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G.R. No.

153076

June 21, 2007

LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION


(LADECO), HENRY BERENGUEL, and APOLONIO R.
DEOCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
MICHAEL RAYMOND ANGALA, respondent.
FACTS:
A Datsun crewcab driven by Deocampo bumped into a Chevy
pick-up owned by Angala (respondent) and driven by Borres. LADECO
owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Mendez.
Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were
running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north
towards Lanang, Davao City.
Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten
kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to
turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was
running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the
point of impact. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because
he noticed a blinking light while looking at the speedometer.
Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was driving were
both running at about 40 kph. The pick-up was running along the outer
lane. The pick-up was about 10 meters away when it made a U-turn
towards the left. Deocampo alleged that he tried to avoid the pick-up but
he was unable to avoid the collision. Deocampo stated that he did not
apply the brakes because he knew the collision was unavoidable.
Deocampo admitted that he stepped on the brakes only after the collision.
Petitioners allege that since Borres was violating a traffic rule at the time
of the accident, respondent and Borres were the parties at fault.
Petitioners cite Article 2185 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
The trial court found that the crewcab was running very fast while
following the pick-up and that the crewcabs speed was the proximate
cause of the accident. The trial court ruled that Deocampo had the last
opportunity to avoid the accident.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts decision. It also
sustained the solidary liability of LADECO and Deocampo. The Court of
Appeals ruled that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the negligence of
the driver is presumed to be the negligence of the owner of the vehicle.

Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front


of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and
overturning, compared to running straight ahead. Deocampo could have
avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pickup. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not
step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the
brakes after the collision.
Petitioners are Solidarily Liable
LADECO alleges that it should not be held jointly and severally
liable with Deocampo because it exercised due diligence in the
supervision and selection of its employees. LADECO did not show its
policy in hiring its drivers, or the manner in which it supervised its drivers.
LADECO failed to substantiate its allegation that it exercised due diligence
in the supervision and selection of its employees. Hence, we hold
LADECO solidarily liable with Deocampo.
Respondent is Entitled to Moral Damages
We sustain the award of moral damages. Moral damages are
awarded to allow a plaintiff to obtain means, diversion, or amusement that
will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the
defendants culpable action. The trial court found that respondent, who
was on board the pick-up when the collision took place, suffered shock,
serious anxiety, and fright when the crewcab bumped his pick-up. We
sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in ruling that respondent
sufficiently showed that he suffered shock, serious anxiety, and fright
which entitle him to moral damages.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to give any
justification for the award of attorneys fees. Awards of attorneys fees
must be based on findings of fact and of law and stated in the decision of
the trial court. Further, no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate. Hence, we delete the award of attorneys fees.

G.R. No. 143363

February 6, 2002

ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner,


vs.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA
DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
FACTS:
St. Mary conducted an enrolment drive and as part of this drive,
they campaign to different schools for prospective students. On that
fortunate day, one named Sherwin Carpitanos--student of St. Mary and
part of the campaign group went to a particular school with his classmates
riding in a mitsubishi jeepney owned by one named Vivencio Villanueva
and driven by his classmate who was a minor. Allegedly the latter droved
the jeepney in a reckless manner and as a result the jeepney turned turtle.

ISSUE:. WHETHER RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES

As a result Sherwin Carpitanos died due to


sustained from the accident

RULING:

The lower court held St. Mary solidarily Liable under article 218
and 219 of the family code and the guardians of the minor driver and the
owner of the jeepney as subsudiarily liable. on appeal to CA the owner of
the jeepney was freed from liabilities.

Both Drivers are Negligent


We rule that both parties were negligent in this case. Borres
was at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following Section 45(b)
of RA 4136, Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane
nearest to the center of the highway. However, Deocampo was equally
negligent. Borres slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing the
U-turn. Deocampo should have also slowed down when the pick-up
slowed down. Deocampo admitted that he noticed the pick-up when it was
still about 20 meters away from him. Vehicular traffic was light at the time
of the incident. The pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the
road. Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving
very fast before the collision, as found by both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Applies
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last
clear chance applies.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than
that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. In this case,
Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since
Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation
since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.

ISSUE:

the injuries he

(1) WHETHER ST. MARY IS LIABLE - NO


(2) WHETHER VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA IS LIABLE -YES

1)
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or
(2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special
parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions
and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.9
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a
minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act
or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the

injury caused because the negligence must have a causal


connection to the accident.

HELD:

"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be
shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence
and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken
by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be
the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an
injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred."

Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 to apply, it is


not necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the
province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either
control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
In this case, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of
Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer, whose duties
include the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and
sewers. The charter of Dagupan provides that the laying out, construction,
and improvement of streets, avenues, and alleys and sidewalks and the
regulation of the use thereof may be legislated by the Municipal Board.
Thus, the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and
control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of


petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. The
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises


control or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the
liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is
clear.
ON DAMAGES:

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. there was no
evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive
the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva,
grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and
control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James
Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened
the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for
moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00. Moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants
wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of the
accident was not attributable to petitioner.
2)
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of
the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact
admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the
latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets."
Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the
respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school,
but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible
for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989


FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk
located at Perez Blvd. (a national road) when she accidentally fell into an
open manhole which was partially covered by a concrete flowerpot and
leaving a gaping hole. Her right leg was fractured, resulting in her
hospitalization and continuing difficulty in locomotion. Because of her
accident, Guilatco was unable to go to work, thereby losing her income.
She also lost weight, and she is now no longer her former jovial self since
she is unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities. She
filed an action for damages against the City of Dagupan.
The City of Dagupan denied liability on the ground that the
manhole was located on a national road, which was not under the control
or supervision of the City of Dagupan thru the City Engineer.
ISSUE:

WHETHER THE CITY OF DAGUPAN IS LIABLE TO


GUILATCO.

Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the
amount of P 10,000.00 should be reduced to the proven expenses of P
8,053.65 only. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. In
determining actual damages, the court can not rely on "speculation,
conjecture or guess work" as to the amount. Without the actual proof of
loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous.
Moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss,
inasmuch as the determination of the amount is discretionary on the court.
Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages are in the
nature of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered
but which for some reason can not be proven. However, in awarding
moral damages, the following should be taken into consideration:
(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's
acts.
(2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as
satisfactory proof of the factual basis for damages.
(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of
the cases enumerated in the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by
the petitioner were proven. Witnesses from the petitioner's place of work
testified to the degeneration in her disposition-from being jovial to
depressed. She refrained from attending social and civic activities.
Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is excessive.
Her handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her
treatment which lasted for one year. Though evidence of moral loss and
anguish existed to warrant the award of damages, the moderating hand of
the law is called for. The Court has time and again called attention to the
reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damages without
basis, resulting in exhorbitant amounts. The amount of moral damages
should be reduced to P 20,000.00 based on jurisprudence.
As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly pointed
out the basis:
To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the
Court, through this case, should serve warning to the city or cities
concerned to be more conscious of their duty and responsibility to
their constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction
work or when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which
are uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in order to minimize
or prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians.
Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as
beautification drives, the end is more important than the manner in which
the work is carried out. Because of this obsession for showing off, such
trivial details as misplaced flower pots betray the careless execution of the
projects, causing public inconvenience and inviting accidents.

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