Journal of Scientific & Industrial Research

Vol 66, February 2007, pp 110-119

Chemical disaster management: Current status and perspectives

Janak Raj Bhardwaj1,*, Raman Chawla1 and Rakesh Kumar Sharma2
1

National Disaster Management Authority, Centaur Hotel (near IGI Airport), New Delhi 110 037
2
Defence Research Laboratory, Post Bag No. 02, Tezpur 784 001
Received 21 July 2006; accepted 25 September 2006

Analysis of major chemical accidents has exhibited deficiencies like laxity towards safety measures, non-conformance
to techno-legal systems and lesser public consultation. A paradigm shift has occurred in governments focus from rescue,
relief, restoration-centric approach to planning, prevention/mitigation and preparedness approach. The designing of safer
engineering practices, standard operating procedures, well-rehearsed on/off-site emergency plans, community awareness,
resource and risk inventory built up, training, education, capacity built up, are important practices that may eventually help
in development of community mindset to bravely face disasters so as to reduce their impact. This review summarizes
existing concept of chemical (industrial) disaster management in India, discusses some important key issues, identifies gray
areas needing recuperation and presents future trends and challenges.
Keywords: Chemical disaster management, Emergency plan, Mitigation, Preparedness, Risk management

Introduction
Industries handling hazardous chemicals (hazchem)
beyond defined threshold values are known as
maximum accident hazard (MAH) units. The nature
of chemical agent and the concentration during
exposure ultimately decides its toxic manifestation
and damaging effects on living organism in the form
of symptoms like irreversible pain, suffering, and
death1 (Table 1).
Man-made and Natural Disasters

Disaster means a catastrophe, mishap, calamity or

grave occurrence in any area, arising from natural or
man-made causes, or by accident or negligence which
results in substantial loss of life or human suffering or
damage to, and destruction of, property, or damage to,
or degradation of environment, and is of such a nature
or magnitude as to be beyond the coping capacity of
the community of the affected area. Flixborough,
Sevaso, Mexico and Bhopal incidents have brought
various aspects of hazards surfacing out of chemical
& industrial installations/storages into sharp focus.
Studies on major accidents can provide important
lessons for managing potential chemical threats in the
future2-3 (Table 2). Chemical accidents may originate
in manufacturing/formulation facility, process

*Author for correspondence

Tel: 25655004; Fax: 25655003
E-mail: jrb2600@gmail.com; ramanjc2004@rediffmail.com

operations at any stage of product cycle, material

handling, transportation and storage of hazchem.
Increased industrial activities, risks associated with
hazardous materials, enhanced vulnerability and lack
of infrastructure (communication, training, education
etc.) are the leading factors for such industrial and
chemical accidents4. Other major causes include
failure in process and safety control system, human
errors, and consequences of natural calamities or
sabotage/attack on the installations/storage sites etc.
The increasing chemical usage eventually necessitates
increasing risk reduction and safety measures.
Chemical disasters could also be triggered by manmade actions such as riots, conflicts including
industrial accidents like fire, explosion etc., and their
environmental
fallouts/toxic
release
and/or
combinations thereof.
Natural disasters are caused by reasons beyond
human control. Natural calamities like floods,
landslides, clone, hurricanes, tornado and earthquake
etc., may also initiate chemical disasters. A major
chemical disaster was triggered on 17th August 1999
following Kocaeli earthquake (Richter scale, 7.4).
Tupras Oil refinery (largest in Greek) situated on
outskirts of Izmit province in northwestern Turkey,
leaked hazardous material into the water supply and
Izmit Bay following structural and non-structural
damages, which subsequently caught fire. Earthquake
caused three simultaneous fires at different locations

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Table 1Broad categories of some chemical toxicants and their

associated disorders*

gas on several lines of the Tokyo subway, killing 12

people and injuring some 6000 more.

Chemical toxicants

Indian Scenario

Disorders

Atmospheric pollutants
Dust (asbestos, quartz)
Asbestosis, silicosis
Smoke and fumes
Metal fume fever
Gases
Chlorine and sulphur dioxide
Phosgene and carbon monoxide
Nitrogenous gases

Lung damage
Lethality
Irritant

Liquids and vapours

Solvents (Anesthetics and
Effect on nervous system
absorbing substances)
Vapours (HCl)
Effect on nervous system
Acids and alkalis (HCl, H2SO4,
Skin irritants & blistering
HNO3, NH3)
effects
Metals and other hazardous substances
Lead, cadmium, mercury, cobalt,
Allergies, respiratory
nickel, arsenic
problems, contact
dermatitis
Lead, vinyl chloride,
Genetic defects
trichloroethylene
*Toxicants presence in small quantities in ambient conditions
results in slow poisoning. Sudden accidental release of large
quantities exceeding the prescribed values of IDLH (Immediate
danger to life and death) or STEL (short-term exposure limit)
resulted in instant causalities or injuries.
Table 2Major chemical and industrial accidents in India
Year

Event

1984
1991

Release of methylisocyanate at Bhopal

Accident to a tanker carrying natural gasoline liquid
on National Highway - 8 in Thane district
Explosion in the IPCL plant at Nagothane
Fire and explosion in a refinery at Vishakapatnam
Release of chlorine gas from GACL, Vadodara
Toluene fire at Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., Mohali
Release of hexane and fire at chemical factory,
Dombivilli
Fire on ONGC platform at Bombay-High
Fire to a volvo passenger bus after collision with a
tanker near Ahmedabad

1993
1997
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

in the refinery, which burned continuously for 6

days5. Japan experienced largest burden of chemical
terrorism -related events in the world. Members of the
religious group Aum Shinrikyo perpetrated Sarin gas
attack on the Tokyo subway on 20th March 1995. In
five coordinated attacks, conspirators released Sarin

India has traditionally been vulnerable to natural

disasters on account of its unique geo-climatic
conditions. Failure of a dam caused flood in Pune
around four decades ago. Leakage of ammonia gas
from M/s Oswal Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd., at
Paradeep during the 1999 Orissa supercyclone and
damage to phosphoric acid sludge containment, and
release of acrylonitrile during earthquake at Bhuj are
glaring examples6,7. The vulnerability to disasters
could be further compounded by activities of hostile
countries and terrorists leading to tempering/ sabotage
of facilities or a deliberate use of chemical warfare
agents etc.
Bhopal Gas Tragedy

The Bhopal Tragedy8-16 occurred as methyl

isocyanate (MIC) leak from M/s Union Carbide Ltd
situated at Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh (India) in
December 1984, resulting in death of 2600 peoples.
Over the years this figure rose to about 16000. This
had brought into sharp focus the unprecedented scale
of accident potential of hazchem in terms of loss of
life, health, injury and need for evacuation (Table 3).
Major flaws observed in the plant were: i) Bulk
storage of such an extremely toxic hazchem was
neither advisable nor permissible; ii) Spare tanks for
emergency transfer of hazchem were not available at
the time of incident; iii) Refrigeration system to cool
liquid MIC was not available as it was shut down in
June 1984 as a cost saving measure; iv) A connecting
pipe in the flare tower had been removed for
maintenance; v) Vent gas scrubber was turned off;
and vi) Emergency water curtain system was not
effectively activated as the spray could not reach the
height at which the gas was leaking. District
administration had no clue whatsoever about the
effluent gases and their medical management. The
form, content, and focus of the Bhopal crisis have
shifted with time; initially it was mainly a medical
and ecological crisis, then it turned into a legal and
corporate crisis, and now it has become
predominantly an economic and political crisis10,17.
There are more than 5 lakh claims for injuries and
losses. It created a compelling evidence for need
of holistic approach to disaster management
and chemical safety for such chemical crises or
events18,19.

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Table 3Case of Bhopal Gas Tragedy

Incident/post incident events

Causes

Lessons learnt

45 tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) released from

storage tank due to an exothermic reaction
between MIC and water mistakably mixed
because of failure in the insertion of slip blinds8,9

Technical failure

Lack of safety protocol during

recommissioning of plant

Safety devices including coolant, vent gas

scrubber, and water sprays were notable to
prevent the release of toxic gas8,9

Failure of safety backups

Lack of drill to check the

functioning of back up system

From 1956 till 1984, there was significant

industrial growth in Bhopal but the pace of
development of infrastructure was less10

Infrastructure
including
medical
system
was
insufficient to handle such
emergency

Lack of preparedness in all

sectors

At the time of event, the survivors were instructed

to go away from the place11

Information and awareness

in such emergency was not
given to public

Lack of community awareness;

no off-site emergency plan

At hospitals, number of toxic symptoms and longterm

epidemiological
consequences
were
observed12

Doctors had no information

on
the
toxicity
and
epidemiology
of
MIC
poisonings

Lack of experts/biomedical
researchers/ specialists, SOPs,
identification of appropriate
antidotes and stocks there of.

No adequate medical documentation was done13

Reduced/focused
measures

Lack of SOPs, education,

knowledge
and
training
practices based on MSDS

Government sponsored studies conducted, but

were not available to public due to court case14-15

Enhances the severity of

long-term impact

Inadequate publication
scientific studies

Cyanide-toxic symptoms were also observed by

clinicians13, 16

Not able to keep/ruled out

the possibility of other gases
released

Lack of chemical detection

equipment/
scientific
understanding

Initiatives on Disaster Management

Post-Bhopal initiatives20-23 were taken at national
level by government, judiciary, industry, public and
NGOs etc. Comprehensive regulations enacted like
MSIHC Rules 1989 and CA [EPPR] Rules 1996
under Environment Protection Act 1986 promoted
environmental friendly practices while Factories Act
1948 and amendments 1987 encouraged safety
practices at factory site (Table 4). The High Powered
Committee (HPC) on Disaster Management Plans was
constituted in August 1999 with the mandate to
prepare disaster management plans at national, state
and district levels. HPC was also to suggest
strengthening of existing arrangements including
relief and development of human power at state level.
After 2002, the second administrative reforms were
introduced. The establishment of National Control
Rooms, Crisis Management Groups at various levels,
and development of MAHC (Major Accident Hazard
Control) System, MARG (Mutual Aid and Resources
Group) and Responsive Care (by chemical industries)
were some of the attained important landmarks.

relief

of

The research initiatives were also encouraged at

national level by IICT (Indian Institute of Chemical
Technology, Hyderabad), ITRC (Indian Toxicological
Research Institute, Lucknow), NEERI (National
Environment Engineering Research Institute,
Nagpur), NCL (National Chemical Laboratory, Pune),
NIOH (National Institute of Occupational Health,
Ahmedabad), DGFASLI (Directorate General Factory
Advisory Services and Labour Institute, Mumbai),
DAE (Department of Atomic Energy, Govt of India,
New Delhi) and DRDO (Defence Research
Development Organization, Govt of India, New
Delhi) etc.
A fairly large number of MAH units have their
On/Off-Site Emergency Plans established. Crisis
Alert System, Web-accident information system, Red
book containing plans and nature of duties of every
responder are the significant efforts of Ministry of
Environment and Forests24, Govt of India, New Delhi.
A national hazardous waste information system
(NHWIS) maintained an online database of > 10,000
hazardous waste generating industries25. The other

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113

Table 4 Important changes in legislation on chemical and industrial disaster management in post Bhopal period
Legislative Changes

Implications

Factories Act, 1948 and

amendment 1987

This act includes 11 chapters describing preliminary information about Factory and
duties of occupier, inspection directives, health provisions/measures needed at site,
safer practices related to hazardous chemicals governs the preventive measures,
employment and wages of labor etc. Special provisions in amended Act include
accidents and diseases (health) related powers for penalties and role of jurisdiction. It
also includes Schedules regarding hazardous processes, permissible levels of
chemicals in work environment, list of notified diseases and right of information
importantly20.

Environment Protection Act,

1986

Enacted as umbrella act by central government in 1986 to cover the identified gaps
in existing legislation. Rules were subsequently framed under various heads

Manufacture, storage and

import
of
hazardous
chemicals rules: MSIHC
Rules, 1989

These rules describe definitions of hazardous chemical, Industrial activity,

Isolated storage, Major Accident, Site etc. These rules also state the duties of
authorities in pre, event and post-event scenario, occupier, notification powers
regarding major accidents and related sites, safety reports composition and its regular
updation, preparedness directives for on-site and off-site emergency plans,
information management, import of hazardous chemicals, their threshold quantities
and usage for development of plans, etc21.

Rules
for
emergency
planning, preparedness and
response
for
chemical
accident: CA [EPPR] Rules,
1996

EPPR rules primarily cover constitution and functioning aspects of central, state,
district and local crisis groups, aid/assistance given to district and local crisis group
along with information provisions to general public22,23.

initiatives of the various stakeholders include

industrial pocket-wise hazard analysis, GIS based
Emergency Management system for planning and
response in MAH installations, establishment of
Emergency Response Centers and toxic surveillance
measures (active survey of the prevailing and
potential toxicants) adopted by Poison Control
Centers. The inventory of isolated storages and
improvement in transport sector (including
identification of vulnerable sites on national highways
and inclusion of Hazmat Response Vehicles) are
under progress.
Evaluation and adoption of international efforts
including ILO (International Labour Organization,
Geneva),
UNEP-APELL
(United
Nations
Environment Programme- Awareness & Preparedness
for Emergencies on a Local Level, Paris), SAICM
(Strategic Approach to International chemical
Management, Geneva), ISDR (International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction, Geneva) etc., are the other
ongoing processes. Overall impact on risk reduction
and safety aspects is still not fully adequate as the
consideration of industrial disasters as safety
problems only and not as extreme events17,26.
Besides, inadequacies in preparedness and capacity
building, ad-hocism and lack of coordination between

various stakeholders were observed among critical

deficiencies of disaster management.
National Disaster Management Authority

The Government of India decided to

institutionalize disaster management among the
mainstream activities of the country. The Disaster
Management Bill was passed to this effect by the
Union Parliament on 28th November, 2005 and
Gazetted as the Disaster Management Act (53 of
2005) on 26 December, 2005, to provide for the
effective management of disasters and for matters
therewith or incidental thereto. Accordingly, National
Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has been
set up at New Delhi under the Chairmanship of the
Prime Minister of India. NDMA is responsible for
laying down policies and guidelines for disaster
management to ensure timely and effective response
to disaster, besides coordination, enforcement and
implementation of policy and plans of disaster
management. Disaster management means a
continuous and integrated process of planning,
organizing, coordinating and implementing measures
which are necessary or expedient of: i) Prevention of
danger or threat if any disaster; ii) Mitigation or
reduction of risk of any disaster or its severity or

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Fig. 1 Disaster management cycle

consequences;
iii)
Capacity-building;
iv)
Preparedness to deal with any disaster; v) Prompt
response to any threatening disaster situation or
disaster; vi) Assessing the severity or magnitude of
effects of any disaster; vii) Evacuation, rescue and
relief; and viii) Rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Involvement of all stakeholders to critically address
all the elements of disaster cycle is an important
aspect for chemical disaster management (Fig. 1).
NDMA is evolving a National Policy on Disaster
Management and necessary guidelines for preparation
of plans by the concerned Ministry and State
Governments. The major focus areas shall include
community awareness, preparedness and capacity

building. It can be achieved by evolving the thought

process and implementation strategies commensurate
with changing times27.
It is essential that all preparedness and capacity
building measures should be included into the
National development plans. The initiatives for
implementation of any effective policy or guideline
should reflect following objectives: a) Preventive
measures; b) Cost-effective precautionary approach;
c) Promotion of market based instruments; d) Public
participation; e) Right to information about risk; f)
Good governance defining legal liabilities and
compensation; and g) Prediction of potential threats
and adoption of risk management strategies.

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Risk Management
Chemical and industrial accidental risks can be
forecasted and reduced effectively by identification of
risk area(s), risk assessment and designing preoperative measures28, 29.
Identification

As a global perspective of risk evaluation, 1700

industrial chemicals have been included under
different categories of risks like inhalation, physical
and ingestion30. Authors have further suggested
precautions to be taken on the basis of associated risk
variables, which are largely influenced by subjective
decisions and specific variability in chemical-specific
data availability and quality30. Efforts are required
to develop a similar nation-specific categorization
of chemicals using global toxicological databases,
material safety data sheets and other chemical
databases.
Assessment

Risk assessment can be divided into short-term

impact (injuries, burns, shock and death etc.) and
long-term impact on environmental parameters.
Short-term effects studied under laboratory based
experimental simulation of the events are useful in
development of preventive guidelines while long-term
effects need field studies. At installation level, risk
assessment can be done by: a) Check listing; b)
Dupoint Indices; c) What If analysis; d)
Consequence analysis; e) Fault tree analysis; f) Event
tree analysis; and g) HAZOP and HAZON studies.
Nanotechnology based miniaturized chemicalspecific biosensors for monitoring and environmental
accident index (EAI) may be simplest tools of risk
assessment. Questionnaire-based data collection gives
indicative trends that help in designing planning,
preventions and decontamination processes31. Another
way to monitor and qualitatively analyze acute release
at installation level is to use thermogravitmetric
analyzer and FITR spectrometer respectively32.
The risks that remain generally ignored are the
psychosocial risks, which include psychological
impact of chemical disaster manifested as
psychosocial trauma including psychological
reactions, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
other psychological ailments in displaced people due
to disaster. Key elements of emergency preparedness
in this field in the development of decision tools
(based upon counseling by psychologists and
psychiatrists) for responders, planners and general

115

public to assess and manage the psychosocial risk

aspects associated with the accident in more effective
manner33.
Risk Reduction Strategy

Risk reduction measures for controlling emission

of toxicants include: i) Good manufacturing practices;
ii) Proper classification and labeling; iii) Continuous
effluent / environmental monitoring; iv) Established
minimum standards for container size, shape and
strength; v) Maximum concentrations in formulation;
vi) Transportation standards; vii) Criteria for storage
and establishment of isolated storages; and viii)
Biological monitoring/ medical surveys of workers
etc. Risk reduction strategy can be effectively worked
out by carrying out SWOT (strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats) analysis at both
management and industrial level. There is need for
creating public awareness at all levels and it is
necessary to have clear, accessible, timely and
appropriate technological information on chemicals
and disaster management for ready use by concerned
authorities
during
an
emergency. Disaster
management education is only available at school
levels. Advanced institutes for training of emergency
services and district authorities need to be clearly
established and those identified need periodically up
gradation and strengthening.
Necessary attention need to be paid for
development of separate safety measures for the
warehouses / isolated storages (not covered under
Factories Act). In transportation sector, medical
response network on highways is one of the major
areas that need extra care and strengthening.
Identification of transport routes of vehicles carrying
hazardous chemicals is an ongoing process, which
needs to be completed on priority.
Review of overlapping statutory provisions under
different acts governing hazardous chemicals is
needed, as there is no harmonization of even the
terminologies used yet. The practices of involvement
of community in the conceptualization, development
and testing of off-site emergency plans would
enhance its practical significance. Non-inclusion of
cryogenics and pipelines management in the statutory
provisions and significant lack of addressals for the
present governance strategies using multistakeholders approach are the other weak spots. In the
control rooms, dedicated staff and experts should be
available all the time and even the database available

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should be comprehensive and adequate. Information

networking system with the state and the districts
need to be further strengthened. Present national
addressals/ methodology for relief and rehabilitation
needs to draw details on the minimum relief standards
for food, water, shelter and sanitation for effective
response procedures. There is a need to integrate a
large number of operating NGOs and various other
private agencies, preparation of national and statewise directory of chemical/technical experts for ready
reference of various responders, and provision of
sufficient number of Hazmat vehicles for quick
emergency response.
Civil defense, home guard and other organizations
have been under-utilized in various calamities. For
using them for chemical disaster management (CDM),
their structure and functions need to be revamped.
Analysis of the case studies of all major accidents
should be compiled at the national level and published
so that concerned persons/organizations are able to
draw lessons. Software for risk assessment and
consequence modeling is still in the developmental
phase at national level. Planning for adequate
financing of disaster prevention, preparedness and
management programmes at the state and national
levels is another big challenge. There is need of
proper guidelines and code of ethics & conduct for a
disciplined, structured and panic-free approach in
quick communication through print & electronic
media of any disastrous event. The decision matrix
should always be accompanied with an explanation of
how data was derived and processed. The qualitative
and quantitative analysis makes different impacts of
the data more understandable. Outcome should be
based on the background study, risk assessment
evaluation
of
current
measures,
extensive
possibilities,
present
restrictions
over
the
usage/disposal, monitoring strategy and industrial
point of view.
Suggested Measures for Chemical Industries

In order to minimize a chemical disaster, following

sequences of action have to be understood,
scientifically appraised and implemented so that
chances of slippage are reduced or minimized:
i) Proper site selection after environment and risk
impact assessment studies to protect the surrounding
population; ii) Correct orientation of hardware,
maintaining lowest elevations for lethal storages; iii)
Selection of state-of-art and clean technology based
on best latest sound and tried initiatives; iv) Use of

best engineering practices, providing safety margins

and material of construction of hardware and vessel
to be fail-safe and long-lasting; v) Other engineering
practices for calculation to optimize thickness,
stress relieving, mounting etc., to be perfect;
vi) Risk assessment studies and predetermined
selection of various options and orientations including
instrumentation, safety provisions, back up stand
by system, WAD (waste air destruction) and
containment system in a manner that the failures or
slippages at any stage if any, are taken care
adequately in the system and itself provided for
immediate correction; vii) Instrumentation including
DCS (Distributed Control System) at control room for
corrective actions without any disruption to operating
staff; viii) Risk assessment and safety auditing should
be carried out by a multidisciplinary team of
engineers, representing all the disciplines selecting
any of risk assessment criterion; ix) Periodic
safety audits/ratings of all industries and other
potentially hazardous storage units by an independent
agency, irrespective of inventory of hazardous
substances and exceptional visits could further
enhance the level of preparedness; x) Periodical
reviewing of internal audit report of structural and
other safety provisions and to prioritize actions
covering the deficiencies on urgent basis; xi)
Provisions for heavy penalty to violators of safety
norms based upon safety audit and exceptional
reports; xii) Selection and training of manpower
should be based on their expert qualification and
experience to man the various operations including
preventive maintenance and maintenance parts; xiii)
Corporate should keep in periodic contact with units
with regard to safety, through receiving and
appraising unit and safety reports; xiv) Adequate
financial budget for safety provisions; xv) High
storages of toxic material specially the isolated
storages without matching containment/ neutralization
system should be discouraged; xvi) Recommendations
of EIA (Environment Impact Assessment) and ERA
(Environment Risk Assessment) should be strictly
complied; xvii) Sharing of material safety data with
employees and other stakeholders; xviii) Training/
Regular mock drills of emergency plans; xix)
Performance rating by appropriate authority; and xx)
Payment of timely relief to the disaster victims
through Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 and
other instruments based upon national criterion should
be strengthened.

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Implementation of Chemical Disaster

Management (CDM)
Disaster competencies include: a) Provisions for
patient care; b) Safe practices; c) Fabrication,
implementation, and evaluation of institutional and
community protocols in preparation for a disaster; d)
Reporting and communicating; and e) Accessing upto-date information34. The information about a release
of toxic chemical should be made available to all
responders by industrial authorities in no time for an
effective and prompt response. All district units
should work as a cell of a state-level tissue
network of SDMA such that lack of communication
and confounding decisions will not further enhance
the effects of damage. The state-level authority unit
should constitute of trained teams of clinicians,
researchers, fire-officers etc. Prompt responsiveness
can be achieved by the development of protocols that
reduce the time lapse between thinking and
implementation. The decisive action of trained
medical team plays important role in combating
chemical and industrial disasters. Sullivan &
Cummin35 have proposed an algorithm as a cognitive
framework for the medical teams on scene.
The media, both print and electronic, make an
imaginative and innovative broadcast to sensitize the
people and yet unduly not alarm them or create panic
both before and after the disaster has struck.
Reporting various facets of disaster should be aimed
at assisting people. Broadcasting requests for specific
type of assistance (matching blood etc), flashing of
photographs of unidentified persons assisting in
communication between affected person and their
families etc. Analytical reports generated by post
disaster toxicological studies can be used for further
assessment of the long-term risks36. Poison control
centers with a trained manpower, knowledge based
databases and cross-responsiveness as well as new
generation of disaster-combat trained paramedics are
few immediate objectives of national disaster
preparedness37.
A unified relief policy for all disaster management
plans (natural or man-made) at all levels and financial
provisions should be made and updated time-to-time.
The relief measures should be prompt and best
achieved by collective and constructive action of all
stakeholders.
Conclusions
Chemical disaster management received greater
emphasis world over only after the Bhopal Disaster.

117

In India, a system has been in place in terms of

legislation,
organization,
competence,
and
enforcement. Still some disparities exist between the
capacities of the various authorities, preparedness and
actual requirement during a hazchem emergency and
the identified deficiencies must be addressed. In view
of large losses of life and property associated with
disasters and their long-term impact on the
community and the nation as a whole, the
Government of India decided to institutionalize
disaster management among the mainstream activities
of the country. Setting up of NDMA is a beginning of
a formalized and institutionalized approach to disaster
management so as to achieve a dream of a safer and
developed India. Disaster Management in India thus
far, was focused on relief, rescue, rehabilitation and
recovery. There is a change of orientation from
reactive disaster response and relief centric approach
to a proactive response based on multi-disciplinary
and multi-sectoral approach. While strengthening its
emergency response (relief, rescue, rehabilitation and
recovery), new disaster management paradigm
stresses
on
preparedness
including
prevention/mitigation. Role of NDMA in tandem with
government at all levels is to raise awareness of the
threats that could face the community and to provide
advice as well as possible public-funded support, on
how they can build greater resilience into their
organizations. The attainment of disaster preparedness
and the promotion of disaster resilience entail
systematic evolution of detailed and comprehensive
mechanisms for all stakeholders. The scenario calls
for concerted and sustained efforts for effective risk
reduction strategies and capacity building to lessen
impacts of chemical disaster.
Future Perspectives
Prediction of future chemical accidents drives
priorities, urgencies, and perceived adequacies of
CDM, an action plan, and government/other funding.
An improper mixing of two chemicals can lead to
injuries (48% more chances of personal injury due to
the above factor as compared to 7% chances due to
other factors)38. Essential areas where preparedness
levels need significant enhancement are: a)
Occupational medicine (responsible for targeted
delivery of preventive and wellness services); b)
Management of injury, disease, and disability; c)
Maintenance of medical information; and d) Other
clinic services required by the institution39.

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Effective disaster management has potential to

counter many factors leading to potential hazards40.
An action plan should essentially address following
major issues: i) Existing risk management strategies
and consequence analysis; ii) Usage of available risk
and resource inventory; iii) Locally available medical,
social and other capacities; iv) Training and education
at grass root level; v) Integration of all mitigation
measures in future developmental plans; vi) Inclusion
of local bodies, NGOs and other agencies; vii)
Coordination between various stakeholders; and viii)
Preparedness measures for prompt and effective
response.
At the national level, a research cell should be
constituted to undertake appropriate studies to capture
the knowledge base and advise the authority. Liaison
and rapport with International Institutions like UNDP,
UNEP, UNIDO and WHO need to be established to
keep abreast with their R&D activities and practices
on risk reduction in chemical industry and to study the
adaptation of relevant portion of the studies in Indian
context.
The
cell
will
also
assist
in
identification/creation of a network of designated
national/regional/state level training/teaching and
research Institutions, development of technology,
processes, practices and procedures and other
measures for improvisation in the chemical safety for
transparent and vetted conclusions.
R&D work at institutional level need be augmented
to generate and provide material safety data, which
has withstood scrutiny. Indian industries associations
and federations [CII, FICCI, ICC (Indian Chemical
Council), IAMA (Indian Alkali Manufactures
Association), Chemical Industrial Association] should
volunteer for R&D work and also for further
transcending information to industries in augmenting
safety
measures.
Advanced
educational
colleges/institutions dealing with industrial projects
should be encouraged to open up separate facilities on
R&D on safety aspects of chemicals/processes.
Institutions
under
various
ministries
like
regional/central labour institutes should have more
pronounced role in training manpower at industries
and factory inspectorates in safety and preparing or
updating checklist/ inspection manuals so that the
regulator in-house inspection is maintained to reserve
causes responsible for an accident. With institutional
support, guidelines for R&D work on chemicals
including good laboratory practices should be
established.

Acknowledgement
Authors are grateful to Gen N C Vij, PVSM,
UYSM, AVSM (Retd), Vice Chairman, NDMA, for
useful discussions and critical comments/suggestions.
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