1

[G.R. No. 122250 & 122258. July 21, 1997]

EDGARDO
C.
NOLASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS,
MEYCAUAYAN,
BULACAN,
and
EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.
FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO
A. ALARILLA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
First, we rewind the facts. The election for
mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on May
8,
1995. The
principal
protagonists
were
petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and private
respondent Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received
29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038 votes.
[1]
Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with
37,240 votes.
On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the
COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. He
alleged:
xxxxxxxxx

firearms without any license or authority to use or

possess such long arms. These persons
composing respondent's `private army,' and the
unlicensed firearms are as follows:
A. Virgilio Luna y Valderama 1. PYTHOM (sic) Cal. 347 SN 26946 with six (6)
Rounds of Ammo.
2. INGRAM M10 Cal. 45 MP with
Suppressor SN: 45457 with two (2)
Mags and 54 Rounds of Ammo.
B. Raymundo Bahala y Pon 1. HKMP5 Sn. C334644 with two (2) Mags and 47
Rounds of Ammo.
C.Roberto Santos y Sacris 1. Smith and Wesson 357 Magnum
Sn: 522218 with six (6) Rounds of
Ammo.
D. Melchor Cabanero y Oreil -

4. Based on intelligence reports that respondent

was maintaining his own `private army' at his
aforesaid resident, P/Insp. Ronaldo O. Lee of the
Philippine National Police assigned with the
Intelligence Command at Camp Crame, applied
for and was granted search warrant no. 95-147 by
Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on
5 May 1995. A copy of the said search warrant is
attached as Annex "A" hereof.

1. Armscor 12 Gauge with three (3) Rounds of

Ammo.

5. In compliance with said search warrant no. 95147, an elite composite team of the PNP
Intelligence Command, Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS), and Bulacan Provincial Command,
backed up by the Philippine National Police
Special Action Force, accompanied by mediamen
who witnessed and recorded the search by video
and still cameras, raided the house of respondent
Florentino Blanco at his stated address at Bancal,
Meycauayan, Bulacan.

1. Paltik Cal. 38 SN: 36869

6. Enclosed as Annex "A-1" is a video tape taken

of the proceedings during the raid.
7. The composite team was able to enter the said
premises of respondent Florentino Blanco where
they conducted a search of the subject firearms
and ammunition.
8. The search resulted in the arrest of six (6) men
who were found carrying various high powered

E. Edgardo Orteza y Asuncion 1. Paltik Cal. 38 Rev with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
F. Francisco Libari y Calimag -

Copies of the inventory receipts are hereto

attached as Annexes "B" to "B-5" hereof.
9. During the search, members of the composite
team saw through a large clear glass window,
respondent's Galil assault rifle on a sofa inside a
closed room of the subject premises.
10. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and
his wife, the members of the composite policemilitary team applied for the issuance of a second
search warrant (Annex "B-6") so that they could
enter the said room to seize the said firearm.
11. While waiting for the issuance of the second
search
warrant,
respondent's
wife
and
respondent's brother, Mariano Blanco, claiming to
be the campaign manager of respondent in the
Nationalist People's Coalition Party, asked

2
permission to enter the locked room so they could
withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room
to pay their watchers, and the teachers of
Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995 elections.
12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs.
Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco, were
allowed to withdraw ten (10) large plastic bags
from the vault.
13. When the said PNP composite team examined
the ten (10) black plastic bags, they found out
that each bag contained ten (10) shoe
boxes. Each shoe box when examined contained
200 pay envelopes, and each pay envelope when
opened
contained
the
amount
of
P1,000.00. When
questioned,
respondent's
brother Mariano Blanco and respondent's wife,
admitted to the raiding team that the total
amount of money in the ten (10) plastic bags is
P10,000,000.00.
14. The labels found in the envelope shows that
the money were intended as respondent's bribe
money to the teachers of Meycauayan.Attached
as Annex "C" is the cover of one of the shoe
boxes containing the inscription that it is intended
to the teachers of Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent
perpetrated the most massive vote-buying
activity ever in the history of Meycauayan
politics. Attached as Annex "D" is the envelope
where this P10,000,000.00 was placed in 100
peso denominations totalling one thousand pesos
per envelope with the inscription `VOTE!!! TINOY.'
This massive vote-buying activity was engineered
by the respondent through his organization called
`MTB' or `MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO
VOLUNTEERS.' The chairman of this movement is
respondent's brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who
admitted to the police during the raid that these
money were for the teachers and watchers of
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Attached as Annex "E" hereof is an MTB ID issued
to one Armando Bulan of Precinct 77-A, Brgy.
Jasmin, Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will
note that the ID is perforated in the middle. The
purpose is for the voter to tear the office copy
and return it to respondent's headquarters to
receive the balance of the P500.00 of the bribe
money after voting for respondent during the
elections. The voter will initially be given a downpayment of P500.00.

16.
This
massive
vote-buying
was
also
perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use
of flying voters. Attached as Annex "F" hereof is a
copy of the Police Blotter dated 8 May 1995
showing that six (6) flying voters were caught in
different precincts of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who
admitted after being caught and arrested that
they were paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent
and his followers, to vote for other voters in the
voter's list.
17. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply
of money, respondent used another scheme as
follows. Respondent's paid voter will identify his
target from the list of voter and will impersonate
said voter in the list and falsify his signature.
Attached as Annex "G" hereof is the Minutes of
Voting and Counting of Votes in Precinct No. 26,
Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan.Annex "G-1"
is the statement of one Ma. Luisa de los Reyes
Cruz stating that when she went to her precinct
to vote, her name was already voted upon by
another person. This entry was noted by Leticia T.
Villanco, Poll Chairman; Estelita Artajo, - Poll
Clerk; and Nelson John Nito - Poll Member.
18. Earlier before the election, respondent used
his tremendous money to get in the good graces
of the local Comelec Registrar, who was replaced
by this Office upon the petition of the people of
Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "H" hereof is an
article in the 3 May 1995 issue of Abante entitled
`1 M Suhol sa Comelec Registrar.'
19. The second search warrant on respondent's
residence yielded to more firearms and thousands
of rounds of ammunition. These guns were used
by respondent to terrorize the population and
make the people afraid to complain against
respondent's massive vote buying and cheating
in today's elections. Respondent's bribery of the
teachers ensured the implementation of his votebuying ballot box switching, impersonations, and
other cheating schemes.
Attached as Annexes `I-1' to I-2' are the pertinent
Receipts of the guns and ammunitions seized
from respondent. Attached as Annex "J" is a
Certification to the same effect.
20. The above acts committed by respondent are
clear grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code for giving money to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing election functions; for
committing acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; and for spending in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by

3
the Election Code. There are only 97,000
registered
voters
in
Meycauayan
versus
respondent's expenses of at least P10,000,000.00
as admitted above. (Emphasis supplied).
On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent
Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation. The
COMELEC (First Division) granted the motion after
finding that there was a "probable commission of
election offenses which are grounds for
disqualification pursuant to the provisions of
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP
881), and the evidence in support of
disqualification
is
strong." It
directed
the
Municipal Board of Canvassers "to complete the
canvassing of election returns of the municipality
of Meycauayan, but to suspend proclamation of
respondent Florentino P. Blanco should he obtain
the winning number of votes for the position of
Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan until such time
when the petitions for disqualification against him
shall have been resolved."
On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift
or Set Aside the Order suspending his
proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his
Answer to the petition to disqualify him.
On May 30, 1995, the COMELEC (First
Division) heard the petition to disqualify
Blanco. The parties thereafter submitted their
position papers.[2] Blanco even replied to the
position paper of Alarilla on June 9, 1995.
On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First
Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground of
vote-buying, viz.:[3]
xxxxxxxxx
"WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
Commission
(First
Division)
RESOLVES
to
DISQUALIFY Respondent Florentino P. Blanco as a
candidate for the Office of Mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan in the May 8, 1995 elections for having
violated Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election
Code. The Order suspending the proclamation of
herein Respondent is now made PERMANENT. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Meycauayan,
Bulacan shall immediately reconvene and, on the
basis of the completed canvass of the election
returns, determine the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates who shall be
immediately proclaimed.

resolution directing the Municipal Board of

Canvassers to "immediately reconvene and, on
the basis of the completed canvass of the
election returns, determine the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates who shall be
immediately proclaimed." He urged that as vicemayor he should be declared mayor in the event
Blanco was finally disqualified. The motions were
heard on September 7, 1995. The parties were
allowed to file their memoranda with right of
reply. On October 23, 1995, the COMELEC en
banc denied the motions for reconsideration.
In this
contends:

petition

for

certiorari,[5] Blanco

xxxxxxxxx
18. Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in
affirming en toto and adopting as its own the
majority decision of the First Division in that:
18.1 It upheld the validity of the May 17, 1995
order suspending proclamation of Petitioner
Blanco herein as the winning candidate for Mayor
of Meycauayan without the benefit of any notice
or hearing in gross and palpable violation of
Blanco's constitutional right to due process of law.
18.2 It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res.
No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the procedure
for disposing of disqualification cases arising out
of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which Resolution this
Honorable Tribunal explicitly sanctioned in the
case of Lozano vs. Yorac. Moreover, it (COMELEC)
violated Blanco's right to equal protection of the
laws by setting him apart from other respondents
facing similar disqualification suits whose case
were referred by COMELEC to the Law
Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and
ordering their proclamation -- an act which
evidently discriminated against Petitioner Blanco
herein.

SO ORDERED."

18.3 It decided Petitioner Blanco's disqualification

case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING in violation of
law and the precedents which consistently hold
that questions of VOTE-BUYING, terrorism and
similar such acts should be resolve in a formal
election protest where the issue of vote buying is
subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of
disposing of the issue in a summary proceeding;

Blanco moved for reconsideration on August

19, 1995 in the COMELEC en banc. Nolasco, as
vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings. [4] He
moved for reconsideration of that part of the

18.4 It declared Petitioner Blanco as having been

involved in a conspiracy to engage in VOTEBUYING without that minimum quantum of proof
required to establish a disputable presumption of

4
vote-buying in gross and palpable violation of the
provisions of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646;
18.5 It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND
PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and utter
disregard of the doctrine laid down by this
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of LABO vs.
COMELEC which was reiterated only recently in
the case of Aquino vs. Syjuco.
On the other hand, Nolasco contends in his
petition for certiorari[6] that he should be declared
as Mayor in view of the disqualification of
Blanco. He cites section 44 of R.A. No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991 and our decision in Labo vs. COMELEC.[7]
We shall first resolve the Blanco petition.
Blanco was not denied due process when the
COMELEC
(First
Division)
suspended
his
proclamation as mayor pending determination of
the
petition
for
disqualification
against
him. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sections 4
and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure merely require that evidence of guilt
should be strong to justify the COMELEC in
suspending a winning candidate's proclamation. It
ought to be emphasized that the suspension
order is provisional in nature and can be lifted
when the evidence so warrants. It is akin to a
temporary restraining order which a court can
issue ex-parte under exigent circumstances.
In any event, Blanco was given all the
opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. On May 25, 1995,
he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order
suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995,
he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify
him. The COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco
thereafter submitted his position paper and reply
to Alarilla's position paper. The COMELEC
considered the evidence of the parties and their
arguments
and
thereafter
affirmed
his
disqualification. The hoary rule is that due
process does not mean prior hearing but only an
opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC gave
Blanco all the opportunity to be heard. Petitions
for disqualification are subject to summary
hearings.[8]
Blanco also faults the COMELEC for departing
from the procedure laid down in COMELEC
Resolution 2050 as amended, in disqualification
cases. The resolution pertinently provides:
xxxxxxxxx
Where a similar complaint is filed after election
but before proclamation of the respondent

candidate the complaint shall, nevertheless, be

dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the
complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department. If, before
proclamation, the Law Department makes a
prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate
trial court, the complainant may file a petition for
suspension of the proclamation of the respondent
with the court before which the criminal case is
pending and the said court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of
guilt is strong."
It is alleged that the violation is fatal as it
deprived Blanco of equal protection of our laws.
We do not agree. It cannot be denied that the
COMELEC has jurisdiction over proclamation and
disqualification cases.Article IX-C, section 2 of the
Constitution endows the COMELEC the all
encompassing power to "enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election x x x." We have long ruled that this
broad power includes the power to cancel
proclamations.[9] Our laws are no less explicit on
the matter. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code) provides:
"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who,
in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration
to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and
261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for an elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived
his status as permanent resident or immigrant of
a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the
elections laws."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides:
"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case - Any
candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If

5
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong."
Despite
these
laws
and
existing
jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC
must follow the procedure in Resolution No. 2050
as amended. We hold that COMELEC cannot
always be straitjacketed by this procedural
rule. The COMELEC has explained that the
resolution was passed to take care of the
proliferation of disqualification cases at that
time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority
to its Law Department as partial solution to the
problem. The May 8, 1995 elections, however, did
not result in a surfeit of disqualification cases
which the COMELEC cannot handle. Hence, its
decision to resolve the disqualification case of
Blanco directly and without referring it to its Law
Department is within its authority, a sound
exercise of its discretion. The action of the
COMELEC is in accord with Section 28 of R.A. No.
6646, viz:
"x x x.
"SEC. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Voteselling. - The presentation of a complaint for
violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by affidavits
of complaining witness attesting to the offer or
promise by or of the voter's acceptance of money
or other consideration from the relatives, leaders
or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient
basis for an investigation to be immediately
conducted by the Commission, directly or through
its duly authorized legal officers under Section 68
or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
(emphasis supplied)
"x x x."
Indeed, even Commissioner Maambong who
dissented from the majority ruling, clings to the
view that "Resolution No. 2050 cannot divest the
Commission of its duty to resolve disqualification
cases under the clear provision of section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646."[10] Clearly too, Blanco's contention
that he was denied equal protection of the law is
off-line. He was not the object of any invidious
discrimination. COMELEC
assumed
direct
jurisdiction over his disqualification case not to
favor anybody but to discharge its constitutional

duty of disposing the case in a fair and as fast a

manner as possible.
Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in
using summary proceedings to resolve his
disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC action
is safely anchored on section 4 of its Rules of
Procedure which expressly provides that petitions
for disqualification "shall be heard summarily
after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and
electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be
the subject of summary hearing. However, its
electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender
should be disqualified from office can be
determined in an administrative proceeding that
is summary in character.
The next issue is whether there is substantial
evidence to prove the vote buying activities of
Blanco. The factual findings of the COMELEC (First
Division) are as follows:[11]
"x x x
"Respondent argues that the claim of vote-buying
has no factual basis because the affidavits and
sworn statements admitted as evidence against
him are products of hearsay; inadmissible
because of the illegal searches; they violate the
Rule of Res Inter Alios Acta and the offense of
vote-buying requires consummation.
We are not impressed.
A studied reading of the affidavits [Respondent's
affidavit is unsigned] attached to the Reply of the
Respondent to the Position Paper of the Petitioner
[Annexes 1, 2 and 3] would reveal that they are in
the nature of general denials emanating from
individuals closely associated or related to
respondent Blanco.
The same holds true with the affidavits attached
to Respondent's Position Paper [Annexes 1, 2, 3
and 4]. Said affidavits were executed by Blanco's
political leaders and private secretary.
On the other hand, the affidavit of Romeo Burgos
[Exhibit "E-1"] is rich in detail as to how the
alleged vote-buying was conducted.
Moreover, the same is corroborated by object
evidence in the nature of MTB [Movement for
Tinoy Blanco] cards which were in the possession
of the affiants and allegedly used as a means to
facilitate the vote-buying scheme.
There are also admissions of certain individuals
who received money to vote for Respondent

6
[Annexes "E-2", "E-3", "E-4", "E-5", "E-6", "E-7",
"E-8", "E-9" and "E-10"].
On the day of the elections, two individuals were
apprehended for attempting to vote for
Respondent when they allegedly are not
registered voters of Meycauayan. A criminal
complaint for violation of section 261 [2] of BP
881 was filed by P/Sr. Inspector Alfred S. Corpus
on May 9, 1995 with the Municipal Trial Court of
Bulacan. The same was docketed as Criminal
Case 95-16996 [Exhibit F-2].
Again, similar pay envelopes with money inside
them were found in the possession of the
suspected flying voters.
The incident was corroborated by Adriano
Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same
[Exhibit "F-1"]. Llorente, a poll watcher of
Petitioner, was the one who accosted the two
suspected flying voters when the latter
attempted to vote despite failing to locate their
names in the voter's list.
From this rich backdrop of detail, We are
disappointed by the general denial offered by
Respondent. In People of the Philippines vs.
Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, May 11, 1993, 222 SCRA
684, the Supreme Court noted that "Denial is
the weakest defense' [page 692].
In People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Precioso,
et al., G.R. No. 95890, May 12, 1993, 221 SCRA
1993, the Supreme Court observed that,
`We have consistently ruled that denials if
unsubstantiated
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence are negative and self-serving evidence
which deserves no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between
the positive declarations of the prosecution
witness and the negative statements of the
accused,
the
former
deserves
more
credence." [page 754].'

The affiants are not the accused. Their

participation in the herein case is in the nature of
witnesses who have assumed the risk of being
subsequently charged with violating Section 261
[1] of BP 881. In fact, their affidavits were sought
by the Petitioner and not by any law enforcement
agency. Even Respondent admits this finding
when he filed his Reply to Petitioner's Position
Paper and Motion to Refer for Preliminary
Investigation and Filing of Information in Court
against the Persons Who Executed Exhibits E-1 to
E-10 for Having Admitted Commission of Election
Offense. If they were the accused, why file the
motion? Would not this be redundant if not
irrelevant?
xxx
Another telling blow is the unexplained money
destined for the teachers. Why such a huge
amount? Why
should
the
Respondent,
a
mayoralty candidate, and according to his own
admission, be giving money to teachers a day
before the elections? What were the peso bills
doing in pay envelopes with the inscription
"VOTE!!! TINOY", and kept in shoe boxes with the
word "Teachers" written on the covers thereof?
There is also something wrong with the issuance
of the aforementioned MTB cards when one
considers the testimony of Burgos that more or
less 50,000 of these cards, which is equivalent to
more or less 52% of the 97,000 registered voters
of Meycauayan, Bulacan, were printed by
respondent; that there are only 443 precincts in
Meycauayan; that under the law, a candidate is
allowed only one watcher per polling place and
canvassing area; and, finally, that there is no
explanation at all by the respondent as to what
these "watchers" did in order to get paid P300.00
each.
xxx
Respondent also avers that for an allegation of
vote-buying to prosper, the act of giving must be
consummated.

However, Respondent conveniently resorts to

section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states that a declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included herein, may
be given in evidence against him [affiants who
executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10] but not against
Respondent.

Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who

gives, offers, or promises money x x x." Section
28 of RA 6646 also states that "the giver, offeror,
the promisor as well as the solicitor, recipient and
conspirator referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b]
of section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall
be liable as principals: x x x.

There is no merit in this contention.

While the giving must be consummated, the mere

act of offering or promising something in

7
consideration for someone's vote constitutes the
offense of vote-buying.
In the case at bar, the acts of offering and
promising money in consideration for the votes of
said affiants is sufficient for a finding of the
commission of the offense of vote-buying."
These factual findings were affirmed by the
COMELEC en banc against the lone dissent of
Commissioner Maambong.
There is an attempt to discredit these
findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the
resort to our technical rules of evidence. Again,
our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules
of evidence should not be rigorously applied in
administrative proceedings especially where the
law calls for the proceeding to be summary in
character. More importantly, we cannot depart
from the settled norm of reviewing decisions of
the COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot review
the factual findings of the COMELEC absent a
grave abuse of discretion and a showing of
arbitrariness
in
its
decision,
order
or
resolution."[12]
We now come to the petition of Nolasco that
he should be declared as mayor in the event
Blanco is finally disqualified. [13]We sustain the
plea. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) is
unequivocal, thus:
"x x x
"SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of
the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice
Mayor.- (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor
or vice mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice
governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the governor,
vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case
may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office
shall be filled automatically by the other
sanggunian members according to their ranking
as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the punong
barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking

sangguniang members shall be resolved by the
drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve
only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent
vacancy arises when an elective local official fills
a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office,
fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this
Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of
votes obtained by each winning candidate to the
total number of registered voters in each
distribution the immediately preceding election."
In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing, the Local Government
Code of 1991 provides:
"x x x.
"ART. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective
Local Officials.- (a) What constitutes permanent
vacancy - A permanent vacancy arises when an
elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office.
(b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the
governor, vice governor, mayor and vice mayor (1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice
mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice
governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall ipso facto become the
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as
the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the
said office shall be filled automatically by the
other sanggunian members according to their
ranking as defined in this Article."
Our case law is now settled that in a
mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained
the second highest number of votes, in this case

8
Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. Thus, we
reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of
Reyes v. COMELEC,[14] viz:
"x x x x x x x x x
"We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC in denying petitioner
Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor
in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.
"That the candidate who obtains the second
highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified
is
now
settled. The
doctrinal
instability caused by see-sawing rulings has since
been removed. In the latest ruling on the
question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voter. The second placer is just that, a second
placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated
by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances.
"Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be
invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for
Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the
belief that Reyes was qualified and for that
reason can not be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is
disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the
elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for
him."
Consequently,
respondent
COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it
failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant
of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC.[15]
A final word. The dispute at bar involves more
than the mayoralty of the municipality of
Meycauyan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of
suffrage
which
is
the
bedrock
of
republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which
our people express their sovereign judgment. Its
free exercise must be protected especially
against the purchasing power of the peso. As we
succinctly held in People v. San Juan, [16] "each
time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to
assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of
republicanism is translated into living reality. If

that will must remain undefiled at the starting

level of its expression and application, every
assumption must be indulged in and every
guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested
exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to
impede, without authority valid in law, the free
and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage, is to
inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic
process."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution of the
respondent COMELEC en banc dated October 23,
1995 is affirmed with the modification that
petitioner Edgardo C. Nolasco is adjudged as
Mayor of Meycauyan, Bulacan in view of the
disqualification of Florentino P. Blanco. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

9
G.R. No. L-46863

November 18, 1939

IRINEO
MOYA, petitioner,
vs.
AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.
Elpidio
Quirino
for
Claro M. Recto for respondent.

petitioner.

LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in the above
entitled case declaring the respondent, Agripino
Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of
mayor of the municipality of Paracale, Province of
Camarines Norte, with a majority of three votes
over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the general
elections held on December 14, 1937, the parties
herein were contending candidates for the
aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the
municipal council of Paracale, acting as board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as the
elected mayor of said municipality with a majority
of 102 votes. On December 27, 1937, the
respondent field a motion of protest in the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Norte, the Court of
Appeals, on July 13, 1939 rendered the judgment
hereinbefore mentioned which is sought by the
petitioner to be reviewed and reversed upon the
errors alleged to have been committed by the
Court of Appeals:
1. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently
or contrary to the controlling decisions of
this Honorable Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del
Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del
Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del
Fierro."

Taking up seriatim the alleged errors, we come to

the first assignment involving the eight (8) ballots
now to be mentioned. (1) With reference to ballot
Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2, alleged to have
been inadvertently admitted in favor of the
respondent, such inadvertence raises a question
of fact which could have been corrected by the
Court of Appeals and which could we are not in a
position to determine in this proceeding for
review by certiorari. Upon the other hand, if the
error attributed to the Court of Appeals consisted
in having admitted ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct
No. 2 instead of the ballot bearing the same
number corresponding to precinct No. 1, and this
latter ballot clearly appears admissible for the
respondent because the name written on the
space for mayor is "Primo del Fierro" or "Pimo de
Fierro", the error is technical and deserves but
scanty consideration. (2) Ballot Exhibit F-26 in
precinct No. 3 was erroneously admitted for the
respondent by the Court of Appeals, the name
written on the space for mayor being "G.T.
Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the
councilor "Alcalde Pinong del Fierro": appears; but
the intention of the elector is rendered vague and
incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was
improperly counted for the respondent. As to this
ballot, the contention of the petitioner is
sustained (3) Ballot Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2
should also have been rejected by the Court of
Appeals. The ballot bears the distinguishing mark
"O. K." placed after the name "M. Lopis" written
on space for vice-mayor. The contention of the
petitioner in this respect is likewise sustained. (4)
Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 was properly
admitted for respondent. On this ballot the
elector wrote within the space for mayor the
name of Regino Guinto, a candidate for the
provincial board and wrote the respondent's
name immediately below the line for mayor but
immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted by
him for vice-mayor. The intention of the elector to
vote for the respondent for the office of the
mayor is clear under the circumstances. (5) Ballot
F-131 in precinct No. 1 was also properly counted
for the respondent. On this ballot the elector
wrote the respondent's name on the space for
vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his mistake,
he placed an arrow connecting the name of the
respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed
on the left side of the ballot. The intention of the
elector to vote for the respondent for the office of
mayor is thus evident, in the absence of proof

10
showing that the ballot had been tampered with.
(6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for
the respondent and the Court of Appeals
committed no error in so adjudicating. Although
the name of the respondent is written on the first
space for member of the provincial board, said
name is followed in the next line by "Bice"
Culastico Palma, which latter name is followed in
the next line by word "consehal" and the name of
a candidate for this position. The intention of the
elector to vote for the respondent for the office of
mayor being manifest, the objection of the
petitioner to the admission of this ballot is
overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid
for the respondent. On this ballot the Christian
name of the respondent was written on the
second space for member of the provincial board,
but his surname was written on the proper space
for mayor with no other accompanying name or
names. The intention of the elector being
manifest, the same should be given effect in
favor of the respondent. (8) Ballot F-44 in precinct
No. 2 wherein "Agripino F. Garcia" appears written
on the proper space, is valid for the respondent.
In his certificate of candidacy the respondent
gave his name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The
conclusion of the trial court, upheld by the Court
of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro"
and "Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not
without justification and, by liberal construction,
the ballot in question was properly admitted for
the respondent.
The second error assigned by the petitioner refers
to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in precinct
No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in precinct No. 2, and Exhibit F6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots appear to
be among the 75 ballots found by the Court of
Appeals as acceptable for the respondent on the
ground that the initial letter "P" stands for "Pino"
in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in
the certificate of candidacy of the respondent.
The petitioner contends that the initial "R" and
not "P". Even if we could reverse this finding, we
do not feel justified in doing so after examining
the photostatic copies of these ballots attached to
the herein petition for certiorari. The second
assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner
questions the correctness of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in adjudicating to the
respondent the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del

Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor. We are

of the opinion that the position taken by the Court
of Appeals is correct. There was no other
candidate for the office of mayor with the name
of "Rufino" or similar name and, as the
respondent was districtly identified by his
surname on these ballots, the intention of the
voters in preparing the same was undoubtedly to
vote for the respondent of the office for which he
was a candidate.lawphi1.net
The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72
ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was voted for the
office of mayor, and it is the contention of the
petitioner that said ballots should not have been
counted by the Court of Appeals in favor of the
respondent. For the identical reason indicated
under the discussion of petitioner's second
assignment of error, namely, that "P" stands for
"Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name
mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the
respondent, we hold that there was no error in
the action of the Court of Appeals in awarding the
said ballots to the respondent.
With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked as Exhibit
F-77 in precinct No. 2, we are inclined to accept
the rest of the disputed ballots for the respondent
not only for the specific reasons already given but
also and principally for the more fundamental
reason now to be stated. As long as popular
government is an end to be achieved and
safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the
modality and form devised, must continue to be
the manes by which the great reservoir of power
must be emptied into the receptacular agencies
wrought by the people through their Constitution
in the interest of good government and the
common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it
implies the adoption of a representative type of
government,
necessarily
points
to
the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the
established authority. He has a voice in his
Government and whenever called upon to act in
justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to
stifle it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the
rule that ballots should be read and appreciated,
if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality.
Counsel for both parties have called our attention
to the different and divergent rules laid down by
this Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will

11
serve no good and useful purpose for us to
engage in the task of reconciliation or
harmonization of these rules, although this may
perhaps be undertaken, as no two cases will be
found to be exactly the same in factual or legal
environment. It is sufficient to observe, however,
in this connection that whatever might have been
said in cases heretofore decided, no technical rule
or rules should be permitted to defeat the
intention of the voter, if that intention is
discoverable from the ballot itself, not from
evidencealiunde. This rule of interpretation goes
to the very root of the system. Rationally, also,
this must be the justification for the suggested
liberalization of the rules on appreciation of
ballots which are now incorporated in section 144
of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No.
357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the
two ballots herein held to have been erroneously
admitted by the Court of Appeals for the
respondent, the latter still wins by one vote. In
view whereof it becomes unnecessary to consider
the counter-assignment of errors of the
respondent.
With the modification of the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the petition for the writ of certiorari is
hereby
dismissed,
without
pronouncement
regarding costs.

G.R. No. L-33541 January 20, 1972

ABDULGAFAR
PUNGUTAN, petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF SULU. respondents.
Jose W. Diokno and Manuel M. Gonzales for
petitioner.
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for
respondent Benjamin Abubakar.
Teao, Garcia
COMELEC, etc.

and

Apostol

for

respondent

FERNANDO, J.:p
The resolution of respondent Comelec 1 now
assailed in this petition for review, was
undoubtedly motivated by the objective of
insuring free, orderly and honest elections in the
discharge of its constitutional function to enforce
and administer electoral laws. 2 It excluded from
the canvass for the election of delegates for the
lone district of the province of Sulu the returns
from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul,
67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk
for being spurious or manufactured and therefore
no returns at all. Unless set aside then, petitioner
Abdulgafar Pungutan, who otherwise would have
been entitled to the last remaining seat for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, there
being no question as to the election of the other
two delegates, 3 would lose out to respondent
Benjamin Abubakar. Petitioner would thus dispute
the power of respondent Commission to exclude
such returns as a result of oral testimony as well
as the examination of the fingerprints and
signatures of those who allegedly voted as the
basis for the holding that no election in fact did
take place. This contention is, however,
unavailing, in the light of our holding last month

12
in Usman v. Comelec. 4 The other principal
question raised is whether the recognition of such
prerogative
on
the
part
of
respondent
Commission would contravene the constitutional
provision that it cannot pass on the right to vote.
The appropriate answer as will be made clear is
likewise adverse to petitioner. Hence, respondent
Commission must be sustained.

Tapul, Parang and Luuk are spurious returns or

manufactured returns and no returns at all and
that the elections in said municipalities are
sham." 7 The above findings of fact found support
in the light of the competent and credible
evidence sustaining that the most flagrant
irregularities did attend the so-called elections in
Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk.

The case had its origin from a petition filed on

December 16, 1970, by respondent Abubakar and
the other candidates, 5 superseding an earlier one
dated December 7, 1970 alleging that in the
towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no
elections were in effect held in view of massive
violence, terrorism and fraud. 6 The respondents
named
therein,
including
now
petitioner
Pungutan, answered on December 18, 1970 to
the effect that the elections were duly held in the
above-mentioned municipalities and denied the
allegation as to the existence of massive fraud,
terrorism and serious irregularities. The case was
duly heard, with oral testimony from five
chairmen of certain precincts in Tapul, five
teachers from Parang, five teachers from Luuk
and three teachers from Siasi, followed by an
examination of the precinct book of voters from
said towns and the fingerprints and signatures of
those who voted, as shown at the back of CE
Form No. 1 and CE Form No. 39 for the 1970
elections for the Constitutional Convention.

As to Siasi: "In Siasi where there were 21,688

registered voters it was made to appear that
20,970 had voted. However, the result of the
examination of the thumbmarks and signatures of
those who voted compared with the fingerprints
of the registered voters appearing in their
registration record, CE Form 1 showed that only
460 of the registered voters had been definitely
established to have actually voted, 131 identified
through the thumbmarks and 329 by their
signatures. The 11,154 of those who voted were
found to be substitute voters: 7,557 were
discovered to be voters voting in substitution of
the registered voters through their thumbmarks
and 3,597 through their signatures. No opinion
was made with respect to the rest of the votes
cast because not all of the 13,282 voters whose
thumbprints could not be analyzed were referred
to the NBI for signature examination. Only 4,631
of these blurred thumbprints from 28 precincts
were referred to the NBI for signature
examination. Examination of these 4,631
signatures revealed that 3,597 were by persons
other than the registered voters, only 329 were
by the register voters and no opinion could be
rendered with respect to 705 for lack of sufficient
basis of comparison. In 26 precincts of Siasi there
was 100% voting but not necessarily by the
registered voters. The overall average for the
whole town is 96.6% voting. There were 80
persons who were able to vote without any CE
Form 1 or without voting in the name of the
voters registered in the precinct." 8

After reciting the relevant facts, respondent

Commission came to this conclusion: "In the light
of the foregoing findings of the Commission with
respect to the manner in which the elections were
conducted in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, the
Commission is of the opinion that the elections in
said municipalities were just as bad if not worse
than the elections in Karomatan, Lanao del Norte.
Actually no elections were held in said
municipalities as the voting was done by persons
other than the registered voters while armed men
went from precinct to precinct, prepared the
ballots and dictated how the election returns
were to be prepared. The same reasons which
compelled the Commission to reject the returns
from Karomatan and to consider said returns as
no returns at all or spurious or manufactured
returns not one notch above returns prepared at
gunpoint (again paraphrasing in the reverse the
second Pacis case) compel us with much greater
justification to find that the returns from Siasi,

With respect to Tapul: "In Tapul where there were

12,223 registered voters it appeared that 11,575
votes were cast. 197 persons were able to vote
without CE Form No. 1 without using the names of
registered voters in the precinct. When the
thumbprints corresponding to the 11,575 votes
cast
were
examined by the
Fingerprint
Identification Division of the Commission, only 3
were found to be identical with the thumbprints
of the registered voters in their registration

13
record: one each in Precincts 8, 29 and 20-A.
5,300 thumbmarks were found to be not identical
with the corresponding thumbmarks of the
registered voters in their registration records, CE
Form 1. 6,199 thumbmarks, however, could not
be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged
or faint. Of these 6,199 blurred thumbprints from
56 precincts, 4,187 from 31 precincts were
referred to the NBI handwriting experts for
signature examination. The result of said
examination by the NBI of these 4,187 signatures
showed that only 13 were found to be identical
with the signatures of the registered voters in
their registration record, CE Form 1, while 2,897
were those of persons other than the registered
voters. No opinion could be rendered on 1,277
signatures for lack of sufficient basis of
comparison." 9 Further: "It appeared, therefore,
that in the whole town of Tapul out of the 11,575
votes cast only 13 were definitely established as
cast by the registered voters. 8,197 were
definitely established as cast by substitute voters.
No opinion could be rendered with respect to
1,277 for lack of sufficient basis, 2,012 were not
examined anymore since these were in precincts
where the number of substitute voting had been
found to constitute a very high percentage. It has
been also established that on Election Day about
one hundred men armed with long arms were
seen going around from precinct to precinct in
Tapul driving away the voters and instructing the
teachers-inspectors on how to prepare the
election returns. Some of the ballot boxes were
seen to have been brought to the Municipal
Treasurer's office early in the afternoon of
Election Day hours before the closing of voting.
Nineteen (19) precincts of Tapul reported 100%
voting while the over-all percentage of voting in
the whole municipality was 94.5%." 10
Then came the recital as to Parang: "In Parang,
where there were 11,761 registered voters in 67
precincts, it was made to appear that 11,083
votes were cast. 66 voters who were not
registered in the precinct were able to vote
illegally without even using the names of the
registered voters therein. An examination of the
thumbprints of those who voted appearing in CE
Form 39 or at the back of CE Form 1 compared
with the corresponding thumbprints of the
registered voters appearing in their registration
record in CE Form 1 showed that only 39
thumbprints of the registered voters in his CE

Form 1, while 4,698 were different from those of

the registered voters. 6,539 thumbmarks could
not be analyzed because they were blurred,
smudged or faint. However, only 2,647 of these
6,539 smudged thumbprints were referred to the
NBI for signature examination since the rest of
said blurred thumbmarks were in precincts where
a high percentage of non-identical thumbmarks
was already discovered. 1,573 signatures were
found to be by persons other than the registered
voters and only 83 were found to be identical with
those of the registered voters. No opinion could
be rendered with respect to 991 signatures for
lack of sufficient basis. In 20 precincts it was
made to appear that all the registered voters had
voted. The overall percentage for the whole town
of Parang was 94%. The evidence also showed
that in a number of precincts in Parang armed
men had entered the polling places and prepared
the ballots. The registered voters were not able to
vote." 11 Lastly, as to Luuk: "In Luuk where there
were 13,124 registered voters, 12,263 votes were
cast. 281 persons who were not registered voters
in this precinct were able to vote illegally without
even using the names of the registered voters.
The thumbprints of those who voted appearing in
their voting record either in CE Form 1 or in CE
Form 39 compared with the thumbprints of the
registered voters appearing in the voter's
registration record in CE Form 1 showed that only
22 of the thumbmarks of those who voted were
identical with the thumbmarks of the registered
voters, while 6,021 were found to be different
from those of the registered voters. 6,134
thumbmarks could not, however, be analyzed
because they were found to be blurred, smudged
or faint. However, the signatures of those who
voted in 13 precincts were examined by the NBI
and it was found that the said signatures were
written by just a few persons as explained with
greater particularity in the earlier pages of this
resolution." 12
In the light of the above and finding no need to
determine how the election was in fact conducted
as to Pata, Patikul, Indanan, Panamao, South
Ubian, Balimbing, Bongao and Tandubas, it was
the holding of the Commission in the resolution of
May 14, 1971: "1. To rule by unanimous vote that
the returns from the 107 precincts of Siasi, 56
precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60
precincts
of
Luuk
are
spurious
and/or
manufactured returns or no returns at all and as

14
such should be excluded from the canvass for the
election of delegates for the lone congressional
district of the province of Sulu; 2. To hold also by
unanimous vote that further hearings on the
petition of [Benjamin Abubakar, et al] for the
rejection or exclusion from the canvass of the
returns from Indanan, Panamao, Pata, Tandubas
South Ubian, Patikul, Bongao and Balimbing
would no longer be necessary, it appearing that
the results of the election would no longer be
affected by the returns from said municipalities
after the rejection of the returns from the four
towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk and,
therefore, for the purpose of the completion of
the canvass, to direct the Board of Canvassers to
include the returns from said municipalities in the
canvass; 3. By majority vote of the members of
the Commission to direct the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sulu to reconvene in Jolo and
complete the canvass excluding from said
canvass the returns from the towns of Siasi,
Parang, Tapul, and Luuk and to proclaim the 3rd
winning candidate at 5:00 P.M. on May 28, 1971,
unless restrained by the Supreme Court." 13 On
May 22, 1971, this petition for the review of the
above resolution of May 14, 1971 of respondent
Commission was filed. Three days later, a
resolution was adopted by this Court requiring
respondents to file an answer not later than June
4, 1971. Both respondent Commission on
Elections and respondent Abubakar duly filed
their answers on said date. Respondent
Commission took pains to explain with even more
detail why such a resolution had to be issued
considering the "massive voting anomalies
ranging from substitute voting to grabbing of
ballots to preparation of election returns and
other election documents at gunpoint" thus
justifying its conclusion that the elections in the
four towns amounted to a sham. The case was
heard on June 8, 1971 with petitioner Pungutan
represented by Attorney Jose W. Diokno.
Respondent Abubakar, represented by Attorney
Jovito R. Salonga, sought permission to submit a
memorandum, which was received by this Court
on June 28, 1971. Petitioner was given the
opportunity to reply thereto, and he did so in his
memorandum filed with this Court on October 18,
1971. The case was deemed submitted on
December 3, 1971. It is the decision of this Court,
as noted at the outset, after a careful study of the
pleadings and in the light of our decision last
month
in Usman
v.
Commission
on

Elections 14 that the challenged resolution of

respondent Commission of May 14, 1971 is in
accordance with law. The petition must therefore
fail.
1. There is no merit to the contention that
respondent Commission is devoid of power to
disregard and annul the alleged returns from 107
precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67
precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for
being spurious or manufactured. So we have held
on facts analogous in character in the above
Usman decision rendered last month. Nor is it to
be wondered at. Any other view would indict itself
for lack of fealty to reason and to the realities of
the situation. It goes without saying that what is
contemplated in the law is that the electors in the
exercise of their free will can go to the polls and
exercise their right of suffrage, with the boards of
inspectors crediting each candidate with the
votes duly obtained after an honest count. It is on
that basis that election returns are to be made.
Where no such election was in fact held as was
found by respondent Commission with respect to
the four towns, it is not only justified but it is its
clear duty to stigmatize the alleged returns as
clearly spurious and manufactured and therefore
bereft of any value. The words of Justice Castro, in
the Usman decision, referring to the election
returns from Karomatan, considered as likewise
not entitled to credit because of their lack of
integrity and authenticity, are opposite: "These
circumstances definitely point, not merely to a
few isolated instances of irregularities affecting
the integrity and authenticity of the election
returns, but to an organized, well-directed largescale operation to make a mockery of the
elections in Karomatan. We find and so hold that
the election returns from the 42 precincts in
question were prepared under circumstances
conclusively showing that they are false, and are
so devoid of value as to be completely unworthy
of inclusion in the canvass. We have no
alternative but to affirm the Comelec's finding
that they are spurious and manufactured." 15 Nor
is it to be lost sight of that the power to reject
returns of such a character has been exercised
most judiciously. Even a cursory perusal of the
mode and manner of inquiry conducted by
respondent
Commission
resulting
in
the
challenged resolution should suffice to remove
any doubt as to the absence of any impropriety or
improvidence in the exercise of such a

15
prerogative. Clearly, there was care and
circumspection to assure that the constitutional
objective of insuring that an election be "free,
orderly and honest" be realized. If, under the
circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion
were arrived at, then certainly there is a
frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this Court
has not displayed any reluctance in yielding the
imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by
respondent Commission in the discharge of its
constitutional function of the enforcement of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections. The long
line of decisions especially so since Cauton v.
Commission on Elections, 16 is not susceptible of
any other interpretation. Only thus may there be
an
assurance
that
the
canvassing
and
proclamation reflect with fidelity and accuracy
the true results of an election, in fact actually
held. We do so again. As a matter of fact, such a
sympathetic approach to the results arrived at in
the discharge of its functions started with the
leading case of Sumulong v. Commission on
Elections. 17 As was so well put by Justice, later
Chief Justice, Abad Santos: "The Commission on
Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to
play a distinct and important part in our scheme
of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that
would be fully warranted in the case of a less
responsible organization. The Commission may
err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created -free, orderly and honest elections. We may not
agree fully with its choice of means, but unless
these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse
of
discretion,
this
court
should
not
18
interfere." The same approach is reflected in
the opinion of the Chief Justice in Lucman v.
Dimaporo when as he pointed out if "pursuant to
our Administrative Law, the findings of fact of
administrative organs created by ordinary
legislation will not be disturbed by courts of
justice, except when there is absolutely no
evidence or no substantial evidence in support of
such findings ... there is no reason to believe that
the framers of our Constitution intended to place
the Commission on Elections created and
explicitly made 'independent' by the Constitution
itself on a lower level than said statutory
administrative organs; ... ." 19

2. The right to vote has reference to a

constitutional
guarantee
of
the
utmost
significance. It is a right without which the
principle of sovereignty residing in the people
becomes
nugatory. 20 In
the
traditional
terminology, it is a political right enabling every
citizen to participate in the process of
government to assure that it derives its power
from the consent of the governed. What was so
eloquently expressed by Justice Laurel comes to
mind: "As long as popular government is an end
to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage,
whatever may be the modality and form devised,
must continue to be the means by which the
great reservoir of power must be emptied into the
receptacular agencies wrought by the people
through their Constitution in the interest of good
government
and
the
common
weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption
of a representative type of government,
necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a
particle of popular sovereignty and as the
ultimate source of the established authority." 21
How such a right is to be exercised is regulated
by the Election Code. 22 Its enforcement under
the Constitution is, as noted, vested in
respondent Commission. Such a power, however,
is purely executive or administrative. So it was
characterized by the Chief Justice in Abcede v.
Imperial: 23 "Lastly, as the branch of the
executive department although independent of
the President to which the Constitution has
given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the
Commission is limited to purely 'administrative
questions.' ...."
It becomes obvious then why the right to vote, a
denial of which should find redress in the judiciary
as the guardian of constitutional rights, is
excluded from the authority vested in respondent
Commission. If the exclusion of the returns from
the four towns in Sulu involved a question as to
such a right, then, clearly, what the Commission
did was beyond its competence. Such is not the
case however. What is deemed outside such a
sphere is the determination of whether or not a
person can exercise or is precluded from
exercising the right of suffrage. Thus, the
question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of
voters is properly judicial. 24 As to whether or not

16
an election has been held is a question of a
different type. It is properly within the
administrative
jurisdiction
of
respondent
Commission. If, as is our decision, no such voting
did take place, considering the massive
irregularities that attended it in the four towns,
then the exclusion of the alleged returns is not
tainted by infirmity. In that sense, the second
issue raised by petitioner that in so acting the
respondent
Commission
exceeded
its
constitutional power by encroaching on terrain
properly judicial, the right to vote being involved,
is likewise to be resolved against him. At any
rate, what was set forth by Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Diaz
v.
Commission
on
Elections 25 would likewise dispose of such a
contention adverse to petitioner. Thus: "It is
pleaded by respondents that the rejection of the
Sagada
returns
would
result
in
the
disfranchisement of a large number of legitimate
voters. But such disfranchisement would only be
provisional, subject to the final determination of
the validity of the votes at the protest that may
be filed with the Constitutional Convention." 26
3. As to the plea in the prayer of the petition that
in the event that the challenged resolution of May
14, 1971 as to the power of respondent
Commission is sustained, a special election be
called by it in all the 290 precincts in the four
municipalities of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, it
suffices to refer to our ruling in Usman v.
Commission on Elections, where a similar point
was raised without success. So it should be in this
case. We see no reason to order such a special
election. 27
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the
resolution of the Commission on Elections dated
May 14, 1971 is affirmed. The Commission on
Elections is directed to order the board of
canvassers to convene without delay and
forthwith proceed with and complete the canvass
of the election returns from all the precincts of
Sulu, excluding therefrom all the election returns
from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul,
67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk,
and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate for
the third Constitutional Convention seat allotted
to the said province. This decision is hereby
declared
immediately
executory.
No
pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 104960 September 14, 1993

PHILIP
G.
ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL
TRIAL
COURT,
BRANCH
7,
TACLOBAN
CITY,
DONATO
ADVINCULA,
BOARD
OF
ELECTION
INSPECTORS,
PRECINCT No. 9, MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE,
and the MUNICIPAL REGISTRAR COMELEC,
TOLOSA, LEYTE, respondents.
Otilia Dimayuga-Molo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

VITUG, J.:
An event in this decade, which future generations
would likely come to know simply as the "EDSA
People's Power Revolution of 1986," has
dramatically changed the course of our nation's
history. So, too, not a few of our countrymen have
by it been left alone in their own personal lives.
One such case is that of the petitioner in this
special civil action for certiorari.

17
The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former
Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez,
and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos.
Sometime in the early part of 1980, the
petitioner, in consonance with his decision to
establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte, 1 caused the construction of his
residential house therein. He soon thereafter also
served as Barangay Captain of the place. In the
1984 Batasan Election and 1986 "snap"
Presidential Election, Romualdez acted as the
Campaign Manager of the Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte where he voted. 2
When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th
of February, 1986, came or were about to come
to a close, some relatives and associates of the
deposed President, fearing for their personal
safety, whether founded or not, "fled" the
country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one, together
with his immediate family, left the Philippines and
sought "asylum" in the United States which the
United States (U.S.) government granted. 3 While
abroad, he took special studies on the
development of Leyte-Samar and international
business finance. 4
In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted
to come back to the Philippines to run for a
congressional seat in Leyte. On 23 March 1987,
he finally decided to book a flight back to the
Philippines but the flight was somehow aborted. 5
On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a
letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District Director of
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
informing him that he should depart from the U.S.
at his expense on or before 23 August 1992, thus:
. . . Failure to depart on or before
the specified date may result in the
withdrawal of voluntary departure
and action being taken to effect
your deportation. In accordance
with a decision made to your case,
you are required to depart from the
United States at your expense on
or before 23 August 1992. 6

Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed

from the U.S. for the Philippines, arriving on
December
1991
apparently
without
any
government document. 7
When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did
not delay his return to his residence at Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters
conducted by the Commission on Election
("COMELEC") on 01 February 1992 for the
Synchronized National and Local Election
scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner registered
himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. The chairman of the Board
of Election Inspectors, who had known Romualdez
to be a resident of the place and, in fact, an
elected Barangay Chairman of Malbog in 1982,
allowed him to be registered.
Romualdez's registration, however, was not to be
unquestioned. On 21 February 1992, herein
private
respondent
Donato
Advincula
("Advincula") filed a petition with the Municipal
Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that
Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in
Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP
881 and RA 7166. 8 Advincula alleged that
Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts,
U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in
the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the
Philippines; and that he did not have the required
one-year residence in the Philippines and the sixmonth residence in Tolosa to qualify him to
register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte.9
On 25 February 1992, Romualdez filed an answer,
contending that he has been a resident of Tolosa,
Leyte, since the early 1980's, and that he has not
abandoned his said residence by his physical
absence therefrom during the period from 1986
up to the third week of December 1991. 10
After due hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa,
Leyte rendered a decision 11 on 28 February 1992,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE
PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the court finds the
respondent to be a resident of Brgy.
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified
to register as a voter thereat.

18
Hence, the instant petition for
exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez
from the list of voter of Precinct No.
9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is hereby
ordered
DENIED
and
petition
DISMISSED.

(2) Whether or not the respondent court erred in

finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left the
country and abandoned his residence in Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails for the

first time the jurisdiction of the respondent Court
and the MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, in taking
cognizance of the case, despite an absence of
any allegation in the petition filed with the MTC
that Advincula was himself a registered voter in
Precinct No. 9 of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte
conformably with Section 142 of the Omnibus
Election Code. 14

Upon receipt of the adverse decision, Advincula

appealed the case to the respondent court.
On 03 April 1992, the respondent court rendered
the assailed decision, 12 thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds
respondent
Philip
Romualdez
disqualified to register as a voter
for the 1992 elections and hereby
reverses the decision of the lower
court in toto.
The Municipal Registrar of the
Commission on Elections of Tolosa,
Leyte, is hereby ordered to delete
and cancel the name of respondent
Philip G. Romualdez from the list of
qualified voters registered February
1, 1992, at Precinct 9, barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this recourse.
On 7 May 1992, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order directing respondent Regional
Trial Court Judge Pedro Espino to cease and desist
from enforcing questioned decision. 13
The petitioner has raised several issues which
have been well synthesized by the Solicitor
General into
(1) Whether or not the MTC and RTC acquired
jurisdiction over, respectively, Case No. 01-S.
1992 and Case No. 92-03-42, the petition having
been filed by one who did not allege to be himself
a registered voter of the municipality concerned;
and

The petition is impressed with merit.

When respondent Advincula filed the petition with

the MTC for the exclusion of herein petitioner
Romualdez, the latter countered by filing his
answer 15 and praying for the denial of the
petition, without raising the issue of jurisdiction.
But what can be telling is that when the MTC
decision, denying the petition for disqualification,
went on appeal to the RTC, Romualdez, in his own
appeal-memorandum, explicitly prayed that the
MTC decision be affirmed. This unassailable
incident leads us to reiterate that "while lack of
jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a
party's active participation in the proceedings
before a court without jurisdiction will estop such
party
from
assailing
such
lack
of
jurisdiction." 16 Undoubtedly, the petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
respondent not only by his active participation in
the proceedings thereat but, more importantly, in
having sought an affirmative relief himself when
the appeal was made to the latter court whose
jurisdiction he, in effect, invoked. Furthermore,
the question is not really as much the jurisdiction
of the courts below as merely the locus standi of
the complainant in the proceedings, a matter
that, at this stage, should be considered
foreclosed.
In any case, we consider primordial the second
issue of whether or not Romualdez voluntarily left
the country and abandoned his residence in
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Here, this time, we find for
the petitioner.

19
The Solicitor General himself sustains the view of
petitioner Romualdez. Expressing surprise at this
stance given by the Solicitor General, respondent
Advincula posits non sequitur argument 17 in his
comment assailing instead the person of Solicitor
Edgar Chua. If it would have any value, at all, in
disabusing the minds of those concerned, it may
well be to recall what this Court said in Rubio
vs. Sto. Tomas: 18

"voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at

least in the context that these terms are used in
applying the concept of "domicile by choice."

It is also incumbent upon the Office

of the Solicitor General to present
to the Court the position that will
legally uphold the best interest of
the government, although it may
run counter to a client's position.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a

most precious political right, as well as a bounden
duty of every citizen, enabling and requiring him
to participate in the process of government so as
to ensure that the government can truly be said
to derive its power solely from the consent of the
governed. 23 We, therefore, must commend
respondent Advincula for spending time and
effort even all the way up to this Court, for as the
right of suffrage is not to be abridged, so also
must we safeguard and preserve it but only on
behalf of those entitled and bound to exercise it.

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and

residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term
"residence" as used in the election law is
synonymous with "domicile", which imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct
indicative
of
such
intention." 19 "Domicile"
denotes
a
fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. 20 That residence, in the case of
the petitioner, was established during the early
1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost
by adopting another choice of domicile. In order,
in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there,
and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. 21 In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled withanimus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual. 22
The political situation brought about by the
"People's Power Revolution" must have truly
caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes,
as well as a serious concern over the safety and
welfare of the members of their families. Their
going into self-exile until conditions favorable to
them would have somehow stabilized is
understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure
from the country cannot be described as

We have closely examined the records, and we

find not that much to convince us that the
petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his residence
in the Philippines and established his domicile
elsewhere.

WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the

same is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE; of the
Decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court
dated 03 April 1992 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court dated 28 February 1992 is hereby
REINSTATED and the Temporary Restraining Order
issued by the Court in this case is correspondingly
made PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUFFRAGE AS RIGHT AND PRIVILEGE

A.M. No. 74-MJ July 30, 1976
SALVADOR
vs.

LACSON,

JR., complainant,

20
RAMON POSADAS, Municipal Judge,
Talisay, Negros Occidental, respondent.

of

ANTONIO, J:
Respondent Municipal Judge Ramon Posadas, of
Talisay Negros Occidental, is charged in a verified
complaint by Salvador Lacson, Jr. with (a)
ignorance of the law, (b) partiality, and (c)
violation of the Election Code of 1971.
The Executive Judge, to whom this case was
referred
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation, found the charges of ignorance
of the law and partiality to be without factual
basis. He, however, found that respondent Judge
has failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 136 of the Election Code of 1971, which
provides:
Any person who has been refused
registration or whose name has
been stricken out from the
permanent list of voters may at any
time except sixty (60) days before
a regular election or twenty-five
(25) days before a special election,
apply to the proper court for an
order
directing
the
election
registration board or the board of
inspectors as the case may be, to
include or reinstate his name in the
permanent list of voters, attaching
to his application for inclusion the
certificate
of
the
Electron
registration board or the board of
inspectors regarding his case and
proof of service of a copy of his
application and of the notice of
hearing thereof upon a member of
the said board (Emphasis supplied.)
In his report of July 17, 1972, the Investigating
Judge stated:
Respondent
disregarded
this
requirement and none of the
petitions for inclusion based on lack
of forms contains the attached
certificate of the Chairman or any

member of the Board of Inspectors

of the precinct concerned to the
effect that petitioner or petitioners
applied for registration on October
9,
1971
but
were
refused
registration for lack of registration
forms. While it may be true that the
various; petitions for inclusion
contained the sworn statement of
Eduardo Belbes that a copy of the
petition had been served on the
members of the Board of Inspectors
of the corresponding precinct, yet
this notice applied to the original
dates of hearing stated in the
Petition and it is reasonable to
assume that on the dates at which
the petitions were ordered reset for
hearing by respondent Judge, to
wit: On October 18 for the petitions
filed on October 14; and on
October 20 for the petitions filed on
October 19, the Board of Inspectors
were not notified. This is impliedly
admitted by respondent when he
expressed the belief that notice to
the Election Registration Board
alone was sufficient, and that the
certificate
of
the
Board
of
Inspectors to the effect that the
petitioners applied for registration
in the corresponding precinct on
October 9, 1971, but were refused
registration for lack of forms was
not necessary inasmuch as he
relied on the testimonies of the
petitioners themselves on that
point. Also, even if respondent was
motivated by a desire to adhere
strictly to the requirement of
Comelec Resolution No. RR-938
that inclusion cases be decided
within two (2) days from the filing
of the petition, it would seem that
respondent acted rather hastily in
resetting the inclusion cases filed in
the afternoon of October 19, 1971
for
hearing
immediately
the
following morning or on October
20, 1971. This is especially true of
Election Cases Nos. 93 to 172,
except Cases Nos. 162 to 172
(Exhs. 8A to 8K inasmuch as Mrs.

21
Efren
admittedly
informed
respondent of the filing of the
cases right the same morning of
October 20. Hence it is not likely
that the various members of the
Board of Inspectors could have
been notified to appear and testify
that petitioners in fact appeared
before their respective precincts
and were denied registration for
lack of forms. caution dictated that
this requirement or this procedure
be followed as this was one sure
way of Identifying the petitioners
and ascertaining whether in fact
they applied for and were refused
registration for lack of forms. True,
inclusion and exclusion cases are
summary in nature but the
procedure adopted by respondent
Judge
provided
no
safeguard
whatsoever against indiscriminate
inclusion. For he admitted that as
long as the petitioners were
present when he called the
inclusion cases for hearing and the
respondent Election Registration
Board or the members of the Board
of Inspectors of the precincts
concerned were not present he
considered the latter in default and
summarily granted the petition.
This could be the only reason why
practically all the inclusion cases
resulted in the issuance of orders
directing the inclusion of the
petitioners now marked as Exhs 'B',
'B-l' to 'B-54' and, as it turned out,
on appeal most of the petitions
were dismissed either for failure of
the petitioners to appear or, as in
Cases Nos. 136-153, because the
Court found on the basis of the
testimony of the Chairman of
Precinct No, 41 of Talisay that he
even had a surplus of seventeen
(17) application forms. 1
In extenuation the Investigating Judge found also
that respondent, in his aforesaid actuations, did
so without improper motive but in good faith.

In our republican system of government, the

exercise by the people of their right of suffrage is
the expression of their sovereign will. It is,
therefore, absolutely essential that the free and
voluntary use of this right be effectively protected
by the law and by governmental authority. As
stated in an earlier case: 2
* * * The people in clothing a
citizen with the elective franchise
for the purpose of securing a
consistent
and
perpetual
administration of the government
they ordain, charge him with the
performance of a duty in the nature
of a public trust, and in that respect
constitute him a representative of
the whole people. This duty
requires that the privilege thus
bestowed should be exercise, not
exclusively for the benefit of the
citizen
or
class
of
citizens
professing it, but in good faith and
with an intelligent zeal for the
general benefit and welfare of the
state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank 92 U.S.
588.) In the last analysis, therefore,
the inclusion in or exclusion from
the permanent electoral list of any
voter concerns not only the latter
in his individual capacity but the
public in general.
In the light of the statutory purpose, the
seriousness of respondent's failure to comply with
the requirements of Section 136 of the electoral
law becomes evident. His good faith or lack of
malice is of no avail, considering that in crimes
which
are mala
prohibita the
act
alone
irrespective of its motives, constitutes the
offense. It appears, however, that on April 8,
1974,
the
President
of
the
Philippines
promulgated Presidential Decree No. 433, which
grants general amnesty under certain conditions
to public school teachers, other government
officials and employees, members of the armed
forces of the Philippines and other persons for
violation of election laws and other related
statutes in connection with the elections of 1965,
1967, 1969, 1971, and the election of delegates
to the Constitutional Convention.

22
There is no question that as a consequence of the
general amnesty all persons who violated the
election law on the dates and occasions therein
mentioned are relieved of their criminal
liability. 3 In the case at bar, respondent is
relieved of any criminal liability for his aforecited
infraction; however, in the public interest he
should be admonished.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby admonished
that he should exercise greater care in the
observance of the provisions of existing laws in
the discharge of his judicial duty, and warned that
any subsequent misconduct shall be dealt with
more severely.

SUFFRAGE AS A DUTY
G.R. No. L-47243

June 17, 1940

CIPRIANO
ABAIL,
ET
AL., petitionersappellees,
vs.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT OF BACOLOD,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ET AL., respondentsappellants.
Vicente J. Francisco, Ramon H. Severino, Abundio
Z.
Arrieta
and
Res.
A.
Sobretodo
for
the
appellants.
Emilio R. Severino, Amado B. Parreo, Vicente T
Remetio and Carlos Hilado for the appellees.

In the year 1937 the total number of registered

voters in the municipality of Talisay, Negros
Occidental, was 3,658. In 1938 the electoral
census of the place, after the registration on
September 24 and October 1, 1938, showed that
the number of registered voters had increased to
18,288. A few days before the election for
Assemblymen on November 8, 1938, or on
October 18, 1938, 17,344 petitions were filed in
the justice of the peace court of Bacolod. Negros
Occidental, for the exclusion of the names of an
equal number of persons from the permanent list
of registered voters of Talisay, Negros Occidental,
on the grounds that they were not residents of
Talisay n accordance with the Election Code, that
they could not prepare their ballots themselves,
and that their registration as voters was not done
in accordance with law. The hearing of the
petitions for exclusion was held on October 28,
1938. After attorneys Hilado, Parreo, Remitio and
Severino entered their appearance for the
challenged voters, the justice of the peace of
Bacolod ascertained who of the challenged voters
were present in court and who were absent.
Thereafter the said justice of the peace declared
those who were absent in default. Failing to
obtain a reconsideration, the attorneys for the
challenged voters moved that, since the
presentation
of
evidence
had
not
yet
commenced, all the petitions be forwarded to the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which
was then presided over by two Judges. The
attorneys for the petitioners in the said 17,344
exclusion cases objected on the ground that the
aforesaid attorneys had no authority to represent
those who were absent. Whereupon the justice of
the peace of Bacolod ruled that said attorneys
could represent only the 87 challenged voters
who were present in the court room and
accordingly remanded their cases to the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental. At the same
time the justice of the peace dismissed 253 of the
petitions upon motion of the petition upon motion
of the petitioners themselves. Although no

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evidence was presented by the petitioners in
support of their petition against those who, were
declared in default, the justice of the peace of
Bacolod ordered their exclusion from the list of
voters on the ground that it was the duty of the
challenged voters appear in court in order to be
personally examined in accordance with section
118 (f) of the Election Code, as one of the
grounds for their exclusion from the list of voters
was that they could not prepare their ballots
themselves, that is, that they could not read and
write. The attorneys for the challenged voters
received notice of the decision of the justice of
the peace of Bacolod on November 2, 1938, when
the present petition for certiorari was instituted in
the Court First Instance of Negros Occidental by
the petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of
the other challenged voters for the purpose of
having the judgment of the justice of the peace of
Bacolod in the aforesaid exclusion proceedings
set aside. After hearing, the Honorable Judge
Sotero Rodas of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental rendered judgment setting
aside the decision of the respondent justice of the
peace of Bacolod and ordering the restoration of
the excluded voters in the permanent electoral
census of Talisay, Negros Occidental. From this
judgment the instant appeal was brought, and
the respondents-appellants make an elaborate
assignment of nine errors. In view of the result
hereinbelow reached, we do not consider it
necessary to consider seriatim these errors.
While the present controversy may seem
academic because the 1938 election is over, we
have nevertheless assumed the task of deciding
the same on its merits in view of the imperative
necessity and importance of having a correct
electoral census in the municipality of Talisay,
Negros Occidental, and for that matter in any
municipality or city in the Philippines, for use in
future elections. In the scheme of our present
republican government, the people are allowed to
have a voice therein through the instrumentality
of suffrage to be availed of by those possessing
certain prescribe qualifications (Article V,
Constitution of the Philippines; sections 93 and
94, Election Code). The people in clothing a
citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose
of
securing
a consistent
and
perpetual
administration of the government they ordain,
charge him with the performance of a duty in the
nature of a public trust, and in that respect
constitute him a representative of the whole
people. This duty requires that the privilege thus
bestowed should be exercised, not exclusively for
the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens
professing it, but in good faith and with an
intelligent zeal for the general benefit of the
state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 588.) In the

last analysis, therefore, the inclusion from the

permanent electoral list of any voter concerns not
only the latter in his individual capacity but the
public in general.
Section 113 of the Election Code provides that if
the Judge of the Court of First Instance is in the
province, the proceedings for the inclusion from
the list of voters shall, upon petition of any
interested party filed before the presentation of
evidence, be remanded to the said Judge who
shall hear and decide the same in the first and
last instance. When, therefore, the attorneys for
the challenged voters moved the justice of the
peace of Bacolod to remand all the exclusion
cases to the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, then presided over by two Judges, it
was mandatory on said justice of the peace to
grant the motion. Without deciding whether the
attorneys who appeared for the challenged voters
were in fact authorized by all, it is our opinion
that, in view of the extraordinary circumstance
that the challenged voters were more than
seventeen thousand and a representative number
thereof were present, and in view of the nature of
the proceedings which affect public interest, it
was error for the aforesaid justice of the peace
not to have remanded all the petitions for
exclusion to the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. Thereafter, in the interest of prompt
and economical administration of justice the
necessary arrangement could have been made to
enable the corresponding judge of First Instance
of the province to proceed to Talisay and hear the
cases there.
The judgment appealed from will accordingly be
reversed and in the exercise of our discretionary
power (Cason vs. Rickards, 5 Phil., 611;
Rementeria vs. Lara, 6 Phil., 532; Agonoy vs. Ruiz,
11 Phil, 204; Muerteguy & Aboitiz vs. Delgado, 22
Phil., 109; Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation vs. Aldanese, 46 Phil., 713; Tinsay vs.
Yusay, 47 Phil., 639; Singh vs. Tan Chay, 51 Phil.,
259; Province of Tayabas Perez, 56 Phil., 257), the
case remanded to the Court First Instance of
Negros Occidental with instruction to hear and
decide the petitions for exclusion of the merits, in
the first and last instance (section 113, Electoral
Code), giving the parties every opportunity to
present their respective evidence. so that it may
thereafter make such corrections in the electoral
census of Talisay, Negros Occidental, as may be
proper (section 90, Electoral Code), and to refer
to the Solicitor-General such violations of the
Election Law as might have been committed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
Avancea C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and
Moran, JJ., concur.

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