LAMERA V CA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 93475

June 5, 1991

ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Esmeraldo U. Guloy for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro
Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle
then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto
Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.
1

As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code reading as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the abovenamed accused, being then the driver and person in charge of an Owner Jeep
Toyota bearing Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pilipinas '85, and without due regard to traffic
laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precautions to
avoid damage to property and injuries to persond (sic), did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and opefate (sic) said Owner Jeep in a
careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, as a result of which said motor
vehicle being then driven and operated by him, hit and bumped a tricycle SUZUki
(sic) bearing Plate No. NA-6575 MC Pilipinas '85, driven by Ernesto Reyes y
Esguerra and owned by Ernesto Antonel, thereby causing damage to the Suzuki
tricycle in the amount of P7,845.00; and due to the impact the driver and the
passengers of a (sic) tricycle Suzuki, sustained physical injuries which required
medical attendance as stated opposite their respective names to wit:
1. Ernesto Reyes More than thirty (30) days
2. Paulino Gonzal More than thirty (30) days

3. Patricio Quitalig Less than nine (9) days

and incapacitated them from performing their customary labor for the same period of
time.
which was filed on 10 September 1985 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila
and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 64294 and assigned to Branch 68 thereof; and
(b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on
Abandonment of one's victim reading as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the abovenamed accused, being the driver of an owner-type jeep with Plate No. NCC-313 UV
Pil. '85 which hit and bumped a motorized tricycle with Plate No. NA-6575-MC '85
driven by Ernesto Reyes and as a consequence of which Paulino Gonzal and
Ernesto Reyes sustained physical injuries and lost consciousness, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abandoned (sic) them and failed (sic) to help or
render assistance to them, without justifiable reason.
which was filed on 14 November 1985 with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 71)
and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2793.
On 29 June 1987 the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig rendered its decision in Criminal Case
No. 2793 finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined
and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced
him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to pay the
costs.
Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila
which docketed the appeal as Criminal Case No. 70648.
In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294
before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. He entered a plea of not guilty.
2

Petitioner's appeal, Criminal Case No. 70648, was decided on 31 July 1989. The court
affirmed with modification the decision appealed from. The modification consisted merely in
the reduction of the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) to two (2) months.
3

Still unsatisfied with the new verdict, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals on 31 August
1989 a petition for its review, docketed as C.A.-G.R. CR No. 07351, assigning therein the
following alleged errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING
OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, THAT "THE
TRICYCLE DRIVEN BY ERNESTO REYES WAS BUMPED BY THE JEEP DRIVEN
BY THE PETITIONER."
II

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG. METRO MANILA, THAT THE
PETITIONER, "LOSING PRESENCE OF MIND AS THE BLOODY SCENARIO
WOULD INDUCE IN THE AVERAGE MOTORIST, HE (SIC) OPTED, PERHAPS
INSTINCTIVELY TO HIDE IDENTITY, APPREHENSIVE MAY BE OVER THE
ENORMITY OF HIS MISDEMEANOR AND THUS DECIDED (SIC) TO WITHHOLD
ASSISTANCE TO HIS FALLEN VICTIMS."
III
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN DECLARING THAT, "AS THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT HAD THE
OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES, IT IS
DIFFICULT TO DISMISS THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF SAID COURT GIVING
CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES" FOR NOT BEING (SIC)
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND CLEARLY THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
IV
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO
MANILA, FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
ABANDONMENT UNDER ART. 275, PAR. 2, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE
(1) DAY OF ARRESTO MAYOR AND TO PAY THE COSTS.
V
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING NULL AND VOID
ALL THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG AND
ALL THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT.
4

The Court of Appeals found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in its Decision
promulgated on 9 November 1989. Pertinently, it ruled:
5

We cannot sustain the contention of the petitioner that par. 2 of Art. 275 of the
Revised Penal Code does not apply to him since the evidence allegedly shows that it
was Ernesto Reyes, the tricycle driver, who negligentlycaused the accident.
Petitioner misses the import of the provision. The provision punishes the failure to
help or render assistance to another whom the offender accidentally wounded or
injured. Accidental means that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without
intention and design and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen (Moreno,
Phil. Law Dictionary, 1972 ed., p. 7 citing De La Cruz v. Capital Insurance & Surety
Co., 17 SCRA 559). Consequently, it is enough to show that petitioner accidentally
injured the passengers of the tricycle and failed to help or render them assistance.
There is no need to prove that petitioner was negligent and that it was his negligence
that caused the injury. If the factor of criminal negligence is involved, Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code will come into play. The last paragraph of Art. 365 provides
that "the penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured party such help

as may be in his bands to give." Petitioner was charged under par. 2 of Art. 275 not
under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
His motion to reconsider the above decision wherein he strongly urged for reconsideration
because:
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . We find it hard to visualize that the accused may be penalized twice for an
"accident" and another for "recklessness", both of which arose from the same act.
We submit that there could not be a valid charge under Article 275, when, as in the
case at bar, there is already a pending charge for reckless imprudence under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. It is our view that the charge under Article 275
presupposes that there is no other charge for reckless imprudence.
having been denied in the Resolution of 17 May 1990, petitioner filed the instant petition.
6

Before Us he raises this sole issue:

Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides as basis for prosecution. "2. Anyone who
shall fail to help another whom he has accidentallywounded or injured" when, he was
previously charged with "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries" under Article 265 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code?
8

He maintains the negative view and supports it with the argument that "[f]or the same act,
that is, the vehicular collision, one could not be indicted in two separate informations at the
same time based on "accident" and "recklessness', for there is a world of difference between
"reckless imprudence" and "accidentally'." As expanded by him:
. . . since petitioner is facing a criminal charge for reckless imprudence pending
before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila . . . which
offense carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he
could no longer be charged under Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment . . . for having
allegedly failed "to help or render assistance to another whom he
has accidentally wounded or injured".
9

In Our resolution of 1 August 1990 We required respondents to comment on the petition.

In its Comment filed on 10 September 1990, respondent People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, putting the issue squarely, thus:
. . . whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code.
answers it in the negative because said Articles penalize different and distinct offenses. The
rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply
pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

In Our resolution of 13 March 1991 We gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. Petitioner submitted his on 22
April 1991 while the People moved that its Comment be considered as its memorandum.
10

We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner is actually invoking his right against
double jeopardy. He, however, failed to directly and categorically state it in his petition or
deliberately obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant absurdity of the two
informations. The reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the three
courts below. In any case, to do so would have been a futile exercise. When he was
arraigned, tried, and convicted in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No.
2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before the Regional Trial Court.
As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former was rendered on 29 June 1987,
while his arraignment in the latter took place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for
double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have been arraigned in the previous
case. InPeople vs. Bocar, supra., We ruled:
1wphi1

11

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Moreover, he is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised Penal Code. In People
vs. Doriquez, We held:
12

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only
for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or
more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution
under the other. Phrased elsewhere, where two different laws (or articles of the same
code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each
crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.
13

In People vs. Bacolod, supra., from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine gun which
caused public panic among the people present and physical injuries to one, informations for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public disturbance were filed.
Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he sought to dismiss the second
on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act
may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offenses the first against a person and the
second against public peace and order one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under
the rule on double jeopardy.
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The first,
Criminal Case No. 64294, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter
(Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal
1wphi1

Code. The second, Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art.
275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against
Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.
Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against Security
are committed by means of dolo.
14

Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither an offense by itself nor
an element of the offense therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by
one degree. The last paragraph of the Article specifically provides:
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such
help as may be in hand to give.
Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the information. The information
against petitioner in this case does not so allege.
Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another whom one has
accidentally wounded or injured is an offense under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same
code which reads:
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has
accidentally wounded or injured.
The foregoing distinctions satisfy the guidelines We made in People vs. Relova, et
al., wherein We held:
15

It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to
be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown
need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the
"same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt
to commit the first or a registration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double
jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense
need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks
to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses
which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.
Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle barred the filing of the
two informations against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is DENIED without pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, 5.

Rollo, 6.

Id., 6-9.

Rollo, 18-19.

Rollo, 14-21.

Rollo, 23.

Id., 5-12.

Id., 9-10.

Id., 11.

10

Rollo, 58-61.

People vs. Ilagan, 58 Phil. 851; People vs. Consults, 70 SCRA 277: Andres vs.
Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216; People vs. Bocar, et al., 132 SCRA 166; Gaspar vs.
Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 415.
11

12

24 SCRA 163,171.

Citing People vs. Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621; People vs. Capurro, 7 Phil. 24; People vs.
Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472.
13

14

Article 3, Revised Penal Code.

15

148 SCRA 292, 310.

PEOPLE V PUGAY
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accusedappellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and
BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal
Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under
an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of
Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the
decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of
Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused
his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior
strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the
wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.

CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).

Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the
trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but
crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin
Samson y Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals by direct participation of the crime of murder for the death of
Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in
favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The
accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal
penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS
ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED
BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL
TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF
THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants'
Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends.
Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of
May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were
different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.

Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel
and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with
several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy
and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him.
They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took
a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the
body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the
process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a
human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the
deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped
the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other
police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring
as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed
to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the
police officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario
municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written
statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two
accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accusedappellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their
written statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that
he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water
and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other
hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see
the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute
any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements
alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into
admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame
on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned
and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the
sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically
stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive
and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and
unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons

investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of
the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the
crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one
Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the
respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accusedappellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses
in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative,
their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the
suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797). Besides, the
matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
<re||an1w>

Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only
was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in
exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading
a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to
testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified
that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant
case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both
Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding
with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour
gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accusedappellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to
pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only
when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that
you were reading comics when you saw Pugay poured
gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How
could you possibly see that incident while you were reading
comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what
they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with
gasoline and lighted and burned later you had a talk with
Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was
trying to prevent him from doing so.

Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a

talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you told him not to
pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if that is
true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do
you mean to say you come to know that Pugay will pour
gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour
gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his
ass you tried according to you to ask him not to and then later
you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you
he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he
was going to pour gasoline that is why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I
thought it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick
on his ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline, is that
correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time
you told him not to pour gasoline when he merely pick up the
can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he
was already in the process of pouring gasoline on the body of
Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that
Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that

Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it
was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased
when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased
on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity
of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before
the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the
accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is
also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the
deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from
different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them
is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs.
Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay.
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring
its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline.
The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before
pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions
who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that
the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this
Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it
is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as
anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner
of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from
four (4) months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his
brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the
deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by
treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against
such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to
kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing
that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of
treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the
body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have
committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of

doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the
deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility.
Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries
on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver
offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article
4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances,
the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The
eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they
noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).
<re||an1w>

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging
from eight (8) years ofprision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by
Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is
P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to
P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the
P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the
court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against
the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.