The Argument of Aristotle's "Politics" 1

Author(s): Marguerite Deslauriers

Source: Phoenix, Vol. 60, No. 1/2 (Spring - Summer, 2006), pp. 48-69
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20304580
Accessed: 13-04-2016 12:14 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Classical Association of Canada is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Phoenix

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

THE ARGUMENT OF ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

Marguerite Deslauriers
i. introduction

?ince the nineteenth century, many commentators have understood

Book 1 of Aristode's Politics as an argument to the conclusion that the polis is
natural.1 Aristode does make claims about the naturalness of certain relations
between people, and the naturalness of political community as such. But I take
Aristode's primary concern in Book 1 to be to establish that there are different

kinds of rule because there are different kinds of people.2 That political community
I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for a grant which helped to
support this work.
1 See Newman 1887, commenting that the subject of Book 1 is olicovouia and ?eanotE?a (citing
3.6 1278bl7). But he seems to believe that the point of the discussion of the household and slavery
is to establish that the household (and hence the polis) is natural: "A modern work would not first
prove that the household exists- by nature, and then inquire whether it ought to exist. Yet this is
what Aristode does in the First and Second Books of the Politics" (xxix). For more recent works,

see Mulgan 1977 and Miller 1995 (esp. chapters 1-2). Miller writes MOf paramount importance for
Aristode's political theory are the doctrines defended in Politics 1.2, that human beings are by nature

political animals and that the polis exists by nature" (15). This suggests that the primary point of
chapters 1-2 of the Politics, at least, is a point about nature. Miller refines the point later, claiming
that the apparent tension between Books 1 and 3 (because the polis is a natural growth in Book 1, and
yet the criterion of identity for 2. polis in Book 3 is identity in constitution) dissolves if we understand

the polis in Book 1 in the sense of a society (i.e., the total community) and the polis in Book 3 more
narrowly as the state. So what is natural, on his view, is the polis as a community rather than as a state.

Mulgan sees (as most commentators do) two parts to Book 1: chapters 1-2 and chapters 3-13. He
seems to believe that the point of the first part is to prove that the polis is natural (18): "After a brief
introduction, Aristode sets out to prove that the polis is natural or exists by nature." But he mentions

that Aristode also formulates the doctrine that the polis is a compounded whole (28). And he claims
that "The nature of these qualitative differences [between the different types of rule] is one of the
subsidiary themes of Book One and serves to connect the lengthy examination of the household with

the general theory of the polis" (36). I take it that Mulgan means to say that the primary theme of
Book One is that the polis is natural, and that the discussion of differences in types of rule is subsidiary
to that theme.

2 In making this argument I am following Malcolm Schofield (1990: 16-17), who writes, "it is
tempting to suppose that Aristode's main object in Book A is to establish that the polis is a natural
community, ... and that the need to show that the household is a natural community is what leads
him to present at some length a vigorous case for the naturalness of one of its two fundamental

component relationships?slavery_But although Aristode does not always make the strategy and
organization of the argument of Book A as explicit as he might have done, it seems probable that his

main preoccupation is not the naturalness of the polis and its constitutent associations?which is a
topic barely mentioned in subsequent parts of the treatise. The issue which appears to dominate his
mind right through the book is the question: how many forms of rule (?pxt|) are there? And the urge

to reply 'not just one but several' is the mainspring of the argument." In a note Schofield adds that
his argument has "much in common" with Natali 1979-80; he also refers us to Kelsen 1977:172-175.

48
PHOENIX, VOL. 60 (2006) 1-2.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

49

is natural because certain political relations between different kinds of people are
natural is a premise of this argument, rather than the main conclusion of Book 1.

To make this case, I want to emphasize the central importance of the argument
concerning virtue in 1.13: that argument demonstrates that there are different
kinds of virtue, which is sufficient to establish that there are different kinds of
people, some of whom are natural subjects.
I will begin by sketching my interpretation of the argument of Book 1. In
section ii below I analyze the argument of 1.13 and then in section in contrast
Aristode's claim that there are different kinds of human virtue, and the political

aim of that claim, with the views expressed by Xenophon and Plato, to whom
Aristode is clearly responding. The argument of 1.13 is, I suggest, introduced in
1.3 where Aristode raises two questions that prove to be connected. In section iv
I discuss those two questions and their relation to the argument of 1.13, in order

to establish that Book 1 is concerned with the question of different kinds of

people and different kinds of rule. Finally, in section v I return to the issue of
naturalness, and set out the connection on my interpretation between the claims
about nature and the claims about different kinds of people and rule in Book 1.

Most commentators seem to agree that Politics 1 divides into the discussion
of 1-2 followed by that of 3-13. It is clear that in chapters 1-2 Aristode claims

(1) that there are different kinds of rule at 1.1 1252a9-17, (2) that the parts
(in some sense) of the polis are households at 1.2 1253bl, and (3) that the city,
and the households that make up a city, and the relationships that make up the

households are natural (in some sense) at 1.2 1252b30-2. Disagreement arises
not over whether Aristode makes these claims, but rather over the relationship

between these claims and the analysis of the parts of the household in 3-13.

Commentators divide into those who see the claims of 1-2 and the discussion of

3-13 as more or less separate, forming together an account of the household as a

general introduction to the Politics, and those who see the claim of 1-2 and the

discussion of 3-13 as somehow connected.3

Of the latter group, some see the connection this way: the discussion of the
household in chapters 3-13 is intended to help establish that the polis is natural.4
Others see the connection rather differendy: the discussion of the household is

intended as an extended analysis of the parts of the polis.5 On that view, household
governance is a subject distinct from political governance, but linked to it because
See also Kahn 1990: 28. I am in agreement with Schofield about how to read Politics 1, and try to
elaborate here the reasons for favouring such an interpretation.

3 For the view that these are separate issues, see Susemihl and Hicks 1894: 23-24. They suggest
that the discussion of the household is the "first main division of the work" and that chapters 1
and 2 form an introduction, but also mention that Aristode discusses both the development and the
naturalness of the polis, without stating how these connect to the discussion of the household.

4 For the view that the discussion of the household is offered in support of the claim that the polis

is natural, see Newman 1887 and Mulgan 1977.

5 Weil (1960) comments that the subject of Book 1 is the household and quotes Barth?l?my
Saint-Hilaire (1837: l.cxlii): "l'auteur examine et d?crit les ?l?ments constitutifs de l'?tat: les individus

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

50

PHOENIX

political society is composed of households (as Aristotle says at 1253b2-3); and

an account of household governance requires accounts of the household relations.

The view is correct but unsatisfying insofar as the explanation is incomplete:

why is an account of the elements of a composite necessary to an account of the
composite? The answer lies in Aristotle's understanding of the relation of the parts
of the polis (households) to the polis: because households are for the sake of the
polis, the polis determines what the household is like, just as, say, the essence of an
animal determines what the parts of the animal will be like, because those parts are

for the sake of the animal as a whole.6 The parts therefore reveal to us something
of the whole, precisely because they are determined by the nature of the whole.

And the relation between household and polis is unlike the relation between
animal and animal part, insofar as Aristotle seems to believe that households
are more readily knowable than the polis in its best form, and so households
can inform us about the essence of the well-formed polis.7 In other words, we
inquire into the elements of a political community not just to confirm that the
polis is indeed constituted out of households and that households are constituted
by certain relations of rule, but because this investigation will tell us something
about the polis. What it tells us, I argue, is that there is a variety of kinds of
person, and also a variety of forms of rule, that can be manifested (although not
all should be manifested) at the level of political society. Aristotle says as much at
1.11252al6-22, introducing the analysis of the polis into (ultimately) households:
xauxa ?b?K eaxiv a^nOi]. ?tiXov 8' ?axai to Xeyouevov 67uaK07roGai Kax? xrjv o^ny
T|uivr|v uiGo?ov. cocraep y?p ?v xo?? aAAo?? x? a?vGexov uixpi xcov ?auvO?xc?v ?vayicri

?taipe?v (xauxa y?p ?Xctxvcrxa fi?pia xou Ttavxo?), ouxco ko? ttoXiv ?? &v a?yiceiTca
cFK07touvx8? ?\|/oue6a icat Ttep? xo?xcov uaMov, xi xe ?ia^?pouaiv ?XXr\X<?v mi e? xi
xexvtK?v ?v??xexai Xa?eiv rcepi eicaaxov xcov psO?vxcov.

et les choses ..." (28). Jowett (1885: xiii) places emphasis on the analytical method of Book 1, which
he sees as allowing Aristode to build up the state "out of its elements." These elements, he comments,
are "the parts into which it can be dissected, not the elements out of which it has grown" (xix). Jowett,

interestingly, seems to take more seriously than many commentators the argument of the last two

chapters of Book 1. He says, "Whether he meant to compare particular relations of family life with
particular forms of government, e.g. the relation of husband and wife to a constitutional government,

and that of father and son to a monarchy, or only to say generally that the organisation of the family

must correspond to that of the state, is left unexplained" (xix). He adds that "it is hard to say how
a particular form of government can be supposed to depend upon the family" (xix). But Aristode in
1.12-13 makes very explicit the connection between the different household relations and different

forms of government: he identifies the relation of man to wife as constitutional (with a proviso), the
relation of father to children as kingly, and the relation of master to slave as tyrannical.

6 For the claim that the polis is the end (t?Xo?) of households, see Pol. 1.2 1252b30-1253al. Jean
Aubonnet (1968: xxxvii, n. 3) points out that Aristode himself, at 4.4 1290b21-39, compares the art
of the theorist who studies political forms with the art of the naturalist who determines the necessary

parts of every living being and classes the species according to combinations of essential organs.
7 For the distinction between what is more knowable in itself and what is more knowable "to us,"

see An. Post. 1.2 71b34-72a5.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

51

But these claims are not true. What I am saying will be clear, if we examine the matter

according to the method of investigation that has guided us elsewhere. For as in other
cases, a composite has to be analyzed until we reach things that are incomposite, since
these are the smallest parts of the whole, so if we also examine the parts that make up a
city-state, we shall see better both how these differ from each other, and whether or not it

is possible to gain some expertise in connection with each of the things we have mentioned

(tr. Reeve 1998).8

The point of the discussion of 1-2 is often misconstrued as a point about

nature, and as a result the relation of the discussion of 1-2 to that of 3-13 is
misunderstood. The point of 1-2 is that it is a mistake to think that ruling is
simply a question of science and that it is a related mistake to think that there

is only one kind of rule.9 The evidence for this is the development of chapters
3-13, and the way in which Aristode introduces and summarizes the discussion
of slavery and other household relations. I shall first summarize the structure of

the discussion in chapters 3-13, and then turn to a more detailed examination of
the working out of the two controversies introduced in 1.3 below in section iv.
In 1.3 Aristode distinguishes the three household relations and allows that some

people believe that there is a fourth part of the household (wealth acquisition). He
discusses the relation of slavery first, and introduces that discussion by connecting
the question of the justice of slavery with the question whether mastership is the
same as other kinds of rule (the question of 1.1). In 1.4-7 he discusses slave/master
relations and concludes that discussion in 1.7 with the claim that different forms
of rule are indeed different relations, and hence that mastery is a question of being
a certain kind of person and not a question of science (in response to the question
of 1.1). Chapters 8-11 then take up the issue whether wealth acquisition is indeed
a part of, or the whole of, household management?the question raised in 1.3.10
8 When quoting Aristode, I have noted the translations in parentheses after passages quoted,
except where the translations are my own.
Paul Moraux (1957: 6) argues that the claim that there are multiple forms of rule, and that there
are parallel structures in political rule and household rule (and within the individual) are themes that

stem from an early dialogue by Aristode, the rcepi ?ikcuocjuvti?. Moraux focuses on the discussion
of the kinds of rule distinguished according to their aims in Pol. 3.6 1278b30-1279a21, but that
discussion refers back to Book 1. The three kinds of rule are Seanoxeia, ?pxri nk oIk?cl?, apx*l

no\\x\Kx\. Moraux (1957: 25) thinks that the important point in this passage is that political rule
can take either the form of despotism or the form of household rule. This is not to say that political

rule is formed on the model of household rule, but it does suggest that we can more easily observe
the relations of rule in a household (if they are more intelligible "to us," if not more intelligible "in
themselves"), and learn something from them about political rule. Parallel passages in the Nicomachean

Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics suggest the same (see Eth. End. 1241b27-40, 1242a31-bl; Eth. Nie.
1160b22-1161a9; as well as Pol. 1.12). I return to this point below in section v.
10 Some think that the space devoted to this question in Politics 1 is sufficient to show that Aristode

does not have a single or even a primary aim in Politics 1. This is not, I think, obvious. These
chapters are clearly intended to dispose of a current notion which Aristode believes is mistaken: that

wealth acquisition is the aim of the household. They open the way for the argument of 1.13, that
the cultivation of virtue, different in kind and not only in degree among the different inhabitants of

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

52

PHOENIX

And finally 1.12-13 returns to the issue of different kinds of rule by examining

the relation of father to children and the relation of husbands and wives. So

the bulk of Book 1 is devoted to discussions which Aristode understands to be

contributing to the conclusion that the different household relations, the different
parts of the household, are different relations of rule.

On my view, then, the examination of the household and its relations in

Politics 1 is intended precisely to demonstrate there are different kinds of natural

subject, and hence different kinds of rule. Aristode argues in 1.1 that it is a
mistake to suppose that there is only one kind of rule. The discussion of slavery in
1.4-7 and the argument to the claim that there are different kinds of virtue in 1.13
are intended to establish that there are different kinds of people (because different
capacities, moral and intellectual, will distinguish different kinds). The argument

that there are different kinds of people helps to establish that ruling is not merely a
question of science (because the ruler must not only know certain things, but be a
certain kind of person; i.e., the ruler must have certain moral as well as intellectual

virtues). Moreover, the argument of Book 1, on this understanding, is more

closely connected to the discussion of the constitution than many commentators
seem to suppose: that there are different kinds of people, and that these differences
are natural, is fundamental to Aristode's argument that there is more than one
"correct" kind of constitution.11

The evidence that establishing the naturalness of the polis and its constituent
relationships is not the main point of Politics 1 consists, as Schofield points out,
of the relative absence of the topic in later parts of the treatise. And the structure

of the argument of Book 1 as I have set it out suggests that the claims about
nature are secondary to the claim about different kinds of people, different kinds
of rule, and the necessity that the ruler should have something more than science.
That is, Aristode wants to establish that there are different kinds of rule. To do
this, he must show not only that there are different kinds of subject, but also that

those kinds are natural. The naturalness he attempts to demonstrate by showing

that the household (which he assumes is natural) contains all these kinds. So

the emphasis of 3-13 is on the differences among the relations of the household

(and hence among their constitutional counterparts) and not so much on the
naturalness of these relations, which Aristode takes for granted.

II. THE ARGUMENT OF 1.13: DIFFERENT KINDS OF HUMAN VIRTUE

My aim in this section is to give a brief account of the argument of 1.13, and
then in section iv below to say something about how the argument fits into the
the household, is the aim of the household. And that, again, has an important bearing on Aristodes
political theory more generally, Aristode repeatedly links what he says about the acquisition of wealth
by the ruler of a household to the same point with respect to the statesman (see Pol. 1.8 1256b34-38,

1.10 125819-21).

11 Kelsen (1977: 175) recognizes the importance of the argument of Book 1 for the rest of the
Politics. He writes, "The train of thought pursued in Book I, which seeks by examining the different
forms of government to lay the foundation for a doctrine of constitutions, is continued only in Book III."

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

53

structure of Book 1 as a whole. I understand the structure of Politics 1 to depend

on the two controversies Aristotle mentions in 1.3: one concerning slavery and one
concerning the sufficiency of "science" (?nioxr\[xy\) for ruling well (1253bl8-23).

The argument of 1.13, I want to suggest, indicates how Aristotle understands

these two controversies to be connected.

First, the account of the argument. Aristotle begins the discussion of virtue in

1.13 by posing and clarifying a question. That question is not so much whether
slaves can have virtues (since even instruments have virtues?e.g., knives can be

sharp or dull), as whether slaves can have human virtues.12 The contrast is not just
with inanimate instruments, but also with animals. If slaves provide only "bodily
services" (x?q acouaxiKa^ urcepecua?) then slaves can be virtuous only in the way
that animals can, by excelling in certain tasks that require bodily excellence. So the
question is whether slaves can have virtues other than the virtues of instruments

or animals?whether they can have the virtues of free persons. Aristotle then
extends the question to women and children, by asking whether in general natural
subjects can have the virtues of free adult men (1259b21-36).

Aristotle makes clear that there are two affirmative responses to this question
that are unacceptable. The first is to say that the virtues of slaves, women, and
children are identical with the virtues of adult free men. This cannot be right
because, were the virtues of natural rulers and natural subjects to be identical,
the naturalness of both the rule and the subjection would be threatened (el uev

y?p bei ?uxJKtt?pou? ??sx?xeiv KOtloKayaOia?, ?i? xi x?v uev apxeiv ??oi av
x6v ?? apxeaGai KaOarcaC; "If both of them should share in what is noble and
good, why should one of them rule once and for all or the other be ruled once
and for all?," tr. Reeve 1998: ad 1259b34-36).13 The second affirmative answer
to the question that Aristotle treats as unacceptable is to say that natural subjects
and natural rulers have the same virtues, but possess them in different degrees.
He rejects this for the same reason that he rejects the suggestion that the virtues
are simply identical: he thinks that if natural rulers and natural subjects had the
same virtues, even if natural rulers were to have more of those virtues, the rule of

natural rulers would not be legitimate (to jii?v y?p apxeaOca Kai ?pxeiv e??ei
?iou|)?pei, to ?? \x?XXov kgu tjttov o???v; "Ruling and being ruled differ in kind,

but things that differ in degree do not differ in that way," tr. Reeve 1998: ad

1259b36-38). This is the argument against Plato and Xenophon, whose views I

consider in section in below.

12 We might remark the oddness of Aristode's choice of domestic slaves as the focus of his
discussion of slavery, since domestic slavery was certainly not the only, or even the most prevalent,

contemporary form of slavery. Pierre Pellegrin (1982) acknowledges this and argues that Aristode
is interested in particular in defending "l'esclavage lignager." Aristode's focus on domestic slavery is
important here for two reasons: first, because it makes the case of women and that of slaves seem
parallel, when they might not so seem had Aristode focused rather on industrial slavery, and second,
because slavery in the context of the household is more likely than industrial slavery to appear to be a
natural relation.

13 Notice that Aristode here takes it as an assumption that there are natural rulers and natural

subjects.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

54

PHOENIX

The difficulty as Aristode sees it is that we cannot say that slaves and women
have the same virtues as men, even if we allow that they might have different
degrees of those same virtues, and still hope to justify the relations of natural rulers
to natural subjects. At the same time, while accounting for the differences in the
virtues of slaves, women, and free men, we must maintain that all the different
kinds of virtue are human kinds.

We should notice that Aristode does give the same names to the virtues that
he attributes to natural subjects and natural rulers. He asks whether slaves can

have temperance, courage, justice, and the like (1259b21-6), whether a woman
ought to be temperate and courageous and just, whether a child can be temperate

(1259b28-32); and responds by asking rhetorically whether a natural subject

can obey well if he is intemperate and cowardly or unjust (1259b40-1260a2).
Moreover, at 1260a20-24 Aristode explicidy attributes temperance, courage, and
justice to women as well as men, insisting that they are different, specifying that

the courage of a man is manifest in commanding and that of the woman in

obeying. And at 3.4 1277b25-29, he states clearly:
T) ?? (|>povT|ai? apxovio? ??io? ?peiT) u?vr|. x?? y?p ?XXaq ?oucev ?vaymiov e?vou
Koiv?? Kai tcdv ?pxou?vcov K?? tcov ?pxovicov, ?pxou?vou ?? ye ook ecmv ?pexT|
<|>povTiai?, ?XX? ?o?a ?Xr|9r|?.
Practical wisdom is the only virtue peculiar to a ruler; for the others, it would seem, must
be common to both ruler and ruled. At any rate, practical wisdom is not the virtue of one

who is ruled, but true opinion is (tr. Reeve 1998).

Thus at the same time that Aristode argues that the virtues of slaves and
women are not simply identical with, or different in degree from, the virtues of
free men, he insists that denying human virtue to slaves and women is equally
unacceptable. If slaves, and, by extension, women, were utterly without human
virtue or incapable of developing that virtue, then how could they be good natural
subjects, i.e., how could they obey well (1259b40-1260a2)? Yet, implicidy stated,
there are virtuous women and slaves, as evidenced by their capacity for obedience.
So women and slaves cannot be incapable of virtue. Moreover, were slaves to have
no virtues at all, then the relation of master to slave would not be a relation among

people and persuasion would have no role to play. Force and coercion would be
the appropriate mechanisms for ensuring the compliance of the slave. In arguing
that slaves have virtues Aristode is arguing that one ought to offer reasons to one's
slave for obedience. So the virtues of women and slaves are human, which will
turn out to mean that they involve reason, but they are different in kind, and not

in degree, from the virtues of free men (the virtues which Aristode describes at
length in the Nicomachean Ethics).

Aristode has set the parameters of his own response to the question of the
virtue of natural subjects: natural subjects must have virtue, that virtue must be
human (i.e., it must involve reason), and that human virtue must be different in
kind from the virtue of free adult men. What he has then to explain is just how
the virtues of women, children, and slaves differ one from the other and in general

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

55

how they differ from the virtue of free men, while remaining recognizably human.

To do this he exploits an analogy between the parts of the soul and the parts of
a relation of rule, where what naturally rules is identified as some faculty which

has reason (presumably, practical reason or the deliberative faculty), and what is
naturally ruled is some faculty which does not have reason (but which, presumably,

is capable of obeying reason, 1260a4-7).14 Aristotle then distinguishes the virtue

of women, children, and slaves from the virtue of free men according to the nature
of the deliberative faculty in each and the relation of that deliberative faculty to
the part of the non-rational soul which can obey.
I will not discuss these distinctions in virtues in more detail here. But in order
to understand why Aristotle differentiates several kinds of human virtue, the first
question to ask is: how does the argument of 1.13 fit into the structure of Book 1
of the Politics} That is, if we assume that the argument of 1.13 must contribute in
some way to the project of Book 1, what does that suggest about what the project
is? And if we can interpret Book 1 in such a way that the argument of 1.13 does

make a contribution to the Book as a whole, how might that influence how we
understand the argument of 1.13?
III. THE CONTRAST: XENOPHON AND PLATO ON THE IDENTITY OF VIRTUES

I turn now to the arguments of Xenophon and Plato for the identity of
virtues across free men, women, and slaves, in order to suggest something of the

philosophical context in which Aristotle claims that slaves and women do not
have virtues identical with those of free men.15 Aristotle's arguments in 1.13 are
explicitly targeted at the political implications of the claim that virtue is the same
in everyone, and so it is useful to consider the contexts in which that claim is

expressed by some of his contemporaries. I do not wish to overstate the differences

between Aristotle and Plato, in particular. It is clear that Xenophon and Plato as
well as Aristotle believed that the good ruler must have certain intellectual and
moral virtues. The differences lie in their claims about who can have such virtues,
what the virtues amount to, and how distinct the intellectual virtues are from the

moral virtues.

I begin with Xenophon. In the Memotabilia Xenophon has Socrates say:

<b?, ?tou av tic 7rpoaT(XTe?r|, ??v yiyvc?aKrj Te Sv ?e? Kai t<x6t(x rcop?CeaOca

?uvrjTca, ?yaO?? ?v ein 7cpoaT(XTr|?, eue xopou eue o?kou eue n?Xeoq eue
GTpcueunaTO? 7tpoaTCue?oi ("whatever someone presides over, if he knows what
14Moraux (1957: 41) points out that Aristotle here seems neither to be taking the view of Plato
(and of the Eudemian Ethics) that the union of soul and body is somehow unnatural, the body acting
as a prison for the soul, nor to be taking the hylomorphic view that characterizes the De anima, insofar

as here the soul and body are taken to be distinct, and necessarily so if the subject/ruler analogy is to

work.

15 Moraux (1957: 28) notes that Aristode is taking issue with Plato and Xenophon in this
discussion, but he treats it as "un point de d?taiT and not as "une th?se centrale." I am treating the

argument that there are different kinds of rule as a central thesis, and not as a point of detail, in

Politics 1.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

56 PHOENIX
is needed and is able to procure it, he will be a good presiding officer whether it
is a chorus or a household or a city or an army that he presides over") and: ^r\

Kaxa<|>p?vei, styr\, ... x v oiKovojaiKcbv ?v?p?v. r| y?p x?v i?icov ?ni^i?Xeia

nXr\Qsi ?l?vov 8ia<|>?pei xi\q xcov koivg?v ("do not hold in contempt men who are

skilled at household management. For attending to private affairs differs only in

terms of multitude from attending to public ones," tr. Bonnette 1994: ad 3.4.6,

3.4.12). These two passages make the claim that ruling in different contexts (a
household or a city or an army, private affairs or public affairs) is the same, because
the contexts differ only insofar as the number of the ruled differs. That is, ruling
a city is different from ruling a household only in that there are more people in

a city than in a household. Aristode rejects this claim in Politics 1.1, as we have
seen.
Xenophon also suggests that the art of household management is necessary for
the political art: ?'va 8? \?\ Suvajaevo? a><|>e?,f|aai rccoc av rcoMo?c ye ?uvr|9eir|?

("But if you are unable to benefit one [household] how would you be able to
benefit many?," tr. Bonnette 1994: ad 3.6.14). Someone who is good at ruling
a city (benefiting many) will be good at benefiting one (ruling a household).
This again implies that there is no difference intrinsic to the knowledge or virtue
required for ruling, whether the rule occurs in a household or a city.

Moreover, Xenophon seems to assume that the virtue of women and men and
slaves is identical. In Xenophon's Oeconomicus we find passages which attribute
the same virtue of self-control (aa><|>pove? or ?yicpaxei? x? eiaiv) to women and
slaves as well as free men. At 7.14-15, Ischomachus reports to Socrates his own
words in reply to his wife, who has said:
xi 5' av ?ya> aoi, ?<|>r|, ?uvaiuriv ouiinp??ai: xi? ?? n ?jir) ?uvaui? i?X ?v aoi rc?vxa
?axiv. ?u?v 8' 6<|>Tiaev r\ \ir\rr\p epyov ??vai a?)<|>pov??v. val u? Ai', ?<|>r|v ?yco, a> yuvai,

ml y?p ?^ioi ? rcaxTJp. ?XX? a?<t>p?vcov xo? ?axi Kai ?v?p?? Kai yuvaiKO? ouxco rcoe?v,
07WD? x? x? ?vxa cb? p?Xxiaxa e^si Kai ?tAAa ?xi nXeiaxa ?k xou KaXou xe Kai SiKaioo
7cpoay?VTJa?xai.

What should I be able to do to help you? What ability have I got? Everything depends
on you. My mother told me that my duty is to practise self-control." "By Zeus, wife," I
said, "my father said the same to me. But self-control for both man and woman means
behaving so that their property will be in the very best condition and that the greatest
possible increase will be made to it by just and honourable means (tr. Pomeroy 1994).

Moreover, in arguing that slaves can be taught household management,

Socrates in the Oeconomicus argues that slaves can acquire the virtues of their
masters, to the point where they might become not only masters but also kings.
In Oeconomicus 12, discussing the training of foremen, Ischomachus argues that
slaves can have, or can acquire, loyalty, self-control (with respect to drink, sleep,
and erotic adventures), and an interest in the profitability of the household. At

13.5 Socrates then says: ?crxi? y?p xoi ?pxiKOu? ?vGpamcov S?vaxai rcoie?v,
SfjXov ?ti ouxo? iced 8ea7toxiKoi)c ?vGpc?Tccov Suvaxai 8i8aaKeiv, oaxi? 8?

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS!

57

?ecrcoTiKou? ?uvaTca rcoie?v, Kai ?aaiA,iKoi)c ("You know, whoever can make
people skilled in governing men can obviously also make them skilled masters

of men; and whoever can make people skilled masters can also make people
skilled to be kings," tr. Pomeroy 1994). Books 12 and 13 of the Oeconomicus
thus introduce another position that Aristotle wishes to refute: that slaves and
masters are capable of the same virtues and for that very reason are politically
interchangeable. A slave who can be taught to be a good foreman could also be
taught to be a good king; this is because both the role of foreman and the role of
king require that one rule over other people, and whether that rule is exercised in
a household or a greater community, it involves the same skills. The position that

slaves do not differ in kind from free men because they are capable of acquiring
the same virtues is thus connected to the claim that ruling in any context is the

same.16 If everyone?free man, slave, and woman?is capable of the same virtue,
then anyone can (in principle) become a ruler, and anyone can be ruled. So the
issue of virtue and its sameness underlies the claim that ruling is the same in any

context.

The sameness of virtue is also asserted by Plato. In a passage in the Meno

(71a-73d) he establishes that men and women have the same virtues, although
exercised in different realms: rc?vTec ap' avOpcorcoi T(p ai>T(p Tp?rccp ayaOo? eiaiv

("For all people are good in the same way," 73cl-2).17 This passage is pertinent to
the discussion of the virtue of slaves, although slaves are not mentioned, because
the point of the passage is that all activities of directing or managing require the
same virtues, whatever the scale of the task. And, of course, later in the dialogue
Socrates takes on the instruction of a slave boy, part of the point must be that
anyone can learn. Just as Socrates argues in the Oeconomicus that a slave who

can be taught to run a household could equally well be taught to be a king, so

here Socrates argues implicitly that a woman who can manage a household could

equally well manage a city (73a6-9):

xi ??: o?k ?v?po? ?i?v ?perriv eXsyec, n?Xiv e? ?ioikew, yuvaiK?? ?? o?K?av; ?yoye. <3tp'
O?V O?OV TE ?0 ?IOIKE?V f^ O?K?av X\ ?XXo OTlo?v, \li\ CKlM|>pOVC?? KO? ?IKOUW? ?lOlKOOVTa;

O? ?fjTO.
"Didn't you say that a man's virtue lies in directing the city well and a woman's in directing

her household well?" "I did." "Is it possible to direct a city or a household or anything else

well without directing it with temperance and justice?" "No."18

16 Again, in the Oeconomicus, Ischomachus says: & Xcotcpaxe?, t? rtaaai? koiv?v tou? Ttp?Ceai ko?
yeopyiKfi Kai noXixiK\\ kc? oiicovouiiqi ko? rcoteuiiq? t? apxtK?v etva?, to?to 5t| auvouotay?) aoi
?y? 7CO?.U ?ia4>?peiv yv?\i\[ to?? ?T?pou? t?v ?T?pcov (aI agree, Socrates, that men differ very much
from each other in intelligence [yvo?urt] when it comes to the skills of governing that are common to

all skilled activities, to farming, politics, estate management, and warfare," tr. Pomeroy 1994: ad 21.2).
17 Translations of Plato's texts are from Cooper 1997.
18 The arguments Socrates uses to establish this claim are not convincing. At 72d-73a he argues
that if the virtue in men and the virtue in women are both really virtue, then the virtue of women

and men must be the same; but this does not follow unless we suppose that virtue is indivisible,

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

PHOENIX

58

This passage makes clear the connection between sameness of virtue and the
capacity to rule; if one is acting with temperance and justice, then whether one is
ruling a household or a city, the good rule one practices will be the same.

This connection is made even more explicidy in the Platonic dialogue, Lovers
138c, where Socrates asserts:
ectxiv apa xaux?v, cb? ?oike, ?aai>.??c, x?pavvo^ tcoXixiko?, o?kov?uoc^ oeott?xti^
ac?(()po)v, ??Kaio? Kai [l?a xe/vrj ?ax?v ?aai^iKii, xupavviKtj, tio^ixiktj, ??a7roxiKT|,
oikovouiktj, 8iKaioauvr|, aco<|>poa?vr|.
"So they are all the same, it seems: king, tyrant, politician, head of the household, master

of slaves, the temperate person, and the just person. And they are all one art: kingly,
tyrannical, political, household management, justice, and temp?rance/'

Moreover, in the Statesman at 259b-c, the Visitor asks, x? S?; \izyaXy\q crxrjua

oiicr|ae(?? f\ ajaiicpa? au n?Xe&q oyKO? ?icov xi npoq ?pxtjv Sioiaexov ("Well

then, surely there won t be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between

the character of a large household, on the one hand, and the bulk of a small
city on the other?") and, when Socrates agrees that there will be no difference,
continues, o?kouv ... (|)avep?v ob? ?7iiaxrj|ar| |u?a rcepi ticxvx' ?axi xauxa. xa?xrjv

Se 8?X6 ?aai^iKT|v e?xe 7toA,ixikt|v e?xe o?kovo^iktjv xi? ?vo|aa?ei, |^r|8?v a?x$

5ia(|)8pcc)>xe9a ("So ... it's clear that there is one sort of expert knowledge
concerned with all these things; whether someone gives this the name of expertise

in kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let's not pick any

quarrel with him"). These passages indicate something more than we found in the
passages of Xenophon: namely, that the virtue necessary for ruling is identified
with an art or a kind of expert knowledge. This is a claim that Aristode rejects
in saying that, while of course the ruler might have a science, it is not because he
has the science but because of the kind of person he is that he rules. Aristode is
separating the science from the virtue of the ruler, which Plato will not do.19
which is just the point in question. Similarly, at 73b~c Socrates begs the question by arguing that
men and women have the same virtue since men and women both become good by coming to possess

temperance and justice; but he has not established that temperance and justice are the same in men
and women?on the contrary, that is what he needs to show. But as the Laches passage (191c-e)

I quote below (59) shows, Plato represents Socrates as taking it to be a fundamental assumption
of the discussion of any virtue that it should be one, because if it is not, then it is not a single

virtue.

19 This should not surprise us. Outside the discussion of political and household rule, Plato argues
that virtue is just a kind of knowledge, while Aristode argues that virtue is something in addition to a

kind of knowledge?a certain training of one's desires. See the Protagoras, especially 329b-333b and
357a-c, and the Nicomachean Ethics at 1144bl7-21. The views of both Plato and Aristode are most
obvious perhaps in the discussions of weakness of will and the Socratic contention that what we call

weakness of will is just ignorance (at 357e). Aristode responds that weakness of will is indeed a kind
of ignorance, but challenges the understanding of ignorance in question. That challenge rests on the
possibility that we can indeed know what the best thing to do is and yet fail to do it because we lack

the desire to do it. See Eth. Nie. 7.3 1147all-24.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

59

Moreover, in those dialogues that take the definition of a particular virtue as

their focus, Socrates takes pains to insist on the importance of a definition that
will recognize the identity of the virtue across varied circumstances and persons.
So, for example, in the Laches (191c-e), he says:
?ouAxSuEvoc yap aoo rcuOeaOai utj u?vov to?? ?v T<p 07tAiTiKcp ?v?pEiou?, ?XX? Kai
TO?? 8V Tip ?7C7UKCp Kai 8V Q?UTiaVTl Tip 7toA,?UlK(p El?El, Kai UT| UOVOV TO?? 8V Tip 7CO?.?u(p,

?XX? Kai to?? ?v toi? rcpo? ttjv GaXaTTav kiv?uvoi? ?v?peiou? ovTa?, Kai ?aoi ye rcpo?

voaou? Kai ?aoi rcpo? Tievia? f| Kai 7tpo? Ta rcoXiTiKa ?v?ps?oi eiaiv, Kai eti a? utj
u?vov ?aoi rcp?? A,u7ta? ?v?pEioi siaiv r\ (|>o?ouc, ?XX? Kai rcpo? S7ii9uuia? r\ Tj?ov??

?eivoi uaxeaGai, Ka? uevovte? Kai ?vaaTp?(()ovT???slai y?p rco? tive?, ? Aaxn?, Kai
?V TOI? TOIOUTOI? ?v?pElOl.

I wanted to learn from you not only what constitutes courage for a hoplite but for a
horseman as well and for every sort of warrior. And I wanted to include not only those who
are courageous in warfare but also those who are brave in dangers at sea, and the ones who
show courage in illness and poverty and affairs of state; and then again I wanted to include
not only those who are brave in the face of pain and fear but also those who are clever at

fighting desire and pleasure, whether by standing their ground or running away?because
there are some men, aren't there, Laches, who are brave in matters like these?20

Aristotle objects then to two of the claims made in the discussions in the
Memotabilia, Oeconomicus, Meno, and Laches (among other Socratic dialogues):
that directing, or managing, or ruling is always the same activity, and that virtue is
the same in different kinds of people. Looking at those discussions we can see the
connection between the two claims, which in turn allows us to see why Aristotle
believes that in arguing in Politics 1.13 that virtue is different in kind in different

kinds of people he is supporting the claim that ruling is different in different

contexts. In arguing that the virtues of slaves and women are different from those
of free men and from one another, and yet are human virtues nonetheless, Aristotle

is arguing, against Xenophon, Plato, and Socrates, that there are different kinds
of people and hence different kinds of rule. Ultimately, he wants to show that,
because the different kinds of rule are determined by natural differences in people,
what it is to rule well cannot simply be a question of science.

IV. THE TWO QUESTIONS OF BOOK 1

I have suggested that the examination of the household and its relations
in Politics 1 is intended precisely to demonstrate that there are different kinds
of natural subject and hence different kinds of rule. Moreover, the argument

of Book 1, on this understanding, is more closely connected to the discussion

of the constitution than many commentators seem to suppose: that there are
20 The list of circumstances in this passage seems broad enough to include the possibility that
women, children, and slaves might display courage. Notice, however, that later in the dialogue Nicias
seems to suggest that when anyone other than a free man (anyone who does not have understanding)
acts in a way that seems courageous, we have to attribute it to "rashness" (197a-b).

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

60 PHOENIX
different kinds of people, and that these differences are natural, is fundamental
to Aristode's argument that there is more than one "correct" kind of constitution.
This is not to say that every natural relation of rule can be manifested in some

correct constitution (despotic rule, while natural to masters and slaves, is not
a correct form of constitution), but only that every correct constitution will be
mirrored by some household relation.
This overview of the structure and the aim of Book 1 is confirmed by Aristode's

discussion of two questions, introduced in 1.3 and referred to at various points

in Book 1 when Aristode summarizes his argument. The two questions concern

slaves and masters, and are, more generally, questions about all relationships
between rulers and ruled. The first is whether ruling is simply a science; the
second is whether slavery is natural and just. In introducing these controversies

in 1.3 Aristode clearly believes that they are connected?indeed, he seems to

treat them as a single controversy, but the connection between them is not made

explicit in 1.3. In what follows I shall examine Aristode's attempts to resolve

each of these questions and consider the connection between them. It appears to
me that the connection is this: to show that ruling well is not simply a science,
Aristode needs to show that it involves virtues other than theoretical virtues, and
to demonstrate the importance of the practical intellectual virtues to good rule, he
needs to show that there are significant differences in the soul faculties of different

kinds of people. My aim in discussing these questions and Aristode's answers to

them is to elaborate the claim that the primary project of Politics 1 is to show that
there are different kinds of rule, that ruling well is not simply a science, and that
the argument of 1.13 has to be understood as contributing to the support ofthat

claim.

Consider Aristode's presentation of th? first of these controversies. He says

at 1253b 18-20 that some believe (a) that the rule of a master is a science and
(as a corollary) (b) that the management of a household and the mastership of
slaves and the political and royal rule are all the same. He seems to suggest that
(a) entails (b); if the rule of a master is a science, then to exercise that science
will be the same in any context, whatever the nature of the subjects to be ruled.

I want to suggest that the subsequent discussion in Book 1, the discussion of

the master/slave relation and the other household relationships is intended by
Aristode to show that while the rule of the master does require the science of rule,

more importandy the rule of a master requires a certain character. Hence, at 1.7
1255b20-35, reiterating the point, he says:
? n?v oSv Searcoxri? ou Aiyexai Kax' ?maxr|fir|v, ???? xq> xoi?aSe eiva?, ?uo?coc 8? Kai
? 8ouXo? Kai ? ???00epo? ?maxrmri 8' ?v eirj Ka? 8ea7toxiK?| Ka\ Sod?iki] ... ?axi 8'
auxT| r\ ?7uaxrmr| o?8?v u?ya exouaa o?>8e aeuv?v. a y?p x?v 80GA.OV erciaxaaGai Sei
Ttoie?v, 8K8?VOV 8e? xaGxa erciaxaaOai 87ux?xxeiv.
The master is not called a master because he has science, but because he is a certain kind
of person, and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there may be

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

61

a science for the master and a science for the slave_ Yet this science is not anything
great or wonderful; for the master need only know how to order that which the slave must
know how to execute (tr. Jowett 1885 [modified]).

The point again is that to be a master it is not sufficient to have the science
necessary for being a master.21
What, then, is the something more than science? Or, what kind of person must
the master be? Aristotle's point is that science as a theoretical intellectual virtue is

importantly different from phtonesis as a practical intellectual virtue that informs

moral character. I have cited above (54) the passage at Politics 3.4 1277a25-29
that makes clear that in Aristotle's view the ruler differs from the subject insofar

as he has phtonesis. We should notice also the passage at 1260al4-20:

?uo?coc to?vuv ?vaymito? E^eiv Kai TtEpi Ta? rjGiK?? ?pET?i? ?rcoXnTiTEov, ?eiv uev
UETExeiv 7tavTa?, aXX o? t?v a?T?v Tp?rcov, aXX ?aov ?Kav?v EKaaTip Ttp?? t? a?ToG
EpyOV. ?I? T?V UEV apXOVTa TE?iaV E^EIV ?E? TT|V T|6lKT|V ?p?TT|V ..., TCOV ?' &XX(?V
EKaCFTOV ?GOV ETtl?aXXEl a?TOl?.

So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the virtues of character also; all should
partake of them, but not in the same way, but only as much as is required by each for the
fulfillment of his function. Hence the ruler ought to have complete virtue of character ...
the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each
of them (tr. Jowett 1885 [modified]).

Moreover, in the discussion of the virtues of the good citizen and of the good
person, at 3.4 1277al4-16, Aristotle insists that the good ruler will always be a

good man, because he is (|>p?viuov.22

Although saying that natural rulers must have phtonesis while natural subjects
cannot will allow Aristotle to argue that ruling well includes something other
than science, and will allow him to distinguish the natural ruler from the natural
subject (I will have more to say about this later), it seems to run counter to the
claim that the rule of the master, of the father, and of the head of a polis are
21 Newman (1887: 133-135) sees the extremes here as, on the one hand, the view of Socrates (as

attributed to him by Xenophon in the Oeconomicus and Plato in the Statesman) that ruling is a science,.
identifying the rule of the master with household management and political and kingly rule, and, on
the other, the view that the distinction between master and slave rests only on convention, not on
nature, and is therefore based on compulsion and consequendy unjust (it is less clear to whom to
attribute this view). The contrast, then, is between a view of ruling as a science, where the possession

of the science legitimizes the rule, and a view of ruling as an unjust practice without justification by
intellectual skill. We might also see here Aristode entering a contemporary debate about the role of
theory in political life. Plato is a proponent of the view that rule is a science?that to rule well is to
have a scientific understanding of the principles of rule (see, e.g., Rep. 443e). Isocrates, by contrast,
denies that it is possible to have a science which allows one to determine what one ought to do (Antid.
271). I am grateful to Denis Vlahovic for pointing out this second contrast of views to me.
22 The passage in 1.3 setting out the question speaks of r\ ?eojioxeia, whereas in 1.13 Aristode
contrasts the virtues of t?v dpxovxa with those of slaves and women. Similarly, at 3.4 Aristode is

speaking of t?v ?pxovta. Because of the contrast with slaves and women in 1.13,1 take it that we
can extend the point to interpret the sense of the passage in 1.3.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

62

PHOENIX

different in kind. That is, if every kind of rule depends on the possession of
phtonesis by the ruler, then it might seem to follow that someone who has phtonesis
could rule a household, a slave, or a polis. So how does Aristotle argue that these

kinds of rule are different? My suggestion is that the discussion of 3-13 (and
particularly of 12-13) is intended to demonstrate the differences among natural
subjects. Because the nature of the subjects of a household and a state is different,
and because rule is a relation between ruler and subject, the rule of these different

kinds of subject will be different.23

So there are two issues at stake in the controversy about rule as a science: the
first is the issue of difference between rulers and subjects, and Aristotle's claim
is that that difference is fundamentally a difference in the capacity or incapacity
for phtonesis (more on this below); the second is the issue of differences among

subjects, which Aristotle argues is a question of the differences of incapacity

for phtonesis. It is this set of differences?the differences in incapacity of the
deliberative faculty in natural subjects?that determines that kinds of rule are
naturally different even though the ruler is the same. Aristotle uses these two
discussions of difference (between ruler and subject, and among subjects) to argue
that there are naturally different kinds of persons, and hence that the possession

of science is insufficient for being a good ruler because it fails to include the
23 One might suppose that Aristode is arguing for the claim that kinds of rule are different in this

way: since phronesis requires experience, and the experience of ruling a household is different from
the experience of ruling a city, the phronesis acquired in each context is different. But this cannot

be Aristode's point. First, because there is textual evidence against it: at Eth. Nie. 6.8 1141b23-24
Aristode says that the political art is the same hexis as phronesis, although they are not the same in being

(t? uivToi e?vcu o? to:?t?v). If phronesis and the political art are the same, then they cannot require
different kinds of experience, and this makes it unlikely that the political art and the art of household

rule require different experience. Moreover, if phronesis, excellence in household management, and
excellence in rule are all the same virtuous state, the virtuous states of women, children, and slaves

must be different hexeis from the hexis of free men (and not just the same hexis differendy disposed).
This is because the virtue of women, children, and slaves, unlike the virtue of free men, is not to
function as a ruler of any kind, but to function in some kind of role of obedience. This is a difference

that Aristode does not treat as circumstantial, because were he so to treat it, it would amount to a
difference in degree of virtue?a difference which would suggest then that women, children, slaves,

and free men could, in principle, exchange places. That is, in saying that the difference in virtues
among different kinds of people is not a difference in degree but in kind, Aristode is saying that the
virtues of different kinds of people cannot be the same hexis differendy disposed, or the same hexis
but less so (what could this mean?), but must be different hexeis. Second, Aristode cannot argue that
the experience necessary to develop phronesis is different from the experience necessary to develop

oikonomike or politike, because to do so would beg the question: Aristode's opponent need only deny
that the experience of ruling a city is significandy different from the experience of ruling a household.
Aristode's interest in denying that rule is simply a question of the possession of a certain science is not
then a concern about the varieties of experience. So Aristode's point in arguing that rule is not simply
a science, and that the rule of household and that of a city is different, is not that there are different

kinds of phronesis and accordingly different kinds of ruler?but rather that there are different kinds of

subject.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

63

practical and moral aspects of character which distinguish the ruler from the
subject. Ultimately the theme of Book 1?that there are different kinds of rule in
nature?is important to the discussion of different constitutions in two ways: first,

the discussion of slavery and in particular the contrast between the rule of a master
and the rule of a king allows Aristotle to introduce the primary division between
correct and incorrect constitutions, according to whether they are organized for
the benefit of the ruler or the ruled; and second, the discussion of the differences
between slaves, women, and children, intrinsically and in their different relations
to the head of the household, allows Aristotle to introduce the distinction within
the class of correct constitutions between monarchy and polity.
I turn now to the second controversy Aristotle sets out in 1.3. This concerns

the naturalness and justice of slavery. At 1253b20-23 he notes that there are
those who affirm that the rule of master over slaves is contrary to nature, and
that the distinction between slave and freemen exists by convention only and

is therefore unjust.24 This second controversy is connected to the first, the

controversy concerning whether science is sufficient for ruling well, and the
connection explains Aristotle's interest in Book 1 in establishing the naturalness
and justice of slavery. If there are natural slaves (people who, by nature, are such
that they should be ruled by others), then slavery is natural and just, which is to
say that the rule of master over slaves is a natural kind of rule. The naturalness

of slavery is a function of differences in intellectual and moral virtues. It is

because the natural ruler has (or can acquire) certain virtues that he is able to rule
legitimately over the natural slave. So the controversy about slavery connects to
the question whether science is sufficient for ruling well, because establishing that
there are natural slaves is a matter of demonstrating that people who lack certain
psychic faculties and their virtues are incapable of rule, and thus that ruling well
requires a certain moral and practical intellectual authority, and not just a certain

science.25

From the passage at 1.7 1255bl6-22 we can see that Aristotle connects the
project of showing that ruling is not so much a question of science as it is a
question of moral character, of being a certain kind of person, with the project of
showing that ruling over equals (constitutional rule) is different from ruling over

slaves (despotic rule):

24 Aristode appears to be arguing against the position that slavery as such is unjust. Who held
this position? While there were those who thought that slavery was "undesirable socially" (because it

deprived free men of labour), and those who thought that certain forms of slavery were unjust, we

have evidence of only three people who might have argued that slavery in any form is unjust: (1)
Alcidemus, who is reported to have said that nature made no one a slave; (2) Onesicritus the Cynic;
and (3) Philemon, who also said that no one becomes a slave by nature. These fragments may explain

why Aristode poses the question in terms of nature. See Schlaifer 1960:127-129.
25 Aristode is not of course content to rest his argument on a difference between those who are
naturally free and those who are natural slaves, and insists that there are least two other "kinds" of
people?women and children?different from free men, slaves, and one another.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

64

PHOENIX

(|>av?p?v ?? Kai ek to?tcov ?ti o? Ta?TOv ?cru ?EarcoTE?a Kai 7toA.iTiKr|, o??? rcaaai
?XXr\Xai<; ai ?pxai, ckncEp tive? <|>aaiv. rj u?v y?p ?X-EuG?pcov (|)?a?i f) ?? ?o??xov
EGT?v, Kai r\ u?v o?kovouikt| uovapx?a (uovapxfi?tai y?p rc?? o?ko?), f) ?? 71oA,itikt|
?X-suOEpcov Kai ?acov ?p^rj. ? u?v ouv ?EarcOTri? o? AiyETai KaT' ?TtiaTrmnv, ?XX? T(p
Toioo?' E?vai, ouoigk ?? Ka? ? ?oG^o? Kai ? ?ta?GEpo?.
It is clear from what we have said that despotic rule and constitutional rule are not the
same, and that the rule in all the other [kinds of rule] is not [the same], as some say. For
there is one [kind of rule] over those who are by nature free, and another over those who

are by nature slaves, and household management is a monarchy (for every household is
ruled by one person), but constitutional rule is the rule of free men and equals. The master
is not called a master according to his science, but because of the kind of person he is, and

similarly the slave and the free man [are a certain kind of person].

This suggests that Aristotle sets out to distinguish natural slaves from free men
in order to show not only that ruling well is not simply a question of possessing
a certain science, but also in order to show that there is a difference between
constitutional rule and despotic rule. That difference depends on the difference
between kinds of persons?free and slave?and the naturalness ofthat difference.
In this passage in particular, Aristotle seems concerned to distinguish monarchy
from tyranny. The distinction lies not so much in the powers of the monarch and
the tyrant as in their intentions and their relation to the ruled. The monarch of
the household has the common benefit as his aim; the tyrant or the slave master
has his own benefit as his aim.26
Now, because Aristotle is interested not only in showing that the ruler needs
to have a distinctive character (and not just to possess a certain science), but also
that there are different kinds of rule, so that ruling a household and ruling a state
are something different, and because he wants to argue that the different kinds
of rule are based in nature, he cannot simply distinguish between slaves and free
men; he needs to establish that just as there is in nature a slave/master relation, so
too there is in nature a relation of rule between equals. The natural relation of rule
between equals is the relation of man and wife in the household.27 So Aristotle
must argue not only that natural slaves are different from free men, but also that
women are different from men, and also different from slaves, and that children
26 This point has to be qualified. Aristode does think that the master of a natural slave can be said
to be benefiting the slave as well as himself, just because the natural slave is a part of his master.
27Moraux (1957: 29) claims that it is the relation between brothers that is a model of a political
regime, and that the relation between husband and wife in a household is one of aristocratic rule, citing

as evidence passages from the Nicomachean Ethics (1161a3-6, 13; 1161a25-30) and the Eudemian
Ethics (1241b30-31; 1242b2-5). In these passages Aristode does say that brothers are equal, except
insofar as they differ much in age, but he characterizes the relation between them as timocratic, and

does not specify it as a type of rule. And while he also says that the rule of men over women is
aristocratic, he insists that men do not rule over women in everything: baa ?? yuvaiKi ?pu?Cei, eKe?vri

?no?i?coaiv ("the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her," Eth. Nie. 8.10 1160b34-35). In
the Politics it is the relation between men and women that Aristotle characterizes both as a kind of
rule (?pxil) and as tuoXitikcoc (1.12 1259bl).

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

65

are different from adult free men, but also from women and slaves, in order to
demonstrate the legitimacy (byway of the naturalness) of constitutional rule and
monarchy. I will elaborate these claims in section v below.
If this is right, then it is not so much the naturalness of the state or of the
household that Aristotle is interested in establishing in Politics 1; it is rather that
there are different kinds of people and hence different kinds of rule, and no science
of ruling the acquisition of which is sufficient to make one an excellent ruler. The

question of virtue arises in this context: if there were a science of ruling, and if
everyone were the same, then virtue would also be the same for everyone. If there
are different kinds of people, then there must be different virtues attributable to
those kinds. This suggests one of the many connections Aristotle draws between
moral theory and political theory: both are concerned with inculcating the virtues.

The aim of the household, like the aim of the polis, is to instill virtues in those
under its rule. But the household has the particular task of instilling virtue in
non-citizens (slaves and women as well as children) and hence of understanding
the differences among different kinds of non-citizens.28
v. CONCLUSION
I have been arguing that Aristotle argues in Book 1 of the Politics that there
are different kinds of people and different kinds of rule. What it is, then, to be

a master is not (merely) to have a certain science but to be the kind of person,
morally and intellectually, who can legitimately rule over others. I want now to say
something about the relation between that conclusion and the claims about nature

in 1.1-2. Those connections emerge most clearly, I think, when we consider the
claims about natural relations of rule in the family together with the distinctions
Aristotle draws in Book 3 between natural or correct constitutions, and unnatural

constitutions.

The argument in Politics 1.1-2 depends on the claim that the dominance of

the head of household over women and slaves is natural. The naturalness of this
dominance is crucial in maintaining the naturalness of the state. Aristode says

(1252al8-bl):

coarcep y?p ?v xo?? aAAoic x? ct?vOexov \i?%pi T?v ?apvG?xiov ?vayKr| ?iaipE?v (xauxa
y?p ?Xaxiaxa ?l?pia xou rcavxo?), ouxco ko? 7toA.iv ?? <&v auyKEixai gkotcoGvxe? ?y?jieoa

Kai rcepi xo?xtov \iaXXov, xi xe 8ia<|>Epouaiv ?XXi\X(?v rai ei xi xexvik?v ?v??xExai

tax?eiv Ttepi ?'raaxov x?v pr^G?vx v. e? 6r\ xi? s? ?pxti? Ta rcp?ynaxa <j>u??iEva ?Xevj/EiEv,

(oanep ?v xo?? aMoi?, rai ?v xouxoi? r?Miax* av oux?o ?EC?pfjaEiEv. avayKrj ?tj
Tcp?xov aov?oa?EaGai xou? ?vsu ?XXr\X<?v \ir\ ?uva^iEvoo? E?vai, o?ov Qr\Xv \ikv rai
dppEv xf|<; YEWiiaEGx; evekev (rai xouxo o?k ek Tcpoaip?aEC??, ?XX* &omp rai ?v xo??
aAAo?? ?ipoi? rai (^uxo?? <|>DaiK?v x? ?<|)?Eo0ai, o?ov aux?, xoiouxov raxaXircE?v ?repov),
28This is how Aubonnet sees the importance of chapter 13 (1968: 10): "l'essence m?me de
l'?conomie domestique est avant tout d'ordre moral: son objet, en effet, c'est l'excellence morale des
?tres humains plut?t que l'acquisition des richesses."

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

66 PHOENIX
?pxov ?? <|)?a?i Kai ?p^ouevov ?i? tt]v acoTnp?av. t? u?v y?p ?uv?uEvov xfj ?iavoio:
Ttpoop?v apxov (|)?a?i Kai ?eotio?ov (|)?a?i, to ?? ?uv?uEvov [TauTa] T(p acouaTi rcovEiv
?pxouEvov Kai (|)?a?i ?ou^ov. ?io ?EarcOTn Kai ?o?^cp Ta?TO auu<|>?p?i. (|>?a?i u?v o?v
?KopiciTai to 9r?A,u Kai to ?oGXov.

For just as in other cases it is necessary to divide the compound into its uncompounded

[parts] (for these are the least parts of the whole), so too we must look at the city,
considering [the elements] of which it is composed, and especially these things, namely
how they differ from one another and if it is possible to grasp in some technical way each

of them. If someone considers things as they grow and from their origin, just as in other
cases, so in these cases he will get the best view of them. In the first place there must be a
union of those who cannot exist without each other, namely, of male and female, for the

sake of procreation (and this is a union which is formed, not of choice, but because, in
common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind

them another like themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, because of preservation.
For that which is capable of foreseeing by intellect is by nature lord and by nature master,

and that which is capable of working with its body is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence
master and slave have the same interest. Now nature has distinguished between the female
and the slave (tr. Jowett 1885 [modified]).

He goes on to describe the formation of families, then villages, and ultimately

states from the combination of villages. He concludes (1252b30~1253al):
?i? Ttaoa n?Xiq <|>?a?i ecftiv, EUtEp Kai ai Tipokai Koivcov?ai. x?Xoq y?p ainn eke?vcov,

r\ ?? <|>?c?i? T??,o? ectt?v. o?ov y?p EKaaTOV eoti ttj? yeveci?co? T?A.?a6??ar|?, Ta?Tnv
<|>afx?v TTjv (|)?aiv E?vai ?maTou, coaTiEp ?vGpamou ?tcttou oiK?a?.
Therefore, all cities are natural, if indeed the first forms of association are [natural], for it
is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully
developed we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a person, a horse, or a household
(tr. Jowett 1885 [modified]).

So the naturalness of the state is indicated by the naturalness of the most

primitive social relations, which Aristotle identifies as the relation between men
and women and that between natural subjects and natural rulers (i.e., masters and
slaves). Establishing the nature of the state by examining its elements is, as the
first lines of the first passage cited above make clear, intended to show us how
the different kinds of rule differ from one another. My claim is not that the
naturalness of household relations causes the naturalness of the polis (if anything

the causal relations work in the other direction, since the city, as the end of
the households, causes them to be natural social entities). It is, rather, that the
claim that the naturalness of household relations (which, Aristode presumes, are
relatively easy for us to observe) is evidence of the naturalness of xht polis. That is,

relations of rule in the polis are not modeled on relations of rule in the household,
but we can know by considering the structure of relations of rule in the household

something about the structure of relations of rule in the city. Aristotle claims,
then, that the state and its elements are natural in order to show that different
kinds of people, with different kinds of virtue, occur naturally, in order to show

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

67

that there are different kinds of rule. The problem lies in the initial claims that
there are certain natural wholes.
In Politics 3 Aristode argues for the correctness or naturalness of certain kinds

of constitutions, based on their resemblance to certain household relations, where

the resemblance lies both in the character of the ruler and of the ruled, and in the

relation that obtains between them. The sign of a correct constitution is that it
involves rule for the common benefit (3.7 1279a25-29). This claim refers back to
the discussion in 3.6 of two issues: (1) what is a city for? and (2) how many kinds
of rule are there? In answering the second question, Aristotle mentions again the
household relations he has detailed in Book 1, and then adds, as an answer to the

first question (1278b37-1279a2):

r| Se xEKVtov ?pXT? Kai yovaiK?? Kai xrj? oiKia? 7iaar|?, r?v ?tj raA.o6|XEV oikovouikt|v,

rjxoi x?v ?pxou?vcov x?piv ?axiv r\ koivou xivo? ?u<|>o?v, raG' aux? fi?v xcov ?pxou?vcov

..., rax? aou?E?rjK?c ?? rav a?xcov ei?v.

But rule over children, wife, and the household generally, which we call household
management, is either for the sake of the ruled or for the sake of something common to

both. Essentially, it is for the sake of the ruled ... but coincidentally it might be for the
sake of the rulers as well (tr. Reeve 1998).

So the claim that constitutions in which rule is for the common benefit
are correct is based on the naturalness of household relations (other than the
master/slave relation) in which the rule of children and women is for the common

benefit. The arguments for monarchy and aristocracy are thus based on the
naturalness of the relation between father and children in the household; the
argument against despotism (except in the case where an entire citizen body is
constituted by natural slaves) depends on the injustice of slavery (except when
the slaves are natural). The argument for constitutional rule depends not just on
showing that there are people who are equal, but that there is some household
(and hence natural) relation where ruler and ruled are equal. And that, I want to
suggest, is why Aristode claims that the relation between husband and wife is one
of constitutional rule, although constitutional rule in which ruler and ruled do not
exchange places. If the rule of husband over wife is a natural relation of rule, then,
just so long as there are kinds of people who are naturally equals, there is some
relation of rule between them that is natural. So it is important to the argument
of the rest of the Politics that Aristode should establish the distinctions he does in
Politics 1 among natural subjects, and among the relations these different natural

subjects bear to the natural ruler. My point, again, is not that Aristode takes
household relations to be primary in a causal sense, but rather that he takes them

to be readily observable, more so than the relations of rule within an individual

soul or the relations of rule in a city, and hence primary to the inquiry.29
29 An interesting question is just how Aristode conceived the connections among the different
levels of rule (in the individual soul, the household, and the city). Moraux (1957: 32) clearly takes
the political level to be primary, treating justice within the household as derived from political justice,

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

68

PHOENIX

The discussion of the naturalness of the relations of the household and

consequent naturalness of the polis in 1.2 is then in preparation for the distinction

between natural and unnatural constitutions in Politics 3. More particularly

the distinctions established in 1.3-13 among slaves, women, and children and
the relations of subjection in which they participate are intended to justify
the distinctions among natural constitutions, as drawn by Aristotle. But the
naturalness of conventional household relations was assumed by Aristode, not
demonstrated. That assumption is then used to demonstrate that there are
different kinds of people, and hence different kinds of rule, and that to be a
master is more than a matter of science. That conclusion, and the elaboration of
the natural relations among different kinds of people, is then used to support the
distinctions among constitutions.

Department of Philosophy

McGill University

855 Sherbrooke Street West

Montreal, Quebec
H3A 2T7 marguerite.deslauriers@mcgill.ca
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AubonnetJ. 1968. Aristote, Politique. Paris.
Bonnette, A. L. tr. 1994. Xenophon, Memorabilia. Ithaca.
BurnetJ. ed. 1903[1968]. Platonis opera. Oxford.
Bywater, I. ed. 1894[1962]. Aristotelis ethica Nicomachea. Oxford.
Cooper, J. M. ed. 1997. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis.
Jowett, B. ed. 1885. The Politics of Aristotle 1. Oxford.

Kahn, C. H. 1990. "Comments on M. Schoneld," in Patzig 1990: 28-31.

Kelsen, H. 1977. "Aristotle and Hellenic-Macedonian Policy," in J. Barnes et al. (eds.),
Articles onAtistotle 2. London. 170-194.
Marchant, E. C. ed. 1921[1971]. Xenophontis opera omnia2. Oxford.
Miller, F. D. Jr. 1995. Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle s Politics. Oxford.
and households to manifest political constitutions. This certainly makes sense in the context of the

ideological claims Aristode makes in Politics 1.1-2 with respect to the city and smaller social units:
that they are for the sake of the city. The question also arises about the kinds of rule possible at
any level (i.e., within the household, within the polis, etc.). Is there some focal form of rule, with
reference to which all the others are kinds of rule? That is, is there a primary and are there then
derivative kinds of rule? (For Aristode's account of the np?q ?v, see Metaph. 7.4 1030a31-b3.) I think

it likely that there is a rcp?? ev relation among the different kinds of rule, judging at least by indirect
evidence. Moraux (1957: 37, n. 47), who argues that the theme of different forms of friendship and
different forms of justice is found consistendy with the theme of different forms of rule, points out

that the different forms of friendship are certainly neither univocal nor equivocal uses of "friendship,"
but rather are rcp?? ev uses (with friendship of virtue as that form to which the others refer). We can

speculate that, in a similar way, Aristode supposes the different kinds of rule are used Ttp?? ?v, with
monarchy perhaps as the focal meaning of rule, because, in an ideal state, it is the best.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1 69
-1989. "Aristotle's Political Naturalism," in T. Penner and R. Kraut (eds.), Nature,
Knowledge and Virtue: Essays in Memory of Joan Kung, Apeiron 22(4): 195-218.

Moraux, P. 1957. ? la recherche de l'Aristote perdu: Le dialogue "Sur la Justice". Louvain.

Mulgan, R. G. 1977. Aristotle's Political Theory. Oxford.
Natali, C. 1979-80. "La struttura unitaria del libro I della Tolitica' di Aristotele," Polis 3:

2-18.

Newman, W. L. 1887. The Politics of Aristotle 2. Oxford.

Patzig, G. ed. 1990. Aristoteles' "Politik": Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum. G?ttingen.

Pellegrin, P. 1982. "La th?orie aristot?licienne de l'esclavage: tendances actuelles de

l'interpr?tation," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'?tranger 2: 345-57.
Pomeroy, S. B. tr. 1994. Xenophon, Oeconomicus. Oxford.
Reeve, C. D. C. tr. 1998. Aristotle, Politics. Indianapolis.
Ross, W. D. ed. 1957[1964]. Aristotelis pol?tica. Oxford.
St-Hilaire, J. B. 1837. Politique d'Aristote. Paris.
Schofield, M. 1990. "Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle's Theory of Slavery," in Patzig

1990:1-27.

Schlaifer, R. 1960. "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle," in M. I. Finley

(ed.), Slavery in Classical Antiquity: Views and Controversies. Cambridge. 93-132.

Susemihl, F. and R. D. Hicks. 1894. The Politics of Aristotle, Books I-V. London.
Weil, R. 1960. Aristote et l'Histoire: Essai sur la Politique. Paris.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 12:14:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms