European Security

ISSN: 0966-2839 (Print) 1746-1545 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/feus20

Not another grand strategy: what prospects for

the future European security strategy?
Ion Berindan
To cite this article: Ion Berindan (2013) Not another grand strategy: what prospects
for the future European security strategy?, European Security, 22:3, 395-412, DOI:
10.1080/09662839.2013.808189
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.808189

Published online: 12 Nov 2013.

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European Security, 2013

Vol. 22, No. 3, 395
412, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.808189

Not another grand strategy: what prospects for the future European
security strategy?
Ion Berindan*

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European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj, Romania

(Received 19 November 2012; final version received 21 May 2013)
The article advocates that the current proposals for a new European security
strategy aim to a similar or even more ambitious strategy than the original 2003
one, calling in effect for a European grand strategy in world affairs. Taking into
account the original aims and consequent results of the initial European security
strategy and related documents, it argues that the European Union (EU) was not
and is still not prepared to undertake a security project of such scope due to
severe limitations in terms of structure, capabilities and learning curve, now and
in the near future. Rather than insisting with an approach that produced very
little, the EU should abandon the traits of a grand strategy in favour of a more
realistic and restrained project that could focus on security matters in its
neighbourhood including the problematic Russian and Turkish issues while
relying on better transatlantic relations and true multilateralism.
Keywords: European security strategy; grand strategy; European security

In 2011 a group of researchers from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs

engaged in a comprehensive analysis on the future prospects of a new European
Security Strategy (ESS) (Andersson et al. 2011). In their view, the time was ripe for a
new ESS based on several arguments: a new European Union (EU) budget cycle, the
review of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the 10th anniversary of
the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP). Furthermore, the analysis has
pointed out to the changes in the European and transatlantic security policies and
the institutional transformations that followed the Lisbon Summits of 2010. A
similar case is made by Margriet Drent and Lennart Landman a year later in one of
the Clingendael Policy Briefs (Drent and Landman 2012). According to Drent and
Landman (2012, p. 2), the 2003 ESS is outdated, unable to connect threats and has
blurry ends and means. However, when probing such an idea on Brussels corridors a
drive in the opposite direction becomes apparent. Arguments like we are tired of
talking strategy and dont open a can of worms seem to prevail on certain eurooffices advocating restraint. They operate under the premise that strategy would be
better devised in periods of reflection rather than in the heat of the crisis (Andersson
et al. 2011, p. 8). Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security, questioned the wisdom of producing more paper and stressed
the need to deliver (Drent and Landman 2012, p. 1). There are voices backing
Ashtons comment favouring actions over words. Many still believe achievable the
*Email: ionberindan@gmail.com
# 2013 Taylor & Francis

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396 I. Berindan
goals set in the original ESS and want to implement what was agreed upon rather
than come up with new strategic thinking (Andersson et al. 2011, p. 7). However,
digging in around a strategy already questioned by the European Councils 2008
Report on the Implementation of the European security strategy (RIESS) would
prove counterproductive. At the same time, finding a common strategic ground in
times of crisis among a significantly increased number of countries seems very
unlikely. Keeping in mind the efforts undertaken in 2003 to reach a consensus, a new
ESS should command a certain degree of cautiousness. Anand Menon goes even
farther calling the need for a new strategy . . . not merely unproductive, but
counterproductive considering a document agreed by all 27 member states to be
flaccid and couched in generalities (Menon 2012).
Nevertheless, there is a general feel, inside the academia and European policy
think-tanks, that beyond timeliness and opportunity, a new ESS is essential not only
for the future European security and defense policies but for the very perception of
the EU as a political and security actor on a global scale. The Union has assumed in
2003 a set of responsibilities in the fields of human development and security,
counter-terrorism or drug smuggling and an iteration of its commitment for a better
world would be beneficial. To achieve this ultimate purpose several courses of
actions were suggested: reinvigorate, revise or reinvent (Andersson et al. 2011),
reviewing and completing (Silvestri 2008, Biscop 2011) or imitating (Drent and
Landman 2012). Ultimately, each carry value and may prove beneficial for the
process of devising a new security document. At this stage it is important to have as
many outlooks as possible. Since the suggestions tend to cover all corners it would
be difficult not to. They are all pointing towards making the old, or a new, ESS work
and deliver.
What surfaces from these possible approaches though, beyond the different
solutions proposed, is the perception of the ESS as a grand strategy document.
Both officials and analysts seem to be caught by the mirage of a European grand
strategy to measure up with EU ambitions at the global scale. Sven Biscop sees the
ESS operating at grand strategic level . . . in grand strategic framework (Biscop
2011, p. 4). One year later, Biscop calls for a European grand strategy altogether
(Biscop 2012). Drent and Landman include the very definition of grand strategy in
their recommendations A new European security strategy should be forward looking
and prioritise among interests, threats, partners and tie them to the capabilities
needed for influencing outcomes (Drent and Landman 2012, p. 5). Stefano Silvestri
considers that in order for the EU be a security actor it needs a credible global
security strategy (that) should therefore be assessed not only in terms of intentions
but of capabilities as well (Silvestri 2008, p. 10), again another vision of a grand
strategy. Finally, Andersson et al. openly suggest grand strategy as a third alternative
to reinvent the ESS, possibly starting from a blank slate (Andersson et al. 2011,
p. 31). This trend may even gather momentum as the analysts cited are highly
regarded specialists in European security and foreign affairs matters with significant
contributions in the field.
However, before embarking onto an approach of this magnitude it would be wise
to consider or reconsider some of the initial premises. World power is not an abstract
concept. It defines the ability, not necessarily the willingness, of a state to impose its
will alone when and where its interests dictate without the need for outside help. It
can shape, single handed, the international security situation in a way that affects

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397

others significantly. It can ultimately ignore the international community or make

pay dearly the states or institutions challenging its actions. In the case of the US
willingness to impose change is evident. Their last several grand strategies underline
how the world is today and how it should look like in the future.
Some countries like the US and Russia reasserted their status acting in Iraq and
Georgia. Other states are considered susceptible of a similar status. China is the best
candidate but has yet to prove its willingness and capabilities to act like one. Is the
EU qualifying for the status of world power? Certainly not. It does not have the
willingness to act alone as self-imposed multilateralism would prevent it and, most
certainly, does not have the capabilities to do so. Why then a grand strategy? What
purpose can a grand strategy serve for an EU that is still not better than the sum of
its parts?
The paper argues that a grand strategy for the EU would be premature today
and in the near future. It contends that the EU is still a power in the making and the
process is susceptible to continue for a significant period of time. Consequently,
instead of devising a grand strategy for what it is considered a well-established global
power, the future European security document should focus on the steps to be taken
so that it has an honest chance to become one, placing the emphasis on internal
transformation and not outside interference. Devising a grand strategy without
being a great power is superfluous. Reaching the status of world power without a
series of clearly defined security strategies is difficult. In the current state of
liminality the EU needs regular reassessment of its security policies
through regular
ESS documents that set clear goals and milestones
for a successful passage to world
power status (and capabilities). This much-needed time frame would also allow for
strengthening and refining a common security culture, alas almost absent today.
Therefore, developing a new ESS should transcend the questions of timeliness and
opportunity and focus on the goals and means to achieve it.
A grand strategy for Europe

the 2003 ESS

There are significant differences between strategy and grand strategy, particularly in
scope and means. A grand strategy means going beyond the military realm to
include the expression of power in the sphere of economy and finance, technology
and diplomacy in times of peace is the most important one. It is an approach that has
developed over time. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Harts definition focused mainly on
wartimes, considering that the grand strategys role was to co-ordinate and direct all
the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political
object of the war (Liddell Hart 1991, p. 322). The understanding of grand strategy
has evolved to include several interpretations pertaining to both peace and war. For
Peter Feaver, Chair of the American Grand Strategy Programme at Duke University,
grand strategy should blend history and political science, public policy and
economics. Colin Gray considers grand strategy to be the purposeful employment
of all instruments of power available to a security community (Gray 2007, p. 283).
Probably the most comprehensive interpretation comes from Joe Bassanis definition,
a more modern and refined interpretation of ends and means, set in a distinct reality,
which completes the meaning of strategic thinking: grand strategy provides the
linkage between national goals and actions by establishing a deliberately ambiguous
vision of the world as we would like it to be (ends) and the methods (ways) and

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398 I. Berindan
resources (means) we will employ in pursuit of that vision (Bassani 2005 p. 10).
Bassanis interpretation derives from the American pursuit for a new world order, a
before and after, vision that successively appears in NSS in latest years. American
strategic discourse consistently speaks of the world as it is and the way it should
be, the very essence of grand strategy. The ESS follows the same rationale and
consequently similar patterns have emerged.
Considering the above, one can easily identify the grand strategy approach of
the ESS. The first European strategic document specifically calls for increased
capabilities, military, civilian and diplomatic in order to address the threats identified
(Council of the European Union 2003, p. 12). This approach bears the marks of
grand strategy as envisaged by Liddell Hart. The ESS talks about more resources for
defense and more effective use of resources. Liddell Hart underlines the need for
grand strategy to calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power.
The ESS points out to values of democracy and human rights. Liddell Hart
emphasises the moral dimension and the positives of a good cause. The ESS
advocates stronger diplomatic capability and a consolidation of national and
European diplomatic efforts. Liddell Hart speaks as well about diplomatic and
financial pressure. Finally, and essentially, the ESS constructs a specific vision of the
future and the steps Europe has to take to get there, much as Bassanis personal
interpretation. Looking side by side, the ESS bears both the features of Liddell
Harts and Bassanis interpretation like all the grand strategies of today do. However,
different ends lead to different means. In the case of the ESS the ends have
substantially contributed to the development of a rather controversial development.
Doing the right thing for the wrong reasons?

the ESS in context

It is important to understand how the ESS evolved into a grand strategy document.
One political analyst was pointing out in a report back in February 2002 that the EU
security policies between 1998 and 2001 have witnessed a process of Brusselsisation
(Bono 2002, p. 44). The report draws attention that decisions were not the outcome
of a grand political and military strategy but rather the product of a series of ad hoc
reactions to the Kosovo war, to domestic and international pressures kick-started by
the Saint Malo Summit. In December 1998 a new direction in European security was
taking course: the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for
analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic
planning (Franco-British Saint Malo Declaration 1998). However, the Kosovo crisis
was soon to be followed by another one that would test the strength of the
transatlantic ties. The 9/11 attacks imposed a completely new set of criteria for
assessing international threats taking center stage over the Balkans crisis and its
particulars. Following a sequence of tragic events the EU, caught off guard twice, has
been pushed to assume an international stance and to act accordingly. If before the
terrorist attacks in 2001 the EU was preparing for addressing future crisis by
strengthening their military capabilities, soon after it was redirecting much of its
attention to terrorism and transnational crime.
The turning point in European security policy has been marked by the second
War with Iraq. The US lost most of the sympathy triggered by the 9/11 attack in a
quite short time span. Moreover, it handled its European allies carelessly in the
months preceding the intervention. The Bush administration turned with a

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399

vengeance against Saddam Husseins regime in utter disregard for international law
or any other actors and interests in the region be they friend or foe. George W. Bushs
unilateralism added significant tensions to an already delicate situation. The
American blunt division of Europe in an old and a new one only added insult to
injury, enough for the French president to remark caustically that the Central and
Eastern countries lost a great opportunity to keep their mouth shut right before the
largest enlargement of the Union. Essentially the Iraq crisis became the source for
one of the major rifts in the history of the transatlantic security community. In an
effort to mend fences Javier Solana announced officially the ESS in late 2003.
This sequence of events contributed significantly in shaping the ESS into more of
a grand strategy document, in close tune with the US vision. The ESS has been a
product of a series of reactions to outside threats and events indirectly related to the
EU. In fact, rallying Europeans around a common security agenda, that would cater
American security interests as well, severely diminished the efforts focused on a
genuinely European strategic project. The ESS borrowed significantly from the
American 2002 national security strategy (NSS), particularly by identifying similar
threats, a strategy devised in a time of crisis and institutional transformation. The
2002 NSS was designed to take into account the newly established Department of
Homeland Security, an umbrella under which American security agencies were to
combat terrorism. Unfortunately the ESS has mimicked in part a document aimed at
rebuilding the confidence of the most powerful nation in the world according to a
strategic culture build over the last 50 years (Greathouse and Miner 2009, p. 2).
The ESS included references to terrorism and asymmetric threats much similar to
the NSS. However, it did not manage to brush off completely the superpower tone
present in the NSS, appearing to assume, as the US, a leading role in the
international security arena. The ESS states that the EU is inevitably a global
player (ESS, p. 1). Unavoidability does not equal capability and a misjudged sense of
duty should not have let the ESS attempt to match what is essentially a deliberate
choice of American policy-makers for primacy (Posen and Ross 1997, pp. 30
43).
A closer examination of the ESS uncovers a generous document, covering a wide
array of issues. The first two chapters were focused on global challenges and key
threats setting strategic objectives to be addressed. Along terrorism and the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), threats like malnutrition
and disease emphasised the human dimension of the ESS, a distinct feature and a
testament to Europes soft power. The EU played the multilateralism card (Council
of the European Union 2003, p. 9), advocating the involvement of other actors,
countries and regional and international institutions in the stabilisation and peace
processes in and around its neighbourhood. Multilateralism was one of the distinct
features of the ESS in opposition to the American approach at the time.
Considering the initial premise, the ESS turned to be a rather different document
than expected. In the late 90s, the European security policies gained momentum as
the Union became involved at regional and international level. Consequently, the
ESS should have become the expression of its new found role in world affairs, a
coronation of the expertise acquired during the Balkan crisis and later on through
the ESDP. Specifically the St. MaloJoint Declaration stated: the Union must have
the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means
to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international
crises. (Franco-British Saint Malo Declaration 1998). Basically, as part of the

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400 I. Berindan
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the ESDP was to deal with all matters
regarding EU security, giving birth to an entire new set of operational structures
bound to materialise ESDP policies under the direct supervision of the members
states. From the five key threats in the ESS, terrorism, proliferation of WMD,
regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime, at least four would hardly need
any credible and substantial high-readiness military forces of 60,000 men deployable
for 60 days as the 1999 initiative envisaged. History exposed the questionable record
of armed forces deployed against organised crime in Italy in 1992 and against
terrorism in 1969 in Northern Ireland. It is unclear what soldiers could have done to
improve the situation in Haiti, a failed state par excellence. Iraqi WMD conundrum
and the general reluctance to employ military actions, first against North Korea and
then Iran, is a testament to the value of armed intervention in tackling proliferation.
Contrarily, military preparedness would have a significant impact in stopping
regional conflicts, like the one in the Balkans in the 90s, which actually triggered the
initiative in the first place. With four out of five threats unmanageable by military
force the ESS has in fact rendered the 1999 initiative economically unviable and
financially unsustainable.
Brusselsisation became even more apparent with the initiation of the ESDP. The
ESDP was not a creation of the 25- or 27-member states. In 2003, the biggest
enlargement wave was near completion, suggesting that the old members were
pushing to setup policies in a very tight time frame and thus consciously, or not,
excluding a significant number of member states from the decision process. The ESS
was speaking in the name of a Europe of 25, yet the 10 new members were to adhere
to an ESS in which they could not exercise any veto power. Many of them, former
communist states, were perceiving security in a much narrower classical sense, closer
to NATO, and consequently rallying behind the US. In terms of security, their
attachment to a defensive alliance like NATO was by far a better option leaving little
suspense about the consequences of a rupture between the old and new Europe. It
was only a matter of time and circumstances before the new member states in the east
would close ranks around the US position in total disregard to the European
solidarity claimed by the ESS.
Nothing spells great power better than an ambitious vision of international
amplitude: an active and capable EU would make an impact on a global scale
(Council of the European Union 2003, p. 14). However, this new found appetite for
international involvement lacked any foundation except for the questionable
colonialist past and in almost complete absence of a common security culture.
For a viable grand strategy to emerge, the security strategy should have been
backed up by a new continental strategic culture completely separate from the recent
history. Since strategic culture is the basis for strategic planning and not the other
way around (Gray 1999, p. 68) meant that the ESS had little experience to be based
on. For a distinct strategic culture to evolve, the ESDP would have needed a much
longer and more consistent successful record than what was possible to be achieved
in a short four-year period, a caveat that the EU was well aware. A specific reference
in the ESS stressed the importance of developing a strategic culture: we need to
develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust
intervention (Council of the European Union 2003, p. 11).
At the same time, the development of a common European security culture was
in direct competition with national security cultures giving birth to a set of internal

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401

but manageable problems. Externally, the international posture assumed by the ESS
was complicated by the colonial past some of the national security cultures carried.
Former colonies may have been justifiably wary about EUs international involvement that would cover neo-colonialist ambitions under the mask of a benevolent,
human-rights-friendly EU.
Finally, the EU has been involved willingly in a process of constructing a security
community inside a security community, specifically a semi-amalgamated European
security community inside a pluralist transatlantic, NATO-centric, security community (Berindan 2012, pp. 33
37). This very process weakened the focus of European
policies and strategies, and the Berlin Agreements only partially addressed the
problems created by this process. Consequently, the EU security policies and the ESS
have fallen victim to the vacillations between a pure European approach and an
integrated transatlantic one (Biscop et al. 2009, pp. 8
9). Since the EU has been in a
constant state of alert in order to not step on NATOs shoes, all its security policies
including the ESS have been voluntarily constrained leaving the EU prone to favour
its soft-power approach.
Should the EUs security and defense policies be conceived based on the initial
Saint-Malo premises, the ESS would have proved to be a much needed steering wheel
capable of making Europe count in world affairs as a world power.
As shown, adverse international circumstances, specifically the 9/11 terrorist
attacks in New York, and the subsequent invasion of Iraq led to a rift in transatlantic
relations. This prompted shortly after a desire in the EU to make peace with its most
important ally. Unfortunately the Europeans used the ESS more as an instrument to
mend fences with the US rather than as a document serving their own interests in the
long run. The transatlantic alliance was not facing its first crisis (Risse 2008, p. 81)
and for sure there were better ways to alleviate differences than by using the ESS as a
medicine.
There was also an unjustifiable sense of urgency. Delaying the adoption of the ESS
for only one year would have given the opportunity for the new member states to
exercise more influence over the final form and content of the document. More visibility
in the ESS and the EU policies in general, of smaller countries would muffle some of the
fears the EU is just a cover for former great power interests in Africa or Asia.
Finally, without the St. Malo objectives met, the EU had to rely on NATO assets
and consequently acquiesce a junior partner position inside the transatlantic relation,
essentially a self-imposed boundary that does more harm than good to the relation
itself. The US stressed numerous times the need for Europeans to step up to the plate
and balance the burden-sharing responsibility of the transatlantic security as a whole.
If the EU aimed for world power status with the 2003 ESS it definitely did a poor
job. However, the 2008 RIESS seemed to steer in another direction.
Evaluating a grand strategy

the 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS

The RIESS has proven to be a milestone, altering in part the perception of ESS as
grand strategy. From the very beginning the report stands by the ESS in terms of
relevance, underlining that its aim is to reinforce not replace it (Council of the
European Union 2008, p. 3). This is true in part. Not all the threats identified in the
ESS are found in the RIESS. While the RIESS identifies, like the ESS, proliferation
of WMD, terrorism and organised crime as threats, it leaves outside failed states and

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402 I. Berindan
regional conflicts adding others: cyber-security, energy, climate change. The issue of
failed states and regional conflicts is treated in a separate chapter
Security and
development nexus (Council of the European Union 2008, p. 8). New areas of security
interest like piracy and small arms and light weapons (SALW) and cluster munitions
and landmines make way in the report. A significant part of the document is dedicated
to the neighbourhood policies and ESDP missions (RIESS 2008, pp. 6
7). The issue
of effective multilateralism is well developed in the RIESS and builds on the original
document, a constant focus in both security documents. Considering that new
identified threats as cyber-crime, climate change and energy security can only be
addressed by a concerted multilateral approach, underlining its role was paramount.
Unfortunately, the effective multilateralisms implementation poor record prompted
the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) to acknowledge, in lower
voice, that multilateral institutions and frameworks have come under severe strain,
and their effectiveness in preventing conflict and guaranteeing peace has often been
questioned (Vasconcelos 2009, p. 14).
Overall, we can consider the RIESS marks a voluntary departure from the grand
strategy approach of the original document. Otherwise, why a report on the
implementation of a document would introduce so many new coordinates? Should it
not be restrained to evaluate the actual implementation of what was decided five
years earlier?
Changes are evident, surpassing content alone. First, the report has no mention
to one rather important aspect present in the ESS: the development of a strategic
culture and, furthermore, fails to mention the contribution of ESDP missions to its
establishment. The absence of strategic culture in the RIESS may even imply that the
EU has in fact abandoned the idea of developing a common strategic culture
altogether, a key ingredient in developing a future European grand strategy.
Secondly, the report changes the ESS not only in content but also in scope. The
global dimension of European security is almost abandoned in favour of a regional
one underlining, besides the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and ESDP
successes, the need for a greater engagement with the neighbourhood (Council of the
European Union 2008, pp. 9
10). In fact the great power outlook of the original
document is significantly toned down to more achievable and in some cases more
pressing issues like energy security
a must after the gas crises in the winters of 2006
and 2008.
Finally, the RIESS makes a return to the issue of capabilities (Council of the
European Union 2008, p. 9) beyond the generalities of the ESS. It mentions
Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams and underlines the role of appropriate
and effective command structures and headquarters capability, strategic airlift,
helicopters, space assets and marine surveillance and the support role of the
European Defence Agency (EDA).
Is the 2008 RIESS a reinforcement of the ESS? The report bears too many new
elements and places the emphasis on quite a different approach, enough to encourage
the reader to interpret it in a different manner. The prominence of the neighbourhood
policies, the absence of the strategic culture imperative, new threats like climate
change or cyber-crime that do not necessarily command world stature to be
addressed, the reinforced idea of multilateralism present throughout the document,
a less Atlanticist discourse and a refocus on military capabilities make the RIESS a
significantly different security document. Most importantly, it lacks the formulae

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bearing the mark of a grand strategy. More than a report on the implementation of
the ESS, the RIESS may be considered a revised security strategy, possibly in better
tune with the actual stature of the EU in the world than the ESS.

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The European approach to security

The ESS has borrowed significantly in content and tone from its American
counterpart, including the grand strategy posture. The problem is that the NSS
and the ESS have different arguments for their existence. Historically, the first
strategic document, the NSC-68, appeared during the Truman presidency. This
means more than 60 years of strategic thinking in terms of security.
A closer look at the origins of the NSS shows that the document has been imposed
on the US President by the Congress, the first one being prepared by Ronald Reagan
in 1987. However, the NSS is more of a statement of intent with public relations value,
laying down the principles that guide US strategy in the short to medium term. The
American NSS is complemented by an entire set of policies, strategic and operational,
put forward by different departments of the administration: Department of Defenses
Quadrennial Defense Review, the State Departments Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review, the Homeland Security Departments Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review and several different specialised agencies that submit documents and
reports like the Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review, Nuclear Posture
Review, Ballistic Missile Defense Review, Space Posture Review, National Defense
Strategy and the National Military Strategy (Conely et al. 2011, p. 16). Politics set
goals, institutions devise strategies and policies to make things happen, bringing
together a large number of agencies that create an intrinsic value of the process
(Conely et al. 2011, p. 16). These documents are implemented quite recently and could
have served as examples for the European policy-makers for the 2003 ESS as followup instruments for propping up and refinement of strategic objectives.
Comparatively, the first major post-9/11 articulation of European grand strategy
(Nelson and Bodurian 2011, p. 93) benefited from supporting strategies in a rather
distinct way. Some parts of the ESS were reinforced by additional documents dealing
with terrorism and WMD, specifically the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD
in 2003 and EU Counter-terrorism Strategy in 2005. Other parts like regional
conflicts, state failure and organised crime were to be addressed by the ENP of 2004.
The ENP structured EU policies towards its immediate and near abroad. This
was a specific attempt to stabilise its borders and establish privileged, bilateral,
relations with 16 countries making for its unique trademark the soft-power
approach. Double the size of the ESS, the ENP set a series of clear objectives
building on several existing instruments like the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership also known as the Barcelona
Process. These objectives were to be addressed by action plans ranging from shared
values to justice and home affairs to energy and transportation. Unlike the ESS,
the ENP talked numbers and provided a clear set of instruments and institutions to
manage them. The ENP has been followed up by three other region-specific
documents, the Union for the Mediterranean (UM), the Black Sea Synergy (BSS)
and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) further increasing the detailed approach of the
ENP. The generous margin of manoeuvre in picking the right instrument or
institution according to particular objectives has been found in the ENP.

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404 I. Berindan
The specific regional focus of the ENP became the most important and best
developed part of the ESS separating it almost completely from the other objectives
stated in 2003. ENP has in part substituted the strategic nature of the ESS with a
more restrictive and at the same time more convenient approach to European
security interests. At the same time, different strategic points present in the ESS have
been left dormant as they were excluded from the ENP and its soft-power approach.
Consequently, the ENP took the limelight of the EUs security strategy, benefiting
from different and regionally focused sub-strategies: EaP, BSS and the UM and clear
implementation instruments making it a viable strategic alternative to the ESS.
Without playing the grand strategy card, the ENP matched the real capabilities of
the EU, not the ambitions of the ESS, being better calibrated to actually serve its
security interests. Should the ENP or an extended security document integrate Russia
and Turkey it could even qualify for a mini grand strategy, again in tune with the
actual abilities of the EU.
Unfortunately, Russia and Turkey, the two most important hard powers in the
immediate neighbourhood, were excluded from the ENP on the basis of separate and
privileged partnerships. The EU did not follow up with significant policy documents
regarding policy implementation on the four-spaces negotiated with the Russian
Federation. European soft power hit the stone wall of Russian ambitions in its nearabroad, a flagrant failure in the EU grand plan towards its neighbor. In a 59-page
document review of the progress of the four spaces, Georgias loss of sovereignty over
a significant part of its territory is mentioned in a one-and-half paragraph (European
External Action Service 2011, p. 1). On the other hand, the European soft touch
significantly improved the record of democratisation and human rights in Turkey.
Without being a complete success Turkish accession negotiations bore fruit. The only
problem is that Turkey is only dealt with through that mechanism which precludes
any other form of discussion including strategic issues, defense and security. Since the
US is pivoting towards Asia-Pacific (Biscop 2012) Europe needs a refocus too. Nick
Witney, the former head of the EDA, suggested that the EU should take the initiative
and engage Turkey, and Russia, in security matters (Witney 2011). Since the ESS
places multilateralism at the cornerstone of its security strategy it would only make
sense to develop relationships on all issues of bilateral interest. The ESS missed the
opportunity to engage Russia only for the RIESS to acknowledge it five years later,
placing the emphasis on common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule
of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and
objectives (Council of the European Union 2008, p. 10), the actual four spaces
negotiated with the Russians in 2003. It is hard to quantify how much the EU lost
because of this omission. Maybe the situation in Georgia would be different today if
ESS would have dedicated an entire chapter to engaging Russia strategically. In a
similar vein, failing to acquiesce the strategic importance of Turkey may have
hampered the EUs leverage in the Middle East. Another kind of relation with
Turkey may have prevented the Mavi Marmara crisis or provided a different
European weight in the negotiations in the Iranian nuclear stalemate. Unfortunately,
all these account for speculations only. Fact is the world in general, and our partners,
in particular the US, judge the EU not only for what we have done but, maybe more
importantly, for what we have not.

European Security

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405

hitting the targets, missing the goals

Through the ESDP, the EU attempted to create a common strategic culture, a key
ingredient of any grand strategy. The ESDP allowed the EU to get involved abroad
in over 20 missions in the last decade from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Tchad,
Somalia and Afghanistan gathering an invaluable expertise in a vast array of security
issues. The EUs ability to manage crisis, particularly through its civilian crisis
management, was so successful that even the US asked the Europeans to share it.
European involvement in the field meant better chances for stabilisation, peace and
security where it intervened. The question is the following: has this success brought us
closer to become a world power? Is the EU really using this pool of knowledge and
expertise to achieve the goals set by the ESS or the RIESS? The EUISS extensive
evaluation of the ESDP best captured the difficulties of making use of the accumulated
experience
good and bad
in these years. The authors underline how difficult it is
sometimes to rise to the expectations: while not detracting from its considerable
achievements, it has to be acknowledged that in some cases the gap between the
discourse and practice of ESDP has been significant. The aim should be to fill this gap
over the next ten years, and move even further than that. (Grevi et al. 2009, p. 404).
Like the US, the EU has established a set of institutions responsible for
addressing different security situations. The EEAS has been established in order to
meet the Lisbon objectives. Mainly focused on regional and international issues these
policies support the effort for internal security of the EU as well, particularly in areas
like human security, including trafficking, organised crime and terrorism. The
Stockholm Programme suggested that an account should also be taken of the
impact it may have on relations with the Unions neighbourhood and particularly
with the candidate and potential candidate countries, since internal security is
interlinked with the external dimension of the threats (Council document 5620/11).
Practically, the policies and institutions set by the EU cover almost all major aspects
of security. The CFSP functions through the Political and Security Committee while
its internal security structure counterpart is managed by the European Standing
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security. Even more structures
unfold as we go deeper into the operational area like the European Union Military
Staff (EUMS) and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) both
integrated into EEAS. Institutional integration into the EEAS counts also the Joint
Situation Center responsible for assessing external threats. Unfortunately, at the
lower echelons there seems to be a lack of cooperation/synergy. Many of these
institutions are integrated vertically, unlike the American system, meaning that
contributions are screened and filtered by institutions up the ladder preventing thus
the creation of a poll of resources at top level: planning documents should include at
the earliest stage not only the strategic objectives of EU action, but also a shared
perspective on the division of labour between EU actors
whether ESDP missions
or Community instruments
and the definition of effective coordinating mechanisms between them (Grevi et al. 2009, p. 406). The EU seems to suffer not from a
lack of vision but rather of a fragmentation (Grevi et al. 2009, p. 406) and in some
cases of ambiguity of the policies it advocates.
Such fragmentation on one hand and overlapping on the other cast doubts about
how strategic the European security really is. Beyond the term strategic showing on
an increasing number of policies the EU has in fact shown little strategic vision.

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406 I. Berindan
Apparently the EU is incapable of putting an end to the development of new policies
and instruments whether the actual security environment asks for them or not. Some
of these strategic documents are revised and/or completed with new instruments,
sometimes are renamed and revamped in an effort to make them more appealing.
Their efficiency and effectiveness are put to the test successively and, if the results are
less than expected, they suffer the same process over and over again. In case of
flagrant failure they are simply left dormant indefinitely. Maybe a process of
evaluation and consolidation would help better integrate and coordinate the security
policies at different levels.
Finally, no matter how successful different policies and instruments may be in
different theatres of operations and what level of integration and effectiveness they
reach if they do not address and contribute, in part or in full, to the goals set by
future ESSs or to the development of a continental strategic culture.
For the moment the EU has a difficulty to pinpoint the areas where its
contribution may add value to international affairs. The EU has scored some
successes in different parts of the globe, but they are neither concentrated nor
focused enough to make for a solid strategic approach. Missions in Aceh, Sudan,
Congo, Somalia, the Palestinian Territory or Afghanistan are so different not only in
their scope but in the means to be employed that it is hard to make for the
foundation and structure of a comprehensive approach beyond the close neighbourhood. Serious steps should be taken to improve the record of the EDA while the
EUMC and the EUMS should be involved from the very beginning in the drafting
process of a new security strategy. Strategic planning and resource allocations should
ultimately validate political will and not the other way around. Policies and
instruments should eventually hone a set of value-added, distinct features, which
would allow the EU to assume, if and where needed, a leading role in the world.
Effective multilateralism

the cornerstone of EU security policies

Effective multilateralism represents a very important part of the European grand

strategy, being present in both the ESS and the RIESS. Without effective
multilateral partnerships, threats like cyber-security, climate change or organised
crime cannot be tackled effectively. Those are but few of the issues that need
international collaboration. Established economic actors and emerging economies
must be engaged in various issues. Privileged partnerships with China, India and
Brazil are important as are those with smaller countries that need support in the
immediate neighbourhood or farther away. It is obvious that no single country can
solve todays stringent problems and the EU ambition to strengthen its record of
effective multilateralism is commendable.
In many cases though, the EU ambitions to develop multilateral partnerships
with countries and international security institutions were unsuccessful. Advancing
policies and taking decisions before the interested parties have a say in the matter
became a pattern in EU foreign policy. The EU fell in the trap of its own soft-power
successful policies regarding EU candidate states. They had to fulfil a set of criteria
in order to be accepted. There was no need for discussions or negotiations. The EUs
take it or leave it policy was, in reality, not so soft and, once the enlargement process
stopped, became utterly counterproductive. Without the prospect of becoming
members, not even in a very distant future, countries and political leaders have very

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407

little incentives to accommodate EU strategies that discard their interests and

agendas. How different is the take it or leave it approach from the American or
Russian ones? Furthermore, despite the much acclaimed multilateralism the EU
failed to engage strategic partners and rally support for its different regional,
neighbourhood policies. The EU was unable to secure some kind of Russian support
for its EaP. Turkey was completely ignored even though its strong ties with
Azerbaijan and adverse relations with Armenia made it an unavoidable actor for
regional stability. The EU, like Russia, seems to conceive its strategies in utero
(Gomart 2008, p. 1) in utter disregard to the multilateralism it so much treasures.
In fact, for an EU championing multilateralism the very understanding of the
concept is peculiar, severely undermining its credibility in front of its partners. For
instance, the EU has claimed that it wants to engage international institutions
including the UN and the OSCE (Council of the European Union 2008, p. 11). The
security situation in Georgia became an issue for the EU after the Russian invasion
in the summer of 2008. Before the incident the Russian blunt occupation of a
significant part of a sovereign state flied under the EU radar. Why? Is it because the
situation in Abkhazia was managed by the UN and the one in South Ossetia by the
OSCE? Why the EU preferred to broker a cease-fire directly with Russia, therefore
excluding everyone else from the process
including the US that actually flexed its
military muscle to stop an escalation of the conflict? Another example of EUs
debatable effective multilateralism is the issue of the SALW. Identified as a distinct
threat in the 2008 RIESS, the document is pointing out to closer cooperation with
UN while forgetting to mention the OSCE! What exactly is wrong with the OSCE
array of mechanisms and projects that deal with SALW and ERW? EU officials
recognised the OSCE expertise and advances in the matter as early as 2005. An ideal
partner to address this problem, it includes practically all EU states, the US, Russia
and Ukraine, the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia
accounting for the
majority of SALW exporters of the world. Why is the need to internalise a problem
much better addressed by someone else, incidentally an international security
institution, supposedly an important partner in the EU partnerships for effective
multilateralism? For someone preaching multilateralism this need for ownership and
exclusivity is surprising. Critics go even further pointing out EUs inability to make
its voice heard inside the OSCE
a possible reason for this internalisation
in which
the values rhetoric does not impress countries that are still willing to use force to
settle disputes. If the EU really believes in effective multilateralism, it should learn
to use its power in the OSCE (Vasconcelos 2009, p. 52) is a strong statement but
points out to a certain inflexibility Europe is displaying in its partnerships.
Internalisation and ownership do not help in establishing, maintaining and
managing partnerships, the EU effectively sabotaging its own grand strategy.
The ability to engage not only political will from others but also financial means,
military capabilities, manpower and expertise should be the norm. Consequently,
international engagement would gather public support easier knowing that others
contribute from their own pockets too. Brokering peace, stability and security with
help from as many partners as possible, involving US hard muscle, Japanese
financing and the like, would be much more effective and in line with European true
capabilities. However, indiscriminate involvement for the greater good of humanity
in general is neither realistic nor sustainable in the eyes of the European public or

408 I. Berindan
their respective financial ministers. Therefore, as in the case of the ESDP missions,
selective multilateralism would be desirable.

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A changing security environment

united we stand?

Security strategies and, to a lesser extent, grand strategies are challenged by

constant international security developments. The change brought by the Arab
spring gave EU the impetus to complement its soft power with a significant hardpower approach. The Franco British-led European campaign, opens a new chapter in
European security. Even if the Europeans succeeded, if only just, in the theater of
operations in Libya proves that the EU is willing and able to influence the outcome
of events in the Mediterranean. Tomas Valasek was right in pointing out that a new
division of labour between NATO and the EU is taking place in the Mediterranean
(Valasek 2011, p. 3). However, the military operations in Libya mark also divisions
inside the EU. Hard power should be a European matter in which not only those
willing
France and UK
and able
Germany, Italy, Sweden, Netherlands
can
have a say. It should be as integrated as its soft-power approach. Coalitions of the
willing may harm intra-European relations first in the domain of security and may
spill over to other areas. The technological, financial and industrial gap between
those able and the rest of the countries inside the EU is immense. Capable countries
should support with all their technological and industrial might the European
common defense and possibly guide the less advanced EU countries in developing
support roles if not their operational capabilities. Future strategies should emphasise
strengthening the EU capabilities as a whole and not set objectives that can,
theoretically, be fulfilled by few.
The Libyan crisis is not a singular example. A closer look at the changing security
environment points to a rather distressing problem. Every time the security
environment changes significantly, cracks appear inside the Union. The Russian
gas crisis found EU countries on different sides: those dependent on Russian gas and
those with alternative sources. The Iraq invasion divided the EU in countries in
favour and countries against the US intervention. The Palestinian Authoritys bid for
a seat at the UN is probably the latest example of EU cacophony, ultimately a token
of how effective the EUs contribution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be.
What prospects for the future ESS?
Officially, overambitious agendas have been postponed for now. Exception makes
Sweden that enlisted the support of Italy, Spain and Poland instructing their national
think-tanks to devise a European Global Strategy. One could speculate about the
reasons behind the Swedish initiative. Sweden contemplates more and more a
rapprochement to NATO or even applying for full membership. Whether it probes
the EU security agenda or just looks for an excuse to join the alliance is difficult to
say. However, the response from other European states to this initiative shows that
chances to jump-start a continental debate on the topic are slim.
The inability to be proactive to the changing environment is the most serious
threat to the EU. Acknowledging realistically ones shortcomings should be only the
beginning of a deeper analysis of the prospects of becoming a significant player. A
realistic timetable for achieving set objectives is also desirable. Currently, a change in

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the security status-quo almost automatically breeds division amongst Europeans,

incapacitating the European grand plan in part or in full.
Every time divisions occur inside the EU, analysts call for more coherence among
the European states. Not enough coherence is the usual suspect asking for more
integration among the EU states. Building on common interests seemed to be the
best option for avoiding divisions. Logic dictates that common interests should
trigger common responses thus avoiding possible divisions. However, such a degree
of integration among the 27
soon 28
European states is not possible in the near
future. Forcing it upon the peoples and countries of Europe would not only be
undemocratic but might even trigger adverse responses. Furthermore, some analysts
criticise the EU for being too much inward-looking calling crises a wake-up call.
They underline the need for the EU to change the way it assesses the international
system (Vasconcelos 2009, pp. 48
49) alas without offering an alternative.
In the interest of developing a solid grand strategy we should explore alternative
approaches. What if instead of looking for what brings us together we try to identify
what keeps us apart? Since many of the changes are systemic (Vasconcelos 2009, p.
49), therefore bound to happen over a considerable timespan, maybe we can identify
them in due time, evaluate their impact and the possible divisions that may induce
and negotiate an intra-European response before they happen. This would be
Europes best bid and the way to turn reactiveness to pro-activeness, a point where
analysts agree on (Coolsaet and Biscop 2004, p. 9). Well cross that bridge when we
get there approach is the perfect recipe for perpetrating divisions and let crises
surprise us. Even better, as the power and influence of the EU grow, we could act, in
conjunction with the US, to alter the future, not least making for an outstanding
effective multilateralism.
Ways to address systemic changes and crises should find a permanent spot in any
future ESS. The EU has been built on the idea of common interests and values.
However, managing the security environment is not comparable. While cohesion and
coherence would continue to advance EU construction inside, divisions may be a
good starting point for addressing EU interests from inside out.
Conclusion
What would have happened if a grand strategy asked for military overspending in
a time when a significant proportion of its population is in dire need? The financial
crisis would have exposed a grand strategy as a luxury most of Europe cannot
afford now or in the near future. The proponents of the grand strategy approach
would have had a difficult time explaining their choice in front of their constituents.
Europe has again turned on its own in the hope of salvaging its own skin and
that of the less fortunate countries at the periphery. In the meantime, human and
security tragedies still unfold in regions close to EUs borders and far away each
and every day.
Consequently, officials need options, analyses or a starting point for addressing
future challenges. The future ESS is one of them. To options like reinvigorate, revise
or reinvent, review and complete or imitate, the European Global Security initiative
adds a poll of opinions and analyses that range from considering a new ESS
unnecessary and unhelpful (Menon 2012) to a mandatory optimism in devising a
new European grand strategy (Biscop 2012). This paper stands in between the two.

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410 I. Berindan
For reasons presented earlier, the EU should not be considered a world power
yet. However, since the 2003 ESS assumed the tone and scope of a world power
consequently embracing a grand strategy approach, this analysis started from the
premise that the EU is set to become a world power and future security strategies
should point in that direction. World power and stature would probably gather
consensus from all 27 members rather easily.
First, a new grand strategy may indeed be unnecessary and unhelpful and, at
this point, be unsound and poorly implemented. However, a set of security strategies
dealing with sectorial issues each addressing specific areas of interest may prove
beneficial. The ENP is probably the best example of a successful one, and possibly a
model to follow. These need not be linked. Each strategy should be evaluated at
regular intervals of three to five years maximum. Budgets, specific institutions or
instruments should be assigned to supervise them and, where possible, each should
carry some criteria of evaluation from the very beginning.
Europe has a number of important issues to mitigate at its own doorstep and two
very important actors to engage, Russia and Turkey, for the resolution of pending
conflicts. Belarus, the conflict between Cyprus and Turkey, the Azeri-Armenian
conflict and Nagorno-Karabakh, the integrity and sovereignty of Georgia are all
very important tests the EU has to pass with flying colours before assuming a more
prominent stance in world affairs. A distinctive security strategy, beyond the four
spaces negotiated with Russia and the membership negotiations with Turkey, is
crucial. The EU does not have the slightest chance to emerge as a serious regional or
international contender as long as Europeans do not close ranks on Russia and
Turkey.
Beyond the close neighbourhood Europe has to decide on a set of geographical
priorities. Running over to solve conflicts in Central Africa is not the real answer
even if desperate situations would welcome a European involvement. The mere fact
that African governments are much easier to tackle than Russia or Turkey is
counterproductive. Finding consensus only on issues thousands of miles away has to
change. Over time fresh voices from less ambitious countries in the EU will gain
more leverage in the overall construction of European foreign, security and defense
policies effectively toning down overambitious projects and approaches.
The EU needs to set in place a distinct strategy to breed a continental security
culture able to integrate the expertise of the ESDP/CFSP and develop a set of
instruments centred on eliminating divisions on a variety of real and probable
scenarios.
The Austrian take on a future ESS has several interesting points. The EU should
consider a specific strategy addressing the development of a European Military
Doctrine, a European Information Strategy and possibly ways for a deeper
integration of European armies. In return, this should be integrated into a bigger
strategy aiming for the development of general EU capabilities and the EDA. Of
course, the temptation to consolidate all these strategies under a grand strategy
umbrella will always exist. The Austrian document succumbed to such an approach
suggesting that the future ESS should be the conceptual-strategic superstructure for
both defining sub-strategies and action plans (e.g. proliferation, fight on terror,
dealing with rogue states) (Reiter and Frank 2004, p.3). While this is ultimately
desirable, Menon rightfully points out the inability of the 27 to reach a consensus. In

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411

the meantime, the rule of the lowest common denominator should not be allowed to
take over as it did in the original ESS.
Beyond geographical focus, the EU should decide what policies are prepared

literally
to lead and when is prepared to follow and in what circumstances. The EU
should be prepared to waive ownership to other international actors, states included,
better prepared to act on specific missions or areas. Not all missions need the EUs
political lead. Some may just need expertise, financing or just a powerful voice to
speak for their account. Effective multilateralism is developed not only by EU
initiatives but also by a certain degree of openness towards other initiatives. In turn
this would breed a significant amount of good-will and help enrich its image of soft
power. Maybe a strategy or set of norms and instruments addressing this issue
should be developed and even institutionalised.
These are but few of the actual sectorial strategies that could be developed in
order to insure the transformation of the EU in a world or global power, for which a
grand strategy would indeed make sense. They do not aim to shape the world
differently, do not commit the EU to unreasonable expectations of performance and,
more importantly, they are sufficiently restricted in scope to be evaluated and
ultimately altered as needed.
However, Europeans can find a common voice in restating the values, norms and
aspirations, a positive example in the world and a dependable actor and partner. A
new European Security (not grand) Strategy could easily concentrate on these. Almost
completely depleted of strategic substance, the NSS is a statement of American values,
a reassuring pat on the back for their partners and allies that the US will uphold their
international commitments. Why should not the ESS follow its example?
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions and
comments.

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