Barrientos vs. Atty.

Elerizzalibiran-meteoro
Facts: this is a case for disbarment on the grounds of deceit and non-payments of
debtsagainst atty. Meteoro.the case commenced when the latter engaged in
availing creditswith abbarientos of jewelries and as payments on this the
respondent issued checks whicheventually declared no sufficient funds to satisfy its
obligation.the respondent defendedhis stance that the said check were already
replaced and that the true complainantexecuted an affidavit of desistance which
manifest that they are no longer interested in pursuing the case.
Ruling: the court found the respondent with a manifestation of lawyers low regards
to her commitment to lawyers oath.the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against closed account indicates a lawyers
unfitness for the trust andconfidence reposed on her.she must conduct herself in a
manner that reflect the valuesand norms of legal profession as embodied in the
code of professional responsibilty.the court found the respondent guilty of gross
misconduct and suspended the latter for 6months in practicing law.

Toledo vs. Abalos

FACTS:Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo,
payable within six months from date, plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee
the payment of said obligation, respondent executed a Promissory Note. After the
lapse of six months, and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her
obligation. Afraid that she will not recover her money, Ms. Toledo sought the help of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the
Commission on Bar Discipline.
[T]he Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the
letter-complaint of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not
answer the complaint. Investigating Commissioner issued an order setting the case
for hearing Despite due notices, respondent failed to appear. Accordingly,
complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte after which, the case
was considered submitted for resolution. Respondent received this order as shown
by the registry return. However, she again did not do anything about it.
ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Abalos may be disciplined by the IB
HELD:YES. Respondent suspended for one (1) month.
RATIO:According to the Supreme Court, the general rule is that a lawyer may not
be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to
discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity. It was,
however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the
Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her

wanton disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her
suspension from the practice of law is warranted.
IN RE: Suspension From The Practice Of Law In The Territory Of Guam Of
Atty. Leon G. Maquera
Facts: In a Letter dated August 20, 1996

the District Court of Guam informed this

Court of the suspension

of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam. He was
suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his
client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a
consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has
also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or
suspension in this realm, provided the foreign court's action is by reason of an act or
omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly
immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's oath. The case was referred by the
Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report and
recommendation. In its decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that Maquera
was the counsel of a certain Castro. Benavente the creditor Castro, obtained a
judgement against Castro, thus Castro;s property was to be sold at a public
auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. However, Castro retains the
right of redemption.
In consideration of Maqueras legal services, Castro entered into an oral agreement
with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. On January
8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's
right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the
judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in
his name.And after, sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three
Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).
The Guam Bar Ethics Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam
praying that Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition,
the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for his
services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure
to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall
not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the
lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and
are fully disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing. On the
basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that
although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence
to establish that Maquera committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines."However,

the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual
dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under
Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Maquera, who was suspended from the practice of law in Guam, be
suspended as
member of the Philippine Bar on the same ground of his suspension in Guam.
Ruling:
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions
committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992,
which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as
an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or
order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension In the case at bar such transaction made by
Maquera falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyer's
acquisition by assignment of the client's property which is the subject of the
litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, the prohibition extends to sales
in legal redemption. This is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office,
an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client
and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.

Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his
clients. They are also
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which
states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful
the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The
equirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good's
standing in the legal profession. The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been
able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the charges of unethical behavior
in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of Hearing
earlier sent by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to
ascertain Maquera's current and correct address in Guam in order that another
notice, this time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring
him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds
(through this Resolution), may be sent to him. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with
the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for non payment
of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. Under Section 10, Rule
139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6)
months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground
for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Cojuangco vs Palma
Facts: On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma, despite his subsisting
marriage, wed Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the daughter of complainant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. Thus, the latter filed on November 1982, a complaint disbarment
against respondent. Palma moved to dismiss the complaint. On March 2, 1983, the
court referred the case to OSG for investigation and recommendation. The Assistant
Solicitor General heard the testimonies of the complainant and his witness in the
presence of respondents counsel. On March 19, 1984 respondent filed with the OSG an urgent
motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the final actions of his civil case
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and his wife Lisa, poses a
prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding, but it was denied. The OSG
transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, the latter found respondent guilty of
gross immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, hence, was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three years. In his motion for
reconsideration, respondent alleged that he acted under a firm factual and legal conviction in
declaring before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a bachelor because his first
marriage is void even if there is judicial declaration of nullity.
Issue:
Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a judicial declaration of
nullity for the purpose of remarriage.

Held:
Respondents arguments that he was of the firm factual and legal conviction when he declared
before the HIC authorities that he was a bachelor since his first marriage is void and
does not need judicialdeclaration of nullity cannot exonerate him. In Terre vs. Terre, the same
defense was raised by respondent lawyer whose disbarment was also sought. We held: xxx
respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this court which holds that
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void an initio is
essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan
Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be
deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage must be regarded as
bigamous and criminal.

Florence Teves Macarrubo vs Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo

Facts:
In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began his career
as a lawyer. However in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage
with Esparza was subsisting. In June 2000, Teves filed a complaint for disbarment
against Macarrubo. Teves alleged that Macarrubo made her believe that his
marriage with Esparza was void; that Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but
later on left her and then Macarrubo subsequently married another woman named
Josephine Constantino whom he subsequently abandoned. Teves presented as
evidence documents proving Macarubbos marriages as well as photos of him and
his wife as a family. Macarrubo was initially declared in default for failing to appear
multiple times but was subsequently given the opportunity to defend himself. In his
defense, Macarrubo avers that he was only coerced to marry Teves in order to save
her face because at that time she was already pregnant; that Teves sent some
strangers to pick Macarrubo up wherever he goes. He presented a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Teves; that the marriage was void for
being a sham. He also averred that the ruling in the said case serves as res judicata
on the disbarment case because Teves failed to appear in the annulment case. He
also avers that his third marriage, with Constantino, is currently being annulled due
to similar circumstances.
The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was never remiss
in supporting Teves and the two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with
her is void, recommended a penalty of three months suspension from the practice
of law for grave misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first
one is subsisting shall be a ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is
subsequently declared void.
HELD: Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared
void, it is still undeniable that he contracted it while his first one is subsisting.
Further, since the second marriage is void, he is then liable for concubinage for
living with another woman while his first marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court
cannot give credit to his defense that both second and third marriages are shot gun
marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely to be coerced. One incident of a shotgun
marriage is believable, but two such in succession would tax ones credulity.
Macarrubos actions show a blatant disregard to the institution of marriage and
family. His acts import moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social
institution of marriage.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such,
including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community.
Macarrubo violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui
generis cases. A disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the
acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative
case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not
affect its course. In this case, the annulment of Macarrubos second marriage will
not work to remove such second marriage as a ground for disbarment.

MARCOLETA VS BORRA

Rodante D. Marcoleta filed a complaint for disbarment against respondents

Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Romeo A. Brawner of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) charging them with violating Canons 1 and 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The
complaint arose from the resolution of the ComelecsFirst Division in favor of one
Diogenes S. Osabel, the head of one of the factions in the party-list group Alagad.
The ponencia was written by Commissioner Borra while Commissioner Brawner
concurred. The dispute was elevated to the Comelec En Banc. Thelatter affirmed the
decision of the Comelecs First Division.
Brawner, in his answer asserted that the complainant should have filed an appeal
via petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, and that being members of a
constitutional body he and Borra are supposed to be insulated from a disbarment
complaint for being impeachable officer. For his part, Borra contends that the Code
of Judicial Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics cannot be made to apply to him
and Brawner because they are not members of the judiciary.
Marcoleta argues that Brawner and Borra cannot take refuge in their being
impeachable public officers to insulate them from any disbarment complaint. For
him the insulation from disbarment complaint of impeachable public officers when
referring particularly to the members of the Comelec applies only to the majority of
its members who should all be members of the Philippine bar, citing Section 1 (1)
of Article IX-C of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Borra and Brawner are supposed to be insulatedfrom a disbarment
case for being impeachable officers
HELD:
At the outset, the Court, guided by its pronouncements in Jarque v. Ombudsman, In
Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Cuenco v. Fernan, has laid down the rule that an
impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first
being impeached. Marcoletas availment of Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution to skirt this rule is specious.
It bears emphasis that the provision that majority of Comelec members should be
lawyers pertains to the desired composition of the Comelec. While the appointing
authority may follow such constitutional mandate, the appointment of a full
complement of lawyers in the Comelec membership is not precluded.
At the time the present complaint was filed, Brawner and Borra and three other
commissioners were all lawyers. As an impeachable officer who is at the same time
a member of the Bar, Borra must first be removed from office via the constitutional

route of impeachment before he may be held to answer administratively for his

supposed errant resolutions and actions.
The Court thus finds respondent Borras contention that the grounds-bases of the
disbarment complaint, fastened on supposederrors of judgment or grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts, are proper for an appeal, hence,
complainants remedy is judicial, not administrative.

BILDNER VS ATTY LOKIN JR

Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr..
This sprung from the time that her father, the late Potenciano Ilusorio, engaged the
services of the law office of Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan where
the Republicwas claiming, among other properties, shareholdings in
PhilippineOverseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT).
Ilusorio, with the assistance of Lokin, entered into a Compromise Agreement where
Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares. Ilusorio-Bildner alleges that the informal
gathering, through the high-handed and deceitful maneuvers of Lokin, was
suddenly and without notice transformed into a Special Stockholders Meeting at
which directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT were elected. Her father contested the
validity of the meeting by filing before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) against Manuel Nieto, et al. who were purportedly elected directors and
officers of PHILCOMSAT, in which SEC case Lokin appeared as the counsel of Nieto,
et al., contrary to his oath not to represent conflictinginterests.
Ilusorio, had earlier filed with the IBP a disbarment complaint. However, on account
of the death of Ilusorio, his complaint was dismissed without prejudice to the filing
of a new complaint by Ilusorios children. Ilusorio-Bildner now filed the complaint but
the IBP Board of Governors dismissed it. No copy of the notice ofresolution was
served upon petitioner. Ilusorio-Bildner, nonetheless, learned about the matter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lokin was personally barred by the rules of ethics from representing
an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm
HELD:
Notwithstanding his acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan and
SEC cases, respondent denies that he was guilty of representing
conflicting interests, he proffering that, in the first place, the case of Ilusorio in the
Sandiganbayan has been the personal account of Atty. Raval, separate and apart

from the accounts of the law partnership. Not only is this claim unsubstantiated,
however. It is contradicted by respondents own evidence and statements.
As earlier noted, respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented by his firm in
the Sandiganbayan case. In light thereof, respondent was personally barred by the
rules of ethics from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his
firm.
Plainly, when Lokin represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an
interest hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he
had priorly negotiated for Ilusorio.
The Board thus erred when, while acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by
respondents firm in his negotiations with the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that
there was no conflict of interest upon a finding that the subsequent SEC case did
not in any way involve the validity of the compromise agreement forged with the
PCGG.