CANON 18

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5687. February 3, 2005.]
FELIX E. EDQUIBAL, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROBERTO FERRER, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J :
p

In a letter-complaint 1 under oath dated January 8, 2002, Felix E. Edquibal,

complainant, charged Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr., respondent, with professional
misconduct and neglect of duty.
Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of respondent to assist his
mother Ursula Edquibal in cases she filed against his sister Delia EdquibalGarcia involving a certain real property in Masinloc, Zambales. His mother
obtained favorable judgments in four (4) out of the five (5) cases handled by
respondent. However, in Civil Case No. RTC-1495-I (filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales), the trial judge rendered a decision adverse to
his mother. Respondent then advised complainant to appeal to the Court of
Appeals and that the cost involved is P4,000.00. When complainant informed
respondent that he does not have enough money, the latter said P2,000.00 would
be sufficient for the moment. After receiving the money from complainant,
respondent told him just to wait for the result. The appeal was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 65019.
When complainant failed to hear from respondent in January 2001, he went to
the Court of Appeals to follow-up the appealed case. He then learned that the

appeal was dismissed for failure of the appellant to file the required appellant's
brief.
In his comment 2 dated June 2, 2003, respondent denied that he filed an appeal,
on behalf of complainant's mother, with the Court of Appeals or received
P2,000.00. What happened was that complainant told him that there is someone
in the Court of Appeals who can help him regarding his appeal. Respondent
claimed that he "did his best" for complainant's mother and did not even ask for
attorney's fees.

HDICSa

On July 30, 2003, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated March 19, 2004, Atty. Leland R.
Villadolid, IBP Commissioner, made the following findings:
"It is clear from the records of this case that per the records of CA-G.R.
CV No. 65019, Respondent is the counsel of record of defendantsappellants therein (including Complainant's mother). In the Resolution
dated 31 August 2000, it was explicitly noted that '(N)otice sent to
counsel for defendants-appellants requiring him to file appellant's brief
within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof was received by him on
March 16, 2000.' If it is true that Respondent never agreed to handle the
appeal, upon receipt of said notice, Respondent should have
immediately manifested to the Court of Appeals that he is not handling
the appeal on behalf of said defendants-appellants. Thus, Section 2,
Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that '[T]he counsel
and guardians ad litem of the parties in the court of origin shall be
respectively considered as their counsel and guardians ad litem in the
Court of Appeals.' By failing to do so, the Court of Appeals had every
reason to assume that he was likewise representing defendantsappellants in the appeal. Accordingly, his failure to timely file the required
appellants' brief resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.

The facts of this case clearly show that Respondent violated Canon 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ('CPR').
Undoubtedly, Respondent's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting
and attending to the interest of Complainant (Complainant's mother)
caused the latter material prejudice. It should be remembered that the
moment a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exert
all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to
exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause makes him
unworthy of the trust reposed in him by the latter. . . ."

Atty. Villadolid recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be

reprimanded "for failure to act with reasonable diligence in representing the
cause of complainant;" and that respondent be directed to "return the amount of
P2,000.00 as and by way of restitution to complainant."
In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-383 dated July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Atty.
Villadolid, thus:
"RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of the
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering the respondent's failure to act with reasonable diligence
in representing the cause of complainant, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr., is
hereby REPRIMANDED and Ordered to Return the amount of P2,000.00
by way of Restitution to complainant."

We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty
recommended.
Records show that respondent was the counsel of record for the appellants,
complainant's mother and other relatives in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019. The
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2000 clearly states that the

"notice sent to counsel for defendants-appellants requiring him to file appellant's

brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof, was received by him on
March 16, 2000." 4 However, respondent failed to file the appellants' brief despite
receipt of such notice.
Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 2. Counsel and guardians. The counsel and guardians ad litem
of the parties in the court of origin shall be respectively considered as
their counsel and guardians ad litem in the Court of Appeals. When
others appear or are appointed, notice thereof shall be served
immediately on the adverse party and filed with the court.

If it were true that respondent did not agree to represent the appellants in CAG.R. CV No. 65019, why did he not file with the Court of Appeals a motion to
withdraw as their counsel? Obviously, his negligence, which resulted in the
dismissal of the appeal, caused prejudice to his clients. Likewise, respondent's
failure to inform complainant of the status of his mother's appeal is inexcusable.
It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence.
Thus, there is a need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the
developments in his case. 5 A client should never be left groping in the dark, for to
do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the lawyer
so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.
Respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provide:
"Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to his client's request
for information."

DTAHEC

Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and
is the opposite of negligence." 6 A lawyer serves his client with diligence by
adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes
entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and
maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability
to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of
law legally applied. 7 It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success
is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima
diligentia) or that "extreme measure of care and caution which persons of
unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their
rights." 8 All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of
vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard,
respondent's failure to attend to his client's appeal is clearly wanting.
In People v. Cawili, 9 we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within
the reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. People v.
Villar, Jr.10 characterized a lawyer's failure to file a brief for his client as
inexcusable neglect. In Blaza v. Court of Appeals, 11 we held that the filing of a
brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the
court. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilaban 12 reiterated Ford v.
Daitol 13 and In re: Santiago F. Marcos 14 in holding that an attorney's failure to file
brief for his client constitutes inexcusable negligence.
In cases involving a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other pleading before an
appellate court, we did not hesitate to suspend the erring member of the Bar from
the practice of law for three months, 15 six months, 16 or even disbarment in
severely aggravated cases. 17

Accordingly and considering the circumstances of this case, we find a need to

scale the recommended penalty upward. Here, we are convinced that respondent
deserves the penalty of suspension for three (3) months.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR. is hereby found guilty of
professional misconduct and neglect of duty. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months with a WARNING that a repetition of the same
or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. He is further DIRECTED to
return immediately to the complainant the amount of P2,000.00.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
|||

(Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, [February 3, 2005], 491 PHIL 1-8)

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6504. August 9, 2005.]
GEORGE C. SOLATAN, complainant, vs. ATTYS. OSCAR
A. INOCENTES and JOSE C. CAMANO, respondents.
Florando A. Umali for complainant.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; AN ATTORNEY GIVING LEGAL ADVICE TO
A PARTY WITH AN INTEREST CONFLICTING WITH THAT OF HIS CLIENT
RESULTING IN DETRIMENT TO THE LATTER MAY BE HELD GUILTY OF

DISLOYALTY. The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an
attorney is retained. An attorney has no power to act as counsel or legal
representative for a person without being retained. To establish the professional
relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought
and received in any manner pertinent to his profession. At the time the
questioned statement was made, Atty. Camano had called the police to restrain
complainant from surreptitiously pulling out the levied properties from the
apartment complex by virtue of which the latter was brought to the police station
for questioning. The statement was made in response to complainant's insistence
at the police station that the levied properties were owned by him and not by the
judgment debtor. No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant
case. More fitting, albeit, to the mind of this Court, inapplicable to the case, is
Canon 15 of the same Code which encompasses the aforementioned rule. In
general terms, Canon 15 requires lawyers to observe loyalty in all dealings and
transactions with their clients. Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to
a party with an interest conflicting with that of his client resulting in detriment to
the latter may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, far be it that every utterance
of an attorney which may have afforded an individual some relief adverse to the
former's client may be labeled as a culpable act of disloyalty. As in every case,
the acts alleged to be culpable must be assessed in light of the surrounding
circumstances.
2. ID.; ID.; RECOMMENDED ONE (1) YEAR SUSPENSION FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW BASED ON RESPONDENT'S OTHER CULPABLE ACTS
WHICH TEND TO DEGRADE THE PROFESSION AND FOMENT DISTRUST IN
THE INTEGRITY OF COURT PROCESSES STANDS. While the levy was
made on chattel found in the apartment of the judgment debtor, Gliceria Solatan,
the complainant was the true owner of the properties. Consequently, the latter
had a right to recover the same. In fact, considering the circumstances, the
questioned statement is in consonance with complainant's foremost duty to
uphold the law as an officer of the court. The statement of Atty. Camano in such
a context should not be construed by this Court as giving advice in conflict
against the interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest

over the incorrectly levied properties. We note that the act of informing
complainant that the levied properties would be returned to him upon showing
proof of his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the interest of the spouses
Genito, but, in this circumstance, lacks the essence of double dealing and
betrayal of the latter's confidence so as to deserve outright categorization as
infidelity or disloyalty to his clients' cause. Nonetheless, after having noted the
foregoing, we remain convinced with the propriety of meting the one (1) year
suspension from the practice of law on Atty. Camano, as recommended by the
IBP, based on his other culpable acts which tend to degrade the profession and
foment distrust in the integrity of court processes.
3. ID.; ID.; NAME PRACTITIONER OF LAW OFFICE MAY BE HELD
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE BY VIRTUE OF HIS ASSOCIATE'S UNETHICAL
ACTS; FAILURE TO EXERCISE CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES OVER
MATTERS UNDER THE CHARGE OF HIS LAW FIRM IS A BLAMEWORTHY
SHORTCOMING. Atty. Inocentes seeks to distance himself from the events
that transpired and the reprimand resulting therefrom by asserting that he was
incorrectly punished for Atty. Camano's acts when his mere participation in the
fiasco was to refer complainant and his mother to Atty. Camano. However, it is
precisely because of such participation, consisting as it did of referring the
complainant to his associate lawyer, that Atty. Inocentes may be held
administratively liable by virtue of his associate's unethical acts. His failure to
exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm is a
blameworthy shortcoming. The term "command responsibility," as
Atty. Inocentes suggests, has special meaning within the circle of men in uniform
in the military; however, the principle does not abide solely therein. It controls the
very circumstance in which Atty. Inocentes found himself.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AS NAME PRACTITIONER OF THE LAW OFFICE,
RESPONDENT IS TASKED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE
REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT ALL LAWYERS IN THE FIRM
SHOULD ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY. We are not unaware of the custom of practitioners in a law

firm of assigning cases and even entire client accounts to associates or other
partners with limited supervision, if at all. This is especially true in the case of
Attys.Inocentes and Camano who, from the records, both appear to be seasoned
enough to be left alone in their work without requiring close supervision over
each other's conduct and work output. However, let it not be said that law firm
practitioners are given a free hand to assign cases to seasoned attorneys and
thereafter conveniently forget about the case. To do so would be a disservice to
the profession, the integrity and advancement of which this Court must jealously
protect. That the firm name under which the two attorneys labored was that of
Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office does not automatically make
Atty. Inocentes the default lawyer acting in a supervisory capacity over Atty.
Camano. It did, however, behoove Atty. Inocentes to exert ordinary diligence to
find out what was going on in his law firm. It placed in Atty. Inocentes the active
responsibility to inquire further into the circumstances affecting the levy of
complainant's properties, irrespective of whether the same were in fact events
which could possibly lead to administrative liability. Moreover, as name
practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to
make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is not without reason or
consequence that Atty. Inocentes's name is that which was used as the official
designation of their law office.
5. ID.; ID.; PARTNERS AND PRACTITIONERS WHO HOLD SUPERVISORY
CAPACITIES ARE LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE TO EXERT ORDINARY
DILIGENCE IN APPRISING THEMSELVES OF THE COMINGS AND GOINGS
OF THE CASES HANDLED BY THE PERSONS OVER WHICH THEY ARE
EXERCISING SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY AND IN EXERCISING
NECESSARY EFFORTS TO FORECLOSE THE OCCURRENCE OF
VIOLATIONS OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY
PERSONS UNDER THEIR CHARGE. Law practitioners are acutely aware of
the responsibilities that are naturally taken on by partners and supervisory
lawyers over the lawyers and non-lawyers of the law office. We have held that
lawyers are administratively liable for the conduct of their employees in failing to

timely file pleadings. In Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Zoilo R. Ferrer, et
al., partners in a law office were admonished for the contemptuous language in a
pleading submitted to court despite, and even due to, the fact that the pleading
was not passed upon by any of the partners of the office. We held therein that
partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious control of court pleadings and
other court papers that carry their names or the name of the law firm. We now
hold further that partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are
legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the
comings and goings of the cases handled by the persons over which they are
exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose the
occurrence of violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons
under their charge. Nonetheless, the liability of the supervising lawyer in this
regard is by no means equivalent to that of the recalcitrant lawyer. The actual
degree of control and supervision exercised by said supervising lawyer varies,
inter alia, according to office practice, or the length of experience and
competence of the lawyer supervised. Such factors can be taken into account in
ascertaining the proper penalty. Certainly, a lawyer charged with the supervision
of a fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes should bear greater responsibility
for the culpable acts of the underling than one satisfied enough with the work and
professional ethic of the associate so as to leave the latter mostly to his/her own
devises.

DECISION

TINGA, J :
p

The present case focuses on a critical aspect of the lawyer-client relationship

the duty of loyalty. The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is traditionally
characterized as "undivided." This means that lawyers must represent their
clients and serve their needs without interference or impairment from any
conflicting interest.

This administrative case traces its roots from the manner by which Attys. Jose C.
Camano and Oscar A. Inocentes responded to the efforts of complainant, George
C.Solatan, to lease a certain Quezon City apartment belonging to the attorneys'
clients. On the basis of acts branded by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) as "bordering on technical extortion," accepting funds and giving unsolicited
advice to an adverse party, and casting doubts as to the procedure of levy, the
IBP resolved 1to recommend the suspension of Atty. Camano from the practice of
law for one (1) year. It likewise recommended the reprimand of Atty. Inocentes,
whom it held liable for the aforementioned acts of his associate, under the
principle of command responsibility.
Only Atty. Inocentes has elected to contest the resolution of the IBP, as he
questions the propriety of his being held administratively liable for acts done by
Atty. Camano. 2 However, the recommendation to suspend Atty. Camano shall
also be passed upon by virtue of Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 3
Attys. Inocentes and Camano were both engaged in the practice of law under the
firm name of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office. Atty. Inocentes held
office in his home located at No. 19 Marunong St., Central District, Quezon City,
while Atty. Camano was stationed at an "extension office" of the firm located in
3rd/F, 956 Aurora Blvd., Quirino Dist., Quezon City.
The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Andres
and Ludivina Genito (spouses Genito), owners of an apartment complex (the
Genito Apartments) located at 259 Tandang Sora cor. Visayas Avenue, Quezon
City, when the Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on 9 July 1986. 4 The
law office represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the
Sandiganbayan, and subsequently, with authority from the PCGG, 5 in ejectment
cases against non-paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments. 6
Complainant's sister, Gliceria Solatan, was a tenant in Door 10, Phase B of the
Genito Apartments. It appears from the records that Gliceria Solatan left for the
United States in 1986, and since then, the apartment was either intermittently

used by members of her family or placed under the charge of caretakers. 7 In

August 1987, a complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed
against Gliceria Solatan. 8 On 3 March 1988, in a judgment by default,
a Decision 9 was rendered ordering Gliceria Solatan to vacate the premises of the
apartment, pay the spouses Genito the amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred
Pesos (P30,600.00) as unpaid rentals from February 1986 to July 1987 with
interest at 24% per annum from 20 August 1987 until the premises are vacated,
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs of the suit. 10
Complainant was occupying the subject apartment when he learned of the
judgment rendered against his sister. On 10 May 1988, prior to the
implementation of a writ to execute the judgment, complainant and his mother,
Elvira Solatan, approached Atty. Inocentes at his home office. Complainant
informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a lease contract
by virtue of which complainant would be the new lessee of the apartment and
thus make possible his continued stay therein. Atty. Inocentes referred
complainant and his mother to his associate, Atty. Camano, the attorney in
charge of the ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito apartments. After the
exchange, complainant went to Atty. Camano at the satellite office of
Atty. Inocentes's firm. From here on out, events quickly turned sour. Different
versions of subsequent events were presented. The facts reproduced hereunder
are by and large culled from the findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
Siegfred B. Mison.

cEASTa

During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement was made in which
complainant and his mother agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of
Gliceria Solatan, including fifty percent of the awarded attorney's fees and One
Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P1,600.00) as costs of suit provided that Atty.
Camano would allow complainant's continued stay at Door 10, Phase B of the
Genito Apartments. As partial compliance with the agreement, complainant
issued in the name Atty. Camano a check for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
representing half of the P10,000.00 attorney's fees adjudged against
complainant's sister.

Complainant and his mother failed to make any other payment. Thus, the sheriff
in coordination with Atty. Camano and some policemen, enforced the writ of
execution on 22 June 1988 and levied the properties found in the subject
apartment. An attempt at renegotiation took place at the insistence of
complainant, resulting in Atty. Camano's acquiescence to release the levied
properties and allowing complainant to remain at the apartment, subject to the
latter's payment of costs incurred in enforcing the writ of execution and issuance
of postdated checks representing installment rental payments. Complainant, thus,
issued four (4) checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust Company dated the
fifteenth (15th) of July, August, September, and October 1988 each in the amount
of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00). 11 Half of the amount
represented complainant's monthly rental, while the other half, a monthly
installment for the payment of Gliceria Solatan's judgment debt.
On 28 June 1988, acting on the advice of Atty. Camano, complainant presented
an Affidavit of Ownership to the sheriff who then released the levied items to
complainant. However, a Northern Hill 3-burner gas stove was not returned to
complainant. The stove was in fact kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito
Apartments wherein he temporarily stayed 12 and, thereafter, turned over the
same to a certain Recto Esberto, caretaker of the Genito Apartments. 13
On 1 August 1988, complainant filed the instant administrative case for
disbarment against Atty. Inocentes and Atty. Camano. 14 After formal
investigation, and despite conflicting testimonies on the tenor and content of
agreements and conversations, several disturbing facts were revealed to have
been uncontroverted Atty. Camano's acceptance from complainant of
attorney's fees and the costs of implementing the writ of execution, possession of
complainant's levied Northern Hill oven, and advice to complainant on how to
recover the latter's levied items. Thus, IBP Investigating Commissioner Siegfred
B. Mison, made the following recommendations,viz:
Based on the facts revealed in their respective Memoranda, the penalty
of six (6) months suspension is therefore recommended to be imposed

on Respondent Camano for committing the following acts that adversely

reflects (sic) on his moral fitness to continue to practice law[:]
1. He received money (P5,000 then P1,000) from the adverse
party purportedly for attorneys fees and for reimbursement of
sheriff's expenses. Such act ofaccepting funds from the
adverse party in the process of implementing a writ, borders
on technical extortion particularly in light of the factual
circumstances as discussed.
2. He gave unsolicited advice to the adverse party in suggesting
the filing of an Affidavit of Ownership over the levied properties,
a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his
own client, supposedly, the Genitos.
3. He failed to turn over the gas stove to either party thereby
casting doubt as to the procedure of the levy.
Based on the facts revealed, the penalty of Reprimand is therefore
recommended to be imposed on Respondent Inocentes for committing
the following acts that adversely reflects (sic) in his fitness to continue to
practice law[:]
1. He allowed Camano to perform all the aforementioned
acts, either by negligence or inadvertence which are inimical to
the legal profession. He cannot claim ignorance or feign
innocence in this particular transaction considering that the
Complainants themselves went to his office on different occasions
regarding this transaction. Ultimately, he exercised command
responsibility over the case and had supervisory control
over Respondent Camano inasmuch as he received periodic
reports either by phone or in person from the latter.
2. The letter disclaimer executed by Mr. Genito filed by
Respondent Inocentes does not mitigate any liability whatsoever
since the wrongdoing done against the profession cannot be

undone by a mere letter from a third party.

15

(Emphasis

supplied.)

The IBP Board of Governors approved the aforequoted recommendation, with the
modification of an increase in Atty. Camano's period of suspension from six (6)
months to one (1) year, in a resolution stating, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the of the Investigating
Commissioner . . . finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification,
and for accepting funds from adverse party in the process of
implementing a writ borders on technical extortion, for giving unsolicited
advice to the adverse party a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the
interest of] his own client and for casting doubts to the procedure of the
levy, Atty. Jose C. Camano is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year, likewise, Atty. Oscar Inocentes is hereby
REPRIMANDED for he exercised command responsibility over the case
inasmuch as he received periodic reports either by phone or in
person. 16

The IBP held that Atty. Camano's act of giving unsolicited advice to complainant
is a culpable act because the advice conflicted with the interest of his clients, the
spouses Genito. The rule on conflicting interests, established in Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, deals with conflicts in the interests of an
attorney's actual clients among themselves, of existing and prospective clients,
and of the attorney and his clients. It states that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

SEcAIC

The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is
retained. 17 An attorney has no power to act as counsel or legal representative for
a person without being retained. 18 To establish the professional relation, it is

sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought and received
in any manner pertinent to his profession. 19 At the time the questioned statement
was made, Atty. Camano had called the police to restrain complainant from
surreptitiously pulling out the levied properties from the apartment complex by
virtue of which the latter was brought to the police station for questioning. The
statement was made in response to complainant's insistence at the police station
that the levied properties were owned by him and not by the judgment
debtor. 20 No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case.
More fitting, albeit, to the mind of this Court, inapplicable to the case, is Canon 15
of the same Code which encompasses the aforementioned rule. In general
terms, Canon 15 requires lawyers to observe loyalty in all dealings and
transactions with their clients. 21 Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice
to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his client resulting in detriment to
the latter may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, far be it that every utterance
of an attorney which may have afforded an individual some relief adverse to the
former's client may be labeled as a culpable act of disloyalty. As in every case,
the acts alleged to be culpable must be assessed in light of the surrounding
circumstances.
While the levy was made on chattel found in the apartment of the judgment
debtor, Gliceria Solatan, the complainant was the true owner of the properties.
Consequently, the latter had a right to recover the same. In fact, considering the
circumstances, the questioned statement is in consonance with complainant's
foremost duty to uphold the law as an officer of the court. The statement of Atty.
Camano in such a context should not be construed by this Court as giving advice
in conflict against the interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no
interest over the incorrectly levied properties.
We, thus, note that the act of informing complainant that the levied properties
would be returned to him upon showing proof of his ownership thereof may hint at
infidelity to the interest of the spouses Genito, but, in this circumstance, lacks the
essence of double dealing and betrayal of the latter's confidence so as to
deserve outright categorization as infidelity or disloyalty to his clients' cause.

Nonetheless, after having noted the foregoing, we remain convinced with the
propriety of meting the one (1) year suspension from the practice of law on Atty.
Camano, as recommended by the IBP, based on his other culpable acts which
tend to degrade the profession and foment distrust in the integrity of court
processes.
On the other hand, Atty. Inocentes seeks to distance himself from the events that
transpired and the reprimand resulting therefrom by asserting that he was
incorrectly punished for Atty. Camano's acts when his mere participation in the
fiasco was to refer complainant and his mother to Atty. Camano.
However, it is precisely because of such participation, consisting as it did of
referring the complainant to his associate lawyer, that Atty. Inocentes may be held
administratively liable by virtue of his associate's unethical acts. His failure to
exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm is a
blameworthy shortcoming. The term "command responsibility," as
Atty. Inocentes suggests, has special meaning within the circle of men in uniform
in the military; however, the principle does not abide solely therein. It controls the
very circumstance in which Atty. Inocentes found himself.
We are not unaware of the custom of practitioners in a law firm of assigning
cases and even entire client accounts to associates or other partners with limited
supervision, if at all. This is especially true in the case of Attys. Inocentes and
Camano who, from the records, both appear to be seasoned enough to be left
alone in their work without requiring close supervision over each other's conduct
and work output. However, let it not be said that law firm practitioners are given a
free hand to assign cases to seasoned attorneys and thereafter conveniently
forget about the case. To do so would be a disservice to the profession, the
integrity and advancement of which this Court must jealously protect.

HScCEa

That the firm name under which the two attorneys labored was that
of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office does not automatically make
Atty. Inocentes the default lawyer acting in a supervisory capacity over Atty.
Camano. It did, however, behoove Atty. Inocentes to exert ordinary diligence to

find out what was going on in his law firm. It placed in Atty. Inocentes the active
responsibility to inquire further into the circumstances affecting the levy of
complainant's properties, irrespective of whether the same were in fact events
which could possibly lead to administrative liability. Moreover, as name
practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to
make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. 22 It is not without reason
or consequence that Atty. Inocentes's name is that which was used as the official
designation of their law office.
With regard to the actual existence of Atty. Inocentes's supervisory capacity over
Atty. Camano's activities, the IBP Investigating Commissioner based the same on
his finding that Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on
the latter's dealings with complainant. This finding is the linchpin of
Atty. Inocentes's supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue
thereof.
Law practitioners are acutely aware of the responsibilities that are naturally taken
on by partners and supervisory lawyers over the lawyers and non-lawyers of the
law office. We have held that lawyers are administratively liable for the conduct of
their employees in failing to timely file pleadings. 23 In Rheem of the Philippines,
Inc., et al.v. Zoilo R. Ferrer, et al., 24 partners in a law office were admonished for
the contemptuous language in a pleading submitted to court despite, and even
due to, the fact that the pleading was not passed upon by any of the partners of
the office. We held therein that partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious
control of court pleadings and other court papers that carry their names or the
name of the law firm. 25
We now hold further that partners and practitioners who hold supervisory
capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising
themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by the persons over
which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts
to foreclose the occurrence of violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by persons under their charge. Nonetheless, the liability of the

supervising lawyer in this regard is by no means equivalent to that of the

recalcitrant lawyer. The actual degree of control and supervision exercised by
said supervising lawyer varies, inter alia, according to office practice, or the
length of experience and competence of the lawyer supervised. Such factors can
be taken into account in ascertaining the proper penalty. Certainly, a lawyer
charged with the supervision of a fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes
should bear greater responsibility for the culpable acts of the underling than one
satisfied enough with the work and professional ethic of the associate so as to
leave the latter mostly to his/her own devises.
While Atty. Camano's irregular acts perhaps evince a need for greater
supervision of his legal practice, there is no question that it has been
Atty. Inocentes' practice to allow wide discretion for Atty. Camano to practice on
his own. It does constitute indifference and neglect for Atty. Inocentes to fail to
accord even a token attention to Atty. Camano's conduct which could have
brought the then impending problem to light. But such is not equivalent to the
proximate responsibility for Atty. Camano's acts. Moreover, it appears from the
records that Atty. Inocentes is a former judge and a lawyer who, as of yet, is in
good standing and it is the first time in which Atty.Inocentes has been made to
answer vicariously for the misconduct of a person under his charge. An
admonition is appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Resolution dated 16 April 2004 is AFFIRMED in respect of the sanction
meted out on Atty. Camano. Atty. Inocentes is hereby ADMONISHED to monitor
more closely the activities of his associates to make sure that the same are in
consonance with the Code of Professional Responsibility with the WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar omission will be dealt with more severely.
No pronouncement as to costs.

IDASHa

SO ORDERED.
|||

(Solatan v. Inocentes, A.C. No. 6504, [August 9, 2005], 503 PHIL 622-636)

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3455. April 14, 1998.]
ARSENIO A. VILLAFUERTE, complainant, vs. ATTY. DANTE
H. CORTEZ, respondent.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Atty. Elias I. de los Reyes for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Sometime in January 1987, complainant went to the office of respondent lawyer
to discuss his case for "reconveyance." During their initial meeting, complainant
tried to reconstruct before respondent the incidents of the case merely from
memory prompting the latter to ask complainant to instead return at another time
with the records of the case. Complainant returned but still without the records.
He requested respondent to accept the case, paying to the latter P1,750.00
representing the acceptance fee of P1,500.00 and P250.00 retainer fee from
January 1987.

IDASHa

Complainant never showed up thereafter until November 1989 when he went to

the office of respondent but only to leave a copy of a writ of execution in a case
for ejectment, which, according to respondent, was never mentioned to him by
complainant.
In its report, the Commission on Discipline of the IBP concluded that the facts
established would indicate sufficiently a case of neglect of duty on the part of
respondent. It recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for three months.

AHcDEI

The Court ruled that respondent has been remiss in his responsibilities. A lawyerclient relationship has arisen between respondent and complainant. His

acceptance of the payment effectively bars him from altogether disclaiming the
existence of an attorney-client relationship between them. It would seem that
respondent hardly has exerted any effort to find out what might have happened to
his client's cases.
Respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
month from notice hereof, with a warning that a repetition of similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

ESHAIC

SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL

ETHICS;

CIRCUMSTANCES,

LAWYER-CLIENT
A

LAWYER-CLIENT

RELATIONSHIP;
RELATIONSHIP

GIVEN
HAS

THE

ARISEN

BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND COMPLAINANT; REASON. The Court is

convinced that a lawyer-client relationship, given the circumstances, has arisen
between respondent and complainant. Respondent lawyer has admitted having
received the amount of P1,750.00, including its nature and purpose, from
complainant. His acceptance of the payment effectively bars him from altogether
disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them. It would
not matter really whether the money has been intended to pertain only to Civil
Case No. 83-18877 or to include Civil Case No. 062160-CV, there being no
showing, in any event, that respondent lawyer has attended to either of said
cases. It would seem that he hardly has exerted any effort to find out what might
have happened to his client's cases. A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client
requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of
him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect, within bounds of the law,
the interests of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility cannot be any
clearer in its dictum than when it has stated that a "lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence," decreeing further that he "shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him."
2. ID.; SUSPENSION; AS PENALTY FOR NEGLECTING A LEGAL MATTER
ENTRUSTED TO HIM. All considered, the Court deems it proper to reduce the

recommended period of suspension of the IBP from three months to one month.
Atty. Dante H. Cortez is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one month from notice hereof, with a warning that a repetition of similar acts and
other administrative lapses will be dealt with more severely than presently.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J :
p

Feeling aggrieved by what he perceives to be a neglect in the handling of his

cases by respondent lawyer, despite the latter's receipt of P1,750.00 acceptance
and retainer fees, complainant Arsenio A. Villafuerte seeks, in the instant
proceedings, the disbarment of Atty. Dante H. Cortez.

cdasia

From the records of the case and the Report submitted by the Commission on
Bar Discipline ("CBD") of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP"), it would
appear that sometime in January 1987, complainant, upon the referral of Atty.
Rene A. V. Saguisag, went to the office of respondent lawyer to discuss his case
for "reconveyance" (Civil Case No. 83-18877). During their initial meeting,
complainant tried to reconstruct before respondent lawyer the incidents of the
case merely from memory prompting the latter to ask complainant to instead
return at another time with the records of the case. On 30 January 1987,
complainant again saw respondent but stillsans the records. Complainant
requested respondent to accept the case, paying to the latter the sum of
P1,750.00 representing the acceptance fee of P1,500.00 and P250.00 retainer
fee for January 1987. Respondent averred that he accepted the money with
much reluctance and only upon the condition that complainant would get the
records of the case from, as well as secure the withdrawal of appearance of, Atty.
Jose Dizon, the former counsel of complainant. Allegedly, complainant never
showed up thereafter until November 1989 when he went to the office of
respondent lawyer but only to leave a copy of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
062160-CV, a case for ejectment, which, according to respondent, was never

priorly mentioned to him by complainant. Indeed, said respondent, he had never

entered his appearance in the aforenumbered case.
In its report, IBP-CBD concluded that the facts established would just the same
indicate sufficiently a case of neglect of duty on the part of respondent. The CBD
rejected the excuse proffered by respondent that the non-receipt of the records of
the case justified his failure to represent complainant. The IBP-CBD, through
Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, recommended to the IBP Board of Governors
the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three months with a
warning that a repetition of similar acts could be dealt with more severely than a
mere 3-month suspension.
On 30 August 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-96191 which
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, hereinmade part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A;' and, finding the recommendation
therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Dante Cortez is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a
warning that a repetition of the acts/omission complained of will be dealt
with more severely." 1

Both respondent lawyer and complainant filed with the IBP-CBD their respective
motions for the reconsideration of the foregoing resolution.
On 23 August 1997, the Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-97-66
that
"RESOLVED to CONFIRM Resolution NO. XII-96-191 of the Board of
Governors Meeting dated August 30, 1996 SUSPENDING Atty.
Dante Cortez from the practice of law for three (3) months with a warning
that repetition of the acts/omission complained of will be dealt with more
severely." 2

The Court agrees with the IBP-CBD in its findings and conclusion that
respondent lawyer has somehow been remiss in his responsibilities.
The Court is convinced that a lawyer-client relationship, given the circumstances,
has arisen between respondent and complainant. Respondent lawyer has
admitted having received the amount of P1,750.00, including its nature and
purpose, from complainant. His acceptance of the payment effectively bars him
from altogether disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client relationship
between them. It would not matter really whether the money has been intended to
pertain only to Civil Case No. 83-18877 or to include Civil Case No. 062160-CV,
there being no showing, in any event, that respondent lawyer has attended to
either of said cases. It would seem that he hardly has exerted any effort to find
out what might have happened to his client's cases. A lawyer's fidelity to the
cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that
should be expected of him. 3 He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect,
within the bounds of the law, the interests of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot be any clearer in its dictum than when it has stated that a
"lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence," 4 decreeing further
that he "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him." 5
Complainant, nevertheless, is not entirely without fault himself. He cannot expect
his case to be properly and intelligently handled without listening to his own
counsel and extending full cooperation to him. It is not right for complainant to
wait for almost two years and to deal with his lawyer only after receiving an
adverse decision.
All considered, the Court deems it proper to reduce the recommended period of
suspension of the IBP from three months to one month.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante H. Cortez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one month from notice hereof, with a warning that a
repetition of similar acts and other administrative lapses will be dealt with more
severely than presently.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made a part of the personal records of

respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, and let copies thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
|||

cdasia

(Villafuerte v. Cortez, A.C. No. 3455 (Resolution), [April 14, 1998], 351 PHIL

915-920)

CANON 19

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-22018. January 17, 1968.]
APOLONIO GALOFA, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NEE BON SING, defendant -appellant.
Madrid Law Office for plaintiff-appellee.
Salvador Nee-Estuye for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENT; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; NEGATIVE PREGNANT,
EQUIVALENT TO AN ADMISSION, WHERE DEFENDANT'S ANSWER FAILS
TO TENDER A GENUINE ISSUE. Plaintiff having alleged his inability to take
actual possession of the parcel of land due to "an unwarranted adverse claim of
rights of ownership and possession by the defendant," followed by an allegation
of how such claim was exercised, defendant's denial of the "material averments
contained in paragraph 4 of the Complaint" conjoined with his disclaimer of

dominical or possessory rights in the manner alleged in the complaint, makes out
a negative pregnant, which is equivalent to an admission.
2. ID.; ID.; PROPER IN CASE OF FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO DENY OR
ADMIT MATERIAL ALLEGATION IN COMPLAINT ABOUT SERVICES OF
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL. As to plaintiff's allegation of his having contracted a
lawyer for a fee, the defendant does not deny the alleged fact; what he denies is
his liability therefor, which is an issue of law. Since defendant neither denies nor
admits the material allegation about the services of plaintiffs counsel, judgment
on the pleadings is proper.
3. ID.; ID.; PLAINTIFF BARRED FROM RECOVERY OF DAMAGES WHERE HE
PRAYED FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. Where plaintiff prayed for
judgment on the pleadings, he is barred from recovery of his alleged damages
because he is deemed to have admitted the truth of the defendant's denial of the
alleged damages and to have rested his motion for judgment on those allegations
taken together with such of his own as are admitted in the pleadings.
4. ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PROPERLY
DENIED WHERE AFFIDAVIT ANNEXED THERETO SHOWS NO RIGHT OR
INTEREST IN THE LAND. Defendant's motion for reconsideration to allow him
to amend his answer contains an annexed affidavit reiterating that he "had no real
right or interest whatsoever not having been involved in any way with any
transaction affecting the title or possession of the same." There was therefore, no
issue to be tried and the denial of such motion was proper. For, why should the
defendant resist the judgment when he simultaneously asserts that he had no
right to the land?
5. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ANSWER; SPECIFIC DENIAL OF ALLEGATION
ON DAMAGES, NOT REQUIRED BY RULES. defendant specifically denied
the allegation in par. 6 of the complaint as to the amount of damages. But specific
denial thereof is not required by the Rules (Sec. 1 Rule 9); and at any rate, the
appealed judgment did not condemn him to pay damages.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J :
p

Direct appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 145 (No. 1737Sorsogon) of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon on the issue of whether or
not the defendant's answer to the complaint tendered a genuine issue.
The plaintiff-appellee Apolonio Galofa filed a complaint against the defendantappellant Nee Bon Sing 1 for the recovery of possession of and to quiet title over
a certain parcel of land in Sta. Lourdes, Barcelona, Sorsogon, alleging therein
the prior ownership and possession of the land by his late father,
Francisco Galofa, and its adjudication in favor of the plaintiff in an oral partition
among his co-heirs. The complaint alleges further:
"4. That plaintiff however, despite the foregoing, was unable to take
actual possession of the above-described property due to an
unwarranted adverse claim of rights of ownership and possession by the
defendant and/or his tenant or encargado, Abion Pantilone, alleging sale
by a certain Fe Nicolas of said property to defendant, which if true, had
no right whatsoever to legally dispose the above-described property not
being the owner thereof, aside from the fact that the defendant is not
allowed under the law to own and possess real properties being an alien,
pursuant to the Constitution and/or the Krivenko case;

prcd

"xxx xxx xxx;

"9. That as a result thereof, plaintiff was compelled to ventilate this case
to court and in so doing has to retain the services of counsel for the
contracted amount of no less than P1,500.00 and/or spent or will spend
the sum of P500.00 because of this case which could have been avoided
had the defendants been more fair and just in his dealings with your
plaintiff.
"xxx xxx xxx"

In his answer corresponding to the above-quoted allegations in the complaint, the

defendant-appellant Nee Bon Sing manifested as follows:
"3. That the defendant denies the material averments contained in
paragraph 4 of the Complaint, the truth being, that the defendant never
asserted title of ownership to the property described in the Complaint to
anybody, much less to the herein plaintiff in virtue of any deed of
conveyance executed in favor of the defendant by one Fe Nicolas, nor
claimed any possessory right over the said property, either by himself or
through another:
"xxx xxx xxx;
"5. That if in fact the plaintiff had contracted, as alleged in paragraph 8 of
the Complaint, the services of counsel and will spend the amounts
therein specified occasioned by the institution of the action, the same is
his own personal responsibility, for which reason, defendant denies any
part and assumes no liability therefor in any manner whatsoever;
"xxx xxx xxx"

Upon motion by the plaintiff that the defendant's answer failed to tender an issue,
the lower court rendered judgment on the pleadings, declaring the plaintiff the
owner of the property "free from any cloud arising from any assertion of adverse
claim or interest whatsoever on the part of the defendant", ordering the defendant
to deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, and to pay attorney's fees
and costs.

dctai

We find that the lower court committed no reversible error in rendering the
appealed judgment.
It is to be noted that, to the plaintiff's allegation of his inability to take actual
possession of the parcel of land due to "an unwarranted adverse claim of rights
of ownership and possession by the defendant . . .", followed by an allegation of
how such claim was exercised, the defendant's denial is as to "the material
averments contained in paragraph 4 of the Complaint, . . ." conjoined with his

disclaimer of dominical or possessory rights in the manner alleged in the

complaint. The defendant's denial is, therefore, a negative pregnant, which is
equivalent to an admission.
"A denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading,
since it cannot be ascertained whether it is the fact or only the
qualification that is intended to be denied." (41 Am. Jur. 429)
"Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or modifying language, and
the denial is conjunctive, a 'negative pregnant' exists, and only the
qualification or modification is denied, while the fact itself is admitted.
Ison v. Ison, 115 SW 2d. 330, 272 Ky. 836." (28 Words & Phrases 314)

As to the plaintiff's allegation of his having contracted a lawyer for a fee, the
defendant does not deny the alleged fact; what he denies is his liability therefor,
which is an issue of law. Since the defendant neither denies nor admits the
material allegation about the services of plaintiff's counsel, judgment on the
pleadings is proper. (Alemany vs. Sweeney, 3 Phil. 114)

LexLib

The defendant, however, had specifically denied the plaintiff's allegations

in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint. He traversed these allegations in
his answer by stating that he "does not possess any knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the (original) Complaint and therefore, denies the
same." But paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint referred to damages, while
paragraph 5 of the complaint merely alleged a conclusion (that by defendant's
acts a cloud over plaintiffs title had been raised) so that the defendant's
specific denials served no purpose at all. As to the amount of damages,
alleged in paragraph 6 of the complaint (P2,000.00 per agricultural year) and
specifically denied by the defendant, as aforesaid, a specific denial is not
required by the Rules. (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Rules of Court) At any rate, the
appealed judgment did not condemn the defendant-appellant to pay damages.
The defendant should have no complaint about the Court's finding, described in
his second assignment of error, that

"the lower court erred in concluding that the allegations in defendantappellant's answer to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint are mere
general denials and not specific denials under the Rules of Court"

because, aside from what has been previously stated, the plaintiff is barred
from recovery of his alleged damages for having prayed for a judgment on the
pleadings, as thereby he is deemed to have admitted the truth of the
defendant's denial on the alleged damages and to have rested his motion for
judgment on those allegations taken together with such of his own as are
admitted in the pleadings. (Bauermann v. Casas, 10 Phil. 386; Evangelista v.
De la Rosa, et al., 76 Phil. 115)

prLL

The defendant's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial furnished no

justification to the lower court to set aside or reconsider its judgment. Said motion
prayed that the defendant be allowed to amend his answer but annexed to it is
the defendant's own affidavit (Annex A, Rec. on Appeal, p. 57) reiterating that he
had "no real right or interest whatsoever not having been involved in any way with
any transaction affecting the title or possession of the same." Definitely, therefore,
there was no issue to be tried and the court's denial of the motion was proper.
And why should the defendant resist the judgment when he simultaneously
asserts that he has no right to the land?

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed,

with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J ., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Amended later to include one Maria Castro who could not be served with summons
and was, presumably, a fictitious person . . . (Defendant-appellant's Brief, p. 2)
and one Apion Pantilone, who was dropped and excluded as a party defendant
by order of the court dated 15 November 1962.

|||

(Galofa v. Nee Bon Sing, G.R. No. L-22018, [January 17, 1968], 130 PHIL 51-

56)

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7298. June 25, 2007.]
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LOLITO
G. APARICIO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J :
p

In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01

of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter
the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for
tax evasion and falsification of documents.
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C.
Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005, complainant Fernando Martin
O. Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the
Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation
conference. In the conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a

claim for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant
rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent notices to
Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this
return to work notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his
client's claim for separation pay. The letter also contained the following threat to
the company:
BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to
file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of
millions under established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to
other multiple charges like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to
the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of
laws.

IDCHTE

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above
amounts as settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). 1

Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards,
complainant filed an administrative complaint 2 with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an
Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims) 3 claiming that
Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainant's legal counsel, also played an important
part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him.
Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no certification against forum
shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues then pending before the
Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the
disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the

prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of Public Functions 4 and for violation
of the Notarial Law. 5
A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed to
appear. 6 Both parties were thereafter required to submit their position papers.
The Report and Recommendation 7 of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan found that complainant failed to file his position paper and to comply
withAdministrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum
shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 8 On 10 July
2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court
the notice of said Resolution and the records of the case. 9 Thereafter, on 18
August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for
Modification of Decision) 10 reiterating his claim of damages against complainant
in the amount of four hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent
in dollars, for filing the "false, malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal
fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a groundless and
false suit." 11
Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline) 12 alleging that he personally submitted and filed
with the IBP his position paper, after serving a copy thereof on respondent by
registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his right to due
process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering his position
paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.
Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26 May
2006 Resolution 13 of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case to
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition on
the merits.
Based on the records, there is truth to complainant's assertion that he filed his
position paper on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to

respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of said document shows that it was
received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt attached to the
same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to respondent on
the same date. 14

CTacSE

Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this
Court for his failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in his
complaint against respondent.
The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required
by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every
petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular No.
04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement to
include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and the
Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2)
of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. 15 Said rule states that a violation thereof would
constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both
petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel
of the party concerned. 16
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against
complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his
complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however,
disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to
the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.
The Court's determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment
proceedings, the reasons for the certification against forum shopping
requirement, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement, and the
merit of complainant's complaint against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen, 17 dwelt on the sui generis character of
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely

civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather aninvestigation by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant
or a prosecutor. 18 [Emphasis supplied]

In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum

shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such
proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary
proceedings against the same respondent, because such other proceedings or
"action" is one that necessarily involves "the same issues" as the one posed in
the disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.
Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping
is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the
same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby
precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or
complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, 19 which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds
to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. 20 Furthermore,

the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency
among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to
promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon
the other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent
the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering
conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue. 21

CASIEa

It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a

certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem
that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the
possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints
considering that said proceedings are either "taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person." 22 Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to
attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another
disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with
ease. We have previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum
shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, "should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or
the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible." 23

At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the
supposed defect in the original complaint. The records show that complainant
submitted the required certification against forum shopping on 6 December 2006
when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss the
present petition.
Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainant's case against respondent justifies the
grant of the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the
threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the
letter is unethical.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding legal
practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. 24 In
particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a
lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case
or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to
compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's
client. 25
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe.
Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the
amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts
including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion,
falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but
they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or
exposure or opposition in the public prints, . . . obtaining of value from a person
as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing
some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." In common parlance and in
general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the
exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an
injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or
by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to
expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim. 26
In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., 27 we held that "[a]n accusation for blackmail
and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail

not only respondent's disbarment from the practice of law, but also a possible
criminal prosecution." 28 While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for lack
of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he
admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing
the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the
other party, and, with boldness, asserting that "a lawyer is under obligation to tell
the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the
State." 29He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard
practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of
disputes.
Respondent's assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that
respondent's threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure
some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client's demands. It was not
respondent's intention to point out complainant's violations of the law as he so
gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to "keep
silent" about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date
indicated.

cETCID

Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this
jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent
relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of
his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to
take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand
requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case
contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file
retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client's
claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to
compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are
definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged

communication rule under which a private communication executed in the
performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter
was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from
the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold
that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering
that he wrote the same out of his over zealousness to protect his client's
interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May 2006
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of
Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
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(Pena v. Aparicio, A.C. No. 7298, [June 25, 2007], 552 PHIL 512-526)