OH CHO, applicant-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

G.R. No. L-48321

August 31, 1946

PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located
in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot,
and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the
lower court, committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the
applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A.
No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest
had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the
laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines,
or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of
the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The
applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his
first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled
to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands
of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the
Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the
nature or classifications of the sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant
immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of
the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it,
the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be
deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act
for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition
precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26,
1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not
have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the
applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which,
tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person
to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and
void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such
pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is
not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object to the application filed
by the vendee.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and
Rafael Lagdameo a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan,
Tayabas, which has been in the continuous, public, and adverse possession of their
predecessors in interest as far back as 1880. on June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the
registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the application
because, among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or
private agricultural lands.
One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-examination, expressly admitted that
the land in question is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into an orchard or
garden. Rodolfo Tiquia, inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness for the
government, stated that the land, notwithstanding the use to which it is actually devoted,
is agricultural land in accordance with an opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of

Justice. The pertinent part of said opinion, penned by Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is as follows:
1. Whether or not the "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XII, of the
Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial
lots for purposes of their disposition.

This is the question squarely reversing to us for decision. The majority, although
reversing the lower court's decision and dismissing the application with we agree,
abstained from the declaring null and void the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as
prayed for the appellant. We deem it necessary to state our opinion on the important
question raised, it must be squarely decided.
The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows:

1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in
the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic
classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution
of the Philippines, the term "agricultural public lands" had, therefor, acquired a
technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in
the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the
phrase "agricultural public lands" means those public lands acquired from Spain
which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by
our Supreme Court in many subsequent cases. (Montano vs. Ins. Gov't 12 Phil.,
572, 574; Santiago vs. Ins. Gov't., 12, Phil., 593; Ibaes de Aldecoa vs. Ins.
Gov't., 13 Phil., 159; Ins. Gov't., vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, 516
Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32 Phil., 271, 276; Molina 175, 181;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560, 564; and Ankronvs. Government of
the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10, 14.)
Residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must
have to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither
timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as
agricultural.
Viewed from the another angle, it has been held that in determining whether
lands are agricultural or not, the character of the lands is the test
(Odell vs. Durant 62 N. W., 524; Lerch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co., 123 p., 25).
In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural or
not (State vs. Stewart, 190, p.,129).
Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision on
August 15, 1940, overruling the opposition without must explanation and decreeing the
registration prayed for the applicant. The Director of Lands appealed from the decision,
and the Solicitor General appearing for appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being
a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or acquire the parcel of land in question
and that the purchase made in question and that the purchase made in 1938 is null and
void.

I. The lower court erred decreeing the registration of the lot in question in favor
of the applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of
the Chinese Republic.
(a) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in the Act of the Congress of July 1,
1902, in the Public Land Act includes residential lots.
In this jurisdiction lands of public domain suitable for residential purposes are
considered agricultural lands under the Public Land Law. The phrase
"agricultural public lands" has well settled judicial definition. It was used for the
first time in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. Its
means those public lands acquired form Spain which are neither mineral nor
timber lands (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; Ibaes de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39
Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government
of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10). In the case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government, supra, the Supreme Court, in defining the meaning and scope of
that phrase from the context of the sections 13 and 15 of that Act, said:
The phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land
Act (No. 926) means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
mineral timber lands.
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"We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of

the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after careful consideration of
the question we are satisfied that only definition which exists in said Act
is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 say that the
Government shall "make and rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or
other dispositions of public lands other than timber or mineral lands," To
our minds that is only definition that can be said to be given agricultural
lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act
No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not

timber or mineral lands. . . ." Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175,
178, 182, emphasis added.)
"This phrase "agricultural public lands" was subsequently used in Act No. 926,
which is the first public land law of the Philippines. As therein used, the phrase
was expressly given by the Philippine Commission the same meaning intended
for it by Congress as interpreted in the case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government, supra. This is a self-evident from a reading of section 1, 10, 32,
and 64 (subsection 6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the phrase "agricultural public
lands" is used in any of said sections, it is invariably by the qualification "as
defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."
"More specially, in the case of Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, supra,
the Supreme Court held that a residential or building lot, forming part of the
public domain, is agricultural land, irrespective of the fact that it is not actually
used for purposes of agriculture for the simple reason that it is susceptible of
cultivation and may be converted into a rural estate, and because when a land is
not mineral or forestal in its nature it must necessarily be included within the
classification of a agricultural land. Because of the special applicability of the
doctrine laid down in said case, we quote at some length from the decision
therein rendered:
"The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by
counsel for Juan Ibaez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is
susceptible of being cultivated, and ceasing to be agricultural land, was
converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal provisions in force regarding
Government public lands which may be alienated in favor of private individuals
or corporations. . . .
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"Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and

may converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation ; for
this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must
necessarily be included within the classification of agriculture land, not
because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it
was originally agricultural and may again become so under other
circumstances; besides the Act of Congress (of July 1, 1902) contains
only three classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to
building lots or urban land that have ceased to be agricultural land. . . .
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"From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced

that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber
zone, all lands owned by State or by the sovereign nation are public in
character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destine to the
use of public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance
with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person; and
considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which
they are accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urbans lands and
building lots being included in this classification for the purpose of
distinguishing rural and urban estates from mineral and timber lands; the
transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to such
classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into
rural estates." (Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 161,
163 164, 165, 166; emphasis added.).
(b) Under the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141
(Public Land Act), the phrase (Public Land Act), the phrase
"public agricultural land" includes lands of the public domain
suitable for residential purposes.
"Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows:
"All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of publicagricultural land, shall not
be alienated . . ." (Emphasis added.).
"Under the above-quote provision, the disposition exploitation, development or
utilization of the natural resources, including agricultural lands of the public
domain is limited to citizens of the Philippines or to the corporations or
associations therein mentioned. It also clearly appears from said provision
that natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, are not
subject to alienation.
"On November 7, 1936, or more than one year after the adoption of the
Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, was
approved. Under this Act the lands of the public have been classified into three

divisions: (a) alienable or disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands. The lands
designated alienable or disposable correspond to lands designated in the
Constitution as public agricultural lands, because under section 1, Article XII,
public agricultural lands are the only natural resources of the country which are
the only natural resources of the country which are subject to alienation or
deposition.
"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provide that the alienable or
disposable public lands shall be classified, according to use or purposes to
which they are destined, into a agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial,
etc., lands. At first blush it would seem that under this classification residential
land is different from agricultural land. The difference however, is more apparent
than real. 'Public agricultural land ' as that phrase is used in the Constitution
means alienable lands of the public domain and therefore this phrase is
equivalent to the lands classified by the Commonwealth Act No. 141 as alienable
or disposable. The classification provided in section 9 is only for purposes
administration and disposition, according to the purposes to which said lands are
especially adopted. But notwithstanding this of all said lands are essentially
agricultural public lands because only agricultural public lands are subject to
alienation or disposition under section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. A contrary
view would necessarily create a conflict between Commonwealth Act No. 141
and section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, and such conflict should be
avoided , if possible, and said Act construed in the light of the fundamental
provisions of the Constitution and in entire harmony therewith.
"Another universal principles applied in considering constitutional
question is, that an Act will be so construed, if possible, as to avoid
conflict with the Constitution, although such a construction may not be
the most obvious or natural one. "The Court may resort to an implication
to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it." But the courts cannot go
beyond the province of legitimate construction, in order to save a statute;
and where the meaning is plain, words cannot to be read into it or out of
it for that purpose." ( 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 135, 136.)
"In view of the fact that more than one than one year after the adoption of the
Constitution the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which a compilation of the laws relative to the lands
of the public domain and the amendments thereto, form to the Constitution.
"Where the legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has
been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative
construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59
C.J., 1102; emphasis added.)

"By the way of illustration, let us supposed that a piece or tract of public land has
been classified pursuant to section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
residential land. If, by reason of this classification, it is maintained that said land
has ceased to be agricultural public land, it will no longer be subject to alienation
or disposition by reason of the constitutional provision that only agricultural lands
are alienable; and yet such residential lot is alienable under section 58, 59, and
60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations mentioned in section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. Therefore,
the classification of public agricultural lands into various subdivisions is only for
purposes of administration, alienation or disposition, but it does not destroy the
inherent nature of all such lands as a public agricultural lands.
"(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause or phrase use in the law, controlling.
"The judicial interpretation given to the phrase "public agricultural land" is a
sufficient authority for giving the same interpretation to the phrase as used in
subsequent legislation, and this is especially so in view of the length of time
during which this interpretation has been maintained by the courts. On this point
Sutherland has the following to say:
"When a judicial interpretation has once been put upon a clause,
expressed in a vague manner by the legislature, and difficult to be
understood, that ought of itself to be sufficient authority for adopting the
same construction. Buller J., said: "We find solemn determination of
these doubtful expressions in the statute, and as that now put another
construction has since prevailed, there is no reason why we should now
put another construction of the act on account of any suppose change of
convenience." This rule of construction will hold good even if the court be
opinion that the practical erroneous; so that if the matter were res
integra the court would adopt a different construction. Lord Cairns said: "I
think that with regard to statutes ... it is desirable not so much that the
principle of the decision should be capable at all times of justification, as
that the law should be settled, and should, when once settled, be
maintained without any danger of vacillation or uncertainty. "Judicial
usage and practice will have weight, and when continued for a long time
will be sustained though carried beyond the pair purport of the statute."(II
Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 892, 893.) .
"An important consideration affecting the weight of contemporary judicial
construction is the length of time it has continued. It is adopted, and
derives great force from being adopted, soon after the enactment of the
law. It may be, and is presumed, that the legislative sense of its policy,
and of its true scope and meaning, permeates the judiciary and controls
its exposition. Having received at that time a construction which is for the

time settled, accepted, and thereafter followed or acted upon, it has the
sanction of the of the authority appointed to expound the law, just and
correct conclusions, when reached, they are, moreover, within the
strongest reasons on which founded the maxim of stare decisis. Such a
construction is public given, and the subsequent silence of the legislature
is strong evidence of acquiescence, though not conclusive. . . . (II Lewis
Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 894, 895.)
"Furthermore, when the phrase "public agricultural land" was used in section 1 of
Article XII of the Constitution, it is presumed that it was so used with the same
judicial meaning therefor given to it and therefor the meaning of the phrase, as
used in the Constitution, includes residential lands and another lands of the
public domain, but excludes mineral and timber lands.
"Adoption of provisions previously construed ad. Previous
construction by Courts. Where a statute that has been construed by
the courts of the last resort has been reenacted in same, or substantially
the same, terms, the legislature is presumed to have been familiar with
its construction, and to have adopted it is part of the law, unless a
contrary intent clearly appears, or a different construction is expressly
provided for; and the same rule applies in the construction of a statute
enacted after a similar or cognate statute has been judicially construed.
So where words or phrases employed in a new statute have been
construed by the court to have been used in a particular sense in a
previous statute on the same subject, or one analogous to it, they are
presumed, in the a absence of clearly expressed intent to the contrary, to
be used in the same sense in the statute as in the previous statute." (59
C.J., 1061-1063.).
"Legislative adoption of judicial construction. In the adoption of the
code, the legislature is presumed to have known the judicial construction
which have been placed on the former statutes; and therefore the
reenactment in the code or general revision of provisions substantially
the same as those contained in the former statutes is a legislative
adoption of their known judicial constructions, unless a contrary intent is
clearly manifest. So the fact that the revisers eliminated statutory
language after it had been judicially construed shows that they had such
construction in view." (59 C. J., 1102.)
"II. The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of said land to
the appellant (appellee).

"Granting that the land in question has ceased to be a part of the lands of the
public domain by reason of the long continuous,, public adverse possession of
the applicant's predecessors in interest, and that the latter had performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and were entitled to a certificate of
title under section 48, subsection (b), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, still the
sale of said land of December 8, 1938, to the applicant as evidenced by Exhibits
B and C, was null and void for being contrary to section 5, Article XII of the
Constitution, which reads as follows:
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assignedexcept to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain of the
Philippines."
"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain (section 1, Article XII of the Constitution; section 12, 22, 23,
33, 44, 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ), and consequently also disqualified to
buy and acquire private agriculture land.
"In view of the well settled judicial meaning of the phrase public agricultural land,'
as hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase 'private agricultural land,' as used in
the above quoted provision, can only mean land of private ownership, whether
agricultural, residential, commercial or industrial. And this necessarily so,
because the phrase 'agricultural land used in the Constitution and in the Public
Land Law must be given the same uniform meaning to wit, any land of the public
domain or any land of private ownership, which is neither mineral or forestal.
"A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning
throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears. ... Where
words have being long used in a technical sense and have been
judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted
by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute
in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words
used in such statute should be construed according to the sense may
vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction., p. 758.) .
"This interpretation is in harmony with the nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose
of our Constitution and laws, to wit, `to conserve and develop the patrimony of
the nation,' as solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the Constitution.
"A narrow and literal interpretation of the phrase 'private agriculture land' would
impair and defeat the nationalistic aim and general policy of our laws and would

allow a gradual, steady, and unlimited accumulation in alien hands of a

substantial portion of our patrimonial estates, to the detriment of our national
solidarity, stability, and independence. Nothing could prevent the acquisition of a
great portion or the whole of a city by subjects of a foreign power. And yet a city
or urban area is more strategical than a farm or rural land.
"The mere literal construction of section in a statute ought not to prevail if
it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute;
and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other
construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent
prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible be so read as to
conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must
be ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason
and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a liberal
interpretation of such words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721,
722.)
"We conclude, therefore, that the residential lot which the applicant seeks to
register in his name falls within the meaning of private agricultural land as this
phrase is used in our Constitution and, consequently, is not subject to acquisition
by foreigners except by hereditary succession."
The argument hold water. It expresses a correct interpretation of the Constitution and
the real intent of the Constitutional Convention.
One of our fellow members therein, Delegate Montilla, said:
The constitutional precepts that I believe will ultimately lead us to our desired
goal are; (1) the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources; (2)
the nationalization of our commerce and industry compatible with good
international practices. With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural
resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one
hundred per cent in Filipino hands. ... Lands and natural resources are
immovable and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body,
the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life.
If we do not completely nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I
am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were
born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence
are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of
foreigner? (2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592.).
From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote:

The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to
insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of
national defense, helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign
control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the
Philippines a source of international conflict with the consequent danger to its
internal security and independence.
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. . . In the preface to its report, the committee on nationalization and preservation

of lands and other natural resources said;
"International complications have often resulted from the existence of alien
ownership of land and natural resources in a weak country. Because of this
danger, it is best that aliens should be restricted in the acquisition of land and
other natural resources. An example is afforded by the case of Texas. This state
was originally province of Mexico. In order to secure its rapid settlements and
development, the Mexican government offered free land to settlers in Texas.
Americans responded more rapidly than the Mexicans, and soon they organized
a revolt against Mexican rule, and then secured annexation to the United States.
A new increase of alien landholding in Mexico has brought about the desire a
prevent a repetition of the Texas affair. Accordingly the Mexican constitution of
1917 contains serious limitation on the right of aliens to hold lands and mines in
Mexico. The Filipinos should profit from this example."
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It was primarily for these reasons that the Convention approved readily the
proposed principle of prohibiting aliens to acquire, exploit, develop, or utilize
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines. For the same reasons the Convention
approved equally readily the proposed principle of prohibiting the transfer of
assignment to aliens of private agricultural land, save in the case of hereditary
succession. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 604, 605,
606.).
All the foregoing show why we, having been a member of the Constitutional Convention,
agree with Solicitor General's position and concur in the result in this case, although we
would go as far as the outright pronouncement that the purchase made by appelle is null
and void.

THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIO, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed the decision,
dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in
LRC NO. B-467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the
private respondent.
The facts that matter are as follows:
On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with the
then Branch I, Court of First Instance of Laguna, a petition [1] for
registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three thousand
six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part
of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio
Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.
Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his
mother, Teresa Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911, [2] and later
administered by him in behalf of his five brothers and sisters, after the
death of their father in 1934.[3]
In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario, became coowners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land
embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of Teresa Lauchangco. On
July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole
ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent. [4]
Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now
Bureau of Lands Management), disclosed:

"x x x
1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of
imperfect title is situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of
Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described on plan Psu-108952 and
is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that
the same is agricultural in nature and the improvements found
thereon are sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and
one house of the tenant made of light materials;
2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military
reservation, riverbed, park and watershed reservation and that same
land is free from claim and conflict;
3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for
Metro Manila squatters nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by
any existing public land application and no patent or title has been
issued therefor;
4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and
exclusive possession of the land who acquired the same thru
inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco as
mentioned on the Extra judicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which
applicant requested that said instrument will be presented on the
hearing of this case; and that said land is also declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name of the
petitioner;
With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the
Director of Lands as the only oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On
February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court
granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders and declares the registration
and confirmation of title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6,
plan Psu-108952, identical to Cadastral Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D,
Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of

Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an area of FORTY THREE

THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters, more
or less, in favor of applicant AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to
Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino with residence and postal
address at Bian, Laguna.
After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the
issuance of decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED
From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of
Appeals, which, on November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed
from.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition;
theorizing that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS
FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF POSSESSION IN THE
MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE
LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE
PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A PORTION OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
[7]

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The petition for land registration[8] at bar is under the Land Registration
Act.[9] Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his petition or application,
ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the
Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession
especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title,
or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and informacion
possessoria or possessory information title, which would become a titulo
gratuito or a gratuitous title.[10]
In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner
below) has not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate his
claim of ownership.[11] The Court has therefore no other recourse, but to
dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land
under Act 496.
Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title
under the Public land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondents
petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its
denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is
not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in
the manner and for the number of years required by law for the
confirmation of imperfect title.
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,[12] as amended by R.A. No.
1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time the Petition of
private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of first Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
x.................x.................x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
(Emphasis supplied)
Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the
possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a
grant from the State.[13]
Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the
petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of
proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director of
Lands vs. Agustin,[14] this Court stressed that:
" x x x The petitioner is not necessarily entiled to have the
land registered under the Torrens system simply because no
one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of his land. He must show, even though there is
no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the
absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in
registering property under the Torrens system, simply
because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in
the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the
land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the
facts presented did not show that petitioner is the owner, in
fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have
registered."[15]

There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before

imperfect titles over public agricultural lands may be granted judicial
recognition.[16]
The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of
the public domain. As enunciated in Republic vs. Lee:"[17]
"x x x Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the
conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is
ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the
judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private
ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such
proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such
claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of
whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its right over the same as dominus. x
x x"[18]
In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the
petitioners may savor the benefit resulting from the issuance of certificate
of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him (petitioner) to
show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land
sought for registration, for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title. [19]
In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his
own possession of subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same
was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement and
partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private
respondent has possessed the property thus partitioned for only twentysix (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration
thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what he
theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However,
other than his unilateral assertion, private respondent has not introduced

sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that his late mother

possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.
Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove
the facts and circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land
applied for. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and
not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. [20]
From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the
earliest tax declaration covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214
issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent and his
brother, Severino Carino. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No.
1921 issued in 1969 declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two
Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax Declaration No. 6359
issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an
assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy
(P21,770.00) Pesos.[21]
It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as
the tax declaration for subject land under the names of the parents of
herein private respondent does not appear to have any sustainable basis.
Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the
name of private respondent and not in the name of his parents. [22]
The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are binding upon this Court is not without exceptions. Where, as in this
case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower courts that subject
land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private
respondent's predecessor-in-interest, such findings have to be
disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court
ratiocinated thus:
"This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower
court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if
considered would affect the result of the case (People v. Royeras,
130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate court based
its judgment on a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc.

v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R.
No. 68533, May 3, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the
general rule that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court.
andx x x in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented
from considering such a pivotal factual matter that had been
overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is clothed with
ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it
finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision."[24]
Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial
court. Had it examined the original records of the case, the said court
could have verified that the land involved was never declared for taxation
purposes by the parents of the private respondent. Tax receipts and tax
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are
mere indicia of claim of ownership.[25] In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:[26]
"x x x if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa
Santiago, had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject
lands declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968,
and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts
and declarations, of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least
proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property." [27]
As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent
that his mother had been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911
is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence. The phrase
"adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner", by
which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and
that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary
support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private

respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing

evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and
duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not
amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to
the oppositor.[28]
[29]

In a case,
this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals for the registration of a parcel of land in the name of the
applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law; holding as
follows:
"Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private
respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or more
possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which
supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the
filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to
discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that
the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in
possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in
private respondent's declaration is hardly the 'well-nigh
incontrovertible' evidence required in cases of this nature. Private
respondent should have presented specific facts that would have
shown the nature of such possession. x x x" [30]
In Director of Lands vs. Datu,[31] the application for confirmation of
imperfect title was likewise denied on the basis of the following
disquisition, to wit:
"We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their
claim of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot
No. 2027-B en concepto de dueno. Although they claimed that they
have possessed the land since 1950, they declared it for tax
purposes only in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed
their application in 1973, the lot was still cogon land or already
cultivated land.

They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peaflor, to testify on

his alleged possession of the land. They alleged in their application that
they had tenants on the land. Not a single tenant was presented as
witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the land as owners.
On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot
justifiably be concluded that they have an imperfect title that
should be confirmed or that they had performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant of a portion of the
public domain."[32]
Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073,
[33]
amending Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, under which
law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a public land, who is
a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove
that his predecessors-in-interest occupied subject land under the
conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only establish
his possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by
law.
The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot
being claimed by the private respondent ceased to be a public land and
has become private property.[34] To reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine
all lands belong to the State. [35] Unless alienated in accordance with law, it
retains its basic rights over the same as dominus. [36]
Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title
to reinforce his petition for registration under the Land Registration Act
(Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof of his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto
de dueno for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his
petition,[37] the Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6
surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the pubic domain not
registrable in the name of private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the
Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of
Laguna in LRC No. B-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and
more particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public
land, under the administrative supervision and power of disposition of the
Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs.

Republic vs Dela Paz

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to set aside the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514,
granting respondents application for registration and confirmation of title over a
parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose
R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed
with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of land [3] under
Presidential
Decree
No.
1529
(PD
1529)
otherwise
known
as
the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with
an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated
plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping).
Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the
following documents: (1) Special power of attorney showing that the respondents
authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan
of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No.
27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development,
Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084;
(4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466;
(6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa

Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10, 1979; (8)
Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any
public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer,
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year
2003 has been paid.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an
agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob[4] dated June 18, 1987,
executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester),
who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela
Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga
Pag-aari ng Namatay[5] dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents
claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been
in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in
the concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred
that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of
the same, in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period
of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of registration with
the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents
presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following
grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years;
(2) that the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax payments
receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land
applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public
domain belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for
the Republic, there was no other oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default [6] against the
whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented
their evidence in support of their application.

In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents'
application for registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto
entered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and
CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and
residents of and with postal address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and bounded
under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and
3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing
Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square
Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and
executory and, upon payment of all taxes and other charges due
on the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration
shall be accordingly undertaken.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. [8] The CA, in its
Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they
have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found
that respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest,
who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise,
held that respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to establish that
the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
ORDER
GRANTING
RESPONDENTS'
APPLICATION
FOR
REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS

HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS

POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION
OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT
NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME
IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.[9]

In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public, and
adverse possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even
before June 12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or
constructive possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of
an owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is within
the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The subject property
remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present
evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous and
adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject
land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land,
they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980,
1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest.
In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's
Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of
real property taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations appearing on the
survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within
the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents
assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the
Court should not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual
findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the
assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. [10] It is not the function
of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a

showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. [11]
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the
CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. [12] These the
respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.
[13]

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right
to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public
domain.[14] The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of

the application
is alienable
or disposable.
To
overcome
this
presumption, incontrovertibleevidence must be established that the land subject
of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[15]
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-000084 [16] (Conversion
Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral
Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following
annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
clasified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,[17] the Court ruled that the notation of the
surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Center, that this survey is inside the alienable and disposable
area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the
Bureau of Forestry, is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible
evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the
inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,[18] the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the
character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation
appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said
properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the
kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and
a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the lands applied for are
alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance
Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical

correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing
to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the
proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for
registration are indeed alienable and disposable.

Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, [19] the Court held that
the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey
by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by
the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of
proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and
disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to establish that the subject land are part of the alienable
and disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible
evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and
disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain. [20]
Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading
of the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation
over the subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo
(Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to
establish respondents predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation of
subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19,
1939,[21] testified that since he attained the age of reason he already knew that
the land subject of this case belonged to them. [22] Amado testified that he was a

tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950, [23] and on about
the same year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the subject land. [24]
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no
specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began actual
occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject
land was previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier
inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was
presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had
been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of
possession required by law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere
conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot
suffice.[25] An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere
conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts
and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.
[26]

Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in

the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best,
respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is required is open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12,
1945 or earlier.[27] Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their
predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of
an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessorsin-interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the
rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership
or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The
fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in
the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest
does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim
of ownership.[28]
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear
picture that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was
classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and
(2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,

exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bonafide

claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for
confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be
denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.COURT OF APPEALS

CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the
bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the
cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this
doctrine was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on
February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three
children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet
Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the
application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by
Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5,
Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 19. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired
the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from

her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was
possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in
1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and
his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed
with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time,
who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her
tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was
sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who
located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the
date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession
of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of
annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts,
and its payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by
the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December
25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of
Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by
Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the
said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring
of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine
Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free
and open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which
they are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United
States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land
sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was
not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and
ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which
reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting

In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la
Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and
Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
their mining claims. 12

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of
ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument
that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim
to the land because it is not alienable and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet
and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug
mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of
Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16
mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed
his declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was
recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the
Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated,
Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June
Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had
submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War
II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and
also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench
side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and
had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison
registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of
Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral
claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.

The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma
mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the
Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the
public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to
the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court
in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a
mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the
court in that case: The moment the locator discovered a valuable
mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in
accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to
deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of
the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and
they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other
person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to
include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid
mining location is made upon public lands afterwards included in a
reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of
the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is
segregated from the public domain even as \against the Government.
(Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal.
131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor
upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator."
(St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650;
655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right
of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals
within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right

of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as

after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a
vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with
the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent
issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent
for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical
purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as
long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his
possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as
though secured by patent.

SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:

We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain,
and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right from
them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the
oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution
against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature
for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was
categorically provided that:

Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary

notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935
within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised
Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the
existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations
as of the date of their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the
laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act
such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had
become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the
private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by
the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of
ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its
registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-

interest. 16The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and
observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer
to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of
discretion or without sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had
really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the
concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property asagricultural land, which it was
not. The property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They
were not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them
as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she
was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much
less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not
only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath
and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land
while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well
because he may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel
lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner,
go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the
surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot
be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land
must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as
already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so
and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were
perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it
did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing
as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of government established
under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not
include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may
be found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are
excluded and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for
the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all
minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a
person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership
of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the
land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The
correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use
to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to
enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The
land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party,
including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining

operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of

course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings. 21
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the
Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land
was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of

acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the
mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE
and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any
pronouncement as to costs.