Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Available at http://www.ijcsonline.com/
Abstract
On an average, more than 8 million people fly in around 100,000 commercial flights everyday around the world.
Software plays a crucial role in the system. Even though accidents occur rarely and the role of software in those
accidents is debatable still, learning from other domains, steps should be taken to ensure if any mishap occurs in future,
software failure is not the cause for the accident. This paper proposes some safety measures that should be taken by
software developers while developing software for aviation industry.
Keywords: Software Safety, Aviation Industry.
I.
INTRODUCTION
121 | International Journal of Computer Systems, ISSN-(2394-1065), Vol. 03, Issue 02, February, 2016
122 | International Journal of Computer Systems, ISSN-(2394-1065), Vol. 03, Issue 02, February, 2016
C. Increased Criticality:
At the same time that size and complexity of software
are increasing, so is the criticality. For example, flight
control surface interfaces were almost exclusively
mechanical ten years ago, now, many aircraft
manufactures are transitioning to fly-by-wire software
to control the flight control surfaces, since the fly-bywire software includes algorithms to improve aircraft
performance and stability
D. Technology Changes:
Electronics and software technology are changing at a
rapid rate. It is challenging to ensure the maturity of a
technology before it becomes obsolete. For example,
safety domains require robust and proven
microprocessors; however, because a new aircraft
development takes around 5 years, the microprocessors
are often nearly obsolete before the product is flight
tested. Additionally, the changes in software
technology make it challenging to hire programmers
who know assembly, C or Ada (the most common
languages used for airborne software). These real-time
languages are not taught in many universities.
Software developers are also getting further away from
the actual machine code generated.
E. More with less:
Because of economic drivers and the pressure to be
profitable, many (may be even most) engineering
organizations are being requested to do more with less.
Most good engineers are doing the work of what was
previously done by two or more people. They are
spread thin and exhausted. People are less effective
after months of overtime. A colleague of mine puts it
this way: overtime is for sprints, not for marathons.
Yet, many engineering products are working overtime
for months or even years.
F. Increased outsourcing and off shoring:
SAFETY MEASURES
Planning
Aircraft Function Development
Allocation of Aircraft Functions to Systems
Development of System Architectures
Allocation of System Requirements to items
(including allocation to software and hardware)
System Implementation (including the software and
hardware development).
These six phases are started from scratch onwards
because airplane construction takes 5 years. Each phase
will have coordination with other phases.
A. System Safety Assessment
Safety is assessed in parallel with the aircraft and
system development. An overview of civil aviation safety
assessment process, as well as explanation of how software
fits into the system and safety framework. Fig. 2 below
shows the iterative nature of the system and safety
development, as the system develops, the safety aspects are
identified and addressed by the design. SAEs ARP4761
[12], entitled guidelines and methods for conducting the
safety assessment process on civil airborne systems and
equipment, provides a detailed description of the
expectations for civil aviation.
1) Safety Program Plan
The safety Program Plan development is typically the
first task performed in the overall assessment of the aircraft
safety. The plan identifies how the aircraft safety will be
ensured, how safety-related requirements will be identified,
123 | International Journal of Computer Systems, ISSN-(2394-1065), Vol. 03, Issue 02, February, 2016
Fig 2. Assessment
Fig. 1 System
2) Functional Hazard Assessment
FHA is developed once the basic aircraft functionality
and conceptual design are documented. The FHA
identifies and classifies failure conditions associated with
aircraft functions and combinations of functions. The
effects of the failure conditions on the aircraft are assessed
against the regulations and supporting guidance that
establish the safety requirements and objectives for the
aircraft. In the aviation world, the required safety
objectives vary by aircraft type (e.g., transport category
airplanes, small airplanes, small rotorcraft, transport
category rotorcraft, engines or propellers. The large
transport category aircraft tend to have the most rigid
requirements due to the overall risk to human life. Small
aircraft have some alleviation, depending on the aircraft
size and its area of operation.
3) System Functional Hazard Assessment
124 | International Journal of Computer Systems, ISSN-(2394-1065), Vol. 03, Issue 02, February, 2016
125 | International Journal of Computer Systems, ISSN-(2394-1065), Vol. 03, Issue 02, February, 2016
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
CONCLUSION
[2]
126 | International Journal of Computer Systems, ISSN-(2394-1065), Vol. 03, Issue 02, February, 2016