The Real Mad Men: The 1960sA Golden Age of Advertising

Max Nemhauser

Advanced History Seminar in Historical Research and Writing

Dr. Culclasure
10 April 2014

Nemhauser 2

Abstract
This essay looks at the advertising of the 1960s, a decade of marketing often called the
Golden Age of Advertising. The Sixties were host to a creative revolution in advertising. Until
then, the structure ad agencies put account managers were at the helm; bringing in the clients
was priority number one. In the 1960s, however, the power structure in the agency would move
from account executive to the creative department.
Using the Smithsonian Institutes online archives, the author created multiple collections
of advertisements, from Maidenform Brassieres to P&G Ivory Soap. By looking at the changes
that took place in the marketing strategies of these products, the creative revolution is made very
clear. In addition, the two largest figureheads of the creative revolution, Bill Bernbach and David
Ogilvy are profiled, and their contributions to the world of advertising are outlined. Companies
whose ads are referenced include Orbachs Department Store, Volkswagen Automobiles,
Hathaway Shirts, Schweppes Soda, Rolls Royce and others.
Among the reasons for the creative revolution are Ogilvy and Bernbach, evolving
technology in photography, widespread adoption of TVs in households and a more educated
public demanding higher quality in advertising.

Nemhauser 3

In 1959, Carl Hahn, the head Volkswagen Motors USA (VW), and Arthur Stanton, the
New York Volkswagen dealer walked back and forth down Madison Avenue stopping at all the
big ad agencies.1 For weeks they visited agency after agency, walking in through big glass
revolving doors eager to see something new, and walking out with the same sulky expression.
Each time it was the same thing. Advertisements like Figure 1, a late 40s ad for Chryslers
Plymouth. As Hahn says, The content of the proposed ads was always the same, a beautiful
house, very happy people in front, beautifully dressedand a glamorous car. Even that in most
cases was not photographed but illustrated with a stupid caption. But [they] didnt have [any]
life. I had more and more presentations. I was desperate, I told Arthur [Stanton] this is just
impossible, we need an agency that fits our product.2
This was the sentiment expressed by many companies at the time. The fifties had
established advertising and marketing as an important factor in sales and profits.3 Karen
Buzzard, in her book Chains of Gold: Marketing the Ratings and Rating the Markets, says that
if the decade of the 50s was the childhood of television, it was also a time when everyone was
still relatively innocent. Both advertisers and their critics were a little wide-eyed to discover that
there could be a certain science to motivation and selling, and that, taken in groups, people were
somewhat predictable.4 Once companies and advertising agencies realized what they had
discovered, they immediately looked to capitalize on this newfound tool for increasing profits. In
1956, Fortune Magazine published a statistic that the total volume of advertising in the U.S.,
national and local, was approximately $10 billion, three times what it had been a decade earlier,
and rising at a rate of about 10 percent since 1953.5
By 1967, this number had risen 50 percent, and amounted to an average of $75 spent on
advertising to each citizen annually.6 Advertising spending was growing faster than gross

Nemhauser 4

national product, national income, disposable personal income, or almost any other relevant
barometer.7
So when Hahn and Stanton walked into Doyle Dane and Bernbach (DDB), a young,
decade old advertising agency at the time, they were not expecting much.8 When they walked out
of the tall Madison Avenue office building that day though, Hahn and Stanton were about to
make history. They had just signed a small $500,000, six-month ad budget for what would
become one of the most iconic ad campaigns in history.9
In 1941, Bill Bernbach was at Grey Advertising, an older, established, predominantly
Jewish firm on Madison Avenue. Nicknamed a Seventh Avenue agency, because the clients
were often Jewish garment businesses located on Seventh Avenue, Bernbach had joined after
spending two months in the army, post Pearl Harbor.10 He quickly rose up the ranks, and by
1945, he found himself copy chief.11 Two years later, having risen to Creative Director, he sent a
memo to his department:12
There are a lot of great technicians in advertising. And unfortunately they talk the best
game. They know all the rules. They can tell you that people in an ad will get you greater
readership. They can tell you that a sentence should be this short or that long. They can
tell you that body copy should be broken up for easier and more inviting reading. They
can give you fact after fact after fact. They are the scientists of advertising. But theres
one little rub. Advertising is fundamentally persuasion and persuasion happens to be not a
science, but an art. 13
This memo has been copied and published and shared many times, and it is central to disciples of
Bernbachs philosophy, still today. It is even referred to as his famous letter.14 But in 1947, it
was revolutionary.

Nemhauser 5

The 1960s would be host to a creative revolution in advertising. Until then, the agency
structure put account managers were at the helm of a Madison Avenue agency; bringing in the
clients was priority number one. Soon, the power structure in the agency would move from
account executive to the creative department.15 While this shift was pioneered by Bernbach, it
would not have been successful had other agencies not followed suit. Taking Bernbachs theories
to heart, Madison Avenue quickly found a new voice in the 1960s, and it was a very loud one.
This transition was also noticeable in the ads that Bernbach and others began to produce.
In 1949, Bernbach met with Nathan Orbach, owner of Orbachs, a department store that
mainly sold womens apparel.16 Orbach had seen the work that Bernbach had done for his store
(Figure 2) and was impressed.17Orbach encouraged Bernbach to leave and create his own agency
with Orbachs as the first client. At first Bernbach refused, but after Orbach confided that he was
planning to leave Grey Advertising anyway, Bernbach decided to leave.18 Bernbach brought with
him Ned Doyle, an account director at Grey known for his ferocious ways of handling clients
who gave him trouble, and even ones who did not.19 Maxwell Dane, a friend of Doyles, ran a
small agency in an even smaller office at 350 Madison Avenue.20 It was there, on June 1, 1949,
that Doyle Dane Bernbach opened its doors and set the stage for a revolution in advertising.
DDB was Bernbachs agency from the start. They strictly adhered to his no-adherence
policy. We must develop our own philosophy and not have the advertising philosophy of others
imposed on us. Let us blaze new trails. Let us prove to the world that good taste, good art, good
writing can be good selling, said Bernbach.21 So when Carl Hahn and Arthur Stanton came into
his agency, Bernbach knew exactly how big an opportunity such as this one could be.
Carl Hahn describes his meeting with Bernbach in 1959, saying, I went to these
primitive offices, no big conference room or hall, no ten vice presidents in blue suits with

Nemhauser 6

neckties and white shirts, and executive vice presidents and senior vice presidents; there was just
a man sitting on his desk in a windowless room, called Bill Bernbach by name, and he showed
me work hed done for El Al [airlines] and moreand I decided what to do: offered six months
an advertising budget of half a million or so, which he accepted.22 Bernbach immediately got to
work setting up a team for BBDs first car account.23 Helmut Krone, a second generation
German-American who had once owned a VW, was chosen as art director, and Julian Koenig, a
young Jew from Yonkers who had once visited Germany, was signed on as copywriter. Koenig
had received a tip from a copywriter he had worked with previously, and when he interviewed
for the job, Bernbach looked through his book and, in the now regular patter, hired him on the
strength of an ad for a root beer that had been rejected by a previous client.24
Hahn had already written the strategy he wanted DDB to take with Volkswagen. 25
Everything was to be simple, resonant, honest and straightforward.26 It was Volkswagens policy
to change the external appearance of the car as little as possible, divergent from the U.S.
automakers policy at the time to take advantage of the image conscious public by obsoleting
their models every year. So Koenig wrote copy to be read like a friendly conversation,
straightforward, like advice from a neighbor. As Koenig said, We just took [the] product and
said what made it good. And we were fortunate enough that there was a lot to say about the
VW. The first VW ad that DDB ran was called Think Small (Figure 3).
Think Small rocked the world of advertising. No one had ever taken a full page ad with
a product on just a quarter of that page. It was unheard of. But DDB and Volkswagen continued
to do what would never have been done with ads like Lemon (Figure 4). It seems counterintuitive for a company to place a large photograph of their car and write Lemon underneath.

Nemhauser 7

But reading the copy, one discovers that the ad is a reference to Volkswagens high quality
control.
With the introduction of the 35mm SLR camera in, advertisers also gained another tool in
honesty.27 Advertisers had an easier time with photography, which is considered a more honest
approach towards imagery. People are willing to believe photographs to be more truthful; and it
also allowed for a more ads in magazines to fit in better with articles that included photographs.
In fact, one of Helmut Krones earliest demands, in the beginnings of the Volkswagen campaign
was that there was to be no logos in the ads, as they signaled advertisement to the reader
immediately, and informs the reader to immediately turn the page.28
In 1963, DDB printed Taxi, a humorous take on the economic and size benefits that the
VW presented (Figure 5). Reading the copy, one learns that the VW Taxi was driven through the
streets of New York and that it turned heads. This concept of putting VW Beetles in places
they did not normally belong became a pattern, and before long there were ads like Police Car
(Figure 6). Not to establish a formula, DDB kept flipping convention on its head with ads like
Family Trip (Figure 7) for VWs new station wagon, more commonly known as the VW Bus.
Not putting the product being advertised in the advertisement was against the rulesit was just
not something that ad agencies would do.29 But the rest of Madison Avenue began to take notice.
In order to illustrate the attention paid to DDBs new kind of advertising, consider an
advertising concept that began before the creative revolution, but flourished once it embraced
Bernbachs philosophy: Maidenform. Maidenform was a small lingerie company established in
New York during the Flapper Era of the 20s, on the premise that women no longer wanted to
wear corsets, binding and flattening their chests, but would rather have their breasts lifted and
held.30 Maidenforms I dreamed Iin my Maidenform campaign came out of the William

Nemhauser 8

Weintraub Advertising agency, an old Madison Avenue agency where, coincidentally Bernbach
had in fact first joined the world of advertising and marketing.31
The I dreamed campaign was first printed in the early forties. Figures 8 and 9 are
examples of the bleak aesthetic and chauvinist attitude that was common at the time with many
ads. Aesthetically, they are monochromatic and not especially exciting. Shopping and getting
makeovers followed such traditional female gender roles; the ads were meant to appeal to the
common lady or housewife, or even a husband buying lingerie for his ideal wife, one who spends
all day in a brassiere and nothing else. Once DDBs creative revolution started rolling, however,
the change in attitude towards advertisements, in aesthetics and in content, changed dramatically.
This is clearly reflected in ads like 1961s I dreamed I walked a tightrope (Figure 10) and I
dreamed I barged the Nile(Figure 11), from a year later. These ads also reflect the changing
mentality in 1960s American culture, with the immediate and abrupt invasion of widespread
feminism and the acceptance of women into social and occupational positions not traditionally
ascribed to women. Part of the allure of these ads was that they seemed like an invitation into
this new culture of feminism and progressivism, with the pretense, however, of wearing a
Maidenform Bra.
The Maidenform I dreamed campaign became so popular, in fact, that they were
parodied by the popular satirical publication, Mad Magazine.32 Mad made parodies of many
popular ad campaigns, and has become a sort of benchmark parameter in deciding which ads
have become culturally accepted or at least have reached wide enough of an audience to be
parodied with success.33 Mads parody of Maidenform, Maidenfirm, (Figure 12) was printed in
the fall of 1962, once Maidenform had successfully made its transition into DDBs creative
revolution style ads and had adopted this new sixties approach to feminism and advertising.34

Nemhauser 9

Maidenform, thus, exemplifies the degree to which DDBs new philosophy was integrated into
an already existing and somewhat successful campaign.
Bernbachs creative revolution did not only extend to individual campaigns, though it
also made its mark on individuals in the industry, even ones established in the industry. In 1939,
David Ogilvy, a British transplant to New York City and a fledgling advertiser, joined George
Gallups organization that focused on what had become the Holy Grail of advertising:
research.35 Gallup, a former professor of journalism at Northwestern University, had begun
researching markets in the early 1930s. According to Cracknell,
He [Gallup] found that ads based on around sex and vanity were the most popular with
women, the second most popular being those based on the quality of the product. Men
also ranked those as their top two, only in reverse order. But in the same survey, Gallup
found that those approaches were the two least favored by advertisers, who preferred ads
leading on efficiency and economywhich were the least favored by all readers.
This news turned heads. One of the largest firms at the time, Young and Rubicam (Y&R), hired
him to lead their research department, but after a few years, Gallup left to create the American
Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO), now The Gallup Organization. Gallups first major success
story after setting out on his own was the correct forecasting of the 1936 election in favor of
Roosevelt. Ogilvy moved to Los Angeles and joined the growing organization in 1939, and
stayed through 1942. While at the AIPO, Ogilvy conducted hundreds of surveys of Americans,
learning how they perceived communication and entertainment, often pre-screening Hollywood
films to gain insight as to their possible box-office performance. In 1942, Ogilvy moved back to
New York City and anxious to begin on his own as a copywriter, founded the Ogilvy, Benson &

Nemhauser 10

Mather agency with an American partner and funds from the British agency he had left behind
when he moved to America.
Coming from a background in research, then, it is understandable that Ogilvy holds a
reputation as a cold, calculated agency director.36 Says Dobrow, David Ogilvy was perceived as
rigid and restrictive, and as a result, OBM was viewed as an agency that played by the
rulesTo Ogilvy, the word was king and the visual took a back seat. Market research, not
inspiration, was his guide. And humor had little place in advertising. Although he differed, then,
in philosophy from Bernbach, his results are eerily similar at times.
OBM first big break came with their Hathaway series. Hathaway, a tiny Maine-based
clothing manufacturer, came to OBM with a paltry $30,000 ad budget for their medium-priced
shirt range.37 Ogilvy created an entire story behind the shirt, adding intrigue and narrative, which
the public ate up. Baron Wrangell, as he was named, also brought into fashion the eye-patch.
(Figure 13) According to Cracknell, it became a popular prop at parties and offices, and other
campaigns aped it, even putting it on animals. In an attempt to add a sense of higher class to the
ads, OGB ran them only in The New Yorker, and its ad manager said hed never seen such
interest in a campaign.38 According to Cracknell, the campaign had a 1,500% increase in sales
from the time they started at OBM until 1969, and name recognition when from under 1 percent
to 40 percent in 20 years.39 Dobrow, however, claims that Ogilvys success with Hathaway, and
with every one of his other successful campaigns came not from his abilities as an ad man, but
his genius as a researcher.40
This claim is supported twofold. Dobrow builds this claim with a visual argument (Figure
14), asserting that Ogilvys rules hindered creativity rather than helped it, asserting that many, if
not all of his agencys ads looked so similar, they could be for the same product.41 Cracknell

Nemhauser 11

affirms this, making the same argument, with two of the same ads as Dobrow, in fact (Figure
15).42
This is not to sully Ogilvys talent as an ad man or marketer. His ads were extremely
popular, but this popularity seemed to follow a pattern. After creating Baron Wrangell for
Hathaway, OBM created Commander Whitehead for Schweppes (Figure 16), a mysterious
spokesman for the Schweppes Tonic Water company, which made waves in glasses across the
country, and up and down Madison Avenue. Ogilvy is best remembered for his classic Rolls
Royce ad (Figure 17), published only oncein just two newspapers and two magazines, but has
continued to be referenced to through today.43 The Rolls Royce ad is also considered to be
Ogilvy closest venture towards Bernbachs creative style, as well.44 Known to be steadfast in his
belief that the public responds to advertising technique over creative ideas, perhaps this ad stands
out so much in Ogilvys portfolio because it seems to defy what he had previously, and thereafter
defined as his ideology in advertising.
Although often painted as an opponent of Bernbachs, and agreeably an opponent in
business with Bernbach, Ogilvy and his success furthered the advertising business creative
revolution of the sixties much farther than it would have gone if solely under Bernbachs
direction. A copywriter, Ogilvys success helped facilitate the move of power in the agency from
account executive to the creative. Dobrow stands out in this argument, asking rhetorically, in
reality, how far apart were the views of these two new giants of the advertising industry?45 Both
believed that the product should be the centerpiecethe hero of the ad,46 both believed in
originality and freshness, and neither believed in unrealistic representations of the products they
were selling. In legacy, Ogilvy and Bernbach are at opposing ends of the spectrum of technique,

Nemhauser 12

but in reality, their underlying approaches and attitudes about influencing public opinion are
quite similar.
When two pioneers in a field achieve success, it is not an indication, however, of a
complete renaissance in theory and methodology. And examples like Maidenform only provide a
specific window into the influence of the 60s creative revolution, as they employed only one
agency, which folded in the 80s.47 In order to prove the larger impact on the entire world of
advertising, look to Proctor and Gambles Ivory Soap.
In Figure 18, a 1945 ad for Ivory Soap created by Cox Advertising, the classic pre-60s
illustrations are at work.48 Multiple images and their accompanying stories create an
overworking ad, trying to do far too many things at once. Juxtaposed with Figure 19, it is clear
the transition that was made after DDB and OBM got the ball rolling. Simple photographs
replace hand illustrations; large, clear, legible type replaces the script-styles less clear mimicry
of handwriting, all while preserving the casual rhetoric of the earlier ad. All of this is also present
in the transition of the Maidenform ads as well, however the Smithsonian Institutes collection of
Ivory ads provide some extra information that the Maidenform collection does not have. Figure
20, an ad from 1992, shows a continued reliance on the techniques of the 1960s. The clear type,
large bright photography and simple phrasing of this example from the Saatchi & Saatchi
Advertising Agency show significant consistency with the Ivory ads of the 60s.
Bernbach died in 1982 at the age of 71, Ogilvy in 1999 at 88. Named the two most
influential men of the 20th century in the advertising industry by Advertising Age magazine, their
work set a precedent for a new kind of advertising.49 The advertising they influenced was so
successful, that in the late 60s and early 70s, Nicholas Johnson, commissioner of the Federal
Communications Commission accused TV networks of deliberately putting on dull programming

Nemhauser 13

to enhance the entertainment value of the commercials.50 Obviously absurd, this episode is
indicative of the incredible power of the ads that came out of the 60s. In dollars and cents, one
can see the growth of the industry even more clearly. In 1960, the top ten agencies on Madison
Avenue made $1.5 billion in billings.51 Ten years later, this number had reached $4 billion.52
Madison Avenue was transformed in the 1960s. David Ogilvy and Bill Bernbach were a
large part of this transformation, but it was their employees who believed in them and it was their
clients who trusted their methods that allowed the creative revolution to take place. In 1957, a
small book was published by noted writer and social critic, Vance Packard, called The Hidden
Persuaders.53 Packards book was an exploration of the so-called manipulators that were those
in the advertising business. The Hidden Persuaders was an instant bestseller and fueled a decade
of national discomfort with the industry of advertising. Proof of its influence on the American
public, Professor David Gast cites Packard in his article Consumer Education and the Madison
Avenue Morality, in which he argues for a more standardized and widespread inoculation
against advertising of American children in schools.
This may also be a cause of the creative revolution. As advertisers lost a hold on the
techniques that had worked in the decades preceding, it became clear that new forms were
required. This led to the more honest, conversational ads like DDBs Volkswagen spots and
Ogilvys infamous Rolls Royce ad.
Gast and others continued their critique of the advertising industry, Hollywood took to
critiquing advertisers and politicianssaw the movies [and] began to attack advertising.
Through this, however, Madison Avenue was making more money than it ever had before.54
Eventually, realizing that advertising would not be disappearing any time soon, politicians began
to see the value in advertising. One of the most controversial television commercials of all time

Nemhauser 14

was produced in 1964 for the Democratic Lyndon Johnson campaign. Nicknamed Daisy, the
black and white commercial showed a young girl plucking petals from a flower as a voice over
counts down from ten to zerountil the little girl and the screen appear to vaporize in an
atomic explosion, before settling on a black screen with the words Vote for President Johnson
on November 3. Daisy brought back the controversy of advertising, and some believe that this
ad destroyed any possibility of the Republican candidate Barry Goldwaters assurances to the
public of his commitment to peace.55
Not all ads of the 1960s were effective, then, and not all helped further advertisings
reputation. The overall tone, however, of the output of Madison Avenue in the 1960s was one of
positivity and progression. Once the 1970s arrived, advertising spending had nearly tripled,
advertising exposure had skyrocketed, and the American advertising industry had revolutionized
its merchandise from uncreative, bored advertisements to creative, unique and fresh
endorsements of products for the modern American.

Nemhauser 15

Notes
1

Andrew Cracknell, The Real Mad Men: The Renegades of Madison Avenue and the

Golden Age of Advertising, (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2011), 86.

2

Ibid, 87.

Karen S. Buzzard, Chains of Gold: Marketing the Ratings and Rating the Markets,

(Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1990), 78.

4

Buzzard, Chains of Gold, 78.

Daniel Seligman, The Amazing Advertising Business, Forbes Magazine, (New York:

Time, Inc., September 1956, Vol 54, No. 107), 10; from Karen Buzzards Chains of Gold.
6

David K. Gast, Consumer Education and the Madison Avenue Morality, The Phi

Delta Kappan, (Phi Delta Kappa International, June 1967, Vol. 48, No. 10) 485; JSTOR, 19
December 2013 www.jstor.org/stable/20371911 .
7

Seligman, The Amazing Advertising Business, 11.

Hazel G. Warlaumont, Advertising in the 60s: Turncoats, Traditionalists, and Waste

Makers in America's Turbulent Decade, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 167.
9

Cracknell, The Real Mad Men, 87.

10

Ibid, 55.

11

Ibid, 55.

12

Larry Dobrow, When Advertising Tried Harder, (New York: Friendly Press, Inc.,

1984), 20.
13

Ibid, 20.

14

Cracknell, The Real Mad Men, 55.

15

Ibid, 50-51.

Nemhauser 16

16

Ibid, 55.

17

Ibid, 55-56.

18

Ibid, 56.

19

Ibid, 56.

20

Ibid, 56.

21

Dobrow, When Advertising Tried Harder, 20.

22

Cracknell, The Real Mad Men, 87.

23

Ibid, 86.

24

Ibid, 92.

25

Ibid, 92.

26

Warlaumont, Advertising in the 60s, 174

27

Cracknell, The Real Mad Men, 73

28

Ibid, 88

29

Buzzfeed

30

Claudia H. Deutsch, "Dreaming of Bras for the Modern Woman." The New York

Times, Business, September 28, 2005.

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/28/business/media/28adco.html
31

Tom Reichert, The Erotic History of Advertising, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books,

2003), 145
32

Claudia Deutsch, Dreaming of Bras for the Modern Woman NY Times, September

33

Stuart Elliot, Skewering Madison Avenue for 60 Years NY Times, October 2012

34

Deutsch, Dreaming of Bras for the Modern Woman NY Times, September 2005

2005

Nemhauser 17

35

Cracknell, The Real Mad Men, 34

36

Dobrow, When Advertising Tried Harder, 36

37

Cracknell, The Real Mad Men, 37

38

Ibid, 40

39

Ibid, 40

40

Dobrow, When Advertising Tried Harder, 37

41

Ibid., 37

42

Cracknell, The Real Mad Men, 39

43

Dowbrow, When Advertising Tried Harder, 159; Cracknell, The Real Mad Men, 45;

44

Dobrow, When Advertising Tried Harder, 159

45

Ibid, 36

46

Figure 7 While the ad does not place the product centrally (it does not even show it),

there is no question that the product, the VW Station Wagon, is the most significant aspect of the
ad. Car ads such as Figure 1 and others from before Bernbachs time often placed a happy
family, or a pristine suburban house with manicured lawn as the focus, and the car off to the side,
parked in the driveway. While this created an implied sense of significance in the cars value as a
step towards this idyllic homestead, the ad was ostensibly selling a certain lifestyle, not the car
specifically.
47

Ad Age, http://adage.com/article/adage-encyclopedia/norman-craig-kummel/98801/

48

Smithsonian Archives, http://siris-

archives.si.edu/ipac20/ipac.jsp?&profile=all&source=~!siarchives&uri=full=3100001~!272986~
!0#focus

Nemhauser 18

49

Ad Age, http://adage.com/article/special-report-the-advertising-century/william-

bernbach/140180/
50

Dowbrow, 200

51

Ibid. Billings represent the amount spent on getting an advertisement to its audience,

whether through paying a magazine publisher for ad space, buying commercial time from a TV
network or putting up billboards, etc. This is the method through which an agency makes the
majority of its income; acting as a middle-man between those wanting to advertise and those
who can bring the advertisements to the public., 200
52

Ibid., 200

53

Mark Grief. The Hard Sell. NY Times Magazine, December 30, 2007.

54

Cracknell, The Real Mad Men, 25

55

Dobrow, 213

Nemhauser 19

Works Cited
Advertising Age, William Bernbach, The Advertising Century Special Report, March 29, 1999.
http://adage.com/article/special-report-the-advertising-century/william-bernbach/140180/
Buzzard, Karen S. Chains of Gold: Marketing the Ratings and Rating the Markets. Metuchen,
NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 1990.
Cracknell, Andrew. The Real Mad Men: The Renegades of Madison Avenue and the Golden Age
of Advertising. Philadelphia: Running Press, 2011.
Deutsch, Claudia H. Dreaming of Bras for the Modern Woman. New York Times, September
28, 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/28/business/media/28adco.html?_r=1&
Dobrow, Larry. When Advertising Tried Harder: The Sixties: The Golden Age of American
Advertising. New York: Friendly Press, Inc. 1984
Doyle, Dane, Bernbach More About Bill: Biography. last modified 2011.
http://www.ddb.com/BillBernbachSaid/more-about-bill/biography.html
Elliot, Stuart. Skewering Madison Avenue for 60 Years. New York Times, October 28, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/business/media/mad-magazine-collects-60-years-ofparodying-madison-avenue.html
Gast, David K. Consumer Education & the Madison Avenue Morality. The Phi Delta Kappan
48, no. 10 (1967): 485-487. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20371911
Grief, Mark. The Hard Sell. New York Times Magazine Sunday Book Review, December 30,
2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/books/review/Greif-t.html
Ogilvy & Mather, David Ogilvy Biography. http://www.ogilvy.com/About/OurHistory/David-Ogilvy-Bio.aspx
Reichert, Tom. The Erotic History of Advertising. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003.
Seligman, Daniel. The Amazing Advertising Business, Forbes Magazine 1956 Vol 54, No.
107 quoted in Karen Buzzard, Chains of Gold: Marketing the Ratings and Rating the
Markets, (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1990), 78.
Warlaumont, Hazel G. Advertising in the 60s: Turncoats, Traditionalists and Waste Makers in
Americas Turbulent Decade. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001.