Ernesto Callado vs.

International Rice Research Institute

G.R. No. 106483, May 22 1995
Facts:
Petitioner was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). On February 11, 1990, while
driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured
in an accident. After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human Resource
Development Department Manager, the latter issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.
Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, that it enjoys
immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic
immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the
same. The LA ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, the NLRC set aside such, and the complaint was dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
a) Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute, which arose from an employer-employee
relationship.
Held:
a) No, IRRI did not waived its immunity. IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3
which provides that it shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that
immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives. Its
immunity is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may
relinquish or abandon this immunity.
Petition dismissed.
The Holy See vs. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, et al.
G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994
Facts:
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the
Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business. The petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila
and registered in the name of petitioner.
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup
assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to
private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana). Respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the land and
damages against the petitioner, as represented by the Papal Nuncio and other defendants.
Petitioner answered, saying that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity
from suit. Respondent contended that the petitioner shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract
in question.
Issue:
a) Whether the petitioner Holy See is immune from suit from its act of entering into a contractual relations centering on
the sale of lot to a private person.
Held:

a) Yes, Holy See is immune from suit in the case at hand. As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution, the country has adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this
affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition
and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.
The Holy See is immune from suit. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the
subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit
or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for
petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.
Calalang
Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated rules and
regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in
prohibition against respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations
complained of infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic
security of all people.

The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de
la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11
pm from a period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently passed and
thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer
challenges its constitutionality.
Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may
at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice,
therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. It is the
promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.

MERITT vs. Government of the Philippine Islands Digested

MERITT vs. Government of the Philippine Islands 34 Phil 311
FACTS:

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, when an ambulance of

the General Hospital struck the plaintiff in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff was so severely
injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same
place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The marks
revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain had suffered material injury.

Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiffs leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that
made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment
of the functions of the brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got from the collision disabled him to do this work
as a contractor and forced him to give up contracts he recently had.

As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at
once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The Philippine Legislature
made an Act (Act No. 2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General
to appear in said suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

RULING:
No, the Government is not legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
It being quiet clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Governments liability to any cause not previously
recognized.That according to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision,
among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts
through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid
down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to
the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed
the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an
agent.For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether
the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has
sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient
funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN, digested
GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages resulting to the death
of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA
maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship functions
but governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, because
its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an
agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their employees.
Fontanilla v. Maliaman
G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045 February 27, 1991
Facts:
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the
tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.
Issue:
whether NIA is performing governmental functions and is thus exempt form suit for damages caused by the
negligent act of its driver who is not its special agent
Held:
No. The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or
ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the
exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The functions of providing water supply and sewerage
service are regarded as mere optional functions of government even though the service rendered caters to the community
as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society.
The NIA was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a
service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA
essentially and purely a government-function corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump
irrigation projects. Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency
renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
The NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not
a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable
for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE
18 SCRA 1120
FACTS:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville", consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration,
Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the CustomsArrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of
Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the
consignee three cases only of theshipment.Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in
the amountof P18,493.37 plus other damages.Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not
being persons under the law,defendants cannot be sued.Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune
from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging
proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants can invoke state immunity.
HELD:
Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result
in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no
waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Bureau of Customs, to
repeat, is part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its
primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other
tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a
necessary incident. Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary
incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not
necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without
necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary
means to that end.