Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Elerizzalibiran-meteoro
Facts: this is a case for disbarment on the grounds of deceit and non-payments of
debtsagainst atty. Meteoro.the case commenced when the latter engaged in
availing creditswith abbarientos of jewelries and as payments on this the
respondent issued checks whicheventually declared no sufficient funds to satisfy its
obligation.the respondent defendedhis stance that the said check were already
replaced and that the true complainantexecuted an affidavit of desistance which
manifest that they are no longer interested in pursuing the case.
Ruling: the court found the respondent with a manifestation of lawyers low regards
to her commitment to lawyers oath.the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against closed account indicates a lawyers
unfitness for the trust andconfidence reposed on her.she must conduct herself in a
manner that reflect the valuesand norms of legal profession as embodied in the
code of professional responsibilty.the court found the respondent guilty of gross
misconduct and suspended the latter for 6months in practicing law.
wanton disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her
suspension from the practice of law is warranted.
IN RE: Suspension From The Practice Of Law In The Territory Of Guam Of
Atty. Leon G. Maquera
Facts: In a Letter dated August 20, 1996
the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual
dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under
Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Maquera, who was suspended from the practice of law in Guam, be
suspended as
member of the Philippine Bar on the same ground of his suspension in Guam.
Ruling:
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions
committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992,
which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as
an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or
order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension In the case at bar such transaction made by
Maquera falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyer's
acquisition by assignment of the client's property which is the subject of the
litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, the prohibition extends to sales
in legal redemption. This is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office,
an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client
and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.
Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his
clients. They are also
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which
states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful
the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The
equirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good's
standing in the legal profession. The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been
able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the charges of unethical behavior
in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of Hearing
earlier sent by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to
ascertain Maquera's current and correct address in Guam in order that another
notice, this time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring
him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds
(through this Resolution), may be sent to him. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with
the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for non payment
of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. Under Section 10, Rule
139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6)
months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground
for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Cojuangco vs Palma
Facts: On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma, despite his subsisting
marriage, wed Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the daughter of complainant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. Thus, the latter filed on November 1982, a complaint disbarment
against respondent. Palma moved to dismiss the complaint. On March 2, 1983, the
court referred the case to OSG for investigation and recommendation. The Assistant
Solicitor General heard the testimonies of the complainant and his witness in the
presence of respondents counsel. On March 19, 1984 respondent filed with the OSG an urgent
motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the final actions of his civil case
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and his wife Lisa, poses a
prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding, but it was denied. The OSG
transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, the latter found respondent guilty of
gross immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, hence, was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three years. In his motion for
reconsideration, respondent alleged that he acted under a firm factual and legal conviction in
declaring before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a bachelor because his first
marriage is void even if there is judicial declaration of nullity.
Issue:
Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a judicial declaration of
nullity for the purpose of remarriage.
Held:
Respondents arguments that he was of the firm factual and legal conviction when he declared
before the HIC authorities that he was a bachelor since his first marriage is void and
does not need judicialdeclaration of nullity cannot exonerate him. In Terre vs. Terre, the same
defense was raised by respondent lawyer whose disbarment was also sought. We held: xxx
respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this court which holds that
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void an initio is
essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan
Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be
deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage must be regarded as
bigamous and criminal.
ISSUE: Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first
one is subsisting shall be a ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is
subsequently declared void.
HELD: Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared
void, it is still undeniable that he contracted it while his first one is subsisting.
Further, since the second marriage is void, he is then liable for concubinage for
living with another woman while his first marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court
cannot give credit to his defense that both second and third marriages are shot gun
marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely to be coerced. One incident of a shotgun
marriage is believable, but two such in succession would tax ones credulity.
Macarrubos actions show a blatant disregard to the institution of marriage and
family. His acts import moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social
institution of marriage.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such,
including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community.
Macarrubo violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui
generis cases. A disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the
acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative
case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not
affect its course. In this case, the annulment of Macarrubos second marriage will
not work to remove such second marriage as a ground for disbarment.
MARCOLETA VS BORRA
from the accounts of the law partnership. Not only is this claim unsubstantiated,
however. It is contradicted by respondents own evidence and statements.
As earlier noted, respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented by his firm in
the Sandiganbayan case. In light thereof, respondent was personally barred by the
rules of ethics from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his
firm.
Plainly, when Lokin represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an
interest hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he
had priorly negotiated for Ilusorio.
The Board thus erred when, while acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by
respondents firm in his negotiations with the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that
there was no conflict of interest upon a finding that the subsequent SEC case did
not in any way involve the validity of the compromise agreement forged with the
PCGG.