillance may increase because drones have the ability to significantly reduce the cost of
widespread surveillance. n144 The benefit of this increased security will come at the cost of individual privacy.

Given the widespread and pervasive nature of potential domestic drone

surveillance, the marginal cost of uncontrolled drone surveillance will likely exceed
the marginal benefit of the surveillance. Therefore, such widespread surveillance will be
unproductive and inefficient for society. [*457] The law must strive to allow the optimal amount of drone

drone surveillance is restricted too much, allowing less than the optimal
level, then society will not realize the full benefit that the surveillance can provide in
the form of prevention, deterrence, and security. n145 At the same time, if the limits are not
surveillance. If

strong enough, too much drone surveillance will lead to significant disutility resulting from the loss of privacy.
Therefore, the law should be structured to allow drone surveillance up to the point where the social benefit of the
surveillance exceeds or equals the marginal social cost or disutility. Following the insights gained from Song's

legal rules may be developed to efficiently implement

domestic drone surveillance while minimizing disutility and social costs of
avoidance. The government should be required to justify the use of domestic drone surveillance to ensure that
economic model of surveillance,

it is deployed in a manner that benefits society. Drones should only be used when the government is able to satisfy
the required levels of scrutiny described in Song's model. n146 Doing so will ensure that the societal benefits to be
gained from drone surveillance will outweigh the privacy disutility and social costs that may result from the loss of
privacy. The next section will apply this conclusion to analyze the current legislative and policy recommendations
for drone surveillance to determine the optimal course of action.

Generic DA Answer
A lack of transparency in data collection makes their impact
inevitable
Scheer 2015 (Robert [Prof @ USCs School of journalism and communication];
They Know Everything About You; Nation Books; p. 157-8; kdf)
OUR GOVERNMENT, LIKE OTHERS THROUGHOUT history, tells us that repressive, invasive, and
paranoid national security policies are for our own good , especially in terms of our safety. Yet
where do the prerogatives of a surveillance state driven by fear and governed by
secrecy really take us? The reality is that these procedures not only are unconstitutional but
all too often lead to bad government policies, both at home and abroad. One need
only review the invasion of Iraq to see the folly of toppling a regime that was an
implacable enemy of al Qaeda-an invasion driven by a fear of weapons of mass destruction that free
access to the available data would have discounted. The direct result, billions of dollars and
hundreds of thousands of deaths later, is a fractured Iraq that, at the time of this writing a
decade later, seems to be in a constant state of bloody division. Or as veteran correspondent
Patrick Cockburn summarized in the London Review of Books in 2014, after the extremist Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) seized huge swaths of both countries: For America, Britain and the Western powers, the rise of lsis and
the Caliphate is the ultimate disaster. Whatever they intended by their invasion oflraq in 2003 and their efforts to
get rid of Assad in Syria since 2011, it was not to see the creation of a jihadi state spanning northern Iraq and Syria
run by a movement a hundred times bigger and much better organised than the al-Qaida of Osama bin Laden. The
war on terror for which civil liberties have been curtailed and hundreds of billions of dollars spent has failed

The obvious lesson of that debacle, and others like it, is that an informed public
with access to accurate information-even when the facts are embarrassing to the
government- is the best safeguard against such errors. Aren't we better off knowing
when our freedoms are threatened or we are being lied to, even by our own leaders,
so that we can rectify such policies? In other words, didn't Edward Snowden, regardless of
the legality of his actions, actually make us safer?
miserably.1

AT: Drones Good

No Link
The plan doesnt eliminate all drones, just puts limits on
surveillance
Galizio 2014 (Gregory; NOTE: A DIGITAL ALBATROSS: NAVIGATING THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF DOMESTIC POLICE DRONE TECHNOLOGY VERSUS PRIVACY RIGHTS
IN MASSACHUSETTS AND BEYOND; 20 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Adv. 117; kdf)
While law enforcement drones need to be strictly restrained by [*143]
statute, the courts, and government agencies, this emerging technology need not be
universally condemned as the advent of George Orwell's dystopian world. American legislatures and
courts should legally discourage all dragnet surveillance conducted with drones. If
sensible legislation, along with strict judicial review, can be established, domestic drones
should be integrated into American skies . The courts must evolve and confront the
rapid pace of technology with more stringent approaches to protecting privacy
rights. On the practical side, civil libertarians should not unconditionally reject law
enforcement's operation of drones if used in the same manner as existing police
technology. The arrival of domestic drones offers a new battle within the dichotomy of privacy and security
V. CONCLUSION

interests. Just as drones may benefit domestic security interests, they burden the right of privacy. As drone and
other technologies further complicate this legal clash of competing interests, it will be up to lawmakers and judges

While drones possess benefits to public safety, the

failure to adapt our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the digital age will create a
digital albatross upon the privacy interests of us all . n156
to offer reasonable and balanced solutions.

AT Link Law enforcement

Many law enforcement agents refuse drones the plan
provides them with an effective and constitutional method to
do so
Sommadossi 2014 (Tiffany; Domestic Surveillance Drones: To Fear or Not to
Fear?; Aug 4; www.legislationandpolicy.com/1425/domestic-surveillance-dronesfear-fear/; kdf)
federal legislation is an excellent sign that Congress is taking steps to
address privacy concerns related to drone surveillance , the question of what to do until federal
laws pass remains. The absence of drone privacy restrictions represents a gaping hole in
American privacy protections, and also puts law enforcement offices in a
predicament. A growing number of law enforcement offices , like the LAPD, are voluntarily
refusing to integrate drone technology into its investigations because of public disapproval. The
While pending

public has made clear that unless strict privacy rules are in place to govern surveillance drones, the benefits they
can provide are not worth the significant privacy implications. Therefore ,

the lack of federal drone law

focused on privacy is simultaneously threatening American privacy interests and
preventing law enforcement from taking advantage of new technologies . As the Supreme
Courts interpretation of the Fourth Amendment slowly transforms and Congress remains suspicious of government
surveillance programs, it will be interesting to see where the pendulum settles on what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the United States when it comes to government surveillance, particularly from the air.

AT: Drones Save Lives

Current tech make drones more dangerous than helpful
Guma 2014 (Greg; Drones and Law Enforcement in America: The Unmanned
Police Surveillance State; Feb 18; www.globalresearch.ca/drones-and-lawenforcement-in-america-the-unmanned-police-surveillance-state/5330984; kdf)
The Defense Committees legislative models are designed to satisfy diverse interests. One creates a drone-free
zone, while another establishes strict requirements limiting their use by law enforcement agencies and other public
officials. The model regulating drone use (rather than outlawing it) allows them to be used with a judicially issued
warrant or for limited non-law enforcement purposes like fire detection, hazardous material response, search &
rescue, and natural disasters. Beyond constitutional concerns, p roposed

legislation also addresses

some safety issues. According to Buttar, many of the drones currently available to law
enforcement have limited flying time, cant be flown in bad weather, must be flown
in sight of an operator, and can only be used during daylight hours, making them
ill-suited to search and rescue missions and best suited for pervasive surveillance.
On the other hand, AP points to some of the attractions driving the rush to drone use. Unmanned aircraft vary
widely in size and capability. They can be as small as a bird or look like a childrens remote-controlled toy, and yet
can be equipped with high-powered cameras, microphones, heat sensors, facial recognition technology or license
plate readers. Similar technology has been used by the US military and CIA to track down Al-Qaida operatives
abroad. Law enforcement likes drones because theyre relatively cheap; they reportedly keep down the price by
cutting fuel and maintenance costs, as well as reducing manpower. Look at it this way: A police helicopter can cost
from $500,000 to $3 million, and about $400 an hour to fly. It can be affordable snooping for those with the
means of surveillance.

AT: Drones Kills ISIS

ISIS is structurally incapable of being a threat
Matthews and Preble 2015 (Dylan and Christopher [Cato's vice president
for defense and foreign policy studies]; Ignore the headlines. The world is getting
safer all the time.; Jan 15; www.vox.com/2015/1/14/7546165/world-getting-safer;
kdf)
DM: Did ISIS change your thinking on this at all? ISIS fighter An ISIS fighter in Syria.
(AFP/Getty Images) CP: Not really, for a couple reasons. ISIS may be a terrorist
organization, and may be an insurgency, and may be a quasi-nation-state or
attempting to become a quasi-nation-state, but it's hard to be all of those things
simultaneously. Austin Long writes about this in his chapter, about the differences
between insurgents and terrorists. Most terrorists operate in the shadows. The hard
part is not killing them, it's finding them. That's why traditional counterterrorism is
an intelligence and information-gathering process. It's a lot like police work. By
declaring itself a state and raising a flag over territory it seizes and holds, ISIS is
trading away one of its key advantages, and opening itself up to more traditional
military attacks. It's a virulent, reprehensible state, but it's not clear to me that it's a
greater terrorist threat than other organizations that are continuing to operate in
the shadows.

xt No ISIS Terror
No threat of ISIS terrorism litany of reasons
Byman and Shapiro 2015 (Daniel L [research director @ Center for Middle
East Policy, Brookings] and Jeremy [Fellow @ Brookings]; Be Afraid. Be A Little
Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq;
January; www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/01/western-foreign-fighters-insyria-and-iraq-byman-shapiro?rssid=LatestFromBrookings; kdf)
Despite these fears and the real danger that motivates them, the Syrian and Iraqi
foreign fighter threat can easily be exaggerated . Previous cases and information emerging from Syria
suggest several mitigating effects that may reduce but hardly eliminatethe potential terrorist
threat from foreign fighters who have gone to Syria. Those mitigating factors include: Many die, blowing
themselves up in suicide attacks or perishing quickly in firefights with opposing forces.
Many never return home, but continue fighting in the conflict zone or at the next battle for jihad. Many of the
foreign fighters quickly become disillusioned , and a number even return to their home country without
engaging in further violence. Others are arrested or disrupted by intelligence services. Indeed, becoming a
foreign fighterparticularly with todays heavy use of social mediamakes a terrorist far more likely to come to the attention of

American and European security

services have tools that they can successfully deploy to mitigate the threat . These tools
security services. The danger posed by returning foreign fighters is real, but

will have to be adapted to the new context in Syria and Iraq, but they will remain useful and effective. Key Policy Recommendations
The model below shows how the various mitigating factors and effective policies can (though not necessarily will) lessen the danger
presented by foreign fighters. Complex Model of Foreign Fighter Radicalization Complex Model of Foreign Fighter Radicalization
Decide First is the decision stage. It makes sense to reduce the numbers of those going to the conflict zone in the first place by
interfering in the decision to go. After all, those who do not go cannot be radicalized by foreign fighting. Western countries should
push a counter-narrative that stresses the brutality of the conflict and the internecine violence among jihadists. However, in general,
governments are poor at developing counter-narratives and lack community credibility. It is usually better to elevate existing voices
of community leaders who already embrace the counter-narrative than to try to handle this directly through government channels.
Also vital is developing peaceful alternatives for helping the people affected by the conflicts in the Middle East. Some fighters
certainly not all but a significant portionwere originally motivated by a genuine desire to defend the Syrian people against the
brutality of the Assad regime. Encouraging charitable activities, identifying legitimate channels for assistance, and otherwise
highlighting what concerned individuals can do to help alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people may siphon off some of the supply
of foreign fighters. Local programs for providing assistance can also improve domestic intelligence gathering capabilities in two
ways, according to Western security service officials. First, simply being out and about in the community gives government officials
more access to information about potential radicals. Families become comfortable with intelligence services, as do community
leaders. Second, such programs allow intelligence officials to gain access to individuals who can potentially be recruited to inform on
other would-be jihadists. Desired Results: Talked out of joining the foreign militias by family or community intervention. Choose
peaceful alternative to fighting. Travel The second stage in the foreign fighter radicalization process is the travel to Syria. Disrupting
the transit route via Turkey is one of the most promising ways of reducing the threat of foreign fighters to Europe and the United
States. Doing so will primarily require better cooperation between Western governments and Turkish authorities, who have not
always seen stopping the flow of fighters as their highest priority. But as Turkish authorities are now becoming more worried about
the jihadist threat to Turkey, Western security services should establish channels with Turkish intelligence and police to warn them of
the presence of specific individuals headed to Syria through Turkey and to encourage Turkey to turn them away from the Turkish
border or stop them at the Syrian border and deport them. Though there are other ways into Syria, all are far harder and more costly
for Western fighters. Security cooperation among European services and between European and American services is also essential.
Intelligence collected from the communications of foreign fighters, shared open source monitoring, and other information from one
service can prove vital for discovering transnational networks. Cooperation within Europe is indispensable for stopping travel as
jihadists from one European country often try to travel to Turkey and then on to Syria via another European country in an effort to
avoid detection. Desired Results: Arrested en route. Stopped at border and deported. Train and Fight In the third stage of the
process, the foreign fighters receive training and fight in Syria or Iraq, mostly out of the reach of European or American influence.
But even here, there are subtle ways of influencing the terrorist indoctrination process. Western security agencies should do
everything they can to sow doubt in the minds of extremist leaders in Iraq and Syria about the true loyalties of Western Muslim
volunteers. Highlighting information gained from recruits and even disinformation about the degree of infiltration by security
services can heighten fears. If jihadist organizations come to view foreigners as potential spies or as corrupting influences, they
might assign them to non-combat roles, test their allegiances by offering them the one-way ticket of suicide bombings, or even
avoid recruiting them altogether. Desired Results: Die in the combat zone. Stay abroad and fight. Become disillusioned with the
struggle. Return Upon the foreign fighters return, the fourth stage, it is critical to turn them away from violence and jihad. Western
services report that they usually know when individuals return and that many return with doubts. As a first step, security services
must triage returnees, identifying which ones deserve the most attention: our interviews indicate triaging is done inconsistently (and
in some cases not at all) among the Western security services. Inevitably, some dangerous individuals will be missed, and some
individuals identified as not particularly dangerous might later become a threat, but a first look is vital for prioritization. Efforts to
promote a counter-narrative are valuable, particularly if they involve parents, preachers and community leaders. Community
programs deserve considerable attention. The goal should be to move potential terrorists towards non-violence; since many are in

that category already, hounding them with the threat of arrest or otherwise creating a sense of alienation can backfire. In the past,
family and community members have at times been successful in steering returned fighters toward a different path, even getting
them to inform on their former comrades. Indeed, sending returnees to jail for relatively minor crimes such as going abroad to fight
with a foreign terrorist organization against a distant enemy may simply put them in prison for a few years and expose them to the
radicalizing elements present in many European prisons, where many minor players become exposed to hardened jihadists and
integrate into broader networks. Desired Results: Arrested and jailed. De-radicalized and reintegrated. No desire to attack at
home. Plot To disrupt foreign fighters in the fifth and final stage of plotting terrorist attacks, security services must remain focused
on the returnee problem and have sufficient resources to monitor the problem as it emerges in their countries. The good news is
that going to Syria and Iraq and returning home usually does bring one to the attention the security services. But maintaining
vigilance as the numbers increase will be difficult purely for reasons of resources. Marc Hecker, a French expert on terrorism,
commented that France could handle the dozens who returned from Iraq but would be over-whelmed by the hundreds who may
come back from Syria. Keeping track of that many suspects, is exceptionally resource intensive, particularly if it involves full-time
surveillance. For intelligence services, often the problem is not in accessing or gathering the data, but in processing, analyzing, and
following up on it in a timely manner. At the same time, their own effectiveness can work against them: by reducing the problem
considerably, they decrease the danger, thereby creating the impression that they need fewer resources. One way to mitigate this
effect is for security services to spread the burden of responsibility around by training and sharing information with local police and
other law-enforcement and community organizations. Security cooperation among European services and between European and
American services is absolutely necessary. Intelligence from the communications of foreign fighters, shared open-source monitoring,
and other information obtained by one service can prove crucial for discovering transnational networks. As noted earlier,
cooperation within Europe is critical for stopping travel, as jihadists from one European country often try to travel to Turkey and then
on to Syria via another European country in order to avoid detection. Desired Results: Attack foiled by law enforcement. Attack

The United States and Europe already have

effective measures in place to greatly reduce the threat of terrorism from jihadist
returnees and to limit the scale of any attacks that might occur. Those measures can and should
be improvedand, more importantly, adequately resourced. But the standard of success cannot be
perfection. If it is, then Western governments are doomed to fail, and, worse, doomed
to an overreaction which will waste resources and cause dangerous policy mistakes.
fails due to lack of training or wrong skills. Conclusion

AT: Plan doesnt solve foreign drones

The plan helps shed light on other drone programs aff is a
critical first step
Selinger and Kaag 2015 (Evan and John [Associate prof of philosophy @ U of
Massachusetts Lowell]; Why domestic drones stir more debate than ones used in
warfighting abroad; Mar 9; http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/PasscodeVoices/2015/0309/Why-domestic-drones-stir-more-debate-than-ones-used-inwarfighting-abroad kdf)
Selinger: Do you think its wrong that were more concerned about domestic uses of drones than foreign ones?

Yes. This attitude reflects a disturbing mix of provincialism and exceptionalism

We need to come to grips with the wars that
are being fought in our name and critically evaluate their justifications. And we need to
Kaag:

that Americans should acknowledge and oppose.

put pressure on the media to continue to cover the stories that allow us to make this crucial evaluation. The

its true that domestic drone

surveillance might erode civil liberties, and degrade the political fabric of the United States. To some
extent the American public knows this is the case and is invested in moving forward carefully. But its equally
true in the case of an abuse of drones in the targeted killing program abroad . Drones
asymmetry suggests a strange political and moral myopia. Yes,

keep boots off the ground and allow political leaders to execute military strikes without the fear of losing troops.
This is mixed blessing.

It also allows leaders to circumvent the traditional safeguards that

protect against illegitimate military actions. The American public tends to become more interested
in armed conflict its execution and justification when it faces the traditional sacrifices associated with war. I fear
weve entered an era of continual warfare where the American public has little incentive to monitor the actions of
its leaders.

This means we risk losing our democratic hold on an important political

issue, shifting power back to leaders who were , at least originally, supposed to be
checked by the will of the people. The issue of moral myopia is a bit simpler. Just because it may be
true, psychologically, that its easier to turn a blind eye to injustice far away, does not mean that its morally

Many drone strikes are in fact legitimate. But certain signature strikes , I
are not. And the American public should be aware of this difference.

justified to do so.
would argue,

AT: Exigent circumstances bad

The Supreme Court defines exigent circumstances
San Pedro 2014 (Victoria [J.D. Candidate, Stetson University College of Law];
STUDENT WORK: DRONE LEGISLATION: KEEPING AN EYE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT'S
LATEST SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY; 43 Stetson L. Rev. 679; kdf)
4. Exigent Circumstances The Court also defined exceptions to the warrant
requirement, n107 including the exigent circumstances exception. n108 [*694]
Exigent circumstances have been described as "situations where ""real immediate
and serious consequences" will "certainly occur" if a police officer postpones action
to obtain a warrant.'" n109 Among the situations that the Court described as
constituting an exigent circumstance was the instance of "hot pursuit," which occurs
when police officers pursue a fleeing felon. n110 Additionally, the Court held that
rendering emergency assistance constituted an exigent circumstance. n111
Additionally, in Wayne v. United States, n112 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that exigent circumstances existed when law
enforcement entered "a burning home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to
prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an injured person."

Police are already trained, adaptation towards drones will be

easy
San Pedro 2014 (Victoria [J.D. Candidate, Stetson University College of Law];
STUDENT WORK: DRONE LEGISLATION: KEEPING AN EYE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT'S
LATEST SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY; 43 Stetson L. Rev. 679; kdf)
[*718] Similar to language in currently proposed legislation, n279 exclusionary
provisions should be incorporated into the enacted legislation. However, this Article
suggests that the exclusionary provisions should be directly tied to Fourth
Amendment exceptions that have been addressed by the Supreme Court. For
example, instead of providing an exception for "emergency situations" n280 it
would be best to use the "exigent circumstances" phraseology that has been
previously defined by the Court. n281 This will provide an easy transition for law
enforcement agencies that prepare their training and manuals according to existing
jurisprudence. If police officers are already trained on what constitutes an "exigent
circumstance," that knowledge can be applied to drone surveillance, rather than
tasking law enforcement agencies with interpreting anew what constitutes
"emergency situations."

Time limits good

Drones are unique in their ability to capture information, time
limits are critical
San Pedro 2014 (Victoria [J.D. Candidate, Stetson University College of Law];
STUDENT WORK: DRONE LEGISLATION: KEEPING AN EYE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT'S
LATEST SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY; 43 Stetson L. Rev. 679; kdf)
Congress
should enact legislation that prescribes a time limit on the duration of surveillance.
The appropriateness of the time limitation could be determined through a
comparison to [*716] another form of surveillance that has been highly regulated by
Congress - wiretapping. After the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of wiretapping in
E. Proposal for Future Legislation To address the legitimate concerns raised by drone surveillance,

Olmstead, n269 the Court then required law enforcement to obtain a valid warrant before conducting wiretap
surveillance. n270 A year after Olmstead, Congress enacted legis-lation codifying the warrant requirement. n271
Along with the codification of the warrant requirement, Congress developed a comprehensive framework for

wiretap legislation provides that a warrant

must prescribe the duration of allowable surveillance. n273 However, the legislation also
states that the surveillance may not extend for more than thirty days. n274 Continuing
regulating wiretap surveillance. n272 For example,

with the presumption that law enforcement will not seek to obtain a warrant before conducting drone surveillance,
imposing a requirement similar to the wiretap requirement will prohibit law enforcement from conducting its
surveillance for extended periods. A statutory, bright-line rule requiring a warrant for long-term drone sur-veillance defining an acceptable period for such surveillance - removes law enforcement's discretion from the equation and
ensures that law enforcement receives the proper guidance to determine situations requiring a warrant. Further,
such rules limit law enforcement's ability to use drones to conduct long-term surveillance at the expense of an

Congress is best suited to determine what distinguishes longterm surveillance from short-term surveillance, as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence lacks a
individual's privacy rights.

description of long-term sur-veillance. Moreover, the thirty-day period prescribed by the wiretap legislation n275
permits law enforcement to gain too much informa-tion about an individual's daily routine and lifestyle. As
cautioned [*717] by the mosaic theory, visual surveillance over an extended period reveals far more about the
individual than an isolated observa-tion. n276 While law enforcement can admittedly learn vast amounts of
information by tapping one's telephone, n277 the amount and nature of information available from drone
surveillance is distinguishable. For example, if a police officer were to conduct wiretap surveillance of John Doe's
home to intercept information regarding a drug purchase, the officer would also be privy to Doe's conversations,
including a call in which Doe's conversation with his partner turns extremely intimate. On the other hand, if the
police officer were conducting surveillance with a drone, he may actually be able to view Doe engaging in
intercourse with his partner. Drone use would allow the officer to view such intimate moments countless times

wiretapping's thirty-day limitation period

inadequately protects citizens from drone surveillance because of the nature and
amount of information available through drone surveillance - a more serious infringement on
privacy rights than intercepting telephone communications. Thus, the time limitation for drone
surveillance should certainly be less than thirty days . Moreover, considering that previous
during the course of the surveillance. For these reasons,

jurisprudence concerning aerial surveillance discussed fly-over observations that were relatively short in duration,

An hourly limit
provides law enforcement with a bright-line rule regarding the permissible scope of
surveillance and also limits the impermissi-ble discovery of the patterns, habits, and
preferences of an individual's life. To provide some flexibility to law enforcement, the time permitted
n278 using an hourly component to prescribe the time limitation would be beneficial.

should not be so limited as to prevent brief aerial observations such as those used in Ciraolo and Riley, but rather
the time limitation should be directed at striking a balance between law enforcement's needs and society's

the legislation should define long-term sur-veillance as

a surveillance lasting longer than twenty-four hours.
expectations of privacy. Thus,

AT: Drone Industry DA

Link Turn--State Regs

State regs are grounding all drones now because of public
outragefederal action that mandates warrants reverses the
trend
Sorcher 2013 (Sara [Deputy editor of CSMPasscode, covering security & privacy
in the digital age]; The backlash against drones; Feb 21;
www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-backlash-against-drones-20130221; kdf)
The Seattle Police Departments planned demonstration of its small surveillance drones quickly devolved into a noisy protest. Angry

residents attending the community meeting in October chanted No drones! drowning out officers
attempts to explain how the unmanned aerial vehicles would support certain criminal
investigations, help out during natural disasters, and assist in search-and-rescue
operations. Now its clear that Seattles drones, purchased with federal grants, wont be flying over the metro area anytime
soon. Amid backlash from civil-liberties advocates and citizens worried about government invasion of their privacy, the mayor earlier

Lawmakers in at least 11
states want to restrict the use of drones because of fears they will spy on
Americans, and some are pushing to require warrants before the robots collect
evidence in investigations. Just this month, the Virginia General Assembly passed a two-year moratorium on drones.
this month tabled any drone ambitionsfor now. Public concerns are not limited to Seattle.

The outcry comes after the Electronic Frontier Foundation sued last year for a list of drone applicants within the U.S. When that
information went public, staff attorney Jennifer Lynch says, it really got people up in arms about how drones are being used, and
got people to question their city councils and local law-enforcement agencies to ask for appropriate policies to be put in place to

Drones change the game: Nearly continuous surveillance could be

possible without a physical intrusion such as a property search or an implanted
listening device. The flying robots can carry high-powered cameras, even facialrecognition software or thermal imaging to see through walls. They can hover, potentially
undetected, for hours or days at a time. As of yet, however , there are no laws governing the use of
domestic drones when it comes to privacy. Unless Congress or the executive
branch moves to regulate the robots use before they take to the skies en masse,
states will likely continue to try to limit or ban drone use altogether, which could
stymie their potential for other, beneficial uses. And failing to enact privacy limits
only increases the likelihood of an incident in which the public perceives that the
technology is being misused. The Federal Aviation Administration, which is charged with overseeing drone
regulate drone usage.

implementation in the U.S., says its focus is totally on safety, not privacy worries. We are concerned about how its being used
only to the extent it would affect the safety of the operation, says FAA spokesman Les Dorr. As it happens, domestic drone
operations are relatively limited because of safety concerns. The FAA has issued nearly 1,500 permits since 2007 for the use of
drones by public entities, such as law enforcement or fire departments, or by universities conducting research. Of those, 327 are
active. For example, Customs and Border Protection uses drones to keep tabs on the border with Mexico, and NASA deploys them to
monitor hurricanes. But the sky will open to drones in 2015 . A federal law signed last year directs the FAA to
safely integrate the unmanned vehicles into the U.S. airspace by then, paving the way for businesses and other private entities to
fly their own drones. With the agency estimating that some 10,000 commercial drones could be flying by 2017, picture this: news
outlets surveying damage from natural disasters, or paparazzi snooping on celebrities. And all 18,000 state and local lawenforcement agencies could be potential customers. The FAA last week began searching for six locations to test drones and is asking
for input on privacy protections for these sites. While the agency acknowledges that privacy is an issue that must be addressed, it
does not claim overall rule-making authority. Its unclear whos responsible for privacy issues at this point and time, says Gerald
Dillingham, director of civil-aviation issues at the Government Accountability Office. No one has stepped up to the plate. GAO
recommends that the FAA, along with the Justice and Homeland Security departments, discuss privacy parameters. If we wait until
theres a crisis, oftentimes the rules and regulations that are made in crisis arent our best showing, Dillingham says. Congress can
also act; Reps. Ted Poe, R-Texas, and Zoe Lofgren, D-Calif., introduced a bill last week requiring warrants for the use of drones in
criminal investigations. The American Civil Liberties Union sees momentum building to put privacy protections in place before the
drones become commonplace. It insists that law-enforcement agencies should not use them for investigations unless authorities
have reasonable suspicion they will turn up a specific criminal act. This is a lower threshold than a warrant, staff attorney Catherine
Crump says, because it does not require officers to go to a judge. We think that standard is what is necessary to prevent lawenforcement agents to engage in purely suspicionless use of drones, flying them around to see whats going on. As it stands,
theres

really not a lot in American privacy law thats going to be much of a barrier
to using drones, University of Washington law professor Ryan Calo says. Court cases invoking the Fourth

Amendment, which guards against unreasonable searches, largely hold that a

person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in public , or from a public vantage point, such as
from an aircraft overhead, Calo says. There are signs, however, that the Supreme Court is reexamining this doctrine. In a case
decided last term, five of the justices objected to police affixing a GPS device to a car without a warrant, and four more objected to

that
drones could be the catalyst for much-needed changes to privacy laws in a
nation in which targeted, unchecked surveillance is becoming increasingly
possible. The danger lies in it becoming the norm.
the continuous surveillance of a suspect. Drones can achieve the same goals without touching a vehicle. Calo thus believes

States bans on drones crush the economy

Wolfgang 2013 (Ben; Drone industry predicts explosive economic boost; Mar
12; www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/12/drone-industry-predictsexplosive-economic-boost/?page=all; kdf)
drones as spies remain matters of intense debate across the country, but
the controversial aircraft are poised to make an impact as something else: economic
engines. Private-sector drones also called unmanned aerial systems or UAVs will create more than
70,000 jobs within three years and will pump more than $82 billion into the U.S.
economy by 2025, according to a major new study commissioned by the industrys leading trade group.
Drones as weapons and

But the report, authored by aerospace specialist and former George Washington University professor Darryl Jenkins, assumes that
the White House and Congress stick to the current schedule and have in place the necessary legal and regulatory frameworks.
Current law calls for full drone integration into U.S. airspace by September 2015, but many key privacy questions surrounding UAVs
have yet to be answered. Theres also growing doubt that the Federal Aviation Administration can meet the congressionally
mandated timetable. If deadlines are met and drones become commonplace in American skies, some states will be especially big

Virginia, for example, stands to gain nearly 2,500 jobs by 2017. It also could take in
$4.4 million in tax revenue and see more than $460 million in overall economic
activity by 2017, the report says. Virginia would gain the eighth-most jobs of any state as a result of drone integration.
Maryland isnt far behind, with projections of more than 1,700 new jobs by 2017. California would be by far the
biggest winner in terms of jobs, with more than 12,000 expected . Florida, Texas, New York,
winners.

Washington, Connecticut, Kansas, Arizona and Pennsylvania are also expected to be benefit greatly from the coming drone economy.

This is an incredibly exciting time for an industry developing technology that will
benefit society, as well as the economy, said Michael Toscano, president and CEO of the Association for
Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, a trade group that has existed for more than 40 years but has come into the public eye

Drone expansion means the creation of quality, high-paying American

jobs, Mr. Toscano continued. But the motivation behind Tuesdays report arguably the most sweeping look ever at the
only recently.

economic potential of drones runs deeper than just dollars and cents. The industry faces an uncertain future in light of growing
public paranoia surrounding the craft paranoia that has only been heightened by the debate over whether the Obama
administration would ever consider using a drone to kill an American on U.S. soil. While the drones that will be employed by U.S.
companies or law enforcement agencies are far different than the military-style UAVs equipped with Hellfire missiles, those
distinctions arent always clear. Tuesdays report not only offered the industry a chance to shine the spotlight on drones positive
uses and economic potential, but also served as an opportunity or, perhaps a warning to lawmakers seeking to limit UAVs. More
than 20 states are considering bills to establish strict guidelines for what drones can do. Virginia is mulling a measure that would put
a two-year moratorium on all government use of drones. Such a measure would be especially harsh because first-responders such

Like other growing and

thriving sectors of the economy, the drone business likely will set up shop in friendly
environments. While we project more than 100,000 new jobs by 2025, states that create favorable regulatory and business
as police and fire departments are expected to be one of the largest markets for UAVs.

environments for the industry and the technology will likely siphon jobs away from states that do not, said Mr. Jenkins, the reports
lead author who used to head George Washington Universitys Aviation Institute and also is a former professor at Embry-Riddle
University. On another front, the FAA appears to be in danger of missing the congressionally mandated 2015 deadline for drone
integration. The agency just recently began taking applications for its test-site program, where drones will be studied to see how
they respond in different climate conditions and at different altitudes. More than 30 states have expressed interest in the program,

Every year that

we delay integration, the U.S. will lose more than $10 billion in total economic
impact, Mr. Jenkins said.
but its unclear when it will be fully established; further delays put the 2015 date in even greater jeopardy.

Link Turn Industry Sustainability

The plan sparks the drone industry
Rule 2015 (Troy A [Associate prof of law @ Sandra Day O'Connor college of law]; Airspace in the age of
drones; 95 B.U.L. Rev. 155; kdf)
Conclusion Innovations in the domestic drone industry are making it possible for citizens to access
low-altitude airspace like never before. Although these technological advances have the potential to greatly benefit

are also creating new and unprecedented conflicts involving the

space through which they fly. Prior to the advent of modern drones, there was no pressing need to
humankind, they [*208]

precisely define the scope of landowners' property interests in low-altitude airspace. Unfortunately, as a growing

ambiguous airspace rights laws are now

threatening to impede the growth of an important new industry. In the midst of these
flock of domestic drones stands ready for takeoff,

pressures, principles of microeconomics and property theory call for new laws giving landowners more definite

These exclusion rights would be

most effective if they were treated as equivalent to rights that landowners have
long enjoyed in surface land and if they extended all the way up to the navigable
airspace line where the public highway for air travel begins. Laws establishing such rights
rights to exclude drones from the airspace directly above their land.

would create a simple "exclusion" regime for low-altitude airspace that is better suited to handle aerial trespass and

They could also be an integral part of a broader

system of new federal, state, and local laws tailored to drones' unique
characteristics. By enacting clear and efficient drone laws, policymakers can help to
ensure that the sky is the limit for the domestic drone industry in the twenty-first
century.
takings questions involving domestic drones.

The plan provides the clarity necessary to make law

enforcement effective and the industry to develop
Rule 2015 (Troy A [Associate prof of law @ Sandra Day O'Connor college of law]; Airspace in the age of
drones; 95 B.U.L. Rev. 155; kdf)

the United States will be unable to take full advantage of modern

domestic drone technologies until federal, state, and local governments develop a more
robust legal and regulatory structure to govern these high-tech devices . For example,
Unfortunately,

conflicts are beginning to erupt almost daily between civilian drone users and private landowners. In Pittsburgh, a
drone recently flew over the playing field during a professional baseball game. n43 In Seattle, a woman getting
dressed in a high-rise building spotted a camera-equipped drone hovering just outside her window. n44 In Nashville,
a civilian drone soared conspicuously close to the city's Fourth of July fireworks display. n45 In Los [*164] Angeles,
hockey fans near the entrance of a professional sports arena threw large objects at a drone and eventually knocked
it out of the sky. n46 In each of these cases, it was debatable whether the drone operators involved could be held

Law enforcement agencies

are also increasingly grappling with difficult questions regarding their own potential
uses of drone technologies. Because of their modest size and ability to provide low-cost aerial vantage
points of activities on land, drones could be of great value to police departments. n48 But
should a police officer need a warrant before flying a small, camera-mounted drone
above a private residence in search of illegal activities ? And, if a police drone flies
directly above private land with neither a warrant nor the landowner's permission
and obtains incriminating photos or video footage, should that evidence be
admissible in court? A few state legislatures have recently enacted laws addressing these sorts of issues,
n49 but such questions still remain unsettled in most jurisdictions. There is even
criminally or civilly liable simply for flying their drones above private land. n47

active controversy regarding the proper scope of the FAA's regulatory authority over drone flights. The FAA clearly
possesses power to bring enforcement actions against citizens whose drones soar through high-altitude airspace
areas or near airports and create serious risks of collisions with human-occupied aircraft. But should the FAA have
regulatory jurisdiction over the flight of a drone if it occurs several miles away from any airport and the device
never climbs more than a few dozen feet off of the ground? In a [*165] recent dispute between the FAA and a
commercial drone operator, an administrative law judge for the National Transportation Safety Board expressed
skepticism that the FAA presently had regulatory power over such flights. The judge colorfully pointed out that,
under the FAA's expansive view of its own authority, even "a flight in the air of ... a paper aircraft, or a toy balsa

Frustrated by a lack of clear

laws relating to drones, many potential commercial drone users are presently
waiting on the sidelines for laws to develop, and some are even threatening to
relocate their drone-related activities to other countries. n51 The magnitude of these
delayed investments and lost opportunities will only grow until policymakers craft a
more workable set of legal rules for drones.
wood glider, could subject the "operator' to" an FAA enforcement action. n50

Legal uncertainty undermines the industry, plan reverse

that
Rule 2015 (Troy A [Associate prof of law @ Sandra Day O'Connor college of law]; Airspace in the age of
drones; 95 B.U.L. Rev. 155; kdf)

recent advancements in drone technologies

are fueling an unprecedented level of interest in these futuristic devices. A wide and
Although drones have been around for decades, n2

growing array of ever-more-sophisticated drones is now readily available for purchase at hobby stores and on the
Internet. Many of these drones sell for just a few hundred dollars and can effortlessly be controlled from ordinary
smartphones. n3 Seemingly overnight, a domestic drones market that once catered primarily to weekend hobbyists
is attracting journalists, real estate agents, wedding photographers, law enforcement agencies, and even delivery
companies. Unfortunately, the

United States seems ill-prepared for the complex legal

questions and regulatory challenges that this massive flock of new domestic drones
will bring. Within the United States, there are already reports of civilian drones crashing into buildings, n4
having hazardously close encounters with helicopters, n5 peeping into residential windows, n6 and being
intentionally shot down. n7 Anticipating the potential benefits and difficulties associated with the emergent

Congress enacted legislation in 2012 instructing the Federal Aviation

to adopt regulations [*158] by September 2015 to facilitate the smooth
integration of "civil unmanned aircraft systems" into U.S. airspace. n8 However, it appears increasingly
doubtful that the FAA will meet that deadline. n9 And in the meantime, the agency is attempting to
domestic drone market,

Administration ("FAA")

enforce a controversial moratorium on most commercial drone use. n10 To date, most of the scholarly n11 and
legislative n12 activity relating to domestic drones has centered on the devices' potential impact on privacy rights
and criminal evidence gathering. Regrettably ,

legal academicians and policymakers have

devoted far less attention to an unsettled property law question that underlies these
and many other domestic drone issues: Up to what height do surface owners hold strict rights to
exclude flying objects from physically invading the airspace above their land? Legal uncertainty and
confusion are likely to continue swirling around the domestic drone industry until
courts or legislators clear up this basic property question.

Link Turn Surveillance -> Offshoring

Surveillance guts competitiveness
Stiennon 2013 (Richard; NSA Surveillance Threatens US Competitiveness; Jun
7; www.forbes.com/sites/richardstiennon/2013/06/07/nsa-surveillance-threatens-uscompetitiveness/; kdf)
domestic spying by the NSA revealed this week threatens the global
competitiveness of US tech companies. We are told we live in a digital world and the future is bright
The vast foreign and

for tech startups as costs of launching new products and services plummet and global markets open up to the

there is a world wide perception that any data that is stored or even
routed through the United States is sucked into cavernous NSA data centers for
analysis and cataloging. That perception was solidified in 2006 when former AT&T technician Mark Klein
smallest vendor. Yet,

blew the whistle on the fiber tap that ATT had provided to the NSA in some of its data centers. Those perceptions

Email archiving services

such as ProofPoint could not sell to even Canadian customers without building local
infrastructure. Even establishing separate data centers in Canada and Europe is not enough to assure
customers that their data would forever stay out of the grasp of US intelligence services. One of the fastest
growing segments of the tech industry is cloud services , with Salesforce.com one of the
have had real consequences for US tech firms seeking to offer global services.

leading examples. Box.net, and other cloud storage solutions, are burgeoning. Cloud infrastructure providers like
Amazon, Microsoft, and Rackspace are investing billions to serve markets that should be global but will be barred
from most countries thanks to the complete abandonment of trust caused by NSA/FBI spying. Since 2006, every
time I present outside the US the same question has been asked: Is the US reading our email? Answers that allude
to protections from abuse and oversight now seem specious. From this week forward a universal suspicion has
transformed into acknowledged fact. Yes, US government agencies are reading email, tracking phone calls, and
monitoring all communications. Brian Honan Board Member of the UK & Ireland Chapter of the Cloud Security

The revelations about the PRISM program could have major

implications for US companies doing business within the European Union . Under the EU
Alliance provided this opinion:

Data Protection directive it is illegal for European companies to export the personal data of EU citizens to countries
outside of the EU and the European Economic Area. Exceptions to this are for certain countries that have similar
privacy legislation in place to that of the EU or where the strong contracts protecting the privacy of that data are in
place. The US in not one of the approved countries but has put in place the EU Safe Harbor program which US
companies can sign up to and agree to apply EU privacy protections to private data. Many of the companies
allegedly involved in PRISM are part of the Safe Harbor program. The fact the US government is potentially
accessing that data could place the European organisations in breach of EU Data Protection regulations. The news
will also heighten concerns many European organisations, especially EU government ones, will have in selecting a
US Cloud Provider for their services. Gabriel Yoran, Managing Director and Founder of German security company
Steganos added: The European Union traditionally favors strong privacy regulations. However, this policy has been
under attack recently, being seen as a competitive disadvantage in the cloud services space. This could
dramatically change now in the light of the recent Verizon findings. Privacy software maker Steganos traditionally
stresses it being headquartered in Berlin and therefore subject to the even stricter German data protection law (one
of the strictest in the world). According to a February survey, 64% of Steganos customers said it was important or

Trust is the very foundation of all

commerce. Once lost it is almost impossible to regain. This weeks revelations that the NSA has
very important to them that Steganos is a Germany-based company.

blanket data harvesting arrangements with Verizon, ATT, Sprint-Nextel, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Skype, Yahoo,
FaceBook and even credit card processors, will have immediate repercussions. Non-US customers of any US
business will immediately evaluate their exposure to these new risks and look for alternatives. European, Canadian,
and Australian tech companies will profit from this. Competitors in those regions will offer alternatives that will also

While the FBI and NSA leverage the

dramatic intelligence opportunities of a digital world, their Orwellian actions are
crushing opportunity for tech giants and startups in the United States.
draw US customers away from the compromised US services.

US risks stalling now, especially in high tech services

prevents sustainable growth
Muro, et al, February 15 [Mark Muro, a senior fellow and director of policy
for the Metropolitan Policy Program, manages the program's economic work and key
policy projects. Jonathan Rothwell, February 2015, Advanced Industries Drive
Broad-Based Growth and Prosperity New Brookings report analyzes U.S. advanced
industries sector, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/02/03advanced-industries#/M10420]
The need for economic renewal in the U S remains urgent
new technologies ranging from
robotics and 3-D printing to digitization
are provoking genuine excitement
nited

tates

. Years of disappointing job growth and stagnant

incomes for the majority of workers have left the nation shaken and frustrated. At the same time, astonishing
the

advanced

of everything

even as they make it hard to see where things are going. Hence this paper: At a critical moment, this report asserts the special importance to Americas future of what the paper calls Americas advanced industries sector.
Characterized by its deep involvement with technology research and development (R&D) and STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) workers, the sector encompasses 50 industries ranging from manufacturing industries

high-tech services
Their dynamism is going to be a central
component of any future revitalized U.S. economy.
these industries
encompass the countrys best shot at supporting innovative
and
sustainable growth.
Advanced industries represent a
sizable economic anchor for the U.S. economy and have led the post-recession
employment recovery.
the sector packs a massive economic punch.
such as automaking and aerospace to energy industries such as oil and gas extraction to

such as computer software and computer system design, including for health applications.

These industries encompass the nations tech sector at its broadest and most consequential.

As such,

, inclusive,

For that reason, this report provides a wide-angle overview of the advanced industry sector that reviews its role in American prosperity, assesses key trends, and maps

its metropolitan and global competitive standing before outlining high-level strategies to enhance that.The overview finds that: 1.

Modest in size,

As an employer

and source of economic activity the advanced industry sector plays a major role in the U.S. economy. As of 2013, the nations 50 advanced industries (see nearby box for selection criteria) employed 12.3 million U.S. workers. That

U.S. advanced industries produce $2.7 trillion

in value added annually 17 percent of all
GDP That is more than any
other sector
the sector employs 80 percent of the nations
engineers; performs 90 percent of private-sector R&D; generates approximately 85
percent of all U.S. patents; and accounts for 60 percent of U.S. exports. Advanced
industries also support unusually extensive supply chains and other forms of
ancillary economic activity.
amounts to about 9 percent of total U.S. employment. And yet, even with this modest employment base,

U.S. gross domestic product (

).

, including healthcare, finance, or real estate. At the same time,

On a per worker basis, advanced industries purchase $236,000 in goods and services from other businesses annually, compared with $67,000 in purchasing

by other industries. This spending sustains and creates more jobs. In fact, 2.2 jobs are created domestically for every new advanced industry job0.8 locally and 1.4 outside of the region. This means that in addition to the 12.3
million workers employed by advanced industries, another 27.1 million U.S. workers owe their jobs to economic activity supported by advanced industries. Directly and indirectly, then, the sector supports almost 39 million jobs
nearly one-fourth of all U.S. employment. In terms of the sectors growth and change, the total number of jobs in the sector has remained mostly flat since 1980 but its output has soared. From 1980 to 2013 advanced industries
expanded at a rate of 5.4 percent annually30 percent faster than the economy as a whole. Since the Great Recession, moreover, both employment and output have risen dramatically. The sector has added nearly one million jobs
since 2010, with employment and output growth rates 1.9 and 2.3 times higher, respectively, than in the rest of the economy. Advanced services led this post-recession surge, and created 65 percent of the new jobs. Computer
systems design alone generated 250,000 new jobs. Certain advanced manufacturing industriesespecially those involved in transportation equipmenthave also added thousands of jobs after decades of losses. Advanced
industries also provide extremely high-quality economic opportunities for workers. Workers in advanced industries are extraordinarily productive and generate some $210,000 in annual value added per worker compared with
$101,000, on average, outside advanced industries. Because of this, advanced industries compensate their workers handsomely and, in contrast to the rest of the economy, wages are rising sharply. In 2013, the average advanced
industries worker earned $90,000 in total compensation, nearly twice as much as the average worker outside of the sector. Over time, absolute earnings in advanced industries grew by 63 percent from 1975 to 2013, after adjusting
for inflation. This compares with 17 percent gains outside the sector. Even workers with lower levels of education can earn salaries in advanced industries that far exceed their peers in other industries. In this regard, the sector is in
fact accessible: More than half of the sectors workers possess less than a bachelors degree. 2. The advanced industries sector is highly metropolitan and varies considerably in its composition and depth across regions. Advanced
industries are present in nearly every U.S. region, but the sectors geography is uneven. Advanced industries tend to cluster in large metropolitan areas. Looking across the country, the 100 largest metro areas contain 70 percent of
all U.S. advanced industries jobs. In terms of the sectors local clustering, San Jose is the nations leading advanced industry hub with 30.0 percent of its workforce employed in the sector. Seattle follows with 16.0 percent of its local
jobs in advanced industries. Wichita (15.5 percent); Detroit (14.8 percent), and San Francisco (14.0 percent) follow. Overall, advanced industries account for more than one in 10 jobs in nearly one-quarter of the countrys major metro
areas. This clustering occurs in a variety of configurations. Some metropolitan areassuch as Grand Rapids, MI; Portland, OR; and Wichitafocus heavily on advanced manufacturing pursuits such as automotive, semiconductor, or
aerospace manufacturing, respectively, while metros like Bakersfield and Oklahoma City exhibit strong energy specializations. By contrast, services such as computer systems design, software, and research and development
predominate in metropolitan areas like Boston, San Francisco, and Washington. For their part, San Jose, Detroit, and Seattle exhibit depth and balance across multiple advanced industry categories. Overall, the number of extremely
dense concentrations of advanced industry actually has declined. In 1980, 59 of the countrys 100 largest metropolitan areas had at least 10 percent of their workforce in advanced industries. By 2013, only 23 major metro areas

The U S is losing ground to other countries on advanced

industry competitiveness
contained such sizable concentrations. 3.

nited

tates

. The United States has the most productive advanced industries in the world, behind only energy-intensive Norway. However, this

competitiveness appears to be eroding. The nations declining

concentration

in advanced industries and its negative trade balance in the sector

do not bode well Since 2000, the sectors

.

employment and output as a share of the

economy has shrunk The

nations standing on these measures now lags world leaders.
total U.S.

Equally worrisome is the balance of trade in the sector.

Although advanced industries export $1.1 trillion worth of goods and services each year and account for roughly 60 percent of total U.S. exports, the United States ran a $632 billion trade deficit in the sector in 2012, in line with
similar yearly balances since 1999. To be sure, a handful of individual advanced industries such as royalties and other intellectual property and aerospace manufacturing enjoy trade surpluses that exceeded $60 billion and $80 billion
in 2012. However, numerous areas of historical strength such as communications equipment, computer equipment, motor vehicles, and pharmaceuticals now run sizeable deficits, as do high-value R&D services and computer and

Notwithstanding the nations strong innovation enterprise the U S

advantage on this front is slipping For certain the advanced industry sector remains
the key site of U.S. technology gains.
For example, the U.S. share of global R&D and patenting is falling
information services.

nited

tates

However, the United States is losing ground relative to other countries on measures of innovation performance and

capacity.

much faster than its

Americas research
dominance looks less impressive after adjusting for the size of its working age
population
share of global GDP and population, meaning that U.S. slippage cannot simply be attributed to demography or macroeconomic convergence. Likewise,

. Turning to the nations critical regional innovation ecosystems, surprisingly few U.S. metropolitan areas rank among the worlds most innovativeas measured by patent cooperation treaty applications

per capita. Among the nations most patent-intensive regions, just twoSan Diego and the San Jose-San Francisco combined arearank in the global top 20 and just two more (Boston and Rochester) score in the top 50.

xtsurveillance -> offshoring

Domestic surveillance causes massive offshoringundermines
the economy
Miller 2014 (Hugo; NSA Spying Sends Data Clients North of the Border; Jan 9;
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-09/nsa-spying-sends-data-clients-northof-the-border; kdf)
In the British Columbia town of Kamloops, arid as a desert with cool summer nights, Telus Corp. only has to turn on

chilly
temperatures are part of Canadian companies sales pitch to businesses looking for
places to store their growing troves of digital information as cheaply as possible. They also
boast of inexpensive hydroelectric power and low seismic activity. And now theyre touting what they
say is a new advantage: less snooping. Revelations that the U.S. National Security
Agency has spied on data networks run by American companies have given
Canadian data-center operators an opportunity. Theyre telling customers from Europe
and Asia that laws north of the border are more protective of privacy. Sales of storage
services in Canada are growing 20 percent a year at Telus and Rogers Communications Inc. U .S.-based
technology companies, meanwhile, complain that the NSA scandal has hurt their
business. There is a structural advantage in Canada in that the data is here and the privacy protection is more
the air conditioning about 40 hours a year to keep its computer servers from overheating. The

stringent, said Lloyd Switzer, who runs Teluss network of data centers. The company has 10 data centers in
Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia, where it opened a C$75 million, 215,000-square-foot (20,000square-meter) facility in Kamloops last year. That site has room for six more modules of expansion, which would
increase the investment into the hundreds of millions of dollars.

-- AT: Canada Good

Canada doesnt solve the aff
Miller 2014 (Hugo; NSA Spying Sends Data Clients North of the Border; Jan 9;
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-09/nsa-spying-sends-data-clients-northof-the-border; kdf)
Snowdens Revelation Data privacy came under scrutiny in the U.S. in June after former NSA contractor Edward
Snowden revealed that his employer was monitoring phone and e-mail traffic emanating from the U.S. International
outrage over NSA surveillance may cost U.S. companies as much as $35 billion in lost revenue through 2016,
according to the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, a policy research group in Washington whose
board includes representatives of companies such as International Business Machines Corp. and Intel Corp. Rogers,
which competes with Telus for phone and Internet customers, gets about C$70 million ($66 million) in annual
revenue from data storage -- still tiny at less than 1 percent of total sales. The unit has had more inquiries in the
past 12 months from companies outside North America than in the entire previous decade, A.J. Byers, who heads up

A lot of international companies trying to

gain access to the U.S. used to go directly to the U.S., Byers said. Now we see a lot of
European and Asian companies talking to us. Rogers and Telus are looking to capitalize on the
the business, said in an interview. Overseas Demand

surge in demand for data storage to make up for the slowing growth of smartphones, which more than half of
Canadians already have. Stock gains for the companies also have slowed. Shares of Rogers climbed 6 percent last
year after gaining 15 percent in 2012. Telus rose 12 percent last year, its smallest annual increase in four years.
Last month, a U.S. federal judge ruled that the NSA probably acted illegally in collecting telephone-call data,
allowing a lawsuit to go forward claiming the practice violates the U.S. Constitution. U.S. District Judge William H.
Pauley III in Manhattan late last month ruled the NSAs bulk collection of phone records is legal, challenging the
earlier ruling. The NSA has said its pleased with Pauleys decision. Facing Charges Snowden has been charged with
theft and espionage by the U.S. government and has avoided arrest by remaining in Russia. While editorials in
newspapers such as the New York Times have recommended that he get clemency, Janet Napolitano, the former
head of the Department of Homeland Security, has said he doesnt deserve a reprieve. Canadas Privacy Act,
enacted in 1983, imposes obligations on 250 federal-government departments and agencies to limit collection and

the datacenter sales pitch glosses over the long history of intelligence-sharing between
Canada and the U.S. The governments have collaborated as far back as the 1940s, said Ron Deibert, an
Internet-security expert who runs the University of Torontos Citizen Lab. Anyone who would look to
Canada as a safe haven would be fooling themselves, Deibert said in a phone interview.
Canada would be one of the poorest choices as we have a long-standing
relationship with the NSA. Surveillance Allowed Communications Security Establishment, the countrys
use of personal information, and gives citizens the right to access that data and correct mistakes. Still,

intelligence agency for communications and electronics, is forbidden from monitoring purely domestic traffic.

Surveillance of foreign communications that involve someone in Canada may be

authorized, as long as one of the parties is outside the country -- a rule established after the Sept. 11 terrorist
attacks. CSE works with its Five Eyes information-gathering partners -- the U.S., U.K., Australia and New Zealand -and must comply with Canadian law in its interactions with them, Andrew McLaughlin, a spokesman for the agency,
said by e-mail. A CSE commissioner, typically a retired judge, submits an annual report to Canadas Parliament
through the defense ministry. Justice Robert Decary, who did the last such report in June, wrote that he was deeply
disappointed that legislative amendments to Canadas National Defense Act proposed by his predecessors that
would improve the provisions that were hastily enacted in the aftermath of September 2001 havent yet been
adopted.

No Internal link industry hype

Their link is just industry hype plan wont hurt the economy
Bernd 2013 (Candice [assistant editor/reporter with Truthout]; The Coming
Domestic Drone Wars; Sep 19; www.truth-out.org/news/item/18951-the-comingdomestic-drone-wars#; kdf)
States Push to Regulate Domestic Drones as Industry Pushes Back The Texas law is just one of many pieces of
legislation placing restrictions on the use of domestic drones to be introduced in 43 states this year, passing in

Many of these state-level bills seek to require search warrants for surveillance
drones used by local police departments, and at least six states have required warrants. In 2013,
eight.

Virginia put in place a two-year moratorium on the use of drones by law enforcement to develop more stringent
guidelines. Legislation restricting civilian drone use has passed in states such as Florida, Tennessee, Idaho, Montana
and Oregon, but other states such as North Dakota have tried to pass laws that would ban weapons from domestic

the industry is pushing back against privacy restrictions and

regulations on civilian drones, saying the restrictions will hinder job creation. In Maine,
drones and have failed. But

Gov. Paul LePage backed up the claim by vetoing a bill that would have required police to obtain a warrant before

"We don't support rewriting

existing search warrant requirements under the guise of privacy," Mario Mairena told
deploying a drone, citing concerns it would kill new aerospace jobs.

the AP. Mairena is a government relations manager for the Virginia-based Association for Unmanned Vehicle
Systems International (AUVSI), an industry group. The group's website boasts hundreds of corporate members,
many of which are defense contractors. The group also has ties to the Unmanned Systems Caucus in Congress.

Whether or not requiring a warrant in law enforcement drone operations would kill
jobs remains to be seen, but the integration of civilian drones into the NAS would
create a considerable economic impact, to be sure. An AUVSI report estimates that that the
integration of unmanned systems in the U.S. will generate more than $13.6 billion
and create 74,000 jobs within the first three years. But strong regulations of
domestic drones in the states may prove especially important depending on what
guidelines the FAA puts in place to integrate the technology into the national
airspace by 2015, as some experts fear the susceptibility to co-option of unmanned systems by third-party
operators could pose serious risks to domestic security.

No internal link US not key

The US isnt key to the global economy
Kenny 2015 (Charles; Why the Developing World Won't Catch the U.S.
Economy's Cold; May 4; www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-04/why-thedeveloping-world-won-t-catch-the-u-s-economy-s-cold; kdf)
first-quarter GDP growth for 2015 was an
anemic 0.2 percent. This immediately sparked fears that a U.S. slowdown could lead to a
global recession. But the clich about America sneezing and the rest of the world
catching the cold doesnt hold like it used to . The U.S. isnt as contagious as it was, and
developing countries in particular are far more robust to economic shocks. Thats good
news for everyone. It means less volatility in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which contributes to happier
Last week the U.S. Commerce Department announced that

people, greater political stability, and stronger long-term growthall of which should help lift the U.S. out of its own

A team of IMF researchers has looked at the long-term record of the worlds
economies when it comes to growth and recession . They measured how long economies
doldrums.

expanded without interruption, as well as the depth and length of downturns. Over the past two decades, low and
middle-income economies have spent more time in expansions, while downturns and recoveries have become
shallower and shorter. This suggests countries have become more resilient to shocks. In the 1970s and '80s, the
median developing economy took more than 10 years after a downturn to recover to the GDP per capita it had prior
to that slump. By the early 2000s, that recovery time had dropped to two years. In the 1970s and '80s, countries of
the developing world spent more than a third of their time in downturns, but by the 2000s they spent 80 percent of
their time in expansions. The first decade of the 21st century was the first time that developing economies saw
more expansion and shorter downturns than did advanced economies: Median growth in the developing world was
at its highest since 1950 and volatility at its lowest. Developing countries still face a larger risk of deeper recession
when terms of trade turn against them, capital flows dry up, or advanced economies enter recessions themselves.
But the scale of that risk has diminished. Thats because low and middle-income economies have introduced policy
reforms that increase resilience: flexible exchange rates, inflation targeting, and lower debt. Economies with
inflation-targeting regimes see recovery periods less than a third as long as economies without targeting, for
example. Larger reserves are associated with longer expansions. And median reserves in developing countries more
than doubled as a percentage of GDP between the 1990s and 2010. Median external debt has dropped from 60
percent to 35 percent of GDP over that same period. Such policy changes account for two-thirds of the increased
recession-resilience of developing countries since the turn of the century, suggest the IMF researchersleaving
external factors, such as positive terms of trade, accounting for just one-third. Thats good news for the developing
worldnot least because volatile growth is particularly bad for poorer people, who are most at risk of falling into
malnutrition or being forced to take children out of school, which has long-term consequences for future earnings.
That might help explain the relationship between growth volatility, slower reductions in poverty, and rising
inequality. Sudden negative income shocks can also be a factor in sparking violence: When rains fail, the risk of civil
war in Africa spikes, and when coffee prices in Colombia fall, municipalities cultivating more coffee see increased
drug-related conflict. The African analysis suggests that a five percentage-point drop in income growth is associated
with a 10 percent increase in the risk of civil conflict in the following year. Finally ,

because volatility
increases the uncertainty attached to investments, it can also be a drag on overall
long-term economic performance. Viktoria Hnatkovska and Norman Loayza of the World Bank
estimated that moving from a comparatively stable to a relatively volatile growth trajectory is associated with a

Lower volatility in the developing

world and its associated long-term growth performance is also good news for the
U.S. A strong global economy is still a positive force for growth in every country, including developed nations. And
drop in average annual growth of as much as 2 percent of GDP.

with the developing world accounting for about one-third of trade and GDP at market rates, as well as three-fifths of

Those hoping for

a recovery in U.S. output should be grateful for stronger economic immune systems
in the rest of the world.
U.S. exports, its role in supporting American economic performance has never been greater.

xtNo Impact
The global economy determines the US economy, not vice
versa
Rasmus 2015 (Jack; US Economy Collapses Again; May 14;
www.counterpunch.org/2015/05/14/us-economy-collapses-again/; kdf)
The problem of weak, stop-go, recovery in the U.S. today is further exacerbated by a
global economy that continues to slow even more rapidly and , in case after case, slip
increasingly into recessions or stagnate at best. Signs of weakness and stress in the global economy are
everywhere and growing. Despite massive money injections by its central bank in 2013, and again in 2014, Japans
economy has fallen in 2015, a fourth time, into recession. After having experienced two recessions since 2009,

Europes economy is also trending toward stagnation once more after it too, like
Japan, just introduced a US$60 billion a month central bank money injection this past winter. Despite daily hype in
the business press, unemployment in the Eurozone is still officially at 11.4 percent , and in
countries like Spain and Greece, still at 24 percent. Yet we hear Spain is now the poster-boy of the Eurozone,
having returned to robust growth. Growth for whom? Certainly not the 24 percent still jobless, a rate that hasnt
changed in years. Euro businesses in Spain are doing better, having imposed severe labor market reforms on

Italy
remains the economic black sheep of the Eurozone, still in recession for years now,
while France officially records no growth, but is likely in recession as well. Elites in both Italy
and France hope to copy Spains labor market reforms (read: cut wages, pensions, and make
workers there, in order to drive down wages to help reduce costs and boost Spanish exports. Meanwhile,

it easier to layoff full time workers). In order to boost its growth, Italy is considering, or may have already decided,
to redefine its way to growth by including the services of prostitutes and drug dealers as part of its GDP. Were the

Across the Eurozone, the

greater economy of its 18 countries still hasnt reached levels it had in 2007, before
the onset of the last recession. Unlike the U.S.s stop-go, Europe has been stop-go-stop.
USA to do the same redefinition, it would no doubt mean a record boost to GDP.

AT: Immigration DA

AT Linkdrones fail
Drones are ineffective at surveillance US borders prove
Bennett, January 7, 2015
(Brian, writes about national security and intelligence in Washington, D.C. He has documented a pattern of
excessive force by U.S. Border Patrol agents and revealed the first arrest on U.S. soil using a Predator drone. He
started as a reporter for Time magazine in Hong Kong in 2000, reported from Pakistan and Afghanistan after the
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and was Times Baghdad bureau chief in 2003 and 2004, Border drones are ineffective,
badly managed, too expensive, official says, LA Times,

http://www.latimes.com/nation/immigration/la-na-border-drones-20150107story.html, Accessed June 24, 2015, YDEL)

Drones patrolling the U.S. border are poorly managed and ineffective at stopping
illegal immigration, and the government should abandon a $400-million plan to
expand their use, according to an internal watchdog report released Tuesday. The 8-year-old drone program
has cost more than expected, according to a report by the Department of Homeland Security's inspector general,

Rather than spend more on drones, the department should "put those funds
to better use," Roth recommended. He described the Predator B drones flown along the border by U.S.
John Roth.

Customs and Border Protection as "dubious achievers." It's time for Congress to agree on a humane immigration
solution It's time for Congress to agree on a humane immigration solution "Notwithstanding the significant

we see no evidence that the drones contribute to a more secure border ,

and there is no reason to invest additional taxpayer funds at this time," Roth said in
a statement. The audit concluded that Customs and Border Protection could better use the funds on manned
aircraft and ground surveillance technology. The drones were designed to fly over the border to
spot smugglers and illegal border crossers. But auditors found that 78% of the time
that agents had planned to use the craft, they were grounded because of bad
weather, budget constraints or maintenance problems . lRelated Proposed U.S. regulations for
investment,

drones expected soon amid soaring sales BUSINESS Proposed U.S. regulations for drones expected soon amid

Three
drones flying around the Tucson area helped apprehend about 2,200 people illegally
crossing the border in 2013, fewer than 2% of the 120,939 apprehended that year
in the area. Border Patrol supervisors had planned on using drones to inspect
ground-sensor alerts. But a drone was used in that scenario only six times in 2013 .
soaring sales SEE ALL RELATED

8 Even when aloft, auditors found, the drones contributed little.

Auditors found that officials underestimated the cost of the drones by leaving out operating costs such as pilot

the flying cost nearly fivefold, to

$12,255 per hour. People think these kinds of surveillance technologies will be a silver bullet. Time after
salaries, equipment and overhead. Adding such items increased

time, we see the practical realities of these systems don't live up to the hype. - Jay Stanley, ACLU privacy expert
"It really doesn't feel like [Customs and Border Protection] has a good handle on how it is using its drones, how
much it costs to operate the drones, where that money is coming from or whether it is meeting any of its
performance metrics," said Jennifer Lynch, a lawyer for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a San Francisco-based
privacy and digital rights group. The report's conclusions will make it harder for officials to justify further
investment in the border surveillance drones, especially at a time when Homeland Security's budget is at the center
of the battle over President Obama's program to give work permits to millions of immigrants in the country illegally
18, 2015 ADD A COMMENTSEE ALL COMMENTS 21 "People think these kinds of surveillance technologies will be
a silver bullet," said Jay Stanley, a privacy expert at the American Civil Liberties Union. " Time

after time, we
see the practical realities of these systems don't live up to the hype. " Customs and
Border Protection, which is part of Homeland Security, operates the fleet of nine long-range Predator B drones from
bases in Arizona, Texas and North Dakota. The agency purchased 11 drones, but one crashed in Arizona in 2006
and another fell into the Pacific Ocean off San Diego after a mechanical failure last year. Agency officials said in

they had no plans to expand the fleet aside from replacing the
Predator that crashed last year. The agency is authorized to spend an additional
$433 million to buy up to 14 more drones.
response to the audit that

Drones are statistically useless in apprehensions border

patrol proves
Lee, 2015
(Brianna, joined IBT in July 2014 and covers U.S. immigration and Latin America.
Previously she worked as a writer and editor at the Council on Foreign Relations and
as a staff writer for the PBS news program "Need to Know, Immigration Reform:
Drones At The U.S. Border Are Expensive, Not Proven Effective, Report Says,
International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/immigration-reform-dronesus-border-are-expensive-not-proven-effective-report-says-1775076, Accessed: June
26, 2015, YDEL)
About half of the 1,954-mile border between the U.S. and Mexico is patrolled by drones thanks to a federal program launched nearly

report says theres no evidence that the drones are

effectively policing the border, and that taxpayers footing the bill to the tune of more than $12,000 per hour of
10 years ago. But a new watchdog

flight aren't getting their money's worth. The Department of Homeland Securitys Office of the Inspector General issued a biting

the Customs and Border Protection agency (CBP). After

eight years, the report states, CBP has invested significant funds in a program that has
not achieved the expected results, and it cannot demonstrate how much the
program has improved border security. The use of military-grade Predator B drones for border surveillance
review of the border drone program, operated by

has ballooned since CBPs program launched in 2005, with proponents saying they had more endurance and better capacity than
other manned flying vehicles like helicopters. There are nine drones currently in operation (CBP has purchased 11 in total, but one
crashed in 2006 and another crashed in January 2014) and they primarily patrol two areas of the border: the Arizona-Tucson sector

The audit, which surveyed border drone operations through

fiscal year 2013, found that relatively few apprehensions of border crossers were
attributed to drone operations. Drones led to about 1.8 percent of apprehensions in
the Tucson sector and a mere 0.7 percent in the Rio Grande Valley , according to
CBPs data. The agency had aimed to fly the drones for 16 hours a day to patrol, but the report found they
were airborne only for 22 percent of that time . Moreover, the report said, the program is far more
and the Rio Grande Valley sector.

expensive than CBPs cost estimates suggest. CBP estimates that each flight hour costs around $2,468, but the inspector generals
office said that figure was closer to $12,255, factoring in additional operating costs of pilots, equipment, support staff and other
overhead. (By comparison, the similar MQ-9 Reaper drone used by the Air Force costs an estimated $3,624 per flight hour, while the
manned F-16C fighter-bomber costs more than $20,000 per flight hour, according to Time magazine's calculations.) The

$443
million CBP plans to spend on program expansion could be put to better use by
investing in alternatives, the report said, referring to the agencys 2012 proposal to
buy an additional 14 aircraft to survey the border. The inspector generals office noted that CBP
agreed with one of its recommendations to work with another Homeland Security office to evaluate the necessity and costeffectiveness of purchasing any additional drones. But CBP said it wouldnt revise its cost calculation methodology to more
accurately reflect the total cost of operating drones on the border, saying its current methods met all federal requirements. This

The inspector generals

office issued another review in 2012 that pointed out inadequacies in the agencys
resource planning for the unmanned aircraft mission. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) also noted in a report last year that around 20 percent
of drone flights from 2011 to April 2014 were conducted in the interior of the U.S.,
away from the border and coastal areas. However, the GAOs findings countered criticisms that the border
isnt the first internal report to challenge the cost-effectiveness of the border drone program.

drone program would raise privacy issues, saying that the Department of Homeland Security was complying with privacy and civil
liberty laws in its use of unmanned vehicles.

AT: Link No Solve Terror

Drones are inefficient mechanism to solve terrorism
Rothfuss 2014 (Ian F [George Mason School of Law]; Student Comment: An
Economic Perspective on the Privacy Implications of Domestic Drone Surveillance;
10 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 441; kdf)
Conclusion
U.S. citizens want to be safe from terrorist attacks and other threats, but not at the
expense of their privacy rights. Therefore, a delicate balance must be achieved
between privacy and security interests. Drones represent a surveillance technology
advancement that threatens to dramatically alter the balance between these
interests. As discussed in this comment, the current legal framework does not
adequately protect privacy from the widespread surveillance that will likely result
from the unrestricted domestic use of drones. Therefore, prompt legislative action is
necessary to address the fundamental privacy challenges presented by the use of
drones. Such legislation should allow for constructive use of drones within a
framework that contains restrictions to protect individual privacy rights. While
widespread general surveillance could make the nation safer from crime and
terrorism, such extensive surveillance will ultimately be inefficient. The surveillance
that could result from the domestic use of drones would detract from individual
privacy and cause individuals to reduce productive activities and invest in
countermeasures. Such "privacy disutility" will outweigh the societal benefits unless
domestic drone surveillance is restricted. Therefore, [*462] without legislative
action we may soon live in a world where "every time we walk out of our front door
we have to look up and wonder whether some invisible eye in the sky is monitoring
us." n175

AT: Legitimacy

No Link Grounds
Expanding 4 Amendment rights in the face of a major
technological advance like drones is well within Court
precedent
Black 13- J.D. Candidate Washington and Lee Law School
th

(Tyler, Over Your Head, Under the Radar: An Examination of Changing Legislation,
Aging Case Law, and Possible Solutions to the Domestic Police Drone Puzzle, 2013,
19 Washington and Lee Law Review, Lexis Nexis) JB
Court acknowledged that "[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected
by the advance of technology." n147 As an example, the majority pointed to aerial
observation cases. n148 The Court wondered openly "what limits there are upon this power of technology to
The

shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." n149 This statement acknowledges two important concepts-

technological advances will continue to stress constitutional protections from undue

searches, and the Court has a role in defining appropriate boundaries for
those advances. n150 As drones represent a major advance in technology, [*1861]
the Court would therefore be well within precedent to adjust the rules accordingly.

No Link Observer Effect

Observer effect enables courts to preserve SOP and avoid

making controversial decisions that might reduce legitimacy
Deeks 13 (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the
U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention,
the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence
issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with alQaeda, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes,
and Judicial Deference, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)
Courts are sensitive to the reputational costs of deciding controversial casesand
cases involving wartime or emergency policies are particularly likely to be
controversial. Many scholars have highlighted the institutional costs of deciding
such cases.284 Judicial decisions on the merits force courts to bear certain
reputational costs. The operation of the observer effect means that courts need to
decide fewer such cases (or decide them in a more modest manner) than they may
think in order to preserve separationof-powers values. This approach allows courts
largely (though not entirely) to avoid making politically controversial decisions that
might cast questions on their institutional competence, while allowing the courts on
limited occasions to stake out their more popular role as defender of rights.285 At
the same time, there are ways in which courts can distance themselves from the
policies in question, thus ensuring that political accountability for the policy falls
squarely on the executive.

AT: Politics

Link Turn -- Bipart

Regulating UAVs is strongly bipartisan
Hurst 13 (Dustin, The Bipartisan Opposition to Domestic Drones, January 29,
http://reason.com/archives/2013/01/29/the-bipartisan-opposition-domesticdroneSEP)
Both the progressive American Civil Liberties Union and the libertarian Rutherford Institute cheer
legislative efforts to place strict limits on unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs. And, prodded by privacy groups,
state lawmakers nationwideRepublicans and Democrats alikehave launched an all-out offensive
against the unmanned aerial vehicles. And to think, only the prospect of complete upheaval of Americas strong
tradition of privacy rights spurs bipartisanship. In at least 13 states, lawmakers this year will examine bills to place strict
limits on how government entities can deploy drones. No state has embedded such regulations into law. Drones are already
everywhereexecuting search-and-rescue missions, tracking cattle rustlers, or monitoring wildfires with minimal cost and little risk
of loss of life. The Federal Aviation Administration listed 345 active drone licenses as of November 2012. Congress has directed the
federal department to streamline the approval process. Starting in 2015, commercial entitiesthink entertainment news outlet TMZ
will have easy access to drone permits. Analysts believe as many as 30,000 drones will populate American skies by 2020. Canyon
County, Idaho, already has one, a camera-equipped Draganflyer X-6 it bought for $33.400 with federal grant money. About a year
ago, Mesa County, Colorado, used $14,000 to purchase its drone, a 4-foot-long, 9-pound plane that can maintain flight for about an
hour. The Seattle Police Department spent $41,000 in August for its Draganflyer X-6. With the booming interest in the myriad uses of
UAVs comes nervous anxiety about the creep of the surveillance state.

Bipartisan Congressional support exists for curtailing drones

Fox News 13
(Fox News, Lawmakers eye regulating domestic surveillance drones,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/05/19/congress-eyes-regulating-drones/) JB
Amid growing concern over the use of drones by police and government officials for
surveillance, a bipartisan group of lawmakers is pushing to limit the use of
unmanned surveillance "eyes in the sky" aircraft. Rep. James Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., along with Rep. Zoe
Lofgren, D-Calif., and Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, is sponsoring legislation that would codify due process
protections for Americans in cases involving drones and make flying armed drones in the U.S. sky
illegal. Sensenbrenner believes it is necessary to develop new standards to address the privacy
issues associated with use of drones which can be as small as a bird and as large as a plane.

Bipartisan Congressional support for curtailing drones through

a warrant requirement
Montopoli 13- senior political reporter
(Brian, Lawmakers move to limit domestic drones,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lawmakers-move-to-limit-domestic-drones/) JB
Drones are coming to a police station near you, prompting lawmakers to craft
legislation designed to limit what they see as the potential for a previously
unthinkable level of Big Brother-style surveillance by the government. Four states Florida, Idaho, Montana and Virginia - have already passed laws to control the use of drones by law enforcement.
The first three have barred police from using drones without a warrant in most cases; Virginia has barred their use
by law enforcement (with exceptions) for two years. According to a tally by the American Civil Liberties Union,
legislation to limit drone use has been proposed in 41 states and remains active in 32 states. There is also a

push

to limit domestic drone use on a federal level. On Friday, the House Judiciary Committee
subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations is holding a hearing called, "Eyes in the

congressional hearing on
domestic drones this year; at the first, Judiciary Committee chairman Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-VT, warned that
"the domestic use of drones to conduct surveillance and collect other information will
have a broad and significant impact on the everyday lives of millions of Americans."
Sky: The Domestic Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems." It is the second

Three bills from the current Congress have been referred to the subcommittee for consideration. The first, called the
Preserving American Privacy Act, would require a governmental entity operating a drone to minimize the collection
or disclosure of identifying information. Another bill, the Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act,
would prevent government officials from using a drone to gather evidence or other information pertaining to
criminal conduct without a warrant. A third would prohibit the use of drones to kill citizens of the United States

Senate side, both Sen. Mark Udall, D-Colo., and Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., are
preparing to introduce legislation. Paul's bill, which his office says will be released in the coming weeks,
is a reintroduction of his "Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act" from last year, which bars the
use of drones by law enforcement without a warrant in most cases. The freshman senator
within the United States. On the

gave the issue of domestic drone use national prominence when he filibustered over what he considered a lack of
clarity from the White House over whether it had the authority to use drones to kill U.S. citizens on American soil
with drones. (Attorney General Eric Holder eventually said the answer, when it came to Americans not engaged in
combat, is no.)

No Link -- Courts Shield

Courts shield avoid political fallout

Whittington 5- Professor of Politics, Princeton University
(Keith, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand: Political Supports for
the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme
Court, The American Political Science Review, Nov., (99)4, p.
583)

some issues that politicians cannot easily

handle. For individual legislators, their constituents may be
sharply divided on a given issue or overwhelmingly hostile
There are

to a policy that the legislator would nonetheless like to see adopted.

Party leaders, including presidents and legislative leaders,
must similarly sometimes manage deeply divided or cross-pressured
coalitions. When faced with such issues, elected officials may

actively seek to turn over controversial political

questions to the courts so as to circumvent a
paralyzed legislature and avoid the political fallout
that would come with taking direct action
themselves. As Mark Graber (1993) has detailed in cases
such as slavery and abortion, elected officials may
prefer judicial resolution of disruptive political issues
to direct legislative action, especially when the courts are
believed to be sympathetic to the politician's own substantive
preferences but even when the attitude of the courts

is

uncertain or unfavorable (see also, Lovell 2003). Even when

politicians do not invite judicial intervention, strategically minded
courts will take into account not only the policy preferences of wellpositioned policymakers but also the willingness of those potential
policymakers to act if doing so means that they must assume
responsibility for policy outcomes. For cross-pressured politicians

shifting blame for controversial

decisions to the Court and obscuring their own relationship to
those decisions may preserve electoral support and
coalition unity without threatening active judicial review (Arnold
and coalition leaders,

1990; Fiorina 1986; Weaver 1986). The conditions for the exercise of
judicial review may be relatively favorable when judicial invalidations
of legislative policy can be managed to the electoral benefit of most
legislators. In the cases considered previously, fractious coalitions
produced legislation that presidents and party leaders deplored but
were unwilling to block. Divisions within the governing coalition can
also prevent legislative action that political leaders want taken, as
illustrated in the following case.

Judicial review allows political leaders to evade responsibilities

Stoutenborough et al. 6 - (James W., Donald P Haider-Markel, Mahalley D Allen. Political
Science Dept - University of Utah, Reassessing the Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil
Rights Cases, Political Research Quarterly, Sep., (59)3; p. 419)

courts have been empowered by and

served the interests of other political actors. While this
In many cases,

undermines the countermajoritarian difficulty as an empirical

hypothesis, it is not at all reassuring from a democratic perspective.

Judicial review can provide an opportunity for

elected political actors to evade responsibilities or
to pursue policies while evading electoral
consequences. Such actions may enhance or enable domination
by letting those actors pursue policies that might lead to domination
without suffering electoral consequences. The possibility that

judicial review can provide another outlet that

permits legislators to "run from daylight"85 and
effect important policy changes with a minimum of
public scrutiny is a serious concern, and may especially
contribute to domination by powerful economic elites. An additional
concern is that judicial review can have the perverse

effect of making legislators less attentive to their

constitutional responsibilities, as they may vote for
legislation they believe to be unconstitutional under the assumption
that the courts will correct their mistake.86

Courts shield insulate from political pressure

Whittington 5- Professor of Politics, Princeton University

(Keith, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand: Political Supports for
the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme
Court, The American Political Science Review, Nov., (99)4, p.
583)
The establishment and
maintenance of judicial review is a way of delegating
some kinds of political

decisions to a relatively politically

insulated institution. This delegation aspect of judicial review
drives the entrenchment thesis, as current political majorities attempt
to insulate their policy preferences from future political majorities by
empowering sympathetic judges who will endure through the electoral
transition. This is only one of the potential uses to which such an
institution may be put, however. Political majorities may

effectively delegate a range of tasks to a judicial

agent that the courts may be able to perform more
effectively or reliably than the elected officials can acting
directly. It is well recognized that explicit or implicit "delegation"
of political tasks to differently situated institutions and actors
can be valuable in a range of political contexts (see generally,
Voigt and Salzberger 2002). Legislative party leaders can solve
collective action problems and protect the value of party labels (Cox
and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Legislative
committees can develop expertise and provide the information needed
to make good policy (Krehbiel 1991). Central banks and

independent judiciaries can allow legislators to

credibly commit to policies valued by key
constituencies (Landes and Posner 1975; Maxfield 1997). Interest
groups can develop cheap information on the performance of
bureaucracies or the preferences of the electorate (Hansen 1991;
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). At the same time, it should be
recognized that apparent legislative delegations may be

as the exploitation of available

political resources and legislative weaknesses by other
actors, such as executive branch officials, to
enhance their own institutional position (Whittington and
better understood

Carpenter 2003). Thus, we should be sensitive to the interaction

between courts exploiting political opportunities and legislative leaders
managing political risk. The courts exercising a power of

judicial review may be a vehicle for overcoming

political barriers that hamper a governing coalition. There are
two preconditions for this possibility to be reasonable. The first is that
courts often be ideologically friendly to the governing coalition. Political
majorities are unlikely to benefit from supporting courts that are
ideologically divergent from them and are unlikely often to be able to
work in tandem with them to achieve common political goals. There
are reasons to believe that this precondition is often met in the
American context, with the selection of individual judges (Dahl 1957),
the departure of current judges (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1995), the
expansion of the judiciary as a whole (Barrow, Zuk, and Gryski 1996;
De Figueiredo and Tiller 1996), and the structure of court jurisdiction
(Gillman 2002) all facilitating the creation of a sympathetic judiciary.
This is not to say that presidents and parties are never surprised by
their judicial appointments or by judicial decisions, but merely that the
Court often shares the constitutional and ideological sensibilities of
political leaders. The second precondition is that judicial review

is actually useful to current political majorities. The

usefulness to legislators of other judicial powers, such as the power to
interpret statutes and enforce the law, is fairly evident. The utility of
the power of judicial review to current legislators is less immediately
evident, but it is easy to see once we note that judicial review may be
used to void statutes passed by previous governing coalitions, thus
displacing the current legislative baseline. When governing

coalitions are unable or unwilling to displace the

legislative baseline themselves, then the courts may
usefully do this work for them. Those invested in the status
quo have less to gain from judicial review (Graber 2000), and so
judicial review is likely to be more useful to some political coalitions
than others, depending in part on their substantive agenda and in part
on the extent to which they have been able to define the status quo.
Nonetheless, as is illustrated in the following, it is unrealistic to assume
that only political actors currently out of power stand to benefit from
an active judiciary.

AT: Federalism DA

No Link
The plan sets a floor states can go beyond it
Kaminski 2013 (Margot E [Executive Director of the Information Society Project,
Research Scholar, and Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School]; Drone Federalism:
Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry; 4 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 57; kdf)
DRONE PRIVACY REGULATIONS There are, broadly speaking, two subjects of drone privacy regulation: law
enforcement drone use and civilian drone use. n8 Most advocates and academics have focused on establishing
privacy regulations to govern law enforcement drone use. n9 This task is worthy of immediate attention. The FAA
already permits law enforcement drone use, where it does not yet permit commercial private drone use. n10 A
number of state and federal bills thus propose warrant requirements for drone surveillance by law enforcement. n11

The federal government could regulate law enforcement drone use as it has
historically regulated other law enforcement behavior, by providing a floor for state
laws. n12 Federal legislation already governs law enforcement use of wiretaps and
pen registers. n13 Drone surveillance is likely to additionally involve video
surveillance, location tracking, and/or facial recognition, among other possible
technologies. Thus federal legislation governing law enforcement surveillance could
be expanded to govern location tracking, video surveillance, and the use of facial recognition software by law
enforcement. n14 [*60] Regulating law enforcement drone use poses few countervailing dangers from legislating
thoughtlessly or in haste; such legislation would implicate Fourth Amendment rights rather than First Amendment
rights, so the worst case scenario is that such legislation might eventually be found by courts not to protect enough
privacy. n15

AT: Terrorism

AT: Link Drones Not Key

Drones are inefficient mechanism to solve terrorism
Rothfuss 2014 (Ian F [George Mason School of Law]; Student Comment: An
Economic Perspective on the Privacy Implications of Domestic Drone Surveillance;
10 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 441; kdf)
Conclusion
U.S. citizens want to be safe from terrorist attacks and other threats, but not at the
expense of their privacy rights. Therefore, a delicate balance must be achieved
between privacy and security interests. Drones represent a surveillance technology
advancement that threatens to dramatically alter the balance between these
interests. As discussed in this comment, the current legal framework does not
adequately protect privacy from the widespread surveillance that will likely result
from the unrestricted domestic use of drones. Therefore, prompt legislative action is
necessary to address the fundamental privacy challenges presented by the use of
drones. Such legislation should allow for constructive use of drones within a
framework that contains restrictions to protect individual privacy rights. While
widespread general surveillance could make the nation safer from crime and
terrorism, such extensive surveillance will ultimately be inefficient. The surveillance
that could result from the domestic use of drones would detract from individual
privacy and cause individuals to reduce productive activities and invest in
countermeasures. Such "privacy disutility" will outweigh the societal benefits unless
domestic drone surveillance is restricted. Therefore, [*462] without legislative
action we may soon live in a world where "every time we walk out of our front door
we have to look up and wonder whether some invisible eye in the sky is monitoring
us." n175

AT: Link Transparency

Transparency in data collection is crucial
Scheer 2015 (Robert [Prof @ USCs School of journalism and communication];
They Know Everything About You; Nation Books; p. 157-8; kdf)
OUR GOVERNMENT, LIKE OTHERS THROUGHOUT history, tells us that repressive, invasive, and
paranoid national security policies are for our own good , especially in terms of our safety. Yet
where do the prerogatives of a surveillance state driven by fear and governed by
secrecy really take us? The reality is that these procedures not only are unconstitutional but
all too often lead to bad government policies, both at home and abroad. One need
only review the invasion of Iraq to see the folly of toppling a regime that was an
implacable enemy of al Qaeda-an invasion driven by a fear of weapons of mass destruction that free
access to the available data would have discounted. The direct result, billions of dollars and
hundreds of thousands of deaths later, is a fractured Iraq that, at the time of this writing a
decade later, seems to be in a constant state of bloody division. Or as veteran correspondent
Patrick Cockburn summarized in the London Review of Books in 2014, after the extremist Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) seized huge swaths of both countries: For America, Britain and the Western powers, the rise of lsis and
the Caliphate is the ultimate disaster. Whatever they intended by their invasion oflraq in 2003 and their efforts to
get rid of Assad in Syria since 2011, it was not to see the creation of a jihadi state spanning northern Iraq and Syria
run by a movement a hundred times bigger and much better organised than the al-Qaida of Osama bin Laden. The
war on terror for which civil liberties have been curtailed and hundreds of billions of dollars spent has failed

The obvious lesson of that debacle, and others like it, is that an informed public
with access to accurate information-even when the facts are embarrassing to the
government- is the best safeguard against such errors. Aren't we better off knowing
when our freedoms are threatened or we are being lied to, even by our own leaders,
so that we can rectify such policies? In other words, didn't Edward Snowden, regardless of
the legality of his actions, actually make us safer?
miserably.1

AT: Link The Wall

A dearth of surveillance didnt cause 9/11, the issue was
coordination
Goitein and Patel 2015 (Elizabeth and Faiza [co-directors of the Brennan
Center for Justice's Liberty and National Security Program]; What went wrong with
the FISA court;
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/What_Went_
%20Wrong_With_The_FISA_Court.pdf; kdf)
The hypothesis that the primary purpose test required the establishment of a
wall which then led to 9/11 is flawed in a number of respects . Most fundamentally, the
9/11 Commissions report showed that the wall did not cause the lack of
coordination that contributed to intelligence failures before 9/11. It documented that CIA
investigators, as well as FBI officials detailed to the CIA, had information months
before the attack that two of the hijackers were potential terrorists already in the United
States. There were many opportunities to share this information more broadly, and most of these opportunities
were squandered because of poor judgment calls by individual analysts.145 Moreover, the hypothesis oversimplifies

While courts signaled that they

would look askance if criminal prosecutors were directing foreign intelligence
surveillance, no court held that the primary purpose test necessitated the
particular limitations that the Justice Department imposed on itself .146 Nor is it clear
that chilling coordination was the direct and inevitable result of implementing
those limitations. According to the Attorney Generals Review Team, the voluntary restraints that were in
the relationship between the primary purpose test and the wall.

place between 1984 and 1993 appear[] to have worked quite satisfactorily . . . both from the perspective of the

At least some of the impediments to coordination

that subsequently emerged appear to have been a result of officials conservative
interpretation of the rules, rather than the rules themselves .148
Criminal Division and that of the FBI.147

AT: Link Surveillance No Solve

Surveillance isnt key to stopping terror
Pletka 2015 (Danielle [Senior vice president for foreign and defense policy
studies at AEI]; Terrorist attacks in France, Tunisia, and Kuwait. Why is Washington
not more interested?; Jun 26; www.aei.org/publication/terrorist-attacks-in-francetunisia-and-kuwait-why-is-washington-not-more-interested/; kdf)
This morning dawned in Washington with news of three new terror attacks, one in France, one in Tunisia, one in
Kuwait. But scroll down a little further on the news page and youll find al Shabab kills 30 at AU military base, IS
kills 120 civilians in Kobane also in the litany of Islamist extremist predations. In two of these attacks, the main
targets were Muslims, either Shiites, Kurds or innocent bystanders and worshipers. Predictably, there has already
been plenty of hand-wringing, statements of defiance from local leaders and victory dances from some .

But the
deeper question of what to do about this trail of horror still appears to be of little
interest in the American capital. Instead, President Obama and others appear fixed on more clerical
style analysis of the jihadi phenomenon, apparently believing that insisting these attacks are perversions of Islam is

While no strategy will eliminate the so-called lone wolf

attacks that increasingly worry US authorities , the perception of victory is the
real siren song for Islamist extremists. While there have been setbacks for ISIS
and others, the reality is that they are not losing , on the verge of losing or even suffering
dramatic defections. American leaders have always hated the practice of picking
winners in any fight. And the same reticence is at play through the Middle East and North Africa. Because
an adequate substitute for action.

of that, and despite half-hearted training efforts for the Syrian opposition and incremental increases in trainers

we have few allies on the ground who are capable of slapping down
ISIS, al Qaeda and their cohort. Instead, we gossip angrily about the weaknesses of
the Iraqi government, the fractiousness of the Syrian opposition and the
incompetence of third world armies. If this is not our fight, then gossip, kibbitzing and apathy
are the right call. But the next terrorist attack on the United States and it will come
will spur more calls to action. Wouldnt it be wise to dramatically step up training,
arms supplies, support and whatever is needed to begin to reverse the Islamist tide,
rather than waiting until the only solution is the commitment of US combat forces?
being sent to Iraq,

Just saying.

Link Turn Industry Sustainable

The plan sparks the drone industry
Rule 2015 (Troy A [Associate prof of law @ Sandra Day O'Connor college of law]; Airspace in the age of
drones; 95 B.U.L. Rev. 155; kdf)
Conclusion Innovations in the domestic drone industry are making it possible for citizens to access
low-altitude airspace like never before. Although these technological advances have the potential to greatly benefit

are also creating new and unprecedented conflicts involving the

space through which they fly. Prior to the advent of modern drones, there was no pressing need to
humankind, they [*208]

precisely define the scope of landowners' property interests in low-altitude airspace. Unfortunately, as a growing

ambiguous airspace rights laws are now

threatening to impede the growth of an important new industry. In the midst of these
flock of domestic drones stands ready for takeoff,

pressures, principles of microeconomics and property theory call for new laws giving landowners more definite

These exclusion rights would be

most effective if they were treated as equivalent to rights that landowners have
long enjoyed in surface land and if they extended all the way up to the navigable
airspace line where the public highway for air travel begins. Laws establishing such rights
rights to exclude drones from the airspace directly above their land.

would create a simple "exclusion" regime for low-altitude airspace that is better suited to handle aerial trespass and

They could also be an integral part of a broader

system of new federal, state, and local laws tailored to drones' unique
characteristics. By enacting clear and efficient drone laws, policymakers can help to
ensure that the sky is the limit for the domestic drone industry in the twenty-first
century.
takings questions involving domestic drones.

The plan provides the clarity necessary to make law

enforcement effective and the industry to develop
Rule 2015 (Troy A [Associate prof of law @ Sandra Day O'Connor college of law]; Airspace in the age of
drones; 95 B.U.L. Rev. 155; kdf)

the United States will be unable to take full advantage of modern

domestic drone technologies until federal, state, and local governments develop a more
robust legal and regulatory structure to govern these high-tech devices . For example,
Unfortunately,

conflicts are beginning to erupt almost daily between civilian drone users and private landowners. In Pittsburgh, a
drone recently flew over the playing field during a professional baseball game. n43 In Seattle, a woman getting
dressed in a high-rise building spotted a camera-equipped drone hovering just outside her window. n44 In Nashville,
a civilian drone soared conspicuously close to the city's Fourth of July fireworks display. n45 In Los [*164] Angeles,
hockey fans near the entrance of a professional sports arena threw large objects at a drone and eventually knocked
it out of the sky. n46 In each of these cases, it was debatable whether the drone operators involved could be held

Law enforcement agencies

are also increasingly grappling with difficult questions regarding their own potential
uses of drone technologies. Because of their modest size and ability to provide low-cost aerial vantage
points of activities on land, drones could be of great value to police departments. n48 But
should a police officer need a warrant before flying a small, camera-mounted drone
above a private residence in search of illegal activities ? And, if a police drone flies
directly above private land with neither a warrant nor the landowner's permission
and obtains incriminating photos or video footage, should that evidence be
admissible in court? A few state legislatures have recently enacted laws addressing these sorts of issues,
n49 but such questions still remain unsettled in most jurisdictions. There is even
criminally or civilly liable simply for flying their drones above private land. n47

active controversy regarding the proper scope of the FAA's regulatory authority over drone flights. The FAA clearly
possesses power to bring enforcement actions against citizens whose drones soar through high-altitude airspace
areas or near airports and create serious risks of collisions with human-occupied aircraft. But should the FAA have
regulatory jurisdiction over the flight of a drone if it occurs several miles away from any airport and the device
never climbs more than a few dozen feet off of the ground? In a [*165] recent dispute between the FAA and a
commercial drone operator, an administrative law judge for the National Transportation Safety Board expressed
skepticism that the FAA presently had regulatory power over such flights. The judge colorfully pointed out that,
under the FAA's expansive view of its own authority, even "a flight in the air of ... a paper aircraft, or a toy balsa

Frustrated by a lack of clear

laws relating to drones, many potential commercial drone users are presently
waiting on the sidelines for laws to develop, and some are even threatening to
relocate their drone-related activities to other countries. n51 The magnitude of these
delayed investments and lost opportunities will only grow until policymakers craft a
more workable set of legal rules for drones.
wood glider, could subject the "operator' to" an FAA enforcement action. n50

Legal uncertainty undermines the industry, plan reverse

that
Rule 2015 (Troy A [Associate prof of law @ Sandra Day O'Connor college of law]; Airspace in the age of
drones; 95 B.U.L. Rev. 155; kdf)

recent advancements in drone technologies

are fueling an unprecedented level of interest in these futuristic devices. A wide and
Although drones have been around for decades, n2

growing array of ever-more-sophisticated drones is now readily available for purchase at hobby stores and on the
Internet. Many of these drones sell for just a few hundred dollars and can effortlessly be controlled from ordinary
smartphones. n3 Seemingly overnight, a domestic drones market that once catered primarily to weekend hobbyists
is attracting journalists, real estate agents, wedding photographers, law enforcement agencies, and even delivery
companies. Unfortunately, the

United States seems ill-prepared for the complex legal

questions and regulatory challenges that this massive flock of new domestic drones
will bring. Within the United States, there are already reports of civilian drones crashing into buildings, n4
having hazardously close encounters with helicopters, n5 peeping into residential windows, n6 and being
intentionally shot down. n7 Anticipating the potential benefits and difficulties associated with the emergent

Congress enacted legislation in 2012 instructing the Federal Aviation

to adopt regulations [*158] by September 2015 to facilitate the smooth
integration of "civil unmanned aircraft systems" into U.S. airspace. n8 However, it appears increasingly
doubtful that the FAA will meet that deadline. n9 And in the meantime, the agency is attempting to
domestic drone market,

Administration ("FAA")

enforce a controversial moratorium on most commercial drone use. n10 To date, most of the scholarly n11 and
legislative n12 activity relating to domestic drones has centered on the devices' potential impact on privacy rights
and criminal evidence gathering. Regrettably ,

legal academicians and policymakers have

devoted far less attention to an unsettled property law question that underlies these
and many other domestic drone issues: Up to what height do surface owners hold strict rights to
exclude flying objects from physically invading the airspace above their land? Legal uncertainty and
confusion are likely to continue swirling around the domestic drone industry until
courts or legislators clear up this basic property question.

Link Turn LAPD

Imposing regulations on drone use can effectively balance
privacy concerns and help combat terrorism/crime
Newton 2014 Editor and Writer at the Los Angeles Times (Jim, Drones and the
LAPD, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-newton-column-lapd-drones20141117-column.html)//
The LAPD acquired a pair of small drones a few months ago from the Seattle Police Department, which dropped its plans to use them after public
objections. Los Angeles has not yet deployed the drones they remain, as Chief Charlie Beck told me last week, in the box. Beck says he's waiting for

drones could be deployed in situations where

suspects are barricaded or holding hostages and where an aerial view might be
helpful. It's hard to argue with that who wouldn't want police to have better information before trying to subdue a hostage taker? But the drones
are just one aspect of a profound reconsideration of the relationship between policing and privacy. Especially in the area of
fighting terrorism, police are moving from solving crimes to anticipating
them, aided by data mining and other technologies. The new techniques carry with them the possibility of
enhancing public safety, but they give some people the creeps. Jamie Garcia and Hamid Kahn are two of those people. They and their
direction from the Police Commission on what will be allowed, but the

organization Stop LAPD Spying are leading an effort to stop the department from using drones. At their offices near skid row last week, they warned of
what they see as police militarization. Other communities are wrestling with similar issues, but Garcia and Kahn note that the LAPD's history of police
spying makes the debate especially important here. In one sense, drones are not that big a deal. Unlike unmanned aircraft operated by the military and
CIA, these don't carry missiles, and because they hover above ground, they can't see much that isn't already visible to a police helicopter or even a
satellite. A drone, however, is smaller and more readily deployed, and for many people it changes the notion of what's private. Most of us regard our
backyards, for example, as private space, but is that a reasonable expectation now that a helicopter, a satellite or a drone can peer into it without entering
the property? Only the LA times would give these two radical clowns space. They say Drones invade privacy issues yet the group of 20 for this group go to
meetings, yell, scream, verbally assault, threaten anyone who doesn't agree with them. They attend police commission meetings all the time cause...
Similarly, a national effort to collect data on suspicious activity can feel awfully invasive. Activity as innocent as taking a photograph of a government
building or engaging in lawful, peaceful protest can trigger alarm in post-9/11 America. We're all concerned about safety, Kahn told me last week, but
at what price? The policing paradigm, he and Garcia argued, has shifted from solving crimes to gathering, storing and sharing information. The result is
an overbearing, wasteful attempt to head off future crimes. Significant numbers of people agree, and 2,000 have so far signed a petition circulated by
Stop LAPD Spying urging the department not to use its new drones. Clear, thoughtful rules are needed for recordings by LAPD Clear, thoughtful rules are
needed for recordings by LAPD Beck is well aware of the uneasiness that technology creates and not just in a law enforcement context. As he pointed

erosion of privacy is playing out in every sector of modern life

out in our conversation, the

. Cameras
are ubiquitous, online activity creates information that is useful for commercial purposes and stores collect data to target advertising. Nobody knows
more about me than the Vons where I shop, Beck said. We are very rapidly entering a time when everyone will know everything about everybody.

There is, however, a special burden on law enforcement to gather and use information
with care. The local Vons may know a lot about its customers, but it can't arrest them. Recognizing that and aware that the LAPD in the 1980s
was roundly criticized for spying on its critics Beck said he's approaching the use of drones with
unusual caution. His staff is working with the ACLU to develop a draft policy on the use of
the small aircraft, and they hope to present a recommendation to the Police Commission in a few weeks. The commission will then
hold public hearings before finalizing a policy. Kahn and Garcia want the department to forswear the drones
altogether. That seems unlikely. Rather than leave his drones in the box, Beck proposes to operate them with clear rules and
sound, civilian oversight ideas that have been fundamental in addressing other LAPD
issues such as racial bias and use of excessive force. Having rules in place may not be much comfort to the person who looks up
from his backyard and sees an LAPD drone overhead. But it could, at least, ensure that the devices are used to fight
crime, not to spy or harass.

Terrorist attack on Los Angeles destroys the economy and

escalates
Lawrence 2012 won the David Gemmell Legend Awards (Mark, Could You Fight a
Terrorist? How to Survive a Terrorist Attack on Downtown Los Angeles,
http://www.secretsofsurvival.com/survival/downtown-los-angeles-brutal-terroristattack.html)//AN
It's no secret that terrorists have been crossing both the Mexican and Canadian borders into the US. Several terrori
sts have reportedly been sent here
from places like Pakistan and we can assume Iran and Syria to train U.S. Muslims (aligned with the cause of Radical Islam) for a probable attack. This is
what an attack might look like and how to survive. Warning: Graphic violence. Extreme survival tactics. If you want to live through this kind of attack, you
may have to do the unthinkable. With police departments in major cities now on active watch for terrorist plots by agents from Iran and Hezbollah as

what would happen if a an attack actually took place on a city

street downtown, like Los Angeles , the center of the CBS report? You're caught in the middle of a
"hot zone" -- people are being killed, terrorists with AK-47s are executing men,
women, and children. Shots fly over head and glass shatters in nearby windows. LAPD: Be On the Look Out for Hezbollah, Iranian Special
Forces CBS affiliate in Los Angeles reported August 29, 2012 that LAPD is actively on the look out for Hezbollah
linked terror groups believed to be plotting attacks on Southern California . See (CBS affiliate):
indicated by CBS news earlier this year,

LAPD: 'Active' Terror Plots Linked To Iran, Hezbollah, 'Sovereign Citizens' The LAPD has it's own counter-terrorism unit, in fact. CBS reports at the first link
above: "'In this region we have active terrorist plots, in this region, right now,' said Deputy Chief Michael Downing, commanding officer of the LAPD's
counter-terrorism unit. The Department is currently tracking 'government of Iran operatives, Hezbollah, sovereign citizen, homegrown violent extremists,
animal rights groups' and others, Downing said. He added that Iranian or Hezbollah agents may initiate attacks locally if war erupts between the U.S. and

terrorist attack probably won't look like

an Al-Qaeda suicide bomber with limited training and no lengthy military experience. It may look a lot more
like an attack by Navy Seals -- but instead of Navy Seals, the attack will come from highly
trained soldiers of Iranian and Hezbollah special forces -- going for
"maximum impact". Maximum Impact Terrorist Attacks For those of you familiar with special forces training, it would be like the local
police (perhaps 30 - 40 cops in the vicinity of a terrorist attack) going up against 75 or more Spetznaz (Russian trained special forces). "Special
forces" means they're trained for the most dangerous assignments -- they are swift, strong, excel
in hand to hand combat, automatic weapons, fearless fighting, and sheer brutality. Local police would be no match -- not
Iran." What would an attack by Iranian / Hezbollah agents look like? This kind of

unless they could round up 300 heavily armed cops to take on 75 Spetznaz (within minutes of an attack) who are armed with fully automatic weapons and
possibly shoulder fired missiles and grenades -- and still that might not be enough. The fact is this -- a small group of highly trained fighters (foreign
special forces) can take down larger groups of fighters (local police) not prepared for this kind of fight. Los Angeles Terrorist Attacks First, let's consider

Major police departments in Los Angeles and New York City

have counter-terrorism squads, but they also have Swat Teams, as do most other U.S. cities with a population of
50,000 or more. U.S. Swat Teams are armed to the teeth with men highly trained for arrests and take downs of dangerous criminals. Jihadist
terror cells from Iran and Hezbollah have highly trained men also -- men trained to kill for Islamic
ideals, men trained with weapons and explosives. Some of these men may be Iranian special forces -- special forces a lot
how local police might react once the initial calls come in.
nowadays

like our own Navy Seals and Airborne Rangers here at home. Many are highly trained, deadly accurate with weapons, dangerous in hand to hand combat.
How these two groups (Swat Teams and Jihadist terror cells) aren't running into one another right now when the terror threat level is so high in America

terror groups (we know they're here, there's no doubt about that) are communicating with one
another at a level that is beating America's surveillance here at home. Jihad: Superior
reveals one thing --

Communications No fly-lists, email and phone surveillance, U.S. mosques infiltrated by government informants -- stakeouts by the FBI and other
undercover government teams are not getting anywhere, it seems. Not to say that the FBI isn't good at what they do -- they have done a great job with
tracking down and breaking up large scale organized crime rings in the past; they've arrested the leaders of street gangs and motorcycle clubs, as well as
a number of large drug rings that can trace their origins all the way to South American drug lords. In any of these groups, dozens and sometimes hundreds
of arrests can take place at one time in a large FBI sting -- But it's not happening with Jihadist terror cells. Risk of Terrorist Attack Remains High With or

risk remains high for a series of simultaneous terrorist attacks

timed to create "maximum terror" in America; terrorists most likely want to
disrupt our already shaky economy and are likely to do that by plotting attacks that cause mass-fear across the
without arrests of terrorist cells, the

United States population. Swat Team Up in Flames What about the local Swat Team? Foreign special forces may already have a plan for taking on the local
Swat Team -- they might blow up their armored vehicle as it leaves base -- the entire Swat Team murdered before they can pose any threat. Or they might
have snipers waiting near the scene, ready to pick off Swat Team members and any others that pose a threat to an active terror attack. Learning From a
Real Terrorist Attack with AK-47s In 2008, Mumbai, India was attacked by trained militants from Pakistan, where multiple locations where attacked at
around the same time, or shortly after one another. One group of militants (ten) that attacked that evening landed on a beach in inflatable speedboats,
simply telling local fishermen to "mind their own business" as they set off into the city (a report to police by the fishermen received little response). One of
the first attacks began when two men with AK-47s walked into a train station and began killing people. In all, just in that train station, they killed 58 people
and injured 104. Then they left the train station, shooting at pedestrians and police, killing eight police officers. They passed a police station but the police
inside were smart -- out gunned, they had secured the gates and shut off all the lights and hid. The attackers ignored the police station and continued

Two terrorists armed with AK-47s storm a cafe, killing at

least 10 people, injuring several more. Multiple other terrorists seize two hotels , The Taj
their attack in the city. Elsewhere in Mumbai...

Mahal and the Oberoi Trident; several people are killed, many more are injured. Hostages are taken at both hotels; many flee from windows as fire fighters
with ladders outside the hotels help several people escape. A Jewish outreach center (the Nariman house) is seized by terrorists, hostages are taken; a few
people end up killed by the time the attack is broken up by counter terrorism teams who are dropped on to the roof by helicopter and covered by nearby
snipers. India's counter terrorism forces eventually are able to infiltrate each location terrorists had seized and had taken hostages; during rescues a few
people are killed, including counter terrorism forces; all but one terrorist (arrested and taken into custody) die. Down in the Mumbai harbor police seized a

it's possible that there had been a bigger attack planned, thus
the reason for the excess weapons stored at the docks .
boat carrying guns and explosives --

Link Turn Surveillance Bad

Surveillance makes counter-terror tools ineffective
Corrigan 2015 (Ray [senior lecturer in mathematics, computing, and technology
at the Open University, U.K.]; Mass Surveillance Will Not Stop Terrorism; Jan 25;
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/new_scientist/2015/01/mass_surveillanc
e_against_terrorism_gathering_intelligence_on_all_is_statistically.html; kdf)
Police, intelligence, and security systems are imperfect . They process vast amounts of
imperfect intelligence data and do not have the resources to monitor all known suspects 24/7. The French
authorities lost track of these extremists long enough for them to carry out their murderous acts .

You cannot
fix any of this by treating the entire population as suspects and then engaging in
suspicionless, blanket collection and processing of personal data. Mass data collectors can dig
deeply into anyones digital persona but dont have the resources to do so with
everyone. Surveillance of the entire population, the vast majority of whom are innocent, leads
to the diversion of limited intelligence resources in pursuit of huge
numbers of false leads. Terrorists are comparatively rare, so finding one is a needle-in-a-haystack
problem. You dont make it easier by throwing more needleless hay on the stack. It is statistically
impossible for total population surveillance to be an effective tool for catching
terrorists. Even if your magic terrorist-catching machine has a false positive rate of 1
in 1,000and no security technology comes anywhere near this every time you
asked it for suspects in the U.K. it would flag 60,000 innocent people. Law enforcement and
security services need to be able to move with the times, using modern digital technologies intelligently and
through targeted data preservationnot a mass surveillance regimeto engage in court-supervised technological
surveillance of individuals whom they have reasonable cause to suspect. That is not, however, the same as building

Mass surveillance makes the job of the security

services more difficult and the rest of us less secure.
an infrastructure of mass surveillance.

Less data leads to effective data, the aff is key to solve

terrorism
Schwartz 2015 (Mattathias [Staff writer @ The New Yorker]; The Whole
Haystack; Jan 26; www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack; kdf)
most dangerous adversaries will be
the ones who most successfully disguise their individual transactions to appear normal,
Before the event, every bit of hay is potentially relevant. The

reasonable, and legitimate, Ted Senator, a data scientist who worked on an early post-9/11 program called Total
Information Awareness, said, in 2002. Since then,

intelligence officials have often referred to

lone-wolf terrorists, cells, and, as Alexander has put it, the terrorist who walks among us, as though Al
Qaeda were a fifth column, capable of camouflaging itself within civil society. Patrick Skinner, a former C.I.A. case
officer who works with the Soufan Group, a security company, told me that this image is wrong. We knew about
these networks, he said, speaking of the Charlie Hebdo attacks.

Mass surveillance, he continued, gives a

false sense of security. It sounds great when you say youre monitoring every phone call in the United
States. You can put that in a PowerPoint. But, actually, you have no idea whats going on. By
flooding the system with false positives, big-data approaches to counterterrorism
might actually make it harder to identify real terrorists before they act . Two years before the
Boston Marathon bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older of the two brothers alleged to have committed the
attack, was assessed by the citys Joint Terrorism Task Force . They determined that he
was not a threat. This was one of about a thousand assessments that the Boston J.T.T.F.
conducted that year, a number that had nearly doubled in the previous two years, according to the Boston

F.B.I. As of 2013, the Justice Department has trained nearly three hundred thousand law-enforcement officers in
how to file suspicious-activity reports. In 2010, a central database held about three thousand of these reports; by
2012 it had grown to almost twenty-eight thousand. The bigger haystack makes it harder to find the needle,
Sensenbrenner told me. Thomas Drake, a former N.S.A. executive and whistle-blower who has become one of the
agencys most vocal critics, told me, If

you target everything, theres no target. Drake favors what

he calls a traditional law-enforcement approach to terrorism, gathering more
intelligence on a smaller set of targets. Decisions about which targets matter, he said,
should be driven by human expertise, not by a database.

No Impact
Their experts have motive to exaggerate the likelihood of an
attack
Weiss 2015 (Leonard [visiting scholar at Stanford Universitys Center for
International Security and Cooperation]; On fear and nuclear terror; Mar 3; Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 7587; kdf)
There is a tendency on the part of security policy advocates to hype security threats
to obtain support for their desired policy outcomes. They are free to do so in a democratic society, and
most come by their advocacy through genuine conviction that a real security threat is receiving insufficient attention. But there
is now enough evidence of how such advocacy has been distorted for the purpose
of overcoming political opposition to policies stemming from ideology that careful
public exposure and examination of data on claimed threats should be part of any
such debate. Until this happens, the most appropriate attitude toward claimed threats of nuclear
terrorism, especially when accompanied by advocacy of policies intruding on individual freedom, should be one of
skepticism. Interestingly, while all this attention to nuclear terrorism goes on, the United States and other nuclear nations
have no problem promoting the use of nuclear power and national nuclear programs (only for friends, of course) that end up
creating more nuclear materials that can be used for weapons. The use of civilian nuclear programs to disguise national weapon
ambitions has been a hallmark of proliferation history ever since the Atoms for Peace program (Sokolski, 2001), suggesting that the
real nuclear threat resides where it always has resided-in national nuclear programs; but placing the threat where it properly
belongs does not carry the public-relations frisson currently attached to the word terrorism.

Terrorists lack the motivation to attack the US

Weiss 2015 (Leonard [visiting scholar at Stanford Universitys Center for
International Security and Cooperation]; On fear and nuclear terror; Mar 3; Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 7587; kdf)
A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might
seize nuclear materials in Pakistan for fashioning a weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have
worked within the Pakistani nuclear establishment, there is little to no evidence that terrorist groups in
or outside the region are seriously trying to obtain a nuclear capability. And Pakistan has
been operating a uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly 30 years with no credible reports of diversion of HEU
from the plant. There is one stark example of a terrorist organization that actually started a nuclear effort: the Aum Shinrikyo group.
At its peak, this religious cult had a membership estimated in the tens of thousands spread over a variety of countries, including
Japan; its members had scientific expertise in many areas; and the group was well funded. Aum Shinrikyo obtained access to natural
uranium supplies, but the nuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned. The group was also interested in chemical weapons
and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 persons. AumShinrikyo is now a small

highly organized groups, designated appropriately as

terrorist, that have acquired enough territory to enable them to operate in a
quasigovernmental fashion, like the Islamic State (IS)? Such organizations are certainly dangerous, but how
would nuclear terrorism fit in with a program for building and sustaining a new
caliphate that would restore past glories of Islamic society, especially since, like any organized government,
the Islamic State would itself be vulnerable to nuclear attack? Building a new Islamic state out of
radioactive ashes is an unlikely ambition for such groups. However, now that it has
organization under continuing close surveillance. What about

become notorious, apocalyptic pronouncements in Western media may begin at any time, warning of the possible acquisition and

Even if a terror group were to achieve technical nuclear

proficiency, the time, money, and infrastructure needed to build nuclear weapons
creates significant risks of discovery that would put the group at risk of attack . Given
use of nuclear weapons by IS.

the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of
its operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects. And, of course, 9/11 has
heightened sensitivity to the need for protection, lowering further the probability of a successful effort.

Counterterror fails Brooks

All of their arguments are epistemically suspect
counterterror measures increase terror
Brooks 2015 (Rosa [Law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz
senior fellow at the New America Foundation]; US Counterterrorism strategy is the
definition of insanity; Jun 24; foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/24/u-s-counterterrorismstrategy-is-the-definition-of-insanity/?wp_login_redirect=0; kdf)
Show me someone who publicly insists that the United States has an effective
counterterrorism strategy, and Ill show you someone who draws a paycheck from
the U.S. government. This week we have seen success across a broad spectrum, Pentagon spokesman Col.
Steve Warren told reporters on June 16, commenting on the death of Yemeni al Qaeda leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi,
reportedly killed as a result of a U.S. drone strike. Any time a terrorist is removed from the battlefield, is killed or
captured, I think the net gain outweighs any potential loss. Loyalty to your employer is a fine thing, especially in a

experts are
far more dubious about the heavy U.S. reliance on air power and targeted strikes .
The tactical, whack-a-mole approach is not having the desired effect, my Foreign Policy
press spokesman, but outside the ranks of officials in President Barack Obamas administration,

colleague Micah Zenko told the New York Times. Not having the desired effect was a polite circumlocution: As

State Department figures show a substantial recent uptick in

global terrorism. In 2014, terrorist attacks increased 39 percent over the previous year,
while the number of fatalities caused by terrorist attacks went up 83 percent. In Yemen, which
Zenko recently noted for FP,

the administration inexplicably continues to tout as a counterterrorism success, U.S. policy in in shambles. If
youre looking for logic here, youre not going to find much, Stephen Seche, a former U.S. ambassador to Yemen,

[al]-Qaeda affiliates are

significantly expanding their footholds in both Yemen and Syria. And the Islamic State also
continues to gain ground in both countries. Meanwhile, in Libya, its utter chaos , former U.N. advisor Dirk
Vandewalle told the Times: The Islamic State and al Qaeda-linked groups are vying for
power, and a recent U.S. drone strike against al Qaeda operative Mokhtar
Belmokhtar shows that were still relying on ad hoc measures. In Iraq, Somalia, and
Afghanistan, its the same story. The United States continues to rely heavily on airstrikes and
targeted killings, while terrorist groups continue to cause mayhem and gain
adherents.
told the New York Times. In mid-June, the Washington Post reported that

Counterterror strategies make terrorism inevitable

Brooks 2015 (Rosa [Law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz
senior fellow at the New America Foundation]; US Counterterrorism strategy is the
definition of insanity; Jun 24; foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/24/u-s-counterterrorismstrategy-is-the-definition-of-insanity/?wp_login_redirect=0; kdf)
Even some of those who do get paid by Uncle Sam have grown more openly skeptical of U.S. counterterrorism

Capt. Robert Newson, a Navy SEAL who served as director of the Joint Interagency
Task Force-Counter Terrorism, told an interviewer at West Points Combating Terrorism Center that
drone strikes, manned airstrikes, and special operations raids buy space and
time. But by themselves they are only a delaying action , and everywhere I have
been, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, every military person up and down the chain of
command acknowledges this. This CT concept the solution that some people champion where
the main or whole effort is drone strikes and special operations raids is a fantasy. Like Newson, I havent
policy.

encountered many defenders of U.S. counterterrorism strikes. Last year, I co-chaired a Stimson Center commission
on U.S. drone policy with retired Gen. John Abizaid. The commission, which included former senior military and

intelligence officials from both Obamas and George W. Bushs administrations, concluded in June 2014 that the

counterterrorism strategy
rests on questionable assumptions, and risks increasing instability and
escalating conflicts. While tactical strikes may have helped keep the homeland
free of major terrorist attacks, existing evidence indicates that both Sunni and Shia Islamic
extremist groups have grown in scope, lethality and influence in the broader area of
operations in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia . In dozens of interviews and conversations
Obama administrations heavy reliance on targeted killings as a pillar of US

with national security experts since June 2014, I have yet to find anyone who wont admit, off the record, that U.S.
counterterrorism policy is flailing badly.So

heres the question: If no one except administration

press flacks thinks the whack-a-mole approach to counterterrorism is working, why
are we still using it?

Counter-terror bad AT: they know something we

dont
Classified info isnt the issue, but ignorance and a failed
bureaucracy 6 reasons
Brooks 2015 (Rosa [Law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz
senior fellow at the New America Foundation]; US Counterterrorism strategy is the
definition of insanity; Jun 24; foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/24/u-s-counterterrorismstrategy-is-the-definition-of-insanity/?wp_login_redirect=0; kdf)
To me, thats one of the unsolved mysteries of the universe, right up there with what is dark matter? and why do
we yawn? Why do smart people like Obama and his top advisors continue to rely on counterterrorism policies that

I can think of a few possibilities. 1. They know something we dont. This

is the most generous hypothesis I can come up with . Maybe theres secret
intelligence information showing that, contrary to all appearances , al Qaeda, the Islamic
State, al-Shabab, Boko Haram, and other major terrorist groups have all been fatally weakened
and peace on Earth is right around the corner. Maybe. But not very likely. 2. We
know something they dont. Back in 2003, many of us were skeptical of the Bush
administrations claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, but told ourselves
that senior officials probably knew something we didnt . Not so, as it turned out. Internal and
arent working?

external critics were ignored or silenced, and everyone from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Secretary of

Had they paid more

attention to critics, the United States might never have launched its misguided war
in Iraq the same war that became an inspiration and training ground for many of the terrorist leaders who
continue to plague the region today. The critics were right. Theres no particular reason to think that
todays senior U.S. officials are any less prone to self-delusional groupthink. Maybe
State Colin Powell convinced themselves that dubious intelligence was the gospel truth.

theyre trapped in their own little bubble; maybe theyve started to believe their own hype. 3. They dont know

Or maybe they dont and cant know that they dont know what
the rest of us know. Maybe no one draws their attention to critical reports. Maybe the internal critics of
what they dont know.

whom there are clearly many censor themselves when theyre around the president and his inner circle. I

the U.S. government is a giant machine designed to prevent senior decision-makers

from every getting any useful information. For one thing, its a vast and sprawling bureaucracy, and
the right hand is frequently oblivious to the machinations of the left hand. In a sense,
sometimes think that

theres just no there there: The State Department doesnt always share important information with the Defense
Department, the Defense Department doesnt always share important information with Department of Homeland
Security, and the intelligence community generally doesnt share important information with anyone. Within
agencies, its no different. Central Command doesnt necessarily know what Special Operations Command knows,
and Africa Command may not know what either knows.Central Command doesnt necessarily know what Special
Operations Command knows, and Africa Command may not know what either knows. Military intelligence and
surveillance assets are concentrated in the Central Command area or responsibility, leaving commanders elsewhere
with less ability to monitor and understand whats going on. Meanwhile, the CIAs shift toward paramilitary

you get a situation

in which U.S. officials can see millions of trees, but almost no one can spot any
forests. Add to this the natural desire to bring good news rather than bad news to the boss and combine it
operations has left it less able to gain vital human intelligence. Put all this together, and

with a bureaucratic culture that insists that everything be boiled down to a few slides or a page of bullet points

Obama cant be expected to know

whether his approach to counterterrorism is succeeding or failing, because the
structure and incentives of the players in his own government make it impossible
for him to know. 4. They dont want to know. Maybe thats too generous. Bush used to boast that he
before it goes to senior officials. Maybe, at the end of the day,

never read the newspaper. Maybe Obama has stopped reading the news too. Or maybe he skips articles that look
critical or negative and goes straight to the sports section. It will be many years before current intelligence

assessments are declassified, but so far ,

journalistic reports of leaked documents and

comments by former officials suggest that theres no shortage of internal evidence
that U.S. counterterrorism policy is failing. According to the BBC, leaked CIA reports concluded that
targeting killings of Taliban leaders were ineffective, for instance. Other internal documents reportedly acknowledge
that U.S. officials are often uncertain whom theyre killing in the first place. But maybe senior officials find reasons

Taking such information fully on board or grappling with the

full implications of the recent rise in global terrorism would require senior officials
to admit (to themselves, even if not to the general public) that a counterterrorism strategy
centered on air power and targeted killings isnt working. Not fun. 5. They know, but dont
care. Perhaps Im still being too generous. Maybe senior administration officials know perfectly
well that their approach to counterterrorism is failing, but simply have no incentive
to change it. Why bother? In less than two years, this administration will be gone, and the next crew will have
to avoid reading such reports.

to clean up the mess which wont be easy, since no one has any magic solutions. In the meantime, politics
trumps policy. The experts, analysts, and pundits can yap all they want, but airstrikes and targeted killings scratch
the itch to do something and look tough while doing it. The long-term efficacy of this approach is immaterial. 6 .

Theyre just really conflicted and confused.

Its definitely possible. In May 2013, Obama told an

audience at the National Defense University that counterterrorist drone strikes raise profound questions and that
the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a comprehensive
counterterrorism strategy. In May 2014, he repeated his commitment to having that discussion and added, I also
believe we must be more transparent about both the basis of our counterterrorism actions and the manner in which
they are carried out. When we cannot explain our efforts clearly and publicly, we face terrorist propaganda and
international suspicion. In September 2014, he admitted, We

dont have a strategy yet for

dealing with the rise of the Islamic State. A few weeks ago, he amended this to we dont yet have
a complete strategy. It shows.

AT: Counterplans

At: Other surveillance tech CP

Drones Key
Drones key, yo
Stanley 2015 (Jay [Senior policy analyst, ACLU speech, privacy & tech project];
What's spooky about the FBI's fleet of spy planes?; https://www.aclu.org/blog/freefuture/whats-spooky-about-fbis-fleet-spy-planes; kdf)
Following up on a May story by the Washington Post about mysterious aircraft spotted circling over Baltimore, the
Associated Press reported today that the FBI maintains a secret air force with scores of small aircraft registered with
13 front companies under apparently false names, and that these planes fly over American cities frequently.

law enforcement has been using aircraft for many decades. So whats spooky
about this story? Several things: These are not your grandparents surveillance
aircraft. As I discussed when the Baltimore story broke, there are several very powerful masssurveillance technologies that utilize low-circling manned aircraft , including
Dirtboxes and persistent wide-area surveillance in which an entire 25-square mile
area can be monitored, and vehicles tracked, for extended periods of time by a
single camera. We need more information about the scope of surveillance these planes are being used for.
The FBI told the AP that its fleet was not equipped, designed or used for bulk
collection activities or mass surveillance. We are glad to hear thatbut that statement bears more
interrogation. For example the AP reports that the FBI occasionally uses Dirtboxes (aka IMSI
catchers or cell-site simulators) on the aircraft. Those certainly qualify as mass
surveillance devices. If the FBI is only using the aircraft when it has a specific
target rather than for broad fishing expeditions, that would be a good thingbut that is not
the same thing as saying that data on masses of people is not being swept up. The
FBI told the AP that under a new policy it has recently begun obtaining court orders to
use cell-site simulators. But we dont know what kind of court orders theyre getting to use the devices.
Rather than warrants, they may just be obtaining pen register orders, as we have seen
Obviously

done by local police in Baltimore and elsewhere. The sheer scope of the program. A 2010 federal budget document
found by the AP mentions at least 115 planes in the FBIs fleet, and the FBI has flown over 100 flights over more

Surveillance turning inward. One trend

weve seen in the last 15 years or so is a great Turning Inward, as US surveillance
capabilities originally built to spy on the Soviet Union and other overseas targets
have swung inward on the American people. The FBI has a spy plane fleet, hidden behind shell
than 30 American cities in recent weeks, the AP found.

companies with three-letter names and headed by ghost CEOS with signatures that dont match over time its all

Cessnas today, drones tomorrow.

Another thing that makes these flights spooky is the prospect that manned aircraft
may soon be replaced with drones. And that will make it all the cheaper and easier to deploy these
flights all the more frequently over even more American cities and towns. And unlike manned aircraft, drones
may not be easy to track through web sites like flightradar24.com, which shows the manned aircraft
very CIA. Yet these are American cities that theyre flying over.

currently in the air around the world and played a key role in uncovering the FBIs air force. It is true that under
orders from President Obama the DOJ recently promulgated a privacy policy for its use of drones, but that policy is

DOJ agencies cant use the planes solely for the

purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment . That is good, but
when agencies want to do surveillance they always claim to have other reasons so
the monitoring is not solely for such monitoring. In the end, it doesnt make sense for
drones to be subject to privacy regulations, but not manned aircraft . Manned aircraft
can and do raise very real privacy concerns ; for example their use in persistent wide-area
surveillance, and in voyeurism incidents. But manned aircraft are not regulated today, because
historically they have been expensive and their use therefore relatively rare, and
not very airtightfor example, it says

their surveillance abilities well-understood and relatively limited. What this story tells us is
that their use is now more widespread than we thoughtand we know their surveillance capabilities
are growing by leaps and bounds. Drones, by raising the prospect of endless free and easy aerial
surveillance, have brought to the fore issues that already existed with manned aircraft,
and new regulations designed to protect against aerial surveillance should not
distinguish between manned and unmanned aircraft. Law enforcement has been using aircraft
for many decades. So whats spooky about reports of FBI fleet of low-circling planes?

AT: Congress CP

No Solve Circumvention
Only a ruling about the 4th amendment can solve CP gets
circumvented
Celso 2014 (Joel [JD Candidate U of Baltimore Law]; DRONING ON ABOUT THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADOPTING A REASONABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE TO PREVENT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS; 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461; kdf)
The advent of the widespread government use of UAS has raised
concerns about the potential threat to Americans' privacy . n64 Critics warn of a surveillance
C. Privacy Concerns

society in which the government monitors, tracks, records, and scrutinizes individuals' every move. n65 Individuals
have expressed sentiments such as, "I do not want flying spy robots looking into my private property with infrared
cameras ... It's an invasion of my privacy." n66 Survey results indicate that the American public is opposed to using
UAS in routine police matters. n67 Public opposition to drone use has had some effect. In
response to public backlash, the Seattle Police Department recently returned its two UAS to the manufacturer after
the mayor banned their use. n68 Virginia's legislature has imposed a two-year moratorium on using UAS for criminal

Similarly, Congress has introduced legislation that would establish

limitations on law enforcement's use of UAS platforms. n70 Although privacy
concerns can be addressed by Congress n71 or state legislatures, the constitutionality of
law enforcement's use of UAS for aerial surveillance will ultimately be determined
by the courts. n72 The issue to be resolved is whether domestic UAS use is lawful
under the Fourth Amendment. n73 The remainder of this comment will analyze the government's use of
UAS for aerial surveillance under [*470] the Fourth Amendment and argue for a jurisprudence that will
maximize protections for individual privacy rights.
investigations. n69

No Solve Observer Effect

Congressional oversight empirically fails at creating an
observer effect
Deeks 13 (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the
U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention,
the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence
issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with alQaeda, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes,
and Judicial Deference, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)

Second, although in theory Congress may insert itself into the policymaking process
including by legislating directly or by conducting oversight hearingsit faces a
number of hurdles to doing so. As Aziz Huq notes, Terrorism is a subject matter
that is especially prone to legislative delegation because it often entails hard tradeoffs. Post-9/11 legislation generally leaves large discretion in executive hands. For
example, when fashioning substitutes for habeas corpus, Congress left open both
substantive and procedural rules.138 In addition to this delegation, congressional
oversight mechanisms have not proven particularly robust.139 The president may
limit executive reporting to Congress by interpreting particular statutory terms
narrowly, as he seems to have done with the term hostilities in the War Powers
Resolution.140 Congressional reports on national security issues tend to emerge
years after the fact and thus have limited impact on policy setting that must take
place quickly.

Congress does not have an observer effect it is even more

aggressive on security than the executive
Deeks 13 (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the
U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention,
the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence
issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with alQaeda, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes,
and Judicial Deference, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)
Second, although in theory Congress may insert itself into the policymaking process
including by legislating directly or by conducting oversight hearingsit faces a
number of hurdles to doing so. As Aziz Huq notes, Terrorism is a subject matter
that is especially prone to legislative delegation because it often entails hard tradeoffs. Post-9/11 legislation generally leaves large discretion in executive hands. For
example, when fashioning substitutes for habeas corpus, Congress left open both
substantive and procedural rules.138 In addition to this delegation, congressional
oversight mechanisms have not proven particularly robust.139 The president may
limit executive reporting to Congress by interpreting particular statutory terms
narrowly, as he seems to have done with the term hostilities in the War Powers
Resolution.140 Congressional reports on national security issues tend to emerge

years after the fact and thus have limited impact on policy setting that must take
place quickly.Congressional Pressure As political scientists have demonstrated, a
strategic executive will be attuned not just to the judiciary as a potential audience
for its policymaking, but also to Congress. The executive accordingly will take into
account potential congressional reactions to its policy decisions when finalizing
those policies. Perhaps, then, Congress is a key source of pressure on executive
policymaking, leading the executive to alter or reveal various national security
policies and procedures. Two facts indicate that Congress has played a modest role
in shaping the national security policies discussed here. First, the timing of the
policy changes seems closely aligned with activity in courts, and seems unrelated to
salient activity in Congress. In many cases, Congress only became involved in
cementing policy changes well after the executive already had made them on its
own. For instance, the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act effectively codified (with
modest amendments) the Bush Administrations 2004 Combatant Status Review
Tribunals.196 Congress has not legislated (or even threatened to legislate) to
mandate particular review procedures for detainees in Afghanistan, the use of
secret evidence in immigration proceedings, or the use of lethal force overseas
against American citizens. In most of the examples considered in Part I, Congress
has come late to the game, if it shows up on the field at all. Second, where Congress
has chosen to legislate in the postSeptember 11 era, it frequently has been more
aggressively security focused and less rights focused than the executive.197 For
instance, in 2007, the Senate passed a Sense of the Senate, by a 94-3 vote,
opposing efforts to bring Guantnamo detainees to the United States,
notwithstanding President George W. Bushs interest in doing so.198 In the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Congress sought to require the
executive to detain members of al Qaeda within a military detention paradigm
rather than an Article III criminal paradigm.199 President Obamas signing
statement opposed that policy and triggered relevant 196. Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified in part at 42
U.S.C. 2000dd to 2000dd-1 (2006)). 197. There are exceptions to this. For
example, certain members of Congress hoped to cabin the executives use of the
state secrets doctrine. See infra note 308. 198. 153 CONG. REC. 19,719 (2007). 199.
National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
102122, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). 2013] THE OBSERVER EFFECT 871 waivers built
into the legislation.200 It is hard to reconcile Congresss security-driven preferences
with policy shifts by the executive in more rights-protective directions. It is possible
that private consultations between some members of Congress and the executive
have affected executive decisions to alter executive policy, but records of those
discussions are not publicly available. There even is evidence of situations in which
members of Congress objected to rights-protective shifts in executive security
policies shortly after the executive issued those policies.201 In short, it is hard to
see, based on available direct and circumstantial evidence, that Congress has
exercised a potent observer effect of its own over the executive in the national
security arena.

No Solve Courts Set Precedent

Courts are key to establishing a legal precedent legislative
oversight is playing technological whack-a-mole
Vacek 09 (Joseph [Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota]; Big Brother
Will Soon Be Watching - Or Will He? Constitutional, Regulatory, and Operational
Issues Surrounding the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles In Law Enforcement; 2009;
http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/mltHandle
r.do?bct=A)//AJ
Every technological step forward in remote sensing raises potential Fourth
Amendment issues, and the implications of law enforcement and executive use of
ever cheaper and more numerous surveillance tools are not fleshed out until the
highest courts profess their opinions, sometimes years later. And in the interim,
even newer technologies have rendered the original technologies and questions
obsolete. Even legislative oversight is ineffective - a deliberative organ's skills at
playing technological "whack-a-mole" are futile when compared to the rate of
industry advancement.
[*675] The societal questions raised by today's law enforcement use of cuttingedge surveillance technology in day-to-day operations will need to be answered at
the same level they are raised - on the ground. There is no precedent that squarely
addresses privacy implications of governmental use of a technology that allows
essentially permanent, multi-dimensional, multi-sensory surveillance of citizens
twenty-four hours per day. A hypothetical example approaching that kind of
surveillance ability would be a police officer's access to a Google Earth n1 like
displway, with a point of view that could be moved or zoomed anywhere in three
dimensions, coupled with real-time visual, audio, thermal, or other sensing. God-like
sensory omniscience, in other words. Individual law enforcement officers' abilities
could be multiplied with a flock of small UAVs, exponentially increasing the state's
power to continually monitor its citizenry.
Our Constitutional jurisprudence, demographics, and technological ability to
remotely sense almost anyone, anywhere, at anytime, seem to be the ingredients
necessary for a police state. But interestingly, law enforcement has not taken full
advantage of the potential tools available to them - perhaps for regulatory
impediments, for budgetary constraints, or to avoid running afoul of the
Constitution. At any rate, permanent, ubiquitous surveillance is not the stuff of
fiction anymore. So what could usher us into the brave new world of a big brotherlike security state? Off-the-shelf technology, an updated regulatory scheme, and
outdated Fourth Amendment cases could.

Courts are key to creating an effective precedent legislative

action will fall behind technology
Koerner 15 (Matthew [J.D. Duke University School of Law]; Drones and the
Fourth Amendment: Redefining Expectations of Privacy; March, 2015;

http://www.lexisnexis.com.p
roxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?
docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T222512
84585&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T2225
1284591&cisb=22_T22251284590&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=7336&docNo
=5)//AJ
[*1133] Drones, with their current and projected capabilities, present a perfect
storm of issues that fall outside of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence but still
appear to implicate the Fourth Amendment. n20 Drones can maneuver through
each and every loophole of the jurisprudence for warrantless searches. n21 They
travel on public airways at low or high altitudes, undetected and with little or no
undue noise, nuisance, or threat to persons or property. n22 They can utilize senseenhancing technologies that are, or will soon be, in general public use. n23 And
drones can use these technologies to gather an abundance of intimate details and
information, previously impossible or impracticable to acquire. n24 Law
enforcement is likely to increasingly use drones for domestic surveillance, n25 and
this will likely propel drones to the forefront of courts' dockets . n26
Scholars have written exhaustively on many aspects of the Fourth Amendment, and
its intersection with drones has recently [*1134] received significant attention. n27
Much of the literature on drones and the Fourth Amendment recognizes that it is
unclear where - and whether - drones fall within current jurisprudence, and
recommends a variety of legislative solutions. n28 But although scholars identify
the legal uncertainties with drones, those recommending legislative action endorse
a partial solution that only perpetuates the problem that the courts have maintained
with respect to technology and the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, just as current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has failed to keep pace with advancing
technology, a legislative approach will also trail behind . n29 This Note addresses
these [*1135] issues and recommends an adaptive approach to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in the age of the drone.
For these reasons, it is highly probable that courts will soon confront issues
regarding the use of drones for domestic surveillance. n30 This Note argues that
when these issues arise, courts should apply the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test expounded in Katz v. United States, n31 and, in doing so, expand on the
subjective-expectation-of-privacy requirement. This oft-neglected element of the
two-pronged test provides critical analysis that is especially relevant to cases
involving drones. In further analyzing and clarifying the subjective-expectation
requirement, courts should proceed in three steps. First, they should determine
whether the surveilled person "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy" - the [*1136] threshold issue in order for the Fourth Amendment to apply.
n32 Second, if the person held a subjective expectation of privacy, courts should
evaluate the scope of that privacy expectation. And third, they should determine
whether the person "exposed [information] to the "plain view' of outsiders" and
whether the evidence at issue fell within the scope of that exposure. n33

AT: Lower Courts CP

No Solve Supreme Court Key

Supreme Court precedent is key to promoting international rule of
law regarding terrorism

Scharf et al. 09 (Michael, Counsel of Record, Brief of the Public International

Law & Policy Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Jamal Kiyemba,
et. Al., v. Barack H. Obama, et al., SCOTUS, No. 08-1234, 1209, p. 8-20)

II. PILPGS EXPERIENCE ADVISING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND

JUDICIARIES ILLUSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
IN PROMOTING RULE OF LAW IN FOREIGN STATES DURING TIMES OF
CONFLICT. During PILPGs work providing pro bono legal assistance to foreign
governments and judiciaries on the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict settings,
clients frequently request guidance on U.S. laws and the role of the
judiciary in the U.S. system of governance. In recent years, as states have
watched the U.S. tackle the legal issues surrounding the war on terror,
foreign governments and judiciaries have expressed keen interest in, and
have demonstrated reliance on, the legal mechanisms the U.S. has adopted
to address the challenges presented in this new form of conflict. The U.S.
Government, under the guidance of this Court, has set a strong example for
upholding the rule of law during times of conflict, and foreign
governments have followed this lead . When states follow the example set
by the U.S. Government, the U.S. can benefit greatly . The U.S. Government
recognizes that foreign states with strong and i ndependent judicial
systems and a commitment to the rule of law make the most stable allies
and partners. Stable allies and partners in turn create the best environment
for U.S. business investments and commerce and provide the most safety for
Americans traveling abroad. Through PILPGs work with foreign governments, PILPG
has observed that U.S. rule of law interests are best represented abroad
when foreign governments view the U.S. as committed to the primacy of
law. See Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical
Contribution to the Compliance Debate, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 45, 64-65 (2009). A.
Foreign Governments Rely on U.S. Precedent to Promote Rule of Law in
Times of Conflict. As noted above, PILPG has advised over two dozen states and
governments on the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements and the
drafting of post-conflict constitutions. PILPG has also advised all the international
war crimes tribunals. PILPG frequently serves as pro bono counsel to foreign
governments and judiciaries, advising those governments and judiciaries on
important legal issues during times of transition. PILPGs unique relationship with
its clients provides the organizations members with rare insight into the
decision-making process of foreign governments and judiciaries and the
i nfluence that the U.S. and this Court have on promoting rule of law during

times of conflict. The following examples, from Uganda, Nepal, Somaliland, and
South Sudan, illustrate some of the ways in which foreign governments and
judiciaries rely on the leadership of the U.S. and this Court to promote rule of law in
their home states. i. Uganda In Uganda, the precedent established by this Court in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229
(2008), influenced judges and legislators to incorporate the principles of judicial
review and enforceability in their domestic war crimes bill. In 2008 members of
PILPG began working with the Government of Uganda to establish a War Crimes
Chamber within the Ugandan High Court to prosecute members of the Lords
Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is an insurgent group operating in Northern
Uganda, which, over the past twenty-five years, has kidnapped over sixty thousand
young Ugandan girls and boys, and forced them to be sex slaves and child soldiers.
PILPG worked closely with the Ugandan government to establish a judicial
mechanism to address this violence in accordance with international legal
standards. After discussing with PILPG this Courts holdings in Hamdan and
Boumediene, the Ugandan government decided to include a provision in their bill
establishing the War Crimes Chamber that provides for appeal to Ugandas highest
court. Following the example of the U.S., the Ugandans felt that it was important
that such high profile and controversial cases involving war crimes and terrorism
should be subject to the highest level of judicial review in order to promote
independence, fairness, and legitimacy. Provided that this Court issues a robust
interpretation of Boumediene, the Ugandan precedent is likely to be repeated by
other countries, such as Liberia, which are also contemplating the establishment of
judicial bodies to prosecute war crimes and terrorism. ii. Nepal This Court has also
served as a model for the nascent Nepal judiciary. Nepals 2006 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement ended a decade-long civil conflict between Maoist insurgents and
government forces. The Agreement provided for the election of a Constituent
Assembly to serve as an interim government and to draft a new constitution for
Nepal. Elected in May 2008, the Constituent Assembly is currently in the midst of
the constitution drafting process. PILPG is advising the Assemblys drafting
committees on a number of issues, among them the structure, composition, and
role of the judiciary. Members of the Assembly have repeatedly expressed the view
that the judiciary is a crucial component to fully and effectively implementing the
constitution and ensuring the balance of power in the new government. In technical
discussions with members of the Committee on the Judicial System, PILPG discussed
several aspects of the U.S. judicial model, including: the U.S. federal and state
judicial structures; the types of cases the Supreme Court can adjudicate; the powers
and functions of the U.S. judicial branch; the devolution of judicial power in the U.S.;
the role of the Supreme Court in establishing precedent for all U.S. courts; and the
mechanisms used by the Supreme Court to ensure enforcement of its decisions in
the lower courts. Members of the Committee on the Judicial System were
particularly interested in how the U.S. federal court system operates at the national
level, and how the U.S. model could be applied in Nepal as Nepal moves towards
decentralizing its court system. As the Constituent Assembly moves forward with
developing constitutional and judicial structures for Nepal, members will continue to
look to the functioning of this Court for guidance on the role of a high court in a
federal system, particularly how this Court enforces key decisions in the lower

courts. iii. Somaliland In Somaliland, the government relied heavily on U.S. terrorism
legislation when drafting terrorism legislation for the region. In October 2008,
Somaliland, an autonomous region inside the international borders of Somalia,
experienced its first large-scale attack by terrorist-linked suicide bombers. The
Somaliland government sought PILPGs assistance to develop a legal framework to
combat terrorism based on U.S. terrorism legislation. The government believed that
rule of law was the best means to combat terrorism and build international support
for Somalilands efforts towards that end. The Somaliland government sought to
address gaps in its legal regime that prevented law enforcement from accessing
information necessary to properly combat future terrorist attacks, such as
telecommunications records, financial transfer records, property rental records, and
vehicle records. The government requested PILPGs assistance in balancing new
government authority with vital due process safeguards that the U.S. and other
states use to protect the rights of citizens. iv. South Sudan In the South Sudan
peace process, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the leading
political party in the Government of Southern Sudan, relied on U.S. precedent to
argue for the primacy of law and the importance of the enforceability of adjudicative
decisions in deciding one of the most important and contentious issues in the
ongoing peace process. In May 2008, large-scale violence in Abyei, South Sudan,
resulted in the destruction of Abyei Town and the displacement of its residents. The
violence further threatened to unravel the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. The violence was a result of
tension between the parties regarding the long-overdue establishment of
boundaries of the Abyei Area, which straddles the North and South of Sudan and
was the location of widespread violence during decades of civil war. The parties had
agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to a specific process to determine
the boundaries of the Abyei Area. When the Abyei Boundaries Commission issued its
binding decision, however, the Government of Sudan refused to implement the
ruling. Given the long and violent history between the parties, the unresolved status
of Abyei threatened to re-ignite widespread conflict. Rather than returning to
hostilities, however, the parties elected to refer the Abyei question to an
adjudicative body. On July 7, 2008, the parties signed the Abyei Arbitration
Agreement. Under the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, the parties agreed to
submit questions regarding the boundaries of the Abyei Area to an arbitration
tribunal seated at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The leaders of
the SPLM/A told PILPG that they sought recourse to an adjudicative body because
they believed that the ruling would be enforceable and would be supported by the
international community. Based on the belief that the U.S. legal system promotes
the primacy of law and affirms the critical role of adjudicative bodies in a system
dedicated to the rule of law, the SPLM/A cited U.S. court decisions in its submissions
to the Abyei Arbitration tribunal. The SPLM/A memorials specifically cited this Court,
as well as U.S. district and circuit court decisions, to bolster the SPLM/As position
that the tribunal should respect the finality of the award of an adjudicative body,
such as the Abyei Boundaries Commission.2 When the Abyei Arbitration tribunal
issued its binding decision in July 2009, the arbitration decision also cited this
Courts precedent.3 This Court thus played an important role in the peaceful
resolution of one of the most contentious issues in the South Sudan peace process.

As the foregoing examples illustrate, foreign governments rely on the precedent set
by the U.S. and this Court when addressing new and complex issues in times of
conflict. Finding for the Petitioners in the present case will reaffirm this Courts
leadership in promoting respect for rule of law in foreign states during times of
conflict. B. Foreign Judges Follow U.S. and Supreme Court Leadership in Times
of Conflict. In addition to its work advising foreign governments, PILPG has been
and continues to be involved in a number of judicial training initiatives in
foreign states. These initiatives aim to foster independent and fair judicial
systems in transitional and post-conflict states throughout Central and
Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. In these trainings, PILPG frequently
relies on the work of this Court to illustrate and promote adherence to the
rule of law. In 2004, for example, PILPG led a week-long training session for Iraqi
judges in Dubai on due process and civil liberties protections to institute in the new
post-Saddam legal system. The training was seen as an important step toward the
democratization of Iraq, and something that would hasten the ability of the U.S. to
withdraw its troops from Iraq. On the second day of the training program, local and
international media published the leaked photos of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The
Iraqi judges would not allow the training sessions to continue until PILPG answered
to their satisfaction questions about whether the U.S. judicial system could ensure
that the perpetrators would be brought to justice, that the victims would be able to
bring suit for their injuries, and that the abuses would be halted. When PILPG
returned for another training session several months later, the Iraqi judges had
mixed reactions to the prosecutions of the Abu Ghraib perpetrators. Some judges
perceived the U.S. prosecutions of the perpetrators as not aggressive enough, which
left the Iraqi judges with the impression that the U.S. was not leading by example.
Although other Iraqi judges appreciated and sought to follow the U.S. example to try
those responsible for abuses before an independent tribunal, it was clear that Abu
Ghraib temporarily set back U.S. efforts to establish rule of law in Iraq. A year later,
in 2005, PILPG conducted training sessions for the Iraqi High Tribunal judges who
would be presiding over the trial of Saddam Hussein and other former leaders of the
Baathist regime. Even more than the human rights training of ordinary Iraqi judges
discussed above, the successful operation of the Iraqi High Tribunal was seen as
critical to suppressing the spread of sectarian violence and heading off a full-scale
civil war in Iraq. The objectives of the tribunal were twofold. First, the tribunal
sought to bring those most responsible for the atrocities committed under the
Baathist regime before an independent panel of judges to be tried under
international standards of justice. Second, the tribunal sought to establish a model
for upholding and implementing rule of law in Iraq and to demonstrate that the
need for rule of law is greatest in response to the gravest atrocities. During the
training sessions, the Iraqi judges requested guidance on controlling disruptive
defendants in the courtroom. Specifically, the judges asked whether they could bind
and gag the defendants in the courtroom as they understood had been done to the
defendants in the 1969 Chicago Seven trial in the U.S. PILPG explained that the
U.S. Court of Appeals had ultimately overturned the convictions in that case, in part
because of the mistreatment of the defendants in the courtroom. United States v.
Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972). This information persuaded the Iraqi judges

to seek less draconian means of control in the trial of Saddam Hussein, which was
televised gavel to gavel in Iraq. See generally Michael Newton and Michael Scharf,
Enemy of the State: The Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein (2008). Foreign
judicial interest in U.S. respect for rule of law during the war on terror is not limited
to Iraqi judges. In 2006, PILPG conducted sessions in a weeklong rule of law training
program in Prague for fifty judges from former Soviet Bloc countries in Eastern
Europe. At the start of the first session, one of the judges asked Sobriaetes li vi
goverit o slone v komnate?, which translates to Are you going to be addressing
the elephant in the room? Michael P. Scharf, The Elephant in the Room: Torture and
the War on Terror, 37 Case W. Res. J. Intl L. 145, 145 (2006). The question referred
to the so-called White House Torture Memos, released just before the training
session began, which asserted that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions was not applicable to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay and which
provided justification for Military Commissions whose procedures would not meet
the Geneva standards. Id. at 145-46. The group of judges asked PILPG to explain
how representatives of the United States could expect to be taken seriously in
speaking about the importance of human rights law when the United States itself
has recently done so much that is contrary to that body of law in the context of the
so-called Global War on Terror. Id. at 145. PILPG addressed judges concerns by
explaining that the Presidents decision to establish Military Commissions via
Executive Order, and whether those Commissions had to comport with the Geneva
Conventions, was currently being reviewed by this Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557 (2006), and that the Executive Branch would be bound to follow the
holding of this Court. Scharf, supra, at 148. Foreign judges closely follow the
work of this Court and the example set by the U.S. Government in
upholding the rule of law during the war on terror. As these examples
illustrate, when the U.S. upholds the rule of law, foreign judges are more
likely to follow.

No Solve International Modeling

Foreign governments model the Supreme Courts rulings regarding
judicial checks on other branches

Scharf et al. 09 (Michael, Counsel of Record, Brief of the Public International

Law & Policy Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Jamal Kiyemba,
et. Al., v. Barack H. Obama, et al., SCOTUS, No. 08-1234, 1209, p. 8-20)
III. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE CONFIRMS THIS COURTS LEADERSHIP
IN PROMOTING ADHERENCE TO RULE OF LAW IN TIMES OF CONFLICT.
PILPGs on-the-ground experience demonstrating the leadership of this
Court is confirmed by a study of transnational judicial dialogue. Over the
past halfcentury, the worlds constitutional courts have been engaged in a
rich and growing transnational judicial dialogue on a wide range of
constitutional law issues. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and
Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing
International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487 (2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, 40 Va. J. Intl L. 1103 (2000). Courts around the world consider ,
discuss , and cite foreign judicial decisions not out of a sense of legal
obligation, but out of a developing sense that foreign decisions are valuable
resources in elucidating complex legal issues and suggesting new approaches
to common problems. See Waters, supra, at 493-94.
In this transnational judicial dialogue, the decisions of this Court have
exercised a profound and profoundly positive influence on the work of
foreign and international courts. See generally Constitutionalism and Rights:
The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad (Louis Henkin & Albert J.
Rosenthal eds., 1990); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of
Rights, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 537 (1988). As Anthony Lester of the British House of
Lords has noted, there is a vigorous overseas trade in the Bill of Rights, in
international and constitutional litigation involving norms derived from
American constitutional law. When life or liberty is at stake, the landmark
judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States, giving fresh
meaning to the principles of the Bill of Rights, are studied with as much
attention in New Delhi or Strasbourg as they are in Washington, D.C. Id. at
541.
This Courts overseas influence is not limited to the Bill of Rights. From
Australia to India to Israel to the United Kingdom, foreign courts have
looked to the seminal decisions of this Court as support for their own
rulings upholding judicial review , enforcing separation of powers, and
providing a judicial check on the political branches.
Indeed, for foreign courts, this Courts rulings in seminal cases such as
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),4 Brown v. Board of Education,

347 U.S. 436 (1954),5 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),6 and Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 take on a special significance . Reliance on the moral
authority of this Court can provide invaluable support for those foreign
courts struggling to establish their own legitimacy, to shore up judicial
authority against overreaching by powerful executives, and to develop a
strong rule of law within their own national legal systems.
This Courts potential to positively influence the international rule of law is
particularly important in the nascent transnational judicial dialogue
surrounding the war on terrorism and the primacy of rule of law in times
of conflict. As the worlds courts begin to grapple with the novel, complex, and
delicate legal issues surrounding the modern-day war on terrorism, and as states
seek to develop judicial mechanisms to address domestic conflicts, foreign
governments and judiciaries are confronting similar challenges. In
particular, foreign governments and judiciaries must consider how to
accommodate the legitimate needs of the executive branch in times of war
within the framework of the law. Although foreign courts are just beginning to
address these issues, it is already clear that they are looking to the experience of
the U.S., and to the precedent of this Court, for guidance on upholding the
rule of law in times of conflict. In recent years, courts in Israel, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have relied on the precedent of this Court in
decisions addressing the rights of detainees.8 In short, as a result of this Courts
robust influence on transnational judicial dialogue, its decisions have proved
extraordinarily important to the development of the rule of law around the
world.
International courts have similarly relied on the precedent of this Court in
influential decisions. For example, in the important and developing area of
international criminal law, the international war crimes tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda both relied heavily on the precedent of this Court in their early opinions. In
the first five years of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the first in the modern iteration of the
war crimes tribunals, the justices cited this Court at least seventeen times in
decisions establishing the fundamental legal principles under which the Tribunal
would function.9 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda similarly relied on
this Courts precedent, citing this Court at least twelve times in its first five years.10
The precedent of this Court has provided a crucial foundation for international
criminal law. The reliance on the precedent of this Court speaks to the Courts
international leadership on the promotion of respect for the rule of law in times of
conflict.
By ruling in favor of the Petitioners, this Court will reaffirm the precedent
established in its prior decisions granting habeas rights to Guantanamo detainees
and, in doing so, demonstrate to these foreign courts, and to other courts who will
be addressing these issues in the future, that all branches of government must be
bound by the rule of law, even in the most challenging of times.

AT: FBI Planes PIC

No Solve -- Circumvention
CP cant solve the aff - gets circumvented and more invasive of
privacy
Stanley 2015 (Jay [Senior policy analyst, ACLU speech, privacy & tech project];
What's spooky about the FBI's fleey of spy planes?; https://www.aclu.org/blog/freefuture/whats-spooky-about-fbis-fleet-spy-planes; kdf)
Following up on a May story by the Washington Post about mysterious aircraft spotted circling over Baltimore, the
Associated Press reported today that the FBI maintains a secret air force with scores of small aircraft registered with
13 front companies under apparently false names, and that these planes fly over American cities frequently.

law enforcement has been using aircraft for many decades. So whats spooky
about this story? Several things: These are not your grandparents surveillance
aircraft. As I discussed when the Baltimore story broke, there are several very powerful masssurveillance technologies that utilize low-circling manned aircraft , including
Dirtboxes and persistent wide-area surveillance in which an entire 25-square mile
area can be monitored, and vehicles tracked, for extended periods of time by a
single camera. We need more information about the scope of surveillance these planes are being used for.
The FBI told the AP that its fleet was not equipped, designed or used for bulk
collection activities or mass surveillance. We are glad to hear thatbut that statement bears more
interrogation. For example the AP reports that the FBI occasionally uses Dirtboxes (aka IMSI
catchers or cell-site simulators) on the aircraft. Those certainly qualify as mass
surveillance devices. If the FBI is only using the aircraft when it has a specific
target rather than for broad fishing expeditions, that would be a good thingbut that is not
the same thing as saying that data on masses of people is not being swept up. The
FBI told the AP that under a new policy it has recently begun obtaining court orders to
use cell-site simulators. But we dont know what kind of court orders theyre getting to use the devices.
Rather than warrants, they may just be obtaining pen register orders, as we have seen
Obviously

done by local police in Baltimore and elsewhere. The sheer scope of the program. A 2010 federal budget document
found by the AP mentions at least 115 planes in the FBIs fleet, and the FBI has flown over 100 flights over more

Surveillance turning inward. One trend

weve seen in the last 15 years or so is a great Turning Inward, as US surveillance
capabilities originally built to spy on the Soviet Union and other overseas targets
have swung inward on the American people. The FBI has a spy plane fleet, hidden behind shell
than 30 American cities in recent weeks, the AP found.

companies with three-letter names and headed by ghost CEOS with signatures that dont match over time its all

Cessnas today, drones tomorrow.

Another thing that makes these flights spooky is the prospect that manned aircraft
may soon be replaced with drones. And that will make it all the cheaper and easier to deploy these
flights all the more frequently over even more American cities and towns. And unlike manned aircraft, drones
may not be easy to track through web sites like flightradar24.com, which shows the manned aircraft
very CIA. Yet these are American cities that theyre flying over.

currently in the air around the world and played a key role in uncovering the FBIs air force. It is true that under
orders from President Obama the DOJ recently promulgated a privacy policy for its use of drones, but that policy is

DOJ agencies cant use the planes solely for the

purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment . That is good, but
when agencies want to do surveillance they always claim to have other reasons so
the monitoring is not solely for such monitoring. In the end, it doesnt make sense for
drones to be subject to privacy regulations, but not manned aircraft . Manned aircraft
can and do raise very real privacy concerns ; for example their use in persistent wide-area
surveillance, and in voyeurism incidents. But manned aircraft are not regulated today, because
not very airtightfor example, it says

historically they have been expensive and their use therefore relatively rare, and
their surveillance abilities well-understood and relatively limited. What this story tells us is
that their use is now more widespread than we thoughtand we know their surveillance capabilities
are growing by leaps and bounds. Drones, by raising the prospect of endless free and easy aerial
surveillance, have brought to the fore issues that already existed with manned aircraft,
and new regulations designed to protect against aerial surveillance should not
distinguish between manned and unmanned aircraft. Law enforcement has been using aircraft
for many decades. So whats spooky about reports of FBI fleet of low-circling planes?

No Solve FBI Planes Bad

FBI spy planes violate privacy because of unique tech
Storm 15 (Darlene, Surveillance by FBI's fleet of spy planes raises privacy
questions, Computer World, 6-3-15,
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2930731/security0/surveillance-by-fbis-fleetof-spy-planes-raises-privacy-questions.html)//BPS
the FBIs surveillance aircraft [are] fitted with tech
equipment capable of tricking the cellphones below it into connecting to it and not
a legitimate cellphone tower and then indiscriminately sucking up info of
subscribers not suspected of any crime . Then again it might not.
That plane circling overhead might be one of

The Associated Press traced at least 50 aircraft back to the FBI, and
identified more than 100 flights in 11 states plus the District of Columbia . Those planes
In a 30-day period,

have been flying over parts of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Minneapolis, Phoenix, Seattle and Southern
California as well rural areas. While you would expect the FBI to use aircraft in investigations, you might not expect
those planes to be registered to shell companies. The AP traced FBI planes to at least 13 fake companies, such as
FVX Research, KQM Aviation, NBR Aviation and PXW Services.
Although the FBI said its aviation program is not a secret, the agency tried the tactic of asking the AP not to
mention the fake companies tied to the planes as it would saddle taxpayers with the expense of creating new
cover companies to shield the government's involvement, and could endanger the planes and integrity of the
surveillance missions. The AP must have thought that request was funny and chose to ignore it because the
information about the shell companies and their links to the Justice Department are listed on public documents and
in government databases.
115 planes belonging to the FBI, including 90 Cessna aircraft, were mentioned in a 2009 budget document, but
while investigating the Associated Press also discovered:

planes are equipped with technology that can capture video of unrelated
criminal activity on the ground that could be handed over to prosecutions . One of the
The

planes, photographed in flight last week by the AP in northern Virginia, bristled with unusual antennas under its
fuselage and a camera on its left side.

Some of the aircraft can also be equipped with technology that can identify thousands
of people below through the cellphones they carry , even if they're not making a call or in public.
Officials said that practice, which mimics cell towers and gets phones to reveal basic subscriber information, is used
in only limited situations.
These are not your grandparents' surveillance aircraft, said ACLU senior policy analyst Jay Stanley. He also
explained that surveillance turning inward is just one spooky element about the FBIs spy planes.
One trend weve seen in the last 15 years or so is a great Turning Inward, as US surveillance capabilities
originally built to spy on the Soviet Union and other overseas targets have swung inward on the American people.
The FBI has a spy plane fleet, hidden behind shell companies with three-letter names and headed by ghost CEOS
with signatures that dont match over time its all very CIA. Yet these are American cities that theyre flying over.

surveillance planes fitted with infrared cameras to

track peoples movements were flying over Baltimore, the AP discovered that some of those FBI
missions circled above at least 40,000 residents during a single flight over Anaheim,
California. The flight patterns were counter-clockwise and about one mile above the
ground at slow speeds, which suggested to the AP that FLIR cameras were being used.
After The Washington Post reported that

Earlier this month, the ACLU hit the FAA as well as the DOJ, FBI, DEA, U.S. Marshals Service with Freedom of
Information Act requests about the surveillance planes and flights over Baltimore. The DEA has at least 92 planes
registered to shell companies and the U.S. Marshals Service use planes with tech capable of capturing data from
thousands of other phones, too.

The Wall Street Journal previously reported the Marshals have been flying Cessna aircraft outfitted with dirtbox
devices for seven years, snagging a large number of innocent Americans every time the feds hunt for criminals.
Dirtboxes work like Stingrays, which are in use by over 46 agencies including law enforcement, the military, and

A Stingray
surveillance device lets law enforcement mimic a cell phone tower, track the position of
users who connect to it, and sometimes even intercept calls and Internet traffic, send fake
texts, install spyware on a phone, and determine precise locations. Dirtboxes can sweep
intelligence agencies across 18 states and Washington D.C. for more than a decade.

up identifying information about tens of thousands of cell phones in a single flight.

The ACLUs Stanley said:

Another mass surveillance technique that uses fixed-wing aircraft is known as Wide-Area
Surveillance. This involves the installation of super-high, gigapixel resolution cameras on
planes, which are then used to monitor entire cities. Every moving pedestrian and
vehicle can be tracked: the beginning and end everyones journeys, and the route taken in between. This
gives the authorities the power to press "rewind" on anybody's movements, and learn a lot of
intrusive things about how they live their life .
The investigation by the Associated Press into the FBIs use of surveillance aircraft does indeed raise questions
about how these surveillance flights affect Americans' privacy even if the FBI has started obtaining court orders to
use the tech. The agencys use of cell-site simulators, aka dirtboxes or IMSI catchers, attached to aircraft is the
creepiest part; the technology can track thousands of innocent Americans who did nothing to deserve having their
privacy and civil liberty rights poked with a surveillance stick.
If the FBI is running targeted surveillance in legitimate investigations, then why collect the whole haystack when
the agency is investigating one bad needle inside it?

AT: McNeal CP

Perm
Permutation do the plan and counterplanThe aff solves the link to the net-benefit
Yang 2014 (Y. Douglas [JD Boston U]; BIG BROTHER'S GROWN WINGS: THE
DOMESTIC PROLIFERATION OF DRONE SURVEILLANCE AND THE LAW'S RESPONSE;
23 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 343; kdf)
Rule 1 embodies the desire of both federal and state
legislatures to exclude certain situations from the burden of a warrant requirement.
a. Rule 1: Warrantless Drone Use

n228 Common examples of non-law enforcement operations include, but are not limited to, land surveying, n229
weather and climate observation and scientific research, n230 wildlife management and protection, n231 and
search and rescue missions. n232 In addition to Rule 1's exemption of non-law enforcement uses of drones ,

Rule
1 also exempts situations where a high risk of terrorist attack or imminent danger to
life or property exists. This specific provision finds its inspiration in Virginia's [*377] warrant
exception that allows drone use for responses to Amber Alerts, n233 Senior Alerts,
n234 and search-and-rescue missions." n235 While the Fourth Amendment covers all government
intrusions of privacy, government activity that does not involve criminal investigation tends to involve "a less
hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime." n236 Moreover,

drones can be a potent tool to assist in searching for missing persons and in police
emergencies, much in the same way that police helicopters and aircraft currently
provide aerial support, albeit at a much higher cost and with less flexibility . n237 Rule 1
reflects a desire by federal and state legislative proposals to exempt exigent circumstances from restrictions on

where a law enforcement agency believes that a particular area,

event, or situation poses a high risk of attack by terrorist s; or that there is an imminent and
articulable threat to a specific person's life or property, substantial legal obstacles should not
hamper that agency. Rule 1's first paragraph is a compromise measure that allows
the government to promptly respond to urgent situations, while ensuring that the
government, and particularly law enforcement agencies, adhere to the privacy
protections of the Rule by demonstrating that probable cause of a high risk of
terrorist attack existed or that an imminent danger to life or property existed at the
time and general location of the drone's operation. n239
drone use. n238 Thus,

No Solve Privacy
CP doesnt solve privacy
Celso 2014 (Joel [JD Candidate U of Baltimore Law]; DRONING ON ABOUT THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADOPTING A REASONABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE TO PREVENT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS; 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461; kdf)
Despite a strong argument that UAS surveillance should not constitute a search as
long as it shows nothing more or different than what is revealed by naked-eye
observation, n240 it is not clear that courts would accept technological surveillance
as an equivalent substitute for manned surveillance. n241 In fact, in holding that the use of a
camera to photograph an open industrial area is not a search, the Supreme Court emphasized that commercial
property does not have the same heightened expectation of privacy as the home and stated that "the photographs
here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns." n242 However ,

given the
expectation of privacy in the home and the Supreme Court's assertion that "in the
home ... all details are intimate details," n243 it could be that any [*488] UAS
surveillance taken through skylights, windows, or open doors constitutes a search.
n244 Finally, and most importantly, in Kyllo, the Supreme Court may have opened the door to
warrantless UAS surveillance of the home at some point in the not-too-distant
future. n245 In holding that the use of thermal imaging constitutes a search, the
Court provided an important caveat by stating that when the technology used is
available to the general public, it does not constitute a search . n246 Therefore, it
appears that the Court's bright-line rule drawn at the entrance to the home may
have been written in "disappearing ink ." n247 To date, UAS are not in general public use. n248 That
is about to change since certain government agencies are allowed to operate them, the FAA is required to fully
integrate them into U.S. airspace by 2015, and their decreasing cost makes them more widely accessible. n249
Once the use of UAS becomes commonplace, the government may be able to use them to photograph or scan the
interior of a home without a warrant, regardless of whether the information revealed could not have otherwise been
obtained without a physical intrusion. n250 Therefore ,

under the Supreme Court's current

jurisprudence, an expectation of privacy from unmanned aerial surveillance of the
home could become unreasonable, removing Fourth Amendment protections from
the place that has historically enjoyed the greatest protection. n251

Circumvention Time Limits

Time limits get circumvented
Celso 2014 (Joel [JD Candidate U of Baltimore Law]; DRONING ON ABOUT THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADOPTING A REASONABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE TO PREVENT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS; 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461; kdf)
A. The Inability of the Katz Test to Address UAS Surveillance While the Supreme Court's decision in Jones could be
interpreted as an effort to bolster privacy protections in public places, it will not affect UAS surveillance which
involves no trespass. n276 If a challenge [*492] to prolonged UAS surveillance were to occur, the Court would have
to either provide an arbitrarily determined length of time during which UAS surveillance could pass constitutional

Any time limit on warrantless

UAS surveillance established by the Court would be based on an analysis of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. n279 Some members of the Court, including Justice
Sotomayor n280 and Justice Alito, n281 may support time limit rules as evidenced by their
concerns that long-term tracking may interfere with privacy expectations . Even if
the Court were to establish such a time limit, it would not be difficult for law
enforcement to circumvent it. n282 However, there are more fundamental problems with the Katz test
muster, n277 or hold that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. n278

than practical concerns with its implementation. n283 [*493] The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has
been criticized for its circular nature. n284 As long as UAS surveillance remains sufficiently rare, an individual's
expectation of privacy is considered reasonable and it is protected from government intrusion by the Fourth

Once UAS flights become routine, the expectation of privacy is no

longer reasonable and its protection is removed . n286 The result becomes a
"paradoxical situation in which law enforcement overreach is legitimized once it
becomes routinized." n287 This could happen as early as 2015 when UAS can be fully
Amendment. n285

integrated into U.S. airspace. n288

Circumvention Curtilage Laws

Curtilage limits fail too court action on warrants key
Celso 2014 (Joel [JD Candidate U of Baltimore Law]; DRONING ON ABOUT THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADOPTING A REASONABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE TO PREVENT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS; 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461; kdf)
Critical to a court's analysis would be how it evaluates UAS surveillance in light of
the emphasis on aerial surveillance taking place in navigable airspace and the
routine nature of private and commercial flights . n218 Because the FAA is currently establishing
navigable airspace for UAS, private and commercial usage of UAS is [*485] restricted and flights are rare. n219 In
the absence of routine flights, it is reasonable to conclude that UAS surveillance of the curtilage of a home is
currently a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. n220 That analysis is likely to change in 2015 and
beyond, when UAS are expected to become commonplace in U.S. airspace. n221 Under Supreme Court

it is likely a search if the government uses UAS surveillance to expose

areas within the curtilage which an individual has concealed from aerial observation .
jurisprudence,

n222 Because the area is not exposed, and curtilage enjoys similar protection as the interior of the home, an
expectation of privacy should be recognized as reasonable. n223 For example, if an individual planted trees in his
backyard to conceal his actions from aerial observation, it would likely be a search if police used laser radar affixed

any Fourth Amendment protection of the

curtilage from warrantless UAS surveillance is likely expiring . n224 Once UAS are
generally available to the public and their flights become routine in public airspace,
an expectation of privacy from UAS surveillance will no longer be reasonable. n225 At
to a UAS frame to see through the foliage. Ultimately,

that point the litigated issue will likely become whether the technology employed by a particular UAS is in general
public use or not. n226 Many of the technologies, such as digital cameras, are already in general public use, and it

curtilage of the home may then be vulnerable

to UAS surveillance without any Fourth Amendment protections.
may not be long before others join them. n227 The

AT: States CP

Perm
The perm solves
Kaminski 2013 (Margot E [Executive Director of the Information Society Project,
Research Scholar, and Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School]; Drone Federalism:
Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry; 4 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 57; kdf)
DRONE PRIVACY REGULATIONS There are, broadly speaking, two subjects of drone privacy regulation: law
enforcement drone use and civilian drone use. n8 Most advocates and academics have focused on establishing
privacy regulations to govern law enforcement drone use. n9 This task is worthy of immediate attention. The FAA
already permits law enforcement drone use, where it does not yet permit commercial private drone use. n10 A
number of state and federal bills thus propose warrant requirements for drone surveillance by law enforcement. n11

The federal government could regulate law enforcement drone use as it has
historically regulated other law enforcement behavior, by providing a floor for state
laws. n12 Federal legislation already governs law enforcement use of wiretaps and
pen registers. n13 Drone surveillance is likely to additionally involve video
surveillance, location tracking, and/or facial recognition, among other possible
technologies. Thus federal legislation governing law enforcement surveillance could
be expanded to govern location tracking, video surveillance, and the use of facial recognition software by law
enforcement. n14 [*60] Regulating law enforcement drone use poses few countervailing dangers from legislating
thoughtlessly or in haste; such legislation would implicate Fourth Amendment rights rather than First Amendment
rights, so the worst case scenario is that such legislation might eventually be found by courts not to protect enough
privacy. n15

Fed Action Good

Federal action is uniquely key
Harman 2015 (Jane [Former Rep, D-CA]; The undercooked debate on domestic
drones; may 1; thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/240728-the-undercooked-debate-ondomestic-drones; kdf)
Today, lawmakers worldwide are sleepwalking through a privacy and security crisis. How
many secure sites have to be compromised before we wake up to the full challenges posed by commercial and law

The Federal Aviation Administration

unveiled rules this February that would make it much easier to operate drones in
the United States: for law enforcement agencies conducting surveillance, for
commercial firms, and for private individuals. Make no mistake: eventually, the last two groups
enforcement UAVs or, in common parlance, by drones?

could include bad actors, even terrorists. Its hard to overstate how undercooked the debate on this future is. The
stakes are high; our privacy and our security are at risk. The implications for privacy and surveillance are huge. In
2012, the Supreme Court ruled that tracking a car using an attached GPS beacon, without a warrant, is
unconstitutional. But what if police use a roving drone instead? That debate is raging in Virginia now, which two
years ago imposed a two-year moratorium on warrantless drone surveillance. Thats where most of the regulatory

At the federal
level, we have a leadership vacuum. With a technological revolution on its way,
Washington is AWOL. How do you square this new world with our Constitution? As Brookings Institution
action is happening on this issue: in concerned states and municipalities across the country.

senior fellow John Villasenor said in 2012, The FAA, I would imagine, has more aviation lawyers than Fourth
Amendment constitutional lawyers. Then there are the new security challenges. Authorities have a poor track
record detecting small aircraft that fly where they shouldnt. In 2010, a Mexican government drone went down in an
El Paso backyard; though NORAD later said it had been tracking the plane, local officials seem to have been taken
entirely by surprise. This month, a postal employee flew a (manned) gyrocopter to Capitol Hill through some of the
most restricted airspace in the country. Incidents like these severely undermine confidence in our preparedness.
One day, one of the craft slipping under our radar will do us harm. Iran has poured funds into developing a suicide
drone essentially a cheap, nimble cruise missile. Its not hard to imagine terrorists building do-it-yourself versions
of the same device, a pipe bomb or pressure cooker strapped to a small UAV. This is a concern others have raised
for years, but it took a drone landing feet from the White House for the Secret Service to start trying out jamming
technology an issue they should have been thinking about years ago. Many drone countermeasures are still
primitive; some of the solutions are worse than the problem. Popular Science advised the White House, Simple
netting, used often at drone trade shows to keep small drones confident to their exhibitions, could also work, if the

We need a serious policy response that

engages Congress; federal, state, and local government and the private sector. This issue is too big
for the FAA, too urgent to postpone, and too important to leave off the national
agenda. Lately, Congress has devoted impressive attention to new risks in
cyberspace. It should put at least as much effort into understanding drones. One option
President wanted to live inside a net all the time.

is to encourage commercial firmsthrough either voluntary or mandatory standardsto hardwire restrictions into
the drones they build and sell. Some companies already program their drones to stay out of restricted airspace and
away from sensitive sites.

Those efforts need a push and a signal boost from government.

No Solve -- Precedent
Setting a Constitutional precedent is key to avoiding
technological whack-a-mole
Vacek 09 (Joseph [Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota]; Big Brother
Will Soon Be Watching - Or Will He? Constitutional, Regulatory, and Operational
Issues Surrounding the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles In Law Enforcement; 2009;
Lexis)//AJ
Every technological step forward in remote sensing raises potential Fourth
Amendment issues, and the implications of law enforcement and executive use of
ever cheaper and more numerous surveillance tools are not fleshed out until the
highest courts profess their opinions, sometimes years later. And in the interim,
even newer technologies have rendered the original technologies and questions
obsolete. Even legislative oversight is ineffective - a deliberative organ's skills at
playing technological "whack-a-mole" are futile when compared to the rate of
industry advancement.
[*675] The societal questions raised by today's law enforcement use of cuttingedge surveillance technology in day-to-day operations will need to be answered at
the same level they are raised - on the ground. There is no precedent that squarely
addresses privacy implications of governmental use of a technology that allows
essentially permanent, multi-dimensional, multi-sensory surveillance of citizens
twenty-four hours per day. A hypothetical example approaching that kind of
surveillance ability would be a police officer's access to a Google Earth n1 like
displway, with a point of view that could be moved or zoomed anywhere in three
dimensions, coupled with real-time visual, audio, thermal, or other sensing. God-like
sensory omniscience, in other words. Individual law enforcement officers' abilities
could be multiplied with a flock of small UAVs, exponentially increasing the state's
power to continually monitor its citizenry.
Our Constitutional jurisprudence, demographics, and technological ability to
remotely sense almost anyone, anywhere, at anytime, seem to be the ingredients
necessary for a police state. But interestingly, law enforcement has not taken full
advantage of the potential tools available to them - perhaps for regulatory
impediments, for budgetary constraints, or to avoid running afoul of the
Constitution. At any rate, permanent, ubiquitous surveillance is not the stuff of
fiction anymore. So what could usher us into the brave new world of a big brotherlike security state? Off-the-shelf technology, an updated regulatory scheme, and
outdated Fourth Amendment cases could.
limited but effective policymakers.

The perm solves

Kaminski 2013 (Margot E [Executive Director of the Information Society Project,
Research Scholar, and Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School]; Drone Federalism:
Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry; 4 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 57; kdf)

DRONE PRIVACY REGULATIONS There are, broadly speaking, two subjects of drone privacy regulation: law
enforcement drone use and civilian drone use. n8 Most advocates and academics have focused on establishing
privacy regulations to govern law enforcement drone use. n9 This task is worthy of immediate attention. The FAA
already permits law enforcement drone use, where it does not yet permit commercial private drone use. n10 A
number of state and federal bills thus propose warrant requirements for drone surveillance by law enforcement. n11

The federal government could regulate law enforcement drone use as it has
historically regulated other law enforcement behavior, by providing a floor for state
laws. n12 Federal legislation already governs law enforcement use of wiretaps and
pen registers. n13 Drone surveillance is likely to additionally involve video
surveillance, location tracking, and/or facial recognition, among other possible
technologies. Thus federal legislation governing law enforcement surveillance could
be expanded to govern location tracking, video surveillance, and the use of facial recognition software by law
enforcement. n14 [*60] Regulating law enforcement drone use poses few countervailing dangers from legislating
thoughtlessly or in haste; such legislation would implicate Fourth Amendment rights rather than First Amendment
rights, so the worst case scenario is that such legislation might eventually be found by courts not to protect enough
privacy. n15

AT: FISA Court Model

Those courts fail in the context of drones
Selinger and Kaag 2015 (Evan and John [Associate prof of philosophy @ U of
Massachusetts Lowell]; Why domestic drones stir more debate than ones used in
warfighting abroad; Mar 9; http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/PasscodeVoices/2015/0309/Why-domestic-drones-stir-more-debate-than-ones-used-inwarfighting-abroad kdf)
The FISA courts
are very weird. Our legal system is based on an adversarial model. In other words, courts are places to
dispute charges and impartial parties a judge and jury make a decision about the
case. The FISA courts arent like this. At all. FISA requests are not disputed . Only a very,
Selinger: Why are you skeptical about replicating the FISA court model in this context? Kaag:

very small percentage of FISA requests have been denied over the courts 30 year history. Most are approved as a
matter of course. Sarah Kreps and I have argued that one of the more disturbing aspects of the FISA courts are their

the special needs doctrine, which allows the government to carry

out surveillance without detailed warrants in order to address an overriding public
danger. We are concerned that this sort of governance, when applied to the issue of drones,
might provide strategists and policy makers with a type of carte blanche over the
targeted killing program. The alternative proposed by the Obama administration what the President
called an independent oversight board in the executive branch doesnt make us feel much better. It does not
address the question of checks and balances that has prompted calls for judicial
oversight.
recent expansion of

AT: Federalism DA
The plan sets a floor states can go beyond it
Kaminski 2013 (Margot E [Executive Director of the Information Society Project,
Research Scholar, and Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School]; Drone Federalism:
Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry; 4 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 57; kdf)
DRONE PRIVACY REGULATIONS There are, broadly speaking, two subjects of drone privacy regulation: law
enforcement drone use and civilian drone use. n8 Most advocates and academics have focused on establishing
privacy regulations to govern law enforcement drone use. n9 This task is worthy of immediate attention. The FAA
already permits law enforcement drone use, where it does not yet permit commercial private drone use. n10 A
number of state and federal bills thus propose warrant requirements for drone surveillance by law enforcement. n11

The federal government could regulate law enforcement drone use as it has
historically regulated other law enforcement behavior, by providing a floor for state
laws. n12 Federal legislation already governs law enforcement use of wiretaps and
pen registers. n13 Drone surveillance is likely to additionally involve video
surveillance, location tracking, and/or facial recognition, among other possible
technologies. Thus federal legislation governing law enforcement surveillance could
be expanded to govern location tracking, video surveillance, and the use of facial recognition software by law
enforcement. n14 [*60] Regulating law enforcement drone use poses few countervailing dangers from legislating
thoughtlessly or in haste; such legislation would implicate Fourth Amendment rights rather than First Amendment
rights, so the worst case scenario is that such legislation might eventually be found by courts not to protect enough
privacy. n15

AT: Kritiks

Framework
FrameworkRole of the ballot is to weigh the plans merits
rejecting the aff because parts of our advocacy are imperfect is
not productiveallowing them to choose the debates focus
wrecks groundundermines deliberation
The alternative jettisons questions of policy because of a risk
of a link, this causes poor decision making and ruins the
process of debate
Pozen 2015 (David E [Associate prof @ Columbia Law]; Privacy-Privacy tradeoffs;
Early draft June 28, 2015 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (2015);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2624281; kdf)
Although it only scratches the surface of debates over surveillance reform, the discussion in Part III demonstrates

privacy-privacy tradeoffs are deeply (if sometimes inconspicuously) woven into the fabric
of these debates. We would find the same thing, Parts I and II indicate, in virtually any area of information
policy. How might we build on these observations? If privacy-privacy tradeoffs cannot be
avoided, how might they be managed? Some basic suggestions emerge from the analysis
above. First, scholars, advocates, and government officials could do a much better job of
identifying and confronting privacy-privacy tradeoffs as tradeoffs. Unless
decisionmakers consider the full set of outcomes associated with each effort to
reduce risk, policy theorists have warned, they will systematically invite [risk-]risk
tradeoffs.76 This warning applies equally in the privacy context. Managing privacy- privacy
tradeoffs requires attention to, and information about, the full range of privacy interests that
may be affected by a decision, the potential conflicts and congruities among those interests, and the
expected distribution and degree of privacy gains and losses. It cannot just be
assumed that because a certain measure causes privacy harm , even serious harm,
privacy would be enhanced overall by jettisoning the measure . Privacy policies and
that

problems cannot be assessed in isolation. Second, the pluralistic turn in privacy theory may need to be qualified or
supplemented in certain respects to accommodate the reality of privacy-privacy tradeoffs .

Pluralistic
theories of privacy, recall, maintain that there are many different valid understandings
of privacy and that none has priority over the others.77 The ability to control ones intimate
relationships is no more or less central to the right of privacy than is the ability to keep secrets or to keep

The danger of this approach is that it increases the likelihood of

intra-privacy conflicts (by recognizing more claims as privacy claims) while simultaneously
depriving us of resources to resolve them (by refusing to supply a hierarchy of
privacy principles). Privacy theory could make itself more relevant to privacy policy
by offering guidance on how to weightor, in cases of incommensurability, how to order various
privacy interests when hard choices must be made among them . These choices
are going to get made, wittingly or unwittingly. The question is not whether
privacy-privacy tradeoffs will be resolved, but whether they can be resolved in a
manner that better serves the ends of privacy, however that ideal is understood and
operationalized. 78 The development of normative frameworks for evaluating
privacy-privacy tradeoffs is an increasingly urgent task for the privacy field.
Third, empirical research could assist in this task . Apart perhaps from situations
where decisionmakers have a strong threshold commitment to one privacy value
photographers at bay.

over another, they may find it useful to learn how affected parties would assess a tradeoff. And at least in
some cases, this information may be attainable. Researchers and regulators can ask people whether and to what
extent they believe an anticipated privacy-privacy tradeoff would be desirable, or design mechanisms that induce
people to reveal their true privacy preferences, and then feed the results into a marginal cost analysis. 79 A pair
of computer scientists recently tried this and found, through a simple survey, that many social network users seem
eager to trade certain forms of personal information for greater control over photographs in which they appear. 80

The very asking of such questions , moreover, may have the salutary effect of raising
anticipated tradeoffs salience and fostering debate .

AT: Law K
Even if the gains of the aff are marginal, they are significant
Greenwald 2014 (Glenn [Constitutional lawyer- patriot]; CONGRESS IS
IRRELEVANT ON MASS SURVEILLANCE. HERES WHAT MATTERS INSTEAD; Nov 19;
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/19/irrelevance-u-s-congress-stopping-nsasmass-surveillance/; kdf)
3) U.S. court proceedings. A U.S. federal judge already ruled that the NSAs domestic bulk collection program likely violates the 4th
Amendment, and in doing so, obliterated many of the governments underlying justifications. Multiple cases are now on appeal,
almost certainly headed to the Supreme Court. None of this was possible in the absence of Snowden disclosures. For a variety of

when it comes to placing real limits on the NSA, I place almost as little faith in
the judiciary as I do in the Congress and executive branch. To begin with, the Supreme
Court is dominated by five right-wing justices on whom the Obama Justice
Department has repeatedly relied to endorse their most extreme civil-libertiesdestroying theories. For another, of all the U.S. institutions that have completely
abdicated their role in the post-9/11 era, the federal judiciary has probably been the
worst, the most consistently subservient to the National Security State . Still,
there is some chance that one of these cases will result in a favorable outcome that
restores some 4th Amendment protections inside the U.S. The effect is likely to be
marginal, but not entirely insignificant.
reasons,