Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Critical Theory
and the
Sociology of Knowledge
A Comparative Study
in the Theory of Ideology
PETER L A N G
New York Washington, D .C ./B altim ore San Francisco
Bern Frankfurt am Main Berlin Vienna Paris
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability
o f the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity
o f the Council o f Library Resources.
For
Margarita, Zachary, Dylan and Kari
Theodor W. Adorno
Contents
xi
Introduction
41
63
81
105
123
Bibliography
185
Index
209
Preface and
Acknowledgments
xii
Introduction
Chapter One
The Origins and Development
of the Frankfurt School's
Critical Theory of Society
10
concrete investigation of how the objective structures of the sociohistorical world are produced and reproduced through human activ
ity and how, in turn, these objective structures take on independent
forms which constrain human activity. Thus according to Lukacs' in
terpretation, the Marxian dialectic was essentially a critical method
for investigating the relation between human subjects and the objec
tive socio-historical world which they have produced collectively.
Lukcs returned to Marx's famous discussion of "the fetishism
of commodities" to unravel the dialectical character of the Marxian
critique of political economy.10
11
12
13
its origins in the critique of political economy to show its utility for a
critique of virtually all spheres of capitalist society and culture, in
cluding science and philosophy.15
The integration of Max Weber's analysis of formal rationaliza
tion and bureaucracy into the Marxian critique of capitalism was one
of the most innovative elements of Lukacs' theory of reification.16
Pointing to commonalities in Marx's analysis of commodity ex
change and Weber's analysis of formal, bureaucratic rationality,
Lukacs noted that both analyses had uncovered similar processes of
abstraction, formal standardization, quantification and specializa
tion at work in capitalist society. Both Marx and Weber had shown
how in the course of capitalist development, the concrete, material
and qualitative aspects of things become devalued in relation to the
abstract, the formal and the quantitative. Both Marx and Weber had
shown how the development of a detailed division of labor in capi
talist society had progressively fragmented both manual and mental
labor. Since these processes tend to veil the concrete, qualitative as
pects of reality and destroy the ability of individuals to readily com
prehend the social whole, Lukacs related them to the progressive
spread of reification.
By synthesizing these elements of Marx's and Weber's earlier
analyses, Lukacs was able to link the spread of bureaucracy to the in
creasing universality of commodity exchange and the partial ration
alization of society and the state in accordance with the requirements
of capitalist reproduction.17 As the interlocking processes of com
modity exchange and formal rationalization come to embrace almost
all areas of life, the material foundations of society are obscured, and
reification sinks all the more deeply into human consciousness.18
According to Lukacs' argument, reification under capitalism
threatens to become total. Capitalism subjects the world to more in
clusive forms of socially organized control than all previous types of
society. The objective world confronting the individual is more than
ever before the product of organized social activity. Yet despite this
progressive "socialization" of the world, humanity is increasingly re
14
15
16
17
sciousness.
18
19
yond. Only the active intervention of the proletariat can avert the
threat of a new barbarism and begin the process of socialist construc
tion. In the revolutionary action of the proletariat, humanity begins
its first conscious attempts to master the social process in the inter
ests of all. As in Marx's original formulation, the transition to so
cialism signifies nothing less than the end of "prehistory" and the be
ginning of real human history.
According to Lukacs, Marxian theory, written from the class
standpoint of the proletariat, was itself to be understood as a con
scious expression of this socio-historical process.34 The comprehen
sive critique of capitalist society developed in Marxian theory clari
fies and elaborates the factors behind the proletariat's elemental
experiences of its own alienation. In doing so, the theory becomes a
decisive weapon in the struggle for proletarian class consciousness.
Lukacs contended that the struggle for proletarian class con
sciousness was of paramount importance, especially during times of
crisis.35 Because of capitalism's immanent tendencies toward reifica
tion in all spheres of life, proletarian thought also could be distorted
by existing social conditions. Therefore it was necessary, Lukacs ar
gued, to distinguish between the actual, empirical consciousness of
the proletariat and the authentic, logically possible class conscious
ness which might be imputed to the proletariat given its objective
historical mission.36 In practical terms, the problem of resolving the
"ideological crisis" of the proletariat posed the task of dissolving the
distortions found in the empirical consciousness of the proletariat in
order to realize the objective possibility of authentic class conscious
ness.
Wfithin proletarian movements, Lukacs noted, the continued
presence of the contemplative and dualistic forms of thought charac
teristic of the bourgeoisie had hindered the development of the au
thentic class consciousness of the proletariat. The struggles against
"opportunism" and "utopianism" that had characterized the history
of the socialist movement were, in his view, necessary struggles for
authentic class consciousness against fundamentally bourgeois
20
21
22
23
24
25
25
forms of knowledge useful for the control of nature and for the re
production and extension of existing forms of social life.53
The status and intentions of critical theory were portrayed by
Horkheimer in a quite different light. He stressed that the basic tasks
of critical social theory go far beyond the description and explana
tion of facts to include the development of a comprehensive critique
of the existing society in light of its suppressed potentialities for
greater human freedom and self-determination. Therefore, in con
trast to the narrow technical interest guiding traditional theory, crit
ical theory is motivated by an "interest in freedom." Rather than
simply accepting "the facts" as given, a critical theory of society is
charged with the comprehension of the total social process through
which those facts were produced. Rather than simply taking the
existing organization of society for granted, critical theory con
sciously seeks to further the struggle for a more rational organiza
tion of society.54
Calling for a reconsideration of traditional epistemology,
Horkheimer argued that all facts presented to the senses are socially
mediated in a double sense: "through the historical character of the
object perceived and through the historical character of the perceiv
ing organ."55 The object of perception has been preformed by the so
cial activity of human subjects, while the knowing subject has been
preformed by the objective dynamics of the social process. Because
both subject and object are historically shaped by organized social
activity, Horkheimer concluded that neither could be accepted as
simply "given" or "natural." Nor could the spheres of "objectivity"
and "subjectivity" ("facts" and "values") be neatly segregated.
Whereas traditional theory had enshrined a static dualism of subject
and object, consciousness and being, critical theory was premised on
developing an awareness of their dialectical interrelation.56
In a manner that clearly harkened back to Lukacs' critique of
the contemplative character of bourgeois science and philosophy,
Horkheimer charged that traditional theory had failed to acknowl
edge the extent to which the objective world confronting the individ
TI
28
29
30
, _ - i.
in ; . ' '
31
32
ate humanity from the blind constraints of both nature and tradition.
Horkheimer and Adorno argued, however, that the events of mod
ern history depression, fascism, and war had revealed the recidi
vist elements latent within the Enlightenment conception of reason.
Over the course of its modem development the concept of reason
had gradually been stripped of all aims transcending the domination
of nature. The Enlightenment conception of rationality had been
progressively reduced to technical rationalityreason as an instru
ment of control. But for Horkheimer and Adorno, the methodical in
sanity of the modern era, reaching its summit in the murderous effi
ciency of fascist barbarism, had proved conclusively that social
progress could not simply be equated with technical progress.
The central thesis of Dialectic of Enlightenment was that the
domination of nature is inextricably linked to the development of
forms of human domination. According to Horkheimer and Adorno,
progress in the domination of nature becomes entwined with the in
creasingly efficient, albeit increasingly irrational, domination of hu
manity by its own productive apparatus and the privileged groups
which control that apparatus. In the struggle for self-preservation,
the violence directed against external nature is also directed against
inner, human nature. Thus through a fateful dialectical reversal, the
project of the domination of nature recoils back upon humanity itself
and the history of civilization comes to reveal a cruel paradox: as
the objective material preconditions for human freedom are estab
lished, its subjective preconditions are destroyed. As technical
progress creates the objective possibility of a free and abundant life
for everyone, realization of that possibility becomes all the more re
mote because human subjectivity has become thoroughly integrated
into an all-embracing system of domination. The individual is re
duced to a cog within the apparatus of administered society.
Opposition to the apparatus is either crushed, marginalized or ab
sorbed. The fears and desires of the masses are mobilized and ma
nipulated to serve the interests of domination. Within the context of
the senseless perpetuation of enforced scarcity, renunciation and sac
33
34
35
36
37
Thus what
38
39
ory of society.92 Horkheimer also developed a deep interest in reli. n For the later Horkheimer, authentic religious experience came
to represent one of the few remaining "visions of the totally other" in
the administered world of advanced capitalist society.93 Politically,
he retreated into more liberal, at times even conservative, positions
seemingly far removed from the radicalism of his early works.94
Although Marcuse did not choose to return to Germany when
Horkheimer and Adorno reopened the Institute in Frankfurt in 1950,
his work continued to be strongly influenced by the writings of his
former colleagues. The deeply pessimistic themes of Dialectic of
Enlightenment were echoed in many of Marcuse's writings from the
1950s and 1960s, particularly in the widely read O ne-Dim ensional
M an (1964).95
Alongside the critical negativity of his later works, however,
40
Chapter Two
42
Critical i h e c r y an d the S o ci o lo gy or k n c z o i f j j e
43
44
45
46
47
the Human Spirit." Mannheim was chosen to give the inaugural lec
ture, in effect a public manifesto of the group, which he delivered in
the autumn of that year. Later published under the title "Soul and
Culture" (1918), Mannheim's lecture already displayed several of the
central motifs that would come to characterize his work.22 Strongly
influenced by Simmel's writings on "the tragedy of culture" and
Lukcics' Soul and Form, Mannheim presented the era as one marked
by a cultural crisis resulting from the "deactualization" of culture.
According to his account, it was the mission of the present generation
of intellectuals to work their way through the crisis and lead in the
rebirth of an authentic culture. By patiently working through the
problems presented in various cultural fields using a variety of tech
niques and approaches, it might be possible to develop a new philos
ophy of history and a comprehensive metaphysics.
Mannheim's doctoral dissertation, titled "The Structural
Analysis of Epistemology" (written 1917-1918; published in German
in 1922), also displays a characteristic search for underlying struc
tures amidst intellectual diversity.23 Mannheim's aim was to un
cover the basic elements and presuppositions of the theory of knowl
edge. He argued that all epistemological theories, whatever their
differences, must make certain fundamental assumptions about the
subject and the object of knowledge and the nature of the relation
ship between them. He insisted, however, that epistemology is not a
wholly self-contained discipline. Ultimately the most basic presup
positions of epistemology must be drawn from other disciplines.
Fully elaborated epistemological theories actually represent "sys
tematizations" which flow from the fundamental assumptions fur
nished by other "foundational sciences." Mannheim mentioned
three disciplines capable of taking on this role: psychology, logic and
ontology.
Mannheim's preference for ontology as the most fundamental
of the foundational sciences clearly surfaces at several points in his
exposition. He made no claim to possess a fully developed ontology,
but he did express a preference for what he referred to as an
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
Chapter Three
64
65
60
67
68
69
70
71
72
The
attempt to understand the "totality of world views" ( Weltanschauungstotalitdt) merely through the investigation of different
styles of thought without adequate consideration of the material
conditions of their development and perpetuation could only result in
a regression to idealism. At bottom, according to Horkheimer, the
sociology of knowledge represented a step backward toward pure
Geistesgeschichte . Mannheim had diluted Marxian concepts and
placed them in the service of a fundamentally idealist philosophical
problematic that Marx had already superseded.
Aside from the early reviews of Ideology and Utopia written by
Marcuse and Horkheimer, Mannheim also came under fire in some
of their more programmatic statements on the nature of critical the
ory. While characterizing the basic intentions of the Frankfurt
73
School's critical theory of society, Horkheimer and Marcuse felt comelled more than once to distance their own project from
Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. Critical comments devoted to
va^ous aspects of Mannheim's work may be found in Horkheimer's
"Traditional and Critical Theory" (1937), Marcuse's "Philosophy and
rviriral Theory" (1937), and Horkheimer's "The Social Function of
Philosophy" (1940).
In "Traditional and Critical Theory" (1937), Horkheimer placed
74
75
76
77
78
79
Chapter Four
Central Problems in
the Theory of Ideology:
A Comparison of Critical Theory
and the Sociology of Knowledge
82
>
83
84
85
86
87
88
functions.21
Despite these areas of (unacknowledged) common agreement,
the Frankfurt School reacted strongly to what they regarded as the
peculiar amalgamation of relativist and absolutist tendencies in
Mannheim's usage of the general-total conception of ideology.
Despite Mannheim's pronouncements to the contrary, they charged
that he had completely collapsed the distinction between origins and
validity. All thought was said to be ideological simply by virtue of its
historically situated, perspectivistic character. After all, Mannheim
actually had declared in Ideology and Utopia that "the thought of all
parties in all epochs is of an ideological character."22 But such an allembracing conception of ideology could scarcely avoid blunting all
critical distinctions between true and false consciousness. Whatever
Mannheim's intentions, he had tended to replace the substantive
evaluation of the truth content of particular forms of knowledge
89
90
ness. They also contain moments of truth that the critique of ideol
ogy must redeem. Since genuine ideologies always tend to promise
more than they can fulfill in reality, critique can turn these transcen
dent elements against the same reality that the ideology purports to
describe. Moving in this direction, the "utopian surplus" of the con
cept provides immanent criteria for the evaluation of the object in its
present form.
The Frankfurt School often used the revelation of non-identity
to develop a mutual critique of concept and object in this fashion.
The confrontation of the concept with its object reveals moments of
non-identity that show the limitations of the concept, while the con
frontation of the object with its concept reveals moments of non
identity that show the unfulfilled potentialities of the object. The
classical bourgeois ideals of freedom, justice and equality, for exam
ple, are contradicted by the realities of life in capitalist society. To the
extent that they veil the true character of capitalist society, these
ideals become false and ideological. But there is more to these con
cepts than false consciousness. Essentially true in themselves, they
become false and assume ideological functions only in conjunction
with the claim that they are fully realized in the present.25 By recov
ering the full content of these concepts, critical theory claimed pos
session of a powerful weapon for the immanent critique of capitalist
society. It could then be shown that the actual organization of capi
talist society systematically thwarts the realization of its own high
est ideals, and therefore, a social transformation is necessary in
order to realize these ideals.
The method of immanent critique reached its most stringent,
methodologically self-reflective form in the works of Adorno. Given
his strong interest in problems of aesthetics, Adorno was especially
concerned to avoid falling into reductive analyses that simply dis
missed particular cultural creations by references to their social ori
gins and functions without adequate comprehension of their imma
nent contents.26
In a 1953 essay titled "Cultural Criticism and Society," Adorno
91
92
93
94
95
96
tendencies and relations '; and fourth, it must defend the claim that
"its realization offers a greater chance for the pacification of exis
tence, within the framework of institutions which offer a greater
chance for the free development of human needs and faculties."4-'
97
<
: i. .
99
He
100
101
102
103
Chapter Five
Conclusion:
The Relevance of the
Comparison for Contemporary
Debates in Social Theory
106
Conclusion
107
108
Conclusion
109
110
Conclusion
111
112
Conclusion
113
114
and social theory has many important consequences for the theory of
ideology. Chief among them is the requirement that the problem of
the relation between consciousness and social existence now be re
cast in linguistic terms. In its most general consequences, the linguis
tic turn has led to the transformation of traditional problems in the
philosophy of consciousness into problems in the philosophy of
language .24 Within the theory of ideology, the consequences of the
linguistic turn may be registered through a reformulation of the tra
ditional problem of the relation between consciousness and social
existence in terms of the relations between language, action and the
reproduction of social systems.
This process of reformulating the theory of ideology in light of
the linguistic turn has lagged behind the pace of the overall develop
ment and, in fact, has only begun. For some time now, discussion of
problems of language and ideology has been dominated primarily by
structuralist and poststructuralist perspectives. Due to a relative
absence of viable alternative perspectives on these problems, struc
turalist and poststructuralist approaches have enjoyed a relatively
clear field of influence.25
To the extent that language occupies the focal point of analyti
cal attention, structuralism and poststructuralism have obviously
participated in the linguistic turn in contemporary theory. But in
some respects, it seems that these approaches participate in the turn
only partially, not fully. Anthony Giddens, for example, has instruc
tively contrasted structuralist and poststructuralist approaches to
language with those approaches stemming from the later philosophy
of Ludwig Wittgenstein .26 Giddens stresses that in the later
Vtfttgenstein the linguistic turn is also a sociological turn. Language
C onclusion
es ^
115
116
C onclusion
117
118
C onclusion
119
sides of the same coin, and he placed the overcoming of this anti
mony at the heart of the programme for early critical theory.37 It
seems evident that this traditional antimony has yet to be fully over
come in contemporary theory.
Much of poststructuralism and postmodernism remains
trapped within the confines of this antimony even when there is no
outright capitulation to relativism. Foucault's attempt to sidestep
problems of rationality, justification and truth by developing an ac
count of the production of "truth-effects" is ultimately unsuccessful.
The attempt becomes mired in unavoidable aporias and deflected but
unresolved grounding problems. Derrida is not a relativist, at least
not of the simple, self-declared sort. As he often stresses, he merely
seeks to problematize certain traditional accounts of truth and refer
ence in order to reinscribe "the value of truth" in "more powerful,
larger, more stratified contexts."38 But it does seem to many that the
endless work of deconstruction carries with it an inverted yearning
for the lost absolute hence the common charges of "negative
metaphysics" or "negative theology" raised against Derrida.39 For
reasons such as these, then, questions may legitimately be raised
about whether these perspectives can move beyond the antimony of
dogmatism and relativism and develop a truly postmetaphysical
approach to problems of rationality, justification and truth.
Some version of a discourse theory of rationality and truth,
such as that proposed by Jurgen Habermas, seems to hold much
greater promise for overcoming the antimony between dogmatism
and relativism and securing the grounds for the critique of ideology.
As we noted toward the end of Chapter 4, Habermas' conceptualiza
tion of rationality in terms of open-ended, fallibilistic discourse
guided by the counterfactual "force of the better argument" does
much to help clarify the grounds from which the defense and critique
of substantive validity claims may proceed.
Contrary to the claims of some critics, Habermas' discourse
theory does not require the postulation of a First Philosophy or fixed
foundation as the basis from which critique proceeds. Nor does it
120
C onclusion
121
Notes
Introduction
1.
124
in
Germany, 1918-1933
ment of His Thought (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp.
St.
Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 15-16, 72-74; David Kettler and
\blker Meja, "Settling with Mannheim," State, Culture and
Society, Vol. 1, No. 3 (April 1985): 226; D. Kettler and V. Meja,
"The Reconstitution of Political Life: The Contemporary Rele
N otes
125
4.
126
6.
N otes
127
Studies in the
The Adventures of a
128
6.
7. See Breines, pp. 72-75, 78-94; and Arato and Breines, pp.
163-200.
8.
N otes
129
11.
130
N otes
37.
131
39.
132
N otes
133
134
66.
68.
Horkheimer, pp. 213, 218, 227, 246. This is not to say that
Horkheimer, Marcuse, or Adorno ever concerned themselves
with detailed analyses of political economy. Such things were
generally left to the economists within the Institute. The
Marxian critique of political economy did, however, provide
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse with a basic model for the
N otes
135
136
N o tes
137
ory during the 1940s, also see Helmut Dubiel, Theory and
Politics, pp. 69-112; Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism
and Modernity, pp. 83-114; and Martin Jay, The Dialectical
Imagination, pp. 253-280.
see his Eclipse of Reason (1947; rpt. New York: Seabury Press,
1974), pp. 128-161. Intended for American audiences, Hork
heimer's Eclipse of Reason was essentially an abridged and
modified presentation of some of the key themes of Dialectic of
Enlightenment.
78. See Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," Part II, p. 95; and
Marcuse, "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man"
(1963) in his Five Lectures (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp.
44-61.
79. See Horkheimer and Adorno's chapter on the culture industry in
Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 120-167. The term "culture in
dustry" was originally chosen to emphasize that modem mass
138
The Free
Press, 1957), pp. 474-488, and "The Stars Down to Earth" (1957)
now in Telos, No. 19 (Spring 1974): 13-90. The thesis of the
total manipulation of the masses by the culture industry pre
sented in Dialectic of Enlightenment was, however, later soft
ened somewhat. See Adorno, "The Culture Industry Recon
sidered" (1967) now in New German Critique, No.
12-19.
6 (Fall
1975):
means, however, did they exempt all "high" art from their cri
tique of the commodification of culture.
83. After the war, Horkheimer and Adorno returned to Germany to
reopen the Institute in Frankfurt in 1950. There they trained a
whole new generation of students. They also began to publish a
new journal, the Frankfurter Beitrdge zur Soziologie.
N o tes
84.
139
New Left
85.
86.
88.
140
N otes
141
93.
94.
142
Toward A
N otes
143
(May 1990):
144
N o tes
4.
145
6th ed.
5.
6.
146
8.
N otes
11.
147
148
Basil Blackwell,
N otes
149
21.
150
N otes
151
33.
34.
Following Dilthey, Simmel and others, Mannheim uses the vitalist concept of "Life" to designate the ultimate metaphysical
substratum of the historical process. Both "Historicism" and
"The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge," are permeated by
the language of Lebensphilosophie. See especially, "Histori
cism," pp. 88-97,106-114,127; and "The Problem of a Sociology
of Knowledge," pp. 60-61,86.
35.
152
of
Cultural-
43. Mannheim, "A Sociological Theory of Culture and Its Knowability," pp. 173-174.
44. Mannheim, "Historicism," p. 130; also see "The Problem of a
Sociology of Knowledge," pp. 62-63.
45. Aside from the "sociology of knowledge" ( Wissenssoziologie ).
Mannheim used two other terms to describe his project: the
"sociology of cognition" (Erkenntnissoziologie) and the "sociol
ogy of mind" (Soziologie des Geistes). See "The Problem of a
Sociology of Knowledge," p. 102; and "Competition as a Cul
tural Phenomena" in From Karl Mannheim, p. 224.
N otes
153
46.
47.
48.
49.
50. Cf. History and Class Consciousness, pp. 187-188 and Ideol
ogy and Utopia, pp. 46-48, 79, 84-87, 286-306. Also see Mann
heim, "Historicism," pp. 90-93 and "The Problem of a Sociology
of Knowledge," p. 62 n. 1.
51. References to the need to grasp "the next step" recur through
out Mannheim's writings. The phrase occurs once in italics in
History and Class Consciousness. Interestingly enough, Lukacs
follows his use of the phrase with a reference to Lenin's contin
ual exhortations to seize "the next link" in the chain with all
one's might. Cf. History and Class Consciousness, pp. 198,221
n. 60 and Ideology and Utopia, pp. 126-134. Also see Mann
heim, "Historicism," p. 131 and "The Problem of a Sociology of
Knowledge," p. 102.
52. Cf. History and Class Consciousness, pp. 228-229 and Ideol
ogy and Utopia, pp. 151-152. Also see Mannheim, "H is
toricism," pp. 115, 130 and "The Problem of a Sociology of
154
308
54. Cf. History and Class Consciousness, pp. 198-205 andId eol
ogy and Utopia, pp. 73, 94-99,192-204, 275.
55. These differences strongly challenge Joseph Gabel s interpreta
tion of the relationship between Mannheim, Lukacs and the tra
dition of "Hungarian Marxism." Gabel rightly stresses the in
fluence of Lukacs and the critical "demystifying" thrust that is
carried over into Mannheim's work. However it is untenable to
maintain that Mannheim was and always remained an "Hun
garian Marxist." To make such an argument one must disre
gard the anti-Marxist thrust of Mannheim's response to His
tory and Class Consciousness. Gabel even manages to claim
that Mannheim became more of a Marxist in his later works on
social planning! See Joseph Gabel, Mannheim and Hungarian
M arxism (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991). Also
see his earlier False Consciousness: An Essay on Reification
(New York: Harper & Row, 1975). In this work, too, the impor
tant differences between Lukacs and Mannheim are overlooked.
56. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 153-164.
57. Mannheim often stressed the need to recognize other social de
terminants of thought beyond class interests. See, for example,
"The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge," pp. 88-89 n. 1,
107-111; "The Ideological and the Sociological Interpretation of
Intellectual Phenomena," p. 123; "The Problem of Generations"
(1927) in Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, pp.
276-320, and "Competition as a Cultural Phenomena" (1928) in
From Karl Mannheim, pp. 223-261.
N otes
155
50.
51.
66.
Mannheim, p. 98.
68.
156
N otes
157
158
3. Marcuse, "Zur Wahrheitsproblematik der soziologischen Methode" in Lieber (ed.) Ideologienlehre und Wissenssoziologie, pp.
379-394. An English translation, "The Sociological Method and
the Problem of Truth," is available in Meja and Stehr (eds.)
Knowledge and Politics, pp. 129-139.
N otes
5.
6.
7.
8.
159
9. Marcuse, p. 385.
10. Marcuse, pp. 385-387.
11. Marcuse, pp. 387-389.
12. Marcuse, pp. 386-387, 390-394.
13. Horkheimer, "Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?" in Lieber (ed.)
Ideologietilehre und Wissenssoziologie, pp. 505-529. An English
translation is available in Meja and Stehr (eds.) K now ledge
and Politics, p p . 140-157.
14. Horkheimer, "Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?," pp. 505, 510-517,
523, 528-529.
15. Horkheimer, pp. 511-513.
16. Horkheimer, pp. 522-523.
17. Horkheimer, pp. 513,515-516.
18. Horkheimer, pp. 517-518,524.
19. Horkheimer, pp. 519,526-527.
160
N otes
161
162
40. Many of the key contributions to the Positivist Dispute are col
lected in Theodor W. Adomo et al., The Positivist Dispute in
German Sociology (N ew York: Harper & Row, 1976).
41. Adorno, "On the Logic of the Social Sciences" (1961) in The
Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, pp. 115-116.
Both
Adomo and Popper rejected Mannheim's sociology of knowl
edge on the grounds that it had completely collapsed all distinc
tions between the genesis and validity of knowledge. However
Adomo was equally critical of Popper's attempt to completely
separate genesis and validity. Charging that neither Popper nor
Mannheim had been able to conceive of genesis and validity in
their unity and contradiction, Adomo argued that questions of
genesis and validity were to be treated as distinct, but related
problems. See Adorno's "Introduction" to The Positivist Dis
pute, pp. 19-22.
42. Adomo, Negative Dialectics (New York: Seabury Press, 1973),
pp. 35-37,197-198.
Nates
163
C h ap ter Four:
Central Problems in
the Theory of Ideology
1.
2.
3.
4. Mannheim, p. 174.
5. Although muted in the English translation of Ideology and
Utopia, the absolutist inclinations of Mannheim's sociology of
knowledge are clearly evident in "The Problem of a Sociology of
Knowledge" (1925) in Wolff (ed.) From Karl M annheim, pp.
101-104.
6.
8.
164
N o tes
165
13.
166
18. See Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 45-50, 190, 262,
301-302.
19. Once again, of course, the figure of Lukacs stands behind many
of these common themes.
20. See Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 310.
21. Karl Popper's attempt to defend a categorical distinction be
tween "science" and "ideology" was one of the key issues in the
Positivist Dispute. In opposition, Adorno asserted the view that
scientific knowledge often assumes ideological functions in mod
em society. See Adorno's "Introduction" to The Positivist Dis
pute in German Sociology, pp. 16-21, 67.
22. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 77. Perhaps in response to
criticism, Mannheim did backtrack somewhat on this issue. In
the Encyclopedia article on the sociology of knowledge appended
to the English edition of Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim seems
to suggest that the term "perspective" should be substituted for
the term "ideology" rather than used synonymously. See Ideol
ogy and Utopia, p. 266.
23. The Frankfurt School often stressed that the limited and socially
conditioned nature of knowledge should not be equated with ide
ology. See, for example, Horkheimer, Anfange der burgerlichen
Geschichtsphilosophie, pp. 73-76 and "The Problem of Truth,"
pp. 417-421.
24. See Horkheimer, "Postscript to Traditional and Critical Theory"
(1937) in Critical Theory, p. 247; "Notes on Institute Activities,"
Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, \bl. 9 (1941): 121-123;
and Eclipse of Reason (1947; rpt. New York: Seabury Press,
1974), pp. 182-183; Adorno, "Introduction," "Sociology and Em
pirical Research" (1957) and "On the Logic of the Social Sci
ences" in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, pp. 23-27,
N o tes
167
26.
168
32. Martin Jay has spoken of all this as the Frankfur: School's ver
sion of the "end of ideology" thesis. See Jay, "The Frankfurt
School's Critique of Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of
Knowledge," Te/os, No. 20 (Summer 1974): 84. The major prob
lem with drawing such a parallel is that the Frankfurt School,
unlike the ideologues of the end of ideology, regarded modern
technocratic ideologies as m ore, not less, ideological than their
classical bourgeois predecessors. See Marcuse, O ne-D im en
sional Man, pp. 11-12.
33. In cases of this type, psychoanalysis came to the fore as an im
portant element in the Frankfurt School's approach to the cri
tique of ideology. See, for example, Adorno, "Freudian Theory
and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda" (1951) in The Essential
Frankfurt School Reader, pp. 118-137. Also see Adorno, "Ideology," pp. 190-191.
34. Once more the influence of Lukacs may be noted. In History and
Class Consciousness, Lukacs had pointed out that both dogma
tism and relativism presuppose the static ideal of a timeless
truth. See History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1968), pp. 186-189.
35. See Horkheimer's critique of pragmatism in his essay "On the
Problem of Truth," pp. 424-427 and in Eclipse of Reason, pp.
42-55.
36. See Russell Jacoby's treatment of the problematic relation be
tween truth and practical success in his Dialectic of Defeat:
Contours of Western Marxism (New York: Cambridge Univer
sity Press, 1981).
37. See Marcuse, "Preface: A Note on Dialectic" in Reason and
Revolution.
N otes
169
38.
39.
41.
Seabury Press,
170
gy o f Knowledge
N otes
171
53.
172
55. It should again be noted that Marcuse did begin to explore these
problems in his later writings.
56. Criticism of "the dominant ideology thesis" may be justly
brought to bear against the Frankfurt School. See Nicholas
Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner, The Dominant
Ideology Thesis (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1980). Also see
John B. Thompson, Ideology and M odern Culture (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 74-121.
57. Habermas has located three chief deficiencies in early critical
theory: 1) the problem of "normative foundations," 2) the "con
cept of truth and its relation to scientific disciplines," and 3) the
"underevaluation of the traditions of democracy and of the con
stitutional state." See "The Dialectics of Rationalization" in
Peter Dews (ed.) Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with
Jurgen Habermas (London: Verso, 1986), pp. 97-103. Habermas'
most sustained critiques of the early school are found in The
Theory of Communicative Action, \bl. 1, Reason and the Ra
tionalization of Society, pp. 366-399, Vol. 2, Life-World and
System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1987), pp. 378-403, and The Philosophical Discourse of
M odernity, pp. 106-130. On the problem of the foundations of
critical theory, also see Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and
Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986) and Axel Honneth, The
Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
58. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, \bl. 1, Reason
and the Rationalization of Society, pp. 386-399.
N otes
173
174
66.
68.
69. See Thompson, 301-302. Also see his Ideology and Modern
C ulture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp.
109-121, 268.
70. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, especially pp. 45,
62-63, 310.
71. See Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon Press,
1974), pp. 22-24 and "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in his
Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1979), pp. 8-25. For an account of the difficulties that led
Habermas to make this distinction, see Thomas McCarthy, The
Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1978), pp. 99-110. Also see Habermas' comments in "Life-
N o tes
175
Chapter Five:
1.
Conclusion
176
6.
8.
N otes
177
10.
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New
York: Free Press, 1992).
11.
178
N otes
179
16.
17.
180
20. The identification of the use of the concept of totality with politi
cal totalitarianism was, of course, a major theme of the nouveaux philosophes in France during the 1970s. See Lyotard's
"Lessons in Paganism" in Andrew Benjamin (ed.) The Lyotard
R eader (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989) for a sense of
where he parts company with the nouveaux philosophes.
21. For critiques of the poststructuralist rejection of the category of
totality, see Douglas Kellner, "The Postmodern Turn: Positions,
Problems and Prospects" in George Ritzer (ed.) Frontiers of So
cial Theory: The New Syntheses (New York: Columbia Univer
sity Press, 1990), pp. 270-275; Steven Best, "Jameson, Totality
and the Poststructuralist Critique" in Douglas Kellner (ed.)
Postm odernism /Jam esonfCritique, pp. 333-368; and Steven Best
and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interroga
tions, pp. 171-175,222-224,256-263. Also see the defense of to
tality in the works of Frederic Jameson: The Political Uncon
scious, pp. 50-57; "Cognitive Mapping" in Gary Nelson and
Lawrence Grossberg (eds.) Marxism and the Interpretation of
C ulture (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp.
347-360; and "History and Class Consciousness as an 'Unfin
ished Project/" Rethinking M arxism, \bl. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1988):
4 9 -72.
22. It is more than a little ironic when philosophers who loudly pro
N otes
181
23.
24. For a general account of the linguistic turn, see Jurgen Haber
mas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1988), p. 117 ff. and Postmetaphysical Thinking (Cam
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 7 ,1 2 ,4 4 ^ 8 .
25. This point has been brought out quite well in Michael Gardiner's
attempt to recover Mikhail Bakhtin's contributions to the analy
sis of language and ideology as an alternative to structuralist
and poststructuralist approaches. See Michael Gardiner, The
Dialogics of Critique: M. M. Bakhtin and the Theory of Ideol
ogy (New York: Routledge, 1992), especially pp. 141-166.
26. Anthony Giddens, "Structuralism, Post-structuralism and the
Production of Culture" in his Social Theory and Modern Sociol
o g y PP- 73-108.
27. Giddens, pp. 84-86. On the relation between structuralism and
poststructuralism, see John Sturrock (ed.) Structuralism and
Since: From Levi-Strauss to Derrida (Oxford: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1979); Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philoso
phy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); and J. G.
Merquior, From Prague to Paris: A Critique of Structuralist
and Post-Structuralist Thought (New York: Verso, 1986).
28. Charges of "textual" or "linguistic" idealism, "pan-textualism"
and the like are leading themes of most critics of poststructural
ism. See Richard Wolin, The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The
Frankfurt School, Existentialism, Poststructuralism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 11; Jurgen Habermas, The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 185-210; and Perry
Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism (London:
\ferso, 1983), pp. 40-55.
182
29. See, for exam ple, Jacques Derrida, "The Principle of Reason:
The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils," Diacritics, Vol. 19 (Fall
1983): 3-20. Also see Derrida, Positions (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 93-94.
30. In the course of an attempt to forge a critical articulation be
tween deconstruction and Marxism, Michael Ryan has high
lighted the lack of a developed social theory as one of the intrin
sic faults of deconstruction. See Ryan, M arxism and Decon
struction, p. 35.
31. Although his claims regarding the political significance of decon
struction would seem to require elaboration within the context
of a developed theory of contemporary institutions, Derrida has
persistently avoided engagement with empirical social and polit
ical analysis. From his standpoint, the problem seems to be that
the social sciences are inevitably tainted with "logocentrism"
and "the metaphysics of presence." Hence they fail to measure
up to the "radicality" of pure deconstruction. See Derrida, "The
Principle of Reason," pp. 16-17. As Peter Dews has shown,
Derrida has accepted the priority of phenomenological/tran
scendental analysis over empirical inquiry from early on in his
writings. See Dews, Logics of Disintegration, pp. 4-19. On
Derrida's distancing from the social sciences and its relevance
for the claims raised regarding the political significance of de
construction, also see Thomas McCarthy, "The Politics of the
Ineffable: Derrida's Deconstructionism" in Ideal and Illusions,
pp. 97-119 and Nancy Fraser, 'The French Derrideans: Polit
icizing Deconstruction or Deconstructing the Political?" in Un
ruly Practices, pp. 69-92.
32. Giddens, "Structuralism, Post-Structuralism and the Production
of Culture," pp. 86-89 and "The Social Sciences and Philosophy:
Trends in Recent Social Theory," also in Social Theory and
M odern Sociology, pp. 59-65. For a more extended statement
of Giddens' own "theory of structuration," see his The Con
stitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
N o tes
183
33.
34.
Bibliography
Abercrombie, Nicholas, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner. The
Dominant Ideology Thesis. Boston: George Allen &
Unwin, 1980.
Adomo, Theodor W. 'The Actuality of Philosophy." Telos, No. 31
(Spring 1977): 120-133.
_________ .
_________ .
Asthetische Theorie.
1970.
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp Verlag,
186
_________ .
_________ ,
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
Agger, Ben.
Telos, No. 35
London:
Bibliography
_________ .
187
Cambridge, MA:
_________ ,
Frankfurt:
_________ ,
New York:
188
_________ .
Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press,
1960.
Benhabib, Seyla. Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study of the
Foundations of Critical Theory. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986.
Benjamin, Andrew. (Ed.) The Lyotard Reader.
Basil Blackwell, 1989.
Cambridge, MA:
B ibliography
189
190
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
B ibliog rap h y
Cambridge,
_________ .
_________ .
PowerIKnowledge:
Selected Interviews and Other
Writings, 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. New York:
Pantheon Books, 1980.
_________ .
192
Aspects of Sociology.
New
B ibliography
_________ . New Rules of Sociological Method.
Books, 1976.
193
New York:
Basic
Stan
_________ .
Boston:
_________ .
Beacon
194
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
Postmetaphysical Thinking.
Press, 1992.
Cambridge, MA:
Action.
Cambridge, MA:
MIT
..
The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2. LifeWorld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Rea
son. Boston: Beacon Press, 1987.
B ibliography
_________ .
195
Critical Theory:
Press, 1974.
Seabury
196
_________ ,
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
Hamburg:
B ibliography
_
197
198
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
Los
Washington,
B ibliography
199
_________ .
_________ ,
_________ ,
London:
200
B ibliography
201
_________ .
_________ .
New York:
_________ .
6th
_________ .
Conservatism.
1986.
_________ .
_________ .
_________ .
Structures of Thinking.
Paul, 1982.
New
202
Telos, No. 27
B ibliography
203
204
Bibliography
205
206
_________ .
Stanford:
Stanford
New York:
B ibliography
207
_________ .
_________ .
208
_________ .
New
Index
Absolute knowledge, 21-22, 35-36,
5 4 ,6 9 -7 1 ,8 3 ,8 9 , 93,119,121,163
n. 5
Deconstruction, 115,117,119,179 n.
17.182 n. 30,182 n. 31
Descartes, Ren, 23
210
In dex
Genesis and validity, 42-43, 48-49,
51-52, 66, 68, 88, 90-91, 92, 105,
162 n. 41
Giddens, Anthony, 114-115, 146 n.
10,175 n. 2,176 n. 8
Gluck, Mary, 149 n. 15
Gouldner, Alvin, 109,176 n. 8
Grumley, John, 179 n. 18
Habermas, Jurgen, 99-103,107, 119
121,171 n. 52,172 n. 57,175 n. 3,
178 n. 15
Harms, John and Schroeter, Gerd,
124-125 n. 3,169 n. 44
Hegel, G. W. F., 6 ,7 ,9 ,1 6 ,1 7 , 21-22,
3 5 ,6 9 ,8 2 ,8 3 ,8 5 ,1 2 8 n. 10,150 n.
29,164 n. 10,164 n. 11
Heidegger, Martin, 65, 68, 128 n. 8,
141-142 n. 96,158 n. 4
Hekman, Susan, 144 n. 1,147 n. 15
Hermeneutics, 45,107-108, 143 n. 1,
147 148 n. 15,173 n. 61
Historicism, 42, 44, 48, 49-50, 52, 55,
6 5 ,7 0 ,8 2 ,1 5 0 n. 29,151 n. 34
Honneth, Axel, 172 n. 57
Horkheimer, Max, 1, 5-6, 23-32,
38-39, 65, 69-75, 94-95, 97, 118,
131-132 n. 43,135 n. 70,136-137
n. 75,138 n. 83,141 n. 9 4 ,157 n.
1,169 n. 44,171 n. 53
211
Idealism, 9, 16-17, 21, 69, 70, 72, 74,
7 6 ,8 2 -83,91,108,181 n. 28
Ideology, 1-4, 7 ,1 4 -1 7 ,1 9 -2 0 , 25, 32,
52-53, 55-59, 63-64, 66, 70-71,
74, 77-79, 81, 86-92, 93, 96,
98-99, 101-103, 108-121, 125 n.
4, 126 n. 5 ,1 6 6 n. 21, 166 n. 22,
166 n. 23, 167-168 n. 31, 168 n.
3 2 ,168 n. 3 3 ,1 7 2 n. 56, 176 n. 8,
177 n. 11, 177-178 n. 13, 179 n.
17,181 n. 25
Ideology critique, 2 -3 , 14-17, 23,
63-64, 71, 73, 74, 77-79, 86-92,
96, 9 8 -9 9 , 101-103, 107-109,
111-121,169 n. 46, 175 n. 72,175
n. 3,177-178 n. 13,179 n. 17
Immanent critique, 79, 86-87, 89 92,102,107-109
Imputed consciousness, 19, 53, 153
n. 49,165 n. 14
Ingram, David, 174 n. 65
Jacoby, Russell, 128 n. 6, 165 n. 15,
168 n. 36
Jameson, Frederic, 136 n. 73, 179 n.
17,180 n. 21
Jdszi, Oscar, 46,149 n. 21
Jay, Martin, 123 n. 2 ,1 2 4 n. 3, 127 n.
3, 127-128 n. 5, 136 n. 73, 157 n.
1,161 n. 30, 164 n. 10,168 n. 32,
169-170 n. 47,179 n. 18
Kadarkay, Arpad, 148 n. 19
Kant, Immanuel, 16-17
212
2
Lieber, Hans-Joachim, 123 n. 1, 158
n. 2
Linguistic turn, 99-100, 114-115,170
n. 50
Loader, Colin, 144 n. 1
Marcuse, Herbert, 1, 6, 2 2 ,3 0 ,3 9 -4 0 ,
65-68, 71, 72-73, 74, 95-96, 98,
127 n. 4, 128-129 n. 10, 141-142
a 96,158 n. 4,171 n. 52
Marx, Karl, 6, 10-16, 17, 19, 28, 30,
34, 52-53, 56, 64, 69, 71, 72, 79,
8 2 ,8 3 ,1 2 8 n. 10,140 n. 92,153 n.
49.164 n. 10
In dex
Meja, Volker, 123 n. 1,124 n. 2 ,1 2 4
n. 3 ,1 42-143 n. 1, 150 n. 29,157
n. 79,157 n. 1,158 n. 2,170 n. 47
Negative dialectics, 36-38, 79, 95,
98,127 n. 4,136 n. 73,139-140 n.
88
Negative metaphysics, 119, 183 n.
39
213
Postmodernism, 3,106, 111-119
Poststructuralism, 3,106,111-119
Pragmatism, 4 2 ,5 4 ,7 1 ,9 3 ,1 6 8 n. 35
Radhakrishnan, R., 126 n. 6
Rationality, justification and truth,
2, 100-101, 118-121, 173 n. 61,
173 n. 62,177-178 n. 13
Neo-Freudianism, 132-133 n. 47
Reich, Wilhelm, 23, 132 n. 46
Neo-pragmatism, 106
Reification, 12-18, 25, 84,94
Norris, Christopher, 177 n. 12
Relationism, 57, 77, 81
Objectivism, 7 ,1 0 6
Offe, Claus, 171 n. 52
Pluralism, 44-45
Scheler, Max, 50
Positivism, 7, 1 1,45-46,52,66,76
214
21
Totalized conception of ideology, l,
3, 56-58, 71, 74, 78, 79, 8 1 ,88-89,
93,96,110-111,117-118
Traditional theory, 6 ,2 3 -2 5 ,7 3
Structuralism, 114-116,181 n. 27
Subjectivity, 7-8, 9-23, 26-27, 3 2 37, 76, 82-84, 99,108,116,151 n.
35,165 n. 15
In d ex
Woldring, Henk E. S., 144 n. 1
Wolff, Kurt H., 143-144 n. 1
Wolin, Richard, 135-136 n. 73, 181
n. 28
215