Professional Documents
Culture Documents
4, October-December 2014
Abstract
In a historic ruling on April 15, 2014, the apex court of India, in the case of NALSA v UoI,
NALA,
de la ed that Hij as, Eu u hs, apa t f o
i a ge de , e t eated as thi d
ge de fo the pu pose of safegua di g thei ights a d that these pe so s have the right to
decide their self-identified gender. Interestingly, this ruling came in the wake of another
Ja ua
uli g, he ei a othe C e h had tu ed the lo k a k o ho ose uals
by withdrawing the legal protection granted to them by the Delhi High Court in 2009. The
judgment does give some brilliant and original jurisprudential interpretations of the
intentions of the framers of our Constitution with respect to sex stereotyping and gender
self-identification while reaching their conclusions. This paper seeks to analyse the
Constitutional bases for recognition of the rights of this community to gender selfidentification as well as make an attempt to highlight the importance of the aforesaid ruling
for Indian law making and social justice aims.
Keywords: Hijras, Gender Self-Identification, Social Justice, Gender justice, Third Gender
[This paper was presented at the 2nd National Conference on Politics & Governance, NCPG
2014 held at India International Centre Annexe, New Delhi on 3 August 2014]
Introduction
In the recent past, there had been mounting controversy and general disagreement and
debate over the legal and societal position; and rights of gay and other third-gender groups
in India. Questions that have jostled for answers include concerns over whether they are to
be dreaded and rejected as a force that threatens to corrupt our cultural beliefs whilst
within our midst or; that they are to be merely ignored and hidden away, being denied the
basic rights and privileges that other citizens enjoy. On the other hand, there also exist
g oups ho hoose to see a e p essio of o l the atu e s di e sit i the a d ish to
el o e the as another color within the rainbow of human variety. Wilhel , Tritiya
Prakriti). Peculiar to India, especially its Hindu majority, hijras, i.e. persons who are usually
PAGMBs [persons assigned gender male at birth] and rarely persons with intersex variations
but identify with the characteristics, roles and behaviours conventionally associated with
the feminine (Chapter 1, Expert Committee Report, January 2014); have been treated with
caution and mixed acceptance. The ancient Vedic literature and subsequent writings on
Hindu mythology and beliefs continually recognised the third gender and those of mixed
ge de ide tities [Lo d Vish u s Vaa a a a ata , Lo d hi a s A dh-narishwar form,
hikha di, a d A ju a s assu ptio of a i ed ge de ole as B iha ala i the Maha ha ata,
etc.] a d assig ed spe ifi ge de oles fo these pe so s of the tritiya prakriti Wilhel ,
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Mukhe jee,
The Constitutional basis of NALSA The hol tri it of Articles 14, 19 and 21 for Transgenders
The P ea le s E ualit ai s a d A ti les 1 , 1 a d 1 : The Preamble of the Indian
Constitution establishes the objectives and goals of the Indian polity. Among these are to
secure to all its citizens social, economic and political justice and liberty of thought,
expression and belief; equality of status and opportunity and to promote among them
fraternity so as to secure their individual dignity. (Pal and Pal, 2013 at p.17). The Supreme
Cou t has e phasized that the o ds f ate it assu i g the dig it of the i di idual ha e
a spe ial ele a e i the I dia o te t. e ause of the so ial a k a d ess of e tai
se tio s of the o
u it ho had ee looked do
upo i the past (Sawhney, 1993,
at p. 3, 391)
Article 14, the guarantee of the fundamental right to equality, grants equal protection of the
la s to ea h pe so . It is a esse tial featu e of I dia Co stitutio alis a d a asi idea
of the ule of La as propounded by A.V. Dicey, that everyone is equal before the law.(Pal
and Pal, 2013 at p.9). Thus the underlying object of Art.14 is to secure to all persons, the
equality of status and opportunity referred to in the Preamble of our Constitution.(Natural
Resources Allocation, 2012 at p. 94). This aspect of non-discriminative equality of status and
oppo tu it , to all pe so s , i espe ti e of thei ge de as e p essl laid do
the
apex court in NALSA thus A ti le 1 does ot est i t the o d pe so a d its appli atio
only to male or female. Hijras/transgender persons who are neither male/female fall within
the e p essio pe so a d, he e, e titled to legal p ote tio of la s i all sphe es of tate
activity, including employment, healthcare, education as well as equal civil and citizenship
rights, as enjoyed by any other citizen of this country. NALSA, 2014 at p. 54). It was further
clarified, based on the conclusions in the Expert Committee Report, that Both gender and
biological attributes constitute distinct components of sex.
Biological characteristics, of course, include genitals, chromosomes and secondary sexual
featu es, ut ge de att i utes i lude o e s self i age, the deep ps hologi al o e otio al
sense of sexual identity and ha a te . The dis i i atio o the g ou d of se u de
Articles 15 and 16, therefore, includes discrimination on the ground of gender identity. The
e p essio se used i A ti les 1 a d 1 is ot just li ited to iologi al se of ale o
female, but intended to include people who consider themselves to be neither male or
female NALSA, 2014 at p. 59). Thus, via these conclusions, the apex court further
st e gthe ed the ideas of hu a dig it hi h a e e essa fo the hu a personality to
flower to its fullest and cannot be realized if a person is forced to grow up and live in a
ge de , hi h the do ot ide tif ith o elate to La e s Colle ti e,
. The ou t
based its findings not only on having gauged the intention of the framers of the
Constitution, but also on principles of international human rights law, especially on sexual
orientation and gender identity, by stating that these must inform the understanding of the
p ote tio s a d gua a tees u de the Co stitutio La e s Colle tive, 2014; NALSA, 2014
at p. 47-48).
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