Fire Safety Journal, 5 (1983) 233 - 240

233

A Review of the Examination and Analysis of the Dynamics of Human

Behavior in the Fire at the MGM Grand Hotel, Clark County, Nevada,
as Determined from a Selected Questionnaire Population

JOHN L. BRYAN
Department of Fire Protection Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, MD (U.S.A.)
and
National Fire Protection Association, Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA (U.S.A.)

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

A 28 item, 4 page questionnaire was mailed

to 1,960 persons, w h o were registered guests
at the MGM Grand Hotel at the time o f the
fire on N o v e m b e r 21, 1980. Responses were
received from 554 guests, approximately 28.3
percent o f the questionnaire population. The
information presented in this report consists
o f a selected presentation o f the data contained
in the complete study report published by the
National Fire Protection Association entitled:
"An Examination and Analysis o f the Dynamics o f the H u m a n Behavior in the MGM
Grand Hotel Fire, Clark County, Nevada,
N o v e m b e r 21, 1980".
The study presents the questionnaire data
in relation to the following: guests' characters
and behavior; the cultural and social relationships between guests; the guests' means o f
becoming aware o f the fire, and the time o f
their fire awareness, the first five actions o f
the guests following their recognition o f the
fire incident; the guests' location in the hotel
and their use o f the hotel stairs; the means o f
evacuation o f the guests, the obstructions to
evacuation and the type o f assistance provided
in their evacuation; the time interval o f the
evacuation delay and the actions o f the guests
while waiting in rooms. In addition, the means
by which s m o k e migrated into the rooms as
reported by the guests was tabulated.
The actions o f the guests appeared to indicate the occurrence o f convergence clusters
among those unable to evacuate immediately,
and predominantly altruistic and cooperative
behavior among the guests.

The data presented in this paper are a condensed and selected presentation of the data
collected in a questionnaire study involving
1960 guests registered in the MGM Grand
Hotel on the night of November 20 - 21, 1980
[8]. The study was conducted by the National
Fire Protection Association with the cooperation and assistance of the Clark County,
Nevada, Fire Department under Chief R o y L.
Parrish. The data presented in this selected
compilation were obtained from the questionnaire responses of 554 guests, consisting
of 28.3 per cent of the population receiving
questionnaires, and these condensed results
should not be extrapolated to other guests or
other segments of the population in the hotel
at the time of the fire incident, primarily
visitors, casino patrons, hotel staff, and
security personnel.
The essential information and support for
the study were provided by the Clark County,
Nevada, Fire Department. Financial support
for the study was provided by the National
Fire Protection Association, which received
financial support from the following agencies:
The Center for Fire Research, National Bureau
of Standards, The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. The United States
Fire Administration, and the Mobil Foundation.
Staff personnel from the National Fire Protection Association assisted in the design of
the study questionnaire and the integration of
the questionnaire data as follows: A. Elwood
Willey, Assistant Vice President, Research and
Fire Information Services {Project Director);

0379-7112/83/$3.00

(D Elsevier Sequoia/Printed in The Netherlands

234

Richard L. Best, Fire Analysis Specialist;

David P. Demers, Consultant; and Paul J.
Thompson. Questionnaire mailing, programming and the processing of returns was
accomplished by Jon C. Jones, Manager, Fire
Data Services, Jeffrey B. Thompson, Manager,
Systems and Programs, Ms. Mary E. Rymsha
and Ms. Lucy Hirshberg. The c o m p u t e r tabulation and analysis of the responses were accomplished by James A. Milke, Lecturer. Ms.
Cindy Baumann and Ms. Alison Rodgers of
the Department of Fire Protection Engineering,
University of Maryland, compiled the analysis
report.

TABLE 1

Relationships between guests in study population

Classification

Number

Spouse
Other
Relative
Undetermined

33~
76
29
lli

61.0
137

7"~5.1

100 0

TABLE 2
M e a n s o f fire a w a r e n e s s f o r s t u d y p o p u l a t i o n
Means

CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE

STUDY

20.0

Number

"~

POPULA-

TION

The study population consisted of 554

guests, from a questionnaire mailing list of
1960 guests for a total response of 28.3 per
cent. Guests with foreign addresses and guests
located in rooms with an identified fatality
were excluded from the questionnaire study.
It should be noted that at least 6 guests did
respond on the questionnaire that were rendered unconscious in their rooms and recovered in the hospital. The sexual classification
of the questionnaire population consisted of
331 male respondents and 222 female respondents with an age range from 20 to 84
years of age.
The relationships of the guests to other individuals within their rooms or adjacent rooms
has been a critical determinant of the actions
of participants in previously studied fire
incidents [1 - 3]. Table 1 indicates t h a t the
majority of the guests were with their spouse
at the time of their becoming aware of the fire
incident in the MGM Grand Hotel Fire. In addition, it should be noted that 80 per cent. of
the questionnaire population were with
another person when they became aware of
the fire incident and only 20 per cent. of the
population were alone.

MEANS AND TIME OF FIRE AWARENESS,

PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT

The means by which the study population
became aware of the fire incident are presented in Table 2. These means of awareness

Saw smoke
Fire apparatus
Smelled smoke
Notified by others
People yelling
Knock on door
Noise
Other
(97.1%)

q5
~q9
7,f
71
7~
4~;
40
~7
53~

i 7.7
16.5
13,8
13.8
t 3.2
8.9
7.4
8.7
L00

TABLE 3
T i m e o f fire a w a r e n e s s o f t h e s t u d y p o p u l a t i o n
Time

Number

06.30 - 06.45
06.46 - 07.00
07.01 - 07.15
07.16 - 07.30
07.31 - 07.45
07.46 - 08.00
08.01 - 09.00
Undetermined

.~*
6~,
19,~
207
2~
In
Ii
1 :,

Total

554

%
l~6
12.3
35.7
37.5
5.0
3.2
2.0
2.7
100

may be classified by the fire generated or

physical means of awareness, and the people
created or psychological means of awareness.
Thus, the psychologically created means of
fire awareness were "Fire Apparatus",
"Notified by Others", "People Yelling",
" K n o c k on Door", and "Noise". The physical
means of fire awareness would, of course, be
the means concerned with the sighting and
the smelling of the smoke.
The time at which the guests became aware
of the fire incident in the MGM Grand Hotel

235

fire is presented in Table 3. In relation to the

times presented, it should be recognized that
the Clark County Fire Department received a
telephone notification of the fire from the
hotel at 07.17 and the first units arrived on
the scene at 07.18 [9]. It should be observed
that approximately 50 per cent of the questionnaire study population were aware of the
fire incident prior to 07.16, and thus prior to
the dispatch of the fire apparatus which alerted
many guests. As might be expected, the majority of the guests becoming aware of the fire
incident after 07.30 were asleep and were
delayed in their awareness and recognition of
the occurrence of the fire incident. It should
also be recognized that some of the guests on
the fifth floor, the first guest room floor level,
were alerted to the fire incident by the sound
of the fire propagation under their rooms.
The means by which the guests became
aware of the fire incident were generally by
very nonambiguous cues as to the occurrence
of the fire incident. The physical appearance
of the smoke was variously described as
"Black", " D a r k " , and as "Suffocating". Thus,
it is apparent that m a n y of the guests were
immediately aware of the extreme threatening
nature of the fire incident. It would appear
that approximately 43 per cent. of the questionnaire population estimated the fire
incident to be serious, while 36 per cent.
estimated the fire incident to be n o t serious.
It would seem a guest's previous experiences
with a fire situation might have an influence
on his estimate of the seriousness of the fire
incident. Thus, it is important that one realizes
that only 60 of the guests indicated that they
had been involved in a prior fire experience.
These 60 guests involved approximately 11
per cent of the study population.
ACTIONS OF THE GUEST POPULATION

The questionnaire distributed to the guests

in the study population provided space for
the respondent to indicate a total of five
actions. Obviously, those individuals who
evacuated the building successfully in less
than five actions indicated a lesser number of
actions. Also, as might be expected, individuals
who attempted unsuccessfully to evacuate the
building were often involved in more than five
actions, and many of the guests detailed these
additional actions.

TABLE 4
First a c t i o n s o f t h e s t u d y p o p u l a t i o n
Actions

Number

Dressed
Opened door
Notified roommates
Looked out of window
G o t o u t of bed
Left r o o m
Attempted to phone
Other

149
88
64
54
25
24
19
131

Total

554

%
26.9
15.9
11.6
9.8
4.5
4.3
3.4
23.6
100

TABLE 5
Second actions of the study population
Actions

Number

Dressed
Opened door
W e n t to exit
Secured valuables
Looked out of window
Left r o o m
Wet towels -- face
Other

111
64
56
37
31
29
20
201

Total

549

%
20.1
11.6
10.2
6.8
5.7
5.3
3.7
36.6
100

The first actions of the study population

are presented in Table 4. It should be noted
that the predominant first actions of the guests
were attempts to structure the situation and
thus they were information seeking actions.
These behaviors involved the actions of
"Opened Door", " L o o k i n g Out of Window"
and " A t t e m p t e d to Phone". The remaining
first actions were primarily preparatory actions
for the initiation of an evacuation, including
the actions of: "Dressed", "Notified Roommates", and " G o t Out of Bed". It should be
remembered that 20 per cent of the study
population were alone at the time of the fire
incident and thus did n o t have the "Notified
R o o m m a t e s " alternative.
The second actions of the study population
are presented in Table 5. As would be expected,
the total second action population is slightly
less than the first action population. An
examination of Table 5 indicates that the first
reported self-protection action by individuals
involved that of "Wet Towels-Face". It should
also be noticed that there is additional prepa-

236

ration behavior and evidence of evacuation

initiation with the actions o f " W ent to E x i t "
and " Secu r ed Valuables".
The third actions indicated a rather critical
departure from the first and second actions,
since the evacuation related actions are becoming prevalent with those of: "Went to
E x i t " , " L e f t R o o m " , " O p e n e d D o o r " , and
" A t t e m p t e d Ex it" , as indicated in Table 6.
The action o f " A t t e m p t e d E x i t " , is the first
indication o f unsuccessful at t em pt s at evacuation by members of the study population, and
these actions were also r e p o r t e d in the f our t h
and fifth actions of the guests.

TABLE 7
Fourth actions of the study population
Actions

Number

W e n t to exit
R e t u r n e d to r o o m
P u t t o w e l s -- d o o r
Went d o w n stairs
Wet t o w e l s -- face
A t t e m p t e d exit
W e n t to a n o t h e r exit
Other

~!
~~
-:, 1
-'"
23
22
1,,~
255

Total

-,q ,2

16 ]
s I
6 ,~
-~.,I
t.6
1.;~
3.6
50,8
1 t)O

TABLE 6

'FABLE 8

Third actions of the study population

Fifth actions of the study populatmn

Actions

Actions

Number

Dressed
Went to exit
Left room
Opened door
Wet t o w e l s - - face
A t t e m p t e d exit
Secured valuables
Other

59
51
44
36
34
31
23
259

Total

537

11.0
9 5
8.2
6 7
6.3
5.8
4.3
48.2
100

The f o u r th actions of the study popul at i on

are presented in Table 7. An exam i na t i on of
these indicates th at the previous behavior
periods o f preparation for evacuation and inf o r m a t i o n gathering to structure the seriousness o f the threat have passed, and the guests
are n ow involved in evacuation or a t t e m pt i ng
to provide an area o f refuge and increase their
self p ro tectio n . The indications of unsuccessful evacuation attem pt s are provided by the
f o u r t h actions of: " R e t u r n e d T o R o o m " ,
" A t t e m p t e d E x i t " , and " W ent T o A n o t h e r
E x i t " . The action of " P u t Towels-Door", is
the first indication of actions to establish and
improve the r o o m as an area of refuge.
The fifth actions involved a popul a t i on of
502 persons as opposed to the 554 persons involved in the first actions, which is a reduction
o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10 per cent. as indicated in
Table 8. The actions are essentially a continuation of the refuge creation and self p r o t e c t i o n
or evacuation actions which were established
in the f o u r th actions. These new items as fifth
actions are reflective o f these tendencies, as

Number
.

W e n t d o w n stairs
W e n t to o t h e r r o o m
Wet t o w e l s -- face
Put t o w e l s - - d o o r
Went to exit
W e n t to a n o t h e r e x i t
Broke window
Other

~.~t
51
,~5
:~ t
29
21
~q
15 ~

Total

t4 1

'~;
.

2 1.3
t 2,3
7.9
7
6.7
I ",
4 3
35 I)
t 00

indicated by the actions of: "'Went To Other

R o o m " , which is a significant indication of
the form at i on of the "Convergence Clusters",
A convergence cluster is the t e n d e n c y for
persons in the structure unable to successfully
evacuate t o converge with each o t h e r in rooms.
In this fire the t e n d e n c y was to move to rooms
with balconies, and to rooms on the North
and East sides with less ext eri or smoke exposure. The fifth action of " B r o k e Wi ndow "
also indicated an action to improve the refuge
capabilities of the r o o m from smoke migration.
EVACUATION

ANALYSIS

OF

THE

GUEST

POPULATION

The evacuation behavior of the guests in

the hotel was primarily dictated by their
physical and psychological state at the time of
fire awareness: w h e t h e r t h e y were asleep, just
awake and n o t dressed, or dressed and awake,
with their location within the hotel. The

237
STAIRWAYNo I

TABLE 9
Guest l o c a t i o n in h o t e l by floor level
Floor
5
8
11
15
18
21
24

7
10
14
17
20
23
26

Total
Per c e n t

S o u t h wing

West wing

East wing

9
3
17
17
32
20
17

31
23
33
48
37
31
13

23
6
35
32
48
27
17

115
22.2%

216
41.6%

188
36.2%

STAIRWAYNO 3

--

~-:~-H ~

.__.,,

519
100%
I

I
guests on the lower floors, generally below
the 10th floor, had minimal smoke exposure,
and non-existant heat exposure. Guests at the
18th floor and above reported thermal
exposure conditions in the corridors and
rooms in addition to the dense smoke conditions. Table 9 indicates the location of the
study population by floor level in the hotel at
the time of fire awareness for the study population. It should be noted that the majority of
the guests indicated at the casino level were in
the New Orleans Coffee Shop. The coffee
shop was adjacent to the Deli, the initial area
of flame observation and propagation. The
population appeared to be well distributed
through the various floor levels of the hotel.
The detailed examination of the data indicated
that the fewest study personnel were located
on the 26th floor, with a single member of
the study population. It should be noted that
the 26th floor consisted of assembly areas and
extensive suites.
Table 9 also indicates the distribution of
the study population in the three wings of the
hotel in addition to the vertical distribution
by floor level. The study population appeared
to be well distributed t h r o u g h o u t the hotel
with the largest number in the west wing and
the smallest number in the south wing.
The location of the wings of the hotel with
the tower stairs is indicated in the diagram of
the hotel presented as Fig. 1. The location of
the interior stairs, numbers 2, 3, and 5, should
be noted, with the location of the exterior
stairs at the ends of the respective wings, indicated as stairs numbers 4, 1, and 6. The
interior stairs were generally untenable early
in the fire incident due to the dense smoke,

L_ _

=
~

--

I
-

~ - - - - ~ - ~ T ~

Fig. 1. R o o m and m e a n s o f egress a r r a n g e m e n t .

and at the levels above the 18th floor, heat

and smoke [7].
The evacuation utilization of the tower
stairs by the study population is presented in
Table 10. Upon examination of this Table, it
is immediately apparent that the interior
stairs on each wing had a very low rate of
usage. This is due to the reported early untenable conditions presented on these stairs by
dense smoke on the upper floors. The arrangement of the stairway access doors to lock
automatically from the stairway side of the
door resulted in persons being trapped on the
stairs once they entered the stairs and encountered smoke: they could only exit from
the stair upon finding someone entering, or
by finding a stair door that had been blocked
open. It should be remembered that 9 of the
84 fatalities were found on stairs, with
T A B L E 10
Use o f the t o w e r stairs
Floor

S o u t h wing
1
2

West wing East wing

3
4
5
6

5-7
8-10
11-14
15-17
18-20
21-23
24-26
Und.

8
9
16
15
18
6
2
0

1
3
2
0
0
0
0
0

0
2
2
2
3
2
0
0

Total
Per c e n t

74
16.9

6
1.4

11
2.5

0
1
17
30
33
20
9
0

6
1
15
3
8
6
1
0

36
12
40
39
37
14
14
4

110 40
196
25.2 9.2
44.8

437
100

238

persons being f o u n d on stairs 2, 1, and 4 [5]

It should also be n o t e d that stair 1 was the
only stair utilized by guests to reach the roof
of the South wing for evacuation by helicopters, and a n u m b e r of guests were trapped on
the stair until the r o o f door was forced open,
venting the stair. The rather high usage of
stair 4 by 25 per cent. of the guests occurred
following the supression of the fire in the
casino area, and the initial usage of this stair
occurred at approximately 08.30. Stair 6 was
the only one that was tenable t h r o u g h o u t the
fire incident at all times, primarily due to the
location of the fire in the deli area and the
flame propagation from East to West, with
the lack of significant exterior smoke exposure.
A summary of the evacuation efforts of the
members of the study population indicated
that approximately 43 per cent of the guests
in this population were successful in their
initial evacuation attempts. It should be noted
that 19 per cent of the population remained
in their rooms w i t h o u t attempting evacuation
due to their perception t h a t evacuation was
n o t possible from their location at that time.
Also, about 37 per cent of the population
a t t e m p t e d evacuation and were unsuccessful,
primarily due to the dense smoke conditions.
The means of evacuation for the members
of the study population is presented in Table
11. Examination of Table 11 indicates that
the most popular means of evacuation was by
the stairs, with approximately 79 per cent of
the study population evacuating the building
in this manner. It should be noted that only 1
individual indicated his use of the elevator.
This individual indicated that he was in the
elevator descending to the casino level before
smelling smoke and becoming aware of the
fire. Thus, when the doors opened and he saw
the smoke in the lobby, he immediately left
the building
The obstructions to the evacuation of the
members of the study population as reported
by the guests are presented in Table 12. It
should be noted, as indicated previously, that
smoke was the primary obstruction to the
evacuation of the guests in the MGM Grand
Hotel fire incident. The second item, of locked
stair doors, appeared to be a factor in the
trapping of persons on the stairways with untenable smoke conditions, and an extensive
n u m b e r of guests reported numerous attempts

T A B L E 11
The means of evacuation for the study population
4

Means

Number

Stairs
Door
Helicopter
Casino roof ( 5 FL. )
Balcony
Window
Elevator
Undetermined

J,37
LI
32
' "
9

Total

-,.q 1

100.0

Obstructions

Number

Smoke
Locked stairs doors
Material -- stairs-halls
People -- stairs
Dark -- stairs
New construction
Height
Other

] 79
38
"_''
24
]?
1
~
i i

(54%)

299

TABLE

'.

78.8
6.1
3 s
2..~
1.6
0 4
0.2

'2 t

k3

12

Obstructions to evacuation

59.9
t 2.7
7.0
8.0
4.0
1.1
1.-1
3.6
100.0

to exit from the stairs before they were

successful. The material reported on the stairs
and halls tended to be luggage initially carried
by guests and then abandoned in the dense
smoke [ 10].
Table 13 presents the assistance provided
to the members of the study population in
their evacuation Obviously, 45.8 per cent of
T A B L E 13
Evacuation assistance to guests
Assisted by

Number

Fire department
Hotel staff
Helicopter
Spouse/roommate
Guests
Construction workers
Security/police
Undetermined

234
15
l2
11
l0
t0
3
.~

(54.2%)

300

%
78.0
5.0
4.0
3.7
3.3
3.3
1.0
1.7
100.0

239

the study population were able to achieve

successful evacuation of the building without
any assistance. Apparently, 78 per cent of
the study population receiving assistance were
assisted by the fire department. The indication
of assistance by other guests, spouse/roommate,
and construction workers are all indications
of the altruistic nature of the actions which
have been d o c u m e n t e d in other fire incident
situations where rather large populations of
persons were denied immediate evacuation
[4,6].

T A B L E 15
A c t i o n s o f the guests while waiting in r o o m s
Actions
Attempted phone
Put materials - - d o o r
Turned on TV
T u r n e d o n radio
Put materials - - H V A C
Wet towels - - face
P r e p a r e d sign
Other
Total

Number

275
224
148
105
85
29
27
109

27.4
22.3
14.8
10.5
8.5
2.9
2.7
10.9

1002

100.0

A N A L Y S I S O F T H E R E F U G E A C T I O N S OF T H E
T A B L E 16

GUEST POPULATION

Means o f s m o k e m i g r a t i o n into r o o m s

The time delay in the evacuation of members of the study population is presented in
Table 14. Following the most prevalent delay
of less than five minutes, the most frequent
delay was from two to three hours, followed
by the one to two hour delay. It should be
noted that the longest reported delay by a
member of the study population consisted of
270 minutes or approximately 4.5 hours.
Obviously, the approximately 55 per cent of
the study population involved in evacuation
delays over 15 minutes were in the refuge area
mode of adaptation within a room, and many
were in the "Convergence Clusters" identified
previously.
The actions of the guests while waiting in
the rooms are presented in Table 15 for the
members of the study population. It is
apparent that these individuals were conducting actions concerned with obtaining
information to structure the situation relative
to the dimension of the threat and their situaT A B L E 14
The e v a c u a t i o n delay for t h e s t u d y p o p u l a t i o n
Minutes

Number

0-5
6 15
16 60
61 120
121 180
181 240
241 300
Undetermined

2O3
42
23
88
140
37
3
18

36.6
7.6
4.2
15.9
25.3
6.7
0.5
3.2

Total

554

100.0

Means

Number

Doors
H V A C unit
Bathroom vent
Window
R o o m joints
Electric o u t l e t s

296
214
134
99
24
21

37.6
27.2
17.0
12.5
3.0
2.7

(388 - - 70%)

788

100.0

tion, as indicated by the actions of: "Attempted Phone", "Turned on TV", "Turned on
Radio", and "Prepared Sign". In addition, the
other predominant behavior was the self preservation actions and the improvement of the
room to become an area of refuge from the
fire effects, primarily the smoke, as indicated
by the actions of: " P u t Materials -- Door",
" P u t Materials -- HVAC", and "Wet Towels -Face".
It is obvious that smoke was the principal
inhibiting factor to evacuation action by the
guests, as previously indicated in Table 12,
concerned with obstructions to evacuation. It
should be noted that six of the respondents to
the questionnaire were rendered unconscious
in their rooms during the fire incident and
were revived after hospitalization.
Table 16 presents the means by which the
smoke migrated into the rooms being used as
areas of refuge by the members of the study
population. Relative to the indication of
doors as a means of room smoke migration, in
addition to the migration of smoke around
the edges of the door, many guests reported
movement of smoke into the room when the

240

d o o r was o p en ed in an evacuation a t t e m p t , to
let others into the room, or to check conditions in the corridor. In some cases the smoke
and thermal effects were u n e x p e c t e d and so
severe th at the occupants were unable to close
the d o o r again. It should be n o t e d t hat guests
who left the r o o m immediately in a successful
evacuation were n o t able to r e p o r t the means
o f smoke migration, although upon their postfire return to the room, physical evidence
indicated smoke had migrated into the room.
It is obvious that the primary means of smoke
migration into the rooms being used as areas
of refuge was by the doors, the HVAC units,
and the b a t h r o o m vent. Relative to the HVAC
units, it should be r e m e m b e r e d t hat the make
up air supply for these units was obtained
directly from the corridors [ 5].

CONCLUSION

The actions o f the guests in this study

population appeared to indicate a population
o f individuals in need of i n f o r m a t i o n relative
to the location o f the fire, the immediate
t h re a t to them, the fire suppression and
rescue actions, and the estimated time before
t h e y could safely evacuate the building.
The determining factor relative to a successful initial evacuation appeared t o be the time
variable of when the individual a t t e m p t e d to
leave, and thus when he was aware of the fire
incident. Also, indirectly, w h e t h e r he was
dressed and able to leave immediately, and his
location in the building. Generally, individuals
in the East wing, and especially those on floors
below the 10th floor, were able to evacuate
with no smoke or thermal limitations througho u t the fire incident. Individuals in the Sout h
and West wings, and especially the West wing,
were in the mo s t exposed position. In addition, persons with r oom s on the West side of
the South wing, and the Sout h side of the
West wing were ex p os e d to the more severe
external smoke exposure and migration.
The f o r matio n of convergence clusters by
the guests at the MGM Grand Hotel fire is an

indication of the need exhibited under the

threat conditions to congregate for mutual
s u p p o r t and c o m m u n i c a t i o n to evaluate the
threat. Indications were received of as m any
as 35 persons in a single room. The convergence clusters were d o c u m e n t e d as having
occurred on 17 floors from the 7th to the
25th floors.

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