RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Legaspi v CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)

Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a special
civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner was
challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities
of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar.
Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution
provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law as in regulation in the manner of examining the public records by the government agency
in custodythereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute.
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by
law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.
The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public interest. All
appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a public office is a
public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities to
their positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on the result of the
CSC eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual
or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person
occupying governmentpositions.
Valmonte Vs Belmonte
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately
before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c)
to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not
having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General
Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e
are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired
objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest
loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should
be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the

government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers
themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible
positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions
being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the
framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by
the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although
citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records,"
the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES GR# 183591, October 14, 2008
Carpio-Morales, J:
Facts:
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of
Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the
aspirations
of
the
MILF
to
have
a
Bangsamoro
homeland.
Issue:
When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its constitutionality merely
moot
and
academic
and
therefore
no
longer
justiciable
by
the
Court?
Held:
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever
remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or
binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore,
and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a
justiciable
controversy
for
resolution
by
this
Court.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable
controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only
advises
what
the
law
would
be
upon
a
hypothetical
state
of
facts.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest
these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power of judicial
review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public
clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not
committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.

Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY

Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that
same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of
the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to
grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the
execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.
CHAVEZ VS PCGG
G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former
government official asked the court to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman]
from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of
Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos
gold hoard.
Chavez assailed the validity of the General and Supplemental Agreement executed by the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs on December 28,1993.
Item No. 2 of the General Agreement states that the assets of the PRIVATE PARTY (Marcos
heirs) shall be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement entered into by the PCGG and the Marcos heirs which
committing to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs is
valid.
HELD: The petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December
28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID
for being contrary to law and the Constitution.
Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of
taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the
Construction. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a
certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution,
specifically provides: "No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no
power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten
wealth cases.

Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses form paying taxes on their
properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill
of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute
class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and
equitable."
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal
revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is
reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's
financial position demonstrates a clear inability to pay. Definitely, neither requisite is present in
the case of the Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the
validity of the claims against their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can
the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a
tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or
excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify the
collection of the tax due. In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done even before the
determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which
legal actions have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised.
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining
order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court
made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the
National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that
the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are
not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking

jurisdiction

over

the

subject

matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among
workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand,
Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and
strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987
of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employeesenjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of
any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as government employees and
that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under
R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes
within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to
enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Benjamin Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers' Union

Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory
(ERF) since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers Union). Under the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which means
that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the
said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU
claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of
the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only
in 1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then
moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he
is not exempt from the close shop agreement because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization, is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWUs and ERFs legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse
to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was
employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein.
Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It
recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it
recognizes the workers right to join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a
constitutional right over a contractual right.

In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Facts: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the
provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP ByLaws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment ofmembership fee and suspension for failure to pay the
same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being
compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty
and property and thereby null and void.
Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent.
Held: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official
national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its
objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe
the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its
existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of
attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
SWS vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the
elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue
that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their
results through mass media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means
other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may
well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES
Facts:
The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections. On June 5,
2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to release an audiotape of a
mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which was audiotaped allegedly through
wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.. In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations "found to have caused the spread, the
playing and the printing of the contents of a tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President
about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections.
Issue: Is the warning to media in not airing the hello Garci tapes a case of prior restraint?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court holds that it is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or
followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents
while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does not
limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an
act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior
restraints on the right to free speech and press.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

People v Pinlac 165 SCRA 675 (1988)

Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He
assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as
evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of
his constitutional
rights
and
without
the
assistance
of
counsel.
Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.
Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the
failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him without
appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover
the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence
and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted
the accused.
Republic Act No. 7438

April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being and
guarantee full respect for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or
investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and
understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of
his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that
before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and
write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the
investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such
investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be
in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid
waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the
municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such
extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.

(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel;
otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences
with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him
or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization
duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization
duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse,
fianc or fiance, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece,
and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who
is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case,
those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light
felonies;lawphi1alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or
grave felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with a capital
offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is
conducted, provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such
municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds
are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be
detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who
fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos
(P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or
both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who
has been previously convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such
investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford
the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister
chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring
privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour
of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years
nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).lawphi1

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any
detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and
prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws,
presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
RIGHT TO BAIL
h deposit, or recognizance. (1a)
Section 2.

Conditions of the bail; requirements. All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:

(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of
the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was
originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court of these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due notice shall be deemed
a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount of the undertaking and the
conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing the face,
left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail. (2a)
Section 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail. No person under detention by legal process
shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. (3a)
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognize as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application
for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his
bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial
Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (5a)
Section 6. Capital offense defined. A capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing at the time
of its commission and of the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. (6a)
Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (7a)
Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person
who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence
presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of
either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify. (8a)
Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall
fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and

(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

Excessive bail shall not be required. (9a)
Section 10. Corporate surety. Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in accordance with
law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an
officer of the corporation duly authorized by its board of directors. (10a)
Section 11. Property bond, how posted. A property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien on the real
property given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days after the approval of the bond, the
accused shall cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with the Register of Deeds if the
land is registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space provided therefor, in the Registry of
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in the office of the
provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure to do so shall be
sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond and his re-arrest and detention. (11a)
Section 12. Qualifications of sureties in property bond. The qualification of sureties in a property bond shall
be as follows:
(a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines;
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the amount of the undertaking;
(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that expressed in the undertaking
but the aggregate of the justified sums must be equivalent to the whole amount of bail demanded.
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over and above all just
debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution. (12a)
Section 13. Justification of sureties. Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken before the judge that he
possesses the qualifications prescribed in the preceding section. He shall describe the property given as security,
stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances, the number and amount of other bails entered into by him and
still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine the sureties upon oath concerning their
sufficiency in such manner as it may deem proper. No bail shall be approved unless the surety is qualified. (13a)
Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with
the nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by
the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper
certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this
Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and
applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever
made the deposit. (14a)
Section 15. Recognizance. Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the court may release a person in
custody to his own recognizance or that of a responsible person. (15a)
Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. No bail shall be required when the law
or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment

prescribe for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the
trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro,
he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the
offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall
be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court. (16a)
Section 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused
is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with
any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the
application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial,
or on appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province,
city, or municipality where he is held. (17a)
Section 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail under section 8 of this Rule, the
court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation.
(18a)
Section 19. Release on bail. The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge with
whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule.
Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted the bail shall
forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending,
which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed. (19a)
Section 20. Increase or reduction of bail. After the accused is admitted to bail, the court may, upon good
cause, either increase or reduce its amount. When increased, the accused may be committed to custody if he
does not give bail in the increased amount within a reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal
charge, who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information, may, at any subsequent stage
of the proceedings and whenever a strong showing of guilt appears to the court, be required to give bail in the
amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to custody. (20a)
Section 21. Forfeiture of bond. When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his
bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to
appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within
which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the
amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the
amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the

accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the
bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or
execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bond. (22a)
Section 23. Arrest of accused out on bail. For the purpose of surrendering the accused, the bondsmen may
arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be arrested
by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion.
An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from
the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. (23a)
Section 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. No bail shall be allowed after the judgment of
conviction has become final. If before such finality, the accused has applies for probation, he may be allowed
temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may
allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall
bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. (24a)
Section 25. Court supervision of detainees. The court shall exercise supervision over all persons in custody
for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the Regional Trial Courts shall
conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city, and municipal jails and their prisoners within their
respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on their proper accommodation
and health and examine the condition of the jail facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of
minors from adults, ensure the observance of the right of detainees to confer privately with counsel, and strive
to eliminate conditions inimical to the detainees.
In cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court, the municipal trial judges or municipal circuit
trial judges shall conduct monthly personal inspections of the municipal jails in their respective municipalities
and submit a report to the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction therein.
A monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the executive judges to the Court Administrator which
shall state the total number of detainees, the names of those held for more than thirty (30) days, the duration of
detention, the crime charged, the status of the case, the cause for detention, and other pertinent information.
(25a)
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. An
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the
legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The
court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. (n)
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS. OLALIA
G.R. NO. 153675, APRIL 19, 2007
FACTS:
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap.

201 of Hong Kong. He alsofaces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That
same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr.
issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying hisapplication for bail and this was granted by
respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
HELD:
No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the
assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as
"the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law
of the requesting state or government."
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown
civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial
or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a
party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently,
this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does
not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditees rights to life, liberty, and dueprocess. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. This Court should not,

therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civilcases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower
than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to
show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." Read full text
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18, 1995)
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying for
the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo
Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him
for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal
Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by
said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged
flight from that country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was
dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto
proceeding against private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for cancellation of
respondents CoC on account of the candidates disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted
quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to
be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term
fugitive from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a
candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases here and abroad
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great
and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181).
However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply
as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain
congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and

undue circumscription of the law.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is in fact
a fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion.
The omission is understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the
basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not
being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
JULY 8, 2014 / ARDYESGUERRA
FACTS:
Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and
remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days.
The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime
occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction
ISSUES and RULING
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only
original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time
they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and
testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the
prosecutions formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice
of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of
the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the
latter fatally defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:
1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed on
or about the 5th of July 1991, such is not fatal to the prosecutions cause considering that Section 11 of the
same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.

What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?

Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part
of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may
be verbal. The specific word demand need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the
person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be
tantamount to a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused,
the query was tantamount to a demand.
May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the
evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their
deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of
the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value
and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950]
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
withoutjustifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about
eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a
counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the
latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed
by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the
opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show
whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of
the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the
presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good
defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the
fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this
case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not
sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the
accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the
offense found to be capital by the court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee

VS.
EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA, accused-apellant
G.R NO 122770, January 16, 1998
FACTS:
Eduardo Agbayani was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter, Eden Agbayani at the sanctity of
their rented room on July 19, 1994 and was found guilty of the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed
before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights
of the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel. He
further alleged that his counsel de oficio was never prepared during all the scheduled hearings; worse, even
waived the presence of appellant after the third witness for the prosecution was presented. He also averred that
the trial court uses its inherent power of contempt to intimidate private complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused
of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case back
for a new trial.
RULING:
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused
of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must
be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that
such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and
trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary.
Thus it has also been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the
trial court failed to inform that accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was
informed by the court of such right.
Sec 19 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2)
days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the
right must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a
ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did
not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the
counsel who represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records showed he was able to crossexamine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent the appellant in court.
The SC thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Pecho v People 262 SCRA 518 (1996)
Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex crime of
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was assailed with the contention of the
defense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused
was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the
absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was acquitted but the court held
judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of
double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime of
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document and that the accused was not informed

of this charge against him in the filing of the information.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted
Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the crime he is charged with as follows:
To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;
To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines
the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information
or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused
may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has
been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the counsel of
the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both or either of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of
the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was
deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952; 31 JUL 1984]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate.
In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan
reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied
the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this
instant petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract or transaction
within the purview of .RA.3019.
Held: R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share
percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and not a
violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in
the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or business transaction,
but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature.
The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a
contract nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some consideration as in credit
transactions. And this element is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.

BORJA VS. MENDOZA [77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned. That
not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision
finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu
presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his
constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to
submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that
the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.
Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why
he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due
process that requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of
possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least
then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being
arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge Senining
convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional
right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with
petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment
can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated
December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside.
Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the
aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu
for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions
of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.

PEOPLE VS TEE
FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid
conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics
Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge
quantities of marijuana.
Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the NBI had not
complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion,
however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24,
1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of
marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach warrant which says an
undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence makes the warrant void for vagueness.
HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of
reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers

serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the
wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus
prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad
or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is
not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to
be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean
that no warrant could issue.
CONDE VS. RIVERA [45 PHIL 650; G.R. NO. 21741; 25 JAN 1924]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less
the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at
hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to
come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when
the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when
originally charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy
trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay
down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the
trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a
year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or
if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases againstthe
Former President Joseph E. Estrada. Perez vs. Estrada [AM 01-4-03-SC, 29 June 2001]
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing
duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the
Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr.
Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and
Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the
petition.
Issue: Whether the press should be allowed to air Estradas trial to the public.
Held: The press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an important
instrument in the quest for truth. Recent history exemplifies media's invigorating presence, and its contribution
to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of the enormous effect of media
in stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly political exercise, indeed
the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times, that would soon culminate in EDSA II. The
propriety of granting or denying the petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the
accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring

a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, the right of the accused must be preferred
to win. With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it
behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and
dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to
by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid
of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and
decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions. Due process
guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above
its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced
not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting
dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. Thus, an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that
belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial
aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only
implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have
enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall
then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings
United States vs. Javier [GR L-12990, 21 January 1918]
Facts: Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of 22 October 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral
situated in the barrio of Trapiche, municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning
when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao had
disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership
of sergeant Presa (+) on November 20, encountered Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez
leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the following
day, the Constabulary found the carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa
Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been
taken from his corral on the night of 22 October 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession
of Javier. Javier was charged for stealing the carabao before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo
Tomas, Province of Batangas. During trial, the sworn statement of sergeant Presca, now deceased, was
presented in court by the prosecution. Presca's signature in the statement was identified. Javier alleged that the
lower court erred in admitting said sworn statement as evidence.
Issue: Whether the sworn statement, which was executed by a person now deceased, is inadmissible inasmuch
as the accused is not given the opportunity to cross-examine the author thereof.
Held: The Philippine Bill of Rights provides "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), states
taht "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: to be confronted at the trial by and to crossexamine the witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, it "intends to secure the
accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an
opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or
ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in
the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because crossexamination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment
and appearance of the witness while testifying. The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and
answer under circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso
of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not

the testimony of a witness deceased, given in a former action between the same relating to the same matter.
Consequently, the exception provided by section 298, No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by
the prosecution in the lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presca a dying declaration or a
deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination. Under these circumstances, the
sworn statement was improperly received in evidence in the lower court. Still, although the Court could find
this to be reversible error and, ordinarily, should remand the case for a new trial. The Court however is
convinced that this would gain the accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao
and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed
sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Talino vs Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, March 16, 1987
FACTS:
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his testimony therein imputing
guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-examine him. 1
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with estafa through
falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount
of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and
never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal
payments. 2 Docketed as CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the accused
until after the prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino
asked for separate trials, which were allowed. They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other
accused continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat gave
damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned transactions. 4 In
due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang
Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the other
defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it
violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether or not the testimony in a separate trial was considered by the respondent court
against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his conviction.
DECISION:
NO. It was not considered in its finding of facts but the court has this to say on the issue.
In its decision, the respondent court * makes the following remarks about the separate trial:
It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial because the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many
incriminatory things against the other accused when he took the stand in his own defense. But because Basilio,
Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a matter
of fact, they were not even required to be present when the other accused were presenting their defenses, the
latter's testimonies cannot now be considered against said three accused.
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to the accused,
especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. 6 While it
is true that Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion for such a trial should
be filed, we have held in several cases that this should be done before the prosecution commences presenting its
evidence, although, as an exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have
rested, where there appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses of the accused. 7 In such an event,
the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain on record against an accused, with right of rebuttal on the
part of the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused. 8

The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for
separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to
avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court,
in according the accused the right of confrontation.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution 9 to the person facing
criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to crossexamine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is
any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who
cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits
are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed
by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration. 11
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not consider the
testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no
mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as
proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government.
The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial evidence other than Ulat's testimony,
we see no reason to disturb them. It is futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional presumption of
innocence because his guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond reasonable doubt, and we
agree.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
CHAVEZ VS CA
TIME TO INVOKE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CRIMINAL CASE
FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged of qualified theft of a motor vehicle,one Thunderbird car, with accessories
amounting to P22,000.
That this theft was committed when the petitioner with the help of one, Asistio have completed a deed of sale of
Thunderbird which belongs to Johnson Lee. Chavesz telephoned Lee and made an appointment for the sale of
Thunderbird with Sumilang as a introduced buyer.
As payment was made to Eugenes restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove to the place. Chavez and
Sumilang, pretending to get the money for the perfection of sale of the Thunderbird car, left the two Chinese
alone, Johnson Lee and his brother.
When the two Chinese went outside to look for Chavez and Sumilang, they could no longer locate the former
and the Thunderbird car was also from the parking lot.
Nevertheless the Thunderbird was impounded however, it was already been repainted.
During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia presented Chavez as a witness. And despite of Chavezs objection being
aware that the latter would be self incriminated, the Court sustained the stand of the Fiscal saying.
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the
accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners statement against himself can be used to convict him.
HELD:
No. It is in the context that we sat that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. To
repeat, it is mandatory: it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right.
The court may not extract from a defendants own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt.
In reality, the purpose calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.

In the case at bar, the petitioner did not volunteer to take the witness stand in his own defence; he did not offer
himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify.
There is not even a valid waiver of the privilege. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be certain and
unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably and willingly made.
Wherefore the accused is acquitted.
People v. Esparas (1996)
J. Puno
Facts: Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of shabu. After arraignment and pleading not guilty, she escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. She was found
guilty and was sentenced to death. She remains at large at present. This is the issue.
Issue: Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparass death sentence despite
her absence.
Held: Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to review a decision imposing
the death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts. There, the Court said,
mainly, that the judgment of conviction (capital punishment of death) entered on trial is not final,
cannot be executed, and is wholly without force or effect until the cause has been passed upon by
the Supreme Court. TC acts as a commissioner who takes the testimony and reports the same to
the Court with its recommendation. A decision of TC does not become final unless and until it
has been reviewed by the Court. An accused who was sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled under the law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is
founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the land, to the end that its justice and
legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of
the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions. (The Court here applied Sec. 50,
Gen. Orders No. 58.)
A little history on the matter: The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty. Section 2(4) of Art. VIII provided for review by the Court of death penalty cases. Both
the Rules of Court of 1940 and 1964 require the transmission to the Court of the records
of all cases in which the death penalty was imposed by TC, whether the defendant has appealed
or not, for review and judgment. These rules were taken from the General Orders itself. The
1973 Constitution did not also prohibit death penalty. Sec. 9, Rule 122 provided the procedure
for review of death penalty cases by the Court. Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure even reenacted said procedure of review and even expressly used the term "automatic
review and judgment" by the Court.
So in People v. Villanueva (1953), the Court held that the withdrawal of appeal by a death convict does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to review his conviction. In People v. Cornelio
(1971), which involved the escape of a death convict, the Court held that said escape does not relieve the Court of its duty of reviewing his conviction. In People v. Daban (1972), the Court said,
speaking about convictions by TC of death penalty on the defendant, that until after the Court
has spoken en consulta, no finality could be attached to said decision. This automatic review cannot be waived by the accused nor by the courts. The mere fact of escape of the accused cannot be
a bar at all. In People v. Saliling (1976), the Court said that it is not precluded from reviewing the
death sentence of an accused who is at large. In People v. Buynay (1984), the Court reiterated the
rule that escape of a death convict will not automatically result in the dismissal of his appeal.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
Facts:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10
year-old daughter of his common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be imposed upon him. He
then filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising constitutionality of Republic Act No.

7659 and the death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed the mode of execution
of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death
by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him
under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due
process, 3. a violation of the Philippines obligations under international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an
unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the petitioner
added equal protection as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death
Penalty Law, and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment;
execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional,
lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than
electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
Issues: 1. Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment? 2. Is it a violation of our
international treaty obligations? 3. Is it discriminatory (pertaining to sec 17)?
Held: 1. No 2. Yes 3rd. Petition denied.
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
because (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage
for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) its
implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the
date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the
possibility of mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel. It is well-settled in
jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In Harden v.
Director of Prisons- punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. Would the lack in particularity
then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law cruel, degrading or
inhuman? The Court believes not. Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which
court will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death
convict. As petitioner already knows, the court which designates the date of execution is the trial court
which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its
promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of
the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of
notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with
the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out not
earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times. Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the
time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive
clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. Petitioner also contends that the infliction of
wanton pain in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an
untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders
lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated. First. Petitioner has neither
alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained
personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the
United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the
convict, without any other evidence whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of

R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to
the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of
the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal
injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. In a limited sense, anything is
cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict,
it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this
reason, is to go unpunished. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty
inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely.
People v. AdilG.R. No. L-41863, April 22, 1977BARREDO, JA!"#$
M a r g a r i t o F a m a J r., w h i l e a r m e d w i t h a p i e c e o f s t o n e , a s s a u l t , a t t a c k a n d u s e personal
violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said Miguel Viajar on
the right cheek, thereby inicting physical injuries whichreuired medical attendance from ! to " days baring
complications. #n July $, %"$!,the accused entered a plea of not guilty &slight physical injuries'. #n June (,
%"$!,when Viajar developed a permanent scar and deformity on the face, he )led a moreserious charge &serious
physical injuries' arising from the same incident.
%##&E$
*s there double jeopardy in this case+
'ELD$
o. -hen the complaint was )led on pril %!, %"$!, only three days had passed since the incident in
which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yetno indications of a graver injury or conse uence
to be su/ered by said o/endedparty. 0vidently, it was only later that the alleged deformity became
apparent. *n1eople v. 2orac, it was held that if after the )rst prosecution a new fact superveneson which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new
and distinct o/ense, the accused cannot be said to bein second jeopardy if indicted for the new o/ense.
*n other words, in the peculiarcircumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent
Fama Jr. cannot hold.
CITIZENSHIP
Co v. HRET
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the
candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are
the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose
Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
ISSUE:
whether or not, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion. (EWAN KO KUNG TAMA TOH)
HELD:
On Jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,

and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to
review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they
have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence
of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is
no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for
the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what
it thinks is apparent error.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the
HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
On Citizenship
His grandfather was naturalized as a Filipino, Ong married a Filipina. Blah blah. He is only renting a house
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case
ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in
order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented
house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate
should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
Disclaimer: I just copy pasted this from the actual case in
toto, if youre going to make a case digest from this, please make the necessary adjustments.
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he was naturalized as
a Philippine citizen. Despite hisnaturalization, he applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport by
the Consular Section of the PortugueseEmbassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies that
his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial
documents he signed, specifically, the Companiesregistry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime
in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition forhabeas corpus. An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court en banc denied the petition.
When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official
documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be
heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less,
upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim
to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient.

REPUBLIC VS DELA ROSA

Posted by kaye lee on 12:16 AM
FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63 before
the RTC Manila.
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication
of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive
weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing.
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24, 1992,
citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing
was moved to February 21. No publication or copy was issued about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992
and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.
RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office
and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final
and executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

Ramon Labo, Jr. vs Commission on

Elections
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for
quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he
was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian
did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he
indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his

marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes
considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will
of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in
the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as
an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of
subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he
needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here.
It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also
claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino
citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress
none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome
the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously,
would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared
the mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of
vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if
a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they
do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms
of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.