Perspectives on European Politics and Society

ISSN: 1570-5854 (Print) 1568-0258 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpep20

Strategy by Stealth? The Development of EU

Internal and External Security Strategies
Ursula C. Schroeder
To cite this article: Ursula C. Schroeder (2009) Strategy by Stealth? The Development of EU
Internal and External Security Strategies, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 10:4,
486-505, DOI: 10.1080/15705850903314783
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15705850903314783

Published online: 20 Nov 2009.

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Perspectives on European Politics and Society

Vol. 10, No. 4, 486505, December 2009

Strategy by Stealth? The Development of

EU Internal and External Security
Strategies
URSULA C. SCHROEDER
Otto-Suhr-Institute of Political Science, Free University Berlin, Germany

ABSTRACT Despite lively debates about the institutional development of the European security
architecture, the larger question of the strategic aims it should serve has received less attention.
This chapter serves to mitigate this lack. It asks how the EU developed its strategic choices in the
security eld. Comparing the emergence of both internal and external security strategies, the
chapter argues that the process has been capability-driven and not strategy-led, resulting in a
capabilitystrategy mismatch. As a result of this strategic void at the heart of the European
security project, actors within several policy arenas in the complex EU architecture have been
able to develop dierent and sometimes conicting strategic ends: counter-terrorism, human
security, common defence, crime-ghting and stability. Particularly in areas where the EUs
Justice and Home Aairs (JHA) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agendas
overlap, the chapter nds that EU actors follow diverging strategic ends. The chapter nally
assesses the eects of this strategy-building process by stealth rather than by design, and
concludes that the incremental development of EU security strategies has led to the emergence of
fault lines in the EUs security policies.
KEY WORDS: Grand Strategy, external security, internal security, EU Security Strategy,
internalexternal security nexus

Introduction1
Ten years after the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the EUs
Justice and Home Aairs (JHA) policy were launched, security issues have become
an integral part of the European Unions policy concerns. This rapid creation of
European internal and external security institutions has generated a large and lively
community of researchers engaged in assessing the European Unions rst steps in
the security eld. Strikingly though, most studies remain limited to analysing the
development of the EUs institutional architecture and its internal and external
Correspondence Address: Ursula C. Schroeder, Free University Berlin, Otto-Suhr-Institute of Political
Science, Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy, Ihnestr. 22, 14195
Berlin, Germany.
Email: ursula.schroeder@fu-berlin.de
ISSN 1570-5854 Print/1568-0258 Online 2009 Taylor & Francis
http://www.informaworld.com
DOI: 10.1080/15705850903314783

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Strategy by Stealth?

487

security capabilities (see, e.g. Howorth, 2003; Monar, 2006; Nowak, 2006). Far less
attention has been paid to the goals and strategic aims these new capabilities serve.
Some research deals with the ESDPs specic political and strategic aims (see Biscop,
2004; Duke, 2004) and the emergence of an EU-wide strategic culture (see Meyer,
2005; Matlary, 2006). Most studies focus on the formulation of the second-pillar
European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2003), rather than
assessing security in a more comprehensive fashion. European internal and external
security interests and aims are therefore still debated in isolation from each other and
current research mirrors the traditional divide between internal and external security
in the European system of states. Yet, complex and increasingly salient security
issues, such as transnational terrorism and organized crime, as well as instability and
conicts caused by failing and weak statehood, traverse the divide between a states
external environment and its domestic aairs. Whether the ongoing blurring of the
divide between internal and external security challenges has had an eect on
European security concepts and strategies remains an open question.
Complementing the analytical scope of current research, this article asks how and
to what end the EU has developed its internal and external security arms: In what
scenarios is the European Union willing to use its internal and external security
capabilities? How does it cope with the increasing blurring of the divide between
internal and external security challenges? And, lastly, do its security strategies
suciently address the complexities of the new European security environment?
The answers the article gives to those questions are less straightforward than one
could expect. It argues that the development of EU security strategies has been
peculiar in that its strategic priorities emerged by stealth, rather than by design. In a
turn-around of traditional expectations of policy design (see DeLeon, 1999), EU
internal and external security capabilities emerged before EU member states had
nished discussing the ends these capabilities and institutions should serve. The
chapter outlines how this counter-intuitive development became possible and
discusses its eects.
The article rst traces the parallel development of EU security capabilities and
strategic concepts. The eventually adopted security strategies have retained their
low-prole status as concept papers, instead of turning into the fully-edged strategic
documents that we know from national political arenas. In its second part, the article
discusses the question of how the outlined specic relationship of overarching
strategic guidance and institutional structures has aected the development of EU
security policies. It nds that this strategy-building process by stealth rather than
by design has both positive and negative eects. As a result of the strategic void at
the heart of the European security project, actors within several policy arenas in
the complex EU architecture have been able to develop dierent yet sometimes
conicting strategic ends: counter-terrorism, human security, crime-ghting and
stabilization. By-passing highly contentious political debates on the aims of
European security policies, the sometimes incremental development of EU security
goals by a variety of JHA and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) actors
enabled the emergence of a broad range of EU security strategies. At the same time,
these strategies have developed in a parallel and fragmented process, leading to the
emergence of fault lines in the EUs security policies at which conicts are likely to
erupt.

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Security Strategies: Changes in Function and Scope

The politics of strategy making in Europe have a peculiar twist. Instead of being
the result of a top-down and hierarchical process, security strategies emerged
through processes of muddling through (Lindblom, 1959) and incremental
strategy-development by a variety of actors. Diverging from traditional national
understandings of the role and function of a security strategy for security policies,
strategy development has lagged behind the institutionalization of the European
security architecture. At the same time, it has remained a relatively technical process
without much exposure to public debates. In the national political arenas, security
strategies have traditionally fullled a clearer set of aims, as the following discussion
of the purposes of strategy shows.
What is a Security Strategy?
In the national security arenas, security strategies or grand strategies have
traditionally been military in nature. Outlining the political purposes of warfare,
military strategy has been dened as the art of distributing and applying military
means to full the ends of policy (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 321). In an alternative
conception, strategy is dened as the bridge that relates military power to political
purpose and as the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of
policy (Gray, 1999, p. 17, emphasis in original; see also Strachan, 2005). These
adaptations of Clausewitzian thought understand strategy as the organizing
principle for the larger political objectives of the use of force in warfare. Drawing
on these denitions, but using them in a wider sense outside the exclusively military
sphere, the article understands grand strategy as a plan of action that applies specic
means to larger objectives. In relation to foreign and security policy, strategy
therefore links the use of economic, military or diplomatic power to specic political
ends and foreign policy objectives (see, further, Kennedy, 1991).
National security strategies follow similar patterns in outlining the longer-term
purposes and aims of a states security policies. Setting out a states understanding of
its specic security and threat environment rst, most strategies follow this up with
an outline of its vital political, military and economic interests at stake. Thus setting
the overall framework of strategic interests, strategies then dene specic security
policies in distinct elds, comment on the nature of the states relationship with
other major players in the international system of states, and outline the specic
missions of the armed forces of a state. Finally, national security strategies often
comment on the general force structure and procurement decisions necessary to full
the outlined missions. In the internal security eld, the development of clear-cut
strategies is rarer. Instead, policy development often takes the form of action plans
or frameworks that respond to new security challenges.
On the whole, security strategies specify the security interests of a state and the
means through which it aims to uphold these interests. They encapsulate a states
understanding of what security is and who the main addressees of security policies
are. A contested concept par excellence, the specic notion of security employed in a
security strategy is the outcome of a political struggle in a state over the allocation of
a states resources and capabilities for a set of specic security goals. Security

Strategy by Stealth?

489

strategies thus serve as an overarching political framework that legitimizes policy

choices in the security eld. In this understanding, strategy-development is an
eminently political and often contentious process.

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The Changing Scope of Security Strategies

The scope of a national security strategy has traditionally been state-centric.
In realist views widespread during the Cold War, grand strategies focused primarily
on upholding the military conditions necessary for the survival of a nation-state in a
potentially hostile international environment. This understanding has changed
considerably since the end of the Cold War.
In todays complex and in parts non-traditional security environment (Kirchner &
Sperling, 2002; Missiroli, 2006), military might is only one of several means to
achieve the desired political outcomes embedded in a security strategy. Security
strategies have therefore started to include a variety of aims and goals outside the
classical military sphere. Public debates about widening the referent object of
security policies from state security to societal or human security and a rise in
non-military security concerns e.g. environmental, energy or food security have
resulted in a broader understanding of security in many security strategies.
At the same time, the blurring of internal and external security challenges has left a
mark on current security strategies. While traditional security strategies were
developed primarily for the realm of defence policy, previously internal security
concerns, such as terrorism or organized crime, today take pride of place in
many external security strategies. Several examples showcase the extent of this
transformation: Perhaps unsurprisingly, the latest US National Security Strategy
emphasizes its aim to ght and win the war on terror and locates the emergence of
new security challenges and opportunities in a process of globalization that has
reached the security eld (The White House, 2006). The recent French White Paper
on Defence similarly places the threat of terrorism front and centre and arrives at the
conclusion that the separation between internal and external security is fading
(Presidence de la Republique Francaise, 2008). Lastly, the rst British national
security strategy of March 2008 acknowledges the wide-sweeping changes in the
UKs strategic outlook:
In the past, national security was understood as dealing with the protection of
the state and its vital interests from attacks by other states . . . Over recent
decades, our view of national security has broadened to include threats to
individual citizens and to our way of life. (UK Cabinet Oce, 2008, p. 3)
On the whole, security strategies have changed both their scope and their
functions: state-centric notions of security have given way to broader ones at the
same time that their traditional recipes for military operations opened up to include
a wider set of civilian and military activities. Has this general trend been replicated
during the process of strategy formulation in the European Union? And how have
actors in the internal and external security elds proceeded to develop strategic
frameworks for their activities? The following pages trace the parallel evolution of
the EUs institutional capacities and political frameworks for its security policies.

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The Evolution of EU Security Institutions and Capabilities

As the policy eld perhaps most closely linked to national sovereignty and decision
making, the development of the European security architecture was initially met with
mistrust and opposition by many national actors. In itself, its relatively rapid
institutionalization has therefore been an astonishing development. Yet, this
development has been driven to a striking extent by technical and institutional,
rather than political questions. Both in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
(AFSJ) and in ESDP, strategic questions took a back seat to debates on the practical
development of internal and external security institutions.
External Security: ESDP Takes Shape
Since its beginnings at the Cologne European Council in 1999, progress in
establishing a common ESDP has been swift, despite a variety of political and
organizational setbacks during the deployment of its rst missions. Yet, one
peculiarity of its development is the nearly exclusive focus on ESDP capabilities and
institutions by both policy actors and researchers. An overview of the major
documents published on progress in ESDP since its inception the biannual EU
Presidency Reports and the European Council Conclusions on ESDP showcases the
EUs capabilities rst strategy second approach to ESDP. Those documents
routinely answer the question of how and when to use the emerging security
capabilities by pointing to the EUs commitment to preserve peace and strengthen
international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter (see
Council of the European Union, 1999a). While closely monitoring the ongoing
processes, the biannual EU progress reports on ESDP focused nearly exclusively on
improvements in the EUs institutional architecture and capabilities. In this way, an
entire institutional architecture was created from scratch early on and, already in
2001, the European Council in Laeken declared ESDP operational. In the following
years, the EU continued to pursue its initial path of rapidly creating external security
capabilities and institutional structures.
Research-driven analyses similarly discuss the status quo of ESDP in terms of its
institutional and capacity development. The following issues are seen as particularly
salient in ESDP development: the institutional fragmentation of EU security
competences into rst-pillar Commission and second-pillar Council activities and the
resulting challenges of coordination and coherence (see Gourlay, 2006; Schroeder,
2007; Kurowska, 2008a); the challenges of capability-development and military force
generation through the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP-)process (see
Schmitt, 2005); and, nally, issues of operational planning and deployment in a
variety of individual ESDP missions.
In sum, discussions on EU crisis management in both research and policy
circles have remained concerned with the development of external intervention
and crisis management capabilities from an eciency-orientated perspective. From
its very beginning, the institutionalization of the EU security policy eld has
proceeded through the rapid extension of civilian and military capabilities, while
avoiding the more dicult discussion of the strategic goals these capabilities
should serve.

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Internal Security: The Rise of Justice and Home Aairs

In the same year as the ESDP, the EU kick-started the establishment of its JHA policy
at the European Council in Tampere (see Council of the European Union, 1999b).
Developing at least as rapidly as the EUs external security arm, a variety of JHA
action plans and programmes mushroomed during the last decade. Indeed, observers
have argued that by now, a majority of newly launched legislative initiatives in the EU
originate in the JHA eld. Covering the areas of police and judicial cooperation in civil
and criminal matters, border control and internal free movement, as well as visa and
asylum policies, JHA has become one of the fastest-growing domains of EU action
(see Monar, 2006, p. 495). Originally an exclusively intergovernmental cooperation
framework implemented to compensate the internal security challenges resulting from
the Schengen agreement on the free movement of European citizens within the Union,
the Amsterdam Treaty transferred the issues of judicial cooperation in civil matters,
immigration and asylum policies to the EUs rst pillar. At the same time, the
Schengen agreements were incorporated into the EUs legal system. Developing
rapidly, EU JHA policies have today turned into a complex mix of legislative
arrangements that cover all aspects of justice and internal security cooperation.
What is striking about the rapid institutionalization of this new European system
of internal security governance is its incremental development (see also den Boer &
Wallace, 2000). As we will see later, political strategies were remarkably absent in the
early days of JHA cooperation. Indeed, the development of the EUs internal
security system is more a story of incremental approximations of national criminal
justice systems than one of custom-made strategies. The earliest forms of police and
intelligence cooperation started out as informal meetings of law enforcement and
intelligence professionals responding to the rise in terror attacks during the 1970s.
Already, in 1975, the Rome European Council initiated the loose and intergovernmental TREVI-cooperation (terrorisme, radicalisme, extremisme, vandalisme internationaux) as a framework for internal security cooperation. Later, when these
informal cooperation and information exchange bodies were brought into the EUs
legislative framework, their informal nature continued. Unlike in the eld of external
security, these cooperation bodies are not staed with professional diplomats, but
instead are drawn from diverse national ministries, forces, and agencies, rooted in
distinctive state traditions (Lavenex & Wallace, 2005, p. 462). As a result of the
informal roots of internal security cooperation and of the operational demands that
closely linked cooperation bodies to the everyday needs of internal security
professionals, the evolution of the EUs internal security capabilities has remained
in the shadow of other policy initiatives. Particularly in contrast to ESDPs relatively
high media exposure, EU internal security policies have not moved much into the
limelight. Building mainly on pre-existing forms of professional cooperation, the
establishment of mutual recognition rules for specic crimes and the creation of a
variety of databases have remained a largely technical and legalistic aair.
EU Strategic Frameworks: Better Late than Never?
Unlike the outlined rapid creation of EU security capabilities, the development of
strategic frameworks for the newly developed ESDP and JHA capabilities proceeded

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U. C. Schroeder

at a much slower pace. EU political decision making on security issues has been
characterized by ad hoc and quick xes to pressing short-term security issues at the
expense of longer-term strategic action. Mostly procedural and focused on dividing
competences among EU actors, EU action plans and frameworks were late to arrive
on the scene and do not have the status of traditional national security strategies.

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Latecomer to the External Security Field: The European Security Strategy

In contrast to the widespread attention paid to the sometimes rather technical
questions of EU capability development, the EUs strategic ends for the ESDP
remained vague and limited to the very generic and under-conceptualized notion of
crisis management. Particularly in its early years, EU member states studiously
avoided potentially contentious strategic choices by deciding on the mandates of
future ESDP missions on a lowest common denominator basis. Most missions were
deployed ad hoc and to relatively safe and uncontroversial locations, while the
comparatively more contentious EU military mission to the Democratic Republic of
Congo in 2003 (Artemis) remained under the aegis of France as a lead nation. The
choice for specic EU mission formats frequently followed a logic of feasibility
what the EU was able to do at a given moment in time rather than a strategic logic
of what would t into the overall security concept of the EU (see Kurowska, 2008b
for a discussion).
The question to what end the EU created its set of civilian and military capabilities
has routinely and vaguely been answered by referring to the aims of the UN
Charter particularly to its general goal of preserving peace and strengthening
international security as well as to the encompassing Petersberg tasks (see Ortega,
2005). As its lowest common denominator, ESDPs aims and tasks have been
qualied as crisis management.2 Within this framework, the EU has rapidly
multiplied its activities and has deployed a series of civilian and military crisis
management missions across the globe.3 Crisis management tasks have thus been at
the core of EU policies in the security eld since their initiation, although the label
EU crisis management has become a catch-all term without precise denition.
While it is a commonly used term, observers agree that its meaning has not been
clearly dened at the EU level (Nowak, 2006, p. 16). Somewhat stretching the
meaning of crisis management, the ESDP has continued to widen the mandates of
its missions by developing civilian priority areas in the elds of police reform, rule
of law, civilian administration and civil protection tasks. Yet, while the operational
focus of ESDP has become rather all encompassing, the strategic agenda remained
limited to its lowest common denominator understanding.
In eect, the EU did not have a security strategy at all until late 2003. Yet, has the
European Security Strategy (ESS) become the strategic saving grace of European
security policies? We hold that not even the adoption of the ESS in December 2003
changed the strategic outlook of the Union much: the development of a common
European security policy has remained a mostly capability- rather than strategydriven process.
Written by a small team within Javier Solanas Policy Planning Sta, the
involvement of additional actors in the drafting process was deliberately avoided to
ensure the coherence of the resulting document. Its content covers a wide variety of

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493

security issues4 and remains vague in its direct policy implications. Although all
major EU policy documents accept the ESS as a key policy concept for ESDP (see,
as one example, Council of the European Union, 2004a), its practical impact has
been limited. In a recent assessment, the former Chief of Sta of the EU Military
Sta, Messervy-Whiting, agreed that while the ESS is generally accepted in the EU
security community as a rough guide for action, it was perhaps not a strategy
document in the true military sense (UK House of Lords, 2008, p. 3). Instead, the
ESS is widely seen as a statement of principles, rather than as a concrete guide to
action. Although it has often been compared to the US National Security Strategy
(see, for example, Berenskoetter, 2005), the ESS in eect has remained a broad
concept paper rather than a security strategy. This becomes clear when we contrast
the ESS provisions with the previously classical way of dening a grand strategy as
a plan of action that calculates the relationship of specic means to large ends.
Indeed, the European Security Strategy qualies neither as a military nor civilian
strategy in the classical sense (see, similarly, Duke, 2004, p. 460; Quille, 2004, p. 425;
Toje, 2005, p. 119). Although it presents a broad overview of the EUs new security
environment and denes three strategic objectives (addressing the threats, building
security in our neighbourhood and fostering an international order based on
eective multilateralism), it fails to prioritize its policy objectives. It neither indicates
conditions for the use of military force or other, civilian, capabilities in the pursuit of
specic foreign policy ends. Due to this lack of clear choices on the potential use of
EU civilian instruments and military capabilities, the ESS has so far not played a
crucial role in dening European security interests. It thus remains to be seen
whether the EU will keep to its narrow, bottom-up, capability-driven, buildingblock approach . . . focused on lling capabilities gaps and rening institutional
decision-making processes (Quille, 2004, p. 432). The Report on the Implementation
of the ESS completed in December 2008 under the French Presidency continues this
trend (on the process, see Pullinger, 2007; Ducarme, 2008).
So far, though, the traditional order of rst developing a security strategy and then
following it through with the aid of specic instruments was turned upside-down
in the European Union: it rst started to develop a set of civilian and military
capabilities and then decided on how to use it (for a similar assessment, see Bono,
2002).
EU Internal Security: Proliferating Road Maps and Action Plans
The process of strategy development played out somewhat dierently in the EUs
internal security eld. The EUs rst policy framework in the eld was initially
known, somewhat unceremoniously, as the Tampere Programme (19992004),
outcome of a special European Council meeting in Tampere in October 1999 on the
creation of an AFSJ in the European Union. As a result, an elaborate legislative
system emerged that covers a wide spectrum of judicial and law enforcement
cooperation. The follow-up Hague Programme (20052010) further deepened the
chosen course of EU internal security cooperation and specically highlighted
the relevance of common action on immigration and asylum issues alongside the
prevention of terrorism. Neither programme can be qualied as a unifying and
visionary strategic statement of EU interests. Instead, the Tampere and Hague

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programmes aggregate a number of diverse policy interests, inter alia mutual

recognition of judicial decisions, a common asylum system and cooperation against
crime and terrorism, under the common roof of Justice, Liberty, and Securitypolicies. The subsequent Stockholm Programme, due to be adopted in December
2009, looks set to continue this style of strategy development. While the two existing
programmes remained somewhat unwieldy and were mainly geared at the interests
and needs of EU security practitioners and lawmakers, their impact and cohesive
force was considerably higher than the European Security Strategys. The European
Commission routinely translates the EUs JHA policy priorities into concrete action
plans and road maps that contain timetables and benchmarks for the adoption and
implementation of relevant activities. An annual report on the implementation of the
Tampere and Hague Programmes rounds o the cycle of policy development. This
report, known as the AFSJ-scoreboard, monitors the adoption of legislative
measures both at the intra-EU institutional level as well as their adoption at
national level.
The development of the EUs Strategy for the external dimension of JHA in 2005
(Council of the European Union, 2005d) also followed a trajectory that emerged
from the JHA service-level. The strategy links the internal and external aspects of
European security and emphasizes the role of internal security for the relationship
between the EU and its neighbouring states. Focusing on common programmes to
manage migration ows into the EU and to counter organized crime, terrorism and
corruption at their roots, the new external dimension of internal security aims to
improve the EUs internal security while at the same time supporting the EUs
political objectives in its external relations (see Balzacq (2008) for a recent overview).
Expanding JHA policies outwards, as Pawlaks contribution in this issue describes
for the case of transatlantic homeland security cooperation, the European Union has
externalized its Justice and Home Aairs policies in a bid to counter transnational
security threats before they spill over into the EUs territory. This recent external
dimension of JHA is inherently a horizontal and cross-pillar strategy that closely
links the EUs internal security and external relations policies. Yet, intriguingly, its
substance was developed almost exclusively within DG JHA, with only limited
input by other stakeholders. JHA actors hijacked the external JHA strategy and
eectively limited access of other involved services both in the drafting process and
during the inter-service consultations (see Pawlak, 2009).
Finally, ongoing discussions on the third post-Hague Programme (20102014) in
the so-called Future Group, an informal group dealing with the future of European
Home Aairs at ministerial level, have so far preserved both style and content of
previous phases of JHA strategy development. Characterized by their informality
and low public prole, JHA strategists of the Future Group focus principally
on preserving the European model in the area of European Home Aairs by
balancing mobility, security and privacy (Future Group, 2008, p. 3). They further
stress the need to deal with the growing interdependence of internal and external
security and to ensure the exchange of JHA-relevant data in European-wide
information networks (Future Group, 2008, p. 3).
On the whole, this very streamlined process of policy development qua action
plans has led to great strides in the emergence of a system of EU internal security
governance. Overshadowed by discussions on the EUs external security capabilities,

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JHA actors have managed to formulate and implement a high number of policy
initiatives during the past decade. Policy development in the JHA eld overall
approximates a traditional model in which policy programmes are followed up by
specic implementation strategies and a review process.
One major exception to the top-down policy development of EU internal security
is the EUs counter-terrorism strategy. In this particular case, the post-9/11 EU
counter-terrorism Action Plan presented a list of legislative initiatives to enhance
the EUs ght against terrorism. Yet, it resembled a laundry list rather than a
comprehensive strategy and principally highlighted and, in some cases, accelerated
the development of JHA policies and instruments that had already been in the
legislative pipeline prior to 9/11 (e.g. the European Arrest Warrant and the Joint
Investigative Teams, see, further, Schroeder, 2006). In eect, the EUs 2001 counterterrorism strategy did not qualify as a specic strategy against terrorist activities as
such, but instead consisted of a range of measures that generally aimed to counter
the insucient harmonization of member states criminal justice and law enforcement systems. The nal adoption of an ocial EU counter-terrorism strategy in 2005
also had a symbolic unifying eect at best. As, perhaps, the rst Powerpoint-based
security strategy ever, the EUs counter-terrorism strategy was created as a set of
slides that very briey outline the general goals of the EU. The new strategy
presented even less new thinking than the Action Plan, and limited itself to
summarizing existing goals under a set of four headings (prevent, protect, pursue and
respond, see Council of the European Union, 2005c). In this case, strategy
development was again turned on its head: strategy clearly followed existing policies.
Similar to ESDP, EU counter-terrorism policies developed incrementally.
Eects of Incremental Strategy Development
The creation of the EU common security policy has followed a somewhat unusual
path. Unlike the classical understanding of policy development through a policy
cycle that moves from agenda setting to policy formulation to implementation to
evaluation (DeLeon, 1999), we have shown that the EU security eld developed at
least partially in reverse. EU actors were keen to avoid conict about policies that
intervened too strongly in the domestic aairs of member states by focusing the
debate on the technicalities and legal issues of security integration. The implementation of security policies in some cases preceded the formulation of security strategies
at the EU level, while more general debates about the direction of European internal
and external security integration were mostly left to a small group of security
practitioners. What eects does this incremental process of strategy shaping by
stealth, rather than by design, have on the evolution of overarching security strategies
for the European Union? The following part shows that this peculiar process of
security policy development within the EU has had both enabling and constraining
eects on the evolution of coherent and comprehensive security policies.
Enabling Eect: Multiplication of Strategic Ends
Intriguingly, the outlined strategic ambiguity of the EU has rst of all had a positive
and enabling function on security policy development. Although the EUs strategic

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void is an often-voiced argument to explain the frequently only slow progress of

European-wide security cooperation, this vagueness has been an incentive for a
dynamic process of policy innovation. As a result, and in contrast to research that
maintains that the EU has no strategic vision, the article holds that EU actors have
developed a variety of dierent strategic ends and priorities. In eect, we are
witnessing a hybrid process in which dierent political actors within the EU decisionmaking process develop the EUs strategic aims by pushing for specic security
programmes and goals.
In the external security eld, the relatively large leeway built into EU strategic
documents has enabled ESDPs rapid extension of competences from its initial
military peacekeeping tasks to a range of external stabilization and security sector
reform tasks. The European Security Strategys wide scope contributed to this
extension, since it left all doors open for potential future missions (Hansen, 2006,
p. 5). As Alyson Bailes (2005, p. 14) also noted, the advantage of the rather general
nature of the ESS is that it has stayed broad-brush enough for all the EU members
to read their favourite agendas into it. Hence, despite its not being an immediately
operational document (see Biscop, 2004, p. 37), the ESS has paved the way for a
larger debate about the aims and future of the ESDP. Not only has it brought the
EUs attempts to formulate a common security policy to the attention of a wider
audience, it has also eectively specied the EUs earlier very general focus on
humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking-tasks within the Petersberg framework. Instead, it has focused on the development of a rule-based international order,
the promotion of good governance and stability in the EUs neighbouring states and
the need for comprehensive civilian and military answers to the new dynamics
threats.
The EUs overall strategic outlook in the internal security eld has remained
similarly unspecic: it promotes the broad notion of a European model of internal
security that balances freedom, security and justice in equal measures. The specic
shape of this model though has not been widely debated: the idea of a common EU
AFSJ as enshrined in the Treaty of Amsterdam has remained a projection screen into
which dierent policy styles and goals can t.
In this hybrid process of strategy development, the encompassing but relatively
vague internal and external security strategies therefore co-exist with a multitude of
more specic but lower-level policy programmes. Developed either as ad hoc
solutions to acute challenges, or emerging from operational actors interests in better
EU-wide information exchange and cooperation arrangements, several strategic ends
for the EUs security policies have emerged in the past decade. The three major goals
of stabilization, human security and crime ghting emerged in distinct organizational
elds in the EU. Stabilization is mostly a goal pursued within the ESDP, human
security stems from actors within the EUs development assistance programmes,
and crime-ghting is strongly linked to JHA actors. At the same time, the Treaty
of Maastrichts initial wording that one of the objectives of the Union is the
implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the eventual
framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence
(Treaty of Maastricht, Title V, J4), has remained largely unredeemed. EU member
states have been largely reluctant to discuss the potential defence-dimension of
ESDP.5

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Stabilization and Governance. The predominant strategic aims of the EUs external
security policies are the promotion of stability and well-governed political order in its
neighbourhood. As a frequent feature of regional strategy papers, the aim of creating
regional stability and well-governed, sustainable political orders that do not interfere
in the internal security of the Union pervades European policies towards Africa,
the Balkans and the Mediterranean states. Most recently summarized in the
EUs overarching Neighbourhood Strategy, already the 1995 Barcelona Declaration on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Council of the European Union,
1995) declared peace, stability and prosperity to be its general objective for the
Mediterranean basin. The Wider Europe Strategy of 2004 the predecessor to the
EUs current neighbourhood policy similarly aimed to create an enlarged area of
political stability and functioning rule of law (European Commission, 2003b, p. 3) in
its neighbourhood. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) itself focuses on
reinforcing the stability, security and well-being (European Commission, 2004, p. 4)
of both EU and neighbouring states by promoting a series of governance- and
stability-orientated measures in the EUs southern and eastern neighbourhood. It
envisages a ring of countries, sharing the EUs fundamental values and objectives,
drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve
a signicant measure of economic and political integration (European Commission,
2004, p. 5). The follow-up declaration on strengthening this project again
emphasized the EUs vital interest in seeing greater economic development and
stability and better governance in its neighbourhood (European Commission,
2006a, p. 2). The European Commissions regional strategy for the Horn of Africa is
another example of a predominantly stability-orientated foreign policy strategy.
It argues that,
stability in the Horn of Africa is also strategically crucial for EU security.
Cross-border dynamics, such as illegal migration and tracking of arms, drugs
and refugee ows, are factors contributing to instability and tensions that
spread throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond, and could even reach the
EU. (European Commission, 2006b, p. 5)
The outlined strategic aim of creating stable regional orders in the EUs
neighbourhood resonates strongly in the European Security Strategy, which argues
that the EU should promote a ring of well governed countries in its neighbourhood,
since the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic
states (Council of the European Union, 2003, pp. 8, 10). The new EU strategy for
Security Sector Reform is one example of how the EU has started to implement its
interest in fostering a stable, democratic and secure neighbourhood. The strategy
builds on the understanding that well-governed and democratically controlled
security sectors contribute to political stability in a region or country. The EUs
strategy for reforming security institutions therefore aims to contribute to an
accountable, eective and ecient security system that can be a force for peace and
stability, fostering democracy and promoting local and regional stability (Council of
the European Union, 2005b, p. 4). Further, actors within the Council General
Secretariat have developed concepts for civilian administration, police and rule of
law missions that aim to strengthen the capacities and institutions of states and

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regions in crisis. The rapid development of civilian security assistance programmes

and the adoption of stability-orientated mission mandates point to the rising
relevance of the strategic aim of stabilization.
Development and Human Security. As the single largest provider of development
aid in the world, the EUs primary objective in this eld is the eradication of
poverty in the context of sustainable development. At the same time, the EU has
also taken on board the conviction in development circles that development is not
possible without the security of a population. This newly found security
development nexus holds that the negative eects of insecurity on development
are so high that security policies have to be a necessary part of developmental
policies. Promoted by actors within the development community, a vocal group
of civil society experts has therefore started to promote the strategic aim of
human security for the European Union. In contrast to traditional forms of
state or national security, the concept of human security refers to freedom for
individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations
(Study Group on Europes Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 5). In a report
commissioned by Javier Solana, the Study Group on Europes Security
Capabilities (2004, p. 5) advanced the idea that the EU should develop a
Human Security Doctrine for its external relations. An epistemic community
(Haas, 1992, p. 3) par excellence, this group is a network of policy practitioners
and academics sharing a set of normative beliefs and a common policy enterprise:
to advance human security as a proactive strategic narrative and an enduring
and dynamic organizing frame for security action (Kaldor et al., 2007, p. 273,
see, further, Matlary, 2006) for the European Union.
Several EU policy programmes, particularly in the European Commission, have
used human security language to describe their goals. For instance, the Gothenburg
programme on the prevention of violent conict argued that the international
community has a political and moral responsibility to act to avoid the human
suering and the destruction of resources caused by violent conicts (Council of the
European Union, 2001, p. 1). Similarly, the European Commissions Communication on Governance and Development held in 2003 that,
the concept of security is increasingly understood not just in terms of security
of the state, but also embraces the broad notion of human security, which
involves the ability to live in freedom, peace and safety. Security must be seen
both as a national interest and as part of the individual rights. (European
Commission, 2003a, p. 8)
In 2009, the Commission will publish an Action Plan on Security and
Development that aims to make the relatively abstract notion of a nexus between
security and development policies more operational and that enables the EU to
move towards the closer horizontal integration of security and development
issues.
A rst practical outcome of the new focus on security issues in Community
assistance programmes has been an increased focus on comprehensive security sector
reforms, as enshrined in the Community Concept for Security Sector Reform

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(European Commission, 2006c). The concept enables the Commission to address

governance decits in security sectors world-wide and is aimed at fostering the
underlying peaceful conditions necessary for sustainable development.
Crime Fighting. Lastly, the aim of ghting crime, be it in the forms of terrorism or
tracking, has become increasingly relevant for the EU. Initially limited to
traditional forms of police and judicial cooperation within the EUs borders,
strategies to ght serious and organized crime have long moved beyond the
traditional domestic sphere of EU JHA policies. Initiated by high-level actors within
the EU JHA policy eld,6 police practitioners at the work-level were also inuential
in pushing for the new external JHA-policy frame (see Bigo, 1996, 2000;
Guiraudon, 2000). As a result, EU foreign and security policies today routinely
incorporate counter-crime policies into their mandates and also the ESS mentions
the new external dimension of the threat of organized crime to the EU. Since
then, the adoption of a whole series of strategy papers and policy programmes
has placed the external dimension of internal security rmly on the EUs security
agenda.
In late 2004, the Hague Programme the main EU strategy document in the area
of JHA called for the development of a strategy covering all external aspects of the
EUs policy on freedom, security and justice (Council of the European Union,
2004b, p. 3). Complementing this top-down decision to develop an external JHA
strategy, the operational-level EU Chiefs of Police Council working group around
the same time adopted the Warnsveld Declaration (Council of the European
Union, 2004c). In this, high-level European police practitioners argued that
organized crime presented a major obstacle for the consolidation of law and order
in former crisis areas and additionally had negative eects on the internal security of
the European Union. The declaration strongly promoted the development of
synergies between ESDP and JHA activities. Predominantly pushed for by actors
within its third legislative pillar, the EU nally adopted an overarching Strategy
for the External Dimension of JHA in 2005. This strategy focuses on third pillar
police and justice policies, but also stresses the necessity of ESDP missions tackling
issues such as organised criminality and corruption (Council of the European
Union, 2005d, p. 4). In a similar vein, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the
recent Vienna Declaration on Security Partnerships (Council of the European
Union, 2006c) emphasized the increased internal security dimension in the relations
between the EU and its neighbours. Early attempts to implement this new strategic
aim were outlined in a series of action-orientated papers on EU internal security
support to the Western Balkans, on EU counter-terrorism activities in North Africa
and on EU assistance to counter-drugs and counter-tracking policies in
Afghanistan.
Further, several currently deployed civilian and military ESDP missions have
incorporated crime-ghting tasks into their mandates.7 In particular, the EUs police
missions in the Balkans play a very visible role in pursuing the EUs external JHA
strategy. In Bosnia (Council of the European Union, 2006b), in Macedonia (Council
of the European Union, 2005a) and in the near future in Kosovo (Zehetner, 2007),
ESDP missions train and support local police forces and reform the national
criminal justice systems. Mandated both to establish European style democratic

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U. C. Schroeder

policing (see Collantes Celador, 2005) and to assist host countries in their ght
against organized crime, these ESDP missions have strayed far from the traditional
understanding of crisis management as the deployment of military peacekeeping
forces to states in acute crisis situations.

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Constraining Eect: Fragmented and Conicting Strategies

As we have seen, the EUs security agenda is not of a piece, but rather emerged in a
hybrid fashion by stealth through the interventions of a series of actors both at the
EUs political and service levels. Because of this incremental and capacity-driven
strategic development, a multitude of EU documents and programmes pursue
dierent strategic aims at any one point in time. The negative implications of this are
obvious: strategic vagueness or indecision should lead to the development of less
than ecient policy solutions than the implementation of policies that follow clearly
laid out strategic choices. In the discussed case, this holds partially true: the sad fact
that the EU has no strategic vision in foreign aairs (Bet-El, 2006, p. 14) has led to
slow and cumbersome ad hoc decisions on the individual circumstances under which
the EU deployed its civilian and military capabilities. The recent development of the
EU battlegroups8 illustrates the prevalence of operational-level over strategic
choices: they do not contribute to a specic strategic framework and have therefore
been characterized as a concept in a search of a strategy (Gowan, 2005, p. 17).
In the internal security eld, the EUs slow progress in coming to an agreement on
a comprehensive approach to terrorism similarly impeded the formulation of
innovative counter-terrorism policies and led to a lowest-common-denominator
approach.
A further drawback clearly is the potential for conict between proliferating
strategic aims that cannot always be easily integrated into a single comprehensive
strategy. The aims of fostering stable governance structures, of ghting crime, and of
promoting human security do not always go hand in hand (see Gibert and Mounier,
this issue for examples). Especially the recent development of a crime-ghting-goal
in the EUs foreign security assistance policies collides with its more encompassing
human security strategies. Following the European Security Strategys assessment
that transnational security challenges can have direct and adverse eects on the
European internal security landscape, the EU has promoted the new External
Dimension of Justice and Home Aairs as one of its central priorities in its
external relations. Whereas, before, crime ghting clearly fell into the competence
sphere of third-pillar internal security actors, this convergence of internal and
external security policies has led the EU to place particular emphasis on counterterrorist and counter-organized crime capacity building in its external police
and judicial reform programmes. Particularly the Western Balkans and Southern
Mediterranean regions have come under increasing pressure to enhance their
cooperation with the Unions ght against organized crime and terrorism (see
Council of the European Union, 2006a, 2006c). In these cases, the EU is torn
between its external policy goal of fostering democratic reforms and human security
and between pursuing its quest for domestic security through ghting crime and
stabilizing its neighbouring ring of friends. Particularly the crime-ghting approach
with its sometimes rather one-sided interest in enhancing the eectiveness of

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internal security bodies in third countries has generally not (been) positive
(Ball, 2004; see, similarly, Lavenex, 2004) for improving their transparency and
democratic accountability. As a result, the human security goal of developing wellgoverned security institutions that are able to provide a high level of security to the
citizens of a recipient country collides with the EUs interest in diminishing the threat
of organized crime to its territory. Hence, although both policy goals could in
principle be complementary, they have so far created a fault line cutting across the
EUs security policies.
Conclusion
EU actors have authored a long series of strategic documents: the EUs Strategy for
the External Dimension of Justice and Home Aairs; the EU Counter-Terrorism
Strategy, the Commissions Development Strategy; the EU Neighbourhood
Strategy; the Vienna Declaration on Security Partnerships; the Gothenburg Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conict; the Tampere, Hague and Stockholm
Programmes. Yet, none of the mentioned documents has so far been able to
comprehensively answer the essential question of any strategic document in the
eld of security policy: what is to be protected from whom and with what means?
Not even the ESS unequivocally prioritizes the EUs security interests. Instead, the
article found that a mostly capability-driven process of policy development has led
to the emergence of several, sometimes contradictory, strategic aims in dierent EU
policy arenas. Depending on the institutional location of the strategic claims made,
the EU should primarily focus on ghting crime, on providing for the security of
individual human beings in crisis regions, on creating a stable neighbourhood for the
EU or on defending the EU against external threats. The comprehensive nature of
the ESS and the Tampere/Hague Programmes did not alleviate this lack of clear
priorities: quite the contrary, they left the scope of the EUs security policies wide
open.
A closer look at recent policy programmes and mission mandates nevertheless
shows the EUs increasing emphasis on the external promotion of security, stability
and order as one of its major strategic aims. Both the stability-orientated European
neighbourhood strategy and the strategy for the external dimension of Justice and
Home Aairs exemplify this trend to externalize the EUs domestic security interests.
In line with the European Security Strategys aim of fostering a ring of friends
around the EU, the two strategic aims of fostering stability and ghting crime in the
neighbourhood have all but eclipsed classical crisis management as outlined in
the Petersberg tasks. In contrast to these aims, the dimension of human security
appears less relevant in current EU security policy documents. Although the
European Commission routinely refers to human security as a strategic end in its
developmental and external relations policies, ESDP missions do not specically
emphasize human security in their mandates. To the contrary, recent ESDP mission
mandates have started to shift their focus away from essentially human securityrelated mandates for instance, human rights training for judicial and law
enforcement actors to capacity building and enhancing the eciency of law
enforcement actors in the elds of border policing or ghting organized crime.
The new mandate of the EU Police Mission to Bosnia is a case in point.9

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U. C. Schroeder

Finally, going back to the overall research interest of this issue in the politics of
security policies, the most intriguing nding of this chapter is the highly apolitical
process of formulating high-level security strategies in the European Union. To
avoid conict among member states about the ends of the Unions internal and
external security policies, top-level strategies (i.e. the European Security Strategy
and the Tampere/Hague Programmes) remained deliberately vague. While the ESS
remained broad-brush enough to t a variety of security interests, the internal
security strategies remained devoid of larger visions and mostly technical in their
approach to internal security cooperation within the Union. Despite the eminently
political nature of strategic questions, the politics of European security policies
took place at the working level of security policy making, instead of at the highest
political level. In eect, overarching EU security strategies legitimate the member
states overall policy choices, while their substance and institutional design has
been shaped at the operational level. In sometimes erce battles over competences
and inuence, EU actors within the Council Secretariat and the European
Commission as well as national actors have competed for sovereignty of
interpretation in questions of security policies. Turning the classical process of
security strategy development on its head, political conicts over future strategies
took place at the level of everyday policy making, instead of at the level of grand
strategy.

Notes
1

3
4

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Final Conference of the UACES Research Group
on European Conict Prevention and Crisis Management Policies in Brussels, July 2007. I thank David
Law, Jolyon Howorth and the conveners and participants of the conference for their valuable discussion
and insightful comments. The author gratefully acknowledges the nancial support of the Volkswagen
Foundation in the European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Programme.
Crisis management generally refers to all activities that attempt to respond to immediate crisis situations
in order to prevent the use of violence or, at least, to prevent further escalation, either in a vertical
(deepening of the conict) or horizontal way (spreading of the conict to other regions) (Schneckener,
2002, p. 3).
For an updated list, see www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id268&langde.
As the main threats facing the European Union, it lists terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional
conicts, state failure and organized crime.
Adding to the defence dimension, the Lisbon Treaty includes a mutual defence provision in Article 27
that commits member states to an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power if a
member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory.
See Lavenex (2006) for a discussion of how immigration ministers pushed for the externalization of
domestic migration agendas.
One example is the mandate of the EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia: outside its main mandate of
providing deterrence and continued compliance with the Dayton Agreement, one of its key supporting
tasks is to provide the security environment in which the police can act against organized criminal
networks.
The Battlegroup (BG) is a specic form of the EUs rapid response elements. It is a rapidly deployable,
coherent and multinational battalion-sized force (+1500 troops), capable of stand-alone operations, or
for the initial phase of larger operations.
The second, refocused, EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deployed since 2006,
supports the Bosnian police reform process and specically focuses on consolidating local capacity and
regional cooperation in the ght against major and organized crime.

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