The FEMA Response To Hurricane Katrina

Research Note: Asymmetric Design
Interoperability and Uncertainty –

the FEMA response to Hurricane Katrina
Richard Veryard & Philip Boxer
September 2005
Status
Incomplete working notes. Contains some useful preliminary analysis,
conclusions not fully developed.
Some of this material was used in our article for the Microsoft Architect Journal
Taking Governance to the Edge (June 2006)
All rights reserved.
Copyright © 2005 Veryard Projects Ltd and Boxer Research Ltd. All rights reserved. Page 1
Research Note: Asymmetric Design Interoperability and Uncertainty – The FEMA response to Hurricane Katrina
• In an emergency, a distributed piece of information calls for a central

Introduction response. A disaster, the converse. Those best informed are in the field;
those best equipped, in the field. The best disaster response system is the
We have been following the recent developments around Hurricane Katrina with one in your hand when the disaster strikes.4
considerable interest, because some of the public criticism of FEMA clearly
But Geddes's optimism is tempered by his distrust of central committees, and his
exposes some of the interoperability risks.1 People have been worrying about the
fear they will abuse their power.
ability of a tightly coupled world to withstand shocks - including Hurricane
Katrina and SARS. Here are some key quotes. • But the changes needed to make things better are politically painful and
resisted by incumbent powers. ... I suspect that central committees will
• Our society, as a whole, has no surge protection - no ability to take
determine we need more central response systems, and weaken the
shocks. We have no excess beds, no excess equipment, no excess ability
economy by taxing everyone hard to pay for it. The exact opposite of the
to produce vaccines or medicines, nothing. Everybody has worshipped at
medicine a “network edge” response would dictate.
the altar of efficiency for so long that they don't understand that if you
don't have extra capacity you have no ability to deal with unexpected There are some interesting (and sometimes shocking) details from the Hurricane
events. (Ian Welsh2) Katrina experience, and several different levels of incapacity can be detected.
• As we have now seen with Hurricane Katrina, even if the capacity were From a systems-of-systems perspective, what we find particularly interesting are
there, the United States’ ability to manage and allocate that capacity is the interoperability failures.
essentially non-existent. (Chandler Howell3) • Inability of FEMA to work with medical professionals unless they are
Welsh quotes some analysis from Sherry Cooper and Donald Coxe, comparing a part of the National Disaster Medical Team. Inability of FEMA to
possible SARS outbreak with the flu pandemic. orchestrate external / autonomous agents. (Overlawyered Blog, via Ernie
the Attorney)
• Because our society and economy is so much more integrated and so
• Inability of FEMA to provide appropriate support for people with special
much more connected (for example the flu had to spread by ship back
needs. Inability of FEMA to collaborate with agencies with specialist
then), and so much more "just on time" that it isn't really a model you can
knowledge and resources. (Conmergence Blog)
use. We'll likely get hit harder, faster and because many locations have
such limited inventories, relying on getting it as they need it, the supply We are particularly focused on the risks associated with interoperability, because
disruptions are likely to be much worse. these are the ones that appear when you scale up to very large systems and
organizations.
Telecoms analyst Martin Geddes offers a potentially more upbeat perspective, at
least in relation to Hurricane Katrina, asking us to distinguish between an
emergency and a disaster.
1
http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.com/2005/09/efficiency-and-robustness.htm
2
http://www.ianwelsh.net/economics-of-a-flu-pandemic-part-ii/
3 4
http://thurston.halfcat.org/blog/?p=233 http://www.telepocalypse.net/archives/000783.html
Problems
Problem Details Analysis Level
Conflict between Doctors were prevented from treating the dying. Inability of FEMA to work with Level 5 FEMA fear of errors of planning. Not
FEMA and volunteer medical professionals unless they surprising given that FEMA appears to have been
"Even people with the noblest intentions can cause more
doctors are part of the National Disaster defined at level 3.
harm than good if they're not part of a coordinated effort"5
Medical Team.
Inability of FEMA to orchestrate
external / autonomous agents.
Conflict between "ADAPT organizers … spoke of people with disabilities Inability of FEMA to provide Level 4 FEMA fear of errors of execution because
FEMA and ADAPT. being the last people evacuated, being actually turned appropriate support for people behaviours provided not capable of being
away from shelters because of their disabilities or because with special needs. customised to these requirements
they had no attendants with them, being separated from
Inability of FEMA to collaborate
family, caregivers and necessary equipment and service
with agencies with specialist
animals, and now languishing in nursing homes and other
knowledge and resources.
institutions unconnected to the official resources being
made available to the majority of Katrina survivors."6
FEMA emergency " By not writing to standards, the Federal Emergency Failure by FEMA to adopt Level 4 fear of error of execution, leading to a
website only Management Agency has created an unnecessary hurdle interoperability standards restriction in functionality that ignores any exo-
supports Internet for many hurricane victims seeking aid who have already interoperability issues.
Explorer endured too much."7
5
http://www.overlawyered.com/archives/002779.html
6
http://edodds.blogs.com/conmergence/2005/09/104_arrested_as.html
7
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1857297,00.asp
Problem Details Analysis Level

FEMA volunteers In the understatement of the year, Portage Fire Chief Tim Training deemed irrelevant (at Level 3 supply-side pragmatics included
had to receive Sosby, said, "It seemed like an incredible misuse of least in this particular context) by anticipation of forms of demand that had different
training in equal valuable resources."8 many stakeholders. priorities and risks… (e.g. not anticipating that
opportunities and evacuation needs of poor created unequal
Opportunity for criticism by
sexual harassment. opportunities, but at a different level of system
those stakeholders who regard
functioning! Ultimately this has to be an error of
such training as irrelevant in all
intention at level 6
contexts.
Inflexibility of policy and its
enforcement.
Conflict between "This isn't an easy call, but sometimes the smartest thing The decision to place FEMA From the FEMA system, a Level 3 approach to
hurricane security to do in an emergency is to suspend security rules. within Homeland Security managing endo-interop risk creates an inability to
and airline security Unfortunately, sometimes the bad guys count on that."9 reflected a supply-side dynamically customise at level 4.
pragmatics that prevented
consideration of a de-
perimeterised approach to
security.
8
http://capitalfreedom.blogspot.com/2005/09/fire-fema.html
9
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/09/hurricane_secur.html
The Risks Matrix

Deciding which endogenous risks to mitigate having identified the exogenous risks.
Asymmetries Risks Input to Type of risk Test Methods Katrina System
Engineering
1st: The Technology Matrix 1 Type I Will physics work Functional testing Had anticipated As far as we know
technology is not endogenous as predicted? of components the effects  the parts work
the product. separately
Engineering Matrix 2 Type II Will the system CBD/Patterns/ Had a dress No regressive
Truth endogenous work as DSLs rehearsal, and testing of bug
Uncertainty predicted? identified lack of fixes against the
transport/stores Ο whole system
2nd: The business Endo-interoperability Matrix 3 Type III Will the Directed MODAF etc no action on the System being
is not the solution. endogenous SoS work as weaknesses of the delivered will not
predicted? existing plans Ο work
Semantic Exo-interoperability Matrix 4 Type I exogenous Can the Directed Identifying the Couldn’t flex How will the
Uncertainty Errors of execution Type I SoS be gaps by split- existing plans to system cope with
Agility/Exo- dynamically screen modelling bring in new demands
interoperability customised in the of the emergency flights placed on it
ways offered? organization, Ο
3rd: The demand Demand-side Matrix 5 Type II Can the defining the Had no means of How will the
is not the orchestration Errors exogenous Collaborative SoS propositions that negotiating what system be used
customer’s of Planning Type II work as a whole address the was brought in on alongside other
experience. Agility/Exo- as proposed? demands, and (eg) emergency systems?
interoperability flights Ο
Ontological Demand-side Matrix 6 Type III Will the creating Effects The ‘Killer’ What are the
Uncertainty Composition Errors exogenous collaborative SoS Ladders defining demand – ‘killer’ demands
of Intention Type III produce the the context-of- couldn’t get that the SoS might
Agility/Exo- effects intended? use. emergency relief not be able to
interoperability on the ground Ο support?
Uncertainty and Risk

Three Types of Uncertainty Hurricane Katrina
Source: Lane & Maxfield: Ontological Uncertainty & Innovation, Santa Fe 2004
Truth In truth uncertainty, actors are Truth uncertainty is the only kind What is the likely force of any future hurricane? Note: this includes systems
Uncertainty uncertain about whether well- of uncertainty that … can be truth and SoS truth as well
What is the breaking point of a given flood
defined propositions are true measured in the probability scale. as component truth.
defence?
or not.
What are the likely consequences of a hurricane on
the population of New Orleans?
Semantic In semantic uncertainty, Reducing uncertainty, often cited What are the success criteria for handling a Note: this includes
Uncertainty actors are uncertain about as the ne plus ultra in the hurricane? reasoning about possible
what a proposition means. economic and business literatures, (directed) interventions into
How effective are contingency plans for the
may be just the wrong thing for systems and SoS.
protection of people and property?
innovative actors to do.
Ontological Sometimes the entity structure Ontological uncertainty, in What are the demographic or political categories Note: this includes
Uncertainty of actors’ worlds change so contrast to truth or semantic by which the hurricane and its aftermath will be reasoning about emergent
rapidly that the actors cannot uncertainty, resists the formation interpreted? effects.
generate stable ontological of propositions about relevant
What are the likely consequences of a hurricane on
categories valid for the time future consequences. The entities
the political climate of the USA (DHS, Iraq,
periods in which the actions and relations of which such
Terrorism, Oil Prices, Kyoto, …)?
they are about to undertake propositions would have to be
will continue to generate composed are simply not known at
effects. In such cases, we say the time the propositions would
that the actors face have to be formulated – that is,
ontological uncertainty. during the extended present in
which action happens.
Types of Risk
Type of risk Test Katrina Defence Katrina Response Systems Engineering Focus
Type I Will physics work as Will this flood defence hold the specified weight of Can we get this vehicle Component Quality
endogenous predicted? floodwater? through this flooded street?
Type II Will the system work as Will this combination of flood defences work as a whole? Do we have enough System Integration. Is there a
endogenous predicted? transport to get everyone single point of failure? Is the
out safely? system as stronger than its
weakest link?
Type III Will the Directed SoS Will the flood defences withstand any possible weather event? Can we provide sufficient System Effectiveness
endogenous work as predicted? food and water for the
stranded population of New
Orleans?
Type I Can the Directed SoS be What is the scope for emergency measures to be taken in the Can the US authorities System Flexibility
exogenous dynamically customised event of an extreme weather event? (For example, deliberately command sufficient
in the ways offered? flooding agricultural or sparsely populated land, to protect resources to deal with the
densely populated land and critical infrastructure.) emergency?
Type II Can the Collaborative Does the land surrounding the city of New Orleans have Can the US authorities Capacity to collaborate with
exogenous SoS work as a whole as sufficient capacity to absorb surplus water? accept help from foreign autonomous resources.
proposed? sources?
(Note: this depends largely on the proportion of the land that
is covered by buildings and roads, which is a bottom-up Can the US authorities
consequence of the quantity of development.) permit foreign embassies to
rescue their own citizens?
Type III Will the collaborative Are the people of New Orleans safe? Is New Orleans a viable Killer Demand
exogenous SoS produce the effects city?
intended?
• Effects: Indirect, Cascade, & Emergent. (These three overlap with the
Analysis first point above, but relate to levels 4, 5 & 6.)
• Endo-interoperability versus exo-interoperability (This distinction takes
Who/Whom into account the contractual basis on which the supplied systems are
defined. i.e. it is the contract that imposes the endo-exo distinction)
In order to do this analysis, it is necessary to say who is the client… in this case • Static versus dynamic (This rests on the distinction between what can be
FEMA under Brown. In technical terms, this means defining (i) the endo-exo
customised by the customer vs only by the supplier.)
‘cut’, and (ii) the viability-identity ‘cut’ locating the ‘mind’ under which the
supply-side pragmatics are being defined – i.e. the form of symmetric governance. • …
The third ‘cut’ defining the domain of behaviours of interest is implicit in the way We should be able to articulate all these in terms of our six types of
the other two ‘cuts’ are made. interoperability/risk.
Note that we can identify four teams from this – blue team (what our side is
capable of doing), red team (what the demand-side is capable of doing), white Solution Space
team (the ‘referees’ of what it is in ‘our’ interests to do), and black team
Faced with interoperability problems, there are at least three possible responses.
(traditionally intelligence assessments of what are all the possible scenarios under
which red team behaviours might arise). This maps onto the 2x2 nicely: red = 1. Increase interoperability. (But what does “increase” mean? It has to be
exo-viability, blue = endo-viability, white = endo-identity, black = exo-identities. defined in relation to the variety of forms of geometry (qua semantics)
From here it is a short step to defining a way into the workshops. that can be supported.)
Note overall the absence of effective command-and-control across the region 2. Increase tolerance/capacity for the risks and errors of interoperability.
means that FEMA’s understanding of its role was by definition limited to levels 1- (But this probably degrades the performance and utility of at least one
3… system for at least one stakeholder.)
3. Make structural changes to remove some of the interoperability
Problem Space requirements.
There are multiple ways of carving up the problem space.
• Scope of interoperability (intra-node, near-neighbour, etc.). . The three Architecture
they identify relate to levels 3, 4 & 5, ‘nodes’ being defined at level 3.
• Risk: Development, Integration and Mission. It is proposed that we Vertical and Horizontal Interoperability
examine the organisation of each of these, so that their own internal
With directive composition (central planning, single design authority), the
consistency/gaps can be evaluated as well as those that arise when they
question of permitted ignorance is delegated vertically, and the resultant business
are composed. (mission = force command, integration = sustainment,
geometry can be kept endogenous. A is decomposed into (or composed from) B
development = commissioning.)
and C. If there are risks associated with the interoperability between B and C,
these risks are owned by the person in the design hierarchy that owns A. This is As the systems get larger and more complex, the controlling mind over
true regardless whether you are following a top-down (analytic, decomposition) the directive composition progressively loses the ability to maintain
process or a bottom-up (synthetic, composition) process. visibility and control (C3I) over what is going on (WIGO).
In contrast, collaborative composition (planning at the edge between multiple So the (attempted) denial of exo-interoperability risk has the effect of amplifying
design authorities) requires that permitted ignorance has to be negotiated, and that risk (for someone).
the resultant business geometry has exogenous and endogenous elements.
The security implications of this can be seen in the growing disenchantment with
the Fortress model, and the emergence of Deperimeterization (Jericho Forum).
Inside and outside
One way of trying to tackle interoperability risk is to bring everything “under Stratified Geometry
control” inside some boundary. Under symmetric forms of governance, the
Re-stating the notion of Geometry and its relationship to interoperability and risk
relevance of exo-interoperability risks is denied. (In contrast, asymmetric forms
of governance will have to agree which forms of exo-interoperability risk can be Stratification produced by three asymmetries - the different levels describing the
ignored.) different kinds of risk.
“Denied” here means both a cognitive refusal to know about the risk The point about the third asymmetry is that it requires dynamic composition,
itself as well as a refusal to respond: it doesn’t exist, and even if it does which in turn requires a variable endogenous geometry.
exist we’re not going to do anything about it, and anyway we’re already
This in turn requires that the business invests in its infrastructures to enable them
doing everything we can. (This is an example of what Freud called Kettle
to be under-determined along those dimensions of behaviour that support the
Logic.)
forms of dynamic composition required.
At the same time, not everything can be brought under control, so risk is
Which in turn requires asymmetric forms of governance capable of authorising
‘exported’ in the sense that some of the costs and consequences of the
such investment.
way the business chooses to handle endo-interoperability risks are
externalised into exogenous geometries (e.g. someone else pays for
disposing of the waste). Exo-interoperability (along with everything else Edge Roles - Collaboration and Negotiation
we cannot control) is Not Our Problem.
Dealing with exo-interoperability calls for proper and accountable collaboration /
But in a situation of asymmetric demand, the more you try to impose control and negotiation between endogenous and exogenous geometries.
export risk, the worse things get.
Collaborative composition - composing services in relation to the context-of-use
Systems bloat.
This places emphasis on the edge role - the role at the edge of the organization,
Systems become increasingly topologically complex. “Inside” starts to where the relationships between endo and exo are negotiated.
contain and/or replicate pieces of “outside”.
Taking “Power to the edge” requires that leadership be distributed, leading to
questions of “Accountability at the Edge”.
In order to hold a person at the edge accountable for the response of the business • To learn collectively how these roles work in relation to one another in
to the particular demand, there has to be transparency of that response. This is a this specific organization at this time.
horizontal transparency that contrasts with the vertical transparency demanded by
• To discover the extent to which this organization lacks capability in
hierarchies. (e.g. in managing supply chains)
respect of these roles, and to start to develop this capability.
Business intelligence examples …
• To obtain a snapshot of the current organization of demand facing this
organization.
Practical steps Possible uses of this workshop process provide a way of approaching a number of
issues relating to the impact of asymmetric forms of demand including: business
Risk Analysis strategy, organizational redesign, SOA design, SOA governance, security
analysis, and governance.
We use methods of organizational and matrix analysis to distinguish the endo-
interoperability risks (which come from failures within the organization) from Team Team Style Team Focus Level Asymmetry
three types of exo-interoperability risk (where the source is outside the
The capabilities that our I.... technology
organization), equivalent to errors of execution, planning and intention within the
side want to use
user’s domain. Blue First
We are aware of various analytical techniques for understanding and managing What our side is capable II... outputs
endo-interoperability risk; we are not aware of analytical techniques apart from of doing
ours for understanding and managing exo-interoperability risk. But in a service- White The … what it is in ‘our’ III . business
driven world these are often the biggest risks - so the general inability to manage ‘referees’ interests to do
them is a very major problem. Many of the organizations we talk to are still in of …
denial about this, but we are starting to find clients who recognize the need for a Second
systematic approach to managing the exo-interoperability risks. What the demand side is I.... solution
capable of demanding of
us
Workshop Approach Red
The way the demand- II... demand
In order to work with these issues within a specific organization, we have side makes use of what
developed a workshop process involving four teams (blue, white, red and black), it demands
which is designed to unpack and articulate the different levels of interoperability
Black Intelligence … what are all the III . context-of- Third
risk. The workshop process is deliberately modelled on military planning, but has
been redesigned for use by commercial / civilian organizations as well as military assessments possible scenarios under use
ones. of … which red team
behaviours might arise
The typical objectives of the workshop are as follows:
The workshop works in the following way.

• Facilitating the embodiment of each colour
• Facilitating the conversations within and between colours.
• Using the understanding of the four colours to lay out the full complexity
of the system within which White must determine what is in its interests.
• Understanding the consequences of the presence/absence of certain
colours for the governance process.
There are particular issues for the role of White.
• White constrains the way Blue behaves in White’s interests. Under
conditions of asymmetric demand, White will have to choose to under-
determine Blue, allow Blue distributed leadership in the way Blue
responds to Red.
• White has to understand Black in order to grant appropriate under-
determination to Blue to enable Blue to satisfy Red.
• In these terms, we may need to introduce a fifth colour (Purple) to
represent asymmetric governance (White addressing explicitly the
consequences of Black).
Notes
The methods outlined in this research note were developed by Boxer Research Ltd
www.brl.com. For further information about Asymmetric Design, please visit
www.asymmetricdesign.com.

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Research Note: Asymmetric Design

Interoperability and Uncertainty –

• In an emergency, a distributed piece of information calls for a central

Problem Details Analysis Level

The Risks Matrix

Uncertainty and Risk

The workshop works in the following way.

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