JOHN D;4;':EY

PilhGLATISX: TiiILOSOPXY AS EDUCATION

*ALL PHILOSOL-'HY I S EIIILOSOYHY O F %DUCATIOIJ"

Bachelor of A r t s , Simon Braser University

a t Burnaby, 3 r i t i s h Columbia, 1967

for the

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Frederick J. Brown Yh.B.

Senior Supervisor

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Thomas J. Biallinson T1h.D.

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PARTTAL COPYRIGIIT LICENSE

I h e r e b y g r a n t t o Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y t h e r i g h t t o lend
my t h e s i s o r d i s s e r t a t i o n ( t h e t i t l e o f which i s shown b e l o w ) t o u s e r s
o f t h e Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y , and t o make p a r t i a l o r s i n g l e
c o p i e s o n l y f o r s u c h u s e r s o r i n r e s p o n s e t o a r e q u e s t from t h e l i b r a r y
o f a n y o t h e r u n i v e r s i t y , o r o t h e r e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n , on i t s own
b e h a l f o r f o r one of i t s u s e r s .

I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permission f o r

m u l t i p l e c o p y i n g of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d
b y me o r t h e Dean of Graduate S t t l d i e s .

I t is u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g

o r p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t b e a l l o w e d
w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n .

T i t l e of T h e s i s / ~ i s s e r t a t i o n:

Author:
(signature )

(name )

(date)

iii

It h a s o f t e n been observed t h a t t h e demolition of f a l l a -

c i e s i s t h e n e c e s s a r y s t a r t i n g p o i n t of c o n s t r u c t i v e e f f o r t .
iiowhere i s the t r u t h of t n i s o b s e r v a t i o n more e v i d e n t than i n
a comprehensive examination of Deweyan pragmatism.

Indeed, t o

m y knowledge, no philosophy has s u f f e r e d such a p p a r e n t misread-

i n g and c o n f l i c t i n g a n a l y a i a as hias pragmatism.

T h i s thesis

found i t s g e n e s i s i n t h e need t o r e s t a t e and defend the axioms

of Seweyan thought, t o demolish the f a l l a c i e s that have turned
pragmatism from the hope f o r a n a t u r a l t e l e o l o g y , based on a n
understanding and a p p l i c a t i o n of the methods of s c i e n c e , i n t o
a philosophic curiosity.

Gddly, pragmatism i s u s u a l l y seen a s

a philosophy c o n j o i n t with timerican c a p i t a l i s m o r as a r e j e c t i o n of C h r i s t i a n thought.

i t i s a g r e a t misfortune that t h e

epistemological and pedagogical c o n t r i b u t i o n s of Dewey have

been allowed t o s l i d e i n t o confusion, midunderstanding and

4

oblivion.

uemey's philosophy o f f e r s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a me-

thod of e d u c a t i n g that could change t h e d i r e c t i o n of pedagogy

from t h e worried i:rinl;ing of hands t o a d i r e c t i o n b o t h i n t e l l i g e n t and s o c i a l . 1 ~meaningful.
Pragilatism must be seen as a comprehensive and f u l l y developed philosophy and
I

a s a simple e d u c a t i o n a l methodology.

The f i r s t s e c t i o n of this t h e s i s , t h e r e f o r e , w i l l be aimed a t

o u t l i n i n g i n some depth the major axioms of pragmatic e p i s t o mology, ontology and axiology.

1 s h a l l d e a l w i t h t h e concept

of freedom, s o c i a l and inciiviaual; tlie p e r t i n e n t i d e a s on knowl e d g e , t r u t h and v a l u e , and the o n t o l o g i c a l assumptions t h a t

umbrella the Deweyan morld-view.

S p e c i a l emphasis w i l l be

placed on the notion of r e a l i t y s o a s t o e x p l i c a t e the s o c i a l

c h a r a c t e r of man's world,

The second s e c t i o n w i l l serve a s a means t o make c l e a r e r

the f a l l a c i e s o f common c r i t i c i s m l e v e l e d a g a i n s t pragmatism.
I n s h o r t , t o p u l l together the loose ends remaining from t h e
previous discussion.

Three questions w i l l be more f u l l y ex-

amined: the i s s u e of freedom as a c o n s t a n t l y evolving and

changing s t a t e ; the r e j e c t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l " e t e r n a l " t r u t h ,
and the use of i n q u i r y a s a method of s o l u t i o n i n questions
of value.
The t h i r d s e c t i o n w i l l take up the question of the r e j e c t ion o r misunderstanding o f Dewey's t h e o r i e s i n education.
Since such r e j e c t i o n h s been t o some e x t e n t a& hominem, I
s h a l l be obliged t o exonerate krofessor Uewey from h i s r o l e a s
an educational ogre.

Overall, the s o c i a l r o l e of education

w i l l be s t r e s s e d , hopefully t o shoiv t h a t contemporary educators

a r e confused about aims r a t h e r than methods.

Xy concluding

remarks w i l l revolve around the i s s u e of education o r d r a s t i c

s o c i a l change, and the pragmatic hope f o r the former,

. . . . . . . . . . . . ii
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

IU.AILarING COmIljltPi&
&STiUCTS

On the Xature of 2reedom

.........

&owledge, dynamism, choice and a c t i o n

Law and custom: " t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f things''

Ontology and the Uew cosmology

I1

On Inquiry, Truth and Knowledge

.......

26

The knowing-doing d u a l i t y
The c o n t r o l l e d process of knowing
Truth and knowledge defined
Notestoparttwo.
111

.........
....

.34

On Value and the C r i t i c i s m o f 2 e l i e f s

36

The reason-belief d u a l i t y
The genesis of value
The i d e n t i t y o f good
Uotestopartthree.

The c a p a c i t y t o achieve s a t i s f a c t i o n
Instrumental u n i v e r s a l s
"The gnawing t o o t h of time"
Notes t o Section Two

41

. . . . . . . . . . 48

The charges against Ueweyls pedagogy

aeweyts hopes for education
The reasons for rejection of pragmatic pedagogy
2duca tion and social change

When t h e i d e n t i t y of the moral p r o c e s s with t h e p r o c e s s e s

of s p e c i f i c growth i s r e a l i z e d , t h e more...education of c h i l d hood w i l l be seen t o be t h e most economical and e f f i c i e n t means
of s o c i a l advance and r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , and i t w i l l a l s o be e v i d e n t t h a t t h e t e s t of a l l the i n s t i t u t i o n s of a d u l t l i f e i s
t h e i r e f f e c t i n f u r t h e r i n g continued education. Government,
b u s i n e s s , a r t , r e l i g i o n , a l l s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s have a meaning,
a purpose. T h a t purpose i s t o s e t f r e e and t o develop t h e cap a c i t i e s of himan i n d i v i d u a l s without r e s p e c t t o r a c e , sex,
c l a s s o r economic s t a t u s . And t h i s i s a l l one w i t h s a y i n g t h a t
the t e s t of t h e i r v d u e i s t h e e x t e n t t o which they educate
every i n d i v i d u a l t o the f u l l s t a t u r e of h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . Democ r a c y has many meanings, b u t i f i t has a moral meaning, i t i s
found i n r e s o l v i n g t h a t t h e supreme t e s t of a l l p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n d u s t r i a l arrangements s h a l l be t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n
they make t o t h e a l l - a r o u n d growth t o every member of s o c i e t y .
John Dewey, i i e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n Philosophy, 1920.

The p r i n c i p l e s of Demeyan pragmatism must be seen f i r s t

and foremost a s an indictment o f t r a d i t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n a l practices.

By r e j e c t i n g o r misapplying the e d u c a t i o n a l philosophy

of pragmatism, t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a b e t t e r , more meaningful

and r i c h e r e d u c a t i o n a l system have a l l b u t disappeared, and
l i t t l e remains save an outmoded and l a r g e l y i n c o ~ p tee n t i n s t i t u t i o n , a f a c t noted by the r e c e n t H a l l Hoyal Commission on
Education f o r the I-rovince of Ontario.

Linked t o t h i s f a i l u r e

i s t h e o u t r i g h t r e j e c t i o n of the e d u c a t i o n a l system by many of

our most g i f t e d c h i l d r e n .

The c u r r e n t r e b e l l i o n , from simple

"dropping o u t " t o the a t t e m p t s t o take over the s c h o o l s , i s n o t

s o much a proclamation of s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n and s e l f - d i r e c t i o n a s

i t i s behavior stemriiing from tne m i s d i r e c t i o n and o f t e n nond i r e c t i o n , of p r e s e n t day educators.

Education, a s Dewey so o f t e n observed, i s the l e a s t understood term i n a l l of human a f f a i r s .

In i t s f u l l e s t possible

sense education i s a t o t a l process, the development of a l i f e s t y l e based on a l l experience, whether t a u g h t i n a formal mann e r o r l e a r n e d w i t h i n the socio-psycho-genic

environment; only

i n t h e most l i m i t i n g may can education be confined t o a c l a s s room o r l e c t u r e h a l l .

A s Radlmkamal Lukerjee contends i n h i s

s t u d y The Dimenaons o f s u m a n Evolution:

EIanis b i o l o g i c a l h e r i t a g e i s o v e r l a i n and obscured by
h i s s o c i a l h e r i t a g e of v a l u e s and symbols i n his e v o l u t i o nary development. The value-and-symbol system n o t only
determines t h e s t r u c t u r e and f u n c t i o n s of s o c i e t y and d i r e c t s i t s e v o l u t i o n , b u t i s i t s e l f s u b j e c t e d t o an e v o l u t i o n a r y process...This...socio-genic
mechanism i s s t r u c t u r e d
and systematized i n t o , and i d e n t i f i e d n i t h t n e communitvts
moral- order and v a l u e ~ h i e r a r c h y ,which i s p a r t l y i n t e r i o r i s e d and indeed i n h e r i t e d a s t h e conscience of t h e i n d i v i d u a l , and p a r t l y l e a r n t , taught and t r a n s m i t t e d as the ext e r n a l social heritageel
7

I t i s n o t too f a r f e t c h e d t o s u g g e s t that many of our

c h i l d r e n a r e a c t i n g o u t the dilemla that i s i m p l i c i t i n Lukerj e e t s statement.

There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t the " i n t e r i o r i s e d "

i s o f t e n a t odds w i t h t h e " l e a r n t ; " f o r example, the JudeoChris t i a n i n h e r i t a n c e of our s o c i e t y l o u d l y proclaims "thou

s h a l t n o t k i l l " b u t e v e r y evening on C.B.C.

News t h e r e i s a n

obvious and b r u t a l r e j e c t i o n of that coma~ancIment. The r a p i d

growth of f r e e - s c h o o l s , of u n i v e r s i t i e s divorced from t r a d i t i o n -

a l s t r u c t u r e s and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , and the a l l consuming d e s i r e

t o b u i l d "whole" s o c i e t i e s f i t t i n g the needs of a l l i t s c i t i z e n s
give ample evidence t h a t our c h i l d r e n cannot a c c e p t t h e r a t i o n a l of a world i n flames, b u t n e i t h e r can they r e j e c t a c e n t u r i e s -

old tradition.

Consequently, s i n c e "man's b i o l o g i c a l h e r i t a g e

i s o v e r l a i n and obscured by h i s s o c i a l h e r i t a g e of v a l u e s , " i t

becomes of paramount importance t o have a method w i t h which

t o c o n s t a n t l y re-examine, and i f n e c e s s a r y , r e c o n s t r u c t such
values.

And t h a t , simply, must be t h e r a i s o n d l e t r e f o r our

Generally, t h e i n e q u i t i e s of formal e d u c a t i o n , and i t s

s t u l t i f y i n g e f f e c t s on the young were seen by Uewey a s l o n g
ago a s the 1890's.

H i s concern was l a t e r summarized i n Human

Nature and Conduct where he w r i t e s :

The i n e r t , s t u p i d q u a l i t y of c u r r e n t customs p e r v e r t s
l e a r n i n g i n t o a w i l l i n g n e s s t o f o l l o w where o t h e r s p o i n t
t h e way, i n t o conformity, c o n s t r i c t i o n , s u r r e n d e r of
s c e p t i c i s m and experiment. Jhen we t h i n k of the d o c i l i t y
of the young we f i r s t t h i n k of t h e s t o c k s of information
a d u l t s wish t o impose and the ways of a c t i n g they want t o
reproduce. Then we t h i n k of t h e i n s o l e n t c o e r c i o n s , t h e
i n s i n u a t i n g b r i b e r i e s , and the pedagogic s o l e m n i t i e s by
which the f r e s h n e s s of youth can be faded and i t s v i v i d
c u r i o s i t i e s d u l l e d . Education becomes the a r t of t a k i n g
advantage of the h e l p l e s s n e s s of t h e young; the forming of
h a b i t s becomes a guarantee f o r t h e maintenance of hedges
of custom.2
C l e a r l y , Dewey was aware t h a t one of t h e fundamental problems
c o n f r o n t i n g s o c i e t y was the s t u p i d and w a s t e f u l way i n which
c h i l d r e n were b e i n g moulded t o "guarantee...the

maintenance

of hedges of c u ~ t o m , ~H i s many books make i t abundantly c l e a r

t h a t t h i s a p p l i e s as 7.17ell t o the l a r g e r p i c t u r e of s o c i a l growth
and d i r e c t i o n : formal e d u c a t i o n i s b u t a p a r t of t h e a t t e m p t
t o m a i n t a i n what i s thought t o be " o l d , and t h e r e f o r e good."

This t h e s i s found i t s g e n e s i s i n the above concerns.

The

t a s k I have a e t myself may be seen a s a n a t t e m p t t o examine the

i d e a s contained i n d e n e y l s p h i l o s o p h i c a l work i n order t h a t I
might l o o k more c r i t i c a l l y , anci I hope more c o n s t r u c t i v e l y , a t
the s t a t e of p r e s e n t day education.

A s opgosed t o the u s u a l

c o m e n t a r y , which i s o l a t e s Demeyts pedagogy from i t s p r o p e r

c o n t e x t , I i n t e n d t o l o o k a t the methods of an o v e r a l l p h i l o sophy.

I cannot make t h i s p o i n t too s t r o n g l y ,

The u n f o r t u n a t e

t r u t h i s t h a t many e d u c a t o r s , when looking i n t o Deweyan pedagogy, do n o t s e e pragmatism a s a f u l l y developed philosophy, b u t

r a t h e r a s a simple e d u c a t i o n a l methodology,
Therefore, the f i r s t s e c t i o n of t h i s paper s h a l l be used
rZ

,
L

t o s y n t h e s i z e the major axioms of pragmatic thought on t h e

I)

'

'

a\ '

n a t u r e of freedom, r e f l e c t i v e thought a s a method of c r i t i c a l

i n q u i r y , and the theory of value,

Although ontology forms the

base u p o n v ~ h i c h a n y p h i l o s o p h y i s b u i l t ,I a h a l l n o t a t t e m p t
t o d e a l w i t h i t s e p a r a t e l y , b u t r a t h e r make t h e pragiiatic conc e p t i o n of r e a l i t y e x p l i c i t and comprehensible i n connection
I t should be c l e a r that

w i t h b o t h epistonology and axiology.

I i n t e n d t o confine my e x p l o r a t i o n s p r i m a r i l y t o Dewey, w i t h

the pragmatic o r i n s t r u m e n t a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n p r o v i d i n g
the c e n t r a l argument of t h i s paper,

I w i l l , however, draw

upon s c h o l a r s such a s Charles S . P e i r c e , .;illiam James and

George H. &ad,

who n e r e i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the development of

pragmatism.
Following t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n I a h a l l a t t e m p t t o answer
common c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l e d a g a i n s t pragmatism.
s e c t i o n two

To a n e x t e n t

ill serve as a swmmry of s e c t i o n one, b u t o n l y

the more p e r p l e x i n g p o i n t s e a r l i e r o u t l i n e d w i l l be emphasized.

-3s t o c r i t i c i s m , a t y p i c a l corntent i s found i n ??illiam YfBytels

book The C r a a n i z a t i o n Kan,

iIe w r i t e s :

...to t h i s day many of t h e most thorough-going p r a g m a t i s t s

i n b u s i n e s s ~ ~ o u lr ed c o i l a t b e i n g grouped w i t h the i n t e l l e c t u a l s , But the two move~nentswere i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d .

...

they provided an i n t e l l e c t u a l framework that would

complement, r a t h e r than i n h i b i t , the f u r t h u r growth of
big o r g a n i ~ a t i o n , ~

I hope t o d i s p e l such misunderstanding by drawing h e a v i l y upon

the l i t e r a t u r e of pragmatism, a l i t e r a t u r e that amply i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t o n l y i n the most s i m p l i s t i c nay can pragmatism be
seen as a synonym f o r p r a c t i c a l .

The s o c i a l philosophy of

Dewey was a v i r t u a l d e c l a r a t i o n of w a r on b i g o r g a n i z a t i o n s
s i n c e he saw t h e nge of &chines,

and by i m p l i c a t i o n b i g indus-

t r i a l complexes, a s a very g r e a t o b s t a c l e t o h m n p r o g r e s s

a view h a r d l y shared by o r g a n i z a t i o n men.

--

"But without passage

through a machine a g e , " wrote Dewey, "mankind's h o l d upon what

i s n e e d f u l a s the p r e c o n d i t i o n of a f r e e , f l e x i b l e and many

c o l o r e d l i f e i s s o precarious...tilat
a c q u i s i t i o n and bhe]

competitive scramble f o r

f r e n z i e d use of t h e r e s u l t s . . . f o r purpos4

e s of e x c i t a t i o n and d i s p l a y w i l l be perpetuated."

The concluding p a r t of t h i s paper i s aimed a t e x p l a i n i n g

i

why Dewey has y e t t o f i n d f a v o r m i t h educators.

: tend

I do n o t i n -

t o analyze i n d e p t h the pedagogy of pragmatism; the method

i s obvious w i t h i n the philosophy.

O v e r a l l , the t h i r d s e c t i o n

w i l l provide some of t h e reasons a s t o p-hy D e ~ e yhas s u f f e r e d

t h e f a t e of o b l i v i o n .

I t i s my hope t h a t by b r i n g i n g prag-

m a t i s m i n t o the l i g h t of day some f u t u r e educator might be

moved t o challenge the c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e s i n e d u c a t i o n ; and
t h a t pragmatisn w i l l provide the methodology t o make the c h a l lenge meaningful.
C l e a r l y , new s o c i a l and e d u c a t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n i s needed
if e v e r we wish t o escape a ~ a o r l dagonized by e v e r expanding

and hideous wars, h a t r e d s , j e a l o u a i e s and hunger, and move t o -

ward a world t h a t w i l l "manifest a f u l l n e s s , v a r i e t y and f r e e don of p o s s e s s i o n [with]

enjoyment of meanings and goods un5

known i n the contiguous a s s o c i a t i o n s of the past."

Introduction

1 *%dhakaml Kukerjee, T h e Dimensions of -Human E v o l u t i o n

(Bombay: Eacmillan, l 9 6 4 ) , p, vii,

2

John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct

(Uew York: Uodern

L i b r a r y , 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. 60-1,
3

Ha .Jhyte, The O r g a n i z a t i ~ nLan

(Sew York: Double-

day, 19561, pp. 22-3.

4

John Dewey, The P u b l i c and i t s Problems

Swallow, 19543, p . 216,

Dewey, P u b l i c , p a 217

( ~ e n v e r :Alan

d2CTIOiT O&

Freedom, Heflec t i v e Thowht and t h e Theory of Value

One of t h e c e n t r a l t e n e t s of John Ueaey's philosopny i s

the pragmatic n o t i o n of freedom.

Xore than any o t h e r s i n g l e

concept i t i s t h e touchstone of p r a g m t i s m .

I n t h e conclu-

ding pages of Breedom i n the Godern '70rld, he e x p r e s s e s t h e

conviction t h a t ,

.,.

the p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom i s deeply grounded i n our

very beings, P t i s one w i t h our i n d i v i d u a l i t y , our b e i n g
uniquely what we a r e and n o t i m i t a t o r s and p a r a s i t e s of
othere. However, l i k e a l l o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s , t h i s poss i b i l i t y has t o be a c t u a l i z e d ; and, l i k e a l l o t h e r s , i t
can only be a c t u a l i z e d through i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s , The question of p o l i t i c a l and economic
freedom i s n o t a n addendum o r a f t e r t h o u g h t , much l e s s a
d e v i a t i o n o r excrescence, i n the problem of p e r s o n a l f r e e dom, ;'or t h e c o n d i t i o n s that form p o l i t i c a l and economic
l i b e r t y a r e r e q u i r e d i n order t o r e a l i z e t h e p o t e n t i a l i t y
of freedom each of us c a r r i e s w i t h h i m i n his very s t r u c t u r e , Constant and uniform r e l a t i o n s i n change and a knowledge of them i n 'laws,' a r e n o t a hindrance t o freedom,
b u t a necessary f a c t o r i n coming t o be e f f e c t i v e l y t h a t
which we have the c a p a c i t y t o grow i n t o , S o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s
i n t e r a c t with t h e p r e f e r e n c e s of a n i n d i v i d u a l ( t h a t g r g
his i n d i v i d u a l i t y ) i n a vay f a v o r a b l e t o a c t u a l i z i n g f r e e dom only when they develop- i n t e l l i g e n c e , n o t a b s t r a c t knowledge and a b s t r a c t thought, b u t power of v i s i o n and r e f l e c t i o n , For t h e s e take e f f e c t i n making p r e f e r e n c e , d e s i r e ,
and purpose more f l e x i b l e , a l e r t and r e s o l u t e . Freedom
has too long been thought of as a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e power
o p e r a t i n g i n a closed and ended world. I n i t s r e a l i t y ,
freedom i s a r e s o l u t e v i l l o p e r a t i n g i n a world i n some
r e s p e c t s i n d e t e r ~ i n a t e ,because i t i s open and moving t o ward a nevi f u t u r e .l
I t would appear that f o r t y y e a r s a f t e r tne above was w r i t -

t e n the p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom h2s s t i l l t o be a c t u a l i z e d ,

dom remains a n a b s t r a c t , a " r i g h t , " a " p r i v i l e g e , " a bromide

Free-

r e s e r v e d f o r p o l i t i c a l r h e t o r i c , a v a i l a b l e only i n America o r
the U.S .S .H.,

depending on one ' s a l l e g i a n c e .

Indeed, t h e agon-

i z i n g confusion over t h e nature of freedom i s r e f l e c t e d i n a t t i t u d e s as v a r i o u s a s the c r y f o r " s t u d e n t power" t o t h e worldvide d e c l i n e of the church,

That g r e a t numbers of C a t h o l i c

p r i e s t s would q u e s t i o n a papal order on b i r t h c o n t r o l i s c l e a r I

l y a n i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e ancien regime no l o n g e r f i r m l y h o l d s
the r e i n s of a u t h o r i t y .

That men, even t h e most r e l i g i o u s of

men, r e j e c t the old way i s evidence enough of t h e profound need

f o r new i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l freedoms.

I n t u r n , our s c h o o l s

and u n i v e r s i t i e s a r e d i s r u p t e d by s t u d e n t r a d i c a l s who p r a c t i c e
what i s roughly described a s " c o n f r o n t a t i o n p o l i t i c s " aimed a t
making our i n s t i t u t i o n s " f r e e , " b u t a s y e t l i t t l e has been
achieved beyond t h e propagation of s l o g a n s and t h e quickening
of tempers.

I n terms of long-range c o n s t r u c t i v e change t h e

s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n s of today m a t t e r l i t t l e ; who o r what i s under

challenge m a t t e r even l e s s ; w h a t does m a t t e r i s the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of r e s o l u t i o n so long a s the p r i e s t o r the s t u d e n t c o n t i n ue t o seek out a n a b s t r a c t .
';ihich r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n , i s i t p o s s i b l e that a n i n t e l l i g e n t theory and philosophy of s o c i a l s c i e n c e , i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o e d u c a t i o n a l p r a c t i c e , xould make n e e d l e s s any such
confrontations?

That i s , could c o n f r o n t a t i o n s be avoided i f

from t h e s t a r t of a c h i l d ' s schooling t h e a b i l i t y t o a s c e r t a i n

the n a t u r e of freedom and a c t upon i t was developed as a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t of the l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s ?

X i t h i n t h e body of t h i s

paper the g e n e r a l i s s u e s of t h i s q u e s t i o n w i l l be examined.

I do n o t i n t e n d t o argue tne c o u n t l e s s r a m i f i c a t i o n s of freedom,

r e f l e c t i v e thought and value.

The f i r s t s e c t i o n , made up of

t h r e e p a r t s , w i l l provide tile c o n t e x t u a l g u i d e l i n e s s o as t o
make p o s s i b l e an understanding of pragmatism, and i n t u r n , t o
make c l e a r t h e major reasons f o r the m i s a p p l i c a t i o n and m i s understanding o f pragmatic pedagogy.

On the Uature of 3reedom

There a r e two c e n t r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t o t h e pragmatic

concept of freedom.
knowledge.

2or one, freedom i s always dependent upon

In Human Iiature and Conduct Dewey e x p l a i n s that

" t h e road t o freedom m y be found i n the knowledge of f a c t s

which enables u s t o employ them i n connection w i t h d e s i r e s
and aims.

A p h y s i c i a n o r engineer i s f r e e i n h i s thought and

h i s a c t i o n i n the degree i n which he knorts what iie d e a l s with.

2

P o s s i b l y we f i n d here tne key t o any freedom."

iind second,

freedom i s dynamic: "i?reedom f o r an i n d i v i d u a l means growth,

5

ready change when m o d i f i c z t i o n i s r e q u i r e d .

"

But the opera-

t i o n of bowledge and dynamism i s baseh on the pragmatic conc e p t i o n of r e a l i t y ,

i n the
-

Faomledge and knowin,: a r e c e n t e r e d with-

e x i s t e n t i a l m a t r i x of s o c i e t y , a s i s t h e examination of

r e a l t h i n @ i n everyday l i f e o r s c i e n c e , " n o t a b s t r a c t knowledge o r a b s t r a c t thought."

Dynamism i s based on a view of

the world a s a c o n s t a n t l y c i m n ~ i n gand boundless p a t t e r n ,

Pragmatism h o l d s no a b s o l u t e s o r e t e r n a l s i n any t r a d i t i o n a l

sense.

Nothing i s f i x e d and f i n a l .

The dynamic n a t u r e of f r e e -

dom means that i t i s b o t h temporal and c o n t e x t u a l , t h a t i t must

be seen a s r e l a t i v e t o a given s i t u a t i o n .

The i s s u e of r e a l i t y , and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s i n terms of

the concept of freedom, i s an important p o i n t t o follow.

Dewey

i s n o t unaware of the major components of freedom a c c o r d i n g

t o the r a t i o n a l i s t and e m p i r i c i s t p h i l o s o p h i e s w i t h which h i s

4

o n t o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n i s i n c o n t r a s t , and he a n t i c i p a t e s c r i t i - -

cism from t h i s q u a r t e r .

I n an e s s a y e n t i t l e d "The Need f o r a

Recovery of Philosophy," he defends t h e pragmatic n o t i o n of

reality.
I t i s o f t e n s a i d that pragmatism, unless i t is 60nt e n t t o be a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o mere methodology, must devel o p a t h e o r y o f R e a l i t y . But the c h i e f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
t r a i t of the pragmatic n o t i o n of r e a l i t y i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t
no theory of A e a l i t y i n ~ e n e r a l . . . i s p o s s i b l e o r needed...
It f i n d s t h a t ' r e a l i t y ' i s a d e n o t a t i v e term, a word used
t o d e s i g n a t e i n d i f f e r e n t l y e v e r y t h i n g t h a t happens. L i e s ,
dreams, i n s a n i t i e s , d e c e p t i o n s , myths, t h e o r i e s a r e a l l of
them j u s t the events wliich t h e y s p e c i f i c a l l y a r e . %ragm a t i s m i s c o n t e n t t o take i t s s t a n d w i t h s c i e n c e ; f o r s c i ence f i n d s a l l such e v e n t s t o be t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r f o r
d e s c r i p t i o n and i n q u i r y . . . l t a l s o t a k e s i t s s t a n d w i t h
d a i l y l i f e , which f i n d s t h a t such t h i n g s r e a l l y have t o
be reckoned w i t h a s they occur i n t e r w o v e n i n t h e t e x t u r e
of events.. .the r e t e n t i o n by philosophy of a n o t i o n of a
A e a l i t y , . . s u p e r i o r t o the e v e n t s of everyday occurrence
i s the c h i e f source of trle i n c r e a s i n g i s o l a t i o n of p h i l o sophy from common sense and science...philosophy i n d e a l i n g with r e a l d i f f i c u l t i e s f i n d s i t s e l f s t i l l hampered
by r e f e r e n c e t o r a a l i t i e s more r e a l , more u l t i m a t e , than
t h o s e which d i r e c t l y happen. 5
I t follows t h a t the concept of freedom i s p o s t u l a t e d i n

d i s r e g a r d of t h e o l o g i c a l dogmas or p o l i t i c a l o r moral imperat i v e s : freedom i s n o t given, b u t i s achieved through i n t e l l i g e n t o b s e r v a t i o n and s c e p t i c a l examination of those t h i n g s
" a s t h e y occur interwoven i n the t e x t u r e of events."

Since

knowledge promotes the p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom, t o know our

world e x i s t e n t i a l l y i s a f i r s t s t e p i n understanding t h e
n a t u r e of freedom.

But only a f i r s t s t e p , f o r w i t h i n t h e con-

t e x t of knowledge and dynamism t h e r e a r e o t h e r components r e l a t i n g t o t h e a-c-t u a l i---z a t i o n of freedom; components i n c l u d i n g

" e f f i c i e n c y i n a c t i o n , a b i l i t y t o c a r r y out p l a n s , the absence
-.

/-

of cramping and thwarting o b s t a c l e s . . . I t

a l s o i n c l u d e s capac-

i t y t o v a r y p l a n s , t o change tile course of a c t i o n , t o experience n o v e l t i e s .

~ i n dagain.. . i t s i g n i f i e s the power of d e s i r e

6

-.-

and choice t o be f a c t o r s i n events."

V i t h i n the above q u o t a t i o n t h e r e a r e two o v e r a l l assumpt i o n s , t h a t the power t o a c t and t h e a b i l i t y t o choose a r e
c e n t r a l t o a r e a l i z a t i o n of freedom.

In dealing w i t h the r o l e

of c h o i c e , Dewey i s c a r e f u l t o p o i n t o u t t h a t e a r l y i n t h e
h i s t o r y of thought the n o t i o n of choice became involved w i t h
t h e i d e a s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and blame.

This involvement cloud-

ed t h e i s s u e s , he claimed, s i n c e blame and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y were

used t o s u p p o r t c e r t a i n s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s which were i r r e l e v -

a n t t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of choice.

dom i n t h e Eodern 7 o r l d Dewey e w a i n e s the question of --.--iden- -- -

'

1
I

--"

In Free-

t i f y i n g choice ni$h de-sirable s o c i a l ends+;.and e x p l a i n s t h e

'

results.
The t h e o r e t i c a l formulation f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of
choice a s t h e h e a r t of freedom becarile.,.imvolved a t a n
early t i ~ w
e i t h o t h e r i n t e r e s t s ; and they. .determined
t h e form taken by a widely p r e v a l e n t philosophy of f r e e dom...philosophy of t h e n a t u r e of choice a s freedom developed as an a p o l o g i a f o r a n e s s e n t i a l l y l e g a l i n t e r e s t :
l i a b i l i t y t o punishment. The outcome was the d o c t r i n e
known a s freecorn of ~ ! i l l . . . S o e s t a b l i s h e d d i d t h i s way of
viewing choice become, that i t i s s t i l l c o m o n l y supposed
that choice. and t h e a r b i t r a r y freedom of w i l l a r e one and
t h e same t h i n g o 7

Thus me i n t r o d u c e the f a v o r i t e argument of freshmen and

p r o f e s s o r s of Logic: the i s s u e of " f r e e - w i l l n v e r s u s "determinism.

"

Dewey contends that the t r a d i t i o n a l argument i s

nothing more than an a b s t r a c t word game and i s t h e r e f o r e of

no r e a l value i n terms of the s o l u t i o n of human problems
t h i s case t h e achievement of freedom.

argument i s i n i t s end r e s u l t .

--

in

The importance of t h e

The i m p l i c a t i o n s of h o l d i n g

e i t h e r f r e e - w i l l o r determinism t o be of major importance i n

m a t t e r s of human conduct f o r c e s man i n t o a paradox,

On t h e one

hand h i s d e s t i n y i s c o n t r o l l e d by some unknown power, which

r e n d e r s h i m impotent, and on the o t h e r , i f he must claim r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r his a c t i o n s , he can only be " f r e e " t o the
e x t e n t t h a t s o c i e t y w i l l allow, a l s o r e n d e r i n g him impotent.
Dewey makes t h e argument concrete by s h i f t i n g t h e emphasis of
,inquiry from a n t e c e d e n t s t o- --consequ_eqcga*"
--The d o c t r i n e of ' f r e e - w i l l ' i s a d e s p e r a t e a t t e m p t t o
escape from the consequences of t h e d o c t r i n e of f i x e d and
immutable Being.
J i t h d i s s i p a t i o n of trat dogma, t h e
need f o r such a measure of d e s p e r a t i o n vanishes. P r e f e r e n t i a l a c t i v i t i e s c h a r a c t e r i z e every i n d i v i d u a l a s i n d i v i d u a l o r unique.
I n themselves these a r e d i f f e r e n t i a l
i n a d e f a c t 0 s e n s e , They become t r u e choices under t h e
d i r e c t i o n of i n a i g h t
Znowledge , i n s t e a d of r e v e a l i n g a
world i n which preference i s an i l l u s i o n and does n o t
count o r make a d i f f e r e n c e , p u t s i n our p o s s e s s i o n t h e
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y by means of which preference may be a n
i n t e l l i g e n t or intentional f a c t o r i n constructing a future
by wary and prepared actison. Faowledge of s p e c i a l cond i t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s i s i n s t r w e n t a l t o t h e a c t i o n which
i s i n t u r n an instrument of proOuction of s i t u a t i o n s havi n g q u a l i t i e s of added s i g n i f i c a n c e and order. To be
czpable of such a c t i o n i s t o be f r e e .8

This, of course, openo the way f o r the c r i t i c s of prag-

m a t i s m t o charge t h a t Dewey d e n i e s f r e e - a i l l , and consequently

i s t i e d t o a d e t e r m i n i s t philosopiiy.

On t h e c o n t r a r y , r a t h e r

than r e j e c t i n g f r e e - r i l l , w h a t he does deny i s the e f f i c a c y

of f r e e - w i l l t o provide any meaningful c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r

human conduct.

He does not deny t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e e x i s -

tence of f r e e - w i l l ; he just d e n i e s i t s u t i l i t y i n e x p l a i n i n g
consequences.

The attempt t o s e e k o u t f i r m , f i n a l and u s a b l e

d e f i n i t i o n s of a b s t r a c t s t h a t remain a b s t r a c t , l i k e f r e e - w i l l
o r determinism, s o as t o answer q u e s t i o n s of human d i f f i c u l t i e s caused by such a b s t r a c t s , h a r d l y seems a worth-while t a s k .
It i s simply a n e x e r c i s e i n asking t a e vronz questiona.

The

d i s c u s s i o n on f r e e - w i l l i s t y p i c a l of t h e consequences brought
I

about by t h e s e p a r a t i o n of m o r a l s from human n a t u r e .

The dan-

gerous s i g n i f i c a n c e of the c l a s s i c a l argument over f r e e - w i l l

i s t h a t i t r e i n f o r c e s t h i s s e p a r a t i o n of moral a c t i v i t y from

10
n a t u r e and p u b l i c l i f e .

Dewey could be seen as a d e t e r m i n i s t , b u t t h e term i s

used r e l u c t a n t l y , f o r want of

b e t t e r one.

then, must be seen only i n a q u a l i f i e d sense.

5 i s "determinism"

itather than

c r e d i t i n g unseen f o r c e s , s u p e r i o r o r d e r s o f e x i s t e n c e o r t r a n -

s c e n d e n t a l laws of the universe, he s e e s the d e s t i n y of man

,-

c o n t r o l l e d by s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s .

Cut s i n c e he a l s o s e e s soc-

i a l c o n d i t i o n s a s u n c e r t a i n and c h a n ~ i n g ,t h e r e can be no
assumptions about what a f u t u r e s o c i e t y k:ay b r i n g , o r t h e r o l e
man w i l l p l a y i n it.

I n essence, Dewey's determinism i a simply

a n awareness of t h e power and p r i v i l e g e of s o c i a l a u t h o r i t y .

Dewey f r e q u e n t l y uses the phrase " p r e f e r e n t i a l s e l e c t i o n "
i n connection -nith c h o i c e ; i t roeam s i r r ~ ~ j ltyh a t the v a i e d
e x p e r i e n c e s of humans provide then1 w i t h $ r e f e r e n c e s from which
to select,

"Choice.. .then p r e s e n t s i t s e l f a s one preference

among and out of p r e f e r e n c e s ; n o t i n t h e sense of one p r e f e r ence a l r e a d y made and s t r o n g e r t h a n o t h e r s , b u t a s the form-

11

a t i o n of a new p r e f e r e n c e out of a c o n f l i c t of p r e f e r e n c e s . "

This i s a n important p o i n t , not because i t i n d i c a t e s the d i s t i n c t i v e l y human a b i l i t y t o measure, judge and a c t upon the
good o r bad of e x i s t e n t i a l c i r c ~ u n s t a n c e s ,b u t because i t b r i n g s
up the q u e s t i o n of the g e n e s i s of p r e f e r e n c e .
the p r e s e n t t o c o n t r o l tne f u t u r e .

":Ye d o n ' t use

!T
;e use t h e f o r e s i g h t of

the f u t u r e t o r e f i n e and expand p r e s e n t a c t i v i t i e s .

In this

use of d e s i r e , d e l i b e r a t i o n and c h o i c e , freedom i s a c t u a l i z e d .

Preference then, vhen seen w i t h i n the c o n t i n u ~ uof
~ p a s t , pres e n t and f u t u r e , i s the unwritten h i s t o r y of a n i n d i v i d u a l .
The a b i l i t y t o choose f i n d s i t s g e n e s i s i n t h i s h i s t o r y ,
The m a n i f e s t a t i o n of p r e f e r e n c e s becomes a ' f u n c t i o n '
of a n e n t i r e h i s t o r y . To understand the a c t i o n of a
f e l l o w clan we have t o know something of tile course of
h i s l i f e . n man i s s u s c e p t i b l e , ' s e n s i t i v e , t o a v a s t
v a r i e t y of c o n d i t i o n s and undergoes v a r i e d and opposed
experiences
a s lower anzmals do n o t . Consequently a
man i n the measure o f the scope and v a r i e t y o f h i s p a s t
experiences c a r r i e s i n h i s preserlt c e p a c i t y f o r s e l e c t i v e
response a l a r z e s e t of v a r i e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s . That l i f e
h i s t o r y of which h i s p r e s e n t p r e f e r e n c e i s a f u n c t i o n i s
complex. Xence the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n t i n u i n g d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of b e h a v i o r ; i n e h o r t , the d i s t i n c t i v e e d u c a b i l i t y
of menolg

--

Thus the i n d i v i d u a l i s placed s q u a r e l y i n r e l a t i o n t o

h i s environment,

I n o r d e r t o a c t e f f e c t i v e l y , be i t climbing

a mountain o r i s o l a t i n g a nea bio-chemical s t r a i n , he must

u t i l i z e a s much of h i s experience a s he can.

Tize r e l a t i v e

s u c c e s s , a s xe have noted e a r l i e r , depends upon the degree of

c o r r e c t information t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l p o s s e s s e s , and h i s
a b i l i t y t o e v a l u a t e such i n f o r m t i o n .

A s a simple i l l u s t r a -

t i o n , a n i n d i v i d u a l may be f r e e t o walk, b u t i f such an a c t

h e l d as consequence h i s f a l l i n g off a c l i f f and being crushed
t o d e a t h , the i d e a of freedom through p r e f e r e n c e i s simply

"

12

untenable,

Unless, of course, the idea of freedom i s s o ab-

s t r a c t and f i n a l t h a t i t a p p l i e s t o the dead a s well as t o the

living,

The Rousseauian idea that freedom p r e v a i l e d before laws

and customs circumscribed i t i s a l s o s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i s e d by
Dewey,

The consequences of such a notion would appear t o be

t h a t i f p r e s e n t laws were l i f t e d , freedom would be assured.

But freedom i a "not obtained by mere a b o l i t i o n of law and i n s t i t u t i o n s , b u t by the progressive s a t u r a t i o n of a l l laws and
i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h g r e a t e r and g r e a t e r aclmowledgment of the
14

necessary laws governing the c o n s t i t u t i o n of things,"

The

" c o n s t i t u t i o n of thingsi1 r e f e r s i n this case t o the s o c i a l

interconnection of p a r t s , t o shared experience throughout
s o c i e t y , the common concerns of a l l c i t i z e n s ,

The b a s i c human

need t o be protected and respected, a need stemming i n p a r t

from the shared experience of violence of a l l s o r t s , b r i n g s
laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o being, and only t o the e x t e n t t h a t
t h i s need i s met w i l l lams remain viable.

The p l i g h t of the

American negro a p t l y i l l u s t r a t e s the reason why l e g i s l a t o r s

must acknowledge the " c o n s t i t u t i o n of things."

It i s impera-

t i v e t o the s u r v i v a l o f America t h a t i t s c i t i z e n s confront the

f a c t t h a t a l a r g e segment of t h e i r s o c i e t y has been d e a l t out
of the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e .

But t o l i f t o r change the laws o r

i n s ti t u t i o n s without changing the sys tern cannot b r i n y about

freedom f o r those outside the system.

There must be an under-

s t a n d i n g on the p a r t of the designers of laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s

t h a t u n t i l a way i s found t o be responsive t o a l l c i t i z e n s ,
the b l a c k people of ~ m e r i c aw i l l , q u i t e understandably, burn

down the i n s t i t u t i o n s and v i o l a t e the laws.

L a w l o s e s i t s meaning when i t becomes an a b s t r a c t ,

It

was o r i g i n a l l y an imminently p r a c t i c a l means of s o c i a l cont r o l and protection.

Zven J e f f e r s o n ' s phrase "Laws above menM

was fundamentally p r a c t i c a l , but when i t came t o mean volumes

of Precedence and T o r t s r a t h e r than p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n a t s o c i a l
anarchy following the Revolution, the "necesesqy laws governi n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n of things" f e l l i n t o the j u d i c i a l wastebasket.
I n essence, Dewey argues that freedom i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d
t o custom and t r a d i t i o n , t h a t law reaches out of custom.

Thus,

i f repression i s a common h e r i t a g e , i t w i l l remain p a r t of

the p r e s e n t s o c i a l f a b r i c .

concrete example o f this a s s e r -

t i o n i s seen i n the development o f modern nations,

I t i s hard-

l y probable t h a t freedom could be assured f o r those s a t u r a t e d

by a s t r o n g s o c i a l t r a d i t i o n , and even l e s s probable where the
s t r e n g t h of t r a d i t i o n i s reinforced by r e l i g i o u s o r p o l i t i c a l
restrictiveness.

It i s no a c c i d e n t t h a t the Soviet Union i s

l a c k i n g i n freedoms a s we i n the western world know them,

The

h i s t o r i c a l shoulders upon rahich modern Aussia r e s t s d a t e s from

the a u t o c r a t i c Byzantine Zmpire, through the r e p r e s s i v e Czar-

i s t times, and ends with the " d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t e f t

To superimpose a p o l i t i c a l philosophy upon a n a t i o n o r s t a t e

t h a t i s s o c i a l l y and psychologically unprepared f o r i t would

be d i f f i c u l t indeed.

The Anglo-Saxon world o f t e n f o r g e t s

t h a t what freedoms we possess a r e based upon nine h~mdred

years o f s o c i a l d i r e c t i o n t h a t held sacred the idea of human
rights.

In h i s study Freedom i n the Xodern Vorld, Dewey summarized

his p o s i t i o n on the pomer t o a c t .

Like c h o i c e , tne power t o

a c t i s c a s t w i t h i n the s o c i a l and e x i s t e n t i a l m a t r i x of l a w
and custom.
The n o t i o n t h a t men a r e e q u a l l y f r e e t o a c t i f o n l y
irt h e same l e g a l arrangements a p p l y e q u a l l y t o a l l
r e s p e c t i v e of d i f f e r e n c e s i n e d u c a t i o n , i n command of
c a p i t a l , and the c o n t r o l of t h e s o c i a l environment which
i s f u r n i s h e d by the i n s t i t u t i o n of p r o p e r t y
i s a pure
a b s u r d i t y , as f a c t s have demonstrated. dince a c t u a l , t h a t
i s , e f f e c t i v e , r i g h t s and demands a r e products of i n t e r a c t i o n s , and a r e n o t found i n t h e o r i g i n a l and i s o l a t e d
cons ti t u t i o n of human n a t u r e , whether moral o r paycholog i c a l , mere e l i m i n a t i o n of o b s t r u c t i o n s i s n o t enough.
The l a t t e r merely l i b e r a t e s f o r c e and a b i l i t y a s that
happens t o be d i s t r i b u t e d by p a s t a c c i d e n t s of h i s t o r y .
T h i s ' f r e e t a c t i o n operates d i s a s t r o u s l y a s f a r as the
many a r e concerned. The only p o s s i b l e conclusion, b o t h
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y , i s that t h e a t t a i n m e n t
of freedom conceived a s power t o a c t i n accord w i t h choice
depends upon p o s i t i v e and c o n s t r u c t i v e changes i n s o c i a l
arrangementsel5

--

--

C l e a r l y , t o b r i n g about the p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom, b o t h choice

and a c t i o n must be combined.

And a l t h o u g h the b e s t combination

of the two depends upon c o n s t r u c t i v e s o c i a l change, t h e emphas i s must be placed on i n d i v i d u l a choice and a c t i o n , so t h a t

such changes can be a c t u a l i z e d .

I n o t h e r words, i t r e q u i r e s

i n d i v i d u a l understanding of t h e n a t u r e of freedom t o b r i n g
about s o c i a l freedoms.
The c e n t r a l problem i n understanding the n a t u r e of f r e e dom i s the r e l a t i o n s h i ~between choice and a c t i o n : "There i s
an i n t r i n s i c connection betneen choice as freedom and power of
I
a c t i o n asFreedom. B choice which i n t e l l i g e n t l y m a n i f e s t s i n d i -

v i d u a l i t y e n l a r g e s the ranGe of a c t i o n , and t h i s enlargement

i n t u r n c o n f e r s upon our d e s i r e s g r e a t e r i n s i g h t and f o r e 16
To choose and a c t
s i g h t , and makes choice rc:ore i n t e l l i g e n t . "

with i n t e l l i g e n t temporal a u t h o r i t y , hoaever, r e q u i r e s i n t e r a c t i o n with objective conditions, and s i n c e Dewey's d e f i n i t i o n of w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s "objective conditionst1 i s t o be found
within the pragmatic concept of r e a l i t y , the o n t o l o g i c a l queat i o n must be examined.

Jewey's a s s e r t i o n s on the nature of

objective conditions a l s o involves the i n t e r - r e l a t e d cosmolog i c a l question, i n order then, t o avoid excessive q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,
I w i l l r e f e r t o the o v e r a l l concern a s cosmo-ontological.

This c l a s s i c a l pre-occupation of the philosophers, the

s p e c u l a t i o n on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the nature of the universe and manta place i n i t , i s gaining new i n t e r e s t today.
For many years the question seemed t o be ignored o r thought
worthless o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n , b u t w i t h the wide advances i n s c i ence, p a r t i c u l a r l y b i o l o g i c a l science, the question has a g a i n
gained currency.

The problem only began t o have genuine f o r c e

when Darwin p u t man back i n t o nature a s a part of i t s contin17

Lkn l o s t his superior and independent r o l e when he could
uwn.
no longer claim a s p e c i a l s t a t u s removed from nature.

Obvious-

l y t h e question seeking an answer i s whether n a t u r a l laws, now

a p p l i c a b l e t o man, a r e the r e s u l t of determined o r i g i n beyond
man's c o n t r o l , o r whether such laws depend upon an e s s e n t i a l l y
unplanned universe where man's i n t e l l i g e n c e imposes order?
The f i r s t p a r t of the question hinges on the Darwinian cont e n t i o n t h a t man i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of nature.

Dewey would

r e j e c t the notion that n a t u r a l law i s determined by f o r c e s beyond our c o n t r o l .

To accept such a theory i s , i n e f f e c t , t o

accept a notion t h a t p l a c e s man i n a paradox.

Xe i s forced t o

l i v e a dual r o l e , s i n c e the force i n c o n t r o l i s " a p i r i t u outside

of nature.

'IT3hen the h i e r a r c h i c a l a s c e n t of nature t o mind

and t o i d e a l forms was disturbed by the conviction t h a t the

subject-matter of n a t u r a l science i s e x c l u s i v e l y physical and
mechanistic, t h e r e arose the d u a l i s t i c opposition o f matter
and s p i r i t , of nature and ultimate ends and goods..

[and].

..

Since man was on the one h m d a p a r t of nature and on the othe r hand a meuber of the realm of s p i r i t , a l l problems came t o
18

a focus i n h i s double nature."

Any f i x e d cosmological no-

t i o n denies the e x i s t e n t i a l nature of human discovery.

In

his book The Quest f o r C e r t a i n t y Dewey explains the need t o

transcend the f i x e d and l i m i t i n g concepts of n a t u r e .

The conditions and processes of nature generate uncert a i n t y and i t s r i s k s a s t r u l y a s nature a f f o r d s s e c u r i t y
and means of insuraiice a g a i n s t p e r i l s . Xature i s charact e r i z e d by a constant mixture of the precarious and the
s t a b l e . T h i s mixture gives poignancy t o existence. If
existence were e i t h e r completely necessary o r completely
contingent, there would be n e i t h e r comedy nor tragedy i n
l i f e , nor need of the v i l l t o l i v e . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of
morals and p o l i t i c s , of the a r t s b o t h t e c h n i c a l and f i n e ,
of r e l i g i o n and of science i t s e l f a s i n q u i r y and discovery,
a l l have t h e i r source and meaning i n the union i n Nature
of the s e t t l e d and the u n s e t t l e d , the s t a b l e and the hazardous. n p a r t f r o m this union, there a r e no such t h i n g s
a s 'ends' e i t h e r a s c o n s ~ a t i o n so r a s those ends-inview me c a l l purposes. 'ihere i s only a block universe,
e i t h e r something ended and admitting of no change, o r e l s e
a predestined march of events. There i s no such thing a s
f u l f i l l m e n t where there i s no r i s k of f a i l u r e , and no def e a t where there i s no promise of p o s s i b l e achievementalg
I t i s apparent v i t h i n the above quotation t h a t the idea

of man imposing order i s e q u a l l y troublesome.

Such a notion

f i n d s i t s beginning i n the attempt t o explain men and the a f f a i r s of men i n terms of science.

AS

the argument goes, if we

can e x p l a i n a l l of nature by reduction t o p h y s i c a l laws, we can

s u r e l y understand man, since he too must conform t o the sane
laws.

This curious quest f o r a new kind of c e r t a i n t y was i n i -

t i a t e d by an a c c e l e r a t i n g succession of d i s c o v e r i e s i n s c i e n c e ,
which i n t u r n provided t h e means t o q u e s t i o n the a l r e a d y f r a g menting o l d o r d e r s of Ohurch and S t a t e ,

But u n l i k e t h e e a r l i -

e r modela of man's p l a c e i n the u n i v e r s e , s a y , t h e H e a r t h of

Zeus o r t h e Great Chain of Being, t h e n e a cosmology l e f t o u t
social direction,

Z t h i c a l n o t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e n a t u r e of

freedom, were n e u t r a l i z e d by the m i s a p p l i c a t i o n o r misunders t a n d i n g of n a t u r a l l a m ,

I n h i s book I n s i g h t and Outlook,

Arthur icoestler contends t h a t " I t b h e new cosmology7 may be

d e s c r i b e d a s a s h i f t from 'guidance from above ' t o 'guidance
from below.'''

He goes on t o say:

I n p r e s c i e n t i f i c times the world was explained, and man's

a c t i o n s were guided from 'above, ' through the agency of
anthropomorphic c l e i t i e ~ . Yhe gods a e r z upward p r o j e c t i o n s of t h e human ima,e, e x t r a p o l a t i o n s of humanity on an
ascending s c a l e , ;Jut the sqectsrcuiar success of t h e new
methods of n a t u r a l science brought a d e c i s i v e change, f o r
molecules and atoras nere e x t r a p o l a t i o n s on a downward
s c a l e , Destiny from 'above ' had been b o t h an e x p l a n a t i o n
of the world and a guide t o conduct; d e s t i n y fro[:! 'below,
determined by e l e c t r o n s and quanta, was an e x p l a n a t i o n
b u t no l o n g e r a guide.20

In t h e same s t u d y , as w e l l a s Yhe ~ .,-c oft Greation and

aost

in

the Uchinir, K o e s t l e r p o i n t s out that s c i e n c e ' s e t h i c a l neut r a l i t y , coupled m i t h i t s prover? tae tllodolo&y, provides the

b e s t means thus far devised t o e ~ t u b l i s ha " n a t u r a l " s y s t e a of

s o c i a l and e t h i c a l d i r e c t i o n ,

..

- - o e s t l e r was h o p e f u l , a s ;vas

3ewey, t h a t "tile s p l i t be tveen reason and b e l i e f

F~iliJh e a l

and

resume i t s o r i g i n a l meaning a s b o t h a g u i d e
21
t o understand in^ and a guide t o conduct, "

X a t u r a l Law

will

Like X o e s t l e r , deaey s e e s temporal a u t h o r i t y born o u t of

of t h e metho& of s c i e n c e , and they s h a r e d the hope that tile
f a c t s of s c i e n c e nould provide tile means with which s o c i e t y

could r e a c h toward freedom, n o t w i t h s c i e n c e a s a panacea but

as a t o o l t o e s t a b l i s h new and more enduring s o c i a l v a l u e s .
I n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s cannot be achieved w i t h i n a u n i v e r s e beyond man's c o n t r o l , n o r i n a u n i v e r s e where
"guidance from below" precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of a n a t u r a l
teleology.

I n s h o r t , the " o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s " determined by

s c i e n t i f i c and common-sense o b s e r v a t i o n can a l s o a a t t o d e t e r mine t h e t r u t h o r f a l s i t y of s o c i a l value s t r u c t u r e s .

Some t h i r t y years b e f o r e K o e s t l e r wrote t h e above s t a t e ment, Dewey summed up h i s p o s i t i o n on the value of s c i e n t i f i c
me thodology as a n instrument t o develop human understanding.

It i s n o t pretended that a moral t h e o r y based upon

r e a l i t i e s of human n a t u r e and a s t u d y of the s p e c i f i c
connections of those r e a l i t i e s with those of p h y s i c a l
s c i e n c e would do away w i t h moral s t r u g g l e and d e f e a t .
I t would n o t make a moral l i f e as simple a m a t t e r as
wending o n e ' s way along a w e l l l i g h t e d boulevard. A l l
a c t i o n i s a n i n n s i o n of the f u t u r e , o f t h e unknown.
C o n f l i c t and u n c e r t a i n t y a r e u l t i m a t e t r a i t s . But
morals based on concern w i t h f a c t s and d e r i v i n g guidance
from them would a t l e a s t l o c a t e t h e p o i n t s of e f f e c t i v e
endeavor and would focus a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s upon them.
It would ~ u an
t end t o t h e impossible a t t e m u t t o l i v e i n
two u n r e l a t e d worlds. It would d e s t r o y f i x e d d i s t i n o t i o n
between the human and the p h y s i c a l , a s w e l l as t h a t between t h e moral and t h e i n d u s t r i a l and t h e p o l i t i c a l . A
morals based on study of human n a t u r e i n s t e a d of upon
d i s r e g a r d f o r i t would f i n d the f a c t s of man continuous
w i t h those of the r e s t o f n a t u r e and aould thereby a l l y
e t h i c s w i t h physics and biology. It would f i n d the
n a t u r e and a c t i v i t i e s of one person coterminous with
those of o t h e r human b e i n g s , and t h e r e f o r e l i n k e t h i c s 22
w i t h t h e s t u d y o f h i s t o r y , sociolo*y, law and economics.
( i t a l i c s added)
The i k p o s s i b i l i t y of l i v i n g i n b o t h a n i d e a l and r e a l world
i s t h e g r e a t e s t s i n g l e b a r r i e r t o the zchievement of freedom.

The s e p a r a t i o n of reason and b e l i e f ruakes choice and a c t i o n

a b s t r a c t i o n s , i d e a s u n r e l a t e d t o t h e f a c t s of human n a t u r e .
i f t h e -:~orld i s a l r e a d y
And the i ~ p l i c a t i o n sa r e profound, f o r "-

done and done f o r , i f i t s c h a r a c t e r i s e n t i r e l y achieved s o

that i t s behavior i s l i k e that of a nan l o s t i n a r o u t i n e ,

then t h e only freedom f o r which a man can hope i s one of e f ficiency i n overt action.

But

if cha.nge

i s genuine, i f a c -

counts a r e s t i l l i n process of making, and i f o b j e c t i v e uncert a i n t y i s the s t i ~ u l u st o r e f l e c t i o n , then v a r i a t i o n i n a c t i o n ,

23

n o v e l t y and e x p e r i e n c e , have a t r u e meaning.''

To conclude t h i s e x n l o r a t i o n i n t o t h e pragmatic n a t u r e of

freedom, an i s s u e t h a t w i l l be a g a i n touched upon i n oonjunct i o n w i t h the Tneory of Inquiry and of Value, I w i l l o u t l i n e

my own e v a l u a t i o n s of the Deweyan p h i l o s o p h i c a l overview.

Ae

I o r i g i n a l l y claimed, freedon: i s trle touchstone of pragmatism,

b u t I have taken p a i n s t o shox thzit t h e n o t i o n of freedom i s

i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o the o v e r a l l philosophy of pragmatism,
So t o sum up, pragmatism o f f e r s a n o p t i m i s t i c outlook

tempered by a n h o n e s t r e c o g n i t i o n of tne c h a r a c t e r of p r e s e n t
knowledge and experience,

I do n o t hold t h a t acience w i l l

s o l v e a l l problems b u t nor do t h e p r a g m a t i s t s .

The c e n t r a l

f e a t u r e of pragmatism i s t h a t i t does n o t o f f e r u n i v e r s a l and

e t e r n a l s o l u t i o n s t o a l l of human a f f a i r s , b u t t h i s d e t r a c t s
n o t one w h i t from i t s usefulness i n d e a l i n g w i t h the world,
e i t h e r p h y s i c a l l y o r metaphysically,

Yragmatisn r e p r e s e n t s

a l o n g awaited weaning from a c h i l d i s h q u e s t f o r c e r t a i n t y

and f i n a l i t y ; the r e j e c t i o n of the d u a l i t y of r e a l and i d e a l

i s a e t e p t h a t goes f a r toward opening up l a r g e r v i s t a s f o r

I- the i n f l u e n c e of man.
\

1 pragmatic

\
t

\ is
5-

I n e f f e c t , t h e r e s u l t of h o l d i n g the

view i s e f a i t h that d i s p o s e s one t o maximize what

i n h e r e n t l y human.

l l n i s p a r t of n s t u r e and s o a l s o a r e

consistent relations.

To the e x t e n t t h a t man becomes aware

of t h e s e r e l a t i o n s through i n q u i r y , and i n t u r n d i r e c t s them

t o his ovm d e s i r e s i n s i d e of experience, he f u l f i l l s himself
i n his world.

W l l i a m James once remarked that l i f e i s o f

'

l i t t l e account i f man i s l i m i t e d by what he cannot k n o w .

'

mission t o a l i f e - s t y l e d i r e c t e d from f o r c e s o u t s i d e of ex-

Sub-

p e r i e n c e , i s , p l a i n and simple, a s u b t l e kind of s l a v e r y .

& e t h e r or n o t man's r o l e i n the u n i v e r s e i s f i n i t e and miniac u l e may be answered i n t h e f u t u r e , b u t u n t i l the answer i s
known i t would seem pragmatic t o p l a y t h a t r o l e w i t h s t r e n g t h ,
courage and t h e abundant i n t e l l i g e n c e now a v a i l a b l e t o man,

S e c t i o n One: p a r t one

1 John Dewey, On Expgrience

, S a t u r e , and P'reedom, ed. Richard

J. Berns t e i n ( ~ e wYork: Bobbs-Kerrill, 1960 ) , pp. 286-87.

2

John Dewey, Human

ilature and Conduct (ilew York: Eodern
L i b r a r y , 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 278.

John Dewey, Reconstruction i n Y h i l o s o ~ h(3oston:

~
Beacon
P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 207.
.--

Uewey, n i x p e r i e n c e , chap. d l i .

John Dewey, "The Xeed f o r a iiecovery of r h i l o s o p h y , "

e n c e(ilei-~York: Eenry Xolt
c-r e a t i v e -I n t e l l i ~---55-6.

, 1917 ) , pp.

Section One: p a r t one

XC'i'AS
--

(cont, )

Dewey, Human Xature, pp. 278-79.

Dewey, On ijxperience, p . 263.

John Dewey, The Q,uest f o r C e r t a i n t y ( ~ e wYork: Capricorn

Booksy 19601, p . 250.

AS

Dewey explains i n Quest f o r Certainty:

7e a r e f r e e i n the degree i n which we a c t knowing what
we a r e about. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of freedom with " f r e e dom of ~ v i l l " l o c a t e s contingency i n the wrong place. Contingency of w i l l would mean t h a t u n c e r t a i n t y was uncert a i n l y d e a l t with; i t would be a r e s o r t t o chance f o r a
decision. The business of " s v i l l " i s t o be r e s o l u t e ; t h a t
i s , t o r e s o l v e , under the guidance of thought, the indeterminateness of u n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s . Choice wavers
and i s brought t o a head a r b i t r a r i l y only when circwnstances compel a c t i o n and y e t we have no i n t e l l i g e n t clew as
t o how t o a c t . p. 250.

10 9eweyY Human Liature, pp. 8-9.

11 Uetvey, On Experience, p . 266.

15

Lewey, On Lmgrience, pp. 271-72

17

John Dezqey, "The influence of Uarwinism on l'hilosophy ,'I

S e c t i o n One: p a r t one

ilOrJXS (cont )

C l a s s i c American Y h i l o s o - ~ h e r a ,ed, b h x H. Fiech ( ~ e wYork:

Appelton-Century-Crof $8, 19511, pp. 336-44.
18

Dewey, w e s t , p. 53.

19

Dewey, ~ u e s t ,pp. 243-44,

20

k r t h u r K o e s t l e r , Insight and C:utlook (Zew York: hkacmillan,

19491, p. 231.
21

K o e s t l e r , I n s i g h t , p . 234,

22

Yewey, Human l a t u r e , pp. 12-3.

23

Dewey, -n

I h t u r e , p. 284.

On Inquiry. Truth and lhowledae

Dewey's Theory of I n q u i r y l e a d s us back t o t h e e a r l i e r

i
I

d i s c u s s i o n on the c l a s s i c a l d u a l i t y o f r e a l and i d e a l .

As

we

have seen, man a t t e m p t s t o l i v e i n two u n r e l a t e d worlds i n a

number of mays.

'

One of t h e more important m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of

t h i s d u a l i t y can be observed i n the s e p a r a t i o n of "knowing"

from "doing."

fieason i s seen as a n a c t of "mind" divorced

-.

from the v u l g a r and conscon world of t h e p r a c t i c a l .

The i d e a

t h a t knowing i s a p a s s i v e and h i g h e r a c t , one of man's l o f % i e r

endeavors , has become i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of reason.
+*

The p r e s e n t day concept of s c i e n c e i s a r e -

f l e c t i o n of this d e f i n i t i o n .

But i t has a long h i s t o r y , begin-

ning w i t h the Greeks who were the f i r s t t o s e p a r a t e t h e o r y

from p r a c t i c e .

--

To them t h e s t u d y of s c i e n t i f i c phenomenon was

b o t h a cosmological puzzle and a s o r t of h i g h l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d

game enjoyed by t h e l e i s u r e c l a s s .

To t h e Greek p h i l o s o p h e r s

t h e p r a c t i c a l a r t s and c r a f t s were thought t o be o u t s i d e o r

beneath t h e i r concern.

Yheir world vas more s u i t e d t o a pre-

--occupation w i t h e t h i c s , music and matherilatics.

Lince the

g r e a t i n f l u e n c e of the Greeks has been acknowledged and chroni c l e d by the h i s t o r i a n s of philosophy and s c i e n c e , i t mould
seem redundant t o d e t a i l the acceptance of the Greek worldview from a n c i e n t t o ~ ~ e d i a e vand
d modern times.
:';bi tehead s famous rermrlc that

I'

Professor

the s a f e s t g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r -

i z a t i o n of the Zuropean p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n i s that i t

c o n s i s t s i n a a e r i e s of f o o t n o t e s t o P l a t o , " i s a s v a l i d today
a s i t was on t h e day i t was w r i t t e n ,

K o e s t l e r claims i t should

be amended t o r e a d "science, up t o t h e Renaissance, c o n s i s t e d

1
i n a s e r i e s of f o o t n o t e s t o A r i s t o t l e . " S u f f i c e i t t o s a y t h a t
modern epistomology s t i l l s u f f e r s from t h e Greek conception of
science.
--,

There a r e t h r e e c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t stem from the

--

- .,. . .,

i; : ,,

\;

knowing-doing d u a l i t y ,

For one, "knowledge" became the means

of seeking o u t and confirming the e x i s t e n c e of a n u l t i m a t e

Being.

Indeed, the o r i g i n a l o n t o l o g i c a l argument was devel-

oped a s a method t o prove the e x i s t e n c e of a Erime Uover, and

soon became t h e C h r i s t i a n argucaent f o r the e x i s t e n c e of God,
The second, the p r o c e s s of "knowing," became t h e mere g a t h e r -

,- i n g
I

of i n f o r m a t i o n without purpose.

And t h i r d , the conception

of "mind" was born, n o t an a c t i v e , changing and e v e r c h a l l e n g i n g mind, b u t a passive r e c i p i e n t of p r e v i o u s "knowledge.

"

L?.

Dewey claimed t h a t a l l t h r e e could be d e s c r i b e d as t h e ~ p e c t a t o r t h e o r y of knowledge.

I n c o n t r a s t , 3emeyts apistomology s e e s knowing gg doing,

\
1

The p r o c e s s of knowing c r e a t e s more problems f o r knowing.

ns

a n i l l u s t r a t i o n , suppose a problem i n l i t e r a t u r e was t o be examined, s a y t h e c h a r a c t e r of the 2001 i n King Lear.

'+':ith t h e

f i r s t r e a d i n g the s t u d e n t i s normally confused, he d o e s n ' t

"know" t h e Pool b u t some ifipressions have l e f t t h e i r mark.
J i t h a second r e a d i n g those f i r s t impressions, i n conjunction

w i t h secondary impressions, may l e a v e h i m l e s s confused b u t

with more problems f o r knowing, s i n c e t h e F o o l ' s c h a r a c t e r
i
becomes r i c h e r v i i t h f a m i i a r i t y and a s s o c i a t i o n , say, w i t h t h e

Pool i n TwelFth Xight, or s i t t i n g a t the n e x t desk.

&en i f

the " l a s t word" on t h e Fool k s been s a i d , o t h e r a s p e c t s of

t h e p l a y w i l l become s u b j e c t m a t t e r f o r examination,

They

too w i l l become problems f o r knowing.

never ending and never f i n a l .

The q u e s t i s on-going,

Iiowever, the r e a d i n g i t s e l f

remains w o r t h l e s s if i t remains passive.

If t h e reading i s

unapplied t h e s t u d e n t i s merely g a t h e r i n g informa t i on, and thus

i s c o n c d d i n g t o the s p e c t a t o r theory o f knowledge.

If a p p l i e d ,

i n l e t us say, the development of a deeper understanding of

human behavior, and i n t u r n a c t e d upon, h i s knowledge of s e l f
and s o c i e t y w i l l broaden.

Only t o the e x t e n t t h a t a c t i o n i s

undertaken v i l l his a b i l i t y t o a c t u a l i z e i n d i v i d u a l freedoms

be widened.
Yhere i s a c o n s t a n t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f problems through
2

tile i n t e r a c t i o n of the knower and h i s s u b j e c t m a t t e r .

re-

c o n s t r u c t i o n that can take place on any l e v e l of c o g n i t i o n :

emotionally, as i n l i s t e n i n g t o a symphony o r viewing a f i l m ;
i n work, as a mechanic a t t e m p t s t o r e p a i r a f a u l t y f u e l pump;
o r i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , a s a m t h e m a t i c i a n works on a problem i n
calculus.
k r a g n a t i c i n q u i r y i s the c o n t r o l l e d proceas of knowin&.
I t i s e x i s t e n t i a l l y based on tile experimental and p r a c t i c a l

i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s of s c i e n c e ~ n c common
.
endeavor,

The gen-

e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of i n q u i r y i s provided by dewey i n Logic: The

Theory
-

of I n a u i r y .

Inquiry i s the directed or controlled transformation

of an indeterminate s i t u a t i o n i n t o a d e t e m i n a t e l y unif i e d one. The t r a n s i t i o n i s achieved by rrleans of opera t i o n s of two kinds whicn a r e i n f u n c t i o n a l corresrjoildence with e a c h o t h e r . One kind of o k e r a t i o n d e a l s w i t h

i d e a t i o n a l or conceptual subject-matter. This s u b j e c t matter stands f o r p o s s i b l e ways 2nd ends of r e s o l u t i o n ,

.The other kind of operation i s made up of a c t i v i t i e s
involving the techniques and organs of observations,
Since these operations a r e e x i s t e n t i a l they modify the
p r i o r e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n , b r i n g i n t o high r e l i e f cond i t i o n ~previously obscure.. ,The ground and c r i t e r i o n of
the execution of t h i s work of emphasis, s e l e c t i o n and
arrangement, i s t o d e l i m i t the problem i n such a way t h a t
e x i s t e n t i a l m a t e r i a l may be provided with which t o t e a t
the i d e a s t h a t r e p r e s e n t p o s s i b l e modes of s o l u t i o n .
Symbols, d e f i n i n g terms and propositions, c a r r y forward
e a t i o n a l and e x i s t e n t i a suhject-matters i n order
problem may be

..

The c r u c i a l f e a t u r e of Dewey's epistemology then i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and formation of the problem within a n e x i a t e n t i a l

matrix

-- f r o m which

the problem i s given and taken

-- and a n

i s o l a t i o n of the remaining doubtful and p ~ p l e x i n gf e a t u r e s ,

i n terms o f a d e s i r e d end,
The f i r s t condition necessary t o s t i m u l a t e i n q u i r y i s a n
indeterminate s i t u a t i o n , o r more simply, doubt.

But doubt i s

continuous because of the nature o f r e a l i t y , which a s we have

'

seen, i s a boundless, changing, i n i t i a l l y u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d

e
t o an ocean. Out of t h i s ocean r e l a experience,
a
p
t
l
y
ldkned
A
t i o n s become e x p l i c i t , thereby a l l o a i n g s u b j e c t s and o b j e c t s
t o develop.

But they remain u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d u n t i l an i n q u i r y

i s underway, f o r " t h i n g s i n t h e i r immediacy a r e unknown and

unknowable, not because they a r e remote o r behind some impenet r a b l e v e i l of sensation of i d e a s , b u t because knowledge has
no concern with them,

For knowledge i s a memorandum of con-

d i t i o n s of t h e i r appearance, concerned, t h a t i s , w i t h sequen4

c e s , co-existences,

relations,"

From t h i s conception of r e a l -

i t y the p e r t i n e n t pragmatic assumptions about t r u t h , f a l s i t y

and the worth of inquiry a r i s e .

Charles P e i r c e , Dewey's i n t e l l e c t u a l mentor, wrote extens i v e l y on the worth of i n q u i r y a s a method of proof,

"The

i r r i t a t i o n of doubt i s the only immediate motive f o r the s t r u g He goes on t o say:

gle to a t t a i n belief,"

It i s c e r t a i n t l y b e s t f o r us t h a t our b e l i e f s should be
such a s may t r u l y guide our a c t i o n s s o a s t o s a t i s f y our
d e s i r e s ; and t h i s r e f l e c t i o n w i l l make us r e j e c t every
b e l i e f which does n o t seem t o have been s o formed a s t o
i n s u r e this r e s u l t , But i t w i l l only do so by c r e a t i n g
a doubt i n the place of that b e l i e f . Xith the doubt,
t h e r e f o r e , the s t r u g g l e begins, and w i t h t h e c e s s a t i o n
of doubt i t ends, Hence, the s o l e o b j e c t o f i n q u i r y i s
the s e t t l e m e n t of opinion. .de may fancy t h a t this i s n o t
enough f o r us, and t h a t we seek, n o t merely an opinion,
b u t a t r u e opinion, But put t h i s fancy t o the t e s t , and
i t proves groundless; f o r a s soon as a f i r m b e l i e f i s
reached we a r e e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i e d , whether the b e l i e f be
t r u e or f a l s e , And i t i s c l e a r that nothing out of the
sphere of our knowledge can be our o b j e c t , f o r nothing
which does n o t a f f e c t the mind can be the motive f o r
mental a c t i o n , The m o s t t h a t can be maintained i s , that
we seek f o r a b e l i e f t h a t we s h a l l t h i n k t o be t r u e .
But we t h i n k each one of our b e l i e f s t o be t r u e , and,
indeed, i t i s nere tautology t o say s o o 5
I n t h e same essay Eeirce examines t r a d i t i o n a l philoso6

p h i c a l methods used t o s e t t l e opinion,

making i t c l e a r that

i n q u i r y based on the p r a c t i c a l methodology of science, i s by

f a r the b e s t system.

I n order t o j u s t i f y t h i s claim, however,

he makes h i s assumptions about r e a l i t y e x p l i c i t , and o u t l i n e s

the methodology of science,

IIe a s s e r t s t h a t p r a c t i c a l l y aAd

experimentally science must d e a l with r e a l things, the v e r i f i a b l e , o b j e c t i v e f a c t s of c o m m o n O ~ t h, a t the process

i s i n no way s u r e of f i n a l r e s u l t s , only of 2 o s s i b l e r e s u l t s .

I n science, a s i n comnon sense, "we seek f o r a b e l i e f t h a t we

s h a l l t h i n k t o be true."
H i s answer t o the old philosophical c o n c e i t on the e x i s -

tence or non-existence of " r e a l " t h i n g s , sums up the essence

of pragmatic ontology.

He a s k s us t o c o n s i d e r what e f f e c t s

of a p r a c t i c a l nature we want the o b j e c t s of our conception

t o have, i n this case " r e a l s , " and then p o i n t s out t h a t the

conception of theae e f f e c t s i s the mhole of the conception o f
the o b j e c t .

A l l e l s e i s s p e c t u l a t i v e and outside proof, b o t h

7

"antecedent t o r e f l e c t i v e inquiry and independent of it.

Yeirce, by claiming a n e x i s t e n t i a l ontology a s a base
f o r his concept o f " r e a l s , " i s a b l e t o s u b s t a n t i a t e i n q u i r y
aa the b e s t avenue t o t r u t h

-- b u t

t r u t h of a f u n c t i o n a l na-

t u r e , which a s we shall s e e , means the v e r i f i a b l e and nothing

else.

A s he w r i t e s :

It may be asked how 3: know t h e r e a r e any iieals.. .The

r e p l y i s t h i s . . . I f i n v e s t i g a t i o n cannot be regarded a s
proving t h a t t h e r e a r e d e a l t h i n g s , i t a t l e a s t does
n o t l e a d t o a c o n t r a r y conclusion; b u t the method and
conception on which i t i s based remain ever i n harmony.
So doubts of the method, t h e r e f o r e , n e c e s s a r i l y a r i s e
from i t s practice...The f e e l i n g which g i v e s r i s e t o any
method of f i x i n g b e l i e f i s a d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n a t two r e pugnant propositions. But here a l r e a d y i s a vague concession t h a t there i s some
thing, which a propzsition
should represent. Uobody, t h e r e f o r e , can r e a l l y doubt
t h a t t h e r e a r e not Heals, f o r , i f he d i d , doubt aould
not be a source of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . The hypothesis,
t h e r e f o r e , i s one which every mind admits. So t h a t the
s o c i a l impulse does not cause men t o doubt i t o 8

Y e i r c e l s contentions do not pretend t o be the keys t o

f i n a l i t y or certainty.

The "contrary coilclusion" t h a t he n o t e s

implies t h a t the end of i n v e s t i g a t i o n cannot be regarded as

i r r e f u t a b l y proving the case one way or the o t h e r ; i f "proofN
must equal "absolute , I t

then the method i s inadaquate.

Jhen

t h i s i s recognized i t becomes c l e a r that the Theory of Inquiry,

although avoiding c o n t r a d i c t i o n , i s simply n o t s a t i s f a c t o r y
f o r those seeking c e r t a i n t y .

P e i r c e does n o t make any claims

f o r c e r t a i n t y , b u t he does very d e f i n i t e l y make the claim of

u t i l i t y f o r i n q u i r y i n the f i x a t i o n of b e l i e f .

A claim p e r f e c t -

l y c o n s i s t e n t with a philosophy t h a t o n t o l o g i c a l l y f i x e s on a
recognition of the temporal and changing n a t u r e of man's world.
Truth and knowledge a r e s i m i l a r l y f r e e from absolute
definition.

Relative t r u t h and r e l a t i v e knowledge hold the

hope of a changing, growing and more timely system of s o c i a l

direction.

In Reconstruction i n l ? h i l o s o ~ hJewey
~
asks t h a t we

r e j e c t the Greek concept of a b s o l u t e knowledge and replace i t

with e x i s t e n t i a l and p r a c t i c a l meaning; e r a s e the A r i s t o t e l i a n
f o o t n o t e , so t o speak.

An a c t that would allow us t o turn

philosophy i n t o a c r i t i c a l and a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n human

#

affairs.
m e n the p r a c t i c e of knowledge ceased t o be d i a l e c t i c a l
and became experimental, knowing became pre-occupied w i t h
changes and the t e s t of howledge became t h e a b i l i t y t o
b r i n g about c e r t a i n changes. Ihowing, f o r the experimental sciences, means a c e r t a i n kind 02 i n t e l l i g e n t l y
conducted doing; i t ceases t o be contemplative and becomes i n a t r u e sense p r a c t i c a l . iiow this implies t h a t
philosophy, unless i t i s t o undergo a complete break
with the authorized s p i r i t of science, must a l s o a l t e r
i t s nature. It must a e s m e a p r a c t i c a l nature.. .9
And i n h i s major study on epistemology, Ax~e-rienceand Hature,
he d e f i n e s the term t r u t h .

''Truth i s a c o l l e c t i o n of t r u t h s ;

and these c o n s t i t u e n t t r u t h s a r e i n keeping with the b e s t

a v a i l a b l e methods of i n q u i r y and t e s t i n g a s t o m a t t e r s - o f - f a c t ;
methods, which a r e , when c o l l e c t e d under a s i n g l e name, science."
There i s , i n f a c t , l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e between t r u t h and
knowledge except i n the temporal sense: one g i v e s b i r t h t o tne

1 other.
\

Knowledge i s a c o n s t a n t l y evolving process that i s , i n

'

e f f e c t , on the way t o becoming t r u t h

--

I n short, knowledge i s

i n t e l l i g e n t doinc, where t r u t h i s the r e s u l t of i n t e l l i g e n t

10

f -

\ doing,

Knowledge then, once the ob-iect of science, i s used i n

a more d i r e c t and u n i v e r s a l sense, t o achieve the consummation

of i n t e n t i o n .

Only t o the e x t e n t t h a t i t a c c o m ~ l i s h e sthis

consummation can i t be s a i d t o demonstrate t r u t h .

To sum up, the means of accomplishment a r e r e l a t i v e l y
simple and imminently p r a c t i c a l .

It begins with a problem

f o r knowing, which causes p e r p l e x i t y , doubt and confusion, an

"indeterminate s i t u a t i o n . "

The second s t e p c o n s i s t s o f ex-

amining the immediate p o s s i b i l i t i e s , of i s o l a t i n g the problem.

The t h i r d , a c a r e f u l study of a l l f a c t o r s surrounding the
problem, a compilation of f a c t s , o f t r u t h s p e r t i n e n t t o i t , i n
order t o b r i n g about deeper understanding,

Fourth, the devel-

opment and widening of a t e n a t i v e hypothesis f o r p r e o i s i o n and

consistency, t o allom f o r speculative examination i n a broader
context,

F i f t h , a d e c l a r a t i o n of a c t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y aimed

a t e x i s t i n g , e x i s t e n t i a l a f f a i r s , and, t o t e s t the hypothesis,

11

the a c t i o n i t s e l f ,

The f o u r t h and f i f t h s t e p s r e p r e s e n t t h e

experimental and instrumental d i r e c t i o n of the inquiry.

To

s t o p before these s t e p s a r e taken i s t o guarantee a t r i a l and

e r r o r i n q u i r y w i t h s l i g h t chance of success.

These f i v e s t e p s

- could be c a l l e d the "theory" of i n q u i r y , o r a properly d i r e c -

t g d r e f l e c t i v e experience.

Gut as I have shown, every one of

the s t e p s involved i s i n some way i n t e r - r e l a t e d with the pragmatic n o t i o n s of knowledge, experience, the nature of r e a l i t y
and t r u t h and f a l s i t y ,

Only through a comprehensive under-

standing of these terms can i n q u i r y be c o n s i s t e n t l y ;vorkable.

Those who doubt the v a l i d i t y of i n q u i r y a s a u n i v e r s a l l y
a p p l i c a b l e means t o s e t t l e opinion, base t h e i r doubt l e s s on

the above o u t l i n e d s y s t e ~thm on mhat they see t o be a l i m i t a t i o n of scope,

The argument goes, a s a me thodology i n q u i r y

could be q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l , so long a s the s u b j e c t matter

remains within science,

But when Dewey speaks of t r u t h a s

"processes of change s o d i r e c t e d t h a t they achieve an intended

c o n s ~ m m a t i o n , he
~ d e a l s out morality,

Dewey a n t i c i p a t e d such

r e a c t i o n ; "To g e n e r a l i z e the recognition t h a t [truth]

means

the v e r i f i e d and means nothing e l s e placea upon men the respons i b i l i t y f o r surrendering p o l i t i c a l and moral dams, and
s u b j e c t i n g t o the t e s t of consequences t h e i r most cheriahed
12
prejudices

."

The crux o f most human p e r p l e x i t i e s i n everyday a f f a i r s

i s the angry j u x t a p o s i t i o n of values.

Dewey, i n s t e a d of ne-

g l e c t i n g values, pointed the way f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g new values

-L

i n the face of change.

H i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t m n s t o p the

f u t i l e attempt t o l i v e i n two unrelated worlds, forced the

i s s u e of values out of the d a r k of metaphysical s p e c t u l a t i o n
and i n t o the hard l i g h t of day.

Section One: p a r t two

Arthur Koestler, The dleepval&rs: A History of Nan's

Chawing
-

Vision of the Universe (Hew York: Grosset and

Dunlap, 1963), p a 53.

John Dewey and n r t h u r F. Bentley, Xhowini;r, and the Known
( ~ o s t o n :Beacon P r e s s , 1949), c h p , 5.

S e c t i o n One: p a r t two

11OrTZ5
-(cont )

John Dewey, L o ~ i c :The Tneory of I n a u i r y ( ~ e wYork: H o l t ,

H i n e h a r t and Vinston, 1 9 6 0 ) , pp. 104-05.

John Dewey, 3 x p e r i e n c e and ITature (Xew York: Dover Publ i c a t i o n s , 1 9 5 8 ) , p. 86.

C h a r l e s Y e i r c e , "The F i x a t i o n of B e l i e f , " P h i l o s o ~ h i &

m i t i n e s of k e i r c e , ed. S u s t u s E u c h l e r (liew York: Dover

P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1 9 5 5 ) , pp. 10-11.
6

P e i r c e , P h i l o s ~ ~ i c a.:ritings,
l

pp. 15-17.

John Dewey, The Q u e s t f o r C e r t a i n a (New York: Capricorn

Books, 1 9 6 0 ) ~p. 69.

k e i r c e , k h i l o s o a h i c a l ;'iritings, pp. 18-19,

John Dewey, i i e c o n e t r u c t i o n i n 2hilosoi;hy ( ~ o s t o n :Beacon

P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 121.

10

Dewey, i i x ~ e r i e n c eand Xature, p. 410

12

Dewey, H e c o n s t r u c t i o n , p . 160

On Value a q u h e C r i t i c s m of B e l i e f s

Both Dewey and Yeirce regarded t h e end of i n q u i r y t o be

the f i x a t i o n of b e l i e f s o r the e l i m i n a t i o n of doubt, a n i d e a
u s u a l l y m i s i n t e r p r e t e d as a l i m i t a t i o n of the u t i l i t y of i n q u i r y when c o n t r o v e r s i s l hurran v a l u e s a r e involved.

Inquiry

i s seen a s u s e f u l only i n s e t t l i n g q u e s t i o n s of t r u t h o r

f a l s i t y , as a kind of wordy, complex and s o p h i a t i c a t e d Venn

But i n no way can i n q u i r y be seen i n s o l i m i t e d a

Diagram.
light.

I n q u i r y i s used a s a method t o c r i t i c i z e and c l a r i f y

meaning; n o t t o f i x c e r t a i n t y or f i n a l i t y , b u t t o e x i s t e n t i a l l y examine human a f f a i r s .

I n E x ~ e r i e n c eand iqature Dewey

a s s e r t e d that " t h e realm of meanings i s wider than t h a t of

true-and-false meanings; i t Bhe c l a r i f y i n g of meanin4 i s
more u r g e n t and more f e r t i l e . ' '

He then went on t o s a y ,

When t h e claim of meanings t o t r u t h e n t e r s i n , then

t r u t h i s indeed pre-eminent. But t h i s f a c t i s o f t e n
confused w i t h the i d e a that t r u t h has a claim t o e n t e r
evsryvhere ; t h a t i t has a monopolistic j u r i s d i c t i o n .
P o e t i c meanings, moral memings, a l a r g e p a r t of the
gooda of l i f e are m a t t e r s of r i c h n e s s and freedom of
meanings, r a t h e r t h n of t r u t h ; a l a r g e p a r t of our l i f e
i a c a r r i e d on i n a realm of meanings t o nhicri t r u t h and
f a l s i t y as such a r e i r r e l e v a n t . And t h e claim of p h i l o sophy t o r i v a l o r d i s p l a c e s c i e n c e as a purveyor of
t r u t h seems t o be mostly a compensatory g e s t u r e f o r
f a i l u r e t o perform i t s proper t a s k of l i b e r a t i n g and
c l a r i f y i n g meanings, i n c l u d i n g those s c i e n t i f i c a l l y
authenticated

.l

4s we have seen e a r l i e r , h1o::lin;;

'

'

l e d change

--

--

t h e means t o c o n t r o l -

i s tile r e s u l t of making e x p l i c i t an opinion

about sonething and t e s t i n g i t e x i s t e n t i a l l y .

It m a t t e r s

l i t t l e whether the opinion t o 'ne t e s t e d i s n a t u r a l o r supern a t u r a l , s i n c e a l l opinions a r e rooted i n hurilan a f f a i r s and

2

a r e products of experience.

Thus i n q u i r y i s a s v a l i d a

system i n h i s t o r i c a l and l i t e r a r y examination a s i t i s i n

b i o l o g i c a l or mathematical theorizing.

'' khd d i f f e r e n c e

in

s u b j e c t - m a t t e r s i s n o t incompatible w i t h the e x i s t e n c e of a
3

kf

common p a t t e r n

i n q u i r d i n b o t h types."

The connection of knowledge w i t h b e l i e f i s fundamental

t o the pragmatic n o t i o n of value, and again the question of
t r a d i t i o n a l dualism i s r a i s e d .

,
\

<

"As a n a t u r a l h i s t o r y of

mind [the n o t i o n that mind and n a t u r e a r e s e p a r a t q i s wholly

mythological.

A11

some b e l i e f . . . I n

knowing and e f f o r t t o know starts from

every i n s t a n c e , from p a s s i n g query t o e l a b -

o r a t e s c i e n t i f i c undertaking, the a r t of knowing c r i t i c i z e s

a b e l i e f which has passed c u r r e n t as genuine c o i n , w i t h a view
4

t o i t s revision,"
This "wholly mythological" n o t i o n , stemming from the

s e p a r a t i o n of b e l i e f from reason, f i n d s i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l

beginnings i n the severance of s u b j e c t from o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y .

I n c o n t r a s t , Dewey h o l d s t h a t tne s u b j e c t i v e s i d e of the sub-

i j e c t - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i t s e l f a p a r t of nature.

Opin-

i o n s about what i s the t r u t h are e q u a l l y as v e r i f i a b l e a s i s

t r u t h i t s e l f , and i n this sense philosophy becomes the c r i t i cism of b e l i e f s .

Philosophy does n o t have tne t r u t h .

There

i s no reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t the imminent domain of t r u t h i s

i n the "mind" of the philosopher, o r f o r that m a t t e r , i n t h e
" s p i r i t " of the theologian.
This view i s o f t e n c r i t i c i z e d a s taking away the d i g n i t y

of philosophy; that philosophy by j o i n i n g w i t h c o r i o n concerns

and p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s becomes simply a n instrument of s o c i a l
reform.

But s u r e l y t h e common concern of a 2 men, i n c l u d i n g

philosophers and t h e o l o g i a n s , must be s o c i a l reform.

If the

philosopher wishes t o r e t a i n his world of Olympian a l o o f n e s s ,

t h a t i s q u i t e a l l r i g h t , b u t his wisdom should t e l l him t h a t
s o c i a l d i s a s t e r i s a very g r e a t p o s s i b i l i t y ; d i s a s t e r of such
magnitude t h a t i t would take with i t b o t h the v a l l e y s of
v u l g a r concern and Olympus.

~ n idn this sense philosophy must

become the c r i t i c i s m o f b e l i e f s .
The c e n t r a l reason f o r t h e s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e confusion
i s the r e t r e a t of most p h i l o s o p l ~ i e si n t o t h e p o s i t i o n that

s u b j e c t i v i t y i s n o t open t o s c i e n c e , that the only s c i e n t i f i c

method worth t h a t name i s q u a n t i t a t i v e measurement.

As Dewey

warns i n Zxperience and Cature :

D e s i r e s , b e l i e f s , ' p r a c t i c a l ' a c t i v i t y , values are
a t t r i b u t e d exclusively t o the h w n subject; this d i v i s i o n i s what makes s u b j e c t i v i t y a s n a r e and a p e r i l .
The case of b e l i e f i s c r u c i a l . For i t i s admitted t h a t
b e l i e f i n v o l v e s a phase of acquiescence o r a s s e r t i o n ,
i t p r e s e n t s q u a l i t i e s which involve p e r s o n a l f a c t o r s ;
and.. .value. A sI?i?rp l i n e of demarcation has t h e r e f ore
t o be drawn between b e l i e f and knowledge, f o r t h e l a t t e r has been d e f i n e d i n terms of pure o b j e c t i v i t y . The
need t o c o n t r o l b e l i e f i s a d m i t t e d ; knowledge f i g u r e s ,
even though a c c o r d i n g t o these t h e o r i e s only per g&c i d e n s , a s the organon of such c o n t r o l . P r a c t i c a l l y
then, i n e f f e c t , knowledge, s c i e n c e , t r u t h , i s the method of determining r i g h t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n b e l i e f s on
t h e p a r t of p e r s o n a l factor^.^
C l e a r l y , j u s t a s knowledge which has come t o be considered
" o b j e c t i v e H a r i s e s from r e a l i t y , s o t o o does value.

Value i s

only o u t s i d e of experience when human i d e a s a s t o good and

6

i
. I

bad a r e considered t o be o u t s i d e of r e a l i t y .

i)eweyVsp o s i t i o n ,

L of c o u r s e , r e j e c t s the n o t i o n that v a l u e s a r e somehow " e t e r n a l "

,--

o r " i r r e f u t a b l e , " that they a r e ends i n themselves.

'

But I

shall have more t o s a y on t h i s i n b o t h s e c t i o n two and t h r e e .

Dewey's conception of r e a l i t y , that a l l mant s experience

l i e s w i t h i n i t and has r e f e r e n c e t o i t , t h e r e b y producing
v a l u e s , allows t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t i n q u i r y i s u n i v e r s a l l y applicable.

A s i n a l l human a f f a i r s , however, t h e r e i s the

q u e s t i o n of end r e s u l t s .

But t o s e e k o u t c e r t a i n t y i n value

i s as f r u i t l e s s a t a s k a s i t i s i n s c i e n c e , f o r l i k e s c i e n c e ,

the q u e s t i s never ending,

The methods o f i n q u i r y promise

only t o c l a r i f y meaning and t o c r i t i c a l l y examine b e l i e f .

The means of c l a r i f y i n g q u e s t i o n s of value were i n t r o duced e a r l i e r i n ny d i s c u s s i o n on choice.

Pragmatically, t o

hold t h a t something i s of value i s n o t only t o perceive some

i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t y of ''good" b u t t o p e r c e i v e g r e a t e r q u a l i t y
i n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r s : 'not i n t h e sense of one p r e f e r e n c e
a l r e a d y made and s t r o n g e r than o t h e r s , b u t a s t n e formation
7

of a new preference o u t of a c o n f l i c t of p r e f e r e n c e s . "

Through the o p e r a t i o n of i n q u i r y man i s a b l e t o make t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between o b j e c t s and s i t u a t i o n s vinich a r e immediately
good and those which a r e e v e n t u a l l y good.

"Of imediate

values.. .which occur and which a r e possessed and enjoyed,

t h e r e i s no theory a t a l l ; they j u s t occur, a r e enjoyed, pos8

s e s s e d ; and that i s a l l . "

Zventual good, o r i t s a p p r a i s a l ,

must involve i n q u i r y :
The moment we begin t o d i s c o u r s e about,..values, t o
d e f i n e and g e n e r e l i z e , t o m.ke d i s t i n c t i o n s i n k i n d s ,
we a r e p a s s i n g beyond value-ob j e c ts themselves ; we a r e
e n t e r i n g , even i f only b l i n d l y , u2on a n i n q u i r y i n t o
c a u s a l a n t e c e d e n t s and c a u s a t i v e consequents, w i t h a
view t o a p p r a i s i n g the ' r e a l , ' t h a t i s the e v e n t u a l ,
goodness of the t h i n g i n question. Je a r e c r i t i c i z i n g ,

i/;'-

(>-

n o t f o r i t s ovm sake, b u t f o r t h e sake o f i n s t i t u t i n g

and p e r p e t u a t i n g more enduring and e x t e n s i v e v a l u e s ,

Dewey does n o t speak of o b j e c t s and s i t u a t i o n s which a r e

a p p a r e n t l y good and thoae which a r e r e a l l y good, s i n c e he s e e s
such a d i s t i n c t i o n as q u e s t i o n begging.

Arguments t h a t l e a d

t o d i s t i n c t i o n s i n kind simply do n o t go f a r enough o r d i g

deep enough,

..,'ithin b o t h r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s t h e f a c t that

an o b j e c t i s b e l i e v e d i n , i s o f f e r e d as reason t o s u b s t a n t i a t e
the b e l i e f , b u t such a n argument i s only p r e l i m i n a r y t o t h e
q u e s t i o n o f t h e g e n e s i s of the b e l i e f and i t s p r e s e n t value,
The a l l - i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r i s v ~ h a tl i e s back of [the bel i e f i n something a s a good and causes acceptance and
r e j e c t i o n ; whether o r no t h e r e i s a method of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and assessment n h i c h makes a d i f f e r e n c e i n w h a t i s
a s s e n t e d t o and denied, Y r o 2 e r t i e s and r e l a t i o n s that
e n t i t l e an o b j e c t t o be found good i n b e l i e f a r e e x t r a n eous t o t h e q u a l i t i e s that a r e i t s immediate good; they
a r e c a u s a l , and hence found only by s e a r c h i n t o t h e a n t e cedent and t h e eventual. The conception t h a t t h e r e a r e
some o b j e c t s o r some p r o p e r t i e s o f o b j e c t s which c a r r y
t h e i r onn adequate c r e d e n t i a l s upon t h e i r f a c e i s t h e
s n a r e and d e l u s i o n of the whole h i s t o r i c t r a d i t i o n r e g a r d i n g knowledge
Thus immediate good and e v e n t u a l good can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d
only i n terms of r e l a t i o n a l a s p e c t s .

good a r r i v e d a t through

i n q u i r y d i f f e r s from an immediate good only t o the e x t e n t that

i t i s h e l d good i n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r goods,

The e x t e n t i s

measured by r e l y i n g u2on an e x i s t e n t i a l a p p r a i s a l of i t s a n t e cedents and consequences.

Goods e s t a b l i s h e d through i n q u i r y

a r e f r e e r and more enduring s i n c a they r e f l e c t e x i s t e n t i a l

c o n d i t i o n s ; t h e r e f o r e , i n no way do t h e y s t i f l e the c r e a t i v e
11

genius of man.

On the c o n t r a r y , by a p p l y i n g the methods of

i n q u i r y t o b r i n g about new human v a l u e s , we xould be immeasuraably enriched.

S e c t i o n Ong: p a r t t h r e e
NOTES

1 John Dewey, E x ~ e r i e n c eand Xature (New York: Dover Yub-

l i c a t i o n s , 1958), pp. 410-11.

2

John Dewey, Logic: The -xheor?r o f I n q u i r y ( ~ e York:

a
Holt,

3 i n e h a r t and -Jinston, l96O), pp. 116-17,

Dewey, ~ x p e r i e n c eand Uature, pp. 428-29

Dewey, Experience and liature, pp. 429-30.

I n t h e c h a p t e r on " b x i s t e n c e as P r e c a r i o u s and as S t a b l e , "

i n L x m r i e n c e and i i a t u a , Sev~eyp r e s e n t s w h a t I s e e t o
be t h e b e s t argument I ham encountered t h u s far f o r the
r e j e c t i o n of c l a s s i c a l d u a l i t y : pp, 68-71.
7

..-.

John dewey, OnZxperience, i;lature, and Breedom, ed. Xichard

J. irlernstein (Eev~York: Bobbs-kierrill, l 9 6 0 ) , p . 266,

2ewey, Lxperience and E a t u r e , p. 403.

Dewey, ~ x p e r i e n c eand L h t u x e , p . 403.

LO

Dewey, ..ixperience aan_ddiTs$u=, pp. 404-05.

11 John Uewey, Kecons t r u c t i o n i n L h i l o s s h . v ( ~ o s t o n :Beacon

P r e s s , 1-965), pp. 212-13,

On tile conclu.diug p a ~ e sof Lecorls t r u c t i o n Uewey sums

up h i s hope f o r

more meaningful s o c i a l d i r e c t i o n based

1I

S e c t i o n One: p a r t t h r e e

iiO'ILS ( c o n t )

on a n a t u r a l t e l e o l o g y :
Poetry, a r t , r e l i g i o n a r e p r e c i o u s t h i n g s . They cann o t be maintained by l i n g e r i n g i n the p a s t and f u t i l e l y
wishing t o r e s t o r e what the movement of e v e n t s i n s c i ence, i n d u s t r y and g o l i t i c a has destroyed. They a r e a n
o u t - f l o w e ~ i n gof thought and d e s i r e s thzt unconsciously
converge i x l o a d i s p o s i t i o n of imagination as a r e s u l t
e l LhousanGs and thousands o f d a i l y e p i s o d e s and c o n t a c t .
T h e y canilot be w i l l e d i n t o e x i s t e n c e o r coerced i n t o bei n The wind of the s p i r i t bloweth anere i t l i s t e t h
2nd. tne kingdom of God i n such t h i n g s does n o t come w i t h
observation. Zut virile i t i s impossible t o r e t a i n and
recover by d e l i b e r a t e v o l i t i o n old s o u r c e s of r e l i g i o n
m d a r t that have been d i s c r e d i t e d , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o
e x p e d i t e the developnent of t h e v i t a l s o u r c e s of a r e l i g i o n and a r t t h a t a r e y e t t o be. iJot indeed by a c t i o n
d i r a c t l y aimed a t t h e i r production, b u t by s u b s t i t u t i n g
f a i t h i n t h e a c t i v e tendencies o f t h e day f o r dread and
d i s l i k e of them, and by the courage aria i n t e l l i g e n c e t o
f o l l o w whither s o c i a l and s c i e n t i f i c changes d i r e c t s us.
bye a r e weak today i n i d e a l m a t t e r s because i n t e l l i g e n c e
i s divorced froril a s p i r a t i o n . The b a r e f o r c e of circumstance coz!ipels us o n m r d s i n t h e d a i l y d e t a i l of our bei i e f ' 3 and a c t s , b u t our deeper thoughts and d e s i r e s t u r n
bzckuards.
.dhen philosophy s h a l l have co-operatea d t h
t r ~ ecourse of e v e n t s and made c l e a r and coherent the
rzea~lingof the d a i l y d e t a i l , s c i e n c e and emotion w i l l
irl.terpenetrate, p r a c t i c e and imagination w i l l embrace.
I-oc-Lry and r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g w i l l be the unforced flowers
3
2
. To f u r t h u r t h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n and r e v e l a t i o n
df
ci~emeanind of t h e c u r r e n t course of e v e n t s i s t h e
t h d k and problem of philosophy i n days of t r a n s i t i o n .

S C T I O K T./ii

Furthur Observations
-------------on >'reedom, I n a u i r y and Ontology

Since pragmatism began, t h r e e major p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c i s m s have been d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t i t .

The f i r s t r e j e c t s the

pragmatic concept of freedom; the second r e j e c t s t h e Theory

of Inquiry a s a v i a b l e t o o l with which t o d e a l w i t h v a l u e ;
and t h e t h i r d r e j e c t s Dewey's e x i s t e n t i a l ontology.

I have

d e a l t a t sorue l e n g t h with most of the c e n t r a l i s s u e s of a l l

t h r e e ; however, i n order t o niake the pragmatic p o s i t i o n more
c l e a r l y d i s c e r n i b l e , 1 s h a l l r e s t a t e some of the more t r o u b l i n g
points.
It may be asked, i s freedom r e d u c i b l e t o a c a p a c i t y t o

achieve s a t i s f a c t i o n or t o a d i s p o s i t i o n t o explore consequences?

There a r e two questions here and the l a t t e r must be r e -

j e c t e d out of hand.

Dewey's concept o f freedom i s more than

mere d i s p o s i t i o n of any kind.

20 d e f i n e freedom as an explor-

a t o r y d i s p o s i t i o n implies a kind of l o f t y indulgence i n d i l e t t a n t e c a p r i c e : back t o the h e i g h t s of Clympus.

Only i f freedom

were seen a s a very p a r t i c u l a r i z e d and a c t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n , and

I, use the term r e l u c t a n t l y , v~ouldsuch a d e f i n i t i o n have m e r i t .

Je saw e a r l i e r t h a t a c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o choice i s i n t r i n s i c
t o freedom; consequently, no m a t t e r w h a t our d i s p o s i t i o n
might be, u n l e s s we have b o t h the a b l i i t y t o a c t and choose

i n accord
-

w i t h our d i s p o s i t i o n , we cannot b e g i n t o achieve

freedom.

As a n i l l u s t r a t i o n , we m y wish t o explore the con-

sequences of changing t h e course of a r i v e r , and f i n d through

our e x p l o r a t i o n s t h a t t o &o so vould g r e a t l y enhance the f o r tunes of the comolunity served by the r i v e r .

B u t a f t e r choos-

i n g t o do s o , u n l e s s we have the power t o a c t , t h e r i v e r w i l l

remain unchanged.

The same arguuent a p p l i e s when c o n s i d e r i n g

the " r i g h t " t o vote.

If t h e r e i s no p a r t y or person represen-

t a t i v e of a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s view, o r the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e i s

s o c o n t r o l l e d that a l l p a r t i e s a r e v i r t u k l l y t h e same, one
must s e t t l e f o r the i d e a l o f the r i g h t t o v o t e , which, a l t h o u g h
very noble i n p o l i t i c a l appearance, does l i t t l e t o f o s t e r r e a l
change.
[that].

Hichard E e r n s t e i n e x p l a i n s t h a t

I'

..lmere e l i m i n a t i o n of o b s t r u c t i o n s

secure r i g h t s and achieve freedom.'

fact, i t is a possibility.

..

.Dewey t e l l s us

i s n o t enough t o

h n ' s freedom i s n o t a

'But l i k e a l l o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,

t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y has t o be a c t u a l i z e d ; and l i k e a l l o t h e r s ,

i t can only be a c t u a l i z e d through i n t e r a c t i o n with o b j e c t i v e

conditions.'

If man i s t o achieve genuine freedom and i n d i -

v i d u a l i t y , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o counter t h e n a t u r a l tendency of
a technological society.

P r e s e n t s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s must

be r e c o n s t r u c t e d so that they w i l l encourage the r e a l i z a t i o n

of c r e a t i v e i n d i v i d u a l i t y .

iiow t h i s i s t o be achieved cannot

be answered i n a wholesale uanner, f o r i t i s a m a t t e r of

1
s p e c i f i c reforms i n p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s . ' '
If t h e q u e s t i o n , ''Is freedom r e d u c i b l e t o the c a p a c i t y t o

achieve s z t i d f a c t i o n ? " were p r o p e r l y q u a l i f i e d , t h e answer

would be yes.

The c e n t r a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n would be that satis-

f a c t i o n cannot be intended as a f i n a l s t a t e ,

There i s no

f u t u r e p o i n t i n time a t n h i c h i t could be s a i d t h a t t o t a l
s a t i s , d f a c t i o n would be achieved.

Preedom, l i k e a l l . of human

a f f a i r s , nas a temporal and c o n t e x t u a l dimension.

It i s

meaningless f o r one t o s t a t e t k ~ he
t i s f r e e : he i s e i t h e r
f r e e t o d o something, o r f r e e f r o & something, b u t never j u s t
free.

S i m i l a r l y , he may be f r e e t o do something now, b u t

t h e r e i s n o t h i n g which i n s u r e s t h a t he w i l l have t h e same f r e e don? i n the f u t u r e ,

i;

man r e l e a s e d from p r i s o n i s n o t a " f r e e f i

man, he i s f r e e from p r i s o n .

lie has g r e a t e r choice and g r e a t -

e r power of a c t i o n , g r e a t e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e achievement
of freedom, b u t i f he u s e s t h e s e p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o a g a i n viol a t e t h e law, t h u s j e o p a r d i z i n g the freedom of o t h e r s , he w i l l
f i n d himself soon deprived of even t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom.
There i s , of course, a s o c i a l argument h e r e .

n s we saw

e a r l i e r , the n o t i o n of choice became involved w i t h responsib i l i t y and blame,

Deviant s o c i a l b e h a v i o r , t n e r e f ore, i s

l a r g e l y misunderstood s i n c e i t i s seen i n terms of blame and

subsequent punishment.

But t h e r e i s ample evidence t o show

t n a t n o amount of punishment w i l l ckmnge t h e consequences of

a man's h i s t o r y , a h i s t o r y w r i t t e n v i t n i n e x i s t e n t i a l exper-

ience.

Kot w i t i l genuine a t t e m p t s t o change t h e laws and

i n s t i t u t i o n s of s o c i e t y have come about, a t t e m p t s t h a t r e f l e c t

e x i s t e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s , w i l l crime and c r i m i n a l i t y be understood and reduced.
i n surii?, i f t h e tern s a t i s d f a c t i o n means t h a t dynamic
s t a t e of a f f a i r s nhicll i u t e l l - i ~ e n t h yatierrlpts t o brink a b o u t
t h e mximum expansion and hamony of i n d i v i d u a l needs, and i f

such a s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s put under the constant s c r u t i n y

of i n q u i r y , then I would have t o agree t h a t freedom i s the
c a p a c i t y t o achieve s a t i s i f a c t i o n ,
It may a l s o be asked, "Is i t n o t p o s s i b l e f o r two people
t o a g r e e on the consequences of an a c t and s t i l l d i s a g r e e on

i t s value?"

O f course,

But as was pointed out e a r l i e r , Dew-

ey makes no claims t o the contrary,

There i s no suggestion

t h a t the c e s s a t i o n o f a l l c o n f l i c t w i l l be achieved through

the use of inquiry,

.:hat i s suggested i s t h a t i n q u i r y i s

the b e s t method t o d e a l with c o n f l i c t of a l l s o r t s .

On t h i s

p o i n t l e t me repeat one of Dewey's e a r l i e r contentions:

I

I
I

It i s n o t pretended t h a t a moral theory based upon

r e a l i t i e s of human nature and a study of the s p e c i f i c
connections of these r e a l i t i e s w i t h those of p h y s i c a l
science would do away w i t h moral s t r u g g l e and d e f e a t ,
It would n o t make the moral l i f e a s simple a matter as
wending one's way along a well-lighted boulevard, A l l
a c t i o n i s an invasion o f the f u t u r e , of the unknown,
Conflict and u n c e r t a i n t y a r e u l t i m a t e t r a i t s , But
morals based upon concern w i t h f a c t s and d e r i v i n g guidance from knowledge would a t l e a s t l o c a t e the p o i n t s
of e f f e c t i v e endeavor and would focus a v a i l a b l e resources upon them,2

To the e x t e n t t h a t r e s o l u t i o n can occur, i t i s b e s t brought

about through a recognition of the consequences of the conf l i c t , determined by the use o f inquiry.
The pragmatic r e j e c t i o n of " e t e r n a l " t r u t h i s another bone

i n the t h r o a t t o the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s o f philosophy,

Dewey

admits t o t r u t h s that a r e i n u sense *out1' of time, t h a t could

be c a l l e d e t e r n a l .

The universals whose existence and value

have been apparent and puzzling t o philosophers t,hrough t h e

c e n t u r i e s a r e not denied by him, f o r physics gives example of
such s t a b i l i t y and pervasiveness ,

C e r t a i n t y , changelessness,

i n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y , " e t e r n a l s o nhich clzaracterize the Greek's

i d e a l s , a r e a t t r i b u t a b l e t o instrumental u n i v e r s a l s , not
hypothesized i n t o a s u p e r i o r order of existence o r transcend e n t a l laws of the universe.

As

Dewey w r i t e s i n B x ~ e r i e n c e

and Hature :
Timeless laws, taken by themselves, l i k e a l l univers a l s , express d i a l e c t i c i n t e n t , n o t any m a t t e r of f a c t
e x i s t e n c e , But t h e i r u l t i m a t e implication i s a p p l i c a t i o n ;
tney a r e methods, and when a p p l i e d as methods they r e g u l a t e the precarious f l o w of unique s i t u a t i o n s , Objects
of n a t u r a l science a r e not metaphysical r i v a l s of h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s ; they a r e means of d i r e c t i n g the l a t t e r .
Events change; one i n d i v i d u a l gives place t o another,
But i n d i v i d u a l l y q u a l i f i e d things have some q u a l i t i e s
which a r e pervasive, common, s t a b l e . They a r e out of
time i n the sense t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r temporal q u a l i t y i s
i r r e l e v a n t t o them. I f anybody f e e l s r e l i e v e d by c a l l i n g
them e t e r n a l , l e t them be c a l l e d e t e r n a l . % u t l e t n o t
' e t e r n a l 1 be then conceived a s a kind of a b s o l u t e perduring existence o r Being. I t denotes j u s t what i t denotes : i r r e l e v a n c e t o e x i s t e n c e i n i t s temporal q u a l i t y
.=is such they b t e r n a l d a r e t o o l s , i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s
, h i s t o r i c events r e g u l a t e t h e i r course . g

....

E t e r n a l e x i s t e n t i a l t r u t h s about the a f f a i r s of men a r e impos4

sible.

To hold this p o s i t i o n i s t o r e p e a t the claim that

t r u t h i s the v e r i f i e d and nothing e l s e .

I t would t e s t the

resources of the b e s t l l i b r a r y on the s o c i a l sciences, o r f o r

t h a t m a t t e r , the Library o f Congress, t o f i n d any e t e r n a l 8
within the temporal world of man and h i s a f f a i r s .

The import-

a n t f a c t , however, i s t h a t we possess more and t r u e r t r u t h s

today than ever b e f o r e , and our r e c o g n i t i o n that these t r u t h s
a r e n o t e t e r n a l does n o t a f f e c t t h e i r r e l i a b l i t y i n the l e a s t .
Despite the f a c t t h a t p r e s e n t t h e o r i e s concerning the o r i g i n
and development of the universe a r e s u b j e c t t o i n f i n i t e modi f i c a t i o n and r e f i % e n t ,

these t h e o r i e s a r e f a r t r u e r than any

of the mythical e x p l d n a t i o n s

which they have replaced.

Luch more i s known about tile f a c e of the e a r t h than was

known by any previous generation.

Je know f o r example t h a t

the base l i n e used t o e s t a b l i s h a l t i t u d e measurement i s n o t

somehow b u l l t i n t o the s t r u c t u r e of the e a r t h , o r given by
the gods o r i n t u i t i o n , b u t i s chosen f o r i t s e f f i c a c y i n i n t e g r a t i n g the i n t r i c a t e p a t t e r n of land measurements.

The

choice of a common measure i s made necessary by the f u n c t i o n a l

e

requirments of c o l l e c t i v e s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s .
A

In p r a c t i c a l

human terms, including "subjec t i v e t ' values a s well aa 'lob j e c t ive" f a c t s , the choice w i l l survive only s o long a s i t remains
functional.

Thus Dewey w r i t e s , "Anything which can e x i s t a t

any place and a t any time occurs aubject t o t e s t s imposed

upon i t by surroundings, which a r e only i n p a r t compatible
and r e i n f o r c i n g .

These surroundings t e s t i t s s t r e n g t h and

measure i t s endurance...The

s t a b l e s t t h i n g me can speak of i a

n o t f r e e from conditions s e t t o i t by other things..

thing

may endure secula s e c u l o r ~and y e t not be e v e r l a s t i n g ; i t

w i l l crumble before the gnawing t o o t h of time, a s i t exceeds
5
II
a c e r t a i n measure. Gvery existence i s an event.

Section Two

1 a i c h a r d J. Bernstein, On Experience, lTature, and Freedom

(xew York: Bobbs-herrill, l 9 6 0 ) , p. x i i i .

2

John Dewey, IIurnan Nature and Conduct (dew York: hodern

Library, 1957), p. 12.

Section Two
IiOPiS (cont. )

John Dewey, Zxperience and J a t u r e (New York: Dover P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1 9 5 8 ) , pp. 148-49.

T o r an e x c e l l e n t a p p r a i s a l o f i n s t r u m e n t a l u n i v e r s a l 8 s e e :

Harold C, B r o m , " I n t e l l i g e n c e and lathe ma tic^,^ Creative

I n t e l l i g e n c e (Hem York; Henry H o l t , 1917), pp. 118-75.
Also: S t e r l i n g Y. Lamprecht, "P;Taturalism and Keligion,"

---- and the IIum.a~,S~iriL (Eew York: Columbia

Naturalism
University P r e s s , 1945), pp. 17-39.
5

>ewey, Xxperience and Uature, pp. 70-71,

SL C !i
103
! TiLXiG

Dewey: The Eost Dangerous Man Since H i t l e r

I n the preface t o L x ~ e r i e n c eand Zducation Dewey expressed

the conviction t h a t " i t i s the business of an i n t e l l i g e n t
theory of education t o a s c e r t a i n the causes f o r the c o n f l i c t s
t h a t e x i s t and then, i n s t e a d of t a k i n g one s i d e or the o t h e r ,
t o i n d i c a t e a plan o f operations, proceeding from a l e v e l deepe r and more comprehensive than i s represented by the p r a c t i c e s
1
and i d e a s of the contending p a r t i e s , " Few i t seems would quarr e l w i t h h i s objective, b u t considering the number of e f f o r t s
being made toward "newt' educational d i r e c t i o n s which have nota b l y f a i l e d , Dewey was being s u p r i s i n g l y o p t i m i s t i c .

Clearly,

e x i s t e n t i a l consequences have s h o m ~t h a t h i s plan of operations

\

have n o t y e t helped m a t t e r s noticeably,

ifithout c i t i n g evidence o r a u t h o r i t y X w i l l presume t h a t
c o n f l i c t about our educational system i s a t l e a s t a s widespread a s i t was i n 1938, the p u b l i c a t i o n d a t e of Axperience
and Xducation.

I n f a c t , i t appears t h a t r e c e n t world events

make t h e c o n f l i c t even more a c u t e ,

has been d i f f i c u l t t o explain away,

Soviet t e c h n i c a l success
I f our system, so much

longer i n operation than the iiussian, cannot maintain a wide

l e a d i n achievement, then the reason i s c l e a r , the "progressiveM
education of Dewey has destroyed J e s t e r n education.

The charge

may sound somewhat overstated and paranoid, b u t i t i s not w i t h -

out foundation; a s j u s t one example, Gortimer Adler, i n a

n a t i o n a l magazine, c a l l e d dewey "the most dangerous man s i n c e
2

Hitler,"

It mould follow t h a t by forswearing Dewey and h i s

fellow pragmatists we may f i n d the way back t o a s u c c e s s f u l

pedagofzy
But f o r a number of reasons the d i f f i c u l t i e s cannot f a i r l y
be blamed on 3ewey and h i s followers,

To begin with, the g r e a t

majority o f schools i n b o t h Canada and the United S t a t e s have

never been anything l i k e progressive schools; indeed, moat of
the so-called progressive schools and educators a r e n o t Deweyan i n any sense.

A l s o , the problem before us i s not e s s e n t i a l -

l y one of methods b u t of aims, meaning that the bulk of the

controversy adout d i s c i p l i n e , problem-solving,

cognitive deyel-

opment, l e a r n i n g process, t o name a few, i s n o t immediately

relevant.

The value questions involved a r e general.

way can they be r e s t r i c t e d t o education alone.

I n no

Je a r e con-

fused about aims of i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l l i f e ; thus the quest i o n s have t o do with philosophy a s well a s pedagogy.
I n the reading I have done, from Jacques Barzun's

The

House of I n t e l l e c t t o the most r e c e n t a r t i c l e s i n The American

Teacher

---9

t h e r e appears an almost hopeless r e c o g n i t i o n that

p r e s e n t day education i s a t b e s t f u l f i l l i n g some of the economic needs o f s o c i e t y , and a t worst, i a a huge and impersonal
wdchine unwilling or unable t o seek out new ways of maximizing
and making r e l e v a n t the experience of the c h i l d .

Eut t o imply

t h a t the p r e s e n t s t a t e of education i s the r e s u l t o f Deweyan

pedagogy i s very l i k e blaming the problems of nmerican s o c i e t y
on i k r t i n Luther Xing.
4

I t must be admitted that Yewey d i d c o n t r i b u t e i n profound

measure t o t h e t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e of l e a r n i n g and t e a c h i n g , as

A i n s t e i n d i d i n the f i e l d of physics.

However, aewey i s no

more r e s p o n s i b l e f o r our d e c l i n e i n c u l t u r a l and t e c h n i c a l

s k i l l s than i s E i n s t e i n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r our s u i c i d a l atockp i l e of atomic death.

Less s o , s i n c e i n most c a s e s Dewey's

work has y e t t o be d i r e c t l y i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o our i n s t i t u t i o n s .

In t h e schools t b t dewey planned the c h i l d was t o become

" t h e sun about which the a p p l i a n c e s o f e d u c a t i o n revolve...

3

the c e n t e r about which t h e y a r e organized."

Schools l i k e t h e

i d e a l home w i t h t e a c h e r s l i k e the p a r e n t s of such a home,

organized and educated s o t h a t i n q u i r y could and would t a k e
place i n an atmosphere of s t a b i l i t y .

P h y s i c a l l y the s c h o o l

was t o be i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o the community, f o r the c h i l d

would "come t o school w i t h a l l the experience he had g o t outs i d e the s c h o o l , and l e a v e i t mith something t o be immediately
4

used i n his everyday l i f e . "

I n p l a c e of the s t a t i c "you

l i s t e n , I t a l k " teaching, and the f i x e d equipment provided t o

f a c i l i t a t e t h i s kind of t e a c h i n g , was t o be s u b s t i t u t e d b o t h
f u r n i s h i n g s and a c d t i v i t i e s r e l a t e d t o " f i e l d , f o r e s t and
f a c t o r y , ' ' and of course t o the home.
These a r e n o t romantic dreams, b u t --n -e c e s s a r y components
through which t h e c h i l d could recedve the r e l e v a n t experiences
needed t o make education something more than a b o r i n g o r f e a r f u l task.

If t h e r e was a romantic element i t was u n f o r t u n a t l y

introduced by t h e l a t e r p r o g r e s s i v e s , b u t the unforgivable

bromides of contemporary f r e e - s c h o o l s , l i k e ' ' i t i s the a d u l t s
t h a t a r e d u l l , " o r "the t e a c h e r i s t o n u r s e t h e d i v i n e n a t u r e

of the c h i l d , this i s t h e method of a l l e d u c a t i o n , " cannot be

charged t o Dewey.

The s l o g a n s a r e E'rijbelts and come from

S c h e l l i n g ' s philosophy.

Aa B e r n s t e i n observes, "Dewey never

advocated t h a t e d u c a t i o n ought simply t o c a t e r t o t h e needs

and w h i m s of the c h i l d . .he c r i t i c i z e d the c h i l d - o r i e n t a t e d

theory of e d u c a t i o n by a c u t e l y n o t i n g that i t h a r b o r s a formal
and empty concept of development.

The c h i l d i s expected t o

'work t h i n g s out f o r h i m e l f ' without r e c e i v i n g the proper

guidance.

Advocating complete freedom of the c h i l d r e f l e c t s

a ' s e n t i m e n t a l i d e a l i z a t i o n of the c h i l d ' s niave c a p r i c e s and

p e r f o r ~ a n c e s and i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t s i n 'indulgence and s p o i l ing.'

Both c r i t i c s and defenders of Dewey have o f t e n n e g l e c t e d

h i s c r i t i q u e of t h e l a i s s e z - f a i r e approach t o education.

This

c r i t i q u e i s developed and explained throughout h i s w r i t i n g s .

?ie t e l l s u s t h a t 'doing as one p l e a s e s s i g n i f i e s a r e l e a s e

from t r u l y i n t e l l e c t u a 2 i n i t i a t i v e and independence,' and that

when u n l i m i t e d f r e e e x p r e s s i o n i s allowed, c h i l d r e n 'graduall y tend t o become l i s t l e s s and f i n a l l y bored, while t h e r e i s
an absence of cumulative, p r o g r e s s i v e development of power
and of a c t u a l achievement i n r e s u l t s . '

In opposition to this

view, Dewey a r g u e s f o r the n e c e s s i t y f o r d e l i b e r a t e guidance,

d i r e c t i o n and order.

Lducation i s , o r ought t o be, a c o n t i n -

uous process of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n which t h e r e i s p r o g r e s s i v e

movement away from the c h i l d ' s immature immediate experience
t o experience which beconies more pregnant - d t n meaning, more
s y s t e m a t i c and ordered.

''

Apart frorrl t h e learning-through-pla;r

corruption of Jev~ey's

pedagogy, what of the c a p t u r i n g of our s c h o o l s by h i s t h e o r i e s ?

How many schools do we have t h t approach the pragmatic p a t t e r n ?

Out of the thousands of schools i n the c i t i e s of Canada and
the United S t a t e s , there i s not more than a handful where Dewey,

or Fr'dbel f o r that matter, would be pleased with what they saw,

The g r e a t m a j o r i t y of our urban schools azs drab and crowded
places, f i l l e d with f i x e d desks, and permeated with a d i s t i n c t
i n s t i t u t i o n a l f e e l and smell.

The s t a f f , although well-rcean-

ing, a r e underpaid and under-educated,

s t i l l maintaining d i s -

c i p l i n e by a u t h o r i t y and teaching "lessons" that would n o t

seem p a r t i c u l a r l y novel t o t h e i r grandfathers.

The p i c t u r e i s

no more hopeful i n the r u r a l a r e a s ; i f anything i t i s worse,

The reasons t h a t Deweyan pedagogy d i d n o t become an i m p o r t a n t element i n most of our schools a r e f a i r l y simple.
the f i r s t place this type o f schooling i s expensive,

In

Uew

d i s t r i c t s would see f i t t o spend the kind of money on educat i o n t h a t would provide anything l i k e what Dewey had i n mind.

--

three
So long a s our s o c i a l p r i o r i t i e s remain what they a r e
n
times a s much money i s spent an.yally on cosmetics and a l c o h o l
a s i s s p e n t on education

--

l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a change

i n the p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e can be foreseen.

Secondly, Dewey i n

the main enunciated and e x p l i c a t e d a p h i l o s o ~ aand t h e o x of

education, a theory d i f f i c u l t t o a s s i m i l a t e and one t h a t would
take time t o work out i n p r a c t i c e .

Few of the thousands who

e a r n e s t l y absorbed education courses l a b e l l e d with Dewey's

name have more than a vague notion of what he was t a l k i n g
about,

There i s i n Uewey'a books a deceptive seeming of the

commonplace.

It i s easy t o read through ;Iuman S a t u r e and Con-

d u c t , nod i n understandind a t most paragraphs, and c l o s e the

--

volume w i t h only a dim and f l e e t i n g g r a s p of the very s u b t l e

and profound reasoning j u s t encountered,

Other works a r e v e r y much more t e c h n i c a l and d i f f i c u l t .

H i s Guest f o r C e r t a i n t y , Logic: The Theory of I n q u i r y , &T

Public and i t s Problems and Xx-mrience and Mature, comprise a

corpus i n comprehension and t e c h n i c a l genius e q u a l t o t h e
g r e a t e s t philosophers.

It i s s a f e t o s a y that many y e a r s of

work w i l l be r e q u i r e d t o a s s i m i l a t e h i s i d e a s i n t o our common

heritage.

Cut even the g e n e r a l pedagogic i d e a s which stemmed

---

fro^ The School and S o c i e w , I n t e r e s t and L f f o r t i n Zducation

and Bemocracy and :ducat-

a r e such as t o r e q u i r e much time

and experimental e f f o r t t o be put i n t o p r a c t i c e ,

i a n y of the

methods which a r e now being used or i n t r o d u c e d as a r e s u l t of

e x t e n s i v e experiment were i n s p i r e d , thougn u s u a l l y unknowni n g l y , by Deweyan i n s i g h t s .

~ ~ they
n d r e p r e s e n t r e a l and e f f e c -

t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of h i s t h e o r i e s .

Yhe example t h a t immediately

comes t o mind i s t h e model schools mentioned i n t h e H a l l iteport,

..hen such schools become more widespread, and have been t r i e d
and observed over an extended p e r i o d of time, then we can
d i s c u s s more f u l l y tne s u c c e s s e s and f a i l u r e s o f deweyan eduation,

U n t i l t h a t time, however, we should n o t d e n i g r a t e 3ewey

f o r t h e r e s u l t s of acbooling that has n o t been deweyan.

As was e a r l i e r suggested, our e d u c a t i o n a l t r o u b l e s do n o t

o r i g i n a t e i n education.

On t h e c o n t r a r y , they r e a c h i n t o the

s c h o o l s from o u t s i d e , a s a r e s t ~ l tof' t h e t e n s i o n s , schisms and

c o n f l i c t s extending t k ~ o u g ; l t h e stnole of s o c i e t y .

lco system

of popular education can p o s s i b i l y succeed without the s u p p o r t

of comn~unit~,
and government.

Ilespect, esteem, p r e s t i g e , econ-

omic rewards given t o t h e educated, economic s u p p o r t t o the

student, a secure r o l e assured t o the graduate, these a r e
n o t j u s t p l e a s a n t t h i n g s t o wish f o r , b u t a r e i n d i s p e n s a b l e
i f the young a r e t o become i n t e r e s t e d i n l e a r n i n g and i n maint a i n i n g a s o c i e t y t h a t s t i l l h o l d s democratic change as the
b e s t method t o achieve s o c i a l j u s t i c e .

If our t r o u b l e s a r e n o t i s o l a t e d t o the classrooms, where

must we t u r n t o s e t i n motion changes t h a t w i l l l e a d t o a
b e t t e r e d u c a t i o n a l system?

On t h e one hand t h e r e a r e those

who would l i k e t o see t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of a n 18th c e n t u r y

l a i s s e z - f a i r e , a u t o c r a t i c and " r e s p e c t f u l " system, b u t h i s t o r y
seldom accommodates dreams, no m a t t e r how comforting,

On t h e

o t h e r hand t h e r e i s change through r e v o l u t i o n , b l o o d l e s s o r

bloody, b u t I doubt i f r e v o l u t i o n , no m a t t e r how j u s t i f i e d ,
w i l l s e e o b j e c t i v e education a s a paramount p r i o r i t y .

Uewey

had a stubborn b e l i e f t h a t "a f u t u r e new s o c i e t y of changed

purposes and d e s i r e s may be c r e a t e d by a d e l i b e r a t e humane
treatment of t h e impulses of the young.

This i s the meaning

of e d u c a t i o n ; f o r a t r u l y humane education c o n s i s t s i n a n i n t e l l i g e n t d i r e c t i o n of n a t i v e a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e l i g h t of the pos6

s i b i l i t i e s and n e c e s s i t i e s of the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n . "

Since

t h e r e a r e i s s u e s y e t t o be explored, however, t h e q u e s t i o n of
e i t h e r education o r d r a s t i c s o c i a l c-knge w i l l be examined a t
the conclusion of t h i s paper,
2evreyts o n t o l o g i c a l a s s e r t i o n s a r e c e n t r a l t o the r e j e c t i o n of pragmatic pedagogy.

But b e f o r e expanding t h i s conten-

t i o n , a few words on the m u l t i t u d e of c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l e d

a g a i n s t Dewey.

Fron L a r x i ~ tt o l o c i c a l p o s i t i v i s t Dewey was

condemed f o r crimes a s various a s materialism t o n a t u r a l i s m

t o s u b j e c t i v e idealism.

I s h a l l n o t , t h e r e f o r e , attempt t o

d e a l w i t h a l l his c r i t i c s , s i n c e t o do s o would embroil me i n

an almost impossible task.

A s a n i n d i c a t i o n of the depth o f

The m i s -

such a t a s k l e t me o f f e r the following observation,

reading and confusion over 2eweyts philosophy i s r a t h e r w e l l

i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t C*L.L. Joad t h i n k s t h a t liarx's
theory of knowledge i s congenial t o Dewey's instrumentalism
because, w r i t e s Joad, Dewey holds

the human mind always

7

changes w h a t i t knows i n the courve of knowing it."

This, i t
8

happens, i s tne fundamental reason why h r x i s t s r e j e c t Dewey,

Zonsequently, s i n c e t h e r e a r e so many c o n t r a d i c t o r y reasons
f o r denying the value of pragmatism, I shall re-exarnine, withi n an e d u c a t i o n a l c o n t e x t , only the major question and i t s
i s s u e s : Dewey's view of the n a t u r e of man's p l a c e i n the universe.
D r , A l b e r t Lynd, i n h i s book duackers i n the k u b l i c Schools,

addresses the question s q u a r e l y i f i n c o n s i s t e n t l y ,

&though

n o t i n agreement witn 3eweyan ontology, he d i d understand some

of tne confusion over 3eneyan pedagogy, and was j u s t i f i a b l y
angry w i t h the nonsense that passed a s progressive education.
The t r a n s i t i o n from Housseau and romanticism t o Dewey
and s c i e n t i f i c pragmatisn i s remarkable. Lven more r e mzrkable i s the invocation of Dewey's name by d i s c i p l e s
who have e l a b o r a t e d those nieaningless i n c a n t a t i o n s , those
'emotive, ques tion-begging words and phrases ' about growt h and joy and r i c h n e s s and the rest of the s t u f f which
passes f o r pioneer thinking i n s o much o f t h e l i t e r a t u r e
of the Eew education. Lost remarkable of a l l i s the dogmatic gse of 9eweyts name by many 5 d u c a t i o n a l i s t s as a
charm w i t h i n tine p r o f e s s i o n and a exorcism without. This
i s a n i n t e r e s t i n g f a t e f o r a philosopher who was the cent u r y ' s most c o n s i s t e n t enemy of dogmatism.,

But Lyndls sympathy and understanding does not extend t o

Yeweyan ontology: %iany of tne p r a c t i c e s of progressivism make
l i t t l e sense when i s o l a t e d by l i m i t e d understanding from the
b a s i c philosophical assumptions of Professor Dewey.

VJhen i n -

t e l l i g e n t l y r e l a t e d t o those assumptions, they may make a

g r e a t d e a l of sense, if you a r e prepared t o go along w i t h M r
10
Dewey's views on the nature of man and h i s universe.'

Since Lynd's book i s addressed t o p a r e n t s of school-age

c h i l d r e n , w h a t he says i n essence i s t h a t the Peweyan method
might make a good d e a l of sense, b u t only i f the parent i s
w i l l i n g t o agree w i t h pragmatic ontology.

Ee a l s o claims that

"the important question here i s n o t whether Dewey's view~lof

the n a t u r e of man and h i s universe a r e r i g h t o r wrong. That
11
i s a s you please."
The troublesome i m p l i c a t i o n of these
atatementa i s the r a t h e r groas r e l e g a t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
away from the educator and toward the parent.

It i s absurd t o

a s k the parent t o read Sxperience and Nature and School and

Society, plus :,kitehead, i i u s s e l l , Xegel, k n t , St. Thomas,
A r i s t o t l e and P l a t o , and then vote a decision.

Stripped o f

i t s d r o s s , Lynd's b e l i e f s would read, " t h e question i s n o t

whether Dewey was r i g h t or wrong, but r a t h e r of what people

think."

Clearly, t h i s i s a d e c l a r a t i o n f o r a continuation of

the impasse i n education, t h a t schools should pass on u n c h n &

the values now c u r r e n t .

The p r e s e n t ~ t t i t u d e s ,h a b i t s and

b e l i e f s of the majority apparently becon;e the norm over-riding;

dewey's i n t e n t i o n t i ~ ne,
t
i n e f f e c t , l e s r n t o t h i n k together
and i n t e l l i g e n t l y i n order t o 1,:odify t h i s vale of t e a r s n e a r e r

t o human needs and d e s i r e s .

A s noted Lynd makes the claim t h a t Dewey's ontology, whe-

t h e r r i g h t o r wrong, i s of no importance and y e t he goea on

t o show why i t i s of the utmost importance, and even of the
utmost danger.

I n h i s arguments he touches on most of the

c e n t r a l questions responsible f o r the r e j e c t i o n , misapplication

or misunderstanding of the Deweyan p o s i t i o n .

Thus I s h a l l

follow h i s p o i n t s one by one.

The f i r s t i s s u e w i t h Lynd i s Dewey's r e j e c t i o n of e t e r n a l
truths.

But as we have seen Dewey d i d accept the idea that

i n appearance and f u n c t i o n there a r e c e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s which

a r e s t a b l e and pervasive.

As a n i l l u s t r a t i o n , the P l a t o n i c

notion was once held t h a t we can approach p e r f e c t i o n i n a c t u a l

measurement.

Today i t i s necessary t o q u a l i f y even a simple

one-half inch, t o the n e a r e s t l / l p 0 0 o r 1/10,000 o r t o a h a t ever degree of accuracy i s needed.

The ordinary science

s t u d e n t knows t h a t an absolute one-half inch i s a l o g i c a l absurdity.

+,hati s absolute i s the f u n c t i o n a l concept.

This

i s indeed p e r f e c t , and our r e a l measurements approach i t only

asymptotically.

I t s purely f u n c t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s c l e a r when

we r e a l i z e t h a t , as a u n i t of measurement, i t needn't be a
h a l f i n c h a t a l l ; i t could j u s t as well be h a l f the l e n g t h of
a box of Xddy ;l;atches.

A s was e a r l i e r pointed out, the choice

of a cornon measure i s made necessary by the f u n c t i o n a l requirements of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t y .

dimilarly, i n s o c i a l terns this i'functional necessity" i s
one of the fundamental reasons behind r e l i g i o u s or p o l i t i c a l
strength.

Scholars from Levy-Bruhl, Lurkheim and Lalinousky

t o ilrthur Koestler, von L e r t a l a n f f y and 2ug11 i)uncan have

supported the claim t h a t the choice of a common d e i t y o r b e l i e f ,

p o l i t i c a l or otherwise, f i l l s the same needs i n man f o r func12
tional social direction.
Yithout I' t r u t h s " held i n common,
whether mythical or n o t , communities and s o c i e t i e s would fade
i n t o o b l i v i o n or r i p themselves t o p i e c e s i n anarchy.

Vith

f u n c t i o n a l commonality a s a q u a l i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e a r e * e t e r n a l t '
t r u t h s , b u t they a r e c o n s t a n t s only i n a n i n s t r u m e n t a l s e n s e ;
i f you l i k e , i n s t r u m e n t a l u n i v e r s a l s .

This may appear t o be a r e j e c t i o n of metaphysics, b u t

Dewey never claimed c e r t a i n t y one way o r the o t h e r on m a t t e r s

of metaphysics.

',hat he d i d say i s t h a t we now h o w more about

the n a t u r e of sureness.

Thus metaphysics, l i k e a l l of human

a f f a i r s , must be examined c r i t i c a l l y i n t h e l i g h t of the f a r

t r u e r t r u t h s we now have a t our d i s p o s a l .
I n his concern over e t e r n a l s , Lynd i s a l s o f e a r f u l t h a t
W the Deweyan rnethod would sweep r e l i g i o n out of the schools,

I n f a i r n e s s t o Lynd, however, he does admit t h a t r e l i g i o n , a s

i t i s p r e s e n t l y maintained i n the schools, i s v i r t u a l l y innocuous.

But he suggests that i r r e l i ~ * . i oshould

n
n o t be t a u g h t ,

and s i n c e he s e e s Deweyan pedagogy a s i r r e l i g i o u s , i t must be

rejected.

To which the obvious r e t o r t i s t n a t the f a i t h of

educator must be i n teaching t h e t r u t h , i n physics, biology

o r geography, a s i n h i s t o r y

-- even

i f the f a c t s o f that h i s t o r y

c o n f l i c t w i t h the f a c t s of our r e l i g i o u s i d e o l o g i e s .

This i s

n o t n e a r l y s o a n t i - r e l i g i o u s and dogmatic as i t may sound.

The body of c u r r e n t theory and observation i n , say, biology o r
anthropology, i s susported by evidence

i t i s and n u s t rermin autonomous.

these d i s c i p l i n e s ,

Any deformation of d a t a o r

theory caused by e x t e r n a l agencies, p o l i t i c a l o r r e l i g i o u s , i s

simply dishonest,

I f , i n the study of h i s t o r y , the Bible i s

found t o be a compilation of mythical explanations common t o

most of the t r i b e s i n the Eesopotamia b a s i n , thus c a s t i n g
doubt on the Bible a s revealed t r u t h , should such information
be supressed?
The same a p p l i e s with the teaching of c r i t i c a l thought,
of methods of i n q u i r y ,

The c o r r e c t way t o approach questions,

whether t e c h n i c a l , humanistic o r t h e o l o g i c a l , i s through prog r e s s i v e experience i n problem-solving and through progress i v e acquaintance with the r e l e v a n t h i s t o r y of man i n a tempor a l , existential setting.

"History i s a bad teacher" i s a

worn out old cliche. "History i s taught badly" i s c l o s e r t o the

truth,

It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note that s o c i a l philosophers

and psychologists of a l l s t r i p e s i n s i s t that t o knox a man i t

i s necessary t o know h i s h i s t o r y , and y e t tne same demand f o r

h i s t o r i c a l knowledge i s not placed upon the young of a n a t i o n

or race,

Ve fumble i n our own h i s t o r y , c a l l i t bunk and con-

tinue the k i l l i n g , a k i l l i n g n o t l i m i t e d t o physical death,

I f thinking i s t o be proscribed because the wrong conclusions
a r e t o be d r a m , we have indeed reached f u l l c i r c l e .

This i s

not the f i r s t time t h a t the schools have been t o l d t h a t reason

i s a dangerous thing.

Papal i n f a l l i b i l i t y , Fuehrerprinzip,

the -.-isdom of the P a r t y , a r e a l l of tneru excuses f o r n o t thinking.

The danger i s not t h a t the young throu&h f a i t h i n reason
may come t o question the f a i t h i n t h e i r f a t h e r s .

Iiaving l o s t

such f a i t h anyway, and n o t having the m a n s of i n q u i r y t o f i n d

new guidance, they w i l l s t r u g g l e h o p e l e s s l y i n the swamp of

u n c e r t a i n t y u n t i l they a r e challenged by some brazen-lunged,
paranoid " s t u d e n t l e a d e r " whom t h e y w i l l f o l l o w because any
f a i t h i s b e t t e r than none.

Aimlessness i s unbearable f o r long.

As K o e s t l e r so b e a u t i f u l l y p u t s i t : "An i n c r e a s i n g number of
s c i e n t i s t s , a u t h o r s , and p h i l o s o p h e r s , s i z e d by p a n i c , advocate
a r e t u r n t o d o c t r i n a i r e r e l i g i o n , t o the worship of an a n t h r o -

pomorphic God,

The f a c t t h a t m i l l i o n s i n o u r day s t i l l f i n d

comfort i n p e t r i f i e d d o c t r i n e proves
f o r self-transcendence

bill

khat-] t h e human c r a v i n g

be p u r c h a s e d a t any p r i c e , even a t

the p r i c e of i t s r e g r e s s i o n t o a f i x a t i o n a t an i n f a n t i l e l e v e l .
Pure myticism i s e q u a l l y u n f i t t o provide a s o l u t i o n .

The

q u i e t i s t mystic and h i s a n t i p o d e , the p o l i t i c a l f a n a t i c , s i n in

opposite d i r e c t i o n s : t h e second through d e n i a l of the oceanic
f e e l i n g , t h e f i r s t through n o t h a r n e s s i n g i t t o s o c i a l i n t e g r a 13

tion."
'?hich b r i n g s us t o t h e added a c c u s a t i o n t h a t Qewey d i d
n o t b e l i e v e i n God and the s o u l .

It i s remarkable t h a t such

c r i t i c i s m should s t i l l remain c u r r e n t i n the l i g h t of modern

t h e o l o g i c a l thought.

Since tile g e n e s i s of C h r i s t i a n i t y t h e r e

have been wide and b i t t e r d i v e r g e n c i e s i n tile i n t e r p e r t a t i o n s

placed upon t h e concepts of Sod an& s o u l .

In fact, liberal

C h r i s t i a n thought today very o f t e n d e s c r i b e s God i n terms

14
I t i u t r u e t h a t Dewey's
which a c t u a l l y owe much t o 3ewey.
God was perhaps more l i k e the over-soul of Lmerson, anchored
t o human s o c i e t y and v i t a l i z e d by c o m u n i c a t i o n .

Clearly not

the grand b u t a b s t r a c t and remote God of d t . Thomas or Luther,

o r t h e bearded impassioned J t e r n a l of t h e Hebrew P a t r i a r c h s ,

o r the i n f i n i t e l y and n a t u r a l - t e l e o l o g i c a l l y evolving "mind"

of Hegel, or "matter" of Urx.

But without being f i x e d o r

immutable, i t was s t i l l a God,

The notion t h a t God i s one and

the same f o r a l l d i s p l a y s a r a t h e r curious l a c k of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n i n matters of theology.

Besides, the unfairness i s compounded by the f a c t t h a t
what i s being c r i t i c i z e d here i s a philosophy and a pedagogy,
n o t a theology.

Some may want t h e i r educational system design-

ed and administered by theologians, b u t I doubt t h a t the majori t y do.

However, t o close the argument on the p o s s i b i l i t y of

t h e o l o g i c a l concensus: *;bitehead has t h i s t o say about the conc e p t of God i n metaphysics:

A r i s t o t l e ' s metaphysical t r a i n of thought...did n o t
l e a d him very f a r towards the production o f a god a v a i l a b l e f o r r e l i g i o u s purposes. It may be doubted whether
aQg properly general metaphysics can ever, without the
i l l i c i t i n t r o d u c t i o n of other considerations g e t much
f u r t h u r than . % r i ~ t o t l e . ~ ~
A r i s t o t l e 1 s god was, of course, merely the "prime mover," the
power which s t a r t e d things going, a requirement i n h i s p h i l o sophy,

'Xhether a " t h i c k e r " f a i t h can be reached by l o g i c

i s a very old question, and one I doubt w i l l ever be answered.

P a r a l l e l considerations apply t o the soul.

Dewey d i d

not b e l i e v e i n the s o u l a s a s u b s t a n t i z l b u t immaterial e n t i t y

i n the t r a d i t i o n a l sense, a s a t h i n g s e p a r a t e from the body.
He never denied, however, t h a t a person i s more than j u s t a
body; t h a t the more i s n o t physical, but, generalized, i s a
man's u n i ~ u eway of e n t e r i n g i n t o i n t e r a c t i o n v i t h other
things, and t h a t the c u l t i v a t i o n o f those h a b i t s and i n t e r e s t s
t h ~ may
t
l e a d t o t h i s unique i n t e r a c t i o n should be man's high-

eat aim.

Again, t o hold one view of t h e s o u l , or conscious-

n e s s , o r mind
more synonyms

--

s o u l h a s been d e s c r i b e d w i t h t h e s e and many

-- i n d i c a t e s a c u r i o u s narrowness

i n theology

and philosophy.

In awn, D r . Lyndts argument would r e a d : Dewey was a f i n e ,

courageous and b r i l l i a n t philosopher w i t h the h i g h e s t i n t e n t i o n s , b u t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of his t h e o r i e s i n pedagogy l e a d s
i n e x o r a b l y t o implanting i n our c h i l d r e n t h e a t h e i s t i c and
r e l a t i v i s t i c p r i n c i p l e s which a r e fundamentally c h a r a c t e r i s t i c

of h i s philosophy.
assumes
-

An important p o i n t t o note i s t h a t Lynd

t h e e f f i c a c y of education i n h a s t e n i n g s o c i a l change.

It would appear that t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what he i s a f r a i d of.

I s h a l l conclude t h i s paper on t h e i s s u e of s o c i a l change.
R.X.

Hutchins i s s u r e t h a t " r e l a t i v i s m , s c i e n t i s m , s c e p t i c i s m

and a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m , the f o u r horsemen o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l apocalypse, have produced the chaos i n education which
16
v i l l end i n the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e Yest,"
Although e l s e -

where i n the same speech he q u e s t i o n s ",,whether and t o what

e x t e n t t h e s t a t e of mind of the p u b l i c i s o r can be the r e s u l t
17
of i t s e d u c a t i o n a l system,l1
He i s a l s o s u r e t h a t Dewey " r e 18

made t h e American e d u c a t i o n a l system i n f o r t y y e a r s . "

Gxcept

t o s a y that Hutchins i s thought t o be a n important spokesman

of e d u c a t i o n , I a m a t a l o s s f o r words.

iiutchins a l s o holds

.hope f o r e d u c a t i o n , that i t may

the opinion t h a t t h e Llemeyan
. __ _
- _
p e a c- e f u l l y accomplish s o c i a l change, i s f a l l a c i o u s . This
'-

i
.

" d o c t r i n e of s o c i a l reform" i s unsound because, w r i t e s Hutc h i n s , "The s o c i a l reformer i s l i m i t e d t o a d a p t i n g t h e r i s i n g

g e n e r a t i o n t o s o c i a l changes a l r e a d y a g r e e d upon.

IIe i s l i m i t -

ed t o meeting needs t h a t a r e sanctioned by the s o c i e t y .

He

can hope t o make himself f e l t i n the educational system only

19

a f t e r he has won over the society."

Dewey, according t o

Hutchins, made himself f e l t because he succeeded i n winning

over s o c i e t y , and because the s o c i a l i d e a s he favored were
those g e n e r a l l y popular i n the ljnited S t a t e s .
seem a t odds on this p o i n t .

IIe and 3r. Lynd

However, I t h i n k I have shown

t h a t n e i t h e r Zutchins o r Lynd need concern themselves over

Deweyan pedagogy, which can hardly be a t h r e a t before i t i s
a fact.
The i s s u e of education as an instrument of change i s a
very old one indeed, b e a u t i f u l l y s t a t e d by Plato.

The answer

t o the question o f r e v o l u t i o n or education probably i s that

there a r e no e i t h e r / o r conclusions t o be drawn.

It i s my hope,

as i t was Dewey's, t h a t education w i l l i n i t i a t e the kind of

a t t i t u d e s f o r reform t h a t would make r e v o l u t i o n unnecessary.

But I am not s o naive t o suggest t h a t education w i l l autom a t i c a l l y b r i n g about the conditions of a democratic s o c i e t y ,
I

and n e i t h e r was Dewey.

ihweyan pragmatism has willed t o educational p r a c t i c e

major concepts t h a t have y e t t o be a c t e d upon with any

three
r e a l f o r c e : the n e c e s s i t y of physical, manipulative a c t i v i t y
t o be a p a r t of l e a r n i n g ; the c r e a t i o n o f a h a b i t of i n q u i r y
based on the proven s y s t e m i n s c i e n c e ; and the very g r e a t
need t o see and v i t a l i z e the s o c i a l r o l e o f education.

Until

these views a r e understood and a c t e d upon by educators, we

can hope f o r l i t t l e b e t t e r than w h a t we have.

F i n a l l y , the

h o w of Professor dewey f o r the d i r e c t i o n of a new educational

system, and s i n c e the e d u c a b i l i t y of man extends t o a l l of

human a f f a i r s , f o r the b e t t e r m e n t of mankind.
Xecause i n t e l l i g e n c e i s c r i t i c a l method a p p l i e d t o
goods of b e l i e f , a p p r e c i a t i o n and conduct, s o a s t o cons t r u c t , f r e e r and more s e c u r e goods, t u r n i n g a s s e n t and
a s s e r t i o n i n t o f r e e cormiunication o f s h a e a b l e meanings,
t u r n i n g f e e l i n g i n t o ordered and l i b e r a l s e n s e , t u r n i n g
r e a c t i o n i n t o response, i t i s the reasonaSle o b j e c t of
our d e e p e s t f a i t h 2nd l o y c l t y , the s t a y and support of
a l l reasonable hopes. Yo u t t e r such a s t z t e m e n t i s n o t
t o indulge i n r o n a n t i c i d e a l i z a t i o n . L t i s n o t t o a s s e r t t h a t i n t e l l i g e n c e w i l l e v e r dominate t h e course of
e v e n t s ; i t i s n o t even t o imply t h a t i t w i l l save from
r u i n and d e s t r u c t i o n . The i s s u e i s one of choice, and
choice i s always a q u e s t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e s . 'Ahat t h e
method of i n t e l l i g e n c e , t h o u g h t f u l v a l u a t i o n w i l l accomplish, i f once i t be t r i e d , i s f o r the r e s u l t of t r i a l
t o determine. ~ i n c ei t i s r e l a t i v e t o the i n t e r s e c t i o n
i n e x i s t e n c e of hazard and r u l e , of contingency and o r d e r ,
f a i t h i n a wholesale and f i n a l triumph i s f a n t a s t i c . But
sone procedure has t o be t r i e d ; f o r l i f e i s i t s e l f s e quence o f t r i a l s . Carelessness and r o u t i n e , Olympian
a l o o f n e s s , secluded c o n t e m ~ l a t i o na r e themselves choices.
2'0 claim- t ~ --.
a _ti n t e l l i g e n c e -i s a b e t t e r method than its
a l t e r n a t i v e g , a u t n o r i t y , i m i t a t i o n , c a p r i c e and i w o r a n c e ,
pre,iudice and wassion ,i s h a r d l y a n e x c e s s i v e claim.
These procedures have been t r i e d and have worked t h e i r
will.
The r e s u l t i s n o t such a s t o make i t c l e a r t h a t
t h e method of i n t e l l i g e n c e , t h e use of s c i e n c e i n c r i t i c i z i n g and r e c r e a t i n g t h e c a s u a l goods of n a t u r e i n t o i n t e n t i o n a l and conclusive goods of a r t , the union of knowledge and v a l u e s i n production, i s n o t v ~ o r t ht r y i n g .
'There may be those t o nhox i t i s t r e a s o n t o t h i n k of
philosophy as the c r i t i c a l method of developing methods
of c r i t i c i s m . b u t i f t h i s conception of philosophy a l s o
n a i t s t o be t r i e d , and t h e t r i a l which s h a l l apgrove o r
coiide~ml i e s i n the e v e n t u a l i s s u e . The import of such
lmoi,~ledgea s we have a c q u i r e d and such exgerience as h a s
been quickened by thought i s t o evoke and j u s t i f y the t r i a l .
( i t a l i c s added)
20

S e c t i o n Three

NO%S

1 John Dewey, E m e r i e n c e and Zducation ( ~ e wYork: ~ c m i l l a n ,

1 9 3 8 ) , p. v i i .

Lortimer Adler, 'Lime lIa~azi..qg, Larch 1 7 , 1952.

John Dewey, "Job Dewey's Gssays on Xducation," Contemp o r a r y Theories i n Xducation, ed. Howard L. Browing
(New York: W c m i l l a n , l 9 6 2 ) , p . 197.

John Dewey, 'r23ssays on Lducation,

PO

'I

C o n t e m ~ o r a rTheories,
~

199.

Richard J. B e r n s t e i n , ed. On Zxperience, lcature, and Pree-

dom (Xew York: B o b b s - L e r r i l l , 19601, pp. x-xi.

6

John Dewey, I-Iwzan iiature and Conduct

(ii819

York: Lodern

Library, 1957), p. 92.

C .U.Z.

Joad, Essays i n F h i 1 ~ s o ~ h . v
ondo don: Hutchinson,

1 9 5 9 ) , p . 67.
8

The one exception among iarxists i s J o b Lewis.

I n t r o d u c t i o n---t o lihilosoohy
-----

In h i s

(London: Lawrence and ' d i s h a r t ,

1954), he i s m o s t understanding of pragmatism, though n o t

overjoyed.
9

s l b e r t i y n d , ,uczckery

i n t g e > ~ & i c S @ ~ ~ o (Xew

l s York:

L i t t l e Ljrown, l 9 3 9 ) , p. 112.

S e c tion Three
UO!D3S (cont.)

10

Lynd, Quackery, p. 114.

11 Lynd, Quackery, p. 109.

12

I n his d i s c u s s i o n o f tne s e l f i n Lind, S e l f , and S o c i e t y ,

Eead says:
&in's behavior i s such i n h i s s o c i a l group t h a t he i s
i s a b l e t o become an o b j e c t h i m s e l f , a f a c t which cons t i t u t e s h i m a more advanced product of e v o l u t i o n a r y development than a r e the l o v e r animals. Pundamentally i t
i s this s o c i a l f a c t
and n o t his a l l e g e d possession of
a s o u l o r mind w i t h arhich h e , as a n i n d i v i d u a l , has been
mysteriously and s u p e r n a t u r a l l y endowed, and w i t h which
the lower animals have n o t been endowed
that d i f f e r e n t i a t e s h i m from them.

--

--

L a d , S e l f , and S o c i e t y (chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago

P r e s s , 19341, p. 137.
13 Arthur H o e s t l e r , I n s i g h t and Outlook (new York: W c m i l l a n ,

1 9 4 9 ) , p. 228.
14

See : John Dev~ey, A Comon Ta i t h (n'ew Iiaven: Yale University

P r e s s , 1934).
1 5 *Alfred IJorth irhi tehead, Science in-she

Lodern 7Jorld ( ~ e w

York: E a c ~ i i l l a n ,l95'i'), p. 125.

16

LL.L. Hutchins, Sreedom, Zduc-z-sion agd the bLund ( l ~ e wPork:

Leridan 13ooks, 19563, p . 17.

SectionIr_@s

NOTES (cont. )

19

Hutchins, Freedom, p . 16.

20

John Dewey, Experience and Kature (Xem York: Dover Books,

1958), pp. 436-37.

Abramson, Norman.

London and

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New York, 1963.

Ardrey, dobert.

A f r i c a n Genesia.

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, Fact.

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ence

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"Decrassifying Dewey," P h i l o s o ~ hof~ S c i -

V I I I ( ~ ~ r j1.91
4 1 ) , 147-56,

-9

I n a u i r y i n t o I n q u i r i e s , ed, Sidney riatner.

-0

Boston, 1954,
-.-

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*

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