LEGAL PROFESSION

Canon 1. Promote and Respect Law and Legal Process

1. In Re: Gutierrez
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He
was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty,
he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he
shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against
Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is
without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted
pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his
sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his
conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was
actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of
motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from
the profession.

2. Zaldivar vs Gonzales
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was
investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and
Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against
Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one
on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the
rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for
an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered
Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true;
that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the
Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even

attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask
him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call
for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily
imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements
constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly
debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated
with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public
interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of
Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In
the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the
Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

Rule 1.01. No Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral, Deceitful Conduct

3. Piatt vs Abordo
4. Ui vs. Bonifacio
Facts: Lesli Ui filed an administrative complaint
ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying an
husband.
In the proceeding before the IBP Commission
a marriage certificate that said that she and

for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on the

immoral relationship with Carlos Ui, her (Lesli)
on Bar Discipline, Iris attached a photocopy of
Carlos got married in 1985 but according to

the certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they were
married in 1987.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she
deserves to be barred from the practice of law.
Held: NO. The practice of law is a privilege. The bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy
the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar, he must also have a continued
possession of good moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct ,
which has been defined as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
a moral indifference to the good and respectable members of the community. Lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must
handle their personal affairs with great caution.
Iris Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos, clothed as it was with what she believed as a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. For such conduct to
warrant disciplinary action, it must be grossly immoral, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
A lawyer is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also behave himself
as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
Her act of distancing herself on her discovery that Carlos was married proves that she had no
intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
On the matter of the falsified marriage certificate, it is contrary to human experience and highly
improbable that she did not know the year of her marriage or she failed to check that the
information on the document she attached to her Answer were correct. Lawyers are called upon
to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts of malpractice.
5. Figueroa vs. Barranco
Facts: Figueroa and Barranco were sweethearts since their teens. Their intimacy
eventually resulted to a son born out of wedlock. At this point (1964) Barranco promised Figueroa
that he would marry her when he passes the bar examinations. After four takes, he finally passed
but did not hold true to his promise of marriage. In 1971, their relationship ended. Years later, he
married another woman. When Barranco was about to take his oath to enter the legal profession,
Figueroa filed a complaint relaying to the court what happened between her and Barranco. Until
1988, Barranco has filed three motions to dismiss because Figueroa still would not persecute and
because for the past years, he has become elected in the Sangguniang Bayan, has actively
participated in various civic organizations and has acquired a good standing within his community
while the case was pending. The court sought the opinion of the IBP which recommended that
Barranco be allowed to take his oath. Figueroa reappeared and intercepted the scheduled oathtaking of Barranco which led to its delay.
Issue: Whether or not Barranco should be allowed to take his oath despite the accusations of
Figueroa.

Held: Yes. The maintenance of an intimate relationship between a man and a woman, both of
whom had no impediment to marry and voluntarily carried on with the affair, does not amount to a
grossly immoral conduct even if a child was born out of the relationship. His previous acts may be
said to be a question to his moral character but none of these are so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
Her allegations that she was forced to have sexual relations with him cannot lie as evidenced by
her continued cohabitation with him even after their child was born in 1964. The ignobleness of
his treatment of Figueroa is sufficiently punished by the 26 years that he has been prevented
from entering the profession he has worked so hard for.
6. Pimentel vs Llorente
Facts: This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P.
Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's oath in
connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers
in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City
Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law. Complainant,
now
a
senator,
was
also
a candidate for
the
Senate
in
that
election.
Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents tampered with the
votes received by them by either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of
Votes (SoV) or reducing the number of votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed
an administrative complaint for their disbarment. Respondents denied the allegations against
them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the 12
canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They
claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake,
oversight,
and/or
fatigue.
Issue: Whether the respondents are held guilty of misconduct.
Held: YES. A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the
bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the
misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers
oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency
on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here,
by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no
falsehood. It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under
greater obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public
trust.
Respondents' participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in general,
and on lawyers in government in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official
duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through
the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first
administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public service. Under the

circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should
be sufficient and issued a stern warning that similar conduct in the future will be severely
punished.
7. Cordova vs. Cordova
In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to Salvacion Delizo and with two children,
left his wife and children to cohabit with another married woman. In 1986, Salvacion and Cordova
had a reconciliation where Cordova promised to leave his mistress. But apparently, Cordova still
continued to cheat on her wife as apparently, Cordova again lived with another woman and
worse, he took one of his children with him and hid the child away from Salvacion.
In 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Cordova. Eventually, multiple
hearing dates were sent but no hearing took place because neither party appeared. In 1989,
Salvacion sent a telegraphic message to the Commission on Bar Discipline intimating that she
and her husband has reconciled. The Commission, since Salvacion failed to submit her evidence
ex parte, merely recommended the reprimand and admonishment of Cordova.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely reprimanded.
HELD: No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence that he has been
morally reformed and that there was true reconciliation between him and his wife. Before a
person can be admitted to the bar, one requirement is that he possesses good moral character.
That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.
On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in
good standing. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue
as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage such
was the case in the case at bar.
.
8. Ventura vs. Samson
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself,
we find that respondents act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former
employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only
admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever
when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her
money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover,
the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost
moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his
profession.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13year-old minor, who for a time was under respondents care. Whether the sexual encounter
between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latters consent is of no
moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible
act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession
and should be disciplined accordingly.
9. Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo
In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began his career as a lawyer.
However in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage with Esparza was
subsisting. In June 2000, Teves filed a complaint for disbarment against Macarrubo. Teves
alleged that Macarrubo made her believe that his marriage with Esparza was void; that
Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but later on left her and then Macarrubo subsequently
married another woman named Josephine Constantino whom he subsequently abandoned.
Teves presented as evidence documents proving Macarubbos marriages as well as photos of
him and his wife as a family. Macarrubo was initially declared in default for failing to appear
multiple times but was subsequently given the opportunity to defend himself. In his defense,
Macarrubo avers that he was only coerced to marry Teves in order to save her face because at
that time she was already pregnant; that Teves sent some strangers to pick Macarrubo up
wherever he goes. He presented a judicial declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Teves;
that the marriage was void for being a sham. He also averred that the ruling in the said case
serves as res judicata on the disbarment case because Teves failed to appear in the annulment
case. He also avers that his third marriage, with Constantino, is currently being annulled due to
similar circumstances.
The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was never remiss in supporting
Teves and the two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with her is void, recommended
a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law for grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first one is
subsisting shall be a ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is subsequently
declared void.
HELD: Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared void, it is still
undeniable that he contracted it while his first one is subsisting. Further, since the second
marriage is void, he is then liable for concubinage for living with another woman while his first
marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court cannot give credit to his defense that both second
and third marriages are shot gun marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely to be coerced. One
incident of a shotgun marriage is believable, but two such in succession would tax ones
credulity. Macarrubos actions show a blatant disregard to the institution of marriage and family.
His acts import moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social institution of
marriage.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the
bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution
of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community. Macarrubo
violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui generis
cases. A disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by
the Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a
disbarment case does not affect its course. In this case, the annulment of Macarrubos second
marriage will not work to remove such second marriage as a ground for disbarment.
10. People vs. Tuanda
Facts; Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from the
Supreme Court finding her guilty of violating BP 22.
Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that
her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the
aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee
(Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.
Issue; WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted.
Ruling; The Supreme Court ruled to DENY the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension. The court
found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude citing Secs 27 and 28 of the
Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
11. Vda. De Mijares vs. Villaluz
Facts; Respondent a Justice of the Court of Appeals was charged with Bigamy by complainant
and
is
being
recommended
for
suspension
from
practice
of
law.
Priscilla Castillo vda de Mijares and Justice Onofre Villaluz married each other pending the
court's decision on the former's marriage. However, their relationship was shortlived as right after
the marriage, the complainant left their would-be-honeymoon place after some unbearable

utterances made by the respondent. Several months after, the complainant learned that
respondent a subsequently married a certain Lydia Geraldez, thus, the basis of this complaint.
Issue; WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz be suspended from his practice of law.
Ruling; Citing Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court found the
respondent engaging in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceiful conduct and recommends
SUSPENSION with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should
he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.

12. Stemmerick vs. Mas

In Keld Stemmerik, represented by Attys. Herminio. Liwanag and Winston P.L. Esguerra vs.Atty.
Leonuel N. Mas, A.C. No. 8010, June 16, 2009, Keld Stemmerik, a Danish national, expressed
interest in buying land in the Philippines and Atty. Mas advised him that he can legally acquire
and own land in the Philippines.
Keld gave Atty. Mas PhP3.8 million as purchase price of the property and returned to Denmark.
Atty. Mas then prepared a contract to sell between Keld (with Atty. Mas as representative) and a
certain Bonifacio de Mesa, who allegedly owns the property. Atty. Mas then prepared and
notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for
PhP3.8 million. Atty. Mas also drafted an agreement between Keld and Gonzales stating that it
was Keld who provided the funds for the purchase of the property.
After the various agreements were signed, Keld tried to get in touch with Atty. Mas, who never
replied to Kelds calls and email messages. When Keld returned to the Philippines, he learned
that he could not own land in the Philippines. In addition, a verification made at the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated
within the former US Military Reservation.
Keld tried to locate Atty. Mas but never found him. It appears that Atty. Mas abandoned his law
practice in Olongapo City. Keld then filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mas with the
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The CBD and
the IBP Board of Governors recommended the disbarment of Atty. Mas. The Supreme Court
agreed that Atty. Mas should be disbarred. According to the Supreme Court:
This Court has interpreted [Article XII, Section 7], as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register
of Deeds, to mean that under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural
lands, including residential lands. The provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional
policy.

Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy,

showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared
spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de Mesa
thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of complainant,
he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.
Respondents misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could
legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the
property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give
due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived
complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and
unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by
complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was
criminal in nature.
The Supreme Court stated that Atty. Mas showed gross ignorance of the law. Based solely on
the facts recounted in the ruling, it is likely that Atty. Mas knew that aliens could not own land, and
for that reason, the deed of sale he prepared was between de Mesa and Gonzales. If Atty. Mas
was not aware of the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership, then he would have likely
placed Keld as the purchaser in the deed of sale. In asking Gonzales to acknowledge that the
funds for the purchase of the property came from Keld, it seems that Atty. Mas was using
Gonzales as a dummy for Keld.
13. Freeman vs. Reyes
Rule 1.02. No Counseling to Defy Law
14. In Re: Terrel
Facts: Terrel was ordered to show cause why he should not be suspended as a member of the
bar of the city of Manila
He assisted in the organization Centro Bellas Artes Club, after he had been notified that the
organization was made for the purpose of evading the law
He acted as attorney for said club during the time of and after its organization, which was known
for the purpose of evading the law
In US vs. Terrel, he was charged with estafa. The court reviewed his testimony and decided that
the charges were true and made an order suspending him from office as lawyer in the Philippine
Islands.

Issue: Whether or not the court was justified in suspending Terrel.

Held: Yes, suspended for one year
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating or
evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer
of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which he may be
removed or suspended.
The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to bedishonest, or the conniving at
a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
HOWEVER, Terrel was acquitted in US vs. Terrel on the charge of estafa. While unprofessional,
is not criminal in nature. Hence, Terrel is suspended for one year (as opposed to permanent
suspension).
15. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
-Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent justices have
violated Rule5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in
violation of the 1987 Constitution.
Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions.
But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political
speeches, contribute to
party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other part
isan politicalactivities.
-Also, petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged a case that would assail the legality
of the acttaken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in
Estrada v. Arroyo
( 3 5 3 S C R A 4 5 2 and356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due
process.-According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of his
Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon
on 11 June 2003, thethree justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest
their bias and partiality againsthis client.-Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. ChicoNazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectfullanguage when she blurted out,
Magmumukha naman kaming gago,
(Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice TeresitaLeonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as
insignificant even before the prosecution could file itscomments or opposition
thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estradas
motionwould result in chaos and disorder.
(Ibid.)
P r o m p t e d b y t h e a l l e g e d b i a s a n d p a r t i a l a t t i t u d e o f t h e Sandiganbayan justices,
Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification.-The petitioner also
asked the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief JusticeDavide, et
al., last January 20, 2001 in:a) going to EDSA 2;b) authorizing the proclamation of VicePresident Arroyo as President on the ground of permanent disability even
without proof of compliance with the correspondingconstitutional conditions, e.g., written
declaration by either the President or majorityof his cabinet;
and c ) a c t u a l l y p r o c l a i m i n g V i c e - P r e s i d e n t A r r o y o o n t h a t s a m e g r o u n d o f
p e r m a n e n t disability.-In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate JusticeArtemio V. Panganiban, he has

demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for severaladvisory opinions

on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan.-Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant
petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSEDfor gross insufficiency in substance
and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no graveabuse of discretion, an
indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition
for
certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

-In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of
disciplinarysanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar
submissions to this Court or to itsMembers.-Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him
by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.In fact, on the 7th September 2003 issue
of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of law? It
rendersthe decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of
fair play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President
Estrada filed his petition, Chief J u s t i c e D a v i d e a n d h i s
f e l l o w j u s t i c e s h a d a l r e a d y c o m m i t t e d t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y - G M A - w i t h a judg
ment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone thecharade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of
GMA as president,can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own
act?
Issue:
WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
-Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can
enlighten the court andcontribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil
595.) However, Attorney Paguiahas not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case
within the judicial forum. Indeed, he hasrepeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and
print media.
Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making
such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed
a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
-It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory
context, relates to actsd e s i g n e d t o c a u s e t h e s u c c e s s o r t h e
d e f e a t o f a p a r t i c u l a r c a n d i d a t e o r c a n d i d a t e s w h o h a v e f i l e d certificates of
candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any
incomingPresident of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional
official function of theHighest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the
Court at such an event could be nodifferent from their appearance in such other official
functions as attending the Annual State of the NationAddress by the President of the Philippines
before the Legislative Department.-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow theerosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let
alone, by those who have been privileged by it topractice law in the Philippines.C a n o n 11 o f t h e C o d e o f P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y m a n d a t e s t h a t t h e l a w y
e r s h o u l d o b s e r v e a n d maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and,
indeed, should insist on similar conduct byothers. In liberally imputing sinister and devious
motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, andauthority of the members of the Court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct andpervert the dispensation of
justice.-The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to

become mindful of hisgrave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.

Apparently, he has chosen not to at alltake heed.-WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effectiveupon his receipt hereof, for conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
16. Kupers vs. Hontanosas
FACTS:
Complainant Kupers filed an administative case against respondent Atty. Hontanosas for
allegedly preparing and notarizing contracts that are both invalid and illegal for being violative of
the limitations on aliens leasing private lands under P. D. 471.
He knowingly indicated that the contract shall be enforced for 49 years, instead of 25 years, and
renewable for another 49 years. He failed to inform his clients of the limitations of the aforesaid
law and by his acts, deliberately prepared a document contrary to law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Hontanosas violated the Lawyer's Oath and several canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibilty in preaparing and notarizing the illegal lease contacts.
RULINGS:
In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the Attorneys Oath
and several canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties
of an attorney-at-law is to obey the laws of the Philippines."
This duty is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath and in Canon 1, which provides that (a) lawyer shall
uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
The other canons of professional responsibilty which respondent transgressed are the ff:
CANON 15 -- A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Aside from constituting violation of the lawyer's oath, the acts of respondents also amount to
gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of Rules Court.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas, is found GUILTY of violating the
lawyers oath and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

Rule 1.03. Not to Encourage Lawsuit or Proceedings

Rule 1.04. Encourage Client to Avoid Controversy

17. Castaneda vs. Ago

FACTS
- 1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit againstAgo in the CFI of Manila to recover
certain machineries.-1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson- 1961 SC affirmed the
judgment; trial court issued writof execution; Agos motion denied, levy was made on Agoshouse
and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved tostop the auction; CA dismissed the
petition; SC
ffirmeddismissal- A g o t h r i c e a t t e m p t e d t o o b t a i n w r i t o f p r e l i m i n a r y injunction to
restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied- 1963 sheriff sold
the house and lots to Castaneda andHenson; Ago failed to redeem- 1964 sheriff executed
final deed of sale; CFI issuedwrit of possession to the properties- 1964 Ago filed a complaint
upon the judgment renderedagainst him in the replevin suit saying it was his
personalobligation and that his wife share in their conjugal housecould not legally be
reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining
Castanedathe Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering thefinal deed of sale; the battle
on the matter of lifting andrestoring the restraining order continued- 1966 Agos filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibitionto enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession;
SCdismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA whichalso dismissed thepetition; Agos
appealed to SC which dismissed the petition- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and
prohibitionw i t h t h e C A w h i c h g a v e d u e c o u r s e t o t h e p e t i t i o n a n d granted
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
W O N t h e A g o s l a w y e r, e n c o u r a g e h i s c l i e n t s t o a v o i d controversy
HELD
- N o . D e s p i t e t h e p e n d e n c y i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t o f t h e complaint for the
annulment of the sheriffs sale, justicedemands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits
oftheir victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for,the respondents Agos abetted by their
lawyer Atty. Luison,have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to theextended prejudice of the petitioners.- Forgetting his
sacred mission as a sworn public servantand his exalted position as an officer of the
court,
Atty.L u i s o n h a s a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o b e c o m e a n i n s t i g a t o r o f c o n t r o v e r s y a n d
a p r e d a t o r o f c o n f l i c t i n s t e a d o f a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, avirtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation insteado f a t r u e e x p o n e n t
o f t h e p r i m a c y o f t r u t h a n d m o r a l justice.- A counsels assertiveness in espousing
with candor andhonesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to becommended; what
the SC does not and cannot countenanceis a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility
of hisclients position.It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on themerit or lack
of his case. If he finds his clients cause asdefenseless, then he is his duty to advice
the latter
toa c q u i e s c e a n d s u b m i t r a t h e r t h a n t r a v e r s e t h e i n c o n t r o v e r t i b
l e . A l a w y e r m u s t r e s i s t t h e w h i m s a n d caprices of his client, and temper his clients
propensity tolitigate.