May 2010

A Review and Elucidation of Pamela Hieronymis Responsibility for believing

Luke Allen
Abstract. The cardinal objective of this paper is to establish that the article
Responsibility for believing (2007), by Dr. Pamela Hieronymi, redefines ones
notion of responsibility and uses an older notion of the will to gain a, otherwise,
controversial claim: One is most fundamentally responsible for ones beliefs.
First, I explain what it is to be responsible, according to Responsibility for
believing. I then provide a basic, yet precise, version of Hieronymis argument that
concludes: we are more fundamentally responsible for our beliefs. Second, I, in
response to her argument, clarify any possible confusion by providing and
discussing a simple, yet accurate, version of her argument, which exactly captures
her arguments claims and displays them in an uncontroversial conclusion. Third, I
present what it is to be responsible in todays world and how the notion of
responsibly is betrayed within Hieronymis paper. Ultimately, I plan to convey that
Responsibility for believing does not hold as much weight as one might believe.
Introduction
The article Responsibility for believing (2008), by Pamela Hieronymi, states that one
can be responsible for what is not voluntary. But, as Hieronymi previously claimed, it seems that
one cannot believe at will only by the desire to believe a proposition, viz., it seems that doxastic
voluntarism is false. Thus, the rejecting doxastic responsibility directly calls into questions ones
responsibility for ones beliefs. 1
First, I explain the given notion of responsibility. Second, I present Hieronymis
argument in a small simple extraction. I then explain how the argument is earned only attributing
a new definition to our, among others, notion of responsibility. Third, I supply a version of
Hieronymis argument in which, I believe, captures the essence and of Responsibility for
believing.

Pamela Hieronymi (2006) Controlling Attitudes, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87: 45-74.

Criticism and revision of Hieronymi

Luke Allen

To be Responsible
The thesis contained in Responsibility for believing is that the assumption that one can
only be responsibility for what is voluntary is false. Hieronymi suggests that the notion of
answerability be considered a minimal notion of responsibility. She takes answerability to mean
that one can [rightly] be asked the reasons, if any, for why one believes P. One can regard P to
be any proposition that one believes, e.g., the belief that Im 20 years old, The moon is made
of cheese. or George Bush is a fabulous specimen of American Values. Note that believing P
can be understood as settling (or having settled) for oneself (positively) the question of whether
Pthe question on which ones considerations for believing P will bear. The phrase settling the
question, is meant only to convey the uncontroversial conceptual connection between a belief,
P, and the answer to some question (whether or not P).2
It is also important to note that Hieronymi states [one must not have a reason for every
belief], which is to say, that one can still rightly be asked why one believes P for which one has
no reasons that will bear on P. To better understand the concept of being rightly asked
consider the following example: Suppose one is asked How much money do you have in your
pockets? Any of the follow answers are sufficient responses to have been rightly asked: A
lot., Some., A little., I dont know., and None.
To compare, suppose one is asked: Why do you believe P? Any of the follow responses
can be accepted in order for the question to have been rightly asked: I believe P because of x.,
Im not sure, there must be a reason., I dont remember., I dont know., and I dont have
a reason. Of course a plethora of answers are acceptable; my only concern here is to give one

2

Settling the question is not meant to introduce a new mental state or event. By settling the question
Hieronymi does not mean, e.g., consciously entertaining the question. The mental state or event that corresponds
to settling the question whether P is nothing other than believing P.

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the general idea of what it is to be rightly asked and to display that a broad range of answers are
sufficient.
Only when the assumption (the assumption that one believes P, not the assumption that
one has reasons) is false the question is not rightly asked. To clarify, once again consider the
question: How much money do you have in your pockets? This aforementioned question is
refused by the response I dont have pockets. The assumption, that one has pockets, is false.
To compare, go back the question Why do you believe P? This question is refused by the
answer, I dont believe P.
I have given a clear definition of what it is to be responsible. That definition being one
can rightly be asked. In the next section I will provide, and discuss, the argument used to gain the
claim one is most responsible for ones beliefs.

Fundamentally Responsible
Given that we have an operational definition of responsibility, able to be rightly asked, I
feel it is appropriate to give an extraction from Responsibility for believing. I believe this
argument captures the essential gist of Hieronymis central argument:
1. We are responsible for what is not voluntary. (Basic)
2. Beliefs are not voluntary. (Basic)
3. Beliefs constitute our moral personality. (Basic)
4. Thus, one is most fundamentally responsible for ones beliefs.
Premise (1) certainly holds a significant amount of weight. Premise (1) begs the question:
how is one responsible for what is not voluntary. The answer for that question rests in the

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definition of responsibility. Here responsibility is understood as able to be rightly asked ones

reasons, if any, that bear on whether P. If beliefs are not directly voluntary we then have a clear
case in that one is responsible for what is not voluntary. This leads to premise (2).
Premise (2), beliefs are not voluntary, is widely held to be true among philosophers and
seems obviously basic (at least to me and any individuals I have encountered). Hieronymi
purposes an activity is voluntary just in the case one decides to do the activity for reasons one
takes to settle the question of whether to do the activity, therein intend to do the activity, and,
providing all goes well, do the activity by executing that intention. For example: I cannot directly
voluntarily form the belief, at will, just like that, that there is a mountain of gold in my backyard
only for the reason I want to believe that there is a mountain of gold in my backyard. Further in
my paper, I provide an argument of Hieronymis that, according to which, believing is not an
action and thus cannot be directly voluntary.
Consider the claim premise (3) made: Beliefs represent ones moral personality. Premise
(3) may be unclear or intuitively contradictory. Suppose there are two adults. Adult One has the
belief abortions are morally impermissible from conception. Adult Two has the belief that
abortion is morally permissible from conception. On Hieronymis view, each adults belief
represents that which is part of ones moral personality. Are the contrasting beliefs to display
something of the adults moral personalities? I do not believe so. Precisely because there are
certain non-moral disagreements between the adults and the non-moral disagreements do not
reflect on morality. Assume each adult holds the same fundamental moral belief that causing
physical pain to live, innocent, young human beings is morally wrong. However, assume that
Adult One believes abortion is morally impermissible because abortion causes physical pain to
the fetus. Adult Two believes abortion is morally permissible, but Adult Two is a future scientist

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that knows the fetus (up to a certain point) is not actually alive and thus the fetus feels no pain
and therefore abortion is morally permissible.
Hieronymi, regardless of todays sense of morality, holds to the conclusion that beliefs
represent ones moral personality. Premise (3) is rationalized by redefining moral personality:
By settling certain questions for oneself, by having a take on what is true, what is
important, and what is to be done, one thereby constitutes those bits of ones mind
relevant to the quality of ones relations with othersand so establishes what we
might call ones moral personality, or, in an older but apt phrase, the quality of
ones will.
Hieronymi (2008: 361) denotes that on the older notion of the will, ones will is ones rational
appetitive faculty, and so encompasses (some of) ones desires or appetites. The older notion of
the will is discussed by Robert Adams (1985: 6) whom Hieronymi cites. Adams elucidates that
the rational appetitive faculty responds to intellectual data.3 Essentially, when Hieronymi
mentions moral personality she refers to something closer to the broader, older, notion of the
will, i.e., rational appetitive faculty. The rational appetitive faculty is understood to represent a
subjects take one some object, the subjects answers to some question(s).
To further illustrate, assume one has the belief that the sky is blue or whether a certain
claim is true or false or even the belief that perfect spheres are smooth, round and circular.
Beliefs constitute ones rational appetitive faculty, which in turn represents ones will. Ones
will represents ones moral personality. Thus, it should now seem clear that every belief
represents that which part of ones moral personality. Premise (3) now is basic by definition. MY
discussion now turns to the conclusion (4).
Premise (4), as responsibility and moral personality are defined here, should seem
significantly less controversial. Although, the phrase most fundamentally responsible remains

3

Robert Adams (1985) Involuntary Sins The Philosophical Review 94: 6.

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to be explained. However, if one considers that ones moral personality is comprised of ones
beliefs, it is permissible to say: beliefs are an integral component of a moral agent. Thus, premise
(4) is true.
Therefore, Hieronymis argument holds. In the next section I will discuss how the notion
of responsibility has been betrayed.

Betrayal of a notion
The way in which Hieronymi uses the term responsibly betrays the general connotation
of what is widely understood when an individual claims that one is responsible for x. To
illustrate, consider the follow two thought experiments. The first thought experiment:
Implemented beliefs. Imagine a world in which God exists and He is the creator
of the universe. Then imagine that he creates the earth, plants, water, animals and a
full grown man named Chad. Chad can be understood as a body of specifically
placed molecules and atoms functioning in a particular way. At the precise moment
God created Chad, God also caused it that Chad obtained certain beliefs. Beliefs
such I (Chad) am the only living human., Some actions may be morally
impermissible., and also simple beliefs such as Healthy grass is green.
Additionally, suppose at the same precise moment, Chad has yet to form any sense
kind of autonomy. Free will has not come into play for Chad. Assume, God directly
controls the actions, thoughts and beliefs of Chad. In other words, God directly and
completely controls Chad. (At least until the point God chooses to attribute free will
to Chad.)
In the Implemented beliefs thought experiment, according to Hieronymi, Chad is
fundamentally responsible for his beliefs. Chad is responsible only because he can
rightly be asked his reasons for his beliefs. Chad does in fact hold his own beliefs (his
own beliefs simply referring to that which Chad believes.) Chad can rightly answer with
responses such as I dont know, P must be true., or God has shown me that P., et
cetera.

Criticism and revision of Hieronymi

Luke Allen

Certain objections may be voiced against the thought experiment. A possible objection
might be that in order for an individual to be right asked: the individual must had obtained free
will. And if that individual (the individual in question) has not obtained free will the individual
cannot rightly be asked his reasons for his belief. Hieronymi intends to relate her term of
responsibility to the individual with free will.
My reply: Objections that free will is criterion to be rightly asked might at first, prima
facie, seem valid point. However, since we are using responsible interchangeably with able to
rightly be asked I see no relevant distinction as to why it is permissible to attribute
responsibility to the free willed individual, (D1), and it is impermissible to attribute
responsibility to the completely controlled, non-autonomous, individual, (D2). D1 and D2 can
each equally believe any given proposition and can each equally be asked ones reasons for ones
belief. It is permissible to conclude that in regards to responsibility there is no relevant difference
between D1 and D2.
A further objection to my reply: D1 and D2 can each equally believe any given
proposition P. However, in the case that D2 is asked his reasons for believing P, it would be the
case that the God directly causes D2 to answer and therefore God is indirectly answering the
rightly asked question of Why do you, D1, believe P? Therefore, God is rightly answering and
it is not the case D1 is rightly answering.
My reply: This objection is blocked simply by the definition of responsibility. To
reiterate, once again, the definition of responsibility according to Hieronymi: to be responsible is
for one to be able to be rightly asked which considerations, if any, bear on ones belief P. Thus,
the assumption (that one has the belief P) made in the question why do you believe P? is not

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rejected because D1 and D2 actually hold belief P. Thus, D1 and D2 are each responsible for
their beliefs.
Throughout my essay I run the risk of over emphasizing, exactly, at least according to
Responsibility for believing, what it is to be responsible. On our definition thus far it should
seem clear that one can be responsible for what is voluntary. Responsibility is not widely
understood as simply being able to be rightly asked. The word responsibility is used in such a
broad sense in Responsibility for believing that the argument ultimately fails to assert anything
short of a tautology.
I purpose an account, in form of a thought experiment and discussion, of what is
generally understood by the notion of responsibility. Consider:
Deadline. Assume that a talented writer has formed and signed a contract with a
book publisher. The contract is mutually agreed upon and absent of any kind of
coercion. The contract states that the author is to have completed a book by the
deadline of some future date. Upon completing and legally transferring the book to
the publisher, the publisher is to pay the author some significant amount of money.
The author and publisher agree that the allotted amount of time provided is an
extremely gracious time period. The author then begins writing his book. However,
the author then feels he would rather play video games than work on his book. The
author then plays video games rather than work on his book. Time passes and the
deadline soon approaches. The author still plays videogames rather than write. The
deadline passes and the author informs the publisher that the book is not completed.
The thought experiment, Deadline, is aimed at providing a case of what we seem to mean when
we utter the phrase that one is responsible for something.
To be responsible is widely, roughly, understood to mean that one caused (or could
prevent) X (X being some state of affairs). The author in Deadline failed to complete his
obligation concerning the contractual agreement. The author is responsible for the state of affairs
that he produced, namely, failure to complete the book by the deadline.

Criticism and revision of Hieronymi

Luke Allen

I have just shown how Hieronymi definition of responsibility misleads and how
responsibility is generally understood. In the next section I supply a premise-by-premise
formatted version of Hieronymis argument in less controversial terms, which earn the
equivalent of Hieronymis thesis.

To be rightly asked
I have, I believe, captured the essence of Responsibility for believing into three simple
arguments. The following arguments assume that an individual holds a belief, P, where P can be
taken as any proposition. Hieronymi does not seem to consider indirectly voluntary in the
same class as voluntary, because this I choose to substitute her use of voluntary to mean
strictly directly voluntary. This does not change or compromise the arguments. Hieronymi
simple asserts one must allow that there are other forms of control. The following arguments
are extracted from Believing for responsibility:

5. Assume setup. (Assumption for conditional proof.)

5.1. In either intending to act or acting intentionally (where the action may be as complex as
you like) you are [able to be rightly asked for] the reasons that you take to show
something good about so acting. (Basic)
5.2. In believing you are [able to be rightly asked for] your reasons that you take to show the
belief true. (Basic)
5.3. If believing brings its own distinctive form of [being rightly asked], then believing
cannot be understood as an action. (Basic)
5.4. Believing and either intending to act (or acting intentionally) brings their own distinctive
forms of [being rightly asked]. (From 5.1, 5.2)
5.5. Believing cannot be understood as an action. (Modus ponens 5.3, 5.4)
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Criticism and revision of Hieronymi

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5.6. If believing cannot be understood as an action, then believing cannot be an action.

(Basic)
6. Thus, believing cannot be an action. (Modus ponens 5.6, 5.5)
6.1. If believing is directly voluntary then, believing is an action. (Basic)
7. Thus, believing is not directly voluntary. (Modus tollens 6.1, 6.2)
7.1 One has settled the question of whether or not P. (From 5)
7.2 If one has settled the question of whether or not P, then one is [able to rightly asked for
ones reasons] on accounts of ones belief P. (Basic)
7.3 Thus, one is [able to be rightly asked for ones reasons] on accounts of ones belief P.
(Modus ponens 7.2, 7.1)
7.4 Thus, one can be [rightly asked for ones reasons] for ones belief P and ones belief P is
not directly voluntary. (Conjunction introduction 7.3, 7)
8. If setup holds, one can be [rightly asked for ones reasons] for ones belief P and ones belief
P is not directly voluntary. (Completes conditional proof 7.4)
Premise (5) simply means this argument is a strict conditional and that an individual has
the belief P. Premise (5.1) and (5.2) may seem complicated.4 I will try to clear up any confusion.
Premise (5.1) states that in intending to perform some directly voluntary action or doing or
having done a directly voluntary action one can rightly be asked the reasons that show it good
to have intended to act or to have acted intentionally. Premise (5.2): if one has a belief one can

4

(Hieronymi 2008) states [B]elieving could not be understood as an action because believing brings with it its own
distinctive form of answerability. In believing, you are answerable for reasons that you take to show the belief true.
In contrast, in either intending to act or acting intentionally (where the action may be as complex as you like), you
are answerable for reasons that you take to show something good about so acting. If we were to try to make belief
into an action, one would have to be, in believing, answerable for reasons that one takes to show something good
about believing.

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Criticism and revision of Hieronymi

Luke Allen

rightly be asked for ones reasons for that belief. But that is not to say every belief needs a
reason.
Premise (5.3) asserts that if believing has a distinctive form of rightly being asked than
that of an action then believing simply cant be an action. Premise (5.4) shows that believing and
acting intentionally do indeed have distinctive forms of answerability. And, thus, leads us to
premise (5.5), then believing cannot be an action. Premise (5.6) seems basic, yet an air of
questioning might lie within: just because something cannot be understood as an action, does that
mean it is not an action? The simple answer is Yes. I choose not to go further into premise
(5.6) as it is taken for granted in the original argument. Thus, premise (6), believing is not an
action.
Premise (6.1) asserts that if believing were to actually be directly voluntary then
believing would be an action. We have concluded that believing is not an action. Thus, premise
(7), believing is not directly voluntary. One must simply allow that there are other forms of
control.
In our setup in which an individual has a belief, premise (7.1), is earned by the definition
of to believe P: one has settled the question of whether P. Premise (7.2), if one has settled the
question of whether or not P then one is able to be rightly asked for ones reasons for belief P.
Thus, premise (7.3), one is able to be rightly asked for ones reasons on accounts of ones belief
P. Thus we come to the conclusion, premise (8), that one can be rightly asked for ones reasons
for ones belief P and ones belief P is not directly voluntary.
Premise (8), one can be [rightly asked for ones reasons] for ones belief P and ones
belief P is not directly voluntary, is conceptually identical with the conclusion:

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Criticism and revision of Hieronymi

Luke Allen

Beliefs, then, are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most
fundamentally responsible most fundamentally responsible, in part because they
are the sort of things which could not be voluntary. (Hieronymi 2008: 372-373)
The inclusion of the word fundamentally may be questionable but I believe the addition of
fundamentally may be at least permissible, if not appropriate. Given that we said early
mentioned that beliefs represent ones take on things, i.e., ones take on the world, it seems
reasonable to suppose that sense beliefs are a fundamental characteristic of thinking being. It is
in the sense that beliefs fundamentally represent ones take on the world.
I have just explained in uncontroversial terms exactly how Hieronymi has earned the
conclusion we are most fundamentally responsible for what is not voluntary.

Conclusion
We have learned, according to Hieronymi, what it is to be responsible. We then earned
her argument for her paper in a simple and short four premise argument. However, it turned out
that redefinition was needed to earn the arguments coherence. We then discussed how the
argument betrays our notion of responsibility. I then supplied Hieronymis argument in a simple
and uncontroversial manner to display the argument clearly. (Hieronymi, 2008)

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