Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4

Harald R. Wohlrapp

The
Concept of
Argument
A Philosophical Foundation

Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning

Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Humanities
and Social Sciences
Volume 4

Series Editor
Shahid Rahman

For further volumes:

http://www.springer.com/series/11547

Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning

The series is developed in partnership with the Maison Europenne des Sciences de lHomme et de
la Socit (MESHS) at Nord - Pas de Calais and the UMR-STL: 8163 (CNRS). Aims & Scope: The
scientific objectives of the series, where humanities and social sciences are conceived as building
interdisciplinary interfaces, are:
This series publishes volumes that link practices in the Humanities and Social Sciences, with
theories in Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning, such as: Decision theory and Action theory,
Argumentation Theories in: cognitive sciences, economy, sociology, law, logic, philosophy of
sciences. The series is open towards research from the Analytic and the Continental traditions, and
has four main focus areas: Pragmatic models and studies that develop a dynamic approach to
reasoning in which argumentation is structured as an interaction or as a game, in which two or
more participants play moves are defined by the type of argumentation in question, communication,
language and techniques of argumentation; studies between the practical and theoretical
dimensions of argumentation, as well as the relationships between argumentation and other modes
of communication, reception, persuasion and power; studies in which reasoning practice is
considered from the point of view of its capacity to produce conviction of persuasion, and focusing
on understanding what makes an argument performative; Diachronic transformations of reasoning
practices studies that emphasize the invention and renewal of reasoning forms, with respect to its
performance and its effectiveness.
General Editor
Shahid Rahman (Lille, UMR 8163)
Managing Editor
Laurent Keiff (Lille, UMR 8163)
Area Editors
Argumentation and Pragmatics
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Erik Krabbe (Groningen)
Frans H. van Eemeren (Amsterdam)
John Woods (British Columbia/Kings
College)
Argumentation and Rhetoric
Fabienne Blaise (Lille, MESHS-Nord Pas
de Calais)
Gabriel Galvez-Behar (Lille, MESHS-Nord
Pas de Calais)
Andr Laks (Sorbonne, Paris IV)
Ruth Webb (Lille, UMR 8163)
Decision Theory, Mathematics, Economy
Jacques Dubucs (IHPST-Paris 1)
Fredric Jouneau (Lille)
Richard Sobel (Lille)

Cognitives Sciences. Computer Sciences

Yann Coello (Lille)
Eric Gregoire (CRIL-Lens)
Henry Prakken (Utrecht)
Franois Recanati (ENS, Paris)
Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
Andr Fuhrmann (Frankfurt)
Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy)
Gran Sundholm (Leyden)
Logic
Michel Crubellier (Lille, UMR 8163)
Dov Gabbay (Kings College)
Sven Ove Hansson (Stockholm)
Tero Tulenheimo (Lille, UMR 8163)
Political Science and Sociology
Jean-Gabriel Contamin (Lille)
Franck Fischer (Rutgers)
Josh Ober (Stanford)
Marc Pichard (Lille, MESHS-Nord Pas
de Calais)

Harald R. Wohlrapp

The Concept of Argument

A Philosophical Foundation

Harald R. Wohlrapp
Professor emeritus of Philosophy
Universitt Hamburg
Hamburg, Germany

The translation of this work was funded by Geisteswissenschaften International Translation

Funding for Humanities and Social Sciences from Germany, a joint initiative of the Fritz
Thyssen Foundation, the German Federal Foreign Office, the collecting society VG WORT,
and the Brsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels (German Publishers and Booksellers
Association).
Translated by Tim Personn in cooperation with Michael Weh
ISSN 2214-9120
ISSN 2214-9139 (electronic)
ISBN 978-94-017-8761-1
ISBN 978-94-017-8762-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8
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Preface to the English Edition

Once more from the beginning (palin ex archs) the Platonic Socrates says, whenever
a dialogue has become so contradictory and confusing that it is no longer possible
for anyone to get their bearings.1 Then the matter is traced back to its beginnings:
aims are ascertained anew, attempted answers examined once more, and ultimately
the participants try to determine whether it is possible to identify certain basic
concepts or thoughts for a new beginning.
European thought about argumentation dates back to ancient Greece. Over the
past 50 years, this thought has taken the form of an academic discipline informed by
the theoretical means of the twentieth century and invigorated by a renewed effort
to address old questions. Today, we face a vast and heterogeneous field that is host
to numerous, and sometimes, contradictory perspectives. It seems that scholars do
not even agree on the basic structures of argumentation. All that we have regarding
the aim of argumentationlet alone the conditions and possibilities for achieving
itare merely different opinions. To be sure, these opinions are also supported
by arguments. Even arguments, however, do not seem to provide any clarity here;
at best they bring a certain structure to the diversity of opinions. Positions are
grouped according to specific approaches: product approach, process approach,
dialogue approach, etc. Is this an expression of pluralism or is it simple relativism?
Representatives of these positions take their views to be valid based on their own
justifications while being fully aware that others think differently. They even engage
in occasional discussions, but generally try not to get in each others way. To my mind,
this state of affairs demonstrates a certain intellectual richness, but also a weakness
with respect to how the matter at hand has been theoretically permeated.
Perhaps it is worthwhile to take a cue from the Platonic Socrates and at times make
a new beginning in our efforts to grasp this matter. At any rate, that is how we looked
at it in Hamburg in the early 1980s. Our pursuit of issues relating to the philosophy
of science (in particular resulting from the Popper-Kuhn controversy) led to the
insight that such issues need to be addressed in the medium of argumentation.
1

Cf. e.g. Plato: Laches 198a, Gorgias 506c, Meno 79e.

v

vi

Preface to the English Edition

Nevertheless, there was hardly any appropriate theory for doing so. The little that was
available seemed to us limited by its ties to traditions (logic, rhetoric) that had
ostensibly been pushed aside but still operated beneath the surface.
Complete analyses of complex, sophisticated arguments that could have had a
paradigmatic function were simply not available. Consequently, we founded the
Hamburg Group on Argumentation Theory and attempted for several years to
think through argumentsin the attitude of what Buddhists call a beginners mind.
We took certain basic distinctions from philosophy (thesis, justification, opinion,
knowledge, contradiction, truth) and tried to determine what really happens in
verbal practice when a thesis is posited based on reasons and/or criticized with
objections. Over time, we saw the emergence of certain basic structures; of course,
this was in part due to discussions with the incipient discipline of argumentation
theory. The groups work resulted in several dissertations (as described in the
Introduction) and led me to believe that the theorization of argument proceeds along
tracks that are well worn and nevertheless of limited scope. It dawned on me that a
new attempt at a philosophical foundation was required. It was this conviction that
gave birth to the present book.
In order to manage expectations, I will outline in some broad strokes what is
presented on the following pages. Let me begin by saying that I do not claim to
offer an elaborate theory of argumentation. Rather, I will just lay down, as it were,
a few salient tracks on which our thinking may proceed. In the case of specific
questions, these tracks can form the basis for the development and justification of
further theoretical structures.
What is new here can primarily be divided into two theoretical movesintroducing
the concept of orientation as the basic unit for the theorization of argument and
decoupling the quality of an argument from its persuasive force. Let me explain this very
briefly. Basically, argumentation is aimed at gaining or establishing orientations.
Orientation is the pragmatic function of theories of all kinds. Anyone who wants to
move in uncharted territories, i.e. anyone living and acting, is in need of orientation
and orientation is something we obtain from theories. According to the terminology
introduced here, theories are verbal formations that open up any domains of reality
at least to the extent that people are now able to act within them. Theories in this
sense do not only exist in the sciences but also in the humanities, in philosophy, and
in ordinary life. Since the world in which we live and act is constantly changing, so
too must our orientations. This means that our theoriesi.e. our knowledge, but
also our more or less fixed opinionshave to evolve in order for them to retain their
function as orientation. From a pragmatic point of view, then, we can distinguish
between old theory that has already been established and new theory that has yet to
demonstrate its value as orientation. Arguing is the activity by which we examine
new theories with regard to their function of providing orientation. A new theory or
a thesis may emerge as valid from a process of argumentation if it can be justified
without a remainder of open objections. This notion of validity as applicable to theses
rather than, as is commonly the case, to (logical) schemes onlywill presumably
be a great challenge to most theorists habitual ways of thinking (I will develop it
in detail in Chap. 7).

Preface to the English Edition

vii

The valid thesis is a new orientation. Material adduced to argumentatively

support a thesis makes use of old theory, i.e. theory which has already been corroborated in its function as orientation. Accordingly, that theory by which we orient
ourselves in the practice of argumentation, i.e. argumentation theory, must make it
possible to grasp the dynamics of orientation formation. A static theory such as
logic cannot do so. In this respect, we see the emergence of a second fundamental
dimension of argumentationbehind the structural dimension, which is captured in
logic and in quasi-logical inferences.
Another new dimension that comes into view when introducing the basic concept
of orientation is the subjective one. It is clear that there is always somebody (an
individual or a collective) that is oriented or looking for orientation. Considering
this subjective side of argumentation requires a willingness to recognize that all theses
bear a subjective imprint and that an argument transports this subjective character in
manifold ways. Of course, this cannot be the last word because subjectivity leads to
biases of all kinds and must therefore be worked off. But in order to do this, a theory
needs to make room for a subjective dimension in addition to the material one.
This takes me to the second new move, the aforementioned act of decoupling
argumentative quality from persuasive force. It should be obvious that the degree to
which a thesis, which has been supported by arguments, can fulfill its function as
orientation depends on the quality of these arguments. This quality has priority over
any possible acceptance by an audience. However, this means that the fusion of
argumentative quality and acceptance already suggested by Aristotle is to be resolved
into a succession of two aspects. Anyone who presents an argument to an audience
faces two distinctly different questions: (1) Is my argument sufficient for presenting
my thesis as valid? (2) Can my argument persuade the audience to accept my thesis?
Keeping these questions distinct seems to be a bewildering imposition. They are
connected, but in a special way: the second question is relevant for the first one only
insofar as the audience might put forward objections to the argument. If that is the
case, the audience adopts the role of a critical opponenta role, however, which is
already needed in answering the first question. In general, the quality of an argument
(once we move beyond simple formal inferences) can only be assessed with respect
to possible objectionsand raising objections always already requires the existence
of a second instance. It follows that arguing is to be regarded as intrinsically dialogical, even if it takes place as solitary reasoning with oneself. (The dialogue partner is
not an audience to be persuaded. What we expect of him or her is not acceptance,
but dialogical control.)
So much for a brief overview of what is new. The German edition of the present
book was published in 2008 and has so far received eleven reviews (in publications
ranging from philosophical journals over the German Medical Associations
official journal to a weekly newspaper2). Five German universities have held
semester-long courses on it. In 2010, it received the award of Geisteswissenschaften
International. This award came with the funding of an English translation, which
has now been completed.
2

There are two reviews in English: Kock (2009) and Hoppmann (2012).

viii

Preface to the English Edition

Of course, this conception of a philosophy of argument does not exist in a vacuum.

Rather, I regard it as contributing to a discussion that has been going on for a long
time and in a particularly intensive way for the last half century. The present book
contains many references, not only to argumentation theory, but also to the philosophy
of science, history, and general philosophy. This should not be surprising. After
all, the concept of argument touches on the grand old themes of truth and reality,
freedom, and humanity. Nevertheless, my references are often brief and resolute,
which some people have held against me. I continue to think, however, that clear
statements serve our common cause more than a practice of constant attenuation
and self-relativization.
Finally, I would like to attend to the finest duty of a prefacethe acknowledgments.
My first word of thanks goes to the organisation Geisteswissenschaften International,
which paid for the translation, and immediately afterwards to my university in
Hamburg, which arranged for intermediate financing.
I would then like to prominently thank my translator, Tim Personn, and his
supervising editor, Michael Weh. Over 1 years of work, with devoted perseverance,
they allowed my book to go out, as it were, into the big world. Katharina von
Radziewsky also provided valuable research assistance.
Next, I would like to express my gratitude to those North American colleagues
who patiently and unselfishly read parts of the manuscript and provided valuable
comments and corrections: Mark Battersby, Tony Blair, Maurice Finocchiaro, Jean
Goodwin, Fred Kauffeld, Bob Pinto, Chris Tindale, Mark Weinstein, and especially
Tom Fisher, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, and Ralph Johnson, who sent careful
and extensive comments on details of my concept and even discussed these with me
(in the case of David and Ralph over several years).
The German edition of the book featured a long list of people who had contributed in one way or another to its production. Three of them I would like to mention
again. These are my philosophizing friends, the jurist Ralph Christensen and the
musician Peter Mengel and then my wife Claudia Lhdorf. They know that the book
would not exist without them, and of course they are aware of my gratitude. My readers
should know of it, too.
Hamburg, Germany

Harald R. Wohlrapp

Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................
The Aristotelian Foundation of Argumentation Theory ........................
Knowledge and Opinion ............................................................
Theory and Praxis......................................................................
Analytics and Dialectics ............................................................
Topics and Rhetoric ...................................................................
Types of Dialogue and Ways of Addressing ..............................
The Formation and Deformation of Aristotelian Theory
in the Philosophical Tradition ...............................................................
On the Concepts of Knowledge and Truth ................................
On the Concepts of Probability and Subjectivity ......................
On Argumentation and Rhetoric................................................
Argumentation Theory Under Construction .........................................
First New Constructions ............................................................
Some Highlights of Contemporary Argumentation Theory ......
Sketch of the Revised Foundation of the Concept of Argument ...........
1

Knowledge ...........................................................................................
1.1
Sketch of the Pragmatic Concept of Theory ..............................
1.2
Action: Praxis .............................................................................
1.3
Theory: The Pragmatic Concept of Theory................................
1.4
The Substance That Theories Are Made of ............................
1.4.1 Concepts .........................................................................
1.4.2 Propositions ....................................................................
1.4.3 Rules...............................................................................
1.5
Theory Types ..............................................................................
1.5.1 Formal Theory ................................................................
1.5.2 Technical Theory ............................................................
1.5.3 Social (Cultural, Culture Forming) Theory ....................

xiii
xix
xx
xxi
xxii
xxiv
xxv
xxvii
xxvii
xxviii
xxxi
xxxii
xxxii
xliii
lix
1
1
11
16
23
23
28
31
32
32
33
34

ix

Contents

1.6
1.7
1.8

Theory as Knowledge.................................................................
Other Types of Theoretical Bases for Arguments ......................
Access to Knowledge: Teaching and Research ..........................

36
48
51

Research ...............................................................................................
2.1
The Concept of Research ...........................................................
2.2
The Limit of Orientation as the Place of Research:
Question, Problem, and Quaestio...............................................
2.2.1 Are These Problems Occasions for Research? ...............
2.3
New Theory That Supports New Actions...................................
2.4
The Thetic Construction .............................................................
2.5
Its a Small World .......................................................................
2.5.1 Assessment of the Entire Construction ..........................
2.5.2 Assessment of the Geographical Thesis .........................
2.6
The Genesis of Thetic Theory: The Research Project................
2.7
Thetic Theory in Dialogue .........................................................

55
55

Subjectivity ..........................................................................................
3.1
The Question of the Subjective Conditions of Insight ...............
3.2
Subjectivity as a System.............................................................
3.2.1 Self-Reference, Self-Relation, Self-Transparency .........
3.2.2 Habitus and Way of Perceiving ......................................
3.3
The Theoretical Level: Orientation System ...............................
3.4
Dynamics of Subjectivity ...........................................................
3.5
Distance and Commitment in Thetic Speech .............................

93
93
98
98
103
107
115
120

Basic Operations .................................................................................

4.1
Theory Minimalism, Concept of Argument ...............................
4.1.1 Two Kinds of Validity Claims ........................................
4.2
Asserting: The Thesis .................................................................
4.3
Justifying: Reasons and Justifications ........................................
4.4
Criticizing: Objection and Refutation ........................................
4.5
Interaction of the Basic Operations
in the Thetic System ...................................................................
4.6
The Completeness of the Triad of Basic Operations..................
4.6.1 The Supposedly Enormous Diversity
of Argumentative Operations .........................................
4.6.2 The False Alternative between
Justifying and Criticizing ...............................................

127
127
132
134
142
153

Frame Structures ................................................................................

5.1
A Further Basic Structure...........................................................
5.2
Frames as Focus and Interface ...................................................
5.2.1 Focusing .........................................................................
5.2.2 The Interface of Subject and Object...............................
5.2.3 The Theory-Practice Interface ........................................

175
175
177
177
179
181

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66
73
75
76
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81
85

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Contents

5.3

xi

Latency of the Frame .................................................................

5.3.1 Frame and Aspect ...........................................................
5.3.2 Way of Seeing and Perspective ......................................
The Subjective Constitution of the World,
the Worldly Constitution of the Subject .....................................
Frame Differences, Frame Change, Frame Sublation ................
What Does It Mean to Work? .....................................................
Emergence and Treatment of Frame Structures
in the Practice of Argumentation................................................
5.7.1 How Do Frame Differences Emerge
and Take Effect? .............................................................
5.7.2 Some Strategies for Handling Heterogeneity .................
A King on His Way to the Republic ...........................................
5.8.1 The Problem ...................................................................
5.8.2 The Events from Mid-1791 Until the Death
of the King in January 1793 ...........................................
5.8.3 Four Arguments ..............................................................

212
214

Dialogue Events ...................................................................................

6.1
The System of Moves and Successive Moves ............................
6.2
Four Dimensions ........................................................................
6.2.1 Material Dimension and Subjective Dimension.............
6.2.2 Procedural Dimension and Structural Dimension ..........
6.3
Linear and Retroflexive Argumentation .....................................
6.4
Discussion of Pros and Cons ......................................................
6.4.1 Integration of the Process-Outcome Relationship..........
6.4.2 Integration of the Subject-Matter Relationship ..............

231
231
235
236
238
245
248
258
259

Validity .................................................................................................
7.1
The Intermediate Realm of the Thetic: Preliminary
Sketch of the Concept of Thetic Validity ...................................
7.2
The Motivational Side of Validity:
Communication of Insights ........................................................
7.3
The Criterial Side of Validity: The Absence
of Open Objections ....................................................................
7.4
The Three Stages of Assessing Validity .....................................
7.5
The Open Forum of Arguments: Trust as the Pragmatic
Function of Validity ....................................................................
7.6
Probable Validity? ......................................................................
7.7
The Concept of Validity as a Thesis ...........................................
7.7.1 Confronting Universalism ..............................................
7.7.2 Confronting Relativism ..................................................
7.7.3 The Relationship to Pluralism ........................................

267

5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7

5.8

182
182
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186
189
195
201
202
204
209
209

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278
284
287
291
294
295
303
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Contents

Argument Analysis ..............................................................................

8.1
What Is Argument Analysis? ......................................................
8.2
The Problem of Interpretation ....................................................
8.2.1 Guide to Argument Analysis ..........................................
8.3
Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate
About the Embryos Right to Life..............................................
8.3.1 Round 1: Main Features of the Positions and Their
Possible Roots in the Participants Biographies ...............
8.3.2 Round 2: Is it Permissible to Kill Embryos
or, Rather, Human Beings to Help Other
Human Beings? ..............................................................
8.3.3 Round 3: Is the Early Embryo
a Human Being or Not?..................................................
8.3.4 Round 4: The Issue of Abortion .....................................
8.3.5 Round 5: The Limits of Using Embryos ........................
8.3.6 Concluding Assessment of the Discussion.....................

315
315
317
321
324
326

331
336
345
347
358

Reflexivity ............................................................................................
9.1
The Problem of Constitution ......................................................
9.2
The Status of Argumentation Theory:
Descriptive or Normative? .........................................................
9.3
What Is Reflection? ....................................................................
9.4
Object- and Meta-level ...............................................................
9.5
Rational Argumentation .............................................................
9.6
Natural, Scientific, and Philosophical Argumentation ...............
9.7
Normal and Radical Study of Argumentation ............................

361
361

Transsubjectivity .................................................................................
10.1 What Is Reason in Argumentation? ............................................
10.2 The Dynamics of Thetic Theory ................................................
10.3 The Recognition of the Other .....................................................
10.4 The Transcendent Core of Secular Reason ................................

393
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403
407
412

References ....................................................................................................

421

Index....................................................................................................

437

10

367
369
373
377
384
389

Introduction

In The Argument Clinic, a sketch produced by the deservedly famous British

comedy group Monty Python, a man entering a building is asked at the reception
whether he wants a larger or a smaller argument. The man books the smaller one
just to get started and see how it goeswhich is said to last 5 min and takes place
in Room 12. He walks down a corridor and, after some calamities (which foreshadow what is to come), he ends up in the designated room where a man behind a
desk involves him in a disturbingly scant controversy. The newcomer seems to have
asked something. Yet when he is assured that, in fact, his question has already been
answered, he says No!, whereupon the employee counters with Yes! The man
insistsNo!this time a bit sharper, only to receive an even sharper Yes! Now
seriously outraged, the man repeats his negative answer: No! Thus it goes back
and forth: Yes! No! Yes! No! Yes! For several long, agonizing minutes,
there is nothing but a staccato of increasingly louder as well as more forceful
affirmations and denials, during which we gradually lose sight of what this is all for.
Suddenly a brief interruption ensueswhich allows them to catch their breath
followed by the exchange of one or two trivial sentences and the customers statement
that what just took place was not a real argument after all. The employee imparts a
categorical Yes, it was! which is countered by No, it wasnt! and immediately
they are back again to their endless, frustrating altercation. Upon the sudden ringing
of a bell, the man behind the desk declares in an authoritative voice that, well, the time
booked for a short argument has now expired. The customer protests, yet this time
he does not receive a Yes! as an answer. Instead, he is kindly asked to leave.
Monty Pythons mastery lies in their ability to present this scenario in an unspeakably
funny manner. It seems ridiculous and miserable; at the same time, though, one cannot
help remembering, on the basis of these scenes, ones own episodes of derailed
discussions. What is the message? Does the Argument Clinic cure us of the expectation
that we could hope for arguments to offer anything but trouble and a waste of time?
Apparently, the possibility of such a satire also depends on the meaning of the
word argument in English, which connotes controversy and dispute more than,
e.g. its German equivalent. Still, the sketch is clearly intended to dispel any illusions
about the rationality of the use of arguments. What can be said about these illusions?
xiii

xiv

Introduction

Do arguments form the locus of rationality, and does the above sketch merely
illustrate an unfortunate aberration? Or is the kind of rationality that can be mobilized in an argument such that it simply fails when confronted with differences
of opinion that, after all, do exist? Are arguments even concerned with opinions
and the differences between them? Are they concerned with who is in the right, and
what is that supposed to mean? Is the purpose of an argument to receive the addressees
assent to an accurate or better opinion? Is it meant to identify an opinion as accurate
or better? Does it achieve both? Does an opinion, if it is sufficiently supported by
arguments, become knowledge? Does knowledge, by the way, emerge through
arguments, or is it suitable only for their premises but in itself supported quite
differently? Is our concept of argument sufficiently rich and diverse to answer these
questions? What, after all, is an argument?
An argument is a sequence of propositions that enables an addressee to rationally
accept a further proposition. Something like this would probably be an ordinary
educated persons answer to the question of what argument means. All this is easily
understandable, except for the expression rationally. What exactly does it mean?
An answer to this question will require quite a few considerations. In the context of
arguments, one will probably first think of logic, i.e. of structures which should be
actualized in the aforementioned sequences of propositions in such a manner that a
conclusion follows logically from premises. If something follows logically, assent
can be expected. But why does such assent even belong to the concept of argument?
Logic is a formal system that allows for the possibility of operating with signs. Its
validity does not depend on whether or not someone agrees. Is an argument, then,
simply a syllogism that has been addressed to someone, and does its rationality depend
entirely on its logical quality? Probably not: after all, the sequence of propositions not
only comprises logical schemes, but also substantial propositions. Such propositions,
which are the premises of an inference, can be true, false, difficult, or undecidable, but
also clear, poignant, confused, misleading, inappropriate, etc. Hence the arguments
rationality will presumably also depend on the quality of the premises. If these are
patently false, unclear, or nonsensical, then we would probably not say that giving ones
assent to the respective conclusion (which otherwise follows logically) is rational.
But do we have sufficiently general criteria to even begin to assess such matters
in a way that is as incontestable as assessing the accuracy of logical schemes? Are
there not as many different opinions as there are people about most matters, so that
an assessment of the premises in an argument is possible only in cases where
distinct fields of knowledge are affected, in which truth and falsehood are clearly
distinguishable and, in fact, already determined in relation to the propositions in
question? This would mean, however, that the rational assent possibly created
or triggered by an argument is essentially something that has its true locus in the
organized sciences.
Yet, it is not the sciences but the spheres of opinion-making in particular those of
publicly relevant opinion making in ethics and politics, that are regarded as typical
domains for argumentation. These domains, however, are characterized by a diversity
of opinions. Most of all, independent opinions seem to be regarded as having a
particular value. Apparently, these are opinions that people have formed on their

Introduction

xv

own, which means at the very least that they understand the respective justification.
Yet it is not easy to see whether independent and rational ways of opinion-making
are compatible or whether they compete. Conditions in which (more or less independently formed) opinions come into conflict with each other may be disturbing. After
all, it cannot be ruled out that opinions may be accompanied by actions and that
dissent may lead to aggression.
Whether the practice of rational argumentation in the aforementioned
knowledge-related sense may help (or whether we end up in the Argument Clinic
after all) will depend on the extent to which the parties involved can be moved, on
the basis of conclusions from premises, to accept or discard opinions. Therefore, the
task at hand will in particular be to identify those premises that can be accepted.
If their acceptance is supposed to be rational in the same sense, then we would
have to seek an adjustment of opinions, ideally on the basis of knowledge, for the
argumentative treatment of dissent.
Is that sufficient? Do we know enough? Indeed, we know infinitely more than,
for example, the ancients. In relation to what we would have to know in order to
reliably solve our major problems, however, things seem to be different. In fact, a
lot may be said in favor of the view that with the realization of our significantly
increased knowledge, we have entered problems of truly gigantic proportions.
Thus, relative to the knowledge we need, we actually do not know more now, but
less. A properly understood concept of argument, however, enables us to mobilize
the practice of argumentation in order to improve our theories. From this vantage
point, it would be possible to state that it is precisely because we know so little that
argumentation has to play such an important role. Hence these considerations suggest
the following result: In our current era, the practice of argumentation is of central
importance. Yet the concept of argument we employa concept which leads us to
demand rationality in argumentationdoes not correspond to this importance.
Anyone who is concerned with clarifying this concept will soon realize that even
just talking about the practice of argumentation is dubious. It is far from clear what
belongs to it, what it is about, and what procedures it requires. One of the consequences
of this heterogeneity is that the function, the importance, and the extent of the practice of argumentation are underestimated. This underestimation, in turn, means that
argumentation theory is often regarded as a secondary or tertiary discipline behind
and below the sciencesas a doctrine of the (more or less) rational solicitation of
assent targeted at decision-making in commerce, law, politics, and journalism. Is this
justified? What is the real significance of the practice of argumentation? Where
does it occur? What do we use it for?
We live in a culture of discussion. This is certainly true of Western industrialized
countries andat least when it comes to political and socioeconomic conditions
increasingly the entire world: Discussions can spring up everywhere and may concern
everything that is problematic and questionable. In political bodies, i.e. national
and nonnational bodies, parliaments, courts, nongovernmental organizations, etc.,
discussion is viewed as the hallmark of democratic procedures. It has spread to
institutions of socialization, schools, preschools, and universities; it has even entered
companies, clubs, and churches. We prefer to regard this situation as expressing

xvi

Introduction

self-determination, openness, recognition, and participation in communal decisions.

With the rise of individualism, an increase in the self-confidence of a greater number
of people, and the spread of democratic practices all over the globe, this culture of
discussion continues to thrive and become more entrenched.
Consequently, an increasing number of issues become problematic and in need
of resolution. More and more people demand to participate. Since the middle of the
twentieth century, and in particular since the end of the Cold War, humanity has
entered an accelerated development with a wide open future. Capitalist commodity
production becomes the decisive factor all over the globe even though its material
beginning, the availability of natural resources, and its material end, waste
elimination, are uncertain and its effects on civilization are questionable. We have
developed and implemented proceduressuch as energy production by nuclear
fission and the optimization of organisms through genetic engineeringthat
already dramatically change our living conditions, and it is uncertain whether the
living conditions of six to nine billion people can be shaped and maintained in a
deliberate way. To the extent that the ideals of public and personal autonomy are
supposed to last, this at the very least results in a tremendous increase in the need
for discussion.
We are realistic enough to see that this increase in significance does not
automatically result in more rationality. After all, the culture of discussion does
not by itself follow the frequently invoked unforced force of the better argument.1
In public debates, arguments play a smaller role than power relations between the
parties involved. Instead of comprehensible reasons for a decision, here we have
acceptance management, and instead of scientifically, ethically, and legally established conclusions, we have to find compromises (which emphasize durability over
validity).2 Generally speaking, the public culture of discussion is only partially
rational, in particular where it matters the most. It is fraught with illusions, errors,
and fraud. Even in smaller manifestations of the practice of argumentation that can
be surveyed more easilyat round tables, in clubs, and relationshipsarguing is
shot through with self-promotion, self-righteousness, and more or less subtle violence.3
On the podiums of serious theoretical work, we can expect a greater degree of
rationality. However, it is not easy to say what could act as a measure of comparison.
Does the case of argumentative rationality look better at academic meetings and
1

This bon mot was coined by Jrgen Habermas; cf. Habermas (1973), and has been greeted with
much acclaim. It expresses the aspect of the effect of arguments in a nicely paradoxical and yet
one-sided way. After all, good arguments do not have to force anything. They can also simply
enrich and enlighten.
2
In the case of compromises, an important question is how long the parties will be bound by them.
The general answer is as long as the power relations they represent still obtain. Nevertheless, a
compromise might be the best that we can achieve after all. Therefore, negotiation as an application
of argumentation (which aims at consensus and, in doing so, emphasizes not only understanding
but also fear and desire) deserves to be taken seriously. For the differences between argumentation
and negotiation, cf. Holzinger (2004), Provis (2004), and Prittwitz (1996), in the latter volume,
particularly the essay by Saretzki (1996).
3
Cf. Kienpointners flowering plant episode, which I quote and analyze in Chap. 2.

Introduction

xvii

in academic journals, among think tanks, and in university departments? Or is

argumentative rationality of minor importance in those institutions anyway, because
their main concern is scientific truth or the organized search for truth? Anyone who
still talks this way today probably holds a keynote speech at a meeting of sponsors
or at the anniversary of a research community. In the real practices of scientists and
experts, talk of truth comes up only in very special situations (most likely regarding
such questions as to whether the coffee machine has finally been repaired or not.)
This corresponds to the state of civilization that we have reached.
The twentieth century has seen a general erosion of the concept of truth. What
I mean is the following: Central fields of science have experienced episodes of
relativization, and as a result, our confidence in the reliability of truths has come to be
rather shattered. A few brief examples will suffice to illuminate this: The twentieth
century began with Einsteins relativization of Newtonian physics, a discipline that
for 200 years had been known as the peak of pure and fruitful science. The humanities saw the triumph of historicism, i.e. the claim that (historical, but also all other
kinds of) truths are relative to different eras. Then Freudian psychology entered
public consciousness with the idea that individual consciousness (particularly
regarding its normative ideas) is relative to biography. In linguistics, Whorf proclaimed
a principle of linguistic relativity in the 1930s, i.e. the assertion that people with
fundamentally different linguistic backgrounds are unable to communicate and that
there is consequently no such thing as the language. In the philosophy of language,
Wittgenstein succeeded with the idea of linguistic meaning as relative to language
games. Ethnology and cultural anthropology produced countless studies that presented all kinds of ideas of truth and accuracy as culturally relative. The culmination
of this cascade of relativization, then, came in the 1960s with Kuhns account of
scientific research results as paradigm relative.
Of course, all these instances of relativization have not remained unchallenged;
there have been extensive, at times acrimonious, discussions about them. Not
everything that was initially claimed has endured over time. Yet the sheer fact that
well-established truths needed to be discussed had at first been alarming for the
educated public. But today this is no longer alarming as we have accepted that truth is
a peculiar matter. Philosophy, the ancestral home of the question of truth, now discusses five to eight conceptions of truth.4 If there is an expert report on any problem,
4

Cf. Knne (2003). Far from merely demonstrating the diversity of conceptions of truth, this book
presents contemporary theses and arguments regarding the question of truth in an admirably competent and differentiated manner. Its argument leads to the authors preferred modest account of
truth. According to this account, a proposition is true if things are as it says they are (336/337). I will
set aside any concerns about whether this account is adequately represented by the formula MOD
(350) and whether it may not turn out to be circular due to Knnes presupposition of classical
logic. In fact, I find it remarkable that Knne is mistaken in his view that this account could sufficiently capture all relevant validity claims (453). The typical validity claim for theses that one can
argue for or against is of a different kind. Let us take his own claim that MOD articulates our
actual concept of truth. This claim cannot be true in the sense in which truth is articulated by
MOD. After all, whether or not it is the case that the formula articulates our actual concept of truth
depends on the extent to which our actual concept of truth is a uniform and stable state of affairs
in the first place. In the best-case scenario, Knnes argument could be universally accepted, and

xviii

Introduction

finding a counter report might be merely a matter of money and information. This is
what I meant to convey by the diagnosis of an erosion of the concept of truth.
The result is relativistic thinking. We cannot do without truths and the examination of truth claims, yet it seems that they only ever endure until the next corner, the
next institute, the next day, and the next interlocutor. I will address this rampant
relativism in this book (Chap. 7). To my mind, as a theorist of argumentation,
what is objectionable about this is the belief that, in light of such relativism, the
practice of argumentation itself is actually useless.
This is due to the concept of argument outlined above. An argument is a schematically representable transition from true premises to a conclusion which, consequently, is true as well. I call this the formal concept of argument. According to
this concept, the premises must be true. However, if truths are relative, then they are
mere opinions, something to accept or reject at will. Arguments, then, would be
nothing more than an encouragement for people with the respective opinion that
they are in the right because they can give a rational account of it.
This poses a precarious situation. For although it is true that the solidity and reliability of truths differ from our initial conception, the dichotomy of absolutely
certain truth and absolutely arbitrary opinion is a rash and thoughtless assumption.
There is a third possibility: the reasonable argument or, in other words, the argumentatively valid thesis. Arguments are what we are left with; they can help us
secure truths, as far as they may reach, and can aid us in occasionally exceeding the
boundaries of truths or at least in pushing them farther. Basically, given the erosion
of the concept of truth, arguments do not become less important, but more so. They
now become, as it were, our last authority for any occasions where we make claims
to truth, accuracy, or validity of various kinds.
Hence the new and great importance of argumentation theory. For half a century,
there has been a new approach to this theory. A lot has happened, which needs to be
talked about. It is remarkable, however, that some very old ways of thinking are
difficult to leave behind, and that therefore the principles of a theory that would do
justice to the new significance of the practice of argumentation have certainly not
yet been understood clearly and precisely. This book seeks to contribute to that task.
Thus, it begins with the most basic question: How can we arrive at an adequate
theory of argumentation?
Those who believe that the practice of argumentation is simply given as a verbal
practice or speech activityand, as such, could easily be investigated empirically
with regard to its featuresare mistaken. We always bring along a certain concept
of argument that determines its structures. There are linguists who really try to just
let the thing speak for itself; consequently, these theorists are at a loss as to what,
in fact, they should pay attention to.5 Of course, we all have preconceptions. Words
then maybe one day things will actually be the way he claims. However, what happens if it will not
be universally accepted? As long as there are no serious objections to it, his claim would be a valid
thesis, but not a true statement in the sense expressed by MOD.
5
One of the few linguists who tried to work completely without bias is Richard Hirsch. He recorded
conversations taken to be argumentative and demonstrated very clearly in his reports that one
can hardly tell where arguing begins and where it ends; cf. Hirsch (1989, 1995).

Introduction

xix

like argument, argumentation, and arguing are part of ordinary language, where
they have a certain meaning. But those preconceptions are not sufficient to precisely
delimit or exclude certain activities.6 Rather, such activities appear to be embedded
in manifold verbal (and nonverbal) events.7
Intrinsically, language has certain effects. Its structures are involved in the formation of opinions, orientations, and participants belief systems. The recording,
transmitting, and processing of information takes place in a verbal medium. Its
participants are people who more or less engage with each other; these people have
feelings, wishes, plans, and apprehensions; they have bodies in which physiological
processes take place during speaking and listening (a slip of the tongue; a bad odor
may turn out to be a lasting obstacle to communication); bodily fluids are released,
adrenaline, dopamine, etc. All of this may affect argumentative speech by facilitating,
complicating, disturbing, or more or less submerging itor even by completely
drowning it out.
Such references to how arguments are embedded should suffice to state the
following: The practice of argumentation is not an objective domain that is simply
available for empirical investigation. Nevertheless, is it not possible to start with our
preconceptions and then proceed further, all the while differentiating them along the
way? Yes, but we run into all kinds of difficulties, in particular since these preconceptions contain elements that do not fit with each other. I already brought this up in
the initial question: On the one hand, arguing should be concerned with the inferential form of a sequence of propositions; on the other hand, it should be concerned
with an addressees assent. On the one hand, the display of knowledge seems to be
the goal; on the other hand, arguing seems to aim at the dissemination of opinions.
How can this be reconciled? Where do these preconceptions come from? What was
the original arrangement of their components?

The Aristotelian Foundation of Argumentation Theory

Explicit theory formation about argumentation starts with Aristotle. This statement
does not merely specify a historical but also a systematic beginning: Our preconceptions of argumentation are a relic of theoretical foundations laid down by Aristotle
more than 2,000 years ago. They continue to act on us by forcing our questions and
attempts at clarification onto certain tracks. Since we do not necessarily break new
6

Jean Goodwin demonstrated this with a computer-supported corpus-linguistic investigation of the

stem argu; cf. Goodwin (2007).
7
It has been claimed recently that there is such a thing as a nonverbal kind of argumentationin
analogy to nonverbal communication. Supposedly, the physicians coat as well as the trial lawyers
robe functions as arguments inasmuch as they indicate expertise. Can a robe be an appeal to
authority for the legal accuracy of any given statement? That is not practical. Certainly, gestures,
manners, and clothes often have effects. These are the effects of the orator, which Aristotle (see below)
summarized under ethos. Taking such effects to be arguments, however, indicates the obscurity
of our basic concept of argument.

xx

Introduction

ground along these tracks, it is advisable to inspect their foundations. This is what
I would like to do briefly here. Subsequently, I will point out problems that have
arisen from the continued effects of these basic insights, distinctions, and theorems.
I will also begin to indicate what needs to be changed or rearticulated in order to
arrive at a concept of argument that is philosophically reflected with respect to the
needs of our modern era.
It is well known that Aristotle constructs his concepts and theories on the
basis of Platos philosophy. He remains particularly committed to Plato in the basic
distinctions between knowledge and opinion on the one hand and theory and
practice on the other. Nevertheless, Aristotle is an independent thinker, the greatest
and most prolific of ancient Greece. To this day, European science rests on his
shoulders. Hence, it is quite right to take him as the locus of the theoretical foundations
of our concept of argument. In the following, I will sketch five basic relations:
knowledge and opinion, theory and praxis, analytics and dialectics, topics and rhetoric,
and types of dialogue and ways of addressing.

Knowledge and Opinion

First of all, it is the concept of truth (aletheia) that Aristotle adopted from Plato
and developed further. Truth is the quality of judgments which state things as they
are. There is also evidence in Aristotle that these things, insofar as they unconceal
themselves, are by themselves the truth. This need not be decided here. At any rate,
truth is ultimately something immutable, something timeless with regard to nature
and the cosmos, namely, what they or their components and structures really are.
Truth presents itself in knowledge (episteme). Actually, there can only be
knowledge of natural or cosmic relations. Hence, the great paradigm cases of
knowledgetoday we talk about science in this contextare mathematics and
astronomy. To what extent other fields can arrive at real knowledge is not clearly
decided in Aristotles writings. While he seems to be hopeful with respect to natural
science, this is much less the case for the practical aspects of social life.8 Clearly, the
(Platonic) dichotomy of being and becoming is at work here.
Knowledge consists of a logically structured system of propositions. We owe to
Aristotle the discovery of logical structures in propositional language. No doubt,
reading the books of the Analytics in which these structures are described and
explained is a rather dry and boring affair for students today (who, as participants
in introductory courses on logic, are shepherded all the way to the logical achievements of the twentieth century). The reason for this is that we can no longer imagine
a situation in which there is no awareness of the formal inferential relations in a
language. According to Aristotle, if something qualifies as knowledge, then it can

Still, some scholars claim to have discovered substantial evidence for this assumption, too. Cf.,
for example, Ernst Kapp, in Kapp (1938).

Introduction

xxi

be deduced from premises by way of compelling inferences (syllogisms), which, in

turn, can be deduced from more general or more abstract premises, etc. Eventually,
we arrive at first principles (archai) which are self-evident. As examples of such
first principles, Aristotle listed the distinctness of categorical propositional forms
(quantity, quality, locality, temporality, etc.), the eternity of matter and prime movement, the principle of noncontradiction, etc.
The opposite of knowledge is opinion (doxa). Plato rather despised opinion,
because he viewed it as resulting from simple sensory perception which is known to
be unreliable at times. Aristotle gives sense perception a bit more credit. Sometimes
he even seems to adopt an epistemological perspective which regards knowledge as
an established form of opinion, but still a kind of opinion. Nevertheless, it is clear
that simple uneducated opinion is contrary to knowledge.
Opinions are not true, but they can be probable (eikos). As will be seen, in
terms of our interests, this is the most promising concept in the Aristotelian theories
on argumentation. Today, this term refers to a blurry blend of plausibility (something that is somehow evident) and relative frequency (e.g. rain probability). The
meaning of probability in the fourth-century BC Greece resembled verisimilitude.
It was applicable if something had a certain appearance. An apple is probably ripe
if it looks ripe; a student has probably learned if he can give a first correct answer.
Issues of probability always make it appropriate to ask the question whether
things are as they seem to be. These things may end up being mere illusions, but not
necessarily so. For one, they may turn to be true after all. It is also possible for
appearances to stubbornly persist, while even diversifying into different subjects or
groups, so that some people take one thing to be true, while others take another to
be true, etc. (Slavery seems to be right, but according to Aristotle only as a natural,
not merely a legal relationship.9)
In the case of important issues, however, we continue to inquire into their inner
workings. Hence the possibility that probable sentences acquire a certain universality,
insofar as they seem to be true to all people, or to most of them or the best of them.
Probabilities thus construed are called endoxa.10 This factual universality, whose truth
has not (yet) been established, is the central concept for argumentation theory. (On this
basis, it will be possible to form the specific concept of argumentative validity.)

Theory and Praxis

In ancient Greek, theory means something like vision.11 The term is supposed to
convey that theory is no longer mere sensory perception; rather, in theory, we behold
with the minds eye. In contemporary English, theory could be taken to mean
9

Cf. Aristotle (1950), Politics I. 2.

Cf. Aristotle (1960), Topics, I, 1, 100b.
11
The Greek word theoria contains three words for seeing or beholding: theoreo, horao,
and theaomaiit is, as it were, a potentiated way of beholding.
10

xxii

Introduction

comprehension. Anyone who has a theory of planetary movements comprehends

these movementswhile the scale and depth of such comprehension might vary.
(Does it allow for predictions? If so, what is their degree of accuracy? Is it embedded
into other, possibly more general theories about movements and weight proportions? etc.) As I said, the Aristotelian concept of theory is guided by the idea that the
mind is able to peer through transient reality and arrive at an essence beyond and
that this essence, as a structure, is immutable.
Praxis is a term for domains in which people actnot so much technically
in the production of certain objects (which would fall under poiesis), but in the
social, interactive production of their living conditions, i.e. especially in ethics,
economics, and politics. In fact, these domains do not really give rise to any
theories because the essential conditions underlying them are not immutable.
After all, we could manage our economies or governments differently than we do
at the moment. Hence, praxis is a domain that is not quite suitable for theory. What
we find here is not real knowledgewe encounter only probabilities produced
less by the intellect (nous) than by practical judgment (phronesis). Aristotles conception constitutes a clear departure from previous thinkers, especially from
Socrates. On his quest for people who have obtained real knowledge, Socrates
finally arrived at the craftsmenat least this is how Plato told the story in his
Apology. The term for simple crafts and trades in ancient Greek is banausia, and
the contempt expressed therein has survived in Banausentum, the commonly used
German term for philistinism. His remarks about the existence of knowledge
among ordinary craftsmen made Socrates a provocateur. Aristotle did not buy
this; while such people might indeed be experienced and have a certain know-how,
he did not think of them as role models for people in possession of knowledge.
(At this point, we already notice the two levels of knowledge that I will discuss in
Chap. 1: HOW-knowledge and WHY-knowledge.)
In terms of our contemporary usage of theory and practice, it is quite remarkable
that, in this conception, high, real theorypertaining to the domain of exact knowledgeis completely divorced from praxis. (For the arch-observer and classifier
Aristotle, it was simply irrelevant that empirical investigations in physics, for example, require experiments and, therefore, actions, and that the results of research in
physics are realized in technologies. In fact, his pure, contemplative conception of
theory can still be traced in scientistic clichs; hence, it is obscure to this day how
the exact sciences are always already embedded in praxis.)

Analytics and Dialectics

Under the title analytics, Aristotle subsumes demonstrations of logical relations,
especially deductive inferences (syllogisms) between judgments that, in todays
usage, we call quantified propositions. If all A are B, and all B are C, then all A
are also C. In more illustrative, slightly simplified terms: If all horses are living

Introduction

xxiii

beings, and all living beings are mortal, then all horses are mortal.12 The subsequent
tradition, especially among the Megarians and Stoics, has further expanded logic so
that logical relations can be traced between singular propositions, as well. If A or B
have been determined to be true, and if B is found to be false, then it follows that A
is true. It is self-evident that the understanding of logical inferences has enabled
humanity to cut some large and bright swaths through the thicket of apophantic
speech. Nevertheless, logical knowledge does not play the decisive role for the
practice of argumentation that is still mostly attributed to it.
In Aristotle, knowledge as such is demonstrated by logically deriving propositions from major premises, which, in turn, follow from still higher propositions.
As already stated, at the top of this structure are the first principles (archai). These are
the irrevocable beginnings of knowledge and truth. They can no longer be logically
demonstrated to be true themselvesrather, they are realized by the intellect (nous).
In other words, logic is a mere technique of moving from some propositions to
other propositions salva veritate. Realizing the truth of the true, however, requires
something different.
This is the provenance of what Aristotle (following Platos dialektike techne)
calls dialectics.13 Long before Plato, dialectics had been an issue in Greek
philosophy. Zeno of Elea had specialized in giving counter-speeches to questionable theses in order to show that a state of affairs turns out to be different if viewed
from different points of view and that, if so, theses end up alternating between being
true and false. Dialectics could produce an appearance of truth, but it could also
dispel mere appearances.14 In Plato, the term dialectics came to represent the art of
dialogically creating or dissolving conceptual relations and thus of approximating
the idea of the matter in question.15 Aristotle uses dialectics to refer to means and
ways of examining or proving the truth or probability of major premises that cannot
be derived any further. In order to judge a controversial thesis, one must proceed by
inferentially tracing it back to first principles that are truths or at least probabilities
(in the sense of endoxa).
In the end (i.e. once a candidate for filling the position of the first principle,
arche, or endoxon has been identified), we therefore rely on inferences or a kind of
support that can no longer be logical. After all, if the intellect is not yet able to
realize a particular matter, but if no further premises for logically inferring the
controversial thesis can be found, then we require other ways for leading the
intellect onto the path of understanding. In this regard, Aristotle offers figures such
as, on the one hand, imperfect deductions and, on the other hand, rhetorical
signals. These allow for the construction of an insight, which takes place not only
12

Cf. Aristotle (1973), Analytica Priora, especially 25b 25 ff., where the explication of complete
figures begins.
13
There is no consensus on the relationship between the syllogistic and the dialectical in Aristotle.
For the purposes of this account, I follow Eric Weils rather convincing position; cf. Weil (1972).
14
It was an art of creating and destroying illusions; cf. Niehues-Prbsting (1987), 189 (emphasis
in original) (Trans. T.P.).
15
Cf., for example, Plato (1964), Sophistes and Politikos.

xxiv

Introduction

on the tracks that we would call cognitive today but also as a result of affective
and emotional influences. Dialectics in this sense is the part of Aristotles theories
which must be considered fundamental for argumentation theory.

Topics and Rhetoric

Under the title topics, Aristotle presents the means of dialectics, namely the
identification and examination of beginnings in discussions aimed at validity. As
I said, perfect syllogisms only play a subordinate role in this endeavor. Now, the
primary topical ingredients are inductive inferences or generalizations.16 These do
not result in real conclusions either; they only arrive at probable ones (however, as
I said, not in the sense of relative frequency, but in terms of verisimilitude). In addition, there are inferences from conceptual determinations such as transitions from
genus to species, to the proprium, the accident. Today, these issues concern the
theory of definition as well as analytical propositions. In terms of a concept of argument, the so-called enthymemes are of particular interest. This term is derived from
the Greek en thymo (in the guts) and refers to imperfect deductions. In the case
of the latter, inferences are not obviously universally true. In part, they are normal
conclusions with some missing premises, which are, however, self-evident and could
be supplemented. In other, more notable cases the inference follows no logical, but
only a semiformal schema, for instance, in the case of the a fortiori argument or the
argument from analogy. Hence, it takes a judgment to assess the applicability of
these schemes in regard to any given circumstances. (It may turn out, for example,
that an analogy that was used turns out to be skewed.) In the case of such judgments,
not only the theoretical permeation of the matter in question is significant but also
the way in which it has been embedded affectively and emotionally.
Therefore, the enthymematic deductions of the topics flow seamlessly into the
forms and figures of rhetoric.17 When Aristotle began to work on rhetoric, there had
already been a 100-year-old Athenian tradition of exercising and teaching professional
public speech. In politics and in court, it was indispensable to represent ones case in
such a way that it would gain the support of a majority. The sophists had demonstrated
that rhetoric could at least partially be devised as a mere instrument for obtaining
assenteven for absurd or outrageous theses. Aristotle, in turn, attempted to theoretically penetrate this skill (techne, practical knowledge) by tentatively systematizing
ways of reinforcing the credibility of a speech in terms of affect and emotion.
He divided these forms into three branches (logos, ethos, and pathos). Logos
concerns the inferential elements of speech, so that logic now appears as a part of
rhetoric. This has caused a lot of confusion. It is true that a logically correct
16

Induction is a passage from individuals to universals, e.g.[,] the argument that supposing the
skilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled
man is the best at his particular task Aristotle (1960), Topics I, 12, 13, 105a.
17
Aristotle sometimes calls rhetorical figures enthymemes and even syllogisms.

Introduction

xxv

argument can contribute to the credibility of a speech. Yet this does not make it a
rhetorical argument. The other two branches concern the speaker and the actual
speech. A speaker of good provenance, who knows how to present himself and is
decently dressed, etc., is more credible than a carelessly dressed person of dubious
origin. Likewise, giving a well-structured speech, whose important sentences are
well formed and repeated so as to affect the emotions, etc., is more credible than
reeling off a few phrases that have been pieced together haphazardly. Furthermore,
Aristotle detected some differences in pathos that relate to the qualities of particular
audiences. Different things will further the credibility of a speech among the old,
the rich, and the educated than among the young, the poor, and the uneducated.18
These theories were derived, on the one hand, from observations and, on the other
hand, from anthropological and psychological theories contained in Aristotles
overall system of philosophy.
The following must be considered in any evaluation of the role of rhetoric: The
Greeks were (and are) a nation that likes to have discussions. This entrenched
culture of discussion had extremely serious aspects (as demonstrated by the trial of
Socrates, a defeat before the tribunal could have lethal consequences), but it also
spawned rhetorical battles in the marketplaces, where the sole aim was not to
embarrass oneself by being forced to admit an absurd or outrageous thesis. Aristotles
rhetoric illuminates, as it were, what actually happened in such events. The actual
rhetorical success was not simply regarded as evidence of the truth or probability of
the thesis: Knowledge of some sophists rhetorical battles was widespread, just like
an awareness of the fact that some tribunals had ruled unjustly in the past, etc.
Aristotles rhetoric is based on a range of supremely important insights. There was
no question, however, that it addressed the credibility of speech and that this quality
may deviate from its truth or probability. A vestige of Platos warning that rhetoric
without insights into the matter in question is a despicable and dangerous skill was
still on Aristotles mind.

Types of Dialogue and Ways of Addressing

The final element of Aristotles theories of argumentation is a rudimentary taxonomy
of ways in which speech aimed at validity can be realized. Three types of dialogue
and four ways of addressing someone are distinguishable here (these are my words,
but the conceptual differences are Aristotles).
By types of dialogue, I mean various ways of attending to the accuracy or validity
of propositions. On the one hand, there are instructional dialogues. In a teachinglearning situation, a speaker conveys her knowledge to a listener. Validity is assumed
in this case, i.e. the dialogue partner is no opponent. Rather, her contributions
18

This is the so-called psychology of the audience mentioned by Dring (Dring (1966), 134 ff.).
For a closer look, cf. Aristotle (1975), Rhetoric, Book II, especially Chapters 12 and 13, where the
contrast between young and old is presented in a rather embarrassing manner.

xxvi

Introduction

articulate her state of comprehension; they are either responses to questions posed
by the teacher in order to test this comprehension or inquiries into the teachers
explanations. Secondly, there are genuine dialogues, in which validity claims are
examined with respect to their validity. In this case, the dialogue partner is a critical
opponent. He checks the validity of the thesis and of the reasons given, compares
these reasons in terms of their internal coherence, and confronts the thesis and its
reasons with his own knowledge and beliefs.19 The third type is the eristic dialogue
(from eris, i.e. strife). In this case, the goal is neither the dissemination of knowledge
nor the examination of validity claims, but the crude enforcement of claims.
No matter whether they represent the speakers idiosyncrasies or whether they are
altogether foolish and paradoxical, the only objective here is to compel the interlocutor to agree with them. These three types revolve around the second one. An
instructional dialogue is actually not yet a dialogue, while eristic speech has ceased
to be one.
Parallel to these categories is a distinction in Aristotles system between four ways
of addressing a speech. I would like to call these monologue, dyad, tribunal, and
oratory (again, these are my terms, but Aristotles concepts). In a monologue, a
human being, as Plato would still have had it, converses with his soul.20 In Aristotle,
this is not an explicitly recognized form; however, soliloquies were of course familiar
devices in Greek tragedy. In our times of heightened individualization, monologues are considerably more significant than in ancient Greece. Therefore, we need
to remind ourselves emphatically that this contemplative way of deliberating with
oneself has a dialogical structure. The second form is the dyad. In this case,
address is reciprocal. It involves two speakers (or groups of speakers) who have a
conversation with or against each other in one way or another. The third form is the
tribunal, where two speakers struggle over the validity of a proposition and address
this struggle to a third party (which might consist of multiple people; in fact, in ancient
Athens, it could have consisted of a few thousand). After a phase of listening, this
third party decides who is right or what is valid. The two parties may be in opposition to one another, but not to the judge. The fourth way of addressing speech is
oratory. In this case, an orator speaks to listeners, usually a larger crowd, whose
assent he or she desires. Speakers using this form are concerned with evaluating
matters (e.g. the commendation or reprimand of a politician). The listeners are no
opponentsthey either give their assent to a speech or they do not.
Obviously, these types of dialogue and ways of addressing speech can be combined. As I said, it is possible to think through the validity of theses and arguments
monologically. Even instructional dialogues can take place in the form of a
monologue (if we try to learn something from a book), while this is impossible in
the case of eristic dialogues. An instructional dialogue can be realized as oratory
(in so-called chalk and talk teaching), even if doing so has only a few useful

19

In this context, Aristotle also distinguishes a cooperative from an agonal type; cf. Aristotle
(1960), Topics, IX 2, 165a 38 ff.
20
Plato (1964), Sophistes 263e, Theaetetus 189e190a.

Introduction

xxvii

applications. It is also possible for an instructional dialogue to take place as a tribunal

(in the case of sample lessons in front of a teaching evaluation committee), etc.
It should be clear that for our present pursuit of theorizing the practice of
argumentation, the most significant form is the dyad aimed at testing validity
(which, in this book, I will call argumentative dialogue). Furthermore, tribunals
aimed at validity (as in a court of law) and oratory aimed at validity (as a form which
de facto occurs in all kinds of presentations, and which must therefore be mastered)
are of great importance as well.

The Formation and Deformation of Aristotelian Theory

in the Philosophical Tradition
Every educated person knows that this title could adorn a weighty tome. Since I do
not have enough time to write that book as well, I would at least like to do the following:
I will briefly point to some aspects of the Aristotelian foundations of argumentation
theory that have been emphasized, developed further, reinterpreted, and reshaped
by the tradition in order to improve our current understanding of argument
sometimes this will mean that we see matters more sharply; at other times they will
seem to us slightly different. I will highlight three themes, namely the lack of dynamism in the concepts of knowledge and truth, the modification of the concept of
verisimilitude, and the relationship between argumentation and rhetoric.

On the Concepts of Knowledge and Truth

As mentioned before, Aristotles concept of knowledge targeted primarily the
domain presently called exact sciences, i.e. formal sciences as well as the theoretical foundations of the natural sciences. In ancient Greece, this ideal of theory
and knowledgearticulated in the demonstration of logical structures, in successive deductions from beginningswas still observed in an exemplary manner by
Euclid.21 This account of geometry, in which the beginnings are definitions and
principles from which all relevant propositions are deduced, has had a tremendous
appeal for the entire subsequent history of thought and science. To this day, we are
still wrestling with the corresponding axiomatic ideal of theory. While Aristotle
refrained from propagating this ideal in relation to knowledge formation in practical
areas, the tradition did not follow him in this regard. Rather, it has produced
axiomatic representations of ethics (Spinoza) as well as politics (Hobbes). It is
not uncommon for todays relevant scientists working in practical areas (politics,
economics, psychology, etc.) to believe that they only do serious science if they take
the natural sciences as a guide.
21

Cf. Euclid (1956).

xxviii

Introduction

Like I said, there is a rift separating Aristotles concepts of theory and knowledge
from praxis. Knowledge, for example, the knowledge of physics, was gained through
observation and contemplation, not in practical actions (in experiments).22 This conception was in part due to the state of science at the time, but it also depended on an
understanding of data that simply conceived of them as something receptive in the same
way in astronomy, stars were simply observed. Over the course of history, since the
Renaissance at the latest, it has become apparent that even the theories of physics have
a practical foundation (which is manifest in the skills of craftspeople and engineers). In modern times, the integration of scientific knowledge into technology and
industry has highlighted the relevance of praxis in the form of applications of knowledge (its progress, its foci, etc.). Nevertheless, it is a fact that the link to practice
has been neglected in conceptions of theoretical knowledge to this dayhence I will
present a concept of knowledge in Chap. 1 that attempts to revise this biasand this
fact is presumably a consequence of the effect of the Aristotelian ideal of theory.
There is a second, closely related characteristic of our concept of theory: The latter
is concerned with being and thus seems to be something static. It is formed as well
as justified, and following these processes it has become valid, i.e. it is knowledge.
If it grows, however, then suddenly former knowledge is no longer knowledge at
all, but mere error and mistake. Depending on ones predilections, one may have
nothing but deep-seated contempt for the ancient Greek assumption that the Earth is
flat (something that, incidentally, Aristotle did not believe; however, this flatness
was the geomorphic knowledge of a time when distances were incomparably greater
than they are for us). In this sense, the Aristotelian (ontological) concept of truth
is still in effect today. Truth is seen as something static, not as a becoming and
knowledge is not seen as transitory; things are simply as they are, and we only recognize them gradually. Anytime we recognize something new, we recognize at the
same time that our predecessors were wrong. This conception, too, is not adequate
and has to be understood differently.

On the Concepts of Probability and Subjectivity

As I said before, Aristotle regarded the discussion of any given thesis as guided by
the directive that it must be traced back to its major premises, which will be either
true or probable. The Roman rhetoricians of antiquity (Cicero, Quintilian) in turn
developed only the topical and dialectical content of those Aristotelian theories that
focused on achieving assent in political speech. Their point was not so much the
identification of content that is universally true, but the presentation of each partys
22

In zoology, Aristotle comes up with a plethora of (sometimes fantastic) details about animals
outer and inner structures. Scholars believe that at least some of these observations are based on
his own dissections. Are these, then, the beginnings of research activities? Yes, but there is a
difference between an activity that merely renders an object accessible and an activity that in itself
shows something new.

Introduction

xxix

interests and how to broaden assent to them. Hellenism emphasized aspects of

aesthetics, poetics, and a general decorum in public speech. Rhetoric becomes ars
bene dicendi (the art of good speech). Since the establishment of Christianity,
however, truths again form the beginnings of arguments: the doctrines of scripture
and of the church fathers. In the scholastic Middle Ages, Aristotles theories are
incorporated (if they are still accessible) into a general way of teaching informed by
Christian doctrine. Arguing becomes a highly differentiated art now, which even
allows for the championing of different positions on complicated metaphysical
questions (such as the existence of universals). On the whole, the task is how to
trace controversial theses back to established Christian principles or their respective
interpretations via chains of syllogistic and topical inferences, possibly supported
by scholastic rhetoric.
During the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, a development sets in that
increasingly erodes these Christian (and Aristotelian) truths as the first principles or
major premises for valid arguments. In fact, once secularization has completely
taken hold of Europes thinking elite, the reliability of said beginnings has thoroughly disintegrated. On the one hand, detecting such beginnings has now been
delegated to philosophy and the sciences; on the other hand, a subjectivism gains
ground, especially in the ethical-political domain. In the 16th and 17th century,
conceptions of truth in the sciences still have clear links to practicelinks, however,
which are weakened significantly over time. Simultaneously, mathematicians develop
a concept of probability designed to theorize what is not yet quite epistemically
secure. This concept applies, on the one hand, to set patterns in random sequences
of events and, on the other hand, to relative frequencies in series of empirical data.
At the end of the 19th century, scientific truth has become pure theory (which is
largely structured mathematically). Subsequently, the aforementioned process of
erosion sets in.
Today, truths can be found in highly differentiated formal sciences, which can
in part be represented by the Aristotelian axiomatic ideal of knowledge. To the extent
that researcherswho have been instructed, for instance, by Poppers philosophy
of sciencestill operate with hypotheses that must not lead to contradictions
and potentially have a certain probability (in the sense of relative frequency23), the
concept of truth guiding empirical research in different fields of knowledge is still
influenced by logic. Since the mid-20th century, it has been recognized that
such operations are shaped by perspectives. In many fields, we are now dealing
with endoxa in the Aristotelian sensein fact, there are usually several ones for
each question, and any hope for exposing the accuracy (truth) of any one current
opinion in relation to any other is rather faint. Hence, we are left with (subjective)
probabilitieswithout having an idea of what it is that distinguishes them from
mere subjective opinions.
In fields that require unambiguous propositionsi.e. particularly in legislation
and jurisprudencethe tribunal is the decisive form of argumentation. Hence, we
23

By now even in a subjectivist version (following Bayes theorem).

xxx

Introduction

encounter arguments (in logical and topical inferences) as well as the heavy use
of rhetoric (which does not always take the form of the ars bene dicendi).
Subsequently, a judge or a majority vote decides what is valid.
However, the form of the tribunal does not answer the fundamental question of
the validity of a thesis. Any decision may be questioned as to whether it was right.
At least in cases in which arguments have been neglected, it may even be criticized.
So, we need a vocabulary for established beginnings and endings of an argument as
well as for established or correct propositions that can be acquired argumentatively.
In Aristotelian terms, what meanings can eikos and endoxon have for us today?
How does whatever is probable or taken to be true by the majority and/or the most
notable and illustrious among them relate to subjective opinion? In what sense
could it be a suitable beginning (or a last reason) for an argument?
It is advisable at this point to realize that Aristotleas far as we are familiar with
his teachings24actually articulates a vague and indistinct notion of endoxon.
What does it even mean that a given proposition is taken to be correct by a majority,
or by a majority of experts, or by the best among them? Why do they take it to be
true? Is there no longer a general answer to this question? Yes, I think there is; in
fact, it is a rather simple one: because the proposition has been corroborated by
their daily life, not only by their speechbecause they did not get stuck using it or
at least did not encounter any serious difficulties. In other words, the sentence was
probable in the sense of being a suitable orientation. Yet why is it, then, that not
everybody accepts it? Because there are always people who do not sufficiently
understand themselveswho do not know what they are doing and whyand also
because there are always people who live differently than most others.
After all, people simply do not function like machines or natural objects; even
though there are uniformities among people indeed, it is hardly ever possible to
formulate strict universal propositions about them.
By integrating this pragmatic aspect into the concept of endoxon, we gain a
concept of argumentative beginnings, which differs in kind from timeless truth as
well as from the mere opinion of the many or of the experts. It is also easily understandable that an endoxon construed in this way has affective and emotional components. The fact that praxis and life leave their imprints on a persons character and
feeling is a truism. At the same time, it becomes clear that simple inferential
speech (even if it involves topical and rhetorical figures) cannot establish new
general orientations from such beginnings. In the best-case scenario, the practice
of argumentation can produce propositions that are accepted, for the time being,
by some or many people. Subsequently, however, these propositions still have to
demonstrate their true suitability as orientations in peoples lives and actions.

24

Ancient scholars were familiar with significantly more writings by Aristotle than we are today.
Diogenes Laertius (cf. Diogenes Laertius (1925), I, 5.1) still counts nearly 400 books, subsumed
under 146 titles. Apparently, most of Aristotles works have been lost; what we can still read today
are texts that were mainly used for purposes of instruction in the academy.

Introduction

xxxi

On Argumentation and Rhetoric

The Aristotelian understanding of rhetoric entails that a thesis which is supposed to
be identified as probable must be credible. The use of topical and rhetorical
figures is meant to promote the said credibility. Due to the vague notion of endoxon,
however, we are given the impression that next to truth, which would have to be
displayed logically or possibly even topically, there is only one alternative, namely,
more or less widespread opinion. To be sure, a pragmatic way of thinking which
introduces the aspect of practical relevance would run counter to such an assumption. As long as there is no recognition of the necessity of taking such a pragmatic
turn, however, we are left with a dichotomy in which truth is objective and probability
is subjective. In that case, the latter does not express anything beyond a factual
opinion (possibly supported by feelings), and the credibility of a thesis becomes
manifest in the simple fact that it is accepted (by many).
These conditions have led to a radical separation between logic and rhetoric
in the subsequent history of thought. It just so happens to be the case that the
soundness of a logical inference can be evaluated independently of the acceptance
of the conclusion. Moreover, it is also true that acceptance can be achieved even in
the case of highly problematic theses, yet such a development is no longer a viable
object of criticism if a high degree of acceptance indicates the credibility of the
thesis, thus acting as a criterion for its validity. The resulting dichotomy of logic and
rhetoric is therefore a legacy that goes back to an ambiguity in Aristotle or to its
perpetuation by the subsequent tradition. Hence, current argumentation theory is
concerned with somehow healing the rift between these two schools of thought.
In doing so, it is more or less successful. On the whole, arguments are still regarded
as either logical (and topical) inferences or as verbal structures for obtaining assent
(by many or all). Below, in the description of contemporary Argumentation Theory
Under Construction, I will show how the various approaches and intellectual efforts
confront this problem.
What Plato and Aristotle have to teach us with respect to rhetoric and any
attempts at taking assentin the sense of a more or less general (or idealized)
agreementto be a criterion for argumentative validity (or probability) is that
opinion and assent are no independent criteria; rather, they are meaningful only in the
context of truth or factual insight. Weespecially we in Germanywitnessed the
masterful rhetoric of Dr. Goebbels at work, who was able to make theses seem credible,
thereby leading straight into the abyss (the extermination of the Jews, total war).25
25

To avoid misunderstandings, I am by no means trying to explain the success of National Socialism

in Germany as a result of the rhetorical skills of the Nazi leadership. Yet anyone who watches the
speaker Goebbels in old newsreel footage can guess why, even after the bombing of major German
cities and the defeat at Stalingrad, there could still be sufficient support for the continuation of the
war among the German public. Even an independent spirit such as Iring Fetscher was impressed
after the radio transmission of Goebbels appearance at the Sports Palace by the glorious public
speech in which the German people were committed to the last battle in a total war with Biblical
solemnity. Cf. Fetscher (1998), 8. (Trans. T.P.)

xxxii

Introduction

So much for the development of ambiguities in the terminology on argumentation

as it has been prefigured by Aristotle. If I were to summarize the result in one
sentence, it would read something like this: We have no concepts for capturing the
essence of a thesis which has been sufficiently backed by argumentation. This
quality (I call it argumentative validity) concerns knowledge, without itself being
knowledge, and it concerns opinion, but transcends the latter by aiming at generalization. Such generalization does not consist in simply multiplying the number of
people in agreement with a thesis, but in ensuring that the supported thesis gains a
certain orientation value.
Throughout history, there has been a constant fluctuation in the way in which the
two components of the concept of argument have been integrated; sometimes this
integration was better, at other times it was worse. By the early 20th century, logic
had advanced to the status of a purely formal scientific discipline whose importance
became apparent only in the context of mathematics and which was barely usable
for the practice of argumentation. Rhetoric had partly become an antiquated study
of how to embellish texts and partly taken up its role as an instrument of manipulation
in the political struggle. After it had been thoroughly exploited during the wars,
however, rhetoric was somewhat discredited for a while. Today, things have
changed again, and it remains to be discussed to what extent this is justified. As for
the actual theorization of argumentation, there has been a veritable new beginning
since the middle of the 20th century, which I will now try to explain and assess with
regard to its main aspects. In the first part of this account, I will address the new
constructions by Toulmin, Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca, Habermas-Lorenzen, and
Hamblin. Subsequently, I will attempt a survey of the various contemporary
approaches and efforts expended in the service of a theorization of the practice of
argumentation.

Argumentation Theory Under Construction

First New Constructions
In 1958, Stephen Toulmin, a British philosophy professor who had worked on ethics
and the philosophy of science, published his book The Uses of Argument. The primary
purpose of this book was to deny logic its suitability as a theory of argumentation.
Logic, Toulmin argued, was now a rigid, formal discipline that had broken free from
the theorization of the practice of argumentation. In order to make a fresh start with
regard to argumentation, he thought it advisable not to take processes in the sciences
but in jurisprudence as a starting point, so as to realize what it means to argue by
observing the proceedings in a court hearing.26 His considerations resulted in a
26

It is amazing to what degree this declaration went unchallengedand has gone unchallenged to
this day. After all, Toulmins theory of argumentation is not a specifically apt apparatus for the
analysis of forensic argument. It is an indispensable practice in court to respond to any objections
raised by the other party, but the model makes no provision for this practice whatsoever.

Introduction

xxxiii

scheme for justifications, which has by now become an essential part of modern
argumentation theory under the title Toulmin scheme.
The point of this scheme is that a claim is made and justified. This justification
consists of four different parts, (1) a beginning (data, grounds), which is evident;
(2) a general rule (warrant), which connects the beginning with the claim; (3) a
theoretical knowledge for supporting the warrant (backing); and (4) a modalization
(qualifier), which restricts the claim in case the rule is not universally valid or if
certain conditions obtain (rebuttals) which render it inapplicable. Toulmins books
and the vast secondary literature written about them give numerous illustrative
examples of how this looks in context. Typical examples of this scheme were and
are scenarios such as: Peterson is probably (qualifier) not Catholic (claim), because
he is Swedish (data), and almost all Swedes are not Catholic (warrant), as demonstrated by the last census (backing).
For a general assessment of the possibilities of this theory, the following must
be kept in mind: The scheme is a paradigm only for justifications. As already
mentioned, justifications consist of four different elements. Relations between these
elements are fixed. Hence, possible applications for this scheme are limited to cases
exhibiting a particular structure.27 I will briefly make a few points on this issue:
The central piece of a justification is, of course, the warrant. It connects the claim
and the evidence. Indeed, the demand that the warrant itself be justified in a different
waya way for which, in turn, there is no further ruleis quite comprehensible in
light of the specific cases mentioned by Toulmin. As a general requirement for all
justifications, however, it is an unnecessary, arbitrary stipulation.
Warrant and backing belong to a field. This concept of a field is a strong, new
element which Toulmin introduced to argumentation theory.28 It allows us to no longer
regard the premises of an argument as isolated propositions, but as coming from a
discipline that features established knowledge. What does it mean for knowledge to
be established? That is the weak point of the matter because this knowledge and its
state of having been established are themselves merely further facts. In other words,
the knowledge involved in argumentative support cannot be examined with respect
to its own justification. Apparently, in grounding his concept of argument, Toulmin
does not want to move beyond knowledge. What this means, then, is that knowledge
has not been constituted argumentatively. Nonetheless, Toulmins answer to the
question of how, after all, it has been constituted is only implicit. He interprets
knowledge institutionally (or conventionally), i.e. there are experts who understand
something and take it to be right. This concept of a field seems to demand a
pragmatic supplement, but there is none in Toulmin. If the field was a domain of
felicitous praxis (see Sect. 1.2), then the knowledge which supports the warrant
would really have been established. As it stands, however, it is a mere de facto
consensus of scientists. Arguing is regarded as something subsidiary, with roots in
knowledge. Knowledge itself no longer has, and no longer needs, a foundation.

27

The Toulmin scheme is actually not too general at all, even though this is often brought forth against
it; cf. Lumer (1999). On the contrary, it is too specific. Cf. my critique of Toulmin in Wohlrapp (1986).
28
Cf. Toulmin (1958), 36 ff.

xxxiv

Introduction

Things are similar in the case of evidence. The latter does not have to be justified
any further either; it simply states whatever is observable. To be sure, there are
simple cases like that, especially in everyday life, when we inquire (as in Toulmins
example) about a girls hair color. That Anne has red hair is evident. Yet regarding
such evidence as the paradigm case is an expression of naive empiricism. Evidence
does not always serve as a secure foundation neither in the sciences nor in jurisprudence. In the sciences, data are obtained in experimental setups that involve many
assumptions. In court, the opposing party may question any evidence concerning its
reliability.
In contrast to backing and evidence, it is possible to criticize the warrant. Yet
there is only one option for criticism in Toulmins model, namely with regard to a
potential lack of universality. What cannot be criticized, on the other hand, is the
warrants possible inadequacy that it might employ categories which are not ideal
for the matter in question. Moreover, if it can be determined that the warrant is not
universally valid, then the claim is merely probable. This, again, is a very specific
restriction.29 Of course, there are claims which become invalid if the rule is not
universal. But the scheme does not even make a provision for cases like that.
In summary, Toulmins scheme does not address the practice of argumentation as
a whole, but only part of it, namely justifying. It devises a structure for this part.
This structure is not open, i.e. it does not enable the development of arguments.
It is not dynamic but, as it were, rather rigid. It does not specify a meta-level as a
point from where to potentially change the structure in accordance with any given
case. It is not dialogical, i.e. an opponent has only one option for making a move:
He or she can criticize the universality of the warrant and, if needed, request a
modalization of the claim. Any possible subjective attitudes, however, can have no
part in this. Nevertheless, this correction feature ensures that the structure offers
more than what is presented by many other theorists of argumentation. Toulmins
scheme conveys a faint notion of dialogicity and dynamisma faint notion, not
more than that.30
The second striking discovery of Toulmins theory is the substantial argument.
This was supposed to be an argument which expands the content of the conclusion
when compared with content already included in the reasons. While the intentions
guiding this idea were good, Toulmin never made it past inductive inferences which
provide, as I said, merely probable conclusions. It is at the very least doubtful
whether such a thing deserves to be called expanded content. In order to achieve
29

The general problem of these modalizations will be discussed in Chap. 7.

In Toulmins second book on argumentation theory (cf. Toulmin et al. (1978)), which is basically
an insistent account of how to apply the scheme, he notes that errors may occur with respect to
each element of the scheme. Based on this consideration, Toulmin specifies a short list of five types
of fallacies. The message to be conveyed is apparently that at each point of the scheme we better
pay close attention, yet this does not make the scheme dialogical. Bart Verheij demonstrates how
the model can be extended by further specifying and discussing its elements; cf. Verheij (2005).
This is certainly an improvement. However, it is still (unnecessarily) restricted to Toulmin-style
arguments without defining the scope in which those arguments make sense at all.
30

Introduction

xxxv

a real expansion of content, the scheme would have to integrate argumentative

inferences that differ from deductive and inductive ones; in particular, it would
have to include analogical as well as abstracting and methodical-constructive
inferences.31 Yet Toulmin does not even consider something like that.
Just like Toulmins concept of a field, his term substantial argument merely
hints at the possibility of transcending the formal concept of argument. It is a tentative crossing of the border, just far enough to think another side is possible.
Toulmins substantial argument never evolved to a state of conceptual clarity;
therefore, it soon disappeared again. In fact, there is already no mention of it in
Toulmins second book.32 As I said, the only component that survived the reception
of the theory was the scheme itself. In sum, it may be concluded that Toulmin
describes the practice of argumentation as a validity-related speech activity grounded
in knowledge (even common sense) which features more, and more liberalized,
inferential possibilities than logic; however, the validity of argumentative conclusions
that has become available as a result of this expansion and liberalization merely has
a diffuse quality somewhere between truth, probability, rational33 acceptability, and
factual acceptance.
Another book published in 1958 was a work by the Belgian professor of philosophy Chaim Perelman and his assistant Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca titled La nouvelle
rhetorique. Trait de largumentation. The title suggests the books trajectory:
Rhetoric is supposed to appear in a new guise as an argumentative discipline. The
domain of argumentation is now that of the plausible, the credible (vraisemblable), and the probable (probable).34 The treatise expressly breaks with the
tradition of logic and its inferential possibilities. While the authors regard such
demonstrations as decisive for science and philosophy, they argue that the method
does not reach into the spheres of everyday life, values, and general humanity. It is
therefore only for these spheres that the topical and rhetorical figures of tradition are
reprocessed in a revised form as argumentative figures. This is a striking theoretical stipulation in the form of a simple act of naming. After all, it excludes the whole
domain of knowledge, i.e. the domain which usually provides arguments with
strength and respectability, as non-argumentative. The divisionwhich has been
virulent since Aristotlebetween a strict theory that leads to knowledge and a
flexible theory that only leads to (more or less widespread) opinions is integrated
into this theory of argumentation in such a way that arguments are in fact
relegated to the domains of praxis and practical wisdom (phronesis) only. This is a
highly misleading decision.

31

By methodical-constructive inference, I mean an operational change in a (real or symbolic)

object or a transition from one state of affairs to another state of affairs which has now been
rendered attainable. This will be explained in detail in Chap. 1.
32
Cf. Toulmin et al. (1978).
33
Rationality or reasonableness are not among the terms introduced or discussed which are listed
in the register; cf. Toulmin (1958), 264.
34
Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 1.

xxxvi

Introduction

In addition to various comments on ways of addressing an argument, which

revisit and alter the Aristotelian dialectical forms (self-deliberation as well as deliberation with others, the epidictic genre, etc.), the book is mainly devoted to two
undertakings:
Firstly, the authors coin the term argumentative figure. This is supposed to be
a verbal occurrence in line with a speakers efforts to reach her audience and effect
either agreement or a modification of the audience members perspectives. Figures
that do not have such effects are considered to be merely rhetorical figures.35 Yet
which figures are argumentative, and which merely rhetorical, can be determined
only on the performative level of speech. In fact, the use of the same figure may
sometimes be rhetorical and at other times argumentative.36 But the authors do
not ask what exactly a manifestation of such effects would look likeafter all,
agreement or rejection is usually not conferred on a single figure, but on an entire
speech or argument. Similarly, there is no consideration of whether these effects
(if they occur) are dependent on regular or isolable conditions, so that a figures
argumentative quality would generally be something invariant. In this respect, the
concept of argumentative figure is rather diffuse.
The main achievement of the book is a detailed classification of figures that
have the potential to be argumentative. With regard to contents, we find a compilation
of topical and rhetorical figures passed down from Aristotle and the subsequent
traditionin particular Roman topical and rhetorical tradition (Cicero and Quintilian).
There are striking figures such as generalization, the causal link, analogy, and
the argument form authority, as well as less striking figures such as argument by
sacrifice (the value of a thing is based on the sacrifice which one is willing to make
for it37) and even observations of rhetorical possibilities that might make use of very
different means (e.g. in making an opponent seem ridiculous38). Nevertheless, the
system of figures lacks systematicity; the argument classes (quasi-logical, based
on the structure of reality, establishing the structure of reality, and dissociating
concepts) have been formed on the basis of rather idiosyncratic considerations;
they are not disjunctive and, on the whole, result in a compilation that is not very
comprehensible in terms of its similarities as well as rather arbitrary in its selection
from the traditional inventory of topical and rhetorical figures.39
It is very likely that this publication was a significant factor in the development
leading up to calling such figures argumentative in the first place. As such, the book
represents a step toward a changed concept of argument. After all, argument in its
Latin origin means ground or demonstration. Traditionally, this was the premise
to a logical conclusion. The figures presented by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
are supposed to show alternatives, namely alternatives with a similarly obvious
35

Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 169.

Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 172.
37
Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 248.
38
Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 205 ff.
39
The system of figures has been criticized as not systematic and not useful enough by others, too.
Cf., for example, Kienpointner (1992), 193 ff., and van Eemeren et al. (1996), 123/124.
36

Introduction

xxxvii

structure (however, the structure of the figures is almost never analyzed clearly; one
of the few exceptions is analogy, in which case the authors offer a very useful fourpart scheme for comparing relations40). So much for this system of argumentative
figures, which is rich in content, but conceptually murky.
The second achievement of the book is a step beyond the boundaries enclosing
rhetoric, topics, and dialectics ever since Aristotle. According to this tradition, ways
of soliciting agreement that are merely persuasive are neutral concerning the validity
and truth of the speechs contents. For this step, the authors attempt to turn to
ways of addressing speech as a criterion by which to judge the binding character of
attainable assent. Thus, they introduce the term universal audience.41 It refers to
an audience which has been generalized with respect to the audience that is actually
addressed. The actual audience is always a particular one; it has particular qualities
and will possibly, depending on these qualities, agree to a thesis or not. Of course,
this is reminiscent of Aristotles psychology of the audience. Now, if an audience
agreed regardless of its particular qualities, then such agreement would apparently
express something universal. Thus, if a speaker addresses her audience and, in doing
so, no longer strives for particular but universal agreement, then this is obviously
something higher and more general.
The authors of La nouvelle rhetorique define this difference between ways of
addressingi.e. between appealing to a particular or a universal audienceas the
difference between persuading and convincing.42 Persuading involves speech
addressed to a particular audience, whereas convincing involves speech addressed
to everyone. Now the question is who is everyone? Children or the feebleminded,
for instance, are not included. Perhaps the term refers to all intelligent adults, to
the elites perhaps. At this point, the authors present a sophisticated solution: There
can be various conceptions of the universal audience, and each person may have
his or her own. In any given type of argumentation, then, we always simultaneously
negotiate a particular conception of the universal audience. Is this suggestion
helpful? It is certainly true that everyone has an idea of the difference between what
was in fact meant and intended and what was rightly meant and intended. It is also
true that this difference touches on the issue of generalization. Yet talk of addressing
the universal audience describes it in a very unclear way. Could this really lead to
such a thing as a criterion of validity?
One may, for example, assume that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca themselves
address their book to the universal audience. Now if I, as a reader, approach
the book, I will still try to recognize its merits and weaknesses. Frankly, I am not
particularly willing to simply agree to this ambitious as well as unclear body of
thought. As I already said, others feel the same way about it. So, what bearing does
the authors aim at the universal audience, which I am happy to concede, have on the
validity, accuracy, or truth of their message? It would be their objective not merely
to persuade, but to convince me. Fine, but their message does not convince me.
40

Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 82, especially 372 ff.

Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 7, 31 ff.
42
Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 29.
41

xxxviii

Introduction

Why not? Is it because I belong to a particular audience with special preconceptions

from which I would have to distance myself in order to be able to accept the
message? But why should the mere intention of a speaker to address the recipient as
a stand-in for the universal audience be sufficient? If I criticize, as I did above, the
concept of an argumentative figure as diffuse, then I also address the universal
audienceat least in the sense of expecting everyone to be able to understand
what I mean. Nevertheless, I believe that there will be readers who prefer Perelmans
text to mine. Now what? Will I have to further familiarize myself with the Romanic
tradition of rhetoric? Will readers with an inclination for rhetoric have to be
introduced to the achievements of conceptual work and pragmatic thinking? What
else could be done? This concept of universal audience does not offer anything
in terms of gaining a clearer viewlet alone in terms of coming to a decisionof
validity, accuracy, truth, soundness, etc. We will find that some addressees agree,
sometimes more, sometimes less. Collective agreement, however, seems to be out of
the question. But even if it existed, we would have no certaintyafter all, everyone
could have been deluded.
The basic idea of the universal audience has attracted much attention, but it has
not been sufficiently substantiated. I will address the question of whether there
could be a general criterion of validity for argumentative theses along these lines
once more in the next section and then extensively in Chap. 7. The answer will be
negative. In sum, the New Rhetoric is an attempt to rationalize rhetoric in order to
transform it from a tool of persuasion and manipulation into a medium of argumentative speech. The intention is already presenta step in the right direction discernible.
Yet while the step approaches the boundary of rhetoric, it never crosses it.
The third new construction is Fallacies, a 1970 publication by the Australian
professor of philosophy Charles Hamblin. Hamblin is not familiar with the two
books by Toulmin and Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca.43 He adopts the third possible
starting point for argumentation theory, which, as stated above, Aristotle had also
tackled already: fallacies. He considers textbook accounts of fallacies and criticizes
this standard treatment as debased, worn-out and dogmatic [] incredibly
tradition bound and dogmatic, yet lacking in logic and historical sense alike and
almost without connection to anything else in modern logic [].44 Basically, we do
not have a theory of fallacy in the sense in which we have a theory of inference.45
According to Hamblin, the definition (supposedly derived from Aristotle) according
to which a fallacious argument is one which seems valid but is not46 does not
apply to all traditional fallacies.
On the basis of manifold analytical considerations of various fallacies (sometimes even in different versions), Hamblin arrives at the statement that the formal
43

At that time, it was still a far cry from Europe to Australia. Therefore, it is all the more amazing
to what degree Hamblins formal dialectic is akin to the dialogical logic (Lorenzen and Lorenz
1978), which emerged in the early 1960s but is never mentioned by Hamblin.
44
Cf. Hamblin (1970), 12.
45
Hamblin (1970), 11.
46
Cf. Hamblin (1970), 12.

Introduction

xxxix

concept of argument involving premises and a conclusion cannot capture the internal
connection found in many arguments: many arguments in practice have a thread,
a development that involves intermediate statements belonging to neither of these
categories.47 Consequently, he develops a concept of argument that refers to a
dialogical setting involving a proponent and a respondent. In order to represent
certain argumentative events, Hamblin devises dialogue systems. Basically, a
dialogue system consists of three elements: commitments, questions, and rules.
In general, the system presupposes a commitment store which is supposedly
accepted by the participants. The rules, in turn, standardize potential moves by the
participants. Finally, Hamblin showsin a manner more suggestive than carefully
executedthat, based on suitable systems of rules, fallacies can be represented as
violations of such dialogue rules.
Hamblin termed his approach formal dialectic. This idea has proven to be
inspiring for subsequent argumentation theory in many different ways. Some theorists positively tried to carry out Hamblins program (especially Barth and Krabbes
formal dialectic), while others integrated dialogue game elements more or less
explicitly into their own considerations (Waltons dialogue typology and Amsterdam
pragmadialectics). Any evaluation of this approach should take into account that
Hamblins observations about the thread and development contain a notion of
the dynamics of argument, which, however, is unfortunately not expressed but
rather suppressed in the dialogue rules.
If a theory of fallacies were meant to sum up the tradition of thinking about this
issue, it would have to counter the obvious heterogeneity of all purported instances
of fallacies. Such concerns, however, do not only apply to the factual history of
these efforts. Just as a theory of argumentation has to be openi.e. it has to make
room, on the level of reflection, for clarification, concept formation, and possibly
even for the standardization of new events in the practice of argumentationthere
can be no final word on what counts as a fallacy either.
There is no doubt, however, that it benefits our orientation in the practice of
argumentation if we are aware of some typical possibilities for error. That is why the
efforts expended by fallacy theorists are indeed useful. Yet in any concrete case, it
cannot be decided formally what is going on with these figures. Is an appeal from
authority or an analogy good or erroneous? This does not only depend on various
different conditions that can be captured in criteria, but often even on the content
modifying the meaning of the criteria. In the next section, about Waltons critical
questions, I will address this issue once more. In summary, constructing a veritable
theory of fallacies is tantamount to restricting the practice of argumentation itself.
While experts on argumentation theory are familiar with the three relaunches
described up to this point, the same will hardly be the case when it comes to the
fourth one that I would like to present now. At issue are efforts surrounding the basic
concepts of argumentative reason undertaken in German philosophy in the 1960s
and 1970s. None of the other approaches share this concern. Since I take this to be
47

Cf. Hamblin (1970), 229.

xl

Introduction

a crucial deficiency, I will try to explain in a few words what was on German
philosophers minds at the time. Ever since the Enlightenment, it had been clear that
reason is reflexive, meaning that it is not based (as in religious thought) on a
higher authority, but only on itself. Practically speaking, this statement entails the
demand that theories must be structured in such a way that accepting them is an
expression of the autonomous human potential for reason.
Opinions are divided on the question of how to meet this demand. The AngloSaxon world had embraced Poppers falsificationism, which stipulates that accepting
a theory can only be regarded as rational insofar as it proves to be durable when
confronted with attempts at refuting it. Any intention to justify theories positively
was rejected as absurd because it would lead to a regress. This seemed to be an
unproblematic position with regard to descriptive propositions in the sciences.48 Its
purport for morality and politics, however, was unclear. After all, we usually ask for
justifications in those realms. One way out emerged in the position that scientific
theories should not be biased by value judgments. Morality and politics, then, were
ultimately subjective. With regard to those spheres, we could not hope for more than
the acceptance by a majority.
The intellectual climate in Germany after World War II and during the subsequent reconstruction was not calmed by such considerations. In the era of National
Socialism, the acceptance by a majority had grounded a regime of injustice as well as
a racist morality. As a result, the search for a reasonably justified ethics had a particular
urgency. Moreover, in addition to this concrete problem, a value-free rationality was
unsatisfactory even from a theoretical point of view. After all, it also dismissed any
justification for itself. According to Popper, it was based on nothing but an irrational
decision.49 That this is a blunder may today be regarded as a simple matter of course.
In any case, this situation can help to explain why the beginnings of argumentation
theory in Germany took the specific direction they did. They aimed at the argumentative foundation of a reasonable morality within a practical philosophy.
The most prominent approaches were the critical theory of the Frankfurt
School around Jrgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel and the Erlangen School
around Paul Lorenzen and Wilhelm Kamlah. Lorenzen foregrounded certain
aspects of the philosophy of language, logic, and science; Habermas emphasized
communicative-sociological as well as historical aspects. Both knew that they were
acting in concert, even though there were hardly any references to each other in
either mans practical work. Erlangen subsequently became the birthplace of the
Constructive Philosophy of Science,50 Frankfurt the origin of the Theory of
Communicative Action.51 The present book springs from a critical acceptance of
the body of thought of both schools, in particular of Lorenzens.

48

In truth, it is only suitable for everyday affairs. In scientific research, there are irresolvable
problems surrounding the establishment of evidence meant to function as a refutation.
49
Cf. Popper (1945), The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol II. Chapter 14, III.
50
Lorenzen (1968, 1987); see also my references in Chap. 1.2.
51
Habermas (1984).

Introduction

xli

First, let us turn to Habermas: After studies in dialectical philosophy (Schelling,

Hegel, Marx) as well as American social research, he began his career in 1965 as a
professor in Frankfurt with theses on the relationship between knowledge
and human interests. His aim was a critical social theory that would serve as a
background for evaluating validity claims in science and society. For this purpose,
he developed a distinction between instrumental and communicative actions
that enabled him to formulate the theoretical elements of his approach: the ideal
speech situation, the consensus theory of truth, and the discourse ethics. With
this approach, Habermas opposed the aspirations of a postmodern relativism
coming from France.52 Later, he turned to the philosophy of law as well as to applied
ethics; to this day, he is vocal as a prominent intellectual in public debates on war
and human technologies.
I will briefly try to explain the three elements mentioned above. Instrumental
actions assume causal relationships between means and ends. Communicative
actions acknowledge that the other human being does not function like an object but
can be moved to cooperation by processes of understanding. Understanding cannot
exist without raising validity claims. Examining and satisfying validity claims
means engaging in argumentation. Yet for Habermas arguing only leads to reasonable
results if the participants are able to express themselves on equal grounds. Any
serious argumentative action must therefore be based on a specific symmetry, the
so-called ideal speech situation.53 This is a counterfactual idealization. Insofar as
it determines the real discourse, however, any factual consensus with respect to that
idealization can warrant truth (or correctness). Thus the second element, the
consensus theory of truth, is formulated.54 With regard to the third elementi.e.
discourse ethics or the presentation of these idealizing conditions as universally
valid (and thus as the beginning of all reasonable arguing)Habermas and his
colleague Karl-Otto Apel could not reach a consensus. Apels discourse ethics
featured a transcendental-pragmatic ultimate justification.55 The compulsion to
manage disagreements in a real discourse under ideal assumptions is supposed
to result incontrovertibly from the performative presuppositions of communication.
Apel argued that the foundations of ethics would this way be secure for all time.
Habermas, on the other hand, relegated this compulsion to the status of a mere fact
whose universally binding character is rooted in a factual lack of alternatives.
This need not be decided here. At any rate, some of these thoughts are indispensable for the theorization of argumentation as a reasonable activity: Habermas
adapts Toulmin, but some of his crucial insights certainly go further. Arguing is a
communicative action concerned with the verbal examination and satisfaction of
validity claims. It must be understood reflexively, i.e. not only with regard to an object-,
but also to a meta-level. This establishes a distance to any concrete argumentative
52

Lyotard (1983).
Cf. Habermas (1973).
54
Loc. cit.
55
I will review Apels version of the consensus theory of truth (a modification of Peirces ultimate
opinion) in detail when discussing universalism; cf. Chap. 7.7.1.
53

xlii

Introduction

steps from where to form the theory and to control the performative presuppositions
(mutual recognition, etc.) that constitute the rationality of any given discourse.
The limitation of Habermas conception is the idea that truth could be found in a
consensus. This is an erratic demand, even if the consensus is qualified by idealizing
conditions. At the core of this problem lies, as far as I can see, a pragmatic thinking
that is not emphatic enough. Consequently, Habermas philosophy is beset by some
ambiguities about the relationship between the natural and the human sciences as
well as by an ambivalent position towards realism. I will try to resolve some of these
issues (Chaps. 1 and 7).
Let us now turn to the Erlangen School: Lorenzen was one of the first scholars
in Germany to engage with analytical philosophy (Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein) and
began in Erlangen in the 1960s to cooperate with Wilhelm Kamlah, a former student
of Heidegger. In 1967, they published the Logical Propaedeutic: Pre-School of
Reasonable Discourse.56 The authors detect in the discussions of their times a
Babylonian confusion and call for a reconstruction of the forms of a precise and
understandable language in order to resolve it. They first clarify predication and
reference according to a strict methodical structure, followed by an illustration of
how we make the world accessible through words and actions. For the normative
establishment of the meanings of words, they introduce the new concept of a predicator
rule.57 This leads to the development of a concept of truth via interpersonal
verification (a variant of the consensus theory of truth). Finally, the authors present
the new dialogical logic. It defines logical operators by possible moves in a dialogue
and logical truth by winning strategies.58 Based on this logical propaedeutic,
the Erlangen School subsequently concerned itself with a normative basis for the
philosophy of science and with a scientific ethics.59 For that purpose, it converted
Kants categorical imperative into the discursive principle of transsubjectivity,
which was even supposed to be supplemented by a Hegelian principle of cultural
understanding (dialectical spiral). There was no agreement with regard to the
meaning of the second principle in Erlangen, however. Lorenzen finally abandoned
it, but he continued to adhere to the demand for transsubjectivity, taking it to be the
decisive condition distinguishing reasonable argumentation from mere sophistry.
The ideas of the Erlangen School are of great importance for the foundations of
the philosophy of science. For a general concept of reasonable argumentation, however, they are only of limited use. On the one hand, they regard validity and truth, just
like the Habermas circle, as the result of a consensus placed under universalizing

56

For the English translation, cf. Kamlah and Lorenzen (1984). For a description of important contents of the book, cf. van Eemeren et al. (1987), 137150, and van Eemeren et al. (1996), 253263.
57
The predicator rule is a harbinger of the inferential semantics in normative pragmatism; cf.
Brandom (1994), 94 ff.
58
This dialogical logic (cf. Lorenzen and Lorenz 1978), which truly refers to the practice of
argumentation, could be interpreted as a response to Toulmins call for a new and practical
logic. This was not seen clearly at the time. Lorenzen and Toulmin had a regrettable mutual disregard
for one another.
59
Cf. Lorenzen (1969).

Introduction

xliii

conditions. And on the other hand, they generally focus on the already achieved
results of the human search for orientation. Even though in the minds of its founders
these results were supposed to include lifeworld competencies, the main focus was
scientific knowledge, primarily the kind of knowledge produced by the natural and
formal sciences. There was barely any regard for the process of research and, more
specifically, for the general pursuit of orientation. It is precisely the latter, however,
for which argumentation plays its crucial role, if it is meant to be more than formal
inferences.
This concludes the presentation of the beginnings of modern argumentation
theory. I will now try to give an overview of how scholars pursued and elaborated
those impulses.

Some Highlights of Contemporary Argumentation Theory

The new argumentation theory is now over half a century old. In fact, it forms a
field for an impressive range of research and discussions about seemingly all
aspects of the practice of argumentation. A new academic discipline has emerged,
including an enormous output of publications as well as specialist journals and
conferencesin particular the central conference in Amsterdam which is organized every four years by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
(ISSA). By now, there is so much theory and empirical observations that the
matter has become quite confusing; as it were, one cannot see the wood for the
trees any longer.
Reference points for purposes of orientation are rare, just like surveys or even
complete assessments of the work achieved so far.60 The proceedings of larger
conferences to some degree compile the state of the debates, e.g. the files from
the Alta and OSSA conferences and in particular the heavy volumes of the ISSA
conferences. These publications convey an idea of the fields diversification. Initially,
these volumes were still structured thematically; by now, all contributions appear
in alphabetical order, accompanied by a CD with a keyword search function.
The book Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory stands out like a beacon in the
dark,61 but it is almost 20 years old (a new edition has been slated for release).
It has become clear by now that theorization in this field must also proceed on the
meta-level.62 However, there is a lamentable lack of clarity when it comes to ideas

60

Cf., for example, Vlzing (1980), van Eemeren et al. (1987), Johnson (2000), Manifest Rationality;
van Eemeren (2001), Crucial Concepts.
61
van Eemeren et al. (1996). This is an overview which presents in 400 pages a comprehensive
survey of the various theoretical contributions (IX). As listed in its preface, the book is not only
the work of the three authors, but involves the contributions of 38 scholars from all over the world
(including the author of the present book).
62
This is true even in the sense of the genesis of individual theoretical approaches; cf., e.g. Zenker
(2007).

xliv

Introduction

about how to appropriately grasp the relationship between object and meta-level
in argumentation,63 just like any clarifying confrontations with the basicsi.e.
fundamental distinctions, theorems, and objectivesare rare. Apparently, theorists
in this increasingly confusing field are content with regarding their work as a proper
normal science within a given paradigm, all the while knowing that there are
other paradigms; to be sure, they occasionally address those alternatives but, on
the whole, they do not seem to expect anything other than a confirmation of the
idea that, basically, anything goes.
What I will attempt at this point is a short critical survey of this field in order to
convey the notion that, on the one hand, there is still room for a philosophical foundation of argumentation theory and, on the other hand, there is also a need for such
a foundation. Thus I will distinguish six sections or foci. The first three are the result
of the work done by Toulmin, Perelman, and Hamblin. Then there is the fourth
focus which takes the empirical study of argumentation in linguistics and communication science as its starting point. The fifth section is the Amsterdam approach,
which has become the most important of all approaches and integrates elements
from all other approaches. The last one presents the Hamburg approach to the
philosophy of argument and concludes with an outline of the present book.
The first section could be entitled Project: Expansion of Logic. After Toulmin
had opened the deductive inference scheme, his successors primarily concerned
themselves with how to theorize nondeductive inferences. They started out (like
Aristotle before them) by considering inductive generalizations, unfortunately often
in parallel with deductive conclusions.64 Hence their temptation to interpret other
inferential schemes (abduction, conduction) in a parallel manner, even though
these transitions are different and much more complex. Of course it is quite right to
examine inferences with respect to the occurrence of (semi)formal figures and to
describe the latter (cf. section Argumentation Theory Under Construction below).
Yet acknowledging this should not make us blind to the fact that any move away
from deductive logic not only changes the form of inference, but the whole underlying
concept of argument. In the case of deductions, the content of an argument consists
in transferring truth from the premises to the conclusion. In the case of nondeductive
inferences, there is no such transfer of truth. Our manner of speaking according to
which premises support the conclusion is sufficiently comprehensible in everyday
speech; defining it, however, demands a particular theoretical effort. Now all sorts
of new questions arise: What are the requirements for premisesdo they have to
be true? What could this requirement mean, e.g. in the case of normative or evaluative premises? Are there any abstract criteria for the quality of nondeductive inferential schemes (e.g. analogies)? What is the quality of conclusions in nondeductive

63

The most prominent publication concerning meta-argumentation is Finocchiaro (2013). For a

short comment on Finocchiaros conception, cf. Chap. 9.4 of the present book.
64
The parallel is misleading because inductive logic presupposes deductive logic, but not vice
versa.

Introduction

xlv

inferences (since, under normal circumstances, they are not true65)? How is a
reasonable evaluation of arguments possible? What are the standards for determining
whether the support provided by the premises is sufficient?66
In the late 1970s, the desire to bring academic logic courses in North America
into closer contact with reality67 led to the development of Informal Logic. This
approach spread rapidly and spawned many textbooks.68 At present, it seems to be
binding for most scholars engaged in the research and teaching of argument. Across
the board, the members of the movement addressed the aforementioned questions.
The central role played by truth in logic was now assigned to rational acceptability.69
Thus rhetoric gained a certain role in argumentationalbeit an unclear one. As a
consequence, it now appears as if the validity, the impact, and the acceptance of
arguments would overlap somehow. How this happens and what it means for the
aforementioned questions has become the subject of manifold discussions that
hardly ever reach a consensus. This is not surprising, however, because ultimately
the task at hand is to develop an entirely new, post-logical concept of argument
which can be determined by nothing but a (meta-)argumentation that is as reasonable as possible. Hence, the label Informal Logic comprises various emerging,
different approaches. There seems at least to be a general understanding that one
should begin with the products of the practice of argumentation. This product
approach is the legacy of formal logic, against which the insurgency of Informal
Logic was directed and to which it remains, ironically, deeply attached. Still, how to
interpret any arguments in this frame is quite unclear (e.g. whether it is advisable
to rely on the setting of premises and a conclusion in analyzing analogies, best
explanations, or even a discussion of pros and cons). Even a comprehensive and
meritorious book such as Manifest Rationality70 by one of the masters of Informal

65

Johnson states in his general definition of argument that the goal is to persuade the Other(s) of
the truth of a thesis (Johnson 2000, 168). This reveals a fundamental uncertainty about the status
of argumentation. The demand for truth is not only too strong (because it usually cannot be satisfied
in the case of nondeductive arguments); it also fails to recognize the pragmatic relations between
theses and arguments on the one hand and knowledge and evidence on the other.
66
The classic textbook Logical Self-Defense (Johnson and Blair 1977) lists acceptability, relevance,
and sufficiency as criteria. The corresponding explanations make use of obvious examples. When
it comes to applying these criteria to serious problems, the authors leave it up to the reader to find
practical realizations. What they fail to indicate, however, is that any application of the criteria
requires the activation of ones own beliefs and that, moreover, these beliefs must also be put up
for consideration (and will possibly be changed in the course of the argumentation).
67
Cf. Kahane (1971).
68
The following publications were among the first ones: Scriven (1976), Johnson and Blair (1977),
Fogelin (1978), Hitchcock (1983), Govier (1985); for a very good summary, cf. Hitchcock (2007a).
69
The problems with this concept stem from its concealed normativity: (a part of) an argument is
rationally acceptable if it fulfills certain criteria that have been established as criteria of
rationality. In that case, it should be accepted by any audience, regardless of what an actual
audience might think about it.
70
Cf. Johnson (2000).

xlvi

Introduction

Logic, Ralph Johnson, creates the impression of a barely manageable variety of

possible ways of thinking.71
In response to the risk of arbitrariness and a shallow relativism, Informal Logic
gave rise to an epistemological approach.72 This approach attached greater
importance to knowledge againas well as, incidentally, to logic. But even this
modification is likely to cause confusion inasmuch as knowledge and truth are
now regarded as given, as independent of any arguments, or even as the direct
results of arguments.
The success of Informal Logic in North America mainly results from the fact that
it has become a major asset to the Critical Thinking movement. The latter is an
educational movement that goes back to John Dewey. It aims to impart general
thinking skills that might be helpful in todays world, including skills such as finding
relevant information, communicating in a factual manner, selecting reliable sources,
understanding statistics, etc.in short, the ability to appropriately assess states
of affairs of all kinds. Of course, arguing is of central importance in this endeavor.
In the resulting connection between Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, questions
surrounding the theory of argument are addressed in a use-oriented manner.73
Abstract theory is met with little interest. To be sure, there are many positive aspects
of this movement. Nevertheless, it is imperative to grasp the importance of understanding a significant matter such as arguing all the way through to its theoretical
foundations. In addition, there is the more general concern that Critical Thinking
skills could perhaps over time repress and replace a real education.
The second section within contemporary theory construction could be entitled
Project: Rationalization of Rhetoric. Thinkers in this vein often invoke Perelman/
Olbrechts-Tyteca and/or the tradition of rhetoric, which is seen as the source of a
nonanalytical, but humane and cultured understanding.74 The alleged importance of
71

Under the headline Rethinking the Nature of Argument, Johnson has proposed a considerable
upgrade of Informal Logic (cf. Johnson (2000), 164 ff.): The lineup of premises, schemes, and
conclusions, he argues, is not sufficient to represent the reality of argumentation. It produces only
an illative core, which must then be amended by a dialectical tier, i.e. a treatment of possible
objections. Within the limits of Informal Logic, this was a revolutionary idea. It earned Johnson a
lot of criticism against which he bravely defended his view (cf. Johnson (2002)). Outside the limits
of Informal Logic, however, the distinction is rather artificial. If real people use real arguments,
then their illative cores have always already incorporated all kinds of dialectical tiers.
72
Cf. McPeck (1981), Pinto (1994), Weinstein (1994), Siegel and Biro (1997), and Lumer (2005).
73
There are numerous textbooks on Critical Thinking. I do not have the proper overview to judge
their quality. Two books, however, that seem to me quite outstanding are Kenyon (2008) and Bailin
and Battersby (2010).
74
Cf. Gadamer (1976) and Niehues-Prbsting (1987), who construes rhetoric as concerned with
insights, not just with agreement (and who nevertheless considers the book by Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) to be the most significant sketch of a philosophically relevant rhetoric
(41)a rather puzzling assessment in my opinion); cf., in particular, Oesterreich (2003), who
wants to establish rhetoric as a new prima philosophia in light of the inevitably rhetorical form
of philosophical texts and thus calls for a rhetorical turn following the linguistic turn. Even if
this causes a stir in the short term, the idea remains superficial: Philosophy in particular strives to
speak conceptually, i.e. it tries to leave the idiosyncrasies of any given formulations behind.

Introduction

xlvii

rhetoric in argumentation is part of the Aristotelian legacy, which at this point

once more deserves a few adjustments. It should be clear that rhetoric is not
specific to argumentation at all. It is a discipline (or an art) that concerns the general
acceptability of communicative utterances of all kinds (it is not even specific to
texts). If taken seriously, it needs empirical support. The contemporary rhetorical
approaches to argumentation often focus on figures that Aristotle termed topical
and rhetorical.
As for topical classification, the best work which has been done so far is Manfred
Kienpointners Alltagslogik.75 On the basis of an extensive review, appraisal, and
critique of existing systems of figures, especially the one by Perelman/OlbrechtsTyteca, Kienpointner constructs as well as documents with rich sample material
a system comprising three major classes, 21 subclasses, and 60 argumentative
patterns. Kienpointner regards these argumentative patterns as context-independent
schemes and recommends his structure as a complete topical system for everyday
argumentation.
The individual schemes are described as consisting of two premises and a conclusion; usually, each case features a descriptive and a normative version. The schemes
are commonly of relative generality. This means that not all people (as everyday
speakers of English) will take them to be true. Kienpointer often marks this by explicitly
conceding the possibility of nonacceptance and by attaching it, for instance, to a
particular social group.76 Consistent with these views, Kienpointner argues for an
explicit relativism with regard to questions of validity or truth. Different people
believe in different things, and which inferences or conclusions they take to be
correct is relative to the general if-then statements in which they believe. This looks
tolerant and conciliatory indeed; still, it is far from clear how it will play out in
communicative reality.
Rhetorical approaches tend, by their very nature, toward relativism. This is fine
as long as we are only concerned with opinions. Things change when we are confronted with theses that play a role in public life and the sciences. In those cases,
relativism is no longer a serious option.77 The idea of the universal audience was
meant to help at this point. As I have already shown above, Perelman fails to bring
this thought to full fruition. Nevertheless, many people found his intention appealing
and some scholars have therefore sought to find a remedy. I will briefly discuss two
notable attempts, one by Kopperschmidt and one by Tindale.

Claiming that this is not possible would ultimately mean denying the human capacity for abstraction.
Cf. the criticism of Oesterreichs program in Niehues-Prbsting (2006).
75
Kienpointner (1992).
76
Cf. the example of the a minore scheme: If there are less compelling reasons to regard the murder
of individuals more negatively than mass murder, and if the murder of individuals should be
regarded negatively, then it is even more the case that mass murder should be regarded negatively.
The murder of individuals should be regarded negatively. Therefore, mass murder should be
regarded even more negatively (unless one adheres to a racist or even national-socialist ethics)
Kienpointner (1992), 287. (All quotations from Kienpointner: Trans. T.P.)
77
The resulting problem will be addressed in Chap. 7, in a confrontation with relativism.

xlviii

Introduction

Kopperschmidt proposed to enrich the matter with Jrgen Habermas principle

of universalization, i.e. with the ideal speech situation. As with Perelman/OlbrechtsTyteca, aiming at the universal audience is supposed to furnish an argument
with the validity criterion convincing (rather than merely persuading). The
universality of the audience, however, is now supposed to be ensured by the requirement that all those affected are provided with unlimited access to the discourse and
that their interests are therefore considered adequately.78 Is this somewhat helpful?
Does unlimited access guarantee the consideration of interests? And if so, does it
simply involve the factual or even the critically discussed interests? Is an argument
for abolishing monarchy only convincing if the monarch also agrees with it?
(Or, to use a more current example, is the Kyoto Protocol only convincing if the
US administration agrees with it?) I think we may give a negative answer. Anyone
who, in addressing this issue, tries to tie the correctness of a thesis to a consensus
(rather than to the quality of the arguments) loses touch with reality. Monarchs and
oil tycoons will not agree to a limitation of their interests unless they cease to be
monarchs and oil tycoons.
Christopher Tindale attempts a theory of rhetorical argumentation which
states that an argument is rhetorical insofar as it aims at persuading an audience.79
The meanings of audience and persuasion, however, have been significantly
altered when compared with traditional (and even with the new) rhetoric. An
audience is now able to enter into a dialogue with the speaker. In that case, it is
interactive or collaborative. And persuasion is no longer supposed to effect
acceptance, but to invite the latter.80 Overall, however, the rhetoric is now supposed
to be truly argumentative, i.e. its results may not simply reflect the inclinations of a
given audience. Tindale intends to achieve this with the help of the universal audience.81 His proposal quite cleverly reverses the direction of communication. While
Perelmans conception begins with the intention of the speaker addressing the audience, Tindale begins with the audience; in fact, he even focuses on each individual
listener who may say: We are always in audience.82 Now if I, as a member of the
audience, happen to have an objection, then this means that the speaker does not
reach me. This shows that his or her argument has not been addressed universally.
Of course, at this point everything depends on whether my objection is justified or
not. In addressing that question, Tindale refers to established criteria of rationality
and, most of all, to avoiding fallacies. In general, Tindales proposal looks like this:
As an (active) member of an audience, I can evaluate whether any given argument has
78

Kopperschmidt (2006), 24 (Trans. T.P.); cf. also Kopperschmidt (1989), 121.

Tindale (2004).
80
Cf. Rhetoric as invitational, Tindale (2004), 50 ff. This amiable formulation goes back to
Robert Pinto (Pinto 1995). I am afraid it does not furnish any further insights: Whether someone
who accepts a speakers assertions does so because he or she has been persuaded or invited or
because the air in the hall was so fresh and the speaker so well dressed is hardly verifiable in
any case.
81
Loc. cit. Chap. 6, Developing the universal audience.
82
Loc. cit. 152.
79

Introduction

xlix

been addressed to the universal audience (and, as such, is universally valid) insofar
as I can evaluate this argument based on (universally valid) criteria of rationality.
I am happy to concede that this is an ingenious, reflexive construction. It must be
noted, however, that it does not furnish the universal audience with any theoretical
content. It is merely a verbal gesture that refers respectfully to Perelman and strives
for the approval of a reader who may recognize this reference: It is invitational
rhetoric. Whoever looks more closely into the construction will encounter the
following problems: The criteria of rationality known to me, as an evaluator, are
abstract. The application to the respective case is concrete. In the shift from one to
the other, my subjective perspective will come into play. In order to neutralize this
source of bias, I would have to put my own evaluation up for consideration again. In
doing so, I cannot simply expect the approval of my interlocutors; rather, I will have
to pay attention to their potential objections to my evaluation. Moreover, the system
of criteria of rationality would have to be open in such a way that, if need be, it
could be modified and developed furtherin meta-argumentationwith regard to
the case at issue. In short, if this construction wants to overcome its limitations, it
may have to move in the direction of what I will propose in this book under the title
The Open Forum of Arguments (Chap. 7.5).
The third section of contemporary argumentation theory takes Hamblins treatment of fallacies as a starting point and could be entitled Project: Specification of
the Theory of Errors. The issue here is a theorization of fallacies. There are three
objectives: Coming up with a definition and a concept of argumentative errors, listing
(as completely and coherently as possible) all argumentative errors, and theoretically
elucidating each individual error. Most work is being done on the third objective; two
thinkers who excel in this regard with numerous publications are John Woods and
Douglas Walton.83 They have established the view that figures which were traditionally regarded as fallacies can have useful as well as fallacious applications. In the
meantime, Walton seems to pursue a certain degree of completion by preferably
writing a full monograph on each fallacy.84 His specialty is the compilation of critical
questions that should enable an evaluator to assess the quality of a figure and
possibly determine whether or not it is a fallacy. Let us look at an example85:
Argument from Expert Opinion
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing
proposition A.
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false).
83

Cf. Woods and Walton (1989). For a broader selection and a good bibliography, cf. Hansen and
Pinto (1995).
84
Cf., for example, Walton (1991, 1992a, 1997, 1998), etc. These books are comprehensive as well
as informative. They present sometimes challenging technical representations involving an
extended logic and special dialogue games, but they also rely on a fuzzy concept of argument or,
rather, on a mixture of the conceptions of argument taken from extended logic, standardized dialogues, rhetoric, and even quite simple everyday conversations.
85
Walton et al. (2008), 310.

Introduction

Conclusion: A is true (false).

Critical Questions:
CQ1: Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?
CQ2: Field Question: Is E an expert in the field that A is in?
CQ3: Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
CQ4: Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
CQ5: Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
CQ6: Backup Evidence Question: Is Es assertion based on evidence?
This system of six critical questions looks rather sophisticated and complete. If,
however, the second question can be affirmed, the first one becomes superfluous
at least if the fourth one has to be answered as well. We should be aware that such
questions reflect nothing more than the extent of their authors ideas about what can
go wrong with an appeal to expert authority. Moreover, the answers are often not
evident, but require an understanding of the concrete case. One should therefore
refrain from simply applying certain critical questions. If, however, their compilation becomes a project involving the whole community, things could improve.
Concerning expert opinion, e.g. the following consideration may be appropriate:
What if the expert knows things that are absolutely new and as yet unfinished? Is
this not a common experience: Experts appear on stage and proclaim the results of
their most advanced researchresults that will be outdated and retracted just a
month later. (Unfortunately, such marvelous news are not necessarily contested by
other experts.) Hence, at least one corresponding critical question should be
added to the above list.
The project of putting together a list of fallacies cannot be finished. This has now
been quite generally recognized, not so much due to unsatisfactory efforts of finding
a uniform concept,86 but to the realization that it will be possible to discover new
fallacies that did not occur in the tradition and sometimes could not ever have
occurred.87 Generally speaking, the project is characterized by a lack of sufficient
awareness that a clear concept of fallacy requires a clear concept of argument. This
becomes particularly apparent in the debates on two fallacies which can only be
grasped once we have taken a serious pragmatic turn in our thinking. I mean the
86

An instructive example of the difficulties can be found in Wreen (1994). Wreen puts forward a
neo-traditionalist concept of fallacies which relies on premises, inferential scheme, and conclusion
a procedure by which not even the ad baculum would be fallaciousand which leads to alienating
acts of formal violence: ((A A) B) B (A A) is a formal non sequitur scheme. According
to Wreen, however, this argument is not fallacious because, after all, the inferred conclusion is
formally true and thus cannot be wrong (100). Based on this idea, Wreen hopes to refute the view
that formal argumentative errors are fallacies in any caseregardless of the fact that, as he stressed
before, a premise could fail to be epistemically worthy (97) and would therefore make an
argument that uses it, a fallacy. My views on the concept of fallacy are somewhat supported by
Hansens paper on The straw thing of Fallacy Theory (Hansen 2002). Hansen discusses some 23
definitions of fallacy. He finally arrives at a kind of generalization: A fallacy is an argument that
appears to be a better argument of its kind than it really is. This is a smart idea, which, however,
lacks a subjective dimension (to whom does it appear to be so?).
87
Cf., for example, Leddy (1986).

Introduction

li

figures called Ad Baculum and Begging the Question. Regarding the first one,
Ad Baculum has often been fitted into a sequence of premise and conclusion and
then misunderstood as a prudential argument. This interpretation ignores the interactive aspects of mutual recognition that are vital for any process of argument.
Frankly, such a reading of Ad Baculum falls, as it were, for the fallacy.88 Secondly,
the debates around Begging the Question seem to develop into a never-ending
story.89 As a matter of fact, these debates serve as an example for why the pragmatics
of argumentation are not adequately captured by speech-act theory. Whether or
not a logical implication contributes anything to a justification, or whetheras in
the case of Begging the Questionit even sabotages the justification, can only be
determined if arguing has truly come to be regarded as a verbal action. In the case
of (viciously) circular arguments, a sequence of actions is performed in which each
action presupposes another. On the whole, the sequence is impossible because it
refers back to itselfa fact that becomes apparent when the last action presupposes
the first. This can be illustrated quite nicely on the level of acting with respect to
examples such as the well-known song about Henry, Liza, and the leaky bucket.
Henry can only fetch water if the hole in the bucket has been mended, which means the
hole needs to have already been fixed in the first place. This is similar in the case of
circular arguments: A thesis cannot be justified by an argument for which the thesis
would already have to be available (as sufficiently justified).
As already stated above, the second point of Hamblins approach, i.e. the way in
which he embeds argumentation in dialogue games, has had a significant impact,
too. In conjunction with dialogical logic, it led to Elsa Barth and Eric Krabbes
formal dialectic,90 then to Amsterdam pragmadialectics, and finally to the approach
developed by Eric Krabbe and Douglas Walton, in which dialogical thinking meets
the project of an extended logic as well as the analysis of fallacies.91
Still, with respect to all standardizations of dialogues which provide more than a
fundamental dialogical control, i.e. which aim at standardizing dialogue partners
rights and obligations in a differentiated manner, the following must be stated once
more: Standardizations like that reduce the practice of argumentation to those types
of cases of which the respective theorist is particularly aware. For them to act as
general theories of argumentation, such systems of norms would always have to
include a provision for reflecting the conditions of its applications and for adapting
it to changed conditions.

88

Cf. Woods (1987), Wohlrapp (1991), and Woods (1998). I will deal with this issue in detail in
Chap. 10.3.
89
This debate was kicked off when Richard Robinson stated that only a false premise and/or a false
or erroneously used inferential scheme could make an argument fallacious; cf. Robinson (1971).
Since neither is given in the case of A A, Robinson argued, Begging the Question would have
to be removed from the list of fallacies altogether. After a period of rubbing their eyes in disbelief,
theorists were led by David Sanford (cf. Sanford (1972)) to the rock wall where ever since about two
dozen of the most astute members of the community climb around. (Almost) everything important
with respect to this issue (in addition to an unsatisfactory solution) can be found in Walton (1991).
90
Cf. Barth and Krabbe (1982).
91
Cf. Walton and Krabbe (1995).

lii

Introduction

The fourth section is the empirical analysis of argumentative texts in terms of

linguistics or communication science. In this case, longer and shorter text samples
containing arguments more or less obviously according to our preconceptions are
examined with respect to the employment of verbal means. This section features
various levels and perspectives, each pertaining to a different discipline: syntax
(e.g. beginning with grammars focusing on linguistic deep structures), semantics,
linguistic pragmatics, and communication theory. In pedagogical contexts, the
motive underlying linguistic, i.e. communicative treatments of argumentation, is
very often an improvement of argumentative skills.92 Of course, the researchers need a
theoretical apparatus in order to select and analyze their material. In the majority of
cases, this means that they take whatever is already known and, if possible, not too
difficult. Very often this ends up being the Toulmin scheme.93 There are now various
applications of this scheme which would presumably have surprised Toulmin,94 but as
it has by now come to be considered a classical tool,95 we will have to live with it.
More generally, it is regrettable that linguistic argument analysts devote little
attention to the theoretical foundations of their work. Usually, they simply view
the practice of argumentation as a given empirical object. I already mentioned the
problems resulting from this conception before. Arguing is not a preexisting, clearly
defined object. Rather, it will have to be specially prepared by the analyst who is
located amidst general communicative events and performs the respective conceptual
work by defining, in a justified manner, the goals, paths, possibilities, and limitations of argumentation. If this requirement is not taken seriously, then we need not
be surprised by the wide range and arbitrariness of different conceptions. It is
impossible for researchers who are merely observers of argumentation to arrive at
justified judgments about whether, and to what extent, validity claims have been
satisfied. From an observers perspective, we can only address certain superficial
aspects of the verbal elements involved in arguing, and even then it is difficult to
avoid a certain arbitrariness. The belief that it is possible to do purely descriptive
workin which case the burden of justifying norms and regulations (a burden which
is typical for normative theories of argumentation) would no longer applyis
misleading. After all, a linguistic analysis cannot be performed without prior decisions and definitions on selecting and delimiting the material at hand.96
92

At this point, the section overlaps with my remarks on Critical Thinking. There is no such movement
in Germany; however, German schools today also devote some time to cultivating argumentative
skills. Currently, the best text in this vein is the booklet by Wolfgang Weimer; cf. Weimer (2005).
93
To my knowledge, it was Dieter Wunderlich (Wunderlich (1974) (Chapter 2: Knowledge and
Reasoning) who introduced the Toulmin scheme into linguistic analysis.
94
For a rather idiosyncratic adaptation, cf. Schndelbach (1985), who manages to plug the proposition:
Anything that is extended is divisible, into the data position, and also makes use of the qualifier
without consulting the meaning of this element, which, in Toulmin, is at least recognizable.
95
It has even been included in the second edition of the Enzyklopdie Philosophie und
Wissenschaftstheorie, albeit incompletely: The entry makes no mention of R, the rebuttal; cf.
Gethmann (2005).
96
Spranz-Fogasy (2003) addresses the problem of constitution and proposes an idealtypical
sequential basic structure of argumentation, consisting of five steps which are actually quite

Introduction

liii

It is well known that language contains semantic structures which can in part be
represented as rules (cf. the predicator rules of the Logical Propaedeutic). Thus, for
example, upon the mention of a fast-food restaurant, we can verbally move on to
statements such as there will be something to eat, there will be plastic plates but
no table cloths, etc. Even words that seem to have only minimal differences in
meaning, such as almost or barely, may lead to significantly different expectations
and ways of thinking. This potential of language to evoke expectations or dispositions
is termed argumentativity in the work of Anscombre and Ducrot.97 With reference
to this potential, they claim that arguing is no specific verbal action, but rather a
component of any speech. This is an original point of view. It has inspired various
kinds of linguistic research, particularly in the Francophone world (Apothloz), but
also in the Netherlands (Snoeck-Henkemans), in Slovenia (agar), and in Germany
(Rehbein). Researchers in this vein examine, e.g. conjunctive adverbs, connectives, and
concessive expressions with regard to their (potentially argumentative) function.
It is important to see that this line of thinking is rooted in a misunderstanding. To
be sure, the examined semantic structures and their functions form a part of all speech
that is correct and comprehensible. However, activating them is not yet arguingit
is only a precondition for it. Of course, no one can prevent the authors from using
the word argument in this way. For the purposes of theory, however, it must be
clear that such use is merely metaphorical.
In my opinion, the best work that is currently being done in the field of empirical,
linguistic analyses of arguments is by Arnulf Deppermann. It involves semantic
analyses that show very subtly how the linguistic meanings of words are formed and
modified in argumentative conversations; moreover, it demonstrates how people
can understand each other if they pay attention to this and how they talk past each
other if they ignore it.98 Deppermann is also aware of the fundamental problem
of linguistic or conversation-analysis-based argumentation researchnamely that
argumentative structures emerge at the linguistic surface only as symptoms and that
it is not even possible to justify the allegation that argumentation has taken place if
there is no theoretical apparatus by which to establish interpretations.
In the fifth section of my short survey of the currents and trends in contemporary
argumentation theory, I have arrived at the Amsterdam approach. This is one of
the oldest approaches; it has a differentiated profile and is suitable for integrating the
preoccupations of most other theoretical currents. The approach combines linguistic

comparable to the stages of pragmadialectics (see below). The central step is the third one, called
display (33). Unfortunately, this does not refer to the display or satisfaction of validity claims,
but only to the development of a position. The fact that Spranz-Fogasy forms a theoretical unit
called position (and does not merely attend to propositions) is meritorious; the restriction to its
development, however, is unfortunate. After all, some positions are discarded in the practice of
argumentation because they are not durable. Cf. also Kindt (2001).
97
Anscombre and Ducrot (1983).
98
Cf. Deppermann (2000) and particularly Deppermann (2003), where, among other things, both
the theoretical constitution of the object argumentation and the way in which it is pragmatically
embedded are explicitly named as desiderata of conversation-analysis-based argumentation
research (13).

liv

Introduction

pragmatics with dialogical thinking and is therefore called pragmadialectics.99

It is characterized by an awareness of theory that is quite unusual (for theories of
argumentation). For one, it begins with a constitutive reflection isolating the theory
in real communicative situations as an ideal model by way of four principles
(externalization, socialization, functionalization, dialectification). In addition, it has
an explicit philosophical foundation (which is Poppers critical rationalism or, in
other words, the satisfaction of validity claims by eliminating contradictions). The
model captures argumentative speech as a complex speech act composed of many
individual speech acts, whose use is arranged into four stages (confrontation,
opening, argumentation, and concluding stage) and standardized by ten rules.
Argumentation is concerned with controversial opinions or standpoints, and it
takes place in a dialogue, i.e. there is an opponent who can agree with or reject the
steps of a justificationthe latter case requires further justification. For the purpose
of such justification, (extended) logical schemes may be employed. The dialogue
ends with the acceptance or rejection of the standpoint or of the respective doubts
about it. This is construed as a solution of the dispute through critical discussion.
Any moves that are likely to divert attention from that goal or to thwart it are fallacious.
The moves are (now) also evaluated with regard to the strategic goal of preferably
winning the dialogue.100 The ten rules are constructed in such a manner that the
largest part of all known fallacies is representable as a violation of at least one of
these rules. By including Searles speech act theory101 and enriching it with Grices
conversational theory,102 the model becomes applicable to ordinary speech, i.e. it
enables the identification of speech actsor the reconstruction of indirect speech
actsas well as their connection to the stages and thus allows for the pragmadialectical analysis of any given texts as arguments.103
I think it is obvious that much of what has been pursued and achieved in argumentation theory is brought together here in a unified conception. The approach is
extremely fruitful, at least in the sense that, at this point, each and every theory of
argumentation is compelled to refer to it; many theorists have connected their
efforts to the Amsterdam approach (e.g. Jacobs and Jackson, Kienpointner, Krabbe,
Walton) or placed them in a relationship to pragmadialectics. Given the clever and
potent publication policy (the original text is in English; translations into all major
languagesFrench, Spanish, Russian, and Chinesealready exist or are in the
works), it is to be expected that the approach will continue to play a significant role
in the future. To be sure, it may be helpful for purposes of mediation. As a general
theory of argumentative speech, however, it seems to be only of limited use. I will
briefly discuss three points: the speech acts, the sequence of stages, and the underlying
understanding of rationality.
99

Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), van Eemeren (2002), van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(2003).
100
van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002).
101
Searle (1969).
102
Grice (1975).
103
Cf. van Eemeren et al. (1993); a brief overview is presented in van Eemeren et al. (1996), 288298.

Introduction

lv

Speech acts are of course relevant; they occur constantly, even in everyday
language, but are not specific to argumentative speech. Moreover, it does not depend
on conditions that can be captured by rules whether, e.g. the speech acts of requesting
and giving a definition contribute to the goal of a dialogue, whether they are
appropriate or necessary, or possibly quite superfluous and, as such, merely an
inflation of the dialogue. Rather, such questions are a matter of content, of speakers
knowledge, and of their individual needs. The basic concept of pragmatic orientation as well as the activities of asserting, justifying, and criticizing, however, will
certainly be useful for the analysis of argumentative speech (I will address these
basic operations in Chap. 4). These are undoubtedly verbal actions, just like arguing
is a verbal action. Yet it is precisely these basic distinctions that the SearleGrice
theories of speech act and conversation fail to capture. Furthermore, these speech
acts are defined by complex conditions, which involve delicate and hardly verifiable
statements about inner states of believing, being convinced, taking something to be
unacceptable, etc.104 It is by no means true that in order to request a speech act or to
criticize its performance, we would examine dialogically whether these conditions
have been satisfied. Rather, the ability to carry out the speech act is assumed, which,
after all, is quite correct. As for verbal actions in the practice of argumentation,
a basic competence can and must be assumed. We all know how to arguesome
better, some worse. A theory, however, should capture this ability so that it becomes
more transparent. If the theory is complicated and difficult to examine, then it does
not render the ability more transparent, but more unclear; in fact, we might even fare
better without a theory. That is the case for Searles and Grices speech acts: while
trying to illuminate the relevant argumentative structures of any given text, they are
dead weight; they obscure more than they clarify.
With regard to the second point, the stages order the practice of argumentation in
a sequence that is not necessarily temporal, but probably systematicmethodical.
Each later stage builds on the outcome of an earlier one. The two middle stages,
i.e. the opening stage and argumentation stage, are essential. In the opening
stage, everything intended for later use is clarified and regulated; in the argumentation stage, it is put to use. Actually, then, this marks the difference between planning
and execution. If something goes wrong in the argumentation stage, this shows that
it has not been sufficiently clarified and regulated in the opening stage. The opening
stage therefore addresses the following question: what is the best way to verbally
resolve our dispute? By definition, this does not involve any arguments. All ambiguities that arise in the opening stage must somehow be resolved by consensus.
Certainly, this setting includes an idea that is correct: for a rational discussion to work, we need means that result from a process of mutual agreement.

104

Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), 3033. Strictly speaking, these conditions are either
contrary to the principle of externalization or (if the execution of a speech act is supposed to be
regarded as externalizing the corresponding internal states) the conditions render the definition of
the speech acts circular. By the way, there is a lot of criticism of Searles speech acts (cf. Meggle
(1985); Lueken (1992), in particular 223237; Schneider (1992); Sander (2002)), which any serious theory that intends to use these speech acts has to confront.

lvi

Introduction

Methodologically speaking, this concerns the relationship between the object and
meta-level of argumentation. Arguing takes place on the object level, while a
theorization about it is locatedif it is at all necessaryon the meta-level. If
suitable theory already exists, then it is used for discussions on the object level.
Yet if the theory turns out to be unclear or controversial with regard to the current
dispute, then arguing moves to the meta-level, i.e. the meta-level becomes the level
on which argumentation proceeds.
This shows that a separation of the two levels into two stageswhereby in the
first the practice of argumentation is prepared and in the second it is carried outis
inappropriate. In cases of really controversial theses, the dispute will immediately
reproduce itself in the opening stage. For instance, people will not come to an
agreement about how to use a certain word if it is foreseeable that, as a consequence of that definition, one party will prevail over the other. The contentiousness of
theses, however, is very often due to controversial terminology. Seek commonalities,
take these as starting points for constructing commonly accepted definitions, and
discuss the thesis along paths that have thus been establishedas a maxim, this is
not bad. Nevertheless, it is possible that common ground will be found only after
extensive discussions in which perspective differences are discovered and overcome.105
Of course, all of this would qualify as argumentation, but not in the sense of the
argumentation stage as described by pragmadialectics. Only when the two stages
are related to one another as two strata (object and meta-level of argumentation) in
such a way that arguing has become self-reflexive will the rigidity of sequential
stages have been overcome; only then will we have arrived at the image of a dynamic
way of verbal communication whose theory, then, might in a more sophisticated
sense be called dialectics.
The third criticism concerns the underlying concept of rationality or critical
rationalist thinking. The goal of argumentation is supposed to be the resolution of a
difference of standpoints. In the opening stage, the dissent is broken down into
theses; in the argumentation stage, the theses are examined regarding their acceptability. Basically, then, this approach is indeed concerned with testing validity
only the conclusions reached here are supposed to be preliminary (still falsifiable)
and do not fulfill any absolute requirements. That is fine, but it goes way too far. As a
result, standpoints typically concern things for which there are only rather arbitrary
opinions (women have their own logic, movie x is better than movie y, etc.). Even
disagreements on nonsensical standpoints can be overcome with some skill.
The guiding idea is that a standpoint, even if it has been justified with valid argumentative schemes, does not have any somehow positive validity or stability. In fact,
it has merely one distinctive quality: the dissent surrounding it has been overcome
a fact that is quite situational; the next speaker may already be of a different mindset
and thus revive the conflict. In terms of a general theory of argumentation, this is
not ambitious enough. What manner of argumentation will enable us to determine,
105

Pragmadialectics offers no theoretical means whatsoever for such problems surrounding

frame structures. Chapter 5 will address this problem extensively and present some strategies for
resolving it.

Introduction

lvii

e.g. that embryo research should only be permissible to a limited degree, or that
the republic is a more humane form of government than monarchy? Does a
scientific researcher, e.g. have no better means for avoiding a disagreement with
another researcher than the defense of his or her standpoint according to the rules
of pragmadialectics? Well, of course he or she does. After all, there are not only
standpoints; there is also theory that has worked well as orientation in a praxis or is
supposed to act as such in the future. Both the question of whether any given premises are suitable and the question of whether any given inferential schemes may be
used do not merely require the opponents acceptance, but also a reference to the
theoretical basis which is available for the standpoint at issue. What is missing in
Amsterdam, then, is a pragmatically grounded concept of theory that can be taken
seriously.
Pragmalinguistics simply will not do for this purpose. It is a descendant of
Wittgensteins pragmatism, but has largely severed itself from the latters valuable
insights about how verbal actions are embedded in nonverbal actions (in language
games and forms of life). Moreover, even Wittgenstein did not develop pragmatics
to the degree it had reached due to the efforts of Kant, Peirce, Dingler, and others;
according to these thinkers the evaluation of theories of all kinds rests primarily on
the link to respective domains of praxis. In short, the pragmadialectical approach is
not pragmatic enough for it to be a suitable general theory of argumentation.
Ironically, the other half of the conception does not fare better: the approach is
not sufficiently dialectical, either. In the context of pragmadialectics, dialectics
refers first of all to the dialogical structure. This structure ensures that the Amsterdam
approach has more to offer than many other theories and rightly so. Without dialogical
control it is impossible to criticize a justified thesis regarding its justification; it can
only be either accepted or rejected. Yet in the next breath, Poppers dialectical
insights106 are invoked, which apparently consist of the idea that all of our views
are generally falsifiable. However, falsificationism cannot cope with the notion of
paradigm shiftsneither in general (Popper-Kuhn controversy) nor even in particular
(perspective differences).107 A dialectics that is more than dialogical would be concerned with the fact that the same object can be described in a certain way from one
perspective as well as in a different way from a different perspective and that both
perspectives are justifiable, i.e. that a dissent can only be overcome once we
have learned how to cope with perspective differences. Such a dialectics could adopt
elements of Hegelian philosophy (which, after all, is called dialectics for a reason)
106

Cf. van Eemeren et al. (1996), 278. In invoking critical rationalism, the Amsterdam linguists
ignore the fact that Popper hardly understood anything about dialectics. For him, dialectics was a
heresy that permitted contradictions, which meant that any proposition could be derived from
them. Cf. Popper (1945), Vol II, Chap. 2 and, prior to that, Popper (1940), a work which presents
a truly disappointing understanding of dialectics, but has nevertheless been reprinted for decades
(even in a German translation).
107
van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), 16, declare (on the basis of the Mnchhausen
Trilemma) that since justificationism is impossible, they have decided to embrace falsificationism.
Unfortunately, their thorough studies of Lorenzens work were not sufficient to show them the
shortcomings of Poppers doctrine.

lviii

Introduction

and would thus be able to address the becoming other of ideas and individual
subjects in practical life as well as in an increasingly enlightened relation to the self
and the world.108 Above, while discussing the stages in the context of the reflexivity
of validity-related speech, I had already indicated this need. Obviously, the understanding of dialectics that informs pragmadialectics is not sufficient for a general
theory of the practice of argumentation. Again, we need something philosophically
more sophisticated.
As the last section on current theories of argumentation, I will briefly illuminate
the development of Habermas and Lorenzens teachings. The two protagonists
soon abandoned their focus on the concept of reasonable argumentation. Yet some
students and followers have sought to carry on. Prominent successors in the
Habermasian vein are Alexy and Kopperschmidt. Alexy developed a model with
precise rules for legal argumentation; observing these rules was intended to turn a
trial into a reasonable discourse.109 Kopperschmidt attempted to develop a rational
rhetoric. He, too, started with rules intended to turn the persuasive speech act
into a reasonable discourserules which were abandoned subsequently.110 In the
end, Kopperschmidt arrived at the already discussed amalgam of Habermas ideal
speech situation and Perelmans universal audience (cf. the criticism above as
well as in Sect. 7.7.1).
Among Lorenzens successors, the most notable are Friedrich Kambartel and
Ulrich Berk. Kambartel had put forward an initially highly regarded proposal for
substantiating transsubjectivity in three demands for moral dialogues (impartiality,
non-compulsion, non-persuasivity).111 Yet after further discussions he arrived at a
conception of reason that is no longer definable in terms of any criteria; instead, it
is supposed to belong to the general background of enlightened culture. I will
return to this idea in the present book (Sect. 4.1). A veritable constructive theory of
argumentation that circulates in the orbit of Lorenzens thought was put forward by
Berk.112 It contains perceptive critiques of every approach in argumentation theory
that had become known in Germany by the mid-1970s (e.g. Toulmin, Perelman/
Olbrechts-Tyteca, Habermas, Kopperschmidt). An interesting proposal taken from
the books independent thoughts is the suggestion to utilize fields of mutually shared
practices as a reservoir for reflexive beginnings (in moral justifications). I will make
use of a generalization of this idea (Sect. 4.3).
Finally, in the early 1980s, a study group in Hamburg surrounding the author of
the present book began a new approach to the theorization of argument. The members of the Hamburg group followed the beginnings of the disciplinary construction
of argumentation theory on an international scale (ISSA) with great interest. There
were personal contacts to Amsterdam as well as correspondences with various
108

Cf. my presentation in Chap. 5.

Alexy (1989). In legal journals, however, these rules have been criticized as too abstract
(cf. Christensen and Kudlich (2001), 66 ff.).
110
For a critique, cf. Berk (1979), 204 ff.
111
Kambartel (1974), 66.
112
Berk (1979).
109

Introduction

lix

scholars in North America. The impression, however, that the disciplines focus on
a variety of details led to the neglect of what is reasonable in argumentation (since,
if at all addressed, it had been defined by rigid criteria) drove the group to continue
to work independently.113 The subsequent analysis of argumentative texts (journalistic, literary, scientific, philosophical), which went on for years, arose from a desire
not to be too dependent on the dominant approaches. Each text was approached
with the guiding question of how it formulates and satisfies validity claims for theses.
It was not before long that we considered the aforementioned product approach to
be too narrow: argumentation often displays a dynamic in which objections are
considered and theses modified. We also realized that the subjectivity of arguers has
to be taken into account. It is frequently the case that issues are grasped differently
by different subjects. Hence arguments can take on different functions (what is a
reason for one person may, in extreme cases, be an objection for another). In the
course of clarifying these two new dimensions, i.e. the dynamics of argument as
well as the role of subjectivity, we saw the gradual emergence of the foundations
of a concept of argumentative reason that has now, in the present book, found its
comprehensive presentation. I would like to introduce it briefly.

Sketch of the Revised Foundation of the Concept of Argument

In the following 10 chapters of this book, I am concerned with developing the
philosophical foundations for a theory of argument. To my mind, the theoretical
labor that has been done over the past half century is sufficient for looking after a
more reflected establishment of basic concepts and principles and thus for a revision
of the Aristotelian foundation.
The ultimate goal of argumentation is to assess the validity of theses. Theses
are primarily understood as new orientations. While it is true that they are also
sentences, propositions, speech acts, proposals for communication, etc., these qualities
are only secondary. Of course, theses are linguistic entities; however, their essence
emerges only against the background of a seriously pragmatic concept of theory
(Chap. 1). According to such a concept, theory is ultimately linked to praxis, i.e. to
a sphere of connected actions. Its achievement in a praxis is to provide orientation.
Orientation is a basic concept of argumentation theory. An orientation is new if it
exceeds previous orientations, especially if it compensates for existing deficiencies
in orientation. The quest for new orientation is research (not only in a scientific
sense but also concerning the praxis of life). The claim to validity, which is raised
by presenting a thesis, is equivalent to the claim that the thesis is suitable as (new)
orientation (Chap. 2).
If the claim can be satisfied, then the thesis is going to be realized (at least by
those who find it plausible). Realizing it means incorporating it into actions, which
113

The most important publications by members of the study group are Lueken (1992), Mengel
(1995a), and finally the great monograph on the progress of knowledge Schmidt (2010).

lx

Introduction

are then transformed by the new orientation into innovative research activities. It is
only in a praxis that the extent of the validity of a thesis becomes apparent. The
pragmatic concept of theory allows for the definition of two different theoretical
modes which I call old (epistemic) and new (thetic) theory.
Epistemic theory is what is assumed in any act of argumentation. Thus it refers
to the stable, but nevertheless transitory and subjectively imprinted building
blocks that necessarily occur in any argument. It is possible to take this concept of
epistemic theory as a basis for constructing, by way of appropriate accentuations,
pragmatic concepts of knowledge and truth that are suitable for argumentation
theory (Chap. 1). Thetic theory, in turn, refers to theory which is creatively
constructed beyond epistemic theory in order to bridge existing gaps in orientation.
At the top of such a thetic structure is the thesis. Arguing that is understood in a
seriously pragmatic way is no mere speech that aims to make opinions acceptable.
Rather, it is the theoretical or theory-forming level that can be found in research of
all kindswhether triggered by the smallest irritations in everyday life or the largest and deepest questions ever posed by human beings.
Arguing should be understood as fundamentally dialogical. Any argument is
addressed to someone, and this addressee should be conceived as a critical opponent,
who controls the thetic structure (frequently, this is the inner opponent in consultation with herself). Two directions are pursued: In an upward direction, theory
is built up, while in a downward direction, it is broken down. One is the
direction of justification, the other the direction of criticism (of the thesis and/or
its reasons). Asserting, justifying, and criticizing are the basic operations of
argumentation (Chap. 4). Arguments (i.e. reasons or objections) mobilize epistemic
and/or thetic theory. The strength and stability of an argument that can be achieved
depends on epistemic theory. Ultimately, then, it depends on links to practically
experienced certainties. A justification is a system of beginnings and inferences
which only partly consists of formal steps; on the whole it forms a constructive,
methodically ordered sequence or network. The role of the opponent consists in
constantly controlling whether these steps build up on each other and thus construct
the overall thesis. Where appropriate, objections must be raised.
Dialogical control has a second aspect that relates to subjective contents. It is
well known that, as a rule, arguments (or their theoretical bases) are usually shaped
by subjectivity or perspective differences (Chap. 3). In order to grasp this influence
of different perspectives, I will introduce the concept of a frame structure. This
structure reconciles subjective and substantial aspects of each given state of affairs
requiring orientation. Whenever an argument becomes controversial, the task at
hand is to examine the frame structures or the compatibility of different perspectives.
In the case of a valid thesis, perspective differences have been overcome or reconciled (Chap. 5).
Argumentative processes can reach a considerable degree of complexity. In order
to understand this, I will distinguish four dimensions: a subjective, material, structural,
and procedural dimension (Chap. 6). The reciprocal references and influences of
dialogue movements show the possibility of a retroflexive structure: An argumentation cannot only support or weaken a thesis but also modify individual arguments

Introduction

lxi

that have been mobilized or the theoretical basis that has been introduced. In this
way, arguments and the conclusion can alternately support one another.
At the center of this approach is the concept of argumentative validity. A valid
argument is more than opinion or conjecture and less than knowledge. A thesis is
valid if it can be justified in such a way that no objections remain. It can become
knowledge if it proves durable in practical realization. Argumentative validity has
a structure aimed at generalization that is articulated here by way of the concept
of the open forum of arguments. This concept avoids the burden of proof that
universalism faces (which cannot be satisfied), albeit without falling prey to
relativism (Chap. 7).
Based on these theoretical tools, it is possible to reconstruct even a sophisticated
controversy to the point that the raised validity claims can be evaluated (Chap. 8).
The grammar of argumentative validity has a reflexive structure. It is not only
concerned with theses and arguments (on the object level) but simultaneously posits
(on the meta-level) a certain theoretical access. Anyone who presents an argument
also (implicitly) makes the claim that it is a good or a valid argument or at least that
it is an argument at all (Chap. 9).
The twofoldedness of argumentation, along with the focus on justifications that are
defended against objections (and, if necessary, revised), connects the reflexive with
the fallible component of autonomous reason. The reason of argumentation is no
additional quality that could be defined by specific, substantial norms (such as
dialogue rules for ensuring that the procedure is fair and the contents moral). Rather, it
is rooted in a conception of argumentation as a transsubjective activity, i.e. a verbal
practice in which the participants subjectivities do not have the final say, but are put
up for consideration just like all other contents and presuppositions (Chap. 10).
Argumentation thus construed forms the core of a concept of thetic reason
(reason of tentativeness). It is the medium of the always unfinished human struggle
for clarity and reliability in all spheres, i.e. in ordinary life, politics, law, science, art,
religion, and philosophy. This medium truly deserves to be carefully thought
through from the beginning over and over again.
One last point:
An adequate concept of argument cannot, as it were, be determined in the ivory
tower by simply discussing theories of argumentation. It even requires the ability to
distance oneself as much as possible from these theories in order to focus on the
object itself. To be sure, such distancing can never be achieved in a perfect manner
this is the so-called problem of constitution which will be addressed multiple times
in this book: Though the thing in itself does not exist; it is possible, however, to
critically refer back to ones own theoretical presuppositions. Nevertheless, we must
locate our theoretical proposals in the reality of argumentation in order to study
them and to demonstrate their relevance and suitability. For this reason, I have
always attempted to illustrate my theoretical proposals by way of examples. These
attempts were guided by the ambition not only to present random finds and ideas
but also to consider some large and important fields of research in the history of
humanity with respect to how they include arguments concerning certain theses.
I primarily refer to four fields.

lxii

Introduction

The first is the departure of Spanish-Genoese navigator Cristbal Coln (Latinized:

Columbus), who wanted to reach India but accidentally discovered the New World,
thereby initiating an epochal cultural transition. The second field is well known in
the philosophy of science: the episode surrounding the heat substance phlogiston
(or caloric) at the beginning of modern chemistry. The third field of examples concerns Frances transition from a monarchy to a republic, especially the debate about
the trial of King Louis XVI. The fourth field of examples is our current debate
about the ethical and cultural significance and legitimacy of genetic research in
food production and medicine.
It almost goes without saying that I am not an expert in all of these fields. I have
studied them and have certainly more than general knowledge about these matters
(especially regarding the discovery of the New World and the French Revolution).
Still, my assessments and conclusions with respect to these fields are not meant to
be contributions to research in the respective disciplines, but examples and illustrations
regarding my contributions to argumentation theory.
Finally, this Introduction should not be concluded without gaining some distance
from all this more or less sophisticated theoryalready existing theory as well as
the new theory, I would like to supplement in a manner both clarifying and corrective
in order to focus once more on the reality of argumentation. Apparently, this reality
has its peculiarities, which might even turn out to be different from what we, as
argumentation theorists, show to be manageable in our examples. This, then, takes
me back to the beginning: While we may have a good laugh about the Argument
Clinic, it had better not be derogatory. Basically, our practice of argumentation is
rather poor at presentat least in light of the infinite task for which it is needed.
Nevertheless, we have no other choice but to take it seriously; and this, in effect, we
might only be able to endure with a sense of humor.114

114

Cf. Christian Morgensterns definition of humor as a view of the finite from the position of the
infinite; Morgenstern (1989), 432. (Trans. T.P.).

Chapter 1

Knowledge

1.1 Sketch of the Pragmatic Concept of Theory

Arguing is only possible if in the process not everything is questionable or
controversial, but something certain or solid can be taken for granted. This simple
insight allows us to distinguish between two pragmatic modes in the verbal activity
of argumentation. One is the mode of the questionable, the uncertain, which is
in need of support; the other is that of the certain and solid, which is used for such
support. Using an architectural metaphor, I call the supporting parts the theoretical
basis of the theses. It is composed of theories of which we are certainin
a sense that needs to be clarified. However, since the theses themselves are
theoretical, it is advisable to articulate the difference as one between two modes
of theory, which I would like to call epistemic and thetic theory.1 The first
important question for understanding an argument is always the following: What is
thetic, what is epistemic? In other words: What is claimed and what is taken for
granted in order to support the claim?
This first chapter will clarify the characteristics of argumentative presuppositions
or rather of epistemic theory. What is it? What is its certainty rooted in and how far
does it reach? Is whatever is taken to be solid absolutely certain or could it also be
shaken, and how is that possible? These are the kinds of questions that will have to
be answered here. The answer will be a small theory of knowledge. This theory
includes observations and reflections about the concept of knowledge, which do not,
however, arise from the traditional problems of epistemology and philosophy of
science, but rather from the needs and problems of the practice of argumentation,
which is the object of my study.
In arguing, the certainty of the theoretical basis consists in not having to make a
validity claim or in the fact that such a claim is of a very different kind than the one
presented for the thesis. If it does not have to be made, the reason is that the claim
epistemic from the Greek epistemeknowledge and thetic from the Greek tithemi is to set
down, to establish.
1

H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,

Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_1,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

1Knowledge

has already been satisfied, and its satisfaction can easily be demonstrated again at
any time. In this case, I would like to speak of knowledge, and for the time being,
I am simply appealing to an intuitive preconception of this word. Knowledge is the
first and noblest kind of theoretical basis. In the case of knowledge, the satisfiability
of the validity claim is universal (in a sense that will have to be clarified in greater
detail). In order to see this more clearly, a concept of knowledge that is useful for
the theory of argumentation needs to be formed. Apparently, such a concept aims at
something more general than what is commonly regarded as knowledge in the sciences (while one should have no illusions, by the way, with respect to a possible
uniformity of these opinions). Experiences in the ordinary practice of everyday life
generate a kind of knowledge, too, and this plays a significant role in the practice of
argumentationif it is understood as broadly as I suggest here.
Other solid elements of argumentation are familiar views that are more or less
generally accepted. They, too, function as theory in a sense that needs to be further
explicated. Even though they are not knowledge, neither are they mere opinion but
rather, as I would like to call it, doxastic theory.2 On the one hand, this includes
matters of course that are typical for the people of a certain epoch or a particular
culture, which would probably not withstand a critical examination, but they are
usually not subjected to it. Such firmly entrenched opinions are not shared by every
individual, but still, by most.3 What is important is that they play a role in cultural
life. I would also like to include as doxastic theory certain beliefs that are only
shared by particular communities and that serve as orientation in their conduct of life.
(Religious views will probably also have to count as doxastic theory.) I will subsume
these three types of semisolid elements, i.e. knowledge, practical experience, and
solid particular beliefs under the designation epistemic theory. How this is to be
understood will be explained later.
But first, there is a caveat: The task of analyzing the kinds of theory that could
serve as the theoretical basis in arguments is complicated by two problems. On the
one hand, even though these elements are fixed within a given argumentor even
only in each given state of conversationthis solidity is not absolute, but rather
characterized by a plasticity that makes change possible, a change of theories which
is simultaneously a change of situations and realities. On the other hand, there is a
subjective side to these solid elements. It is small in the case of knowledge; it only
concerns the selection of appropriation (different dialogue partners know different
things) and the type of application. In other kinds of theoretical basis, the subjective
side is considerable. A certain firm conviction can virtually characterize a person.
And a change is at least theoretically possible here as well. People can change even
their firmest basic convictions, which coincides with a change in their personality.
Hence, the analysis of the theoretical basis is a complex matter. Of course, this
complexity is due to my own conceptualization of the practice of argumentation as
doxastic from the Greek doxa(fixed) opinion.
Aristotle spoke of endoxa in this context. Cf. Aristotle (1960), Topics, I.1. 100B 20: Endoxa are
those (views) which commend themselves to all or to the majoritiy or to the wise that is, to all of
the wise or to the majority or to the most famous and distinguished of them. (trans. E. S. Forster)
2
3

1.1Sketch of the Pragmatic Concept of Theory

comprehensive and profound. If plausible reasons could be found to restrict it, for
example, to discussions in daily life and in school classes, or at least to the justification of norms in morality, politics, and law, the task would obviously be easier. But
I think that these distinctions would be artificial and that certain aspects of scientific
and philosophical argumentation are, for example, intrinsic to the practice of argumentation and could only be neglected under penalty of simplicity.
The task is therefore to develop a concept of theory which, on the one hand,
acknowledges that theories are changeable and, on the other, takes subjectivity
into account. How is this supposed to work? The term theory is known to be a
vast semantic reservoir in which all kinds of possible things float around, all in a
tumble. For Aristotle, theoria is a pleasurable contemplation.4 There is also the
concept of theory as a system of propositions with explanatory or even prognostic
potential or Poppers use of theories as the name of general propositions (e.g. that
all ravens are black),5 and there is simple everyday expression, for example, in
journalism, where even a politicians most superficial claims about a possible fiscal
deficit qualify as theory. Even in challenging methodological approaches, or in
the philosophy of science, the use of the term theory is by no means uniform.6
It may refer to a sequence of signs that meets certain syntactical criteria or to a system
of propositions for which semantics provides reference to the world. The differentiation between theoretical concepts and observation concepts introduced by Carnap
leads to certain clarifications, but also to new problems, such as whether there can
be such a thing as a pure language of observation. Whenever explanatory power is
considered to be a fundamental aspect of theories, the perspective of critical
rationalism is influential. According to critical rationalism, theories are linguistic
constructions that represent objective relationships in general propositions which
are hypothetical. They can be subjected to tests, which they can fail in terms of
theirvalidity claim. Subsequent problems, for example, regarding the appropriate
schematization of the lawlike character of general propositions, especially in the
reconstruction of scientific explanations according to the Hempel-Oppenheim
scheme, have kept philosophers busy.7 Often, a fundamental distinction between
theories in the natural sciences and theories in the cultural sciences or humanities is
deemed necessary. For the realm of culture and human life, not only explanatory
theories, but interpretive theories are also taken into account. These might not
formulate deterministic, but statistical, laws or perhaps even no laws at all, but rules
or norms. In all these variations of the concept of theory, the mutability of theory
(the genesis of a theory, the progress in knowledge) and its subjective (epochal,
cultural) character raise significant problems. The task described above is hence
very difficult.
The pragmatic approach seems to provide a way out. Regardless of its various
forms, its main idea is to place theories in a context of action and in regarding their
Aristotle (1968), Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10.
Cf. Popper (1968), Chapter III.
6
Cf., for example, Thiel (1998).
7
Cf. Stegmller (1969), Chapter I.
4
5

1Knowledge

importance and possible validity as corresponding to certain benefits that they

provide for action. Today, primarily the American pragmatism of the late 19th and
early 20th century is relevant. Charles Sanders Peirce writes: Consider what
effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of
our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our
conception of the object.8 This is a promising maxim; it has the potential to also do
justice to the two problematic aspects. The aspect of mutability could be interpreted
as the development of our practical purposesthe aspect of subjectivity as each
scientists perspective.
However, the effort to extract suitable directives for argumentation theory from
the texts of American pragmatism leads to rather vague results. Already the founding fathers Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead did not agree about the relationships
between theory, action, and world. Although it was taken for granted that a theory,
whose acceptance or rejection did not make a difference for practical purposes, was
nothing but empty talk, the old philosophical questions about subjectivity and
objectivity, truth, and correspondence retained their controversial potential under
the pragmatic maxim. This fact was even amplified by the pragmatists various
areas of activity. In Peirces case, these were natural science, logic, and semiotics;
in James and Meads case (medicine and), psychology; and in Deweys, pedagogy
and politics.
People were fascinated by the experimental method, which was construed as
active rather than receptive and taken to be ideal for a general concept of research
and action. In the process, however, the scientific-technical focus proved to be
restrictive. Experimental actions provide experience, which, at least in our
everyday thinking, maps the real world. Peirce developed a kind of metaphysical theory
of categories, in which firstness signifies what exists independently, secondness
the (e.g. active) relatedness to what has been untouched, and thirdness the mediation between the first and the second. The interpretation of these categories is
not, and never has been, uniform.9 Peirces closest students already had different
interpretations. Regarding its practical relevance, it is striking that Peirces systematic
starting point is not human practice, but the existence or experience of the world.
Peirce considered the medieval problem of universals (are concepts real or do we
merely think them?) to be significant and took himself to be a metaphysical realist.
According to his concept of truth, human research converges with the acquisition of
what is real.
The three other early pragmatists were concerned with a practicable development of Peirces doctrines.10 In particular, they considered the relationship between
theory and reality. They engaged extensively with the concept of experience in an
Peirce (1965c), 258, Collected Papers 5.402 (How To Make Our Ideas Clear.)
For a critical discussion, cf. Bernstein (1971), 177183.
10
Peirce despised adjusting philosophy to the demands of everyday practical suitability. When he
saw what had become of his pragmatism, he turned away angrily, describing his own views as
pragmaticisma name, as he wrote ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers; cf. Peirce
(1965a), 5.414.
8
9

1.1Sketch of the Pragmatic Concept of Theory

effort to reject Cartesian dualism (which had already been contested by Peirce) as
well as sensualist empiricism. Although this led to some idiosyncrasies (in James
account, even religion is based on experience11; he called truth the cash value of a
theory), the early pragmatists are fully aware of the general role of theory in action.
James sometimes refers to this function by the same term that I use in this book to
designate the pragmatic function of theses and theories: orientation.12
John Dewey, by far the most prolific author of American pragmatism (the
complete edition of his works comprises 37 volumes), strove to bring the scientific
method to fruition for general education and democratic participation. This part of
his work has had a great influence on modern education, not only in the United
States13 but worldwide. In the context of the present book, his later work Logic: The
Theory of Inquiry is worth mentioning.14 This is the ambitious attempt to conceive
the whole conceptual framework of humanity as a result of inquiry. Even logic and
mathematics are presented as a result of successful transitions in research activities.
Even if such an empirically rooted view of formal knowledge is not quite s atisfactory,
it leads to interesting innovations. In addition to inductive logical generalizations,
Dewey describes a second type of generalization, which is much more practically
relevant: the identification of a kind, expressed in generic propositions.15
Furthermore, Deweys qualification of research results as not true, but as
warrantably assertible16 is also very important to me. The latter concept is a
variant (albeit less differentiated) of the concept of argumentative validity, which
I will develop in the present book. On the whole, Deweys conception of inquiry has
some structural affinities with the notion of research presented here, but it still relies
on concepts of reasoning and acting that are ultimately committed to the thought
patterns of the experimental natural sciences.
The pragmatic theorist who has most thoroughly thought about the notion of
action is George H. Mead. However, Meads idea of the three stages of the act17
(wherein the instrumental character of acting remains dominant) is less interesting
for an understanding of the relationship between theory and practice than his symbolic interactionism.18 Inspired by psychological thinking and dialectical theory,
this theory seeks to account for how language, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity are
Cf. James (1912b).
What would it (an assertion, H.W.) practically result in for us, were it true? It could only result
in our orientation, in the turning of our expectations and practical tendencies into the right path;
cf. James (1912a), 32. Of course, this is only a colloquial use of the term; for an explicit introduction, cf. below, Sect.1.3.
13
Cf. my comments on the Critical Thinking movement in the Introduction.
14
Dewey (1938).
15
Dewey (1938), Chap. XIV. Accounts of generic propositions are absent from logic textbooks
(Iknow of only one exception: Kambartel and Stekeler-Weithofer (2005)). Even more astonishing,
however, is its absence from current works on Informal Logic and Critical Thinking.
16
Cf. Dewey (1938), e.g. 9, 10, 104.
17
Mead (1938), 325.
18
Mead (1934).
11
12

1Knowledge

formed in communication and interaction. I will make use of it in the present book
(Chaps. 3 and 10)while even going further than Mead by pointing out the elevation of intersubjectivity to transsubjective reason.19
The clearest idea that can be taken from the pragmatic understanding of theory
and action is instrumentalism or rather the assumption that, in their main function,
theories can be regarded as instruments for successful actions. This is an ambi
valentissue. On the one hand, it makes it possible to undermine the fact-value
dichotomyan advantage that I would like to make use of. On the other hand, the
transformation of all conceptual and theoretical problems into the question What is
the outcome of thinking that way? narrows and flattens thought in an objectionable
way. The most common and obvious purposes become the measure of a theorys
quality. The inner and deeper components of the felicity of an action that I have
entitled value and meaning (cf. Sect.1.2) dissolve into the calculation of
benefits. Likewise, problems of object constitution or the ascent from action to
theory (cf. Chap. 9) are not properly considered.20
The second striking achievement of American pragmatism is the focus on
research activities. As I said, this issue was also slightly accentuated and narrowed
by the ideal of the scientific experiment, but the concept of research actually
exceeded this. It is all the more regrettable that within this concept, the practice of
argumentation was not considered and examined as a specific activity with its own
qualities and powers.21
Concerning the key question about a concept of theory that would apply to the
solid parts of argumentative efforts, what we are offered here are theories that represent effects or causal relationships and whose certainty is ensured by the fact that
orchestrated actions have certain externally verifiable effects. This is better than
nothing, but not much. The instrumental link to practice lends the theory practical
support only, as it were, after the fact. Theory here only partially reflects praxis.
American pragmatism, now a century old, has changed in various ways. The basic
idea of judging the quality of theories, first of all, with regard to their link to practice, has not been pursued and developed systematically. Instead, there has been a
fusion with analytical philosophyoriginally a strict opponent of pragmatism.22
Then pragmalinguistics and contextualism further diluted and flattened the link to
practice. Today, thinking pragmatically is not something specific or distinctive
In Hegelian thought, subjectivity is developed even further than by Mead (namely to self-
consciousness). Cf. McDowell (2003) and, with more distinct references to Mead, cf. Stekeler-
Weithofer (2005), Chap. 13.4.
20
On the question of object constitution, Peirce was more sophisticated than his followers. He
views the constitution of concepts not only in the context of practical consequences but particularly
in the context of behavioral patterns; cf. Bernstein (1971), 5357.
21
With the inductive and particularly the abductive argument, Peirce had two truly nondeductive
inference schemes whose prominent role for research he clearly recognized. But he understood
them as quasi-logical conclusions and not as forms of substantial arguments that need to be controlled dialogically.
22
Both, Moore and Russell, published harsh criticisms of the pragmatic concept of truth; cf. Russell
(1966), Moore (1907).
19

1.1Sketch of the Pragmatic Concept of Theory

within the philosophical mainstream.23 In the highly abstract debates about the
concepts of knowledge, science, and truth (debates that, in terms of metaphysical
finesse, are comparable to those of the scholastics), the pragmatists stand out less
because of a genuinely pragmatic way of thinking (i.e. under recourse to action as
the basis), but rather because they like to refer to the writings of the founding
fathers.24 Much of the internal debate within pragmatism has in the recent past been
structured around the controversy between realism and relativism. If, on the one
hand, the use of theories in scientific practice yields no truth (at best in the end, in
the sense of Peirces ultimate consensus) but may only prove feasibility and if, on
the other hand, our way of doing and wanting things is no longer uniform but rather
split up into different paradigm communities or cultures, then relativism looms
large. To counteract this, any version of scholastic realism (i.e. the assumption that
the objective structures of the world exist independently of our theories) seems to
offer a way out or at least a stopping point.
Hilary Putnam, the protagonist of this group, has come forward with perceptive
reflections on realism (among other topics that are not relevant here). Over time,
Putnams view of realism has undergone remarkable changes. It was based on the
assumption that references to natural kinds such as gold and water function as
rigid designators (Kripke). Regardless of time or place and even under completely
different conditions of living and acting, they refer to the same thing, and bit by bit
scientists detect the essential qualities of these natural kinds. Their identity is
fixed by the worldnot by our talk about it. This is supposed to be the explication
of a realist position.25
In analytical philosophy, Putnam caused quite a stir with these considerations;
and even though things have calmed down by now, positions on the question of
natural kinds are still complex and unclear. Their most conspicuous shortcoming
is the absence of any link to practices; the key terms are always perception,
experience, and linguistic meaning. This notoriously ignores the fact that

criteria of identityeven for extensionsare set by us and that we have good reasons for doing so in each case. However, these criteria do not arise from thought
experiments involving fictitious twin earth conditions, but from our felicitous technical practices. We can perform technical actions with gold other than the ones
Archimedes performed insofar as we are able to distinguish it from fools gold.
What Archimedes would have said about our ways of distinguishing is purely a matter ofspeculation. It does not advance our understanding and cannot supply reasons
forone or another sort of realism (metaphysical, external, internal,26 scientific).
Bernstein listed even Popper and Feyerabend as pragmatists; cf. Bernstein (1971), 174.
Cf. Sandbothe (2000).
25
Cf. Putnam: The Meaning of Meaning. In: Putnam (1975).
26
The philosopher of science Ian Hacking mocks Putnams internal realism and believes that he
will illuminate this tricky debate by making the following statement (Hacking (1983)), 23: Now
how does one alter the charge on the niobium ball? Well, at this stage, said my friend, we spray it
with positrons to increase the charge or with electrons to decrease the charge. From that day forth,
Ive been a scientific realist. So far as Im concerned, if you can spray them then they are real.
23
24

1Knowledge

Nevertheless, pragmatists, presumably because they reject the ordinary correspondence

theory of truth, seem to be vulnerable for ontological questions,27 and even Putnam is
apparently easily provoked in this regard.28
The pioneer of the second group is Richard Rorty.29 He has been accused of
relativism (by others, e.g. by Putnam), which he has countered with the assertion
that his position would be more appropriately characterized as ethnocentrism.30
This suggests that for Rorty not everything is true and/or good relative to a given
system. Rather, he holds that the values and the discourses of the Western industrialized nations should be regarded as the most advanced and relevant ones. But apart
from this assessment, Rorty views any content (values, knowledge) as contingent,
i.e. there cannot be a perspective from which what has been achieved would be
superior to any conceivable alternatives. Rorty discusses criteria like personal
liberty or the repression of violence, cruelty, and pain,31 but the results require many
presuppositions and are theoretically and empirically rather vague. Whenever Rorty
comments on the possibility of discussions between members of different cultures
and collectives, he mentions only vocabularies. Every culture has a different
vocabulary. To move from one to the other is a matter of persuasion, Rorty claims;
The difference between reasons and causes, and thus between violence and speech,
no longer exists.32 That is an interesting statement, which is, nevertheless, exaggerated.
I will discuss these points as a problem of frame structures and frame sublation in
Chap. 5. Rorty labels his investigations and deliberationsguided by the question
What use is it?33as pragmatism and presents himself as a kind of destroyer of
the philosophical tradition. For instance, he contends that moral philosophy provides
knowledge that can morally improve people,34 and since that is not forthcoming, any
further ethical theorizingfor example, about human rightsshould be abandoned.
(emphasis in original) This includes the correct suggestion that, in the case of such questions, we
should reflect on technical practices. Yet it does not provide any reasons for adopting a philosophical or scientific realism. Even the reference to microphysics is superfluous. In fact, the operations
in a car paint shop would be sufficient: By spraying them (the paint particles) onto the sheet metal,
it really becomes corrosion proof. Do the workers represent any realism if they think this way?
27
Even Habermas has by now positioned himself ontologically. He finds an argument for the
fact-value dichotomy in the fact that in theoretical reason, we presuppose the objective world as
something beyond our thinking. Hence, he asserts that a justification transcendent concept of
truth would be applicable in this case; cf. Habermas (2003), Chapter 5. In Sect.1.6, I sketch out a
concept of truth which, for one, can be applied to both the theoretical and the practical realm
and, moreover, is rooted in the foundations of fields of practice rather than in ontological
presuppositions.
28
Cf. Gross (2004).
29
Rorty died in 2007, after the completion of my manuscript.
30
See Rorty (1998), 51.
31
Cf. Rorty (1989), 81.
32
Cf. Rorty (1989), 48 ff.
33
Cf. Rorty (1998), 45.
34
Cf. Rorty (1993).

1.1Sketch of the Pragmatic Concept of Theory

To continue thinking about these problems and to look for clarifications is a sign of
intellectual immaturity.35 No more philosophical work is needed, but emotional
representations of the right values, for instance, in Beecher Stowes Uncle Toms
Cabin. In general, Rortys dealings with philosophy feature a crudeness and
curtness that might be appealing to young readers (or those young at heart). But
the attitude of dismissing great ideas possibly before even understanding them is
questionable indeed.36
The insistence that everything is allegedly contingentif it is supposed to mean
more than: We now understand only what we understand nowimplies a superior
vantage point which we simply do not have and cannot reach, not even with great
vehemence.
Our excursion into the pragmatism of North American philosophy has shown
the following: We should hold on to the view that truths cannot only be found
in factual but also in practical fieldseven though it is not immediately clear
what that means and how truth can be distinguished from thetic validity. Apart
from this point, however, American pragmatism does not have much to offer for
a concept of theory and knowledge that could be used in argumentation theory.
What is missing is any kind of explicit and differentiated link to practice by
which the quality of theories, in particular a kind of solidity which could mark a
theory as knowledge, could be assessed. The fixation on theory or discourse is
a shortcoming of the entire tradition of academic philosophy, and unfortunately,
in this regard the pragmatic factions are no exception. Regardless of this fixation
on theory, arguing as the medium for developing theories in research is neglected
too much.
In order to arrive at a more appropriate version of pragmatism, we have to take a
wider circle of philosophical pioneers into account. Insights by Aristotle, Vico,
Kant, Marx, Nietzsche, Dingler, Lorenzen, and Janich need to be considered as
well. In the end, one might even use ones own intelligence.
In my opinion, an adequate pragmatic concept of theory begins with human
actions and with the need to recognize those structures on which their felicity
depends. They have to be articulated symbolically or, rather, in linguistic signs,
fixed, and made universally accessible. This may only lead anywhere, of course,
ifthere are such felicity structures in actions, and if not any kind of aimless
behavior is taken into account, but only actions that are stabilized by standards
and routines, and that, I would say, have achieved the status of a praxis. Theory
in the pragmatic sense that I am suggesting here is the symbolic representation of
the felicity structures of a praxis. Theory comprises concepts, propositions, and
Cf. Rorty (1993).
Cf. Rorty (1980). I must confess that during the study of this book, I sometimes could not help
wondering whether Rorty understands the ideas he rejects well enough. One example would be his
treatment of Kants Copernican Turn and the subjective constitution of objects (loc. cit., 148164).
Rorty has been criticized for his arrogant tone, especially in this work, and regrets this tone by now.
Cf. Rorty (1998), 45. The shortcomings of his argument, however, do not concern his tone.
35
36

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1Knowledge

s ystems of propositions. If we have a theory at our disposal, then we are oriented

in areas where the respective practice is being applied or where it at least has some
relevance. That means we notice significant differences and connections, understand at least some of what is happening, and have realistic views about what
needs to be done for actions to succeed. So if I use the term theory in this book,
it always aims at the function of concepts or propositions to guide us: the function
to enable us to orient ourselves in the world or the users, i.e. those who accept
the theory and take it to be true, to orient themselves. Thus, a way to answer
questions about the meaning or truth or validity of theories has been found: we
need to examine in which areas and for which practical matters the corresponding
concepts or propositions contribute anything to orientation (I also say have an
orientation value).
Obviously, in this view, the relationship between theory and practice is not
merely instrumental. Theory is not only an instrument for certain purposes, but
provides support and stabilization of practices in a much broader sense. To use a
phrase borrowed from the philosophical tradition (I will define it more carefully in
Chap. 9), theory is a reflection of practice. Nevertheless, the felicity of practical
actions is the basic criterion for the validity of a theory. Even theories that do not
directly and obviously refer to practical concerns obtain their potential significance
from the fact that they play a role for the felicity of actions, i.e. that they have an
orientation value, even if that value is mediated.
In a praxis, accuracy and felicity are interdependent regarding the significance
and validity of a theory. Both support each other mutually. Disturbances and irritations in the practice might motivate revisions of the theory. Internal clarifications of
the theory, corrections, and extensions might make the practice more stable, transparent, and potent. During its refinement, the theory appears in the aforementioned
new pragmatic mode, which I will call thetic theory. The thetic mode has a peculiar relationship with the modifications of practice undertaken for the purposes of
research. The relationship is peculiar because new, tentative actions cannot yet have
the stability of a well-established praxis, and hence nothing definitive can be known
about their felicity structures. If we do not want to depend on mere opinions, however, there has to be some form of safeguarding thetic theory as well. This safeguarding is the argumentative dialogue.
By now, it should at least have become partially clear what the pragmatic concept
of theory can provide for an understanding of the practice of argumentation. It
enables a characterization of the relationship between the reliable and the questionable elements of an argument. This relationship is that between an old and a new
theory or rather between epistemic and thetic theory. The relationship between the
old epistemic and the new thetic theorywhich then, integrated into actions, leads
to new epistemic theory, provided it is successfulat the same time illuminates
what is really meant by theoretical change. Moreover, this pragmatic concept of
theory has a subjective (inner) side to it, which represents the ways of orientation
specific to an epoch and even to individual users of the theory. Thus, it appears to
satisfy the two requirements mentioned above, i.e. it can represent the mutability of
theories as well as their subjective character.

1.2Action: Praxis

11

1.2 Action: Praxis

If theory is to be based on actions, then the first task is to develop a suitable concept
of action. Today, there are extensive discussions about a concept and a theory of
action, which have become entrapped and entangled in manifold constellations of
problems. Many problems are due to the fact that the mysteries of the mind-body
problem reside in the concept of action. The acting subject is a thing in the world,
but its intentions are not: They exist in the sphere of intra- and intersubjective
communication. A good concept of action has to take this into consideration. In the
past, I have already tried to conceptualize acting as a complex phenomenon that
is stabilized in a cycle of linguistic-argumentative and objective-formative stages.37
An action thus understood has an inner and an outer side, but the two sides only
become accessible in the interplay between the individual subject and the group.
It is important, however, to understand an action as a praxis. As a praxis, action
can become the systematic beginning of a conception that theorizes the reasonable
argumentative development of orientations.
The development of the concept of praxis begins with thinking about ordinary
skills and abilities, even in the simple, colloquial sense. To say that someone can
act, first of all, merely indicates the ability to carry out processes intentionally, often
aimed at a goal or a purpose. It should be clear that we are all able to do this and that
there is no need for extensive clarifications of intentionality, etc. We do not need
such clarifications for our everyday practical competence, or rather theoretical clarifications are only possible if we have a starting point we could clarify, anyway.
Paradigm cases of actions for which I presuppose our competence are the operations of the human body, in particular of the hands (the German word for action
is Handlung, a derivative of hand). Examples would be opening a window,
hammering a nail, running, swimming, and taking the bus to work, as well as singing,
chatting, and relaxing. If these cases are investigated more closely, however, all
sorts of difficulties regarding the demarcation of an action from unintended b ehavior
or mere bodily states arise and even regarding the identification of individual action
units within the, more or less, deliberate way of acting that makes up the daily life
of modern people.
As I said, we can distinguish the inner side from the outer side of an action. Even
if these are metaphorsafter all, an action is no vessel, no house, and no piece of
clothingwe can still differentiate between two components here because they can
come undone and then cause confusion. On the one hand, an action is an event in the
world. It happens in a certain space, it takes a certain period of time, it can be perceived by other people, and it has effects and consequences. On the other hand, it is
an event that has an initiator and a controller who has intended something and, in
doing so, generally possesses at least a rudimentary understanding of the situation.
This inner component includes a more or less clear conception of the actions meaning for the agent. Within this conception, we can distinguish between a dimension
37

Wohlrapp (1979).

12

1Knowledge

of purpose, a dimension of value, and a dimension of meaning. The purpose is the

state of affairs the action is meant to cause. That we pursue purposes and can even
achieve them is a basic experience and also that we have to employ means for this
purpose. The first and the most basic requirement of rationality is an adequate
relationship between purposes and means. There is something great and resplendent about this instrumental rationality, and something unspeakably petty and
miserable if it is turned into the exclusive or highest form of human reason. After
all, it is imperative in a very fundamental sense to pay attention to the inside of an
action as well, i.e. to everything that acting and effecting cause in ourselves.
Reflection provides a second layer of action for which I have suggested the term
value.38 The value of an action is what the action supplies the subject with in terms
of enjoyment, fulfillment, and self-affirmation. People can train themselves to place
all of this in the achievement of their ends. In this case, they only gain something
from their actions if they meet the defined goals. This could prove to be an impoverishment. Someone who, for example, pursues ambitious goals, but never achieves
them, could no longer say that, overall, it was good enough having wanted to
succeed (cf. the Latin proverb in magnis voluisse satest). Instead, he would have
to admit that he actually gained nothing from what he did. A third layer that reflection may discover in an action, and for which, in my opinion, the English term
meaning (or existential meaning) lends itself well, seems to be entirely f orgotten
and obscure. Meaning is the embeddedness into the whole of life. The action is
experienced as a moment in the becoming of the subject, a moment in the process
of life that requires trust and generates confidence. For many people, this level, too,
has grown into the level of purposes or, rather, has wasted away within it. Still, there
may then at least be certain special moments which give rise to the impression that
meaning is lacking. I will address this topic in Chap. 10.
The most important distinction for the subsequent stabilization of an action in
practice and its theory is that between the felicity and infelicity of an action.39 This
distinction reconnects the inside to the outside. An action is felicitous if it turns out
the way it was designed to, and it is infelicitous if it fails to do so. Apparently, this
can have very different results, depending on the design and varying degrees of its
sophistication. We might be tempted to link felicity directly to success as the
achievement of a purpose. People who are very focused on instrumental rationality,
or who determine even practical rationality solely as the achievement of a purpose
in relation to the effort expended, will regard it as appropriate to consider success as
the sole criterion of felicity. Others, however, who realize that we also live during
the respective actions and possibly even want to live well and properly, are prone to
find this less plausible. To them, an action will only count as felicitous if the
action in itself was satisfying and enriching. Those who will regard an action, even
more profoundly, as a manifestation of life, will also take its meaning into account
Cf. Wohlrapp (1998a).
For the insight that felicity, or rather the felicity-infelicity opposition, is the decisive criterion
for an action (at least for its ascent to the level of theory), I am indebted to Peter Janich (cf. Janich
(1992).
38

39

1.2Action: Praxis

13

concerning its felicity. But regardless of peoples views, it seems irrefutable to me

that we distinguish felicity from infelicity regarding an action and that we strive
towards felicity.
In fact, for some actions, felicity is the criterion for whether or not they have
taken place at all: for instance, when cleaning a room, repairing a device, opening a
box, closing a door, etc. If a car does not move after the repair, what has taken place
was not a repair, but merely the attempt at a repair. For yet other actions, there does
not seem to be a difference between felicity and infelicity. In the case of dancing,
singing, speaking, etc., an attempt may count as an actualization of the action just
as much as an excellent execution does. In these cases, if we want to stress the
felicity, we add a specification of quality: dancing well, singing beautifully, speaking
perfectly, etc.
What is important for the following conceptual development is an understanding
of the difference between the felicity and the infelicity of an action as the beginning
and systematic basis of anytheoretical and practicalefforts to improve our ability
to act. This reference to the felicity structures of an action describes theory differently and more generally than the instrumentalist view of theory. Moreover, by
doing so, realistic or ontological confusions can be recognized as simple problems
of sequence in the theory architecture. As agents, we humans are as close to reality
as possible: We belong to it, we ourselves are causes, and we are a world shaping
itself. If we accentuate the differences between felicities and infelicities and grasp
them in an increasingly sophisticated way with regard to their contours and conditions, we delve ever deeper into the world. But in the process, reality becomes more
and more objectifiedit becomes more and more human reality. At some point,
metaphysical speculation tries to think back to the world in itself, but it cannot get
rid of the subjectivity which is meanwhile achieved as a counterpart of reality.
For each individual action, whether it is felicitous or not depends upon countless
internal and external conditions of which we do not have any control. At a certain
point, something in the situation might be different from all the other times, something
might be missing, there might be a disturbing element, or there might be a lack of
inner concentration, calm, or motivation. Because of these uncertainties surrounding
the felicity of an action, there are praxes for all important aspects of coping with
life. A praxis is a system or field of actions that are related to each other. The actions
presuppose, enable, support, and correct each other; they replace each other under
varying circumstances; and they produce, keep together, and secure the appropriate
fabric or network of a situations circumstances. The actions in a praxis are standardized; the peculiarities of individual actions are less important, they are merely
actualizations of schemes,40 and the schemes are constructed and fitted together in a
way that overall they generate the accomplishments of a praxis. A praxis is thus
much more stable in terms of correctness or felicity than a single action. Praxes
areusually successful. They are purposeful, valuable, and meaningful (in the sense
explained above). This is why they are created, handed down, and continue to be
For the difference between action and action scheme, cf. Kamlah and Lorenzen (1984),
Chapter III. 6: Sign and Meaning; Activity Schemata; also cf. Kamlah (1973), 66 ff.
40

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1Knowledge

developed. Still, goals are not always achieved. Even in a praxis, not every attempted
action is successful. But a fully developed praxis also has to include routines for the
detection and elimination of disturbances. Hence, success will eventually follow.
Let us consider some examples. Wherever something is mastered, there are
praxes: in cooking, washing, cleaning, and personal hygiene; maintaining and
repairing devices, vehicles, or facilities; constructing and demolishing buildings
and bridges; dissolving traffic jams; or building and disarming bombs. I think these
examples are sufficient to claim: If people are able to do something, they have found
a way out of the uncertainties surrounding the felicity of individual actions by
developing a praxis. That is the case both for the very simple tasks of our everyday
life as well as for even the most specialized activities in pursuit of highly differentiated purposes, which can be exercised by only very few people.
These examples are rather technical, so it should be noted that there are praxes
not only in technology but also in the social domainfor example, in managing a
business, in finding and enforcing a decision, in legislation, working in legal professions, and working in public administrationbeing responsible for a swimming
pool, a registration office, a school, a university, etc. There are people everywhere
who (hopefully) do not only do something but also know how to do it. The praxis is
structured around conditions of felicity and infelicity. The felicity structures make
up the core of a praxis. And these felicity structures are captured and represented
symbolically in theory. They are what makes a theory (construed pragmatically)
more than a mere assortment of words and sentences that are forever hypothetical
and fallible. The notionso popular today in philosophy, but also in postmodern
culture sections of newspapersthat theory is simply fallible, that it could turn out
to be false at any time, is the result of certain developments in the philosophy of
science. Despite its astute modesty, it exhibits a massive pragmatic blindness. I will
try to explain this briefly.
In the early 20th century, members of the Vienna Circle developed a notion of
science that took all serious knowledge to be made up of empirical data and logical
conclusions. But since the general, lawlike propositions of natural s cience cannot be
represented that way, Rudolf Carnap tried to develop an inductive logic41 that was
supposed to precisely account for the path from data to laws. The project was not very
successful and more or less failed when Karl Popper outlined an entirely different
picture of scientific research in his The Logic of Scientific Discovery.42 The order
was to no longer ascend inductively from data to general propositions, but from
hypothetically presumed general propositions to data that could be produced in
tests, which meant, however, that the hypotheses could never be verified, but at best
disproved. As a basic idea, this view is correct, but it has, unfortunately, led to a
narrow-minded school of thought in philosophy and the p hilosophy of science
which frowns upon justification.
However, whether justification or falsification is the path of knowledge (of course
both are necessaryI will address this in Chap. 4) is a pointless dispute as long as
41
42

Carnap (1971).
Popper (1968).

1.2Action: Praxis

15

the practical relevance of the findings or assumptions are not taken into account.
That is what I mean by pragmatic blindness. Not only do we ordinary people
act but, of course, scientists do so, too; they measure and experiment, change and
vary situations, etc., but in the initial phase of the philosophy of science at the
beginning of the 20th century, only one theorist considered this to be important,
namely Hugo Dingler.43 Dinglers approaches have been revived not until the
second half of the 20th century, in so-called methodological constructivism.44
Since then, and in particular with new experimentalism, the relationship between
knowledge andaction has become a relevant topic. Nevertheless, the diagnosis of
pragmatic blindness for the theory-fixated mainstream in epistemology and the
philosophy of science still largely apply. Without paying any attention to a practical
orientation and to the realization of knowledge, with fallibilist thought alone, we
are not capable of grasping the enormous technical and social accomplishments45
that make up our culture.
For the stabilization of the felicity structures of praxes, however, something else
is important as well: Praxes are interactive, they socialize people, and they overcome peoples initially palpable separation in an individual action. This is the r eason
for their culture-forming power. The subject of a praxis, if it is at all possible to talk
about it, is not a single person, but the group; a group, moreover, that usually exists
not only in the present, but as a unit within the time needed to develop the praxis and
to hand it down. As a result, it is important to note that in a praxis, not merely the
crude achievement of ends but also the aspects of the value and meaning of an
action unfold and become stabilized. People form their identity around a praxis that
they have learned, that they know how to do, and in the felicitous execution of
which they experience their own value in the context of society and in the creation
of the concrete world. Guilds of craftsmen, professional organizations, and associations of all kinds represent and stabilize this cultural side of actions that have been
developed into praxes, which go beyond the mere achievement of ends.
Because the felicity of an action that is stabilized in a praxis has further
dimensions which secure, apart from the achievement of goals, self-realization
andthe cultivation of trust, praxes are usually structured not merely by technical,
but also by moral or rather ethical and legal norms. This fact is the justification
Originally a mathematician, Hugo Dingler was a professor of philosophy in Munich and
Darmstadt after World War I. He recognized that the basic problems of the exact sciences arose
from the ambiguity of their operational-normative foundations and published, among others,
important papers on the concept and history of the experiment (cf. Dingler (1928)) and on the
justification of physics (cf. Dingler (1938)). Due to certain voluntaristic and idealistic elements in
his works, he was largely ignored after World War II when analytical philosophy began to receive
attention. This was exacerbated by the fact that he had compromised himself under the Nazi
regimealthough others did, too, as is well known, without suffering the exclusion of their
achievements.
44
cf. Holzkamp (1968), Janich (1985), Kamlah (1973), Lorenz (1970), Lorenzen (1968), Mittelstra
(1970), Tetens (1987).
45
Not even to mention the formal accomplishments. When it comes to formal theories, the
fallibility theories sound differently anyway.
43

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1Knowledge

formy talk, here and henceforth, of normative orientation, normative theory,

and particularly of normative research. The construction of an ancient polis is
moral, political, economic research; the modern revolutions were research on political governance, etc.
The topic of action and its practical stabilization is obviously a broad field. For
now, I will not continue to inspect it, but conclude by saying once again that what
we need for a theory of argumentation is a little action theory: In the practice of
argumentation, if it is not merely talk in which opinions are shared and exchanged,
we need solid theoretical elements. We need theory of which we understand that it
has more lasting value than any view or opinion that the interlocutor has just
acquired. The certainty and sustainability of a theory arises, however, beyond all
formal qualities from its link to felicitous action. Theory that aims at representing
the felicity structures of praxes has a different potency. It is significantly stronger
and more binding than a randomly accepted opinion. Therefore, what needs to be
developed is a pragmatic concept of theory.

1.3 Theory: The Pragmatic Concept of Theory

Even in simple actions, we more or less understand what we do. We have concepts
that verbalize the important differences and propositions that indicate how s omething
is done and possibly even why it needs to be done that way. In a single action, such
as the widely discussed example of opening a window,46 it is of little importance
whether someone knows how to turn the handle (in the best way possible) and
even why this will work or rather which mechanical laws formulate the relationship
between the pressure that has to be applied and the friction that has to be overcome.
We can simply try it out, and if someone cannot find out how to open the window,
maybe because of a new type of locking device, somebody else has to show him.
This is not the case in a praxis in which, as I said, conduct is standardized and
coordinated. If a single action is executed unprofessionally here, it does not necessarily lead to failure at once; indeed, increased efforts may balance out the lack
of skills elsewhere. Nevertheless, in the case of a praxisdue to the coordination
of actions to a systemtrial actions soon reach their limits. Usually, a proper
introduction is necessary. Such an introduction consists of instructions about how
to act and explanations that answer the newcomers questions about the why and
wherefore of an action and may therefore lead to an understanding. This is the
place where the need for theory arises: the search for orientation and understanding regarding a praxis. On the one hand, this applies to the novice, who is
introduced to a praxis by participation and instruction. But on the other hand, it
also affects the expert if heencounters persistent problemse.g. in connection
with serious changes to the assumed normal conditions of an actionthat cannot
be resolved. In this case, the need to optimize a praxis necessitates the ascent to
46

Cf. von Wright (1971).

1.3Theory: The Pragmatic Concept of Theory

17

theory or rather new research for the revision and improvement of existing theory.
Hence, there are two approaches to theory: research and teaching.
In both cases, what theory is and what it is supposed to achieve becomes clear
through a reflection of praxis that seeks understanding (of the why and wherefore of
the actions). Theory formed for this purpose has the task of supporting the praxis
or of providing practical orientation.
The interplay between theory and practice that is characteristic for a pragmatic
concept of theory is actually a simple story, but one that is seldom told today. What
is told in its place is the story of an instrumentalism that elucidates these matters
only insufficiently and in a one-sided manner. Consequently, disputes over the
right kind of pragmatism arise. However, such highly abstract debates and emphases rather seem to blur the basic contours of the relationship between theory and
practice. Hence, what I am trying to do here is to present, with as many details and
illustrative examples as possible, the ways in which theory is supported by practice.
I will need this for a concept of theory that satisfies the requirements of argumentation theory. I will start with teaching and will address research in the next chapter.
Teaching provides access to knowledge by offering access to praxes in which
knowledge shows its guiding function. This takes place in a so-called teachinglearning situation: There is someone who understands and knows how to do something (a teacher), and there is someone who does not know and understand butwants
to (a student). To illustrate these conditions, I refer to a praxis that is somewhat
archaic and quite familiar (due to DIY experiences): the practice of woodworking in
carpentry and joinery.
Let us say a carpenter shows an apprentice the first steps of woodworking.
Heteaches him how to use an ax, a hatchet, and a saw for shaping; then, he shows
him how to work with a smoothing plane, a file, and with abrasives for surface processing; finally, he demonstrates techniques of joining woods with pins, grooves,
screws, and nails. The actual teaching and learning looks like this: The teacher gives
instructions and possibly even demonstrates what to do. The student responds with
imitations and trial actions which the teacher either endorses or corrects. All of this
is interspersed with explanations, i.e. with theory.
In each individual action, the student needs to pay attention to what matters. That
means he needs to see through each respective action in order to arrive at its
scheme.47 The more he succeeds at this, the more he can abstract from random
variations of a given execution. After all, every situation of working with smoothing
planes, for example, is a little different. On the other hand, there are differences in
executions that seem tiny from an objective point of view, but may turn the execution into an unsuccessful deviation. The master handles objects differently than the
apprentice. He holds the plane and the file differently; he moves tools in a different
way. If the apprentices plane gets stuck or if his hammer swings off, then the
apprentice must grasp the difference between a possible variation of the execution
and an erroneous deviation from the action scheme. And he needs to do so in his
own actions.
47

For the distinction between action and action scheme, cf. Footnote 40 above.

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1Knowledge

As I said, such activities are supported by verbal explanations. Partly to illustrate

and justify his instructions and corrections, partly as a response to his students
questions, the teacher displays his knowledge about the praxis. In the ideal case of
teaching, the student already has firsthand experiences with certain differences in
modeling an action. Sometimes, he vaguely perceives his deviations and assumes
that his failures are connected to them. But the relevant circumstances are not yet
clear to him. Subsequently, the teachers instructions enable him to understand the
internal connection between his actualizations and the resulting success or failure.
If this suddenly happens, accompanied by Bhlers Aha! effect,48 then s atisfaction,
joy, and self-confidence arise, all of which make understanding very attractive. If all
goes well, the student simultaneously acquires a know-how and an understanding.
He learns theory as a reflection on practice.
This simple example illustrates the sense in which theory supports practice:
Concepts and propositions do not simply represent what has so far only been
experienced in concrete situations, but they articulate it in symbolic generality.
Conceptssuch as designations for types of timber, degrees of hardness, etc.
articulate differences that are important for various practical purposes in the future.
General propositions, for example, about the relationship between certain actions
and functional changes in the object, are by no means merely hypothetical. They
rather structure what an agent expects and pays attention to. Through these general
propositions, the agent is able to theoretically understand what he is capable of
doing practically.
If a field of praxis is surrounded and permeated by theory, however, we are far
from knowing what is the case there in itself or how objective reality is
constituted. We can operate within it and not only by trial and error. We can act,
i.e. we can operate with an awareness of what we do and with the fundamental confidence that the action will be felicitous. In a praxis, felicity is no longer a gift of the
world or a fortunate exception; it is the rule. The confidence that it will remain the
rule stems from the fact that, in the theory, we have captured the felicity structures
to a considerable degree. I will say, in a theorized area of practice, we are oriented.
Theory is not a representation of reality, but orientation within it. No ontological
presuppositions whatsoever are needed for this pragmatic concept of theory.49
The concept of orientation is (despite its occasional use in American pragmatism)
the great desideratum, in epistemology and the philosophy of science as well as in
the contemporary interdisciplinary theory of argumentation. Orientation in this
context refers to a linguistic or theoretical unit (concept, proposition, system of
propositions) with respect to its original function. This function consists in making
the relevant conditions for an action identifiable, distinct, and comprehensible.
Cf. Bhler (1930), 20: There was often this suddenness of the solution to the problem. The
subjects did not know how to describe it better than to say that the solution came to them with an
inner Aha! and I have therefore called that jolt the Aha! effect (Translation T.P.).
49
The requirement that reality exists at all, which Putnam, for example, deems necessary despite
all his criticism of ontology (cf. the discussion of ontological problem cases in: Gross (2004)),
also is superfluous. Besides, no one even knows what this requirement actually means.
48

1.3Theory: The Pragmatic Concept of Theory

19

Thus, it facilitates an action in the full sense, in particular a free action.50 If

orientations in an area of praxis form a stable and relatively closed system, I would
like to call this knowledge. This suggestion is still only a sketch of the concept of
knowledge that I will propose here. A detailed explanation of this closure will be
given below (in Sect.1.6).
First of all, we can broadly distinguish between two types of knowledge, which
I would like to call HOW-knowledge and WHY-knowledge. HOW-knowledge
represents what needs to be done for actions to succeed. WHY-knowledge explains
how this is possible. These names follow the ancient distinction between techne
andepisteme. Today, it can be conveyed by the terms know-how and science. In
contrast to the ancient world,51 today we are no longer aware of the fact that knowledge about the HOW but also about the WHY refers to praxes. Knowledge as
science seems to come into being autonomously; and it is only related to praxes
when it comes to its applications.52
This is due to the fact that the sciences are regarded as ideals. In this model, the
motivation for seeking knowledge is not the interaction with nature, but its detached
contemplation. The primary area of science is not technologysuch as mechanics
or, nowadays, genetic manipulationbut the (supposedly) pure desire to understand phenomena. In the past, these were processes in the sky, stellar motions or
weather phenomena such as lightning and rainbows. Phenomena of this kind attract
the curiositas: peoples curiosity.53 Nevertheless, mere curiosity is an insufficient
motivation for acquiring knowledge over the millennia. Today, as scientific research
has become major research and costs enormous amounts of money, this picture of
pure curiosity and contemplation is entirely misleading.
If we understand the processes surrounding the search for knowledge this way, a
cycle emerges in which theoretical and practical steps alternate and complement
each other. In the process, something practical may move forward a few steps without any theoretical support or something theoretical may proceed without a link to

The significance of the concept of orientation has been well understood in philosophy, but it is
not yet central. Orientation is clearly an important issue for Kant; cf. Kant (1786) and Mittelstra
(1982) for a modern treatment of Kant. Apparently, interest in the topic of orientation has
recently increased again in Germany; cf. Stegmaier (2005).
51
The fact that practical and theoretical knowledge belong together is still clearly visible in Platos
philosophy. The separation between the two types of knowledge began with Aristotle.
52
To avoid possible misunderstandings, the distinction to which I am pointing here has been known
since the ancient Greeks and refers to two kinds of knowledge (routine knowledge and scientific
knowledge). In contemporary epistemology and the philosophy of science, however, the distinction
between know-how and know that is widespread. It was introduced by Gilbert Ryle; cf. Ryle
(1949), Chapter 2. However, he did not distinguish between two types of theory or knowledge.
Ryle rather distinguished between practical and theoretical knowledge. We can, for instance, say,
he knows how to make a reef knoteven though this could just be a competence to act or behave.
Ryle has quite correctly pointed out (and in this, hardly anyone has followed him) that felicitous
praxis systematically precedes its theory (l.c. 33). In the theory itself, however, he no longer distinguished knowing about the existence of facts from knowing how to explain them.
53
Blumenberg (1973).
50

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1Knowledge

practice. But on the whole, the two always belong together. Just as there is no
practice devoid of theory, there is no theory completely detached from practice.
Obviously, in this view, theory is always presumed to exist already. For access to
a praxis or rather to its accurate or improved mastery, a teaching-learning situation
has to be assumed, in which a knowledgeable teacher is in possession of the theory.
This is a deliberate conception. Where there are praxes, there are also teaching and
learning. If the theoretical permeation is low, the praxis is not yet stable. It still
requires considerable attention and is susceptible to aberrations or variations if the
situation varies. It is particularly sensitive to the agents changes in mood and
motivation. With increasing theoretical permeation of the praxis or rather of the
subject area, its support becomes better and the theory becomes more general. It is
then possible to answer why questions with general propositions that connect this
particular praxis with others (e.g. woodworking practices with the experimental
methods used in physics and chemistry). This gives the theoretical-practical cycle
a historical dimension. In the early stages of a discipline, the theory is concrete,
i.e. close to the types of action supported by it. In the later and more advanced
stages, the theory becomes increasingly more rich and abstract. This is another
reason why the practical relevance of theory (at least in academia, the situation is
different for technical colleges) is so much more mysterious for us than, say, for the
people of the Renaissance.54
Nevertheless, so far, I have merely conceptualized the question of the genesis
and validity of a theory, as long as it is a reflection of praxis, with regard to their
fundamental relationship and access in the teaching-learning situation. In order to
understand this better, this relationship needs to be considered in its dynamics,
i.e. as a true extension of practice and an improvement of theoryin the relation
between old and new practices as well as between old and new theory. This will be
addressed in the next chapter under the heading research.
I now come to an aspect of the pragmatic concept of theory that will be particularly helpful in understanding how theories change. I call this aspect the
constitution of the subject-object relationship. This name obviously reminds us of
traditional philosophical problems. Is it really necessary for a theory of argumentation to reflect on how we enter an object relationship to something that we, in
turn, face as a subject? Can this be more than needless philosophical speculation?
Yes, I believe so. I even think that such a consideration is absolutely essential for a
reflected concept of research and theory change and thus for a concept of argumentation. I will try to represent these relations in a way that should be comprehensible
not only to philosophers but to regularly educated readers, too.
We can approach this topic by realizing that theory allows us to gain a distance
to the circumstances of a praxiswhich I call theoretical distance. In a praxis that
is barely permeated theoretically, this distance is rather slim. We are still involved in
the praxis, i.e. in the execution of our actions, we have difficulties keeping on track.
Our actions contain mistakes, misinterpretations, and subtle responses to changes
that are due to idiosyncrasies, even to mood swings. Why do you hammer like
54

Cf. Olschki (1927) and Mittelstra (1970).

1.3Theory: The Pragmatic Concept of Theory

21

that? the student is asked about his deviations from prescribed practical standards.
In this case, we could almost say that this is not so much a person using a hammer,
but that he is hammeringin fact, an amateurish one. So in this situation, viewed
from the outside, a person, a hammer, a base, and a nail are controlled in a certain
way and undergo changes. The student, we would say, does not yet understand
what really matters. This is the typical condition of introductory phases. The relevant differences have not yet been learned in a stable manner. They have no practical reality. Objects that play a practical role are determined in a c orrespondingly
vague, open, and ambiguous fashion. Of course, this is different for the teacher. But
let us, for the moment, stay with the learners perspective: Only with increasing
practice will objects and their relationships stand out. Progressively, a morass of
practical optionsovershadowed by designations for differences and propositions
for relationships, i.e. the statements of the teacherwill change into an area with
well-distinguished objects that may be altered purposefully in actions.
The most interesting and far-reaching point, however, is that with the progress of
theoretical permeation, objects do not only emerge clearly but may even become
other objects. Where the layman sees trees, the expert sees a mixed forest afforested
20years ago. Let us take another example: the maze of metal, plastic, and rubber
parts under the hood of a car. In order to identify any twisted black cable as the
ignition cable in this labyrinthwhich disappears at one point, only to be seen
again at some other pointI need quite a bit of the theory usually acquired in the
practice of a car workshop.
Again, to counteract the one-sided impression that this merely applies to the
peculiarities of technical activities, I will briefly take a look at culture-forming practices, too. In many respects, actions such as the management of a community or the
command of a ship form praxes as much as the construction of houses or ships does.
Especially in the theoretical permeation of the praxis, the same developments can be
observed. Of course, cultural praxes are not structured by natural but by social regularities. But these are not arbitrary, either. Rules, conventions, and laws need to be
in harmony with peoples options for acting and understanding. The rules of a club
might be legally correct, but its members do not understand them. In this case, they
cannot standardize the clubs activities in a clear and transparent way. A legal
system that is stupid, impractical, and cruel always runs the risk of being violated.
Even if there is more room for agreements in the social and cultural than in the
technical realms, standardized and coordinated actions, whose relationship towards
each other and to the outcome is expressed by theory, manifest themselves in the
cultural sphere as well. In that case, the theory in question is normative theory. As
with technical practices, there are better and poorer executions. There are beginners
who have not yet understood the respective issues. There are theoretically supported
perceptions and expectations about what happens in the area and what could possibly
happen within it. There is also the same manifestation of an object relationship,
i.e. the appearance of clearly defined objects in a field of possibilities. For the captain
of a ship in the Renaissance, for example, there are degrees of resistance in his crew
that range from reluctance and disobedience all the way to mutiny. The captain
needs to have graduated response patterns for these kinds of behavior.

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1Knowledge

Theory in its function of supporting praxes generates the clear structures of a

praxis and concreteness of the relevant circumstances. Hence, it creates the object
in the subject-object relationship. The side of the subject, however, is more
important, since it has received much less attention. It is usually called training
and education.55 It is a fact that theory shapes and produces people who act and
theorizealthough maybe behind their backs, so to speak. Not only the object but
also the subject is constituted in theory, if it supports the praxis. This fact is notoriously neglected in the philosophy of science and culture. Hence, it is hardly possible
to sufficiently understand it at the moment. For a realistic argumentation theory,
however, this fact is of crucial importance. I have therefore tried to illuminate the
issue to a certain degree. I will first present a sketch and later (in the chapters about
subjectivity and reflexivity) go into more detail.
Subject constitution is related to the fact that a praxis structures a whole arsenal
of opportunities to act. They could also have been structured differently. There are
other possibilities. A given structure works because ofapart from objective
conditionspeoples aims and ends. These precede the praxis. Of course, they are
not fully developed and shaped in a distinct way, but are merely rough, approximate
motivations through inclinations, needs, and compulsions that we try to satisfy.
Precise, concrete manifestations of ends and aims emerge only in the reality of
acting and theory making.
This is why I distinguished between an inside and an outside of the concept of
action. Insofar as we form and fashion ourselves in what we want, do, and accomplish, the practices are of course also two sidedand so, ultimately, are the theories.
On the outside, they represent objects of practical reality, their relationships, and
changes. At the same time and largely unnoticed, they represent us. Yet, this relationship between a practically relevant objectivity on the one hand and subjectivity
on the other cannot, so to speak, be observed on a stage. On the stage, we see the
processes of objective organization. These can be observed from the spectators
seats, where, for the moment, all lights are off. Even if they are turned on (in reflections), the spectators do not simply see themselves, but each other. Only from the
we of these communicationsmore or less pronouncedindividuals develop,
who elaborate these we-relationships into an ego-consciousness, each in their own
personal way.
Then this subject side becomes visible as a demonstrable difference. You live with
other theories than I do. And that is the case even though we live in one and the same
world and are connected in various ways. This shows that you are a different person.
The German word for education (Bildung) does not denote the subject-shaping function
of theory in a neutral way. It rather connects it with a value judgment which, however, is ambi
valent. Traditionally, educated middle-class intellectuals of the 19th and early 20th century
(Bildungsbrgertum) were guided by certain theories, in particular by the history and literature
of the ancient world. These theories were not only supposed to shape people in a certain way but
also to complete and improve them. Since many educated people in Germany sided with the
nationalist ambitions that led to the world wars, however, the term lost its positive connotation.
Today, it is becoming more important againthe point is to articulate the opposition to a smooth,
instrumental concept of training that is aimed at pure economic applicability.
55

1.4The Substance That Theories Are Made of

23

1.4 The Substance That Theories Are Made of

Theory is linguistic. It consists of linguistic signs of words and sentences. In its
primary function, language is communication. In the function of theory, language is
used to acquire, determine, and test orientations that, beginning from practical references, make the world comprehensible.
For a theory, it is always essential that its validity claim can be satisfied. We must
be able to test whether its propositions are correct, true, or useful assumptions.
Propositions about states of affairs are particularly relevant, but so are propositions
that express connections or relations between states of affairs. In all propositions,
there are concepts whose meaning must be stable and accurate according to the
respective purposes and circumstances. Furthermore, a theory may include procedural rules for the production of states of affairs (conditions, effects). I will discuss
this linguistic inventory of theories. I will not provide a detailed discussion of
current issues in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of science, but
rather will clarify some basic notions about concepts, propositions, and rules as far
as they are useful for the practice of argumentation.

1.4.1 Concepts
If the validity of a proposition is assessed, we will sooner or later wonder about the
meaning of its words. A word has to have a specific meaning; it must be possible to
determine and establish this meaningotherwise, to test the proposition would be
a futile exercise. In our everyday practice of argumentation, we employ colloquial
words whose meaning is known to be vague. This, however, is a misguided judgment. After all, it is one of the typical accomplishments of ordinary language that
the meanings of its words are context sensitive.56 Generally, people who communicate know very well what words like wood, metal, star, compass etc. mean
and do not mind that the objects in the night sky denoted by the term star are not
the same as the stars in a Christmas shop.
If ambiguities of meaning or equivocations confuse our understanding, however,
it is advisable to know how to fix the use of words or, rather, how to define them.
When they have a fixed or fixable meaning, words are called concepts. This is a
difference between words and concepts that is not merely verbal but conceptual: The two words word and concept have different meanings.
To define a concept means to craft from its possible uses a piece of linguistic
practice that is isolated as distinctly as possible, understandable, and learnable by
others. This will hardly be possible in ordinary language because we all speak it.
The complaint about the vagueness of ordinary language is notorious, even among linguists
and philosophers of language, who should know better. If someone were trying in vain to hammer
down on a steel nail with a rubber hammer, though, we would not blame the hammer, but the
handyman.
56

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24

But we do not all have the same communicative needs. Thus, we will not readily go
along with just any use restrictions. In this respect, dictionaries that specify the
meanings of words are only rough inventories of the most common possible uses.
As soon as we turn to praxes and to subject areas corresponding to relevant
praxes, however, the situation changes. It is clear that where something is mastered
there are also concepts, i.e. words, whose meaning is fixed. This is the case in the
trades, in the organization of businesses, in public administration, and particularly in
the sciences. A praxis is learned together with the relevant language (or rather the
specific concepts), and divergent language use then no longer indicates a special
liveliness or creativity. Rather, deviations indicate that the person who speaks in
such a way is a layperson or beginner. Even in everyday life, the situation is not
hopelessly arbitrary. If a confusion in communication is obviously caused by a word,
one canfor the momentsimply fix a meaning. Is this apple ripe? No? So is it
unripe?57 If we encounter such a sharp alternative between the ripeness and unripeness of table fruit, our conversation partner can easily fix the problem by pointing
out that there are intermediate steps and that this apple, for example, is quite ripe.
Generally speaking, the intrinsic potential of language includes the possibility of
sharpening and stabilizing concepts. This possibility is, of course, used when it is
important to us. Hence, an understanding becomes possible (with each other, but
also in monological thought) that does not constantly need to take the intricacies of
the situation and its participants into consideration. These ways of sharpening and
stabilizing concepts are usually called definitions.
A definition has the form:

definiendum = definiens

The definiendum is the word that is to be defined. The definiens contains those
linguistic (or even nonlinguistic, as in beginnings and operational definitions) expressions or combinations of expressions that are supposed to specify the meaning. The
whole point is that, at each occurrence of the definiendum, we can go back to the
definiens. Of course, it must be presumed that the definiens has already been defined
or no longer needs a further definition. A definition, therefore, is a rule for a transition;
the possibility of transition established by the definition is an element of stabilization
and standardization. Such elements turn colloquial communication, which is only controlled within a given situation, into a regulated and learnable linguistic practice that is
useful for the purposes of theory building and the practice of argumentation. Words for
which definitions are established have a different status than the wild, free words of
ordinary language, which is ever changing and quickly adapting to new situations.
Some references to episodes from my field of examples (i.e. the western passage
to India, the fire element phlogiston, the trial of the French king, and current genetic
research) will illustrate the function of clear and defined concepts in theories that
can be used within argumentation. The reflections of the voyager Coln on his way to
India made use of terms for geographical units such as leagues, miles, latitude, etc.,
57

Such examples are discussed in Bayer (1999), 148.

1.4The Substance That Theories Are Made of

25

whose meaning had to be determined. What can happen if, for example, the
meaning of the term mile varies, will be discussed in Chap. 2, at the occasion of
the mensuration of the longitude. Concepts for different types of ships, rigs, and
components for determining the position at sea, etc., played a major role. The transparency of all arguments that, for example, played a role in the Committee of
Talavera depended, among other things, on the definitions of such concepts.
In the convent debates on the trial of Louis XVI during the French Revolution,
complex concepts such as the general will (a concept taken from Rousseaus philosophy), the incompatibility of king and citizen in one and the same person, the
inviolability of the king, etc., were significant. The deep disagreement about how to
deal with the monarch can be seen in the theoretical uncertainty and ambiguity of
these terms. This will be discussed in greater detail in Sect. 5.8.
The chemical experimenters of the 18th century explored substances through
processes of combining, separating, cooling, and heating. For the description and
explanation of what was done and of what happened, there were terms suchas air,
water, fire, element, principle, and, particularly relevant for my field of examples,
phlogiston. The phlogiston could be dissolved in air, which then resulted in
phlogisticated air. Alternatively, all phlogiston could be withdrawn from the air,
which was then dephlogisticated air. It is quite clear that the orientation value of
theories and the opportunity to discuss them depended on the precise determination
and grasp of such concepts.
Another example is our current debate on genetic research, particularly with
embryonic stem cells: In this case, all arguments depend on whether concepts such
as stem cells, totipotent cells, etc. are defined. The confusion that arises when a
central term such as embryo or early embryo is not clearly defined can be seen
in the dialogue What is the human being? that I analyze in Chap. 8.
Although these examples should suffice to elucidate my diagnosis about the role
of concepts within arguments, for a further justification I would like to address three
fairly widespread views that seem to conflict with this theory of concepts.
The first and most important one goes back to Wittgenstein or rather to the reception of some passages of the Philosophical Investigations. Concerning the meaning
of the word game, Wittgenstein describes the failure of his attempts to specify in
a definition what is common to all games. He realizes that for every new kind of
game that he considersball games, which can be played in teams but also alone,
usually according to rules but possibly even without them, as is the case with children who throw a ball, etc.; board games, which seem to be success driven, but to
this feature there are exceptions as well, etc.there are always new important
qualities that cannot be reconciled with the complex of properties considered so far.
In order to describe these relationships, Wittgenstein invents the term family
resemblance. According to Wittgenstein, the various possible uses of the word
game are related to each other like the members of a family. In families, there are
generally some similarities between some of its members that, however, do not exist
between others, while for those others yet other similarities appear.58
58

Cf. Wittgenstein (2009), Philosophical Investigations, 6580.

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This is Wittgensteins claim in his Philosophical Investigations. Meanwhile, in

the reception of his work, especially in the postmodern and relativistic reception, a
careless rejection of any clearly defined speech has emergedunder the guise of
theauthority of this accurate philosopher of language. In some circles, it is now
customary to refrain from the task of defining concepts by claiming that they do not
feature common properties and can only be regarded as a family. This is an often
inappropriate and unnecessary expansion of the insights of the Philosophical
Investigations.
Wittgenstein argued against the idea that a definition has to refer to a word of
anexisting languagewhich also has to be aliveand that the definiens has to
articulate the properties all objects designated by the definiendum have in common.
If we ask what a word means because we want to test a propositions validity, however, the situation is quite different. There is no clear wordobject relationship
whatsoever from which it could be stipulated that the definition has to contain all
commonalities. We have only a preconception of the matter, which we have
acquired in a language that moves independently. By asking for a definition, we
deliberately bring this independence or wildness of the movement of language to a
halt in order to limit and control the possible uses.
The second apparently incompatible view is the assumption that definitions
could be traced back to relations in which the intended difference can be perceived
with the sensespreferably, of course, with the eyes. This view can be found in,
e.g. the so-called ostensive definitions (Strawson, Quine) and their modification, the
exemplary introduction (Kamlah/Lorenzen). Here, the underlying idea is that we
gain first predicates with a stable meaning by showing the intended distinction in
terms of perceptible properties. Thus, simple color predicates like red or green
are defined by references to tomatoes and fresh blood or to early summer grass or a
hunters suit. This is what defining ostensively is supposed to mean. Against the
idea that this is a first time determination of the meaning of a word, however, it
needs to be said (and this time with Wittgenstein) that such a process already
presupposes the whole mechanism of language, especially an awareness that color
differences may be relevant and that, obviously, here they are.
In exemplary introduction, there are at least not only examples of the predicate
to be introduced, say, bassoon, or gone away, etc. There are also counterexamples that are no bassoon, or not gone away.59 Nevertheless, even here, it is
not obvious that the relevant distinctions denoted by the predicate terms cannot be
introduced from the distanced, or contemplative, attitude of the observer, but that
they refer to recognizable differences, which are demonstrable in a praxis and
then stabilized by the linguistic symbol. Generally speaking, definitions of concepts that are supposed to lead to a viable theory capable of providing orientation
have to begin with the elementary and irrefutable experiences of the felicity and
infelicity of actions in praxes. I refer once again to the practice of wood processing. This lumber, for example, has a grain which dictates the direction of its
processing. That fact that it has differences such as degrees of hardness, surface
59

Kamlah and Lorenzen (1984), I. 2 and III. 3.

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27

structures, colors, etc., can be captured in concepts, and these concepts in turn
contribute directly to the orientation value of a theory.
The third view that needs to be refuted states that what really matters, at least in
serious science, is not the meaning of concepts, but only the truth of propositions.
This view was held, for example, by Popper. It is still defended by his supporters
today.60 But it does not have any significance beyond a very special conception of
empirical science as represented by these theorists. Everyone who thinks just a little
more generallyalso about scienceencounters problems for which the meaning
of the concepts has to be fixed.61 This is reason enough to refute the view that
definitions are generally not necessary. The other half of the view, that they are not
possible because we always need already defined concepts, had already been
discussed by the Greek sophists (talk would never come to an end). Nevertheless,
this assumption is based on carelessness. For one thing, what we need for first
definitions are not so much words as differences that can be experienced practically
and which we can point out. On the other hand, every rule of word usage, which
brings one word into definitional dependency with another, introduces a stable
element into the language. To put it differently: Linguistic stability does not always
have to be presupposed; it can also be generated step by step.
Common sense usually completely ignores the fact that the truth of sentences
does not only depend on the circumstances in the world but also on the circumstances in language, especially on the meanings of words. A road sign such as
slippery when wet is based on the increased slipperiness of the surface of a wet
road in relation to a dry one. In the case of a very light drizzle, the road is for a while
covered with droplets only, not with a continuous water film. If only the second state
corresponds to my notion of wetness, the road in the first state is not yet really
wet, and I might ignore the sign. This can be dangerous because the road is much
more slippery in the first than in the second state.
Definitions can determine matters of life and death even more directly. Since the
word dead as a medical term is defined by irreversible malfunctions of the brain,
a person can be dead in a certain state in which he would not have been dead before
the establishment of this definition. And if this definition were to be developed further, at some point whole brain death could be replaced by partial brain death. Then
people would be dead even sooner. (I will speak again about these issues in Chap. 8.)
A variant of the view that if definitions pose such serious theoretical problems it
would be better to do without them is the doctrine of implicit definitions. This
notion was introduced by David Hilbert in connection with his formalization of
Cf. Popper and Eccles (1977), viii: Words should be used well and carefully [] but their
meaning should never, we think, become a topic of discussion or be permitted to dominate the
discussion, as happens so often in contemporary philosophical writing. And although it is sometimes useful to indicate in which of its various senses we use a word, it is not possible to do so by
defining it, since every definition must make essential use of undefined words. [] [T]o put it in a
nutshell, what we are interested in is not the meaning of terms but the truth of theories; and this
truth is largely independent of the terminology used.
61
Cf., for example, the simple objection that Ulrich Charpa brings forth against this doctrine:
Charpa (1996), 78 ff.
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geometry. According to Hilbert, the sentences of a theory (in this case the axioms of
geometry) are merely forms of sentences that signify relations between blank spaces
designated by the terms point, line, plane, etc. The theory applies to each
system of objects which would make the system of propositions true. The intention
to work without definitions is, however, illusory. After all, in order to insert any sets
of objects (Hilbert considered beer mugs) into the blank spaces of the theory, an
understanding of the original theory (here: geometry) and its meanings has to be
presupposed.62

1.4.2 Propositions
Propositions that are relevant for the orientation function of a theory may concern
facts. Examples: Whales are mammals. Coln made four trips to the New World. He
believed that the east coast of Asia was 4,500km away from the west coast of Spain.
The revolutionary activities in France after 1789 alarmed the royal houses of Europe.
Hippos are stronger than elephants.
In such propositions, what matters for testing their validity is, as I said before,
the way in which the words that occur are defined. What exactly is a whale, what
is a mammal? What does it mean to alarm someone? What does it mean to
believe in an unknown distance? What is a comparison of strength in the case of
large animals from different species? Depending on the respective answers, the
corresponding propositions are true, false, or undecidable. Procedures for testing
the details of a claim often need to be determined in addition to, or within, the
definitions.
Theories not only include propositions that describe facts. A far more important
variety of theoretical propositions or theorems are if then sentences. They
represent relationships between facts or substantial relationships in complex states
of affairs.
Their form is the following: AB, where the capital letters are variables for
arbitrary descriptions of states of affairs and the double arrow symbolizes any substantial relationship between A and B that theoretically allows the transition from
Ato B. Propositions expressing that a transition from one piece of theory to another
is feasible are also called inferential propositions.
A small example from the nautical knowledge of the discoverer of the New
World will illustrate this point. The rigging of sailing ships matched the wind
conditions in the regions to navigate. There was a striking difference between square
rigs (square sails) and Latin rigs (triangular sails). Latin rigging was better suited
for cruising in a headwind or under changing wind directions; square rigging was
better for sailing straight ahead. Coln had one of the three ships provided by the
Spanish monarchy, which was Latin rigged, converted to square rigging before its
departure from La Gomera. Based on this fact, it could be argued (according to the
62

For the idea of an implicit definition and criticism of it, cf. Kambartel (1968), 165 ff.

1.4The Substance That Theories Are Made of

29

argumentative scheme argument to the best explanation; cf. Chap. 4) that the man
had precise expectations about the wind conditions at 30 latitude, i.e. the height at
which he wanted to cross the Atlantic.63 The relevant experiential knowledge can be
formulated in the following inferential propositions:
1. Square rigging suitability for sailing straight
2. Latin rigging suitability for crossing
3. On 30 latitude, stable westerly winds on the ocean
In normative theories, the if then sentence occurs as a norm. It expresses a
permission or an obligation to realize the then part once the if part applies.
Simple normative experiential knowledge looks, for instance, like this: An open door
may tempt a saint. Expressed in a conditional sentence, we first have the theorem:
given the right opportunity, someone will take it. Consequently, since this is the
case, better not create any opportunity!
In legal norms, the structure is exactly the same; the content, however, is much
more differentiated. For example: If the perpetrator exceeds the limits of necessary defence due to confusion, fear or fright, then he shall not be punished ( 33
German Criminal Code). In this case, a decision whether the if part of the proposition applies in a particular case requires a complex psychological or sociopsychological evaluation. To the extent that the if part can be justified, it is necessary
to fulfill the then part of the statement, i.e. not to punish the excess of
self-defense.
The establishment of a link between states of affairs, if not called for normatively,
is the result of attentive praxis, usually from the position of a participant. Sometimes
the link also becomes clear through observationwhich, however, in this case is a
praxis of systematic observation regarding certain issues and not a random observation from the position of a passerby. A proposition that verbally formulates a
relationship supports the praxis by saying that the then part is accessible if the
if part is realized. In representations, praxes can be perceived as abstract networks
of action schemes. In practical reality, however, they consist of nothing but actual
actions, not all of which are over and done with. What therefore follows in reality,
if the if part of a theoretical proposition occurs, is not already fixed by the succeeding then part. Nevertheless, the proposition provides us with a certain expectation
upon which we act. This expectation is usually not disappointed. This is what I mean
by saying that the theoretical proposition supports the praxis.
In order to further explain the nature of inferential sentences, I would like to
point out two complications that are generally not sufficiently taken into account by
current views on the problem.
 irst Complication: The Ceteris Paribus Clause
F
Inferential if then sentences are not to be understood as strict general propositions (with the universal quantifier) that become irrelevant in the case of a single
63

Cf. Venzke (1991), 128.

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counterexample. With a conditional sentence, we do not have to mean that for any
event where the if part occurs, there always has to be an event (or staging) of the
then part. The sentence is usually an expression of typification and generalization.
We do not know the relations as relations of the world or of the whole world. We
know them from situations that we comprehend (scientists in the laboratory or, in
general, agents in their respective limited areas of practice).
Then we generalize them ceteris paribus, that is, all other things being equal
(i.e. those conditions not expressly articulated in the if part but assumed as part
of a normal situation), into a conditional sentence. Strictly speaking, there is a
ceteris paribus clause before each theoretical proposition about its material
content. This clause is a wild card, however, because we usually do not know for
certain which conditions are relevant for the then part to be realized and how they
might change.
If I say, for example, that my daughter is already quite a good driver, this does
not mean that whenever she sits behind the wheel, she will move the car safely
from P1 to P2. It means that it is the case under the conditions under which I have
seen her drive so far. I have not said anything about what will happen if the road
is extremely slippery or if she has not slept. Such a transfer of the conditions taken
into account in all conditions takes place constantly, even in the conditional
sentences generated by organized science. Connections experienced under laboratory conditions are formulated generally, that is to say without a specification of
all conditions (which no one may know). This is the nature of laws, both in
natural sciences and in social and cultural studies. In this respect, laws do not
really apply to the world, but to (hopefully) homogenous sections of it which we
control. (Only in the formal disciplines the situation is different. That the square
root of 2 is not a rational number, that there are infinitely many prime numbers,
etc.those are universal relationships for which there is no open field of additional factors that might qualify as conditions because this area is constituted by
our own operations.)
 econd Complication: The Logical Structure of Conditional Sentences
S
In my symbolic notation of the if then sentence AB, the double arrow
represents any possibility to move from A to B. Someone trained in logic might
want to add the connective sub here (the so-called material implication, symbolized
byor ). But this is often not appropriate. The truth conditions for a conditional
sentence in propositional logic are in fact very specific. According to these conditions, transitions of this kind are false only if the A part is satisfied, but the B part is
not. In any other case, including, for example, both parts being false, the conditional
sentence is true. This logical connective has been constructed for specific purposes in mathematical logic,64 and it concerns propositions that are independent of
each other with regard to their content. Hence, standard examples in German logic

Cf. Bochenski (1970), 20; cf. also Kneale and Kneale (1962), Chap. III, 3, The debate on the
nature of conditionals.
64

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31

classes are nonsense phrases such as: if the moon is made of green cheese, Brigitte
Bardot is a Nobel Prize winner. In these cases, the if then transition does
notconcern any content. In the practically relevant language, in which we express
theoretical inferential sentences, however, we usually mean a specific content, such
as temporal or causal relations. Simple examples would be the following: If it rains,
the soil is wet. If I am at home, I turn on the heating. The interpretation of a conditional sentence as a material conditional (or a material implication) can only play
a marginal role for the theoretical understanding of our practice of argumentation.65
After all, in arguments, we deal with transitions from argument to argument, which
draw on substantial connections for their justification. There can also be purely
truth-functional relationships. But usually, the quality of an argument does not depend
on them.66 (I address this difference again in Chap. 4 under the title Justification.)

1.4.3 Rules
Besides concepts and propositions, rules make up the substance of theories. Rules
differ from propositions in that they articulate limited possible courses of action.
Iprimarily mean the regulations of theoretical discourse. There are, for example,
linguistic rules. Some of these I have already discussed above under definitions.
There are others, especially what Kamlah/Lorenzen call predicate rules (which
can also be regarded as partial definitions), i.e. correlations of concepts to rules
or systems of concepts for the production of certain possible ways of expression,
e.g. metric terms.
In addition to linguistic rules, theories also include procedural rules for the production of effects or situations of all kinds. Experimental arrangements generally
follow meticulous regulations, etc.
What I have said above about normative conditional sentences is also relevant for
practical rules. Typical examples of practical rules include, e.g. the recommendations by Baron von Knigge on how to deal with people67: Do not complain about
misfortune, not even to your own wife; do not boast about your lucky situation; do
not be too openhearted towards other people; do not extend your hand to just anyone;
and do not talk about business in the company of your friends and even less about
These considerations are not too complicated. Indeed, for logicians and philosophers of science,
they are trivial. Still, there are people who hope to improve the logical and argumentative competence of their listeners by teaching them to regard colloquial if then sentences as material
implications. Cf. Ghde (2004). An excellent criticism of this view has been brought forward by
Geert-Lueke Lueken; cf. Lueken (2006).
66
The difference between the logical conditional and the argumentative ifthen sentence is
discussed in Kamlah and Lorenzen (1984), Chap. V, 2; more carefully in Berk (1979), 100 ff.;
cf.also Stalnaker (1968).
67
Cf. Knigge (1788). Knigge was a German noble man who in the late 18th century had published
a collection of conduct rules which is (partly) respected until today.
65

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disagreeable things. These were rules for citizens (recommended by a nobleman);

the advice that the citizen Niccolo Machiavelli gave his prince 250years earlier were
quite different68: The prince should only stay true to his promises to the extent that it
benefits him; he should not ally himself with a more powerful prince to attack a third
party; he should prevent his advisors from flattering instead of informing him, etc.

1.5 Theory Types

There are theories about everything and everyone. Because the meaning of the term
theory is so indeterminate in both ordinary language and the language of science,
the conclusion presented herethat argumentation is about theory constructionmay
still need some clarification. To further clarify the pragmatic conception of theory,
it might be helpful to sort theories into types. This should demonstrate that there are
serious differences within theorys basic function of offering orientation that we
need to observe in the practice of argumentation. Depending on the type of theory
in question, different things will need to be done in order to evaluate and construct
arguments for theses.
At least three fundamentally different types of theories can be identified: formal,
technical, and social theories, which I will briefly characterize.

1.5.1 Formal Theory

Formal theories do not refer to praxes related to states of affairs that we humans
come across in our actions and dealings with the world, but to those we ourselves
have constituted: numbers, arithmetic and logical operational possibilities, random
generators, games, etc. Here, the relevant structures are either determined by ourselves or they are consequences of our determinations.
In this type of theory, a specific justification for a claim can be valid a priori,
meaning from the first, i.e. without empirical evidence, or it can be understood by
reflecting on how the domain has been constituted. Such justifications are generally
called proofs. Even the usage of proof is not clear, though; in jurisprudence, for
example, we find circumstantial evidence,69 which is actually a non-compelling
justification of the type argument to the best explanation (cf. Chap. 4). In formal
theories, however, a proof generally consists in presenting a deduction. This is a
mechanical operationwhich, as such, can also be executed by a machinethat
gradually produces the alleged state of affairs. Thus the proposition, There is no
Cf. Machiavelli (1977).
Translators note: The German original has Beweis in both the case of proof and evidence,
as the demonstration that compels the mind to accept an assertion as true in formal disciplines and
the statement or material object presented in a court of law are both called Beweis in German.
68
69

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33

rational solution for the square root of 2, for example, can be proven by constructing
a contradiction from the contrary assumption, i.e. that there is a rational number
which is the result of extracting the square root of 2.
Even under these special circumstances of the self-constituted domain that is represented by formal theory, there can be states of affairs that are not determined a priori.70
For natural numbers, a prime number is defined as a number with no proper divisors,
but we must still check for each number whether it is prime or not. There are rules of
thumb for finding prime numbers in certain sections of the numerical series (e.g. the
Sieve of Eratosthenes71), but there is no formula for generating all prime numbers.
In general, the possibility of a compelling proof is typical for formal theories.
Sowhenever a proof is required or given in the practice of argumentation, the theoretical basis that is required must be of the type formal theory.

1.5.2 Technical Theory

Technical action is action in pursuit of certain ends by orchestrating means of which
we know or suspect that they will cause the desired states of affairs. In cases like
this, the theory at our disposal represents a causal connection between the means
orchestrated and the ends achieved. For technical action to succeed, regularities in
the natural process must be understood. In argumentation, these regularities are
available as if then sentences that are able to explain meansends relationships
that can be experienced in acting. The knowledge of the natural sciences is a vast
reservoir of technical theory, which is one reason why these sciences can be understood as technological sciences.72
As a matter of fact, this term is much more appropriate than our accustomed talk
of natural sciences and natural laws, because it does not require the metaphysical
claim that such theories represent natural events objectively. Even where scientific
knowledge does not have any technical applications, it is still the result of technical
courses of action, namely of the use of measuring instruments and apparatuses for
creating effectsequipment that is constructed and installed in such a way as to
yield reliable, reproducible data. The fact that scientists often take themselves to
represent how the world is in itself indicates that they misunderstand the character
and power of theories. Maybe, this demonstrates that the old Aristotelian ideal of
theory and knowledge (theoria as actualizing the joy of understanding) still lives on.
Wittgenstein pointed this out (cf. Wittgenstein (2009), Philosophical Investigations, 68) using
the example of tennis. As is the case with all games, tennis is constituted by rules. But these rules
do not, for example, say anything about the exact height and speed of the ball when it is flying over
the net.
71
The prime numbers below a number n are obtained if all the numbers up to n are written down
and then first the 1 and, successively, the proper multiples of 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, etc. up to m with m2>n
are crossed out.
72
This view was developed by Paul Lorenzen; cf. Lorenzen (1987), 18.
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1.5.3 Social (Cultural, Culture Forming) Theory

It is a well-known fact that our social relations involve a plethora of praxes. We may
consider these as theorizable insofar as we can detect relevant differences, similarities, relationships, and regularities within them. Here, too, having theory at ones
command usually means that the corresponding praxis will be more reliable, more
transparent, and more stable. There is a widespread view that social theory is more
ambiguous and uncertain than theory in the natural sciences. The reason for this is
obvious: Human behavior is less clear and less stable, to the point that even collecting
reproducible data generates difficulties. A frequently proposed solution consists in
writing theoretical propositions about human behavior in the form of statistical
statements. Both the charge of ambiguity and the statistical solution, however,
derive their plausibility from the fact that the natural sciences are regarded as a
model for all serious theory.
This ignores the fundamental difference between conditions in nature and among
human beings. This difference is particularly striking from a pragmatic point of
view. Propositions about relationships between people and their behavior concern areas of life in which we could always, at least in principle, conduct ourselves
differently than we have done so far. In particular, we can act, i.e. determine our
behavior on our own.
Does such talk presuppose the existence of a free willand do I therefore take
a stand on an issue that has currently (in the discussion of brain research) become
very controversial once more? Of course, this depends on what I mean by will.73
If the will, or rather its operation, is an organic event, then it is subject to physiological causalitiessuch an assumption is not problematic. The assumption that
this organic event can be influenced by conscious decisions is equally unproblematic.
(Do I want to put a piece of sugar into my coffee or not?) The simple, easily understandable, and at all times easily reproducible proof for the freedom of decision is
the decision to regard oneself as free to decide.74 This is something we can actually
decide. We might even do so if the assumption that we are free were objectively
false. Hence, it is objectively true. The great plausibility of the view that humans are
always determined, or rather incapable of deciding freely, stems from the fact that
we are often not at the height of our attentiveness and readiness to decide. Someone
who is dulled, tired, or strongly affected emotionally easily reacts in a quasiautomatic way to stimuli. In this regard, psychoanalysts spoke of a causality of the

For the career of the concept of will in philosophy cf. Mittelstra (1989a), who ends his account
with a plea for the substitution of will with decision.
74
Apparently, William James experienced this insight as a conversion that turned him into a man
aware of his freedom in the first place. Cf. his letter in James (1920), 147: I think that yesterday
was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouviers second Essais and see no reason why
his definition of free willthe sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have
other thoughtsneed be the definition of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present
until next yearthat it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.
73

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unconscious. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to identify people primarily with their

weak and dull phases.75
This freedom, or the fact that people can choose, lends propositions of the social
theory type a different pragmatic status. This is strikingly evident in the effect of the
self-fulfilling76 or self-destroying prophecy. A prediction about a stocks expected
gains or losses can lead straight to those gains or losses. Information about a traffic
jam on a particular section of a road contributes to its dissolution. A publication
about an untouched holiday paradise (which the addressees understand as a prediction: If you go there for your holidays, it will be wonderful) abruptly ends the
places praised condition.
It goes without saying that there is no such thing in technical theory or in the knowledge of the natural sciences. Social theory is an expression of collective self-reflection
on relations in our actions and practices. It can contribute to the conceptualization of
these actionswhich, subsequently, may change circumstances. As I said, at present
this fundamental difference is not very popular in the social sciences. Guided by the
criticalrationalist view of science, a conception of technical theory often dominates
the field of social practices, actions, and conduct, too. Social change is viewed as a
result of technical activity (while the changes are not supposed to be too radical77).
Strictly speaking, this is a mistake. It is indicative of a way of thinking that is not
reflexive but, rather, adheres to the belief that social conditions are simply right in
front of us. I want to say this for once in all clarity: This is a primitive stage of theory.
Because of certain uniformities in their actions, people are regarded as objects that
move and change monotonously in the manner of natural objects. Consequently, the
theorist formulates propositions about such uniformities, which a ruler or politician
utilizes for technical actions. Could something like that not be successful? Sure, a
prince, for example, may be successful by observing Machiavellis aforementioned
advice: Keep minions, threaten your enemies, and satisfy your subjects with bread
and circuses. But such conduct has simply not reached the state of our cultural
awareness and knowledge about peoples dignity and potential for autonomy.
To avoid misunderstandings, I would like to conclude my discussion of the three
types of theory with the (rather obvious) statement that these types are not disjoint.
On the contrary, most of our relevant theories probably consist of parts belonging to
different types. Of course, technical and social theory contain formal theory as soon
as quantified variables are discussed. It is not necessarily inappropriate that social
theory includes technical theory; it depends on the content. Technical theory, on the
other hand, will probably include social theory only in exceptional cases.
This is a fallacy, pars pro toto, a specification of the fallacy of hasty generalization. The understanding of a mere part of the state of affairs in question is simply presented as an understanding
of the whole of it.
76
The locus classicus for the self-fulfilling prophecy is Merton (1957). In substance, however,
the thought had already been clearly expressed in 1931, when Otto Neurath published his text on
empirical sociology; cf. Neurath (1973), 405: Predicting an eclipse of the sun does not affect the
eclipse; but predicting the position of the market does influence the stock exchange.
77
Social and political scientists in Poppers wake recommend piecemeal technology, cf. Popper
(1957), 21.
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1.6 Theory as Knowledge

With a conceptual blueprint generated by the pragmatic concept of theory in place,
we can now define a concept of knowledge that is, on the one hand, appropriate for
the concerns of argumentation but, on the other hand, also rooted in the practice of
argumentation. In other words: Based on the distinction of particular occurrences
and constellations in the practice of argumentation, we are now able to define a
concept of knowledge that captures the stable and universal as well as the transient
and paradigm-specific aspects of knowledge. I have already mentioned several
times the highly specialized attempts to define a concept of knowledge among
philosophers, epistemologists, and philosophers of science. This state of the debate
makes it a daring task to say something about knowledge without first jumping
into extensive discussions about the issue.
But the aim of this presentation is primarily to say something (hopefully) meaningful and useful about how to theorize the practice of argumentation. Naturally,
this leads to a certain focus. If I am not completely mistaken, however, this focus
will be suitable for contributing to a more general clarification of the concept of
knowledge. Hence, some of the realistic, naturalistic, and rhetorical excesses of the
post-Kuhnian philosophy of science will eventually turn out to be avoidable
aberrations.
At the beginning of this chapter, I wrote that in order for us to arrive at serious
arguments, we need theory as a basis for construction. I also argued that we
usually have such theory and that an asserted thesis is a piece of theory which
exceeds this basis. What is going to be added is the idea that the theoretical
basis itself is not sacrosanct, but may be challenged and revised. This is hardly
surprising; after all, the theoretical basis contains theories of a very different
kind and quality. What I now want to designate as knowledge is a prominent,
i.e. particularly stable kind of theoretical basis that can only be annulled argumentatively and put up for d iscussion with the help of specific objections and
procedures.78
The pragmatic concept of theory basically states that the function of theory is to
theoretically support the praxis, i.e. to provide practical orientation. The content of
Readers should be aware that this is a fundamental decision: Knowledge should be seen as a
mature state of a theory. Mainstream epistemology nowadays takes knowledge to be a state of mind.
This leads into a maelstrom of problems, in which inner-subjective elements and outer-objective
elements, and thus epistemology and philosophy of mind, science, and psychology, spin around
among aspects of language and experience. In the line of thought developed here, the basic term is
orientation in action. Felicity in action then corresponds to truth in theory. Any coherent line of
thought needs an appropriate starting point as well as some effective theoretical structures. These
are the steps here: action, orientation, praxis, theory, research, argument, realization, knowledge,
and truth. On the basis of a definition of knowledge as a mature theory, we can move to a definition
of knowledge as a state of mind: Someone knows something if he or she possesses knowledge and
obtains some orientation from it. Thus, knowledge is never an original state of mind caused by some
state of affairs in the outside world. This view, which is held, e.g. by T. Williamson (cf. Williamson
(2000)), uses the term knowledge where we better speak of orientation.
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37

the validity claim that accompanies each theory is that the theory in question does
provide such orientation. Here and henceforth, I want to use the term knowledge
if this validity claim has been satisfied in a particularly closed way (although it is
only closed for the time being) both theoretically and practically. I will now try to
explain this.
Let us start with the function of supporting the praxis. Suppose a theory contains relevant concepts, good descriptive, and/or normative theorems, and it
answers the questions that arise in the praxis (including explanations for why some
things work satisfactorily and why others do not). In addition, the theory forms its
users and thus seems to be complete both internally and externally. Is this enough
to grant it the seal of approval known as knowledge? Let us consider, for example, astrology and oracle consultations (although today we no longer pay a visit to
Apollos priestess in Delphi, we might go to the I-Ching specialist in HaightAshbury or Greenwich Village). In these cases, there are structured practices of life
coaching and decision-making which are, indeed, supported theoretically. It might
seem obvious for a p hilosopher of science to reject such theories on account of
their lack of prognostic powers. But rejections like that only work as long as the
failed predictions cannot be salvaged with the help of explanations that are more
than mere ad hoc explanations (excuses).79 Still, this is not sufficient for a concept
of knowledge, in particular, according to a reasonably sophisticated preconception
of the term. Knowledge is not supposed to articulate mere idiosyncrasies, but
factual relationships. Moreover, it needs to make these relationships transparent
to any number of people in a way that is unaffected by individual differences.
This is the meaning of the claim that these relationships need to be suitable as
orientation. How can this claim be satisfied? If practical support were the only
criterion, it might be possible to say that the practice of oracle consultation is
guided by knowledge.
We might even assume that the representatives of such disciplines believe that
they are knowledgeable for these and similar reasons (the praxis is supported
theoreticallymaybe even through traditions). It seems that we are faced with the
choice of either softening the concept of knowledge by regarding it as relative or
dismissing such knowledge as illusory or deceptive (often with arguments that are
quite silly80). There is, however, a third way: to regard practical support as a necessary, but still not sufficient criterion for knowledge, and to look for further criteria.
This is what I would like to do.
For a discussion of argumentative validity in the strict sensea validity that might
be called truth in the domain of thetic reasonI refer the reader to Chap. 7.
To my mind, Imre Lakatos gave the most impressive account of how futile it is to establish accurate prediction as the criterion of a theorys quality. Cf. Lakatos example of the astronomer who
infers from his theory the existence of a planet that, subsequently, cannot be foundbut this fact
can be explained again and again. Cf. Lakatos (1970), 100/101.
80
Cf. the scorn that Feyerabend heaped on the arguments which prestigious representatives of
the natural sciences brought forth in their criticism of astrology, in Feyerabend (1982), Part II: The
Strange Case of Astrology.
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Presently, I will continue with a concept of theory understood as knowledge. For this
purpose, I propose three criteria that, taken together, capture the kind of specifically
permeable closure for which we may use the term knowledge.81 The criterion of
practical support that already applies to all epistemic theory is taken for granted. To
this we add: realization, methodical construction, and coherence, all of which I will
now explain.
(A) Realization
Realization is a strengthening of the criterion of practical support. I call a theory
realized if it has entered reality to the point that it shapes the world and the
people. Once this point has been reached, it is impossible to mentally eliminate
the theory without eliminating oneself or rather without abstracting oneself
from reality in a way that does not leave any room for a point of view from
which to make a judgment. The fact, for instance, that we have lights in our homes
realizes chemical, physical, and aesthetic theory, which has been formed over the
course of centuries. Some materiala metal, a gasburns without burning up.
This requires knowledge of material properties and of the isolation of gases,
especially of oxygen, which is necessary for burning. It also includes techniques
of extracting oxygen, whereby the combustion is delayed. The energy required
for combustion comes from power stations or from fossil fuels, such as oil or
gas, in the industrial production of which an immense technical but also social
knowledge has been realized. The lamps burn in buildings that are based on structural calculations in which the most diverse types of knowledge from architecture,
mechanics, electrodynamics, glass and plastic production, etc. have been realized.
This knowledge is formed, backed up, and handed down in social organizations.
Our entire civilized life is structured by social and political institutions, a public
administration with offices, agencies, etc. All these institutions and organizations
realize social knowledge, i.e. knowledge about manifold viable possibilities of
human life.
I believe that these points are sufficient to once again emphatically reject the
view that there is no such thing as positive theoretical knowledge and that everything
is a hypothesis. At most, this view can sometimes make sense for very specialized
problems in philosophy and the philosophy of science. The fact that reality has been
shaped by human knowledge often escapes us because it is self-evident. Only
changes that we experience ourselvessuch as computerizationare conspicuous

The expression closed theory does not stand for a strict concept with selective criteria for its
application. It refers to an idea that needs to be clarified with reference to concrete cases and
examples. Those who find this too vague and hence reject it should at least consider that our
scientific grandmasters do not have more than this idea, either. For instance, Heisenbergs attempts
to define a concept of closed theory were far more ambitiousclosed theories were supposed
to be valid everywhere and at all times; cf. Heisenberg (1971), 308 ff. But aside from Newtonian
mechanics, they were also supposed to include quantum theory, whose closure Einstein
vigorously denied and which Popper even called the great quantum muddle; cf. Popper (1982),
50, 52, 64, 77.
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39

enough to be noticed. In all other cases, we resort to historical studies and historical
imagination. What is even harder to notice, because it is all the more obvious,
is the realization of knowledge in the formation and development of humanity.
We are different human beings than those who set out for the New World in the
early 16th century or those who began to break up the French monarchy in
the late 18th century. But very little can be said about this, because the relevant circumstances are accessible to us only as indicationsthat is, from the
outside. So much, then, for being realized as a criterion for theory that qualifies as
knowledge.
(B) Methodical Structure
Methodical structure is a requirement for the internal organization of a theory.
Itreplaces the axiomatic structure of the Aristotelian ideal of theory with regard to
a pragmatically based concept of theory. The criterion states that the theory can be
comprehended as an insightful mental path. Such a path consists of steps that need
to comply with certain elementary considerations of order. For each step, the conditions for its execution must be specified. In particular, no step may make use of
conditions that will only be brought about by its execution. This might sound very
complicated. In the simplest case, it means that in a theory that is supposed to be
regarded as knowledge, definitions must precede theorems, and links to practices
need to precede definitions. It sounds like an agreeable demand, like recommendations for didactic presentations. But that would be a misunderstanding. This methodical structure concerns the transparency of theories and hence their validity claims.
It is particularly important for the assessment of arguments. Importance and general
awareness, however, obviously do not always coincide. This is also the case here.
Imust therefore go back a bit further and explain the criterion of methodical theory
construction in some detail.
I would like to ask you to think back again to the concept of praxis and its
support through theory. A praxis is a system of interrelated actions. Actions always
depend on conditions. Certain situational features must be given for the action to
fulfill its purposei.e. a different situational feature. In an established, standardized
praxis, every action is the actualization of an action scheme which can be used to
produce a new situation scheme based on a situation scheme that is needed as a
condition for the action. In the aforementioned practice of timber processing, tree
trunks, saws, and workers are needed to produce boards; planes are needed to
straighten them; many more boards, a construction plan, workers, engineers, and
architects are needed to build structures such as a house, a bridge, or a ship. Bridges
are needed to negotiate an otherwise impassable terrain, ships are needed to reach
destinations by water, etc. The conditional nature of the individual action can be
written symbolically as follows:

SF SF
AS

1Knowledge

40

SF is a symbol for a situational feature. SF is a symbol for a situational feature

that has been modified with regard to SF. AS stands for action scheme. If the condition SF is missing, then an action must specifically produce it. On the other side of
the relation, SF can function as the initial condition for yet another action step.
With regard to the objectives and in compliance with the conditions required in each
case, sequences of actions are thus created that may sometimes complement each
other in practice and at other timesdepending on the initial situationreplace
each other.

AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4

Some interesting things can be said about these action sequences. They cannot
contain any gaps and must be organized in a certain way. An action that produces
a certain situational feature must be executed before another action that requires
this very feature as a condition for its own execution. The order cannot be reversed.
The production of a required condition also cannot be postponed for thetime
being and then be executed after further steps in the sequence of actions have
been taken.
Obviously, this is a very basic structure that children, who begin to find their way
around in the world, are faced with all the time. If the apartment door is closed, you
cannot go back inside and get the key to open it up again. The well-known ditty
about a boy and a girl who communicate about how to plug a hole in a bucket
namely with straw, which needs to be cut with a knife, which, in turn, has to be
sharpened on a stone, the cooling of which requires them to fetch water using the
very same bucket they need to fix in the first placeillustrates the calamities that
action sequences can lead to if the order imposed by specific conditions has not
become transparent to us. The previously mentioned Hugo Dingler termed this
structure of action sequences pragmatic order.82
But far from being relevant on the childrens playground only, it is quite clear
that, in particular, elaborate plans for organizing, e.g. the launch of a spacecraft or
for executing mass events like a general election, the Olympics, or a pilgrimage to
Mecca, are strictly bound to the pragmatic order. Disaster relief efforts proceed in
an exceedingly chaotic way, even though they have raised more than enough money,
if there are no action plans that have been structured according to the pragmatic
order. An organization might provide, e.g. equipment or installations that require a
much higher level of infrastructure, much greater technical care, etc., than is available in the region in question. In short, in such cases, there are actions and action
sequences which lack beginnings or are undermined and thwarted by other actions
(brought in by other workers) and their results. The pragmatic order is a fundamental condition for the success of sequential actions. Compliance with it does not have
In order to build a house, the foundation must be laid down first. Only then can the rest be built
on top of it. In all cases where an action A creates the condition for executing an action B in the
first place, the order is clearly ensured. We want to call such a sequence the pragmatic order of
actions. Cf. Dingler (1938), 116. (Translation T.P.).
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41

to be demanded normatively. Actions that ignore it simply fail. In one way or

another, we do not reach our goal in those cases. Where bigger action sequences are
concerned, we create chaos. If the conditions for an action are not natural but
constituted culturally, the idea suggests itself that they are somewhat less binding.
But that would also be a misunderstanding. In social relationships, numerous actions
are conditioned in exactly the same way. They fail if executed in the wrong situations or without sufficient preparation.
A very considerable proportion of the turmoil during the French Revolution was
due to increasingly chaotic economic relations, which led to supply shortages, riots,
and criminal activities everywhere. This was almost inevitable, because the pragmatic order in social structures had previously been determined by the monarchy.
With the elimination of the monarchy, this pragmatic order had lost its footing. The
task now was to establish new regulations that were not only politically desirable,
but also pragmatically possible.
This comment might perhaps be construed as an argument against the need for a
pragmatic order. Do these processes not show its mutability? Nicholas Rescher has
argued that Dinglers principle of pragmatic order becomes obsolete in suitable
circumstances.83 His idea is to feed the results of actions back into a new, improved
action plan. Instead of discussing examples, Rescher presents diagrams that illustrate his
concerns very well. But the picture of a lion, even if well drawn, simply does not roar.
We could reinforce Reschers argument by thinking about the following observation regarding attempts to reorganize society during the revolution: whether an
action A1 actually presupposes an action A2 is an empirical question and therefore
fallible in each specific case. This means that you cannot be sure whether A1 really
needs to precede A2 or whether the alternative A1, might not produce the same
results. This is correct. Moreover, it is not only true for the pragmatic order in social
structures of action and interaction but even more so in technical activities. We no
longer rely on oil for our lamps to burn, nor on oxen to pull plows and wagons. The
computer does not need a ribbon, as the typewriter did, and the airplane dramatically shortened the time needed for covering distances.
What happened is that, in each concrete case, the necessary conditions for an
action have become possible conditions, for which there are now alternatives. But
does this change the basic structure of the pragmatic order? Does an action no
longer depend on specific conditions? That would only be the case in a paradise of
knowledge, where all the desired knowledge and understanding are available without further ado. But as long as we live an earthly life with limited knowledge and a
finite time to improve it through research, we must comply with the principle of
pragmatic order in our action sequences.
The fact that practical actions are subject to a pragmatic order has interesting
consequences for theory construction. Theory is supposed to support the praxis and,
in doing so, is itself verbal praxis. Actions in a verbal praxiscommunication and
theorizing in a languagealso depend on conditions. We have developed forms for
terms, principles, theorems, and descriptive and observational propositions to
83

Cf. Rescher (1977), 67.

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ensure their adequacy. I have talked about this before, under the title The Substance
That Theories Are Made of. Such forms are, for example, kinds of definitions,
constitutive principles, and specific variables, as well as methods to measure them,
possibilities of testing propositions, and of moving from some propositions to other
propositions while preserving their truth-value. In a specific theory, steps and their
order can be distinguished in a way that is analogous to the pragmatic order. If data
are measured, for example, to calculate a position, the functionality of the instruments has to be guaranteed first. To formulate propositions that are truth-apt, there
has to be a terminology first, etc.
However, the peculiarities of linguistic action entail that a sequence of theoretical
steps does not adhere to a pragmatic order, but to an order that is analogous to it. This
is the methodical order.84 It, too, states that steps must be taken in sequence and that
they need to be organized with respect to the fact that each particular step is conditioned by the results of other steps. Its binding character, however, is different, for in
a language we can fabricate the existence of fictitious conditions or erroneously take
advantage of conditions that are not even at our disposal. The absence of a condition,
e.g. due to an ambiguous or even contradictory definition of a concept, does not
necessarily impede our thinking and talking. Hence, theories may well contain several
fictions. Today, we can easily agree that this was the case, e.g. in the Middle Ages. We
are amused by the idea of the fabled islands Atlantis and St. Brendan, which were
listed on marine maps of the time; or the strange tendency of the body to move towards
its natural place, a tendency that was assumed instead of gravity; or the alleged effects
of some physicians obscure practices, such as bloodletting, etc. We can assume that
the same fictional assumptions occur in todays theoriesand some people have
argued accordingly85but this is of no further interest in the present context.
At any rate, this is the consequence of the characteristics of the linguistic practice of
theory construction: steps which are merely fictitious do not necessarily fail by themselves. The methodical order must therefore be demanded as a normative principle.
Steps of theory construction that violate this principle are possible, but they are not
appropriate, at least when it comes to presenting the praxis-supporting q uality of a
theory. They are errors in reasoning that, in an argument, would lead to objections.
I hope it is nevertheless clear that this methodical principle stands in the same
relationship to any theory as this theory to its relevant praxis. It supports theory
construction by being a starting point for understanding. And just as in a praxis, a
theory construction that has been organized methodically promises to deal with the
theory in a less ambiguous, more consistent way. The aspect of instrumental rationality, however, is not everything. There are always enough people and opportunities
where thinking and acting proceed well without any extensive efforts to understand
and organize methodically. The meaning of these considerations is therefore ultimately to be found on the subjective side: The factual understanding of a field of praxis
in the form of a methodically transparent theory is a part of self-understandingby
understanding the theory, we understand what we are really doing.
84
85

Cf. Wohlrapp (1978).

Cf., for example, Dingler (1926); for the social sciences: Andreski (1972).

1.6Theory as Knowledge

43

So much for the methodical principle. The aim was to show its role in assessing
the validity of theories. A theory whose methodical construction is not understood
is not necessarily worse than the opposite. It might even be much more stimulating
and interesting. But it has a different status. It is still thetic. In the next chapter,
Iwill have to talk about such differences in status.
(C) Coherence
The third criterion that I propose for distinguishing a theory as knowledge is
coherence. This criterion only will be addressed briefly. It is fairly well known due
to the so-called coherence theory of truth86 and a position in the philosophy of science called coherentism.87 The basic idea is that a theory which is supposed to be
established as knowledge must also fit with other established theories. What does
fit mean in this context? What kind of a relation is this? For one, it obviously
excludes outright contradictions. In theories, contradictions would only occur in
exceptional cases anyway. In general, different languages have been formed for
the various fields of praxis. The language of mechanics is not simply transferable
into the languages of biology or psychology, the language of engineering cannot
simply be translated into the discourse of history. Even within a given discipline,
there may be theories that capture very different aspects of the field in question.
In psychology, there are theories about perception and perceptual illusions that do
not deal with other theories of the same discipline, e.g. instincts and their vicissitudes. Hence, in order to judge the coherence or, rather, the hanging together of
theories, the different aspects or emphases of praxes need to be related to each
other. Moreover, a comprehensive perspective needs to be developed by joining the
parts of praxes together. In most cases, that would require a very significant further
development of theories or, rather, of knowledge from an inter- or transdisciplinary
perspective.
Consequently, the basic idea of the coherence requirement as a criterion for
knowledge points us to the future of further scientific research. For any particular moment, however, it simply says: A theory or part of a theory must fit with
other theories so that by conjoining them, no objections arise. The other theories
have to add to orientation by way of explanation and clarification (albeit in a
different context, under different aspects). To a large extent, this is the case for
numerous theories which are part of our body of knowledge. After all, a conduct
of life has apparently been possible up to now that is guided by many different
theories.
One final note in order to avoid misunderstandings: The criterion of coherence for
a pragmatic concept of knowledge is weaker than the coherence theory of truth.
Against the latter, Russell objected that coherence only works as a criterion for truth
if the other propositions and theories, which the proposition in question is supposed to

Cf. the classical study Rescher (1973). Rescher also combines coherentism with pragmatism, but
his understanding of the latter follows William James and focuses on instrumentalism.
87
Cf. Laurence Bonjour, The Elements of Coherentism, in: Bonjour (1985), 87110, 239241.
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be coherent with, are true themselves.88 Hence, as a criterion of truth, coherence

presupposes that there are truths and that they are recognizable. The criterion turns out
to be circular. But this objection does not affect coherence as a criterion for knowledge, as proposed here. On the one hand, it is softer and points to further research. On
the other hand, there is a basis of felicity on which the assessment of a theory rests. A
new theory that claims to be knowledge has to fit with theory for which orientation has
already been established as stable. It is therefore not knowledge that needs to be presupposed for coherence; coherence rather has to be presupposed for knowledge.
Thus, by way of these three criteria of closure, a concept of knowledge can be
determined on the blueprint of a pragmatic concept of theory. This concept of
knowledge is appropriate for the purposes of argumentation theory and can qualify
as an explication of our intuitions about the term knowledge. We have thus cultivated a territory for argumentation theory that is usually governed by epistemology and the philosophy of science. As described above, under their aegis, the link to
praxis has been mostly neglected. The theoretical turn brought about by Thomas
Kuhn created space for this link, but it was mainly filled with subjectivity and
relativism. Kitcher freed the philosophy of science from the digressions of its sociopsychological phase by no longer binding knowledge to the qualities of theories, but
to the specificities of mental states. The corresponding question is the following:
What does it mean that someone (a scientist) knows something?
This shift of the question, it seems, is suitable for clarifying the role of knowledge
in argumentation theory. After all, it is people who claim to know something in
dialogues (at conferences, in committees, and in everyday life), and it may be asked
what that is supposed to mean. With the proposals presented above, the answer
would be that by claiming to know something, one raises a specific validity claim
for a part of a theory (concept, proposition, set of propositions). This claim is satisfied with justifications that are protected in particular against objections which
mobilize the three criteria. Knowledge in this sense of a cognitive state would be
defined in the following manner:
Someone who possesses a knowledge K knows any propositions p1-pn if he
believes them to provide reliable orientation based on a justification that utilizes K
and if this belief is usually not disappointed. Readers who are acquainted with philosophical epistemology will recognize this concept as a variation of Platos famous
definition of knowledge in the Theaetetus. Today, Platos definition is generally
understood as follows:
X knows that p means X believes that p is true, X is justified in his belief that
p is true, and p actually is true.
The difference between this Platonic notion of knowledge and the pragmatic
concept of knowledge outlined here is mainly that the latter does not require a
concept of truth. Instead, it provides the concept of a regularly reliable orientation
which is derived from knowledge. Everything that could be formally derived from
knowledge may then be termed true or a truth. I will explain this shortly.

88

Cf. Russell (1907), 3334.

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45

First of all, I think that this puts the concepts of knowledge and truth in the right
order. If I know, for example, that at a certain moment Theaetetus sits (Platos
example), that would mean that I take the proposition to be a reliable orientation,
because I see the man sitting before me, my optical impressions are usually reliable,
and I have no reason to doubt them at the moment. The relationship between visual
impressions and the objects perceived is theorized in my knowledge about ordinary
seeing, and my justification obviously refers to that knowledge. All of this is not
very mysterious.
Some 50years ago, Edmund Gettier attempted to refute Platos concept of
knowledge.89 The response to this refutation among philosophers and philosophers
of science was immense. Therefore, I want to confront the question whether it also
applies to the pragmatic version of the Platonic notion of knowledge. The answer is
no. Conversely, the pragmatic concept of knowledge shows that Gettiers critique is
erratic (and also misunderstands Plato), because it works with an unreflected, superficial concept of justification.90
Gettiers refutation consists in constructing justifications for the attribution that
X knows that Jones owns a Ford that are false. In Gettiers scenario, X believes
that Jones owns a Ford and Jones actually does own a Ford, but Xs justification for
his belief is wrong. For example, X justifies his belief by saying that Jones always
used to own a Ford and that, in fact, he has seen him in a Ford yesterday. In principle, Gettiers objection is based on the following possibility (it is actually more
complicated, but has this structure): It only seemed as if Jones always used to own
a Ford. Even the Ford that X saw him in yesterday was only borrowed. This morning, however, Jones bought a Ford. Consequently, everything is now exactly as X
believes, but not for the reasons that make him believe it.
The refutation consists in the idea that there may be cases in which belief and
fact correspond to each other, but the justification only applies to the belief, not to
the fact. Whoever finds this convincing should, in my opinion, think about the
meaning of the term justification. I will go into this in more detail in Chap. 4. For
now, I will only say this much: If I can give a justification for my belief that a state
Cf. Gettier (1963).
Readers who are familiar with contemporary philosophical epistemology are well aware that the
discussion of Gettiers paper has brought about a giant flock of approaches and theories about justification, among them foundationalism, externalism, internalism, reliabilism, coherentism, etc.each
of them comprising several variantsand has also revived the problematic position of skepticism (in
at least five different forms). Useful overviews such as Hetherington (1996) and Bernecker and
Dretske (2000) present an enormous amount of highly sophisticated considerations, but no solution
to the question of how to conceive human knowledge. Indeed the concept of k nowledge developed in
the present approach utilizes some of the basic ideas of foundationalism, coherentism, internalism,
and reliabilism, but it has a completely different structure. It makes no alethic or ontological presuppositions. It is a rather evolutionary (but non-naturalistic) concept that describes how knowledge
arises from a general orientation in our life praxis via increasingly differentiated research activities.
Its main elements are the pragmatic concept of theory and the model of research, which consists of a
cycle of argumentation, tentative action and realization in the world. Even if I have provided no
more than an outline in the present context, I think I have elucidated and illustrated it with so many
(non-artificial) examples that I am justified in hoping to have shown the following: This is a new and
promising direction in the development of a workable understanding of human knowledge.

89
90

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of affairs p obtains, it is not simply the factual path that I took in reaching that belief,
but the systematized, standardized path that can be repeated by me and others.
Ajustification is a method (Greek: mthodos, a fortified, trusted path) to arrive at
a belief, not the path by which I, however accidentally, arrived at that belief. If I
believe that Jones owns a Ford because I have often heard that he owns a Ford and
I recently saw him drive a Ford, then these are indicators for all sorts of things,
including the fact that Jones owns a Ford. But they would only be a serious justification for Jones ownership of a Ford if they were part of a theory of ownership of
a car and a personpossibly even of a particular car and a particular person. It goes
without saying that there is no such theory. What Gettier calls justifications are
nothing but vague possibilities. Someone who believes he knows something cannot
be satisfied by this. However, if the requirements for a justification are increased
to the point that they need to make use of serious theory, Gettiers counter-
construction is no longer possible and his refutation becomes invalid.
Should Gettier demand that, in order to know something, someone has to be
able to give a justification that encompasses any possible changes of normal conditions, then no human being has ever known anything. Maybe Gettier would like to
pass this objection on to Plato? After all, he claims to have refuted him. Yet Plato in
particular had very high standards for a justification. It was supposed to tie the
matter in question to its corresponding idea. Regardless of the details of Platonic
ideas and the participation of states of affairsone thing is undeniable: Any factual
evidence and indications for a state of affairs are different and something less than
the connection to or association with the idea. Taking this into consideration
should suffice to reject Gettiers refutation of the Platonic concept of knowledge.
If someone says, I know that Jones owns a Ford, this can, I think, be reconstructed quite well with the definition given above for a pragmatic concept of
knowledge: In my relationship to Jones, I orient myself at the fact that he owns a
Ford, and I feel entitled to do so because I can give a justification that reliably
theorizes regularities in Jones ownership of the car. If it turns out that the theory
utilized in the justification does not contain everything about Jones relationship
with cars or does not even apply under the given circumstances, this is a new argument regarding the state of argumentation that I was in when I said that I know he
owns a Ford. Now, what is actually wrong with this?
Philosophers think in a more sophisticated way than ordinary people do. Perhaps
it would be advisable to formulate the statement slightly differently when addressing them like this: As far as I know, Jones owns a Ford.91
Apparently, what results quite informally from the pragmatic concept of
knowledge is a (pragmatic and dialogical) concept of truth. At the core of this
concept is a justification or statement of grounds to which there is no objection.
For ordinary people, both statements mean the same thing. For philosophers of science, it is obvious that knowledge is something that is valid generally, that it is something universal. Nevertheless,
it can only be invariant with regard to known changes in conditions, not also with regard to changes
that are not yet known. As far as we know is a phrase that is added to all of our knowledgefrom
everyday banalities to the cutting edge of science. It is the colloquial formulation of the ceteris
paribus clause already discussed above.
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47

Since pragmatically construed knowledge can also be normative (the law of the
land, e.g. is normative knowledge), this concept of truth also covers the semantic
content usually referred to as good or right.
The lack of objections to a justification refers to the criteria for knowledge laid
out above. It states that the theory mobilized for the justification does not display
any flaws regarding realization, methodical structure, and coherence. However,
such an absence of objections is not an intrinsic quality of theories, but a state of
argumentation (for further details, cf. Chap. 7). Such a state may change if a new
objection can be formulated as a result of new circumstances or new ideas. So it is
true: Justification can be lost.92 Usually, this factalong the lines of Gettiers
argumentis regarded as a fundamental objection to a concept of truth based on
justification. For the approach outlined here, it needs to be spelled out clearly what
can cause a justification to become lost: In our actions, we have tapped into new
possibilities or parts of the world so that, consequently, we are now able to think
further. If something like that happens, the truth of propositions can change without
relativistic consequences.93 Hence, the objection expressed by Albrecht Wellmer
that a concept of truth needs to contain an anticipation of future proof does not
apply.94 This would be tantamount to saying that, with a proper justification for a
true statement, we simultaneously claim that no subsequent dialogue will ever lead
to an objection, which is neither satisfiable nor necessary.
The same thought is mobilizedalbeit with more formal effortin Crispin
Wrights currently much-discussed concept of superassertability95: once-true-
always-true. This idea is supported by an antecedent realism, which holds that
actually the world exists independently of human beings and their development.
The objection that I bring forth in Chap. 7 against Peirces ultimate opinion
applies in this context as well: There are no sentences (propositions) of which we
could say that they will remain true in the future. Only always in hindsight and in an
abstract way, we can say, for example, that the Greeks already recognized certain
truths of mechanics, optics, and astronomy that are still relevant for us today.
To summarize: a concept of knowledge can be derived from the pragmatic
concept of theory, according to which a theory symbolically articulates the felicity
structures of a praxis. Knowledge is theory whose orientation value is stabilized by
three criteria, namely realization, methodical structure, and coherence. These criteria have the character of principles, i.e. they are abstract and need to be concretized
for specific fields. Even without such concretization, they already suffice to
differentiate knowledge from conjecture and hypothesis, and at the same time it
might still be local and procedural. Knowledge thus construed is universal insofar
as there are no known conditions under which it does not hold. Each piece of
Cf. Putnam (1983), 84.
They are not relativistic in the usual sense. The judgment of validity or truth is relative to the
state of argumentation, which, in turn, is relative to each achieved understanding of the world. But
the limits of this particular understanding are always only recognizable when exceeded; cf. the
Section Relativism in Chap. 7.
94
Cf. Wellmer (1989), 340.
95
Cf. Wright (1992), 60 f., 75, 865, 922.
92
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knowledge functions as a premise or beginning for the deduction of truths. This is

the outline of a concept of truth that has its basis in justifications and is not subject
to objections of the type advanced by Gettier, because it makes use of a more differentiated concept of justification (justifications contain theory relative to each
achieved state of argumentation).
The colloquial, practical talk of true and truth (it is true that the wall is white
and that the rose is red, that I should clean up my desk, that sunshine follows rain,
and that man is made of crooked wood) should be viewed as a low, modest version
of the pragmatic concept of truth. It does not require an explicit structure of justification and seems to simply reflect a given reality because it often refers to practical
matters.
A statement that has been justified as true or as implied by knowledge is not falsified by the next best statement that is inconsistent with it. If it is supposed to be
more than an anomaly, the inconsistent statement must at least be justifiable with
recourse to epistemic theoryi.e. theory that is already stable as a support for
practiceif it cannot be justified with knowledge. It is only this kind of constellation that results in a quaestio or is fit to initiate research (cf. Chap. 2). The same
applies to objections to gaps in ones knowledge.

1.7 Other Types of Theoretical Bases for Arguments

In any practice of argumentation, there are theoretical presuppositions. Some of
these presuppositions are more tenable than others. My term for the totality of these
presuppositionswhich can still be subdivided into categories, types, and modes
is theoretical basis. I have also called such presuppositions epistemic theory.
The term refers to a mode in which we argue and act on the assumption of certain
theories. The first and most noble kind of epistemic theory is knowledge that is
realized practically and features internally and externally satisfactory theoretical
qualities. But there are also other kinds of theory that we presuppose. That is to say,
we assume their validity in our practice of argumentation and use them to construct
new theory.
I subsume these other varieties under the designation doxastic theory. That we
act on the assumption of such theory is justified by the fact that we use it as
practical orientation. Doxastic theory does not simply mean accepted opinion.
The maxim that we have to agree on a theoretical basisI will call such a common
theoretical basis argumentative basisshould not simply be considered as being
followed when the participants give their factual consent.96 The reason for this is
Cf. Wolfgang Kleins proposal (Klein (1980), 19) that the goal of argumentation is to transform
something collectively questionable into something collectively valid with the help of something
collectively valid. That sounds like an interesting alchemical process of transformation. However,
this process does not result in anything stable if, as Klein believes; what is collectively valid is
simply what has been accepted factually. Nevertheless, Kleins paper contains some interesting
96

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49

that a merely spontaneously accepted opinion is not sufficiently stable to support an

argument or to contribute to the support. After all, a spontaneous opinion is as
quickly accepted as abandoned. A thesis whose justification depends on mere
opinion does not offer much practical guidance: As soon as something happens that
conflicts with this opinion, it is discarded. Hence, doxastic theory needs to p rovide
orientation and to be practically relevant. In contrast to knowledge, it is less sophisticated intra-theoretically, less transparent, less coherent with other orientations,
and not realized to such a large extent.
The aforementioned esoteric practices of stellar and oracular inquiry contain
doxastic theory. We encounter this doxastic theory when our interlocutors are adherents of such practices. However, it is not true that any doxastic theory in this sense
is accepted and taken seriously only by certain individuals or groups. Although this
is the case for most of what counts as doxastic theory, there is also doxastic theory
which everyoneor at least the vast majoritybelieves and which therefore shapes
practical reality almost like knowledge does.
Examples are metaphysical materialism (actually, the world is material),
enlightened egoism (actually, individuals only seek their own advantage and that
of those close to them, i.e. there is no layer in their personality that connects them
with the whole human race), the lack of alternatives to democratic capitalism (i.e. in
a community with a government elected by everyone, access to goods and ways of
acting and living has to be organized through private enterprises), etc. Such views
are not decisive worldwide, but at least in Western industrialized countries. In the
course of globalization, however, they spread all over the earth.
In Aristotles argumentation theory, such views were called endoxa. They were
usually considered as merely probable. Today, with the term probable, we
mostly associate quantification and statistical reasoning. As I mentioned and outlined in the introduction, this was different for Aristotle. Though not shared by all,
as is the case with knowledge, endoxa were still shared by most people or by the
most knowledgeable. This is a useful insight. However, it does not clarify how
endoxa relate to knowledge and mere factual opinion. The stipulations proposed
here, on the other hand, can clarify these relationships to some degree. Doxastic
theory is more than mere accepted opinion insofar as it has a certain guiding function for those who work with it in practical reality. And it is less than knowledge
insofar as it is less universal, less realized, and less theoretically transparent. In
summary: Doxa, doxastic theory, and endoxa are theoretical propositions that, for
the time being, have not become expressly questionable and for which there is no
researcheither because they are too self-evident or because we are stuck with a
particular way of questioning.

and valuable thoughts. Particularly its inventive way of describing the dynamics of argumentation
made sense to me at the time. Klein considered it meaningful, albeit with a bit of bad conscience,
that argumentation displaces what is debatable (24). I have incorporated this insight into my
proposal for a successor thesis (Chap. 4). The main weakness of Kleins approach is, I believe,
its narrow conception of pragmatism (which is restricted to a linguistic pragmatism).

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Another important variety of doxastic theory is mundane or lifeworld k nowledge.

In our everyday life, we all possess innumerable routines that could possibly be
represented theoretically. Usually, such routines contain all sorts of theories and, of
course, scientific knowledge (which, however, is often out-of-date). Lifeworld
knowledge is very close to the respective actions or praxes. It contains a number
oftheories that would withstand a rigorous dialogical examination and may thus
legitimately be described as knowledge. But it also contains many mistakes, idiosyncrasies, mostly unintentional allegations, and habits that would immediately
become void if they were taken seriously and examined as theory. However, these
theoretically imperfect parts are usually mixed and intertwined with solid knowledge,
particularly with elementary, almost irrefutable truths.
Despite its often theoretically dubious quality, lifeworld knowledge is not more
easily questioned in arguments. In fact, it is much less often seriously called into
question. Moreover, it is the basis for the reconstruction and teaching of all serious
theory. All validity claims need to be traced back to it. But once again, this basis is
also something factual; it is not the final or absolute foundation of all legitimate
theory.
Of course, most characteristic for lifeworld knowledge is its reference to the
normal practices of everyday life that are accomplished without any particular
pretenses or purposes. Lifeworld knowledge, as the theoretical side of everyday
activities, is practical in an almost palpable sense.97 Where sense data (typically
considered to be the beginning of all rational theory98) play a role, they do so because
we can usually rely on them being correct. Nevertheless, our aptitude for certain
sensory perceptions is not simply given, but formed or acquired. Ordinary people,
for example, do not have absolute hearing. They do hear the sound that is created
by playing the second string of a violin; but they cannot discern whether it is the
standard pitch A. This is different in the case of a white wall. Every person with
normal vision can confirm that it is white.
A final kind of doxastic theory are ideas (especially religious ones) that bestow
existential meaning upon life. Their scope and importance are enormous. For most
people, if they are not distracted from themselves by too much work or worries,
their own actions are embedded in views that concern, organize, and interpret their
life as a whole. Such views are generally not completely private, for they link people
to groups, tribes, and communities. Whether this is consistent with any of the great
religions and their organizations or whether it is just a more or less complex collective myth does not really matter. What does matter, however, is that even on these
highest (or deepest) levels of understanding of the self and the world, there is
theory.99 In part, this theory is acquired during early childhood or in the decisive
Cf. Mittelstra (1991).
Ulrich Steinvorth, for example, considers sentences such as The wall is white or There is a
glass of water on the table to be the unproblematic beginnings of knowledge; cf. Steinvorth
(2002).
99
I will discuss this in Chap. 3 under the title The Level of Existential Meaning in the System of
Orientation.
97
98

1.8Access to Knowledge: Teaching and Research

51

stages of socialization, and it is then sometimes discussed, in some cases even

passionately. But insofar as it is accepted, it is realized in the respective peoples
theoretical and practical activities. For this reason, this is the most important variety
of doxastic theory.

1.8 Access to Knowledge: Teaching and Research

How do people arrive at knowledge? Basically, in two ways. If knowledge already
exists, they acquire it through teaching. If knowledge does not yet exist, but is
needed, people acquire it through research. Teaching is constituted by a teachinglearning situation. I have written about this extensively in Sect.1.3. In this context,
I was concerned with teaching an easily comprehensible practice, woodworking, by
means of which I explained the relations between action and understanding or,
rather, the ascent to theory. However, if we speak of teaching in connection with
knowledge, we usually do not think of a training workshop, but of schools and
colleges. In the latter cases, we are very far removed from the praxis. For most
teachers, it is a truism that this is a disadvantage. In terms of a pragmatic understanding of theory, it is catastrophic. Knowledge learned mechanically according to
the principle of the Nuremberg Funnel100 initially remains an empty thought
pattern that does not help to understand anything. A successfully completed examination does not prove that the candidate is knowledgeable; it rather shows that he is
a person with a good, perhaps even creative, memory. Anyone working in institutions of teaching and learning that lack references to praxes, which are guided and
supported by the theories that are taught, hopes that the students will be able to use
and implement their knowledge in real life. That is to say, they hope that the
students will recognize relevant situations and correctly connect them with the
previously received instructions.
Still, the teaching-learning situation is an interesting type of dialogue for the
practice of argumentation. Teaching does usually not consist in the teacher lecturing and the student memorizing.101 On the contrary, the teacher is concerned
with the students cognitive stimulation. The subject matter is presented in the
form of theses with justifications and possible objectionswhich are partly
brought forth by students and partly introduced by the teacher as contrasts. This
Translators note: The phrase Nuremberg Funnel is a description of a mechanical way of
teaching and learning. It has its origins in the title of a German textbook on poetics published in
Nuremberg in 1647. The phrase became a common idiomatic expression whose wide distribution
is still reflected in contemporary German expressions such as etwas eintrichtern (literally to
funnel something in).
101
Even during my university days, there were still professors who read a text aloud while students
would transcribe as much of it as possible (often with the help of a shorthand, they had learned or
developed for that very purpose) and then memorize the text at home. Some of what is considered
to be the most advanced kind of academic learning today under the rubric of e-learning is structurally akin to this old-authoritarian kind again.
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creates an extraordinary situation of argumentation. Knowledge occurs as a

thesis, even though that would not be necessary because it has already moved
beyond the thetic status. That, however, is only true for the teacher, not for the
student. If it can be assumed that the student knows at least a few things, it makes
sense to take this already existing knowledge as the theoretical basis and construct new knowledgewhich the student has yet to learnon top of it as the
thesis. Exactly what kind of process this is will be discussed in the next chapter.
This type of argumentative practice is interesting because the propositions or
conclusions it justifies as valid do not really need any justification. It is a fact that
they are validbut the student is not yet aware of this. The justification may be
able to show him that the knowledge in question results from premises he has
already learned. In other words: In this teaching-learning situation, a justification
may demonstrate to the student that he already knows what needs to be learned.
Such a demonstration is particularly striking if the justification makes use of a
syllogism.
This allows us to formulate a first answer to the always interesting question of
why logicistic thinking seems to be so plausible in argumentation theory: In the
whole history of thought, the teaching-learning situation has been viewed as the
typical locus of argumentation. On the one hand, this was the case in schools,
where students were introduced to knowledge. On the other hand, it was the case
in scholarly debates, which aimed at deriving controversial or questionable propositions in one way or another from statements by relevant authorities that functioned as stable truths. In those cases, too, the strongest argument was the syllogism.
The fact that this could not really work, that a syllogism cannot generate any new
substantial knowledge, did not confuse people. They simply did not give a sincere
account of the subtle operations of interpretation and reinterpretation that they
implicitly carried out in their conclusions derived from quotations by Aristotle and
the Church Fathers.
I would like to say this quite clearly at this point: An instruction that seeks to
convey knowledge through mere talk should incorporate at least some aspects of the
practice of argumentation. In a dialogue, the student has the opportunity to criticize
that a certain inference is incomprehensiblesince inferences cannot always be
logical. This may at least lead to some references to the praxes in need of orientation
and support.
Such a pedagogical argumentation is therefore suitable for detecting and eliminating the students subjective deficits in understanding. The practice of argumentation is not exhausted by logical reasoning. There is also a subjective side to serious
arguing. Any theoretical basis, all theses and arguments can take on a subjective
form in a dialogue and must then be treated and processed correspondingly. As for
the school, the ideal situation would be one in which the teacher has the individual
students learning success in mind and regards it as the goal of his pedagogical
activities. Currently, we are far away from this ideal case in schools and universities
(in Germany). Nevertheless, the task should be clear.
The other access to knowledge, research, is disproportionately more important for
theorizing the practice of argumentation. Research is, at the same time, teaching the

1.8Access to Knowledge: Teaching and Research

53

subject in question. There is no teacher, but reality. Reality, however, is not

ready-made, but exists as a field of open possibilities, which can be realized and
unfolded in many different ways. Research takes knowledge into account, too. But
inthis case, it is not sacrosanct; we have to be prepared to revise and renew it
sometimes in smaller or larger parts, sometimes all the way down to its foundations.
It may not seem easy to reconcile the ways in which knowledge can be revised
with the pragmatic concept of theory. If a practice is established, this means that
human actions will lead to success in a regular and satisfactory manner. Theory that
qualifies as knowledge represents these conditions symbolically in concepts, propositions, and systems of propositions. Now, if knowledge is revised, does that show
that our practical successes were merely imagined?
No, praxis is always richer than theory.102 Only in hindsight, once the theory has
been improved, we can say what was incomplete or mistaken about our understanding of the praxis. These relations can be illustrated by famous examples
from the history of science. Let us consider the phlogiston theory: Research about
a heat substance, which began to take off in the early 18th century, was based on
knowledge about combustion that went back to the days of Prometheus gift to
humanity and on knowledge about metallurgical processes that had also endured
for millennia. People were able to melt iron ore into iron, turn copper and tin into
bronze, etc. These practices were well known and understood and, where necessary, theoretically transparent as well. It does not matter that the corresponding
theorywhich was partly alchemical and hermetic theorywas later dismissed.
In hindsight, we can say that the relevant parts of theories on combustion and
smelting consisted of HOW-knowledge (know-how) with a long and successful
history and only a few, tolerable puzzles.
By the end of a turbulent research period during the first half of the 18th century,
alchemy had lost its significance. The old doctrine of the elements had been turned
inside out, air and water were no longer elements, heat was not a substance anymore, and oxygen was now necessary for combustion. This means that there had
previously been objects in the praxis that subsequently did not exist anymore, even
though it was still the same praxis: namely the elements air and water and the substance phlogiston (the identification and designation of phlogiston only
endured for about 50years, but during that time, the practice of, for instance, soda
production explicitly referred to the phlogiston103). And suddenly, in the millennia-old
practice of smelting metals, there was an important elementoxygenthat had not
existed before.
I realize that this description is offensive because it tells the story as if there were
mighty magicians at work, who can make some things vanish and bring other things
into existence. It is a provocation that seeks to dramatize the entanglement of
It is true in an abstract way that we could theorize a respective praxis differently. In a concrete
situation, though, we have no reason to. The fact that a theory does not exhaust the potencies of a
praxis, that there are other possibilities which we explore when our orientation proves to be deficient
is the pragmatic significance of Quines indeterminacy thesis. Cf. Quine (1960) and Quine (1981).
103
Cf. Psarros (1999), 155.
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theoretically grasped objects with human practices and their respective goals. It is
easy to say that the (natural) world is as it is. But it is also a completely empty statement. The world of Homer already included the possibilities of DNA analysis and
cell phones that our own world contains. Odysseus, however, did not have a cell
phone. Nor did Homer know that he did not possess a cell phone. (Moreover, he did
not even know that he did not know, i.e. this is an instance of exponentiated ignorance that I will address in Chap. 5.)
The unwrapping and realization of the possibilities of reality that constitute the
advancement of knowledge is not a process like opening a curtain. Newly appearing
objects have not previously been on the stage of the human theater. This is true for
oxygen as well as for bacteria, X-ray radiation, electric power, social security, and
the identity card. It is even true for America, which became the New World once
it had been discovered. This erratic suggestion can be found in numerous
Enlightenment publications in which nature is depicted as a beautiful lady who is
disrobed by another beautiful lady, namely science. To this day, the Nobel Prize
medals for the natural sciences are adorned with a 19th century representation of
this ceremonial disrobing. Whether this will mostly delight men or possibly also
women is less important than it is misleading. In truth, something new emerges, a
new object, and something old disappears which is not just the virginity of the
world. What vanishes are real objects and actions of all kinds (because they are only
partially included in the books of history) and, consequently, circumstances that
constitute peoples lives and themselves.
The actualization of real possibilities,104 with the progress of knowledge as its
theoretical side, is a process in which people give up all they live and exist for and,
by doing so, become other people. They fight each other on account of this and then
reconcile and find social forms which allow them to truly experience the newly
created possibilities without laying waste to the world. Knowledge is indeed transitory. But only when viewed in the context of human life praxis, it becomes evident
what that means. Without this background, theories about the growth of knowledge
are nothing more than abstract intellectual games.

It is feasible that there could have been other actualizations of what is possible. In light of this,
our history would have to be considered an anthropocentric actualization. But even this idea is still
too general. The actualization of what is possible contains structures of framing (cf. Chap. 5) and
hence selections that shape some lines of development and suppress others. It is not simply man
in his interactions with the world who develops this world and himself. He always only pursues
certain possibilities. Whether possibilities that have been ignored or suppressed will ever turn up
again is unpredictable. Cross-cultural medicine is an instructive example in this regard. European
traditional medicine has turned the human body into a technical mechanism whose parts are
repaired, reactivated, and replaced if they do not function properly. In traditional Chinese medicine, on the other hand, the body is an ensemble of energies that flow along specific pathways
(meridians). Such energies may be blocked, so they have to be stimulated to break the blockades.
The current hope that this view may not be lost in the process of globalization is probably rooted
in the fact that this kind of medicine remains affordable.
104

Chapter 2

Research

2.1

The Concept of Research

If orientation is missing, but is necessary or promising, we carry out research.

Research, then, is goal oriented, not a shot in the darkeven though in many cases
something that emerged out of the dark proved to be valuable for research. The great
and general aim of research is orientation: how to improve, complete, and correct it.
Ordinarily, we associate research with science, institutionalized science, and,
most of all, with the natural sciences. Great role models in this regard are genetic
engineering and particle physics, both of which excavate the fine structures of the
world through persistent labor in the laboratory and tremendous instrumental effort.
Perhaps only space travel is similarly impressive as a type of large-scale research
that smacks of adventure and the discovery of the true limits of earthly life. However,
social research, historical research, linguistic research, case law, or even philosophical
reflections seem to be less important offshoots of laboratory science, and their
results are seemingly much less consequential.
Just as commonly, research is regarded and described as the expression of a pure
quest for knowledge. Our usual understanding of research views it as driven by an
interest in things that actually do not concern us at allhence by the pure desire for
knowledge characteristic of theoretical curiosity.1
Although this certainly used to be a motivating factorand occasionally still is
todaycuriosity is, at most, one side of the proverbial coin. Research that is set in
motion by curiosity is beyond or above the ends and needs of living human beings.
It is not driven by them, but develops separately from needs and practices. Such a
concept of research draws a one-sided picture, which continues to be influential in
the philosophy of science and even dominates the self-understanding of many scientists. It seems as if research was primarily or exclusively theory construction. The
practical side, however, that is, the side of research activities, remains neglected and
misunderstood.
1

Cf. Blumenberg (1973), who tells the story of this curiositas.

H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,

Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_2,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

55

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2 Research

This, too, is a result of the developments in the 20th-century philosophy and

philosophy of science that I already mentioned in Chap. 1. When the theorists who
think about knowledge and truth have studied a certain field themselves (most philosophers of science were educated in an exact science like physics or mathematics),
but are not actively involved in research activities, it comes as no surprise that
they equate the development of science with the development of theory. Thus,
Reichenbachs distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification (a modernization of the old distinction between genesis and validity) was
regarded as quite plausible and soon made mandatorycoupled with the demand
that one ought to restrict oneself to the context of justification. Needless to say that,
in the context of justification, people only thought of formal derivations from
premises and of the eradication of logical contradictions. The picture that Popper
draws of science and its progress in his classic book The Logic of Scientific
Discovery2 is convincing only as far as the restriction to the context of justification
(understood as the strict observation of logical steps) remains intact. In retrospect,
this limitation is so extreme that it is hard to understand why Popper could receive
such tremendous support. After all, in this picture of science, nothing was justified anymore. Instead, hypotheses were set up and upheld as long as they survived
attempts at refuting them. Only motives (not justifying arguments) were considered
for the genesis of hypotheses. But these remained largely unnoticed, because they
belonged to the context of discovery.
When Kuhn threw this picture into disarray with his (by now equally classic)
book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,3 part of his achievement was to ignore
the restriction to the context of justification and to study the context of discovery.
Hence the new picture of scientific progress was more realistic. A theory is not
abandoned simply because, when tested, it leads to contradictions; likewise, a different theory is not adopted simply because it passes the tests. Rather, theories are
embedded in paradigms, which contain many nontheoretical parts, in particular
personal experiences, relationships, and preferences. The progress of scientific
knowledge is the triumph of one paradigm over another. Whether one paradigm
triumphs over another justifiably is not a burning question in Kuhns book, because
the new picture of scientific progress is explained with respect to the history of
science and not to problems and processes at todays fronts of knowledge. In
retrospect, it is very easy to say that, for example, phlogiston theory was rightly
succeeded by oxygen theory. But for the parties involved in this transition, it is
usually a complex question without a compelling answer. Lavoisier, one of the
protagonists of this revolution (who, tragically and ironically, became the victim
of an entirely different revolution, namely the political revolution in France),
abandoned the phlogiston, but still pursued his own concept of a heat substance
(which he called caloricum) for decades.
If the question of justification comes up with respect to paradigm shifts, a judgment about the appropriateness of frame structures is needed. I will approach this
2
3

Cf. Popper (1968).

Cf. Kuhn (1970).

2.1 The Concept of Research

57

problem in Chap. 5. For now, I will only say this: Regarding heat as a substance,
even as an element, means framing certain phenomena (experienced partly through
the senses, partly through apparatuses) in a certain way. Thus, the heat substance is
inside the warm object, it is able to leave it, go back into it again, etc. But if heat is
considered to be the motion of the objects particles, then everything is different. In
that case, warming up an object means setting its parts in motion; it no longer means
adding a substance. What we would now have to decide is in what sense a theory
that frames heat as motion could be better than a theory that frames it as a substance.
Kuhns account of the progress of knowledge, however, does not allow us to judge
this according to general theoretical and/or philosophical criteria. It does not even
put the question on the agenda as the most central one. Instead, it introduces a perspective that presents the fact of theoretical change as a result of many personal and
social circumstances, events, and reactions that have to be described in terms of
sociology and social psychology.
As a result, the philosophy of science has for decades been preoccupied with
descriptions of various social, mental, and political circumstancessometimes even
peculiar onesthat influence and, to some extent, determine the research process in
the laboratory. The philosophy of science was almost perceived as a variation of
the description of social and material relations within an alien and strange tribe. The
real question as to why research results, theories, hypotheses, interesting effects, or
explanations could be right or wrongand in what sense frame structures might be
justifiablewas replaced by the question of why certain people believe something
and how they are able to move others to a similar belief. Postmodern social constructivism took over the philosophy of science and, for a time, even succeeded in replacing the concept of scientific or theoretical truth with the concept of being persuaded
by just any constructions.4

Cf. Latour and Woolgar (1979). According to this account, empirical natural science actually
consists in creating any (seemingly arbitrary) constructions of order. But if we ask about the
validity claim of this theory, and whether the theory itself is also merely a construction of some
order, we receive the following instruction at the end of the book: [] we do not claim to have
any better access to reality [than the scientists, H.W.] and we do not claim to be able to escape
from our description of scientific activity. [] In a fundamental sense our own account is no
more than fiction (257, emphasis in the original). Hence, the scientific presentation of neuroendocrinological circumstances in the brain, for example, is described from a sociological and
anthropological perspective, which regards itself as a fiction and thus insinuates that it is similar to what is described. As far as the latter is acceptable, it is about as relevant as the statement
that both the scientist and the philosopher of science use computers. Science as a praxis, however, has felicity structures that have to do with the confirmation and progress of knowledge.
Anthropologists of science, who objectify this praxis, can only grasp the outside of the process
of forming a conviction. They ignore the difference between a belief of any kind (e.g. the belief
formed in a research group after the approval of their grant application) and a true belief. Such
a description of science, which does not care about the (implicit) validity claims of the described
praxis, is actually no description of science at all. Granted, it needed to be said that scientists act
just as smartly, stupidly, and brilliantly as ordinary people. But it is a helpless aberration to seriously present this as a philosophy of science. For socio-anthropological thinking in the philosophy of science, cf. also Knorr-Cetina (1981).

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In 1983, Ian Hackings book Representing and Intervening5 was published and
claimed to be the first thematization of the scientific practice of experimentation.
Dingler and the circle of methodical constructivists around Paul Lorenzen,6 who
had never abandoned the issue, were not mentioned in Hackings book. But at least
the genuine questions about science and knowledge were taken seriously again. Ten
years later, Philip Kitchers book about scientific progress was published,7 subtitled
Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. In this book, the rampant
socio-anthropological perspective was reined in, but the concept of knowledge was,
as it were, personalized. Specific qualities of theories were no longer considered as
candidates for the definition of knowledge, but rather the scientists cognitive or
mental states. In the conclusion of Kitchers book, we read that science has not
really progressed as gloriously as legend would have it. But by and large, according
to Kitcher, things in science have at least been rational. Now, he writes, the task is to
observe and change scientific practice.8 Since the end of the 20th century, the so-called
new experimentalism has introduced approaches to mainstream philosophy of science
that address the practice of science and take it seriously. There is some reason to
hope that, in the future, certain things will improve.9
Quite obviously, scientific research in its disciplinary guise is an activity that
develops standardssystems of interrelated kinds of actions that aim at known or
expected felicity structures. So even in science there are regular praxes in the sense
explicated here (in Chap. 1). In fact, this is actually quite typical of established
scientific disciplines. It makes sense to embed research practice into more farranging areas of practiceinto general goals, desires, and hardshipswhen we try
to elucidate factual motives for the acceptance or rejection of theories. But these
motives tell us nothing about whether the accepted theories are valid or true or
whether they are at least better than the ones rejected in any factual respect.10

Cf. Hacking (1983).

Cf. Dingler (1938), Lorenzen (1961, 1964, 1987), Inhetveen (1983), Janich (1985), Tetens (1987).
7
Kitcher (1993).
8
Kitcher (1993), 390/91 ff.
9
Ulrich Charpa develops a theoretical description of the research process that describes researchers actions as guided by rules that are typical for the virtues of the successful researcher; cf.
Charpa (2001). Scientific knowledge is supposed to be understood as nothing more than the
knowledge of researchers (92). Hence Charpa does not refer to theories, butin accordance with
the perspective advanced by Kitcher et al.to mental facts (93). These, however, are not mere
opinions (94). They are epistemically privilegedwhich is because they rest on well-founded
decisions to accept a thesis (183 ff.). Charpa calls a decision well founded if accepting T is considered to be the best way to meet a research objective (established in a reputable tradition). Prima
facie, this is a reasonable and plausible view. It can be reconciled with the notion that T is a thesis
for which we have a clear argumentative construction in the sense of the concept of dialogical
justification expounded here. It should be noted, however, that traditions, even if they are reputable
and have, so far, been successful, may under certain circumstances also turn out to be shackles that
need to be cast off.
10
This is why Lakatos wanted to separate these parts of the history of science as external, which,
however, was met with little enthusiasm. Cf. Lakatos (1974).
6

2.1 The Concept of Research

59

It is a fact that research has become very expensive in the course of the 20th century,
especially in the professions that are considered to be relevant. Hence, it needs financial
backers. As a consequence, its goals are determined by other peoples interests.
Therefore, research partly takes place in the R&D departments of private companies.
In general, research provides research results. But even if these are integrated into
existing theory, they are not yet knowledge. They only become knowledge through a
successful realization in practical life. For this to succeed, it takes more than simply
embedding research results into the factual fabric of the dominant interests. What is
needed is progress in human self-understanding. Whether the changes following largescale research in the natural sciences can become meaningful and fruitful will depend,
among other things, on the results of research in the humanities and social sciences and
in jurisprudence and philosophy. All these disciplines will be necessary for furthering
self-understanding or for dealing with the frictions that will most likely develop.
The practice of argumentation deals with new orientations. New orientations are
developed by research. That is the reason for why a theory of argument needs a
concept of research. Such a concept must not be reduced to a theory-laden conception of what is going on in science labs; it has to be more general.
In order to develop such a concept, I suggest the following view: People want to
find their way around. They have a basic need for orientation. First of all, as part of
the general necessities of life, this need is embedded in the ordinary activities of
coping with life and the world. Under certain circumstances, it may rise above these
activities and gain some distance to and independence from them. If something is so
unclear, incomprehensible, doubtful, or disputed that subjective assessments and
dogmas dwindle, then the need for orientation appears in its purest form. To pursue
this need means to do research.
More precisely, research means the following: We deliberately and intensively
establish contact with the facts in question. Even though this contact is also guided
by what we know about the matter, such knowledge must be used very carefully. I
will soon explain why that is the case. In particular, it is important to note that such
research-based contact is not merely receptive. Sensuous, emotional, and intuitive
forces need to be activated for it. We must commit ourselves to the causenot just
as thinking beings but, more generally, as bodily, vital people. As I said before, in
research we mobilize all the knowledge that is available of a particular subject. But
at the same time, this knowledge is kept at a distance, because it may be responsible
for the gaps and errors in orientation. The facts or phenomena, which manifest
themselves in contact with it, are ideally examined without any reservations. Often,
we need to develop appropriate procedures for this specific purpose. Depending on
the topic, this requires the deployment of means and time and a specific ethos independent of individual interests. In this sense, research is a type of action that aims at
new orientationwhere orientation is to be understood in the sense of the pragmatic concept of theory developed in Chap. 1. Research is ubiquitous human behavior aimed at expanding our possibilities of understanding and acting.
Thus understood, research is multidimensional. We can distinguish between
four dimensions. Later, when we are concerned with describing the practice of argumentation, we will meet these four dimensions again in a slightly different shape.

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For now, we can distinguish between a theory-forming and a theory-testing, a

subjective and an objective dimension. It is part of the felicity conditions of research
activities that researchers avoid both being entirely detached from reality and being
completely embedded in individual interests. Felicitous research strikes a balance
between a commitment to ones own projects and a distance that is concerned with
validity and truth. Research is by no means simply trial and error. It is rather typical
for serious research that the researcher already knows something, but he needs to use
his knowledge as well as keep it at a distance, because it both supports and impedes
the process.
Research in this sense does not only exist in the sciences. It constantly occurs in our
normal life praxis and in our ways of coping with the world. Where do we find a quiet
little pub with friendly service and moderate prices in the city? How do we get our
broken down car back home from a deserted country road? Why does the new computer cause such annoying problems? Small children in particular are avid researchers.
In fact, their appropriation of the world is exemplary for the concept of research that I
aim at here. Not only do they explore the external world and its possibilities, but in
doing so they also explore themselves, that is, their own possibilities of doing and causing something, understanding, and communicating. In addition, children and young
people strike an almost perfect balance between commitment and distance. Even
though they usually know and understand much less than the world, organized by
adults, requires them to, they have not resigned themselves (in a frustrated or modest
manner) to the facta part of the conditio humanathat all knowledge and understanding is merely partial. On the other hand, they are not yet fully assured and rigid in
what they already know and understand, because their knowledge is backed up by very
little life experience. In general, if their acquired theories prove to be a hindrance, they
are able to let go of them much more easily than adults.
We live in times of upheaval at the beginning of the 21st century. Peoples living
conditions change at a pace that creates a sense of unreality. The motto of lifelong
learning contains some truth. In the terminology favored here, according to which
learning is not something receptive, but something activesomething that activates
individual questions, existing epistemic theory, and a creative intuition that, ultimately,
may aid in furthering knowledgeit should actually be called lifelong research.
Conscious, awake people have always been known to do research all their lives. If
common people of the future developed such a research disposition, they would be
far superior to common people of the past and present. It would appear that such a
development is even necessary. Because only then can they hope to find solutions to
ecological, economic, and political problems that seem hopeless today.

2.2

The Limit of Orientation as the Place of Research:

Question, Problem, and Quaestio

If orientation is missing, research is carried out. This does not imply that, where
there is no research, people are oriented. Adults have usually reached a state of
normal orientation: some knowledge mixed with a little more doxa. Taken together,

2.2 The Limit of Orientation as the Place of Research

61

this is no more than a small boat on the vast ocean of ignorance. Still, this acquired
bit of epistemic theory allows for some coarse navigation. This normal orientation
enables the average person to get through the day, usually even through years and
decades. Even if the questions become big and serious, most of the time we average
people have enough wit and thick skin to repel them.
Most of the timebut not always. Sometimes we have reason to pause after all.
Technical problems, interpersonal problems, and metaphysical problems can
assume proportions in which the orientation deficit becomes painful. As is well
known, knowledge can be bought from experts; consequently, we often ask them.
But on the one hand, there are no experts for every field, and on the other hand,
expert knowledge is also limited and, in particular, shot through with personal
opinionthis becomes obvious time and again in questions about large-scale technologies, medicine, economics, etc. Therefore, if there is a pressing concern, we have
no choice but to start research on our own, using the means that are available.
In this context, problem is one of my terms for the type of situation in which
orientation is missing, but necessaryor at least desirable. Without a noticeable
lack of orientation, there is no research. We are finite beings with a finite orientation. But few of these limits are perceived as a deficiency. Someone who knows
more is not just a bit less limited. He especially knows more about the possible
limits of orientation. These limits of orientation become particularly palpable in the
case of gaps in understanding for which there is no explanationsometimes not
even a proper description of the circumstances in questionor in the case of contradictions, for example, if what we discover is very different from what we expected
to happen.
In order to clarify this explanation, I would like to discuss some situations that
are candidates for problems. It should be clear that most problems in the daily life
of the (rich) industrialized countries are basically interpersonal problems. We have
a lot of theory for such problems: ethics, psychology, communication theory, and
social psychology. But this theory is both extremely context sensitive and usually
not available in problematic situations. If, however, we simply continue to argue
without questioning the theoretical basis, we experience episodes like the following
one, which is presented as an example for an argument with a system of contrasts in
Kienpointners Alltagslogik11.
A husband and wife (Siegfried and Martha) get into a fight because the woman
waters flower pots in the bathroom sink, which makes it difficult for the man to
wash his hands.
M: The flowers need it, because otherwise theyll be ruined. And by the way, a
flowering plant costs 11 dollars.
S: Well, then you shouldnt have bought such an expensive plant in the first place.
M: The flowers were a gift.
S: Ah! First they cost 11 dollars, now they are a gift.
M: If someone gives you a gift, then you cant let it go to ruin.

11

Kienpointner (1992), 318.

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Kienpointners analysis of the passage is this: Marthas utterance contains, on

the one hand, the conversational implication that she has bought the flowers
and, on the other hand, the explicit statement that they are a gift. Claiming that
the flowers were a gift and that they were bought, however, is a very obvious
contradiction.12
What is going on here? What is the point of this passage? Is there a deficit in
orientation that needs to be resolved? Could the issue be whether it is right for the
flowering plants to be in the sink? For that question, however, the difference
between having bought something and having received it as a giftand whether
they are contradictoryis completely irrelevant. Is the point that the man wants
to demonstrate to the woman that she does not think logically? Or does the woman
want to show the man thatlogic or notshe has the necessities of practical life
and a sensible human behavior in mind? Does mentioning a price really imply
(conversationally) that one has bought the flowers? Is the view that one should
not spend 11 dollars on flowers affected by the information that the woman has
not spent the money herself? Does the demand not to let flowers that are a gift go
to ruin say anything about whether they should now sit in the sink? Perhaps the
point is not whether the flowers should be in the sink at all, but rather that two
people, who each constantly insist on being right, have found yet another opportunity for their petty games. Do we not need something entirely different than
such funny or pathetic cantankerousness? I know that this whole scenario may be
regarded as something argumentative. Some people might even like to regard it as
typically argumentative in order to demonstrate that arguing is a misguided and
abstract matter.
But, on the one hand, this is not necessary. It would be enough to say that
something is missing here: the question as to what the thesis is and which theory
is established in order to proceed with it. If there is not enough theory, we could
say that the dispute in question is not decidable argumentativelyit is, in fact,
not even something to argue about. We rather have to come to some kind of
amicable agreement.
On the other hand, regarding the scenario as argumentative does not make sense.
Sometimes we really want or need to do research to counter a deficit in orientation,
which means we have to set up theses about the states of affairs in question and
discuss them afterwards. But if we devalue our argumentative competence by applying it to foolish bickering, we will not have anything left for those cases where arguments are actually needed.
These remarks arise from the conviction that the practice of argumentation is
very important and precious. The rational organization of the world and the justification of human self-confidence depend on it. Hence, not every disagreement or
even conflict is an occasion for argumentation, but only situations that are about
testing and improving orientations.

12

Kienpointner (1992), 318.

2.2 The Limit of Orientation as the Place of Research

63

Let us consider some other examples from our daily life and wonder to what
extent they could be opportunities for serious research:
(1) The light in the living room does not work. The key to the house has disappeared.
(2) A mathematical task or quiz, a puzzle turns out to be difficult.
(3) The children want to ice-skate on the frozen pond, but we are not sure that the
ice is thick enough.

2.2.1

Are These Problems Occasions for Research?

If the light will not switch on, a normally oriented, ordinary person tries to replace
the light bulb or check the fuse. If that does not help, usually an electrician who
knows the relevant practice of emergency maintenance is called in to take care of
the problem. It is clear that, in this case, there is a solution to the problem. The ways
to find it are also known. The fault is nothing really new. It might take a while to
detect it, but this is merely due to the fact that there are several possibilities and that
the inquirer is too inexperienced to find the solution right away. I would like to call
this type of occasion a task, not a problem. Exercises in schools and universities
are of the same type. In these cases, it takes existing competence to find the solution;
in turn, the competence is trained by exercising it.
The same applies to the lost key. It might have been misplacedso we check a
few places where it might be. If this does not help, we call a locksmith to deal with
the matter. But some people might want more: to find the key at any price, even if
all possible spots have already been searched thoroughly. This might make sense if
life is sufficiently well structured, so that further ways of locating the key can be
found.13 If not, everything is up in the air. (In that case, all we are left with are rules
of thumb such as You should search under a lantern, because at least you will have
some light.) A lost key may still be a problem in that case, but only as a source of
trouble and no longer as a stimulus for research in the sense outlined here.
The scenarios in (2) are of a different type. In these cases, it is also clear that there
are solutions, but currently no standardized approaches to these solutions. I would like
to call this type a puzzle. What is needed here is not so much a standardized competence, but rather general creative intelligence and imagination. Puzzles are like an
equation with two unknowns: the solution and the way to arrive at it. If knowledge can
be accumulated to arrive at a solutionas in the case of guessing games that, for
example, require you to narrow down results by asking a game master 17 + 4 informative questionssolving a puzzle can become an activity similar to research. But the
conceptual difference I aim at is this: There is a solution in this case. The solution is
already a part of knowledgebut not yet of the guessing persons knowledge.
13

In Gabriel Garca Mrquezs novel One Hundred Years of Solitude (cf. Mrquez (1984), 286 ff.),
the old blind Ursula finds her daughters lost wedding ring, because she is completely aware of
all her habitsa wonderful episode!

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Case (3) is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is clear that there is knowledge about
the bearing capacity of the ice depending on its thickness. On the other hand, this
knowledge is not available to the family at the lake. The childrens curiosity and
confidence become a problem in the sense of a danger that is difficult to avert. In
order to solve this problem, we impress upon the children that going on the ice
must be approved first. Outside the big cities, where such approval is a municipal task, questions of this kind are answered by experience. Again, the solution
(appropriate ratio of ice thickness and frost duration) is there, in principle; it is just
not available in this specific situation. We may then do small research (supervised
research): We conduct and analyze trial actions in order to test the thesis that the ice
can already bear some weight (by throwing stones onto the surface, sending the dog,
moving onto the edge of the pond ourselves, paying attention to sounds from the
ice). Each cracking sound refutes the thesis.
Let us move from the small to the big questions:
(4) It is unclear what it means to dispose of the radioactive waste from nuclear
power plants for many thousands of years.
(5) It is unclear how the genetic optimization of living beings may lead to the
progress of humanity on Earth.
(6) It is unclear how German universities can become institutions capable of educating
the required democratic-republican elite in the 21st century.
These questions are all problems in the sense envisaged here. We do not yet have a
solution. It is not even certain that there is one. Moreover, there are no standardized
approaches. It makes sense to consider a solution to (6) as a prerequisite for meaningful
research regarding (4) and (5). Anyone who is concerned with the details of such problems will soon find that it is particularly uncertain whether the problem has been
described properly in the first place. Complex problems are self-referential in the sense
that the process of grasping the problem can be obscured and influenced by the problem itself. In that case, the problem reflects the manner in which it is perceived.14 This
has implications for research, or rather the researchers need to prepare themselves for
changes in the deeper layers of their understanding of themselves and the world.
To illustrate this, I will present three larger and more complex historical problems. Since we were born later, we can study the research undertaken in the past and
hope to gain at least a few insights for our own research. The main insight I hope to
gain is that the role arguments have played in this research will become clear.
(7) At the end of the 15th centuryConstantinople had fallen, and the overland
passage to India had been lostit was doubtful whether the Atlantic Ocean
could be navigated by sea and whether India could be reached via the western

14

Cf. Watzlawick et al. (1974). In his book Change, Watzlawick distinguishes between first-order
and second-order solutions. In the case of second-order solutions, the real challenge is how to
conceptualize the problem. The book contains very enlightening descriptions. Watzlawicks insinuation, however, that typical mental disorders are of the second-order typeand can be cured
quickly and sustainably with ingenious redefinitions of problemsis likely to create illusions.

2.2 The Limit of Orientation as the Place of Research

65

passage. Research on this issue led to knowledge about the sphericity of the
Earth and to the discovery of the New World.
(8) At the end of the 17th century, researchers of the Western world were preoccupied with the topic of combustion. Their research first led to the introduction
of the substance phlogiston, then to its elimination, and finally to the transformation of alchemy into modern chemistry.
(9) At the end of the 18th century, absolute monarchy as a form of government had
been recognized as unsuitable and inhuman in France. Its violent abolition
during the Revolution created an enormous amount of problems, for example,
the specific problems of how to meet the troops of hostile European powers that
far outnumbered the revolutionaries, what should happen to the abdicated king,
etc., as well as the general problem of how to envision and organize the reality
of a rational republic. To this day, we are still preoccupied with that problem.
The great bulk of examples that I will use in this book to illustrate, explain, and
justify my proposals for argumentation theory is taken from these three historical
episodes of research and problem solving. A fourth field which I will refer to was
discussed above under (5): Toward the end of the 20th century, the human DNA was
mapped out. Geneticists, initially restrained by a jurisprudence based on moral reasoning, have embarked on a quest for the eradication of hunger and disease by means of
genetic engineering. It might sometimes seem as if genetic engineering could provide
humanity with the Archimedean point from which it can control its own evolution and
create the ideal human being. But life on Earth could also regress into chaos. So when
I present, construct, and comment on arguments from this field, I no longer merely
exemplify my ideas, but rather test whether a concept of argument that has been sufficiently clarified can contribute to the big debate about the future of humanity.
Back to the list: First of all, it should have become clear by now that not every
why question, not every disagreement, nor anything that is somehow difficult
induces research in the sense intended here. Not only those simple cases that we
categorized as bickering, task, and puzzle but also the very large oneslike the
meaning of the world and of humanityare of a different kind. In the latter two
cases, there is not even enough epistemic theory to ensure that we understand what
the problem is supposed to be.
To summarize, the basic structure of the problem as an impetus for research
consists of:
(a) A definable gap in orientation, which has the form of an open question, a missing explanation, and a persistent contradiction
(b) A need to fill the gap in orientation that cannot be warded off
(c) The absence of a clear approach to a solution
(d) A background of orientations that is available as epistemic theory in order to articulate the problem, outline a solution, and construct mental paths to arrive at it
Perhaps I should state explicitly that this concept of a problem is not quite like
our common understanding of that term. It is not necessarily a problem if we do
not know, master, or understand something or if we are unsure about how to proceed. What probably needs to be added to make it a problem is the threat of harm

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in case the orientation is not improved. But this is not necessary in order to stimulate
researchunless the noticed gap in orientation is already viewed as harmful. I will,
therefore, call an occasion for research a quaestio. Medieval rhetoricians and dialecticians used this word to designate a question in need of discussion. Such quaestiones are not necessarily descriptive; they can also be normative. Accordingly, I
regard efforts to elucidate and solve problems in the normative domain as research,
too. By doing so, I have once again accentuated our ordinary use of language. For
instance, in this book I regard the question of the proper form of the republic in
postrevolutionary France and the question of a sensible use of genetic engineering
as research questions. Thus, they have been accentuated differently than if we took
mere agreement on any solution among the parties involved to be the way to resolve
normative questions. Research is not primarily about agreement, but about new orientations. But this is a stipulation with regard to argumentation theory that does not
say whether, and in what sense, normative and descriptive arguments are distinct.
Both are only committed to the common question of how to rationally continue
thinking and acting beyond all previously established practice and theory.
One final point of this topic has yet to be discussed. I said above that problems are multidimensional. I mentioned a subjective and an objective dimension.
Problems can be characterized as relationships between orientations, deficits in
orientation, and the need for orientation. These three instances may vary from person to person. Hence, with regard to problems, the subjective side always needs to
be taken into account. A particular state of affairs is a problem for someone: Some
things are problems for some people, but not for others. Whether or not a pair of
curlews can brood in a meadow near the river Elbe is a problem for the farmer who
owns the meadow and for the few environmentalists who are aware of the birds.
But it is not a problem for audience members of the local theaters premiere of
King Lear. For them, it is a problem who has been cast as Cordelia. This, in turn,
does not concern the buskers from St. Petersburg, who hope to make a few Euros
in front of the theater by playing the most wonderful music. Some problems affect
many people; somesuch as ecological problemsaffect all of us. And yet this
does not mean that everyone who is affected by the problem engages with it and
initiates research.

2.3

New Theory That Supports New Actions

Research about a problem means, first of all, approaching the state of affairs in
question in the most unbiased way possible. In Chap. 1, I described how a theory
that supports a praxis generates an increasingly distinct subject-object relationship, if the formulaic rule stage (How-theory) gives way to a proposition stage
that elucidates and represents connections (Why-theory). Approaching the state
of affairs in question means undermining, abandoning, and dissolving this relationship, if necessary. A problem has a certain status within orientations. It is experienced and understood in a certain way. There are different kinds of adjacent

2.3 New Theory That Supports New Actions

67

epistemic theory which define the problem, act as a bias, and need to be put up
for discussion in order to reach an appropriate solution. Ideally, all the parts of
knowledge and doxa that affect the problem in theory and practice need to be
reviewed and, if necessary, abandonedincluding the relevant parts of ones selfunderstanding.15 The researcher has to be able to become one with the state of
affairs again, if possible.
In the research process, previously available epistemic theory acts as old theory. It plays a rather ambiguous role. On the one hand, it acts as a support; on the
other hand, it blocks new insights. On the one hand, it is a corroborated requirement
for capturing structures; on the other hand, it theorizes the field in question in such
a way that the problem occurs in the first place.16 It is tempting to express the
specific difficulty of the researcher trying to get in touch with a state of affairs as
follows: He has to penetrate the old way of theorizing to arrive at the thing itself. Yet
this characterization contains a misleading image. The old theory seems to be
wrapped around the thing like a crust or shell. Should it not simply be discarded, so
that the thing can be revealed in all its truth? This view contains a whole lot of
Western ontology. The slogan of phenomenology at the beginning of the 20th century
was Back to the things themselves! The phenomenologists were the last philosophers to clearly express this ontological condition; subsequently, it was criticized by
Heideggera critique which, though ambiguous and difficult to understand, seems
to argue for taking language and praxis into account.17 As such, it appears to move
in the same direction as Wittgensteins philosophy of languagethough the latter
partakes of a different spirit.
If we speak strictly, that is, taking the satisfiability of implicit validity claims
into account, a separation between theory and thing is impossible anyway. An
ontology as a verbal representation of what a thing really is, or what it is in
itself, is always a piece of theory itself. Even though it is more abstract, it still
carries a validity claim with it that can only be satisfied by presenting a potential
orientation value. Modern (post-Kantian) ontology fulfills much of its justificatory
duties by diligently modifying and repeating expressions that have already been
put forward over the course of the history of philosophy. Depending on individual

15

It is quite clear that, in research, humans have to let go of their prejudices. But how this can be
done is by no means clear. Great thinkers have devoted themselves to this question. Francis
Bacon, for example, who introduced induction as a research methodfully aware that it is a
mode of reasoning which easily leads to mistakesadvised his readers to become conscious of
their idols and to abandon them. For this purpose, he sorted these idols (Lat. idola, stereotyped thinking) into four groups (Idols of the Tribe, the Cave, the Market Place, the Theater), so
that one could at least catch a glimpse of the possible traps that demanded attention. Cf. Bacon
(2000), Book I, 3868.
16
Such impediments are usually connected with received ways of framing an issue; cf. also Chap. 5.
These are particularly persistent if they also mark boundaries between subjects or disciplines. It was
difficult to advance the theory of heat because, among other things, heat was first analyzed in physics, then in the (nascent) field of chemistry, and finally in physics again. In this respect, research is
naturally transdisciplinary; cf. the instructive examples in Mittelstra (1989b, 2007).
17
Cf. Gethmann (2007).

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assumptions, this procedure is likely to be met with either respect or disapproval.

Anyone who thinks about the meaning of certain propositions in an unbiased,
inquiry-based way and tries to find reasons for their validity either fails or is presented with the necessity of serious and lengthy studiesontology, after all, is a
specialized discipline of philosophy. However, the fact is mostly ignored that, from
the simplest to the most subtle figures of thought, implicit validity claims need to
be satisfied or at least clarified.
In my opinion, we need to understand the validity claims for ontological statements as follows: The author has gained these insights as a result of his reflections;
the audience now needs to receive them as an appeal to recognize itself, or rather
the preconditions of its own thinking and believing, in the presented formulations
(cf. Chap. 9). But some philosophers recognize themselves in the early Wittgenstein,
The world is everything that is the case,18 while others prefer the late Heidegger:
The wide expanse of everything that grows and abides along the pathway is what
bestows world.19 In order to avoid simple relativistic consequences, there seems to
be only one thing we can do: to refer to actions and to the standardization of actions
in praxes, to form and stabilize concepts on this basis, in short to seriously think
pragmatically.
In an action, we are simply and directly involved in the matter. In our practical
dealing with situations, events, and other people, we ourselves are a thing in progress, a thing shaping itself. As a result, the aforementioned approach to the states of
affairs in questionwhich is supposed to strip off the theoryneeds to take place
in a praxis. A praxis is a sphere in which the subject-object relationship is, as it
were, still soft. In Chap. 1, I developed the concept of praxis in such a way that a
praxis consists of actions that are already standardized and schematized. Such a
praxis with its felicity structures provides links to epistemic theory. During research,
some things could possibly already be changed at this lowest level. An organized
praxis and its action schemes need to be dissolved again into actual courses of
action and individual actions that are taken into consideration, observed carefully,
and possibly altered creatively. In short, we need to test changes that may have little
value in terms of instrumental rationality and simply serve the purpose of exploring
possibilities.20 The practical extensions and changes thus created can then gradually
be supported theoretically. This generates new theory. It has a different status than
the old, epistemic theory. I call it thetic theory.
The center of thetic theory is the thesis. A thesis is something similar to a
hypothesis. But I would like to make a conceptual distinction concerning the

18

Wittgenstein (1981) Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Sentence 1.

Heidegger (2010), 70.
20
Cf. the free exchange that Lueken ((1992), 294 ff.), following Feyerabend, recommends for
overcoming incommensurable relations. An incommensurable relation is a relation between heterogeneous theories that has been imaginatively pushed to extremes (cf. Chap. 5). As far as this
free exchange is helpful, so is the generated practical contact presented here, which subverts rigid
objectifications.
19

2.3 New Theory That Supports New Actions

69

relationship between distance and commitment.21 A hypothesis is purely cognitive,

while a thesis is a piece of pragmatically construed theory. As such, it guides actions.
Someone who advocates a thesis does not merely do so verbally, but also acts
accordingly, takes risks, etc. To be sure, we work with a hypothesis as welldraw
conclusions from it and design experiments. But the main focus is on the distance to
the event. In the case of a thesis, it is precisely the other way around: The main point
is the conviction that one is right.
This new theory cannot be stabilized with respect to felicity structures in the
same way as old theory. The language is tentative and so are the actions. We do not
yet know the matter sufficiently. The main task of the new theory is presenting a
solution to a problem.
Let us take a look at the examples for the sake of illustration:
Research on combustion in the early 18th century contained experiments where
metals were roasted, substances weighed, and the air generated in these experiments
utilized (by exposing a candle to it, letting a mouse breathe or rather suffocate in it).
The experiments were articulated verbally, of course. This language represents the
respective state of research at the time and is full of oddities for later readers. For
instance, Robert Boyle (16271691) weighed the heat substance, which Ernst
Stahl (16601734) later christened phlogiston. He recorded this weighingover
the fire, 8 oz of tin absorbed about 23 grain of the heat substance in 1 hand did
not notice anything strange.22
At times during the French Revolution, no stone was left unturned. Especially
during the second part (from August 10, 1792, to the end of the Reign of Terror at
9. Thermidor, on July 27, 1794), the leading figures hardly knew what to do and
what they did. Certainly, they needed to rebuild the republic or rather protect it in its
early stages. But what was the republic under the conditions in France at the end
of the 18th century? The revolutionaries resorted to forms of government that were
corroborated. Some of the protagonists, in particular Robespierre and Saint-Just,
based their formulations, figures of thought, and sometimes even clothing on
knowledge about the ancient republics of Greece and Rome, which they tried to
update in line with the times.
As I said, new theory does not offer anything concrete that characterizes an
action as felicitous. It draws its stability from the fact that it crystallizes around a
sketch for problem solving. This sketch is articulated in thetic theory. It culminates,
as stated, in the thesis, which grounds the respective research.
A thetic sketch is an expression of the researchers intuition and imagination.
Usually, when we hear the word intuition, we seem to think of a kind of perception: a sixth sense or a supernatural, holistic understanding of the thing in question.
Imagination, on the other hand, sounds as if the whole sketch came from the
inside onlyas if it were merely a human creation in which any objective content
would be merely accidental. I think it is almost impossible to decide whether it was
21

Cf. Elias (1987).

Toulmin and Goodfield call this episode one of the most tantalizing moments in the development of our ideas about matter. Cf. Toulmin and Goodfield (1962).
22

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originally a form of perception or mere imagination. In fact, it does not even matter.
What does matter is that the researcher abandons established structures of practice,
approaches the matter in question, and by doing so gains experiences that can be
articulated in a thetic sketch for problem solving. It might be true that the nature of
seeking and approaching the matter is already guided by such a sketch or at least by
anticipations. But in the thetic sketch, tentative new actions now acquire a structure.
These new actions need theoretical support, in order for us to grasp what is important about themthe schematicand to evaluate its outcomes or consequences.
The research process is therefore not only a theory-building, purely cognitive
activity. It is a cycle in which theoretical and practical phases interlock: It questions
established theory, contains trial actions and evaluations, creates new theory, compares old and new theory, repeats trial actions and evaluations, improves new theory,
further revises old theory, etc.
In this process, many things can change: Praxes can be accentuated differently;
objects may disappear, as I mentioned, or may be recognized as reified aspects of
misconceived action conditions. New objects can appear, or new aspects may acquire
objective solidity within the conditions of action. Old theory may change, be revised,
and altered to a greater or lesser extent. People may change by revising their selfunderstanding, acting differently, adopting different habits, and living different lives.
For certain research purposes, the social sciences distinguish between an
observers perspective and a participants perspective. The original reason for
this distinction was to stress the difference between research in the social sciences
and research in the natural sciences. It might be impossible to measure social processes by observation. This requires the participation of the scientists. The participation provides them with experiences while acting in the relevant context. They
do not merely collect data. In the natural sciences, the situation is different. It is
impossible to participate in the processes of nature. Nevertheless, there are no
pure observations here, either. There is always a certain degree of the researchers involvement through the constitution of objects, that is, through theoretical
and conceptual guidelines.
For a general concept of research, we need both perspectives. But since the
observers perspective seems to be more natural to us, we explicitly have to initiate
the participants perspective. A simultaneous perspective of observer and participant can generally be realized in research through a parallelism of the object level
of action processes and the meta-level of reflecting on these processes.23
This parallelism between participation and observation is mirrored in the attitude
of researchers and arguing persons in an antagonistic structure: On the one hand, in
the context of a quaestio, (old) theory needs to be utilized, but on the other hand, it
also needs to be called into question. I would like to describe this as follows: The
researchers attitude contains both a commitment to the problemor rather to the
23

For the theorization of argumentation, and then especially for argumentation analysis, these conditions are essential. Without a participatory perspective, it is hardly possible to grasp, let alone
assess appropriately, what is actually happening in an argument. This topic will be discussed in
detail in Chaps. 7 and 9.

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71

researchers attempt to solve the problem, that is, to the thesisand as a distance to
this thesis. After all, the thesis might not be valid; it might just be a figment of the
imagination. Ultimately, neither side is preferable. Therefore, commitment and
distance need to be brought into a balance.
In any case, the researcher needs to be committed; otherwise, he will not
even muster the intellectual and physical energy to generate a thesis, realize it
in trial actions, evaluate the realization, reformulate the thesis, etc. If we ask
what fueled the great explorations of the past, we find many things: the prospect
of fame and fortune (in the case of Coln); service to humanity, coupled with
selfishness (welfare committee in the second phase of the Revolution); the pride
and joy of discovery (the chemists), etc.
In the case of ones own theses, commitment seems to be a resource that comes
naturally. After all, people have desires, dreams, compassion, curiosity, and want to
exceed their limits. Without this resource, no research is set in motion. But if there is
not enough distance, research does not go very far. It gets off course and leads to
dead ends and idiosyncrasies; researchers isolate themselves, end up in harms way,
and even get killed in extreme cases. Distance is needed, so that it can become apparent what we do when we orchestrate new actions. Complete objectivity is impossible.
Only in hindsight, when the result has turned into knowledge, can we understand
what the researcher has actually done. Beforehand, during the evaluation of the trial
actions, these actions are viewed through the lens of the thesis. Consequently, things
must have gone really bad for anything to even stand a chance to contradict the thesis. Usually, everything is a confirmation or can be interpreted as a confirmation by
expanding or modifying the thesis. For this reason, generating distance is an integral
part of research. Sometimes, an old skeptical principle can help: Simply and mechanically assume the counter-thesis. The best way to produce distance, however, is to
avoid developing and pursuing thetic theory in a monologic way, solely in contact
with the matter in question. Instead, we need to develop it in a dialogue with a critical
opponent. A lot will have to be said about this at the end of the chapter.
Good illustrations can be found in our field of historical examples:
Coln, for one, can be diagnosed with a lack of distance. The man risked his life
and that of his men to prove his thesis that India lies beyond the Atlantic, at a distance of about 4,500 km. It must have been an overwhelming experience to discover land at the predetermined distance after about 4 weeks, during which the
situation on the ships had become precarious. Coln never stopped believing that
he had come to India. This view, which he disseminated in speeches, petitions, and
letters, was so powerful that, until the recent past, parts of the Caribbean were
referred to as the West Indies, and to this day Native Americans are often called
Indios or Indians.
It is trite to call for distance in the turmoil of the French Revolution. The faction
of the Gironde, largely consisting of intellectuals, often presented exemplarily wellbalanced submissions. Among other things, it argued against the execution of the
king. Condorcet, one of its leaders, was rather removed from the turmoil. Although
he had been denounced and pursued himself, he was able to clearly and extensively
describe the social and human progress that had been achieved through the abolition

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of absolute monarchy.24 Saint-Just quite rightly retorted to this: Those who attach
any [sic] importance to the just punishment of a king will never found a republic.25
The king, Saint-Just argued, was not a delinquent citizen for whose sentencing justice could play a role. He was an external enemy of the Republic (he had been
proven to have conspired with the foreign powers that marched against France).
Such an external enemy had to be eliminated. (I will talk about this argument at
great length in the last section of Chap. 5.)
In the development of modern chemistry, the phlogiston theory was a way of
framing reality that enabled the execution of many interesting and fruitful experiments. Joseph Priestley discovered dephlogisticated air (the later oxygen)an
object with truly exciting new propertiesby heating mercury. Priestly believed in
the phlogiston theory for all his lifeeven when its refutation (a big problem was
that phlogiston had to have a negative weight) was palpable. He did not deem it
necessary to establish a critical distance to the phlogiston frame. Thus, Priestley is
an example of the kind of scientist in the history of science who has to die for some
narrow-minded theories to disappear from the world.
I suggested talking about research even in regard to normative questions. In
research on normative theories, it is generally more difficult to talk of distance than
in research on descriptive theories. Whether the space between Spain and India had
been calculated or estimated correctly can be decided in a more distanced manner
than the question of whether it is right to execute a king who was still perceived as
their ruler by many of his subjects. The simple reason for this may be that there is
no answer, that at best the consequences of an executionsome of which can be
identifiedmay be compared with the imagined consequences of a non-execution.
But why is there no answer? Is it because there is no theoretical basis that could
provide criteria of correctness? In fact, something like that existed: General norms
of natural law and specific legal codes such as the constitution of 1791, which had
been signed by the king after his initial refusal and which guaranteed his inviolability, were relevant for this question. Equally relevant was knowledge about the
consequences of the execution of the English king in the century before (in England,
the monarchy had been restituted). And, ultimately, the declaration of human rights
that had been drawn up by the revolutionary parliament itself was also relevant.
When we investigate the rightness of a verdict, we need to define precisely what is
in question. Depending on this definition, a decision can be called right. In the case
of the French king, a distinction between moral, legal, and political rightness may
provide some clarification. Of course, for the final decision as to whether the execution or any other type of punishment is right, these aspects need to somehow be related
to each other, if possible even by integrating them. I will talk about this in Chap. 5.
24
25

Cf. Condorcet (2009).

Cf. Walzer (1974), Saint-Just 13. November 1792.

2.4

2.4

The Thetic Construction

73

The Thetic Construction

As I have already explained, research is not simply a process of trial and possible
error, new trials and new possible errors, until finally an approach proves to be
tenable. Rather, research is a very conscious use of theory. It even creates new
theory by revising an old theory to a certain degree. In every moment of the
research process, old and new theories interlock. Of course, it is absurd to believe
that new theory could follow formally (by way of logic, arithmetic, game theory,
or probability theory) from old theory. It is impossible to deduce a conceptual
sketch that addresses a quaestio. Thetic theory is a construct. But this does not
mean that, using our creative intuition, we build it up step by step. Such a claim
would be both far-fetched and unnecessary. Normally, the sketch is holistic. What
crosses our mindsa thought, an idea, a pictureis still whole. But by subsequently reflecting on the sketch, articulating it in language, distinguishing its
parts, and justifying or evaluating its tenability, we are able to perceive or reconstruct it as a thetic construction.
Such a thetic construction consists of parts that have been taken, as far as possible, from available epistemic theory. In the process, a change in function or
status takes place. Epistemic theory is corroborated with regard to its guiding
function in a praxis. Thetic theory, however, no longer has this guiding functionor not yet. As a result, parts of the epistemic theory may undergo changes.
At the least, they are separated from the context in which they have performed a
guiding function until now. Most of the time, they are also reconstructed, reinterpreted, compressed, and expanded in all sorts of ways. Concepts, for instance,
are reinterpreted in unusual contexts; previously disregarded implications are
developed further and related to information from other fields; new states of
affairs are considered in analogy to already known facts. Finally, the thetic construction may also include entirely new parts, new concepts, new combinations
of states of affairs, new boundaries, new thought processes, and redesigned
action opportunities. Due to the old theorys change in function, the boundaries
between new and old are sometimes blurred. Nevertheless, this is the basic structure of thetic construction:
epistemic theory thetic theory
constructed further to
At the top of the construction, we find the thesis. It is the answer to the quaestio,
the uncertainty, the problem that led to the gap in orientation. Conversely, the construction shows how to ground the thesis. After all, its grounds (or the basis of
its justification) are made up of epistemic theory, which is further developed in the
thetic construction. Someone who finds the architectural metaphor expressed by the

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words basis and grounds compelling may perhaps also regard the following
diagram as helpful:
T
R
R
R
R
R
R
-------------beginning / basis
There is a thesis (T), which articulates a piece of new theory to correct an
orientation deficit. And there is a justification, which connects the thesis with the
theoretical basis. This justification consists of reasons (R - R - R), which support
the thesis. For the sake of a better visualization, these reasons are represented as
pillarswhich of course does not mean that there always have to be two pillars. The
whole construction bridges, so to speak, the gap in orientation.
I would like to note the following in order to rein in the ramifications of the
architectural metaphor: In a concrete construction, the difference between thesis
and reason is often not clearly visible. For the purposes of a diagram, however, it
makes sense to locate reasons below the thesis. In argumentative conversations, in
which such thetic constructions are developed and reviewed, reasons merge almost
seamlessly with explanations and clarifications, which accentuate another aspect
of the thesis, and even with affirmations that reformulate in a more pointed manner
what has already been asserted.
Nevertheless, as a pragmatic difference in status, the difference between thesis
and reason is fundamental (once again, the architectural metaphor!). The thesis is
reflected in the justificationmore precisely, in the theoretical basis. Already
existing epistemic theory is a kind of mirror in which we want to see the thesis
reflected. If it becomes sufficiently clear, we are motivated to work with the thesis.
This thetic construction answers the following question: What certainty and
authority entitle us to represent and pursue the thesis? Its real accomplishment consists in presenting the thesis as theoretically attainable. The proposed thesis
exceeds the limits of orientation. It is supposed to illuminate new parts of reality, in
order for us to be able to risk the respective expansions of our current praxis. A
thetic construct that is made of parts of available theory (epistemic theory and elements of construction) in a seamless and consistent mannerand that, moreover,
leads to the thesisrelieves the thesis of its alien and arbitrary character. It instructs
us to regard the thesis as a new, abstract, and stylized outgrowth of already established orientations. The theoretical attainability thus demonstrated has the power
to both legitimize and motivate. It offers a legitimate reason for accepting the thesis
as new orientation and for realizing it in new actions or in extensions or changes of
established praxis. And it motivates us to attempt these steps, because it rests on
established theory and thus provides the trust needed for research activities
particularly in the case of heroic research (cf. below).

2.5 Its a Small World

2.5

75

Its a Small World

What now follows is a detailed example that is supposed to illustrate how epistemic
and thetic theory interlock in a thetic construction. It is the argument that Cristbal
Colnlong before his rise and fallpresented to the advisory boards of Europes
royal houses, the last of which was the Committee of Fray Talavera at the Spanish
royal court.
In popular accounts, this construction is often regarded as an expression of pure,
inspired intuition; more sophisticated accounts also view it as indicative of a profitseeking, objectively untenable adventurism.26 In his imagination, Coln had reduced
the size of the Earth substantially. He repeatedly insisted: Its a small world.
Playing down the size of the world in such a way is typical of endeavors that exceed
the scale of previous human accomplishments. (We find a similar rhetoric in some
contemporary proponents of genetic manipulation.) But if we bear in mind the state
of knowledge and proficiency at the end of the 15th century, the following becomes
apparent: Colns construction was indeed possible and his thesis theoretically
attainable. His conviction could be considered as a rational representation of the
problem, even if it was embedded in the self-image of an egomaniac. Apparently,
the Committee of Talavera presented him with arguments that he was unable to diffuse on the spot. (In Sect. 2.7, I will have an opportunity to talk about that dialogue.)
What needs to become clear for now is merely that the construction, though not
compulsory, was really possible. Now, let us come to the point.
In this construction, the following five steps can be distinguished:
(1) Contrary to views that the Earth is a discor hump-like figure surrounded by
the ocean and divided into two parts (Eurasia and Africa)India, or the east
coast of Asia and the islands situated off its coast, can be reached from Europe
by way of a western passage that leads across the oceanic sea.
(2) This western passage does not only exist; it can also be traversed with normally
equipped ships within a reasonable amount of time.
(3) A royal house of Europe that reaches countries in East Asia by way of this western passage will tap into vast new sources of income via trade or acquisition.
Hence, sending out an expedition trying to find this passage will lead to enormous
material advantages for any royal house that undertakes such an endeavor.
(4) The inhabitants of those countries could be converted to Christianity. Thus, the
salvation of those involved, both of the converts and the missionaries, would be
neatly advanced.
(5) He, Cristbal Coln, the sole person with the required information and the
necessary self-confidence, should therefore be entrusted with this expedition.
With this construction, Columbus tried to persuade the royal expert committees,
first in Portugal and then in Spain. When they failed to be convinced by it, he sent
26

Some very stark judgments in this vein can be found in Vignaud (1911) and Venzke (1991). In
Nunn (1924), some of these views are refuted convincingly.

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his brother to England. In the event of another rejection, he would have turned to
France. But the Spanish queen ignored the rejection of the expert committee at the
last moment and entrusted the man with the execution of the project.

2.5.1

Assessment of the Entire Construction

Of course, for an assessment to be adequate, we have to be sufficiently acquainted

with the conditions in science, technology, politics, and morality during the
Renaissance. On that basis, it is not difficult to assess the legitimacy of the five parts
of this construction.
Step (1) contains the spherical shape of the Earth. This was fairly well known at the
timeit was not yet knowledge, but part of the epistemic theory of the thinking elites.
Nevertheless, it meant something very different than today. After all, the spherical
shape does not determine whether the deeper and, in particular, the opposite parts of
the world are accessible for humansand if they are, whether it would be possible for
people to return. As I said, these concerns, which were connected with the so-called
antipodes argument, will be discussed in the section on dialogue.
Steps (3) and (5) become comprehensible in the context of customs of the time.
With the ancient empires as role models, the seafaring nations had established a
practice of discovering foreign countrieswhich meant conquering and exploiting them. In this sense, Portugal had, since the 1530s, discovered the west coast
of Africa and had imported commodities, gold, pearls, ivory, and black slaves in
particular. The Portuguese king awarded licenses to all possible kinds of businessmen and adventurers. They allowed these men to privately profit from what they had
discovered for Portugal.
Step (4), Christianization was obvious. The Pope, as the supreme power that
formally commanded the Western hemisphere, had to ratify such annexations.27
Naturally, then, the justification had to refer to this topos. However, Colns accentuated desire for a Christian mission was peculiar.28 In this zeal, he was matched by
the most Catholic of kings, Hernando and Ysabel of Spain. Nevertheless, the later
differences between the discoverer and his employers were caused, among other
things, by this very issue.
27

After the Donation of Constantine, the Pope owned the entire Western hemisphere. (Constantine
had been cured of leprosy by Pope Sylvester. As a reward, he gave him half of the world.) The
corresponding document was exposed as a forgery for the first time around the middle of the 15th
century. But at the time of the discovery of the New World, it was still in effect, i.e. the Pope
decided whether it was right to seize a country in and beyond the Atlantic.
28
Many commentators are fascinated or repulsed by Colns Christianity. Cf., for example,
Madariaga (1939), Chapters XI and XII, who concluded from the many peculiarities that Coln
was a Jew. The Jewish journalist Wiesenthal ((1973), passim, especially 109139) worked on this
thesis extensively, only to reject it in the end. For a comprehensive description of the arguments
about Colns alleged Jewishness, cf. Bhm (1992), where all known arguments in favor are invalidated, which caused Bucher (2006), 251, to regard the refutation as final.

2.5 Its a Small World

77

The only truly unclear and controversial step was step (2), the geographical argument. The western passage to India was supposed to be traversed with ordinary
ships in a reasonable amount of time. But there were several constraints, first of all
psychological ones: 3050 men were squeezed into a small space of about 150 m2;
the storms were a threat to their lives and led to extreme situations time and again.
Moreover, the amount of time a sailing ship could spend on sea was technically
limited by the amount of supplies that could be stored and by the fact that the ships
hulls were damaged by seawater on the outside and by woodworms on the inside.
For these reasons, a calculation or at least a somewhat reasonable estimate of the
distance between Spain and the east coast of Asia was essential. Of course, there
was no knowledge about thisonly many, more or less reliable, opinions.

2.5.2

Assessment of the Geographical Thesis

According to Colns geographical thesis, India was located about 3,000 Roman
miles (about 4,500 km) west of Spain. It could thus be reached in three to four
weeks. I will briefly explain how he arrived at that conclusion. As I said, the aim is
to elucidate the nature of the thetic construction and of the old theory built into it.
As an educated person of his time, Coln had access, albeit with some effort, to
the following documents:
Ptolemys cosmographic writings, handed down in the tradition of Arab
astronomers
The Venetian Marco Polos 13th-century travelogue Mirabilia mundi
The representation of the world Imago mundi (1410), a work by one Pierre
dAilly, former chancellor of the University of Paris
Since the beginning of 1492, the new Erdapfel (the first representation of the
Earth in spherical shape) by the Nuremberg-based traveler and cartographer
Martin Behaim
Letters and a map by the Florentine scholar Paolo Toscanelli. These were
particularly important. In the research on Columbus, there is disagreement
whether Toscanellis letter to Coln is authentic. Certainly authentic, however, is Toscanellis letter to the king of Portugal, a copy of which was apparently among Colns possessions.
In addition to this material by people who could, with some justification, be
regarded as competent, information on the matter was also available in a variety of
philosophical and literary texts. At the end of the Second Book of On the Heavens,
Aristotlethen still known as the philosopherhad explicitly agreed with those
who regarded the Earth as (spherical and) small. There had to be a link to India by
way of the pillars of Hercules (Gibraltar), he argued, because one could find elephants in both places. And Seneca, in the First Book of Quaestiones Naturales, had
talked of new continents (novos orbes) that the ocean (i.e. the Atlantic) also contained. It is clear that Coln was familiar with this material. As evidenced by a

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logbook entry dated September 2, 1492, he also paid close attention to reports and
tales by coast dwellers and sailors who claimed to have seen land in the west under
peculiar circumstances.
Was all of this epistemic theory? In order to assess the orientation value of this
material, we also need to consult the Bible as a general background. For people of
the Late Middle Ages, the Bible was the epistemic frame of reference in all matters
not answered by evidence. The Bible, however, states (Book of Ezra) that six parts
of the Earth are covered by land; only 1/7 is water. Coln often quoted this passage
and referred for support to Augustine, who regarded Ezra as a prophet. With this
background, he structured the specific information available in such a way that he
was, in the end, so convinced of the existence of the countries and islands close to
the Asian mainland as if these, in the words of Las Casas, had been located in his
own room.29
Colns way to arrive at his distance specification has by now been well reconstructed.30 It consisted of two steps. First, he determined the distance in degrees of
longitude; then, he calculated the size of the terrestrial globe or, rather, the width of
a longitude.
The first step, given the sphericity of the Earth, was to formulate any distance as
a part of the 360 available for the circumference of the Earth. In order to do so,
Coln referred to Pierre dAilly, who had referred to Ptolemy and, even before
Ptolemy, to Marinos of Tyre. Ptolemy had specified the area of the continental
mass at 180. But this was corrected to 225, Marinos value. Ptolemy had not been
familiar with Indias expanse beyond the Ganges (India extra Gangem), which
was now added to the value. So much for the knowledge of the ancients. Later,
Marco Polos specification of the distance between India and China justified adding
another 28which already anticipated the results of the second step. Marco Polo
also reported the existence of the big island of Cipango (Japan), located 1,500 miles
off the coast of Asia. Coln regarded this as a reason to add another 30. Together
with the 9 of the distance between Spain and the Canary Islands, Colns presumed
point of departure, this resulted in 292. For some other reason, which is incomprehensible to me, he added another 8, so that the distance from the outermost west to
the outermost east amounted to 300hence the distance to be covered was 60.
Except for that last detour, everything seems clear. But regardless of assuming
292 or 300, this was still quite a large value for the size of the land mass.31 On
Behaims globe, for example, it had been 240. Should Coln not have used this or,
ideally, a mean value? Well, I think he was justified in his calculations. He knew
from his own nautical experience that some parts of these estimates were uncertain. I will talk about the status of the topographical maps again at some later
point. Apparently, Colns position was anchored securely in the argument from
29

Cf. quotation in the introduction to Columbus logbook, Jane (1968).

The most accurate by George E. Nunn; cf. Nunn (1924).
31
Nunn (1924), 89, provides a list of nine different determinations of the size of the land mass. It
shows that the size of Eurasia had constantly increased in the minds of experts since the early
Middle Ages. Colns specification, however, by far exceeds all the other ones.
30

2.5 Its a Small World

79

authority based on the prophet Ezras specifications: If only 1/7 of the Earth is
covered with water, then, given the Earths sphericity, the eastern edge of India cannot be much more than 60 away.
As a second step in determining this distance, Coln calculated the distance between
any two longitudes on the surface of the Earth. Of course, this meant specifying the size
of the globe. What could Coln know about this? As early as ancient times, the history
of cosmography had generated calculations of the Earths circumference, such as the
measurements of Eratosthenes (around 200), Posidonius (about 65), and other topographical surveyors. Some of these measurements deviated by only 2 % from the currently known value.32 But with the decline of Alexandria, this knowledge was lost and
became a legend. In the 9th century, some Arabs on behalf of the Caliph Al-Mamun of
Baghdad, especially the geographer Al Farghani (Latinized: Alfraganus), determined
the width of the longitude at the level of Sinjar as 56 2/3 milesa number that remained
authoritative from this point in the Middle Ages to the end of the early modern period.
Coln worked with this number and even claimed in one of his notebooks to have
checked it personally. Hence, it was this value that he used to determine a longitudinal
width in Roman or Spanish miles that corresponds to 83.86 km.33 But since, ultimately,
Coln did not intend to cross the ocean at the equator, but at around 30 latitudethe
level of the island Ferro (Hierro)this value was reduced to about 74 km. Thus, the
distance to be covered was about 4,500 km.
In this way, Columbus had found a route to India that seemed to be more than just
a foolish idea. In addition, there were all sorts of islands along this route, the mythical
Antilia, St. Brendans Island, etc., where one could hopefully interrupt the journey.
As is well known, nobody has ever been able to find these islands. In the late 15th
century, however, they were by no means merely a chimera or a seamans yarn.
They were marked on maps, and serious endeavors relied on them. In the 70s,
Portugal even sent out several expeditions to find and conquer them.34
32

Cf. Peter (1972), 40. Upon closer inspection, however, it turns out that, according to our current
state of knowledge, Posidonius cannot be credited with independent measurements at all. The
process of Eratosthenes measurement ([] throughout antiquity [] [the] only geodesy []
worthy of the name, Miller (1919), 16; Trans. T.P.) is difficult to comprehend today. As a result,
two values circulated, namely 250,000 Egyptian stadia (39,375 km) and 252,000 Egyptian stadia
(39,690 km). Cf. also Eratosthenes (1969), 99 ff.
33
The information is incorrect; a longitude is 111.12 kilometers wide. What went wrong? Nunn
(1924; 1, 6) still assumed that Al Farghanis measurement of 56 2/3 miles was wrong. In the meantime, however, it has become clear that the Arabian mile (1.97 km) was longer than the Roman mile
(1.48 km), so that Al Farghani was more or less right. Commentators like Venzke, who are aware of
this, mock Colns error as a gallop through the difficult terrain of a geographical definition of the
Earth (Venzke (1991), 72; Trans. T.P.), without noticing that their accusation is cheap. After all,
nobody in the Late Middle Ages knew of this difference. This is a typical error of assessment that
arises when an interventional evaluation is made in the immediate aftermath of an internal evaluation, without asking what the participants in the argument could have known (cf. Chap. 7). The
really interesting question here is just how the seafarer could have been able, as he claimed, to have
verified Alfraganus specification, even though he interpreted it erroneously (as a Roman mile). Was
he no more than a braggart after all? As usual, Nunn (1924; 1318) has something significantly
smarter and more differentiated to say about this, too.
34
Cf. Bucher (2006), 8387.

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I will now turn to an assessment of the validity of Columbus construction. The

estimates and measurements handed down by tradition and then summarized by
Pierre dAilly were partially epistemic theory. But it is impossible to determine
where epistemic theory ended and the imagination that exceeded such theory began.
Due to different systems of measurement (e.g. counting day trips), there was a
huge margin of error with respect to specific distances. Of course, there were expert
opinions. But while they all referred to Ptolemy, ultimately they also led to vastly
different results. The relevant parts of the thetic construction included an evaluation
of the marine maps available at the time, whose status is certainly interesting
enough. Coln carried one on his journey,35 which is believed to have been a copy
of Toscanellis map.
Experiences with sailing the coasts of Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North
Atlantic reach back into prehistory. The maps in use are visual versions of theories
that support the praxis of navigation. What I mean is this: A sailor, who had sailed
around the southern tip of Messenia on the Peloponnese and was able, afterwards,
to continue in a northwestern direction, understood his actions with respect to
their geographical possibilities inasmuch as the coastal line recorded on the map
showed this course.
The degrees to which the praxis of navigation was developed in Colns days
varied widely. As a result, there was a range of barely confirmed reports about other
coasts. Due to the lack of possibilities to confirm them, it was impossible to distinguish a genuine report from a seamans yarn. On the one hand, the mapswhich
truly represented the world viewcontained too little (only two land masses,
Eurasia and North Africa). On the other hand, they also contained too much (such
as the already mentioned islands in the middle of the ocean, as well as areas where
the sea monsters Gog and Magog were said to dwell, etc.36).
Thus, these maps, in contrast to our present maps, were thetic in several respects.
An assessment aimed at isolating the solid elements of knowledge could not be
finished in theory alone. Only practical research could lead to further insights.
In addition, the thetic construction by the discoverer of the New World contained experiential knowledge about prevailing wind directions. To the west, there
were the trade winds at 2530 latitude. Equally reliable winds in an eastern direction could be found at 3540 latitude. This was nautical experiential knowledge
which, of course, was secured only for areas near the coasts. Metaphorically speaking, Coln could only be sure of an initial push out onto the ocean. Whether
these wind conditions would, in fact, endure all the way to Asia, or rather to the
Caribbean, was anybodys guess. Colns general navigational skills contained further epistemic theory, for example, knowledge about the capacities of sailing ships,
35

Cf. Jane (1968), 11: logbook entry from Sept. 17, 1492; and cf. Jane (1968), 17: logbook entry
from Sept. 30, 1492. Cf. also Venzke (1991), 82.
36
Madariaga (1939), 75/76: Travellers stories, sacred books, charts and documents, old wives
tales, every form of lore contributed to the discussions. [] Round a kernel of direct observation
there spread a circle of authority, classical and biblical, and beyond it an aura of hearsay, and still
further afield a world of imagination.

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The Genesis of Thetic Theory: The Research Project

81

about food supplies, leadership, and, of course, about navigation. This knowledge,
too, depended on the conditions of prior praxis in a way that is difficult to account
for. A good navigator was able to stay on course on the high seas without a landmark orientation, just by using a compass, quadrant, and astrolabe (contemporary
position indicators for navigating by the stars). But what needed to be done if the
information available through these apparatuses became inconsistent was not clear.
Apparently, Coln experienced this situation. In the process, he probably discovered what is today called declination and decided to rely on the information
given by his compass.37
To sum this up, the entire sketch of this trip to India on the western route is a
unique thetic construction. The parts of theoretical bases that reconcile the justifications with the best available knowledge are quite apparent.38 To what extent the
constructed thetic parts that exceeded this knowledge were valid could not be
decided for the time beingat least not in theory. Consequently, the geographical
thesis implies the nautical thesis that India can be reached with normal ships on the
western route in a reasonable amount of time.

2.6

The Genesis of Thetic Theory: The Research Project

The thetic construction is a theoretical formation in which epistemic theory is

expanded into thetic theory in order to bridge a gap in orientation. Hence, the thetic
construction creates a piece of theory that enables further practical actions. These
actions yield certain results and probably shouldespecially from a pragmatic
point of viewsay something about the validity of the construction. It is tempting
to think that these results decide whether the thesis is valid or not. In simple, clear
everyday situations that is indeed the case. If the dog breaks through the frozen
surface of the pond and returns to shake its wet fur, then the thesis that the ice is safe
has been refuted: Children you cannot go ice-skating yet.
Apparently, such clear situations were paradigm cases for a naive falsificationism as promoted by the early Popper. Thesis, test, refutation, new thesis, new
test this would be the cycle. But, as a matter of fact, such a cycle does not even
properly describe our daily research. Even our everyday theses include epistemic
theory and in most cases also real knowledge. This epistemic theory is used to
evaluate the test results, incorporate them into the construction, and take them
into consideration in the next trial action. Because the dog is lighter than a child,
the child would definitely break through the ice. Hence, there will be no further
attempt for the time being.

37

Cf. Jane (1968), 11: logbook, entry from Sept. 17, 1492. Some interpreters, however, believe that
the whole difficulty is merely an expression of the nautical ignorance of various copyists.
38
[] the evidence shows Columbus to have been painstaking in his inquiries and to have utilized
the best information available in his time. Nunn (1924), 30.

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Generally speaking, the result of an action is not self-evident. Rather, it needs

to be evaluated. In such an evaluation, the result is embedded into theory.
Consequently, the following difficulty occurs: The theory is a structure of old and
new theory, in which not only new theory is tested and possibly changed, but also
the old theory needs to remain open to corrections. Thus, in an evaluation, there
are always many possibilities to theorize the result of an action. Suppose the result
was interpreted as counterevidence. In that case, the theory would have to be withdrawn, altered, broken downto what degree, and in which way, depends on the
case. A complete withdrawal of the thetic theory as a whole, that is, what naive
falsificationism recommends, is only one possibilityand an extreme one at that.
More realistic is a theory change. In that case, theory can be dismantled, but it can
also be expanded.
The latter case, in which a counterevidence is not interpreted as refuting the
theory, but as showing its incompleteness, is particularly interesting. Subsequently,
the thetic theory is supplemented by including an explanation which classifies, as
well as embeds, the inconsistent test results and reconciles them with the theory. In
the case of the frozen pond, this could look as follows: The dog broke through the
ice at a point where the ice is particularly thin, because a brook feeds into the pond
nearby. Maybe we need to try it on the other side.
But is this not simply an excuse? It seems as if the proponents of the thesis want
to be right at any cost. After all, why did they not go straight to the other side? In
this case, the philosophy of science would describe the theory as being exhausted.
This is an expression that illustrates the fact that a theory always has a certain mental and theoretical potential. It contains epistemic theory, and this theory is useful
for more than just for the quaestio which is presently intended to be theorized with
its help. Since that is the case, perhaps the thesisif its potential is fully activated
can explain the counterevidence after all. But that means it would be advisable not
to dismiss it prematurely. Exhausting, then, means unblocking and tapping into
the theoretical potential of a thesis. Yet this potential has no clear boundaries.
The idea of exhaustion is therefore completely plausible. Its realization, however,
is not that easy. What is needed is a criterion to distinguish an ad hoc explanation
(a lame excuse) from a fruitful explanatory expansion.
These reflections on the exhaustion of the thesis give reasons for including a
new concept in our conception of research. The thetic construction is not simply the
result of a single creative sketch, which we utilize and possibly abandon subsequently. Rather, the construction is something in the making. It only begins with a
conceptual sketch. Such a sketch then serves as a theoretical support for trial actions,
which approach the matter in question. The sketch can help to evaluate this theoretical apparatus, possibly by changing it. I would like to use the term research project for this genetic, cyclically progressing side of a thetic construction. It is an
amalgam of Hugo Dinglers concept of exhaustion and Imre Lakatos concept of the
research program. The latter was introduced into the philosophy of science to meet
the problems of naive falsificationism. But since it was also unable to definitively
solve these problems (there is no criterion for determining whether to retain or
abandon a program at any given moment), the term was not long-lived in any

2.6

The Genesis of Thetic Theory: The Research Project

83

significant way.39 I think that it could still have a chance in argumentation theory.
But I take the liberty to rename it research project: program sounds like mere
software, while research project raises expectations that something will be done
practically, too.
Research project, then, designates the procedural dimension of a thetic construction. For the state such a construction is in at any given moment of its development, I use the expression position. Having a position with regard to a quaestio
does not only mean establishing a thesis. It also means being able to mobilize all
kinds of epistemic and thetic theory to advocate it. If the thesis is discussed or realized, this theory is the resource to improve it, if necessary.
In Lakatos work, the research program is a dynamic theoretical formation for
research in a problem area. It consists of theory (in my words: partly thetic, partly
epistemic), which is designed to develop research activities and to evaluate their
results. Crucial for this conception is a pragmatic distinction between the theories
developed within the program. Such a distinction must be drawn with respect to the
question of how to deal with the theory in the face of inconsistent resultsnamely
whether to revoke or maintain and develop it. Lakatos called the first type of theory,
that is, the one that is put up for discussion and possibly broken down, the protective belt. The second type, which is retained and secured with additional theory, he
called the hard core. This core ensures, so to speak, the identity of the program.
As long as it is retained, or can be retained, the research program is alive.
Its life consists first in generating activities and thetic theory, then in evaluating
the results of research activities, whereby everything is put up for debateexcept
for the hard core. From this point of view, research is equivalent to an exhaustion
of the theoretical potential of the hard core. As long as this exhaustion enables further productive research, the program progresses. The program degenerates, on
the other hand, if the exhaustion constantly yields results that require the construction of more thetic theory, which, in turn, further determines the practice of research
in theory, without ever leading to any confirmation of these determinations in practicewhereby the theory ends up increasingly suspended in midair, so to speak.
But this does not mean that it needs to be abandoned. Nothing, especially no meaningful conception of rationality, can force a researcher to abandon a program that
degenerates. Some programs degenerated for a long timeyears, even centuries
and then progressed again, possibly because a new invention provided a new tool.40
To once again address the aforementioned problemexcuse vs. reasonable expansion of the theorywe do not find a real criterion for such a distinction. Thus, whether
a project is abandoned, changed, or kept on track in the face of a constant increase in
thetic theory that does not lead to successful illuminations of the problem, or that makes
it more manageable, is a matter of the personalities of individual researchersof their
ability, as we might say, to strike a good balance between commitment and distance.
39

Holm Tetens went to great lengths to revive the term; cf. Tetens (1994). To my knowledge, however, his attempts were not well received. Wolfgang Detel introduced a simplified variant under the
name Forschungseinheit (research unit); cf. Detel (2007), 129131.
40
Cf. Lakatos (1970), 138 ff.

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I would like to turn to an illustration of these concepts now:

Coln discovered land after 33 days, at almost exactly the distance from Spain
where he had expected to find India. The journey, that is, the trial action based on
his thetic construction, had been faced with enormous difficulties. In the end, the
crew had been completely demoralized and on the verge of mutiny.41 He had mastered everything. The Lord watched over him. And he was confirmed gloriously:
The country had been found at precisely the point he had specified. India (or
rather CathaySouth China) had been reached. Henceforth, Coln exhausted
his construction. What he found were not the populous urban cities of Marco
Polos reports, but villages with naked, benevolent savages. When he heard some
similar-sounding words in their language, however, he believed them to speak of
the Great Khan (the Emperor of China). Even when the signs accumulated on
other expeditions that nothing was the way it should have been in India, Cathay,
or Cipango (Japan)and when it turned out that Cuba was not a continent, but an
islandhe held on to his thesis and produced an incessant stream of corresponding explanations.
Did the project degenerate? This is hard to say. Nunn points out that Balboa
(1513) adopted Colns point of view; that Waldseemller and the German cartographers followed him, at least partly; that Cabot believed Coln (1544); and that
Gastaldis map (1562) still identified the discovered territories as the eastern edge
of Asia.42 The project was dead (in this respect) once the new continent had been
identified and christened America (after the first name of Colns friend Amerigo
Vespucci).43 But, as already mentioned, the inhabitants of this continent are still
called Indians.
Now I intend to present a brief example for the progressive type of theory development. The example is by Ludwig Wittgenstein, from his Remarks on the
Foundations of Mathematics. Holm Tetens has convinced me that it can be interpreted as an example of the exhaustion of a sentence.44 Wittgenstein considers the
status of arithmetic propositions. Their truth does not depend on experience; on the
contrary, they make certain experiences possible in the first place. Wittgenstein
argues that we will always adhere to propositions such as 2 + 2 = 4, no matter what
any counterevidence suggests: If 2 and 2 apples add up to only 3 apples, that is,
if there are 3 apples there after I have put down two and again two, I dont say: So
after all 2 + 2 are not always 4; but: Somehow one must have gone.45 What we

41

Both Fernando Columbus and Las Casas report that, on September 23 and 24, violent riots
broke out among the crew. These riots were directed at their leader. They lasted until the eve of the
discovery and were accompanied by threats. Berger (1991), Vol. II, 390 (Trans. T.P.).
42
Nunn (1924), 90.
43
This was a process of gradual acceptance. On his world map of 1507, Waldseemller was the first
to have recorded a new continent called America. But some years later, on his second map, this
continent had been removed again. On this second map, things were represented according to
Cristbal Colns reports, i.e. Cuba was the eastern edge of Asia, etc.
44
Cf. the nice explanations in Tetens (1994), 32/33.
45
Cf. Wittgenstein (1956), 162.

2.7

Thetic Theory in Dialogue

85

are witnessing here is the birth of a research project. There is a problem, an anomaly.
And we transform the arithmetic proposition into the hard core that is now being
exhausted: We construct thetic theory in order to explain how the apple could
have disappeared.
Arithmetic is a formal theory, that is, it theorizes practices and domains that we
have constituted through our own thinking. Is it not self-evident, then, that we will
not accept any counterevidence to its propositions? Are formal theories perhaps part
of the hard core of any research project? This is a good idea. But in reality, we cannot presuppose that a formal theory is complete and without errors in every respect.
Freges system, which presupposed naive set theory, was complete; still, Russell
used it to formulate the famous antinomy that bears his name.
So the fact remains: A thetic construction evolves in the form of a research project that is assessed, changed, and expanded according to the generated new opportunities for acting and their results. For the time being, nothing definitive can be said
about the validity of the theoretical and practical results.
This is unsatisfactory: If only history can judge the quality of a research project,
and if history is not yet over, at least not while we are still preoccupied with the
problem, then the frame of reference for an assessment is simply too large.

2.7

Thetic Theory in Dialogue

I have now outlined the conceptual requirements that allow me to locate the practice of argumentation. Faced with a quaestio, we look for orientation; we mobilize
the available epistemic theory and further construct it into a thetic sketch; finally,
we try to secure its validity by acting with the sketch in mind. In the process, we
change and develop it further, if necessary. Yet, we cannot determine in advance
whether the sketch is good and correct, whether the orientation it offers is indeed
legitimate, and whether it corresponds to the reality of actingor whether the
construction is merely a fiction that leads people to miss, degrade, and destroy
themselves and their world. All this can only be determined by approaching the
matter in question. Gloomy prospects indeed!
Still, the researcher, or the community of researchers, has a resource that allows
him or her, as far as possible, to secure the suitability of the thetic program. This
resource is the other human beingthe other person who knows different things,
provides different experiences, and brings different assessments and intuitions to
the table. This other person is able to critically test the thesis and possibly raise
objections against it. In other words, the thetic construction needs to be tested in an
argumentative dialogue. The outcome of such a dialogue is able to provide a criterion for the suitability of the thesis. This is my reason for regarding argumentation
as a dialogical event and for dismissing as inadequate all argumentation theories
that do not regard a dialogical setting as the standard case of argumentation. I am
aware that this is not self-evident. Christoph Lumer expressly disapproves of dialogical argumentation theories by arguing that they theorize primarily the function

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of social coordination, while at the same time losing the reference to truth.46
Indeed, involving the Other certainly does not guarantee truth. Moreover, including
another subjective element in the matter is problematic because it may become necessary to distance oneself from it again. But to ignore the dialogue and to state that
arguments [are] usually monologues47 is tantamount to throwing out the baby
with the bathwater.
It is true that even the dialogical criterion cannot reach as far as the judgment of
history. But, as I said, that judgment is simply not accessible (on time). For starters, testing the thesis in a dialogue breaks the spell of the seeming alternative
between rejecting and further exhausting the research project theoretically and practicallyan alternative that can be fatal in the case of large, far-reaching theses.
The role of dialogue in argumentation theory is contested, which may be partly
due to an ambiguity in what dialogue means. There are at least two different
meanings of the termone is too narrow and the other one too broad. According to
the narrow concept, a dialogue is a verbal exchange between pairs of interlocutors,
following strict rules,48 whereas the wide concept refers to any communicative event
involving a mutual acknowledgment. Thus, the idea that argumentation has a generally dialogical character can be rejected on the basis of the narrow concept of dialogue49; and it can be affirmed with reference to the wide concept.50 Things become
even more complex because the notion of a dialogue somehow overlaps with the
(narrowly drafted) notion of dialectic: If doubts or disagreements appear, the dialogue is regarded as a dialectical exchange. Therefore, as long as argumentation is
basically conceived as a premiseconclusion sequence, dialectical does not seem
to be a general quality of argumentation. In the view developed here, the term
dialogue is located in between the narrow and the wide concept, and it includes
the aspect of the dialectical. Any argumentation striving for the examination of a
thesis validity needs a control instance and is therefore intrinsically dialogical.
Two roles pertain to this understanding of dialogue: proponent and opponent.51
The proponent is the author of the thesis. He or she advocates the thesis by presenting reasons for it. The opponent is the instance of criticism. Criticism does not mean
refutation of the thesis, especially not refutation at all costs. Neither does criticism
46

Cf. Lumer (1990), 6, 25, 316 ff. Lumers anti-dialogical position is partially explained by the fact
that, for him, argumentative validity presupposes scientific truth. In the production of the latter,
however, Lumer does not see a place for argumentation.
47
Loc. cit.
48
Examples of this kind are the dialogues of the Dialogue Logic, of Hamblin, Hintikka, Walton,
and others.
49
This is the core of the argumentation in Antony Blairs often cited paper about the limits of the
dialogue model of argument; cf. Blair (1998).
50
This is the strategy of Christopher Tindale when referring to Mikhail Bakhtin. He quotes him
about the dialogical as involving a whole formed by the interaction of several consciousnesses,
none of which entirely becomes an object for the other; cf. Tindale (2004), 98.
51
In the course of a dialogue about a thesis, the roles may change. If the opponent puts forward an
objection which includes an assertion that is subsequently questioned, the proponent takes over the
role of the opponent and vice versa.

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Thetic Theory in Dialogue

87

always have to be cooperative and helpful. All that depends on the individual case.
Depending on the kind of thesis, and the way in which it is brought forward by the
proponent, excessively rigorous criticism may be as inappropriate as excessively
friendly criticism. In this respect, the term dialogue should not entail any obligationsexcept control of the feasibility of the steps of the justification.
Perhaps I should mention that a dialogue does not necessarily require two partners. There is not always a different, sufficiently knowledgeable and cooperative
subject who will help to discuss the thesis. In that case, the researcher has to rely on
his own critical potential to review the pros and cons of the thesis and assess its
roots in the available epistemic theory. As a reflective being, this researcher is capable of dividing himself/herself into two partners by also taking up the role of the
opponent. In this context, it might be enlightening to know that the original Greek
meaning of dialogue was not interlocution, but something like thinking something through.52
Nevertheless, obviously the required function of critically examining a thetic
construction is typically assumed by a real person. Hence, the necessary distance to
the thetic sketcha sketch that is so evident to the author that he is inclined to stick
to it and exhaust it more and moreis integrated into the very form of the conversation. In a dialogue, the thetic construction becomes a thesis. For this thesis, the
opponent will demand a justification. The justification consists of steps in which
the parts of the relevant thetic and epistemic theory are presented and reviewed in
the order in which they build on each other. A dialogue, then, begins with a thesis
and ends, ideally, with a judgment about its validity, rejection, or its use as the basis
for further action.
This, finally, brings us to an elucidation of the most important concept of the practice of argumentation: the validity of a thesis. First of all thetic validity is not the
same as the truth or correctness of epistemic theory. In the latter case, there are references to functioning practices and to the two criteria of theoretical coherence and
practical orientation value, which are even intensified in the case of knowledge. In the
case of thetic theory, however, we cannot rely on functioning practices. The actions
underlying it are merely tentative; they test the theory and expand or alter the practices. There is simply no theoretical-practical stability yet. This is the reason why
there is a problem of assessing research projectsan assessment that could seemingly
only take place once this stability has, as it were, been secured conclusively. In short,
the reference to the praxis, which is crucial for the validity of theory and knowledge
in pragmatic thinking, is still unstable in the process of establishing and improving
theses. Therefore, the concept of thetic validity needs to be determined differently.
The concept of thetic validity, I would suggest, has two sides: a subjectivemotivational and an objective-criterial side. The objective side is the dialogical
52

Dialogue is a derivative of dialegesthai, which meant talking or thinking through (e.g.

through a complex, even intractable idea). The prefix dia does not mean two, but through.
The protagonist of the ancient tragedy thought about a problem in a dialogue with himself/herself.
The choir (as the agent of the forum) commented on these considerations. The second dialogue
partner sprung from this interaction.

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completion of the already discussed theoretical attainability. I call it objection-free

attainability, or simply absence of open objections. The subjective side I will call
credibility for now. Presently, I would like to briefly summarize both. A more detailed
account will follow in Chap. 7.
(A) Objection-Free Attainability
The thesis requires a connection to epistemic theory and, ultimately, to knowledge.
If a path can be constructed step by step from established theory to the thesis
according to the ideal of the methodical series of stepsthen the theory is attainable. Each step must be feasible, based on the theoretical material generated by
previous steps. As a rule, this connection is not complete. The thetic construction
introduces new theoretical elements (see above: differently accentuated concepts,
newly applied propositions, connections that have not existed up to this point, new
distinctions that have yet to prove their value, differentiations, separations, etc.) The
steps all need to be possible (executable), but not all of them, may be necessary.
This means that doubts of the kind why in this way? are always possible. Such
objections are usually empty. Objections, however, which act as a reminder that
relevant considerations are not taken into account, or which point out contradictions, are not empty. It is up to the opponent to ensure that the steps are executable,
that everything relevant will be taken into account, and that no contradictions
remain. If these three requirements are fulfilled, then the thesis is free of objections
or objection-free.
(B) Credibility
Objection-free attainability of a thesis is a weak requirementat least in comparison to the strong criteria of validity that, as some philosophers of science claim, are
demanded in the sciences. No one is forced to take a thesis that is attainable without
any objections as a practical guide. But, apparently, for someone who takes it as
such, the thesis is credible. Credibility, then, is not an objective quality, but a
binary relation between a thesis and a researcher, for whom it is useful as an orientation. The action that it supports theoretically is often not trivial; it might even be
risky. Calling the thesis credible means that it, or rather its justification, generates
the confidence to act on it.
Frequently, confidence generated in a dialogue is rooted in the proponents personality.53 Then it has less to do with the merits of the argument. But a thesis can
also generate confidence on account of its theoretical qualities: if the justification
enables the opponent to have a real insight, that is, close a gap in orientation. It then
dawns on himyes, thats what it could be, or even: It has to be like that. Such
insights usually have an emotional basis. I will come back to this in more detail in
Chaps. 3, 7, and 10.
In order to test the suitability of the terminology proposed here, let us have a
quick look at our examples again:

53

Aristotle discussed these matters under the heading ethos; cf. Introduction, section The
Aristotelian Foundation of Argumentation Theory.

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Thetic Theory in Dialogue

89

I already mentioned above that Coln encountered people at the committee of

the Spanish royal court who were not impressed by his construction and ultimately
rejected his request. No protocols or other documents about the conversations survived. But Colns son Fernando left a strongly idealizing biography of his father
behind, in which he casually reported the reasons for the committees rejection.54
In addition to all sorts of doubts (over the centuries, so many learned men were
unaware that the eastern edge of Asia was located within reach, and a vagabond
Genoese sailor claims to be wiser than all of them), mainly three arguments are said
to have played a role:
(a) The distance is unrealistically small.
(b) There will be no return from this journey due to a reversal of the conditions of
gravity on the other side of the Earth.
(c) The endeavor is sacrilegious.
(a) The first argument can be assessed with regard to the account given in
Sect. 2.5. After all, the construction was not necessarily compelling. Anyone more
careful in calculating the size of the land masses could easily arrive at a considerably larger distance. According to the ideas of the already mentioned Nurembergbased cartographer Martin Behaim, who had participated in many Portuguese
expeditions before the coast of Africa, the Eurasian land mass was indeed considerably larger than even Ptolemy had surmised, but it still only amounted to 240.
Thus, the Atlantic would have been twice as wide as in Colns construction.
Consequently, bearing in mind everything that is known about the conditions of the
first journey, a crossing would have been impossible. But what would the result of
this have been in a dialogue? Why should Behaim have been right? He simply
regarded different reports and evidence as important than Coln. Ultimately, this
was a case of doxa vs. doxa. Colns thesis fulfilled the objective criterion of
attainability, but it did not become credible to the committee members.
(b) The second argument is the famous antipodes argument, which had already
been brought forward as an objection to the sphericity of the Earth since ancient
times: The people on the other side, the argument went, would have to be antipodes. They would have to walk with their feet upwards or fall down. This, however,
could not be the case. Obviously, our low inclination to accept the potency of this
argument as an objection to Colns endeavor is rooted in the fact that the center of
the Earth, as the center of gravity, is self-evident to us today. But while this is the
case for us today, it was not the case for disputants of the late 15th century.
In a dialogue, the argument would look something like this: The nautical
experience that, on the sea, if a ship is far away, you can only see the peaks of masts
and sails, speaks against the disc shape of the Earth. It is possible, however, to
modify the thesis by integrating this objection: Such experiences are still compatible
with a hump shape of the Earth and, in particular, with the idea that there could be
a zone in the vaulted area from which there is no going back. The proponent of the
disc thesis could advance this accentuated reformulation of the thesis. It would
54

Cf. Venzke (1991), 111, 144.

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2 Research

exhaust the potency of the antipodes argument even further. Although no one knows
if there is another side of the Earthregardless of whether it has the shape of a disc,
a hump, or a globeour imagination is confounded by all these shapes. This confusion is an argument against attaching an orientation value to the thesis. Nautical
praxis in the 15th century, however, had truly introduced new knowledge; Coln
was familiar with this. In 1434, the dreaded Cape Bojador on the west coast of
Africa, beyond which the Inferno populated by monsters was said to begin, had
been circumnavigated. In 1488, Bartolomeu Dias had crossed the equator for
Portugal and made it all the way to the Cape of Good Hope. No extraordinary
changes in gravity or difficulties on the way back had been reported. And although
the Portuguese were renowned for their secretive policiesfor example, they never
published their measurementsDias glorious return to Lisbon in December 1488
had been a public event at which Coln himself was present.55 Hence, this was
epistemic theory that sufficed to refute the antipodes argument.
In short, although Coln did not have access to todays refutation of the argument, he could regard the antipodes argument as a purely theoretical concern of
scholars.
(c) I will not address the third argument now, because it requires other theoretical
instruments (subjectivity and the concept of frames, Chaps. 3 and 5).
A thesis is thetically valid if a researcher has successfully made his point in
the dialogue: If he or she can demonstrate to competent and approachable opponents
that the two requirements of objection-free attainability and credibility are fulfilled.
Subsequently, the thesis can be realized in actions. Such actions, however, do not yet
constitute a praxis. They have not yet been tried and standardized; they are still
research activities. What now determines the quality of the valid thesis is reality. If
the thesis is good, it opens up new domains of reality. If it is bad, the action may lead
to ambiguous results. In the worst case, it can be a downright failure.
Theses can be distinguished according to their scope. Realizing large theses
means bigger changes of previous praxes than small theses. Because theses
even the ones tested in a dialoguecan turn out to be erroneous, realization remains
a risk. For that reason, large theses are broken down as much as possible. If that
is not possible, if money or patience are lacking, even large theses are realized. This,
then, is heroic research. Its theme is, as it were, truth or doom.
Most research from the list of historical examples is heroic research in this
sense. Colns expedition could have failed. (The distance to America is manageable
indeed. But there are storms that engulf such small boats. Moreover, there are the
psychosocial conditions of a crew unhinged by fear that make any further movement
impossiblea crew that had neither the strength nor the supplies needed to turn
around.) The rebuilding of French society could have failed. It takes a lot of additional theory and abundant details in this case, anyway, to argue that something either
succeeded or failed. In the history of medicine and pharmacy, a number of selfexperiments have been reported. Today, we carry out experiments with animals first.
55

Cf. Berger (1991) Vol. I, 61.

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91

Insofar as harming them possibly means less harm to humans, this could be regarded
as a way of breaking down the thesis.
The heroic researcher, who risks his own health and even life in pursuing the
thesis, has become rare, if not extinct. At the same time, the theses that guide
research today, for example, in research about the genetic optimization of human
life, have grown immensely. We all are the subject of this research. This is the meaning of the term risk society.56 A lot of knowledge has been realized in major technologies. At the same time, we do not know much about possibly relevant conditions
and consequences of these technologies. In this respect, large-scale technological
facilities are not just applications of knowledge, but also, partially, realizations of
theses. Overall, we humans are part of the heroic research project active evolution. We have to participate in the dialogue about these research activities. We have
to keep discussing, until no serious objections to the theses that are realized on a
trial basis are left. There has to be enough time and money to do this. Our selfrespect as autonomous human beings requires it.

56

Cf. Beck (1992).

Chapter 3

Subjectivity

3.1

The Question of the Subjective Conditions of Insight

As I argued in the Introduction and several times thereafter, it is advisable to theorize

the practice of argumentation with regard to two aspectsa factual dimension and
a personal dimension. The pragmatic theory of knowledge and research illuminated
the factual dimension. I will now introduce some considerations about a modest
theory of subjectivity in order to capture the personal dimension of argumentation.
This is not meant to be a psychology or a theory of cognition (in the sense of a
theory of causally conditioned internal states such as attitudes and beliefs). It is
rather supposed to be a reflexively comprehensible theorization of the conditions
of the possibilities for insightin particular of that kind of insight which can
hopefully be set in motion by arguments.
To begin with, the fact that arguments have a personal dimension means
that they are introduced by people who hope to support or refute theses. These theses are individual sketches concerning limits and gaps of orientation. In the normal
case, arguments are used by persons who take them to be right. They are addressed
to other persons in order to provide them with insights into unclear and questionable
states of affairs.1 Therefore, the practice of argumentation as a whole is communication, social interaction, and mutual education of people.
Against the background of the claim that arguments should be subjectively
invariant, these remarks might sound objectionable. It does not matter for an argument, or its validity, to whom it is addressedsuch is the widespread belief. This is
indeed correct, at least in the sense that an argument does not count more or less

The widely discussed objective of (rationally) persuading the addressee is not taken up here.
That objective suggests the determination of causal effects of argumentative practice. Yet to
prove that an addressee accepts or rejects a conclusion because of a particular argument is a
(rather tricky) empirical issue.
H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_3,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

93

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Subjectivity

because it is presented by, or addressed to, a particular person.2 But even in order to
correctly interpret this requirement, we need to have an idea of what actually
constitutes the subjective dimension of argumentation. Cases in which emotions
come into play seem to be the easiest to understand. For example, arguments can be
presented in a threatening or endearing tone of voice. They may spark pride,
resentment, hatred, fear, etc. Whether intended or not, these are all attempts at influencing the addressee by way of feelings. In general, such attempts do not concern
the validity of theses, but their implementation and acceptance. Dont you ever wish
you could go on a dream vacation? Or, with a slightly different structure, do you
want total terror, or do you want effective security measures? Theoretically, it is not
a problem to distinguish such rhetorical procedures from an argumentative dialogue.
If the goal is enforcement, the addressee is not recognized as a dialogue partner.
He is a means, not an end in himself.3 In practice, however, it is often difficult to
discover something like that, and it is even more difficult to prevent it.
Cases in which legitimate attempts at argumentation are affected by subjective
views, their distinctive features and potential incompatibilities are entirely different.
These cases, which are quite frequent, raise problems that can no longer be articulated,
let alone understood and treated, by the vast majority of approaches that currently
exist in argumentation theory. Traditionally, subjectivity is only of interest here
because a proponent has to take it into consideration if he wants the addressees
consent to his thesis. The addressee is able to grant as well as refuse such consent.
Hence, the conditions that could influence her behavior have to be taken into
account as well. Usually, the result is a collection of more or less sophisticated
rhetorical devices whose suitability for fostering acceptance is warranted by the
rhetorical tradition. The effectiveness of such figures is usually assumed without
any further examination.4 In the best case, this presumed success of persuasion
2

It seems there are exceptions: In the rhetorical tradition, there are versions of the ad hominem
argument in which a proponent undermines his credibility by possibly contradicting himself with
his thesis. The contradictory relationship may be one between saying and doing (the drinker or
smoker who recommends abstinence) or between the current thesis and previous utterances
(he always argued against a quota for women, but now, at his favorite female students investiture,
he presents it as an argument). It is true that, in such cases, an ad hominem argument is usually
effective. Nevertheless, we should distinguish between the credibility of the thesis and the
proponents credibility. Even speakers with a damaged ethos (as Aristotle called these features,
cf. Introduction, Sect. Topics Rhetoric) may present valid theses. Moreover, apparent contradictions
can possibly be clarified and eliminated in a dialogue.
3
Cf. the problem of the so-called argumentum ad baculum, Woods (1987), Wohlrapp (1991),
Wreen (1990).
4
Claims about the effectiveness of rhetorical figures are notoriously unjustified by rhetoricians and
theorists of rhetoric. A reexamination is therefore long overdue (cf. again my critique of Perelman/
Olbrechts-Tytecas concept of rhetorical figure in the Introduction, section First New
Constructions). After all, the conditions of persuasive communication have been changed significantly by the omnipresence of advertising, with its ingenious as well as sordid tricks. Cf., on this
point, my criticism of Katarina Sobota, a scholar of the rhetoric of law. Sobota investigated
the function of rhetorical figures in the opinions of the highest German courts and came to the
conclusion that the persuasive power of these texts is not based on arguments, but on the use of
rhetorical figures. Anyone who tries to understand her studies will note that important terms such

3.1 The Question of the Subjective Conditions of Insight

95

is related to the addressees distinctive characteristics (e.g. young-old, rich-poor,

educated-uneducatedjust like Aristotle sketched it in his audience psychology;
cf. Introduction, section Argumentation Theory Under Construction). Still, it is of
utmost importance that the following is clear: Such considerations, theories, and
aspects cannot illuminate, let alone help to understand or accept argumentative
subjectivity. They only instrumentalize it without much ado.
Allow me, therefore, to conclude the following: We do not yet have any adequate
conceptual tools for capturing the subjective dimension of argumentation. But we
need such tools, because it is not only a fact that arguments are subjectively affected
but also a necessityat least if we regard argumentation not merely as a persuasive
medium, but as an effort to control and test the validity of research theses.
If the practice of argumentation were only concerned with knowledge, its
representation and reexamination, then subjectivity would not be an issue. After all,
knowledge is subjectively invariant. If someone does not want to accept a part of the
stock of knowledge, there is no need for argumentation and argumentation theory,
but for a motivation to learn. In such cases, what is needed is a capable teacher,
possibly even a piece of pedagogical theory. Thetic speech, however, exceeds
knowledge: The continuous reliability of doxa, which is not subjectively invariant
per se, is at stake here, for example. This is the place for thetic sketches, and in such
sketches subjectivity plays a role, of course.
The task at hand is to adequately account for this subjectivity without surrendering
to relativism, which would be tantamount to blunting and devaluing the practice of
argumentation. A theory of argument needs a concept of subjectivity which construes the subjective dimension not just as a web of conditions that have to be taken
into consideration for obtaining the desired acceptance. Neither should subjectivity
be understood as a bastion that is permanently set against the rest of the world.
Certainly, people need their own specific guidelines. These guidelines have to suit
them, but they also have to be valid. Therefore, they must reflect both the world and
the other human subject. Hence, the task of this theory of subjectivity can be formulated as follows: It needs to make both the specificity and the limits of the subjective
dimension conceptually accessible. This has to be done in such a way that these limits
are not considered as solid and final, but ultimately as mutable and malleable.
The following considerations aim at characterizing the normal participant in
the practice of argumentation as a subject capable of arguing reasonably. This
requires the construction of a conceptual framework that captures the subjective
conditions of understanding and its possible improvement, that is, the conditions
under which subjects create and maintain adequate theories as orientations.
Maintaining orientations means carrying out research projects around the relevant
limits of orientation; it means designing thetic constructions, taking arguments

as rhetorical figure, argument, and persuasion are not clearly defined at all. The validity of
Sobotas corresponding statements can therefore hardly be tested. In particular, Sobota adopts
large parts of the tradition and theory of rhetoric without reexamination. Any statement about the
wonderful effects of these figures that has been handed down is simply taken at face value. For
details, cf. Wohlrapp (2005).

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Subjectivity

into account, distancing oneself, or striking a balance between distance and

commitment, and finally bringing ones actions in line with valid conclusions.
If I talk of a subject, what I have in mind is a center of forming orientation,
which focuses on states of affairs in a specific way and is limited in this sense.
Subjects are not central control units of their own development that could supervise,
let alone plan or determine everything in advance. Rather, subjects are centers which
only have a partial overview of things. They accompany rather than drive some of the
processes taking place and, as Plato said about the soul, are nourished by insights.
Subjects in this sense are usually individual people. However, for a realistic concept of subjectivity and, in particular, for an adequate assessment of the possibilities
and limits of argumentative discourse, it makes sense to regard groups and collectives as subjects, as well. I am thinking of research teams or groups of friends, but
especially of organically evolved collectives such as families, tribes, and nations.
A person develops a singular ego by emancipating herself from the tribal community and by comprehending herself as part of the larger community of human beings.
This will also be addressed in more detail in Chap. 10. I will designate individual
people as persons with respect to them being agents of their own search for and
creation of orientation. The fact that a person is subjective, then, means that his or
her individuation is unfinished.
Such a person is fragmented. She is split into roles, which sometimes groups her
together with other people, but at other times prevents her from approaching them
at all. She is, on the one hand, too involved in these roles and, on the other hand, not
involved enough. Our roles may overlap; they may be sources of interference or
support. Some of them cannot be easily taken up or left again. Sometimes it may be
necessary, however laboriously, to change roles; at other times, it can be relaxing
and alluring to play a new and different role. The permanent task is to become more
and more conscious of ones singular individuality in the process. With considerable
patience and luck, we comprehend this to some extent in the course of our lives.
Thus, I would like to call an individual a person who thinks, acts, and lives with a
clear awareness of his or her uniqueness and indivisibility. By this definition, the
normal participant in argumentation is only partially an individual. However, he or
she has both the ability and the motivation to continue in this direction.
The postmodern way out of all these efforts is to fashion oneself as a patchwork subject, that is, not as an individual, but as a dividual.5 The resulting
orchestrations of personalities can be interestingbut probably more in the sense of
5

For starters: individual in Latin means indivisible. Dividual has been coined on this basis
and means divisible. It is well known that Nietzsche, long before Freud, argued and polemicized
against the uniformity of the ego; cf., for example, Nietzsche (1966), III, 612. This is quite right
with regard to chains of thought which introduce allegations and speculations about this ego that
are accessible (some of Descartes formulations are exemplary of this), if at all, from an internal
perspective and whose universal validity can, therefore, not simply be assumed. But to conclude
that there is no such thing as an ego leads to purely academic debates. The fact that people can refer
to themselves (in acting, talking, thinking) is a matter of course. Whoever wants to get to the
bottom of this self-reference should perhaps simply sit on a pillow in front of a wall and meditate
on the question Who am I? (Zen Buddhists affirm that this is an exercise worth pursuing.)

3.1 The Question of the Subjective Conditions of Insight

97

a public persona that is presented with avant-garde intentions. How the fragmented
person fares on a day-to-day basis with this refusal to be an entity that relates such
changing fragments to herself, takes responsibility for successes, undertakes the
necessary steps to treat failures or ruptures, and lives increasingly toward her own
deathis an entirely different story.6
I hope it has become fairly clear that such a theorization of subjectivity is no
psychology, at least not in the sense of a theory of mental capacities such as wanting, feeling, thinking, and of their normal and possibly pathological states and
developments. Rather, the focus here is on aspects that matter on the path to
individuation (as defined above), that is, on structures that are formed along such a
path. In the course of a persons development and maturation, these structures
become permeable. This concept of subjectivity is not rooted in the identity theory
of mind, but in the idea of transsubjectivity. This idea could possibly appeal to my
readers, if they become aware of the fact that it allows us to comprehend certain
experiences and desiderata of the practice of argumentation.
I have to concede that this conception implies a certain revision of the currently
popular and, to my mind, superficial concept of subjectivity. The more the ideology of competition and the erosion of solidarity and collaboration progress, the
more thetic constructions and arguments seem to meet acceptance and understanding only if they cater to the addressees inner rational egoist. This type of
person is rational by the standards of the homo oeconomicus.7 She calculates
her activities with regard to time, effort, and success. She has organized her
purposes in a system of preferences, the highest level of which is either hedonistic
(the only thing that matters is fun), arbitrary (my idiosyncrasies are my purpose in
life), or simply empty. In private life, this kind of rationality will probably often
be interspersed with moods of compassion and love, perhaps also with a touch of
esotericism, and, on the dark side, with derailments into cruelty and vengefulness.
Such irrational blunders are often inserted, albeit with some troubles, into the
rational scale of preferences by reinforcing the idea that one leads a truly human
(all too human) life.
Against the background of an anthropology structured like this, a person accepts
arguments only if they indicate that it is advantageous for her to view the quaestio in
terms of the submitted thesis. An argument shows her: Yes, actually I want this, too.

Jan Philipp Reemtsma expressed his deep respect for the former boxing champion Muhammad
Ali by describing Alis individuality not as normal and uniform (associated), but as mutable
(dissociated) at all times. Cf. Reemtsma (1998). This is certainly a fascinating text about a
fascinating person. Nevertheless, I do not agree with Reemtsmas anthropological theory that this
is indicative of the individuality of the people of the future. Some contact with non-Europeans,
especially with Central Asians and Black Africans, could have enriched the authors background
with regard to the normal structure of personalityin fact, even reading Thomas Manns Felix
Krull carefully might have been sufficient. To my mind, the boxers subsequent fate also casts a
different light on Reemtsmas thesis. (However, that was not clear in 1995, when Reemtsma first
published the book.)
7
Cf. Becker (1993) and Kirchgssner (1991).

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Subjectivity

(This is analogous to the logicistic concept of argument, in which the addressee

comes to the following realization: Yes, actually I know this already.)
But how about theses that do not seem advantageous to the enlightened egoist?
Are these invalid from the start? Does it depend on whether the criteria for advantages
or disadvantages that are employed here are relevant for what this person could
reasonably bethat is, what this person could be as an individual, or which of
her beliefs are sustainable in the context of a membership in the large community
of humans?
The theorization of argumentative subjectivity that I aim at responds to the
following questions: What is the background of the particular person speaking
thetically? How are her thetic constructions embedded into her self-conceptions?
In what sense can the use of arguments become binding for her? How can her
self-relation render her receptive or unreceptive to appreciating arguments?

3.2
3.2.1

Subjectivity as a System
Self-Reference, Self-Relation, Self-Transparency

In the pragmatic conception of theory, theories are defined functionally with respect
to their orientation value. Orientations are sought out, accepted, and used by human
subjects, by individuals and groups. In theories, construed as orientations, human subjects always represent themselves. Outside of the references of living and acting
subjects, there is no theory; there is no meaning, not even signs.8 Remnants of texts
that have been handed down in encyclopediasbut even on inscribed tablets, in cave
drawings, etc.can gain theoretical substance if people understand them and relate
them to the reality of acting in their past and present. Texts, then, are not independent
in the sense that they could have an intrinsic meaning, but only in the sense that they
contain an inexhaustible potential for references to theever-changingreality of
acting. As a result, the author of a text cannot define and determine the interpretation and meaning of a text once and for all. In short, without any reference to human
subjects orientations and ways of coping with reality, there are no symbols, no
signs, and no theories. This ubiquity of the subjective inner side of theory holds
true in particular for theories that occur in our practice of argumentation.
8

Karl Poppers dictum of a third world of theories (Popper (1972)) is naive metaphysics as long
as it simply refers to the reification of mental activities. It is of the same kind as the assumption of
a kingdom of God (existing independently of us) or a transcendent world of Ideas. Such reifications ignore that what we talk about are possibilities and results of our own abstractions. There are,
however, ways to address the sphere of the mind reflexively. In my opinion, the most impressive
achievement in this area is G.W.F. Hegels philosophy. Hegel does not simply talk about the
mind, but offers a construction according to which we humans activate the mind in our thinking.
Moreover, he claims that if we carry out this reflection radically, we are part of the process in which
the universe thinks itself through and comes to understand itself. This is more daring than Poppers
idea, and, in contrast to the latter, it is not nave.

3.2 Subjectivity as a System

99

Theories are constructed and used by subjectsthis constitutes their subjective

dimension. In their meanings, theories are related to practices. Subjectivity is
already a part of this practical basis, whose relevant structures or felicity conditions
the theory represents symbolically. As far as practices are carried out by people
collectively, these people literally represent themselves. They experience each other
and their mutual reality. In Chap. 1, I mentioned the value aspect of actions in this
context. As a reminder there are purposes, which can be pursued. Attaining or
missing them is an objective state of affairs; but, beyond purposes, what also
matters for actions is the fact that people live and realize themselves in the course
of acting, that is, that they turn their potentials into a reality for individuals and the
community.
Let us briefly illuminate each individual humans process of becoming a subject.
As I have already pointed out in Chap. 2, our childhood is a time of exploring the
world. In sensing, feeling, and experiencing, we explore, to an equal degree, our
bodies and our action opportunities. Hence, we experience both our powers and our
impotence. This self-perception of the agent in action, this inside view in executing
ones own actions, is the basis for the systemic nature of subjectivity. Nevertheless,
the formation of this inside view is not something that occurs in solitary seclusion.
Rather, it is modified, expanded, and corrected by the external view that the other
subject introduces to the interaction. In adolescence, we acquire distinctions that
pertain to our own inner states and, concurrently, also learn how to perceive these states
adequately by paying attention to adults (hopefully accurate) verbal ascriptions.
If a child, who is learning how to walk, falls down, the mothers reaction (Oops, that
went wrong! or even: Oh, my poor darling, now you have really hurt yourself!)
instructs the child to perceive her own state.9
This is how subjectivity becomes a closed systemI will have more to say about
this laterbut it is dialogical nonetheless. A human being evolves in interactions
and dialogues, in relations to itself and others, and in the success and failure of
attempts to pursue a purpose, realizes itself, and seeks recognition. In this evolution,
there is not only the relationship to another subject, but also the relationship to
animate and inanimate nature. Everything refers back to the subject, who, through
these influences, enters into a relation with herself.
I propose to call this the self-relation. The ego is constituted as a more or less
stable quasi-object through the duality of the relationship to oneself (Ime) and to
the Other, that is, the relationship to other subjects (who also have a self-relation)
and objects (which have no self-relation). Treating something as an object, then,
means refraining from assigning it a self-relationwhether there is one or not.
If I treat a mountain or a tree as an object, I do not grant it a self-relation. This
is quite unlike, for example, the animist, who expects the tree to be animated:
to harbor within itself a living and acting spiritual being. If I treat another person as
an object, then I ignore her (existing or at least possible) self-relation. It is not

For an extensive theoretical foundation of this view, cf. George Herbert Meads Symbolic
Interactionism, in: Mead (1934), especially Part III, Self, Chapters 22, 25, 27.

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always immoral to treat other people as objectsnot if they agree to such treatment
(e.g. in sexuality, during an extreme hike through the mountains, etc.).
As anthropologists and historians of civilization teach us, a fully developed selfrelation is a late civilizatory achievement. It is the result of numerous self-references in
feeling, reflecting, and contemplating. Such self-references help create an increasingly
stable background of self-perception.10 When that is accomplished, the person exists
in a self-relation. He or she has thus attained a state in which rational conduct is,
in principle, possible. This state is a prerequisite for any participation in the practice
of argumentation that corresponds adequately to the significance of the matter.11
We also have to consider that our current self-relation is developed to different
degrees in different individuals and that, as a whole, it is still quite rudimentary.
Hence, we are far from being completely transparent to ourselves. We do not notice
everything that happens to usneither all the impulses within us nor all the
impressions we receive. Over long periods, we do not know what we want, what
we do, and who we really are. It is almost impossible to determine whether our
notionsthat is, the thoughts, moods, and emotions that we noticeoccur
spontaneously or as reactions. Likewise, it is difficult to understand to what degree
our answers or opinions are influenced by dispositions that we harbor unknowingly
and unintentionally. If established structures are clearly troublesome and agonizing,
we may revisit their genesis (which might be a reaction to experiences or an expression
of their inadequate treatment) in order to integrate them into our self-relation or to
become aware of them in a new way. Usually, this does not result in a state of
complete self-transparency, either. None of these insights is particularly new, of
course. They may even have become stale or been marginalized by 20th-century
discoveries in depth psychology and depth psychotherapy which, for a while,
created a certain euphoria.12 Thus, the Other in its absolute alterity has finally
10

Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, B 158, Fn: The I think expresses the act of determining
my existence. The existence is thereby already given, but the way in which I am to determine it,
[], is not yet thereby given. For that self-intuition is required [].
11
Ideas about what constitutes a human being as a person are manifold. I cannot survey all these
suggestions in their entirety. However, I would at least like to mention Daniel Dennetts proposal
(cf. Dennett (1987), partly based on Harry Frankfurt; cf. Frankfurt (1971)). Dennett enumerates six
conditions for personhood: intentionality, rationality, embeddedness in the world, self-referential
intentionality, reciprocation, and reflexive self-transformation. To my mind, the possibility of
reflexively adding higher levels to intentionality is particularly useful, as well as the role played by
social interaction and, finally, the assumption that the person is, as a matter of principle, capable of
reflective conduct. What is missing, however, is an account of how intentional states are stabilized in
praxes, in customs, and in the habitus. Furthermore, Dennett neglects the role of theory and research
as conditions of rationality and the level of meaning, or of confidence, as the basis of beliefs. But
this criticism is probably due to the focus of my theory of subjectivity, which, unlike Dennetts, aims
at understanding argumentation. The concept of person which I consider to be the most profound
today was developed by the German philosopher Robert Spaemann; cf. Spaemann (2006).
12
In this regard, even Hegel tells us to be wary of an exaggerated psychotherapeutic optimism that
all id could become ego: Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned
he really has in him, should he have once forgotten them: they belong not to his actuality or
subjectivity as such, but only to his implicit self. Hegel (1971), (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical
Sciences), 403.

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101

become a big issue for us.13 It is obvious, however, that the mystery of the Other is
actually the flip side of our own lack of self-transparency.
Once we recognize that self-transparency can, at best, be achieved only partially,
the problem of lies and sincerity, for example, looks quite different. A deeper ego
can possibly utter falsehoods without lying. We tell children that a guardian angel
watches over their beds and that Saint Nicholaus puts candy into their boots.14 And
that is true, even though there are no beings with wings at their shoulders or bags on
their backs. The safety and bestowment conveyed by these formulations, however,
exceeds the childs mental capacities. The fact that the truth of statements has a
different status among indigenous peoples has become apparent to many who got
involved with them and were in for a surprise.15 Is somebody a liar who says that she
has an immensely rich cousin, two hotels in the capital, etc.? Could it not simply be
a case of a less differentiated self-relation, in which facts, wishes, and fantasies do
not have to be clearly separated?
In any case, there is no need for a nave total rationalism. Neither is there any
need for the opposite extreme: The view that the capacities of rational argumentation
do not matter at all, because we are ultimately governed by our irrational, animalistic
drivesand the corresponding notion that reason is nothing but a beautiful illusion
that any sober scientist rightfully dismisses with a smile.16
Maybe it is helpful to provide something like a map of subjectivity.17 In line
with a fundamentally pragmatic way of thinking, it is wise to once again introduce
praxis and theory as two major components. Praxis comprises everything that a
person does to cope with life and the world, ranging from simple, spontaneous
reactions and trial actions to the development of fully formed practices and participating in them. The other component is the practice of reflecting on the events and
experiences of our life praxis by positioning and conducting oneself in relation to them.

13

Authors to consult regarding a philosophy of the Other are the French philosopher Emmanuel
Lvinas (cf., for example, Lvinas (1987)) and, in a German context, most probably Bernhard
Waldenfels; cf. Waldenfels (2004).
14
Translators note: German children learn that if they clean their boots and place them on the
doorstep on the eve of Saint Nicholaus Day, which takes place every year on December 6, Saint
Nicholaus will come at night and reward them by putting candy and other gifts into their boots.
15
Cf. Colns reports of strange stories told by the Indios: about a country whose inhabitants had
an eye in the middle of their foreheads and about islands so rich in gold that they consisted more
of gold than of soil (Jane (1968), 6869, 114116: Colns log, entries from November 23 and
December 22, 1492 (however, the language barrier and the Spaniards strange lust for gold
certainly had a part in this, too)), or cf. Nigel Barleys witty account of how the Dowayo in West
Africa dealt with truth (Barley (1986)).
16
It is well known that sociobiologists, neuroscientists, and geneticists are currently on a mission
with this message, which is truly not a gospel. Cf., for example, Dawkins (1976).
17
Currently, maps of the inner world are quite popular; cf. for instance in Gosepath (1992), 21 ff.,
and in Steinvorth (2002), 76 ff. They are problematic, however, insofar as they suggest that
differences in the inner regions, layers, or competences are something like the rivers, coastlines,
or mountains of the external world. As is well known, it was one of Ludwig Wittgensteins
major concerns to break this suggestion. Cf. the arguments against a private language in the
Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein (2009), 243 ff.).

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Such reflection symbolically represents these relations and events to the subject if
the subject learns and generates theory.
Subjectivity is closed and self-referential in a specific way that might be
captured best by the term systemthe basic concept of systems theory. I will first
sketch this concept and then justify it at some later point. The subject is a system
primarily in the simple sense that it consists of parts which are related to each
other. These parts interact and perform a certain work, including, in particular, the
work of stabilizing and maintaining the subject in her uniqueness against the
environment. The relation of system to environment designates the same threshold
that I articulated with the internalexternal metaphor in Chap. 1. As a system, the
subject may be considered closed in the following sense: Systems are circulatory;
their work is performed by parts which, in turn, are activated by other parts of
the system. Thus, what happens in the environment may affect some parts of the
system, but how the system ultimately reacts will be determined only by its entire
self-referential structure.
I am aware that this use of the concept of a system adds an objectivist nuance to
the theory of subjectivity. With respect to the lack of self-transparency under discussion, however, this is not completely inappropriate. The sole access to subjectivity
is through reflections. I only understand myself in a self-relation and never as a real
object. I have to concede, then, that large parts of my inner life are and remain in
the dark. Still, there is the tween deck of psychosomatic medicine, where, for
example, vexations become manifest in gastric disorders and humiliations in
arthritis. Not everything can be strictly controlled in this domain. But, arguably, some
things may at least be regulated and tamed a bit. How I move my arm, though,
or even how I grasp a thoughtthese are internal processes that I definitely cannot
capture in reflections.
A simple technical system suffices to explain the most important feature of the
self-referentiality of subjectivity: A heating thermostat maintains a constant
temperature, because the apparatus corrects any deviations from the temperature set
for a sensor by switching the heating on and off. Insofar as this temperature sensor
is part of the apparatus, the latter refers to itself when functioning properly.
When such systems were first discovered, these recursive structures were called
cybernetic, that is, governing (or self-governing). A structures quality of
self-referentiality was characterized as closed. This sounds as if nothing could
enter the structure,18 which is misleading because, naturally, changes picked up
by the temperature sensor are caused by the temperature outside. What is coming
in, then, is simply not coded in such a way that it could set the system in
motion directly. The specific temperature of the environment does not determine

18

It is an enthralling idea that a system could develop in an environment from which it receives no
information. This is the reason for the fact that Humberto Maturanas writings caused such a stir
(cf. Maturana (1994, 1998)). In broad daylight, however, this turns out to be much less exciting,
because such systems are structurally coupled with their environment, i.e. they occur in a form
in which they do not respond to a single environmental event with specific actions, but perceive
such events as changes to their interior and, if possible, adapt this interior accordingly.

3.2 Subjectivity as a System

103

the constant temperature of the room. Rather, the latter is the result of activity
within the system. Such open recursive systems will form, by way of analogy, a
suitable background for describing the subject that we encounter in the practice of
argumentation.

3.2.2

Habitus and Way of Perceiving

A fully socialized person is endowed with the freedom of decision. In principle,

she can act differently in every new moment. Nevertheless, she does not act this
freedom out in a life that is arbitrary and undetermined at all times, but by developing
certain habits and a particular style of acting, thinking, and talkingand, therefore,
also of arguing. This personal style evolves by engaging with specific natural
(e.g. geographical, climatic) and cultural (e.g. linguistic, historical) circumstances
of life, as well as with the internalized results of this contact. This style is something
like a persons second nature. It becomes manifest in a persons posture, way of
walking and thinking, and characteristic speech patternsquite generally, in the
body as well as in the soul and in the latter particularly in spontaneous impulses,
that is, in reactions to stimuli.
Such relatively fixed structures within a persons rather free opportunities for
development have always been the subject of speculation and theorizing. Aristotle
already had a term for them (hexis). Over the course of the history of ideas, many
conceptual systems have been created to designate different temperaments or
characters and to distinguish between more or less distinct behavioral styles, often
depending on bodily features. The expression habitus (and its corresponding
words in English and French) has been in frequent use since the early 20th century.19
It designates a kind of system-like stability of behavior in individual people, possibly
also in collectives. Another common term is behavioral disposition (used by
Willems and Bourdieu). However, I fear that the term is slightly too neutral for our
purposes. Even a piece of sugar has dispositions. A habitus, on the other hand, is a
network of habits, that is, actions and attitudes that originally arose in a more or
less new and soft way and then hardened schematically. Arnold Gehlen believed
that the habitus replaces our lost instinct.20 A person with a habitusthus
construedis limited, but she has the advantage of not having to constantly make
decisions. At the least, Gehlens thesis is interestingalthough, of course, in the
case of really important decisions we would like to remain open to other options.
Still, it is an instructive message that the habitus is a network of habits which are
stabilized by their interdependencies.

19

Cf. Gehlen (1988), Berger and Luckmann (1966), and, in recent decades, notably Pierre
Bourdieu, for example, in Bourdieu (1984). For a detailed account of the connection between the
concept of habitus and frame structures, cf. Willems (1997).
20
Cf. Gehlen (1988).

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For argumentation theory, however, the concept of habitus is useful, if only for
the reason that it can lower expectations about the benefits of argumentation to a
realistic level. We can assume that interlocutors follow certain patterns and schemes
in their statements, that is, their theses, reasons, objections, etc. Orientations are
formed in line with a habitus: Knowledge and doxa are appropriated only insofar as
they are in line with this habitus. Conversely, the habitus is formed and solidified on
the basis of these orientations. Especially assessments and theses that exceed the
limits of orientation are influenced by habits. The habitus is the stable element that
we discover in the partners of our argumentative conversations. What makes the
concept so attractive, however, is that the habitus is something that has developed
and which, in principle, can be changed again. It is not compulsive (except in
neurotic behavior, which we therefore regard as pathological). Rather, it allows for
deviations. If, for whatever reason, deviations accumulatefor example, when a
new person, a new job, a new home enters someones lifea habitus can be changed
fundamentally, possibly even revolutionized completely.
By way of the concept of habitus, we can now form a term, or a pair of terms,
which is very helpful for theorizing the practice of argumentation: way of perceiving
and perspective. The term way of perceiving designates the system-specific,
habitually stabilized view from the inside, in which a person relates everything she
experiences to previously encountered forms. Such a way of perceiving cannot be
objectified. It is impossible to observe a state of affairs in ones specific way and to
simultaneously focus on this way of perceiving with all its features and limitations.
As a republican, I might be able, for example, to identify and perhaps appreciate
what it is that makes my point of view typically republican. But the particular way
in which I perceive itmy specific style of being a republicanis something
I cannot objectify.
My opponent, however, is in a different position: The other person, the other
subject, can objectify and assess my specific way of seeing, experiencing, thinking,
and assimilating. In this case, my way of perceiving is regarded from the outside.
There should be a different term to signify this. I use the term perspective. A perspective is a way of perceiving as seen by the other. I will address the details of
this difference and the possibilities of objectifying a way of perceiving extensively
in Chap. 5.
The habitus is the ensemble of a subjects characteristic features that become
manifest in her perspective. This even includes, for example, prejudices. They are
either formulated as thetic sketches that correspond to the habitus or they are based
on experiences and have already been integrated into the habitusand are now
reproduced stereotypically at every new occurrence of the matter in question.
Interests belong to the habitus, too. I define an interest as the customary desire to
determine a certain state of affairs in a way of ones own.21 Subject S (i.e. a person
21

The concept of interest arises in the context of the standardization of economic states of affairs
(bonds, etc.) in Roman law. In the Middle Ages, its meaning shifted to interest in the financial
sense. In modern times, this has been generalized to private gain, whereby the morality of interests
became an issue. Enlightenment thinkers sought to find a reconciliation. In Groundwork of the

3.2 Subjectivity as a System

105

or a group) is interested in determining a state of affairs SA as D. So this is a ternary

relation. With respect to C. Colns fantasies, plans, and thetic constructions
before the start of his journey, for instance, we might say that he was interested in
determining the Eurasian land mass to be as large as possible. What matters to me
regarding the concept of interest is how we treat something in thinking and acting if
it is among our interests: S needs D(SA) in order to live a life that is right and
corresponds to his personality. In the development of an interest, S fuses with
D(SA), so that eventually it becomes a part of S to regard SA as D.
We embrace interestswhich is coupled with a request for the rest of the
world to respect and recognize the determination of D(SA) as one of Ss properties.
This might lead to complications. For instance, a contemporary Western diet is
characterized by a rather excessive consumption of meat. Hence, people who are
accustomed to this will regard it as among their interests to have access to
affordable (and thus industrially produced) meat. At the same time, they reject factory
farming. It is scandalous to treat animals as biomass. But since contemporary
Westerners do not manufacture their meat themselves, this pragmatic contradiction
does not become virulent. Unceasing uproars about the excesses of industrial meat
production, however, demonstrate the viability of this contradiction.
We may or may not be aware of interests. Their genesis may or may not be
transparent to us. Therefore, they may be regarded as conditioned. Naturally, the
fact that interests are tied to the conditions from which they arose points to alternative possibilities (her interest in safety is due to war experiences during her childhood or to a break-in in her apartment). In this context, it is important to note that
interests are not part of a (static) sense of identity. As a rule, we appropriate interestsoften quite thoughtlesslyand then act them out, like all habits.
For argumentation theory, it is important to what extent interests can be put up
for debate. They are part of the presuppositions of an argument. They are beginnings
which, however, may be questioned under certain circumstances. I have to be able
to ask a proponent: Why is this (still) of interest to you? In other words, the fact that
something is in someones interest is not enough to accept its legitimacy.
Basically, the concept of interest is vaguer and more unclear than the concept of
a need, which it has replaced.22 If we regard people as beings with needsbeings
who can show solidarity with others on the basis of their mutual needinessthen
this primarily addresses the fact that humans qua humans are always already in need

Metaphysic of Morals, Kant speaks of rational interests and demarcates them from pathological
interests. Kant still regards it as a matter of course that general and particular interests need to be
distinguished and that the latter are problematic. In Hegels work, interests are associated with the
preservation of ones identity, while the subject still has to account for the development of this
identity. Today, we deal (or struggle) with a use of the concept according to which an interest has
become an argument that is barely questionable: If something is in someones interest, it is part of
his identityand it is every persons right that her identity is acknowledged.
22
An example of talk about interests that is definitely over-the-top can be found in statements
about an embryos justified interest in nidation (a phrase taken from Antonio Autieros article in
Lexikon der Bioethik; cf. Autiero (2000)).

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of something.23 Hence, we have made a fundamental distinction between need and

desire. This distinction is in danger of being lost, because it is often difficult to make
generally valid classificationsthis is a need that is merely a desire. In Stefan
Gosepaths book about Enlightened Self-Interest, for example, there are only
desires, the fulfillment of which is supposed to be in our interest.24 According to
Gosepath, not a single desire, no matter how fundamental, is generally justified.
Consequently, all desires are equal in that they can only be legitimized with respect
to private scales of preferences. As a result, there are no longer any desires that we
may expect a dialogue partner to have because she is a human being.
It seems to me that this is not adequate. Is it not part of the self-relation of a person,
who manages to live a life with scarce goods, to ask herself: Do I really need this or
do I merely desire it? After all, this is the reason for teaching such a distinction to
our children. A child who needs ice cream on a summer day may be right if all the
other kids have ice cream, too. But if she wants to have a second or third ice cream,
we do ourselves and the child a favor if we remind her of the difference between
desires and needs: My darling, you already had onethat should be enough. This
difference is relevant, even if I do not know once and for all how much ice cream a
child needs under what circumstances. This is because it has consequences for the
conception of freedom and coercion. Freedom is regarded as the fulfillment of
desires to the greatest extent possible. That person seems to be free who can do and
have whatever she desires. Without a distinction between need and desire, then,
every denial of a wish would diminish ones freedom. The child whose wish for a
second or third ice cream is denied would literally be forced into abstinence. This
causes much mischief.25 If power structures are involved, these circumstances
become even fiercer. The person in power believes that she does not need the distinction, because she can do whatever she desires. This does not work, either. But to
argue against such a point of view, especially once it has become quite entrenched,
requires much benevolence and shrewdness.26
Finally, the emotional background of the habitus has to be addressed. For one,
there is the bodily feeling as an ever-present backdrop. As I have already stated, this
feeling is the basis of all orientations. It is always important to ask how much of it
is assimilated into a persons conscious self-relationand under what conditions.
23

For this characterization of humans as beings in need, cf. Wilhelm Kamlahs anthropology,
Kamlah (1973). Kamlah defines need as justifiable desire (justified wish). This was uncontroversial in Erlangen at the time. Lorenzen provides a similar definition; cf. Lorenzen (1969), 7.
This simple distinction between wish and need, which is indispensable for a civilized life, becomes
problematic if justifications are no longer uncontroversial. But just as the occurrence of dusk is no
reason to abandon the distinction between day and night, so the reference to controversial cases is
no objection to the difference between need and desire.
24
Cf. Gosepath (1992).
25
In the Republic, Plato taught that people exceed the framework of a healthy polis once they want
more than they need and drop the distinction between desires and needs (cf. Plato (1964), Republic,
369a373e). It then becomes the luxurious or sumptuous city (polis tryphosa), which is
expansive and needs warriors.
26
Cf. the argument against Callicles in Platos Gorgias, 482c527e (Plato (1964)).

3.3 The Theoretical Level: Orientation System

107

After all, this emotional basis has a part in influencing, leading, and seducing
people. The hedonistic self-styling of modern man that is heavily promoted at present
(primarily, it seems, by a consumption-oriented advertising industry) is actually a
deindividualization. On the one hand, it complicates a persons process of individuation, because consuming new goods changes ones lifebut these changes hardly
ever factor into the purchase decision. On the other hand, the mass production of
goods that attempt to signal an exquisite individuality results in an oddly strained
conformity of lifestyles.27 Even democracys existing power structures (along with
their deformations) predominantly win acceptance through appeals to emotion
which, as we all know, actually represents an infantilization.
Being aware of ones feelings and emotional reactions is therefore undoubtedly an
important component of the competence for argumentation. Little is gained by simply
establishing rationality and emotionality as antipodes. A lack of emotion may signify
indifference, disinterest, and, more generally, dullness or hard-boilednessnone of
which are necessarily advantageous. On the other hand, very rational views may stir up
many emotions if the proponent is strongly committed to them. But whether something
like that simply happens, or whether the participants notice what they feel when confronted with one argument or another, that is already quite a notable difference.28
The conceptual proposals for a systemic structure of the subject provided in this
section can be summed up in one thought that allows us to regard the seeming
objectivity of controversial states of affairs in a more realistic way. People relate to
states of affairs in a subjective way, which they cannot objectify or transcend as a
whole. In this respect, any arbitrary state of affairs that we are trying to determine
through dialogue is initially a state of affairs for you or for me. Should its determination encounter difficulties in argumentation, it becomes a matter of dissolving,
whenever possible, involving the ways of perceiving, breaking them down to their
components, and making them permeable for each other. If this process is successful,
it loosens and dissolves subject-specific theorizations on the one hand and habitual
entrenchments on the other. Only if we succeed in this, we face a uniform fact
whose theorization could enhance our orientation. Once again, this is the subject for
which I will develop the concept of frame structures in Chap. 5.

3.3

The Theoretical Level: Orientation System

At the beginning of Aristotles Metaphysics, we read: All men by nature desire to

know.29 The subsequent text of BOOK I. addresses the features of knowledge and
contrasts knowledge with mere sensory certainty and experience. According to this

27

The chapter on the culture industry in the Dialectic of Enlightenment (cf. Horkheimer and
Adorno (2002)) is not only still relevant today. In fact, its relevance has even multiplied over the
60 years since the books publication in 1947.
28
Cf. Wohlrapp (2007).
29
Aristotle (1936), Metaphysics, I.1.

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account, knowledge consists not only in being acquainted with the fact that states of
affairs and circumstances obtain (hoti) but also with respect to why they exist
(dihoti). The proof of knowledge lies in the fact that it can be taught and learned.
This is a beautiful, pragmatic point of view, even though it has not yet been executed
very consistently. For Aristotle, the pursuit of knowledge is a part of human nature.
However, a natural curiosity can also be found in animals, especially in young
animals. (Will this lead to brain growth in the long run, and will these animals
eventually reach understanding about the causes of and reasons for the events
surrounding them?30)
The idea that this is natural desire requiring no specific causes, needs to take a
sharp pragmatic turn. The pursuit of knowledge has to be regarded as a practical
desire for orientations. In the process of becoming a subject, people extricate themselves from a state of mere natural behavior (sucking, crawling, dodging obstacles,
testing objects, fleeing) and begin to act. In other words, their responses are no
longer simply prompted by internal and external stimuli. Rather, they set themselves purposes and goals by activating memory and imagination; pursue these
goals even against any resistance; and thereby realize themselves. In the reality of
acting thus created, there arises a necessity for orientationthat is, for theories that
symbolically represent practically relevant distinctions, relationships, and regularities. These are actually needed (not merely desired). But, in the process, a desire
for them is also created, which no longer belongs to nature, but to culture.
I call this the need for orientation. It is not only rational in the sense of instrumental rationality but also a component of self-knowledge. Knowing what it is that
I really do is the pragmatic version of knowing who I am. In that regard, the Delphic
oracles Gnothi Seauton (know thyself) is an appeal to get to the bottom of the
desire for orientation. At bottom, the knowledge we all strive for has a normative
component: the desire to understand where we come from and where we want to
go. This component relates to the level that I have described as the level of
existential meaning.
Following the concepts of theory and research, the meaning of the expression,
need for orientation, refers not only to descriptively recordable facts but also to
normatively structured circumstances. I am aware that abstracting from such a
profound difference might cause some confusion. Does not everything in the
normative domain depend on us humans? This would mean that, establishing a
norm merely determines things the way we want them to be. After all, we need
orientations for a given, and initially, quite alien domain. The normative domain,
however, is not alien. It is a part of us. We institute it in the first place.
This is certainly plausible, but it is not quite right. The freedom of choice that we
presume when thinking in this way is a rather late product of civilization. Even until
today, it has only been partially realized. Human life, after all, is conditioned, and
these conditions must be observed in our norms. The fact that humans depend on

30

Cf. Thomas Nagel, who explores the possibility that one day an intelligent bat could reflect on
the workings of optical sense perception in human beings (Nagel (1974)).

3.3 The Theoretical Level: Orientation System

109

each other (for better or worse) is the source of morality. If this fact is entirely
disregarded, the norms do not work.31 They equally fail to work if they blatantly
ignore basic human dispositions, yearnings, experiences, weaknesses, and imperfections or if not enough of those affected really understand them. Hence, our
stipulations about how the state should be managed, what should be considered
lawful, how societys wealth should be distributed, etc., can fail. Simple despotism
does not work. It no longer works once the subjects have tasted freedom.
An advertisement that is a downright fraud does not work either. The fraud is
exposed and the advertised product is rejected. Neither do huge differences between
rich and poor work, particularly when they occur in one and the same state. They
paralyze the basic social consensus, turning the rich into cynics and the poor into
criminals. Actually, such examples suffice to show that norms are normative theories
with a guiding function.
At the same time, regarding theories as orientations entails that they raise a
validity claim. After all, in our search for orientations, we do not look for just any
theories, but only for those that are right and truethat is, those that cohere with
other theories and, when realized, add up to a meaningful practical reality. A persons
need for orientation then has two directions. In one, the person, as a subject, wants
herself. She wants to lead a unique life based on her commitments. In the other
direction, she wants to do this in a way that is satisfactory and takes external conditions into accountprimarily, other people. In this second direction, she transcends subjective determinations and opens herself up to objective living conditions.
I will discuss this in detail at a later point.
Now, is the observation that people have a need for valid orientations reconcilable
with the fact that there are also bitter truths to which we probably prefer sweet
illusions? Yes, I think so. As we all know, for example, there is a trend in our consumption of resources that will transform the Earth into a place that is no longer
conducive to human life. This is bitter insofar as such knowledge, if it is supposed
to guide our actions, would require significant changes in contemporary culture and
its normative systems of politics, economics, and law. These changes would end
some influential peoples sweet, illusionary caprice. But this is not a theoretical
problem. These truths, if that is what they are, will catch up with us, not only in
terms of natural processes that have their own dynamics (ocean currents that have
maintained climate zones at a stable level will change and give up this function; the
decay of radioactive substances will disturb, destroy, and alter life processes;
transgenic organisms will thwart the repair mechanisms of organic nature that have
been formed over eons of evolution, etc.) but especially in terms of a deformation of
cultural achievementsof economic, legal, and political structures that are based
on everyones basic consent. The more this happens, the bigger and clearer our need
to understand what is going on will become.

31

In Ancient Greece, the view existed that humans, by their very nature, only want what is good
and right. Of course, this did not go unchallenged. However, the arguments exchanged in this
debate are still instructive. Cf. again Platos Gorgias in Plato (1964), Gorgias.

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Subjectivity

Once again, this theme of concerning oneself or being concerned with bitter
truths points to what I have called the second direction. It is a sham and a superficiality that man just wants himself. On the one hand, the particular human subject,
the individual person, and the specific group have a need for orientation. This need,
then, is subjective. Orientations are formed within the subject system or adopted by
it. As a rule, they turn out such that they update the subjects habitual systemic character. On the other hand, orientations not only have to be a good fit with the subject
but must also adapt to the conditions of life and human reality. Hence, from the
beginning, the need for orientation has a transsubjective character. It causes a subject to transcend her respective horizon and her specific perspective, and refer to a
general forum. The latter could be other peoplefor example, important people in
ones life, or relevant experts, or perhaps all human beings, or objective reality. I
will deal with these issues in detail in Chaps. 7 and 10. In the context of subjectivity, however, it is important to note that any possible conception of universality
is, first of all, a subjective one, and it has to be opened up for the second direction.32
In order to see what this means more clearly, some more theoretical groundwork
is once again necessary.
If people have arrived at a reasonably functional, reasonably socialized state, they
are no longer permanently searching for orientation. They have already achieved a
lot and have reached a state of normal orientation, whichthough inaccurate and
full of gaps and idiosyncrasiesis sufficient for ordinary everyday life.33
In order to describe the content of this competence, I would like to introduce the
concept of an orientation system.34 It designates that subsystem of a subject
system, which allows us to control our attitudes and actions. An orientation system
contains what people have in their minds and what they use to make sense of what
happens to them (in their imagination and in the real world). It is, one might say, the
cognitive, intellectual part of a person that supports and binds the habitus from
the inside.

32

This impulse is also notable as a compelling moment within theotherwise conceptually

unfinishednotion of the universal auditorium (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 7). For
a discussion and critique of the universal auditorium, cf. below in the Introduction, First New
Constructions and Sect. 7.7.1.
33
This normal orientation could perhaps be described as a veil of knowledge, in a negative
analogy to John Rawls famous metaphor (cf. Rawls (1971), 24: The Veil of Ignorance).
34
I took this expression from Geert-Lueke Luekens contribution to argumentation theory (Lueken
1992), which does not develop it very far conceptually. The corresponding term in anglophone
countries is belief system. There are different definitions for belief, but none of them map
seamlessly onto the concept of orientation. Especially the question under discussion here,
whether belief expresses mere acceptance or also conviction (cf. Cohen (1989)), can remain
unsettled (or be treated on a case-by-case basis). If a theory is taken as orientation, it structures
ones attention in acting. It does not have to be determined in advance whether this theory is taken
to be real or merely possible. In the case of research theses, it would even be preferable not to
decide this question prematurely (in the sense of a balance between distance and commitment).
In short, the orientation system completes, in a pragmatic manner, the concept hinted at by
the belief system.

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111

Some structures that are relevant for argumentation theory can be identified in
such an orientation system. For one, it contains those parts of general knowledge
and proficiency, universal and specific doxai, beliefs and superstitions, and, ultimately, research results or theories that the subject appropriates and then uses to
advance her various larger or smaller inquiries. As a result of the experiences,
joys, and hardships of life, the orientation system undergoes changes that are
stronger in young people and milder in adults. In its overall dynamics, an orientation system may be interpreted as a large, complex research project (heroic
research: we put our lives on the line). Everything that the subject acquires belongs
to this project: which parts of knowledge and doxa she appropriates and which
limits of orientation she notices, explores, and exceeds. The more the subject
begins to determine herself, the more decisions of this kind are clearly moments in
her major research project of self-realization. But, carried along on a flood of information, many things enter the orientation system as mere facts that are only tested for
validity if inquiries lead to objections that reach deeper or farther than the issue
in question.
Hierarchies or gradations between orientations and types of orientations have a
special importance for argumentation in terms of relevance, validity, and internal
stabilization. The difference between a hard core and a protective belt that I have
already mentioned in Chap. 2 is also useful here. For one, an orientation system
contains loose parts that break down easily; it contains parts that support other parts
and, therefore, are not given up so easily; and, finally, it usually also contains parts
that are fundamental. These latter parts act as principles inasmuch as they occur in
all other orientations and are hardly ever abandoned.35 More solid parts are usually
knowledge and those doxai that are connected with poignant experiences, in
particular from ones early childhood. The parts that are less solid are theses and
positions that move outwards from this system, that update and analogize it when
faced with gaps in and limits of orientation. Even accepting marginal opinions
is generally habitual, and so is the rejection of such opinions if the situations conditions change.
The expression orientation system contains the component system. I have
already pointed out that I use it merely to refer to a self-referential complex of parts
that tends to evolve while maintaining its form. When I use this term, I do not presuppose that the system has been constructed consistently and without contradictions, and that, within it, desires, wishes, and interests are organized in hierarchies of
preferences that are possibly even transitive. Of course, a rational dialogue partners

35

Formulations like given up easily or hardly ever abandoned are purely intuitive and perhaps
unsatisfactory. To my mind, however, we cannot say much more here. Quine formulated rules that
were supposed to describe and standardize this adherence to or abandoning of theories: on the one
hand, he claimed, we need to take care not to change the belief system too much when dealing with
objections; on the other hand, we aim at the greatest simplicity possible in doing so (cf. Quine
(1961), 2046 and Quine (1974), 24). These rules were formulated for the natural sciences, but
they are not even observed there (cf. Ghde (1997)). For our way of dealing with theories in everyday life and philosophy, they are hardly more than interesting mental exercises.

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system of orientation might contain such an ideal.36 But no one should believe that
this has ever been carried out. People might have a great capacity for tolerating
cognitive dissonance and may even differ regarding whether and to what extent
they are in denial of dissonance, inconsistency, inconsequence, and incompleteness
in their orientation system.
Even though the orientation system is the conscious level of the habitus, this does
not mean that it is present and at the subjects disposal at all times. Neither does it
mean that it is sharply defined against the aforementioned emotionality that is
characteristic of the habitus. Body awareness and emotional statements about
situations and events, encounters and relationships, etc., are also required for being
in a state of orientation.37 We should realize that we are basically only capable of
acting in the world if we are emotionally oriented. If this emotional orientation is
not sufficiently developed, or not at all, everything becomes very difficult.
Finally, the orientation system has a reflexive structurethat is, a subject attributes
her orientations or the results of her realization, to herself. She refers to herself,
activates the aforementioned self-relation, and even theorizes about herself. This
results in a self-understanding as part of the self-relation. The subject understands
herself that is, she articulates her opportunities for acting and thinking verbally,
relates desire and reality to one another, and locates herself in relation to other
people and conditions in the world. In the end, the whole orientation system is
nothing but self-understandinghowever, that is a truth which will have to be
achieved. Any objectifying, reifying theorization that revolves around the world
and people, and then even around oneself in terms of a mentalistic philosophy of
mind, would actually have to be begun or reconstructed as a work of reflection.
How is the orientation system anchored? In what sense are its solid parts solid?
Are references to the systems emotional background and self-referentiality enough
to understand what enables us to adhere to principles, or to stay, as it were, on
course to some extent? Our self-understanding includes the aforementioned
hierarchy of theories or beliefs that function as orientations. The deeper and
more solid ones are those on which life is already based to a certain degree. They
are known to be more secure; we believe in them more strongly. Hence, they are
experienced less as theories and more as the actual contours of the world. At the
very bottom of the hierarchy, we find those theories that express an elementary trust
in the world and in ourselves. We do not have to be aware of them in the form of
36

Gosepath (1992) presents a systematic refinement of this ideal aiming at a general competence
in critical reasoning and is not small-minded in other respects, either. Yet, Gosepath does not
address the question of how people can change, even though he realizes (44) that, under the
requirement that one persons wishes or maxims be rationally consistent, Paul and Saul cannot be
the same personwhich is counterintuitive, of course.
37
Taking recourse to many details and instructive illustrations, Luc Ciompi develops the idea that
states of affairs always somehow feel a certain way, that we also get to know and recognize them
by way of such feelings, and that certain transitions are (not) compelling to us because they feel
right (or not); cf. Ciompi (1988). Cf., for example, his reference (195) to the difficulties of
Renaissance astronomers who attempted to imagine that the planetary orbits are elliptical: after all,
the paths established for such affect-logical schemata would have been (perfect) circles.

3.3 The Theoretical Level: Orientation System

113

theoretical propositions. But we should be able (at least, partially and tentatively) to
articulate them verbally, if necessary. This is by no means easy. We have now reached
an area in which theorization acquires a somewhat artistic character, because there
is no longer a veritable object relation. The disciplines that are responsible for this
area are, for example, depth psychology, theology, and philosophy. Depending on
ones preferences, formulations such as basic trust,38 trust in God, or trust in the
Encompassing39 or in the intangible40 are employed. In the diction proposed
here, this is the level of existential meaning. It contains those (quasi- or meta-)
orientations that relate individual orientations, and thus conceptions of fields of
praxis, to the whole of human life, to subjective finitude, and make it seem basically
right and good. To my mind, whether the level of meaning is theoretical orientation
(that is, cognitive understanding), or whether it is just emotional orientation (that is,
an encompassing feeling of rightness that remains constant through experiences of
adversity and suffering)in short, whether it is more about understanding or about
feelingdoes not have to be determined. Insofar as a level of meaning is superimposed onto the orientation system, and thus holds it in place, it is called the
sense of meaning, as suggested by Paul Lorenzen.41
This level of meaning is generally not a requirementneither that it exists nor
that we encounter it in communication in one way or another is necessary for our
actions to succeed. Yet, if we focus more closely on the transsubjective stance that
is activated in the practice of argumentation, we encounter the necessity to strongly
believe in human reason. This, then, is the guise under which the level of meaning
enters the practice of argumentation. If I engage in a dialogue about the validity of
a relevant thesis, and if it is possible to develop an argument that justifies the thesis
as valid, then the fact that we are ready to proceed into action with the thetic orientation thus produced is a testament to our trust in human reason.
This is especially true in cases of heroic research. The discoverer of the New
Worlds level of meaning was permeated by a trust in God. For a fifteenth-century
sailor, this was quite normal. We moderns need an almost complete and ubiquitous
trust in human beings when dealing with the difficulties of our enterprisesif we
do not simply bury our heads in the sand, despair, or make it through the day with
stupid or challenging entertainmentthat is, if we dare to see where humanity is off
to. I will talk about this in detail in Chap. 10.
Any state of affairs, activity, condition, etc., is meaningful insofar as it is
embeddedmore or less consciouslyinto basic orientations that create a sense of
trust. With some justification, we may call them religious.42 They rectify a persons (non-interruptible) bond to the events that occur over the course of his life.
Obviously, established religions are possible ways to articulate this level of existential meaning. So, should we also call a view such as contemporary materialism, which
38

Cf. Erikson (1950), especially Chapter VII.1, Trust vs. Basic Mistrust.
Cf. Jaspers (2003).
40
Cf. Kambartel (1989b, c).
41
Cf. Lorenzen (1987), 272273: Sinngehalt.
42
From Latin religio = reconnection.
39

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presents itself as rationaland its economic expression, the capitalist commodity

economyas religious in this generalized sense?43 I am uncertain about whether
they can create the trust necessary to transcend subjectivity. Subjective particularity,
we might say for now, is lived, individually developed existential meaning.
In order to grasp subjective character of orientations of all kinds, I have
developed a conceptual tool: the framework. As already announced several times,
I will devote Chap. 5 to this topic. But in order to demonstrate how the topic of
frames arises from considerations about argumentative subjectivity, I will expound
on the notion of perspectives that I touched upon earlier. Ordinary language
apparently allows us to speak of our subjective particularity and the differences
between individuals by saying that we see things from different perspectives.
Initially, this can be interpreted quite literally. I may stroll through Hamburg and,
arriving at Jungfernstieg Boulevard, see the Alster Pavilion, but not the tower of
City Hall. The seagull in the sky above me, however, can see both objects from a
birds eye view. If I am in a helicopter above Hamburg, I have a birds eye view,
toobut partially and not to a very large extent, because no rooftops or flagpoles
are possible landing places for me. Still, the metaphor of perspective is striking:
we inhabit different positions. You are to the left, and I am to the right of the City
Hall. Our perspectives differ. My City Hall (City Hall in my way of perceiving)
does not look like your City Hall (City Hall in your way of perceiving). If we
change positions, you see what I have seen and vice versa.
In order to be able to generalize such differences between objectswhich might
be due to different perspectivesas differences between specific subjects, I would
like to use the term frame. If something is different for me than for you because
I inhabit a different position in relation to it, then I will say that I see, experience,
understand it, etc., as framed in a different way. Seeing something in a certain
way means seeing it as something. You can see City Hall as a magnificent
neoclassical building, as the political antechamber to the Hamburg Stock Exchange
located behind it, as a house that rests on 10,000 oak piles in the swampland of the
Elbe river, as a beacon of Hanseatic pride, or as something else altogether.44
Depending on my intentions, and on what kind of person I am, one frame may
seem more appropriate to me than the other. If we enter into a discussion about
something pertaining to this building, these frames will become relevant as structures of our arguments. The fruitfulness and success of such discussions will depend
on our ability to recognize and integrate these frames. More on this in Chap. 5.

43

As far as I know, this idea comes from Walter Benjamin; cf. Benjamin (1999).
The Enlightenment thinker Johann Friedrich Oberlina pastor in Alsace who corresponded
with Kant and, among other things, looked after the schizophrenic poet Lenz (cf. Bchners drama
Lenz)settled disputes with the help of a wooden board that is still on display in the Muse
Oberlin (Waldersbach/Alsace) today. Oberlin prepared this board by gluing painted triangular slats
onto it in such a way that, from one perspective, it showed the picture of a rose and, from another
perspective, the picture of a cross. The pastor placed this board between the contending parties and
asked what they saw in the picture. After very different responses were given, he urged the parties
to exchange positions. Supposedly, this lesson helped settle many disputes.
44

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3.4

Dynamics of Subjectivity

115

Dynamics of Subjectivity

Up to this point, subjectivity has been described as a recursive system. It is now

important to understand that this system is dynamic. A subject who is able to account
for arguments that do not fit into her system needs to be able to change. Therefore,
the subject in argumentation theory should be conceived of as something that is
coming-to-be. This is not difficult with respect to children and teenagers. Adults,
however, are people who have stopped growing. Or does this actually only pertain to
the body, but not to the consciousness, the soul, and the mind? Usually, we attribute
the particularity of a person to the existence or lack of properties. The resulting
impression of the subjects objective solidity is ratified, as it were, by corresponding
self-ascriptions, and it is further confirmed and hardened by the play of mutual
expectations in our social encounters. The static approach to subjectivity that emerges
from these assumptions, however, is one-sided. It is justified only when supplemented
and countered by a second approach that accounts for the processual dimension.
To put it simply, a human comes into being and perishes just like everything
else that is finite in the world. This external knowledge of the transience of life
cannot be obtained if we construe consciousness to be a static entity. It is the
cause of the strange horror at becoming aware of ones own decay that, for example,
Hugo von Hofmannsthal expressed quite tersely in some of his poems:
From On The Transitory:
Here is a thing no one can wholly grasp,
Too terrible for tears or for complaint:
That all goes by, that all goes flowing past.
And that this Self of mine, all unconstrained,
Came gliding straight to me from a small child
Came like a dog uncanny mute and strange.45

Whoever is not satisfied by the content of this poetry has to seek a conceptual
framework that allows the articulations of ego-consciousness to be something
dynamic. The task at hand, then, is to theoretically grasp identity in transition.
Leibnizs law (two entities are identical if they are indistinguishablethat is, if
statements about them are possible that can be substituted for each other salva
veritate)46 is not sufficient for this task. However, we do not need a new discovery
in philosophy either. The idea of identity as something coming-to-be has been
developed and expressed a long time ago, most strikingly in Hegels dialectic: in the
structure of the mind that is allegedly in itself and also in the Other.47
What Hegel means can be expressed in ordinary English as follows: a subject
emerges as a rational being by entering the Other, by engaging and identifying
with itin other words, by conforming to the Other (nolens volens). In the course
of this experience, she refers back to herself, returns to herself, and, in reflections,
45

Trans. Naomi Replanski, cf. Replanski (2012), 157.

Cf. Kuno Lorenzs clarifications in Lorenz (1969).
47
Cf. Hegel (1977), Phenomenology, Chapter VIII, Absolute Knowing.
46

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Subjectivity

discovers that she has been synthesized with the Other. In doing so, the subject does
not undergo any adventures that could possibly be avoided. She could not remain with
herself; she would perish on account of her own imperfection and incompleteness.
Rather, the subject has to become Other in the starkest and most obvious sense
possible. Only then can she hope to grow and move ahead. The point of such a process
for the subject is to no longer maintain her identity, at least not the one that has just
been gained. She has to let go of that identity and put it up for consideration. This is
the distancing that I will address again at a later point. In any case, the subjects task
is to become Other (and she probably has no other choice but to do so). Some of
this we surely understand over the course of our lives. This is where we locate the
ever-present moment of human freedomand it is the same zone where we are in
danger of descending into the confusions of a loss of self. (But even a possible
failure of the subject still belongs to the development of the mind. To pin ones
hopes on the latter, however, exceeds the concerns of the individual.48)
This dialectical model of the development of the mind can provide a structure
that aids in theorizing the possible changes of subjects in a self-relation. With some
adaptations and modifications, it should be suitable for representing the difficult
issue of subjectivity in-the-making as proceedings in an argumentative dialogue.
As I have already said, however, in order to describe this more precisely, I will need
the concepts of frame and frame structure discussed in Chap. 5.
On the inside, the subjects dynamic development occurs as an advancement of
understanding. But we do not simply understand more and more in the process.
Rather, if we understand something new, then our system of orientation, as well
as our understanding of world and self, undergoes shifts, generalizations and
simplifications. If static parts of our self-relation block this growth of understanding,
then the process of subjectivity in-the-making may possibly still continue in the
unconscious parts of the habitus, and set changes and developments in motion
there. If whatever is new has ripened to a certain point, so to speak, there may be a
breakthroughtriggered by just about any information, thoughts, or experiences
and, consequently, we will have gained a new insight.
This sounds optimistic, almost nave, since becoming a subject is a process full
of uncertainties. A focus on the advancement of understanding, however, is
indispensable for the prospect of a successful coexistence of independent subjects.
Moreover, it is by no means impossible that we could become conscious of
such a development, which, subsequently, would be supported by the practice of
argumentation. In order to advance this, a readiness for radical research could be
encouraged in the subject. Radical research is research that puts previous theorizations up for consideration as much as possible and necessary. In radical research, the
subject is prepared not only to use and adjust the components of her system of
orientation in her thetic constructions but also to distance herself from themin
particular, from opaque and unjustified determinations and beliefs. Rather than
48

An often-repeated objection to Hegels philosophy is that it conceives of the single person as

nothing but a mote of dust in the process of the minds self-fulfillment. For a possible resolution of
this problem, cf. my attempts on transsubjectivity in Chap. 10.

3.4

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externalizing itself as a solid object, the self bends back onto itself reflexively, while
putting the assumed validity of its orientations up for consideration.
The normal subject in her state of normal orientation, in which she argues at
most for small theses, cannot arrive at the distance towards herself that is necessary
for truly profound changes and developments. Of course, this is different in
exceptional situations. People in grave danger and people who are enthusiastic or
distressedwho leave their normal, veiled state of orientation due to specific
circumstancescan arrive at such a distance. I will sketch some situations from our
field of examples that will illustrate this point.
When late medieval sailing ships were caught in a storm so strong that nautical
knowledge was no longer sufficient, the shipits sails reefed, its middle mast
loweredwas at the mercy of the elements. The crew of 30 to 60 people, who lived
in a space of 120180 square meters, experienced how the voyage turned out to be
a prominent part of their journey of life, perhaps the last one. They became children
again; they prayed, confessed their sins to each other, and made vows. Coln went
through several such situations. Apparently, these experiences only confirmed his
belief in the mission of Christianizing the New World.49
During the French Revolution, there was the famous night of August 4, 1789.
In the days and weeks after the storming of the Bastille, the insurrection had
swept through France. During a meeting on August 4, which stretched far into the
night, members of the National Assembly addressed the new situation. Under
pressure from some representatives of the nobility and clergy, who displayed a
prudent readiness during these decisive hours, the assembly literally talked itself
more and more into an unanimously nationalist fervor. At the end, the first and
second estates voluntarily renounced a majority of their privileges (servitude,
enforced labor, tithe, hunting monopoly, etc.50).
In the last section of this chapter, I will again try to provide a detailed account of
the notion of distancing or of putting ones own theories and beliefs up for consideration. Great philosophers have tried to articulate the principle of distancing.
The greatest and most difficult formulation is probably the condition referred to in
Rousseaus Social Contract by the name of alination totale.51 A person forms a
state with others by distancing herself from all her idiosyncratic drives and by

49

Cf. Colns detailed descriptions in Jane (1968), 164: logbook, entry of Feb. 14, 1793. On the
journey back, just south of the Azores, Coln sails into a hellish storm with the two remaining
caravels (he had already been forced to leave the Santa Maria behind). The entire crew vows
ceremoniously to embark on a pilgrimage should they be saved. Apparently unmoved by the fury
of the elements, Coln writes a long account of his discoveries for the Spanish royal couple. This
account is wrapped in an oilcloth, placed in a sealed barrel, and thrown into the sea. The barrel has
never been found, but a copy of the text (which the man prudently produced as well) survived and
was distributed as a pamphlet all over Europe under the title First Letter from the New World
(cf. Jane (1968), 191 ff.).
50
Cf. the account of historian Jules Michelet, who is roused into such an enthusiasm by his own
descriptions of that night that he concludes resoundingly: Vive la France! Cf. Michelet (1952),
Vol. I, 217.
51
Cf. Rousseau (1998) (Social Contract), 15.

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articulating the impulses of the volont gnrale (general will), thus reflecting on
herself as a part of humanity. This thought was almost a commonplace during the
Revolution. In arguments, it has been used and abused in various ways. At any rate,
it needs to be interpreted benevolently to show its greatness.52 Nobody can be forced
to accept, let alone understand it.
Kants categorical imperative was influenced by Rousseaus concept of general
will.53 In its various aspects (generality of the maxims, recognition of others as ends
in themselves), it also presupposes the following: a person is capable of distancing
herself from her immediate drives (whatever their origin).54
I am aware that these explanations of the dynamics of subjectivity are fairly
general and abstract. So, what do we do with them? At the beginning of the chapter,
I wrote that a theory of subjectivity should be comprehensible reflexively. In order
to explain precisely what this means, I will introduce some thoughts in Chap. 9.
If I understand something reflexively, I recognize myself in itor I recognize
circumstances that I know from my own praxis, now possibly perceived in a new
way. Still, it is legitimate to ask how argumentative subjectivity and its dynamics
manifest themselves. For an answer to this question, I refer to the long analysis of
the conversation between Hppe and Merkel in Chap. 8. What becomes apparent in
that conversation is that the partners specify, accentuate, and reformulate their positions with regard to the respective opponents arguments. These remarks are at least
(a few) clues to the character of the dynamics of argumentative subjectivity.
In empirical social psychology, the change of belief is an established topic.
Why, then, should we not resort to that discipline for an answer to the question of
how our beliefs change? We cannot do so because it is apparently impossible to turn
the change of belief into an accessible empirical object.
A classic study concerns the analysis of Karens aptitude test.55 The test
person, Karen, is a student who, based on her grades in four college classes, believes
that she is good at physics and history, but not at philosophy and music. She now
takes an aptitude test that yields the result that she has a talent for science and
music, but not for history and philosophy. Karen accepts this result. Her interpretation is that her history class must obviously have been very easy, and that she should
have worked harder for the music class. Is this an example of the formation and
transformation of beliefs as a result of arguments? Should we consider her grades as
arguments for the first belief and the results of the aptitude tests as arguments for the
second? But why, we might ask, does she regard the aptitude test as being more
important than the results of her courses? This seems strangeafter all, the aptitude
test lasted perhaps an hour, while the classes carried on for an entire semester. But
people are not entirely rational; perhaps they are also disposed to trust psychological

52

Cf., for example, Kersting (2003) and Mauss (1994).

Cf. Ernst Cassirers paper on Kant and Rousseau: Cassirer (1965).
54
John Rawls idea of the veil of ignorance (cf. Rawls (1971), 24) can also be read as (very
clever) fiction that corresponds to our modern self-conception and makes this idea of the ability to
distance oneself from oneself comprehensible.
55
This account is based on Harman (1986), Chapter 4.
53

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119

tests more than their own experiences. But then, Karen learns that the aptitude test
results were not based on her test performance, but had been falsified with experimental intentions. Subsequently, psychologists observe a confusing phenomenon.
It is called belief perseverance: Karen remains largely convinced of the beliefs
that she has accepted (based on false information). There are different theories that
try to explain this (the foundations theory of belief revision and the coherence
theory of belief revision). These theories compete with each other, which leads to
new research projects that aim at testing them empirically. Thus, another area of
research has been added to the manifold landscape of social psychology.
It would be an advantage if the idea caught on that such research is only remotely
related to what we call belief, conviction, etc.something that is formed, at least
partially, based on arguments that can also be corrected and completed based on
arguments. Sure, these experimental situations collect data on a concept that is
subsequently called belief. But this insinuates that such a belief is accessible in
the first place or that the answers actually indicate a persons beliefs. It seems to me
that this insinuation is not justified.
The first objection is the aforementioned lack of self-transparency. Generally, we
do not know ourselves in detail. But this uncertainty is dispelled, as it were, if there
are boxes that we can check in order to answer the question (although our choice
might also be due to a variety of other motives).
The second concern is more specific: in the experiments that I have described, a
further source of confusion results from the fact that the subjects initially receive
some information, but are subsequently informed that the information was false.
Hence, it is not surprising that Karen gives less credit to the second than to the
first information: the language game information implies, after all, that what
somebody tells you is true and correct. This language game is broken if someone
points out that the previous information was wrong. The second piece of information can no longer make use of the innocent state in which one expects to hear the
truth, let alone restore such a state. Hence, the data produced in this way can
hardly be interpreted correctly. It is quite thoughtless, then, to suggest that they are
simply documents of changed or unchanged beliefs.
This concern, albeit somewhat mitigated, also applies to large sections of
empirical social psychology as carried out in academia (where the test subjects are
usually students of psychology). The entire discipline cannot be kept separate from
the knowledge that, time and again, the test directors instructions interfere with
experimental situations. There is a variety of experiments in which test subjects are
asked or provokeddue to incorrect informationto display the kind of behavior that
is the real issue under investigation. A test group of ten people is asked to carry out
a simple task (e.g. name the obvious color of an object). Nine people unanimously
give a wrong answer; the tenth person does not know that she is the only real test
subject and that the experiment is designed to test the strength of judgments under
social pressure. Particularly since Milgrams classical experiments,56 which are well
known by now, potential test subjects are sufficiently aware that any information
56

Cf. Milgram (1974), 176.

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about the experiments design that they receive cannot be taken at face value,
because the information itself could have been provided with the intention of provoking the reaction that is to be tested.
So much for this. The best way to gain access to the inside of thetic speech is
by entering into an argumentative dialogue in order to discuss a thesis with an opponent. If the proponent abandons or reformulates a thesis, or if the opponent drops an
objection, this is sufficient evidence for the assumption that a way of perceiving
has been changed.

3.5

Distance and Commitment in Thetic Speech

In the last section of this chapter, I would like to discuss the concept of distancing in
detail.
The distance from oneself that is necessary for testing a thesis in an argumentative
dialogue cannot be obtained through special measures or rules. Any rule57 can be
avoided or perverted if one is not concerned with the validity of the thesis, but instead,
with being right or winning over an addressee. Hence, the distance must come about
on its own, driven by the momentum of argumentation in which peoples presuppositions are increasingly put up for consideration, and whereby these people themselves
are increasingly called into question. Initially, a dialogue partner will only be open to
arguments that are either a good fit for her orientation system or that promise to mend
or overcome any already occurring or anticipated fissure or crack in it. Even this,
however, might be true to only a very small degree. (Most people could live simpler
and happier lives if they abandoned their attachments to material circumstances and
goods as well as to wealth and power. However, they do not abandon them, presumably because they cannot imagine the resulting increase in freedom.)
For argumentative speech, I consider significant, a particular attitude of the subject
that I have called distancing. We distance ourselves from our own involvement in
situations that are questionable or problematic. In the process, we distance ourselves
from ourselves, insofar as we deal with the problem, cannot extricate ourselves from
it, and regard some solutions as right and sensible.
What is this distancing? Figuratively speaking, we create a gap, a certain
space, between the part of our ego that is located at the limit of orientationthe ego
that is involved with the problem and has produced the thesisand the remaining
parts of the ego, which are at least halfway coherent and concerned with other states
of affairs. Such a distance usually comes about all by itself, if we spatially or
temporally move away from a problem. In that case, we have become a bit Other.
Sometimes, this can already be achieved through distraction or by focusing on
something different, like a book, a piece of music, a play, etc. In the distance, we are
still involved, butthis is what generates hope and optimismwe are no longer
57

Cf., for example, the seven rules of rational discourse in Alexy (1989), or Pragmadialectics
Ten Commandments of Critical Discussion (van Eemeren et al. (1996), 2834).

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3.5 Distance and Commitment in Thetic Speech

committed and entangled to the point that the problem possesses us completely.
Once distanced, we stand outside, so to speak. The problem is now in front of us; it
becomes an object, something factual. At the same time, the subject isor, rather,
we aresmaller: We are thrown back to that part of the self-relation which is not yet
preoccupied with the problem. By focusing on this part, we are not only diminished
but also freed to some extent from those states of affairs that are questionable and that
disturb our orientation. The subject in the realm of thetic reason is not the old Western
self-consciousness, heavily laden with all the unsolved problems of the difference
between transcendental and empirical ego. Rather, this subject travels lightly
through zones of tentativeness. Along the way, she uses her theories for orientation
wherever they are helpful, but always with an awareness of their incompleteness;
she is ready to dissolve them and maybe put them together differently, and particularly willing to cast off her own corresponding shackles and support structures.
Thetic distancing is a peculiar attitude that everyone is quite familiar with, but it is
probably still not easily understood. In the reality of the practice of argumentation,
it is initially buried under manifold communicative purposes (entertainment, recognition, face saving, etc.) that are likely to divert our (lightweight) concentration away
from the validity of the thesis. I will therefore try to characterize thetic distancing
as accurately as possible. The vital point is the proponents specific identification
with a certain thesis that responds to a quaestio.
We can regard the ways of being involved in a problem as grades between two
poles. One pole represents complete unity and involvement with the thesis whereas
the other pole stands for separation and otherness. Distancing is the movement
between these two poles.
U

(A) Unity
In the case of complete commitment (in the diagram: pole U), everything that is discussed as questionable is simply mine. The thetic sketch is my opinion. If I articulate
it, my talk revolves around objects. But, actually, they are my objects: they express
and update only my subjective system. For example, I might talk about slavery in
ancient Rome and might castigate it as incompatible with human dignity. But what
I really talk about is my slaves, my Rome, and my dignity. The reasons I might
resort to in order to support my views belong to my world. They are my intellectual flesh and blood.58 If the other does not accept my reasons, if she contradicts
them, I am personally affected.
In this state, objections show me nothing that I have not seen or considered
before nor anything I have ignored. Rather, they deny my way of thinking and my
way of life; they can hurt and outrage me. I am outraged if an adversary does not
58

The most prolific writer on argumentation theory by far, Canadian scholar Douglas Walton is
convinced that slavery in ancient Rome was already absolutely wrong; cf. Walton (1992b), 99.

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admit, claims not to understand, or presents as questionable something that is very

simple and apparent (to me). It seems obvious to me, not that she does not understand
it, but rather that she does not want to understand it, that she willfully denies it and,
thus, that she is malevolent, orif she really cannot see what I meanthat she is
not competent enough, or, in extreme cases, even a bit feebleminded.
At this pole of complete commitment, emotions are virulent and easily noticeable.
If the proponent is in this state of mindor even if both dialogue partners arethere
is little hope of advancing questions of validity. The subject feels either understood
or misunderstood and is inclined to interpret any understanding she encounters as
confirmation and support of her own thesis. In the worst cases, even the experience
of being misunderstood can be interpreted as confirmation that one was right after
all (being misunderstood is hardly surprising, with an interlocutor like that!). This
means that we are not close to the matter at hand. We are stuck within ourselves
without really noticing this, of course. We are truly personal and truly subjective.
If, in this state, emotions come up, this is completely appropriate. Their presence
indicates that the degree of our commitment to a thesis, or of our participation and
involvement in certain ways of framing and treating problems is high.
(B) Otherness
The other pole, complete separation (in the diagram: pole O), is the outside view of
my problem. Actually, this position can only be inhabited by the Other, the dialogue
partner. In spite of all my possibly activated empathy, this Other is outside of my
way of looking at the quaestio. Consequently, Position O is perfect, pure objectivity
and independent of my own participation. I cannot take this position, butand this
is the essence of distancingI can attempt to approach it. I try to find an attitude
towards the problem as if I were outside of myselfwithout, at the same time, losing
myself or the connection to my subjectivity. This endeavor to distance oneself is the
recognition of the Other that is characteristic of the reasonable practice of argumentation. The Other is an independent entity that is not caught up in my commitments
and self-love: a separate source of information and ideas outside of my own perspective. I acknowledge this independence if I admit it into my own attitude. In that
case, I am distanced.
Generally speaking, it is much easier for people who are confident about
themselves and their place in the world (commonly known as strong characters)
to distance themselves from their commitments than people who are easily thrown
into doubt. Nevertheless, there is also a perverse realization of this attitude: that of
the high-flyer. As Hegel once remarked,59 such a person is above the matter not
because he has worked his way through it, but rather because he has never been
caught up in it in the first place. This disposition to deal with problems in a dry
manner that is devoid of emotions is ubiquitous among intellectuals, whose presentations end up sounding unspeakably theoretical and abstract. For them, lived
reality becomes accessible only through theories; consequently, reality is less
experienced than conceived. In such cases, theories are not orientations in the world.
59

Cf. Hegel (1977), Phenomenology, Preface.

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123

Rather, people with such dispositions have lost themselves to the theories and can
no longer attain the world.
The attitude that is characteristic of thetic speech oscillates between these two poles.
Typically, it starts with a strong personal involvement, a personal commitment to the
problem or to a solution that is regarded as correct. If this solution is established as
the thesis and introduced into a dialogue, the first step of distancing has already
been taken. Involvement has been suspended; one still remains involved in the
matter, but does not actualize it; rather, one focuses on the matter at hand. There is
still a degree of involvement, but one is no longer entangled and bound by the thesis.
One moves out into the open and makes space for other possibilities in ones subject
systemat least insofar as the falsity of the thesis, if it is demonstrable, can be
accepted. One turns away from oneself and towards the matter to focus on its
truth. The opponent, to whom the quaestio looks different, is an indispensable
aid in doing so.
The extent to which this distancing needs to be enacted, and whether more
distance is better than less, cannot be determined once and for all. Some people
would undoubtedly be better argument partners if they were more distanced and
matter-of-fact. With other people, we probably hope for a smaller distance along
with more participation and involvement for the sake of the issue at hand.
For all intents and purposes, the fact of being involved is a part of thetic speech.
It is the material from which the thesis and the arguments that I present are
fashioned. Without participation, there is no thetic speech and no talk about the
right solution to a problem, because there is no problemat least, not for me.
If I do have one, then it is a problem surrounding practical issues, for which I need
a solution. To the extent that I need one, it is obvious that I will try to construct a
solution that carries my signature. My opinion would be such a solution to the
problem. Yet, the formation of an opinion does not still my desire for orientation.
My desire is not just for any response, but for the right, valid, optimal response to the
quaestio. A solution to a problem that is merely my opinion will be structurally
related to the problem. If I pursue it, I will end up having to deal with the problem
again sooner or later. As far as possible, the valid solution to a problem will be
located outside the limits of my subject system. Hence, the act of distancing is about
opening up this possibility.
Since it is my own desire to not just seek and track any seemingly plausible solution to a problem, but a valid one, the principle of distancing is not a norm that has
been imposed from the outside or an ideal that has been forced upon me. Rather,
it expresses my own interests. It is the idealized form of a tendency that I pursue
naturally in my business as an adult, rational being.
In the act of distancing, my opinion becomes a thesis. This is a change in the
pragmatic status of the utterance. Forming an opinion on how to solve a problem is
a creative process in which something new comes into being. The resources for
thismy knowledge, my life praxis, our culture, which form the realized recognition
of descriptive, explanatory, and normative contentare available. If a quaestio occurs,
a gap has formed on this cognitive canvas; a rift that needs to be mended. The texture

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Subjectivity

that is meant to bridge this gap has to be produced by no one but me. This texture is
my opinion. I understand it, know its exact use, its nuances, and its meaning to a
larger extent than is apparent in the verbal articulation by which I present it.
By establishing this opinion as a thesis, I release it from my direct influence.
It becomes an independent entity that has to prove itself in the communicative sphere
of the world. Although it still has my supportmy commitment, after all, endures
even beyond the act of distancingI accept that it is now viewed from different
perspectives and is therefore confronted with other parts of knowledge and doxa
than the ones I could provide. My distant commitment for the thesis lies in constructing a justification for it and in defending it against objections, in expanding
and reformulating it, if necessaryin short, in doing everything possible to retrieve
the thesis in an argumentatively reflected form as a conclusion.
If I thus put my opinion up for consideration as a thesis, if I release it into the
transsubjective sphere of thetic speech, and if I expose it to the game of thought,
I basically expose myself. The extent to which I am willing to suspend a solution
that seems obvious to meand to consider it, instead, as a mere proposal, as a draft
for a solution that is valid more generallyis the extent to which I am ready to
refrain from myself as a special subject, letting the matter at hand act upon me.
Basically, I would be willing to change my life or to have it changed by an orientation
that has been judged valid.
This, however, is preposterous. It is an almost impossible demand that will only be
found in old books on virtue; an ideological goal that seems quite out of place in our
modern world. Even if it is, as we have learned, the extension and elaboration of my
own desire for orientation, how is something like that supposed to become reality?
A predicament arises from the fact that, on the one hand, we want to stay true to
ourselves and hold the right to complete our individuality. On the other hand, this
tendency is counteracted by the tendency to transcend ourselves and generalize our
opinions. This predicament is reflected in the fact that, when we release the opinion
as a thesis into the communicative world of the argumentative dialoguea release
associated with the act of distancingthis results in a pressure to act. This
pressure forces us to justify the thesis and refute any objections that it encounters.
The strongest pressure to act occurs in the case of a contradiction that has been
revealed as immanent. If someone demonstrates to me that the argumentation I provide
in support of my thesis contains both A and non-A, and that this contradiction cannot be properly neutralized, even by exhausting the core of my argument, this has a
distancing effect that is almost unavoidable. Consequently, I will call the thesis into
question; I do not want to simply pursue it anymore, but will abandon it or seek out
other research opportunities.
In thetic speech, we do not just want to keep what is oursthat is, our opinions.
Neither do we want to sacrifice and withdraw them in the face of just any new aspect
that is alien to us and which we cannot yet assess properly. We might not want to
retain our opinions, but we want to be proved right. This is not necessarily a bad
habit, which would now have to be disciplined using norms. It is an expression of
the fact that, along with the thesis, we have put ourselves on the line. We want to be
proved right means that we want to demonstrate that we have not merely presented

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125

something that is subjectively suitable, but that is valid transsubjectively. We claim

that the opinion we have formed captures the matter at hand accurately and that the
thesis is a step en route to understanding this matter.
But, as is well known, the desire to be right has a bad reputation. A dialogue
partner who wants to be proved right is someone who will not withdraw or
appropriately reformulate her thesis in the face of objections, but who will resort to
excuses. She is someone who will try to strengthen any irrelevant or remote shades
of meaning and who will introduce any ad hoc exemptions and special stipulations
in order to somehow hold on to her thesis. While this is certainly true, it merely
concerns the (aforementioned) concrete communicative events, which often come
down to saving face, for instance. Furthermore, this is, I venture to say, only the dark
side of the desire to be right. There is also a light side. After all, the pressure to act,
which results from thetic speech if the thesis is in danger, also activates an intellectual
potential that can generate new arguments. Under pressure to act, we might develop
new arguments that otherwise, in calmer moments, would not have occurred to us.
This means that dialogues are impacted by a force, which ensures that preferably all
and preferably the strong arguments pertaining to a matter will be found and brought
to the table. This is an inherent force that, analogous to the so-called invisible
hand of ideal market activities, organizes thetic speech.
Still, this means that, for the concept of argument, it would be better if we let go
of any rationalistic illusions. People are looking for valid orientations, even beyond
their limits. But how far they are willing and able, in the process, to put their
acquired orientations and, thus, themselves up for consideration is another story.
In any case, this can go on for a very long time. Just think of the ecological crisis.
The responsible parties do understand one thing or another, but they are by no
means in agreement. Many of them are faced with the prisoners dilemma,60 and,
by and large, they do far too little of what we now know to be necessary. Some
people believe themselves to be in a safe place, while others believe in nothingat
the most, in last quarters profitsand otherwise focus on more pleasant things. But
once the entire public orientation system (in both, knowledge and doxa) is pervaded
by ruptures and gapsthat is, once it barely holds together, and once hardly any
coherent, consistent meanings can still be formedthe willingness to put apparent
certainties (or even hardened thoughtlessness) up for debate will probably increase
again. (And such a state is more likely to occur than are apocalyptic natural
disasters.)
60

The prisoners dilemma (cf. Rapoport and Chammah (1965)) is a well-known problem of
rational choice theory. It is generally understood to mean that cooperation and solidarity do not
pay and, for that reason, cannot be rational. Some conclude that this indicates the end of all
community based on reasonable autonomy (cf., for example, Becker (1987)); others point to the
rashness of such conclusions (Sen (1999)). In recent days, theorists have begun to review the
assumptions underlying the model of rational behavior by testing empirical predictions derived
from these assumptions. Test subjects were asked to decide either selfishly or cooperatively
when faced with the promise of real rewards. The results clearly show that human decision-making
deviates quite strongly from the rationality that the model calls for. Cf. Fehr and Schmidt (2001)
for details.

Chapter 4

Basic Operations

4.1

Theory Minimalism, Concept of Argument

The previous chapters contained preliminary work for a pragmatic and conceptual
explication and analysis of argumentation as a verbal practice located in the area
between the nonbinding exchange of opinions and the acquisition or dissemination
of binding knowledge. So far, the following picture emerges: prompted by an
important issue or problem, a person reaches her limits of orientation; consequently,
she begins to approach the relevant matter by doing research around these limits;
she formulates a position, summarizes it in a thesis that exceeds the limits of orientation theoretically, and asks a critical dialogue partner to help test its tenability.
This is the first step into the practice of argumentation.
In the following three chapters, I will theorize this practice of argumentation.
In the process, the definitions, principles and evaluations that have already been
developed preliminarily will now be applied. The goal is a description that captures
the main structures of the concept of argument. This description is not a guide on
how to argue. To my mind, such a thing is superfluous because the competence
necessary for participating in natural argumentation is something we acquire
during socialization. Rather, this structural description is a theory that provides
orientation in the domain of argumentative speech. It allows us to find our way in
the practice more easily, to note basic structures, to distinguish between what is
important and what is unimportant, and to understand more precisely what we are
actually doing. This does not guarantee that the practice will be executed properly,
well and correctly. But within the frame that has been sketched, the practice of argumentation can occur as a reasonable activity or even as the confirmation of the
human capacity for reason.
As is well known, todaythat is, since the second half of the twentieth centurys
new wave of argumentation theorythere are quite a few proposals and approaches
for a theorization of argumentation. Their goals are usually more ambitious than
mine. They want to show how to argue correctly, rationally and successfully.

H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,

Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_4,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

127

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4 Basic Operations

Of course, these goals contain certain preconceptions; among other things, particular
notions of truth and correctness will be assumed. If rational argumentation is
equated with correct logical deductions, a notion of truth will be presupposed.
If it is equated with success or with obtaining acceptancethe addresses acceptance, the audiences, the potential clientsthe correctness of the task is simply
assumed. The viewpoints developed in training courses on argumentation that currently spring up everywhere at least partially affect and change the general practice
of argumentation. Any aspects highlighted in the process seldom derive from a
sophisticated and pragmatic way of thinking. As a rule, they are either rational in a
mere instrumental sense or syntactical. The coaches, it seems, think it is necessary
to rely on argumentative patterns. Hence, they teach elementary classical logic or
Toulmins schema, but do so in a rather uncritical way. Nevertheless, we have
reason to hope that even this will eventually heighten general awareness regarding
existence and relevance of a culture of argumentation.
On the whole, the contemporary way of looking at arguments is success based.
If people systematize and improve their practice of argumentation, they hope to
benefit from these intellectual efforts. This is legitimate if only it was not always
geared towards money. Likewise, schools teach argumentation in debates that are
competitive in nature and generally do not focus on how to test the validity of a
thesis, but on how to broaden consent. Business enterprises coach their employees
in the practice of argumentation in order to make them more effective negotiators
and salespeople.
In contrast, the aim of the theorization of argument presented here is more
modest in one respect, but less modest in another. Certainly, less modest is the goal
of separating argumentation from gaining consent. Instead, argumentation is concerned with the validity of the thesis. I want to stress that this is the primary aspect
of argumentationan aspect that has been widely neglected in discussions about
argumentation. More modest, on the other hand, is the internal theoretical goal that
could be described as an overview. I am by no means concerned with a detailed
theory that would even apply to the surface level of language (for instance, by determining which words or phrases (e.g. because, thus, therefore) indicate occurrences of
argumentation). Rather, I intend to drive a few wedges into the practice, so to
speak, which will illustrate some principles regarding basic distinctions and connections. Knowing and observing these will enable us to be more aware of what we
do in the practice of argumentation and how we can pursue questions of validity.
As a whole, these distinctions and principles make up a theoretical apparatus that
is minimal in the following sense: it only captures relations that are relevant for
every single instance of argumentation. Moreover, it only captures these relations with
respect to the goal of testing and assessing validity claims. It seems advisable, to my
mind, to define such structures in a very basic sense and to fill in the details depending
on each particular case. After all, if such details do not come about on their own
within a framework provided by the basic structures, then they need to be put up for
discussionthat is, new theory needs to be generated by approaching the concrete
case in question and then stabilized in argumentative speech (on the meta-level).

4.1 Theory Minimalism, Concept of Argument

129

Such theory minimalism does not express an imprecise and only preliminary
understanding.1 It corresponds to the desire to regard the practice of argumentation
as the epitome of reasonable activities and to take it seriously as such. Under this
guiding principle, argumentation must remain open. Reason, as far as it is representable in a theoretical structure, needs to leave a door ajar. We can never completely
objectify what it truly is. A theory of reason would itself have to be reasonable, but
in what sense? That it meets its own requirements is not sufficient. In order to assess
whether a theory of reason is reasonable, we would need a theory-transcendent
criterion of reason. Since we do not have such a criterion, the theory of reason must
remain open in order to be able to point beyond itself.
German philosopher Friedrich Kambartel tried to solve this problem by not
defining reason according to any rational criterion, but as the quality of a culture.2
Because the concept of culture used in the process was not quite clear, however,
Kambartel was accused (under the conditions of a politically and morally charged
intercultural debate) of cultural relativism.3 In order to counter this criticism, we
could characterize the culture of reason via the dominance of argumentation, which
is something Kambartel also does, at least to some extent. The subsequent task,
then, is to describe the practice of argumentation in such a way that cultural boundaries can be transcended in a reasonable manner.4
But this cannot solve the problem of the door, which reason needs to leave
ajar in order to maintain the structure of our rational theorizations either. This
problem is the reason for the principle of minimalism in argumentation theory.
Actually, this principle is nothing more than the simple requirement of being
restrained when establishing a concrete and detailed theory. Of course, this is no
solution (after all, what does it mean to be restrained?), but a mere precautionary
measure. The real solution lies in assuming or admitting a transcendent element
within argumentative reason: the pragmatic function of creating trust, which is
inherent in every single argument, implicates, on the meta-level, the entire practice
of argumentation insofar as it is sustained by trust in human understanding as the
ultimate authority. I will say more about this at the end of this book.
At least the restraint required for theory creation becomes apparent in the following
fact: we can argue for the structures of argumentation theory if they are actualized
in real cases (cf. Chap. 8). By doing so, we remain on the tracks laid down by the
very structures of argumentation for which we argue. In this way, the theoretical apparatus remains strictly reflexive: on the one hand, it reflects the concrete forms
of argumentation, and on the other hand, it stipulates those meta-level forms in
which discussions about forms on the object level would have to occur. A relevant
consequence of the principle of minimalism is the criticism of superfluous or
1

This is how Geert-Lueke Lueken presents the matter in his interesting account, which partly aids
our understanding (retroflexivity), but partly lacks complete transparency (consensus and/or validity, dialogue and/or method?). Cf. Lueken (2000b), 36.
2
Cf. Kambartel (1989d).
3
Cf. Gronke (1998).
4
Cf. my attempts on this in Wohlrapp (1998a).

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4 Basic Operations

excessive theory. Such criticism demonstrates that theories which establish specific
and detailed requirements, specifications, and criteria that claim to be valid universally (such as Toulmins schema and the stages and rules of pragmadialectics) apply
to a limited area only.
So what can be done now in order to drive the first wedges into the practice of
argumentation? A careful inspection of this practice shows that there are three
relevant speech act structures that occur regularly. Hence, the ability to agree about
these structures is fundamental. I suggest the following names for these basic
operations: asserting, justifying, and criticizing. There are no strict, externally
applicable criteria for their definition. Although they are significantly different, their
differences are less verbal-external than pragmatic-intentional. The following
characterizations of these operations must therefore be read in a reflexive state of
mind. Every person who is familiar with the practice of argumentation from a
participants perspective should either be able to recognize them readily or at least
realize that these characterizations allow her to carry out a first, broad ordering of
her argumentative actions, even if she has not yet seen them in such a way.
Taken together, asserting, justifying, and criticizing constitute thetic speech
(also: the thetic system). Thetic speech is a communicative possibility that can be
actualized should a question of validity occur. It may, for a while, become a more or
less clearly pronounced level of communication, until either the validity question
has been answered or those involved with the issue have somehow strayed from it.
In order to demonstrate the character of this level of the thetic system, I will once
again (cf. Chap. 2) briefly outline situations of the type emergence of the validity
question.
Communication is multifaceted. We talk to each other, often without any explicit
purpose and exchange information, preferably news. I tell you something and you
reciprocate. In the process, we also exchange opinions, often without noticing or
intending it. Exchange of opinions is mutual communication of opinions.
Communicating an opinion means imparting specific informationnamely, how
I position myself in relation to the subject of our conversation, whether I find it
important, interesting, bad, good, pretty, and nicer than anything I have heard today,
etc. By way of such exchanges of opinion, we get to know each other; we are
cherished, rejected, and acknowledged. Normal communication like this nourishes,
warms, and reassures us of our affiliation with the human race (almost like the geese
who honk to each other). But it does not end here.
Every now and again, these normal communicative events are interrupted by the
question of whether what is being said is correct. Is it right? Is it true or accurate? Is
it good? Is it appropriate? Such questions are also known to emerge in the stream of
communicationand they may well submerge again. After all, there are a hundred
and more different ways in which they can be ignored, trivialized, or blocked.
But sometimes there is more at the bottom of such a question: a problem, a curiosity,
and a specific interest. The person posing the question has noticed that an opinion
highlights an orientation deficit that she may have already been familiar with, and
that she may even have already addressed in research activities. It is at this point that
the question of validity arises. Regardless of the communicative intentions that led

4.1 Theory Minimalism, Concept of Argument

131

to its formulation, an utterance is now interpreted as raising a validity claimthat

is, as raising the claim that something is right, true, good, and appropriate; in short:
Valid in any sense. Subsequently, this claim is interrogated: Is it right after all?
What kind of situation is this, what kind of claim, and how can it be satisfied?
Obviously, there are many different ways in which an utterance p can be valid or can
claim to be valid. Let us consider some of them. With p, someone could assert
that p is:

Acceptable for the recipient

Capable of winning a majority
Capable of leading to a consensus among all parties involved
Compatible with prominent norms
Capable of meeting relevant standards (efficiency, optimization of results,
rationality)
Capable of effecting a compromise between two opposing positions
Capable of expressing a situation aptly or appropriately
Even if p articulates a command or a threat, it could still claim to be right insofar
as it presupposes (perhaps correctly?) that the author has the required powers or
power potentials at his disposal.
What is the point of bringing all these facets to our minds? It is supposed to make
us realize that the speech act raising a validity claim can express very different
things and that, therefore, there are many different ways of demonstrating the
legitimacy of such a claim (if it is done at allfor that is not a given).
Some argumentation theorists in Germany have attempted to systematize validity
claims. Habermas proposed a system of five types of validity claims: truth, rightness,
appropriateness, truthfulness, and comprehensibility.5 In his criticism, Kopperschmidt
brought them down to two different validity claims.6 Lumer also distinguished
between five different types, without claiming that they constitute a complete system.7 I think such proposals have their merits, especially if specific modes of satisfiability are constructed alongside each respective type of validity claim. There is,
however, a danger in stipulating certain typesand, thus, boundaries between these
typesbased on a few concrete cases. Ultimately, this might impede and restrict the
practice of argumentation in the case of new concrete cases.
In order to understand the pragmatic features of argumentation, we are well
advised to begin by assuming that there are two major categories of validity claims.
They are not distinct in terms of content, but can be distinguished with regard to
the stability and reliability of the propositions and theories for which validity is
asserted. Hence, they build on the distinction between epistemic and thetic theory
developed in the first two chapters. Accordingly, we have to consider two kinds of
validity claims.

Habermas (1984), 38
Kopperschmidt (1989), Sect. 1.2
7
Lumer (1990)
6

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4.1.1

4 Basic Operations

Two Kinds of Validity Claims

(A) Epistemic validity claim

The claim raised by presenting p is that it provides an orientation that is tested and
proven. P is part of a theory that clearly refers to a praxis and has shown that it
provides orientation within that praxis.
Such an epistemic validity claim is satisfied by providing the respective
references: In discipline xy, p is part of the established body of knowledge; in
praxis yz, p is a piece of theory that is tested and proven. If that is not enough, it is
possible in extreme cases, to enter into a teaching-learning situation (if success is
likely). The interlocutor who questioned the validity is now the student and, subsequently, becomes capable of understanding the state of affairs expressed by p on
her own. Something like this can occur if she works her way into activities that are
typical for a praxis and focuses on elucidations and explanations of possible and
achievable effects and changes along the way. In short, satisfying an epistemic
validity claim means engaging in educational practice.

(B) Thetic Validity Claim

In this case, presenting p means raising the claim that p is suitable as a new orientation.
P is not epistemic theory, but a piece of thetic theory. This is the kind of validity
claim that is typical for the practice of argumentation. Satisfying it means starting
an argumentative dialogue. The person questioning its validity is not a student, but
an opponentthat is, he plays the role of a critical examiner, who has an essential
part in the satisfaction of thetic validity claims.
Due to its focus on the question of validity, the speech act that is set in motion by
interrogating a thetic claim has certain characteristic structures. Systematically, it has
a beginning and an end. It begins by presenting the first thesis, and it ends by assessing the validity claim of the conclusion. What happens in the interim, we could
call argumentation. Such an argumentation consists of arguments. This way of
talking seems to come quite naturally. It is significantly more difficult, however, to
specify an argument as a unit. In any given argumentation, what is an argument?
Where does one end and the next one begin? Can arguments be counted?
The usual parlance of an argument, two arguments, etc., suggests the existence of well-differentiated, individuated units. What could these be? At the very
least, there is one answer. In fact, it is common among theorists of argumentation:
an argument is a sequence of propositions of various forms and functions. It usually
includes two premises and at least one transition schema, followed by a conclusion.
I take the liberty to call this the PPC schema of argument.8 This answer is not
entirely in harmony with the usual parlance. After all, we can say that we have an
argument (or two) for or against a thesis. Based on the PPC schema, this would be
nothing but a premise (or two). In ordinary English, the expression an argument
8

Cf. the introduction to Wohlrapp (1990).

4.1 Theory Minimalism, Concept of Argument

133

refers to an individual premise as well as to the group of premises, form of transition,

and conclusion all taken together.9 Hence, if we restrict the meaning of this term, it
could lead to misunderstandings.
But a real drawback is that, by accepting the PPC schema, we commit ourselves
to a logicistic view of argumentation. After all, a logical inference is a very special
type of argument thatas a complete argumentationonly occurs in rare cases.
It was this consideration that led the aforementioned Stephen Toulmin, who ushered in modern argumentation theory in the late 1950s,10 to superimpose another
reason that he called backing, onto the general premise, called warrant in
Toulmins terminology. This stipulation, however, is incongruous, as it no longer
provides a justification for this backing, nor does it provide one for the data.
There are, then, two ways of beginning a justification that can be superimposed
onto a warrant. According to Toulmins prescriptions, the logicistic concept of
argumentconsisting of major premise, minor premise, and conclusionneeds to
be replaced with a schema that justifies every claim in three steps, by specifying
data, warrant and backing. For cases in which the backing does not sufficiently
justify the warrant, the schema does not simply provide further steps of justification
for the backing. Rather, the claim must now be limited (probably, if no exceptional conditions exist). This is similar in cases in which the data are challenged.
Again, there is no option of including a further step of justification for the data.
Rather, the data themselves must now be raised to the level of a claim. This claim,
in turn, has to be shown to be valid based on a complete justification, including
data, warrant and backing. Objections are part of this system only in the form of
requests for further justification. Moreover, objections against data and backing
have no place in it whatsoever.
I think it has become apparent from this description (which, incidentally, presupposes only the triad of basic operations presented in the following) that Toulmins
schema unlaces the logical corsetbut only to replace it immediately with another
corset. Nevertheless, acceptance of Toulmins schema has been overwhelming and
enduring, in spite of many points of criticism.11 My only explanation for this is that
argumentation theorists were happy to have a handy tool at hand that is easy to manage as well as quick to learn and to teach (after all, it is acquired much faster than
even the most elementary principles of formal logic). On the other hand, its success
is probably also due to the simple reason that the schema has been around for half
a century and continues to claim its place in argumentation theory. After all, who
can afford to start theorizing all over again or to review past achievements critically
by appealing to ones own practice and understanding? The wheel has already
9

Translators note: This polysemy is exacerbated by the fact that, in English, argument can also
refer to the entire (often pugnacious) debate that individual arguments, in the sense specified
above, may be a part of. This is a source of potential confusion that this translation sometimes tries
to sidestep by using the term argumentation when referring to such an event as a whole.
10
Toulmin (1958); cf. Introduction, section First New Constructions.
11
Wohlrapp (1987). This essay also points to other critics of Toulmins proposals who have been
disregarded by the vast majority of Toulmins followers.

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been invented. Argumentation theory, however, is a special case. It is concerned

with a theory of our reasonable autonomy.
But let us return to the question: what is an argument? The concept of argument
that I propose is simple, open, and practicalbut it does not look very impressive at
first sight. According to this proposal, an argument is any smaller or bigger part of
argumentation that has an identifiable function in demonstrating the validity or
non-validity of the thesis. Hence, an argument can be any step in the argumentation,
but also a group of several steps if, taken together, they have a single functionfor
example, the function of refuting an objection. I do not have a criterion for
individuating arguments that would apply independently of context. I do not even
consider such a criterion useful. (For that reason, I also use argument as a short
form for argumentation.)
The result is a picture of argumentation starting with a basis and aiming at a
thesis. In this picture, argumentation is composed of argumentative units called
arguments. The sequence of arguments is determined by case-specific necessities,
by the burden of proof for the thesis, and by further necessities generated by objections. In any case, it will result in structures that correspond to the three basic
operations, which are described below.

4.2

Asserting: The Thesis

Asserting means presenting a statement that exceeds the limits of orientationin

other words, that which is supposed to function as new orientation. The point is not
that something is being said, but that what is said is something new: something that
could take us further with respect to an ambiguity, a gap in knowledge, and an
orientation deficit; something that is supposed to advance a solution or provide
some kind of clarification. Such a statement does not occur by itself, but is coupled
with a validity claimthat is, the claim that it is right. This assertion is the thesis.
A more accurate elucidation of what a thesis is should determine its pragmatic
function. It should also indicate how this function is realized in language and which
successive operations it can and should entail. A thesis that has been reviewed in
an argumentation is called a conclusion. In this terminology, then, a thesis and a
conclusion differ regarding their pragmatic function. The thesis claims to be suitable as a new orientation. In the conclusion, this claim is satisfied if this is made
possible by the proposed argumentation.
In Chap. 2.7, I sketched a concept of thetic validity that I will elaborate further in
Chap. 7. The pragmatic status of the thesis is due to the fact that the thesis is no longer
a simple expression of opinion, but that simultaneously, on the meta-level, another
opinion is asserted. This is namely the opinion that the statement is validthat is,
that it can function as new orientation not only for me, the author, but also for
other people who enter the dialogue as critical opponents. Other peoplethis is
a requirement which establishes, for the time being, a nonspecific universality as a

4.2

Asserting: The Thesis

135

component of thetic validity. From a pragmatic point of view, this means that not
only the proponent but also any other people who encounter the quaestio could take
the thesis as new orientation. Raising a validity claim, then, means asserting that the
thesis is suitable as orientation; thus, the quality known as thetic validity can be
attributed to it. At the moment this claim is made, it still remains unclear what process is capable of proving it. The person authoring the claim, however, commits
herself to a particular outcome: the thesis, she asserts, will prove to be valid.
It is fairly common practice to regard an assertion as an expression of a belief
that something is true. But this is disadvantageous in the sense that, strictly speaking,
it presupposes a concept of truth that is far from unproblematic. In Chap. 1,
I defined a concept of knowledge by way of the criteria of closure for theories.
As shown, based on this concept of knowledge, we can talk of truth. However,
this means that claims made in the act of asserting cannot be truth claims. Someone
who makes a claim in the sense intended here does not necessarily affirm that the
content of his statement will at some point become knowledge. At any rate, it seems
to me that the validity claim is not that strong in the case of theses. In theses, we are
concerned with the phase of creating or developing knowledgenot yet with
knowledge itself. When it comes to knowledge, the validity claim is different: it is
epistemic.12 In a claim, it is thetic, meaning that new orientation is available.
The act of asserting exemplifies the double structure characteristic of research.
Someone who makes an assertion is both committed and distant. Let us first consider
the notion of commitment in this context. The proponent of an assertion is bound to
the thesis; he is not indifferent to it. After all, the thesis is his sketch. It embodies
some of his intuitions and, frequently, even some of his desires and feelings. He may
believe in it as he believes in his children or the products of his mind. As I have
already mentioned, it is this attachment that distinguishes a thesis from a hypothesis, the latter of which is a content-related supposition or presumption. Although
both words have unrestricted colloquial meanings, commitment or a lack thereof
can still be established as a conceptual difference. There are also people who are
committed to a hypothesis; those people represent it as a thesis. Someone who puts
forward a thesis believes in its validity.
Committed assertions do not only occur in an argumentative dialogue. If I have
no justification for my thesis or only a rather weak one, I can still bet on its validity.
On the racetrack, for instance, I can consider a team or a horse to be strong and then
bet money on their success. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant wrotein a
discussion of different kinds of beliefthat he believed so strongly in the existence
of human beings on other planets that he would bet his entire fortune on it. But he
added wittily that this is not too risky, for it could not be ascertained anyway.13 The
stakes in the case of an assertion in an argumentative dialogue are the adoption of the
burden of justification or the burden of proof. But this is not an external obligation.
12
Even Aristotle saw this quite clearly at times; cf. Aristotle (1975), Rhetoric, 1391b: When we
know a thing, and have decided about it, there is no further use in arguing about it.
13
Kant (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Part II, Chapter II, Section III: On having an opinion,
knowing, and believing

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If you make an assertion, then the fact that you are committed to the thesis means
that you are interested in a justification that proves its validity.
Yet an assertion made in thetic speech not only expresses commitment and the
principle that self-imposed rules must be followed, but also expresses reservations and distance. We know too little about the states of affairs in question. The
theoretical-practical process of research is not finished yet, and the result is still
open. Caution and attention, therefore, are paramount. A thetic assertion is not a
mere belief. It is a postulation that expresses something about me, but which is also
supposed to become part of the fabric of social life, independent of my own inclinations and interests. (The extent to which this is the case becomes apparent in the
success or failure of my justification.)
With regard to this balance between commitment and distance, we can further
clarify the thetic claim by distinguishing it, on the one hand, from self-revelation
and, on the other hand, from self-assertion.
Someone who reveals herself exposes her inner world and her feelings, assessments, opinions, and thoughts. This involves no claim that these are intersubjectively
binding. However, there are situations in which it might at least seem as if that were
the case. A star who reveals herself in an interview can expect to have her fans take
her statements as guidelines. This is a case of imitation. If I want to be like you, then
I have established a condition by which your revelation is supposed to serve as a
guideline for me. Normally, however, this condition is not given.
Self-assertions occur when I make statements primarily in order to be right.
Others are supposed to regard these statements as valid because I am so strong and
assertive. What is lacking here is, again, the element of distance. Potential concessions are not due to voluntary acts of understanding. Such self-assertions can often
be observed in the early stages of thetic speech in children.14 Im stronger than you;
I say whats right; cmon, admit it; etc. (Unfortunately, some adults have never outgrown this stage.)
Could sample sentences demonstrate what assertions are? Due to the free-floating
character of sentences taken out of contexta topic that will be addressed in the
followingthis is not possible in any definitive sense. However, examples should at
least provide some further clarification.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

This apple is not ripe yet.

Columbus was a Jew.
King Louis XVI has been kidnapped.
The phlogiston theory should be highly valued as a milestone in the development
of modern chemistry.
(e) We must not experiment with embryos.

14

Piaget and his successors and followers examined the stages of development for various
intellectual competencesmost notably, the so-called Kohlberg stages in the development of
moral judgment. So far, there have been, to my knowledge, no specific studies dealing with the
development of argumentative competence. Some material about this issue can be found in Miller
(1999) and Groeben et al. (1993).

4.2

Asserting: The Thesis

137

These are all declarative sentences, presented here without any context, without
reference to a discursive situation, and thus without a pragmatic status. As long
as this is the case, we cannot determine whether or not these sentences represent
assertions. They could be examples of sentences containing at least three words or
of sentences that are descriptive or normative. The only way to determine their pragmatic character, then, is to situate them.
The following comments are intended to demonstrate this:
Sentence (a) says something about an apple that is apparently present in the
discursive situation in question. If it is necessary to say something like this, for
example, if a mother talks to her little boy, then the boy is obviously not aware of
this fact. The mother is able to present evidence for the apples unripeness (color,
odor) with which the boy is not familiar. She and her son are situated at different
points along an epistemic slope. For her, the sentence is not thetic. For him, it is.
If he expresses doubts, she could introduce him to external indicators of ripeness in
apples. If she is clever, then she does this in a way that allows his understanding
to grow gradually, all the while responding to possible questions and objections.
(This is pedagogical argumentation.)
Sentence (b) refers to the question of the discoverer of the New Worlds ethnic
background. This background is not as clear as the name Columbus (a Latinized
version of Colombo, Italian for cock dove, which fits Genoa as a birthplace) might
suggest; but the discoverers name was Coln (Latinized: Colonus, the settler). In that
respect, there are some gaps in orientation here. Salvador de Madariaga, the author
of a great biography of Columbus, presented (b) as a thesis. Other experts have
argued against it. I reported this controversy in Chap. 2. Records in the Vatican
could possibly shed further light on this, but they are not available for research
purposes. Thus, the sentence is an assertion whose validity is disputed.
Sentence (c) is a statement made by the moderate faction during the first phase
of the French Revolution. The imprisoned king had tried to escape in order to ally
with other European royal houses against the newly founded French republic. The
moderate members of the Gironde wanted a constitutional monarchy. They believed
that they needed the king and, thus, attempted to portray his escape as a kidnapping.
Such a portrayal was possible because the difference between escape and kidnapping depends on the intentions of the parties involvedand intentions are not overt
facts, but only accessible through interpretations. The sentence articulates an assertion, which was eventually received by a very skeptical National Assembly.
Robespierre mocked it by asking rhetorically: Can the people believe that kings are
abducted like women?15
Sentence (d) is a normative assertion. It is a positive assessment of the theory of
the heat substance phlogistonthat is, it asserts that the theory is correct. The theory, which was formulated by Ernst Stahl, Prussian king Frederick IIs personal physician, argued that heat is a substance. In the same way that wet sponges, mops, etc.,
contain water, sun-baked stones and burning fire logs contain fire or, rather, phlogiston. This is a material substance, which passes from the burning material into the
15

Cf. Robespierres statement mentioned in Lewes (1849), 169.

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4 Basic Operations

(increasingly warmer) surrounding air during combustion. Today, this theory is a

source of amusement. But someone who presents sentence (d) as a thesis is committed
to taking it seriously.
Sentence (e) is an observation that follows from the German Embryo Protection
Act of 1990. This is a part of the law of the country and the sentence is normative
knowledge. But since this law is highly controversial, the sentence can point to a
hidden gap in moral orientation. Consequently, it can be read as a claim that is
supposed to fill this gap in orientation.
A few counterexamples might also be useful for the purpose of conceptual
clarification:
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)

Is this apple ripe?

Paris is located in France.
Columbus made four journeys to the New World.
Oswald T. Avery recognized as early as 1944 that the DNA portion of the
chromosome had to be the carrier of genetic activities.
(j) Louis XVI is said to have commented on the people of Paris storming of the
Bastille by saying: This is a revolt.
(k) Boyles weighing of fire was a ridiculous mistake.
What I said above about the positive sample sentences also applies to these cases.
For an assessment of their possible status as assertions, they must first be located
pragmatically.
In a discursive situation, such as the one outlined above, sentence (f) is not
an assertion. If the boy asks a question of this kind, he shows that there is a gap
in his orientations, nothing more. Neither does (f) presuppose an assertion that
is merely implicit (the apple is either ripe or not; it is possible that it is ripe, or
something like that).
Sentence (g) is not an assertion. It is part of established orientations and no limit
of orientation is exceeded. In ordinary conversations (in the Western world), this
sentence is not theticit is a piece of information. Such pieces of information do
not raise a validity claim that their proponents would possibly have to satisfy. They
rather assume that this has already been done long ago. An anchorwoman has no
reason to justify anything, as she makes no assertion. Yet, if the sentence about Paris
is uttered in an elementary school class, then the discursive situation is different.
Presumably, the sentence does exceed the limits of some childrens orientation
systems. Given their location on the epistemic slope, sentence (g) is a
quasi-thesis.
Sentences (h) and (i) are part of established knowledge. Hence, they too introduce some nuggets of information. But, in contrast to (g), this information is not
part of general knowledge. Even for ordinary readers, these are quasi-theses.
Sentence (j) is not an assertion, but recounts a story or a rumor. If we talk in this
way, the goal is generally not the examination of thetic validity, but entertainment.
Just imagine what a harmless fool the king wasthe revolution breaks out and he
completely misjudges the situation. A sentence like (j) will be answered by, for
example: Yes, and you know what Ive heardthe only thing he wrote in his diary

4.2

Asserting: The Thesis

139

on that day, July 14, was Nothing.16 Well, somebody who is that stupid deserves
no better.
Sentence (k) describes one of chemist Robert Boyles experiments as ridiculous. A person who makes a statement like that displays the know-it-all manner
of someone born later. Ridiculous expresses a feeling of contemptuous rejection. Hence, this sentence is most likely a case of the aforementioned self-revelation. Expressive speech is not instructive in the same way that pieces of information
are. Although it might be entertaining at times, entertainment is not its aim either.
Rather, as I have already said, such speech revolves around self-expression.
Someone who wants to detect a validity claim in such a personal and emotional
expression does not necessarily need to have truthfulness in mind.17 The point is
probably that the legitimacy and adequacy of this emotion supposedly applies to
any subject. Not only the speaker but also any other agent of the universal forum
(all of us) would regard the idea of weighing fire as ridiculous. But I, for
example, do not agree with this. In fact, todays know-it-all manner, which leads
some people to regard a variety of past experiments as mistakes, is quite obnoxious. It took almost 100 years until Lavoisier repeated the experiment and realized
that Boyle had ignored a component of the air (oxygen, as Lavoisier called this
part) that was relevant for combustion.
This discussion of examples indicates that, from a pragmatic perspective,
assertions are about orientations. Therefore, they can be used in both normative
and descriptive propositions. This is a deviation from the existing uses of language. A common view is that only descriptive propositions are assertable because
only those can be true. In this usage, normative propositions are not claimed, but
proposed, for instance. This sounds softer and more moderate and indicates that
the corresponding validity claim has to be construed in a different way than in the
case of descriptive sentences. Habermas aforementioned system of validity claims
has further entrenched the view that normative propositions can be used to raise a
(thetic) validity claim, but that such validity claims fundamentally differ from
those raised by descriptive propositions. Validity claims of the latter kind are called
rightness. Their satisfaction consists in striving for a consensus (which is qualified
in one way or another).
My suggestion would be to acknowledge such substantial differences between
validity claims, but to refrain, for the time being, from classifying them theoretically.
The fundamental assumption that validity claims for normatively formulated theses,
or rather for norms, are satisfied differently than validity claims for descriptive
theses and that the difference is one between consensus formation and scientific
inquiry is problematic.18 Our practice in this regard differs from case to case. Such
a fundamental and abstract distinction, therefore, cannot be justified. To my mind, it
16

Cf. Pernoud and Flaissier (1961), 41. The king was a passionate hunter. It is likely, therefore, that
the diary entry refers to his hunting success on that day.
17
Cf. again Jrgen Habermas system of validity claims, in Habermas (1984), 38.
18
As mentioned above in Chap. 1, American pragmatists have always been skeptical about a separation of the realms of facts and values with regard to their inquiry and correct understanding.

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4 Basic Operations

is much more important to first characterize the act of making a thetic assertion as
an argumentative operation via pragmatic structures (references to other operations,
possibilities for inferences and necessities) that remain the same regardless of any
differences between validity claims.
I have already addressed the risks of a profound abstract systematization of
validity claims. In any particular case, we will often encounter variations and
hybrids of the aforementioned types, which should not be leveled, if possible.
For example, if we have to assess the positions in the trial against the king during
the French Revolution, the following questions arise retrospectively: is Saint-Just
and Robespierres thesis that Louis Capet should be killed with the guillotine a
political thesis? Is it a legal, moral, historical, or even an aesthetic thesis? Does an
assessment require us to regard these different possibilities as different validity
claims? Should we call the historical thesis (this is what history demanded) descriptive and the political thesis (power relations in France and Europe at the time
made the execution a necessity) normative? What kind of validity claim would an
aesthetic thesis raise (being killed with a guillotine is a form of execution that befits
an absolute monarch19)?
As I have already pointed out several times, an assertion raises a thetic validity
claim. This claim is not the same as an epistemic knowledge or truth claim. After
all, problematic situations are characterized by the fact that the available knowledge
is not sufficient. As long as there is sufficient knowledge, nobody needs to assert
anything. If difficulties arise that can be solved by referring to already available
knowledge, what is called for is not argumentation, but education. As I have also
mentioned earlier, however, we have all acquired different parts of knowledge and
are not equally well-informed with respect to a particular problem. If someone does
not know and does not believe that Native Americans are called Indians today
because Columbus considered himself to be in India half a millennium ago, then
there is a situation in which we seem to oscillate between epistemic and thetic validity
claims.
Such differences in knowledge are not the exception; they are almost the rule.
It is completely normal to encounter an epistemic slope in a given dialog. The
proponent knows something that the opponent does not know. Usually, the reverse
is true as well. I think this is why thetic claims are so easily confused with already
existing, yet currently unavailable knowledge. The seeming plausibility of logicism
in argumentation theory is due to the same phenomenon. Hopefully, the pragmatic
differences that I have highlighted repeatedly will enable us to see this a bit more
clearly. On the one hand, people sometimes believe that they know something
which, in fact, they do not know (occasionally even something they cannot know: I
knew I would come back here one day and see this fountain again, etc.these are
19

In feudal Europe, the death penalty was carried out in different ways for members of different
estates. The have-nots were hanged, citizens were decapitated with an ax, and nobles beheaded
with a sword. When the Revolution began to execute its enemies, three years after the proclamation
of universal human rights, it made use of the new humane death machine constructed by the
French physician Joseph-Ignace Guillotin.

4.2

Asserting: The Thesis

141

cases in which knowledge is confused with certainty). On the other hand, there is a
difference between possessing knowledge that can be imparted (in which case,
little is known about how to communicate it in the cleverest and quickest way possible; some people simply believe what they hear, whereas others demand extensive
justifications that are perhaps replete with explanations or conjectures as to why
they have not noticed this so far) and having, for the time being, only theses at ones
disposal (possibly from an expanded position). In any case, this is a relevant difference in argumentative dialogues.
Finally, I would like to say something about the verbal forms in which the basic
operation of asserting can occur. Pointing out the pragmatic status as well as the
balance between commitment and distance does not specify any criteria for the
verbal act of asserting. So how should we recognize an assertion? Are there no
verbal indicators? No, at least, not any reliable ones. Suppose someone utters the
following in regular English (not in a special text of analytical philosophy): I assert
that p. It is by no means clear that an assertion has been made. To the contrary, in
my experience, this is more often an indicator of self-assertion and self-righteousness.
On the other hand, assertions can come in very different verbal forms, which do not
even have to be declarative sentences. A questionfor example, Wouldnt it be
better for us to turn around?can easily express the assertion that it would be
right to do something, in this case to turn around. In the reality of our practice of
argumentation, assertions often do not even appear in the form of whole sentences
(according to the guidelines of our grammarians). The point is to understand that an
assertion is made by adopting or modifying some keywords. In usual speech activity, everyone can do this. This is the meaning of the oft-repeated observation that all
of us are experienced in the practice of argumentation. We are already able to participate in it. Nobody has to teach it to us, as it were, from the outside, by way of
external criteria. If it is truly unclear and, in the process, also important whether
something is an assertion, we can simply ask. Of course, this is not possible if the
statement in question is part of a text. In such cases, we determine its pragmatic
status to the best of our knowledge. Consequently, this determination itself becomes
a thesis, for which we might possibly have to give reasons.
In short: the argumentative operation of asserting or positing a thesis cannot
be traced back to specific verbal forms. There is a lot of confusion surrounding
this issue. Great theorists of language, such as Frege and Wittgenstein, for example, defined an assertion as a statement that is declared to be true (preferably a
mathematical equation).20 It is fairly common to tie assertions to the sentential
form S is P. This practice persists even though it is obvious that this sentential
20

Scholars struggle to differentiate statements, true statements, statements held to be true, and
genuine theses. Frege calls an assertion a sentence that is declared to be true; cf. Frege (1997),
151171. Wittgenstein remarks (Wittgenstein (1981), Tractatus, sentence 4.442) that the judgment
stroke in Frege and Russell is quite meaningless and shows nothing more than that they hold
the proposition marked with this sign to be true. Wittgenstein himself writes (4.21): The simplest
kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs. (Emphasis
added, H.W.) One of the few contemporary philosophers who meticulously attend to these differences is Kuno Lorenz; cf. his essay Urteil (Judgment), Lorenz (1995).

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form is by no means used only for positing theses. Furthermore, theses can be
posited without this form.
Whether theses adhere to the form S is P,that is, the propositional form of
predications about an objectin their deep structure, however, is a question worthy of
consideration. To my mind, it is unnecessary and unrealistic to affirm and demand this
for each factual occurrence of the speech act of asserting. After all, theses are often
unfinished; they evolve during the process of thetic speech. Nevertheless, it seems correct to me that we tend to gravitate toward the basic structure of predicationthat is,
S is P (where P can also be a normative predicate), in our practice of making assertions. This tendency becomes manifest in the fact that if S and P remain unclear, then
certain questions arise and cannot be dismissed. What are we actually talking about?
What does the other party want to assert about the state of affairs in question?
In the chorus of basic operations, assertions play a special role. They express
dealing with the limits of orientation and can occur wherever there is a problem
or a question that cannot be clarified and answered by the available orientations.
The available orientations are used as the theoretical basis. It is also possible,
however, that the available orientations, or any part thereof, become questionable
with regard to the current problem. In a dialogue, this results in doubts about and
objections to, a piece of epistemic theory that has been introduced as a prerequisite.
If it is not a misunderstanding or a mere lack of comprehension that can easily be
cleared up, then such a situation changes the pragmatic mode of the piece of theory
in question. It becomes thetic again and needs to be asserted.
This has a serious consequence. Any contribution to a dialogue can occur in the
mode of assertion. Reasons or objections that have been introduced as epistemic
might get caught up in the dynamics of thetic speech and then require justifications
themselves. The wider and deeper the reach of these dynamics, the more are the
participants orientations put to the test and up for debate. This means that the practice of argumentation can significantly unsettle ones understanding of oneself and
of the world. In Chap. 10, I will make some points about the role of these thetic
dynamics within the possible reason of argumentation.

4.3

Justifying: Reasons and Justifications

The second basic argumentative operation is the practice of justifying or of giving

reasons. Justifying, logon didonai, the principium rationis sufficientis, and good
reasonsthis is a vexed and venerable issue. Hence, it is not easy to restrict oneself to what is relevant here for understanding the practice of argumentation. The
concept of justification that I propose is reconcilable with almost everything philosophers currently say about justifications. But it abandons any posited limitations
(as I have noticed and understood them), and is pragmatic and dialogical instead.
Thus, it construes the potential certainties that can be generated by an argumentative
justification, as resulting from a practical basis. Moreover, it includes the notion of
examining a thesis by way of a critical dialogue.

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143

Justifying a thesis means satisfying the validity claim it raises by placing the
thesiswhich initially hovers, so to speak, over the ground (of what has been
secured, of knowledge)firmly on this very ground. If this is done properly, the
thesis can stand on its own feet. It no longer needs anyone to present it in its place.
What is this ground?21 Before someone presents a thesis, certain facts are
established that can be presupposed as a base. Nevertheless, there is a gap between
the basis and the thesis. From the proponents point of view, this gap becomes
manifest in his distance from the thesis. The justification does not eliminate this
gap. It fills it with theory. This theory constructs a path from the basis to the thesis
for our understanding. If this is successful, then the validity claim has been satisfied
and the thesis is valid.22
A justification cannot directly create, cause or even enforce an understanding of
the problematic state of affairs that the thesis claims to clarify. Understanding is, in
other words, the intellectual substance of theories; it is spontaneous activity of the
free human mind. Nevertheless, justifications can provide the conditions for understanding to a large extent. For this purpose, they mobilize theory, which constructs
a thesis on the basis.
A justification that seeks to guide the opponent into understanding would do well
to adhere to the ideal of the methodical sequence of steps. This has already been
mentioned (Chap. 1), but I will briefly present the essential points once again.
A justification is a mental path that can be divided into successive steps. A step
is a verbal or mental action (I use the makeshift term mental action to abstract
from any particular verbal forms) that carries out a transition from an already
achieved state to a new one. In a diagram, a step looks like this:
ThE ThE
O
ThE is a theoretical element; ThE symbolizes a theoretical element that has been
changed in relation to ThE. O refers to the operation that accomplishes this change.
21

Translators note: The German original plays with an ambiguity of the word Grund, which can
mean both ground and reason. Thus, it uses Grund as a hinge between the architectural imagery
of the previous paragraph and the ensuing discussion about reasons as parts of a justification.
22
In his original interpretation of Hegels logic, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer writes that the mere
demand of providing theses with reasons [is] far too unspecific to aid in distinguishing a reasonable argument from purely subjective talk. The basic problem, he goes on, is to determine in each
case under what kind of reason a particular relevant reason can be subsumed (Stekeler-Weithofer
(1992), 253; Trans. T.P.). It is true that there are different kinds of reasons and that it can be
unclear or ambiguous which kind is appropriate in each respective case. Yet, on the one hand, we
have no other means but the practice of argumentation to decide this question. On the other hand,
we can still say quite a few things about the general form of a justification: It must enable an opponent to understand the sequence of steps (i.e. the sequence of presuppositions and transitions) that
leads to (or supports) the thesis. Describing and explaining this general form is by no means a
superfluous exercise, especially because this form is missing in ordinary preconceptions of argument and because the logical inference (which, in reality, is only one rather insignificant species of
justification) is said to be the ideal model.

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A step is executable if it can be performed based on parts of theory that have

partly been presupposed and partly been generated by previous steps. It must be
enabled by hitherto available theory. (Such an enabling differs from logical or
formal compelling. This issue will come up again, albeit in more detail, in a discussion of the relationship to logicism.) The last step, finally, arrives at the thesis in
question.
Is this picture not too simple: a sequence of successive and consecutive steps?
Does it do justice to the complex mental activity of justifying? First of all, it is supposed to illustrate elementary relations. In the reality of the practice of argumentation, a justification does not have to be linear. We will often discover that steps and
step sequences are intertwined. They sometimes move along parallel tracks, sometimes merge, sometimes refer to previous steps and possibly even, much later, go
back to the beginnings, clarifying them in the process or regarding them as cast in a
new light, etc. In Chap. 6, I will take a closer look at these relations.
But first the essential point: A justification definitely consists of two components
that differ in their pragmatic mode. The first component is the beginning (or the
beginnings, because there may be more than one), the second is the transition. In a
diagram, this could be illustrated as follows:
B, B T
The beginning is the basis (B). It is epistemicthat is, understood and tested. It
is the ground of knowledge and know-how, which is necessary for the problem, the
question, and the gap in orientation to appear in the first place. If there were no
basis, there might be chaos, but no specific problem. After all, without reference to
existing orientations, there are no gaps in or limits of orientation. The second component is the transition. It is accomplished through the use of theory, which can be
more or less complex but, taken as a whole, must have the form B T,that is,
it must enable the transition from B to T.
A few further explanations of these two components are in order. First, let me
address the beginning. Every justification presupposes beginningsthat is, it presupposes the availability of a theory that can function as the beginning of a justification of theses surrounding a problem. Is it permissible to assume that the beginnings
necessary for a particular justification are always available? Of course not; after all,
not every argument can be justified as valid. But if we argue seriouslythat is, if we
establish a thesis as an answer to a definable questionthen this process is preceded
by a praxis and a theory, no matter how rudimentarily crafted, which can provide the
beginnings for a justification. Therefore, it is legitimate to assume beginnings
because that is where the participants are already located in the first placeat those
very beginnings. After all, the corresponding theories or parts of theory already
function as orientation in their actions and in their lives.
But since every piece of theory that is intended to be used for any purpose must
be taken out of its original context and situated as well as contextualized, in relation
to the new purpose, such beginnings have a thetic potential as well. We can

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145

distinguish between received and reflexive beginnings. In the case of received

beginnings, we already have epistemic theory. Hence, it can simply be used. In the
case of reflexive beginnings, all we have is praxis and real life. The beginning then
attempts to articulate these theoretically. It is also possible, however, that beginnings display both features.
In the following, I will provide a few explanations of the second component, the
transition. Transitions contain especially theoretical if then sentences as discussed in Chap. 1. Such types of sentences that are used in justifications need to be
clarified. From a logicistic point of view, they are material and/or formal implications; hence, this characterization is inadequate. Toulmin created the already mentioned concept of a warrant in order to capture the special character of this kind
of transition. Such a warrant is construed as a general if then sentence, which
expresses a material relationship between two states of affairs. Warrants are not
hypothetical. They are not mere assumptions, which can be falsified anytime they
are applied. Rather, they are parts of the theory of a field. Fields are areas of
knowledge. They have to be present for warrants to exist. Only then are justifications possible. To my mind, all of this seems to be right so far. Still, there have been
lengthy discussions about these concepts, especially about the notion of a field,
which culminated in abandoning the concept of argument fields.23 The reason was
mainly that Toulmins fields were not deemed homogeneous and stable enough and,
therefore, generally did not provide the warrants with the required certainty.
However, problems with the concept of argument fields are due to the fact that
Toulmin did not regard his fields as fields of praxis, whose felicity structures are
represented in theories and developed further in research projects. He conceived of
them in purely cognitive terms. They were supposed to contain knowledge, but in a
rather conventionalist sense. Therefore, it seems obvious that some people will soon
object to the lack of a broad consensus, in many cases, among experts in a given
field. Still, the concept of a warrant can be rescued or clarified by giving the concept
of argument fields a pragmatic twist. Consequently, the if then sentence in the
warrant refers to action opportunities, and is stable and secure only to the degree
that these action opportunities are stabilized in a praxis. Does the caveat of heterogeneity and lability also apply to these praxes? No. This is merely an impression we
have due to our desire for innovations. In reality, any generally relevant ways of
acting are standardized, normalized and, thus, turned into praxes (in the sense outlined in Chap. 1).
If the inferential step in a justification is construed as a transition supported by
theory, with the supporting theory being a theorization of action opportunities, then
it is possible for there to be steps in an argument that are newthat is, whose
theoretical form has not yet been epistemically established, but is, for now, thetic.
Initially, securing such steps that have a new form merely consists in creating an

23

Cf. the critical articles on the concept of argument fields in the anthology by Benoit et al. (1992):
Rowland (1992), Willard (1992), and Zarefsky (1992).

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understanding of the results of each step or of the entire sequence of steps. Such
sequences of steps enable our thinking to move forward.24
With such a pragmatic account of the theoretical propositions that are responsible
for transitions in justifications, we have moved beyond logicistic thinking. But this
does not mean that the stability of propositions is now due to mere acceptance or
convention. A justification can inject the potential trust stored in available epistemic
theory into the construction of a thesis by using praxis-related, material if then
transitions. This makes it possible to provide a display of validity that exceeds the
criterion of concrete acceptability by an addressee, without being immediately
binding for all people. I will discuss this in detail in Chap. 7.7.1.
An extremely important consequence of this insight is that the justifications thus
designed are no longer deductive. They may contain deductive steps, these are noncompelling overall. Instead, they are what I would like to call epagogic.25 They
lead (our understanding) from the assumed basis to the thesis in question. Such
guidance is a matter whose success depends on the specifics of each individual case
and can only partially resort to formal and semiformal elements. An epagogic justification is no longer formal. It is, if I may adopt Toulmins term (in the hope that I
have reconstructed his intentions), substantial. The substantial concept of justification is not a dilution of the formal concept of justification. Rather, it articulates the
intention and function of this operation as it is found constantly in the practice of
argumentation aiming at new orientations. This concept of justification is universal.
The concept of proof, on the other hand, is a specific form of justification that has
been intensified for special purposes and is restricted to transitions in formal theories (logic, mathematics, etc.).
The substantial concept of justification reverses the deductivist headstand26
that we, as Aristotles heirs, constantly perform in our understanding of justification.
In his Analytics, Aristotle plowed through the area of necessities. In this work, justifications were syllogistic inferences. Propositions that turned out to be achievable in
the process were true, regardless of what people said. The Topics, which addressed
the realm of likelihoods, presented other justifications (e.g. generalizations) and

24

In philosophy, such arguments occur quite frequently (cf., for example, Descartes cogito or
Kants transcendental deduction). But steps like these even exist in natural or scientific argumentation. Most often, they occur in the argument from analogy (in which case mapping the structure of
the source relationship onto the target relationship allows us to see a new aspect; cf. Mengel
(1995a)). Consequently, with regard to the possibility of new steps, the plausible conclusion that
every argument has to include a rule-like transition (cf., for example, Toulmins statements on the
warrant, cf. Toulmin (1958), 97 ff., or Josef Kleins remarks on the generalizing conditional,
cf. Klein (1987), 90 ff.) should only be affirmed with some caution.
25
Usually, the counterpart to deduction is known as induction. There is indeed a use of these terms
according to which all non-deductive arguments are called inductive (cf. Salmon (1973), Chap. 3).
However, this is misleading because generalizations, a certain type of non-deductive argument, are
called inductive, too. In fact, the term induction has been co-opted by inductive generalizations to the point that it is no longer a suitable designation for justifications that are constructive
and substantial. Hence, I have adapted the Aristotelian term epagogic (Greek for leading to).
26
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, in Stekeler-Weithofer (2000), 112. (Trans. T.P.)

4.3 Justifying: Reasons and Justifications

147

beginnings that were not true, but only taken to be true.27 This gave Aristotles
successors an impression that endured for 2,000 years: That dialectical justifications
are a weaker variant of actualthat is, logicaljustifications. But an understanding
of justification that regards logical entailment as fundamental and dismisses other
modes of justification as dependent upon it is a misconception. The task now is to
recognize that things are the other way around. Initially, we know, and know how to
do, many things; subsequently, we articulate this knowledge in our theories and have
substantial reasons to hold these theories to be true. Then, we notice that our theories
also have formal structures, which allow us to transform, take apart, and reassemble
these theories without changing their truth-valuein other words, to deduce
something from them logically (and in other formal ways).
Deductive reasoning makes no progress in knowledge and understanding. It is a
transformation and conversion of already existing knowledge and understanding.
Nevertheless, it can lead to an increase in clarity, but that is different from a growth
of knowledge. Aristotle did not have the latter concept yet, but he might have hoped
or believed that correct logical deductions would be suitable for such a growth of
knowledge. His definition of the syllogism as a transition from something that is
stated to something other than what is stated points in this direction.28 The question is this: In which sense could the content of the conclusion be something other
than the content of the premises? If Aristotle had been aware that the one is the same
as the other, albeit in a different (logical) form, then we can reasonably expect him
to have expressed this view quite clearly in his definition. But that is not the case.
In the other direction (now moving from the conclusion to the premises), the logical inference becomes a justification that traces a thesis back to its presuppositions,
thus proving its truth, provided that the deduction has been carried out correctly and
the presuppositions are true. As long as there is no clarity about the pragmatic status
of theoriesas long as we ignore that they are supposed to be orientations for new
domainsthe aforementioned impression can endure. Consequently, a dialectical
justification might seem to be an improper and deficient version of logical deductions, its results being ultimately less reliable. Under that impression, the real practice of argumentation would be an activity for maintaining knowledge, so to speak.
We iron out errors in knowledge, arrange it, make it transparent, highlight certain
parts as needed, isolate, and reassemble them. In addition to knowledge, there are
also opinions that may be influenced by rhetorical figures. But such influence says
nothing about the possible truth of the results of our rhetorical efforts.
Actually, this deductivist paradigm of justification could only have been called
into question once knowledge had been recognized as historical. This recognition

27

Cf. Aristotle (1960), Topica, 1. Cf. also the explanations of eikos and endoxon in the Introduction
to the present book, particularly sections The Aristotelian Foundation of Argumentation Theory
and The Formation and Deformation of Aristotelian Theory in the Philosophical Tradition.
28
The syllogism is a logos en ho ti ton tethenton tinon heteron ti ton keimenon ex anangkes
symbainei to tauta einai (a speech in which certain assumptions are made, something other than
what is stated necessarily follows from the fact that the assumptions are such. Emphasis added,
H.W.) Aristotle (1973), Analytica Priora, I, 1.24b18.

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set in around the turn of the 20th century29 and became generally accepted when
Kuhns book on scientific revolutions was published. Only now has the idea become
acceptable that the truth of knowledge is nothing static, but something in-themakingsomething dynamic to which no formally logical representation could do
justice. Only now has it become possible to recognize argumentations role in the
research process and, thus, to form a more general concept of justification that aims
primarily at the construction of a suitable new theory.
So far so good. But this concept of the substantial or constructive justification of
theses is not yet complete. If the beginningsthat is, the theoretical basisconsist
of knowledge and doxa, then they are secure insofar as they have been tried and
tested in a praxis. But if the if then sentences used in transitions are universal
propositions, which are ultimately backed by links to the practice as well, why should
it not be possible to deduce the thesis logically? The reason for this is that, in the
normal case, a thetic construction contains more than just these two components.
In the component transition, a substantial justification must also include
elements that are different in kind from the field-specific if then sentences
(field-specific topoi). I propose to call them elements of construction (fieldinvariant topoi). These are also if then sentences, which, however, are not
substantial. On the one hand, they are formal; but, more typically, they are semiformal. Formal elements of construction are, for example, propositions from formal
disciplinesthat is, logic, mathematics, game theory, etc. Employing them does not
change anything about the available stock of substantial epistemic theory, but merely
transfers it into other forms. This is different in the case of semiformal elements of
construction. These are argumentation schemes as recorded in the traditional topoi
and lists of fallacies. Such schemes can be analyzed as if then sentences that are
relevant to questions of validity under certain specifiable conditions. Consider, for
instance, generalizations, examples, slippery slope arguments, the argument from
authority, the argument from analogy, the argument to the best explanation, and the
part-whole argument.30 Such schemes are used in thetic constructions to connect the
solid parts of the theory. They are semiformal in the sense that they contribute to
a display of validity only under certain conditions. Under other conditions, they
may be fallacious. How to assess a specific use of an analogy, whether it works as a
transition or ends up being an error because the analogy is lopsided, can only be
determined on a case-by-case basis.31 Whether a justification can yield a display of
validity depends, among other things, on such judgments.

29

Poincar wrote in 1902: Descartes used to commiserate with the Ionians. Descartes in his turn
makes us smile, and no doubt someday our children will laugh at us. Is there no way of getting at
once to the gist of the matter, and thereby escaping the raillery which we foresee? [] No, that is
impossible; that would be a complete misunderstanding of the true character of science. Cf.
Poincar (1905), 141.
30
Manfred Kienpointners book Alltagslogik (cf. Kienpointner (1992)) is an attempt to put together
a complete system of such topoi.
31
Cf. Mengel (1995a).

4.3 Justifying: Reasons and Justifications

149

Let us look at an example. At the time of the discovery of the New World, its
inhabitants were, from the beginning, regarded as inferior.32 They were treated
accordingly: betrayed, robbed, deported, commanded, punished in draconian ways,
etc. After 1500, they began to fight back, and Spain entered into a war with the newly
discovered territories. According to the requirements laid down by the 15th-century
Christian rulers, this had to be a just war. Nevertheless, the Indians were maltreated
and massacred in the same gruesome manner that occurs regularly when countries
are occupied militarily and there is a large imbalance of power in an almost lawless
environment.
The Dominican friar, Bartolom de Las Casas, who had become Bishop of
Chiapas, left behind a moving account of these events.33 At the very least, this
account impressed the Spanish court to the degree that the problem was recognized,
taken seriously for a while, and discussed by experts. The party that regarded the
occupation and the ensuing violence as a just war was led, for some time, by Juan
Gins de Seplveda, court chaplain and tutor to the prince. In 1550, this man and
Las Casas engaged in a five-day-long public dispute, which has gone down in history as the dispute of Valladolid. Seplvedas arguments are recorded in a fraudulent dialogue about the just causes for a war. The dialogue has been handed down
verbatim and speaks volumes about the state of the art in argumentation among late
medieval scholastics. An argumentation scheme that is typical for that time and
notorious in dialogues, is the argument from authority. Among the authorities were
Aristotle, the church fathers, and, for Seplveda, more generally, the wise or the
philosophers.
The main argument for the justice of war was precisely the alleged inferiority of
the Indian tribes, whose savagery was said to culminate in human sacrifice. From
this allegation, the scholar derived a natural legal claim to power for the Spanish
because all of this is by divine and natural decree and law, which commands that
the most perfect and powerful should rule over the imperfect and unequal.34
Perceived as a substantial if then sentence, this observation accomplishes
the required argumentative transition in the following way: If someonethat is, a
person, a peopleis more perfect than another, then he is entitled to domination;

32

Cf. Jane (1968), 23/24: Columbus log, entry for 12 October, 1492, the first (!) day in the New
World: They all go naked as their mothers bore them. [] They are very well built with very
handsome bodies and very good faces. [] They do not bear arms or know them. [] They should
be good servants and of quick intelligence, since I see that they very soon say all that is said to
them. [] At the time of my departure I will bring back six of them to Your Highnesses, that they
may learn to talk in the Castilian language.
33
Cf. Las Casas (1992). This mans testimony is particularly important for an assessment of the
state of argumentation half a millennium later because it shows that, even back then, it was possible
to think very differently about these matters, and not merely from a marginal outsiders perspective. At least Las Casas succeeded in prompting the Spanish royal house to enact Las Nuevas
Leyes de las Indias in 1542, a series of laws that banned slavery and the employment of indigenous people in bad, ruinous work (such as pearl fishing). (Still, the American lobby saw to it that
these restrictions were terminated again after a few years.)
34
Cf. Seplveda (2003), 58.

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the other must serve him and may rightfully be enslaved. Any possible resistance
can or, what is more, must be put down.
Is this epistemic? Can it simply be assumed? In the end, even Seplveda does not
seem to regard this argument as strong enough. Consequently, he follows up by
justifying his proposition using a more abstract proposition about the dominance of
form over substance, where the form, being more perfect, presides and dominates,
and matter obeys its rule. According to Seplveda, this is particularly apparent in
living creatures, where the soul rules and is like a head of the household, and the
body is subjected to it and is like a servant.35
Finally, the wild man is perceived as analogous to the body, the tame one as analogous to the soul (Seplveda had never entered the New World; he had read Las
Casas depictions of the conquistadors ravages, but still managed to perceive the
Spanish Christians as perfect and tame). Thus, a second and more fundamental reason has now been established below the first one. The dominance of form over
substance is a topos taken from the critical reception of Aristotles hylomorphism.
In this respect, Seplveda provides an appeal to authority, hoping that the matter has
now been grounded in a sufficiently secure epistemic basis.
As authority figures, he summons the philosophers. Any philosopher is rightfully embarrassed by such an appeal (and secretly hopes that he would have talked
differently back then). Still, it is part of historical knowledge that these gentlemen
were considered experts on such matters in the late Middle Ages.
Hence, the structure of the justification is as follows: The claim to domination
based on greater perfection is supported by the argument from authority about
the savages who are supposed to be dominated by tame people just as the body
is dominated by the soul. The source of this analogythat is, the relationship of
body to soulis based on the form-substance relationship, in which the form
dominates the substance. Moreover, this relationship is backed by the argument
from authority, which is essentially another if then sentence: If authority
figures xy describe the relationship in the manner specified, then that description
is correct.
Mind you, I am merely talking about the structure of this justification here.
The fact that it is structured in this particular way does not demonstrate its validity
per se. Let us quickly glance at the two previous steps: Should we not reassess these
authority figures with respect to the quality of their judgments? Did the relevant
authority figures at least agree in their judgments? No, there were contemporaries,
such as the already mentioned Las Casas and a professor of theology named
Francisco de Vitoria, who held the opposing view. This objection single-handedly overturns the argument from authority: If the authority figures are not in
agreement about a quaestio, the argument from authority is nothing but a (desired)
selection from a range of available options. This selection cannot be justified
with reference to the fact that the people who are selected are authority figures
(even if that is granted).

35

Loc. cit.

4.3 Justifying: Reasons and Justifications

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What about the argument from analogy? Taking Perelman/Olbrechts-Tytecas

analogy structure36 as a basis yields the following systematization.
The thesis that the tame dominate the wild is justified, on the one hand, by
the source proposition, The soul shall rule the body. On the other hand, it is
justified by analogizing the body to the savage (or the Indian).
Thesis
Justification

The tame shall rule the wild.

Beginning: The soul shall rule the body.
Step: The relationship between tame and wild is analogous to the
relationship between soul and body.

Assessment: The analogy is fatally flawed. The relationship between body and
soul is intrinsic and indissoluble. That one of the two shall be dominant is epistemic
knowledge, at least in Seplvedas days. The relationship between Spaniards and
Indians, however, is very different. Both have existed independently of each other
for a long time. In principle, they could regulate their relationship differentlyfor
example, by mutual agreement.
We could almost talk of a duality of justification with regard to the two different
components, beginning and transition. As noted earlier, an understanding of the
thesis is possible only if something can be presupposed as certain, as a theoretical
basis from which to construct the thesis. Hence, what is presupposed must already
exist in a way. But what if the presupposition itself turns out to be uncertain?
Then, its pragmatic mode changes. It becomes thetic again, has to be treated as a
thesis, and, in turn, justified. If we want to use it for the justification of the original
thesis, it has to be justified first. This follows from the requirement of methodical
order. More generally, a justification consists of a sequence of steps of justification.
This sequence starts out with beginnings, which actually have to be available. From
such beginnings, we construct the thesis. Along the way, the argumentative steps
support the thesis. This support takes place in the mind, in the imagination, and in
our understanding. Consequently, it replaces the practical support that does not yet
exist in new thetic theory.
Apart from factual aspects (structure of the thesis), a justification also has a
subjective side. The addressee of a justification may be able to understand the individual steps. If all goes well, she gains the very insights into the respective situation
that are articulated by the thesis. But these insights do not come with commitments
attachedthat is, whether the addressee understands and then follows her insight
in acting is not specified by the concept of justification as I have proposed it here.
This is what distinguishes a justification from an incentive. Incentives, for example,
in advertising, aim at acceptance. They send out stimuli to which the addressee
36

Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 82 and 83. This analysis of the analogy argument is the best in the standard literature on argumentation theory. It depicts the specific character
of the analogy as a relation between two relations. Mengel (1995a) elaborates on this in detail.
The usual treatment of the argument from analogy as a sort of inductive argument (cf., for example, Salmon (1973), Chap. 3) encourages a conflation of analogy with generalization and is better
abandoned.

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is supposed to respond. If that is successful, then acceptance occurs as a mere

reaction: we purchase a particular product, vote for a certain party, etc.
In advertising, there is no reflective distance that could be bridged by theoretical
steps in a comprehensible way. In fact, advertising ensures the absence of such a
distance. Acceptance is supposed to happen immediately, as if it were the addressees
very own concern.
If the voluntary acceptance of a thesis is explained using the concept of distance,
then the often-neglected difference between justification and explanation also
becomes clear. Ordinary English speakers often do not strictly distinguish between
the two. This might be because both are responses to the question Why? Moreover,
both argumentative justifications and causal (or final) explanations are indicated by
words such as because, therefore, hence, and thus.37 This confusion continues in theory because even great thinkers do not seem to think it necessary to draw
a distinction here. Nevertheless, the difference is quite clear. A justification demonstrates the validity of a thesis. This thesis represents a particular state of affairs; the
justification shows, in turn, that this representation is a valid orientation. An explanation, however, shows, not the validity, but the genesis of the state of affairs in
question. It thereby presupposes that the state of affairs has been represented
accurately.
The genesis is usually represented by indicating procedural laws. Why did the
lake freeze over? Because it has been below 0 C for days. This is an explanation.
It assumes that the freezing over of a body of water after many days of frost is due
to certain laws of nature. The case in which I ask why the children have stepped onto
the frozen surface is quite different. In the latter case, I possibly want to know why
the children believed that stepping onto the ice was the right thing to do. The surface
looked solid and the dog had no problems running across it. Such a response implies
that the children did not just step onto the ice on a whim, but that they did so because
they had a justification for their action. This suggests that the children were free to
accept the thesis about the accessibility of the ice as a guideline. That should give
pause for thought: An argumentative justification presupposes freedom. Thus, it
appears that the theorization of argumentation is not just a formal task or one that
aims at descriptions of verbal structures, but an issue addressing the great philosophical questions.
The difference between justifying and explaining is further confused by the fact
that there is a rather common justification scheme (one sort of element of construction) in which the thesis is a state of affairs that is supposed to explain the state of
affairs mentioned in the justification. This scheme is called the argument to the
best explanation. If I justify the proposition, The apple is ripe, by saying that it
has red skin, I use this justification scheme. The red skin is an obvious fact; even a
small boy can see it. And the best explanation for its existence is that the apple is
ripe. Hence, the reference to this red skin can justify the assertion.
37

This is also an argument against the (unfortunately, quite common) view that such words are
indicators of argument.

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As I said, an explanation presupposes that the state of affairs at hand has been
represented accurately. However, there is still the question of how this state of
affairs originatedfor example, what caused it to occur. It is this question that the
explanation is trying to answer.
Explanations themselves can be questioned or disputed again. No, this did not
cause it, that didwe could perhaps argue along those lines. But this is different
from disputing the way in which a state of affairs has been represented. If an explanation is disputed, it might have to become a thesis and be justified as such. In order
to do this, we must specify the procedural laws under which the matter has arisen.
Furthermore, we need to rule out that it could have occurred any other way. If both
are successful, the explanation is shown to be valid.
In the event that an explanation is presented as a justification, the thesis is something that can explain certain existing states of affairs. In addition to this justification,
we must also prove that the matter could not have been explained in a different, more
suitable way; after all, that is why it is called the best explanation.
Is what I have proposed sufficient for a proper concept of argumentative justification? At best, it provides some basic contours. In order to detect where a justification occurs in the turmoil of the practice of argumentation, I have to be aware that
such paths and networks of paths, which lead from certain preconditions to theses
by way of theoretical transitions, look very different depending on the area of
discussion. A justification for a historical thesis, such as Columbus was a Jew,
is different from one for the psychological thesis, The main motive for the conquest of the New World was greed for gold. A justification for the economical
thesis, The gold from the New World has devastated the economies of Europe,
is yet another thing altogether. These differences are a result of differences
between theories in different areas of praxis.
What remains comparable in all justifications, however, is the structure of beginnings and transitions (which could potentially contain intermediate theses) and the
fact that thetic theory is constructed using epistemic theory, which functions as a
prerequisite.

4.4

Criticizing: Objection and Refutation

It is common to identify arguing with justifying, which, to my mind, narrows

its meaning. I will address this explicitly in the last section of this chapter. For now,
I will simply state the following: There is, at the bottom of argumentative speech, a
basic critical intention on which both thesis and justification depend. If we consider
the meaning of the term validity claim thoroughly, it should be obvious that it
presupposes or produces a dialogical situation. In this situation, there is an opponent
who determines independently whether the claim has been raised legitimately, and
who has the option to say No. I will therefore introduce criticizing as the third
basic operation now.

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The words criticizing, criticism, etc., are derivatives of the Greek words
krinein and krisis, which mean separating, dividing, judging, judgment, decision,
etc. Generally speaking, a critical attitude is one that pays attention to necessary
differences. The proponent may have his own knowledge and his own insights and
opinions. But none of these are binding for the opponent, unless he realizes them
himself. Hence, criticism mobilizes basic differences between insights and perspectives. A critic is not someone who says No at any cost. Criticism may even be
cooperative in the sense that it pushes the proponent to improve or intensify the thesis.
Nevertheless, criticism is grounded in the possibility that things could be different.
It insists on distinguishing what is different. It is based on our deep-seated suspicion
that the proponents thesisno matter how interesting it is and how sophisticated its
justificationis not the whole truth; rather, our suspicion suggests that it is restricted
and conditioned, that it is finite. The more beautiful, witty, and original the thesis, the
more it needs to be emphasized that it is by no means valid based on these qualities
alone, but that its validity is still a completely open question. In order to pursue the
question, we examine what the proponent puts forward in the dialogue; anything that
is relevant for the possible validity of the thesis needs to be presented. In particular, we
now confront the thesis with what is old and what is known, with what we have
already understood. This confrontation mobilizes the steps of justification, which are
also examined. The goal is an assessment of the validity claim, even if that means
limiting or rejecting it. Criticism ensures that the justification is clear and that it can be
reconstructed in individual steps. Finally, the critical intention is realized in the
requirement that every single step must be understandable.
Platos dialogues are exemplary in this regard. After every single step, Socrates
ensures that his interlocutors are able to follow his line of thought. Moreover, he
interrupts a speaker who does not agree to step-by-step critical examination. One of
Platos objections to sophistical rhetoric was that the sophists made long speeches:
In a long speech, the arc of justification is longso long, in fact, that opponents and
audiences lose track of the argument. Hence, they can no longer test whether they
follow stringent thoughts or a speakers caprice.
In Platos later dialoguesfor example, in the Republicthe dialogue form
seems to have regressed to the point of being an artificial ornament. The interlocutor
no longer presents any substantial objections; he merely says Yes or repeats,
parrot-like, the most recent clause. But it would be a mistake to conclude that the
Republic is not presented as a dialogue. Rather, Plato has now simply clarified his
thoughts to the point where he is able to present them coherently. They have been
divided into logical steps, so that the reader can stop at each one and consider
whether she is able to understand them.
Similar to a justification, a criticism may require a sequence of steps. In that case,
the single step is called an objection. If a criticism is capable of entirely rejecting
the validity claim of a thesisthat is, if it shows that the claim is not validit is
called a refutation.
But is it not possible to capture sufficiently the critical intention by referring to
the operation of asserting? Is the critic not simply someone who puts forward an
antithesis to the thesis and tries to justify it accordingly? No, because it is possible

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to criticize without defending a thesis.38 For example, if I notice some defect in my

opponents justification, I can indicate this mistake without asserting that his thesis
is wrong. Thinkers who criticized proofs of Gods existence are great examples of
this practice. Kant criticized his contemporaries proofs of Gods existence without
wanting to claim that there is no God. But is that not equivalent to asserting that a
particular step in the justification is wrong? No, it is a criticism of this step and not
necessarily what I have characterized as an assertion, which features a construction of ones own thetic theory that exceeds available orientations. Declaring a piece
of theory to be defective is possible without establishing ones own thetic theory.
Especially when I criticize immanentlythat is, when I demonstrate that a justification is self-contradictory or circularI do not need to present any substantial
theory, not even from the knowledge basis.
These remarks should have sufficiently justified including criticism as a third
basic operation, next to assertion and justification. A consequence of this measure is
that we can participate in the practice of argumentation even with preliminary positions that are, for the time being, still underwaynamely, as critical reviewers. Only
people who regard empty criticism as careless and dangerous might disagree with
this. Certainly, there are some unpleasant excesses in this context. There are paper
doubts,39 and there is the skeptical principle of refraining from any firm judgment.
But using these as arguments against considering criticism to be a basic operation is
like using alcoholism as an argument against enjoying a glass of Burgundy.
As in the case of justifying, we could identify and catalogue certain figures for
criticizingtypical error figures. The English-speaking rhetorical tradition provides collections of fallacies.40 These include, for example, hasty generalization,
argument from authority, analogy, and composition-division. But as I have said in
the previous section, these are most often argumentative figures for justifications in
which they can occur as semiformal elements of construction. They are regarded as
fallacies because they might perform typical errors. This is the case, for instance, if
the data basis that a generalization rests on is too small, or if the data basis, no matter what its size, is unrepresentative of the total amount of data. In such cases, the
generalization is hasty and cannot justify a general thesis about the total amount of
data as valid. If an analogy is flawed, forced, artificial, or the like, it cannot function
as a justification either.
Some of these figures, however, are proper figures of criticism. These figures
are almost perfect for constructing objections to theses. I will address two examples: the ad hominem argument and the circular argument.

38

Aristotle already distinguished between counterargument (anti-syllogism) and interjection

(enstasis); cf. Aristotle (1975), Rhetoric II, 1402a.
39
Cf. Peirce (1965b), 370374 (Fixation of Belief).
40
The majority of books on elementary logic in the English-speaking world contains lists of fallacies, which are described briefly and demonstrated by way of examples; cf., for example, Copi
(1986). Most of these fallacies go back to compilations provided by the rhetorical tradition, in part
to Aristotle; cf. Rhetoric, Book II. Hamblin (1970) began a systematic theorization of these figures.
Cf. also Woods and Walton (1989), and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992).

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The ad hominem argument has been included in lists of argument forms since the
time of Aristotle.41 This figure of objection is one of the most common argumentative and rhetorical figures. It enables the opponent to attack the proponent, rather
than criticize the thesis. The Latin phrase ad hominem means to or against the
person. In this case, criticism is aimed at the proponent of a thesis. It might be relevant if it says something about the proponent, which disqualifies him as the presenter of a valid argument. This is the case, for instance, if there is evidence that the
proponent does not know or understand anything at all about the matter at hand or
if he has such a strong interest in certain circumstances that he is incapable of a
detached judgment and is only able to express this subjective interest. Such statements about the proponent, however, entail a substantial burden of proof. If their
validity is not obvious, they have to be presented and justified as a thesis.
Consequently, their outcome is undetermined and the criticism not justified per se.
Such a development would not necessarily be fallacious. The tradition also knows a
variation of this figure, in which it is argued that the proponent already said something else regarding the quaestio in contrast to what he is saying in his present thesis
(the so-called ad hominem ex concessis). If it is possible to expand the thesis in this
wayif we can create a larger overall thesis and if it is inconsistentwe have a
serious objection. The question remains, however, whether this really is an argument ad hominem, or whether it is a normal argument ad thesem. After all, it is not
the person, but her utterances, which are the subject of criticism here. We possibly
owe it to the tradition that this objection is regarded as a fallacious figure. The really
fallacious variation of ad hominem, however, is far more famous and rightfully
infamous. It consists of simply denigrating the proponent instead of presenting a
bona fide objection to his thesis. The desired result is that nobody takes his thesis
seriously and tests it accordingly.
One might think that this is something the audience will recognizeevery person who listens and reads with only the scantest amount of attention should see
this immediately; therefore, this figure is relevant only for the lowliest kind of
mudslinging. Far from it. The attentive argumentation analyst discovers, to her chagrin, that this figure is used even in very important debates among scientists. An
example of this is James Watson, the discoverer of the structure of the DNA, who
wrote a bestseller about his research process42 and was awarded the Nobel Prize.
Subsequent to his discovery, Watson became a vehement supporter of certain
applications of genetic engineering and let himself be carried away to the point
of pouncing on critics of such applications with ad hominem attacks. In his book
about the social significance of genetic engineering, Jost Herbig gives an impression of this:

41

Cf. Aristotle (1936), Vol. VIII: Metaphysics, 1062a3. Aristotle used an ad hominem as part of an
acceptable argument. John Locke was the first to include it in a list of fallacies; cf. Locke (1975),
Chap. XVII, 21, p. 686. David Hitchcock attempts to reestablish it as a valid form of argument;
cf. Hitchcock (2007b).
42
Watson (1968)

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Watson remarks about Erwin Chargaff, another pioneer of genetic research, but
one who, in view of the newly emerging possibilities, made a mark as a whistleblower by warning against the dangers of genetic manipulation: Chargaffs attempt
to slow us down is to be expected of someone who has not moved ahead at all in the
last 30 years.43 He also writes about two researchers who are critical of genetic
engineering:
She (Ruth Hubbard, a biologist, married to Nobel laureate George Wald) and this miserable
little woman named Ursula Goodenough [] reject people who work harder than they do.
If other people did not work as intensely as they actually do, there would not be such a large
difference between Ursula Goodenough and real scientists. I am convinced that Ursula
intends to slow science down. Only then would she be able to keep up.44

The argumentative quality of these comments is not even worth thinking about.
These slanderous remarks fall back onto the complainant. At any rate, that is the
way it should be.
The second figure of criticism is the objection of circularity. This figure has
also been known since ancient times (the tradition knows it as petitio principii or
circulus vitiosus) and was already described by Aristotle.45 It states that the
sequence consisting of a thesis and steps of justification has a circular structure.
Hence, the justification does not connect the thesis with the basis. The connection is
illusorythe sequence of steps leads around in a circle. The thesis occurs again at
some point within the justification, which means that it is supposed to be justified by
itself. When we think pragmaticallythat is, when we regard the justification as a
result of steps that refer to structures of praxisit is quite clear that this is a mistake,
simply because there is no available path to take. After all, someone who takes a path
that loops from A back to itself can never arrive at B. Similarly, it is impossible to
move forward from the basis to a thesis or backward from a thesis to the basis, by
way of a circular justification. But since logicistic thinking is still so strongand
since, logically speaking, an inference from a thesis to itself is of course valid (T
logically entails T)an adequate analysis of circular arguments is a tricky task that
has already produced much in the way of complicated treatments.46
43

Herbig (1980), 129. (Trans. T.P.)

Herbig (1980), 129. (Trans. T.P.)
45
Cf. Aristotle (1965), On Sophistical Refutations, 167a 37 ff.; 168b 22 ff.; 181a 15 ff.
46
The difficulty of understanding circular argument strongly indicates the ongoing tacit influence
that the deductive logical paradigm has on argumentation theory. Even Maurice Finocchiaro, a
highly experienced analyst of arguments in the history of science, seems to have overextended
himself on this topic. In Finocchiaro (2013), 234, he recognizes two types of circular arguments, a
stronger and a weaker one. In the stronger sense, one of the premises is identical with the conclusion (this seems to denounce the simple inference A entails A as a circular argument); but in the
weaker type, the premise is only no better known than the conclusion (this is a rather misguided
idea: If, e.g. Aristotle justified his claim that the earth is roundwhich he certainly did not
knowwith the claim that it stands in the center of the universewhich he did not know, either
he is bravely speculating, but not at all arguing in a circular fashion). cf. for circular argument as
well, Introduction, section Some Highlights of Contemporary Argumentation Theory; Sect. 6.3.;
Chap. 9, Fn. 24 (on Reschers concept of rationality).
44

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In order to illustrate circular arguments, I offer an example that will appear in a

different context once more in Chap. 8: An arguer M. contests the right to life of
human embryos and tries to justify this thesis with a thought experiment involving
a fire in a laboratory that threatens a newborn baby as well as a set of human embryos
in a petri dish. A rescuer entering the room does not have enough time to save both
the baby and the embryos and, therefore, has to make a choice. M. assumes that
the rescuer would choose the baby; he claims that this preference shows that,
according to our moral intuitions, the embryos protection rights are inferior to the
babys. This attempt to justify his contestation is countered, however, by an objection from an opponent H.: The rescuers assumed behavior can be interpreted in
various waysin particular, as a conditioned emotional pattern. In that case, it
would not say anything about a ranking of basic protection rights in our moral intuitions. M. now wants to refute this objection with the admonition that each rescuer
is simply obliged to respect the right to life of the baby and, therefore, has to make
the corresponding choicethat is, to save the baby.
This is a circular argumentation. The thesis is justified with an example whose
justifying force depends on an interpretation of behavior according to the thesis.
The fault in the argumentation is not simply that the thesis already appears among
the premises. Rather, the fault is that, on the one hand, the thesis needs to be justified
and, on the other hand, it is supposed to be valid already. If the justification is taken
to be a line of thought that leads from the grounds to the thesis, then this line of
thought simply cannot be pursued.
Ad hominem arguments and the criticism of circularity are argumentation
figures used in objections or refutations. There are other typical figures of objection
for example, the negative version of the argument of the qualitative leap (slippery slope), which is used to present as inevitable that some disastrous
consequences will result from the realization of a thesis and which, therefore, is
an objection to the thesis. (The analysis in Chap. 8 will deal with this figure in
detail.)
The possibilities of formulating objections are, as in the case of justifications,
manifold and field-specific. We should, however, consider two fundamental kinds
of objections: one called gap, the other contradiction. I will briefly characterize
both.
A gap objection means that the justification is incomplete. At least one of the
steps of the justification does not contain enough (epistemic) theory. The path from
the basis to the thesis is not completethere is still an open spot. Is this not always
the case when the thesis is not strictly derived, but only construed as a possibility?
In an abstract sense, this is quite true. A gap, then, would be no flaw at all.
However, sometimes an opponent cannot understand a justification or, if he eventually can, this might be due to a mental leap, which cannot be expected under
normal circumstances. This is not supposed to mean that the idea of an average
intelligence is entering into the formation of a concept here. The point is rather
the concession that the difference between a step of justification and a gap can only
be drawn concretelythat is, with regard to a specific situation, which is not determined by external criteria, but by the opponent.

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159

To my mind, it is reasonable to conclude that all our justificationseven those

that we or the experts can easily understand(may) contain gaps. We humans are
so smart that we often like to jump ahead; only if the justified theses turn out to be
inappropriate do we concern ourselves with a pedantic and meticulous reconstruction of the sequence of steps. Only then do we expose the (problematic) presuppositions that were involved in certain steps of the justification. We criticize and abandon
them. Over the course of Western history, most revisions of our knowledge exhibit
this structure: A wrongly assumed, implicit presupposition was made explicit, then
criticized, and finally dropped.
Advancing an objection of the kind gap, therefore, means questioning whether
a particular step has been justified. Consequently, the dialogue partner has to justify
it. The opponents first move following the positing of a thesis is usually of this
kind. For starters, it means nothing more than: I dont understand; I see no way that
could take me to the proponents postulation. As stated, this can be an expression
of a very personal shortcoming. If the justification is designed methodically,
however, it should be possible to aid the opponents understanding by bridging the
gap. This means, first, that the necessary beginnings have to be either located or
inserted within the opponents orientation system. But even in that case, there will
still be opponents who are unable to understand, for instance, because they are hampered by subjective influences. The proponent would then have to criticize these
subjective presuppositions or something would have to be done to resolve them
this, however, often cannot be done using arguments anymore. Is there a criterion to
distinguish cases in which a gap objection expresses contingent or subjective
shortcomings from cases in which the justification is incomplete (for the time being)
and in which, therefore, the thetic construction has to be further developed? I am
afraid there is not. Nevertheless, it should have become clear that the incompleteness of the path of justification, which is always more or less present, can be too
large. In those cases, we get objections of the kind gap.
This is especially the case if it is not at all clear how the presented part of a
justification relates to the thesis. This is not relevant for the thesis, we might hear
then. To say of an argument that it is irrelevant is a harsh accusation, one that is difficult to justify and refute. As a result, some people believe that we need a distinct
theory of the relevance of arguments. In general terms, however, what we have here
is an objection of the kind gap. Additional steps of justification need to be constructed in order to reach usable beginnings.
In some cases, an objection of the kind gap is even significantly stronger if it
indicates that the gap is necessary as a structural property of the justification presented up to that point. Such a situation arises in the case of objections of circularity.
If a justification is circular, it returns to itself. The gap opens up between the loop
that is traversed and potentially available epistemic beginnings.47 Robespierres
accusations in the indictment of Danton cannot be traced back to incriminating facts
that would support them if the incriminating facts only lead back to Robespierres

47

For an analysis of the circular justification as a necessary gap, cf. Wohlrapp (1978).

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accusations. After all, as the assertions of a biased party, these are anything but
unproblematic beginnings for a justification.
The second kind of objection is the contradiction. An objection of this kind
consists in presenting something that is incompatible with the thesis or with a
part of the justification. This additional incompatible element either derives from
the justification itself, in which case it is immanent, or it derives from the epistemic theory that the opponent is able to mobilize against the justification (or the
thesis). Thus, while in the case of a gap, there is not enough theory to construct
a path to the thesis, in the case of a contradiction there is too much theory. A relation
of contradiction is obtained if propositions of the form A and of the form non-A
are supposed to be valid simultaneously. There is no doubt that something is
wrong with that, but not because Aristotle explicitly established this fact.48
Rather, such contradictory propositions have no pragmatic orientation value. Like a
gap, a contradiction does not allow us to proceed in understanding an argument.
In an analysis of the practice of argumentation, we do not only have to expect
contradictions on the level of declarative sentences. We may also expect incompatibilities between all those theories and parts of theories that can be asserted or
assumed for thetic speech. In this broader sense, there are also contradictions in
normative systems as well as contradictions between propositions and actions (or
norms regarding actions). These are so-called performative contradictions, in
which something that someone asserts is incompatible with the maxim that
simultaneously guides his actions.49
I will illustrate objections of the kind contradiction using an example taken
from contemporary debates about applications of genetic engineering in Germany.
These debates revolve around the preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). This is
a technique where embryos that have been bred in vitro for artificial insemination
are examined for genetic defects before being implanted into the womans uterus.
Understandably, genetically defective embryos are not used. The woman is not supposed to give birth to a child with a predisposition for a hereditary disease. The
problem, however, is that in the process, embryos are produced that will not be
implanted into the womans uterus, but will be rejected. This practice violates the
right to life which, according to current interpretations of the German Basic Law,
already applies to the embryo. Therefore, PGD has been banned in Germany
(Embryo Protection Act of 1990, 2).
The justification for this ban rests on a contradiction between the implications
of the thesis that PGD has to be available and Article 1, Section 1 (human dignity)
of the Basic Law, which is a part of our basis of knowledge. Supporters of PGD

48

Aristotle (1936) Vol. VIII, Metaphysics, Book 4.3

The term, performative contradiction, was invented in German philosophy during the debate
about K. O. Apels ultimate justifications (Apel (2003)). A striking example for performative
contradictions are humanitarian interventions or military attacks that attempt to protect and preserve
human rights through acts of war, in the course of which human rights violations are necessarily
committed. Cf. Wohlrapp (2004).
49

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161

disagree with this state of affairs.50 They point out the practice of aborting embryos
before the twelfth week of a pregnancy, which is illegal in Germany, but exempt
from punishment. Naturally, this practice is a violation of the right to life that the
aborted embryos have been granted. This, too, is an objection of the form contradiction. This contradiction is a good criticism (good in the sense of being parsimonious: Positing it does not require asserting anything) because it highlights a
contradiction in the basis of knowledge used for justifying a prohibition of the PGD.
The basis of knowledgethat is, German Basic Law, the Embryo Protection Act of
1990, and a 1993 ruling by the Federal Constitutional Courtprotects an embryo
against its rejection during PGD, but it does not protect it against an abortion
(at least, not in the sense of upholding an effective ban).51
The argument that is supposed to dissolve this contradiction states that an abortion
is exempt from punishment for a very specific reason: because the will and selfdetermination of the woman who is supposed to give birth to the embryo trumps the
protection of the embryo. It is now generally accepted that the pregnant woman
cannot be forced to carry a child to term and that the embryo can only be protected
at the cost of forcing her do so.52 The point is the womans self-determination,
which, according to this argument, includes the right to reject the condition of pregnancy. Some people have noted that this argument is not entirely appropriate because
the idea of a rejection of the pregnancy implies a relationship to an external
attacker, or to a parasite, a bacterium or a virus.53 Nevertheless, it seems to represent
the current state of argumentation on this issue.54
So much for the kind of objection called contradiction. From a dynamic point
of view, the two kinds, gap and contradiction, can be combined to form two
aspects or sides of criticism. Generally speaking, argumentative criticism consists in
showing that the thesis is not tenableat least, not based on the justification given
so far. It demonstrates this by marking the boundary or dividing line beyond which
the assertion loses its validity. This view takes into account that, by and large, if we
intensify our opinions to the status of theses, we start from something that is definitely legitimate. And the human error stems from the fact that we, usually without realizing it, happen to believe that we have moved beyond it. In an argument,
this is articulated by showing either that what you are asserting is not accessible, or
that it leads to a contradiction.
50

The ramifications of the idea that this very complex process of implanting embryos could turn
out to be a remedy for a womans infertilityindeed, could be her best chance at giving birth to a
healthy childare difficult to reject. Nevertheless, they could also be fashioned into an argument
against the entire unreliable and risky process of implanting of embryos.
51
Germany, albeit meanwhile (2012), the contradiction has been resolved and PGD is now allowed
in Germanyalbeit under strict conditions.
52
Cf. Kollek (2001), 150. (Trans. T.P.).
53
Cf. Winnacker (2001), 119.
54
By the light of day, this argument only articulates the majority opinion. The argument owes its
strength to Thompsons analogy of the violin virtuoso, who has been plugged into you overnight;
cf. Thomson (1971). This argument from analogy, however, has been brilliantly refuted by
Reinhard Merkel; cf. Merkel (2002), 97101.

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Interaction of the Basic Operations

in the Thetic System

In communication, we might encounter questions of validity. These break up the

normal practice of exchanging opinions; thetic speech is situated at the edge created
in this process. Pragmatically speaking, thetic speech aims at restoring orientations
that have turned out to be deficientthat is, at gaining new understanding. It probes,
articulates ideas and intuitions, tries to support them argumentatively, and tests this
support. In thetic speech, we carry out speech acts that, based on their purpose and
function of constructing and testing thetic theory, actualize the structures of asserting,
justifying, and criticizing.
Thetic speech then generates new theory, often in waves and phases. It is built up
in attempts at justification and broken down again in attempts at refutation. If this
succeeds, the two opposite movements in a dialoguethe creative and supportive
generation of structures and the dissolution of parts that cannot be maintained after
questioning and disputelead to new valid theories, which are accepted as conclusions and taken as new orientations for expanding the praxis. I will address the
details of these dialogical dynamics in Chap. 6, under the heading dialogue events.
Still, I would like to already make some remarks about how the basic operations
interlock in an argumentative dialogue.
Systematically, a dialogue begins by positing a thesis. (In fact, it often begins
differently: One of the participants raises a question of validity and succeeds in making it an issue, by questioning, by insisting, or, most often, by objecting in some
way.55) The opponent then has three options with regard to the thesis:
1. He can adopt the thesis.
2. He can dispute it by positing another thesis that is incompatible with it.
3. He can criticize it by using an objection, in the simplest case by demanding a
justification.
In case (1), he is not a critical dialogue partner, but takes up the side of the
proponent, who needs an opponent for critical examination. In case (2), there are now
two theses involved; hence, it needs to be decided which one should be examined.
55

At this point, Amsterdam pragmadialectics carefully distinguishes between a first stage of

confrontation and a second stage of opening a dialogue. Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004),
60. The confrontation stage has been reached once normal communication produces a dissent.
In the opening stage, this dissent is subsequently channeled into the thesis in question (called a
standpoint) and treated with appropriate measures for a controlled examination. Only when
everything is in place do the participants enter the real argumentation stage. The distinction
between the first two stages or, rather, the superimposition of a confrontation stage, suggests that
the practice of argumentation arises mainly from verbally articulated disagreements. This is an
unnecessary restriction. If it is eliminated, the confrontation stage sees the occurrence of what
I have called the appearance of the validity question or the breakdown of normal orientation.
That disagreements with other people often have these effects, however, is certainly true.

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163

Since a thesis can be answered in several ways, the counter-thesis brings with it a
particular emphasis bearing requirements for the ensuing examination. In case
(3), typical thetic speech begins.
Confronted with the request for a justification, the proponent presents reasons,
shows how the reasons relate to each other and, finally, demonstrates how they lead
to the thesis. Once again, the opponent can either question each movethat is,
ask for a justification and by doing so render the content of each move theticor he
can dispute the movethat is, demonstrate that it is contradictory by setting an
appropriate part of theory against it. If this part is taken from the epistemic basis,
then the proponent now either attacks this part of knowledge or concedes the contradiction and withdraws as well as replaces the move. If this does not work, he
should concede that the justification has failed.
However, if the part of theory that the opponent has set against the proponents
moves is not epistemic, then the situation at this point is similar to the beginning,
when the opponent posits a counter-thesis to the proponents thesis. Then thesis
stands against thesis, and what needs to be decided is which one to examine first. It
is clear, systematically speaking, that such an objection by the opponent can affect
the proponents justification only if the objection itself has been justified as valid.
Any objection is a substantial objection only insofar as the theory employed in it has
been proven to be epistemic. If it is thetic, then its validity has to be presumed for
the proponents justification to be considered defective.
If the examination of an opponents thesis is interposed, we have a subdialogue
in which the former opponent occupies the role of the proponent. Here, we encounter
the same practical structures as in the main dialoguethat is, assertions are backed
up with justifications and reviewed in each step. In principle, this can again lead to
the constellation where the opponent (in the main dialogue: the proponent) posits a
thesis against a step of the proponents (in the main dialogue, of the opponents)
justification. If it is decided that the thesis needs to be examined, this leads to a
subdialogue of a subdialogue of the main dialogue.
Systematically, this structure can be as complex as possible. In the reality of the
practice of argumentation, however, it is already difficult enough to manage one
subdialogue. As a rule, it is preferable to avoid opening up any further subdialogues
and, if possible, to separate the issue in question.
In any possible complexity, the events in an argumentative dialogue are governed
by some simple normative structures. These result from the same intentions and
objectives that shape the basic operations. I will try to formulate them as four
principles.
1. The principle of assertion
Assertions are answers to quaestiones (= verbally expressed orientation
deficits), which emerge as candidates for new orientations.
2. The principle of justification
Assertions prove their orientation value by way of justifications. Justifications
are constructions that link some new theory back to epistemic theory (tried and
corroborated orientations).

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3. The principle of criticism

In order to ensure the orientation value of assertions, they and their
justifications are subjected to criticism. Criticism can question and/or dispute.
If it questions, any doubt expressed must not be empty. If it disputes, it either
mobilizes an epistemic basis or displays the validity of the included intervening
counter-thesis in a subdialogue.
4. The principle of accounting for criticism
Objections are taken into account in the case of doubts by specifying steps of
justification for what is in doubt and in the case of contradictions by criticizing
the contradictory theory or by withdrawing ones own.
It is apparently possible to take these principles and create a veritable codex of
norms for the practice of argumentation. I do not think this is advisable, for the
reasons specified under the heading theory minimalism (Sect. 4.1). Argumentation
takes care of itself.
This does not mean, however, that it would be best to leave it in the state of
natural argumentation (cf. Chap. 9). An awareness of the basic structures that is
as strong as possible is necessary. Only such an awareness will enable us to identify
and supply the conditions for a successful and satisfying practice of argumentation.
It is particularly important that we do not simply assert, justify, and criticize, but
that we ground the use and design of these operations in the currently available
theoretical basis. After all, it is only due to the employed epistemic theory that our
argumentative efforts can arrive at valid and binding results. Therefore, this theory
must be as stable as possible and must represent as much knowledge as possible.
As is well known, there are problems for which barely any epistemic theory is
available. In that case, we can also assert, justify, and criticize, but the whole
process is rather frustrating. Conclusions that may be achieved in the process
document our imagination and willingness to cooperate. Their factual durability,
however, is anyones guess.
Finally, I have to elucidate a variation of the basic operation of asserting. In the
real practice of argumentation, theses (as well as arguments) are malleablethat is,
they evolve in the continuously changing light of events. Sometimes, the opponents
objections demonstrate to the proponent that his original formulation of the thesis
was not apt. The thesis is an expression of a position and the position, having
been confronted with an opponents objections, can help formulate an appropriate
modification of the thesis. I call such an operation the postulation of a successor
thesis. In aiming at a dynamic picture of argumentation, we should not focus on
individual, isolated theses. Rather, we should keep in mind that, in their search for
orientation, people entertain larger or smaller research projects related to the theses
that they posit or seriously consider. In this respect, it is appropriate to grant the
possibility of reformulating the thesis and of taking into consideration, in the successor thesis, any new aspects introduced by way of objections. Hence, the dialogue
begins with a thesis on the part of the proponent and, for the time being, without a
thesis by the opponent. In the course of the dialogue, there can be successor theses to
any theses and subtheseson the side of the proponent as well as on the side of the

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opponent. In extreme cases, the modification of the thesis (or counter-thesis) is so

strong that it is withdrawn. A more accurate representation of how procedural
sequence and structural formation interlock will follow, as I said, in Chap. 6.
The three basic operations interlock, relate to each other, and relate to themselves. They form a network of structures that simultaneously exists on the object
level and the meta-level and, in that sense, is reflexive. This becomes evident when
a thetic operation executed by an adversary turns out to be unclear or disputable.
This is supposed to be an objection? one might hear in those cases. This is an
objection on the meta-levelan objection to the fact that an utterance has been
introduced as an objection without any obvious authority. An answer to this
question would have to justify that it is an objection, while also explaining why this
is the case. Generally, the operations of asserting, justifying, and criticizing are
accompanied, on the meta-level, by the claim that they are valid. They are actions
that are accompanied by a claim to correctness. Asserting a thesis means, on the
meta-level, asserting the thesis that the thesis is valid. Giving a reason means, on the
meta-level, asserting that the reason given is valid or epistemic. Should the asserted
epistemic quality turn out to be deficient, then the reason, insofar as it has implicitly been asserted as valid, would now have been presented as thetically valid.
Similarly, raising an objection on the meta-level indicates that the objection is
validthat is, that the defect it highlights in the thesis or the argument really exists.
If necessary, this assertion must be satisfied, too.
The special significance of this reflexive level, which arches over every move of
thetic speech, has perhaps still not become quite clear. In Chap. 7, in a discussion of
the concept of argumentative validity, I will make this implicit meta-level explicit.
It fulfills an evaluative function, which ensures that the results of argumentation will
not merely be assessed in each current dialogue, but also that these results are
located at the general level of an open forum.

4.6

The Completeness of the Triad of Basic Operations

In the last section of this chapter, I will argue for the triad of the basic operations of
asserting, justifying, and criticizing. This is necessary since this triad is not at all
accepted in the literature on argumentation theoryusually it is not even consideredeven though a naive reader may easily comprehend it. In principle, it is advisable to introduce this triad once we have clarified what a thesis or what thetic theory
is. If we seriously attempt to theorize the new and questionable, our approach takes
on the three forms of constructing new theory, of linking the new theory to the available old (safe) theory, and of examining the new theory with respect to its internal
and external fit through a confrontation with further theory. The process of justifying and supporting moves upwards with regard to the alleged thesisin other
words, it builds up thetic theory; when the process of criticizing and examining
moves downwards, it dissolves thetic theory (and, thus, possibly also epistemic
theory), which has been shown to be defective. This might already be sufficient.

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The justification for this triad may appear to be plain and simple, but I believe that
it suffices. Nevertheless, I will round it out and back it up by defending the triad of
basic operations against two complementary objections it might face. One points
out that the practice of argumentation includes many more essential operations
than these three. The other objection claims that there is only one complementary
operation to asserting which forms the core of the practice of argumentation.
Depending on the philosophical outlook in question, this operation is either justifying
or criticizing.

4.6.1

The Supposedly Enormous Diversity

of Argumentative Operations

Anyone who reads academic papers on argumentation analysis or theory will learn
about a variety of different verbal activities, such as questioning, answering, conceding, granting, mitigating, insisting, etc. All of these play a role in the practice of
argumentation and seem indispensable for understanding it theoretically.
Should this diversity be reducible to three basic operations? I would like to show
that this is at least a sensible goal. If, for example, an operation such as insisting
has been introduced, it is by no means clear what its function should be in examining
raised validity claims. Only when this is determined does it become clear what
happens in the context of an argumentation if someone insists. It could mean
insisting on a particular step of a justification with regard to a doubt. In that case,
such an insistence would be a renewed or repeated justification, perhaps accentuated
in a special way. But the purpose of that accentuation can again only be answered by
the question: What does it contribute to an examination of the validity claim?
Generally speaking, positing the three basic operations involves the following
thesis from my argumentation theory: All verbal operations that matter in argumentative conversations either actualize one of the three basic operations or serve to prepare
them, begin them, or articulate their results. In order to support this thesis, I will now
discuss an almost arbitrarily chosen argumentation analysis, in which far more than
three operations are addressed. Subsequently, with regard to that specific case, I will
demonstrate what a reduction to the basic operations means and why it makes sense.
The analysis can be found in an article by two American dialogue theorists.56
It presents an empirical study of argumentative conversations that were initiated,
carried out, and analyzed in the authors research project.
The introduction includes some valuable suggestions to the effect that arguing
means communicating, that it does not necessarily have to adhere to the model of a
typical pro and contra discussion (because these often resemble zero-sum games57),
and that only scientific argumentations deal with truth, whereas in daily arguing one

56
57

Salmon and Zeitz (1995).

Salmon and Zeitz (1995), 2.

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On the Completeness of the Triad of Basic Operations

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can progress rather successfully through mere talk. (That may be true, but
considering any possible successes still requires goals.)
The analyzed conversations were led by students. They revolved around the
question of whether the United States should continue to use nuclear power.
Participants were advised to arrive at a consensus within 20 min.
The brief description of the analytical apparatus specifies that the authors were
less concerned with the correctness of the arguments than with the following
occurrences:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Defending positions (how and for how long)

Adjusting theses with regard to other contributions
Making concessions
Citing examples
Posing questions
Challenging points of view
Attacking points of view
Contesting theses
Conceding individual points
Providing further examples
Reformulating positions
Strengthening or weakening utterances
Shifting focus

If the speakers posited a thesis and provided a reason for doing so, this was
recorded as a conclusion and a premise. The only logical structures that occurred
were the statistical syllogism and the modus tollens.
Obviously, this is a long list of argumentative operations. Hence, they would
have to be reducible (without any significant violence) to the three basic operations.
But before doing so, I would like to reverse the question: What prompted the authors
to include these operations in their analytical apparatus and not others? Why not
also include things like appeasing, bothering, goading, etc.? This is presumably
because these would not belong to the level of argumentation, but to the relationship
level. But was arguing not supposed to be communication? At any rate, this might
work. But how about, for example, ignoring, highlighting, and disregarding? Should
we emphasize these as important and dismiss them as irrelevant? Again, why only
these operations? I cannot find an answer.
The most explicit statement on this issue is the authors following assertion: No
unique natural system for classifying the components of arguments is available.
Classificatory systems are instruments for specific purposes and should be judged
accordingly.58
This is indeed a good fit with contemporary thinking. Nevertheless, I find it a bit
superficial, especially as the specific purposes are not named. On the other hand,
the basic operations of asserting, justifying, and criticizing are, as I hope to have
shown in my justification, a natural system of classification; they remain the same
58

Salmon and Zeitz (1995), 5.

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4 Basic Operations

regardless of their purpose. They simply emerge when we think about how to
distinguish argumentative speech about established theories from any other propositions (presented for purposes of entertainment, emotional expression, information,
etc.). Therefore, we should note that this diversity of argumentative operations does
not come with its own justification attached.
But let me now explain the aforementioned claim:
1. Defending a position: This is equivalent to justifying; the how refers to forms
of justification and the how long refers to the number of steps generated in
response to the opponents objections.
2. Adjusting theses by taking other contributions into account: This is equivalent
to formulating a successor thesis to a thesis.
3. Making concessions: This is equivalent to granting an objection by reformulating
or abandoning a thesis or an argument.
4. Citing examples: This is a specific figure of justification.
5. Posing questions: This is argumentative only if the questions express doubts
that is, objections of the form gap. Otherwise, questions can express all kinds
of demands for clarifications or elucidations regarding one of the basic operations and, thus, prepare them.
6. Challenging points of view: This is equivalent to a criticism based on doubts; it
means that you need to justify this!
7. Attacking points of view: This is a criticism aimed at contesting the validity of
the thesis. (The difference between challenging and attacking is supposed to
be gradual; attacks, Salmon and Zeitz assert, are direct attempts to dismantle
an opponents argument.59 That is too complicated because it cannot be determined objectively whether an utterance is really intended to pursue this goal.
Even if it could be determined, the focus here is on an objection and whether
it holds up or not.)
8. Contesting theses: This is, again, a criticism aimed at contesting the validity of
a thesis.
9. Conceding individual points: This is equivalent to granting objections or rather
to adopting theses or arguments.
10. Providing further examples: Cf. 4.
11. Reformulating positions: This means formulating successor theses.
12. Strengthening or weakening utterances: This is also equivalent to formulating
successor theses.
13. Shifting focus: Again, this is the formulation of a successor thesis.
Counting theses and conclusions as premises is the result of static logical thinking.
No difference is made between a thesis and a conclusion. The occurrence of exactly
two logical schemata is certainly due to the authors particular material.
That is it already. So, what escapes these explanations?
Adopting or making concessions does. Apparently, I cannot grasp this practice
using my three basic operations. What about that?
59

Salmon and Zeitz (1995), 6.

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On the Completeness of the Triad of Basic Operations

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If it is not carried out with strategic intentions (I will grant you something insignificant in order to be able to contradict you more effectively with regard to something important), then this, too, is a successor thesis. The opponent moves on to the
ideal successor thesis if he can understand the proponents steps of justification.
This is an additional determination of the concept of a successor thesis: Those who
did not agree at first, but agree subsequently, have moved on from criticizing the
thesis to adopting it (based on arguments, that is).
When I look at the analyses that Salmon and Zeitz performed based on these
operations, I find some obscure passages, rather chaotic diagrams (diagrams that do
not reduce complexity, because understanding them requires a great familiarity with
both the content and the theoretical apparatus), and I cannot figure out in the least
what the point of all of this is supposed to be.
There are answerable questions like: Why does participant C, at point X, say
that? The answer is: To meet the challenge posed by A at point Y. But is this an
adequate way of meeting the challenge? If not, what would happen then? Would it
be a defect? Would such a defect say anything about the quality of the conversation
or about the quality of the analysis?
What seriously baffled me was the authors claim that the test subjects did not
pursue a rather questionable issue any further.60 The issue in question was a topic
shift from talk about the long retention period of residue from acid rain to the
statement that the amount of acid rain overall could possibly be reduced. At this
point, the authors are surprised that [n]o one challenges this shift.61 I am trying
to imagine what would happen if I had to arrive at a consensus within 20 min.
Why should I problematize such a shift? Why should I even want to know which
common stereotypes about nuclear energy are right and wrong? The requirement
was to reach a consensus in a short time. Is the safest way to reach a consensus not
to be content with something vague? Yes, but you are also supposed to have a discussion. Ok, we will, and I am against it. If the other person starts to make her case,
however, and this takes some time, I will slowly cease to be against it. At the end,
the authors are pleased to remark that the participants showed a spirit of cooperation
and a willingness to let the conversation follow different directions.62 This, they
suggest, is a typical aspect of argumentative conversations. So, is this supposed to
be the result? Is it not rather a typical aspect of conversations in which we are supposed to produce a consensus within 20 min?

4.6.2

The False Alternative between Justifying and Criticizing

The fact that it is quite common to equate arguing with justifying has already been
mentioned. Regardless of where you look, the vast majority of theorists, particularly
60

Salmon and Zeitz (1995), 9.

Salmon and Zeitz (1995), 9.
62
Salmon and Zeitz (1995), 14.
61

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4 Basic Operations

those who work with any schemata in the tradition of Toulmin, equate arguments
or argumentations with justifications for theses or conclusions. This is undoubtedly
the case in logicism, from where it probably spread quietly to the newer argumentation theories, to discourse theory, to Toulmin, informal logic, Lumer, the legal argumentation theorists, etc. This kind of thought is not dialogical, but monological; it
always aims at showing what needs to be done in order to demonstrate that a thesis
or conclusion is true, correct, or justified. Of course, this corresponds to the original
meaning of argumentum, which means grounds of evidence and refers, if not
immediately to logic, at least to any conceptions of grounds whose sufficiency
had to be demonstrated. The focus on justifying becomes even more understandable
because arguing is supposed to be about truth and not, or only secondarily, about
falsehood. Anyone who makes an assertion should be able to demonstrate that she
is right; this is the implied maxim. That this demonstration should take place against
a background of possible falsity, possible error, or even fraud does not seem to be a
major focus in this ideal of the practice of argumentation.63
I can only make sense of this bias by suggesting that theorists who want to tackle
the issue in a serious manner and take scientific arguments as a model, should transpose the traditional theories of justification, inference, and logical reasoning (albeit
in a modern form) onto the practice of argumentation.64 In these time-honored theories, arguing is not understood as dialogical, let alone as pragmatic. Rather, it is a
verbal activity that is represented syntactically or, at best, semantically (in recent
times, even epistemologically; there are epistemic conclusions, systematized in epistemic logics.65) As long as the theorist is unable to abandon these old theories, they
structure the reality of the practice of argumentation in a one-sided manner as an
effort to justify the truth or validity of theses.

63

In his book Was ist Vernunft?, Steinvorth (2002), Ulrich Steinvorth describes reason as the
capacity to justify or give reasons (10; Trans. T.P.). At first, this sounds like justificationism.
But then Steinvorth further characterizes this as the capacity to justify and criticize validity
claims (ibid.; Trans. T.P.). As such, it could nicely correspond with my proposals. But what the
book has to offer in terms of a clarification of this capacity (other than an extensive, often even
enlightening and inspiring embedding in the systematics and history of philosophy) is rather disappointing. Anyone interested in what it means to justify is referred to a seven-page section in the
chapter Begrndungen (5275), in which it becomes clear that Steinvorth equates justifications
with logical inferences.
64
The following statement by the philosopher of science, Ulrich Charpa, which introduces his
chapter on argumentation (Charpa (1996), 145 ff.), is exemplary: An argumentation is ordinarily
understood to be an at least sufficiently ordered nexus of mental or verbal units. The most common
specification in the philosophy of science of our century interprets scientific arguing as a case of
standard logic with possible extensions. Hence the main building blocks are statements; ways of
connecting them are preferably those of deductive inferences, which are most likely supplemented
by forms of inductive reasoning (Trans. T.P.).
65
Contrary to what I call epistemic theory, epistemic logic is concerned with formal relationships
between epistemic states, such as beliefs, knowledge, etc. In the definition of such states, it
naively presupposes a concept of truth and is, therefore, of limited relevance.

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171

Thus, essential aspects are cut off from the reality of argumentation. In order to
capture more of this reality, there needs to be at least one addressee at whom to
direct these clever logical tricks. However, the element of dialogue enters this game
only if the addressee is not a silent, receptive audience, but a person interested in the
possible truth or validity of an assertion. If the dialogue partner is then able to
respond, she will be ready to voice her consent or her concerns. Consequently, there
is, besides the activity of justifying, a second, critical activity. This further justifies
the inclusion of criticizing in the canon of basic operations.
It is interesting that there is also a completely contrary position, which states that
arguing is nothing but criticizing. This position hardly allows for any serious asserting or, put differently, asserting a thesisin which people, who do research based
on their interest in new orientations, articulate themselvesis merely the distanced,
almost bureaucratic postulation of hypotheses. As far as the truth or validity of
such propositions is concerned, proponents of this position maintain that the only
option is criticizing, not justifying.
In the early 20th century, Karl Popper developed these views in the tradition of
his teacher Jakob F. Fries. Subsequently, they influenced the further development
of the philosophy of science significantly. I already outlined this in Chaps. 1 and 2
with respect to various aspects. Now I would like to return to this point once more
in order to illuminate further the emergence of the strange alternative between
justifying and criticizing. In the 1920s, the Vienna Circle around Moritz Schlick
and Otto Neurath posited as a criterion for scientific knowledge its justifiability
from empirically testable propositions by way of logical conclusions (hence the
label logical empiricism). But this criterion was unable to obtain the general
propositions of the natural sciences, the so-called laws of nature. After all, the
generalization of data is not a deductive, but an inductive operation. The result
was the project of an inductive logic. Always led by the central idea that complex scientific propositions had to be verified by some justification, this project
was pursued for decadesin particular by Rudolf Carnapin spite of increasing
difficulties.
Popper interrupted these efforts with his message that general empirical propositions could never be justified as true, but only be refuted as false.66 The examples
that were discussed back then are simple enough to make the plausibility of this way
of thinking accessible even to the layman: All swans are white, it was argued, is
not a verifiable proposition because you cannot get hold of all swans in order to test
their color. If there is only a single black swan, then it is obvious that the sentence
has to be wrong. Since a promising hypothesis has been falsified in this case and,
thus, been recognized as a mistake, knowledge has advanced a little further. Popper
elaborated on this insight (which is correct in a certain, albeit very simple sense) for
decades in his philosophical and epistemological research program of critical
rationalism, whose potential, amazingly, still does not seem to be quite exhausted.
66

Popper (1968).

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4 Basic Operations

With increasing acceptance and disseminationin Germany, the economist and

social philosopher Hans Albert promoted this programfalsificationism became a
modern, modest, and serious position opposing the age-old metaphysical heresy
that propositions could be justifiable.
Justificationism finally received a deathblow when Hans Albert formulated
his Muenchhausen Trilemma in 1968.67 The situation of the seeker of justifications is exactly like that of the legendary Baron Muenchhausen, who fell into
a swamp and wanted to pull himself out by his own hair. After all, demanding a
justification for a proposition means drawing upon propositions that, in turn,
require a justification as well. This makes necessary further propositions that are
themselves in need of a justification, and so on. According to Albert, this either
goes on forever and becomes an infinite regress, or is canceled arbitrarily at
some point. The third option is the pretense of a completed justification by arguing in a circular fashion. Hence, there are no propositions that could be justified
as true; rather, there are only hypotheses that have resisted all previous attempts
at refutation. Such unrefuted hypotheses are what we call knowledge.
With this Muenchhausen Trilemma, Albert kept the German philosophical
discussion in a state of suspense for decades. Very few critics have been able to
refute this argument. The few who did refute it were ignored. The refutation
consists in exposing the dramatically abstract character of the entire scenario,
which ignores the reality of human beings who seek orientations, posit theses,
and subsequently justify and criticize them. Albert universalizes an artificial
model of scientific experimentation. Anyone who looks at the world with open
eyes, including at the world of everyday life, will realize that there is knowledge
of a very different kind in every nook and cranny of human reality. If you take
your car to a garage because it does not work properly, you expect to find people
there who positively know how to repair a car. This expectation is entirely justified because the knowledge of people in the workshop is not backed by heretofore unrefuted hypotheses, but by one-and-a-half centuries of experience in
automotive engineering. In short, the error in the scenarios of critical rationalism
is the lack of any pragmatic thinking. This is unrealistic: All of modern culture is
based on the fact that theories are not mere intellectual games, but that they support practices.
Therefore, it is out of the question that justifications are impossible. The criticalrationalist position gains its limited or apparent authority from the fact that it presents
the demand for justifications as a desire for something absolute. Whoever wants to
justify something, it suggests, has to do so to the extent that the justified proposition
is now absolute knowledge, which is true necessarily and for all times. Of course,
this has been the aim of philosophy. In the 1970s and 1980s, Karl-Otto Apel struck
a tone in his search for an ultimate justification that resonates with this tradition
of absolute certainty. But the intention of dismissing or limiting such aspirations
67

Albert (1985). Alberts trilemma is a variant of a similar trilemma in Popper (cf. Popper (1968),
25) that Popper, in turn, adopted from Fries.

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On the Completeness of the Triad of Basic Operations

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does not legitimize an outright rejection of the idea of justification.68 On the

contrary, limiting argumentative operations to criticism is a mistake. It is far from
reality and misses the role that arguments have, could have, and should have in the
praxis of the human quest for orientation.
One could perhaps say that the system of three basic argumentative operations
presented here frees the legitimate intentions of both, justificationists and falsificationists, from their one-sidedness and reunites them once again.69

68

Hans-Joachim Niemann, interpreter and popularizer of critical-rationalist thought in Germany,

tells the same old story of the impossibility of absolute justifications in his Wrterbuch des
Kritischen Rationalismus, Niemann (2004). Under the heading Begrndung (Justification),
Niemann initially also endorses the Muenchhausen Trilemma, but finally sees a new purpose to
the question of justification (36): Theories, statements, findings, opinions, or actions are to be
regarded as justified in a new sense if there are strong arguments and test results that speak in
their favor and against all alternatives. Such arguments and test results are not irrefutable findings,
but they are accepted because they are unproblematic for the time being (Trans. T.P.). This sounds
promising. Subsequently, however, arguments are described as things we use to promote
acceptance (37; Trans. T.P.). Since the dictionary does not include an entry on promotion, the
reader may wonder if something different is meant here than in the case of advertising laundry
detergents. Looking up some keywords like arguments and argumentation, culture of argumentation yields some commonplaces (using logic and experience, 23; Trans. T.P.), some original
insights (arguing is more important than calculating, and: many arguments are so difficult that
we can comprehend them only in more mature years, 24; Trans. T.P.), and, finally, the suggestion
that the weal and woe of all of us will depend on arguments and fallacies, which, therefore, deserve
more attention. I would like to emphasize this latter point (Niemanns few references to literature
on argumentation theory, however, leaves one with considerable doubt regarding the degree to
which the author has been following his own maxim).
69
It is astonishing that this step has not been taken yet, particularly because it is so obvious (I have
been promoting it for more than 20 years; cf. my presentation at the Philosophy Congress in
Hamburg in 1990, published as an appendix to Wohlrapp (1995a)). It almost seems as if the parties
involved have grown fond of their hostile positions. In 1992, Stefan Gosepath published his
critically acclaimed book, Aufgeklrtes Selbstinteresse (Gosepath (1992)), in which he defines
rationality as well-foundedness, because, he asserts repeatedly, it is a meaning that covers all
situations of its use (49, 209; Trans. T.P.). Anyone who is familiar with the dispute between justificationism and critical rationalism will be puzzled by this. Does he not have anything to say about
the decades of affirmations and extensive arguments with which, for example, Albert countered
each new plea from the camp of justificationism in the various editions of his Treatise on Critical
Reason (Albert (1985))? (Cf. the nearly 60-page appendix to the 5th edition (available only in
German).) If you look closely, you will find a short remark in the third part of a prolonged footnote
(49 f). There, Gosepath writes that the justificationism to which he commits himself is rejected by
the so-called critical rationalists. He points to an article where their position is described. But there
is nothing else, no attempt to defend his position with arguments. With such discursive behavior, it
will be difficult to agree on the nature of human reason.

Chapter 5

Frame Structures

5.1

A Further Basic Structure

In addition to the three basic operations of asserting, justifying, and criticizing,

there is another structure that, to my mind, seems indispensable for theorizing the
practice of argumentation. It is not located beside the other three operations but
occurs within them as the always relevant and potentially movable boundary
between the subjective and objective content of the issues in question. I will call this
structure a frame. This rather vague title will allow me to address the various and,
sometimes, sublime relations in the vicinity of this boundary, which often corresponds
to the boundary of the subjects orientations.
Over the past few decades, some interesting aspects of the concept of frame
structures have been addressed, particularly in psychology and political science.
But its significance for argumentations and arguments has not been adequately
understood yet, assuming that it has been noticed at all. 1 This is rather strange
because the success or failure of individual argumentations depends almost
entirely on this concept.
The concept of frames developed herein does not refer to the rhetorical aspects
of argument (which would be a very subtle endeavor in need of empirical support),
but to the epistemological side. It takes ideas from the classical theory of
abstractionthe Aristotelian aphairesis, which is ubiquitous among scholastics as
the qua-thematization (humans qua living beings, qua beings in need of redemption, etc.)and connects these with Heideggers as-structure of understanding,2

On the one hand, there has been talk of perspectives and different languages of description, as
if we were able to simply choose between them at whim (e.g. Habermas and Kopperschmidt); on
the other hand, a complete compartmentalization of orientation systems opposed to one another
has been propagated (e.g. by Luhmann and Lyotard). Some more concrete notions were Toulmins
qua what (Toulmin (1958), 30) and Zarefskys definitions (Zarefsky (1997)). For my own
preliminary work, cf. Wohlrapp (1984, 1996, 1998b).
2
Heidegger (1996), 32.
H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_5,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

175

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Frame Structures

Wittgensteins thoughts on seeing-as,3 and especially the frame concept of

American social psychology. Apparently, Bateson was the first to note the
relevance of this structure for psychology and psychotherapy. Watzlawick, in
turn, popularized it,4 Goffman demonstrated its usefulness for the sociological
perspective by performing frame analyses,5 and Willems elevated the concept of
frames onto an anthropological level by connecting it with Gehlens and Bourdieus
concept of habitus.6 In neurolinguistic programming, the concepts psychotherapeutic aspects were further developed into a kind of therapeutic cure-all under
the designation reframing.7 I owe some clarity to debates in the philosophy
and history of science, particularly Flecks discussion of thought style8 and
Feyerabends concept of covert classification,9 but also Poppers resistance10 to
this structure.11
The result is the B-as-A structure, or B [as A]. This structure is a fundamental
hinge on which thought, behavior, and actions turn in the process of interaction and
individualization. It is the point of access that creates concreteness through limitation: It enables the disclosure and appropriation of the world, but also restricts it;
therefore, people must constantly transcend it in their inquiries. This frame structure
can, with some justification, be described as multidimensional. For one, we can
distinguish between an inside and an outside here as well. On the outside, it constitutes objects; on the inside, subjects. Secondly, it has a cognitive and an active
side: From below, it structures behavior and actions; from above, it structures
understanding.
If the practice of argumentation is interpreted as a medium of truth-seeking
or of the generation of valid orientations, it is located in this nexus of subject/
object and theory/practice, too. Hence, the development of conceptual tools for
understanding and elucidating this structure is an important desideratum of
argumentation theory. Insofar as this project is successful, it also bridges the gaps
between knowledge and opinion as well as between validity-related argumentation
and impact-related rhetoric.

Cf. Wittgenstein (2009), Philosophical Investigations, Part II, xi.

Watzlawick et al. (1974), Chapter 9.
5
Goffman (1974).
6
Willems (1997).
7
Bandler and Grinder (1985).
8
Fleck (1979).
9
Feyerabend (1975), Chapter 17.
10
Popper (1994).
11
By now, the terms, frame, framing, and reframing, have almost become commonplaces in
North American psychotherapy, mediation, and political science. There is a lot of material on the
Internet that is generally appealing, conceptually fuzzy, and full of quite heterogeneous examples.
Cf., for example, the essay at www.beyondintractability.org/essay/framing (Sept. 2012). As far as
I can see, the B-as-A structure developed here would mean an increase in conceptual sharpness for most
of the available contributions on the topic of framing.
4

5.2

Frames as Focus and Interface

5.2
5.2.1

177

Frames as Focus and Interface

Focusing

Any way of grasping a state of affairs is selective, even if this is neither intended nor
known. We do not simply grasp objects or states of affairs, but capture them in a
frame. What this means is, first of all, very simple: We grasp only sections of them.
Each section contains only a part of what could be learned or said. This limits the
objects possibilities of disclosing itself and, in turn, limits our possibilities of
experiencing the object. This limitation is inevitable because it provides the focus
without which a goal-directed investigation and, therefore, understanding would
be impossible. I would like to emphasize that such a selection can indeed take
place as a conscious consideration of certain aspects, but, at first and much more
fundamentally, it always already takes place directly in perceiving, experiencing,
imagining, etc. Anything that is addressed is addressed as something. In other
words, it is framed in a certain way. The term, frame, refers to the boundary of
the area that has been drawn around the state of affairs in the process of grasping
itboth, in the case in which this is performed as a positive, conscious action and
in the case in which this happens unnoticed. Frame, boundary and area represent
spatial metaphors. Those who prefer a literary metaphor may also use the term,
context. The point is to illustrate relations that actually pertain to the dynamics of
consciousness.
Let us consider an example from everyday life: People talk, for instance, about
trafficits growth, its dangers, its function, how to develop it in a rational way, etc.
In such talk, a car can be addressed as a means of transportation, a status symbol,
a vehicle of freedom, a destroyer of cities, a waste of energy, a replacement for
the railroad, and many other things. Obviously, there are many ways to address the
carthere are many frames. Let us look more closely at one of them, for example,
probably the simplest one: The car as a means of transportation. Certain facts
and relations emerge in this framing, such as a desire for the mobility of people and
goods. The car is a good means to satisfy this desire: It is convenient, flexible, and
interesting. The fact that cars require the construction of roads then leads to the
frame, traffic as shaping the landscape. Other aspects regarding the function of
the natural and cultural environment lead us to the frame, impact on ecological
balance. A subsequent frame could be the economic one, which focuses on the
car as a cost factor. Individual users have to pay for acquisition and maintenance;
society has to pay for the requirements and consequences of car traffic.
Completely different aspects of the car emerge if we view it with regard to its
individual mental and emotional significance. It is interesting to note that a car
is a private space. The car is a mobile part of ones dwelling, so that by using it
you remain within your own four walls, as opposed to public transportation, which
forces you to abandon your private space and endure strange people, smells,
and messages, whether you want to or not. (This subtle duality is probably one of
the main parameters standing in the way of restricting car traffic. The car is privacy

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Frame Structures

in public, a private shelter and lookout in the midst of the roughness of public life.12)
Finally, if we consider the frame of society and interactive relationships, what
emerges are social hierarchies and their markers in the form of all kinds of
accessories. A particular car enables you to claim a particular status; it allows you
to compete for as high a status as possible.
Obviously, there are all sorts of relevant possible ways of thinking about car
traffic. All these frames, in turn, form overlapping and more or less connected
frame structures. Such structures lead to even larger frames. In the example of the
car, these frames pertain to the physical and mental aspects that are intertwined or
demarcated from one another in different ways than, say, ways of thinking about
cars with respect to the exhaust gas produced or the costs incurred. Ultimately,
our entire view of car traffic is merely a particular way of focusing on facts as
components of our human world. For the vultures that charge swoop down on
roadkill, the passing cars will probably mean something else entirely.
If we consider a situation in a frame, certain transitions and demarcations
automatically suggest themselves. Others are not as obvious, but we ignore them.
It is as in the case of a picture frame, which signals, Look at what is shown here, not
in the next frame, which is not always easy to do in a picture gallery. The frame
also says, Do not look at what is outside the frame, such as the wall or wallpaper.
The point is not that the latter is of no interest whatsoever, but that it would only be
so under different questioning (in different frames).
The ways in which aspects that emerge in one frame are demarcated from aspects
in another frame vary dramatically. Usually, as in the example, there are connections
and transitions. The boundary drawn by the frame then seems to be slightly permeable.
But this varies depending on whether the focus is conscious and intentional or not. In a
dialogue, we can address car traffic first with regard to economic, then ecological, and
finally even sociological or sociopsychological aspects. In the case of discrepancies
between the findings and hypotheses that are formulated from various perspectives,
it should be unproblematic, in principle, to neutralize them as differences between
aspects. This is not the case if people discuss car traffic with no explicit reference
to aspects and if all the involved parties mutually have the impression that the
others are taking the easy way out or put fringe issues at the center of discussion.
These opponents do not notice that their framing is limiting their focus. They believe
that they are dealing with only the thing itself and are confused by the other sides
objections. I will further develop this idea in the section on Latency. Still, this
much should have become clear already: If the talk about a state of affairs is framed
in a certain way, then the state of affairs has a certain significance for the speakerit
is located in a certain place within her orientation system and is evaluated in a
certain way. This subjective significance may change if the frame is changed.13
12

On the problem of privacy in public, cf. Sennett (1977).

This is why the concept of frame structures is so fundamental for certain psychotherapeutic
interventions. Cf., again, Watzlawick et al. (1974).
13

5.2

Frames as Focus and Interface

179

For the practice of argumentation, such a change of significance can have a serious
consequence: A thesis about a state of affairs may be valid or acceptable in one
frame, but irrelevant or invalid in another.

5.2.2

The Interface of Subject and Object

Are we free to frame an issue in any way? Two answers suggest themselves and
both are far from attractive. Saying yes means emphasizing freedom of thinking
at the price, as we shall see, of its feebleness. Saying no means regarding thinking
as very subject-specific and, corresponding to the individuals separated from one
another, as ultimately sealed off against each other. I would like to take a middle
path. Different people and groups inhabit different parts of the world (not different
worlds, for that would make communication seem hopeless) depending on their
attitudes and places in life. If a person perceives a situation spontaneously, the way
in which she frames it is determined by how she lives. Enter, the concept of habitus.
Spontaneous framing is habitual; the habitus, in turn, evolves and is reinforced via
such frames. On the outside, the frame constitutes, as it were, the object or the area
in which the object is apprehended; on the inside, it constitutes the observer. The frame
is an interface of experiencing and processing, on one side of which the object and
on the other side of which the subject are born, evolve, and grow.
Examples for this quality of framing are easy to find. Let us think of the selective
perceptions that correspond to specific jobs. An architect who walks through a city
sees buildings of all kinds as well as their shapes, their age, and the building
materials used. She sees what problems the construction of a corner building at an
acute-angled fork in the road answers to, involuntarily assesses the quality of the
solution, etc. A gardener perceives other things: the cultivation of plants beside an
avenue, the trimming of trees, their health, and the system of parks and gardens. She
sees rare and extraordinary shrubs, the fashions that guided their selection, and
assesses their utility or folly. To a car salesman, the city will present itself in yet
another way. In her case, it is structured according to the occurrence of certain
brands, the age of vehicles, the alleged buying power and susceptibility of the residents
in a particular district, etc. Finally, a beggar sees places where she collects some
change, perceives free and more or less tolerable opportunities for finding warmth
and shelter from the weather, assesses the possibility of competition, etc.
I will leave it at that; situations like this are well known. What I would particularly
like to stress is this: It is not that the architect cannot notice the miserable state of the
oak trees or that the beggar cannot be familiar with the latest series of Fords. But this
is not what usually happens. Evaluations and assessments regarding these other
states of affairs are not as spontaneous, not as certain, and not as reliable as those
regarding states of affairs rooted in the subject system. Different ways in which
people cope with life entail different frames in which objects emerge; subsequently,

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Frame Structures

people also tend to use these frames in whatever else they are doing. If this works
well over a certain period and proves to be durable, these frames create parts of the
world on the one hand and particular subjects on the other.
So, yes, the image lies in the eye of the beholder. But that is only half of the story.
Likewise, the eye of the beholder arises from the image; in other words, visual perception is formed and trained in a process of focusing on the content that appears in
the preferred frame. This structure not only permeates the individual circumstances
of life, where it shapes personalities and corresponding realities, but also occurs in
the larger or global perspective.
At various places on the planet, over different historical epochs, we find striking
differences that can be construed as frame differences. Hence, the structure matches
quite well with what we usually call cultural differences. Cultures are frame
systems; in a culture, subjective and objective determinations develop alongside
each other and, as such, fit each other.14 An outside observer does not fit in at
first; therefore, she cannot simply experience everything that can possibly be
experienced in a foreign culture. This applies to ethnological fieldwork, where
the aim is to understand and map an unfamiliar way of life; it also applies to the
much simpler experience of traveling. According to Goethe in Wilhelm Meisters
Travels, nothing teaches us more than traveling, so long as the traveler is clever and
open-minded.
It is well known that, in the West, perception and cognition have mostly been
based on visual sources. The Greeks may have been particularly talented at this kind
of understanding through seeing15 (in Asia, smell and sound are said to be more
important). At any rate, this has been further developed and trained in the Western
world. During the Renaissance, the central perspective was discovered for pictorial
representationthat is, for the representation of the visible.16 Prior to that, artists
had depicted objects as flat or located in a vague, erratic, or multi-perspective spatiality. This was not simply due to inadequacies on the painters part. Rather, it documented the less clear, less individualized modes of perception that characterize
phylogenetically and ontogenetically earlier stages in the development of humankind. Todays private transportation on roads, where vehicles in our field of vision
quickly change their size, is firmly rooted in a mastery of the central perspective.
(This is why traffic is so dangerous for small children.)
What is the result of these considerations? Comprehension and experience
are subjective. This is simply a banal result if it leads to a run-of-the-mill relativism
that regards everything as different for you and for me. Still, all binding communicationespecially any argumentative dialoguehas to take this perspectival
difference into account. This requires theoretical tools that clarify how it is possible
that the same state of affairs can be grasped differently or even contradictorily.
14

Cf. my essay Wohlrapp (1998a), especially Part III.

The Greek word for to know is eidenai, which literally means have seen. Cf. also the praise
of vision as the preferred mode of cognition in Aristotle (1936), Metaphysics, A.1.1.
16
In general, this is attributed to Fra Angelico in 1455. In the 20th century, M. Escher reversed it
again.
15

5.2

Frames as Focus and Interface

181

My suggestion is this B-as-A structure. It states that the dissimilarity of the world is
a dissimilarity of ways of framing the same world by different subjects. I will lay
out this metaphysical issue in more detail in Sect. 5.4.

5.2.3

The Theory-Practice Interface

So far, I have treated frames as structures of perceptionof grasping something as

somethingand portrayed them as membranes in the reciprocal formation of a subjective and an objective dimension. But the concept of a frame, as I envision it here,
comprises a second pair of dimensions. It connects the cognitive with the active
sphere of subjectivity; hence, it crosses over into objectivity insofar as actions and
behavior leave traces in the world.
The principle is that we treat something the way we perceive it and vice versa.
A focus in perception corresponds to a focus in behavior and actions. The framing
that informs these actions actualizes the framing that has arisen in the act of
perceiving. This actualization confirms and strengthens the frame of perception
because it seems to work as expected. Finally, once actions have become praxes
in the subject area and, as such, have become more differentiated and stable,
there will soon be nothing new left to learn. Anything that could possibly be vexing
has become irrelevant. The world (in this area) has been acquired; subjects are
consolidated.
In order to illustrate these relations, our treatment of artifacts like cars and
traffic is much less illuminating than our way of dealing with the organic world of
plants and animals. What is an animal (for us)for example, a farm animal like a
chicken? Given the controversies over the right way of keeping animals that are
currently being fought out in industrialized countries, we can expect a range of
responses. The chicken as a farm animal is a resource for the production of eggs
and poultry. Under the currently prevailing economic circumstances, the chicken is
framed in such a way that, ultimately, it is nothing more than biomass used as
capital. Framed in this way and treated accordingly, chickens are clearly having a
hard time. Animal lovers and animal rights activists fight for a different frame.
They argue that the chickenthe animalshould be regarded as a creature with
a right to a species-specific life, or even as a moral counterpart. I think the
latter is an anticipation of a cultural level that we have not yet reached17 and about
17

At present, animals live among humans in an incredible variety of life forms. These range from the
sub-proletarian biomass in industrial agriculture to the aristocratic dogs and cats in urban apartments, which are fed, coiffured, and entertained by exquisite cultural programs. Even their inner workings are articulated or constructed in a specific literary genre (in a bookshop in Hamburg, I discovered
two entire shelves filled with books written from the point of view of birds, cats, dogs, horses, and
hamsters). Wild animals could ultimately prove to be even more important for humanitynot so much
the marsupials (rabbits, giraffes, etc.), which are hunted and sponsored, as the pests (potato beetle,
European corn borer, and microorganisms such as bacteria and viruses, etc.) that are literally assailed
in very expensive wars that have so far resulted in rather Pyrrhic victories.

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Frame Structures

whose availability and desirability little is currently known. In any case, the chicken
should be construed as a sentient beinga frame that obligates us to grant a
certain respect as it is articulated (though rarely enforced) in the animal protection
laws of most civilized countries. For a justification of this way of framing, we can refer
to Kant, who remarked perceptively that humans regress to a state of brutalization if
they treat animals inhumanely.18 This remark has to be understood with respect to a
feature of the aforementioned concept of frames: The structures of the subject vary
with those of the perception (and, subsequently, the treatment) of the object.
In a story about his childhood in Chile, biologist Humberto Maturana provides
an example of a case in which a chicken is, in a very broad sense, integrated into
the community as a domestic animal, even as a family member. In Maturanas
parents house, there was a chicken that had a name. It ate at the table alongside
the rest of the family, and one night somehow managed to wake up the mother,
lead her to the chicken coop, and show her a fellow chicken that had been killed
by a raccoon.19
Some questions are even more closely related to the formation of human selfconception: questions about what it means for humans to frame one another in
communication and interactionfor exampleas worker and boss, tenant and
landlord, employer and employee, master and servant, slave and slave owner, and
native and foreigner. If activated, these frames always suggest a network of modes
of behavior and action. This usually coincides with specific expectations, competencies, and cultural imprints, both for the person who frames in this way and for the
person who is apprehended and treated in this framing.

5.3
5.3.1

Latency of the Frame

Frame and Aspect

The frame structure as it has been illustrated thus far seems to be an interesting and
not particularly difficult idea. The basics of this concept are already contained in
any more or less sophisticated understanding of pluralism and tolerance. Upon
closer examination, however, there appears to be a complication. It is of utmost
importance, particularly for the practice of argumentation, to have an understanding
18

Cf. Kant (1996), The Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right 17. In this paragraph, Kant
argues for a persons duty to refrain from the violent and cruel treatment of animals based on the
fact that it dulls his shared feeling of their suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural
predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in ones relations with other men. Epistemically,
this argument stands on solid ground, unlike the current objection raised against it that it is speciesist
(i.e. that it elevates humans above animals). In all human attempts at coping with everyday life, we
elevate humans above animals (with minor exceptions), and we do so willingly. (Even critics of
speciesism will find it acceptable to crush a mosquito if they are bitten by one.)
19
Cf. Maturana (1994), 102.

5.3

Latency of the Frame

183

of this complication, which is caused by the fact that the structure can be latent
and, in that case, a great compulsive force and that it can only become available
for reflection once it has been made manifest. When the basic properties of the
frame structure have been elucidated, it might initially seem as if the respective
frame is a matter of choiceas if, in our cognitive and active reference to any
objects, we choose the frames we deem the best or most appropriate and possibly
add others in order to consider further aspects of the matter. Someone who talks
about an animal and begins by framing it as an organism could subsequently
also regard it as an information-processing machine or as a moral counterpart, etc.
So, although each frame entails a certain limit of reference, is it not possible to
extend this limit further by adding frame upon frame? Moreover, if we have the
impression that our dialogue partner frames the matter differently, can we notfor
the sake of peace, or in order to extend our own horizonscontemplate whether
to adopt his frame as well?
No, it is not that easy. First, among the limits imposed by certain frames, there
are some clear alternatives (an animal, e.g. cannot be regarded both as an object
of unlimited exploitation and as a moral counterpart). In such cases, a decision
needs to be made which has consequences for any further frames. More important,
however, is that some frames are a better fit with my habitually formed subjectivity
than others. Some properties of a state of affairs are less relevant to me, some are
beyond anything I would even be prepared to consider, and there are some of which
I have not even the slightest clue that they do in fact exist. These differences are
responsible for the fascinating interplay between latent and manifest framing.
In the case of a manifest frame, we are aware of the restrictions entailed by our
way of apprehending a state of affairs. In such cases, we usually say that we regard
a state of affairs with respect to a certain aspect (or that it concerns a particular aspect of the issue). This happens, for example, when I, depending on the
circumstances, regard car traffic with respect to economic, ecological, and sociopsychological aspects or when I discuss the biological, legal, and economic aspects of
keeping farm animals. Aspect is the name for the manifest, chosen frame that we
have in front of us like an object. In each case, we can understand what belongs to this
frame by allowing the respective limitations in our way of seeing to take effect.
This is different in the case of a latent frame. Although our way of seeing is
limited here as well, it is not clear to us what we are doing and what effects this
might have. After all, we think we are concerned with the thing itself, not merely
with one or some of its aspects. The latent framing of a state of affairs occurs spontaneously: It seems obvious to me because it suits my habitus; it is typical of me.
If, for example, I come from a traditional family of farmers, I will most likely not
be a friend of industrial factory farming. I will also frame chickens in a different
way than what I see in battery cages. Just as I cannot reinvent myself at whimI am
a person who, by realizing my potential, has achieved a few things and these
achievements are built into my body and my soulI also cannot adopt frames that
do not fit me at all. I can believe that this is possible, and I can try it and apply
myself to this task completely, but whether I frame something in one way or another
is not a simple choice.

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Frame Structures

In most cases, latent frames are also ranked by relevance. Those less entangled
with subjectivity are easier to recognize and accept as mere options. This is
different in the case of frames that directly map the contours of my habitus. If I put
these up for consideration, I partially put myself up for consideration as well.
I would like to call these primary frames in this context. Primary frames hold
together the frames and aspects that I can consider. They determine which aspects
I regard as fundamental and which ones as secondary. A primary frame does not
easily become manifest. It is in such a primary frame that I have become familiar
with certain circumstances, have learned to orient myself in them, and have thus
become familiar with myself. To recognize a primary frame is what is traditionally
called self-knowledge. If, for example, my dialogue partner spots a primary frame
in my statements and confronts me with his observationsaying, youre a typical
tree hugger, a technophile, a mental acrobat, or the likeI typically do not respond
by saying that he is right. His remark does not concern me; I do not know what to
do with it. The reason is that merely denoting the frame verbally is insufficient for
producing the reflexive distance necessary to make the frame manifest.
Primary frames often affect the level of existential meaning within the orientation
system. If persistent differences and disagreements arise over the validity of hypotheses,
it becomes necessary to detect the primary frames and adapt them accordingly. It is
by no means clear that anything could be clarified or changed by means of argumentation at this point. Often, the only thing that can be done is the formulation of tasks
aimed at producing the necessary distance.

5.3.2

Way of Seeing and Perspective

Once the frames through which someone apprehends something have been
objectifiedthat is, once the relevant limitations and boundaries can be identified
I would like to talk of the perspective from which someone apprehends and acts.
From a certain perspective, the relevant frames then appear as aspects of the
object or as a recommendation to view the object with respect to these very aspects.
But as long as the relevant frames are latentthat is, their limitations are effective,
but their type and extent are not seenI use the term, way of seeing. Therefore, a
perspective is an objectified way of seeing. Ultimately, it is impossible for me to
apprehend my way of seeingthis is possible only for you, but for you it has become
a perspective. Hence, the manifest frame corresponds to the perspective and the
latent frame to the way of seeing. Certainly, these are all terms of colloquial and
academic English which, as such, do not have a fixed meaning. Hence, these stipulations are not meant to be rigid definitions of the meaning of these already existing
words. Rather, they are merely supposed to highlight conceptual differences that
might be useful to consider.
In the following, I will further elucidate the interplay between latent and manifest frame structures. I began my explanations by writing that a frame or an act of

5.3

Latency of the Frame

185

framing coincides with a focus on some of an objects possibilities while the rest is
blocked out or simply disregarded. We will now have to talk about the consequences
of that statement. In a trivial sense, blocked-out possibilities are just thatblocked
outwhich means that they are not noted. However, since a focus can become distinct
only against the background of other possibilitiesin other words, since an objects
considered possibilities constitute a section only with regard to other somehow
considered possibilities, this partial character disappears as soon as those other
possibilities are really blocked out. This process causes the frame to become latent;
it submerges. Our way of seeing seems to render more than one section of the
thing accessible; it seems to give us access to the thing itself. We tend to take the
perceived section for the thing itself. In our pluralistic times, everyone willingly
admits that their view of things is subjective and limited, but that is just a truism.
Admitting it is far from recognizing these limits. Our own view does not come to the
fore; self-knowledge is a difficult and lifelong task, which, at any rate, has not
become any easier in a pluralism in which anything goes.
The latency of (primary) frames is the source of all the problems that I have
described above (Chap. 2) as meta-problems. In the case of problems that have
been perceived incorrectly, the relevant states of affairs have only been grasped or
understood partially, and this without the people involved knowing of it. Such problems cannot be solved. Sometimes, they cannot even be treated effectively because the
basic contours of the thing in question have been described incorrectly underestimated,
or not noted at all. An incorrectly described problem that cannot be solved because
of this incorrect description is a frame problem; it is an epiphenomenon of the
frames latency. If we perceive something incorrectly, this mistake remains hidden
from us because, along with our perception, we cannot simultaneously notice the
way in which we perceive it, our way of seeing.
How to reduce car traffic is probably a problem of this kind. As long as the primary
frame (complex) in which the car emerges as irresistible to the average resident
of developed countries has not been identified, any measures to rationalize it
will hardly be consequential. The petroleum tax that was passed in Europe for
ecological reasons works only if most people frame their car primarily as a
cost-producing means of transportation. If this is not the casethat is, if the primary
meaning of the car is differentthen the petroleum tax causes annoyance, but not a
reduction in car use. It causes annoyance because, instead of solving the problem, it
makes more expensive somthing that seems to belong to a decent and humane life
in a way that is not quite understood properly.
Generally speaking, every theory contains latent frames that are due to the
circumstances of their creation. A latent frame is doubled (or potentiated) ignorance.
We do not know what we block out and we do not know that we do not know.
It is in this sense that theory and knowledge are limited. Similarly, the growth of
knowledge depends on the ability to detect frames and make them manifest. Certain
outermost frames that have to do with our humanity are inescapable. We will never
inhabit the world and our lives in the same way that houseflies, peregrine falcons or
hippopotamuses do.

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5.4

Frame Structures

The Subjective Constitution of the World, the Worldly

Constitution of the Subject

Kants transcendental philosophy teaches us that the objects of experience have to

be constituted if we want to formulate verifiable propositions about them. Using
our cognitive faculty (which consists of sensibility, rationality, and reason), we
introduce forms into the indifferent multitude of the world that make it seem human
in outline and governed by human rules. It is impossible for us to know it in and of
itself. This has consequences for any theory that we use for purposes of orientation:
It has a tacit philosophical or proto-theoretical bias that corresponds to the aforementioned forms of cognition. This is where we stake out, as it were, what can
potentially happenthat is, which objects and events are potential or can be
experienced. This proto-theoretical prefix is the objects constitution. If it is constituted, it can be investigated; the results of the investigation, provided they are
correct, make up the cognition of the object. Since forms of cognition are part of the
nature of human subjectsunder normal circumstances, people have a natural gift
for cognitionKant spoke of the objects subjective constitution. Hence, he
emphasized something that should have been a matter of course: that the world that
human beings apprehend is indeed a human worldthat is, that objects and events
do not arise objectively from the indifferent multitude of the world in the same
way that they appear to our cognition. This was by no means a relativization, as if
the world were actually quite different in itself.20 Most of all, this subjectivity of
constitution was not meant to be understood as a dependence on the individual
subject in its distinctiveness and particularity.
Nevertheless, the idea that the concreteness, regularity, and intelligibility of the
world are constituted subjectively contains two basic findings that make it useful for
a theory of frames.
First, the constituent forms restrict an objects potential. In visual perception,
objects cannot appear to us other than, for example, in time and space. And bodies
or organisms cannot appear to us other than in the conceptual shape of, for example,
body or organism. We can put this positively in sentences which are, therefore,
true a priorithat is, whose truth content can be judged before any empirical
investigation of bodies and organisms has occurred with regard to their extension
or utility.
Secondly, the boundaries of the possibility of experience correspond to the human
cognitive faculty. Therefore, the limitations of these forms are simultaneously the
limitations of all humankindlimitations that we need to consider in order to
prevent cognition from suddenly escalating into exuberant speculation.

20

As I indicated above, side glances at how animals constitute their world are useful in order to
point out the boundary, but not in order to assert anything about the other side of the divide. Every
idea, every result of inquiries into how animals constitute the world inevitably frames this constitution in a human way. Cf., again, Nagels considerations on what it is like to be a bat (1974) and, on
an even more fundamental level, Hans Julius Schneiders study (Schneider (1989)).

5.4 The Subjective Constitution of the World, the Worldly Constitution of the Subject

187

My question in this book pertains to which structures are relevant for argumentative
validity. This question is more general than Kants inquiry into the possibility of
scientific knowledge or metaphysics. After all, we not only argue about empiricalscientific, moral, and aesthetic theses but also about many others. Anything that
can become the content of a statement, however, may initially function as a frame,
thereby staking out an area of special attention. Hence, the frame as a structure
that constitutes an area is analogous to Kants (transcendental) forms of
cognitionthat is, the structures which constitute an object. A frame limits the
ways in which we can address somethinga limitation which, as long as it is latent,
immediately takes effect as an objects boundary.
Let us now look at the linguistic operations that articulate this boundary.
Of course, they include the use of a predicator,21 so that the limits dictated by the
frame are determined by the predicators semantic content. In ordinary language,
this semantic content is not strictly fixed. It can partly be spelled out in the form of
predicator rules.22 These are rules that allow or prohibit transitions to other
predicators. Hence, they articulate the meaning of a predicator A as a bundle of
possible positive and negative transitions to other predicators B, C, etc.
Let us consider an example: In the case of the predicator, flower, transitions to
plant, living being, blooming, smelling, wilting, etc., are possible and
may be actualized depending on individual circumstances. Transitions to machine,
speaking, jumping around, etc., are usually not possible. Actualizing them
would mean, in one way or another, to use the term metaphorically. Why are some
transitions possible, but not others? There are no reasons for this fact that could be
located in any external purposiveness. On the contrary, this bundle of transitions
is the meaning of the predicator. It articulates the regularities of its use. In this
context, Wittgenstein introduced the concept of a language game, which we
should definitely embed into the established praxes I mentioned in Chap. 1.
As I said, however, in an ordinary language that is alive, such a meaning is not
strictly fixed. Semantic rules are a bit like a river bed and meaning is somewhat
like a river. The river relies on such a bed, but it also digs in and changes it. Verbal
communication is a process of continuously working on, fixing, and changing the
meanings of predicators while they are in use. In the practice of argumentation, such
events play a role as (subtle) shifts in meaning and may, if misunderstood, lead to
irritations.23 The concept of frame structures will also allow us to clarify this change
in meanings.
If any given predicator A is used as a frame to address a state of affairs denoted
by B, this opens up certain possibilities of transitioning from B to components a1,
a2, etc., all belonging to A, but it also closes off others.

21

Predicator is the term Paul Lorenzen introduced (for good reasons) for the logical predicate or
the general term, along with the emphasis that it implies a distinction. Cf. Kamlah and Lorenzen
(1984).
22
Kamlah and Lorenzen (1984), 5764.
23
Cf. Deppermann (2000).

188

Inferential scheme :

B
B
B

Frame Structures

a1
a2
a3
etc.

This can be spelled out with regard to the example above: If something is a
flower, then it may also wilt; if it is a flower, it will have a scent; if it is a flower, it
cannot speak, etc. All possibilities of a state of affairs B that are incorporated into a
frame A together form a group G of potential statements. Turning G into a statement
about the state of affairs B means talking about B framed as A. Therefore, I will call
G the inferential potential of the frame A.
A frames inferential potential is not definite, but it is not arbitrary either. As with
a hike in the mountainswhich, at a specific location where a certain section of the
landscape can be surveyed, enables any number of detailed statements about this
part of the landscape, but not about things beyond the next mountain ridgethe
frames inferential potential can take on any dimension while it is still always
limited in content. It is limited by the absence of any potential statements that could
have been derived from contrary framings (in the example above: to move from
talk about something as a flower to the idea that it speaks is a transference; it
transfers the meaning into the frame of human communications).
The openness of the inferential potential of a frame A is due to the openness of
the meaning of the predicator A. In standardized languagefor example, in a
sciencethis meaning has been determined and the predicator defined; it has
become a term. Expressions such as molecule, cell, genome, monarchy,
democracy, island, continent, etc., are defined in their respective scientific
disciplines, quite independently of what people do with them in ordinary language
and in the arts section of a newspaper. If something is addressed in biology as a
genome, then the inferential potential has been determined. It simply follows
from the definition of genome. As I said, without a definition, language use is open.
But it can be clarified by inquiring. Sometimes, one can even criticize language use
by putting forth objections to certain uses of words. But these objections would have
to firmly rely on a theoretical basis, which will be difficult in a non-standardized
language. Hence, a frame retains its openness while simultaneously limiting possible
ways of thematizing things.
The fundamental difference between predication and framing is this: In a predication, we use a finished and available linguistic sign to distinguish a referential
object from others and equate it with yet other objects according to the ways
articulated by predicator rules. In this sense, the predicated object is a flower, a
car, an island, an embryo. If a new object is, for example, shaped like a flower but
made of silk or paper, the predicator flower prepares a place for it among our
orientationsa place, however, that it can occupy only partially. Many typical
transitional possibilities for living being, plant, and so on, lead to contradictions.

5.5

Frame Differences, Frame Change, Frame Sublation

189

After all, paper flowers are not real flowers; they are merely pseudo-flowers or
images of flowers. The predication, flower, is metaphorical.
This would be different only if I frame such a craft product as a flower. In this
case, I assign it to the subject area marked out by the predicator flower. That
flowers exist is simply presupposed here; whether this particular object qualifies as a
flower or not, however, is unclear. Rather, the attribution opens up possibilities of
comparison. The given and already individuated object has certain aspects that
now emerge in the light of the frame [flower]. Hence, what appears are a flowers
shape and colorwhich more or less do justice to the originalbut also a certain
lifelessness and scentlessness. Our industrial civilizations addiction to growth
and progress has altered the status of a flowers liveliness. That cut flowers pass
away after a few days in the vase is regarded with regret; hence, a flower that does
not die may be quite welcome. It might even be a more complete flower than
the flower from a nursery. As for the smell, this suggests that we need to perfume
the thing.
Overall, this example shows that in an act of framing we do not predicate
anything, but posit a possible broader term. We do not make any statements, but
open up realms of possibility in which the respective object can be viewed and
treated. By realizing and designing such possibilitiesfor example, by adding a
scent that has been perceived as missing in the frame [flower]we simultaneously
extend the meaning of the predicator. Its situationally invariant core grows ever
more abstract and empty; in return, it incorporates components that express mere
possibilities and whose applicability requires a specific assessment of the situation.
Furthermore, the framing is marked from the outset as an operation that selects only
one possibility among others. Any deliberate act of framing entails that the matter
can be thematized differently. To explore these other possibilities and see what aspects
emerge in other frames is a further source of openness.
On the whole, this frame semantics can help reconcile the limitations of thematization with the openness of concepts. And that is a wonderful advantage.

5.5

Frame Differences, Frame Change, Frame Sublation

It is well-known that there are limits to human cognition and understanding regarding
the orientation of each individual person as well as of humanity as a whole. What is
less generally known is that these are very special limitsnamely, limits that have
no other side. They are either marked by contradictions that block any further
thoughtthe Kantian antinomies were impressive examples in this regardor
not marked at all; the matter at hand simply becomes impassable and trickles out.
In such cases, orientation ends because no one thinks any further and no one thinks
further because no way has been paved for thought. It is typical of limits of orientation
that they have not been explored and that this ignorance forms a blind spot, which
seems to make ones own way of perceiving necessary or inevitable. The concept of
frames is supposed to illuminate these limits of cognition. The term, frame, denotes

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Frame Structures

the structure that limits orientations in their individual components as well as in

their entirety. In general, this statement means that, in our orientations, we perceive
the world as something in both, its details and as a whole. Whatever it is known
as is just one option. But saying this presupposes that another option has emerged
and that the frame has, therefore, been sublated.24 As long as this is not the case,
the frame is the self-concealing limit of the development of subject and world.
Conceptually, the following is still unclear: Frame denotes both a component
of someones actual way of seeing and the limits of the area in which something is
deliberately thematized. I have already encapsulated this difference in the expressions, aspect and perspective vs. (effective) frame and way of seeing. In the
case of different aspects, moving from one aspect to another does not mean that
anything is being sublated. Even though the limits of the area are not sharply
defined in this case either, they are still limits that have another sidenamely, the
other possible aspect under which the matter can be discussed. By shifting between
two already known aspects, then, one does not sublate a frame. What happens
therebywhether the thing should, as a matter of expediency, be conceived as
nothing but a bundle of aspects and whether the concept of a frame sublation then
develops without an objectthat will now be the focus of further discussion.
Let us return to the beginning of these considerations. Using the example of car
traffic, I demonstrated that a state of affairs can be framed in different ways. Suitable
examples show that a particular way of thematizing an aspect can be quite unproblematic. The car can be regarded as a means of transportation and also as part of
ones private sphere. In that case, the car appears as a state of affairs, both clear
and well laid out. It seems that states of affairs can then be easily broken down into
bundles of aspects. The situation is different with respect to the realization of a
frame. An animal can turn into a miserable piece of biomass and it is highly
questionable whether this change is reversible (for the individual animal).25 When it
comes to the roles played by a person in the contemporary diversity of social life,
there do not seem to be any problems either. Barring the possible exception of the
very outlandish, fractal self-presentation suggested by postmodernism, we understand ourselves to be bearers and actors of various roles. Someone can be a bank
customer, a participant in traffic, a father, a college professor, a member of a choir,
etc., without any of these frames disturbing each other or requiring any substantial
changes to the personality or the state of affairs in question. But even in this situation,
we are not entirely immune to surprises. If a young man in a public sauna recognizes
the sweaty pile of flesh on the bench next to him as his professor, this could be a
communicative challenge for both sides. In that case, the task at hand is to somehow
reconcile the new relationship with the former.
24

The term, sublation, has been used to translate Aufhebung in Hegels writings, where it designates
the Aufhebung of a thesis and an antithesis in a new synthesis. In the context of this book, I would
like sublation to refer to the possibility of leaving a state of affairs untouched in different
frames, while finding a third, which encroaches upon the other frames without retracting any of
the determinations contained by them.
25
A few years ago, the magazine of the German newspaper, Sddeutsche Zeitung, published a
feature about an attempt to re-naturalize five battery hens, which began a new life in the natural
environment of an organic farm. The results were not completely discouraging.

5.5

Frame Differences, Frame Change, Frame Sublation

191

Hence, the following principle applies: If the frame changes, then the object is at
stake; it will have to absorb the new possibilities and reconcile them with prior ones; in
the process it will more or less become different. The following questions ensue:
Which circumstances can change the frame? Which changes should be considered?
I would like to begin by illustrating the situation of a frame change with the help
of a model. I will use the figure of the duck-rabbit head that Wittgenstein referred
to in his thoughts on seeing-as.26
Fig. 5.1 Wittgensteins
duck-rabbit head

It is well known and fairly obvious that this figure can be seen both as a duck
and as a rabbit. So, do I have two different states of affairs in front of me? I think
that we can answer affirmatively, at least for now. In the frame [duck], the two fingerlike protrusions on the left side are the bill. In the frame [rabbit], they are the
ears. A bill is not a pair of ears. These are predicators with contrary uses. Ascribed
to the same thing, they lead to a contradiction. This means that either at least one of
the two statements is false or that it is not one and the same object being addressed
in the same respect. Indeed, we are talking about different respects here. I obviously
talk about the duck-rabbit head in a different sense if I talk about it as a duck than if
I talk about it as a rabbit.
We have arrived at something special here. If I say, for example, about a chessboard, that it is black and white, while admitting that anything black is not white,
then there are two respects, each of which takes into consideration only one part of
the state of affairs and ignores the other. The difference between those respects of
the frames, however, concerns the state of affairs in its entirety. Moreover, it is
something that is transitory. If I view the duck-rabbit head as a rabbit and treat it as
such, for example, by beginning to color it in, the frame [duck] will soon become
obsolete. Hence, the aforementioned contradiction will no longer be possible either.
The realization of a frame change consequently brings with it a change in the state
of affairs. This was the same in the case of a chicken framed as livestock.
In order to express that, initially, only the frame and nothing in the object itself
is changed, I would like to call this a reflexive change. It may be said, then, that a
reflexive change can be followed by a real one which, in turn, is irreversible. Would
it be reversible if it remained just a reflexive change? Again, this relates to the
26

Wittgenstein (2009), Philosophical Investigations, Part II, xi.

192

Frame Structures

question of the degree to which we can choose the frames that allow us access to
states of affairs in our attempts at coping with life. I tend to think that we only have
a choice in insignificant cases, but not in important ones dealing with forays past our
limits of orientation. In the latter case, for better or worse, we have to live with the
reflexive change; its dismantling constitutes historical reflection.
I would like to illustrate this by way of some examples: a rather small one,
followed by two bigger ones.
Until the 1960s, films in theaters and cameras were generally not colored. There
were a few movies that used color as a stylistic element, such as Eisensteins
Battleship Potemkin, where the blood of murdered men that runs down a staircase
suddenly takes on a red hue. The horror of the audience was of a special kind
(it contained, as I would like to say in advance, a frame sublation). In normal
photographic and filmic representation, all colors were present, but just as shades of
gray. Nobody had a problem in identifying the colors of the bright red carnation
flower in its buttonhole at the rendezvous or of the radiant blue summer sky. They
were red and blue and we saw them immediately as red and blue.
Then came color movies. With their advent, the following question arose: How
could we see colors where there were none? But they were there, one might say.
So try to grasp the difference. Why does such an attempt fail? With movies in color,
black and white movies gained a foil for comparison that did not exist before.
As long as we watched black and white movies, we did not regard them as black
and white. We regarded the reality thus represented as filmic or photographic.
It is not until the appearance of color on the screen that movies as we knew them
became black and white movies. But such black and white movies are no longer the
same as movies before color. They have been changed reflexively.27 Moreover, it
turns out that the reflexive change is irreversible. After all, the added difference in
colors (from red to red) did not exist before the advent of color on the screen. Once
movies in color hit the scene, the black and white movie that does not have a color
counterpart is irretrievably gone.
This reflexive change is the secret behind the so-called incommensurability in
epochal changes.28 When such change takes place, differences are quite obvious in
the process of transition. They can be experienced through contrasts to the prior
state, which must, therefore, still be alive and on peoples minds. Once it is gone, the
new state has arrived and can no longer be compared to the old one. It can, but the
comparison is inexact because it is unable to represent the layering of reflection and
the distance made possible by it. The new state was not included in the old one as a
foil for comparison. The memory of the old state, however, does contain this foil.
The comparison of the old state with the new one has two sides; prior to this, it had
just one, and this was not a side in a relation suitable for comparison. The new state
might have been imagined from within the old one and it is possible to remember
this imagination. But, again, it can no longer enter the stage of memory as pure,
27

In a window display in my neighborhood, a photographer offers black and white photos for
applications because they seem respectable.
28
Cf. Kuhn (1970). Cf. also Lueken (1992), Chapters 1 and 2.

5.5

Frame Differences, Frame Change, Frame Sublation

193

because it has to emerge from a scene where the reality of what was imagined
already exists.
Describing the relationship between two eras or between a contemporary and a
bygone era as incommensurable means articulating a paradoxical thesis. Anyone
who tries to justify it beyond pointing out the newly added layer of reflection refutes
herself. By indicating any such incomparability, we produce a common frame (even
though this frame will initially only be minimal). Soon, the frame will allow for
exhibiting other similarities. For a knowledgeable and creative person, this is no
problem at all. At any rate, the protests and rebuttals brought forth against the
incommensurability thesis (a thesis that Feyerabend exaggerated with characteristic
wit29) and the arguments for these rebuttals (which demonstrated important similarities between the eras30) had a point, at least as far as they were directed against the
consequences of the irrationality of sciences. Nevertheless, the following should
have become clear given my explanations in Chap. 1: The growth of knowledge is
not a rational process in terms of a logical deduction. Rather, such growth contains
an element of the free creativity of the human mind, which finds expression in the
thetic constructions of research as well as in the argumentations and realizations
surrounding them.
In order to illustrate this fascinating situation with respect to epochal changes,
I have first, almost as a model, considered the duck-rabbit head, and then the advent
of color movies. In addition, here are two examples of social or sociopsychological
ruptures.
First example: daily life in Ludwigslust (Mecklenburg). 30 years ago, this was
life in the GDR. Anyone who lived there at that time can recall an image of a capitalist Germany. But this memory cannot reproduce the image that reigned at the
time. As a result of lives lived in the interim, there are now differences that were not
there 30 years ago. Back then, people did not have the vivid experience of life in the
market economy of a reunited Germany. But what was lacking in particular was
the consciousness of the lack of such an experience. This was not merely simple, but
rather potentiated ignorance.
Second example: the self-understanding of the French king after July 14, 1789.
On the eve of the storming of the Bastille, Louis XVI still believes the event to be
only a minor insurgency.31 This estimation will change significantly over the course
of the following years. The king enters the new situation gradually, responds to
the demand for a constitutional monarchy, but makes it clear in his behavior that
he does not really care about these matters. Instead, he bets on Frances defeat
by Prussia and Austria; he conspires, attempts to leave the country secretly, and is
prevented from doing so. Each stage is incommensurable with the previous one.
29

Cf. Feyerabend (1970, 1975), Chapters 15 and 16.

Cf., for example, Toulmin (1967).
31
Cf. the corresponding report in Pernoud and Flaissier (1961), 45: During the night of the 14th
15th the king was awakened by the Duke of Liancourt. [] His visitor related what had happened.
Louis XVI was astonished. Its a revolt, he said. No, Sire, its the revolution. Louis XVI was
deeply moved and decided to go to Paris on the 17th.
30

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Frame Structures

After August 10, 1792, he livesalong with his familyas a prisoner in the
Temple and can no longer defend himself against all kinds of harassment. For his
welfare, he now depends on people who were his subjects just three years earlier.
They have now become citizens who initially try to use him for their purposes and
then finish him off quickly. Regardless of the extent to which the king really accepted
some of the ideas about human rights that were enshrined in the new constitution he
signed (and that were irreconcilable with the ideas of monarchy), it is a fact that he
experienced tremendous changes (first steps towards realizing the frame of human
rights) among these people compared to their former reality as subjects. Previously,
these changes had existed as possibilities, for example, in the writings of the
Utopians and particularly of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Thus far, they had merely been
the imagination of a new situationnow, many of them had become reality.
I will mention this again in Sect. 5.8. In any case, the self-understanding of the
king is at the center of a great period of rupture, which affects societys consciousness
as a whole. Contradictions emerge and the process of negotiating them produces
new contradictions. The king did not survive this period, but neither did those
who ordered his execution. Finally, once the monarchy in France was restored, it
had become something completely differentsomething even less viable than the
Ancien Rgime.
Let us summarize these epochal changes as the realization of frame sublations:
Something is unknown in the previous state, which then becomes known in the later
state. Looking back from the later state, what was missing can clearly be seen and
remembered now. But the reality of the previous state had been determined by a lack
of knowledge about which experiences were missing for the adequate assessment of
differences between these states to be possible. This potentiated ignorance, this
ignorance of ignorance, is the key difference between the situations before and
after sublating the frame. Certainly, in some circumstances, reflexive changes can
be forgotten; only with the coming of the next generation, which has no firsthand
experience of the previous situation and only knows it based on descriptions and
reports, will they be eliminated completely.
At this point, it is imperative for an understanding of how orientation is produced
through research and thetic theory to comprehend the following: Reflexive changes
are changes in how we conceptualize states of affairs; their realization leads to
changes in these states of affairs as well as in the participating subjects; hence, such
reflexive changes are accompanied by changes and developments in the words and
concepts that articulate these states of affairs verbally. In this respect, frame changes
and the frame sublations accomplished thereby are the basic elements in semantic
shiftsthat is, in a diachronic semantics.32
If this frame semantics is utilized for the analysis and improvement of the practice of argumentation, then the following applies: We need to consider and possibly
initiate or articulate processes of becoming aware, in which latent or solidified
frames may be sublated by generating a reflexive distance.
32

As discussed in my presentation of the construction site of argumentation theory, Arnulf

Deppermann has carried out interesting studies in this regard and presented these processes
albeit not understood as frame sublationsin great detail. Cf. Deppermann (2000).

5.6

5.6

What Does It Mean to Work?

195

What Does It Mean to Work?

As I wrote in the first section of this chapter, the idea of a frame structure is common
in psychology, psychotherapy, and political science. Integrating it into argumentation
theory highlights some previously unnoticed contours. In order to convey these as
clearly as possible, it might be helpful to prepare a few slightly more detailed case
studies that demonstrate the analytical potential of this tool. In this chapter, in
Sects. 5.6 and 5.8, I will present two such studies, one concerning the human
capacity to play and the other dealing with a life-and-death struggle. I will begin
with the innocent, very successful episode, in which boyish smartness magically
transforms work into play.
The episode is part of Mark Twains stories about Tom Sawyer. Relations here
are simple and clear; people act and talk and use words with certain meanings.
The words refer to lines of action or parts of established praxesin particular,
work and play. Effective framings contribute to the meanings of words by
keeping the designated actions within certain limits. Since these limits become
objectionable in the situation, the young hero Tom engages in interactive research
activities in order to transcend them. The point is to transform a matter that is
considered work according to all available epistemic theory. The thetic construction leading to this research is less Toms actively designed sketch than a
fateful occurrence in a time of great need; fortunately, Tom is smart enough to
descry its potential. What follows are actions, attempts, and extensionsthrough
trial actionsof the established praxis of whitewashing a fence. All of this is
guided by a bold thesis, which can indeed be realized based on an insouciant
seriousness that only children can exhibit. Hence, work is carried out without anyone
having to work and the afternoon is saved.
The scene takes place in the Southern United States in the late 19th century in
a small town by the Mississippi river. Tom is a white boy who lives with his
aunt Polly. Despite Pollys occasionally schoolmarmish regiment, Tom hardly
suffers because he has some remarkable talents. The episode in question begins on
a beautiful summer day, which is also a public holiday, when it suddenly crosses
Pollys mind that the great garden fence is in dire need of a new coat of paint. Since
Tom does not have anything else to do anyway, she asks him to do it. When a
grumpy Tom begins the work, the boys from his gang come over and start to tease
him about it. In particular, Ben Rogers, a strong fellow who is Toms main competitor for the role of leader, suggests with hypocritical sympathy that Toms activity
should be considered a penalty for having done some wrong. Because Tom does
not want the damage to be exacerbated by ridicule, he inquires gruffly what Ben
means by work. Thus begins a wonderful transformation of the action of whitewashing a fence and its value. After all, for Toms question to be convincing, he
needs to display suitable behavior that will cast doubts on the obviousnamely,
that what he does is work. After a theatrical performance accompanied by
speeches that further stress and expand his denial, he is able to demonstrate a committed, truly devoted actualization of the action of whitewashing a fence, which
appears to be quite pleasant. This, then, is supposed to be work? Confused by such

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theoretical-practical opposition, Ben tries to ensure that he is not being fooled.

He asks whether Tom would not prefer to go swimming with them, but receives
the reply that swimming is something you can do every daywhitewashing a
fence though, Tom asserts, now that is something very special. Finally, Ben gives
in and asks whether he could perhaps give it a try. But, of course, Tom refuses.
Oh, why not? Tom explains the reasons: His aunt has very precise ideas about
the care required for whitewashing and he, Ben, presumably lacks the proper
motivation. Besides, nohe was having a really good time and that is something
you do not easily give up. So what else is left for Ben to do but offer a deal?
An apple changes hands, and over the next half hour, a previously derisive Ben
Rogershis brow now furrowed and his lips pressed together tightlycan be seen
spreading paint over the fence, surrounded by more and more children, who do not
believe their eyes at first, but soon begin to participate in this splendid whitewashing
in return for corresponding benefits. Come evening, the fence is triple coated and
Tom a rich man.
Let us first look at the frames involved and their dynamics. Whitewashing the
fence is an activity that is regarded as workby the boys aunt; by the boy
himself, who has no desire to do it on a day off; and by his friend and rival Ben
Rogers, who teases Tom about it. Nothing indicates at the beginning that the
negative assessment of the matter has to do with a certain frame and that this
quality could change if the frame itself changed. But this is precisely the point of
the dialogical-interactive development that takes place between the participants: the
frame in which whitewashing the fence is regarded and carried out is sublated by a
denial of this very frame; instead, the oppositenamely, pleasant leisure activityis
claimed to be the appropriate frame; and this claim, finally, is enforced in an interactive sequence of demonstration and participation.
How we frame a state of affairs is a matter of choice only in a limited sense.
There are always frames that are efficient, that are not manifest, and that commit
us to a certain form of the matter and ourselves. Of course, that a fence should be
whitewashed, above all on a holiday, generally moves the corresponding action into
the frame of work. That work can also be pleasant, satisfying, etc., does not
change the fact that this is a particular instance of work and that it will bring neither
joy nor satisfaction. A boy who is forced to apply a coat of paint to a wooden fence
on a holiday cannot fool himself with good intentions: look at the bright side, and
the like. He has entered the hard reality of the adult world, where such tasks are
carried out by workers (either hired oron the banks of the Mississippi in the 19th
centuryheld as slaves). In short, the frame from which this activity emerges
and which determines its potential for displeasure can hardly be changed by an
act of will.
This is the interesting and instructive core of the story: The action is not
redefined, but the frame sublation arises in the course of the interactions as an
epiphenomenon of the intended actions.
When Tom receives his aunts task, he is at his wits end. He submits to the seemingly
inevitable and begins to paint. So when Ben Rogers comes and talks sardonically of
a penalty, this adds an element to Toms activity that draws attention to the frame
of work even more painfully. Not only does Tom work; he is also being ridiculed

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197

about it. He who claims to be the smartest among the members of the gang was
unable to evade this work of whitewashing. What a shame! This fact is the last straw.
Tom is unwilling to accept itnot on top of everything else. After all, the qualification of his work as a penalty contains a twofold humiliation: first, that he is
working at all or that he is forced to work (it is, after all, a holiday, when nobody
works voluntarily) and, secondly, that this is apparently a penalty for a prank,
which means, in turn, that he has not been cunning enough to avoid getting caught.
This is the point of Toms response: to ward off humiliation. He does not initiate a
conscious action, directed by instrumental rationality; rather, he simply reacts in
order to shake off humiliation. To be sure, it would also be possible to enter into a
contest of mutual insults. But from Toms present position, he would be all the more
vulnerable, which would make this an uneven affair.
Instead, he ascends to the intellectual level. He starts a discussion of language
use, the point of which is far from clear at first. After all, the question, what do you
mean by work? is nothing but a desperate attempt to deny the obvious. Of course,
the other person does not believe it. This is where a way out becomes visible: for the
opponent cannot know whether Tom truly is in the position of someone who is
working. When Tom denies this, whether what he says is true solely depends on
him. The correspondence between speech and subject matter is what is at issue,
and Tom can try, with his actions, to present the matterwhitewashing a fenceso
that it corresponds with his assertion that it does not qualify as work. He can
try to appear credible. For this to happen he can do something. Tom now presents whitewashing as fun. This acting-as-if itself already changes the frame or
enriches it with a reflexive element that opens it up. A playful consideration of
whitewashing as leisure activity is not a leisure activity per se, but that is beside
the point here. All the demonstration needs to do is allow Toms preoccupation to
shake off the appearance of work, which leads to barrenness, debasement, and
humiliation. Moreover, it is successful because it is now determined by a new
purpose: to baffle Ben and thus rob him of his cheap advantage. In other words,
the very moment that this whitewashing is executed consciously in order to realize
a nonverbal assertionthat this is not mere workit ceases to be mere work. It is
just like in the case of Ren Magrittes famous depiction of a tobacco pipe whose
title is This is not a pipe. So what is it, one might ask. This alone might warrant the
assertion because a tobacco pipe is an everyday object that everyone knows and
about which no one would ask what it is.
So the whitewashing presented to Ben is primarily a whitewashing that, in contrast to any ordinary whitewashing, is reflexivethat is, reflexive with respect to the
question of an appropriate framing. After all, the ordinary frame of work has been
called into question. This difference is not merely verbal; it is not the case that
the whitewashing is simply a whitewashing whose reality is obvious and that the
challenge, therefore, would only be a matter of which words to use to describe it
properly. Rather, and this is the wonderful thing, by questioning the obvious, we
change realitythat is, the behavior and views of the people involved. Reality is
constituted if those who act, interact, cooperate, and have a discussion within it
acknowledge it in a certain way. This acknowledgment of an action as work by
the participantsthe employer, executors, and spectatorsdetermines whether or

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not what is happening is, in fact, work. To the extent that Ben recognizes and
acknowledges that what Tom is doing is something other than the stupid act of
whitewashing that he had first (correctly) perceived, the action gains a different
significance. Thus, it becomes a different reality.
Let us look at the habitual dispositions in this case to examine the subjective
content of the frames in question and whether they are capable of supporting the
frame sublation.
Tom is a smart kid; whether he really is the smartest of the whole gang cannot
be ascertained objectively, just as this is rarely ever objectively determined in
the corresponding reality, but more a matter of constant trade-offs, quarrels,
rivalries, and acknowledgments. At any rate, the story presents him as being quite
concerned with appearing to be particularly smart, clever, and imaginative to his
playmates. Hence, the situation in which he grimly starts painting the fence is
already pretty miserable. The dreaded moment arrives when Ben steps in and
puts the matter in a nutshell without the slightest sympathy. There is now only one
alternative: victory or defeat.
This is a typical situation: We are entangled in problems and now the people
around us also label and, thus, cement that situation. If I am now predisposed in a
certain wayand Tom certainly isthis is a situation in which I may encounter
a saving grace. But the beauty in this case is that it is not a big deal and not a strategy,
more the courage of despair. It is merely the latter that Tom needs here. By rejecting
the framing, by bringing up a question of definition, he contests the normal frame.
What am I doing here? Has this been determined in advance? No, this cannot be
decided by stupid Ben Rogers; I, Tom Sawyer, will decide for myself. This is the shape
of Toms decision; nothing else is needed. The ensuing dynamics of the situation
have already been largely determined by Bens habitus.
Ben is not stupid either, but he is careless enough to flatly act out his advantage
when he sees Tom whitewash the fence. Finally, he is unambiguously superior,
while the ever-competitive, always superior, ever-loud-mouthed Tom sits in front of
him like a trapped rabbit unable to leave its cage. It is now my turn to be superior,
Ben thinks, just you wait! But few of his ideas are well founded. Surely, his past
experiences have prepared Ben to expect Tom to produce ideas he did not think of
himself and to have access to things that are inaccessible to him. Therefore, he is
poised to accept Toms denial of the nature of whitewashing as work; what great
thing, he asks himself, has the guy found this time around?
Ben knows Tom. He knows that Tom really has certain skills; he has accepted
this willy-nilly; hence, he is predisposed to look for a kernel of truth in Toms assertion that what he is doing does not qualify as work. When he finally asks to have a
turn at whitewashing, he is truly open to new experiences. He wants to find out
whether Tom is right or whether he has just been ridiculed. Of course, if Tom simply
let him have a turn now, Ben would notice that there is nothing special or new
about whitewashing a fence, but that it is merely the most ordinary kind of drudgery.
At this point, Tom truly becomes the director of the scene; he no longer reacts to
an emergency situation under high pressure, but deliberately does the right thing:
He demands payment. Once Ben has paid him, the acknowledgment is palpable.

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199

It has materialized. Everything now happens automatically. Ben is painting and is

unable to sustain the impression that this is merely an ordinary act of whitewashing a
fence. After all, for these boys, an ordinary act of whitewashing a fence is something
that must be done because it has been ordered by an adult. It is not something that
anyone would ever do voluntarily on a sunny holiday afternoon, let alone something
you would pay money for. It is quite clear that this new paid action of whitewashing a
fence is not work, but something new and special, a new experience.
This complicated interplay between Toms and Bens habitus, however, is not
necessary for the other children to want to paint as well. All that is needed is a natural curiosity and the willingness to pay in order to be able to participate in this great
thing that someone has discovered.
Is this not too simple? Sure, paid and voluntary whitewashing is not work. But
the playmates have been drawn into this by way of an interactive sequence; they did
not choose it without bias. Thus, the matter has the structure of the emperors new
clothes that do not exist, which is allegedly the same as saying that one cannot see
them. Admission of this fact, however, is locked by a bolt made of shame and
embarrassment.
But even this is not the whole truth. Toms approach produces an interactive
web of assertions, recognitions, and actions, which fills the afternoon in a novel,
interesting, and entertaining way. So, it is true: This is really something different
from whitewashing the fence as work, even though it has exactly the same resulta
carefully painted picket fence.
Let us finally consider the inferential potential and the changes taking place here.
Whitewashing a garden fence is a line of action that allows, suggests, and prohibits
all sorts of transitions to other issues. It is structured, for example, by the nature of
the paint, the brushes, and the competence of those who carry it out, all of which
entail, for example, certain attitudes. The brush must touch the surface, which
means that it needs to be led there by the hand and arm. If the arm is too short or
the painter too small, what is required is a lengthening of the brush or a ladder.
The color must be spread with the brush, which requires a certain force. The arm
applying it grows weak after a certain time and has to rest. As a result, it takes a
certain period of time to paint a surface. The agent may integrate all of this in his
orientation system in one way or another, so that corresponding rules of conduct
will follow.
As long as the fence is painted normallythat is, framed as work, the following
material inferences are conceivable. For instance:
Whitewashing a fence

Spreading paint on a wooden surface

Straining hands and arms
Paying attention to the proper way of saturating the brush
Not getting lost in thoughts
Staying with the matter patiently
Minding the respective subordinate purpose
Pursuing the respective subordinate purpose as a means
to the ultimate purpose

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Frame Structures

Of course, these are not all the possibilities that we can find in such an
action. But these are the ones brought into focus by the frame, work, and thus
exposed to view. In principle, there is no doubt that whitewashing a fence enables
many completely different things. Depending on ones predilections, one could,
for example, inhale the paint fumes intentionally in order to reach a state of
intoxication, engage in a strange kind of calisthenics to be able to reach distant
spots with the brush, put a painting on the fence, and then another one on top
of that, etc.
When Tom questions whether his activity is whitewashing as work (which
would then permit the corresponding humiliating inferences: he was unable to
escape his aunts coercion; he is not as smart as he claims, etc.), it becomes a
matter of transcending this inferential potential, of discovering something new.
The first new possibility is easy; it is simply present as soon as Tom denies that
what he does is work or as soon as he disputes the definition of the concept,
work. This turns whitewashing a fence into a reflexive activity, which it is not
in the ordinary case.
Tom wants transitions like the following:
Whitewashing a fence

New
Exciting
Fun

The most interesting aspect of this episode is that he tries to act so that these
new transitions become possible. He cannot do this alone because whether or
not these inferences obtain depends on their acknowledgment by a speech and
action community. In this case, it is the community of children in which Tom and
Ben compete for leadership. For this group, whitewashing a fence is not new,
exciting, and fun; rather, it is old, tiring, tedious, and just work. The possible
transitions established by the frame, work, are negations of what Tom needs
here. In all its main inferences, whitewashing a fence being work is clearly
demarcated against pleasant ways of spending a summer afternoon. In fact, it is
the opposite. If its transitions are supposed to be stable, whitewashing a fence
needs to be put in a different framethat of a pleasant and, in particular, a new
leisure activity.
Nobody knows how to do that. Tom does not know it in advance either, but he
discovers that he can successfully challenge the old frame. For now, this challenge
is an as-if. It takes interactions for it to gain stability and a positive characterization
as a new kind of whitewashing a fence. This new kind is cool, just awesome
until the children talk about it at dinner and their parents say: Tom really fooled you
there, didnt he? But even this does not prove that the whole thing was an illusion;
it only demonstrates that the group which introduced the new kind of whitewashing
a fence cannot be expanded indefinitely. And that, after all, is why children often
find adults to be really stupid.

5.7

5.7

Emergence and Treatment of Frame Structures in the Practice of Argumentation

201

Emergence and Treatment of Frame Structures

in the Practice of Argumentation

Now I want to turn to the question of how the complex of problems surrounding the
issue of frames appears in argumentation, what constellations and problems it can
help identify, and what clarifications and solutions are made possible by its realization.
It needs to be said that, as a rule, any contributions to argumentations, even if they
are factual and distant, present the states of affairs in question from the speakers
point of view. The frames that contribute to these views can complicate the matter.
They are the latent, subject-specific generic terms that allow for a dialogical treatment
of the states of affairs in question. If they differ, then this is a source of differences
that is difficult to elucidate because we are usually unaware of such subject-specific
classifications.33 We should strive to make this complex occurrence of latent and
manifest generic term to minor term relations transparent and to blaze trails for
controlling such subjectively caused frame differences.
For that reason, we should distinguish between cases of aspect difference and
cases of perspectival difference. In the former, the issue is how to combine different
aspects to form complex aspects; in the latter, the issue is how to bring together
different perspectives by way of frame sublation. In thetic speech, I will speak from
my own point of viewwhich I cannot objectifyeven if I intentionally emphasize
certain aspects or complexes of aspects. The same is true for my opponent.
With respect to the duck-rabbit head, these relations can be presented as follows:
I see the duck-rabbit, but I do not know that I see it as a rabbit. I might think,
for example, that it is a young animal with a chubby baby animal face. You, on the
other hand, see the duck-rabbit as a duck, but do not notice the particular way of
seeing that suggests the duck frame to you. Hence, you find my statement comparing
it to a chubby baby face inappropriate and absurd. You then say something about the
bill, and I find this even more inappropriate and absurd than you considered my
statement to be. After all, while there is a remote possibility that a duck might have
a plump childs face, it is impossible for a rabbit to have a bill.
This, then, is the structure of certain experiences in a dialogue that occur if arguments are framed differently or if theoretical bases are heterogeneous. We talk at
cross-purposes without even noticing it. What we do notice sometimes, however, is
that our dialogue partner says strange things about the state of affairs in question.
The most obvious response will be to regard him as less than competent. This usually decreases the appreciation I have for him. If, subsequently, he says things that
are completely impossible (that a rabbit has a bill), I turn away indignantly with
a shrug. It is at this point that the concept of frame structures is well suited to
clarify things.
33

It is one of the most important tasks in comparative epistemology to find out how conceptions
and hazy ideas pass from one thought style to another, how they emerge as spontaneously generated pre-ideas and how they are preserved as enduring, rigid structures [Gebilde] owing to a kind
of harmony of illusions. Fleck (1979), 28.

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5.7.1

Frame Structures

How Do Frame Differences Emerge and Take Effect?

Clearly, proponent and opponent hold positions that are opposed; any statements
derived from these positions, however, do not constitute real contradictory relations
of the form A and non-A. This is because the theoretical bases do not match. Behind
or below A is a theoretical basis that uses certain concepts and conceptual systems
(if-then statements, links to other concepts, etc.). There is also a certain theoretical
basis below non-A, but it does not enable any transitions to the concepts taken from
the basis of A. The theoretical bases are not interconvertible; there are no common
generic terms; the terms are separated, and that means there is no measure to assess
the particular quality of the structures they help construct.
Let us illustrate this with respect to some important events from the realm of
New India.
I already mentioned several times that Coln had difficulties justifying his thesis
or his thetic construction regarding a western route to India to relevant dialogue
partners and that it was a challenge for him to refute their objections. The decisive
event was a dispute in the expert committee of the Spanish royal house, which deliberated over the issue for nearly four years. It is here that Colnthe self-taught,
adventurous sailoreventually meets Fray Hernando de Talavera, confessor to the
Spanish Queen Ysabel and head of the committee. It appears that something other
than the sustainability of arguments for the length of the journey calculated by
Coln played a role in the discussions. In order to assess the differences between the
positions that clashed here, we have to focus on the two characters. Talavera is a
man of God, who strives to overcome the small subjective desires of human beings.
Unfortunately, such people tend to use their own ascetic, saintly standards for judging others. By these standards, Colna man preoccupied, if not obsessed, by his
ideais a vain human being who puts forward the prospect of missionary work
only to conceal his actual goals, which are fame, wealth, and power.34
As Colns son, Fernando, reports, it was held against his father that the endeavor
would be sacrilegious. The theoretical basis of this objection is clear. Christians have
a goal that they ought to pursue in all things: to provide for their salvation. Hence, a
seafarer who has not come very far in this regard, has better things to do than embark
on a journey to the oceanic sea in order to seek countries that might not even exist.
What can we say about such an objection? An expedition to discover and conquer
colonies based on colonial praxis and the thetic construction of a travel route might
seem like a sufficient justification. But this does not mean that the expedition is
equally justified as an action for the improvement and attainment of Christian salvation.
34

Cf. the impressive presentation in Madariaga (1939), 151: As for Talavera himself, his feelings
can be easily guessed. He was no less out of the common than Colon [sic]but in such a different
direction of the human compass that a thorough understanding was well-nigh impossible between
them. Colon [sic] was a hero; Talavera was a saint [] Colon, with his fire to do something, to
conquer, to reach the summit of glory, must have appeared to Fray Hernando as a poor man
suffering from a monstrous swelling of the self, and the good priors charitable soul must have
ached for him.

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The point here is to relate these two frames to one another. Coln apparently lacks
self-knowledge and foresight. As we shall see, he was completely unable to fulfill
the role he had stipulated for himselfnamely, to manage these new territories. It is
possible that Talavera was aware of this. On the other hand, it is also possible that
there was a lack of lively curiosity in Talavera. After all, the study of anything new
was part of the Christian mission of inhabiting the Earth. But this idea is counteracted by concerns that all earthly knowledge could turn out to be useless if it does
not help people further their faith or even dissuades them from it. How to deal with
this conflict prior to addressing concrete problems depends on the personalities
that are involved. In the history of Christian churches, dignitaries were often
powerful men who stabilized the tension between earthly and spiritual concerns for
themselves in ways far different from what they demanded of Christian foot soldiers.
In any case, this accusation of sacrilege prevented the two antipodes, Coln and
Talavera, from arriving at a shared assessment. The frames remained heterogeneous
at this point and the Committee finally rejected funding the Indian expedition.
Nevertheless, it took place because the Queen (on the advice of her Jewish financial
counsel, Luis de Santangel)35 paid for the flotilla and its equipment, which Coln
used to set sail in the summer of 1492.
The clash of divergent frames becomes most dramatic and immediate when the
discoverer has landed and, along with his men, meets naked, beautiful, and friendly
people on a wondrous, paradisiacal Caribbean island. Anyone who reads these
scenes in the log and imagines how the Spaniards apprehend the Caribbeans, and
how the Caribbeans apprehend the Spaniards, will hardly be able to avoid a deep
resignation. The Spaniards see naked people. But what is nudity for them? Childlike,
savage, shameless helplessness. In contrast, these men appear in their clothes, with
metal fittings, helmets, and iron breastplates. Without anything being said or done,
the Spaniards are suddenly facing a power difference that, once perceived by the
Indians, must lead to war. The Spaniards regard themselves as emissaries of the
royal house, who have discovered a new country for Spain.
As far as the details of this discovery are concerned, is it possible for them to
notice that they do research herethat is, that they do not know who and what it
is they have in front of them, but that they constantly form theses that they simply
assume to be valid orientations and that they are horribly wrong about this? Is it true
that since they discovered this country for their kings, it now belongs to Spain?36 And
because it belongs to Spain, its people are subjects of the Spanish monarchyand
the Spaniards, as its emissaries, have the right to command them? What would have
become of that perspective if the country had really been Cathay (China), as
Coln believed, and the people subjects of the Great Khan? Why do they, as
emissaries of the Spanish royal house, have the right to command in a foreign country
independently of its internal social structures? Why are they allowed to use force if
35

This is one of the arguments for the hypothesis that Coln himself was a Jew. Cf. my discussion
in Chap. 4.
36
Not even this was correct: Ownership had to be enforced against Portugals originally legitimate
claims through a dmarche to the Pope.

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Frame Structures

the Indians do not cooperate? As I said, this is actually a moral-sociological-military

research project (with geographical, geological, botanical, zoological, climatological, etc., extensions). Coln is at least slightly aware of this. His records in the
log indicate (beside a dominant desire for riches) a sometimes childlike curiosity
and enthusiasm (certainly, they are the feelings of a socially superior child who has
to interact with poor, powerless children). Among his men, however, the mentality
of infantrymen on occupied territory seems to have been the norm.
To the Indians (who obviously did not regard themselves as Indians at all), the
Spaniards first seem to be interesting strangers who come with high, incomprehensible
demands and bring strange, unknown objects and terrible weapons. Maybe they are
divine messengers? The more their claim to power becomes obvious and is enforced
by violence, however, the more they become intruders and attackers, against whom
one has to defend oneself. Within the shortest amount of time, there is not a single
interaction or communicative utterance left which is not heterogeneous and could
have a chance of being adequately understood.

5.7.2

Some Strategies for Handling Heterogeneity

Based on the assumption that the role of frame structures and frame differences as well
as the complications and opportunities arising from the oscillation between latent
and manifest framings have been well understood, I will now discuss some procedures for handling these challenges in the practice of argumentation. I will present
four strategiesnamely, frame criticism, frame hierarchization, frame harmonization,
and frame synthesis. I would like the reader to approach the term, strategies, with
care and will supplement this call for caution with a remark at the end.
(A) Frame Criticism
The principle here is that the frame employed to address the state of affairs is
criticized and classified as inappropriate. It is not appropriate to regard B as A, we
might say. We might back this up by arguing that such a frame opens up a potential
for utterances that are unreasonable or will lead to contradictions.
First example: After Coln has found India in the paradise of the Caribbean
islands, he initiates contact with the indigenous population, fully aware that he
will assume a future position of domination. Of course, a significant language
barrier needs to be overcome first. The sailor who at least speaks Genoese, Latin,
Portuguese, and Spanish more or less well, has sufficient self-confidence to find his
way about in the language of the native people aided by facial and gestural communication. After two months, he can write: Every day we understand these
Indians better and they us, although many times there has been a misunderstanding.37
Nevertheless, another entry gives away perfidiously what kind of linguistic competence
is acquired here: [] they went ahead to give the news to the cacique, as they call
37

Jane (1968), 93: Columbus log, entry for Dec. 11, 1492.

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him here. Up to that time I had not been able to understand whether by this they
meant king or governor. They use also another name for a grandee, whom
they call nitayo; I did not know if by this they meant hidalgo or governor or
judge.38 This passage demonstrates the kind of touching, yet violent, naivet
that allowed Coln to superimpose Spanish social structures latently or as a matter
of self-evidence onto preexisting relations. He has not the slightest doubt that, in
this India, there are kings, hidalgos, governors, judges, etc. Consequently, he
simply regards it as his task to identify the corresponding words in the foreign
language. Similarly, we moderns do not have the slightest doubt that this frame is
dramatically wrong and would have to be sacrificed in the interest of any serious
understanding.
Second example: In Georges Pernoud and Sabine Flaissiers anthology, The
French Revolution, there is a long account of a lawyer who arrives in Paris during
the time of terror. Because of some trifles, he is held for a long time in the
Conciergerie (the prison of the revolutionary tribunal). This man writes, among
other things, about a prostitute he meets there. The woman tells him that, if only she
were allowed to do so, she would immediately throw herself down before the queen,
who is also imprisoned there, in order to show how far below the queen she stands.
The reporter comments on this statement by saying of the woman that [i]t is therefore not astonishing that she had never raised herself to the level of thinking of kings
as nowise superior to the common run of mortals.39 The woman regards herself in
the frame of loyal subject and fully agrees with this, both emotionally and intellectually. Any autonomous human being, however, criticizes such a frame as wrong
and inappropriate. No person should be understood as the subject of another.
Generally, the following needs to be said about frame criticism: If determinations
of states of affairs are rejected as false, then this is an extraordinary criticism. In the
event of any offensive determination, such criticism dismisses the entire inferential
potential of the corresponding frame. Something like that is only justifiable if we
are above the matter, as it were, and therefore apprehend the frame as a whole. We
must have recognized its limitations as a source of mistakes that, as we are already
aware, we (no longer) want nor have to make. In general, this applies to developmental phases that have been overcome. The frames only seem to be located next to
each other; in fact, they are behind each other. (The example with the queen
addresses the so-called threshold of modernity.)
Third example: Let us consider a current issue, the debate about the killing of
innocents. Are we permitted, in dangerous situations that might cost the lives of
many people, to kill a few (though they are innocent and have not consented to their
sacrifice) in order to save the many?
By now, there seems to be a common moral intuition that suggests an affirmative answer.40 If we examine the respective arguments, we quickly arrive at the
frame problem. The proponents refer in their arguments to the summation of
38

Jane (1968), 118: Columbus log, entry for Dec. 23, 1492.
Cf. Pernoud and Flaissier (1961), 265.
40
Cf. Fritze (2004).
39

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Frame Structures

rights to life: The right to life of the few, they argue, has less weight than the right
to life of the many. But this is a quantitative frame that is out of place concerning
people and human rights: The right to life of two people does not count twice as
much as that of one person; they both possess the full human right. This is not a
quantitative but a qualitative matter. Hence, the appropriate argumentative strategy
in this case would be as follows: Criticism and rejection of the quantitative frame,
which gives the idea of pitting one person against another the appearance of
plausibility.41
(B) Frame Hierarchization
This involves at least two different frames that can be recognized as competing or as
generating incompatibilities. In principle, a solution would consist in arranging them
hierarchically. This requires two steps. First, frame differences need to be broken down
into aspect differences. Second, these aspects must be arranged into a hierarchy that
may need to be justified separately.
First example: In discussions about embryonic research in Germany, the positions of scientists are opposed to the positions of those who want to save lives.
Biologists support research on embryonic stem cells. Arguments in this case are, for
instance, the chances of eradicating currently incurable diseases such as Parkinsons
and Alzheimers as well as the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of science and
research. The opposing view is based on the embryos right to life. This right to life
has also been guaranteed in the German Basic Law.
In this controversy, embryonic stem cells have been framed heterogeneously.
In the frame of the fundamental right to freedom of research, they are promising
research objects. In the frame of the fundamental right to life and the bodily integrity
of human beings, they are protohumans; thus, they have to be protected from fatality
and waste.
Ulrike Riedel, who worked for the Federal Ministry of Health at the turn of the
millennium, illustrates in a statement how these two different frames come to be
aspects under which the state of affairs may be considered. Both aspects relate to a
selection of qualities and relationships of embryonic stem cells. The aspect that
affects the embryos right to life, the argument goes, is more important than the
aspect that concerns the freedom of research. The reason for this hierarchy is that
the right to life belongs to the highest values in the Constitution and that the freedom of research can be realized in alternative ways.42
Second example: In the debate on the trial of French King Louis XVI, which
took place in the winter of 1792/1793, there were a number of grave frame divergences. I will present some of this in detail. A striking case of frame hierarchization was carried out in the arguments made by Mr. Morisson (cf. Sect. 5.8.3
below): He conceded that the king would have to be considered guilty by necessity if the issue was regarded in the frame of natural law and morality, but at the
41
42

For more details, cf. Wohlrapp (2004).

Cf. Riedel (2001), 272.

5.7

Emergence and Treatment of Frame Structures in the Practice of Argumentation

207

same time, Morisson argued, that the king could not be prosecuted in the legal
frame of the law. This divergence is overcome by an argument for hierarchization.
The legal frame is supposed to be more important and, as such, located above the
frame of morality.
(C) Frame Harmonization
Relations in this case are again similar to those of hierarchization: There are at least
two competing frames that initially need to be treated as aspect differences. The
principle behind the solution does not involve superimposing the respective frames,
but arranging them side-by-side: The incompatibilities concerning the specifics
of the case are overcome, so that the relevant frames can coexist next to each other
after some retraction and containment.
There are several possibilities for specific cases that often appear in compromises: If divergent frames between dialogue partners block the advancement of an
argument, there may be a thesis that both could agree to accept, provided they see
their own respective reasons as being accounted for at least partially. But such a
result can only carry with it a validity claim if it endures more generallythat is, if
it is not individually tailored to the subjects involved.
There are many instances of frame harmonization in todays pluralistic and
multicultural society. Individuals and groups have their own respective lifestyles in
which certain determinations of states of affairs (such as norms dealing with
clothing, nutrition, marriage, and funerals) are considered right, desirable, or even
prescribed but which may be objectionable or even prohibited in the next group.
For example, German funeral rites prescribe the use of coffins, which are unusual,
undesirable, and prohibited in Islam. In the latter, the dead are buried wrapped in a
cloth.43 After a period of uncertainty due to these differences, many major German
cities have changed cemetery regulations so that there is now one section of the
cemetery where you can be buried in accordance with Islamic rites. The two frames,
which were heterogeneous with regard to the question of a dignified and proper
burial, can coexist. The contradictions they initially generated have been reduced to
differences in kind. In such solutions, where we can accept the determination of the
same states of affairs in different frames, we simultaneously recognize our own
frame as merely a limited aspect of the matter and admit this factthat is, we have
accepted and transcended a part of our own ignorance.
(D) Frame Synthesis
Here, too, we encounter frame structures that are incompatible. But in this case,
the principle is no longer (as with the other three strategies) containment of one or
more frames; rather, the solution is sublation. Although this is rare, sometimes
there are possibilities of leaving the state of affairs untouched in both frames, while
finding a third that encroaches upon both without (as in the case of harmonization)
necessitating any concessions in terms of a conscious retraction of certain

43

For frictions between Christian and Muslim burial rites, cf. Heine (1997), 221229.

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Frame Structures

determinations. This is, of course, the most desirable option for all dialogue partners
who come across heterogeneous frames. Indeed, in the previous section, this has
been accomplished in a truly exemplary, even pleasing and amusing manner in the
episode about Tom Sawyer whitewashing a fence, where the frame of work is synthesized with the actually incompatible frame of play. Sometimes, such a frame
synthesis is accomplished in a compromise that we regard as particularly good and
satisfying. These are very special, possibly even surprising solutions, which can be
found through creative ideas, often after the frames involved have been thoroughly discussed (in other words, cut up and tested in different new combinations, cf. Chap. 6).
The manifestation of the framethat is, the reflexive transformation of a way of
seeing into a perspective or the change from frame to aspectis either presupposed
or accomplished by all of these strategies. For the strategies to work, the participants
need to realize that their way of seeing the state of affairs in question is determined
by frames and that the state of affairs would look different from a different, yet
equally possible perspective.44
My talk of strategies is not supposed to convey the idea that there are such
things as safe, methodically paved ways for decreasing argumentative heterogeneity
according to rules and for obtaining valid argumentative results. On the one hand,
these paths always depend on accurate analyses of details and the solutions that may
be found will be specific, often even highly situational. On the whole, it is imperative to be aware that the heterogeneity of frames is due to the diversity of human
subjects. These subjects are the result of a process of life lived over years and
decades. Only rarely will they yield to a carelessly presented argument or follow a
thesis that is not a good fit with themthat is, which does not fit their orientation
system but puts it into a state of unrest and disarray instead. Only once an orientation system is ripe for changethat is, once a subject has already experienced
certain sections of her system as brittle, contradictory, frozen, abstract, etc., does an
argument attempting to revise a frame stand a chance of leading to the retraction of
an orientationsometimes, even to the collapse of a smaller or larger section of the
orientation system as a whole.
One Last Thing
In principle, attempts to adapt or revise a frame stand a much better chance if
they are carried out in a pragmatic state of mind. The problematic character of certain divergences in the frame structures becomes apparent insofar as they lead to
incompatibilities and frictions in and between praxes (cf. Sect. 5.2.3 about the The
Theory-Praxis Interface). Hence, the search for frame compatibilities is ultimately

44

In argumentation theory, these problems are discussed under the headline of Deep Disagreement.
The term was introduced by Robert Fogelin (1985), who claimed that a difference in the
backgrounds of peoples life forms could not be overcome in rational argumentation. A very good
and comprehensive discussion of this issue is Finocchiaro (2013), Chapter 7. Frame theory as it is
developed here could still offer some new aspects.

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

209

a matter of the compatibility between differently conceived praxes or of devising

new praxes in such a way that divergences are eliminated or mitigated.
In Canada, there is now a certain willingness to make up for the wrongs inflicted
upon indigenous peoples during the period of discovery and conquest. Can this be a
matter of giving back the territory to indigenous peoples because it really belonged
to them anyway? Apparently, such a question conflates two different concepts of
property, the modern idea of private property and the traditional ownership of the
common land, on and off which the tribe lived. The idea of private property guarantees an almost unlimited availability of the landincluding its exploitation (as
well as destruction) to the largest extent possible. Of course, this is completely different in the case of a traditional understanding of property. It seems that these
concepts are divergent with respect to their frames, and todays transfer of land to
indigenous peoples (or their descendants) would not be a return of property, but a
much more extensive transfer. In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada performed a
frame harmonization under the name, Aboriginal Title. The land will be returned
to the descendants of indigenous peoples (who are respected in Canada today as
First Nations), but in a special form of ownership, which permits use in accordance with the traditional lifestyle, but does not imply the modern, totalized profanation of the land. Certainly, this will not satisfy all claims to justice. Still, the idea
is instructive as a solution that applies to the practical differences of dissimilar concepts of ownership.

5.8

A King on His Way to the Republic

As the last part of the chapter on frames, I will now present a study of the frame
issue in an extremely serious debate. It is part of the most important argumentative
processes in the transitional period between feudalism and modern democratic
Europe. In the following, I invite my readers to a lesson about the turmoil of the
French Revolution. The matter is not without interest in and of itself, and a potential
benefit could be the clarification of the controversial role of frame structures and
possibilities of handling them argumentatively in phases of social upheaval.

5.8.1

The Problem

The French Revolution has probably stayed alive in our general historical consciousness primarily because of its critical phase, from the storming of the Bastille
(July 1789) to Robespierres death (August 1794). The trial against King Louis XVI
took place almost exactly in the middle of this phase, in November and December
1792, and ended with his execution in January 1793. The trial began with a debate

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Frame Structures

in the newly elected National Convention, which dealt with the treatment of the
deposed and imprisoned king. The king could have easily been killed in the summer
of 1792, during the storming of the Tuileries Palace. But since this had been prevented by the prudence of his followers,45 a conscious and responsible choice about
his fate now had to be made.
The Convention was a panel of 749 people with very different political views,
among them, in particular, the loyalists to the crown (Royalists), the group of liberal
citizens (Gironde), and the Jacobins, who were also called the Mountain Party
(Montagne) because of their seats in the upper ranks of the atrium-shaped conference room. In between, there was the (by far biggest, heterogeneous) crowd of
undecided, temperate, wavering, or fickle members alternatively called the plain
(Plaine) or swamp (Marais).
The question of the fate of the king was framed by the Convention in very different ways. This diversity of ways of seeing was heightened by the fact that the social
and legal status of the king was far from clear. From September 1791 to August
1792, he had been a constitutional king; before that, he had been an absolute monarch. Had his deposition now turned him into a regular citizen of the state or was he
still constitutional king because he had been guaranteed inviolability (inviolabilit)
by the Constitution, which was still in effect? Or was he actually still an absolute
monarch because his dismissal following the revolutionary activities had taken
place against his will and contrary to the laws of the Ancien Rgime? Louis XVI
embodied in his person three sociopolitically disparate eras; he was the epochal
rupture personified and eluded any unambiguous characterization, for good
reasons.
As a result, there was no authority that could have judged him. As absolute monarch, he was the highest court himself; as constitutional king, he had at least not
been subject to any other legal institution. Now, he was a prisoner of the Paris
Commune, but only de facto, not de jure, for he had not been brought into this situation by any legal procedures. The newly elected Convention was the parliament,
but it was neither authorized nor competent per se to file a lawsuit against the king.
There was a third aspect of the problem: the question of which law was to be
considered relevant. France had had a constitution since June 1791, and in September
of the same year, the king had sworn an oath to it. There were several articles in it
which the king had clearly violated by rejecting the constitution, leaving the country, and conspiring with foreign powers. However, this very constitution demanded
that such violations could not be punished in any other form than by deposing the
king and turning him into an ordinary citizen. Any further punishment was not an
option. The deposition had now become a fact and the Convention had abolished the
monarchy during its first meeting in France. But did this indeed turn the king into
an ordinary citizen? The European monarchies, especially Prussia and Austria, were
45

The decisive factor seems to have been a cold-blooded departmental prefect, whoalmost
against the will of the monarchmoved the royal family from the palace to the conference hall
of the Assemble lgislative, where 80 delegates willing to protect the King were still around.
Cf. Pernoud and Flaissier (1961), 126141.

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

211

at war with France, and everyone knew that the Republic would be terminated in the
event of Frances defeat. In that case, the king, or rather the citizen Louis Capet,
would ascend to the throne again.
In the Convention, there were mainly three positions regarding the problem of
Louis XVI. The Royalists wanted to leave him untouched and give him any role
from which he could potentially rise to the throne again. The Gironde wanted to
convict and punish him, but then restore him as a constitutional king. Their model
was the history of the English Revolution, which a century ago had transformed
absolute monarchy into constitutional monarchy, the de facto rule of the bourgeoisie. The third position was that of the Montagne. They argued that the king should
be tried and executed. The Montagne was a very small minority; they had only
about 80 representatives. Nevertheless, their position prevailed in the course of the
debates and votes. In the end, the king was sentenced to death and guillotined. How
was this possible?
Depending on the historians school of thought, different moments in the web of
forces and events of the winter of 179293 will seem to be responsible for this outcome. A lot has been written about this. Most commentators believe that the execution of the king was wrong and unjust. A mediocre, personally kind-hearted man
had to pay for the excesses of his predecessors Louis XIV and especially Louis XV.
Almost no one asks how the protagonists justified the execution and no one even
tries to examine the validity of the justification.46 Often, the execution is readily
associated with the terror.47
This is surprising because the French Revolution is the historical event that
spawned our present democratic-republican rule. The execution of the king is symbolically and theoretically the culmination of this change. This is where monarchy
and class differences were eliminated, which, in turn, was the prerequisite for our
present consciousness of self-determination, equality, and human rights. Hence, it
should be of interest whether this elimination was achieved by processes which we
will consider to be legitimately justified.
The discussion about the trial of the king was extensive and multifaceted. In
more than 100 speeches, a range of arguments were put forward; these arguments
were addressed, reinforced, or attacked. Some arguments were simply ignored;
some changed in the course of these discussions; some were discarded; others
46

An exception is the book by Michael Walzer (cf. Walzer (1974)) who published 11 of the most
important speeches in English translation, along with an extensive commentary that also draws on
comparisons with the English Revolution. In the foreword, Walzer writes: I have tried [] to
judge the kings judges and their judgement. He concludes that, based on the moral and political
argument, the sentencing and execution can be considered justified; cf. 6989.
47
Walzer (1974; 78 and 87) speaks out against this view. His main argument is that Louis was
convicted as part of an event that still largely resembled a legal trial (a hearing, a defense by an
attorney, a vote of judgment by a committee). The victims of terror, on the other hand, had been
exposed to pure arbitrariness. I would like to add that the judgment and execution of the king were
decided by the Conventionthat is, the representatives of the French nation, under the scrutiny of
a very observant public. By contrast, the executions during the Reign of Terror were not public, and
no longer needed to be.

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continued to be relevant. I assumeand this can be seen in the four speeches

presented in greater detail belowthat the fate of the theses and arguments
depended to a significant degree on whether they were intelligible or backed up by
other reasons or whether they were attacked and refuted. The whole debate is particularly instructive with respect to the issues of framing and argumentation. As I
said, the states of affairs addressing the king, his privileges, his actions, the state
institutions, etc., were framed in several different ways, so that theses, arguments,
and conclusions often did not exactly correlate. The progress of the debate brought
about new information and new reflections, which often revolved around various
issues and problems, changed the corresponding framessometimes subliminally,
sometimes deliberately. Thus, they also determined and changed the possible validity or invalidity of central arguments.
In order to illustrate this, I have selected four speeches by Mailhe, Morisson,
Saint-Just, and Robespierre in which the argumentative significance of frame divergences as well as the treatment and change of frame structures appear in a particularly impressive way.
A brief introduction: Mailhes speech is incoherent because legal and moral
frames compete in assessments of the kings actions and ultimately remain unreconciled. The king is inviolable in the legal frame, but is violable or, rather, has been
violated justifiably in moral terms. Morissons speech eliminates this incoherence
by clearly separating the legal and moral frames and arranging them hierarchically.
In the moral frame, Morisson condemns Louis far more sharply than Mailhe, but in
the legal frame, which alone is binding for state action, Louis is acquitted. This is
unsatisfactory not only in an emotional sensethat is, with respect to the desire for
revenge that has first been incited and then abandoned, but because the hierarchical
order of the frames involved no longer adequately fits with the states and orientations achieved in the meantime. Saint-Justs speech then entirely annuls or undermines the moral and legal framework. It places the kings deeds in a frame that
articulates the emerging republican rule. The king now appears to be an external
enemy and attacker. Robespierres speech adopts this view, expands it, intensifies
and stabilizes the arguments, and calls (with markedly different consequences) for
the death penalty. For a better understanding of the context of these arguments, I
will put forward a brief outline of the events.

5.8.2

The Events from Mid-1791 Until the Death

of the King in January 1793

In early June 1791, the legislature passes the Constitution. The king rejects it and
tries to leave the country, but is seized in Varennes and brought to Paris, where in
September he accepts the (slightly modified) Constitution and swears an oath on it.
Thus, he becomes a constitutional king who is granted royal inviolability, among
other things, and the right to veto laws passed by the legislature. As is understood

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

213

by the parties involved, the king receives these privileges not as a simple reminder
of his monarchical past but also in the general interest of establishing a firm, stabilizing authority in times of upheaval. The king immediately begins to exercise his
veto power, especially regarding laws that are supposed to revise the structure of
ownershipsuch as the nationalization of the goods of exiled aristocrats. He agrees
with the declaration of war on Prussia and Austria, hoping that the Republic will be
defeated and that he will be reinstated as the monarch.
On June 10, 1792, Roland, the Minister of the Interior and a member of the
Gironde, demands that the king give up his veto policy; consequently, Roland is
dismissed. 10 days later, an armed mob breaks into the royal palace in the Tuileries,
humiliates the king (by forcing him to wear a red cap), and urges him to surrender
his veto power, which he refuses to do. In the course of July, external is added to
internal destabilization: The warring forces win one battle after another and cross
the French border on July 25. The Duke of Brunswick, military leader of the imperial troops and a relative of Louis XVI, publishes a manifesto in which he announces
to the French a rigorous restoration and a blood court in Paris, should the royal family be harmed.
This manifesto causes tremendous indignation in France. On August 10, there is
an armed uprising in Paris which inaugurates the second stage of the Revolution.
When the Tuileries are attacked, the palace guard kills about 400 people. The rebels
take bloody revenge; in total, there are about 1,500 deaths. The deposition of the
king is announced; he is jailed as Louis Capet along with his family in the monastery Temple. Longwy surrenders on August 26 and Verdun on September 2. The
imperial troops approach Paris. Danton sets up a peoples militia; in the prisons,
about 1,300 inmates are massacred as counterrevolutionaries. On September 15,
elections for the parliament, the Convention (Convention Nationale), take place.
September 20 is the date for the battle of Valmy, the first battle in which the French
troops prevail (with the battle cry of Vive la nation!) and refashion themselves as
the army of revolution and liberation. On September 21, the Convention begins its
work and the aforementioned factions emerge. The monarchy is abolished; France
is solemnly declared to be a Republic that is one and indivisible in a new era, the
year I of the republican calendar.
Among the first tasks of the new parliament is the solution of the problem of
Louis Capet, aka Louis XVI. In early November, a commission is formed, consisting mainly of members of the Gironde, in order to investigate the possibility of a
formal trial. Based on the report of this commission, from November 7 onwards, a
controversial debate with many submissions deals with the possibilities and modalities of such a trial.
On November 20, a secret iron cabinet built into the masonry of the Tuileries
is discovered. It contains papers and correspondences proving that the king conspired with foreign powers and betrayed the Republic. The moral reproach of
betrayal is no longer in doubt and cannot be sugarcoated in the debate. On
December 11, the king is interrogated by the Convention. He appears humble and
humane, but denies all charges: He denies having signed the papers and having
known of the iron cabinet (although the blacksmith, who built the latter, gave a

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Frame Structures

report about the order and its details).48 On December 26, the king appears before
the Convention a second time, now with three defenders, among them the young
lawyer, Raymond De Sze. The tenor of the defense is that there is no law by
which the king could be found guilty.
On January 14 and 15, the Convention reconvenes to proclaim its verdict. Louis
is found guilty of having conspired against the liberty of the French people and the
general security of the state.49 With respect to sentencing, there is first a majority of
five and, when cross-checked, of one vote in favor of the death penalty. On January
21, 1793, the French King Louis XVI dies on the guillotine as Louis Capet.

5.8.3

Four Arguments

(A) Mailhe on November 7, 1792

The deputy, Jean-Baptiste Mailhe, a lawyer from Toulouse who belongs to the
moderate center, presents the results drafted by the commission. He mainly mentions two questions that need to be answered: Should the king be brought to trial?
If so, who is supposed to act as judge? The answer is a long speech (about 16
printed pages) that presents possible answers, some in great detail. The result is the
statement that Louis can be taken to court before a tribunal that is composed in
such a way that the whole nation with its 83 departments is represented in the
deliberations. The final judgment is up to the Convention.
The main line of argument is that, for each question, the related problems are
highlighted and solved. In the terms of argumentation theory, the result is reached
as a conclusion after dispelling a series of four objections.
Ma1: The first objection to charging the king at all states that, according to the
Constitution of 1791, the king is inviolable and sacred (inviolable et sacr).
Mailhe discusses the meaning of this provision and argues that the inviolability
is not absolute but conditional, which is due to the fact that it is supposed to
ensure general welfare. The Constitution covers actions which, should the king
engage in them, would cause him to lose this unassailable position as a constitutional king. These are mainly three types of action: denial to swear an oath on the
constitution, conspiracy with hostile powers against France, and escape from

48

There has been much speculation about the meaning of this. The following thought by Evelyne
Lever strikes me as simple and understandable: Louis XVI was not aware of any obligation to tell
them the truth. He represented an idea of the state which was the opposite of theirs. Without a
doubt, the king believed himself to act in accordance with a higher monarchical interest; thus he
regarded his maneuvering, which he felt no need to report to these republicans, as legitimate. Cf.
Lever (1985), 650 (Translation T.P.).
49
The verdict reads (cf. Lever (1985), 656): au nom du peuple franais Louis Capet coupable de
conspiration contre la libert de la nation et la suret gnrale de l tat (In the name of the French
people, Louis Capet is found guilty of conspiracy against the liberty of the nation and the general
security of the State; Translation T.P.).

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

215

France. The king has committed all three, but, as we know, under the protection
of the inviolability clause.
Mailhe now argues that it is unacceptable that the king, if only he is adroit
enough to avoid those acts that would force his abdication, could abandon himself
to his most savage passions[.] Does this mean that he could have used his constitutional powers for the overthrow of the Constitution [] and the nation [] would
have no right at its reawakening to avenge itself upon him?50 But maybe he could
have carried out the three incriminating acts in such a way that they would not have
become completely apparent. If he had, for example, protested against an invasion
in a pro forma manner, but not properly and effectively, this would have necessitated
a more detailed investigation and assessment of the kings deeds. There were, then,
cases in which the Constitution placed the inviolability of the king before the legislature for judgement.51 This argument eliminates the first and main obstacle for a
trial, the kings inviolability.
Ma2: This is followed by the second objection: There is no institution that could
prosecute or condemn him because no institution is higher than the king. Here,
Mailhe discusses the construction of the state according to the Constitution of 1791
and sees that, although no institution is higher than the king, the nation itself has to
be considered higher because it has produced the Constitution and established all
these institutions. Hence, the king could not be judged by any institution. It did not
follow, however, that he could not be judged by the nation, since to come to such a
conclusion would be to claim that by virtue of the Constitution, the king was superior
to the nation or independent of the nation.52 This, however, was out of the question.
No, the nation was not and could not be limited by the inviolability of the king.
(Ibid.) It was not a case of reciprocity because Louis XVI was king only by virtue
of the Constitution, but the nation was sovereign, quite independently of the
Constitution or the king. (Ibid.). In its theoretical basis, this second argument
refers to the exalted position of a nation that hierarchically ranks even above the
king. Hence, an institution like the Convention, if it directly expresses the will of the
nation, is also located above the king.
Ma3: The third problem is a lack of laws that are applicable to the king. This is
a strong objection despite the removed obstacles for the trial: With what is the king
supposed to be charged? After all, he cannot be brought to justice simply on account
of a lack of morals, but only for a breach of clear, well-established standards. In
order to refute this objection, Mailhe refers to the Penal Code, where there is a law
designed to punish breach of trust by public officials [] that is the law which
strikes down traitors and conspirators.53 Thereafter, he confronts his own argument with the anticipated objection that the law has been passed after the
Constitution was adopted and, hence, cannot be applied to the king, whom the
Constitution has granted inviolability. But he then weakens this objection by pointing
50

Walzer (1974), 94.

Walzer (1974), 95.
52
Walzer (1974), 98.
53
Walzer (1974), 100.
51

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Frame Structures

out that laws against treason have existed at all times in all countries: Moreover, is
it only the new French code that contains such laws? Have they not existed
through all times and in all lands? Are they not as old as society itself?54 Therefore,
it is a contingent fact that a law against treason was passed after the Constitution;
with respect to the substance of the law, however, there is a self-evident standard
which the nation can invoke regarding the king.
But now a problem arises: The king has never officially acknowledged the
Constitution. The Constitution forbids him the denial of an oath, conspiracy, and
escapedeeds to which he was entitled as an absolute monarch had they been necessary for restoring or maintaining his power. That the king has currently committed these acts, however, shows clearly enough his actual convictions. Is he not
bound by the constitutional norms at all? But would this not mean, in turn, that he
is not vested with constitutional inviolability either? At this point, Mailhe appeals to
the rights and obligations of nature, which have a higher rank than human
institutions.55 Even the king, he argues, cannot escape the great principles of natural and social justice.56
Ma4: Finally, he addresses the problem of which committee to appoint in order
to act as judge on Louis. The argument here is apparently a consequence of the
second one. What needs to be overcome is the concern that there are no courts above
the king. As Mailhe explains with reference to the historical example of the English
Revolution, the parliament cannot simply act as the judge. Now, everything depends
on the task of establishing the nation as the judge over Louis actions. Mailhe has
described the nation as the highest authority and as a limit to the kings privileges
whether they existed or not. Hence, he summons the Convention, which entirely
and perfectly represents the French Republic.57 Consequently, the nation has also
accorded this Convention the power to judge Louis.
Once framed this way, the Conventions mission is the following: You are to
pass judgment on the crimes of a king, but the accused is no longer a king. He
has resumed his original title; he is a man. If he is innocent, let him prove it, if he is
guilty, his fate should serve as an example to the world.58 The speech concludes
with a detailed proposal for the formation of a commission investigating Louis actions
and reporting back to the Convention, which then has to come up with a verdict.
In short, Mailhes argument runs as follows: Among other things, the king has
betrayed the nation and is responsible for much bloodshed. These are crimes
that are punishable under the Constitution and the Penal Code. That the same
Constitution, which forbids such acts for the king, also exempts him from punishment is not a real obstacle for a trial. For, on the one hand, it was the nation that
54

Walzer (1974), 100.

Walzer (1974), 103.
56
Walzer (1974), 103.
57
Walzer (1974), 107.
58
Walzer (1974), 107.
55

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

217

vested the king with his inviolability. Therefore, the nation is above him; it may and
must ensure that its interests are protected and that it is not betrayed. On the other
hand, the king has not accepted the Constitution; hence, he cannot rely on it. This
leads to the conclusion that a trial is possible, that there are laws whose breach
allows for a prosecution of the king, and that there is a committee sanctioned to
judge him.
Is this argument valid? The theoretical basis that Mailhe partially resorts to and
partially constructs constitutes legal norms. They are taken from the Constitution
and the Penal Code. On the other hand, there are still the norms of natural law and
morality. These act as support for an assessment of the extent to which the legal
standards are supposed to be binding for the king and the nation. The obvious problem with this argument, however, is that the two framesthat is, of law and of natural law or moralityhave not been reconciled argumentatively (only rhetorically).
In fact, they are in conflict. In the legal frame, the Constitution is a body of laws
designed to bind the king inasmuch as it contains the clear rules that identify his
actions as punishable (without the Constitution, a monarch would have to be considered free in this respect). At the same time, it is regarded as an expression of the
inalienablein the sense of natural lawsovereignty of the nation, which therefore
disposes of the king inviolability as guaranteed by the Constitution.59
(B) Morisson on November 13, 1792
Charles Francois Gabriel Morisson was also a lawyer (from the Royalist Vende).
He was one of the few speakers during the entire debate who seriously defended the
king. His speech is a virtuoso example of legal rhetoric. Morisson describes the
kings deeds in the worst way possible, calling him a bloody monster, and runs
the full gamut of emotions against the king only to find that, unfortunately, there are
no legal means by which to hold him accountable. He then appeals to the dignity
and generosity of the nation, which has every right to expel the wretched subject
Louis from French soil.
In terms of content, the speech fleshes out a consistent defense of the king, which
is essentially adopted by de Sze in his final speech on December 26. (Still, this no
longer had any effect; the orientation systems of too many representatives were
occupied by the moral argument against the traitor, the state-theoretical argument
which declared the king to be a foreign body, and the political argument about the
kings dangerousness.)60
Mo1: Morissons starting point is the unlimited sovereignty of the nation,
which forms the ground for Mailhes argument. There is no doubt, he argues,
59

In the very instructive Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, Mona Ozouf writes: Mailhe
subtly but not without difficulty steered a course between the desire to judge the king according to
the terms of the Constitution and the need, in order to judge him, to suspend the immunity promised by the Constitution., Furet and Ozouf (1989), 98.
60
In the debate following de Szes statement, the butcher, Legendre, actually manages to request
that the tyrant be disassembled into 83 parts and that one be sent to each department; cf. Lever
(1985), 655 (Trans. T.P.).

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Frame Structures

that the members of the Convention represent the nation and, therefore, have the
plentitude of its sovereignty. I have no intention of contesting their rights: I shall
always respect them. But these rights have limits, limits all the more sacred in
that nature herself has fixed them for the happiness of the entire human race.61
It is therefore right, Morisson holds that this sovereignty includes the authority
to proclaim laws and also to revoke or change them if the disputed facts appear
in a different light. Yet when a nation has promulgated a law, although it is a
bad law, although the nation has the right to change the law at will, nevertheless,
that changed law cannot have a retroactive effect, and the previous law must
apply to all events which took place while it was still in force. One cannot dispute this truth without doing injury to the most basic principles of justice, principles sacred to all orderly nations, principles unknown only to tyrants.62 Then
he applies this statement to the case of Louis XVI: In order to judge him
according to our institutions, there must be a statute which can be applied to
him. Yet no such law exists.63
There is no doubt, Morisson states, that Louis has committed high treason and
other evil deeds. He enumerates seven felonies, including, in particular, the massacre of August 10, which falls under the kings responsibility. The rhetoric at work
here is blatant: he ordered the slaughter of thousands of citizens who committed no
crime against him but that of loving liberty and their country. The blood of these
unhappy victims still runs warm in the streets; they call upon France to avenge
them.64 But now, Morisson says, we need to turn to the law for help. Then we realize: Well, that penal code has no provision which may be applied to Louis XVI,
since when he committed his crimes, there was a written law which carried an
express exception in his favor; I refer to the Constitution.65
According to Morisson, the Constitution says loud and clear that the king must
resign for such crimes and become a citizen like other citizens, who will be tried
like them, for acts posterior to his abdication.66 Thus, the penalty for Louis crime
is his demission. A constitutional demission will turn him into a citizen of France
and, as such, he will be punishable like any other citizen. As a citizen he cannot
be held accountable for acts committed as a king. As a king, on the other hand,
he could not be held accountable for them because he was inviolable. Again, we
arrive at the aforementioned conclusion: There is simply no law on whose basis the
king could be punished for his deeds.
Mo2: He then addresses the argument that the king could not invoke the
Constitution because, as a matter of fact, he never accepted it: The Constitution
61

Walzer (1974), 111112.

Walzer (1974), 113.
63
Walzer (1974), 113.
64
Walzer (1974), 113.
65
Walzer (1974), 113.
66
Walzer (1974), 114 (emphasis in the original).
62

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

219

was the law of my country without the consent of the king; it was law by the will of
the sovereign, the people [] Yes, if I broke the laws of the land, albeit I had never
approved them, I ought nonetheless to suffer punishment according to those laws.
And if they contained some clause favorable to my position, I would have the right
to ask for that benefit, to ask it of the sovereign which would have no right to refuse
since my right sprang only from its supreme will, a will which it can change only
for the future. Fortunately these maxims are incontestable. Fortunately for us, we
practice them daily.67
This clearly shows that the Constitution was in effect because it expressed the
popular will and not because the king might have consented to it. It once again
stresses that the Constitution, just like any other law, cannot be changed retroactively. Therefore, contrary to Mailhes insinuation, the inviolability cannot retroactively be tied to the condition that the king may not oppose the nation.
The argument of non-acknowledgment is therefore refuted by the argument of
the prohibition of ex post facto laws. It is also remarkable that this prohibition of ex
post facto laws is expressly not tied to the legal tradition (nulla crimen sine lege) or
the nature of justice, but to everyday practice. This makes insights into its validity
more accessible. Even in simple contexts, such as promises and treaties, we act in
accordance with this prohibition. We substantiate our freedom in norms and adhere
to them as long as they have not been suspended or changed. An action that complies with our norms cannot be condemned on the basis of a new, supplemented
norm. Such a thing would open the floodgates to arbitrariness.
So, Morisson mainly introduces two arguments that function as objections to
Mailhes argumentation: the argument of the limits of sovereignty and the argument
of the prohibition of ex post facto laws. The two arguments are linked; the second
further develops an aspect of the first. Both arguments are also compatible with the
argumentative basis presented by Mailhe: the theory of the sovereignty of the nation.
Argumentatively, what is accomplished here is the introduction of a distinction:
Sovereignty, although unconditional, is still limited. It is limited insofar as it has to
express itself in legal norms, which are then realized in such a way that life becomes
predictable and the question of its rightness can be assessed. This is a necessity and
from it follow the principles of rogation or derogation as well as the prohibition of
ex post facto laws. Hence, the frame problem becomes obsolete in Mailhes argument. The legal frame is outlined in its purity and placed hierarchically above the
moral or emotional frame. Thus, the status of the Constitution is clear. Mailhes
argumentation for the trial has been completely refuted.
With this result, the question of what to do with Louis has become one of mere
purposiveness. One has to find something that is in the best interest of the nation.
Banishment is not a necessary, but at least a possible option. In the absence of any
objections, this proposal has been justified as valid.

67

Walzer (1974), 115.

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Frame Structures

(C) Saint-Just on November 13, 1792

Louis-Antoine Lon Saint-Just was a newcomer, considered to belong to the
Montagne, who spoke for the first time in the Convention on November 13, immediately following Morisson. His speech was short (one-third the length of Morissons
remarks) and straightforward. The echoes of this speech reverberate throughout the
centuries, but acclaim has not been quite unanimous. While Walzer, for example,
calls it the most brilliant speech of the debate,68 Michelet speaks with consternation of a discours atroce and sans passion.69 Saint-Just is 25 years old at this
point and has only 20 months left to live. (He will be executed in Thermidor 1794,
along with Robespierre.)
The speech begins as follows: I shall undertake, citizens, to prove that the king
can be judged, that the opinion of Morisson which would respect inviolability and
that of the committee which would have him judged as a citizen are equally false,
and that the king ought to be judged according to principles foreign to both.70
Saint-Just demands additional distinctions with respect to the king, his actions,
and the state of the union (distinctions such as the one between enemy and delinquent and the one between positive national law and natural or international law).
As long as these are not taken into account, Saint-Just argues, the debate cannot get
past legal quibbles. Recognizing Louis as a traitor to the nation should be sufficient.
Indeed, for Saint-Just, any talk about the legal situation would be less advanced
than in the time of Caesar. Then, a tyrant was slain in the midst of the Senate, with
no formality but 30 dagger blows, with no law but the liberty of Rome.71
Thereafter, he attacks head-on the attitude of those who concern themselves with
a legal framework for convicting Louis: Those same men who are to judge Louis
are charged with founding the Republic. Those who attach any importance to the
just punishment of a king will never found a Republic.72 Hence, the assumed political perspective is addressed and discussed in terms of its appropriateness. I will
return to this. The actual argumentative operation then consists of an objection to an
assumption that both Mailhe and Morisson take to be self-evident: that the king is a
member of society.
Having read Rousseau, Saint-Just can assume an awareness of the topos of the
social contract.73 This social contract is a philosophical construct designed to give
all social relationships between people a conceptual basis. It expresses the original
agreement of seeing oneself as a part of society and of participating in the general
process of decision-making. Such an agreement entails mutual recognition and
equality. This is the background against which to ask what it is that makes a king.
The answer is that the king is a man who stands outside, who seizes the power, and
who, thus, breaks with the original state of equality. No man can reign innocently.

68

Walzer (1974), 61, 120.

Michelet (1952), Vol. II, 73 (a ghastly speech without compassion).
70
Walzer (1974), 121.
71
Walzer (1974), 122.
72
Walzer (1974), 122.
73
Rousseaus work on the social contract (Rousseau (1998)) appeared in 1762.
69

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

221

[] Every king is a rebel and a usurper.74 Since, as such, he constantly oppresses

those below him, he is a tyrant.75 This can never be just, nor justified by the peoples consent.76 But since a king establishes legal forms for his regime, his usurped
and unjust power will eventually come to seem lawful. Anyone who takes up the
task of arguing with the king about his deeds will succumb in the end: [] for in
treating him so, you cannot make him answer for his hidden malice: He will lose
you in the vicious circle created of your very accusations.77
What we see here is a kind of normative genesis of the nations relationship to
the king which, according to Saint-Just, is still in place at the time of the debate.
Saint-Just shows how this relationship might have developed, beginning with the
situation where it did not yet exist. According to this reconstruction, it was certainly
a mistake to include the king as an office bearer in the Constitution and to guarantee
him certain privileges. The belief that this could secure the good of the nation was
blindness, a short-sighted or timid maintaining of old forms. That it was a mistake
became obvious when the king, instead of cooperating, destabilized the state and
conspired with foreign powers. In other words, the kings treason has highlighted a
problem that cannot be easily fixed. Morisson has proposed such a fix, but it is
unsatisfactory because it does not sanction the moral accusation against the king
(traitor) and because it leads to a danger to the Republic. Saint-Just merely touches
on these two points rather than fully address them. With respect to the second, the
danger, he says that Morisson talks as if the Republic had been consolidated; according to Saint-Just, however, the opposite is the case. Robespierre will expand this
point into an explicit argument.
At any rate, no fix should be worked out on a basis that is demonstrably deceptive: that the king could be integrated into the social contract retroactively. Rather,
the consequence must be that he is outside: a foreign body, an incommensurable
element. Since he has attacked the Republic, he must be treated and attacked as an
enemy. Therefore, his treatment is not a matter of national law, but of international
law. According to international law, however, a nation has the right to defend itself
against an aggressor.
In short, the argument consists of three steps:
St-J. 1: The legal argument is contradictory; its decision in favor of a legalistic
solution is unsatisfactory.
St-J. 2: The contradictory determination of the kings legal position dissolves if it is
seen clearly that the king does not even have a legal position with respect to the
Republic. There is no contractual bond and the natural bond was dissolved by the
king himself.
74

Walzer (1974), 124.

Walzer (1974), 123, 126.
76
Walzer (1974), 123124. The assumption here is that natural liberties are inalienable. This is an
idea that is part of our concept of human rights, but it does not follow directly from the social
contract. Rousseaus thoughts on forms of government were directed by instrumental rationality
throughout; he did not favor a democracy, but a meritocracy; cf. Rousseau (1998), Book III,
Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
77
Walzer (1974), 123.
75

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Frame Structures

St-J. 3: Since the king has attacked the Republic, he is an external enemy and must
be fought as such.
The conclusion is that Louis should be judged as an enemy alien.78 Louis is not
to be judged in a legal framework, but according to the practices of war. What this
means follows from a purely rational or functional consideration: how to render the
man innocuous? Saint-Just thinks of it in this way: there is no citizen who does not
have the right Brutus had over Caesar.79 According to this proposal, Louis would
be an outlaw.
Here, we are dealing with an impressive frame-sublating argumentation. I will
try to outline this and form an assessment. After all, the legal frame introduced by
Mailhe and Morisson is not simply that of the Ancien Rgime. It is an extended and
generalized successornamely, the incipient legal consciousness of the bourgeoisie. In this frame, the king may well be regarded and treated under different aspects:
Louis

as a monarch
as a constitutional king
as a citizen

absolutely inviolable
inviolable under certain conditions
violable

The inferential potential of these frames is established by national law, the

second determination is also influenced by considerations of natural law and moral
sentiment, and the third by the articles of the new Constitution. Saint-Justs argument abstracts from all three frames by way of reflexive distancing. Thus, and by
doing so, it articulates a new vision: The vision of the Republic.
This is Saint-Justs accomplishment: With respect to the royal trial, he is the first
to articulate the very position, in terms of a theory of the state, that is characteristic
for the Republic. The Republic is the form of state following the social contract. It
is the starting point for cultivating the state of nature. Its organization brings forth
the original sovereign. There are no privileges here; on the contrary, the privileges
of ranks or of individuals are already deployments against the original sovereign.
Therefore, the Republic is bound by no law that has been set up to protect any privilege. A republican simply knows no kings. This is the meaning of the qualification
of the king as a foreign body in the social contract.
Thus, Saint-Just contradicts Morisson in a fundamental and highly interesting
way: When the Constitution was adopted, the Republic did not exist yet; the nation
was still shaped and tainted by the conditions of the Ancien Rgime and was not yet
one with itself. It has now reached that state of oneness. It is now able to determine
itself and he, Saint-Just, makes an effort to articulate this.80 This is why we do not
break any of our own legal norms and why we do not apply any laws retroactively.
78

Walzer (1974), 126.

Walzer (1974), 126.
80
Saint-Just, in the spirit of Rousseau, also emphasizes that he demands nothing but what is
demanded by the nation or the majority of its representatives: But, as my personal will concerns
a portion of the law which has not yet been written, I shall open my mind to you (Walzer
(1974), 126).
79

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

223

Back then, we did not even exist yet. Now that we have come to an awareness of our
sovereignty and autonomy, we can only say that we do not accept any agreements
with a king. The Republic is not the legal successor of constitutional monarchy,
but is something new. In Saint-Justs speech this is addressed as the reflexive
frame of the Republic that has now been reached. His speech gives voice to the
young, even childish Republic, which has just learned how to talk.
Is this a valid argument?
The most striking thing about it is that it changes the frame of the quaestio.
As we would say today, the argument is supposed to effect a Gestalt shift similar to
the shift that takes place in the case of the duck-rabbit head, from duck to rabbit, or,
in a different case, from witch to young lady. It moves beyond the pattern of the
three old frames by disregarding their (unacceptable) presuppositions. Hence, we
are, so to speak, at the very beginning (at the level of the original social contract) in
a state of perfect equality. This beginningthat is, the assumption of an original
dialogue situationcannot be denied argumentatively. Any denial would presuppose it. So, the original dialogue is taken as a starting point for a way of organizing
societya social organization whose shape is to be determined on an egalitarian
footing. This results in the basic democratic, republican structure as a principle of
political philosophy. Each originary claim to privileges breaches it. Anyone who,
like the king, not only claims such privileges, but even takes action accordingly, has
to be considered an enemy of the Republic. So far, so good. It looks as if the monarchy cannot be justified from the vantage point of the Republic. But why is it necessary to argue from that vantage point? Is it possible that the justification is valid
only relative to it? What about the opposite position?
The monarchist denies the starting point of the republican argument, the equality
of all dialogue partners. Not all people are capable of participating in a dialogue.
Stupor and obstinacy prevent many from determining their own lives; they need to
be governed by other, better people. This is, broadly speaking, the normative genesis of aristocracy. If this idea remains pure (i.e. without being tainted by sprinkles of
participatory thinking), then it leads to monarchy. The best person becomes king; he
must be the ruler; everybody else must be subordinated (perhaps in an appropriate
hierarchy). Part of this justification, it seems, is the assumption that the qualities of
a ruler can be tested. How could this be done? Certainly not in a dialogue with the
subordinates. The only criterion would be the fruits of success: A good rule is
reflected in the happiness and prosperity of its subjects. But neither monarchy in
general nor the Ancien Rgime in particular can shoulder this burden of proof.
So, is the republican right after all? Yes, but only in an abstract sense. In practice,
this idea does not take place during the creation of the world, but in modern Europe,
amidst bitter struggles for power and wealth and for the transformation or abolition
of monarchical institutions that have proven to be disastrous for large parts of the
French population.
The Republic has begun, but it is a controversial, hard-fought beginning. The
Royalists do not accept the idea of a Republic. And this is the important point:
The French Republicthat is, the application or applicability of the idea of natural
law onto the reality of France in the late 18th centuryis only a thesis so far; it is

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Frame Structures

not epistemic theory yet, nor is it knowledge. The proponents of this thesis are
largely unreliable figures (Danton, Robespierre), some of them quite dubious
(Marat). The monarchy was bad, but it was bearable. The Republic is a dream,
perhaps a mere utopia.
Let me be clear: The theoretical basis for the thesis of the Republic is sufficient.
But a realization of this thesis faces the Ancien Rgime as an obstinate enemy.
Hence, it is this situation that the proponents of the republican thesis would have to
address in their considerations. It is this problem that demands their thetic constructions and their protection against objections. It is not so much that they would have
to argue for the Republic and against the monarchy. Rather, they would have to
argue for the transition from the monarchy to the Republic. This also requires a
theoretical basis, probably in the form of epistemic theory about institutions and
institutional change (i.e. moral and political thoughts and experiences) and of particular legal norms. But these cannot justify a move beyond the monarchical form
of government either; they all come out of the very life forms established under the
monarchy.
A revolution is a violation of the law; it is the capital crime and it breaks the
foundation of the justice system by transforming the frame structures of all institutions. For this reason, there can be no argument that could represent the transition in
terms of a proper chain of reasons in a purely theoretical manner. What is needed,
instead, are phases of realization that change the situation and may thereby prepare a better, real ground for insights. Again and again, over months and years,
argumentation must start anew and substantiate as well as stabilize the justification.
In the interim, everything depends on how far the reasons have already become reality or how much trust they can generate (and for whom), so that in one way or
another, we can continue on the same path.81
In such transitional periods one is usually on one side or the other, either still a
monarchist or already a republicanor in between as a moderate of one of the
bourgeois factions. Therefore, a reasonably durable judgment about the validity of
the republican thesis can be made only after the fact. As I stated above in Sect. 5.5,
a retrospectively constructed argument cannot do justice to the objections it is able
81

The way in which Immanuel Kant, the greatest republican thinker, who observed the Revolution
with much attention as a man of more than 60 years of age, represents this oscillation in his pronouncements on the legitimacy of the Revolution is striking. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant
writes in The Doctrine of Right under the header Constitutional Law (cf. Kant (1996), 96):
Therefore a people cannot offer any resistance to the legislative head of a state [] There is,
therefore, no right to sedition (seditio), still less to rebellion (rebellio), and least of all is there a
right against the head of a state as an individual person (the monarch), to attack his person or even
his life (monarchomachismus sub specie tyrannicidii) on the pretext that he has abused his authority (tyrannis). Any attempt whatsoever at this is high treason (proditio eminens). Just three
pages later we read: Moreover, once a revolution has succeeded and a new constitution has been
established, the lack of legitimacy with which it began and has been implemented cannot release
the subjects from the obligation to comply with the new order of things as good citizens, and they
cannot refuse honest obedience to the authority that now has the power (98). But, the philosopher
decrees, when the monarch returns [!] to the estate of a citizen, he is still entitled to his possessions, because they were taken from him unjustly (98).

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

225

to refute because it cannot reestablish the way of seeing that caused the people
(Royalists and Girondists) to regard these objections as making sense. All it can do
is point out the following: the opponents perspective at the time was this-and-that,
but that is necessarily only an external view of things.
It is typical for dialogues during the transitional period that the available theoretical basis equips the conservative groups more easily with positive support for
their arguments, while the strength of the groups of innovators is criticism. The
positive alternative theory grounds a thetic construction in very little epistemic theory, which, moreover, is highly abstract and may easily be dismissed as a pipe
dream. The conviction of the king was an incredibly serious matter. If it is only supported by such a lightweight fabric as an argument, it is difficult to agree with it.
Theoretically, it is quite clear what the republicans should have done: They
should have taken measures to make peace with the supporters of the old order.82
But it is equally clear that, as a rule, peace with enemies depends on whether one is
strong enough to hold them in check if need be. Such strength was lacking in France.
So, was the revolutionary argument valid? Yes, but it could not develop the degree
of practical strength the Republic would have needed in order to avoid being sucked
into the maelstrom that led to the subsequent terror.
So much for the assessment of Saint-Justs arguments. Robespierre completed
this thought and gave it a different emphasis.
(D) Robespierre on December 3, 1792
Maximilien Robespierre represents Paris in the Convention; he is one of the opinion
leaders of the Montagne. He had been a member of the constitutional assembly,
where he made a mark for himself as a staunch opponent of the death penalty,83 a
position he modifies significantly in his argumentation during Louis trial. In its
tenor, the speech continues and expands Saint-Justs elaborations. Any assessment
of the speech needs to take into account that, in the meantime, the iron cabinet has
been found, the kings treason can now be proven by documents, and the situation
in the city is marked by food shortages and riots resulting from increasing agitation
on the part of the Royalists.
What Robespierre adopts from Saint-Just is, of course, the republican frame.
Hence, there is no longer a need for lengthy explanations to determine that the king
is outside the social contract, that he is a foreign enemy who, as such, is subject to
international law or the laws of war. What seems equally self-evident is that, as a
matter of principle, the monarchy and the Republic are irreconcilable. The Republic,
it is assumed, follows the eternal laws of reason; the monarch opposes them. In
short: As for the people, [] what other law can they follow than justice and
reason supported by their unlimited power?84

82

Cf. Walzer (1974), 74: To found the republic it is necessary to make peace precisely with the
enemies of the republic, with all those men and women on Robespierres list.
83
Walzer (1974), 130.
84
Walzer (1974), 133.

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Frame Structures

Ro1: The first argument that goes beyond Saint-Just also draws the conclusions
that follow from the establishment of a republican frame: The other frames are not
simply alternatives; rather, they are obsolete. Hence, some concerns can be
presented as expressing an obsolete way of thinking: The majority of citizens adhere
to the most arbitrary conventions [] as an absolute rule of true or false []
We do not once imagine that for the most part they must necessarily still spring
from prejudices which despotism fostered within us. So bent were we beneath its
yoke that we rise with difficulty to the eternal principles of reason.85 These obsolete
ways of thinking lead to the acceptance of the king and his rights, even if such
matters become less than obvious once the false presuppositions are withdrawn.
Even the compassion the Royalists appeal to, Robespierre claims, is an expression
of these false ways of thinking.86
Ro2: At this point, Robespierre introduces in the frame of republican thinking, a
new argument against the trial: To propose a trial for Louis XVI. [] would bring
the revolution itself before the court. In fact, if Louis could yet be tried, he might
be found innocent. Do I say found? He is presumed innocent until the verdict.
If Louis is acquitted, where then is the revolution? If Louis is innocent, all defenders
of liberty are slanderers.87 Is this argument valid? The result of every legal trial is
open; every trial begins with the assumption that the accused is innocent until
proven guilty. This means that a trial puts the Revolution, which implies a judgment
about the king, up for debate. Consequently, does a rejection of the trial follow simply from an adherence to the republican frame? I do not think so. Obviously, the
Republic does not accept a king, but it is less clear how it goes about doing so.
Robespierres remonstrance requires that all factually taken measures be interpreted
as essential for the establishment of the Republic, as something that is no longer up
for debate. This requirement is excessive.
Ro3: The second new or continued argument concerns the danger to the Republic.
The generosity recommended by Morisson is something only a stable Republic can
afford, not one that is still in its infancy and must ward off all kinds of internal and
external opposition. Robespierre backs up this argument with descriptions of the
current situation in Paris, where the Royalists openly demand the restoration of the
monarchy and where in the Convention there is even talk of Louis good deeds.88
This argument prepares the statement about what to do with Louis in the name of
national interest.
85

Walzer (1974), 132.

This has often been misunderstood. Even Michelet castigates the lack of feeling, particularly, as
I said, in Saint-Just, who had spoken of the purchasability of tears. Robespierre, however, does
not speak out against compassion in general, but against compassion for the tyrants rather than for
their victims (We flaunt a false humanity because the sentiment of true humanity is alien to us; we
revere the shadow of a king because we do not know how to respect the people; we are kind to
oppressors because we lack feeling for the oppressed (Walzer (1974), 133)). Incidentally, he is not
said to have been a compassionate person. But this does not invalidate his argument at this point.
87
Walzer (1974), 131.
88
Walzer (1974), 134.
86

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

227

Ro4: Up to this point, Robespierre has completed the argument in the manner
outlined by Saint-Just, but he differs from it with respect to the consequences. He
pleads for a formal execution. The plea begins as follows: As for me, I abhor the
death penalty as it is permitted to an extravagant extent in your [i.e. the legalists
H.W.] laws.89 In the constitutional assembly, he says that he had argued for its abolition, as it seemed like political-moral heresy at the time. But in the case of the
king, he believes it to be justified: True, the death penalty in general is a crime
since, following the unchanging principles of nature, it can be justified only in those
cases where it is vital to the safety of private citizens or of the public.90 Why is it
vital? Because a deposed king, in the midst of a revolution only supported by laws;
a king whose very name draws the scourge of war restless on the nation,91 cannot
be rendered innocuous by either prison or exile. Regretfully I speak this fatal
truthLouis must die because the nation must live.92
If we think within the republican frame in the manner outlined by Saint-Just,
take this frame to be sufficiently legitimized and assume that the description of the
situation brought forth in the argument about danger is accurate, then this conclusion is prima facie more plausible than Saint-Justs. The latter had granted each
citizen the right to assault the king as a form of personal vengeance. But the legal
basis for this is the quasi-law of the state of nature, which is merely exaggerated
euphemistically under the titles international law or martial law. In contrast,
Robespierre proposes that Louis should be sentenced to death and executed without a trial, but the execution should nevertheless be based on a formal decision by
the Convention. Hence, the killing, which remained undone in August, is supposed
to be carried out as a public act of the Republic in order to avenge Louis bloody
fight against the Republic.
However, there is a crucial downside to this difference: While Saint-Justs proposal would have resulted in a random killing of the king, Robespierre delivers a
rule: The death penalty is permissible in very special, exceptional circumstances,
such as if the security of the Republic is at risk. With the death penalty, the Republic
fights against a person who has been found to be a foreign enemy. It would soon
become clear that there are many thousands of such foreign enemies of the Republic
in France. In the case of Louis XVI, it still seems self-evident that he is such an
enemy. That it has taken someone else to identify him as an enemy is not relevant.
But it will take less than a year (July 26, 1793) until food peddlers and speculators
are threatened with the death penalty as enemies of the Republic. And one-and-ahalf years later (on June 10, 1794), the death penalty has become the only possible
punishment. On July 30 (Thermidor 10), 1794, even Robespierre himself, who is
executed together with 104 followers, falls victim to it.

89

Walzer (1974), 137.

Walzer (1974), 138.
91
Walzer (1974), 138.
92
Walzer (1974), 138.
90

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Frame Structures

I am not saying that the transition from the execution of the king to the terror was
inevitable. There are simply too many other relevant circumstances at play for this
to be a case of a classical slippery slope beginning with the death sentence against
the king. When the argument is put forward and considered, no terror is in sight
yet. Therefore, the reference to the subsequent terror cannot be used as an objection
to the validity of the argument. (That would be an instance of the very know-it-all
manner of those born later, which I will address in Chap. 7.)
At any rate, what I would like to say at this point is that this justification for the
death penalty and the subsequent execution of the king provides the argumentative
basis for more death sentences. The reason for this is simply that the verdict has not
been defined as a one-time exception; rather, it has been provided with an exception rule. This is the obvious difference with respect to Saint-Justs proposal: The
king is not just killed randomly, but for a purpose (publicly showing the vengeance
of the people) and according to a justificatory frame (as an enemy of the Republic)
that generates a rule.
If we question the argument for the execution with respect to its (internal) validity, then the objection that it will lead to terror is, as I pointed out, not at our disposal. So is there nothing to object to in the argument? Could we not derive an
objection from the idea of human rights? Robespierre himself had referred to the
human right to life and limb in order to argue against the death penalty. Why does
he not do it here?
If it is true that only the Republic provides the political and moral space in which
a justification for the rejection of the death penalty has a practical basis in the social
reality of equality and recognition, then the matter is paradoxical. In order to build
the Republic amidst the ruins of the monarchy, these ruins must be neutralized. The
monarchy has other means of enforcement than the Republic (which, as Robespierre
says, only has the law). The monarchy may pass draconian rules and implement
them with all the force necessary. The Republic cannot do this (theoretically). How,
then, can the Republic prevent the resurrection of the monarchy? Should it resort to
means that are not its own, but the means of its enemies? A very popular argument
in this respect is the argument of the last battle, which will lead to peace. But this
argument suffers from the fact that it is impossible to ensure such a finality. In order
to assess Robespierres argument, we need to ask whether the death penalty [as an
act of war against a foreign enemy] is really framed differently than the death penalty [as the most severe penalty for a crime]. The answer is affirmative. But can this
frame difference be maintained if it turns out that there are more foreign enemies
inside the countryalways more?
There is, within the republican frame, still another possible reason for the formal
execution of the king. This one does not concern Louis XVI as the worthy, harmless,
slightly devious man he apparently was; rather, the king is now treated as a representative of the mystical kingship that is to be eliminated through his execution. The
monarchy exists in the sphere of symbolism, beside the religious. Its power over the
people is based not solely on coercion, but also (maybe even more powerfully) on
the fact that it occupies the level of existential meaning in the orientation systems of
human beings. This is true, but it is far from certain that the execution of the king

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic

229

eliminates this mystical kingship. It may result in the opposite: The executed king
can become a beacon for the monarchy. The available epistemic basis is far too
slight in this case.93
In the end, all that is left for an assessment long after the fact is a kind of transcendental justification. We would have to read the argument for the execution of
the king, which is supposed to lead to the establishment of the Republic, in such a
way that it is intended to secure its own preconditions. In 1792, this was nothing less
than a circle. Today, however, it looks different. For us, the awareness of human
rights, which were nothing more than a thesis during the Revolution, has become
epistemic theory; it is a normative foundation of our civilization. This development
has to be understood, among other things, as a result of the execution of the French
kingthat is, as a result of a breach of the principle of human rights. Would it have
been possible for us to reach this state of awareness without that execution?

93

The results of the execution of the English king Charles I, 150 years earlier, which were discussed frequently in the debate in the Convent, do not provide the proper theoretical basis for
constructing a more or less sustainable argumentation. Only this could be stated with certainty:
The execution of the king did not prevent the reestablishment of the monarchy.

Chapter 6

Dialogue Events

The previous five chapters have prepared the core elements for a theory of
argumentative speech. The pragmatic concept of theory and the difference between
thetic and epistemic theory that follows from it, as well as the double structure of
orientation with its reference to the subject and to the matter in question, provide
the primary basis for understanding research carried out by human subjects. The
verbal practice of argumentationthat is, the dialogical testing of validity claims
raised by research thesesprovides the theory for this research. The concept of
frames enables us to capture the generation of theory that guides research in its
specifically subjective forms. The forms designated by these frame structures are
amendable to reflexive changes. These changes, in turn, allow for the development
of both, states of affairs and subjects. Hence, argumentation is at the center of latemodern humanitys attempts to chart a course into a future autonomy.
This chapter will describe some of the typical events in the dialogical activity of
argumentation. Put differently, it will provide the conceptual means for outlining
some characteristic occurrences and possibilities. First, I will systematize the
application of the basic operations in any concrete discussion as potential and
successive moves. I will then designate as four dimensions, two pairs of aspects,
each consisting of polar opposites, which will help clarify events in the practice of
argumentation. What emerges from this discussion is mainly the difference
between linear and retroflexive argumentation. Finally, the theoretical core
articulated thus far will enable an investigation of what is arguably the most common application of argumentative speech: The discussion of pros and cons.

6.1

The System of Moves and Successive Moves

By distinguishing the three basic operations, we have merely identified three

types of thetic functions. An understanding of these differences, however, may
lead to certain questions about the details of the practice of argumentation: For
H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_6,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

231

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Dialogue Events

example, is this part of a justification? What is the thesis we are dealing with here?
Are these all the objections that have been raised against the thesis? At this point,
we need to study and systematize the possibilities of introducing such thetic functions in dialogical moves. A move is the performance of any utterance in a
dialogue gamethat is, in a system of utterances that can contribute to the raising, testing, ratifying, or rejecting of a validity claim. Thus, a dialogue (game)
consists of moves; it begins with an opening move and then contains nothing but
successive moves. In order to get a general idea of what happens in a dialogue, we
must examine which moves are potential opening moves and which potential successive moves.
Opening Moves
In principle, any actualization of a basic operation can initiate an argumentative
dialogue. Hence, I will briefly examine three varieties of opening moves.
The simplest beginning is positing a thesis. Verbally, this can happen in many
different ways. A theoretical core of argumentation theory, however, does not have to
cover any of these possibilities. To the extent that I presuppose an elementary argumentative competence, I assume that the assertion of a thesis will be recognized as
suchat least in clear cases. (In cases that are less clear, it will be recognized during
subsequent conversations.)
The second way of opening up a dialogue is through an intervention that
objects to something of note in the conversation or the text. This is always an opening move if it changes the pragmatic status of the communicationfor example, by
turning a conversation into an argument. Such actualizations are quite common: Is
this even true? I cant imagine it. I dont think so. No, this seems wrong to me.
These objections may doubt or dispute some previous utterance. An objection that
disputes the validity of a previous statement is actually a (negative) thesis. If we
successfully posit the previous statement as a thesis by putting forward such an
objection, we arrive at the constellation of thesis/counter-thesis. At this point, we
need precautions that allow for an investigation of both theses in such a way that the
resulting mess remains manageable. The simplest precaution would be to discuss
first one thesis, then the other.1 But that is not necessarily the best option because the
objections to a thesis can frequently be determined more clearly in an attempt to
justify the counter-thesis.
An objection that has been raised is nothing but an offer to enter into an argumentative dialogue regarding the subject of the objection, just as the positing of a
thesis is an offer too. But offers do not have to be accepted.
This is true for the entire dialogue (as it also applies to all other verbal communication): Moves can be ignored. The partner (or oneself in ones own dialogical
reasoning) can do something other than make a successive move. For instance, we

This is the strategy proposed by Amsterdam Pragmadialectics; cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(1992), 1622.

6.1 The System of Moves and Successive Moves

233

can just start talking about something different or cease to communicate altogether.
Although we know forms of communication that permit no disregard or that sanction it harshly (e.g. in court: Answer, defendant! Or in an oral examination: What?
You do not know the answer?), at every turn of an argumentative dialogue, there
is the possibility of ending it.
The third way of opening up a dialogue is by presenting a reason. Again, it is
necessary to clarify what this move refers to. This reference would have to be to
something thetic. As in the case of an objection, this could be something that is
given (implicitly) in the context. In that case, either something occurred in the
previous conversation, which now emerges as a thesis in light of our attempts to
justify it or we will explicate it subsequently. The standard situation for presenting
a reason is a constellation in which the references are as follows: It has already
been clarified what the thesis is and this thesis has attracted an objection that the
reason is now supposed to eliminate. The situations described below under (2b) or
(3d) are of this kind.
Conclusion: There is only one real opening movenamely, the positing of a
thesis. The other two operations are also suitable as opening moves, but they indicate that an implicit opening of a dialogue has already taken place (or was desired)
and will now be made explicit.
Successive Moves
At any point in a dialogue, I have two possibilities besides the aforementioned
uncooperative disregard. I can:
Adopt the dialogue partners moves
Retract my own moves
If I adopt a partners move or retract my own, there is no need for any further
discussion. I have reasons (hopefully) and/or occasions for this adoption or retraction, which are related to insights into the validity of the thesis in question. Neither
an adoption nor a retraction indicates by itself why they occur. It is clear, however,
that an adopted or retracted utterance needs no further examination in a dialogue.
Ideal cases in this respect are the adoption of an opponents move based on an
insight into its validity and the retraction of ones own move based on an insight into
its invalidity.
Apart from that, there are three groups of successive moves that I will only
briefly mention in what follows. It should not be difficult, however, to illustrate
these possibilities. In these groups, there are six real successive moves. These
are: (1ba), the objection based on doubt (d-objection); (1bb), the objection based
on contestation (c-objection); (2b), the consideration of an objection through
justification; (3b), the objection based on doubt against the objection based on
contestation; (3c), the objection based on contestation against the objection
based on contestation; and (3d), the consideration of the objection based on contestation by transforming and integrating it into ones own position.

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Dialogue Events

Overall, the three groups appear as follows:

(1) Following A as a presented thesis or argument, these successive moves are
possible:
(1a) Adopting A
(1b) Criticizing A
A criticism in the sense of (1b) has the following options:
(1ba) Doubting A (?A)
(1bb) Contesting A by positing A (where A implies non-A)
(2) Following a doubt about A (?A, in the sense of 1ba), these successive moves are
possible:
(2a) Retracting A
(2b) Justifying A (presenting a reason, either a subordinated or a coordinated
reason)
(3) Following a highlighted contradiction A (where A implies non-A), these successive moves are possible:
(3a) Accepting A, that is, retracting A
(3b) Doubting A (then continue as in 2)
(3c) Contesting A by positing A (where A implies non-A) (then continue
as in 3)
(3d) Integrating A (incorporating A into ones own position through permutation or frame change)
That is it. More specifically, any utterances in a conversation are part of an argumentative dialogue if an opening move or successive move that is part of this system
of moves and successive moves can be detected among them. Everything else forms
the communicative context of the dialogue game.
It is advisable to write this in a diagram or tableau, where the proponents and
opponents possible moves are displayed consecutively in a row.
P
T

?T

R (R T)

A (A T)

?A
B (B A)
R (A T)

Legend: T stands for thesis, ?T for doubts about T, R for reason or step of a justification, and R T denotes an established way of transitioning from R to T. A stands for an
argument that is different from T (or a different thesis), and the sequence A T denotes an
established transition to the negation of T. B, in turn, stands for an argument (or a thesis) that is
different from A and T; the possible transitions indicated next to it correspond to this denotation.
In the first line, after the proponents second move, the opponent could either continue with
?R or state the following: This justification is not sufficient; we need more reasons. But this
would not be a new successive move; rather, it would be of the same type as the opponents first
doubt. The same is true for B in the proponents third row and for R in the fourth.

6.2

Four Dimensions

235

This scheme of possibilities in argumentative dialogues is less a way to regulate

actually existing discussions and debates, and more an offer of a taxonomy that
helps identify the events in a discussion (cf. below, Sect. 6.2.2) as dialogue moves
and relate them to each other in the context of an analysis aimed at validity. In a real
discussion, for example, doubts about a thesis might not be followed by the proponents attempt at justification, but by a counterattack in the form of an ad hominem
attack (Havent you always been in favor of this?!). A first attempt at justification
might follow only once this has been refutedthat is, once the opponent has backed
up his right to question the thesis in the first place. Of course, we would not include
such detours in our taxonomy of argumentative dialogues. The aim of taxonomy is
simply to clarify the pursuit of the validity question with respect to the selected
thesis/theses.

6.2

Four Dimensions

In order to classify the events taking place in the actual practice of argumentation,
theorists have always distinguished aspects, dimensions, levels, and the like.
Aristotle addressed this under the rubrics of syllogism, topics, and rhetoric.
Modern argumentation theory mentions various perspectivesfor example,
regarding process, procedure, method, and product.2 It seems, then, that these
events can be investigated with respect to many different questions. Of course, a
crucial factor for any classification of aspects is what is being regarded as the goal
of argumentation.
In this dialectic and pragmatic view, the goal of any argumentation is testing
validity claims. For practical reasons, I distinguish between four dimensionsin
concurrent pairs that form tense relationsin order to focus on the pursuit of this
goal. These are, on the one hand, a material dimension3 and a subjective dimension and, on the other, a procedural dimension and a structural dimension.
The relations between these dimensions are complex, insofar as two dimensions
interact antagonistically, and the two pairs, though they are at odds, interact and
benefit from one another.
If all goes well, the process of discussion desubjectifies and objectifies the states
of affairs that are framed subjectively in the respective arguments. This can be seen
in argument structures that illuminate the final validity of the thetic construction. If
we are led to examine such relationships with respect to the parameters of our

Cf. Wenzel (1980). A similar taxonomy is proposed in Habermas (1984), 843. Johnson (2009)
is concerned about the ambiguities and inconsistencies of these distinctions and their relationship
with the Aristotelian theories.
3
Translators note: In the sense of pertaining to the matter at hand.

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Dialogue Events

ordinary conception, which is still dominated by logicism, we primarily take two

dimensions into account: The material and the structural dimension. Hence, a good,
sensible practice of argumentation would consist in sticking to the matter itself,
being familiar with the relevant states of affairs, taking into consideration all available information about these states of affairs, and accepting only those conclusions
that can be derived from true premises in a structural scheme that is as formally
coherent as possible. I have already pointed out the shortcomings and disadvantages
of this concept several times. It simply does not take into account that knowledge is
not static, but rather something coming-to-be (and passing away) and that theses are
not mere opinions, that they are instead sketches designed to compensate for a lack
of orientation. Furthermore, there is no recognition of the fact that states of affairs
are primarily acquired and presented by subjects, and that this subjective imprinting
cannot be ignored, but needs to be treated and transcended if its limiting, distorting
effects are to be mitigated at all.
Particularly instructive in this regard is that this conventional view, which is
based on objectivity and structure, is not regarded as reductive and restricted; on
the contrary, it seems to be more direct and realistic. Our ordinary relationship to
the state of affairs implies that something subjective inheres in the conceptions,
which must be rendered conscious and mitigated. This subjective remainder is not
an object in our field of vision, but a part of the gaze. Hence, it is perfectly suitable
for this element to either go unnoticed or, if it is finally noticed, to have always
been known. Things are very similar in the case of the procedural dimension.
Should it merely occur to me that my perspective is broadened or transformed by
one of my opponents arguments, then this is not even an event in any sense of the
word. After all, we evolve all our life; this happens gradually and is hardly ever
noticed.
The quadruple of dimensions supplements the two dimensions that have already
been made explicit by supplying their respective implicit antagonists. Hence, the
tense relationship between the stage and the scenery now takes center stage. I will
first explain the two pairs of dimensions in their relations to one another rather
abstractly and then illustrate them with a few references to the pool of examples.

6.2.1

Material Dimension and Subjective Dimension

The material dimension of the practice of argumentation concerns the fact that,
in arguing, we present and try to determine states of affairs. The subjective dimension concerns the fact that this presentation and determination always occur from a
certain perspective.
Let us begin with an elucidation of the material dimension: We engage in argumentation, understood as the search and investigation of new orientations, only if
there are new and strange states, processes, and behaviorsin others and possibly
even in ourselvesthat take us to the limit of our normal orientation. This orientation works fairly well as long as it determines the states of affairs as widely and in

6.2

Four Dimensions

237

as much detail as necessary. At the limits of orientation, where theses and arguments
are formulated for the purpose of elucidation and illumination, argumentation is a
matter of determining states of affairs accurately, as they really are orin the
case of normative states of affairshow we really want and can want them to
be. This talk of reality is not supposed to refer to any material metaphysics, but to
the fact that we always want to answer as accurately and thoroughly as possible the
questions expressing our lack of orientation. In doing so, we commit ourselves to
objectivity or try to ensure as much as possible that we are not trapped within our
subjective impressions and imaginings.
This commitment to objectivity unfolds in different ways. One is the reference to
theoretical bases, which can be used to support the argument. We examine the theoretical basis from which theories and arguments are constructed (a construction that
subsequently proves itself in the use of concepts, opening statements, and transitions) with respect to its possible universality. In doing so, our striving for reference
to the matter becomes manifest in the greatest possible use of the kind of epistemic
theory that yields a common argumentative basis or that has possibly even been
established as knowledge. The epistemic theory contained in an argument guarantees stability through references to a praxis. Knowledge is its strongest element.
A second way of strengthening the material dimension of the practice of argumentation is by opening oneself up to the opponents perspective, that is, by concerning oneself with his views and his position. The subjectivity of the constitution
that we use to support the state of affairs in question by means of theses and arguments can never be completely dismissed, but the practice of argumentation aims at
neutralizing and transcending it. I cannot place myself outside of my own way of
seeing; my opponent, on the other hand, does not even have to try to do so: He is
automatically outside of my way of seeing and vice versa. Certainly, subjectivities
do not simply cancel each other out in such a way that, in their interactions, the state
of affairs could appear in and of itself. Strictly speaking, we can refer to the state
of affairs in and of itself only by way of inquiry; in the practice of argumentation,
this takes the form of a quaestio. But if we pursue the quaestio argumentatively by
transcending and integrating subjective determinations, we, in the end, do not generate the state of affairs in and of itself either. Rather, it is for us and, as such, is
temporary: It can fall apart in the case of mistakes, contradictions, or limitations.
We are generally unable to prevent this from happening.
Objectivity is often contrasted with emotionality. As I mentioned in Chap. 3, this
is neither necessary nor always helpful. Emotionality arises from the affective bond
to certain subject-specific determinations of the state of affairs. It feels quite wrong
if one is forced to watch the driver of a sports car flirt with a girl through his open
car window while the engine is runningit smacks of noise disturbance, exhaust
disturbance, foppery, and showing off. But this is not true for every observer. For
my mother, who had lived through the war and postwar years, the apotropaic roar of
firecrackers and rockets on New Years Eve felt quite wrongdepending on her
mood, it sounded like air raids or a waste of money. But for my children, such an
emotional reaction sounds quite wrong, tooit sounds like being stingy and stuck
in the past.

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Dialogue Events

Subjective attachments are unavoidable; they can only be mitigated through a

process of distancing. Hence, distance sometimes needs to be a general attitude
and, at other times, it must be generated in the discussion (by working on the
frames and possibly undermining the primary framing). It should be clear that an
immediate acting out of emotions in dialogical interactions is a form of subtle
violence that must be controlled. Nevertheless, it has been made sufficiently clear
by now that rationality and emotionality cannot simply be played off against one
another.
This idea should be extended. What is true of emotions is also true of the entire
subjective imprint: It does not make objectivity impossible. The basic fact of the
subjective dimension is that a state of affairs is framedthat is, influenced in a
more or less obvious way by the coordinates of the position from which the thesis
or the particular argument is put forward. To put it in more fundamental terms, it
is influenced by the orientation system that entertains the position as a research
project. We are bound to admit the following: Any determination of a state of
affairs that carries with it a validity claim is primarily located in a certain perspective. To the degree that, as proponent and opponent, we are different subjects,
have formed different orientation systems, and entertain different research projects, our theses and arguments will be heterogeneous. But we do not always come
across this heterogeneity by ourselves. Dialogues can drag on without any of
theperhaps subtledifferences in the use of words becoming apparent.4 We
only begin to look around and may have a chance of coming across the heterogeneity of arguments once the evidence that there has been a misunderstanding
becomes overwhelming.

6.2.2

Procedural Dimension and Structural Dimension

From a static perspective that merely directs our attention towards the structures
involved, the heterogeneity of arguments cannot be dissolved. Hence, there are
different frames at play, and arguing either comes to an end5 or our consideration

Arnulf Deppermann describes it this way: The participants in argumentation construct arguments which they frame as objections and refutations of opposing positions, while the attacked
position, however, is not the opponents original position, but a more or less changed representation of it. Cf. Deppermann (2000), 153 (Trans. T.P.). Deppermann recognizes and describes such
semantic shifts very well in his writings. What he neglects somewhat, however, is an explanation
of these shifts as the result of the encounter and interaction of heterogeneous positions. Although
Deppermann uses the word position, he has no concept of a project formation that posits a thesis
and then generates connecting and successor theses under the pressure of counterarguments, all the
while further developing the concepts, if necessary. In other words, he has no concept of a formation in which people who seek orientation for their actions and their lives present themselves.
5
In his book, Lyotard (1988), Jean-Francois Lyotard claims that (a) heterogeneity is the norm in
discourse and that (b) the problem is principally not solvable. To my mind, both claims are theatrical or gloomy exaggerations.

6.2

Four Dimensions

239

requires another dimension that not only highlights the products of thinking,
researching, and theorizing but also the process of their creationa process that is
not yet over in the respective moment of observation. Arguing not only pertains to
the sphere of the correctness of the conclusion, which philosophers of science have
called the context of justification, but it also needs to be expanded to include the
context of discovery.6 In order to do so, we posit the second dimension herethat
is, the verbal process of theory formationin which we seek, find, develop, and
elaborate appropriate parameters for the practice of argumentation. The procedural
dimension of argumentation is represented by the term, discussion, and the structural dimension by the terms, inferential structure or inference structure. The
concepts posited thereby are more detailed definitions of colloquial words. In ordinary language, discussion has a much broader extension. It is not necessarily
limited to the procedural side; sometimes, it is almost synonymous with argumentation. It is equally common, however, to describe argumentation only as what
we have designated as inference structure and that probably corresponds to the
original (Latin) meaning of argumentatio.
Discussion is derived from discutere (cut, destroy). It is precisely this imagery
that suits our purpose here: For the procedural dimension of discussions, it is not
essential that arguing takes time, but that complex thoughts, viewpoints, ideas, and
positions (or just the frames that organize them) are broken up, cut up, or divided
through confrontations with new viewpoints, which then facilitates possible recombinations. The role that argumentative speech may play in the theoretical support of
research processes depends essentially on such a destruction of the respective
aggregates and on the testing of newly recombined aggregates.
In the discussion, there are contributions that may be theses as well as arguments for or against certain theses. Of course, all sorts of preparations, introductions, or explanations of theses and arguments can occur. The contributions are
consecutive and, thus, refer to each other and to the thesis that the respective
speaker is discussing. This results in moves and successive moves, which I tried
to systematize in Sect. 6.1. In the reality of dialogue events, this is often much less
orderly. For instance, a successive move might not directly follow the move it
refers to, but might occur much later. On the other hand, a move can refer to several previous moves in such a way that it needs to be clarified how and in what
order the reference can now be examined. Actually, the procedural character of a
discussion does not alone, and not primarily, consist of a temporal sequence of
moves. On the contrary, the fact that a dialogue takes place in timeand, in fact,
takes timeis initially simply a contingent matter. Any theoretical coercion to
grasp dialogue events in a procedural dimension results only from the fact that the
6

This distinction was introduced by Hans Reichenbach (cf. Reichenbach (1938), 1). Karl Popper
adopted it in his Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper (1968), Chapter I, 2). Until the Kuhnian
turn, it belonged to the base stock of thought in the philosophy of science, a cornerstone of the
static, theory-fixated way of seeing. The old philosophical distinction between genesis and validity
is much more suitable for general theoretical purposes. It has now been accentuated differently and
become more parsimonious (in particular, it does not imply any ideas about the notion of discovery
that are biased in favor of the social sciences).

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elements of these eventsthat is, the theses and arguments put forward through
contributionsare transformed in the course of the discussion. This process
becomes apparent in reformulations and particularly in a special kind of reformulation, which I have described as permutation above under (3d).
I would like to think for a moment about how and why a thesis or an argument
might change. Of course, they may change factually because people are distracted
and, for example, change the meaning of words and sentences without being aware of
it. This is not very interesting here, although it certainly will affect the outcomethat
is, the finally accepted conclusion. As an evaluator, one has to concern oneself with
the rectification of such connections at least by the time the argument is analyzed
systematically. Some conclusion or another might present itself quite differently.
Now, the interesting cases with respect to the procedural dimension are those in
which a part of an argumentative speech undergoes a transformationnamely, as a
result of coming to terms with a move made by another party. I will call such
changes reformulations. Reformulated theses and arguments are successor
theses and successor arguments. They occur when a discussion partners contribution casts new light on one of my own contributions. In some circumstances, this
might lead to the need for me to explain and accentuate what I meant. Why is this
necessary? Well, because I was not exactly sure about my thesis previously.
I knew what this thesis was, but I only knew it against the background of what I had
previously considered. I now have to reformulate it against the broader and altered
background introduced by my opponents statements. (At this point, the reader will
surely be reminded of the frame changes mentioned in Chap. 5.)
Pragmatically speaking, such a reformulation means that in argumentative
speech, which is now viewed as an action, something is realized that has been
introduced by the dialogue partner. A partners contribution to the discussion may
change the opinions and insights I had with respect to my thetic sketch. In that case,
I have to decide how to maintain my validity claim with respect to a particular thesis
or argument. Frequently, it becomes necessary to reformulate them. Such reformulations develop both, the thetic construction and the resulting view and insight
that I had of the states of affairs surrounding the quaestio.
In an argumentative dialogue, I often come across the fact that my opponents
arguments frame the states of affairs differently. Hence, our positions are heterogeneous. Therefore, the task at hand is to reduce heterogeneity by modeling the frames
and to place the respective state of affairs in a single frame or complex of frames.
Doing so may result in arguments being permuted. In extreme cases, the replacement of a frame can turn an objection into a reason or a reason into an objection.
I think that such permutations (sometimes, things are permuted over and over
again) are typical of discussions that progress. Ideally, the frames involved will not
be reconciled in just any kind of way, but literally synthesized: This is where the
need for a third frame or complex of frames comes in, which allows the frames
pertaining to contrary determinations of the state of affairs to coexist. However, this
is rare. Usually, any constellation will do in which they can exist together or next to
each other, while still conveying an understanding of the states of affairs at the limits
of orientation, at least by showing other possibilities.

6.2

Four Dimensions

241

To sum up, spectacular permutations change the thetic function of arguments.

In some cases, I may transform something that you put forward as a reason for
your thesis into an objection, or something that you used as an objection to my
thesis becomes transformed into a reason for it. This is done by sublating and
changing the frame.
To illustrate this, I will once again refer to a small example from Columbus
studies. In his deliberations with the Spanish royal house, Coln was first of all
required to overcome the skepticism of experts about the possibility of a Western
passage to India. On this front, he presented the thetic construction that I outlined in
Chap. 2. But the whole thing had a second side to it that dealt explicitly with business. The man offered the discovery of colonizable territories, for which he could
expect a reward in the case of success. Now, Coln was a man whose thirst for
adventure and whose belief in being one of a select few were allied closely with a
pronounced business sense. Thus, in the case of his success, he demanded a reward
that exceeded any measure. First, he demanded titles and dignities, some of which
could not be awarded to foreigners (a hereditary title of nobility, the title of admiral of the oceanic seas) and some of which did not exist at all (viceroy of the new
territories). Second, he demanded a significant and lasting stake in the gains resulting from these discoveries.
Andreas Venzke illustrates the many reasons why these demands could not have
been met under any circumstances.7 That all demands were finally met nonetheless
in the Treaty of Santa Fe is one of the many riddles surrounding the person of Coln
and the discovery of the New World. How could this have happened? Argumentatively
speaking, there are several irrefutable objections to the Spanish crown signing such
a treaty. Hence, there is no theory that could answer the question. But Venzke writes
that it may have been the very excessiveness of the demands that lent the project the
seriousness necessary for its acceptance.
This argument is interesting because it sublates the frame for assessing
demandsa frame in which their adequacy, if predictable, is in a fairly stable relation to their chances of being accepted. After all, Colns plan is doubtful indeed.
If he had demanded comparatively modest rewards, this would have almost functioned as a confirmation of such doubts. Hence, a rejection would have been quite
likely. The expedition could not have been presented as worthy of funding based on
further objective reasons. By connecting the request with these exorbitant demands,
Coln might have paved the way for the final boost of significance that was still
missing. A different perspective shows that, instead of being a reason for refusal
(such as one would expect at first), the excessiveness of his demands emphasized
the significance of the expedition, which (in fact) exceeded all measure once more,
thus turning it into a reason for acceptance.
Today, this trope is no longer unusual. In the case of research grant proposals,
expert fees, salary expectations, etc., it is primarily the claim for money that is supposed to warrant the worth of the issue. By reading this mode of action into the
7

Cf. Venzke (1991), in the chapter on the capitulations of Santa Fe, 115 ff.

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Dialogue Events

context of the late Middle Ages, Venzke apparently assumes that something like this
is part of human nature. Regardless of whether this is the only possible reading, one
thing is clear: Venzkes thesis can solve the riddle of the Treaty of Santa Fe.
Finally, I would like to remind you once again of a structure I briefly introduced
in Chap. 4, but whose function can only really become understandable now that we
are dealing with a dynamic view of the practice of argumentation. Once we have
given up the static conception of argumentation in which argumentative speech is
nothing but the actualization of fixed structures and we begin to understand arguing
as a process in which structures are formed and transformed in their focus on the
question of validity, we can describe this in such a way that the reformulation of
theses can be interpreted as a modification of the operation of asserting. It is a fact
that not only in an argumentative conversation, but also in an argumentative essay
that presents the development of a thought, we make progress in understanding what
is asserted as well as progress in understanding what counts as a good argument for
and against it. This is documented by the fact that theses and arguments are reformulated. The thesis reformulated in this processthat is, based on argumentsis the
successor thesis. Successor theses are restrictions, intensifications, extensions, or
re-accentuations of the initial thesis.
The successor thesis needs to be distinguished, on the one hand, from the
connector thesis and, on the other hand, from the actual new thesis, which
occurs in case of a change of subject. A connector thesis is formulated when an
argument highlights the importance of a hitherto underappreciated aspect of the
quaestio, which must now be included in the thetic sketch in accordance with the
position guiding it. A change of subject, on the other hand, takes place if an interest
in the original thesis is exhausted or put on hold. Of course, since everything is connected in one way or another (given sufficient imagination, some connection can
always be found), saying whether or not this is the case is not always easy.
Still, I think that a distinguishing criterion begins to emerge if we ask when and
why we should draw this distinction. This is the case if one party says: This is
something different, something new, which no longer (directly) relates to our topic.
Someone who puts this forward as a (meta)-objection against a reformulation of the
thesis states that there is a gap between the existing thesis and the new assertion.
If this gap is not closed in an understandable way, then we are dealing with a change
of topic. But if it is closed comprehensively, then we are dealing with the reformulation of a thesis based on arguments. In the latter case, the unity of discourse has
been preserved, and we have a successor thesis.
As an example for a successor thesis, I will now present another episode from the
events surrounding the discovery of the New World. It is described only in broad
contours in Columbus log,8 but we can easily reconstruct it in the form of a
dialogue.
It is a memorable debate. India has been found; the Spaniards have been able to
make it back to the shores of Portugal after the loss of their main vessel and a crossing during which they were beset by the heaviest of storms. The relations between
8

Cf. Jane (1968), 182, log, entry for March 5, 1493.

6.2

Four Dimensions

243

Spain and Portugal are tense. The Treaty of Alcacovas (1479) has entitled the
Portuguese to all the countries in the southwestern ocean. Colns journey probably
violated this treaty, even though this cannot be determined conclusively at the time.
So the Portuguese king sends out a gunboat to meet the two battered Spanish caravels
at the mouth of the Tejo river. What follows is a picturesque scene of ridiculous and
magnificent tragedy. Bartolomeu Dias, Portugals greatest navigator, attempts to
treat Coln as a buccaneer who has illegitimately taken possession of territories.
The rough outlines of the ensuing war of words can be reconstructed in four moves:
D1: You have to come off the ship onto our boat and identify yourself.
C1: No, I will not do that. My identity, my self-understanding as a representative of
the Spanish crown, does not allow me to do so.
D2: In that case, send the owner of the ship to deliver the papers.
C2: No, my identity as a captain, who is responsible for the well-being of his crew,
does not allow me to do that.
For the purposes of this demonstration, I will focus on the transition from D1 to
D2. D1 posits a thesis. Dias formulates a request. He may have meant this as a command or an attempt at an instigation. But the fact that the exchange becomes a
conversation in which arguments are used turns this request into a thesis. In my
reading, Dias sentence expresses his opinion that it would be necessary or appropriate for the Spaniard to descend from his ship and identify himself on the Portuguese
boat. Coln, however, provides a counterargument including a reason. Dias now
reformulates his thesis in such a way that it bypasses the state of affairs used by
Coln to justify his refusalnamely, that he is a representative of the Spanish
crown. Colns criticism is not itself criticized, but integrated. Hence, this is a reformulation based on arguments. Nevertheless, it cannot be somehow derived from
the previous arguments. It has only been made possible. The form that a reformulation of a thesis takes under any given circumstances depends on the field in which
we are operating. It requires expertise (in this case, knowledge of the legal situation)
and imagination.
The successor thesis in this case is a restricted version of the original thesis. Dias
does not yield. These Spanish sailors, he believes, must face the fact that they have
intervened in Portugals sovereign rights and that this will not be accepted. Since the
captain is apparently intent on a confrontation, which involves risks and may not be
strictly necessary yet, the task is to assert the same thesis in a suitably changed form.
Question: Should we not say that Dias has abandoned his original thesis and put
forward a new, weaker one? Yes. It should be clear, however, that the second thesis
does not come out of the clear blue sky, but that there are positions (see Chap. 2.6).
Dias does not introduce anything new, he merely further articulates his position.
The man has not abandoned his goal; his second thesis probably allows him to target
it more clearly than the original one. It may become clear at this point in what
sense even normative theses have the status of theory in the research process.
Initially, Dias does not understand the situation and its implications. It is only after
Colns objection that he sees what sort of person the Spaniard is and in what kind

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Dialogue Events

of situation he has ended up by enforcing his kings orders. The fate of his first
thesisnamely, the captains self-confident and determined oppositionhas
introduced this new information.
The successor thesis also needs to be distinguished from the possibility of
merely elevating an argument to the status of a thesis. Only the statusor, rather,
the current argumentative functionchanges in this case. In principlethat is, in
accordance with the principle of argumentative speechevery utterance can be
interrogated and examined regarding any validity claims included therein. Such an
interrogation might necessitate the explicit assertion of an argument, which consequently becomes a (sub)-thesis.
Once it has been understood that theses and arguments usually do not leap forth
ready-made from the debaters heads, but that they are developed and shaped in
discussions, what suggests itself is the observation of the development of concepts,
theories, and action opportunities over a longer period. In analogy to the small process, which can take place in a single dialogue, we now arrive at the conception of
a big process, which is the process of the growth of knowledge. With respect to
theory, we are not only dealing with a single dialogue, but with a whole sequence of
dialogues. This sequence does not merely consist of conversations; it is interrupted
by phases in which the previous view of the thesis is realized in trial actionsa
realization that shows results, which can then be introduced into the next dialogue
as a new argument. This big process reveals the role of argumentative discourse
in the process of human progress. It does not only change individual orientations
in specific areas, but rather the living conditions of the subjects utilizing themin
other words, it changes the whole human world.
I would now like to elucidate the structural side. After all, there are many different ways of referring to the structure of a discussion. At this point, I would like to
address the structure we produce discursively by attending to theses, considering
how we may back them up, and asking whether the presented reasons are good
that is, whether they have been constructed based on pertinent epistemic theory. If
we have finally identified, in a discussion, a thesis for which we have good reasonsreasons that could refute any potentially existing objectionsthen we call
this result the conclusion.9
It is a sad but unavoidable fact that by no means do all discussions lead to a conclusion. If, however, a discussion has succeeded, this can be represented in a discussion protocol, in which the main arguments (i.e. the ones that have endured) appear
as premises and in which the transition from this group of premises to the conclusion is (more or less) reasonable. Such a discussion protocol is what I have called
inference structure. This term refers to the network of relationships between the
premises and the conclusion, and among the premises themselves. The PPC structure apparently covers this inference structure; as such, it is quite correct. What is
wrong about it, however, is the assumption that it will be there from the start, so that
any dynamics are no longer necessary or possible. From the dynamic perspective,
9

From Lat. concludere: to complete, to decide.

6.3

Linear and Retroflexive Argumentation

245

the inference structure, or the structure of a justification against which no more

objections exist and which therefore supports a conclusion, guides the verbal activities in a discussion. I think this is realistic: We attempt to produce the thetic construction that we consider right for each quaestio and demonstrate its validity by
using reasons as well as reasons for reasons, rejecting objections, and providing
reasons for objections.
So much for the terms of an abstract account. The multidimensionality of argumentative speech aimed at here already allows us to seek an answer to the question
of how even heterogeneous positions and arguments can culminate in a valid result.
This leads to a process of discussion in which we move forward toward theses and
backward toward appropriate arguments by way of presented theses and arguments
as well as revised theses and arguments. The process of searching and reformulating
continues until we arrive at a conclusion articulating the state of affairs in question
in (a complex of) frames that reconcile and unify the main arguments.
The relationship between process and outcome in the practice of argumentation
is not a simple temporal sequence. On the one hand, at any moment, the process
yields a result that may potentially be defined as the state of discussion. On the
other hand, the result alone that determines what is part of the process. Arguments
are, in this sense, premises in the process of becoming, and theses are conclusions
in the process of becoming. In contributions to the discussion, we explore transformations of the theoretical form of states of affairs, which come together in the
conclusion to stabilize each other and, thus, determine the form of the premises.
This retroflexive structure apparently requires a revision of the usual preunderstanding of a unilateral relationship of support between premises and the conclusion.10 I will return to this point later.

6.3

Linear and Retroflexive Argumentation

In this section, I will discuss structural properties of the relationship between, on the
one hand, the arguments accepted as premises and, on the other hand, potential
theses which are isolated and one of which is established as the conclusion in the
end. This relationship features a distinctive structure, which I call the retroflexive
structure. Its occurrence is not unusual, but there is, to my mind, nothing in theory
that captures it adequately. Hence, I will try to penetrate this structure theoretically.
For this purpose, I differentiate it from the linear structure, whose occurrence is
actually quite rare, but which is still the standard case according to theorists
particularly those affiliated with logicism, of course.

10

Cf. the great book by my student, Ursula Schmidt (2010), where this structure enables a differentiated reconstruction of the Copernican Revolution in argumentative steps. Geert-Lueke Lueken
also presented a small, easily comprehensible, and well-analyzed example in Lueken (2000b),
4449.

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Dialogue Events

The key question regarding this difference is whether the theoretical basis that
grounds the thetic construction is maintained throughout the process of argumentation or whether this basis is transformed because of occurrences in this process
that is, because of emerging gaps or inconsistenciesso that the finally attained
group of premises and a conclusion rest on an evolved theoretical basis.
The first structural genesis is called linear and the second retroflexive. The
term retroflexive is supposed to highlight that the process of argumentation bends
back on itself11 and, in doing so, is impelled to change. After all, as already indicated
above, the practice of argumentationunderstood as the dialogical development of
a thetic structure that culminates in the thesisis itself a verbal process for realizing
considerations and interpretations. For instance, we establish definitions, and if the
defined terms are used in statements, then the definitions have been realized in the
process. If, for example, we can show some consequences of a generalization to be
undesirable, and if this generalization then becomes slightly restricted, this is also a
verbal realization of the argument. A closer look at these processes shows that this
is the construction of thetic theory. The revision of the theoretical basis, which can
occur in the process of construction, is partly the replacement of one epistemic
theory with another, more suitable one, and it is partly its replacement with new
thetic theory. Often, frame structures are also adapted in the process.
In the case of linear argumentation, it is transparent which arguments act as reasons, how these subordinated and/or coordinated reasons build upon each other, and
how they relate to objections: by denying, refuting, or integrating them. Apart from
that, it can be determined by way of analysis which theories are incorporated,
because the argument will presuppose them. Although the relationship between the
reasons and the conclusion is not deductiveat least, not when it comes to substantial argumentsit is like a one-way street. The premises provide reasons and
presuppose the incorporated epistemic theory. The reasons within a justification are
ordered in a sequence of steps based on the principle of methodical order. They are
arranged anterior to each other and to the thesis as a whole in a systematic fashion.
In the case of a retroflexive structural genesis, there is a relationship of support
that is bidirectionalthat is, from the group of premises to the conclusion and vice
versa. This happens if the theoretical basis that we introduce to the discussion
proves to be a failure as an argumentative basis. This may be the case because the
bases are not homogeneous from the outset and, therefore, require further work on
the frames. But it may also be because an objection causes the epistemic basis used
by a proponent in his argument to be exhausted.12 This requires the increased thetic
content to be reconciled with the bases through a process of revision. In such a case,
the argumentprovided that it produces a conclusionhas transformed the theoretical basis that led to the construction of the original thesis.13
11

From Lat. retroflectere: to bend backwards.

Translators note: Exhausted is meant in the sense of unblocking and tapping into the theoretical potential of a thesis (cf. Sect. 2.6).
13
The origin of this structure can be traced to Nelson Goodmans attempt to provide a foundation
of logic (cf. Goodman (1965)). Even if that attempt proved inadequate, the retroflexive structure
12

6.3

Linear and Retroflexive Argumentation

247

Such a structural-genetic analysis provides two directions for the process of

argumentation: Forwards and upwards as well as backwards and downwards. The
construction of the thesis moves forwards; the selection and shaping of the theoretical conditions for this construction, if necessary by enriching it with thetic theory,
moves backwards. If this leads a dialogue group to process and prepare the theory
required for the satisfaction of a validity claim until it is a good fit, however, is this
not a circular procedure? A vicious circle that, as is well known, is a fallacy? No,
the difference is this: In the retroflexive structure, the epistemic basis that grounds
the thesis evolves; in the circular structure, however, it remains the same. The retroflexive structure has a procedural dimension in which something new is being created; the circular structure simply reproduces the same assertion that has already
been questioned. The retroflexive structure is the productive circle, which is the
circular structure that all those people are seeking who look for a silver lining in this
matter, but have not yet penetrated it far enough.14
Of course, for it to generate a valid conclusion, the retroflexive structure must also
be linked to an epistemic basis. If the latter merely consists of thetic material, it
generates theses from theses and, as such, is viciously circular. Any real treatment or
development of the theoretical basis generally requires a realization of thetic material.
Hence, in the retroflexive structure, the treatment and transformation of the epistemic
basis means that new information must be obtained and incorporated.
But new information has to come from somewherethat is, the proponents
research process has to progress in this respect. Two sources are possible here. On
the one hand, there is the opponent. He could introduce something that exceeds the
proponents state of orientation. On the other hand, the field of praxis might provide
new experiences. For instance, something has been done differently this time: The
action has been expanded and intensified, and this has led to the rise of new aspects.
Tom Sawyers whitewashing of the fence in Chap. 5 was such a case. The incorporation of new information into the theoretical basis (or epistemic theory) transforms
the latter. The argument refers back to its own presuppositions. This is what I call
retroflexive.
In view of these considerations, we discover that a very common instance of
seemingly logical reasoning that generates new knowledge is actually a covert case
of retroflexive argumentation. Anytime someone puts forward a new thesis that
surprises us and backs it up with implicatory premises that are also new to us, this
seems to confirm the logicistic idea that we can deduce new theses by way of deductive inferences. But a logical inference cannot provide the thesis with an epistemic
status. Only a realization of the thesisas well as the vivid, practical experiences

has become a vital figure in philosophical argumentation. A good example is John Rawls reflective equilibrium for justifying the principles of justice. According to Rawls, the latter is achieved
by going back and forth between moral principles and concrete moral judgments and thereby
producing a balance through revisions both above and below (i.e. by developing appropriate
beginnings for an appropriate normative conclusion); cf. Rawls (1971), 4851.
14
Cf., for example, Rescher (2000), 314; cf. also Footnote 24 in Chap. 9 on Reschers circular
rationality.

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Dialogue Events

that result from incorporating the thesis in ones orientationscan do so. If someone
introduces as a premise a new piece of information that logically entails a previously questionable thesis, then it is not the logical inferencethat is, the final step
of a justificationwhich could render anything valid here. Rather, it is the reason or the information that is presupposed in the inference to the conclusion. If this
information is correct, then the thesis is valid. However, it is not the case that we
arrived at this new insight argumentatively; we have simply been instructed by a
new piece of information that we did not possess before.
To illustrate this, let us consider another example from research about the
discoverer of America. It has been said that Coln was not Italian. Apparently, he
could not speak Italian. None of the documents by him were written in Italian, not
even his letters to other Italians like Toscanelli, his Genoese banker, or his brother.
Therefore, let us assume the following premises:
P1: Coln did not write any of the preserved documents in Italian.
P2: The set of preserved documents is representative for the set of all of Colns
documents.
P3: Anyone who does not write in Italian cannot speak Italian.
P4: Anyone who cannot speak Italian is not Italian.
From this, it follows logically that:
C: Coln was not Italian.
But did we really know the premises? No, but we accept them if they are used by
an expert. Thus, this is the procedure: If a thesis is justified by a deductive inference,
then premises are used in the process. If the proponent is sufficiently trustworthy,
we accept his premises instantly. This can lead to the impression that new theories
can be justified by logical inferences. (By the way, only P1 is established as
knowledge.)

6.4

Discussion of Pros and Cons

The practice of natural argumentation and, to some degree, of scientific and philosophical argumentationespecially where we seemingly or in fact deal with economic circumstancesis largely carried out in a special form for which the term
Discussion of Pros and Cons has become common. A study of this practice may
almost convey the idea that this is the typical method of using arguments. Even if a
private matter requires a prudent decisionregarding a vacation trip, a purchase,
a place to study, etc.we identify and weigh the pros and cons for one or the other
possibility. Of course, television debates about politically or socially controversial
subjects like building a new airport, the installation of phone masts, euthanasia,
genetic engineering, etc., contribute significantly to the prevalence of this form of
argumentation.

6.4

Discussion of Pros and Cons

249

Here, the following standard format has emerged: There is a thesis and a counterthesis, which are each represented by an advocate; both advocates plead their case
in order to justify the respective thesis. Then there are experts on controversial
issues who are questioned by the advocates, so that the arguments are confirmed,
rebutted, or modified. Finally, there is a judge: the present or observing audience.
The aim and conclusion of such an event is a vote. Possibly, in contrast to a vote at
the beginning of the event, its result is viewed as an assessment of the validity of
the thesis.
Debates, such as the ones that take place in a competitive fashion in schools
and universitiesparticularly in the English-speaking worldhave a slightly different format. Here, we have a pro party and a con party for each thesis. Both attempt
to justify their own position and to rebut the opponents position in a particular order
of contributions to the debate. One party wins. This winner is determined by a jury
of judges, who are usually experts on the matter and/or the art of debate.
A discussion of pros and cons is a distinct form of argumentation whose
features promote a view according to which successful argumentative results
depend on the number and weight of the arguments put forth.15 This may be intuitively
plausible, but can hardly be captured theoretically. At the beginning of Chap. 4, I
addressed the problem of how to individuate arguments. A solution to this problem
determines whether there can be a certain number of arguments in the first place.
I demonstrated why we should refrain from setting up precise criteria for individuation and be content with an intuitive understanding of argumentative units. But
this means that, when it comes to satisfying validity claims, the suggestion that we
should put our faith in the larger number of arguments, rather than the smaller
one, becomes an open-ended endeavor. Moreover, the metaphor insinuating that
arguments have a weight (A1 weighs more than A2) or a force (A1 is stronger
than A2) has hardly ever been precisely clarified, either. I will come back to this
at some later point.
Such questions, however, do not arise in scenarios involving the public discussion of pros and cons. After all, these scenarios are not cases in which arguments
are somehow measured and weighed in any comprehensive manner. Rather, the
judge simply announces a result. If she can be forced to explain her judgment,
then she just says that more and/or weightier arguments spoke for it than against it.
As long as argumentation theory provides no tools for the discussion of pros and
cons, the faon de parler of numbers and weights will continue to give an opaque
and, in some parts, a quite arbitrary procedure a faade of objectivity.
To my mind, this state of affairs is dissatisfying, especially in light of the ubiquity and influence of discussions of pros and cons. In the following, I will try to
improve upon it.
The discussion of pros and cons has some conspicuous features that distinguish
it from an ordinary dialogue that aims at justification and is controlled by the
opponent:
15

An early example of this way of thinking is Benjamin Franklins famous letter (September
19. 1772) to Joseph Priestley; cf. Franklin (1973).

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Dialogue Events

(a) At issue is not a thesis, but a decision among the pair of thesis and
counter-thesis.
(b) Several independent arguments can be put forward for both the thesis and the
counter-thesis. Taken together, they do not have to form a chain of reasons, but
can relate to each other in any other way.
(c) In general, the arguments concern various aspects of the relevant states of
affairs; as such, they are independent of each other and cannot be easily
compared.
(d) The relations of arguments to each other and to the thesis seem to depend on
qualities that make arguments countable and weighable.
(e) The decision in favor of the thesis or the counter-thesis is a result of the comparison of arguments with respect to their precise countability and weighability.
At this point, the question is whether the discussion of pros and cons can be
captured using the existing theoretical apparatus. Put differently, can the approach
presented here shed light on the use of arguments in discussions of pros and cons,
or are we dealing with something completely different? After all, it is also conceivable that the validity of a thesis is not at all the issue, but that we aim instead at the
greatest possible assent to a decision. But as soon as such an agreement is supposed
to be more than a mere situational factthat is, if it is supposed to express a general
acceptabilitythen a validity claim arises whose satisfaction would have to be
testable.
In the literature on argumentation theory, the discussion of pros and cons rarely
receives specific attention. In fact, most authors do not even mention it specificallyneither Toulmin nor Perelman, Habermas, Kopperschmidt, or Lumer. One of
the few German authors who does concern himself with this form is the linguist
Dieter Wunderlich.16 He recognizes the heterogeneity of arguments and introduces
many suggestions, good ideas, and examples. Overall, however, Wunderlich wants
to solve the problem of heterogeneity by assigning a degree of evidence and a
degree of relevance to argumentsunfortunately, without further specifying how
to determine such degrees. There is some literature on the form of the debate, but
most of it on the level of simple handbooks. In the English-speaking world, where,
as I mentioned, the debate has a larger cultural significance, there are also more
ambitious works. The great book by Ehninger and Brockriede17 is a classic. It
includes much know-how, but also some real argumentation theory. Hence, it is
surprising that these authors also recommend the Toulmin schema, even though it
cannot be used to model the particular constellation (arguments whose frames are
divergent oppose each other) and the distinct dynamics (arguments provoke further
arguments) of the debate setting. In Manfred Kienpointners Alltagslogik,18 the discussion of pros and cons appears as a well-known form of traditional rhetoric (in
utramque partem). It is even recommended with considerable emphasis (as the
16

Cf. Wunderlich (1980).

Ehninger and Brockriede (1973).
18
Kienpointner (1992).
17

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Discussion of Pros and Cons

251

third postulate of rhetorical relativism),19 but its theoretical elucidation is still a bit
meager: It consists solely of the hint that this is a type of argumentation scheme
that is located on the same level as the types of descriptive and normative or of real
and fictional schemata.20
Some theorists try to make headway by framing the intuitive terms, ranking
and weight, with the conceptual means of decision theory.21 To that end, arguments can be made comparable by assigning scores to themideally, a pair of
scoresso that both the ranking and the weight are recorded quantitatively. If done
skillfully, this weighing of arguments is a simple arithmetic operation. Does this
improve our understanding of the rather significant part of our ordinary practice of
argumentation? Presumably, the difficulty will be how to make the assignment of
scores comprehensible in some way.22 In simple cases, it will be easy to assign a
higher score to A than to B instead of saying, I think A is more important than B.
It is at least an appealing game to try to test the degree to which ones preferences
form transitive relations. Whether this has anything to do with rationality, however,
is another matter and has to be considered with respect to the contents. In particular,
it is far from clear whether such possibilities for comparisonwhich abstract from
both, the content and the subjective character of value assessmentsmake any
sense at all. In order to ensure a methodologically safe procedure, we would have to
introduce a subject-invariant metric predicate of the form argument A weighs n.
This predicate would be a parameter for categorizing arguments on a hierarchical
scale of preferences. Constructing something like that, however, requires solving
some serious problems:
Hierarchies of preferences are usually subject specific.
Hierarchies of preferences are often not even transitive within the same system
of orientation.
Arguments can have different preferences in different contexts.
How to solve these problems is not quite clear. However, in light of these difficulties with such a predicate, which could possibly be resolved with the help of
improved formal tools, let us not forget that a calculation facilitated in such a way
is not equivalent to argumentation. The potential of argumentative speech precedes
19

Kienpointner (1992), 162 ff.

Cf. Kienpointner, (1992), 241. In this book, Kienpointner develops a context-independent basic
schema of argumentation (19), which consists of three parts, called argument, inference rule,
and conclusion. Apparently, this is a scheme that can merely represent either a pro argument
orin the case of a negative conclusiona counterargument. We learn nothing, however, about
what sort of schema would enable a discussion of pros and cons. Kienpointner merely insinuates
that such a discussion would expel us from the confines of the Cartesian claim to absolute truth
and falsehood (163) and propel us into the zone of rhetoric, where we would possibly encounter
a consensus on a higher level (163). To be sure, this indicates a certain degree of goodwill on
Kienpointners part, but did he not suggest that such a result could be achieved by way of argumentation (according to a specific schema)?
21
Cf., for example, Scriven (1981), Schmidt-Faber (1986), and Paschen (1996).
22
For criticism of this approach, cf. my essay Wohlrapp (1996).
20

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all computing; it sets in at the moment when we address how and why we should
assign a certain quantum of weight to a particular argument. After all, the weight
of arguments is, at first, something subjective. A simple quantification without further ado would neither express this subjective element nor surpass or transcend it,
but amalgamate it based on a false idea of objectivity, thus rendering it invisible.
As far as I can tell, only the Canadian scholar, Trudy Govier, has made a serious
attempt at analyzing forms of argumentation that also feature counterarguments.23
23

Cf. Govier (1987), Ch. 4: Two Unreceived Views about Reasoning and Argument.This
was more or less the state of the art until 2010, when the CRARR institute in Windsor/
Ontario held a conference dedicated to discussing the specific qualities of the conductive
argument. Subsequently, 15 papers based on the conference contributions were published in
Blair and Johnson (2011). This book is now an instructive source for ideas of what to think
about that figure. The introductory chapter (Blair (2011)) presents a list of questions, which,
however, are raised in the frame of Informal Logic. Most of the following articles, then, circle around problems of (A) the nature of the counterconsiderations: Are they premises
(Jin), or objections (Johnson), or are they defeaters (Pinto), or counterarguments
(Walton)?; (B) the weight (resp. strength) of single, summarized, and outweighed considerations (Allen, Freemann, Pinto, Zenker); and (C) the nature and justification of the transition from the pro and con considerations to a conclusion (Allan, Freemann, Hansen). A rather
clear-sighted view from within the given frame is presented in the paper of Robert Pinto
(2011), who states that the relative strength of pro and con considerations depends on our
preferences and that these can be reasonable if we have good reasons. My own paper
(Wohlrapp (2011)) contains a tightened version of material included in the present book,
enriched with some more illustrations and a decisive criticism of Wellmanns original idea.
Govier has contributed an afterword to the book in which she comments on most of the
papers and offers a new version of her diagram (my criticism about the missing subjective
and procedural dimension is not mentioned at all). Two papers present some criticism of my
views. Fischer (2011) rejects three of my objections against Govier. Firstly, he asserts that
weighing is possible as heft-weighing (which is right, but not for all cases and definitely
not for the disputed ones); secondly, that the ceteris paribus clause must be understood not
in the scientific, but in an everyday sense (however, my criticism of Goviers treatment is not
sensitive to that difference); and thirdly, that my (retroflexive) procedure applies only to
normative issues (which is not the case). Finocchiaro (2011) (a meritorious paper describing
in detail all the approaches to the conductive argument) criticizes my proposals as being
not sufficiently descriptive, but possibly excessively prescriptive. This is an interesting
objection. It could be raised against any theory that tries to understand a human practice
which is not well understood at present or whose current conceptualizations are misleading.A
short time later, Jonathan Adler published an article (Adler 2013) rejecting any efforts at
balancing pros against cons. Adler holds that conductive arguments in the latter sense are
impossible: If a discussion of pros and cons reaches a (detached) conclusion, then this is
the case only because the counter-considerations have been nullified. This view is interesting. It can lead to a more pragmatic treatment of what it is we really do when we move from
pro and con arguments to a certain conclusion. As far as I understand this, the normal
procedure in a discussion of pros and cons is that we do not simply accept every argument;
rather we check them (that is what it means to complete the discussion). Within and after
this process of examination, we try as much as possible to integrate the (rest of the) cons into
a (modified) conclusion. In the present book, this is what I describe as the retroflexive
structure. Certainly, this does not always pan out as intended. In such cases, we usually make
a decision and accept a conclusion (which is certainly different from somehow inferring
it). This means that we have now disregarded the aspects presented in the counter-considerationsno matter whether by outweighing or nullifying them. And then, of course, we
have to bear the practical consequences of disregarding them.

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For that reason, I would like to discuss her analysis in detail and point out its weaknesses. Some of these weaknesses are a direct consequence of Goviers essentially
logicistic approach (although she takes herself to be an Informal Logician). This
approach causes her to prefigure the discussion of pros and cons in a specific way.
An argumentative procedural dimension is not considered; instead, the initial idea is
that different premises come together, thereby enabling the rational acceptance of a
conclusion through their interaction. When Govier then turns to the question of how
to conceive of this possible rational acceptability, she even ponders a continuation
of the discussion beyond the premises considered heretofore, but this approach is
not developed further with any systematic significance.
The various pros and cons, she holds, should be considered together as a group
of premises, which allows for the transition to a conclusion. This transition is supposed to be based on a process of weighing. Since such a transition based on
weighing is neither deductive nor inductive, but merely brings the premises together,
Govier calls this form of argument a conductive argument.24 Such a conductive
argument is characterized by the following four features:
Different arguments that are independent of each other appear as premises.
The group of premises is openthat is, it can become larger if a new argument
is found and smaller if an argument is refuted.
There can be counterarguments (counter-considerations) among the premises.
The conclusion is not logically derived from the premises, but emerges from
them in a process of weighing pros and cons.
First of all, it needs to be conceded that this description is well suited to capture
the intuitions we acquire by using this form in natural argumentation. But our theoretical understanding would clearly benefit from knowing in more detail what it is
that is actually happening when the premises are brought together in such a
remarkable way.
I will refer to two of Goviers own examples in order to discuss her suggestions,
a smaller and a larger one.
The smaller example concerns the case of a married couple that has to decide
which nanny to hire.25 There are two candidates, Jane and Sueboth apparently
already known to the family. What speaks in Janes favor is that she lives close by,
which means that the distance is not too long if she needs to be driven home at night.
What speaks against her is that she was once caught stealing. What speaks for Sue
is that she has always been reliable and responsible; however, her way home takes
five minutes longer.
Govier sees no problem in weighing arguments in this case. Based on what is
known about the candidates, the couple could make a rational decision in favor of
Sue. I will not contest her claim, but I am keenly interested in how the couple is
supposed to do this. It has weighed the arguments. What does that mean? How does
24

Conductive is derivative of the Latin conducere = to bring together. The term and the conceptual
approach go back to Wellmann (1971).
25
Cf. Goviers A Practical Study of Argument. 3rd edition. (1992), 312313.

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the weight of the risk of theft compare with the weight of a shorter way home?
Even if both weighed something, is this weight something stable? Is it of equal
size for each person? These two theoretical problems must be solved for a weighing
to be possible. One concerns the comparability of the various states of affairs in
question; the other concerns the comparability of positions. If we could solve the
first problemthat is, if we could say something substantial about the weight of
the argumentsit would still not be certain that this weight is independent of the
positions involved.
In order to discuss the matter with the help of a more relevant example, I will
take up a question that Govier has discussed throughout the different editions of her
textbook, her treatment of the matter becoming increasingly more sophisticated.
Rather than tracing the development in detail here, I will refer to the version presented in the fourth edition.26 Govier discusses the thesis that active euthanasia
should be legalized and presents four arguments in favor and two against it:
Pro1: Responsible adults should be allowed to choose whether they want to live or
die.
Pro2: Legalizing active euthanasia would spare many patients unbearable pain.
Pro3: Social costs would be reduced.
Pro4: Family members would be spared the agony of having to watch a loved one
die a horrible and unworthy death.
Con1: There is a certain risk of abuse.
Con2: We can never say for sure that a cure for the disease cannot be found.
After enumerating these arguments, the question that Govier addresses is whether
the thesis can be concludedthat is, how to weigh the pros and cons. On the one
hand, she stresses that there is no rule or formula for weighing; on the other hand,
that does not mean that the whole matter is hopelessly subjective or merely a matter of emotion.27 This is followed by a five-page discussion of the procedure she
envisions. In the end, she does not arrive at a decision on the matter, but keeps the
question open. According to the envisioned procedure, each argument is supported
by general principles in its relation to the conclusion. The comparative strength of
the argument is supposed to depend on the differentially restricted generality of
these principles.
With respect to the first of the aforementioned arguments, this means, for
instance, Other things being equal, if a practice consists of voluntary or chosen
26

Cf. Govier (1997), 393 ff. Goviers account of the conductive argument has improved significantly in the transition from the 3rd to the 4th edition. It was within this transitional period that the
ISSA conference took place in Amsterdam in 1994, where I presented my critique (cf. Wohlrapp
(1995b)) and had the opportunity to discuss it with her. Unfortunately, she has considered only a
little of what I had to say. Her presentation of the conductive argument has also remained the
same in the relevant section of her second theoretical work, Govier (1999), 155180, and in a more
recent edition of her textbook (Govier (2005)). Therefore, and because of an ongoing general interest in the debate on euthanasia, I take the liberty to make this dispute public now, based on broader
and hopefully deeper insights.
27
Govier (1997), 393 ff.

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255

actions, it should be legalized. For the third argument in favor, the principle is the
following: Other things being equal, if a practice were to cut social costs, it should
be legalized. The antecedent of these principles conceived in such a way is, as
Govier says, the ceteris paribus clause. Without this condition, any considerations
for example, about the appeal to cost reductionwould show that the principle of
social costs should be kept low may lead to the elimination of all sorts of things
that seem valuable to us (schools for the blind and pensions for the elderly are mentioned explicitly). This leads to the following question: What conditions have to be
given and maintained for the principle to be situated accurately? Her answer, [i]n
this case, there are many indeed.28 For instance, the following: the practice would
have to be socially acceptable, not cruel, not in contravention of recognized human
rights, without significant negative social consequences and so on.29 It is impossible, Govier claims, to enumerate all of these conditions. With respect to the appeal
to cost reduction, she sees much that could be different and that might provide an
exception to the general principle underlying it. For that reason, Govier argues, cost
reduction is a weak argument for the legalization of euthanasia. In contrast, the
principles underlying the arguments in favor of avoiding pain on the side of the
patients and suffering on the side of family members have far fewer exceptions.
Hence, Govier regards the arguments Pro2 and Pro4, which utilize these principles,
as much stronger.
This is followed by some well-intended advicefor example, that one should
avoid a one-sided view (a tunnel vision). Govier also suggests considering other
counterarguments than the ones included among the premisesfor instance, the
following propositions: physicians who perform euthanasia violate their duty to
preserve life; someone who is in severe pain may not be able to make a free choice.
Taking all this into account does not automatically lead to a procedure. But, in the
end, one might be said to have good reasons for committing to a conclusion.
As I said, one can readily agree with all of this. But I will say it one more time:
Govier presents nothing except the instruction to reason as carefully as possible
about an issue and to consider different aspects before reaching a conclusion. It is
significant that she does not arrive at a decision about the issue of euthanasia, as I
already mentioned, but finds that such assessments are nearly always open to
debate.30
Turning now to criticism, I would like to point out, first of all, that the underlying
logicistic PPC approach seems artificial and as restrictive as a tight corset. While
there is a reference to the process of argumentation insofar as the group of premises
is characterized as open, this process is not accounted for in the PPC scheme.
What am I to do with a group of premises that consists of some arguments, but is
open in all other respects? Am I supposed to add some arguments and discard
others? But why and how does the group of premises that will be weighed eventually emerge from the open group of premises, which is presented to me as a
28

Govier (1997), 393 ff.

Govier (1997), 393 ff. (Emphasis in the original.)
30
Govier (1997), 398.
29

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conductive argument? By what rule does it emerge, and why is the rule not part of
this conductive scheme? The instruction to think of other arguments and not to be
one sided in ones considerations is good and useful. But there is no place for it in
this scheme. On the contrary, it tears it apart. The idea that further aspects must be
added and incorporated into the assessment is testament to a style of thinking that
attempts to be procedural and dynamic, but is prevented from being so by the context of the conductive scheme. After all, truly procedural thinking would have to
take into consideration that additional arguments often do not lie around and can
be simply picked up, but that they are developed and tested via discussion.
In order to be able to integrate this theoretically, Govier would have to step out
of her fixed logicistic point of view. The conductive scheme is evidently an extension of logical reasoning. It appears to be more liberal because, in addition to ordinary premises, it also seems to know negative premises. Nevertheless, it is a
Procrustean bed for argumentation. The procedural dimension does not quite fit this
bed and, therefore, is restricted. This dimension can still be seen, though no longer
in vital action, but merely as a solidified trace.
The next point of criticism concerns the procedure of weighing arguments. There
is something plausible about the idea that the relationship of arguments to the conclusion assumes general principles and that these, construed as instances of universal quantification, are valid only in a restricted sense. This idea also continues
Toulmins conception of a warrant to which there could be exceptions. But why is
an argument considered weak based solely on the fact that there are more exceptions to the assumed if-then sentence? Is there any way to compare the number of
exceptions by counting them? Must we not bear in mind that our use of general
principles abstracts from situational features and that, depending on how they are
situated, there may be many exceptions to them? Does this leave room for anything
countable?
At this point, we encounter the general problem of the ceteris paribus clause.
I already mentioned this in Chap. 1. All our know-how and knowledge is subject
to the assumption of a normal situation, even though we are unable to say what
exactly constitutes such a situation. The clause states that the propositions in
question are valid under normal conditionsthat is, under conditions similar to
those of the normal situation. Considered in abstract terms, this is a good idea. In
an argumentative dialogue, however, it is meaningful only if a proponent, who
would like his thesis to be governed by this clause, is able to specify which conditions to keep identical within the assumed normal situation. I described the
clause as a wild card because it can come into play anytime the opponent
shows that the thesis is not true. In that case, the proponent can reply by saying
that he is still right, but that something changed among the things he wanted to
keep constant. That is a beautiful reply. However, the opponent can now complain that the proponent did not integrate such constancy as a specific condition
into his claim. Was there any way for him to do this? No, he would have had to
know what change of conditions could possibly destroy the thesis.
Let us consider the matter on the basis of the third argument in favor of euthanasia. Is it not necessarily true that reducing social costs is good? No, it is good only

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under the condition that these costs are not required for maintaining communal life.
Otherwise, reducing such costs would be bad. What needs to be discussed, then, is
whether or not the costs accrued by the life and care of dying patients are necessary
for the existence of a community. A conceivable answer would be that such costs
are necessary as long as euthanasia is prohibited, but that they become unnecessary
as soon as euthanasia has been legalized. This, however, would simply render the
appeal to cost reduction circular.
If we argue less ineptly in this case, however, we will still be able to see that how
we assess the argument depends on the conclusion. Hence, we would arrive at a retroflexive structure. But regardless of how we decide the question of the necessity of
social costs for the terminally ill, this is quite different from the question of how
many exceptions there are to a cost reduction that is, in principle, desirable.
The arguments that Govier regards to be stronger do not fare much better. Legal
euthanasia, she argues, prevents family members from witnessing an agonizing death.
Here, the general principle would be: Other things being equal, insofar as a practice
would avoid suffering, it should be legalized.31 Is it not strange that there are people
who find such suffering and compassion to be a part of life? In his autobiography,
Bertrand Russell reports that accompanying the dying process of his friend Whiteheads
wife was a turning point in his own life. Russell writes that it made him realize the
incredible fragility of human life, about which he had previously been clueless.32
What would Govier say in response to such questions and suggestions? That they are
just exceptions? That there are not many of them? And that, therefore, avoiding suffering has to be considered a strong argument after all?
Suppose it was correct that most people preferred to be spared such suffering.
Would it not be appropriate to ask, then, whether this perhaps indicates a social
development that is undesirable? If there is some truth to that idea, then the legalization of euthanasia would contribute to an undesirable development. Where does this
leave our argument? Far from being a particularly strong argument for, it would
become a strong argument against legalizing euthanasia.33 At any rate, it is not very
productive to ask how many exceptions we should consider with respect to the general principle underlying this argument. As in the case of reducing social costs
never mind whether it is good or notall we can do at this point is to state
laconically: Well, it depends. Needless and unnecessary suffering should be avoided
if possible. But avoiding non-needless sufferinga suffering that, if we know and

31

Cf. Govier (1997), 394.

Cf. Russell (1967), 146: When we came home, we found Mrs. Whitehead undergoing an unusually severe bout of pain. She seemed cut off from everyone and everything by walls of agony and
the sense of the solitude of each human soul suddenly overwhelmed me At the end of those five
minutes, I had become a completely different person. For a time a sort of mystic illumination possessed me. I felt that I knew the inmost thoughts of everybody that I met in the street, and though
this was, no doubt, a delusion, I did in actual fact find myself in far closer touch than previously
with all my friends and with many of my acquaintances.
33
I would be happy if my readers could see that this case exemplifies how an argument can be
transformed through a frame change. (And that it is a valid argument.)
32

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Dialogue Events

endure it, distinguishes a human life from an immature, hedonistic mode of

existenceis not just good.
Where does this leave us with respect to the question of the number of exceptions? I think it must be said quite bluntly: nowhere. This quantitative trace leads us
astray. The exceptions are not countable, and if an intuitive estimation is supposed
to lead the way, then it is not clear what the result of such an estimation means for
the practice of argumentation. But even if we ignore all of these inconsistencies for
now, how would we process the somehow calculated numbers of exceptions for the
various arguments anyway? Would we really calculate them arithmeticallyso
that, for example, a larger number of exceptions would lead to a lower score for
argumentative strength? Would we then add up the scores for the pros and compare
them with the sum of the scores for the cons? So that, finally, we would plainly see
whether or not this leads to the conclusion? This can hardly be true. Presumably, in
the face of such a lack of understanding, Govier would throw up her hands in horror.
But could she deny that it was she who led the way?
What can we do in order to address this particular form of argumentation more
appropriately? First, we should overcome the logicistic approach and replace the
static material point of view with a multidimensional one. Consequently, instead of
manifesting the rigid conductive argumentative scheme, we introduce a dynamic of
process and outcome, and instead of focusing on seemingly simple states of affairs,
we highlight their subjective acquisition, which can be assimilated and processed.

6.4.1

Integration of the Process-Outcome Relationship

Considering the aforementioned examples in the polarity of process and structure

frees me from the Procrustean bed of the conductive scheme. Regarding the procedural dimension, we would have to consider how we actually argued; regarding the
structural dimension, our focus is on the outcome of that argumentation. I will
sketch this with respect to Goviers two examples.
First, the nanny case: In order to arrive at a rational decision, the discussion of
the arguments presented so far would have to be completed. What do they mean?
Are they correct at all? This results, for example, in the following questions: How
big is the difference between the two ways home? How serious was the theft? What
was stolen? Did a clarifying conversation take place? What is the risk of being
robbed by a girl who has been caught stealing before, but who would still like to
babysit again? And especially how do the two girls interact with the children?
If I want to compare the pros and cons with respect to the question of who to
hire as a nanny, it is initially quite unclear which arguments to take into account.
Of course, (only) the relevant ones should be considered. Hence, the process of
discussion will consist in isolating the relevant arguments. As a part of this process,
whatever may occur to the participants can be taken into consideration. Once an
argument has been put forward, it may potentially be directly tested and potentially
also rejected. This may resemble the following dialogue:

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259

Husband: But is it true that the way to Sues house takes only five minutes longer?
The last time I drove her home, it took nearly 45 minutes.
Wife:
Yes, but that was when they were doing construction work on the Cushing
Bridge.
The longer way home was an argument against Sue. It does not weigh much
as long as the two girls ways home differ only by five minutes. If the difference
is significantly larger, however, the argument becomes more important. That is the
point of the husbands contribution to the discussion. He criticizes the claim that
it is only a difference of five minutes by referring to the duration of his last trip.
The wife, in turn, weakens this objection by pointing out its limits: It is only true
due to a big construction site, which means that you lose time. Usually, that is not
the case.
It is clear that this questioning of the argument will not appear in the discussion
of the resultsthat is, in the final summary of the argumentseven though it played
a role in the process of detecting these arguments. This state of affairs can be generalized: a discussion of pros and cons involves finding the relevant arguments as well
as assessing their function for the thesis. The conclusion emerges from a process of
comparing the relevant arguments to the thesis.
By noting the two dimensions of process and outcome, we are now able to see
that the openness of the group of premises merges two ideas into onenamely,
the idea of finding the relevant arguments and the idea of a joint relevance of these
arguments for the conclusion.

6.4.2

Integration of the Subject-Matter Relationship

I will now turn to the second polarity, the relationship between the subjective and
the material-objective dimensions. Here, I aim at an elucidation of what it means for
the arguments in the premises to be independent of each other. The pros and cons to
a quaestio usually address it with respect to different aspects; in order to see this
clearly, we use the concept of frames. Any argument is then independent of any
other argument insofar as it captures the state of affairs in a different frame. The
state of affairs is the objective component, the frame the subjective component. As
I have already stated and exemplified several times, the same state of affairs framed
in different ways can lead to different arguments. If we bear in mind that, in the
practice of argumentation, the differences between subjects become manifest in different ways of framing the states of affairs, it makes sense that a state of affairs may
be an argument in favor of a thesis for one subjectivity, while it is an argument
against the thesis for another. It is precisely not the case that how to theorize the
states of affairs is fixed prior and external to the argumentation.
Obviously, the weighting given to individual arguments will depend on the
position of the speakers. This position may change, which can then be expressed
by a frame change.

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Here is a corresponding variation of the nanny example:

Husband: I no longer have a good feeling about Jane. Well, you know, that theft
Wife:
I really dont think shes that bad. She is young and, after all, opportunity
makes a thief. Why dont you have a serious talk with her and then well
give her another chance?
There is a blatant frame change in the wifes argument. The nanny is no longer
just a service provider, but a young person for whom the couple could also feel
responsible to a certain degree. If this is accepted, then Janes theft is no longer
necessarily an argument against her. If we assume that the couple has a real investment in social work, the girls misstep could prove to be a challenge for the two.
Then, it is even an argument for Jane.
More generally, arguments introduced into a discussion of pros and cons correspond to different aspects of the state of affairs in question. These various aspects
presumably result both from the fact that the positions of the parties are affected in
various ways by the state of affairs and its determination, which is up in the air, as well
as from the fact that the positions of the parties involved are usually quite different.
Goviers conception of the conductive argument obscures this. Another reason why
the conductive argument can only capture a part of the events in a discussion of pros
and cons is that it assumes a uniformity of positions. A person, or a group of people
whose positions are homogeneous, seems to ask what speaks for and what speaks
against euthanasia. But people may localize and evaluate these states of affairs differently in their orientationsthat is, they may take up different and potentially
conflicting positions. Moreover, it is a lot easier to find arguments that correspond
to a position once this position has been adopted and integrated into ones life than
to communicate about it from the distance of a far-reaching indecision. None of
this, however, comes into play in the conductive argument. If these points are taken
into consideration, then the subject of a discussion of pros and cons becomes a
complex field where several specific problems occur that cannot be captured,
let alone solved, using the currently available means of argumentation theory.
At the beginning of this section, I listed the characteristics of this form in points
(a) through (e). The emerging problems can be tackled if the four-dimensionality of
the practice of argumentation forms the background for such a treatment. This leads
to a strategy for having a discussion of pros and cons wherein collecting and compiling the arguments (which already exhausts most discussions of pros and cons) is
only a first step that needs to be followed by two objectives: completing the discussion and integrating the frames.

6.4.2.1

First Objective: Completing the Discussion

The objective of completing the discussion is guided by the idea that the strict opposition of the initially appearing pros and cons needs to be dissolved. After all, it is
this opposition that makes the issue so puzzling. Pros and cons are placed on the
stage like blocks whose meaning, relevance, and weight seem to be fixed and about

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whose relationships between each other nothing can be said except that they are
supposed to support or weaken the thesis. On what potency this support or
weakening is based, however, is largely unclear. All that is clear is that the pros are
located on one side and the cons on the other.
As a first step of completing the discussion, we determine which arguments
can be grouped togetherthat is, which pros correspond to which cons, and, if
applicable, we supply what is missing. Following such a collection of arguments on
both sides, one for the pros and one for the cons, we seek an argument for each one
that does not already have a corresponding argument on the other side.
In practice, it looks like this: Whenever there is a pro argument that does not have
a corresponding counterargument, the party arguing against the thesis is prompted
to say what they think about the pro argument, whether or not they want to adopt it,
and if they refrain from doing so, they are required to explain why. This should lead
to the production of a corresponding counterargument. A similar procedure is
followed in case there is a counterargument that does not correspond to a pro
argument.
As a second step of completing the discussion, arguments might have to be
questioned. For this purpose, the focus is now on their theoretical basis. If it is
merely doxastic or even thetic, then the argument can be questionedthat is, it
becomes thetic itself and must be reintroduced as a sub-thesis.
The third step of completing the discussion deals with the possibility of frame
differences. In those cases, we need to seek out the frames and dissolve or break up
their rigidity, which is based on nothing but a false sense of naturalness.

6.4.2.2

Second Objective: Frame Integration

As I said, intuitive descriptions of discussions of pros and cons usually emphasize

that, once the arguments have been compiled, they need to be weighed. This
metaphor of weighing insinuates that, on the one hand, heterogeneously framed
arguments are comparable in terms of a weight and that, on the other hand, this
weight is something that transcends subjective assessments. Both, the comparability
and transsubjectivity of arguments, however, are not simply given by compiling and
contrasting the arguments. Rather, both must be prepared.
The weighing of arguments, which forms the next task, retains this metaphor
of weighing. But it consists mostly of hierarchies and summations that are simply
asserted and which the parties involved accept more or less willingly. This approach
is somewhat similar to a negotiation that aims at a compromise.34 If this really takes
place, the guiding principle is no longer argumentation, but a balance of interests. As I wrote in Chap. 5, a balancing of interests can be construed as a validity
claim. But it should be quite clear what it is that we are actually looking for in such
a case. A thesis that is valid based on cited arguments is not the same as a thesis that
34

Cf. Mengel (1995b) as well as the literature on argumentation and negotiation which I mentioned
in the Introduction, footnote 2.

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Dialogue Events

claims to balance the interests involved. We should be quite clear about this
difference.
What does it mean to balance interests? To an unbiased person this might
sound like a change of situational conditions in such a way that different interests,
which could not be reconciled in a similar way before, now become reconcilable.
As is well known, this looks quite different in reality. Generally, a balance of interests is a solution that represents or enforces existing power dynamics. In a specific
case, this means that the interests of the party that is more powerful are taken into
account more than the interests of the party that is less powerful. If the goal is a
solution for which these power dynamics are no longer relevant, then something
else is needed: a processing and modeling of the relevant frames in which the state
of affairs appears, in such a way that the frame differences of the relevant arguments
are processed and these frames integrated.
For this to be possible, however, the frames must generally be modeled in a process of providing criticism and alternative information, which renders them reconcilable in the first place. I propose some possibilities for modeling frames in the
practice of argumentation, which have already been introduced in Chap. 5. At this
point, I will merely indicate them once more. Further illustrations should be unnecessary because I have already used these structures and will continue to do so.

Frame Criticism or Frame Substitution

These consist in discarding as inadequate the frame in which the state of affairs
emerges and in either just rejecting the corresponding argument or in continuing it
with a more adequate frame that replaces the original one. The most common case
of frame substitution is the permutation of the argument, which turns an objection
into a reason or a reason into an objection.

Frame Hierarchization
This consists in ranking frames in a hierarchy of significance with respect to the
particular case (i.e. not immediately with a claim to general validity). Thus, an argument which captures the state of affairs in a frame that ranks higher is more important than one that uses a frame that ranks lower.

Frame Harmonization
In this case, the frames involved are modified, usually in a process of differentiation,
in such a way that they are no longer exclusive, but have become reconcilable. The
state of affairs in question can be seen in both frames and is restricted in both so that
the determinations no longer collide. This is possible only locally and situationally,
not generally.

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Frame Synthesis
In this case, the frames involved are suspended, differentiated, and brought
together in a new frame (possibly one of the two original frames, though they are
usually slightly modified). Consequently, the two arguments no longer contradict
one another.
Finally, it should be clear that, even when using these strategies, we cannot lead
every discussion of pros and cons to a clear conclusion. People usually have a hard
time jumping over their own shadows. Therefore, the final issue that needs to be
formulated is tasks for distancing. In formulating such tasks, the disagreement continues to exist, but it has now been apprehended. We disagree because you cannot
distance yourself from xy and I cannot distance myself from yzthis would be the
outcome of such a discussion or analysis.
To conclude this chapter, I will briefly illustrate the ideas of completing a discussion and integrating frames by using the example of the legalization of euthanasia
or the arguments put forward by Govier.
Let us think about what the outcome would be if we had completed the discussion of the arguments. In the following, I will discuss the arguments starting with
the last and ending with the first one, because I believe that the first pro argument is
actually the single most important argument in this debate.
Let us begin with the second counterargument, the argument that legalization is
potentially overhasty, because we cannot, in good faith, rule out the possibility of a
cure. As a representative of the pro party, I would counter it by saying how rare this
is; and if someone was really suffering from a disease that is the subject of intensive
researchwhich, moreover, promises to be successful soonthat person would
also not let herself be killed. It might be objected that pressure from the family
could still effect the killing. But this is the first counterargumentnamely, that
there is a possibility for abuse. This is, of course, a serious problem. If it is foreseeable that a legalization will lead to the abuse of euthanasia, then it simply cannot be
legalized justifiably. As a supporter of the pro party, I would react to this argument
by intensifying the thesis. I would formulate a successor thesis that regulates euthanasia so severely that abuse is now virtually impossible.
Let us turn to the pro arguments. I have already mentioned this above. Under the
aspect of completenessthat is, of completing the discussionI would put forward
the following consideration to counter the argument that euthanasia reduces the
suffering of family members: Such sorrow is generally a part of human life; we
ought not to free ourselves from it by killing the dying patient prematurely. As a
consequence, society would become more hedonistic, careless, and emotionally
shallow. This is not desirable.
The third argumentthe appeal to cost reductioncorresponds to the already
mentioned counterargument that such costs are necessary and that their reduction,
therefore, results in no benefit. With respect to the appeal to pain reductionthat is,
the second pro argumenta representative of the counterparty must first point out
that very effective pain medication is available nowadays and that the idea of having
to kill human beings because they are no longer able to endure their pain is probably

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Dialogue Events

relevant only in very few cases. So what about those cases? Do they call for the legalization of euthanasia?
This takes us to the first pro argument. This argument is the central and most
serious one on the list. Anyone who wants to contribute to the discussion is required
to reflect deeply on this argument.
Does our concept of freedom not also cover self-determination of the time of
death? Yes, it does. Today, suicide is morally neutral, although this is not yet
reflected in the common German term, Selbstmord (literally self-murder, with
murder denoting a killing from base motives). That is, we grant a person the
decision to end her life on her own initiative. We might regret this under certain
circumstances, but we do not morally blame her. So much for suicide. But euthanasia is not about suicide; rather, it is about the right of a third person to kill a person
who is willing to die, but lacking the strength, the courage, or the means to do so.
Is it true that the permission to do this strengthens the right to self-determination of
the person wishing to die? I think this is an illusion that can only be maintained on
superficial inspection. In order to dispel this illusion, an examination of the frames
involved is both advisable and productive.
The legalization of euthanasia changes the situation for all individuals who are old
and infirm, and who cause their environment trouble and costs simply by staying
alive. If there is the legal solution of letting-oneself-be-killed as an alternative to
patiently enduring the situation, such endurance becomes an action. Suffering, misery, and strain will no longer be fateful occurrences. Rather, they become akin to
actions. The patient is no longer forced to be a burden to herself and her environment.
This is now something that she has chosen. Each day that she puts up with it, or
forces her environment to put up with it, is a choice. This choice was hersshe
would attribute it to herself; thus, the assumption that adults ought to choose responsibly will take hold. In other words, the legalization of euthanasia shifts the frame
of infirmity. It no longer suffices to bear it; one must now want to bear it. Such a will,
as well as the execution of that will, is governed by an expectation of normative justifiability. If something is covered by the frame [action], then we expectquite
rightlyresponsibility from an adult. And how can a terminally ill, suffering human
being ever be responsible for imposing the endurance and acceptance of her situation
upon herself and her environment? Of course, once her situation has become hopeless, she will sooner or later bring herself to accept an adult responsibility or find it
in herself to do so even in the face of her relatives mild lack of comprehension. It
should be clear that such a social or moral pressure is no abuse, but rather part of the
use of the legalization of euthanasia. Hence, this interpretation of the first pro argument is by no means a variation of the first counterargument.
Once we have realized this frame shift, coinciding with the legalization of euthanasia, we see that the increase in self-determination associated with it is a precarious matter. Self-determination would only increase in those few cases in which
terminally ill patients obviously want to die and obviously cannot effect this on their
own. In all other cases, however, the self-determination would decrease. Thus, the
most important pro argument has been neutralized through frame substitution or it
has become a counterargument. Actually, this should be enough to say no, the

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265

arguments we have considered in our compilation of pros and cons as a whole do

not speak for, but against the legalization of euthanasia.
The upshot of the discussion of the conductive argument is as follows: It becomes
apparent that the conclusion we have reached via the presented arguments is not the
outcome of a weighing, regardless of what that is supposed to be. Rather, it has been
achieved through an examination in which the arguments were put together to form
a thetic construction and were considered and further discussed with respect to their
suitability for supporting the thesis. As long as we have to deal with open counterarguments in a dialogue involving such a structure, either the thesis is not a valid
orientation or we have not yet completed the discussion. If Govier is ready to treat
the legalization of euthanasia as a conductive argumentthat is, with open counterargumentsthen it is not surprising that she is unable to formulate a clear conclusion. A conductive argument is nothing more than a state of argumentation assessed
at some point in time. The fact that pros can be weighed against cons means nothing more than that a judge deems the aspects of the state of affairs mentioned in the
pros (respectively, the manner in which these aspects are affected by the selected
conclusion) to be more important than the aspects that are mentioned in the counterarguments. This act of deeming important is a purely subjective event that may
have been affected in obscure ways by the fact that argumentation has taken place.
Nevertheless, the term, weighing, adds nothing but an objectivist label.
The purpose of this chapter was the discussion of some events in argumentative
dialogues, which can be understood based on the substantial approach developed
here. I hope I was able to put the idea across that the practice of argumentation contains not only structural and material, but also subjective and procedural aspects.
That these latter two dimensions have been largely neglected in previous theorizations has led to some bias and thoughtlessness. It is possible that this discussion may
have helped dissolve some of this now.
Once the procedural aspects of argumentation have been understood, we are in a
position to realize that arguments will typically not enable us to reach any conclusions that have the stability of knowledge. Nevertheless, arguing will allow us to
arrive at outcomes that reflect our state of understanding and insight in a comprehensible manner, thus differing markedly from arbitrary decisions. This is not
equivalent to saying that everything important can be reached by way of arguments
and that we are entirely spared decisionistic judgments. But it does mean that we
will be able to know more accurately where argumentative justification ends and
decisions begin.

Chapter 7

Validity

7.1

The Intermediate Realm of the Thetic:

Preliminary Sketch of the Concept of Thetic Validity

At the heart of this theory of argument is the concept of thetic validity (I also use the
terms argumentative validity or simply validity). This should not be surprising
because this theory defines arguing as the activity of examining and satisfying validity claims. What is a validity claim? What is this validity that is being claimed for
a thesis? These questions have come up beforein Sect. 4.2in the context of
explaining the operation of asserting. At that point, I made a distinction between
epistemic and thetic validity claims and briefly sketched the outlines of the concept
of validity in the thetic realm. In this chapter, I will try to present and define the
concept in more detail.
A perusal of the available proposals and considerations for a conception of validity in argumentation may lead to the impression that the field is beset by all kinds of
ambiguities, confusions, and problematic prejudices. To my mind, there are, in particular, three distinctions that have not yet been clearly or, in light of the pragmatic
features of argumentation, sufficiently understood.
The first is the poorly understood and observed difference between the thetic and
the epistemic. There is no doubt that asserting something that we know or have
already realized practically by integrating it into our form of life is not the same as
asserting a new theory that is designed to shed light on unexposed areas of the
world. In the first case, the question of the validity of the theory will presumably be
answered with reference to realizations (unless there is a real contradictionthat
is, both sides of the contradiction are justifiablewhich indicates a need for
research). Being realized is a criterion of validity that is largely independent of how
many people understand and accept that theory as well as how many are actually
familiar with it. This is true for the large majority of the formal, technical, and social
theories that give our life its current shape. Thetic theory, which is formulated with
respect to certain quaestiones that it argues for, is, however, quite different. A definition of the concept of validity in the realm of thetic theory must be able to capture
H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_7,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

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Validity

the notion that people who have been hitherto unwilling to be guided by a thesis
would be willing to do so because of an argument. Hence, the concept of validity
should refer to these peoples reasons for seeking in the thesis a potentially viable
orientation for action. Such reasons need to be distinguished from mere subjective
motives. The difference will lie in a certain universality and thus the task at hand is
to explicate this thetic universality.
The second distinction whose significance is not clearly seen is the one between
assent (consensus) and understanding. Of course, any attempt at defining thetic
universality must highlight that accepting a thesis does not merely express pure
subjectivity. How can this be done? Most theorists take it to be self-evident that the
assent given by a group of addressees can be generalized, even if they do not reach
a consensus on how to do this. In that case, a thesis would be valid not only if a
particular opponent or a particular group was ready to accept it, but also if every
person was willing to do soor at least every person characterized by certain qualities such as competence, impartiality, and freedom of choice. The problem is that
this conception of assent actually draws upon understanding. The requirements laid
out by these theorists clearly demonstrate it to be a kind of assent that is not caused
by the proponents beautiful eyes, but by an understanding of the matter. It seems
quite impossible to me that such an understanding could be desubjectified by merely
qualifying the activity of assenting. In fact, I believe that such desubjectification
only becomes possible by qualifying the notion of dialogue results. Below (in
Sect. 7.5), I will outline my proposal for an open forum of arguments, which differs from the idea of universalizing the addressees assent.
The third distinction, which is so vaguely understood that it complicates the
conception of thetic validity, is the one between the normative and the descriptive. Many theorists seem to think that any true examination of a validity claim
in the descriptive realm would have to call upon organized sciences which are
usually competent enough to provide what is required. The science of engineering, for instance, determines whether the efficiency of a machine can be
improved by a certain modification. This determination is made without a doubt,
that is, with a result that may claim to be true. After all, it is in such contact with
the world that we may fail; conversely, if the world lets our use of technology
prevail, then this shows that we have found a truth. Not so in the realm of the
normative, where all that seems to matter is our will. This, then, is the provenance of the idea that in moral, political, legal, and perhaps even philosophical
questions, the consensus of all (or of everyone who is affected) is the appropriate criterion of validity.
It seems to me that there are plain errors involved in these conceptions that need
to be shown and rectified. In the technical sphere, research is necessary. But research
does not simply provide true propositions; it also produces new valid theses which
can prove their suitability by being realized. Apart from intra-theoretical criteria
(cf. Chap. 1), the only thing that is ultimately left as a criterion is felicity in the matters of practice. This felicity, not the world, is the final authority. So, on the one
hand, there is no simple pathway from the descriptive realm to truth; all knowledge
ultimately expresses nothing but our (more or less complete) mastery of certain

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269

areas of praxisa mastery that is never final. On the other hand, the situation in the
normative realm is analogous. Here, the issue is the construction of an area of normative praxis that has to connect with all existing and past praxis, and must match
our human idiosyncrasies and potential for development. Again, the felicity of
praxis is the final authorityand we can still fail even here. After all, whether or not
a praxis is felicitous can sometimes be a contentious question. Such cases require
close observation in order to figure out what is going on. But even then the general
principle is this: What matters is not the consensus achieved in the end, but the felicity or infelicity of praxis.
Following these attempts at clarification, I will return to the pragmatic characteristics of the thetic realma realm that, in my opinion, has not yet been sufficiently understood. By thetic realm, I mean the intermediate realm between
opinion and knowledge, as well as between subject and object. Opinion is arbitrary; knowledge is true. The thetic exceeds opinions about and aims at acquiring
knowledge without actually reaching it. It begins as a subjective projection and
seeks objective relations. The thetic is the sphere where we are oriented, but these
orientations are not certain and they are not sufficient. My large-scale illustrations
and models for the thetic realm are the Atlantic Ocean beyond which India could
allegedly be found and revolutionary France which removed its king from office
and moved with rapid strides toward being a republic. In the thetic realm, we
actand since previous standards of praxis are no longer binding, we try new
things. In the process of acting, we often do not know what it is we are doing or
how to accurately describe the outcome of our actions. The available theory is
partially obsolete. It is not clear which of its parts are still usable. Anyone in their
right mind, or anyone wishing to stay that way, will avoid rejecting the whole
orientation system because of a single gap in orientation. As I explained in Chap. 3,
orientation systems are usually structured hierarchically, with some levels that are
more rigid and others that are more flexible; clearly, the rigid ones are abandoned
less frequently. How this happens in each individual instance can be described in
detail only on a case-by-case basis. Knowledge and existential meaning are generally more rigid than any thetic or doxastic theorems. Nevertheless, in case of the
really serious and important quaestiones, everything is up for consideration.
Nothing (no material orientation) is absolutely certain.
The thetic realm is the realm of the new, the unfinished, where relations have no
fixed form yet, or many possible forms. It is the domain where insights are not yet
firmly grounded in established relations of praxis, but may suddenly flare up without any guarantee that they will persist. What is new is often seductive and intoxicating. Structures built too quickly may end up being nothing more than fragile
houses of cards; even impressive insights that are experienced as evident may turn
out to be illusions. The human being addicted to novelty tends toward hubris. We
need to consult old knowledge and become aware of its persistent contours which
are still manifest in all the forms and, especially, the frame structures of our own
performances and perceptions. But even what is oldold knowledge, old doxa
does not provide absolute certainty. Anyone who retreats from the thetic realm,
anyone who turns away from emerging gaps in orientation and focuses only on the

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Validity

zones of established praxis and epistemic theory, might avoid hubris, but will
encounter nemesis while remaining stuck.
What is at issue in the thetic realm is orientation. Knowledge is only of limited
value here and philosophy has not yet entered the scene. We urgently need new
orientationthat much is a truismhence, a multitude of offers and promises
arises. The rhetoric used to advertise these is usually that of a service provider
who is not so much interested in the matter at hand, as in money and power.
Apart from the prospect of opening up new parts of reality, we must also reckon
with all kinds of seduction and illusion here. But the most important question in
the thetic domain deals with the validity of claims, and it is this question that is
answered by the practice of argumentation. The intermediate realm of the thetic
is the domain of arguments.
The concept of argumentative validity encapsulates how to satisfy a thetic
validity claim. This satisfaction, in turn, demonstrates that the claim has been raised
justifiably. I would like to propose the following definition of this term:
Argumentative validity is the quality of a conclusion, acknowledged in the forum, of
conveying and/or consolidating, as the result of an objection-free justification, insights into
a domain in question and thus suitable as a new orientation for action in this domain.

The key elements in this definition are justification, absence of open objections,
understanding, forum, and new orientation. In this chapter, I will explain how these
elements come together in the concept of validity. Subsequently, I will argue that
this concept, taken as a whole, is an innovation in argumentation theory, that is, a
new theoretical orientation for the practice of argumentation in the thetic realm. Of
course, this definition seems so attractive to me because of some motives and concerns which I would like to disclose in advance:
1. I am interested in a midrange universality, that is, a universality located in
between the mere local validity that a thesis may have for those who have examined and understood it and the universal validity that is supposed to apply to all
human beings in some way.
2. Since there are no certainties in the thetic domain, a valid thesis may not be
deduced by formal means (from already existing knowledge). This does not
mean, however, that in this domain any criterion of validity may merely consist
of assent to a thesisregardless of how that assent may be universalized. In fact,
there is a midrange certainty in between: the certainty of a thesis which is well
justified, not confronted by any open objections against it, and which grants an
understanding of the domain in question to those interlocutors who are committed to the thesis.
3. Argumentative validity should be of midrange compulsion. A thesis should be
valid in such a way that anyone who does not understand it is free to not accept
it without being regarded as stubborn and irrational per se. Just as in the case of
knowledge, for it to be valid, the thesis should not have to depend on everyones
expected or even factual acceptance.
Capturing these three concerns in a concept of universal argumentative validity,
then, leads away from the seemingly self-evident idea that such validity depends on

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the acceptance by (many or all or the most qualified) speakers. It opens up a larger
view that does not generalize about the speakers, but about the arguments.
The concept of validity has two sides, an inner and an outer side (or a subjective
and an objective side). The inner side is what I call communication of insights.
If someone is presented with a thetic construction for a domain at issue, then this
person will be able to understandif all goes wellthe state of affairs in this
domain. People are usually motivated to accept a thesis, that is, to use it for purposes of orientation by insights of this kind. However, insights are subjective; it is
not a good idea to turn them into a downright criterion for validity. At the most,
they may be an indication of validity. But since our need for orientation transcends
subjective dispositions and aims at something that is universally valid, the thesis
needs to be put forward and examined critically in a dialogueno matter how
evident it may seem to be. In the dialogue, the opponent mobilizes objections to the
thesis and the proponent tries to refute or integrate them. The judgment about the
validity of the thesis depends on the success of these efforts. The thesis is valid if
there are no open objections leftin other words, if the objections against it can be
eliminated one by one.
Of course, the validity question is judged by actual dialogue partnersthere
is no way around this requirement. For a judgment to express something universally valid, the individual evaluator regards the respective dialogue as a stand-in
for the open forum of arguments. This means it is assumed that a thesis, insofar as it is valid, has integrated all available arguments regarding a certain
quaestio. This constitutes the universality which is expressed in the validity
claim for a thesis.
Consequently, the concept of validity itself is a thesis which I have to posit and
represent in the context of further research into the practice of argumentation. The
justification I will present for it consists, first, in implementing a reflexive level or,
put differently, in considering my opponents actual options and, second, in seeking
a confrontation with other proposed concepts of validity. These are generally universalistic, but there are several different versions whose defects and weaknesses I
will try to portray. The last remaining adversary that needs to be defeated is relativism. Finally, my conclusion in this chapter will attempt to clarify how this concept
of validity relates to the idea of pluralism.
If, in the thetic realm, we argue about the validity of theses, this is an acting out
of thetic reason. Thetic reason is concerned with what is preliminary; it is the
origin of innovation if such innovation combines an understanding, sharpened by
the process of critique, with a thoroughly examined confidence. It is the ability of
human beings to gradually become agents of their own development.1
1

If I may take the liberty to say this, with a nod to Hegels metaphor for philosophy in the Preface
to the Philosophy of Right, thetic reason is the intelligence of the owlyet, pace Hegel, not of
Minerva, but of Athena, who was elder and therefore wiser than the former and realized that even
in the twilight of the day all is but a woven web of guesses (Xenophanes; Fragment 34).
Consequently, she does not wait for her flight until all figures have grown old and gray. As she gets
blinded by sunlight, she contents herself with hunting in the shade and, in all other matters, counts
on the processes of acclimatization and on the evolution of her eyes.

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7.2

Validity

The Motivational Side of Validity: Communication

of Insights

Anyone looking for orientation is in need of insights. I will hardly accept a thesis
that is not clear to me. If it is outright counterintuitive, not even the most beautiful
justification will make me use it as an orientation for my actions.
What is an insight? What role does it play in the practice of argumentation?
Questions like these are not typical in argumentation theory. Of course, this is
because the subjective side does not usually receive proper attention, except in the
form of the desired assent. For that reason alone, some generally clarifying
comments might be in order. The term insight is a term of ordinary language.
People can have insights and, in that case, are reasonable.2 The child is reasonable
if it no longer needlessly infuriates the short-tempered father. The railway traveler
is reasonable if she or he accepts an unwelcome delay as the result of a tree that has
fallen on the tracks. What seems to be at issue here is the understanding acceptance
of contexts that are not self-evident and to which there may even be some resistance.
It is rather uncommon to call texts, and hence theses, reasonable. Understandable
would be possible, but whenever I talk about the corresponding quality of a thesis,
I will use the term communicating an insight.
For the purpose of integrating it into argumentation theory, the meaning of
insight can be further established. The psychologist and forward-looking theorist
of the pragmatic dimension of language Karl Bhler coined the term Aha moment3
to designate the sudden ascent from a zone of obscurity into the bright light of
understanding where something, which had remained hidden, suddenly becomes
discernible. A great example of this phenomenon in the history of philosophy is
Descartes, whose carefree general doubt in the Meditations spread a dull and unsettling mist over everythinguntil he arrives at the understanding that he himself, as
the source of doubt, must exist with certainty.4
The typical situation leading to the practice of argumentation is when there is
something we do not understand, whereupon a thesis is introduced which is supposed to take care of this deficit. What is lacking here is orientation, and the thesis
is supposed to supply it. Actually, the thesis is unable to do soat least in the full
sense of orientation which I explicated in Chap. 1. For orientation to be complete
in that sense, the domain in question would not only have to be mastered
2

Translators note: reasonable is used to translate the German einsichtig, which is derived
etymologically from the noun insight (Einsicht) and can mean both having insights and
being reasonable.
3
Bhler wrote about speech act and speech action (cf. Bhler (1990), 57 ff.) around the same
time that Wittgenstein wrestled with the concept of language games, and thus many decades
before Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) initiated speech act theory. For the Aha moment of
inner illumination; cf. Bhler (1930), 14 (cf. also above, Chap. 1, note 35).
4
Cf. Descartes (1993). Descartes believed that his insight into the existence of his ego-consciousness
indicates something objective. This is the typical mistake we make when we suddenly and intensely
understand something that has been puzzling us for a long time.

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theoretically, but also practically. Argumentation cannot achieve such a thing. What
it can do, however, is produce insights. I understand this word quite literally in
this context. We have insights into the domain at issue (using the eyes of the
mind). This is not yet a complete comprehension that is alive with feeling,
experience, and the ways to cope with the latter two, but it is a start which bodes
well for expecting further developments.
Such insights, which sometimes flare up in arguments about a thesis, are a new
and an emergent understanding. They are not merely theoretical ideas, but contain
sensory (e.g. visual) elements. An insight is intellectual, but it is not clearly differentiated from a feeling. Typically, insights feel right and enriching. Such a sudden
understanding is the motivation for integrating a thesis into the research process as
a practical orientation. For the individual subject, then, insights determine whether
or not to accept a thesis. If it were not paradoxical to say so, we could almost call an
insight the subjective criterion of validity. After all, it is impossible to determine
the accuracy of an insight on the basis of any external features. Even if an impression is very strongYes, thats it! It has to be!and even if it informs all our
thinking and feeling, we cannot be sure that it will not turn out to be a mistake and
an illusion. This is the reason why an insight, which may be the determining motivational factor for accepting a thesis (especially if it can be conveyed in argumentation), is not a suitable criterion for the validity of a thesis.5
In the standard case (whose variations, e.g. if someone just prattles away, can
be represented as modifications), the proponent has an insight. He verbally articulates this in the thesis. Now, if the addressee agrees, this might indicate that the
thesis is understandable, but it says nothing about the validity of the thesis. Both the
proponent and the opponent agree that orientation can be completed in such a way
and thus act accordingly as long as no one interferes. We have become accustomed
to saying that things are as the thesis says for those who agree with it. For Coln,
the original inhabitants of the Caribbean were just servants and slaves. For Peirce,
Descartes methodical doubt was empty. For the typical Polish Christian, the late
Pope John Paul II is a saint.
In many cases, this is sufficient. We have our opinions, our peers are in agreement with us and as long as we are dealing with matters like the best spaghetti
sauce or the most satisfying sexual practice, there is very little to be said against
it. This is different if the matter in question affects human interactions. Then
5

Karl Popper describes Bohrs, Heisenbergs, and Einsteins different interpretations of quantum
mechanics such that, although all three had arrived at the same state of knowledge and
argumentation, they differed markedly in their insights, which is why they drew such very different
consequences. While for Einstein, the state that had been reached was merely provisional (and the
waveparticle duality merely a stopgap), Heisenberg had the vision of an illuminating
simplicity [] [which] made him feel this is it: this was the end of the road, the final truth
(Popper (1982), 8). Bohr, on the other hand, acknowledged quantum mechanics, partly in despair
(9), as the last step in physics: it is no longer comprehensible, he argues, because it is not a description of reality. However, this has to be accepted because in the atomic region [] no such reality
existed (10). Hence, while Einstein hoped to continue physics as a theory of reality, Bohr and
Heisenberg agreed that an act of renunciation of our understanding was needed (10).

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Validity

incomprehension and dissent occur; the orientation value becomes questionable.

The demands placed on insights increase. Are they clear? Are they really insights
or are they merely superficial ideas, semblances, or illusions? In that case, it is
time for argumentation, which will, of course, not always occur. If it does not
take place, the view in question can become solidifiedan obsession, a form of
private dogma. If the matter concerns others as well, then it is desirable that they
share my insight, if indeed it is one. The view is therefore elevated to the status
of a thesis and will become the subject of an argument. So, in that case, do I talk
in order to obtain assent?
I think this is misleading. The issue is not assent, but agreeing about insights. If
I understand something and present it to someone who also understands it, that is a
strong indication that the matter is good and sound. This is the contact des esprits
that the authors of the Nouvelle Rhetorique were so fascinated with.6 It is a regrettable plunge from the height of thought that they subsequently revert to only talking
about the assent of an audience. Examining ones insight by sharing it with someone
else is certainly not a bad endeavor. And in this endeavor, rhetoric matters. If others
can share an insight, it also loses its exclusively subjective character.7 Is generalizable insight, then, a suitable criterion of validity? No. After all, if people fail to
understand an argument, this might be due to many different things. Perhaps the
matter exceeds their intellectual capacities. Or their belief might simply be wrong,
and those who have understood it up to this point have fallen prey to an illusion.
Only a dialogical examination of the argument can provide clarity about what is the
case and what an achieved insight might mean for the validity of the thesis. Hence,
a criterion of validity can only be found in dialogue. I will explain this in the next
paragraph. However, this much should already be clear: Generalizing the insights
afforded by a thesis makes much more sense than generalizing the assent to it. It is
therefore quite unfortunate that the various attempts which rely on universalization
in finding a criterion for the validity of theses all universalize assent or a consensus.
I will discuss all these attempts again in more detail in Chap. 7.7.
What does it mean when my addressee, that is, my opponent or audience, agrees
with my argument? Is this something positive? That depends on what I really want.
If I look for allies and supporters, because I do not want to or simply cannot pursue
the project on my own, then I have succeeded. But if I want to examine my own
argument, mere assent will not get me anywhere. More specifically, I do not know
what it is that I have achieved with such assent because it is not quite clear what this
assent actually means. It could mean that I have pleased, entertained, informed, or
even impressed my audience. My diction, my voice, or my tie may be the reason for
the assent. No matter how extensive it might beassent can definitely not be a sufficient criterion for validity. Is it at least a necessary criterion? No, because on the
one hand, its absence may mean that this time around it is the tie that is the cause of
dislike. On the other hand, the same reason that trumped insights as a potential
6

Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 2. The contact of minds.

Cf. Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason A821/B849: We ought to test whether the grounds that
are valid for us have the same effect on the reason of others.
7

7.2 The Motivational Side of Validity: Communication of Insights

275

criterion also applies here: the addressee may not agree because she is overwhelmed,
does not know enough, is not sufficiently versatile in thinking or imagining
something, or is not sufficiently committed to the quaestio that the thesis addresses.
A complex thesis that is backed up with a sophisticated argument asks too much of
most people. Hence, it will probably only gain significant support, based on superficialities. (The latter are popular components of the topos of authority: If someone
introduces, e.g. a sophisticated vocabulary, perhaps a Latin quotation, then it will
presumably mean that he is right.)
Let us consider how assent and insight relate to one another. Generally, insight
implies assent, but assent does not imply a corresponding insight. Whoever has an
insight will give his assentthat much can be expected. If something is understood,
it is like an inner possession. It no longer has to be accepted explicitly. Does this
mean that every insight which is gained in a dialogue has to result in assent?
Probably not. If my opponent hears new arguments against a thesis that he has held
for a long time, he may still refuse to assent even if he understands the arguments.
He may not yet trust his (fresh) insight or he wants to save face or the like. There are
obviously exceptions to this rule, but they confirm, as it were, the rule that insights
imply assent.
However, it goes without saying that assent does not imply insights. As I said
before, a speakers voice or clothes are often much more effective than the quality
of her statements. Nevertheless, assent may be relevant for understanding, namely,
if it functions, so to speak, as a receptacle or garden for the insight to take root in
and grow. One example would be certain principles of classical pedagogy. German
students had to memorize important texts such as the Catechism, the great poems
(Schillers The Hostage and The Diver, Conrad Ferdinand Meyers The Feet in
the Fire), or perhaps even Book 22 of The Odyssey (which details the slaying of the
suitors). This practice was based on the assumption that such inner possessions
shape the students experiences of life and teach them to deal with such matters. It
was thought that they would project these valuable structures into the future, which,
in turn, would lead to a deeper understanding of what they had learned.8
In any case, the expectation that assent is a preliminary and sometimes even necessary, first step for the occurrence of insight constitutes the rational aspect of appeals
to authority. Say a thesis seems dubious to you. Just accept it for now. There is someone who posits the thesis and whose insight is greater than your own. That is one
possible way to eventually arrive at the corresponding insight yourself. Especially in
matters of some complexity, it is possible that there are preliminary stages which
may not be immediately comprehensible and which therefore have to be accepted for
now (this is the meaning of Anselm of Canterburys formula credo ut intelligam:
only in faith we can we hope to glimpse one or another aspect of Gods glory). I think
that every sensible understanding of authority is based on this basic idea.
8

This can even be tested empirically, at least in part: Does a person who has spent his adolescence
playing ego shooter games live differently than someone who grew up reciting Friedrich Schillers
Song of the Bell or Honor to Woman (To her it is given/to garden the earth with the roses of
Heaven!)?

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Validity

What are the consequences of these considerations for the relationship between
assent and insight? Is it reasonable, after all, to regard argumentation as aiming at
assent? That depends on the thesis. The aforementioned cases presuppose that the
theses in question are valid, that is, having the corresponding insights is desirable.
By contrast, let us consider the case of a crafty demagogue. The assent that such a
person might generate is also potentially suitable for creating certain insights. But
it would have been better, had they not been created.
At this point, I have placed insight in quotation marks to signal that there are
no real criteria for recognizing which insights are right and valuable and for
distinguishing them from false and illusory insights. I mentioned at the beginning
that talk of the inside is metaphorical. It is easy to say that, if we have an insight,
it is accompanied by mental images, conceptions, etc. But this says nothing about
their quality. Descartes believed that if something has been perceived clearly and
distinctly, then it is also right.9 The man had a beautiful, sharp mind. But what
might his servant have perceived clearly and distinctly? Maybe various legends
and images of saints and demons? Would Descartes not have dismissed this as mere
fancy? Perhaps, then, all insight is illusory? Theoretically, this would not even be a
huge disturbance. For, after all, insight is subjective and thus hard to demarcate
from self-delusion.
Such considerations assess insights into theses with respect to their correctness
or suitability for supporting the thesis. And this is the genuine achievement of the
practice of argumentation: we examine an insight that has been articulated in a
thesis by justifying the thesis in a critical dialogue with an opponent, who will
examine the thesis and try to understand it.
On the subjective side, then, the function of argumentative justification is to
generate insights in the opponents consciousness. However, as I pointed out at the
beginning, insights often arise spontaneously. This does not seem to fit together. For
an insight to be built up properly, it would have to be broken down into parts, each
of which would have to be generated by a step of the justification. The last step,
finally, would tie everything together. But an insight usually arises as a whole,
triggered by one or another clue that the opponent receives by the reasons presented.
Still, the idea that insights are formed according to a methodical structure is not a
stranger to philosophy. Evidently, Plato conceived and experienced the matter in
such a way. In his dialogues, every step of thought is followed by a break. The
person leading the conversation asks the addressee: Dont you agree? And then, the
addressee is required to give his assent. It is quite clear that merely saying yes is not
the point herein fact, it is decidedly not the point. In Platos Gorgias, saying yes
(if you insist) is expressly rejected several times. Rather, the interlocutor has to
announce whether he understands the matter.
9

Cf. Descartes (1993): The truth of cogito-sum res cogitans, which has been developed in the
second meditation, is characterized by the fact it has been perceived clearly and distinctly (clare
et distincte). In the third meditation, these properties are posited as the criteria for truth: And thus
I now seem able to posit as a general rule that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is
true.

7.2 The Motivational Side of Validity: Communication of Insights

277

Neverthelessand Plato illustrates this perfectly in the Gorgiasan insight

cannot be assembled or generated in such a way that the addressee would have to
accept it. After all, an insight cannot simply be made, or produced, or even forced.
In a dialogue, there is language; this language can attest to an insight, but it cannot
convey and deliver this insight to an opponent directly. The fact that it arises is a
fateful occurrence. Surely every proponent wants the opponent to have an insight
into his thesisnot only for the conversation to be successful or for the thesis to
spread, but, in particular, for the proponent to be able to examine himself and to
ensure that his own understanding is not an illusion.
Let me be clear: There is no causal relationship between an externally demonstrable chain of reasons and a corresponding insight that could be scientifically
represented. A proponent may have an insight and may still fail to justify it because
the opponent introduces an objection which the proponent cannot refute. Would the
objection inevitably destroy the insight in this case?
Not necessarily! This is where the subjective nature of insights becomes relevant:
the inner image, the idea of a solution to the issue at hand, is actually revealed as an
illusion by any objection that I cannot refute. But the image can be so powerful that
it remains and causes me to disregard the objection. This objection simply cannot be
right, I tell myself. Why?I do not know that at present, but it will come to me soon
enough. What we are dealing with here is the same figure as in the case of assent as
a receptacle for an insight that should arise in the future. In this case, there is the
hope that our insight will become complete or differentiated in the future, so that we
will be able to refute the objection. This is only human and, indeed, there are always
examples of how such a hope is fulfilled.10 Still, the following needs to be explicitly
stated: Anyone who proceeds this way has abandoned thetic reason and is merely
hoping that everything goes well.
Should we not try to directly distinguish insight from illusion (i.e. without the
detour via argumentation)? Does a true insight not coincide with a special feeling
of evidence or accuracy, while illusion has a stale, stubborn flavor? There are people
who claim to have access to a kind of emotional knowledge that exceeds the mind.
But that does not help. If we want to proceed reasonably, then the fruits of such
intuitions would have to be put forward and justified as theses. Mind you, this does
not per se militate against following ones intuitions, and there are certainly some
people who have an unusually high talent for this. What it does militate against,
however, is the idea that we could present an intuition, when what is really required
is the presentation and justification of a thesis.
My determined decision to reject the idea of turning the achievement of an
insight, or the assent to it, into a veritable criterion for argumentative validity is
10

There are great examples of this, also in the history of science; for example, Darwins decadeslong adherence to his thesis of the origin of species by natural selection. There was a flurry of
objections to this, which he was initially unable to refute; however, over time refutations were
found, for instance, regarding the objection that there were missing links (the absence of extinct
intermediate links in the fossil record). Darwin produced an exhaustion of the thesis which was
initially just an excuse (fossils are hard to find), but which was later spectacularly confirmed by the
discovery of the archaeopteryx fossil in the oolitic slates of Solnhofen.

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Validity

based on an experience. We have encountered this experience in our practice of

argumentation. In fact, this is something we note both in ourselves and in our
opponents: As participants, we are committed to a variety of interests due to our
positions; we are involved and ensnared in relationships and even, at times, stuck on
the wrong track. The possibility of simply accepting or rejecting as arguments new
ideas and aspects of theses, which are affected by these provisions, is so heavily
restricted that the validity of the thesis should not depend on an assent or even an
insight which may or may not take place.

7.3

The Criterial Side of Validity: The Absence

of Open Objections

In order to judge the validity of a thesis, we have to determine the state of the
argumentation that supports it. The term state of argumentation is analogous to
the common term state of discussion. Based on our experience with the practice
of argumentation, we are familiar, for instance, with questions about the state of
discussion and with the admonition that a certain contribution lags behind the
state of discussion or anticipates it. If we use the term discussion to describe the
procedural aspects of argumentationas suggested in Chap. 6then a state of
discussion turns out to be something rather accidental. If, for example, a participant
of a discussion insists, that is, she reiterates an already refuted argument (because
she has forgotten the refutation or simply did not understand it in the first place),
then she begins to lag behind the state of discussion. This can be a disturbance. It
can be annoying, and maybe this deficit will be addressed. In that case, progress is
impeded even further. Yet none of this matters for assessing validity. The only
relevant question here is this: to what degree are previously presented arguments
capable of justifying or refuting the thesis? This, then, is the question of the state
of argumentation. How can it be answered?
In Platos dialogues, there are phrases such as: Let us sum up and see what the
results are. This leads to the creation of a special protocol for the discussion, which
sorts contributions according to their thetic function, that is, whether they belong to
a thesis, a successor thesis, or a connector thesis and whether they justify or criticize,
and, if so, what it is they refer to. All dialogue events that do not have any apparent
thetic function are neglected at first. This is also true for doubts, as long as they
express the speakers subjective shortcomings or are simply empty (paper doubts).11
Materials like this are not completely removed, but merely pushed to the background.
It may still be useful for justifying previous interpretations and decisions on how to
sort certain contributions. (I will exemplify these processes in Chap. 8.)
11

Peirce distinguished between genuine or living and pen or paper doubts. Researchers are
people who have real doubtsin my formulation: they feel the gap in orientation; philosophical
skeptics, however, express formal or empty doubts (if they cannot gain absolute certainty about a
matter). Cf. Peirce (1965b), Sections 370374 (from The Fixation of Belief).

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The Criterial Side of Validity: The Absence of Open Objections

279

This is followed by the generation of a structural scheme which illustrates the

network of relations within the argument. For this purpose, the arguments must
be examined. Arguments that are repeated are also put on hold for now, as are
arguments that cannot be integrated. Those arguments that survive such an
examination are identified in relation to each other and to the thesis. They are
brought together in a diagram. There are already several proposals for argumentation diagrams: Kleins tree diagram,12 Grewendorfs network diagram,13 Barth
Krabbes dialogue diagram,14 etc.
Of course, a dialogue diagram is best suited for my proposals. There are two
parts to it. One is assigned to the proponent of the thesis, the other to the opponent.
On the proponents side, we find the thesis and all of the arguments supporting it,
as well as all the objections to the opponents moves that have come up in the
course of the dialogue. On the opponents side, we find the objections to the thesis
or to any of the proponents arguments, as well as any possibly presented reasons
for these objections.
Subsequently, the reasons, or their interactions, must be screened. If they provide
a theoretical basis which has become stabilized as an argumentative basis and if
these reasons can be put into an order which, starting from epistemic beginnings,
gradually builds up a path to the thesis, this justification renders the thesis
theoretically available. The model for such a chain of reasons is the methodical
sequence of constructive philosophy.15 Of course, in the reality of our argumentative
efforts, a justification is often not a simple chain, but a complex web or network.
Under certain circumstances, the link between arguments is not only basic (comprising a beginning and a first step) or twofold (consisting any step with a predecessor and a successor step), but manifold (consisting any step with multiple predecessor
and successor steps). Nevertheless, the reconstruction of a justification has to show
which arguments are based on which. And, those other arguments must be systematically examined and secured beforehand.
The next part of the analysis concerns the question which parts of the justification face objections and to what degree these objections have been refuted.
Objections raised by an opponent that have not been refuted or integrated by the
proponents arguments are called open objections. Open objections undermine
the justifications function of paving a way to the thesis. If the latter is theoretically available, this only means that some available theoretical basis can be
assembled to form an intellectual path to the thesis in question. But this only
becomes relevant if the thesis is introduced into a dialogue, that is, if another
subjecta source of independent information, insight, and imaginationhas
12

Cf. Klein (1980), 26.

Cf. Grewendorf (1975), 142150.
14
Cf. Barth and Krabbe (1982), 67 ff. [The sample dialogues largely deal with the existence of
God, so the role of the (dogmatic, stupid) proponents is designated as Pope, whereas the (clever,
cheeky) opponent is addressed as Olga.].
15
For explanations of the methodical sequence, cf. Chaps. 1 and 4.
13

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Validity

grappled with it. Hence, the theoretical availability of a conclusion must be

completed by addressing all open objections in a dialogue until we arrive at an
absence of open objections. The absence of open objections is the criterion for
thetic validity. Now we have a criterion for when an insight tells us that what a
thesis might convey is serious, that is, when it is no mere illusion, namely, when
no objection remains open in a dialogue about this thesis.
We must not forget that whenever we determine the state of argumentation, that
is, whenever we structure an argumentation in a conspicuous way, we also need to
pay attention to frame structures. If an objection is raised, the question to ask is
whether it addresses the issue at all. In the case of divergent frames, we need to
examine whether they have been addressed within the argumentation, so that individual arguments can justifiably be related to each other. Only an objection that is
placed in the same (or a possibly expanded) frame as the justification undermines
the theoretical availability of the thesis. If an opponent raises an objection that
presupposes a heterogeneous theoretical basis, this annuls (at least at this point)
the basis for argumentation and separates it into the respective theoretical bases of
each participant.
Now, the basic idea of a criterion for thetic validity has been formulated and the
aforementioned definition substantiated: A thesis is valid, relative to the state of
arguments that have been introduced for and against it in the dialogue, if no open
objection against it remains.
If such an absence of open objections obtains, it is merely a fact. The difference
between a state of argumentation in which a justification no longer faces any objections and a state of argumentation in which it is still subject to objections is small,
sometimes tiny. Is it sufficiently significant to provide a regular criterion for thetic
validity? Why not? I anticipate three obvious objections and will try to refute them:
(1) Objections are always possible; (2) Should there be an absence of open objections, this is most likely only temporary; and (3) The absence of open objections is
not so much a criterion for validity as an indicator of a research monopoly.
(1) Objections Are Always Possible
First of all, I have to concede that the idea of an absence of open objections does
not say much, in part because of the sparse and highly abstract way of defining
objections in this minimal approach (cf. Chap. 4). Nevertheless, this is sufficient for
an understanding of the basic lines of argumentation and as a directive for assessing
its validity. How do we answer the reproach that objections are always possible?
This reproach indicates, on the one hand, a superficial understanding of the
practice of argumentation and, on the other hand, an inaccurate understanding of the
criterion. After all, what would happen if an objection is raised? Someone presents
something which contradicts an utterance made by the proponent. Or, someone
complains about a gap. Easy!
But this only seems easy because it does not take into account that objections, far
from simply being accepted, are examined by the proponent. The proponent takes
up the role of the controlling opponent with respect to an objection to the thesis or

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The Criterial Side of Validity: The Absence of Open Objections

281

a reason. Hence, if a contradiction is detected, the next question will concern the
corresponding theoretical basis. The latter, however, cannot simply be found at will.
Some objections may also be struck down by the meta-objection that they are no
real objections, but merely artificial aspects, paper doubts. If something like that
occurs, it needs to be clarified on a case-by-case basis whether a particular objection
is sound, whether it shows the justification to be false or not. Conceptually, it is
quite possible to determine whether someone is simply unable to understand a
justification or whether it contains a substantial gap.16
Now to the second point, the notion that the understanding of the criterion is
merely superficial: Absence of open objections is a criterion that assesses the
actual state of argumentation surrounding a thesis. However, not all (logically)
possible arguments need to be considered; rather, the focus is on those arguments
that have actually been raised or could have been raised if further information about
the quaestio had been added which is now available (I will discuss this process in
more detail in the next section). Thus, a difference has been established which
surely is often difficult to trace in detail, but which is conceptually indispensable
once we concede that understanding and knowledge evolve procedurally.
(2) The Absence of Open Objections Is a Temporary State
The second concern is that the absence of open objections is a temporary state. After
all, is it not always possible that the next interlocutor joining the dialogue would
raise a new objection? Only in formal disciplines can we potentially exclude the
possibility that new objections will be raised. In the frame of elementary arithmetic,
for instance, any objections against a sentence such as 7 + 5 = 12 (which Kant
regarded as a priori) are impossible. This is due to the fact that, based on the selfconstructed nature of the subject area, in formal theory, any potential objections can
be anticipated. In theorizing material issues, however, this is impossible because we
can never be sure that there will be no further objections. So, how are we supposed
to formulate a solid concept of argumentative validity?
First of all, the following must be conceded: At any moment, someone may
enter the scene with a new argument. In that case, the state of argumentation will
be changed. The new argument may turn out to be a valid objection, and the thesis would be lost. Still, as long as the new argument has not occurred, we simply
have nothing better than the thesis and its justification. But that is not nothing
eitherand if we take it as a new orientation, then we proceed as rationally as
possible.
This has serious consequences. Rather than downplaying them, I will try to illustrate those consequences as vividly as possible with the help of an episode that took
place during the exploration of the New World. It is entitled Cuba is not an island,
and it illuminates a new side of research and the role of argumentation within it.

16

I describe a substantial gap as a gap that cannot be bridged on the basis of our currently available knowledge. Sometimes this is formally established, such as in the case of circular arguments.
Cf. Wohlrapp (1978).

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Validity

Cuba Is Not an Island

(A) The Story
This episode concerns the second of four trips that the Genoese sailor, who had
been promoted to admiral and viceroy in the meantime, took to the New World. An
expedition of three ships, with a crew totaling about 80 people, embarked from the
newly founded colony in Hispaniola (now Haiti/Dominican Republic) in search of
the mainland. Previously established geographical conceptions located the islands,
conquered for Spain, in the ocean near the coast of the Asian Continent, but at least
near Cipango (Nippon). Since trade relations with Japan, China, and India were the
driving force behind the expedition of 1492 and since colonization turned out to be
a laborious and hardly profitable business, there was a strong incentive for the
Spanish to reach the mainland.
The flotilla departed in a westerly direction at the end of April 1494 and sailed
for more than six weeks up the southern coast of Cuba with minor interruptions,
but under the almost unimaginable hardships of incessant rain, food shortages,
and, in the end, the daily experience of running aground between one of the
innumerable offshore islets. On June 12, on the eve of turning around, a scene
took place which has caused most commentators to regard the discoverers
stubbornness with the harshest ridicule and incomprehension. According to
Jakob Wassermann, [a] more Don-Quixotic outrage upon truth can hardly be
conceived.17 Coln assembled the crew of all three ships and had the clerk Perez
de Luna inquire whether they had any doubt that this land was the mainland []
and if they had any doubt or notion thereon, he begged them to say so, for he
would soon remove it and would make them see that this is truly the mainland.18
None of the men reported any doubts; Coln had everyone swear an oath that
they are on the mainland.

(B) Assessment
What are we to make of this? We could ridicule this episode and take it to be a
parody of the consensus theory of truth. So everyone agreed and swore that
Cuba is not an island. And, thats why it is not an island? Actually, this is quite a
superficial argument.
To my mind, the decisive factor seems to be the call to raise objections. There
are none. And that is no mere coincidence; it is rather a fact that no one having
an understanding of cartography can raise an objection. No one is able to trace
the coastline up to the point where it merges with itself. To be sure, the Spaniards
had been told by the Indians that Cuba is an island. But, then again, the Indians

17
18

Wassermann (1930), 156 ff.

Madariaga (1939), 283.

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The Criterial Side of Validity: The Absence of Open Objections

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constantly tell fairy tales anyway. Hence, there is no theoretical basis from
which to construct an objection to the mainland thesis. In this respect, the thesis
is valid. There is nothing wrong in taking it as an orientation and also in acting
on it (carefully).
Cuba is not an island: this is the new valid thesis in terms of pragmatic dialectics.
The best available knowledge has been constructed into a thesis to which no objection can be raisedor, rather, to which all objections that have been raised can be
refuted and weakened with good reasons. After all, the statements made by the
inhabitants of this country could be regarded as objections: statements in a language
which is understood poorly and made by people who cannot be trusted because they
have already told all kinds of wild stories.
This assessment shows a rough outline of the relations between thesis, practical realization, and knowledge. The territory whose coast they have navigated is
the mainland. This is now a new orientation. It has been acted upon (realized)
by others also trying to reach this mainland, whereupon it turned out to be an
island. The valid thesis has not become a part of knowledge. It was a stage in the
evolution of research.
To be sure, it is possible to object that this thesis about the mainland was nothing
more than a conjecture which was inappropriately supported for obvious personal
and political motives. But such an objection simply omits the whole practical effort,
the part of real life that these people have applied in their research. How we describe
our treatment of theories in research is simply not an arbitrary matter. The usual
descriptions fall short of the pragmatic side of things: we hazard our precious human
lives by relying on theory, that is, not only on solid, established knowledge but
(increasingly these days) on theory which is only more or less devoid of any open
objections (and characterized by expectations of utility and gain in other respects).
(3) The Absence of Open Objections Is Not a Criterion for Validity, but an
Indicator of a Research Monopoly
The third objection concerns the sociopolitical reality of research. It states that the
factual absence of open objections indicates less a particularly relevant justification
than the fact that objections cannot be raised. I am not so much thinking of the
possibility that real dialogue partners might prevent each other from raising objections by nonargumentative means (threats and bribery). Avoiding this is a matter of
how to factually carry out an argumenta matter for which appropriate measures
(conversational rules) may be taken as needed.
Theoretically significant, however, is any case in which there are no objections
because the proponent inhabits a research monopoly. Within certain limits, this is
Inevitable. After all, research on particular issues is carried out by individuals and
certain groups who often gain a lead over possible opponents with respect to the
availability of information. Effective and appropriate criticism relies on knowledgeable opponents; the more controversial the theses surrounding a problem, the more
such opponents there are. The greater the effort that research requires, however, the
more the structure of the common quest for validity, which is controlled by critical
opponents, becomes deformed and distorted.

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For instance, there are presently no relevant objections to the use of GM

technology in food, because virtually all research aims at facilitating this very use.
Research is expensive and investors obviously have little interest in potential
hazards. In this case, the de facto absence of objections has been predetermined by
the structure of the research landscape.19
Are the results still valid? The degree to which they are valid as technical
possibilities can be seen in their realizations. When it comes to the alleged harmlessness, the example of genetic engineering demonstrates quite realistically
what we mean by heroic research (cf. Chap. 2). We, that is, humanity incapable
of examining the thesis of the harmlessness of transgenic organisms effectively
(e.g. by extensively funding research at universities or governmental research
institutions that aim at controlling such technologies), are unable, for the time
being, to produce any objections. Consequently, the results of genetic research
are realized in our daily lives and we all conduct research (for we all are affected)
that is grounded in the purportedly valid thesis raised by the proponents of
genetic engineering. How good or bad GM technologies really are (for human
health, the ecological and economic situation on the planet) will be determined
in the long runonly by way of realizations.
So, we may conclude the following with respect to the explanatory power of this
criterion: The criterion is indeed highly abstract, but it probably hits the nail on the
head. Furthermore, it may be substantiated as needed.

7.4

The Three Stages of Assessing Validity

There are three possible verdicts about the conclusion with respect to the state of
argumentation: valid, invalid, or undecidable. If there are no open objections to the
justification, then it is valid. If there are objections, it is invalid.
Yet there is a third possibilityit is one of the characteristics of thetic reason that
it is not binary. Even if it is usually necessary to arrive at a clear verdict that is either
positive or negative, it is still important to know how far argumentation has taken us
in that case and at what point a decision completes a verdict that was theoretically
unavailable. This third possibility, which is undecidable, means that the available
argumentative basis is not sufficient for either achieving the thesis or for disproving
it. In spite of how preliminary such a finding isafter all, sometimes the available
theoretical basis can be developed furtherthis possible verdict is still important
for knowing what one is doing.
This third possibility has mainly two applications:
19

That this research landscape is simply characterized by the disinterested search for truth is
unlikely. Some recently publicized events justify a healthy dose of skepticism. In 19971998, the
Rowett Research Institute in Aberdeen/Scotland experimented with transgenic potatoes as feed for
rats. The lead scientist, Arpad Pusztai, concluded that the feed weakened the immune system of the
animals significantly. When he tried to make these results public, he was fired.

7.4 The Three Stages of Assessing Validity

285

First, arguments addressing large and loose theses such as Life is beautiful,
Music is an elixir of creativity, Rousseau is the cause of the French Revolution, etc.
With respect to the beauty of life, there is nothing that could help us find a certain
practical basis for this statement. It could simply be anything. The statement is
probably not even intended to be read as thetic, but rather as expressive. With respect
to music as the elixir of creativity, we might think that this is a toned-down version
of an assertion such as Music fosters creativity. In that case, the task at hand
would be to determine what we mean by music (listening to music, playing music,
what kind of musicfrom Bachs fugues to Cages ambient sounds?). Different
answers to this question will presumably result in different conceptions of how
creativity (which would also have to be determined) is affected. That Rousseau is
said to have caused the revolution probably gives too much credit to the man. In
order to assess such a sentence, we would have to construe the revolution as
causedby thoughts, theories, demands, etc.; in particular, the role that
Rousseaus ideas played during the period of social changes (from 1789 to 1792, or
until 1799, or even until 1848?) would have to be something one can assess
overall, a rather futile exercise.
The second kind of argument where we have to expect undecidability concerns
the clash of heterogeneous theoretical bases that cannot be sufficiently translated
into one another. This applies, in particular, to discussions in intercultural dialogues. Even in modern industrialized countries, many basic states of affairsfor
example, property, the difference between wealth and poverty, sexuality, pornography, prostitution, the right age for marriage, what degree of kinship precludes a
marriage, etc.are described and treated in dramatically different and incompatible frame structures.
Validity qua absence of open objectionsthat is the basic idea of the criterion.
A criterion is commonly understood to be something that can be questioned and
assessed from the perspective of a disinterested observer. Things are different,
however, with respect to assessing a state of argumentation. Although the absence
of open objections is truly a kind of criterion, someone has to become involved in
the matter in order to be able to assess whether it obtains; this kind of involvement
must be deeper than, for example, hermeneutic efforts at interpreting a text. I will
explain this briefly.
In order to assess an argument with respect to the validity of the thesis, it is
necessary first to acquire the state of argumentation. The evaluator must become
familiar with the quaestio, see the limits of orientation, and acknowledge the thesis, that is, the culmination of a thetic construction, at least as a potential theory
which could contribute to orientation. The arguments as its parts must be properly
related to each other and evaluated as parts of the construction. Very little is certain
with respect to relations among reasons and relations among objections, and that
also is quite abstract. Any specific classification (e.g. this is an addition to that
argument; this is an objection to a remark which has no thetic function in itself,
etc.) requires an involvement with the content in order to manage an appropriate
interpretation. Still, ones own involvement does not cease once the acquisition has
been accomplished, and it has become possible to determine how far the dialogue

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partners have come with respect to assessing the validity of the thesis. Rather, in
that case, the established state of argumentation must be opened up again in
order to mobilize ones own state of information and judgment for a potential continuation of the argument.
Determining the state of argumentation by an evaluator takes place in three
stages:
(A) Internal Determination
During this first stage, the evaluator reconstructs the argument, condenses the
state of argumentation, and examines whether the arguments presented justify
the thesis without any open objectionsall in the manner described. After this,
it is decided whether the thesis is valid, invalid, or undecidable.
(B) Advanced Internal Determination
During the second stage, the state of argumentation that has been established
internally is reopened and, if necessary, supplemented by arguments that do not
occur, but could have occurred, that is, arguments which the speakers could have
known. These arguments are then introduced to the discussion. They may be
additional reasons that refute open objections or additional objections which
the opponent has only de facto refrained from introducing to the discussion. Hence,
this advanced stage evens out a lack of attention and a capacity for remembering,
as well as a dialogue partners level of information which just happens to be
fragmentary. After adding these arguments, the next step is to examine again
whether the theory is valid, invalid, or undecidable. The verdict reached this
time may differ from the assessment established during the first stage.
(C) Intervening Determination
During the third stage, we, that is, the evaluators, reopen the state of argumentation once again and have to decide whether we are aware of any further
arguments that make any reasons in the (extended) text inconsistent, deprive
any objections of their soundness, or even contain new aspects. These arguments are added; the outcome is examined once more. The result of this examination, in turn, might differ from the previous stages.
I think it is obvious that the second stage is derived from the third. It is our task
as evaluators to attribute knowledge and awareness to the opponents whose dialogue and its outcome are assessed by us. We, the evaluators, must declare: This is
something they could have known or included in their dialogue. Nevertheless, the
distinction between the second and third stage is relevant, and recognizing it is
advisable in order to fully appreciate the arguments. The transition from the second
to the third stage signifies that an evaluator can take something into consideration
which was not available to the dialogue partners. Such a superiority can be rather
contingent (if I have some information which is not available to the dialogue partner
due to some serious, but merely factual reasons), in which case the intervening
determination of the state of argumentation can hardly be distinguished nonarbitrarily from the advanced internal determination. Things are different if my
position is grounded in advanced praxisa praxis that contains action possibilities

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The Open Forum of Arguments: Trust as the Pragmatic Function of Validity

287

which exceed the dialogue partners possibilities. In that case, the theoretical
stylization of this more advanced praxis allows for introducing further information
to the dialogue. Hence, it becomes possible to take the growth of theory into consideration when assessing the validity of the thesis.
A common mistake in assessing orientations of former times is to forget that
people did not even suspect certain things that are self-evident today.20 The
notorious ridicule of Colns blatant misjudgments regarding the size of the Earth,
which I pointed out in Chap. 2, is an example of this phenomenon and so is any
disapproval of Boyles attempts at weighing a fire substance. In fact, the know-itall manner of those born later is as much a mistake as is the one for which they
want to blame those involved in research at the time. In case of historical processes, such as the execution of the French king during the Revolution, retrospective assessments are even trickier. We, as those born later, know the outcome of
these processes; it is impossible for us to discard this knowledge again.21 We know
of the terror against the counterrevolution that ensued after the execution, and we
are aware of the excesses that followed. We know of the Napoleonic Empire, the
restitution of the Bourbons, and the Second Empire. All of this casts an entirely
different light on the arguments for and against the conviction and execution of the
king than at the time of the Convention in November/December 1792. Jules
Michelet, studying the events half a century later, regarded the execution as a clear
mistake, but this assessment is based largely on political aspects whose weight
arises from a knowledge of subsequent history. For us today, looking back at several revolutions, even bloodless ones, and taking human rights to be essential,
things are yet again different.
Why should a validity assessment take the evaluator into account? Because argumentation is a praxis by way of which people form or maintain their orientations.
This is an effort which, even though it is de facto carried out by individuals, is
relevant for everyone. After all, everyone has a need for valid orientations and the
realm of thetic reason knows no objective certainties.

7.5

The Open Forum of Arguments: Trust as the Pragmatic

Function of Validity

So far the judgment about thetic validity is up to the evaluator, who determines
and fixates the state of argumentation. What kind of a figure is the evaluator?
In what sense is it possible for her verdict to express something universal? I will
say the following: The evaluator acts as an agent of the open forum. Forum
denotes the instance that ensures the universality of the judgment about validity.
20

Douglas Walton has dubbed a variant of this fault Monday morning quarterbacking; cf. Walton
(2011), 208.
21
This is the problem of potentiated ignorance, which I have addressed in Chap. 5.

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Validity

What this means is that everything now depends on how this forum is composed.
There are apparently many options for its composition. As I already mentioned
several times, the most obvious option seems to be a generalization of the various
instances of dialogue and, in doing so, most often a generalization of the consenting opponents. Hence, the forum would not only comprise the factual opponents, but any possible opponents. But what would that achieve? When it comes
to the value of insights about the material world, then the many are not a reliable measure. In the dialogue Gorgias, Plato has Socrates espouse views on the
wretchedness of doing wrong which, as the opponent Polos argues, no one in the
city would accept. No matter, Socrates replies unflinchingly, all he cares about is
the agreement with his current opponent. And when Polos denies him such an
agreementeven though all arguments speak against himSocrates/Plato
replies that this is a pity, but that the important thing was for him to be in agreement with himself.22
This already shows quite a range of possible ways of conceptualizing the forum
or, rather, the universality that is relevant in the practice of argumentation. But we
cannot stop here because, as already demonstrated, the matter should not be conceptualized in such a way that agreement is a criterion for validity. Turning agreement,
even agreement coupled with understanding, into a criterion for validity may lead to
the kind of discord that has become known as the compulsion to consent, which
opens the door to arbitrariness.
It is my intention to present a conception of the forum that takes as its starting
point the characteristics of real research. Research is local; it is driven by individual
people, individual groupseven if commissioned by larger groups such as the
general public (in public research institutions) and even if it proceeds along
standardized modes, thus forming (more or less binding) communities. It is these
characteristics of research which demand that the forum initially be understood as
local. But it is regional only insofar as it begins in specific locations, namely those
places where problems are detected and research is initiated. Subsequently, it is
open, that is, without fixed borders and with the capacity to expand freely. I will
attempt to conceptually grasp a forum that expands in this fashion.
As everybody knows, forum means marketplace. In a marketplace, there is a
general coming and going; some things are handed over, others are takennot only
goods and money, but also information, news, opinions, and theses. Even arguments
sometimes occur. They may contribute to the validity or invalidity of theses, classify
them as new orientations, or reject such a status as illusory. This is the feature that I
will take up. The forum, which I conceptualize as the stage on which any theses can
acquire universal validity, is the open forum of arguments.
This forum develops if the dialogue is designed to be open for further opponents
who are less interesting as people with new and special points of view, than as
contributors who know new arguments regarding the thesis. Certainly, an argumentative dialogue is an event which is realized in the reality of human communication.
22

Cf. Plato (1964), Gorgias 476a and 482c.

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289

Each of the parties have their own orientation systems which contain orientations
that are more or less relevant for the thesis under discussion. Nevertheless, entering
into the dialogue already requires the acts of distancing to the degree that, if possible, only what is a suitable argument for or against the thesis or an already presented
argument is introduced. Insofar as the dialogue partners ensure the validity of the
thesis, only the state of argumentation is relevant.
Assessments of validity articulate this state of argumentation with respect to the
thesis. Now, if the dialogue is designed to be open for other opponents, the first
consequence is that the evaluator who joins the discussion will actively participate
in it, reopen the state of argumentation, and determine whether there are any new
arguments. If there is a new argument, it will be integrated into the previous validity
assessment. This is what I call the open forum of arguments: The resulting
structure of the dialogue as an event that joins all arguments into a thesis and
regards this set of arguments not as something currently available, but as something
potentially in-the-making.
The open forum expands synchronically as well as diachronically. Synchronic
expansion means that the current state of argumentation of the dialogue that we
are inas those who address the quaestioexpands as soon as a new dialogue
partner joins us from the outside, or if we are informed of another dialogue group
that has reached a different state of argumentation. In each case, the center is
formed around the we of those currently speaking. Newly added arguments and
modifications of the thesis, etc., are integrated into the insights and considerations
of this center. There is no superior position from which to survey the many parallel dialogue groups and states of argumentation, nor is there any need for such a
standpoint. It suffices to say that each dialogue partner or evaluator who is
confronted with new arguments acts as an agent of the forum insofar as he or
she integrates these new arguments into the previous state of argumentation. The
same is true of diachronic expansion. It is actually still synchronic, but described
from a different perspective. The key point in both cases is that new arguments
arise after the arguments that have already been considered, so that the expansion
of the forum is a process in time. If a thesis is judged to be valid, it becomes a new
orientation for actions.
As an orientation for actions, the new valid thesis is more inert than the thetic
theory, which is deliberated in a dialogue. Practices are integrated into the habitus
and determine social institutions. Such a practice is not immediately called into
question as soon as a new objection arises. This reality of the quest for orientation
and the fate of each new orientation that has been found determine the pace of the
ubiquitous research process. The willingness to open the state of argumentation for
new arguments is pitted against our inertia to change more or less important sections
of life. This structure already suffices to explain the difference between various
groups, subcultures, and cultures concerning their forms of life. Even if they commit
themselves to research with the same devotion, their theses might look very different.
Nevertheless, the judgment about validity should refer to the forum of arguments
and not to the state of the realizations. (The latter would lead to relativism.) From

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this vantage point, we can also say that an individual or a group, even a large group
such as a nation or culture, lags behind the state of their insights. The Revolution in
France was the great paradigmatic case of an era in which the monarchical form of
government lagged far behind the insights of those living in it, but which, at the
same time, was firmly held in place through (institutionalized) violence until it was
abolished through (informal) violence.
To conclude this section on the open forum, I will once again deal with the
question of the pragmatic status of a valid thesis according to this broader sense. So
far, it should have become obvious that a judgment about validity expresses the
following: The thesis is suitable as a new orientation. The validity judgment is
backed by the fact that the thesis which is deemed valid encapsulates the entire
theoretical content of the argumentation. The thesis is, as it were, the synthesis of
the state of argumentation. However, the link to practice through which we regard
the theories again raises the question of what such a judgment means practically. By
comparison, if we examine epistemic theory with respect to this question, the
answer is clear: It provides orientation and this achievement is demonstrable in the
felicity of the practical actions. Epistemic theory does not need anything else for it
to bridge the gap between arguing and acting.
This is different in the case of thetic theory. It is not sufficient to say there are no
further arguments that speak against this. Or, in the best-case scenario, I understand
clearly and distinctly that things are as stated by the thesis. A judgment of validity
simultaneously expresses the credibility of the thesis. It states: The thesis is suitable; you can put your trust in it. Now, it is precisely this function of trust building
which argumentation has to fulfill if it wants to present a thesis as valid. Trust is
necessary for transforming real life and actions based on new orientations. This is
the link between the practical felicity of actions and the argumentative satisfaction
of validity claims: An assessment of the thesis as valid expresses trust in the felicity
of the actions that are guided by it.
Such confidence in the strength of arguments is the self-confidence of
autonomous human beings. In dealing with a thesis, we are no longer backed up
by any experiences of coping with reality. All we rely on is the argument, the
verbal structure. We trust in it because it has been confronted with all the available
knowledge and with the intelligence of the Other. Nothing protects us from the
possibility that even these instances are perhaps not enough to invalidate an
insight that is, in fact, nothing but sheer illusion. Hence, the person who jeopardizes her life, based on her argumentatively examined understanding, demonstrates trust in the idea that her own reason, optimized in dialogue form, is
sufficient to renew life with new realities.
We human beings, traversing the thetic sphere, must therefore believe that we
can stand our ground in the (natural and social) world on the basis of our theses.
Strictly speaking, we are always dealing with the world as it is for us. But due to
the fact that we take (must take, for we have no other choice) our thetic reason as the
basis for shaping the world, this thetic reason is the for-itself of the world. Hegel
still called such thinking speculation. Today, we have moved beyond this; we can
understand that it is our last reasonable option.

7.6

7.6

Probable Validity?

291

Probable Validity?

As I already pointed out in Chaps. 1 and 4, Aristotle, in the mature phase of his
philosophy, distinguished dialectics from analytics. While the latter addressed
knowledge and necessity, dialectics, which was originally intended to be a theory
about Platos art of dialogue, now merely referred to opinions or probability (to
eikos). Analytics consists of systematic discussions and logical deductions.
Dialectics concerns reasoning and argumentation. This was the beginning of a
rankingstill in effect todaywhich stipulates that argumentation does not contribute anything (except for formal criticism) to the serious process of knowledge;
that it is rather a preform, suitable for conflicts in the realm of everyday life and, at
best, politics and morality. Yet, general opinion has it that there is hardly anything
in these realms that could function as a stable theory for argumentative bases.
Ultimately, everything is based on consensus, and results represent the distribution
of rhetorical and social power rather than real insights into the matter in question.
At the new beginning of argumentation theory around the middle of the twentieth
century, Toulmin came up with the great idea of undermining the dichotomy
between precise knowledge and mere opinion by declaring legal arguments to be the
model for theory construction in argumentation. Yet somehow, Toulmin seems to
have been unable to completely disentangle himself from his education in natural
sciences. Following elaborate reflections on the theory of probability (which were
hardly suitable for the envisaged purpose),23 he reserved a place for the modal weakening of an assertion in his now famous scheme (cf. Introduction, the section
Argumentation Theory Under Construction).24 If arguments are not sufficient for
a conclusion, the latter should be weakened by using a qualifier such as
presumably or probably. Toulmin envisioned primarily two types of uses in this
respect, which he illustrated as follows:
A child is invited for tea by a friend; he wants to go, but is unsure whether an
already scheduled trip to the zoo will be over in time for him to visit his friend. So,
he answers: I will probably come.25
The second type of situation is concerned with the kind of questions whether a
particular Swede is a Catholic if 98 % of Swedes are not. Again, the response is: He
is probably not Catholic.
Is this a reasonable proposal? First, I will try to specify our common intuitions.
If I make statements such as My brother will probably come visit me in Hamburg
this year or The current president of the United States will probably go down in
23

Cf. Toulmin (1958), Chap. II: Probability.

Toulmin (1958), 101. Klein suggested (Klein (1980), 1819) that this should not be regarded as
a weakening of the validity claim, but as a weakening of the thesis. I am happy to follow this proposal because it avoids a fourth possible judgment besides valid, invalid, and undecidable
namely, probably valid. Pragmatically speaking, there is no difference between asserting that the
sentence Peterson is probably Protestant is valid and asserting that the sentence Peterson is
Protestant is probably valid.
25
Cf. Toulmin (1958), 48 ff.
24

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Validity

history, then it is not clear whether these are even meant to be understood as thetic.
After all, it is quite possible to distinguish considerations from argumentative
speech. The former makes no claim to validity, but raises our awareness of possibilities that could influence the validity of other sentences.
If we believe, however, that such sentences are truly thetic, then it is advisable to
determine whether the modalization of probability in these cases should be construed or, rather, reconstructed either qualitatively or quantitatively.
In the case of the child that has been invited, I would argue for a qualitative interpretation. The child means something like this: I would like to come. And if we are
back from the zoo in time, I will. But I dont know whether that will actually be the
case. That is what I mean by saying: I will probably come.
An unbiased analysis would arrive at the result that, in this case, the theoretical basis
is not sufficient for a prognosis (let alone a definitive promise). So why should we not
plead for this case being undecidable? Because the child wants to see his friend and
might still be able, for example, to change the length of his trip to the zoo accordingly.
The situation does not allow for judging the decisive if-then statement to be true, but
there is a considerable effort to make it true for the situation in question. Assuming that the
child is successful, the prognosis, I will come, can be inferred logically. Where
there is a will, there is a waybut not always. It is this uncertainty that is expressed by
the term probably. This is a form of soft necessity that takes ones own influence
on the situation as well as its uncertain outcome into account for the assessment.
Toulmins second type of situation is of a very different kind. If we say that the
Swede Peterson, as a member of a largely non-Catholic population, is probably
not Catholic, then this is clearly meant in a quantitative sense. I have already discussed this in the Introduction. Today, it is common to understand probably in this
quantitative sense. Yet, if we construe it that way, we replace the actual thesis
which picks out a person, in this case Mr. Peterson, and says something about him
with a thesis that applies to a whole range of people, none of which have been
identified. That is how things look from a pragmatic point of view. I will discuss this
in more detail in the following.
Depending on ones intentions, the talk of probability in a quantitative sense
can be either semiformal or even purely formal. Let us briefly consider these two
possibilities:
(A) Statistical Probability
We make statements that are probably true, based on random samples which
emerge from a process of counting. (98 Swedes out of our random sample of
100 are not Catholic.) The counted number is then extrapolated to the total
population. This procedure is semi-formal in the following sense: It is only
significant if the random sample is representative, and in the production of this
random sample, we draw on substantial knowledge as well as on subjective
views on what counts as relevant.26
26

Much is still open at this point and will be fixed by decisions which may be tainted by arbitrariness. Hence, many social scientists only take those statistics seriously which they have examined
themselves.

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Probable Validity?

293

(B) Probability in Terms of a Theory of Chance

We make statements about the instances of a random sample here, as well. Yet,
in this case, the selection of these instances is unproblematic because the sample has been produced by a random generator and is therefore homogeneous.
Given a precision die, it is possible to calculate how probable it is for a six to
be thrown. This is a formal art, a branch of mathematics. We do not gain any
new substantial orientations by engaging in it.
These, then, are some possibilities for modally qualifying a thesis. But what such a
thesis really means and how it relates to a non-qualified thesis, whether it is a
weakened version of the latter and what that is supposed to meanall of this can
only be clarified once we consider the thesis in a pragmatic frame of mind, that is,
with respect to its function as a suitable orientation. What are we to do with theses
such as P. is probably not a Catholic, The train is probably not on time, etc.? As
I already pointed out, if probability is understood as quantitative in these cases, this
means that we replace one thesis with another. Consider the following dialogue:
P: Peterson is not Catholic because he is Swedish, and people in Sweden are almost
never Catholic.
O: But there are some Catholics in Sweden.
P: Yes, 2 %.
O: Couldnt he belong to those 2 %?
P: Probably not!
In this example, modalization is best understood as a successor thesis that results
from modifying the original thesis, based on previously presented arguments.
(Incidentally, this was also Toulmins original idea, but he did not introduce a term for
a thesis that has been modified after the fact. This is a weakness of his conception
because there are countless possibilities of thesis modification, in addition to such a
weakening of probability.) However, the modification is so serious that we might
almost call it a replacement of the thesis. After all, the modalized thesis no longer
applies to the individual case, in our example the case of Mr. Peterson, about whom we
wanted to say something; it now involves a series of cases. Whatever might be said
about the series, however, does not apply to the individual case. The individual case
gives us only two options: yes or no. If I treat the probable non-Catholic Peterson as
a non-Catholic, then I may have committed a faux pas if it turns out that he is, after all,
a Catholic. How can we solve this problem? Here are two suggestions:
1. Subjectification
The main idea here is that such modalizations are really about subjective forms.
What does a probability of 2 %, 25 %, or 75 % mean for the reality of acting?
That will depend on the thesis and the orientation system, or on the position that
incorporates the thesis if it is accepted as valid. Has the thesis merely been entertained or is it at the center of attention? For instance, if a probability of more than
50 % is integrated into the orientation system, then this integration takes place
because it is suitable for the proponent to test it and use it in his research. Some
people had vital organs removed prophylactically because they learned in genetic

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counseling that they had a 60 % probability of getting cancer. Others, confronted

with the same numerical values, deem the fact that their prospect of staying
healthy is 40 % and thus reason enough to refrain from surgery. There are formal
systems that encapsulate this subjectified version of probability under the heading subjective probability.27 These systems are based on the fact that people are
willing to attribute a numerical value to their assessments of a cognitiveemotional
amalgam of theoretical instructions and feelings of security or insecurity. We
would do well to regard such numbers with great caution. Similarly, it is better not
to raise questions about stabilization and transitivity. In ordinary language, this
subjective probability is also called plausibility, a term which, in general, does
not imply any further theoretical aspirations. We simply accept that some people
find plausible what is completely strange or outlandish to others.
2. Dynamization
This second proposal follows from the conclusion considered above in the
example of the childthat the modalization is performed because the argumentative basis is insufficient. The forum will usually find these cases as undecidable. However, given the obvious potential for individual influence, I have
argued for the exceptional character of this case. We might be able to describe it
in such a way that the thesis is, as it were, not yet completethat is, there is a
need for improving the theoretical basis, a need for further research. This might
not be very helpful in cases of an acute need for orientation, but it shows that the
modified thesis does not constitute an argumentatively backed orientation for
acting and that we still need a decision.
This leads to a more general statement. Argumentative results that rely on such
softeners (probably, maybe, I suppose so) do not indicate a particular species of
the practice of argumentation (argumentation in everyday life). Rather, they indicate
a phase whose outcomes provide only a limited basis for orientationan orientation which still requires a decision that consolidates the assessment into the kind of
yes/no dichotomy needed for acting. If an area, which we explore on the basis of the
probable theses, requires a more precise orientation, then the modal weakening calls
for further research.

7.7

The Concept of Validity as a Thesis

I have now arrived at the last section of my account of the concept of argumentative
validity. In this section, I will posit the adequacy of the concept as a (meta-)
thesis, which needs to be justified in such a way that no open objections remain. It
will be easy to see that this is not an additional idea, but only further explicates the
internal structure of the concept. The claim to universality, which is implied by
27

The theoretical basis of these approaches is the subjective interpretation (degree of belief) of
the probability theory of Thomas Bayes. For details, see de Finetti (1972).

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calling a thesis valid, has been defined with respect to an open forum of arguments in this dialecticalpragmatic approach. If the justification of a thesis has
been controlled by an opponent who arrives at a judgment of validity, then this
means that it can accommodate all arguments. It is clear that this universal quantifier can only refer to a state of argumentation that is available and that can well change
when the thesis is acted upon. Thetic universality is possible only in the practice of
argumentationthe only final authority in this regard.
In practical terms, this means that my (meta-)thesis promotes the rise of another
dialogical structure: I, as the proponent, have to vouch for the validity of my argument; consequently, all other concepts of validity that have heretofore been formulated are on the side of the opponents; finally, it is up to you, dear reader, to determine
the state of argumentation and evaluate the validity of my thesis.
It is a well-known fact that there are quite a few conceptions of what it means for
a thesis to be universally valid. Naturally, these conceptions will influence our
considerations. Hence, the dialectical and pragmatic conception of universalism
I explicate here willby its own standardshave to be defended against all these
other conceptions and their limitations will have to be exposed. The next 20 pages
will be devoted to this effort.

7.7.1

Confronting Universalism

By a universalistic concept of argumentative validity, I mean a conception that

equates the validity of a thesis with its generalizability. In this weak sense, I call
universalistic any demand that the thesis be universally validregardless of what
exactly this is supposed to meanand not merely subjectively or locally valid. The
concept of validity developed in this book is also universalistic, but this does not
mean much as long as I have not yet determined what I have in mind here. Common
conceptions of universalism all refer to the totality of a somehow existing or
presumably closed set of people and speakers, who are either directly involved or
indirectly affected. The fact, however, that they all differ in how they make this
reference allows for a distinction between several concepts of universalism.
Now, if we are not going to simply accept the postulations of our precursors, then
the suitability of a universal concept of thetic validity will have to come from
argumentation. That is the purpose of this section. I will consider five conceptions
of universalism, which I call simple, projective, elitist, democratic, and
ultimate universalism. All these conceptions have identifiable weaknesses and
limitations that need to be transcended for the practice of argumentation to take up
its prevalent position.
Perhaps a brief preliminary remark is in order. My argumentative discussion of
these concepts will be short and, as it were, make reference to ideal types. I will
present only sketches of what I have understood to be the core of a position and
refrain from giving long quotations, lectures, and retrospective or interpretive
appreciations. It is possible that some representatives of these conceptions will

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perceive such an approach as counterproductive. After all, did they not try to develop
their ideas in a thorough and differentiated manner in lengthy debates spanning
many decades? And now, a few brief sentences are supposed to adequately characterize what is essential to these ideas and will allow us to assess them? I do not mean
to simply shrug off such accusations. However, I have participated quite extensively
in these past debates; at this point, I am merely concerned with surveying the state
of argumentation. Now, let us get down to business:
Simple universalism is the universalism of common sense. If something is
right, it is right for everyone. This sound view has been afflicted by postmodern
relativism, a damage which is largely due to the fact that people consider the whole
world to be their own bedroom, where I can exercise my quirks and idiosyncrasies
without restraint. My wallpaper, furniture, pictures, memories, and opinions, these
are all right and validfor me, that is. As soon as we scale-up slightly, as soon as
we are facing situations that involve knowledgethat is, in technology, natural
science, formal science, law, and administration of the communitythings turn out
to be quite different. At that scale, it is obvious again to say that what is right is what
is affirmed by everyone. Once this simple universalism takes into account
deranged people, small children, or philosophical skeptics, it recognizes a need for
limitations: Everyone can agree or, rather, everyone can agree in principle and
understand that which is valid.
There are two problems with this view. One is that the statements about the
potential to agree or understand might require further clarifications. My best friend
does not understand arithmetic; she cannot even do elementary calculations or
understand their solutions. But would she be able to do so in principle? May be,
she had had a good education in mathematics and a loving mother who was an
expert at arithmetic? Yes, but there are people whose intellectual potential will
never prosper into a mastery of numbers, not even under the best of conditions.
Some people are even biased against numbers; may be they should have wanted to
be amiably led to the desired proficiency. If this idea is pursued further, then qualifying conditions enter the concept of universalization. This is the birth of an elitist
universalism, which is explained in detail below.
The second problem is that this idea seeks the models of universal validity in the
fields of knowledge, not research. Yet, things here are quite different. For instance,
there are the specifics of orientation systems, which lead to certain assessments and
maybe even to concerns about ever engaging with anything in the thetic realm. If, in
the process, objections arise, then it is often difficult to discern whether they merely
express subjectivity or are raised at a distance from it. In any case, with respect to
the validity of theses, simple universalism is a massive endeavor: At its most
extreme, justifying a thesis would involve the task of overcoming the singularities
of all human beings.
For the second conception of universalism, I have coined the rather strange term
projective universalism. I hope to explain it properly. The term is supposed to
refer to an idea articulated by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in their book La
nouvelle rhtorique. Trait de largumentation, which I already mentioned in the

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Introduction (cf. the section Argumentation Theory Under Construction).28 The

qualifications of this rhetoric as new and argumentative contained in the title
were meant to convey the intention of aiming at a kind of assent that is no longer, as
in traditional rhetoric, equivalent to the factual assent of any particular audience; but
a kind of assent that, if it is at all attainable, expresses something universally valid.
This conception was guided by the thought that a proponent can argumentatively address an audience in a number of different ways. While this will always
be a specific audience with particular characteristics, interests, and commitments, it is still an open question whether the speaker draws on these or whether
she aims merely at those of her listeners traits which they share with all (adult,
normal) human beings. In the latter case, by addressing her particular audience,
she turns to the universal audience (auditoire universel).29 If, with respect to
each specific addressee, only this very person is addressed, the resulting kind of
argumentation aims at coaxing people into agreement (persuader); if the particular addressee, however, stands in for the universal audience, then the goal is
rational persuasion (convaincre).
This concept of a universal audience has developed a strong hold on cultures
with a Romanic backgroundprobably not least because it articulates a very clear
push toward universalization, while, at the same time, being underdetermined and
leaving open many possibilities of interpretation and inference. It is not self-evident
that a thesis, which has been presented and justified in front of the universal audience, is in any way superior to a thesis which has been presented to a merely particular audience. What can be assumed, however, is that the proponent who faces
the universal audience does not attempt, so to speak, to play on the obvious
idiosyncrasies of his addressee. That is at least something.
Still, the decisive questions remain. How should the universal audience actually
be defined? The authors consider different possibilities: That it could really involve
all people or that it could stand for the elite or the experts on each quaestio. And
then, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca make the crucial move (which has led me to
choose the term projective universalism): Each speaker already has his own
conception of universality that he addresses when he argues with universal validity
in mind. This is not as weak a suggestion as it may initially sound. Indeed, how to
distinguish between particular and universal validity is now up to the speaker. But
the fact that there needs to be such a distinction in the first place has been put on
record as a requirement of this conception of the universal audience. Any relativistic
consequences are averted by stating that, in argumentative speech, we (implicitly)
also discuss how to properly determine the universal audience.
This is a clever measure that takes into account the open door of reason (cf. Chap. 4).
It results in a structure which is akin to the positive pluralism that I will introduce at the
end of this chapter. But it is still not sufficient and too unspecific. I will briefly repeat
the main arguments against it that have already been presented in the Introduction.
28
29

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969).

Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 7: The universal audience.

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This conception does not provide any criterion for determining whether a
particular argument is valid. Should I accept a thesis because I suppose that the
speaker who presents it to me is addressing the universal audience? Is there anything
that could tell me whether or not that is the case? If so, what if I prefer a different
conception of the universal audience? And finally: Why is it that nothing here
depends on dialogue anymore, that is, on the way in which I engage with the thesis
and the practice of argumentationnot only by listening and being receptive, but by
actively voicing my opinion and, possibly, my objections?30
The third conception is elitist universalism. It states that an argument is valid
insofar as it has the support of all those who possess certain competencies. This idea
has found a simple and catchy formulation in the Logical Propaedeutic:31 Validity
is determined by those who are knowledgeable and not biased. If they give their
assent, the thesis is considered valid. This is fine as a necessary condition (especially
for elementary propositions, whose truth is in question). But when it comes to
complex quaestiones, the criterion basically means nothing more than this: Let
honest experts decide; they will do the right thing. However, this is not satisfying.
Expertise usually has a subjective imprint (cf. Chap. 3). The deliberations of experts
will therefore also contain frame structures that need to be tackled (cf. Sect. 5.7.2),
and they will not often arrive at a consensus due to their biographical fixation.
The fourth kind is democratic universalism. Jrgen Habermas and his students,
in particular, defended this conception, which had a huge impact in Germany and
still does. The basic idea is that a thesis is valid if anyone who speaks or lives under
conditions enabling a free, independent verdict can agree with it. This idea was
already mentioned in the introduction (see again the section Argumentation Theory
Under Construction). It originally emerged in the guise of the concept of the ideal
speech situation.32 It placed particular emphasis on ensuring that the discursive
formation of opinions, regarding a thesis, is devoid of structures of domination.
Anyone who can talk on an equal footing with all other participants of a discourse
will agree to certain theses, which are then valid insofar as they articulate our unrestrained cognitive faculty and autonomy. In the progress of these discussions and
considerations, Habermas has further developed the definition of the conditions
under which people can speak freely. Finally, these conditions have come to match
those of the democratic constitutional state, in its idealized republican form, in
which responsible citizens self-determine the standards for how to organize their
community. In that state, only those action norms are valid to which all possibly
affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.33 If this is really
30

Joseph Kopperschmidt, the editor of the German translation of The New Rhetoric, tries very hard
in his Preface to emphasize the difference between the new and the old rhetoric: while the old one
sought only approval, the new one aims at validity (Kopperschmidt (2004), VIIIXI). Unfortunately,
this is true only with regarding the intentions of the two authors.
31
Cf. Kamlah and Lorenzen (1984), Chapter IV, 1.
32
Cf. Habermas (1973).
33
Cf. Habermas (1996), 107. This parsimonious discourse principle for action norms subsequently generates the principle of democracy. It states that only those laws are legitimate which

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supposed to be a criterion, then it becomes imperative to reflect on what is meant by

rational discourse. Of course, Habermas, as a leading contemporary German
philosopher, has much to offer that is valuable in this regard. In answering the
specific question what the discourse should look like, he usually refers to his student
Robert Alexys elaborate system of rules of discourse.34 Still, the general idea in this
case is once more that if a discussion is rationalwhich has now been defined by
certain rulesthen a consensus that is possibly achieved in the end demonstrates
the validity of the sentence in question.
How do we respond to this? First, by reiterating that this definition will not do for
the descriptive sphere. Habermas latest take on the descriptive sphere, or the field
of scientific knowledge, is that it is concerned with discourse-transcendent
truths.35 This seems to be a corollary of the consensus theory of truth, but nonetheless
a metaphysical illusion. With respect to this problem, I have remarked several times
that both the normative and the descriptive spheres are concerned with the felicity
conditions of praxes, and that we encounter restrictions in our praxes which need to
be explored and which are, as long as they are not entirely transparent to us, precisely thisrestrictions. That the world or reality is different than our own cultural
human nature in this regard is a metaphysical claim which is unnecessary and cannot be satisfied.
On the other hand, the main weakness of Habermas criterion is that it is a
consensual criterion. To be sure, that is a feature it shares with most of the familiar
and discussed criteria of universalism. While this gives it more clout in terms of the
politics of science, the same cannot be said with respect to philosophy or the
philosophy of science. I will outline this in detail below.
The fifth kind of universalism is what I call ultimate universalism. This
conception goes back to Charles Sanders Peirce. It states that a valid thesis (Peirce
can meet with the assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens in a legal process (110). Surely this principle captures much of the intuitions that converge under the label democracy. If we keep in
mind, however, that in currently existing democratic countries this assent (Zustimmung) of all
citizens is formally equated with their participation in parliamentary elections, then we become
aware of a huge gap which cannot be bridged satisfactorily by pointing to the necessity of representation. Does the Habermasian principle of democracy suggest, then, that a large number of
important post-war laws and governmental decisions that were rejected by a majority of the
German population (rearmament, emergency legislation, implementation of nuclear power for purposes of energy generation, EU enlargement, European monetary union, introduction of genetic
engineering) should be considered illegitimate? It is unclear whether Habermas himself would
make this claim, and I do not think he would. Rather, I believe that in case of such disputes, he
would pay less attention to the opinions of all citizens than to the rationale for passing these laws.
It, however, means that in any given case, it is less the assent (of all citizens) that is decisive, but
rather the quality or intelligibility of the presented arguments.
34
Cf. Alexy (1989).
35
Cf. Habermas (2003), 24748: Truth is a justification-transcendent concept that cannot be
made to coincide even with the concept of ideal warranted assertability. For a justification of this
view, Habermas refers to Albrecht Wellmer, and he partially even adopts Crispin Wrights ideas
(cf. my critique in Chap. 1). Habermas perspective is pragmatic in the sense of a moderate reference to lifeworld concerns and to the performative nature of speech. A reference to further praxes
or even to the practice of research regarding problems of orientation cannot be found in his work.

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called it true) is one that obtains when research about it has continued up to a fictitious end-point. What we call true, then, is what all who investigate a quaestio agree
to at some point.36
Again, the idea is as simple as it is catchy: Each individual researcher remains
entangled in the partial errors of his/her particular preconceptions and research conditions, and thus produces imperfect results permeated by falsity. But then, these are
corrected by his/her successors who no longer remain stuck in these conditions. In
turn, these successors mistakes are weeded out by their successors, and so on, ad
infinitum. The research process is a sequence of steps approaching truththe latter
being what remains as an ultimate belief.
This conception takes up and expands the fact that research on a quaestio is not
a one-time event with a momentary outcome, but that it is a communal process
which continues over time. Anyone who enters it at some later point possesses his/
her predecessors results, but is no longer caught up in their restrictive conditions.
The successor does not merely stand behind his/her precursors, but rather on their
shoulders.37 He or she is higher up and can see farther. Insofar as this process is
potentially iterable at will, a last community of researchers will be able to note
everything that is limiting and erroneous, and will be unimpaired by these restrictions in their judgments.
The idea of revisions through new beginnings under successively improved
conditions is impressive, but there are still a number of inconsistencies in this
conception. Hacking believes that Peirce was influenced by the experience that in
experiments (specifically, in order to determine the gravitational constant), results
differed at first, only to increasingly level out at a uniform value.38 This might be a
good explanation, but it highlights the first major one-sidedness of the concept even
more: Its model is research in the natural sciences.
Does it work as a general criterion of thetic validity? How does it help in assessing
a specific research thesis? This last question indicates that the idea does not really
contain a criterion of truth, but only a definition of truth.39 This has led Karl-Otto
Apel to synthesize Peirces thought with the aspect of idealization contained in
Habermas proposal about the ideal speech situation. The result of this synthesis is
a conception of validity as the ultimate consensus of an ideal research community.
This conception is supposed to guide current research as a regulative idea.40
36

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean
by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. Peirce (1965a), Collected
Papers, Vol. V, 268, or 5.407.
37
Based on an already existing literary topos, Newton wrote that he was able to see farther than,
say, Descartes because he was standing on the shoulders of giants. Robert Merton has traced the
history of this topos (in Merton (1965)).
38
Cf. Hacking (1983), 107.
39
For the distinction between a criterion of truth and a definition of truth, cf. Skirbekk (1977),
Introduction.
40
Truth is that consensus which would ultimately be reached by an unlimited research community
if the research process were to be continued under ideal communicative [] and epistemic []
conditions, thus critically transcending any factual consensusi.e. being potentially infinite.

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Furthermore, this research community has also been identified as a community of

argumentation,41 that is, the conception now includes the idea that argumentation is
essential in research. To my mind, this is currently the most sophisticated conception
of universalistic validity. Nevertheless, I have three objections.
First: This is yet another variant of the consensus theory of truthan idea that
has, frankly, not been fully thought through. It is not the fact (or fiction) that the
last community is in agreement on an issue which constitutes the truth or validity
of any determination of a state of affairs. The distinguished quality of what this
infinite community is supposed to have reached in the end is a state of being
oriented completely, comprehensively, and beyond a single doubt. Even the last
dialogue partners can still be asked: Why did you give your assent? And they will
not respond: because everyone gave their assent. Rather, they will point to the
insights for orientation conveyed through the theory as a reason for doing so. A
thesis is not valid because all are in agreement; on the contrary, all are in agreement
because the thesis is valid.
Second: New arguments do not only enter research about a quaestio as a result of
the researchers intellectual creativity; most of all, they emerge because the practical
realization of a thesis highlights some aspects of the state of affairs in question that
were previously invisible or unnoticed. Not everything that needs to be considered
in arguing about a thesiswhich, after all, theorizes into the unknowncan be
anticipated. Not all relevant objections can occur. The thesis will have to be
reformulated based on its realization; it will change. The longer this process will
take, the more intense and far-reaching will be those changes. For instance, the
knowledge of what happens in combustionoxygen is absorbed and light emitted
illuminates the nocturnal study through its realization in the light bulb. This knowledge could not have been derived from the insights of Heraclitus regarding the solar
fire. In short, the ultimate universalism skips the phase of realization, the necessary
integration into a praxis.
Third: The conception ignores history or conceives of it as natural history.
Human history is constituted by cycles that can be expressed as follows: Knowledge
that supports the praxis, thetic theory, a realization that extends the praxis, and an
integration of (possibly adjusted) thetic theory into knowledge that supports the
praxis. Over time, we come to understand what happens and what can be done. This
understanding forms our human self-conceptionwhich is also nothing but a bundle of theses under discussion, some of which will be integrated in realizations.
Each new insight contributes to a determination of the conditions for each new
action. And in this process of constantly revising our self-conceptions, human
beings will change again and again.
People today are different from those living in antiquity, the modern era, and the
nineteenth century. Even todays adolescents are already different from when I was
a teenager. They understand themselves and the world in a different way; they have
(Apel (2002), 133, emphasis in original; Trans. T.P.). A very similar formulation can be found a
year later in Apel (2003), 196.
41
Cf. the texts by Apels student Dietrich Bhler, in particular Bhler (1998).

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other conceptions of what it means for something to be right, and they do other
things in this differently conceived world. Have we not freed ourselves from some
particularities, in contrast to the state of mind of people living in the late middle
ages? Would we still send out an adventurous navigator of indeterminate origin,
equipped with nothing but erroneous maps of the Atlantic Ocean, on a passage
across the latter in order to Christianize, enslave, and massacre the gentle, peaceful,
and beautiful native population of the Caribbean? Probably nota whole body of
human rights speaks against this. Such an assessment, however, is unreal. It was
precisely against the background of decisions made by the Spanish royal house,
which are now regarded as dubious, as well as of the consequences of conquering
the New World that we have become the kind of people capable of challenging those
decisions today.
So much for these objections. Apparently, the idea of ultimate universalism can
be formulated in terms of the pragmaticdialectic that I envision here; then it
becomes the framing of the research process coupled with a continually repeated
opening of the state of argumentation whenever new arguments occur. This definition would state that what is valid is the result of the last subsequent dialogue about
a thesis. The problem, however, is the correlation between the first and the last
thesisthe one that has been deemed valid. As it were, the validity claim raised by
the first thesis would aim at the last thesis. In between, however, lies the whole
history of the development of humanity, of humans changing over and over again.
According to the validity claim of the thesis, we would have to skip all these. As
argumentative researchers, we would aim at insights that we could never reach
insights that would only be available to our successors who will have completed
everything. By no means, would truth here be of the thetic sphere; it would be of
knowledgenot the kind of knowledge, however, that would have been realized in
felicitous praxes while still being subject to revisions: rather, a knowledge that
satisfies those claims commonly identified by the predicate absolute.
To sum up: There are many reasons for why the current versions of universalist
thinking are not suitable for supplying a criterion for the validity of theses that we
discuss because we are yet to know whether they are true. For one, defects are due to
an inadequate conception of the very universality that should be governed by this
validity. To my mind, conceiving of this universality as something coming-to-be is the
right way to go here, but it still does not take into account the fact that human history
is not natural history but a historical process, that is, a process in which the selfreference of subjects as well as their reference to the process itself lead to changed
self-conceptions and then, by way of realizations, to changes to the process.
On the other hand, the defects of the universalistic conceptions under discussion
here are due to the fact that they are consensus theories. There is not much to be
gained for a universal criterion of validity from the simple truth that we can determine the life of a small club (a small polis) all on our ownthat is, that some kind
of norm is valid because we have come to an agreement on it. To be sure, once we
transcend the situational intelligibility of circumstances, the sheer fact of a consensus can support the web of norms (and is quite indispensable, in fact, where the most
fundamental normsin our case today, human rightsare concerned). It cannot,

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however, function as a justification. Assent as such cannot be a justification because,

at any given moment, we can ask for its own justificationand if the matter at hand
concerns us, we should.
The only possibility to avoid this objection that I am aware of consists in
foregoing altogether the universalization based on assent and replacing it with universalization based on arguments (cf. the open forum of arguments, Chap. 7.5). If
this process is guided by historical thinking, then it results in the dialectical and
pragmatic universalism developed here.

7.7.2

Confronting Relativism

First, another brief recap: The approach presented here defines the concept of argumentative validity as the content of a forums evaluative judgment concerning a
conclusion, made on the basis of a particular state of argumentation. Validity is thus
relative to the state of argumentation. Depending on how far a given state of affairs
has been investigated and on what efforts were expended in the research process
(which commonly gives rise to new arguments), the state of argumentation may
change slowly or quickly. Still, each factual state of argumentation is supposed to be
the decisive factor. Is this not relativismand, what is even worse, relativism of a
particularly naive kind?
My answer is no. On the contrary, if properly thought through, this concept of
validity provides the theoretical resources for ordering and understanding the
problems surrounding relativism, absolutism, universalism, and particularism.
I will discuss two questions:
First: What is relativism and why is it a disturbance?
Second: Can relativity to a state of argumentation be equated with relativism?
First: Relativism is a position according to which all validity claims can only
be satisfied relative to a system in which they are raised. The system to which
a particular validity claim is relative must be identifiable on the basis of some
information. At the very least, it must be clear what does and what does not
belong to the systemwhat forms, as it were, the environment of the system.
It goes without saying that the relativistic position is placed squarely in this very
environment, at an external standpoint from where the boundary of the system is noticeable.
As far as relativism itself raises a validity claim, this also falls under the
relativistic qualification and is therefore only satisfiable relative to a system. This is
where the well-known problem of self-application turns up: The standpoint from
which to raise the relativistic thesis is itself part of a system which, from the outside,
would have to be perceived as limited. This would require, then, another external
standpoint in order to be able to situate the validity claim of the relativistic thesis
according to its content. In short, the superior position that relativism utilizes in
articulating its thesis is, strictly speaking, unattainable.

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Validity

This is the fundamental theoretical defect of relativism. If the matter is considered

in an academic debate, this is a refuting argumentnot so, however, among an
ordinary educated public. In order to judge from a relativistic perspective, the
universal quantification (all validity claims are internal) is not necessary. It suffices
to say that all relevant substantial validity claims, which I have met so far, can more
profitably be understood and treated as internal. Or for a harmonious coexistence in
a multifaceted world to be possible, it is just plain advisable to regard validity claims
as intra-systemic.42 This means, however, that by and by we abandon all theoretical
and philosophical standards. No one has to uphold a relativistic thesis in order to
agree with a sentence such as Let everyone seek heaven in their own fashion.
For a more detailed investigation of the characteristics and burdens of justification
associated with the relativistic thesis, I will now consider a few different configurations
that are frequently taken as an occasion for relativistic thinking.

7.7.2.1

Semantic Relativism

This concerns linguistic understanding. What a verbal expression means is relative

to a language game, that is, a web of verbal communication and practical
interaction in which the expression is suitable for understanding. The same expression may mean different things in different language games. As a result, validity
claims that are satisfiable in one language game may fail in another. A sentence
about the meaning of nail may be valid in one language game, but invalid in
another. If I make the statement, That is a dirty nail, in order to refer to the
pin-shaped, clay-covered metal object in your hand, then you may take offense at
my utterance if you have just spent some time thoroughly scrubbing your hands,
including your fingernails. Both spheres of perception, which may have been
constituted by our different interests, form two different systems. It is easy to see
how this confusion can be overcome (what do you refer to by using that?).
Things become somewhat more difficult if the reference is not so obvious.
Water, for instance, does not mean the same in everyday life and in agriculture as
it does in science (H2O). Sentences about pure water may be true in one language
game, but false in another. Even in this case, however, a translation is possible without major difficulties if we isolate the different purposes and praxes, and understand
the purposes of scientific praxis as a culmination and differentiation of simpler epistemic purposes in everyday life.43
42

This is the way we might make sense of the Rhetorical Relativism recommended by Manfred
Kienpointner (Kienpointner (1992), 153165). Along this line, Kienpointner regards it as
desirable to become acquainted with new aspects of realitywhich, after all, will always be
perspectively shortened by ones own language game (156; Trans. T.P.). Most people will
probably be happy to agree with this. But what is missing in this account is the dark side of the
matter: These new aspects could turn out to be highly problematicfantastic and cruel rites of
initiation, conceptions of honor which give us the creeps, etc.
43
For a much more elaborate refutation of semantic relativism, cf. Donald Davidsons famous
essay on the conceptual scheme and the possibility of translation (Davidson (1974)). Although

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Yet the more different language games are embedded into different forms of life,
the more superficially similar expressions may differ in their meaning. In that case,
semantic relativism crosses over into cultural relativism.

7.7.2.2

Cultural Relativism

This concerns the meaning and evaluation of praxes, webs of praxes, and the facts
of life. Customs and rituals may be admissible or good, valuable, and even sacred in
one culture, but contemptible, stupid, and barbaric in another. Pederasty was common in Athens and, if at all connected with relevant value judgments, regarded as
something rather positive. For us, this is child abuse, a terrible crime, the only sexual
practice that is clearly condemned under penalty of law. What one culture views as
the sanctity of the propositions of a text is regarded and despised as foolish literalism by another, etc.
Intuitively, this is all fine. It seems particularly clear if the point is the relativization of a culture dominating other cultures.44 Yet if we truly want to posit cultural
relativity or even the fundamental and inevitable relativity of such judgments, we
encounter the problem of clearly distinguishing systems from one another or, rather,
of identifying the system boundaries where the respective validity claims end.
How far does the system of a dogmaticfundamentalist religion reach and where
does it end? What seems to be a way out of this predicament, namely the idea that
the reach of a particular system extends as far its validity claims are accepted, turns
out to be circular. What we need instead is a definition of system that is independent of raising and acknowledging a validity claim. This means that a serious cultural relativism requires a concept of culture which enables descriptions of cultures
as units that are not mutually translatable. A strictly pragmatic point of view may, at
least, partially be of help here. It would not start with symbolic content, but with
forms of praxis and life. This would allow for a definition of cultural differences
without having to use the differences of established validity claims. Regarding the
aforementioned example, it would approximately look as follows: The ancient
Greeks lived in poleis, individual city-states, each of which was autonomous; their
educational system offered organized classes only for the acquisition of basic skills;
all higher competencies were gained in the personal contact that an ephebe had
Davidson mentions the link from language to practice in that essay (67), his thinking is not really
pragmatic, but analytical and empirical: The decisive factor for the truth of judgments is supposed
to be the tribunal of experience (14). That Davidson discusses experience without any reference
to questions of constitution clearly matches the nature of the debate in which he intends to place
his essay, but it weakens his contribution to the problem of semantic relativismwhose conclusion
is, of course, quite right.
44
The motivation of the founder of modern cultural relativism, the GermanAmerican anthropologist Franz Boas, was to deny the claim that the standards of the white race are universal. Thus he
wrote in 1887: civilization is not something absolute, but it is relative, and our ideas and
conceptions are true only so far as our civilization goes (Boas (1887), 589). A contemporary voice
is Geertz (1984).

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Validity

with adult citizens, etc. Such differences would suffice to differentiate the old
Greeks from us or from todays inhabitants of the Hellenic Republic.
Nevertheless, it is and remains difficult to distinguish the cultures with respect to the
validity claims raised within them. Based on the example, a relativist would have to
show the following:
1. Our verdict about child abuse makes use of something that was not available to
the ancient Greeks (a theory about children growing up, including their sexuality
and possible disturbances of the latter, which has been tested and established in
practice).
2. Our verdict is by no means an extension and improvement of the (fictitious) state
of argumentation in ancient Athens; rather, it is based on quite different (incomparable) arguments.

7.7.2.3

Paradigm Relativism

This no longer generally concerns claims to validity, but, more specifically, claims
to knowledge or to insights into states of affairs. From the time of the ancient Greeks
(Empedocles),45 fire was considered an element participating in, for instance, warm
and hot objects. It was not until the eighteenth century that this conception was
challenged and eventually discarded. A major step in this development was the
identification of the fire or the warmth substance designated by the term phlogiston as part of a new theory, deemed brilliant at the time,46 which could even demonstrate its practical relevance. Todays chemists can hardly believe that anyone has
ever seriously regarded warmth as a material substance.
There are three major periods in which very different theories about warmth
were considered to be knowledge: Three different paradigms, as we have learned
to say over the last 50 years. Thomas Kuhn provided many arguments and ideas for
distinguishing one paradigm from another; only few of these have proven to be
durable. Once again, the theoretical problem here is the system boundary. If relativism is right, the systems cannot be mutually translatable. Insofar as the
terminology, at least the basic terms, are constitutive of the system, the task at hand
would be to justify why they are not mutually translatable. This is obviously not
easy. In the history of science, the terminologies were de facto translated into each
other. Anything that resisted this translation was omitted. Hence, the concept of a
warmth substance has disappeared; the concept of elements that was part of the old
cosmology has also disappeared, or rather its remaining link to the modern concept
of elements is rather weak.
45

Cf. McLean and Aspel (1970). Empedocles fragment 17.

Its author Georg Ernst Stahl was able to demonstrate experimentally that sulfur consists of sulfuric acid and phlogiston, and was honorably mentioned by Kant in the second edition of the
Critique of Pure Reason (Bxiii). Kant regarded Stahl as one of the more recent natural scientists on
whom a light [had] dawned and who knew, by their deeds, how to make nature respond to their
questions.
46

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The succession of paradigms constitutes a development. While it is impossible to

construct this development on the basis of the first paradigm, it can certainly be
reconstructed on the basis of the last one. This is again the same figure that I mentioned on several occasions: Empedocles was unable to know which of his insights
would remain or what would be retained in a transformed and enriched form. We,
however, are able to recognize this retrospectively.
The same can be said for political history: Here, for instance, the concept of the
monarch has disappearedat least insofar as it includes a justification and
sanctification of this form of rule. All that is left is a designation for an obsolete
form. As such, it is either a mere ornament or, if it makes the old claims, it can only
be upheld by violence. Retrospectively, however, we can identify a perennial
element here, too (though this requires much good will), namely the idea that people
usually do not govern themselves and thus delegate the organization of their public
affairs to an elite.
An incommensurability between paradigms that relativism would require is
an absurdity. The idea of incommensurability is valuable as a borderline case,
and, as such, it can also be elucidated to a large extent. (I made an attempt to do
so in Chap. 5.) As participants, we will encounter such a relationship only insofar as we meet utterances that seem to rely on a heterogeneous basis. In that
case, we may devote ourselves to reducing frame divergences. Any success in
this endeavor removes the hold that a paradigm relativism might have over us.
It seems, then, that the paradigm becomes tangible only in the moment of its
disappearance. Perhaps, it is this fact that predestines Kuhns talk of the paradigm to be less suitable for scientific eras and more for all kinds of potential
changes that are considered grave and have not yet been completely understood.
If the public city cleaning service installs new garbage cans, which differ in
shape and size from the old ones, an op-ed in the local paper will describe this
as a paradigm shift.
In fact, the only sector of knowledge where we meet veritable paradigm differences that are stable and may even be respected is the normative onethe law. In
connection with, for example, euthanasia, sexuality, embryo research, etc., some
Western states ban certain practices that are permitted in others. This does not mean,
however, that it is basically impossible to transcend system boundaries in this
regard. Germans, for instance, are more sensitive when it comes to these issues than
people from the Netherlands, because of the Nazis euthanasia laws. This could
explain the fact that the states of argumentation in both the countries are different.
However, it is a completely different assumption than the claim that it is impossible
to ever complete the discussion: We do not have to come to an agreement; we can
simply continue to exist that way.
These three types of relativistic constellations should suffice to give an impression of circumstances which may suggest the assumption of a merely relative validity of propositions. The resulting theoretical problems should all have become quite
clear: (1) a definition of the system boundary that does not refer to the scope of
validity claims; and (2) evidence to back up the notion that the system boundary is
not permeable for extending the satisfiability of validity claims.

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If these problems could be solved (or disarmed by mitigating the relativistic thesis
in the aforementioned sense), what would still remain problematic about relativism?
Would it not simply be a blessing because it gives rise to a sense of modesty,
diversity, and tolerance? We could abandon all rigorism (for which we seem to have
a natural penchant in Germany). We would be open to an enrichment that stems
from the diversity offered by the variety of approved systems. That is right, but it
only focuses on the sunny side and ignores the shadows (more on this soon).
However, even a generalized readiness for relativistic tolerance is not good and
right per se. It would lead to a disturbance of research. Truth and validity would
become something minuscule, provinciala matter of opinion of individuals and collectives. Consider a simple analogy: Every child knows that a stick held into the water
appears to be bent. As long as we do not take it out of the water, this bent appearance
is the truth of the stick. It persists until someone takes the stick out of the water, and it
becomes apparent that it is not bent. Relativism states, as it were, that we should or
would have to place both observations side by side. The systems (stick in the water,
stick out of the water) are different, and both the findings, each relative to the respective system, have to be considered as final. Nevertheless, anyone who wants to know
whether the stick is bent or not will relate the systems to one another and will want to
find out how two contradictory judgments can be true.
This is the conditio of the human search for orientation. We come across the
limits of orientation and will attempt to transcend them in order to see the limitations
of our previous orientations and to possibly sublate them. Relativism implies the
claim that this is impossiblea claim that is excessive. It cannot be satisfied and
should therefore not be taken as an orientation.
This is the practical objection to relativism: Ultimately, it limits and provincializes research. In this context, it is worth noting that moral relativism (slightly
dramatized here as cultural relativism) is much more likely to be accepted than
epistemic relativism (concerning different paradigms).47 There are probably two
main reasons for this.
The first one revolves around the fact that moral relativism is regarded as a purely
descriptive statement about the fundamental differences between moral principles
and practices. Of course, this statement would not face the problem of selfapplication. That is correct, but rather shortsighted. For, on the one hand, even the
position of moral relativism requires a standpoint outside of or above all systems.
On the other hand, a truly consistent moral relativism would not only cognitively
diagnose the impassable differences between moralities; it would also have to characterize the fact that moralities are valid only relative to systems as right and good
in which case, of course, the problem of self-application would resurface.
The second reason for the broader acceptance of moral relativism is probably the
view, either wise or weary, that the human species is almost infinitely diversified,
47

About morality [] some people, philosophers included, are inclined to be relativists: they hold
that there are many alternative moral codes specifying what counts as good or bad conduct, but no
facts by virtue of which some of these codes are more correct than any of the others. Cf.
Boghossian (2006), 3; that passage also includes further references to genuine moral relativists.

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that is, people are ultimately too different for everyone to regard the same norms as
valid. Hence, the impossibility of bringing everyone into a moral balance turns into
the virtue of multicultural tolerance. It should have become obvious by now what
can be said with respect to the aforementioned sunny and shady sides of this view.
The fact that a complete disregard for the shady side does not work becomes
apparent no later than when a filmmaker, who finds it acceptable to vilify Muslims
publicly, meets a Muslim who finds it acceptable to massacre him publicly for doing
so.48 In fact, this had already been obvious beforehand, when the demand for traditional moralities to conform with human rights met with a defiant refusal. With
respect to the shady side, then, we can probably only conclude the following: Moral
relativism is not more harmless than epistemological relativismit is perhaps even
more dangerous.
Basically, though, the differences are artificial. Both versions of relativism are
concerned with the validity of theories and with the idea that the practical contexts
governed by these theories are not compatible and cannot be made more compatible through the theories, but rather seal themselves off from each other and
become isolated. This is a source of problems, both of theoretical problems, that
is, the understanding of any states of affairs does not continue (past the system
boundary)and of practical problemspeople who take their own actions to be
right get in the way of each other and thus give rise to aggression.
Relativism cannot function as a possible basis for questions of truth, rightness,
and validity. We need to come to terms with relativism, both conceptually and
theoretically.49
For that purpose, let me first distinguish between relativism and relativity.50
Someone makes an assertion and tries to satisfy the validity claim raised thereby.
At this point, the problem of the ceteris paribus clause that I have already mentioned several times can arise again (cf. Chaps. 1 and 6). It may turn out that in
making the assertion certain situational conditions were tacitly assumed to be
constant and normal, even though they fluctuate in reality. Now, if these conditions are momentarily different than assumed in the assertion, this may impair
their validity. Recognizing and understanding this, however, does not provide a
reason for the relativistic thesis. It indicates the relativity of circumstances (in our
natural and cultural reality), and by exposing this relativity in practice, we further
the formation of theory and knowledge.
It could be useful to illustrate these basic conditions by way of a simple example:
the changes of the aggregate states of water.
48

Translators note: This remark refers to the murder of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh by a
Dutch-Moroccan Muslim in Amsterdam in November 2004.
49
In contemporary philosophical debates, especially in the United States, relativism is usually
confronted with some version of realism. Cf., for example, Norris (1997). To my mind, this is a
poor strategy. On the one hand, philosophically speaking, realism is a very weak position, and on
the other hand, it has nothing to say about cultural and normative disciplines. Accordingly, as
I already mentioned in the text, people are inclined to perceive moral relativism (reductively) as
a cognitive view.
50
Cf. Lueken (1998).

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Validity

When exceeding a certain temperature (today, in our case, 100 C), water
turns to vapor. This has been a part of our knowledge for a long time. A subsequent discovery shows that the change of states does not depend on temperature
alone, but also on air pressure. If this result is reproducible,51 then the claim
about the change of states is no longer valid only relatively. Rather, knowledge
has now become more differentiated, and at the same time, more general. In
hindsight, the previous knowledge could now be considered particular (or
seemingly valid). This would mean that it depends on previously unknown
conditions that have now been recognized.
If we ask ourselves whether there can be knowledge that is not tied to specific
conditions in this way (and which would then become particular once these
conditions have been recognized), the answer would realistically have to be negative,
at least, for all material knowledgeand if we specify the definition of material,
this might even be an analytical proposition. As long as we still do not know, realize,
and understand everything, that is, as long as we cannot take everything into
consideration in our actions, our knowledge is tied to the circumstances (which
cannot be grasped conclusively) of the normal situation. It is relative to these
circumstances. The question now is whether these relativizing circumstances of
knowledgeand even more so of the respective theoriesare reason enough to
judge our current theories as having only limited validity in a relativistic sense.
If the state of knowledge is not definite but multifaceted and indistinct, then it is
quite true that the various schools or doctrines may form systems in the sense of
relativism. But if we possess or assume a state of knowledge that is uniform, then
relativity, at least understood as restrictiveness, is no longer noticeable. Consequently,
the verdict that this is relativism is no longer applicable. At any rate, stating the fact
that human knowledge and pursuits are finite does not make a theory relativistic. A
statement of only relative (or genuinely particular) validity requires a standpoint
from where we understand more than from within the system. We have to be
able to see further and deeper.
This is the problem that I have called the identification of the system boundary.
Now, if we think procedurally in the aforementioned way and regard each respective
state of knowledge or theory as a (temporarily closed and practically realized) state
of argumentation, then we may define the system boundary or the external position
as follows:
An evaluator inhabits an external standpoint if she can contribute at least one
new argument to the achieved state of argumentation. A new argument contains a
piece of new theoretical basis and thus changes the previous theoretical basis
thereby enabling a noncontingent revision of the validity claim. Such a new argument generates a new state of argumentation with respect to the quaestio. This state
constitutes a genuine (not just playful) external standpoint from which one can say
that the previous validity assessment was only relatively valid, that is, valid
relative to the theoretical-practical system expressed by the previous state of
argumentation, which has now been transcended.
51

Cf. Mittelstra (1992).

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Let us once again look at the discovery of the New World or the geographical
aspects of this extraordinary event. Previously, the Earth had a flat or humpbacked
shape. This description was based on the best available knowledge, which had,
moreover, been tested in all relevant praxes (traveling the world with vessels and
ships). However, many scholars held that the Earth was actually a sphere. They had
partially good reasons for this belief. (Still, they also had good reasons, e.g. for
believing that the stars were made of ether, or quintessence.) This sphere thesis
was then realized in the first half of the sixteenth century. Thus, it became knowledge. The circumnavigations of the globe introduced a new argument that had not
been available in the previous system. Hence, we know something that was not
previously known, which does not mean that the previous knowledge has to be considered as an error. Our predecessors knew something and we know something, and
although the two pieces of knowledge are incompatible, the judgment representing
both does not entail relativism. Rather, it expresses a relativity to the respective
practical and lifeworld circumstances and the states of argumentation made available thereby.52 This is possible because these circumstances merged into one
another, that is, the latter emerged from the earlier one. Consequently, knowledge
can be reconstructed as something coming-to-be in such a way that it undergoes a
development in which earlier stages are not simply refuted as false by later ones
which would follow from a conception of knowledge as ahistorical. According to
the view presented here, knowledge in its progress grazes particularitya particularity based on its embeddedness in praxes and the lifeworld that, as such, cannot be
sublated. This passage is a process in which praxes and lifeworlds simultaneously
provide more action possibilities for humanity (not, however, for amphibians, hippos, and hawksbut anyway, they do not act).
So much for the diachronic analysis of historically consecutive theoretical and
practical formations. But what about the coexistence of synchronic systems? In this
proposal, which aims at the possibility of mutually translating systems into one
another by opening up the respective states of argumentation for one another, we
can always grasp systems that exist side-by-side only consecutively. After all, we
begin to think and judge in one system, push argumentation as far as possible within
the system, and then apply arguments from the next system to this state of argumentation in an attempt to integrate them.

52

To avoid misunderstandings: This view does not commit us to the claim that the Earth used to be
flata claim that, due to reflexive changes, could not even be satisfied (cf. problem of incommensurability, Chap. 5.5). Instead, when we say that people used to believe that the Earth was flat, it
involves a distancing from the old knowledge. If, however, this distancing is supported by new,
previously inaccessible (epistemological) arguments, then it is not relativistic. The state of argumentation representing the old knowledge is closed with regard to the epistemic theory that was
available in relevant dialogues at that time. The revision of the state of argumentation that has now
become possible is therefore not expanded internally (cf. Chap. 7.4), but it is intervening. It is
backed by action possibilities (of assessing the shape of the earth) which are new, but which can
also be regarded as an extension and improvement of possibilities enabled by old praxis. This way,
we can position ourselves outside that old system of knowledge without having to dramatically
detach ourselves from it.

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Thus the content of the relativistic thesis is the following: Anyone who says that
validity claims are always internal produces the restriction that is implicit in the
verdict of relativism himself/herself; and he/she does so by closing off systems
against each other without having the respective arguments for showing that he/she
has already transcended these system boundaries.
At this point, a more detailed explanation is probably in order: If we construe
validity judgments as the result of carrying out practices and dialogues, then these
judgments represent states of argumentation. Closing off systems against one another
would mean that in a system S1 an argumentation A1 would lead to a conclusion C1,
while in another system S2 an argumentation A2 would lead to a conclusion C2 and
that it is impossible for arguments to be transferred back and forth between A1 and
A2. But why should that be impossible? In principle, there is no reason for this. All
that is left is the relativistic point of view which simply posits this impossibilityin
a know-all, humble, resigned, or cynical manner. States of argumentation which, for
reasons of fact or coincidence, turn out to be impermeable to each other are now
necessarily and definitely closed off. If they were kept open, it would be possible to
observe how arguments from A1 relate to arguments from A2. If the matter cannot
proceed because of frame divergences, we could examine where it is stuck. We do
exactly the same thing internally, within our own system, in order to proceed (e.g. if
husband and wife, student and professor, customer and salesperson, etc., do not
get along). As long as argumentation is stuck, there is simply no valid thesis, and
differing validity judgments are premature. Strictly speaking, the judgment would
have to be undecidable on the basis of all available arguments. Such a judgment
may not be more satisfactory than the one concerning systems that are mutually
closed off and their relative validities. In contrast to the latter, however, the former
judgment is theoretically open.
Now, the contrast to such an openness highlights the defect of the relativistic
point of view that I described in the beginning: Relativism either means closing a
vague but still open state of argumentation between the systems, or it means not
reopening the states of argumentation that have been closed off against each other
accidentally or factually. In both cases, it is the perspective of the relativistic position that produces the closure.
Another outcome follows from these elucidations: if you do not accept relativism, you are not forced to endorse a concept of absolute validity.53 Such a concept
would require a theoretical basis that is system invariant or transsystemic and would
thereby enable the assessment of all validity claims in all possible systems. We
would do well to carefully refrain from such claims. It is always enough to argue
from a particular position.
53

According to Albrecht Wellmer (1986), 100, relativism is the shadow of absolutism as both are
committed to the desire to anchor truth in an Archimedean point [] which is located outside of
our factual discourses (Trans. T.P.). I think that this is only partially true. To be sure: an
Archimedean point in the sense of something solid for all time is not at our disposal. But there
are anchors of validity outside our factual discourses: our felicitous praxes (cf. Chap. 1) and the
belief that we will be able to develop these further in a way that is consonant with human dignity
(cf. Chap. 10).

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If I come across validity claims (e.g. in other historical periods or cultures) which
I do not regard as valid, I can construct an argumentation for them. I can consider
whether seeking out equivalences might lead to differentiations of my position and/
or another position that could result in new reasons or whether objections remain.54
Is this always going to work? No. Even in the case of extensive work on frame
structures, the matter will often remain undecidable. However, this is not the same
as saying that validity claims are only relatively valid. After all, such a state of
affairs may be regarded as provisional. We can tell ourselves that we have simply
not progressed further than this. We have not progressed far enough in knowledge,
in understanding, and in the dialectical imagination of analyzing and synthesizing
ideas for us to be able to bring the countless, disintegrating, and antagonistic
research projects of human society into a relationship in which we no longer disturb
and destroy, but rather benefit and complement each other. We have only come as
far as we have. At the same time, however, we should keep in mind that the respective states of argumentation are open for each other. And so, the practice of argumentation retains its ubiquitous meaning.

7.7.3

The Relationship to Pluralism

In order to complete the discussion of relativistic thinking, I will finally address the
issue of pluralism. Pluralism usually refers to the fact that there are parallel and
competing research projects about many of our big quaestiones. These projects
generate states of argumentation for their positions that are not related to each other.
Depending on ones orientation system, the idea of pluralism is connected with a
positive evaluation, a negative one, or with no evaluation at all.
If I conceive of pluralism in such a way that the states of argumentation are not
closed off against each other, but only de facto not related to each other, then this
results in the constellation which I have described under the heading provisional
relativism. Validity claims are relative to each achieved state of argumentation;
they are not isolated from each other, but currently there is no one who could relate
them productively.
A variation of this constellation could be called protection-zone relativism. It
means that some views will go unchallenged because we know that they occur during a certain phase of development and might even be typical of it. Think of the
bravado and obsession with technology often found in adolescents. They will grow
out of it. They will perhaps grow out of it more straightforwardly and definitively if
they are given a free rein within it. We already know that the ideas they have are
neither right nor valid. And yet, we do not act out the role of the opponent. Unlike
a provisional relativism, then, this protection-zone relativism does not stipulate

54

In Wohlrapp (1995c), I proposed that seeking out equivalences could be a way of accessing
foreign cultures and discussed this proposal with examples.

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Validity

that the result is still open; it is clear in this case that the matter is invalid, but also
that it has a certain temporary function.
In the end, this might allow us to formulate a positive concept of pluralism. It
would follow from the idea of equating what is valid with the various states of argumentation taken as a whole. Although we do not know how to combine themthey
are heterogeneous, partially complementary, and partially contradictorywe could
accept this as the plural form of the truth as it is now relevant for us. In any case, as
long as we continue to argue with a view to transcending contradictions, this
conception can easily be connected with the aforementioned pragmaticdialectic
universalism.

Chapter 8

Argument Analysis

8.1

What Is Argument Analysis?

By argument analysis, I mean the analysis of any given text with respect to argumentative
structures. The term argumentative structures refers to the features developed in
previous chapters, that is, epistemic and thetic theories, the operations of asserting,
justifying and criticizing in their various forms, position and program, frame and
aspect, perspective and way of seeing, linear and retroflexive argumentation, and,
above all, the concept of validity. Of course, it makes more sense to perform an
argument analysis on a text which has already been identified as argumentative
than on one which has not been classified as such.
Anyone who takes a modern poem, for example, by Rilke or Trakl, and performs
an argument analysis on it should not be surprised if the result is not significant.
Does such a text even raise a validity claim? To be sure, it would be wrong to deny
this outright. However, in such cases, the validity claim is of an entirely different
kind than the one raised in argumentative speech. I have already addressed this in
Chaps. 4 and 7. The truth claim of poetry is more direct and comprehensive. It is not
aimed at elucidating limits and gaps of orientation which have been clearly identified in a confrontation with questions and problems, but at verbally articulating and
appropriating subtle emotional and sub-emotional spheres of human reality. An
analysis of poetic texts would require an apparatus that can capture whether and
how the text achieves such a poetic effect. Let me preface the following with a few
remarks that specify the relationship between theory and practice, as discussed in
Chap. 1, as well as the objects produced by their interplay, with respect to circumstances in the theoretical analysis of an object.
It is obvious that such an analysis requires a theoretical apparatus which formulatesin concepts and propositionsthe kinds of relevant differences and relationships that occur in practice and thus becomes a part of concrete reality. Such an
apparatus enables us to analyze the relevant relations as an object by dissecting
it, that is, to elucidate its composition, and thereby explicating and grasping its
potential for inhabiting various states. These relations are the same in a chemical
H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_8,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

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analysis which reveals how a substance is composed of elements, as in a text

analysis and, in particular, in an argument analysis. This apparatus determines
what is actually possible or what can be experienced regarding the object. Structures
not provided for by the apparatus will elude my analysisI will not recognize them.
Hence, the structure of the apparatus is a decisive factor in what the analyzed object
will mean to me. The structure itself contains decisions that result from a previous
understanding of the matter.
In the case of argumentative speech, we traditionally have two or three apparatuses of logic, rhetoric, and maybe of the topicsall of which can be traced
back to Aristotle. Logic captures truth relations; rhetoric addresses effect relations;
and the topics capture a mixture of both. As I have repeatedly mentioned and discussed, these apparatuses provide no uniform concept of argumentation because
they focus, on the one hand, on factual truth and, on the other hand, on person- or
subject-centered effects of acceptance. The distinction between facts and subjectivity is good and appropriate; the separation of the two, however, is not. A rhetoric,
which aims at gaining effects in the sense of a subjects immediate and direct
ascentthus exploiting the human susceptibility of being led and temptedas well
as a logic that conceives of truth independent of the orientation of living human
beings, cannot be convoked to realize the twofoldedness of factuality and personality
in the practice of argumentation.
The apparatus developed here is different in this regard; it contains the factual
dimension and the personal dimension as two mutually dependent sides or aspects
of the dimension of validity. I consider this reference to validity to be characteristic
of argumentation. This is, of course, itself a stipulation in the realm of argumentation theory, which would possibly have to be justified under the watchful eyes of an
opponent. What follows from this stipulation is that the apparatus disregards many
structures that are relevant in other approaches (such as speech acts in the approach
of pragmadialectics and traditional rhetorical figures in the approach of the Nouvelle
Rhetorique, etc.). I have already justified the centrality of the concept of validity, as
well as the concept itself, in great detail in the previous chapter. The justification for
the analytical apparatus now ultimately consists in the fact that it enables the examination of validity in the sense of this concept of validity.
If we were to confront the most widely used analytical apparatus, the Toulmin
scheme, with a text as complex as the conversation between Hppe and Merkel,
which will be analyzed below, would also put at center stage the question of validity.
However, it would also give rise to a huge number of claims and relevant data, warrants, and backings which are often related to each other in a way that is quite elusive. In the end, the whole procedure would almost inevitably lead to the conclusion
that both interlocutors are probably right.
The structures of the minimal apparatus developed here have been detected
reflexively or constructed, knowing that they can be recognized in the practice of
argumentation and that this practice can be executed and represented more clearly
and distinctly if the structures are in view. Hence, the theoretical apparatus has, like
many other apparatuses, been prepared for practical purposes. However, it often remains
unclear what this is even supposed to mean. In this case, it is supposed to mean that

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317

the apparatus enables readers, who are interested in the validity or invalidity of
theses and arguments, to assess the outcome of an argumentation by retracing it.
In this chapter, I will prove this by performing an illustrative analysisthe analysis
of a prolonged argumentative dialogue about controversial issues related to the
innovations of genetic engineering that concern us at the turn of the millennium.

8.2

The Problem of Interpretation

Before beginning with the analysis, I will briefly touch on a fundamental problem
which is posed almost inevitably by the constellation of a theoretically ambitious
evaluator and a text that has been produced with other concerns in mind. Even if a
particular text is undoubtedly an argumentative conversation, it has still emerged, as
it were, naturally. What we have here is a controversy, and the parties simply say
what they have to say about the matter and about utterances made by the other side.
It does not yet constitute a big intervention if, as an evaluator, I say that they articulate
theses and attempt to justify these as well as weaken objections raised by the respective
opponent. However, I begin to divide the text into various parts and highlight structures in those parts that I regard as relevant, then I mobilize my own understanding
of the text, which might be quite different from the authors understanding of it. In
other words, there is a wide gap between the material and the apparatus. How can
we bridge it? This is the problem of interpretation.
The text makes many assumptions which have not been established by explicit
agreement. It is a feature of any conversation that it begins on the basis of the
belief that the otherin the following example, even the moderators and the
audienceunderstands what is being said, both in terms of the literal meaning and in
terms of the relevance and importance attributed to the statements. Furthermore, a
conversation is grounded in the belief that sincerity and goodwill are the norm, and
that humor, ironic intent and the like can be signaled clearly enough. Since the
evaluator does not participate in the conversation, assumptions like these are accessible to her only indirectly, if at all; she has to understand the verbal (and possibly
nonverbal) actions in the text and know how to interpret them with respect to their
function for the overall goal of the conversation.
Since speakers and situations are unique, recording any contributions to the discussion with a theoretical apparatus that reveals their structures coincides with an act of
interpretation. As a general problem of hermeneutics, this is hardly exciting. But to
anyone performing an argument analysis, it must be quite clear that using an apparatus
in order to analyze an issue always means interpreting it. In the absence of such an
interpretation, no text would be accessible. However, I can never be sure of the
correctness of my interpretation (of the appropriateness of my apparatus).
What should we do about the problem of interpretation? It seems that there are
several waysin particular, a normative, a descriptive, and a reflexive one. In the
normative case, the apparatus is made binding for the practice of argumentation.
This can be achieved by teaching itfor example, in schooland by committing

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students to keeping the structures of the apparatus in mind, when they make their
contributions to the discussion. If all goes well, we eventually come to achieve a
condition which requires no further interpretations because the matter will already
bestow precisely those structures on itself, which we intend to select in order to
capture it. Of course, there can still be various deviations in each particular case
because the degree to which the apparatus is understood as well as the ways in
which it can be grasped may vary.
The descriptive way often consists of simply postulating an interpretation. We
note, for example, thats right, these are assertions, that thing is an argument for this,
and this an argument for that. It may, under certain circumstances, not be easy for
someone else to understand this. Indeed, interpretations may at times seem somewhat arbitrary. What do theorists of argumentation make of this issue? At the upper
end of the spectrum, there is the extreme reaction that, given these challenges, we
might as well do without a theoretically sophisticated analysis entirelyand simply
record what we see.1 At the lower end, there is sheer dogmatism. In that case, one
simply no longer questions ones own reading and understanding of a text.
Theorists of argumentation have not paid much attention to the problem of
interpretation or the gap between theoretical apparatus and natural material.
Christoph Lumer remarks that there is no such thing as a universally valid method
for interpreting arguments; people just interpret whatever they want to; interpretation,
he concludes, is a form of muddling through.2
That, in particular, may be appealing in its openness. Lumer has presented his
own way of analyzing in 14 rules.3 These include, for instance, detecting indicators of argumentation (Rule 3) and determining the type of argumentation
(Rule 10). Of course, this assumes that the text contains indicators of argumentation in the first place and that the argument types developed by Lumer are relevant. In other words, he presumes his own apparatus and hopes that interlocutors
and evaluators will go along with it because they will realize its appropriateness.
Still, I remain to be convinced that it is appropriate. After all, Lumer presupposes an
ordinary relationship between theory and object, and believes that an argument
analysis is supposed to lead the theorist to true universal propositions about factual arguments by way of induction.4
How could we respond to this approach? First, it is important to insist that the
validity of arguments is not an objective quality that could be determined from
the vantage point of a disinterested observer. Rather, it requires a participants
perspective. This has been emphasized by Kopperschmidt, even by Habermas:
From the, as it were, extra-communicative, objectifying role of the observer, which
it is possible and advisable to inhabit with respect to natural, i.e. mindless procedures,
[] arguments can neither be identified as such nor can the specific roles of

This position is exemplified by the work of linguist Richard Hirsch, in Hirsch (1989, 1995).
Cf. Lumer (1990) (Trans. T.P.)
3
Cf. Lumer (2003), 715719 (Trans. T.P.)
4
Cf. Lumer (1990), 10 (Trans. T.P.)
2

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319

argumentative utterances be determined within complex mutual references or their

fundamental function of support for problematized validity claims be understood.
It is therefore necessary for analysts of argumentation [] to assume the role of a
virtual participant.5
Among discourse theorists in the Habermasian vein, then, we find a clear affirmation of the participants perspective. However, they have not taken this to heart, or at
least, it cannot be seen in their work. Habermas has not performed any argument
analyses at all, or he has not published any. Kopperschmidt sometimes demonstrates
his way of analyzing through small examples.6 These examples illustrate that the
evaluator has to mobilize her hermeneutical skills. A potentially relevant difference
between observation and participation regarding the analysis of argumentative structures, however, is not apparent. After all, the Toulmin scheme, which looms in the background here, eliminates the need to refer to the argument from a participants
perspective. Someone who performs an analysis based on this scheme will arbitrarily
sort any recognizable justifications into the three categories of data, warrant, and
backing. In most cases, the claim will be assessed to be somehow probable. What
remains completely implicit, however, is that these classifications express the evaluators own interpretive assessments and would actually have to be justified (in front
of a forum that ensures universality for which the scheme makes no provisions).
As previously mentioned, the apparatus proposed here focuses its analyses on
detecting what is argumentatively valid. What is valid is determined by a process
in which the evaluator acquires the state of argumentation and assesses it on the
basis of what she knows and thinks about the content of the quaestioall the while
continuing argumentation as far as necessary and possible. In other words, this kind
of analysis begins in a way that is more or less observing and then becomes
increasingly participating.
The principle of the analysis is that those statements and words whose meaning
is not obvious are interpreted with respect to the (assumed) goal of validity. They are
understood as contributing something to proving the invalidity or validity of a
thesis.
Here are some examples from the conversation in Sect. 8.3.3: In 3M1, Merkel
says that the example of the burning laboratory does not prove anything and merely
illustrates something. In my interpretation, however, illustrating is a form of
justifying. Hence, I agree with Hppe, who also affirms this and then goes on to
explicitly reject the assumption that the example could have any justificatory
function (for the thesis that the embryo has a lower moral status than the infant).
However, I do not simply claim to be right or posit this as the only possible interpretation.
On the contrary, I clearly point out that this interpretation is thetic, that is, that I am
prepared to argue for it, if necessary.
Second example: In 3H1, Hppe refers to the same example and to the decision,
which Merkel considers to be correct, to let the embryos burn. He says: Do you

Cf. Kopperschmidt (1989), 79; similar statements can be found in Habermas (1984), 108 ff.
Cf. the three sample analyses that illustrate the Toulmin scheme in Kopperschmidt (1989),
123142.
6

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Argument Analysis

want to infer from the decision [] that it is permissible to exploit patients in a

persistent vegetative state by taking their organs? In my interpretation this is a
rhetorical question with the following meaning: In the spirit of your maxim, you
would have to infer the exploitation of patients in a persistent vegetative state from
my parallel example, but you will not do so. The question, however, only works as
an objection to Merkels example, given this interpretation. I would not even know
what to do with the speech act of asking a question in this case, were it not for
validity as a principle of interpretation.
Third example: In 3M2, Merkel speaks of embryonic stem cell research.
I replace this with research involving early embryos, which is, of course, not the
same. But the only issue here is the question as to whether early embryos may be
used as material for research. Hence, that would be an (implicit) justification for the
(equally implicit) thesis of interpretation contained in the reformulation.
Of course, it is also conceivable that in some part of a text, no contribution to proving or examining validity can be identified at all. Such a part is therefore deleted.
As previously mentioned, understanding an argumentative text by way of analysis
means interpreting it. Like any act of interpretation, it is governed by the principle of
not making the author look unnecessarily bad. This principle of charity has by
now become a fairly common principle of textual work, almost a commonplace.
Consequently, there are also improper applications of it. In her book Problems in
Argument Analysis and Evaluation,7 Trudy Govier has devoted an entire chapter to the
question of to what extent argument analysis should be based on a principle of charity.
She traces the origins of this principle back to Wilson and Quine, and demonstrates
how the analyses of conversations and arguments have made use of it (there is no sign
here of what Lumer calls muddling through). In this context, Govier makes a very
important point: A strong principle of charity (which would eliminate any errors in
a text) is counterproductive, in particular, for the purposes of argument analysis. If a
contribution to a discussion contains uncertainties or errors, then it is important to see
how the opponent reacts to it. If he responds by raising objections, for example, these
would be completely incomprehensible if the errors had already been eliminated in
the course of an analysis guided by charity. If he does not raise any objections, this
also provides important information about his argumentative skills. In other words,
even an analysis guided by charity must recognize defects in the material.
Govier then recommends a modest principle of charity which states that we
always have to assume that the author of the text to be interpreted harbors a will to
participate in the argumentative exchange. This is a useful suggestion, not only
because it points us toward a direction which I also recommend, but also because it
takes up the idea that argumentative texts contain specific intentions which, as we
may reasonably expect, structure the text. It is advisable to think this thought even
furtherso far, in fact, that it even encompasses the analyzing theorist. We then
arrive at the kind of specific reflectiveness that is typical of the practice and theory
of argumentation (which will be addressed in the next chapter). In sum, regarding

Cf. Govier (1987), Chap. 7, 133158.

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321

the problem of interpretation in argument analysis, I would like to propose a principle

of the reflective participants perspective. It reads as follows:
Interpret the text in such a way that it can be read as an appropriate contribution
to the argument about the quaestioand be prepared to argue for your interpretation, if necessary.

8.2.1

Guide to Argument Analysis

The process of argument analysis can be divided into five steps, each of which
addresses specific questions. By working through these five steps, the material of any
given communicative utterance is first shaped into an argumentative text whose argumentative structure is then isolated and finally analyzed in various respects regarding
the question of the validity of theses (possibly also of epistemic theory). The result is
formulated as a complex judgment on the internal and intervening validity of the thesis
in question and also on the potential subjective and/or material gain of argumentation. The following five groups of considerations will serve as a guideline:
(1) Producing the text
(1a) Identifying the problem, quaestio, controversy, and position(s)
(1b) Editing the text
Dividing it into sections or rounds
Editing individual statements: deletions, additions, and transformations
Determining the theoretical content by highlighting key terms and
propositions
(2) Producing the argumentative structure
(2a) Process
Identifying the thetic function of individual moves (theses, arguments,
successor theses, successor arguments)
Consolidating this identification with respect to:
A material dimension (theoretical contents, structural figures)
A subjective dimension (constellation, and development of positions
and frames)
(2b) Result
Material dimension (states of argumentation)
Internal assessment (results of rounds, results of the whole dialogue)
Advanced internal assessment (completion and correction by attributable information and attitudes)
Intervening assessment (completion and correction by the theorists
information and attitudes)
Subjective dimension (new insights, demands, responsibilities: who
would have to distance himself/herself from what?)

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Argument Analysis

(3) Questions for analysis

(3a) Quaestio, problem
What is the problem? How is it viewed by the different parties?
Which theses or partial theses can be found in the text in order to
address it?
(3b) Thetic function
What is/are the function(s) of each given utterance within the thetic
system?
Specifically: Which argument(s) does it address within the body of dialogue that has been generated so far?
How does it present its occasion? How does it interpret it?
How does it respond to it?
(3c) Frame events
Which frames (inferences implicitly constitutive of problems) are put into
play?
How are they introduced or modeled by each respective utterance?
Has a frame been identified, sublated, and modified?
(3d) Semantic events
What concept is questionable? What concept is contained in the quaestio?
What are the partial concepts (key terms) for modifying this situation?
How are these used and transformed, or elaborated by associated and/
or disassociated determinations with respect to their semantic content?
How do they combine to form the concept in question (the missing
theory of the matter)?
Each contribution by one of the parties is affected by the degree to which
concepts are modified.
(3e) Material dimension: use of theoretical bases
What do the parties take to be true or right? What part of this is
knowledge?
What theories (or inferential relations) are used?
What theories (or inferential relations) are produced?
Which of the opponents theories (or inferential relations) are referenced?
What is the use of structural elements (figures such as analogies, generalizations, and practical inferences)?
(3f) Subjective dimension: positions and habits
What orientations are involved?
What positions (systems of orientations, in particular, also schemes for
problem solutions) are expressed by the theses?
Do positions evolve?

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323

To what extent is a position rooted in the habitus of a person? (In this case,
analysis touches on the explanation of a position provided by social
sciences.)
Does the opponents habitus retain some frames, that is, does it cause
some inferences (not) to be made?
(3g) Developments
How do the theses and arguments affect the opponent?
Does anyone adopt anything and why?
Is there a change of position and why?
Are there changes to the problem or to how the problem is viewed? Does
any of this further the dialogue?
Are there retroflexive structures (i.e. are any presuppositions that have
been introduced modified or retracted)?
(3h) Validity
Which thesis is valid/invalid?
Based on what arguments?
Relative (internal) or full (advanced internal and intervening) validity?
(4) Procedure during the assessment:
Each statement requires the preparation of an analytical commentary that
consists of:
(4a) REF: Explicit reformulation of the text
(4b) THEF: Determination of the thetic function(s) of the statement, that is,
what refers to what, in what way, possibly linearly or retroflexively
(4c) MAC: Consolidation of this determination by focusing on the material
dimension (theoretical content, figures of argumentation)
(4d) SUC: Consolidation of the determination by focusing on the subjective
dimension (position, frame(s))
(4e) IVA: Intervening assessment, that is, general and advanced comments,
evaluations, and judgments
(5) Final questions:
(5a) Who would have to make what changes, for example, by adopting or
dismissing something in order to arrive at the state of argumentation?
In other words, what objectives does the argumentation expect from the
participants?
(5b) Do speakers positions become stronger or weaker (does their respective
research project progress or degenerate)?
(5c) What does each respective speaker gain (by including new information, by
integrating new perspectives)?
(5d) What does each respective speaker lose (based on new obligations to give
reasons, new research challenges, new demands)?
(5e) Who wins/loses the current dialogue?

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8.3

Argument Analysis

Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate

About the Embryos Right to Life

The conversation analyzed here addresses the question: What is a human being?
It was organized by the Christian monthly magazine Chrismon in the summer of
2001 and published subsequently in the magazines August issue.8 The two parties
involved are Hubert Hppe and Reinhard Merkel. Hppe is a representative of the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the German parliament and a committed
pro-lifer. Merkel is a professor of criminal law and philosophy of law at the
University of Hamburg. He has distinguished himself as an extremely controversial
and perceptive critic of the legal and ethical aspects of what is possible in medicine
and genetic engineering.
The ensuing argument analysis consists of (a) the published text of the conversation, divided into five rounds; (b) a commentary following each contribution,
which is supposed to make the process of the discussion more transparent; and (c) a
determination of the state of argumentation following each round as well as the
entire dialogue.
As I have said above, the analytical commentary has up to five parts which are
labeled as REF, THEF, MAC, SUC, and IVA. REF stands for reformulation and
contains a polished recapitulation of the contribution. THEF stands for thetic
function and denotes what references are made to the theses under discussion.
MAC means consolidation of the material dimension, which refers to a consideration of the potential durability of theses, reasons, or objections in the light of
the available epistemic theory. SUC means consolidation of the subjective dimension and explores visible or increasingly interpretable indicators that the states of
affairs at issue have been adopted by subjects, that is, it refers to positions and to
ways in which they take root in the habitus of these subjects. Finally, IVA stands for
intervening assessment and contains the statement that I, qua evaluator, would
like to make regarding each respective contribution or each achieved state of
discussion. (It is not always the case that all five sections will be addressed; sometimes there was simply nothing relevant for me to add.)
The conversation has been staged as argumentative communication and appears
to have clearly argumentative aspects. Even on a superficial reading, it becomes
apparent that there are theses as well as attempts at justifying them, at weakening
reasons, defending counter-theses, etc. Often, it is even made explicit whether a
position has been introduced.
As announced by the title of the dispute, the problem is how to define a human
being. More specifically, the issue at hand is how to specify the beginning of a
full human life which has a protected basic right to life. The concrete question
under discussion is whether or not the early embryo (EaE) is a human being.
The speakers are not in agreement on this and hence the controversy. There is the

Cf. Chrismon (2001).

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Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate About the Embryos Right to Life

325

thesis, represented by Hubert Hppe, that it already is a human being. This thesis
reflects Hppes experience as the father of a child with a disability as well as his
religious convictions. Reinhard Merkel defends the counter-thesis that the embryo
is not yet a human being. It is based on a position which is not immediately
defined in terms of its content, but reflects a certain expertise in difficult problems
of applied ethics.
The conversation is moderated by two journalists working for the magazine
Chrismon, whose interventions interrupt the flow of the conversation and naturally
divide it into five rounds. In the following, the text has been reproduced in italics
and divided into the said five roundseach featuring an explanatory title. Individual
utterances are numbered as moves and reactions, and are initially presented
verbatim. Each utterance is followed by an analytical commentary. After each
round, the state of argumentation is determined and subjective challenges are
addressed. Finally, a result is formulated with respect to both the material and the
subjective dimension.
First, I would like to provide something like a stage direction for reading the
conversation. There are six constantly recurring concepts in the discussion,
which I designate by using abbreviations (in the hope that this highlights the argumentative structures):
Early embryo (EaE)
Basic right to life (BRL)
No basic right to life (No-BRL)
Living human being (LHB)
Patient in a persistent vegetative state (PPVS)
Brain-dead individual (BDI)
Besides these six constantly used abbreviations as well as abbreviations that will
occasionally be introduced for a specific purpose, the text also contains abbreviations
for the components of the analytical commentary (already mentioned twice):
Reformulation (REF)
Thetic function (THEF)
Consolidation of the material dimension (MAC)
Consolidation of the subjective dimension (SUC)
Intervening assessment (IVA)
Furthermore, there are abbreviations such as BL (Basic Law),9 FCC (Federal
Constitutional Court), PID (preimplantation diagnostics), and EPA (Embryo
Protection Act of 1990). Finally, there are short names for dialogue moves. These
names comprise three pieces of information, namely the round, the author, and the
move. 3M2, then, is to say: In the third round of the dialogue, this is Merkels
second move.

Translators note: The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz fr die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland) is the Constitution of Germany.

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Argument Analysis

Overall, 15 abbreviations and short names for dialogue moves are in use. Anyone
reading this chapter might get the superficial impression that this is an elitist or
esoteric writing style. This is a risk I will take because I hope that, given a continuous and attentive reading, these abbreviations will become familiar to the reader
and thus make the matter more transparent.

8.3.1

Round 1: Main Features of the Positions and Their

Possible Roots in the Participants Biographies

CHRISMON: Mr. Hppe, Mr. Merkel, you are both very interested in early, endangered, and disabled life. Why is that? What is the role of personal experience in
this regard?
1H1: I have three children, including a son with spina bifidain other words, with
an open back. This has made me very attentive to the discrimination of people
with a disability. For example, we spent years fighting for him to be able to attend
a regular school.
There are so many prejudices regarding this question! However, I have been
committed to the fight for endangered life for a much longer time, even as a
politician. This has to do with my religious convictions. At first, I was concerned
with the issue of abortion, followed by preimplantation diagnostics, and finally,
embryo research. And I must conclude, to my chagrin, that once you begin to
limit human dignity at one point, it will slip in other areas as well. The best
example of this is the Netherlands: They were the first in Europe to permit
abortions. Now they are at the forefront of euthanasia.
Analytical commentary on 1H1:
REF: Hppes commitment to the human dignity of people with a disability
and to endangered life, in general, draws on religious convictions and a
concern for his own child whose fate allowed him to experience the discrimination against people with a disability. As a politician, Hppe has had the
experience that limitations of human dignity lead, on a slippery slope, to
further limitations. In order to exemplify this, he points to developments in the
Netherlands, where the legalization of abortions was followed by similar considerations regarding euthanasia.
THEF: The following thesis can be identified: Human dignity should not be
limited. The justification for this is the slippery slope thesis which is present
throughout the entire conversation: If we limit human dignity, we enter a slippery
slope. The example provided to back this up is the Netherlands. There are, then, two
figures of argumentation here: slippery slope and example.
MAC: The if-then sentence is doxastic. It is backed up by experience, that is, it
is a generalization of Hppes experience in parliamentary debates about abortion,
embryo research, and PID. This sentence is specifically exemplified with references
to the developments in the Netherlands.

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Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate About the Embryos Right to Life

327

SUC: Hppe regards PID and embryo research as the limitations of human dignity or as a threat to life. He frames his commitment to the protection of endangered
life as a religious conviction.
IVA: The explicit reference to religious convictions, as a source of motivation for
pro-life activism, marks the level of existential meaning in the position. At this
point, it is unclear what precise principle is being followed here.
1M1: I have two healthy children. I am primarily interested in the difficult ethical
questions of this sphere. I do not need an intense personal experience involving
people with a disability in order to clarify those questions; After all, they do not
address, as is often said, the problems of disabled life. It is undisputed and indisputable that every born individual, irrespective of their degree of disability, has the
same basic right to life as any other individual. Nevertheless, there are situations in
which it is permissible to let severely damaged life expire without an intervention or
even to actively terminate it. This applies, for example, to newborn babies who are
left to die without any effort to keep them alive after it has become clear that their
life span will be extremely limited and painful.
Analytical commentary on 1M1:
REF: Merkel is interested in the clarification of ethical issues, regardless of personal
experiences involving people with a disability. Any born individual (BI) has a basic
right to life (BRL). There are exceptions: critically ill newborns who may be left to
die or even be actively killed.
THEF: BI BRL. With regard to the subsequent ban on killing BIs, there are
exceptions for certain critically ill newborns. As a counter-thesis, this is directed at
1H1 (if such exceptions are regarded as limitations of human dignity).
MAC: As a legal principle, BI BRL is epistemicpart of the normative knowledge
of our legal system. Among BIs, there is severely damaged life. This is medical
knowledge. The claim that it may be killed in conformity with our principles is a
legal or even an ethical thesis.
SUC: Ill newborns are regarded as severely damaged life. In that case, there is a
kind of inference from the act of letting them die to the act of actively killing them.
IVA: It is unclear how to reconcile this principle with the exceptions and how to
understand the inference from letting-die to killing.
CHRISMON: What illnesses do these children have?
1M1a: There are dozens, but Ill give you one: it is called epidermolysis bullosa atrophicans letalis. Children who are born with it usually live four weeks at the most.
Their skin peels off from the body. This is an extremely painful process that cannot
sufficiently be relieved by using painkillers. Anyone who prolongs these childrens
lives by means of intensive care prolongs their agony in a way that is reprehensible.
And anyone who simply lets them die still condemns them to a terrible death. It is
impossible, however, to ethically or legally infer from the undisputed right to life an
obligation to an agonizing death. Even the active killing of these children, then, does
not touch upon their right to life and thus does not violate it, either; in extreme
cases, it may even be morally imperative.

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Argument Analysis

Analytical commentary on 1M1a:

REF: Children with epidermolysis bullosa atrophicans letalis (EBA children) have a
short and painful life. Although they have a BRL, they do not have the obligation to
live. Killing them is not prohibited by the BRL. It may even be imperative.
THEF: EBA children and their terrible lives function as a reason for the counterthesis to 1H1 as set out in 1M1. The form of justification is example.
MAC: Knowledge about EBA, as well as knowledge about the BRLthat there
are exceptions to it.
SUC: The BRL does not imply (not even ethically) any obligation to accept a
painful fate.
IVA: It is still unclear how to reconcile this principle with the exceptions. In analogy
to 1M1 (inference from a permitted act of letting-die to a permitted act of active killing),
there is another inference from a kind of killing that is permitted to a kind of killing
that is morally imperative. It is not quite clear what this is supposed to mean.10
CHRISMON: Mr. Hppe, you say, nip it in the bud.
1H2: Yes, because exceptions never just remain exceptions. It has always been like
that in the past. I still remember that preimplantation diagnostics were introduced because of such terrible individual cases. Today, it is the rule in pregnancies in Germany. Children with Down syndrome are killed on this basis,
even though it is impossible to argue by reference to their suffering. I can see a
pattern behind this. First, you take cases that are so awful that everyone says: Oh
God, this suffering is terrible! And then you use this reaction to create a new
rule. The ban on killing is undermined by appeals to compassion. That is what
I am fighting against. It is against the law to actively kill a person, except in
self-defense.
Analytical commentary on 1H2:
REF: People may not be actively killed, except in self-defense. If we permit exceptions,
then it will not stop at that. PID, introduced as an exception to prevent terrible
individual cases, has become a method of aborting children with DS. This forms a
pattern: Exceptions motivated by compassion lead to new rules.
THEF: There is a counter-thesis to the thesis in 1M1 here: No exception to the
ban on killing! The justification for this counter-thesis: No exceptions remain
exceptions, as exemplified by PID.
MAC: The pattern exceptions lead to rules is a generalization of cases such as
the recent career of preimplantation diagnostics.
SUC: The introduction of PID is regarded as exploiting peoples compassion;
such exploitation, in turn, is regarded as objectionable.

10

In his habilitation thesis (cf. Merkel (2001)), Reinhard Merkel illustrates the problem of killing
critically ill newborns with reference to numerous examples and argues for changing the criminal
law accordingly. However, such changes are not, at least in part, legally binding yet. This could at
least partially explain the fluctuations in Merkels argument (from a right or an obligation to a
moral imperative to kill such children).

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Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate About the Embryos Right to Life

329

IVA: The ban on killing that has virtually no room for exceptions seems to
highlight the underlying principle of religious conviction. It is a sort of rule of
thumb that exceptions eventually become rules.
1M2: But besides self-defense, we also know the state of emergency as a legal
principle. To my mind, the fate of the child that I have just described is an extreme
case of the state of emergency. I do not want to endorse the movement for euthanasia. But I say this: We have clear criteria for identifying exceptions to the rule
of the ban on killing. And we maynowe have to apply these for the sole
reason that it benefits newborns whose suffering is hopeless and painful. Such
neatly defined exceptions hardly undermine the underlying prohibitionsas little,
in fact, as does the exception of self-defense.
Analytical commentary on 1M2:
REF: In addition to self-defense, the law also knows the state of emergency, which
applies, for example, in EBA children. In the case of these children, a violation of the
ban is possible and imperative. Cases such as these are defined by clear criteria.
THEF: The statement contains two objectionsone directed at There is only
self-defense, namely There are also states of emergency; and the other directed
at Exceptions to rules undermine the ban, namely Exceptions can be clearly
defined.
MAC: The state of emergency as part of emergency laws is legal knowledge.
That the criteria for states of emergency are clearly and neatly definedeven with
respect to the killing of newborns that are unfit for lifeis a thetic evaluation.
SUC: If a child has such a disease, it is in a state of emergency. Killing it is
emergency relief. Such emergency relief is different in kind from euthanasia.
IVA: What is permissible or even imperative in states of emergency is the result of
a case-specific weighing. As with all cases of weighing, everything depends on a
balanced and prudent judgment. Actually, this is not the same as having clear criteria,
where everyone can be expected to arrive at the same result. Why such a killing of
children is supposed to differ from euthanasia remains an open question.
Evaluation of Round 1:
Quaestio: Should there be exceptions to the constitutionally enshrined ban on
killing?
Argument:
Hppes thesis: No, there should not be any exceptions (to be more precise: There
is only one exception, namely, self-defense). Justification: Any exception leads to a
slippery slope. Exceptions to the ban on killing do not remain exceptions; they
rather lead to rules that erode the ban. This can be seen in the example of the
Netherlands and in the experience of introducing PID in Germany. This line of argument does not take into account Merkels objections concerning the permitted or
absolutely imperative killing of critically ill newborns.

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Argument Analysis

Merkels thesis: Any attempt to avoid further exceptions to the ban on killing
(besides self-defense) is irrelevant. They already exist in accordance with the
emergency principle. It permits or may even demand killing. There are clear
criteria for neatly justifying whether something counts as an exception. Claiming
that there are neat justifications by way of clear criteria addresses Hppes slippery slope objection: It is contestedat least for these cases.
If Merkel is right, then the outcome is as follows: Either we have already entered
the slippery slope or the alleged automatism exception rule has not (yet) set in.
With respect to Hppes concerns about slippery slopes, the following question
arises: Is it possible to cling to the spot of clearly defined exceptions, for example,
for EBA children?
The two positions are pitted against one another as follows:
Hppe: If we define exceptions in the area of the protection of human life, sooner
or later there will be new rules with a diminished protection of life. The subjective
roots of this orientation are as follows: Hppe is a politician and a parliamentarian. He has personal experience with how laws or their interpretations change in accordance with changes in interests. Hence, he is skeptical of Merkels assumption that
this is something we could control.
Merkel: Merkel is a lawyer and an academic. Laws are made by us; they are at
our disposal. There is no automatism that would lead to their degeneration. This is
a culturalistic position which emphasizes the legal autonomy of people in a state.
The fact that legislation is guided by interests is either irrelevant or part of the
normal process of creating and transforming our legal reality.
Intervening assessment (IVA):
As I said, the criteria for applying the emergency principle depend on a prudent
judgment. In fact, this alone should prevent us from simply dismissing Hppes
worries. But why does Hppe not address Merkels objections?
Merkel uses a rhetoric that appeals to emotions. In order to neutralize this rhetoric, as it were, we might raise a series of questions: How frequent is EBA? Why
does he first speak of dozens of such illnesses (2030 illnesses?), then at least of
EBA children in the plural, and finally, of one child (in the singular)? Are these
cases sufficiently relevant and controversial to require legal regulations? Or would
it be possible to assess them individually on a case-by-case basis without having to
define explicit rules for exceptions?
Why does not Merkel respond to Hppes pattern of the exception becoming
the rule?
Why does he shift in his statements about exceptions, such as EBA, from speaking
about permitted acts of letting a person die to the absolute imperative of actively
killing a person?
In what sense is the killing of a child with EBA something other than
euthanasia?

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Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate About the Embryos Right to Life

331

Conclusion: Neither Hppes nor Merkels thesis is sufficiently evident to be

clearly justified. Even if Merkel is right, his argument concerning EBA children
does not refute Hppes general concerns. Moreover, it does not have any bearing
on Merkels main thesis, posited in the remainder of the dialogue, that the early
embryo does not have a basic right to life. At most, it might have some significance
as a rhetorical device (tilling the soil, weakening resistance), but not as a step within
a justification that is supposed to prove validity.

8.3.2

Round 2: Is it Permissible to Kill Embryos or, Rather,

Human Beings to Help Other Human Beings?

CHRISMON: The current debate is not, however, about the right to life of newborn
babies, but of embryos: using embryonic stem cell therapy, we might be able to
develop therapies for patients that today are considered incurably ill. May I kill one
human being so that I might be able to help another human being at some point?
2H1: Absolutely not. After all, even the early embryo is a human being. So, what is
enshrined in the basic law applies here too: human dignity is inviolable. Similarly,
it is not permissible to kill a patient in a persistent vegetative state in order to
help other patients with his organs.
Analytical commentary on 2H1:
REF: The early embryo (EaE) is a human being; it has a BRL. Like a patient in a
persistent vegetative state (PPVS), it must not be killed for the benefit of others.
THEF: Thesis: EaE must not be killed in order to help others. Justification: EaE
is a human being; a human being has a BRL that is analogous to the BRL of PPVS.
MAC: The sentence EaE is a human being is thetic. Insofar as this thesis is
valid, the implication that it must not be killed for the benefit of others is valid too.
The analogy between EaE and PPVS is supposed to further justifyagainst possible
doubtsthat EaE must not be killed.
SUC: It is obvious that an EaE is framed in the same way as a human being here.
This frame even covers extreme cases of what it means to be human, such as PPVS
with all their claims.
IVA: If Hppes thesis EaE human being is valid, then EaE must not be
killed is also valid by logical inference. As long as the thesis is doubtful, however,
so is the consequence. The analogy to PPVS does not advance the thesis.
CHRISMON: Mr. Merkel, you would not kill a patient in a persistent vegetative
state, but, if in doubt, would you kill the embryo?
2M1: First of all, I would like to agree with the principle stated by Mr. Hppe. It is
absolutely out of the question to kill a human being, who is invested with basic
rights, solely for the benefit of a third partyno matter whether it is a million
people or more. But not every living human being is a bearer of such basic rights.
Consider, for example, brain-dead individuals. They are not bearers of basic
rights and neither is the early embryo.

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Argument Analysis

Analytical commentary on 2M1:

REF: No human being invested with a BRL may be killed for the benefit of others
(no matter how many they are). However, there are living human beings (LHBs) who
have no-BRLfor instance, brain-dead individuals. The EaE belongs to these LHBs.
THEF: Thesis: EaE is an LHB, but no bearer of the BRL; cf. the analogy to the
brain-dead individual.
MAC: The sentence EaE is a human being without BRL is thetic. Insofar as it
is valid, the following is also valid: EaE is similar to BDI. If it is not valid,
however, then the analogy does not further help justifying it.
SUC: The frame for the EaE introduced by Hppe has been changed. This frame
is now called LHB and includes not only the peripheral area intended by Hppe, but
also the extreme margins of human existence, whose residents are not invested with
the BRL per se.
IVA: The consequence of this contribution is that the EaE may be killed for the
benefit of a third party. The validity of this has not yet been justified. The analogy
to the BDI does not provide a justification either. As with Hppe, the quality of the
analogy depends on the validity of the thesis.
What becomes clearly visible, however, is the frame shift: The frame peripheral
area of human existence, where Hppe located the EaE along with the BDI,
is transformed to a frame LHB with reference to brain-dead individuals who have
no-BRL. In the frame LHB, it is still an open question whether the BRL applies.
CHRISMON: A bold comparison.
2M1a: Why? Because brain-dead individuals are dead? But it really is not that
simple. After all, only their brain is dead. Biologically speaking, 97 % of their
bodily substances are still alive, significantly more than in the case of a
Analytical commentary on 2M1a:
REF: Brain-dead individuals can be compared with the EaE because only their brain
is dead; the remaining 97 % of the body, however, is still alive.
THEF: This is the thesis: The comparison between brain-dead individualEaE
is adequate. This is the justification: Brain-dead individuals are not simply dead, but
97 % alive. This thesis supports the thesis EaE is a human being without BRL.
MAC: The life of an LHB is quantifiable in terms of the set living bodily
substances.
SUC: Just as brain-dead individuals are not yet simply dead people, EaEs are not
yet living people. This frame is therefore called living human beings. An EaE is
not a human person, but still a human being. This is not as unique as it might seem.
The same is true for brain-dead individuals.
IVA: The introduction of a frame for beings who are human but do not have a
BRL could be suitable for sublating Hppes frame of the peripheral area where the
BRL is still guaranteed.
2H1a: leg amputeeyes, Ive heard that one before.

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Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate About the Embryos Right to Life

333

Analytical commentary:
This objection shows why Merkels point does not work: Hppe is already familiar
with the argument and has prepared himself for it. The effect of frame sublation is
often based on the emergence of a new way of seeing. However, no such thing takes
place in this case because it has already been considered and rejected. Therefore,
this is a mere shifting of the frame, which does not lead to a convergence of
positions.
2M1b: Well. Nevertheless, we actively end the biological life of a brain-dead
individual in favor of third parties by removing organs. We are only permitted
to do so because he is not invested with basic rights, although biologically he is
still alive as a human being. There are, in such extreme cases of human existence,
two sources for determining who is the bearer of basic rights: first, the Basic
Law and, second, the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court. With
regard to the embryo, in 1949, the majority of the Parliamentary Council voted
against the inclusion of unborn life in Articles 1 and 2. Hence, the embryo
cannot be granted basic rights on the basis of the Constitution. Now, what do
the judges say? The abortion decision of 1993 shows them getting caught up
in self-destructive contradictions. First, they emphasize that the embryo is
invested with the individual right to life. But then, they commit the state to
ensuring the possibility of mass abortions all over the country, which is the
same as asking it ex officio to participate in allegedly illegal killings. This is,
without exception, an established legal practice. Under such circumstances,
the alleged bearer of basic rights is no longer a bearer of basic rights, whether
you call him that or not.
Analytical commentary on 2M1b:
REF: Brain-dead individuals may be used for the benefit of third parties because
they do not have a BRL. The BRL at the extreme limits of human existence is
determined by the Basic Law and the Federal Constitutional Court. The Basic Law
is silent on the EaE; the Constitutional Court rulings on the issue are contradictory.
The actual legal practice of abortions being exempt from punishment does not grant
the EaE a BRL.
THEF: The nonexistent BRL for the EaE prompts the ensuing identification of
two sources for defining who is invested with the BRL. That neither source is capable
of bestowing the BRL on the EaE justifies the No-BRL thesis.
MAC: The differentiation between an LHB with or without the BRL is further
consolidated. That brain-dead individuals do not have a BRL is a valid norm, that is,
legal knowledge.
SUC: The legal situation is contradictory. But since legal practice is clear
without ambiguity, it is the decisive factor for the valid norms.
IVA: The transition from an unclear and a contradictory legal situation to legal
practice is the evidence of good pragmatic thinking. Still, it is not a solid basis for
Merkels thesis that the EaE does not or should not have a BRL.

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Argument Analysis

2H2: I cannot accept those arguments. There is no other compelling criterion for
answering the question of who is human and therefore has the right to life
than the biological one: Human life begins with the fusion of sperm and egg.
Anything else is dangerous. Criteria that are less distinct could change given
different interests. This can be seen in the debate about PID and embryonic stem
cells, where people come up with all kinds of new definitions. Politicians, who
had voted differently 10 years ago, have suddenly discovered that the embryo is
not yet a human being before its 14th day of development. So, it is a fair game
and may be used for research. I presume that, for such people, the end justifies
the means.
Analytical commentary on 2H2:
REF: There is only one clear biological criterion for the beginning of human existence:
fertilization. Other criteria are less distinct and vary according to different interests.
This shows that the end justifies the means for some people.
THEF: The thesis states that the beginning of human life should be determined by the unique biological criterion of fertilization. This makes the EaE
a human being, which is a counter-argument to Merkels thesis in 2M1. The
references to the debate about PID and the new discovery of the 14th day as the
beginning of human life serve as reasons for the thesis of the distinct biological
criterion.
MAC: It is biological knowledge that human life begins at conception. It does
not follow, however, that it has the BRL from this beginning. The latter is a
contested view. That relevant definitions and determinations vary in accordance
with different interests is a fact. To what extent is this relevant here remains an open
question.
SUC: Legal regulations cannot answer basic ethical questions, especially when,
as is the case here, they are not clear. Such questions can only be answered by the
nature of the matter. Some of Hppes religious convictions may become apparent
in this view, which, however, have not been turned into an explicit argument. Hppe
is not sanctimonious.
IVA: Hppe is looking for a theoretical basis that arises spontaneously and does
not require any human decisions. This is influenced by a concern that such decisions merely reflect the state of political strife. This worry is justified, but the hope
that a criterion for deciding who is invested with a BRL simply reveals itself as
vain. If it is supposed to be a biological criterion, the moment of nidation would
do just as well. This would, of course, make embryo research permissible and
constitute the first step into a whole new way of having the nature of humanity at
ones disposal. Hppe is far from being curious about this; he has seen too much
that is reason for concern.
Evaluation of Round 2:
Quaestio: Is it permissible to kill human beings or, rather, embryos in order to help
others?

8.3

Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate About the Embryos Right to Life

335

Argument:
Hppes BRL thesis: Neither human beings nor embryos, who are comparable to
PPVS, may be killed in order to help others. This is justified by the inviolability of
human dignity as guaranteed by the Constitution. There should be only a biological
criterion for who is invested with such dignity, namely the fertilization of the ovum.
The reason for this is that all other criteria may change, given varying interests and
purposes. This had often happened during the last decade.
Merkels thesis: Human beings must not be killed. Reason: They are bearers of
the BRL. However, the EaE may be killed in order to help others. Reason 1: It is a
human being, but not one invested with the basic right to life, just like the brain-dead
individual (No-BRL thesis). Reason 2: The text of the Basic Law as well as Federal
Constitutional Court rulings determine who is invested with the basic right to life.
The text of the Basic Law does not grant the EaE the BRL. The Federal Constitutional
Court ruling of 1993 is contradictory, but establishes a legal practice in which the
EaE de facto has no-BRL.
The way frames are introduced and treated in this round make it highly
interesting in argumentative terms. Hppe talks about the EaE in the frame of a
peripheral area of human existence, where, for example, the PPVS with her full
BRL is also located. This frame is simply posited, that is, there is no justification
for why the EaE should be regarded as comparable with a PPVS. Merkel responds
by adopting this frame, but also refashions it into an extremely marginal space
where it is not clear per se whether the beings that can be found there have a
BRL or not. This frame shift is executed by using the sophism of the brain-dead
individual. Someone who is brain-dead is a living human being (LHB)both
alive and dead.11 She is more alive even than a leg amputee (who has a BRL of
course), but since the brain-dead individual is dead she has no-BRL and can be
used for the benefit of others.
Apart from this dubious rhetorical maneuver, Merkel is right in confronting
Hppe with the concern that not all borderline and liminal states that a human being
can be in are invested with full BRL protection. Still, this contributes nothing to the
question of what status the EaE should have.
Hppe resorts to a biological criterion in answering this question, Merkel to
a constitutional one. Both criteria are thetic; neither one is rooted in knowledge.

11

This sophism feeds off the unsolved problem of the brain death criterion. A person whose brain
functions have ceased to work is actually a dying person. Dying is a process and the person is
dead only once the dying process has ended. That the brain death criterion is presently established
in many countries is due to a certain acceptance of transplantation medicine, which has been
advertised in campaigns and is still not very far-reaching; cf. Hoff and in der Schmitten (1995).
Part of the confusion associated with brain death could be resolved if it is stated unmistakably
that the term brain death does not constitute a new or a redefinition of human death, but that it is
the designation for a criterion that is supposed to indicate when it is legal to remove organs and
actively terminate the dying process. (It would be clearer and more honest, in my opinion, to
refrain from talking about brain death entirely. After all, the death of these people is not a consequence of the death of their brains, but a consequence of the removal of organs.)

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Argument Analysis

If at all, Hppes criterion is supported by tradition, but tradition is far from being
universally binding. (That a biological criterion is not independent of interests
seems to have escaped Hppe. After all, even the moment of nidation is a biological
criterion. This is something that will have to be addressed in Round 5!)
Merkels criterion makes a decision between the self-contradictory messages by
the Federal Constitutional Court ruling. That the EaE does not have a BRL in our
legal practice is well justified (by reflecting on this legal practice), but it remains a
thesis because such a judgment requires a particular institutional procedure (a verdict
by the Federal Constitutional Court). Merkels thesis tries to anticipate such a verdict.
Hence, it does not actually say, EaE does not have a BRL, but gives it a normative
inflection: EaE should not have a BRL.
Since the Federal Constitutional Court ruling (1993) is contradictory on the issue
of abortion, things cannot remain the way they are. It is quite unclear what they will
look like in the future. There is no doubt, however, that the present state of affairs
has been influenced by concerns about the possibility of social conflicts. Even
Hppes concerns can illustrate this. In other words, the fact that the Federal
Constitutional Court ruling is contradictory can be used by both parties in their
respective justifications.
Conclusion: In Round 2, there are two contrary answers to the quaestio. Each
has a justification which, beginning, for example, with the fact that the Federal
Constitutional Court ruling is contradictory, builds up structures that are themselves
thetic. So, everything is still up in the air.

8.3.3

Round 3: Is the Early Embryo a Human Being or Not?

CHRISMON: For you, Mr. Merkel, it is clear that an embryo is not a human being.
In an article, you introduced the example of a burning laboratory.
3M1: First of all: no, I do not say that at all. The embryo is very much a living
human being, but not a bearer of basic rights. Now, regarding my example:
I imagine a burning laboratory with ten or even 10,000 embryos that had been
fertilized the previous day on one side of it and an unconscious infant on the
other. As a rescuer entering the lab, you will only be able to save either the
embryos or the infant. Everyone would say, I will rescue the infant. In a strict
sense, the example does not prove anything, but it illustrates a point, namely that
our moral intuitions suggest a fundamental difference between our duty toward
an infant and our duty toward early embryos.
Analytical commentary on 3M1:
REF: An embryo is an LHB without the BRL. This is a result of our moral intuitions:
Our duties toward the EaE are less stringent than those toward an infant. An illustration of this is the thought experiment with the burning laboratory in which a rescuer
who has to choose between an infant and an almost arbitrarily large number of EaEs
would save the infant.

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Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate About the Embryos Right to Life

337

THEF: The thesis that the EaE does not have a BRL is repeated. Justification: As
the thought experiment with the burning laboratory shows, our moral duties toward
the EaE are less stringent than toward the infant.
MAC: The thought experiment is an imaginary situation where one has to make a
choice. Even without conducting a proper survey, Merkel can assume that most people
would decide in his sense. It is unclear, however, what that means. There is a gap in the
inference from the statement that the addressee would normally save the infant to the
statement that it corresponds with our moral intuitions to deny the EaE the BRL.
IVA: Merkel attempts to provide a distinctive ethical justification for his thesis
that the EaE should not have the BRL. Because the Federal Constitutional Court
fails as a source of justification, another source must be found. This other source is
our moral intuitions. Merkel seems to believe that this source could contribute
something reliable to such issues. Yet this ignores the questionable ideas that, for
example, contemporary philosophers have drawn from this source.12
3H1: And what if the childrens medical unit and the unit with patients in a persistent vegetative state are both on fire, but I can only evacuate one? Do you want
to infer from the decision in this case that it is permissible to exploit patients in
a vegetative state by taking their organs? The example involves emotional relationshipsbut what do they say about the right to life? Faced with the choice of
saving my wife or a complete stranger, or even you, Mr. Merkel, it goes without
saying that I would choose my wife. But that does not mean that I deny you the
right to life. This conflict is an illusion anyway. Former Federal President Roman
Herzog even takes it to an extreme by saying: Anyone who does not immediately
clear the embryo for research prevents healing sick children with cystic fibrosis.
But if Mr. Herzog cares so much about the lives of children, why does he want to
get at those embryos? He could simply use his income to save children all over
the world by making it possible for them to be vaccinated.
12

Our moral intuitions are often enlisted to form the basis not only for denying that the EaE has the
BRL, but even for denying that any fully grown-up human beings are invested with it if their sacrifice is
found to be instrumental in saving many other fully grown-up human beings. Here are just a few
superficially collected examples: Meggle (2000), 150, asks his readers if they would not sacrifice a
human being in order to rescue 20, 50, 200, 1,000, etc., hostages. He goes on to say that he thinks such
reflective exercises are terrible, but believes that they show the purpose of ethics. (Trans. T.P.)
Schmcker (2000), 334, introduces a thought experiment that involves the inhabitants of a whole area
who are under threat of devastation from terrorists in possession of a nuclear bomb. He confronts these
inhabitants with a passersby who stands in the line of fire while the culprits are being shot and who must
therefore, as a way of offsetting the lives of the many against the life of the one, be sacrificed in accordance with our moral intuitions. Merkel defends such abstruse thought experiments, cf. Merkel
(2002), 97, because they make complex normative problems seem to be manageable. Yet this is not a
compelling defense against the concern that such unreal scenarios do not simply reveal useful and stable
moral intuitions, but that they can also rouse and shape any normative views almost at will. For a critique
of such use of moral intuitions, cf. my essay: Wohlrapp (2004), in particular part IIB, The moral
intuition as an unfit aide. Steinvorth, who was familiar with this critique, still does not shy away from
presenting his readers with the idea that pushing a person in front of a train in order to rescue a group of
children is in line with our moral intuitions. Cf. Steinvorth (2002), 153 ff. Frankly, to what degree these
colleagues have understood the idea of an enlightened individual ethics has remained a mystery to me.

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Argument Analysis

Analytical commentary on 3H1:

REF: In an analogous situation of having to decide between children and PPVS, a
similarly obvious result does not have the same consequences. This shows that
the example does not actually rank different rights to life, but emotional relationships. For purposes of illustration, differences in attention and familiarity (a total
stranger, an interlocutor, ones own wife) are exemplified. The conflict between
the possible cure for sick children and the EaEs BRL is an illusion. People like
R. Herzog could advance the healing of many sick children without having to
make embryos available.
THEF: There is a counterexample that is structurally similar to Merkels, but
results in something absurd. It contests the connection between Merkels example
and his statement about the EaEs lesser moral value. In addition, Merkels example
is framed differently: as an indicator of degrees in emotional relationships.
The altered framing is justified by references to examples.
The second argument (the conflict is an illusion) is a thesis about the assumed conflict between embryo research and the chances of recovery for sick children: This conflict is an illusion. Reason: Anyone who (like R. Herzog) is interested in healing sick
children may earn those merits without surrendering EaEs to consumptive research.
MAC: The counterexample (children/PPVS) is structurally similar insofar as the following alternative applies: There are two kinds of prospective victimsfull human beings
and human beings in an extremely marginal area of existence; it is only possible
to save one kind. The fact that consequences which are structurally similar are still
absurd, however, points to the inappropriateness of the frame. Subsequently, the correction of the frame is made explicit: The example is not at all about rights to life, but
about emotional relationships. This frame substitution is justified by some remarks.
The second argument refutes the alleged alternative between helping sick children
and adhering to the ban on embryo research by pointing out a third possibility.
SUC: Hppe is aware (possibly due to his life with a child with a disability) of the
emotional content of a situation which Merkel has merely constructed as a thought
experiment. Hence he feels what might incline an impartial observer to make the
decision to save the infant: emotional affection. The fact that this does not immediately reflect a moral obligationthat the latter, in fact, arises from higher or deeper
human impressionsis another indication of Hppes religious convictions.
IVA: The assertion that our moral intuitions make us value the EaE less is not
discussed. (This could only be used, however, to formulate more objections to 3M1.)
The criticism of the framing, of its replacement with a different framing, and of the
justification and explanation of this substitution refutes the justification that Merkel
intends to provide by using the example of the burning laboratory for his thesis that
the EaE does not have a BRL.13

13

In his book, Merkel (2002), 152154, Merkel addresses Hppes criticism of the example involving
the burning laboratory once again, tries to refute it one more time, but argues in a circular fashion.
I will discuss this attempt in detail in Chap. 10.2.

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3M2: Again, I cannot and do not want to prove that embryonic stem cell research is
permissible! What I do show, however, is the major difference in our duties with
respect to early embryos on the one hand and born humans on the other. And,
this difference should lead us to more accurate elucidation of its underlying
causes.
Analytical commentary on 3M2:
REF: The example of the burning laboratory is not intended to prove that research
involving EaEs is permissible. It is only supposed to show the difference in rank
between duties and that the reasons for these differences need to be elucidated.
THEF: The thetic function of the example of the burning laboratory has been corrected. It is not meant to argue for research with EaEs, but for a difference in rank
between duties toward the EaE and toward a born human being. This leads to the successor thesis that the difference between duties is supposed to function as a step of
justification from the example of the burning laboratory to the EaEs BRL.
MAC: It is further unclear how imagined reactions to artificial extreme situations are supposed to say or show something about moral obligations and their
rankings.
SUC: Merkel takes a step back, but does not forego his justification; instead, he
situates it differently. This is an understandable rhetorical maneuver, which, however,
does not work in argumentation aimed at validity. The gap has not been bridged;
rather, it has been displaced.
IVA: Merkel takes the refutation of his justification as an opportunity to change
its significance. Now the example of the burning laboratory is no longer supposed
to say anything about the EaEs BRL, but about the difference between duties.
However, it remains an open question how to make the transition from an affirmation
of the primary rescue of the infant to a higher obligation on our part.
3H2: Wait, thats not true. You have written in an essay that it would be merciless
not to be allowed to kill embryos if their cells can be used to help already born
human beings.
Analytical commentary on 3H2:
REF: This is wrong. On a different occasion, you have called the act of legally
preventing embryo research, which could be used to help BHB, as merciless.
THEF: This is an objection to Merkels retraction of the consequence in 3M2.
It has Hppe pointing out that the retraction conflicts with other utterances made
by Merkel.
MAC: This is an argumentum ad hominem: ex concessis, a form that can be
valid if the counterpartys targeted utterance is indeed relevant for the thesis in
question. Merkels next contribution shows this to be clearly the case. Hence
Merkels position is contradictory. The shift of his justification to a different
location within the position has been of little help to him.
IVA: The contribution addresses only the first part of 3M2. The second part
remains unanswered. This is not a mistake because Merkels announced need for
clarification resulted only from his own reading of his example; all the while, Hppe

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Argument Analysis

has presented an alternative interpretation (cf. 3H1) which no longer requires any
further clarification. With regard to the first part of 3M2, Hppes objection slightly
shifts the meaning, because of the saying that the EPA is merciless is not the same as
rejecting it as false. Still, the remainder of the conversation shows without a doubt
that the remark was meant to be understood that way (as a rejection).
3M3: Yes, I assert that the Embryo Protection Act mercilessly refuses to grant help
to human beings who are suffering severely.
Analytical commentary on 3M3:
REF: The EPA mercilessly denies suffering human beings hope or help.
THEF: The objection in 3H2 is accepted. This means that, for now, the attempt
at defining the thetic function of the example of the burning laboratory such that it
is no longer a plea for research involving EaEs has been abandoned. The new thesis
is that the EPA is merciless because it rejects patients. This serves as a justification
for the implicit thesis that the EPA should be changed, so that embryo research
would be approved. This thesis, in turn, makes use of Merkels main thesis which is
that no EaE should be accorded a BRL.
MAC: The Embryo Protection Act prohibits research involving EaEs. Saying that
this prohibition constitutes a rejection to help severely suffering human beings means
assuming that, in the absence of the ban, the plight of these suffering people would be
alleviated. Nobody knows if and when the hopes associated with embryo research
(therapeutic cloning) will be fulfilled. There are probably only a few scientists who
can evaluate in an unbiased way how realistic these chances are. It cannot be ruled
out that the hopes will remain unfulfilled.14 (Cf. below 5H5.) In this respect, talk
about a merciless rejection contains another thesis about the estimated chances of
embryo research, which is not justified any further.
SUC: Opportunities must be seized. Society has an obligation to do everything
possible to alleviate the suffering of human beings who are seriously ill.
3H3: But that means you open the floodgates to a grim balancing exercise. How is
this any different from the practice in China? People who have been sentenced to
death are exploited there as organ donors, according to the principle: If he will
die anyway, he can at least help others with his organs.

14

This is reminiscent of Hwang Woo-suk, the world-acclaimed South Korean genetic engineer,
who had allegedly cloned 11 stem cell lines and seemed to be just a few steps away from therapeutic
cloning. In January 2006, his records turned out to be fraudulent. This is particularly relevant for
estimating the chances of these techniques because Hwang was not a lonely bookworm who made
wild claims to a world that had such an urgent desire for positive results that it believed him.
Instead, he had published his findings along with 24 coauthors in internationally renowned
professional journals, where they went through a process of peer review which is supposed to
ensure the quality of the submitted articles. In that respect, the discovery of these forgeries says a
lot about the scientific and publishing operations of this industry.

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Analytical commentary on 3H3:

REF: The juxtaposition of EaEs with the seriously ill, who might be helped by
embryo research, is immoral. It is in similar terms that the practice of organ harvesting is
discussed in China.
THEF: This is an objection to Merkels criticism of the EPA. The comparison
with organ harvesting on Chinas death row convicts assumes that it is a practice
based on an immoral balancing exercise. Any attempt at weighing the use of EaEs
against the possible benefits of such use for the seriously ill should also be
rejected. The figure of argumentation used here is an analogy.
IVA: According to human rights, no human being may be killed so that her
organs benefit others. In Europe, the criterion of brain death allows us to make
organs available for transplantation without thereby also infringing on the BRL
of (former) organ owners. In China, a state with capital punishment, there
is apparently another way to legally acquire organs. The balancing exercise is
grim (immoral) if we assume that the death row inmate actually has a BRL
which is precisely what Merkel does in his reply. This would mean that either the
death sentences in China are illegitimate or capital punishment is illegitimate as a
whole. It is not clear what the opponents are thinking about this. If we accept the
Chinese death sentence, the removal of organs would apparently have to be
considered as an execution of the death penalty. This conflicts with our legal
conditionsin Germany, organs may only be removed for transplantation with the
consent of the donor. But it does not involve a grim balancing exercise.
3M4: Of course, you are right in this regard, Mr. Hppe; this cannot be allowed.
The same is true for end-stage cancer patients. Nobody could say: Lets
kill them quickly so that we still have some of their organs. After all, these
patients are human beings with the subjective basic right to life. Early embryos,
however, are not human beings, and my laboratory example merely illustrates
this fact.
Analytical commentary on 3M4:
REF: It is right to condemn organ harvesting in China, which is comparable
with the removal of organs from terminally ill cancer patients. Such a removal must
be denounced because these people have a BRL. The same is not true for EaEs as
the example of the burning laboratory shows.
THEF: Organ removal in cancer patients is illegitimate, just like in the case of
Chinas death row inmates, because it violates the BRL. In this respects, there is
agreement. In other respects, there is a repetition of the thesis, which is supported, in
turn, by the examplealready refuted in 3H1of the burning laboratory.
IVA: In this contribution to the conversation, the speakers have it all wrong. It is
wrong to compare Chinese organ harvesting with a fictitious removal of organs
from terminally ill cancer patients. The latter are not sentenced to death (if at all,
only in a metaphorical sense). Anyone who is legally sentenced to death has apparently been dispossessed of their BRL. The moment when this dispossession takes
effect is determined by the country responsible for the sentence. Even if wequite

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Argument Analysis

rightlyreject the death penalty, the situation of the death row inmate is fundamentally different from that of the dying patient. Secondly, the idea of removing
a dying cancer patients organs for the purpose of transplantation is absurd.
Finally, the claim that the example of the burning laboratory shows that the EaE
does not have a BRL is simply repeated without taking into consideration the refutation presented in 3H1.
3H4: But in order for us to never be in situations where we have to discuss such
questions, we must not let the ban on killing unravel at either end of human
existence. Otherwise, we risk total arbitrariness, a slippery slope: Killing is
intolerable, and I am quite intolerant in that regard. And since you brought up
the abortion ruling: I am not convinced by some of its aspects either. But
the argument of the judges was that a mere ban on abortion cannot protect life
effectivelyin that case, women will just have an abortion secretly. If they are
forced to have counseling, however, the kind of counseling offered could emphasize the protection of life. This concession is not required for PID. It is impossible
to carry out PID secretly because too many people are involved in it. In that case,
then, the ban is working.
Analytical commentary on 3H4:
REF: The ban on killing must not unravel because we must not get caught up in difficult controversies with only arbitrary exit strategies that may lead, ultimately, down a
slippery slope. The abortion ruling is not fully convincing, but mandatory counseling is supposed to ensure a better protection of life than a mere ban. After all, abortions can be performed secretly. This is not true of PID, which can therefore simply
be banned.
THEF: Hppe repeats the main thesis of adhering to the ban on killing, if possible
without any exceptions. Likewise, he repeats the main justification, which consists
of the slippery slope thesis (otherwise we are in danger of slipping). The slippery
slope is illustrated here by disputes over details that cannot be determined clearly:
those should also be avoided. The difficulty of ethical and legal finesse in marginal
areas, then, becomes a part of the justification.
The second argument addresses Merkels criticism of the Federal Constitutional
Court ruling in 2M1b. The ruling is defended against criticism: Given the special
circumstances of abortion cases, it is considered strategically suitable. Because
these circumstances are not given in the case of PID, the ban on PID (in the Embryo
Protection Act of 1990) is correct and in accordance with the Federal Constitutional
Court ruling.
IVA: Hppe continues to ignore Merkels objection from Round 1 that the ban
on killing has already begun to unravel (more extensively than just in cases of
self-defense). The reference to difficult and perhaps unresolvable debates, which
would result in unraveling, is irrelevant in the very face of such unraveling. Hppe
would have to show that such unraveling has not yet taken place; simply claiming it
is not enough. Defending the Federal Constitutional Court ruling as strategically

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Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate About the Embryos Right to Life

343

useful does not remove its contradictions. You cannot have your cake and eat it too,
even if this might appease the minds of people tolerant of contradictions.15
Evaluation of Round 3:
Quaestio: Is the early embryo a human being?
Argument:
Hppes thesis: The EaE is to be regarded as a human being and treated accordingly.
Hppe has already represented or assumed this in Rounds 1 and 2. At this point, he
draws on his position in order to obtain objections to Merkels arguments. Confronted
with detailed questions, he repeats his warning that the ban on killing might unravel
and justifies this, just like in the previous rounds, by the threat of the slippery slope.
Hppe cannot advance his own thesis any further in this round, but he makes
progress in rejecting Merkels thesis.
Merkels thesis: Although the EaE is a human being, it has no-BRL. In order
to justify this, Merkel uses the example of the burning laboratory to appeal to our
moral intuitions. The appeal fails; the argument is completely refuted. To minimize
the consequences of this appeal for a position concerning the EPA, the example
is not supposed to be a justification. In this context, Merkel is provoked to posit his
thesis that the EPA is merciless, the justification of which once again resorts to his
thesis that the EaE does not have a BRL.
The state of affairs:
In the previous round, Merkel argued that the EaE does not have a BRL because the
FCC has been unable to bestow it in its contradictory ruling. This legal argument did
not convince Hppe. In fact, it did not have to convince him because the statement
that the EaE has no-BRL only concerns the present situation. The present situation
is an expanse of legal debris, where a practice has been established that repeatedly
runs counter to the principles invoked. This is not a sustainable situation; it must
be corrected. Now, the question is: how? This is the background for a normative
reading of Merkels thesis. It states that the EaE should not have a BRL. It is this
thesis which is supposed to be justified by the appeal to moral intuitions as triggered
by the example of the burning laboratory.
Merkel attempts to trivialize the matter rhetorically. The example, he says, is not
a proof in the strict sense; it is merely an illustration. The term illustrate appears
twice (in 3M1 and 3M4) to describe this special relationship between the example
of the burning laboratory and the thesis. That the example is not a proof is trivial,
at least when a proper concept of proof is assumed (in the sense of a compelling
inference). It is not enough, however, for it to merely illustrate something. An
illustration shows something in a text. If we take the text at issue here to be the thesis,

15

A year after this conversation took place, Reinhard Merkel published a study in which he
brilliantly and meticulously analyzes the contradictory character of the abortion ruling of 1993. Cf.
Merkel (2002), 34116.

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Argument Analysis

then the example of the burning laboratory, being a mere illustration, would be the
content of the thesis, albeit in the form of an image or a fictional situation. Merkel
could then be read as saying: The fact that you would save the infant and not the
embryos in the described situation figuratively shows your different or, rather, larger
obligation to the born human being. Does this work? Is an illustration capable of
showing such a thing? The image or the type of the described situation is ambiguous.
Hppes interpretation of the matter is dramatically different. Only if the thesis as a
text is a caption under the illustration does it become clear what the image actually
represents. In other words, either the illustration does not stand in a clear relation to
the thesisin particular, it does not show anything about its correctnessor it
really is a mere illustration of the thesis, in which case it depicts the very state of
affairs claimed by the thesis. Nothing more and nothing less. This would mean,
however, that Merkel, by providing this illustration, does not progress in justifying
his thesis; he simply asserts the thesis once again in a more graphic form.
But it is quite clear that this is not his intention. He believes, rather, that the example
of the burning laboratory helps him move forward in justifying his thesis. If we engage
with the situation described in the example, the justification is supposed to make us
realize the following: Yes, I would really think that it is right to save the infant. There
you go, Merkel would reply, you are following your moral intuition. We rely on it in
finding an ethical reason for a question that is legally undecided and grant the EaE less
constitutional protection on that basis than we do the infant. There may be people who
follow this suggestion. Nevertheless, the suggestion of moral intuitions is exhausted
the moment someone asks what kind of competence such a moral intuition is supposed to be and how we can determine whether it is not merely a tendency that has
somehow been triggered, that is, whether views, for example, the idea that people
should be living in ethnically uniform groups or that a person who molests and murders
a child should be executed, etc., also constitute our moral intuitions or, if that is not
the case, what it is that distinguishes them from real moral intuitions.
In summary: Merkel recognizes that he needs an ethical justification for his main
thesis that the EaE does not have a BRL. The example of the burning laboratory is
supposed to fulfill this function, but it fails to do so. Hppe refutes this attempt at a
justification. As a result, Merkels thesis is up in the air.
On the one hand, the successor thesis of the mercilessness of the EPA assumes
a realistic prospect, namely that embryo research will lead to treatments for the
illnesses targeted. This prospect is by no means posited as a thesis and justified as
far as possible; rather it is simply assumed to be correct. It could be interpreted
as a generalization about past events, where research led to the expected results.
As long as no serious doubts arise, this is a sustainable potential justification.
Yet once legitimate doubts occur (such as Woo-Suk Hwangs forged results), the
generalization is too uncertain to be considered a justification.
On the other hand, of course, the said connector thesis of the mercilessness of the
EPA again assumes the validity of Merkels main thesis that the EaE should not have
a BRL. For only if this claim is valid can we even begin to think about embryo research.
If the main thesis is not valid, then holding back embryos is no more merciless
than, for example, holding back patients in a persistent vegetative state.

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345

At this point, Merkels main thesis is not yet valid. And therefore, the connector
thesis is not valid, either.

8.3.4

Round 4: The Issue of Abortion

CHRISMON: Mr. Merkel, if you value the uniformity of the law above everything
else, then you will surely agree with Mr. Hppe regarding a ban on abortion?
Analytical commentary: In Round 2, Merkel criticized the inconsistency of the
Federal Constitutional Court with respect to that of the EaE. Since abortion is
exempt from punishment, he resolved the contradiction by concluding that the
EaE does not have a BRL. The opposite decision would also be conceivable: to
demand a ban on abortionthis would resolve the contradiction and reinstate the
uniformity of the law as well.
4M1: No. But I think, given the background of Catholic doctrine, that the Pope was
right in ordering German bishops to abandon the system of counseling. Anyone
who believes that the embryo has also been created in Gods likeness and that
killing it is therefore a serious offense must not aid and abet individual abortions, even if he hopes to reduce the total number of abortions by doing so.
Personally, however, I think that abortions are permissible because I do not
regard the early embryo as a bearer of basic rights.
Analytical commentary on 4M1:
REF: In the context of Catholic doctrine, the Pope was right to order his followers
not to participate in abortions, even if the decision to have one is a result of counseling.
Personally, however, Merkel regards abortions as permissible because, for him, the
EaE does not have a BRL.
THEF: Support for abortion is a substantiating consequence of the main thesis
that the EaE does not have a BRL.
SUC: Merkel suddenly confronts his own position with the position of Catholic
doctrine. Catholic teachings provide a background against which the Pope is right. It
is apparently self-evident that there are grounds for criticizing this background.
IVA: Before dismissing Catholic doctrine, the following should be considered. It
is quite true that in a republican community, a church has no general legislative
competence. Whether the embryo is worthy of protection, however, is a question
that has been raised to an ethical level because German law is still contradictory in
this regard. At this level, it is no longer a matter that religious doctrine has no
relevance. At least a good reason for the particularity of this doctrine would be necessary. However, Merkel does not seem to articulate a validity claim in order to
oppose the validity claim of Catholic doctrine, but to simply present a different opinion. This would mean that he has left the discussion. Consequently, we should not
interpret it that way. It also follows, however, that Merkel has to justify why he is
right with respect to the validity question on the issue of abortion.

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Argument Analysis

It is not only controversial whether abortion should be permissible, but also

until when it should be permissible. 4M1 is silent on this. It is understandable,
then, that this question is raised next (in conjunction with a question about valid
motives).
4H1: So why dont you put your cards on the table! Are you also in favor of letting
a woman remove her three-month-old fetus in order to use the cells for helping
her father who suffers from Parkinsons disease? An American woman wanted
to do that!
Analytical commentary on 4H1:
REF: Articulate your position with regard to the suggestion that a three-month-old
fetus could be used to test possible therapies for a relative.
THEF: Hppe requests that Merkel disclose his extended position with respect to
the state of affairs in question. The previously supplied justification does not cover
the validity of the timing and motivation described.
IVA: It is not entirely clear what is actually requested in this utterance. Was this
a case of aborting multiples? Or was the project based on several pregnancies, each
of which was supposed to be terminated in 12 weeks? Or was this simply a slip of
the tongue?
4M2: To my mind, this is still ethically and legally justifiable if it takes place prior
to the 12th week of embryonic development. In contrast, the more developed
fetus is at least a possible bearer of subjective rights in a moral sense, whereas
the embryo is not. It does not mean that I want to deprive embryos of any kind of
protection. After all, we cannot do whatever we want with dead bodies, either,
although they are no longer invested with any basic rights. This touches upon the
dignity of the dead and the living. We want the overall texture of our regime of
norms to be humane. A part of this is that we cannot treat all human substances
as a thing.
Analytical commentary on 4M2:
THEF: There is a second connector thesis to the main thesis (no-BRL for the EaE):
The EaE without a BRL lasts until week 12; after that, a BRL would be possible.
Still, the EaE is accorded the protection (of the dignity of our species) woven into
the texture of our regime of norms.
IVA: How would Merkel ethically and legally justify the use of embryos
that are up to 12 weeks old? Probably by once again referring to his no-BRL thesis.
It is far from clear, however, why such a project would not affect the humane
overall texture of our regime of norms. Merkels response seems imprudent and
spontaneous.
Evaluation of Round 4:
Quaestio: Is abortion permissible? If so, until when (and for what reasons)?

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Analysis of the HppeMerkel Debate About the Embryos Right to Life

347

Argument:
Hppe does not formulate any theses, but demands that Merkel formulate non-arbitrary
limits for the permissibility of abortion.
Merkels thesis: Abortion is permissible at least up to week 12, even for the purpose
of exploring possible therapies (for relatives). Since this is illegal in Germany,
Merkel would have to give a separate justification for this thesis. In justifying it,
however, he merely refers back to his main thesis. So far, it says this: The EaE does
not or should not have a BRL. Yet this does not cover the use of up to 12 weeks old
embryos for medical research. In this sense, Merkel formulates a more specific
connector thesis in 4M2, which determines that human beings should be considered
an EaE (without a BRL) up until week 12.
This connector thesis, however, is actually not reconcilable with Merkels position
as previously stated. In the example of the burning laboratory, which was supposed
to demonstrate that the EaE has a lower value than the infant, the EaEs were fertilized
the day before, that is, at the most they were dots in a petri dishnot moving creatures with limbs and a face. In other words, the example of the burning laboratory
would no longer yield a clear decision in favor of the infant if it involved 12-weekold embryos (which must be imagined, for the sake of the thought experiment, as
extrauterine). Quite apart from the ambiguity of his interpretation, then, it would no
longer lead to Merkels result.
Conclusion: In this round, Merkel formulates a connector thesis which is
supposed to be backed up by the previous main thesisstill pending justificationbut
which is actually not even entirely reconcilable with it. The burden of justification
has become larger and more complex.

8.3.5

Round 5: The Limits of Using Embryos

CHRISMON: Is there a use of embryos that should not be permitted?

5M1: We must not treat them in a way that I would like to call, quite abstractly,
frivolous. Frivolous in this sense, for example, would be the creation of
humananimal hybrids as well as everything that merely satisfies the whims of
researchers. I would also make it illegal to use PID in selecting embryos for the
color of their eyes or hair.
Analytical commentary on 5M1:
REF: EaEs must not be used in a way that is frivolous. Frivolous uses are, for
example, those that arise from a researchers whims or that determine the color of
the eyes or the hair of the future child.
THEF: This is another connector thesis intended to determine or restrict the main
thesis more precisely. The EaE has no-BRL, but it is invested with a protection from
frivolous treatment. Frivolous is determined both conceptually (whims of
researchers) and by the use of examples (humananimal hybrids, preselecting the
color of eyes and hair).

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Argument Analysis

MAC: The thesis refers to the dignity of the species as alluded to in Article 2
of the German Basic Law.
SUC: Subjective formulations such as a way that I would like to call frivolous, and I would also make it illegal to indicate that Merkels proposals on
what the protection of EaEs is supposed to defend against are personally motivated.
Once accepted, these personal proposals could be enshrined in more detailed legal
regulations (cf. 5M4). There is no need to justify them any further, then, if they
are construed like this, that is, as an articulation of general moral intuitions.
This contribution breathes the spirit of legislation, possibly even of constitutional
law, but it has certainly not been formulated from the perspective of a rhetorician or
a politician who needs to prevail in a fight over interests and dispel objections raised
by interlocutors.
IVA: The connector thesis is very important; it tries to address the charge that the
EaE without a BRL is fair game (2H2). At the heart of this attempt is the term
frivolous. The definition by way of casual determinations, however, can only
serve to illustrate, not to seriously delimit certain uses. The (presumably guiding)
intention of positing this as a moral intuition, that is, as the beginning of a justification, is beset by the already noted notorious defects of this mode of justification.
This is also reflected in Hppes subsequent request.
5H1: Why?
Analytical commentary on 5H1:
Hppe does not have similar intuitions and thus requests a comprehensible justification for why the selection of the color of eyes and the hair should be banned
which, for Merkel, is intuitively correct.
5M2: Well, just in the light of the overall character of our regime of norms. Such a
thing would not fit into a humane society.
Analytical commentary on 5M2:
REF: The examples given are frivolous or beyond permissibility because they do
not fit with the character of the regime of norms in our humane society.
THEF: This continues the elucidation of the connector thesis: The EaE must be
protected from frivolous treatment. Frivolous, as a criterion of exclusion for the
possible treatment of embryos, is defined further as not fitting with our humane
regime of norms.
MAC: The definiens is recognizable, but it is broad and indistinct.
SUC: This demonstrates Merkels self-understanding. We live in a humane society organized by norms. This is something stable. It cannot be endangered by new
norms that standardize new possibilities.
IVA: This reference to the overall structure of the regime of norms in our humane
society suitably and quite generally characterizes our lifestyle and our ideals. For it
to serve as a justification against Hppes concerns, however, this point would have
to state in much more detail what is meant by being humaneamong the societies to
which Merkel refers here (cf. the next contribution, 5M3) is the United States, where

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death penalty is largely accepted. But even a clear definition of what it means to be
humane does not address Hppes concern that this definition may change, that it is
not fixed, but must be maintained over and over again.
CHRISMON: How about PID-based sex selection?
Analytical commentary:
The exclusion of selecting the hair and eye color is so arbitrary that a different
socially relevant possibility is discussed. The question serves to explore the position: Please formulate a connector thesis to this, as well.
5M3: That would be a devastating tool in countries where discrimination against
women is an actual social and perhaps even legal reality. It should therefore be
banned in such places. But if, for example, in Germany, France, or America, a
family withsayfive daughters wants to select a male embryo, I would regard
this as ethically acceptable.
Analytical commentary on 5M3:
REF: In countries where women are discriminated against, this should not be
permitted; but it could be permitted in countries with equal rights.
THEF: This is a connector thesis with respect to the meaning of frivolous,
which aims at preserving the principle of equal rights between men and women.
SUC: Merkels connector theses are certainly meant to provide orientation for
research on the development of a humane society. But their status slides slowly from
thetic to a mere consideration.
IVA: Merkel seems to have dramatically lost sight of the fact that the issue
in question is PID. PID is the process of initiating a pregnancy by in vitro
fertilizationa process that is very expensive and laborious for women and,
moreover, has a very low success rate. That permitting the preselection of
male embryos would be a devastating tool is nothing but rhetorical bluster at
the moment. Finally, it is unlikely that a woman in the Western world, who has
already had five children, would try to have a sixth with the help of reproductive
medicine.16
5H3: But that confirms everything I have said before: We are going down a slippery
slope. What if the family has four daughters? Or three?
Analytical commentary on 5H3:
REF: This response confirms a concern which has been mentioned many times
(that denying the EaE human dignity will lead to a normative slide into arbitrariness). The choice of a limit of five daughters over a limit of four or three daughters is arbitrary.

16

It is possible that Merkel hopes to lend his bold theses more credibility by employing them on
the grounds of political correctness.

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Argument Analysis

THEF: The connector thesis in 5M3 is rejected because accepting it means

going down the normative slippery slope which has already been rejected as
unacceptable several times.
MAC: The normative difference between familial situations involving five, four,
or three daughters, which is of normative relevance (for the question of the frivolity
of our treatment of embryos), is rejected.
SUC: Hppe now sees his visions of the slippery slope thesis confirmed directly
by what his interlocutor has stated in all innocence.
IVA: Even Hppe is no longer aware that the issue at hand is PID. He obviously
sees only the generous gesture that Merkel makes in order to construct his case in
such a way that it may currently draw a consensus.
5M4: Difficult normative boundaries will always have to be drawn and, indeed, we
do so in thousands of other areas. Lets talk again about the things that are
already possible today: that we permit the abortion of children with Down
syndrome as late as in the sixth, seventh, or even the eighth month, that iswe
both agreea scandal. Again, in the first 3 months, during which, given all we
know from embryology, the embryo is not capable of having experiences; it is
also subjectively not injurable. At this stage, I would merely exclude practices
that are frivolous, but not the killing. Afterward, a gradual and increasingly
compounded guarantee of subjective moral protection sets in: The further the
fetus develops, the more it experiences, the more comprehensive its protection
must be. How this can be realized legally may remain open at this point.
Analytical commentary on 5M4:
REF: It is normal that there are difficulties in drawing these normative boundaries.
In doing so, however, we should use appropriate criteria. The abortion of children
with Down syndrome in the sixth month and later is wrong. One criterion should be the
ability to have experiences, which sets in about 3 months into the pregnancy.
According to current science, the embryo does not have any experiences before this
and is therefore subjectively not injurable. In this period, the embryo should be
protected from frivolity, but not from killing, and this protection should increase in
proportion to the embryos increasing ability to have experiences. Legal regulations
for more specific hierarchies must still be found.
THEF: This completes the connector thesis about protection from frivolity. The
result is an entire second thesis which complements the main thesis. It states that,
during the pregnancy, the embryo should be granted increasingly protected positions, the more its ability to have experiences increases. The thesis also entails
that the ability to have experiences begins during week 12, that all which has to be
guaranteed before that period is protection from frivolity, and that this protection
should increase after week 12.
MAC: Embryology can only know what the 12-week-old embryo experiences if
it determines what is meant by experience. Such a determination is difficult to
label knowledge, especially once it becomes known that this is a matter intended to
determine who is accorded the BRL.

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IVA: On the one hand, Merkel regards it as a scandal to abort children with Down
syndrome (term used here: children!) after the sixth month. On the other hand, the
protection is supposed to increase gradually with the onset of the ability to have
experiences. This could be reconcilable if construed as follows: After the sixth
month, the protection that is now appropriate would have to ban the killing. Whether
this means that the embryo has the BRL from the sixth month on, however, remains
unclear.
5H4: But thats exactly what I criticize. You simply introduce yet another criterion,
in this case: It has no subjective experience. By the way, I dont believe that
this is true of the 12th week at all.
Analytical commentary on 5H4:
REF: Your contribution once more demonstrates the slippage of normative standards. The criterion of the subjective ability to have an experience is arbitrary and,
with respect to week 12, even doubtful.
THEF: Setting up the ability to have experiences as a criterion is regarded as
an indicator of slippage. Reason: This criterion is arbitrary. In addition, a further
objection to the criterion is formulated: It is disputed that this criterion is not satisfied by the 12-week-old embryo.
5M5: Well, I do not want to have a dispute over embryological findings; lets just
stick to the early embryo.
Analytical commentary on 5M5:
THEF: This constitutes a retraction of the dividing line between the EaE with
no-BRL and the fetus with a possible BRL after week 12. Thus, the contribution in
4M2, where the use of 12-week-old fetuses for therapeutic research has been
supported, would have to be retracted or modified.
IVA: In 5M4, Merkel said that, given all we know from embryology, the
embryo has no experiences before week 12. Yet faced with the slightest doubt, he
retracts that claim. This indicates that, at this point, thetic speech has become
noncommittal consideration. It is clear that Merkel rejects the BRL of the unborn
human being at the beginning and that he wants it to arise gradually over the
course of the pregnancy. The precise moment is not visible. Moreover, anyone
asking for a justification is simply referred to the overall texture of our regime of
norms.
5H5: But thats precisely the point of a slippery slope. To always be able to say quite
flexibly, well, in that case, well just take the next smaller or larger one if it is
more useful for research. That is exactly the decisive point. Lets assume that it
turns out to be impossible to breed replacement cells for sick patients from the
stem cells of the earliest embryos. I do not think that those who have suddenly
discovered that the 14th day is critical for the beginning of human dignity,
because that is when the embryo is implanted into the uterus, would stick to their
position. The slippery slope is real!

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Argument Analysis

Analytical commentary on 5H5:

THEF: The slippery slope thesis is regarded as confirmed once more by the
contribution in 5M5. The flexibility shown (in that case the ability to have
experiences will just set in earlier) is not a virtue; rather it shows the slippage of
serious value standards .
MAC: The 14th-day mark would make EaEs available for experiments with
therapeutic cloning. To date, no one knows whether this is even a possibility. If not,
it is realistic to assume that the mark will simply be shifted for more mature embryos
to be useable in the experiments. The 14-day criterionmore or less confirmed as
the moment of nidationis new and can therefore easily be shifted.
IVA: This contribution is interesting insofar as it intends to draw the justification
of the thesis (Hppes slippery slope thesis) from events that are currently taking
place in the dialogue. This is a reflexive justification, or a reflexive beginning of
justification. Hppe articulates verbally what he learns practically in argumentation. In
order for this strategy to work, Merkel would have to recognize it, based on Hppes
hints, in his own practice of argumentation.
5M6: Not at all. Attitudes among the general public may vary. But in the development
of laws and normsand thats whats at issue herethis risk of a slippery slope is
quite unreal. And in that regard we are far behind of what is morally permissible
and imperative today. You sound to me like someone who says: If we raise the
speed limit to 55 km/h in cities, then we open the floodgates to unrestricted road
rage. I am telling you that, by specifying the 14th day, we have found a very
plausible limit, and if we establish this legally, then we must ensure that it is
observed. Ethically, of course, it does not at all make a difference whether the
14th or 15th day is selected.
Analytical commentary on 5M6:
THEF: Now that Hppe has directed his slippery slope objection specifically at Merkels
contribution, Merkel finally responds to it. He confronts him with the counter-objection
that the risk of slippage is unreal. In order to justify this, Merkel distinguishes
attitudes among the general public from attitudes that guide the development of
laws and norms. The former are in danger of slipping, the latter are not; in fact, they
are actually particularly resistant to slippage, which can be seen by the fact that the
presently valid norms stay far behind of what is permissible and imperative. Insofar
as this is true, the slippery slope objection has been relegated to its proper place and
refuted there. Moreover, there is a second counter-objection to the slippery slope
objection: the analogy to an increase in the speed limit. Just like an increase from 50
to 55 km/h does not lead down a slippery slope, defining day 14 or 15 as the beginning
of human development does not lead down a slope either.
MAC: It is probably true that, under normal conditions, the views of the general
public will slip more easily than those of the legal elite. (This is not, however, generally
true; there were, e.g. many lawyers who supported the German National Socialist
Stateeven though it slipped dramatically.)
SUC: His statement that we, in the German legal system, are lagging far behind
of what is morally permissible and imperative suggests that Merkel seems to know

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quite well how to define the latter. It is far from clear, however, whether this is simply
whatever the others are doing (Australia, the Netherlands, England) or whether it is
something Merkel can back up with a serious justification. Similarly, it is difficult to
decide whether the man thinks like a statesman or politician at this point, whether
he speaks from the perspective of a legal regulator, or whether he simply desires
acclamation by his peers.
IVA: Merkel has not accepted Hppes offer for reflection, or he has even refused
it. At the most, the only people who go down the slope are others, who are less
knowledgeable and less attentive. Public attitudes may fluctuate, but this is not true
of the views of the elite charged with developing the law. As seen above, however,
this is not necessarily correct.
The second counter-objection is also useless because the analogy is wrong.
The speed limit of 50 km/h has been well established in our practical lives for
half a century. A small change can easily be absorbed without running the risk
of a slippery slope. This is quite different in the case of the 14th-day limit: it is not
a small quantitative change with respect to the existing limit; rather it posits
something qualitatively new, namely, a human being that is available for all
(non-frivolous) purposes.
5H6: or the 20th.
Analytical commentary on 5H6:
THEF: The firmness of the established dividing line is explored by tentatively pushing it a little further.
IVA: Only the determination of the dividing line is explored. Hppe apparently
understands the tentative shift as a test of its seriousness. But this runs counter to
Merkels intentions. He was only concerned with staking out a period in which the
ability to have experiences does not apply yet.
5M7: Yes, because even after 20 days we are still far away from the moment at which
the ability to have experiences begins and, consequently, the morally justifiable
status as a bearer of rights sets in.
Analytical commentary on 5M7:
THEF: Again, the tentative designation of day 20 serves only to outline an area that
is at least still outside the criterion of the ability to have experiences. In the
following, however, it is claimed quite explicitly here that the ability to have experiences may morally justify certain protective rights.
MAC: These definitions are not part of the legal system, but belong to Merkels
thetic position that aims at improving this very legal system.
IVA: The ability to have experiences is not a clear and unproblematic criterion.
Cf. the IVA of the next contribution.
5H7: So the 20th day is still not the last word! A look at the books of history will
show that things often went wrong when there were opportunities for selecting
people. How can anyone be so naive as to believe that things will not go equally
wrong in PID and stem cell research of all things!

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Argument Analysis

Analytical commentary on 5H7:

REF: Apparently six more days during which the embryo would be available are not
even worth considering. This gives rise to concerns. So far, the selection of people
has always gone wrong. Anyone who thinks that it will go well in the case of PID
and stem cell research is naive.
THEF: There is an inference from the carelessness shown in pushing the critical
limit of the onset of human life ahead by 5 or 6 days to concerns about the potential
of a selection which had always gone wrong in the past.
IVA: The dissent about setting the 14th, 15th, 20th, or perhaps even a later day as
the limit is due to a misunderstanding. Hppe is concerned with the seriousness of
seeking a solid criterion that does not arise from an arbitrary postulation, which
causes him to regard the willful shifting of the limit as proof of the suspected
arbitrariness. Merkel, on the other hand, is concerned with a criterion that designates,
as he sees it, a decisive qualitative difference (the ability to have experiences).
Its definition would have to be specified in more detail after consulting with
embryologists. Moreover, he seems to be reasonably certain that such an ability to
have experiences has not yet set in after 23 weeks.
Whether that is right is not easy to decide. The ability to have experiences is not
a good criterion. Depending on what is meant by experience, it could cover the entire
range of developing into a human. If experience is already supposed to be given in
a being that doubles up when hurt, or relaxes in a warm and peaceful environment,
then it is highly probable that even the EaE has the ability to have experiences. If it
requires integrating the emotion into a self-relation,17 however, then it is most likely
that even the infant does not yet have the ability to have experiences. Because the
embryo cannot be asked whether it experiences anything, the criterion would have to
depend, if it should really be established, on the existence or development of physiological receptors in the nervous system. Thus the ability to have experiences would
have been objectified and anything else that could have enabled an understanding of
the criterion has been lost.
Moreover, it is an isolationist criterion. The question of whether human beings
have any experiences dependsparticularly in the case of early, small, growing
human beingson whether this is shared and preferably articulated by others who
are already fairly certain of their experiences. In other words, it is rather the mother
than the scientist who can tell whether the child has any experiences.
5M8: It is impossible to ensure with complete certainty that there will not be any
individual abuses. Even a total ban cannot ensure this. But thats exactly not a
slippery slope. It does not destroy our regime of norms. After all, the fact that
there are people who kill others does not mean that we have to be concerned
about a slippery slope regarding the ban on killing. Morally speaking, we do not
have the right to block a main effect that is morally imperative because of
concerns about undesirable side effects.

17

This position is represented, for example, by Norbert Hoerster in Hoerster (1991).

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Analytical commentary on 5M8:

THEF: Yet another argument from analogy against the renewed diagnosis of a
looming slippery slope is brought forward: Just like no individual acts of murder
cause the normative ban on killing to slip, possible individual abuses of the use of
embryos cannot soften the respective legal norm either.
IVA: The argument is wrong (murder is not an abuse of the norm banning
murder) and it does not fully apply to the argument in 5H7. Abuse is only one of the
ways in which the moral substance of a norm can deteriorate.
The second argument about the morally imperative main effect is based partly on
the assumption that embryo research leads to the expected reduction of suffering in
patients. Otherwise, it could not be morally imperative. On the other hand, it
assumes that the EaE should not have a BRL. Both assumptions, especially the
second, have not been satisfied.
5H8: Of course, we do. Surely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an example.
Because the risk of abuse is too great, we prohibit the transfer of nuclear
weapons in general.
Analytical commentary on 5H8:
REF: There are cases in which the main effect of a morally imperative action
is blocked due to suspected side effects. An example of this is the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
THEF: This is an objection to the second argument in 5M8. It takes the form of
a counter-example to the universal quantification asserted there.
MAC: Hppes claim that it is morally imperative to transfer nuclear weapons
(as long as they are not abused) is a strange and surprising mistake.
SUC: At this point, the official party line of the Christian Democratic Party
presumably comes into conflict with the pro-life principle that Hppe endorses.
5M9: If the side effects jeopardize the existence of the world, then it is permissible.
Otherwise, it is a matter of weighing pros and cons.
Analytical commentary on 5M9:
THEF: The objection in 5H8 against the second argument in 5M8 is neutralized
by presenting as a major exception the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
allegedly has the same structure (of blocking morally imperative main effects due to
concerns about undesirable side effects).
IVA: Today, many applications of what is discussed as large-scale technology
jeopardize the existence of the world. Genetic engineering, in particular, also
puts the world at risk. In other words, the exception is no exception. But since
the example is erroneous already, it does not matter that its refutation is equally
erroneous.
Evaluation of Round 5:
Quaestio: What legal protection should the embryo be granted?

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Argument Analysis

Argument:
In response to this quaestio, Hppe has already claimed several times that the
embryo should have the BRL. Merkel has denied thisin line with his main thesis
that the EaE does not have the BRL, which he has defended and attempted to justify
in Rounds 2 and 3. In this round, he presents a connector thesis, namely that the
embryo should be accorded a gradual protection, beginning with protection against
frivolity, and then, given a growing ability to have experiences, increasing in
protection all the way to the full BRL. Merkel does not offer any clear and strict
criteria for the terms used here: frivolous and able to have experiences. In the
case of frivolity, he points to the overall humane character of our regime of norms,
which he characterizes with some aperus that seem rather random. (Determining
the color of the eyes and hair is not supposed to belong to it; avoiding a possible
sixth daughter is.) The ability to have experiences as a criterion for a subjective
protective right is justified by reference to the injurability associated with it. Initially,
Merkel considers week 12 as a date for the beginning of the ability to have
experiences. When this is questioned, he backs out to the position that this ability is
at least not yet given until the 14th, 15th, or 20th day of the pregnancy.
Hppe regards these attempts at stabilizing the meaning of frivolous and able
to have experiences as unfit for preventing slippage. On the contrary, he takes
Merkels lightly made and corrected attempts at a definition (the embryo cannot
have any experiences prior to week 12? Ok, but at the very least not before day 14,
or 15, or 20) to be a confirmation of the reality of the slippery slope. Thus, the
slippery slope thesis is no longer a general possibility, but aimed directly at Merkel.
And now, Merkel (finally) addresses the argument. He denies its validity in an
argumentation whose components at times seem to be gathered rather spontaneously. It develops in four stages toward the end of the conversation.
The first argument claims that the danger of a slippery slope applies only to attitudes among the general public, but not among the legal elite.
The second argument is an analogy to the speed limit, where a slight increase
would not lead to road rage. By referring back to the moment when a human being
begins to exist, this analogy is supposed to justify the harmlessness of a slight shift
away from the moment of fertilization and toward approximately day 14. When this
moment is subsequently, and on inquiry, postponed until day 20even though the
ability to have experiences is still allegedly far from realized at that pointHppe
renews the charge of the slippery slope. In turn, the analogy to an increase in the speed
limit is itself criticized as an example of slippage. This justification for the danger
of slippage is complemented by a historical argument: So far any move away from
the ban on killing has had bad consequences. This historical fact is something to
reckon with in the case of PID and stem cell research as well.
Merkels third argument against the slippery slope thesis responds directly to
this. It is anotherslightly skewedanalogy: Any possible abuses of PID and stem
cell research would not cause our regime of norms to slip, just like the existence of
murders does not erode the ban on killing.
Finally, there is a fourth argument. It is a connector argument to the argument of
the mercilessness of the Embryo Protection Act in 3M3. The latter argument had

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been sustained by tying it back to the main thesis as a way of countering Hppes
comparison with Chinas death row prisoners. It stated that, since EaEs have no-BRL,
they may be used in medical research for curing diseases. Hence, the Embryo
Protection Act would be merciless by banning this. Now, in the connector argument,
the argument takes a moral turn. Such embryo research has a morally imperative
main effect, apparently the relief from suffering, which should not be blocked
because of concerns about side effects. The response to this fourth argument is
Hppes objection that this is similar to the case of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. And this criticism is then neutralized by Merkels last remark that this is
an exception because the whole world is at risk. In that case, it is permissible. In all
other cases, we have to weigh pros and cons.
Determination of the state of argumentation
(A) Internal determination
The criticism of the criteria presented (frivolous, able to have experiences) as
arbitrary proves the thesis of the embryos gradual protective rights (gradation
thesis) to be untenable as it offers no protection against slippage of the normative
contents. In this sense, the slippery slope thesis prevails at first, only to be criticized
in turn by four arguments. The first (attitudes among the legislative elite) and the
third argument (acts of murder as abuses) are sustained; the other two are criticized,
one of them (speed limit analogy) by also confronting it with the slippery slope
thesis and the other (main moral effect) by confronting it with a counter-example
(Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) which is then neutralized as exceptional.
Conclusion: Merkels gradation thesis faces Hppes slippery slope thesis. The latter
is damaged by two open objections. Hence the gradation thesis remains, though its ad
hoc justifications and explanations hardly suffice to give it a firm epistemic footing.
(B) Advanced internal or intervening determination:
The second half of this fifth round is characterized by a decline in attention and
an increase in avoidable errors on the part of the interlocutors.
Hppe could easily refute the first counterargument against his slippery slope
thesis (argument of the moral firmness of the legal elite). He would not even have to
go back to the Nazi judges. The example of the judges at the Federal Constitutional
Court, who, under the pressure of public opinion, changed their views on the
protection of embryos significantly over the course of 18 years, suggests at least
skepticism about the picture that Merkel draws of lawyers.
With respect to the second argument (speed limit), it is not difficult to see that
the analogy is flawed. A speed limit is an established norm, which can even be
subjected to slight changes. By contrast, establishing the beginning of life at day 14
constitutes a far-reaching modification of the previous beginning at fertilizationa
modification which is new and, as such, unstable.
The mistake in the third argument is to equate violations of a norm with changes
to a norm, which is also something an attentive interlocutor might notice. This rejection, then, would refute Merkels third argument against the slippery slope thesis.

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Argument Analysis

The fourth argument should not be countered by reference of the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty; that is a mistake on Hppes part. If this treaty is supposed
to function as a counter-example to Merkels proposition, then the state reached by
the transfer of nuclear weapons would have to be a morally imperative main effect.
But that is far from the truth. Nuclear proliferation, even of all the good states or
of our allies only, is not morally imperative. Moreover, in his response, Merkel
adds yet another mistake to this one: There is no doubt that undesirable side effects
in genetic engineering and its applications may also put the existence of the human
world at risk, that is, what is presented here as an exceptional criterion also applies
to Merkels own option.

8.3.6

Concluding Assessment of the Discussion

In Round 1, Hppes slippery slope thesis faces Merkels differentiation thesis.

The slippery slope thesis is justified as a generalization about historical experiences.
The differentiation thesis is justified by reference to the exceptional criterion
argument (clear, skid-proof criteria). The justification of the differentiation thesis is
epistemically stronger than that of the slippery slope thesis. Hence, the differentiation
thesis prevails.
In Round 2, Hppes BRL thesis faces Merkels no-BRL thesis. The BRL thesis
is justified (poorly) with the PPVS argument. The no-BRL thesis is justified (equally
poorly) with the BDI argument, on the one hand, and with the FCC ruling argument,
on the other. The justification shows that Merkels thesis would actually have to take
a normative turn. But such a normative turn is not supported by the FCC ruling argument and is therefore up in the air. In addition, Hppe presents the thesis of the
necessity of clear biological criteria as a connector thesis to his BRL thesis. In order
to justify the former, he repeats the slippery slope thesis (a somewhat damaged
remainder from Round 1). An intervention could make this even stronger: The FCC
ruling could now function as a justification, that is, at this point an objection may be
turned into a reason. Thus, the slippery slope thesis is strengthened specifically and
serves to justify a variation of the BRL thesis. This is confronted with the no-BRL
thesis at the end of Round 2, but in a normative version which still lacks justification.
In Round 3, the no-BRL thesis (even given a normative turn) is justified with the
argument involving the example of the burning laboratory. This is refuted. The
thesis of the mercilessness of the EPA, added as a successor thesis, is criticized with
the argument of prisoners on Chinas death rows and subsequently defended by
using the no-BRL thesis, whose justification had just been refuted. This means that
the no-BRL thesis is still up in the air, closely tied to its connector thesis of the
mercilessness of the EPA, which even depends on yet another unsatisfied thesis
(probable success of research).
In Round 4, Merkel formulates another connector thesis to the no-BRL thesis
which asserts the permissibility of aborting the EaE. The explanation of this
connector thesis promises a specific, diminished protective right for the EaE.
Nevertheless, everything still depends on the validity of the main no-BRL thesis,

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which has not yet been established. As a result, Merkel is no step further. (His
justification was the FCC argument, i.e. the finding that the FCC ruling, which was
supposed to accord the EaE its BRL, is contradictory. In the following, however,
Merkel still has to argue for his preferred resolution of the contradiction; i.e. he is
not free of the burden of justification for the no-BRL thesis in its normative guise.)
In Round 5, Merkel presents the gradation thesis (the embryo is invested with a
gradually increasing protective right) as a further connector thesis that substantiates
his main no-BRL thesis. The gradation thesis meets violent, constantly renewed
criticism based on the slippery slope thesis (which is now directed specifically at the
interlocutors arguments), a criticism that cannot be dispelled by any of the four
arguments brought forth against it.
Overall conclusion: Merkels (normative version of the) thesis that the embryo does
not have a BRL lacks any effective epistemic footing. Hppes response, the thesis
of the embryos BRL, is partly rooted in the FCC rulings (which are still binding
despite their inconsistency). Moreover, the objections raised against it can be refuted
or integrated (partly by intervention). The slippery slope thesis, which connects to
the BRL thesis and partially supports it, is able to fend off (partly by intervention)
the objections raised against it.
This produces the following result: Hppe has won the dispute; Merkel has lost.
This result documents the state of argumentation as determined by me in the role
of the intervening evaluator. What does it say about the validity of the theses discussed here? How do things look on the forum, that is, when I raise my own result
to the status of a thesis and face the public in order to defend it against possible
objections? What sorts of objections can I expect? There is no doubt that the social
debate over whether embryos may be used for researchindeed, even the debate
over whether it is good for humanity to abort themhas not come to an end. The
two debaters who participated in this conversation exchanged some arguments on
the matter; for some of these the analysis has demonstrated how they relate to each
other. Some were even quite useful, such as Hppes refutation of the example
involving the burning laboratory.18 It is imperative, however, to consider the controversy more thoroughly with regard to the frames involved. Mainly two frame
controversies are relevant here:
The first concerns the way in which the embryo is framed. Hppe sees it as an
already grown, already created human being which possesses everything that constitutes a human being. Merkel, on the other hand, sees the embryo as a living being
that is on its way to becoming a human. Is there any way to decide this difference
beyond the arguments that both contribute? How does this relate to the issue of
abortion? It is apparently not permissible from Hppes perspective, but it is not
immediately permitted from Merkels perspective eitheronly if we decide to
make it legal.
This leads to the second frame difference. Merkels thinking is culturalistic but
Hppes is naturalistic (with a religious foundation). Merkel makes it clear from the
18

Cf., again, the continuation of this dispute, which I will discuss in Chap. 10.2.

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Argument Analysis

very beginning that the question of who should belong to the human community can
only be decided by us humans and by nobody else, certainly not a transcendent
power such as nature or its creator. Hppe seems to view this differently. Humans
are not even sufficiently fixed in their world to take a stand and to argue on their
own; rather they must respect the limits set by nature. If they fail to do so, they will
lose their footing (and run the risk of slipping).
I think it is obvious to regard the first frame divergence as arising from the
second. This would mean that, on the lowest level of the debate, we have identified
the opposition religious vs. secular thinking. If we do not want to let this get
out of hand in the form of a controversy between (pauperized) fundamentalism and
(plutocratic) hedonism, then we must see to it that we isolate the religious, transcendent substance of serious secular thinking and synthesize it with the constructive
and historical, that is, regarding historical influences, levels of serious religious
thinking. This is probably not an entirely hopeless endeavor, but a different task
than the analysis of this discussion.

Chapter 9

Reflexivity

9.1

The Problem of Constitution

The goal of this book is to elucidate the practice of argumentation with regard to its
possibilities and limitations. Anyone who takes a look at how argumentation has
been theorizedin fact, ever since Aristotlewill get the impression that it is a
simple case of theory generation. There is a given object, namely argumentation,
which is appropriated and made accessible via theory. In the Introduction, I had
explicitly called this view into question. In fact, it should have become clear by
now that such an approach is not appropriate for any theory. In the chapter entitled
Knowledge, I have shown how and why we need to take a pragmatic turn. The
result is a pragmatic principle: the relationship between theory and object is secondary; primarily, we have to seek out and study the relationship between theory and
practice. Relationships in argumentation theory, however, are unusual, even from
a strictly pragmatic point of view: Theory does not gain the autonomy of an abstracted
symbolic presentation of relevant structures in the practice of argumentation, but
rather forms a meta-level which makes us aware of the object level and reflects it. In
order to illustrate this in more detail, I will now begin with the general problem of
the constitution of objects. If I can illuminate this problem, the special status of
argumentation theory in philosophy and the philosophy of science should become
apparent.
Systematically speaking, every theory begins with the following question: How
is the object of our theorizations constituted? I am well aware that such a question
might be confusing to some readers. How on earth can you even begin to think that
the object is constituted? It is simply given, and usually we have all sorts of useful
and relevant concepts at our disposal for denoting differences in the object and relationships between these distinctions. Such an innocuous remark is consistent with
everyday situations. Sunshine is simply given, and we put the pots (also given)
onto the windowsill (given) for the plants to grow better. (Only the causal relationship
between sunshine and plant growth does not seem to be simply given.) In everyday
practices, we can afford to have such views. Upon closer inspection, however,
H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_9,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

361

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9 Reflexivity

harmless statements like these are far too superficial; hence, thoughtful people in
Kants wake have criticized and rejected this myth of the given.1
Practical reason does not know what to do with such criticism; philosophy is
therefore forced to reiterate it time and again. Once more: It is a myth that states of
affairs are simply given. The truth of the matter is that they have gained this shape
and availability through complex theoretical-practical efforts. Often, they contain
and manifest the legacy of centuries. For instance, we have electrical outlets in our
homeselectricity was a great source of fascination for scientists at the beginning
of the 19th century. We have glass windows that let in the lightthe practice of
melting silicon oxide with varying admixtures into glass had already been known to
the Romans; industrial production of halfway flat panes began in the 19th century.
There are indoor plants in front of the windowthey come from east Asia or
Tasmania and have been adjusted to the conditions of northern European living
rooms. This should suffice to say that the relevant object does not exist by itself,
rather it is the result of human praxis and human understanding. This praxis and
understanding are not yet complete. Any concrete result, then, is merely a phase.
In order to move forward, we have to mentally participate in this phase and ask
ourselves how to best connect with the previous process. How much theoretical
understanding is already contained in the sense of immediacy in which the object
seems to be given? How can this epistemic theory be represented systematically?
With such questions, we have now arrived at the problem of constitution. The
disciplines that have traditionally been concerned with its solution, that is, philosophy
and the philosophy of science, discuss it in the following way: How do we arrive at
definitions of the basic concepts of our theory? How do we generate them and how
do we ensure their adequacy?
In these definitions of basic concepts, the theory posits the objects that it represents. Of course, in doing so, it makes certain assumptions. What are these and why
can it make these assumptions? My suggestion (cf. Chap. 1) is to regard theory in a
pragmatic manner as orientation for a praxis whose felicity structures it represents.
This means, then, that we presuppose a praxis (with a lower degree of theoretical
permeation). Objects exist, or do not exist, with respect to standardized human
actions. This sounds complicated, but it clarifies circumstances in everyday life. In
the practice of indoor gardening, there are certain types of plants (namely those which
are on sale at a nursery and whose aptitude for heated rooms is known or secured by
cultivation); these plants have certain needs; moreover, there are pests and other
adverse influences (dry air). There are the surfaces of leaves, if only in the meso-range,
that is, as far as we can see them with the naked eyebut not in the micro-range, as
a cell formation, in the molecular sphere, or even on the atomic level. Then there is the
indoor gardeners mood. (Healthy plants lift your spirits; we are assured by our indoor
gardening guidebook. Plants are said to react to those moods.) Even such cursory
points, it seems, highlight the different ways in which ordinary objects are given.
In the sciences, this much is clear, the question of how the states of affairs at
issue are given is literally of fundamental importance. It is quite surprising, then,
1

Cf. Sellars (1968), Chapter 5, 30, 38; and, more reflected: McDowell (2008), Chapter 1.

9.1

The Problem of Constitution

363

that this field is beset by myths as well. The most amazing and at the same time most
persistent myth has it that any objects which are the objects of serious science
should be given in the same way as objects in the natural sciences. This is already a
myth for the simple reason that it entails a view of objects in the natural sciences as
simply being there. According to this view, newcomers enter a laboratory, receive
explanations for what they see (the tracks in the cloud chambers are subatomic
particles, etc.) and are thus facing the objects under investigation.
A little bit of knowledge about the history of science is required to dispel this
myth. Consider, for example, the fate of the elements: these already existed in
ancient times (earth, water, fire, air) and they continue to exist, albeit in a completely
different shape (periodic system). Phlogiston existed for about 5080 years; today,
it is a cause for ridicule among the know-it-alls. Bacteria have not been around for
very long. When they were discovered by Semmelweis,2 they also became an object
of ridicule for the authorities. As Valry notes casually,3 it took mechanicsafter
all, the best understood of all physical disciplinesalmost 3,000 years to find the
right parameters (i.e. to recognize and exclude subjectively projected influences
such as mental forces and real parasitic influences such as friction) for being able
to understand and practically realize what is happening in throwing a stone. Mind
you, this is the case in natural sciences, where we supposedly have a firm footing: The constitution of an object determines what is available for systematic study.
In the case of a misguided, but, for some extraneous reasons, seemingly obvious constitution, it may take a long time, sometimes centuries, until it is viewed as unfit and
changed accordingly.
In light of these circumstances, it seems a bit naive to regard object relations
in natural sciences as universally binding and as a model for social and textual
sciences or, since this does not work without any problems, to complain about a
separation into two cultures.4 Psychology, economics, sociology, etc. currently
generate an almost arbitrary number of theories which ignore the problem of
constitutionthis means that they regard the so-called phenomena (e.g. peoples
attitudes and changes in attitudes) as given or as seemingly given, draw up
hypotheses about these phenomena, and then attempt to test them by using all
sorts of more or less ingenious examination procedures.
The problem of constitution concerns the questions as to how objects are given,
what do we do to enlist them as known and familiar in such a manner that the
objects are given in the way they are, and finally, whether our assumptions are valid
in these regards. If these assumptions shall be revealed in a constitution theory,
they apparently give rise to a special foundational theory which antecedes the
object theory. It is sometimes a considerable achievement to merely identify these
antecedent components.

Semmelweis (1983).
Cf. Valry (1992), 371.
4
Cf. Snow (2001).
3

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9 Reflexivity

The antinomies chapter in Kants Critique of Pure Reason is exemplary in this

regard.5 The philosopher shows that it is possible to construct justifications for claims
about transcendent objects such as the finitude of the world or the immortality
of the soul (i.e. justifications that summon up the best available knowledge at the
time), and he demonstrates this possibility both for the affirmation and for the negation of each statement. Actually, this is a crushing finding: Faced with such objects,
reason becomes entangled in antinomies. The solution, then, consists in correcting
the constitution of objects that is implicit in these claims about transcendence. Such
a correction proceeds by revising the definitions of world, infinity, etc., based on a
closer investigation of the matter. It turns out that something has been taken as
objective, which actually belongs to the subject. The move that makes this transparent,
that is, the explication of implicit forms of intuition and cognition, is a corrective
separation of the subjective and the objective. Carrying out this separation as well
as presenting it in an insightful way is the solution to the problem of constitution.
Yet this may sound as if the problem were some kind of delicacy from the highaltitude regions of theoretical philosophy. To avoid this suspicion, I would like to
direct our attention once again to sciences, in particular to an episode that I have
already mentioned several times. At the beginning of the 20th century, there was a
foundational crisis in logic and mathematics.6 One of its causes was Russells
famous antinomy. Bertrand Russell had shown that it was possible to formulate a
contradiction in the system of arithmetic (i.e. the mathematics of natural numbers)
developed by the greatest logician at that time, Gottlob Fregea contradiction
that was due to Freges use of the naive concept of set. This concept had later
been systemized by Georg Cantor and it stated that all objects which fall under a
given predicate A form a set. According to this axiom of comprehension, even the
predicate (is a) set which is not a member of itself forms a set. Unfortunately, this
set is a member of itself precisely when it is not a member of itself.
Freges devastation in the face of this discovery is still traceable todayin the
afterword to his magnum opus The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, where he talks about
Russells letter that had reached him at the date of printing.7 The problem with this
matter was the intuitive definition of a set, or the seemingly unproblematic givenness of a set composed of objects that have been compiled somehow or other.
This concept of a set was (and is) part of the constitution of numbers, that is, the
objects of mathematics. Apparently, this constitution had not received enough attention. The solution again lies in revising the basic concept, more specifically in
differentiating the concept of a set according to a theory of types or in reintroducing
it constructively.
Despite its obvious importance, the issue of constitution has often been neglected
and underestimated by the philosophy of science since its emergence in the
early 20th century. Only Hugo Dingler, who has been mentioned several times
5

Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, Book II. Chap. II:
The Antinomy of Pure Reason.
6
Thiel (1972).
7
Cf. Frege (1964), 127 ff.

9.1

The Problem of Constitution

365

(in Chap. 1), made it the center of his philosophy of science. Methodical constructivism
took this up in the second half of the 20th century and pursued it under the rubric of
prototheories. Today, not much of this has survived.8 The mainstream in the philosophy of science is analytical: It regards the scienceswhich are usually not
aware of the problem of constitution, but only suffer it (during foundational crises
and transitional phases)as a given and does not see any reason for concerning itself
with the problem of constitution. There are many kinds of criticism (including
improper ones)9 that address it: Those who intend to score points by highlighting
this problem, the critics say, obviously aim at instructing and regulating the sciences,
whichin spite of their defectsare still the most rational of all human
endeavors.
As a result, conflating constitution theory with object theory is seen as something
normal. Even well-known philosophers of science write at times that basic concepts
cannot be, or should not be, defined. Instead, the conflation is systematized, as it
were, for example, by considering that initially imprecise definitions could slowly
be specified if empirical results are fed back into the definitions.10 This levels the
difference between definitions and empirical data to a large extent. While this might
seem to be modern and realistic, it is actually quite thoughtless. People who do so can
no longer precisely say what it is that they are doing. Is that an important consideration in science? The major disadvantage of such an approach is that scientific
knowledge loses its general comprehensibility. It is no longer on the basis of ones
own insights that one integrates it into ones orientation system, but on the basis of
authoritative assurances. This opens the door to the rule of experts or to a blind faith
in science (as well as to an irrational opposition to it). I do not understand this anyway,
the layperson says. Nuclear reactors are so safe that an accident may happen only
once in 10,000 years, experts said before the accident in Chernobyl. Very few
people were even able to assess how such an object, an accident of a certain
probability, is constituted in the first place. It involves all sorts of assumptions
which cannot be secured. If they were made explicit, then the magnificent powers of
persuasion or suggestion of such statements would soon falter.
In Chap. 5, on the issue of frame structures, I addressed a specific aspect of the
problem of constitution. To say that we apprehend every object in a certain frame
already implies that it is not simply there and given, but that we, who apprehend
it in this frame, have made a selection. I have done my best to exemplify this idea.
To sum it up briefly, in all my examplesbe it the discovery of the New World or
the beginning of modern quantified chemistry, the establishment of political
autonomy in the French Revolution, or the decisions of biotechnologythe essential
point is to sublate old frames which restrict the investigators ways of seeing and to
capture objects in a new and more appropriate way.
To my mind, it is a good idea to generalize the problem of constitution by creating
a greater awareness of frame structures. In particular, doing so means avoiding all
8

Cf. Janich (1992) and Jelden (1995).

Cf. Stegmller (1973), 26.
10
Cf. Strker (1977), 5456.
9

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9 Reflexivity

(unsatisfiable) claims that a certain treatment of the problem of constitution (as in a

protodiscipline) is the true or the only reasonable possibility. The conception
proposed here has it that a certain constitution theory is never necessary, but, at best,
possible without any alternatives. The solution to problems associated with this idea
can be found in the explication or sublation of frames or frame structures. Both the
figure of reflection and the argumentative treatment of results of reflection are well
suited for this purpose. More on this issue is provided below, in the sections on
reflection and argumentation.
Please allow me another brief remark on the notoriously neglected question of
constitution. Even political revolutions are concerned with the problem of constitution.
As long as any organization of social relations is almost automatically apprehended
in the frame of monarchy, for instance, it is crazy, ridiculous, or criminal to conceive
of, let alone realize, an autonomous community. The ruptures of science are called
revolutions because the abstract theoretical constitution of the object as articulated
in basic concepts and basic principles, that is, the primary frame, is turned around
when they occur. It is depressing to see that, in the case of such ruptures, the most
important scientists occasionally act like princes and kings faced with a radical
change threatening or ending their rule. In this respect, it would do us well to be rather
cautious about appraisals of science as the most rational of all human endeavors.
These extensive ruminations on the constitution of objects are intended to lead to
the following statement: The question of constitution is important in any kind of
theory construction and, in one way or another, can also be answered. Given a line
of thought that is sufficiently precise, it will most definitely be possible to distinguish the theory of the object from the theory of its constitution. Object theory will
presuppose constitution theory, that is, it will assume it for its validity claim. The
constitution theory itself raises a validity claim as well. It states that its primary
theorization of the circumstances in a praxis is functional as well as meaningful.
Is it possible to argue in favor of this? The opponent in a dialogue cannot be forced
to accept a particular constitution theory (which, after all, is not unusual in the
case of research theses); we can only call upon him to recognize himself, as it
were, in a proposed theoretical articulation of practical experiences. I will address
this question in more detail at the end of the next section.
This is usually different in object theory, where it is possible to demonstrate its
validity to the opponent because of the criteria of validity. Employing the criteria of
validity always means assuming a certain constitution. It has hopefully become
obvious by now that the theory of the object and the theory of its constitution are
distinctboth in their goals and in their ways of achieving these goals.
Now, this is exactly what is different in argumentation theory, where we can raise
the question of constitution literally at any moment. The (skeptical) question whether
a given statement is an argument at all can occur at any point. To what extent this is
in fact possible, however, is another story. Theoretically, it is certainly possible.
Moreover, such a question must remain answerable; it cannot be postponed, so to speak,
until the cows come home. In this respect, we encounter a remarkable situation: In
the theory and practice of argumentation, there is no distinction between constitution theory and object theory. The reason for this is not that the two levels of theory

9.2

The Status of Argumentation Theory: Descriptive or Normative?

367

have been fused out of sheer negligence, but rather that the practice of argumentation
requires interaction of the two theoretical levels for it to remain open.

9.2

The Status of Argumentation Theory:

Descriptive or Normative?

This section addresses the question whether a theory of the practice of argumentation
should be descriptive or normative. An example for a descriptive theory is the theory
of the solar system; its components are descriptions of celestial bodies and constellations, their movements, etc. Such a theory enables predictions and these can rationally justify the corresponding actions. (Cf. Thales, who predicted the olive harvest
and whose business was flourishing as a consequence; and cf. Coln, who predicted
a lunar eclipse to indigenous people on the fourth crossing and thus secured food for
his crew.)11 Other descriptive theories concern, for example, the shape of the Earths
surface, including all the landmasses, which Coln used to navigate, and the phlogiston theory, which made certain processes in combustion comprehensible.
An example for a normative theory is the French Constitution of 1791 on which
King Louis XVI swore an oath, only to later instrumentalize it for his own purposes.
Another normative theory is the natural law which contains human rights norms
although it is far from clear what it comprises. Even the rules of chess are examples
of normative theory. A normative theory formulates some ways of restricting actions.
Hence, it states the following: All actions in question ought to be limited to those
actions whose descriptions are reconcilable with the norms. Normative theories
assume that addressees are capable of restricting their actions accordingly.
The distinction normativedescriptive has implications for dealing with theory
and possible ways of justifying it. Descriptive theories are justified in a different
way than the normative ones. In the case of descriptive theory, the point is ultimately to find correspondences between what has been articulated theoretically, and
what can be done and experienced practically. In the process, the practical is the
independent authority; the theoretical is the dependent authority. The theory is supposed to appropriately represent and make comprehensible what we can do and
experience practically. If this collapses, the theory must be adjusted. In the case of
normative theory, it is the other way around. Now, the theoretical is the independent and the practical is the dependent authority. Norms are maintained, and
practices are corrected or discarded if deviations arise.
Let us return to the initial question concerning argumentation theory: Is it
descriptive or normative? If it was descriptive, it would outline the existing practice
of argumentation, make reasonable classifications, and distinguish parts and aspects
so that possibilities for doing and organizing something become comprehensible.
It would not give any instructions on how the parties should act. It would merely

11

Cf. the amazing episode in Jamaica, Berger (1991), Vol. 2, 246 ff.

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9 Reflexivity

describe their actions as follows: The participants make utterances of the types of
sentence: interrogative, declarative, imperative, etc.; they take turns talking and use
words such as because, due to, and therefore in order to express a justification,
as well as words like but, however, and no in order to express an objection, etc.
If it were a normative theory, however, things would be quite different. A normative
theory would posit norms and thereby guide the ways of acting along the following
lines, for example, anyone who makes an assertion has to justify it; anyone who is
confronted with an objection has to take it into consideration; if you cannot refute
an objection, you have to retract your thesis. Or it might look like this: For purposes
of highlighting argumentative speech, we have to use certain wordsindicators of
argumentation. Strictly speaking, this would mean that if the theory was normative,
any noncompliance with the norms shows that the corresponding action cannot be
an instance of argumentation, but has to be something different.
We should not, however, lose sight of the fact that a theory of argumentation does
not create a new game whose potential is completely up to the authors caprice, but
that it is meant to theorize an existing practice (even if the latter is heterogeneous
and unclearthe fact of its existence is undeniable). In this respect, a normative
theory implies the burden of having to justify and prove that it would, in fact, clarify
and improve the corresponding practice. A descriptive theory of argumentation
would not imply such a burden. Therefore, it is often considered (by linguists) to be
more serious and scientific. I have expressly denied this in the Introduction.
Once more, normative or descriptivewhat is better? Maybe, they are not even
mutually exclusive. A comparable case in this regard is grammar. It theorizes what
counts as a properly formed sentence in a language. Originally, the point here was
intelligibility. In the grammar of a civilized language, however, there are much more
ambitious goals than mere, crude understanding. Grammar helps to further solidify
a linguistic stage of development that has matured into poetry and literaturea state
which thus, at the same time, provides possible expressions for a rich variety of states
of affairs. Although many ungrammatical sentences may be easily understandable,
their structural features lack the differentiated expressive potentialities of a language
thoroughly shaped by grammar.
Now, if grammar is considered to be normative, as is the case in schools, then it
is meant to secure this stage of development. Hence, it contains rules for making
verbal statements and anyone who does not adhere to them does not speak (proper)
English. So far so good. Still, the normative understanding of grammar cannot suffice. New situations give rise to a new need for expressions. If these are articulated,
our way of speaking has changed. This is language development. Given a normative
understanding of grammar, such language development would require a conscious
change or expansion of norms. Consequently, someone would have to discuss it and
make the respective decisions. Yet something like that happens only in exceptional
cases, for example, at the Acadmie franaise.12 It is the ordinary course of events
12

The Acadmie franaise is an institution charged with the care of the French language that goes
back all the way to the Ancien Rgime (founded by Richelieu, 1635). To this day, its decisions are
binding for the teaching of French. (In my opinion, the result is impressive.)

9.3 What Is Reflection?

369

that forgetfulness, defiance, and the necessity to linguistically adapt to new situations
cause people to speak differently than how they have been taught in school. Everyday
people and writers make the first step. Later, linguists include it in grammar as a
new possibility.
Now, my suggestion with regard to the question of status is this: The theory of argumentation is beyond the dichotomy of description and normalization, but for different
reasons than in the case of grammar. I would like to say that it is reflexive. That is, it
forms its basic concepts and principles on the basis of reflecting on the practice of argumentation and must show its results by using argumentation. This has a remarkable
consequence: Good argumentation theory will ultimately only exist on top of a good
practice of argumentation. (The same applies conversely.) In order to elucidate this suggestion, I will now offer some thoughts and insights on the issue of reflection.

9.3

What Is Reflection?

Reflection is a term used in optics, which has been adopted by philosophy. For a
while, it played a central role in describing philosophical method. By now, it has
a mere shadowy existence and its meaning (now similar to consideration) has
become indistinct, pale, and general. In substance, philosophy is familiar with reflection since the Greeks. In Platos dialogues, the typical philosopher is like a midwife. He helps the student to give birth to seemingly unfamiliar thoughts, which
were actually only concealed by the hustle and bustle of immediate human life and
which can therefore be brought to consciousness in a kind of memory process
(anamnesis). In Aristotle, there is already a clear awareness of ones own mental
activity, that is, of a thinking that pays attention to itself and thinks about itself. The
Greek terms for this were noesis noeseos or epistrophe. In Latin, epistrophe
became reditio ad seipsum, which Thomas Aquinas shortened to reflexio. In the
17th century, Locke uses reflection in explicit opposition to sensation, but the
meaning remains unclear. As a consequence, the surrender of immediacy associated
with reflection becomes more pronounced (here we have the opposition: immediatereflected), which led Rousseau to the statement in his Discourse on the Origin
of Inequality that the state of reflection is a state contrary to nature.13
In German Idealism, the term reflection has become the central philosophical
concept. Kant called transcendental reflection the process of the mind turning
back on itself in an attempt to determine the extent to which concepts stem from
pure understanding or from intuition.14 Fichte takes this to an extreme. Reflection is
what brings about the I. The I is then, as it were, split (IMe), but it can break
down this division again in iterated, increasingly higher reflections. At the end of
13

Rousseau (1992), 22 (French original: 138): [] ltat de rflexion est un tat contre Nature,
et [] lhomme qui mdite est un animal dprav. ([] the state of reflection is a state contrary
to nature and [] the man who meditates is a depraved animal.)
14
Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, B137.

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9 Reflexivity

this process, a sphere of heavenly love is allegedly attainable, in which the division
associated with reflection has been transcended. According to Schellings critique
of reflection, however, the I can never leave the circle of consciousness, that is,
it can never arrive at nature. One might ask: Where does this idea come from? After
all, nature was at the very beginning of reflection. In order to understand it, we
formed the concepts in the first place, then imposed the control of reflection on
them, and then directed our attention to the concept-forming I. Has the beginning
now necessarily been lost? To be sure, Fichte had no distinct natural philosophy;
he was more concerned with the culture and organization of human society (as,
incidentally, was Socrates).
Hegel, who perfected German Idealism, on the one hand, makes reflection a part
of his system. He portrays humanity as a process of consciousness undergoing various stages of reflection: We may go from sensory to logical reflection and from
transcendental possibly even to absolute reflection. On the other hand, Hegels use
of the word reflection is sometimes derogatory, for example, when he castigates
the formalism and subjectivism of Kants followers as a philosophy of reflection.
Post-idealist thinkers have turned reflection into an inner quasi-perception.
Reflection becomes introspection in which the reflecting human being observes
her inner states and events. At the turn of the 20th century, this becomes increasingly criticized as psychologism. Brentano rightly warns us that an internal perception can never be an observation in the strict sense.15 Wittgenstein demonstrates
that the description of internal states would have to take place in a private language, which is not possible.16 Husserlanother critic of psychologismdiscovers phenomenological reflection, which is supposed to have a universal
methodological function for philosophy. According to Husserl, there are various
levels or types of reflection which, moreover, exist in an alleged order that needs to
be observed. Sartre is concerned with an (ontological) variation of phenomenology, and in so doing, he reinforces (like Rousseau) the difference (to immediacy)
set up by reflection. In the second half of the 20th century, the topic seems to have
been exhausted.
A real step forward in terms of conceptual development comes with the critical
theory of the Frankfurt School. Adorno and Habermas assail Poppers philosophy of
science and society for its blindness to reflection.17 What is meant here by reflection is an awareness of the historical and social conditions of ones own actions and
beliefs. This leads Habermas to the following proposal: The communicative
practice of everyday life is, as it were, reflected in itself. This reflection is no
longer a matter of the cognitive subject relating to itself in an objectivating manner.
The stratification of discourse and action built into communicative action takes
the place of this prelinguistic and isolated reflection.18 This is where I would like
to enter the conversation.

15

Cf. Brentano (1973).

Wittgenstein, L. (2009), Philosophical Investigations, 243280.
17
Cf. Adorno et al. (1976).
18
Habermas (1987), 323.
16

9.3 What Is Reflection?

371

Now, if the term reflection is supposed to be part of a serious terminology, then

we will have to somehow position ourselves in relation to the questions raised by
this tradition. There are mainly three such questions:
(a) The relationship of the reflected to the reflecting: How is it possible that there
are, at the same time, division and unity?
(b) The relationship of the reflected to the real world: Is it possible to reach the real
world, or is everything merely an inner feeling, a fact of consciousness? Does
anyone who takes the results of reflection seriously become entangled in solipsism
and subjectivism?
(c) The status of the results of reflection: What sort of validity claim do they raise?
Is it possible for them to arrive at true propositions or new valid theses? In what
sense are the results of reflection argumentatively demonstrable?
I take the liberty of giving three brief answers to these three problems.
Regarding (a): First of all, the relationship of the reflected to the reflecting is not
a real object relationafter all, there is no counterpart. Since an object relation is
the only relation that allows us to test claims in the mode of empirical investigation,
the results of reflection are deemed mere subjective introspection. The way out of
thisby somehow standardizing the relationship by using the methods of empiricalpsychological sciencecauses, if it succeeds at all, reflexive relations to be
absorbed by object relations. The peculiar character of self-reflection disappears; it
becomes self-objectification. The problem has not been solved, but misplacedand
hence the impossible search for an object where there is none.
Habermas has pointed us to a way out by giving reflection a communicative turn
in line with the insights of the philosophy of language. In fact, the reflexive
pragmatic way of thinking presented here (Chap. 1) allows us to clarify the matter
even further: Division becomes stratification and the monological consciousness
becomes dialogical. The subject is not a person who thinks and reflects all on her
ownwho observes her inner world and makes statements about it which others
can either accept or reject. Rather, the point of reflection is the observation of practices
which are performed interactively and cooperatively. These practices represent a
know-how. They contain tacit knowledge. The practices are then revisited by
asking: Why are they important? What are their purpose, value, and meaning? Yet
how are we to analyze a praxis so that all this becomes clearer and more distinct and
the praxis freer and more stable (e.g. so that rigid rules are replaced by particular
principles, a mission statement or the like, something that all parties can acknowledge
and develop according to their subjective dispositions)? Reflection in this sense
spreads (improved) theory over a stratum of (at least rudimentarily available) practical
commonalities. It is a reconsideration, and its subject is us.
The same applies to the results of such reflections. It is true that these results are
brought about by considerations which people articulate with a view to what they
believe themselves to be doing in a praxis. To be sure, the first steps, that is, the
verbal articulation of what is practically relevant, are taken by specific individuals.
However, such an articulation of distinctions and principles does not produce findings
which confront others with a stark choice of either acceptance or rejection; rather, it
leads to proposals on how to possibly interpret what has been jointly and communally

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9 Reflexivity

done as a course of action, a praxis. These proposals are discussed, if necessary, and
confronted with possible counterproposals. This requires arguments, which, in this
case, seem to have an interesting, special role and form. (They will likely not be
logical inferences, but substantial arguments. More on this under (c).)
Regarding (b): This is a pseudo problem. The question whether reflection allows us
to ever reach the real world or whether we merely drift about in the circle of our
consciousness assumes an ontology of the real world. Where are we supposed to
find such an ontology? If we intend to talk about the real world in a way that is
transparent and comprehensible, then the first thing to take into consideration is the
everyday distinction between appearance and reality. There are well-known paradigms which convey the impression that this is a clear distinctionthe seemingly
broken rod in the water and the seemingly huge moon that rises in the evening sky and
actually has the same size as the one in the middle of the night. In other words, we
know that our senses can be deceived. Put more generally, the appearance is something that is trustworthy in a limited context or domain, but not outside of this domain.
This structure of reality being exposed as mere appearance is characteristic of many
episodes in the growth of knowledge. Something that has previously had a certain
quality still retains this quality. However, its limits have been recognized and its meaning has been adjusted. The Earth is still flat as long as we are moving on it by foot.
However, that is the extent of it: Our recognized reality (which we capture, feel,
treat, modify, enjoy, and respect in our practices) may prove to be imperfectly or
erroneously recognized. It may turn out that, in our common reflection on these
practices or in the resulting theory, we have missed something or understood it
superficially and fragmentarily. In that case, we are able to say that we have not reached
the real world with our previous understanding. Whether we have reached it
afterwards however, cannot be answered. Still, it is important that the practice works
and that questions (about the why and wherefore of it) are answerable. In this sense,
there is no mistaking reality for mere subjectivity in our actions.
Regarding problem (c), I propose the following idea:
The result of reflection is addressed to someone who is well-versed in the practice
at issue and who has a need for appropriate theorizing. This results in the character
of the raised validity claim: This theory found in reflection (a theory comprising
as I said, basic distinctions and principles) allows us to understand ourselves as joint
practitioners. It helps us to understand our actions and, at the same time, ourselves
with regard to our purpose, our values, and our existential meaning. The result of
reflection, then, is self-knowledge. The validity claim that it raises states that we are
able to recognize ourselves in it.
For a review of this claim, then, the addressee would have to check herself; she
would have to relate it to her own actions and her own participation in a praxis. In
the process, she may fail, refrain from it altogether, or she may simply have enough
of it. In short, nobody can be forced to understand correctly the result of reflection.
What is more, nobody can be forced to accept it.19 The only compulsion at this
19

This is the error in the conception of Karl-Otto Apels (otherwise meritorious) ultimate
justification. Cf. my discussion of this conception in Wohlrapp (1998a), Part II.

9.4

Object- and Meta-level

373

point is that of following ones own insights, that is, of taking seriously what it is
that one sees. (It is sadly self-evident that this condition is not well developed in
every person. Bumps in ones biography may have caused it to be warped or buried.
But even if that is the case, it is ultimately only up to the person herself to recognize
this and to realize that paths need to be pursued for uncovering it again.)
What should be done, however, if the result of reflection is explicitly rejected?
Such a situation leads to an argumentative dialogue. (We can distinguish between
two different cases. In one, the result is questioned or negated without there being a
counterproposal. In the other, a counterproposal has been submitted.) What kinds of
arguments can occur in that situation?
For the sake of consistency with prior proposals, I would have to say that
arguments must be tailored from the previous theory, that is, from the theory that
has already been incorporated into practices. Actually, the result of reflection in the
guise of the thesis cannot be anything more than a summary, integration, clarification, and correction of theory that is in practical use already. A presentation of such
a theory, integrated into arguments, may be suitable to remind the addressee of the
details that he or she already knows.
Arguments brought forth in favor of the results of a reflection have a special
status. After all, as a rule of thumb, arguments are constructed largely from the epistemic theory which is already part of orientations. In this case, however, we are
concerned with beginnings or with the question to what degree it is possible to make
people regard these beginnings as suitable. Are they necessary? Are there alternatives? Are those less suitable? These are the kinds of questions that a justification
for a particular result of reflection has to answer. In the dialogue, then, the addressee
is pointed to the practical circumstances and events that he or she already knows,
but maybe not in this given formin this verbal articulation, in this context, and
under this definition. Yet to the extent that these practical occurrences are covered,
the addressee is reminded. A process of anamnesis has been initiated, which
makes her aware of what her soul already knows or, in other words, what she
already knows as an acting, interacting, and cooperating human being.
The justification for a reflexive thesis reminds us of more or less well-known
details and might rearticulate these in order to clarify, complete, or correct them.
Hence, this is the way of justifying a reflexive thesis: clearing away errors (which
is the negative business of dialectics) and bridging gaps. (Bridging gaps is not the
same as deducing. It is a constructive procedure.) Since and insofar as the justification is capable of doing so, it can validate a thesis which is the result of reflexive
efforts.

9.4

Object- and Meta-level

Where does this take us with regard to the question of constitution? The constitution
of an object, that is, its composition relevant for the issues at hand, is supposed
to be determined reflexively. Below the level of seemingly natural object relations

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9 Reflexivity

(in which the object is there), there is the level of practical actions. Reflection
focuses on this level and encounters basic structures, which are articulated in basic
concepts and principlesat first, thetically and then, if they prove to be durable,
epistemically. Hence, the object of a theory is nothing external, alien, which has
been given and discovered. The object has not been found, as it were, on the outside,
but on a level where we are interwoven with it in practical actions. Thus, the object
relation arises only in theoretical articulations which represent the structures of our
practical actions symbolically. Like all theory, then, the constitution theory raises a
validity claim which might have to be satisfied argumentatively in a special way.
Equipped with these considerations, we now return to the question of how the object
of argumentation theory, the practice of argumentation, has been constituted.
The answer is this: The practice of argumentation is itself a theory-generating
activity. It is the theoretical side of research at the limits of our orientations. It generates new theory and seeks to support and examine it by linking it to old theory.
This practice has an inherent tendency to scale up until it becomes a theory by itself.
Every argument in support of a thesis is accompanied by the claim that it is a good
and relevant argument which will show the thesis to be attainable. Every single
objection, in turn, contains the claimbesides an intent to reject the thesis with
regard to its content or the relevant part of the justificationthat by raising it, the
validity claim is being treated and examined properly.
At any point in the practice of argumentation, a request or an objection (But is
this really a good reason, a justified objection?) can take us up to the meta-level of
argumentation theory.20
So far, this looks like a rather normal relationship between theory and practice.
A practice takes place along structures which are more or less normal and familiar.
If there are deviations, or if irritations occur, then there is the possibility of ascending to the level of theory in order to confirm or correct the practice. As already
indicated, however, the practice of argumentation has a special, self-referential

20

To date, the only scholar who paid extensive attention to the meta-level and understood that
argumentation theory can only be established via meta-argumentation is Maurice Finocchiaro
(cf. Finocchiaro 2005, 2011, and particularly 2013). Certainly, his work has broken new grounds
for argumentation theory. With all due respect, however, I think that his views still lack further
philosophical permeation. Finocchiaro wants the meta-level to be separate from what he calls
ground-level arguments. Meta-arguments are supposed to be a special class of arguments. Yet
this leads to grave problems when it comes to drawing a line of distinction. For one, it is clear that
fallacy criticism is meta-level argumentation (Finocchiaro 2013, 75). But in the discussion of a
certain objection to a fallacy reproach, Finocchiaro feels the need to invent a second- and a thirdlevel meta-argument (loc. cit.). On the other hand, the ground level cannot be kept pure. Finocchiaro
regards Galileos dialogue about the Aristotelian geostatic view as a piece of meta-argumentation
(op.cit. Chapter 13), even though it is obvious that, in toto, Galileo is arguing (on the ground
level) against the Aristotelian theories. Thus, he seems to argue on both levels at the same time.
As far as I can see, these confusions disappear if the view developed in the present book is adopted:
Intrinsically, argumentation is a reflected two-level activity, even if the meta-level is not always
consciously activated.

9.4

Object- and Meta-level

375

relationship with its own theory. I would like to elucidate this even further. What
does the normal case look like?
Take the practice of medicine. It consists of an aggregate of actions directed at
the care and healing of the human organism. This practice is permeated and
enclosed by a theoretical level, that is, there are concepts (of the organisms parts
and states) as well as propositions (propositions about facts, about processes, about
nomological connections) that symbolically articulate what is being done practically and thus make it describable, understandable, and teachable. The practice is
structured by its objectives (disease prevention, healing); the theory supplies criteria for its felicity and success. This is the regular relationship: Practice and theory
are in a relationship of object- and meta-level, and both levels are distinct insofar
as they differ in their paths and goals. The practice is focused on health and treats
the body according to this aim. The theory is focused on a knowledge of health and
its conditions, that is, it is directed at certain truths. Thus, it makes systematic
observations and generates concepts, principles, and hypotheses about contexts
and systems whose components stabilize each other. Theory, then, does not simply
guide a praxis; it rather reflects the latter by elucidating the regular possibility of
its practical successes.
In the domain of argumentative speech, this relationship is different. Here, practice and theory are not distinct, but they form a single, self-referential system in
which object- and meta-level may occasionally be distinguishable, albeit never continuously. The theory refers to the practice as its object domain, but it also belongs
to this domain itself. This may sound confusing and deserves to be explained.
Any reasonably educated person has had experiences with the practice of argumentative speech in the form of discussions, disputes, debates, and verbal confrontations
all of which we have to go through at times. Suppose that, in this practice, there is
an occurrence that has been marked as defective or faulty by a participant. For example, there might be the charge that a particular persons reasoning is circular.
Apparently this charge is situated on a theoretical meta-level, where the marked
occurrence circle (petitio principii) has been identified as a mistake. Now, assume
further that the author of the circle is well-versed in argumentation theory and
knows that this figure is a large and controversial topic in that discipline. In this
case, the allegation of circularity is not simply accepted and acknowledged by
retracting the respective theory. It rather leads to a discussion about the nature of the
circle, under what conditions it is defective, and whether such conditions hold in
the current case.
This means that the occasion of a practical problem takes us up to the level of
theory, that is, to the meta-level; at the same time, however, we are also back in the
practice of argumentation. This practice is not intra-theoretical and, as such, separate from the practical problem. On the contrary, the theoretical discussion takes
place hand in hand with the practical discussion. Even if this continues, even if we
pile (meta-)level upon (meta-)level, the basic relationship does not change: no matter at what point we pause, we can never secure theoretical structures in any other
way than by arguing for them, that is, by presenting them as theses, by justifying

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9 Reflexivity

them, and by defending them against possible objections.21 In a slightly more

dramatic way, I could express this by saying that, in the study of argumentation,
praxis is the highest meta-level.
Yet even if an argumentation theory tries to come to terms with its constitution
reflexively, it is still not a uniform objectthere are very different theoretical
approaches. How do we respond to this result?
Consider medicine, a suitable example of what things are like if a practice is not
uniform. After all, there are many schools or approaches in medicine which are
heterogeneous in the sense that, in starting from different conceptions of the
human being, they take very different therapeutic actions. I will name only the most
radical opposition: There is, on the one hand, ordinary scientific or conventional
Western medicine and, on the other hand, homeopathic medicine. The practices can
partially complement each other, but this requires tolerance on both sides. For the
most part, their representatives regard each other with skepticism and with the
proviso that the other side is wrong, or perhaps even deceitful. Of course, this
heterogeneity of practices is mirrored in the theories which are mutually translatable only in part; mostly, they are disparate. They make use of entirely different
basic concepts (the organism as a material, technical unit here, the organism as an
aggregate of body and soul there; nothing but technical causal relations here,
nothing but the mobilization of ethereal forces there). This becomes manifest, for
example, in the fact that homeopathic holistic medicine regards the medication of
conventional or scientific medicine as an invasion, similar to the bull entering the
proverbial china shop, while conventional medicine, in turn, regards homeopathic
medication as the administration of a placebo.
One might perhaps think that the success of a cure would be a suitable criterion
for comparison. Its application could qualify one method as inferior to another or
even discard it as ineffective entirely. Yet the most that even this method can ever
achieve is a more differentiated understanding of domains of authority; ultimately,
however, it does not provide the desired criterion because the parties have different
conceptions of the meaning of healing or health.
To sum up, there may be different approaches and points of view in an object
domain and these may produce profound differences both in the practice and in the
theory. If questions of validity come up in such a situation, we lack comprehensive
criteria of validity; the latter are difficult to establish because they require the existence of commonalities, based on which theoretical assimilation could take place.
In the field of argumentation theory and practice, precisely these circumstances
are quite different once more. As I said, there is no shortage of different approaches.
Moreover, in discussing them, we will each apply our own specific criteria of validity. By doing so, however, we engage in a mutual practice; we relate our arguments
to each other; we contemplate our respective opponents theses, construct objections
21

The fact that theory generation in argumentation theory proceeds via the practice of argumentation can be seen in many contributions in professional journals of argumentation theory. For a
commendable example of such argumentative argumentation theory, cf. the article Hitchcock
(2002).

9.5 Rational Argumentation

377

to them, construct reasons for these objections on request, confront the opponent
with our own theses and reasons, etc. In other words, even though we start out from
various assumptions, argumentative speech is the place where we meet. To be sure,
we do not always meet; not every sentence brings us togetherwe definitely even
talk at cross-purposes sometimesbut insofar as we meet, we create a uniform
practice of argumentation. This is again the difference to any other given problem
area: If a homeopathic physician has a discussion with a conventional physician,
both are situated on the meta-level of theory and usually only reproduce the very
heterogeneity that distinguishes their practices. What they do is arguing about medicine. What argumentation theorists do, however, is arguing about arguing. Possible
different approaches are not simply an object; rather they are introduced practically
and theninsofar as such efforts are successfulclarified, adapted, and made compatible. If we were to translate such an interaction into the case of the physicians, they
would try to heal one another.

9.5

Rational Argumentation

In the context of these two levels of argumentationwhich constantly reflects its

theoretical meta-level in practice and thereby ensures its general opennessit is
now possible to discuss the usual defect of attempts at describing and defining
rational argumentation: These attempts gain momentum through reflection but
ignore this process when it is time to formulate a result. None of the conceptions of
rational argumentation that can be found in teaching materials and guides are reflexive. They create a stable meta-level of criteria above a given level of argumentative
practice and thus determine what is right and what is wrong about the practice.
Whatever fulfills the criteria is right; whatever violates them is wrongthe aforementioned notion of normative theory is the guiding principle here once more.
Therefore, we find metaphors such as argumentation game, dialogue game, or
justification game.
In the best-case scenario, the construction of such systems can be envisioned as
follows: Someone notes and observes incidents in which argumentation is used.
Although this rarely looks like the Argument Clinic mentioned in the Introduction,
our given chaotic reality will presumably lead to a desire for performing this practice
in a more rational fashion. At this point, it is decisive what the theorist means by
rationality (or reason). In all cases that I have seen, rationality is supposed to
be determined by a few invariants, formal qualities, or criteria. Although proper
definitions of rational or reasonable are rare, it seems settled that certain formal
qualities are necessary conditions for rationality. More specifically, there are three
kinds of such qualities, namely that knowledge or the relevant facts be considered,
that the logical relationships be correct, and that the dialogue partners social
relationships be fair. Additionally, in practical matters and decisions, the criteria regarding utility maximization come into play. If I summarize formal logic and the consideration of facts as invariants of truth relations and aspects of utility maximization

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9 Reflexivity

as economic invariants, then I obtain three kinds of criteria for investigating the
rationality of arguments:
(a) Invariants of truth relations
(b) Invariants of economic relations
(c) Invariants of social relations
The term rationality, by the way, is a word that belongs to ordinary language (just
like reason). People use it to express themselves for various purposes. If scientists
and philosophers go about standardizing its use, it is far from clear whether this has
any bearing on the general use of the term. In ordinary English, rationality and
reason are synonymous to some extent, while the meaning itself is rather vague.
Usually it refers to a typical human potential of a higher and superior order that is
unfortunately ignored all too often in everyday life. Frequently, however, it also
indicates the mere assertion of something as higher and superior that turns out, upon
closer investigation, to be rather deplorable. With regard to the practice of argumentation, however, the positive meaning of rationality is still very common.
A system of norms and criteria, whose application would make argumentation
rational in the eyes of its creator, is therefore likely to be met with warm acclaim.
Even if the system ends up being formalized so strictly that hardly anyone understands it and even if, as usual, it is hardly ever tested with respect to its presumed
positive effects, let alone used in pursuing serious quaestiones, it still claims to
represent the rationality of argumentation, or at least to make a challenging
proposal.
In such procedures, two points call for criticism. For one, the criteria are not
general enough; the second point is closely connected: The concept of rationality is
not sufficiently open.
I will begin with the first point and refer to the three kinds of criteria mentioned
above:
(a) The first kind contains knowledge and logic. Consequently, it leads to the
requirement that arguments are valid logical inferences from true premises, or that
any asserted propositions can be controlled and possibly criticized in light of these
truth relations. Contributions to this issue may vary greatly in detail (depending on
the respective authors level of knowledge and formal skills). Some are only concerned with basic logic, while for others, alethic soundness includes various systems of truth conditions, causal relationships, as well as classical and nonclassical
logic, mathematics, semantics, the theory of probability, etc.
There is a general lack of awareness that, as long as transitions are formally
valid, argumentation is restricted to the unpacking and repacking of the already
existing knowledge and that this is not sufficient for theorizing the potentialities of
argumentative discourse. I have already addressed this several times. After all, argumentation often proceeds past the existing knowledge. In fact, my proposals treat
just this kind of knowledge-exceeding, research-supporting argumentation as the
heart of the matter. While theorists, for example, in Aquinas times, could still
restrict themselves to the study of logical argument because they were unaware of
the transitory nature of knowledge, we can no longer do this. For us, it has become

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379

strikingly clear that we never know enough, that we must proceed using theses
which cannot be derived compellingly from existing knowledge. We construct
them on the basis of knowledge and, in the process of realizing them, we have to
trust in our ability to understand and learn.
The use of formal systems assumes that these dynamics have been halted, that
is, that we have clearly defined terms as well as clearly identifiable sentential truths.
In research, however, that is only the case for the elements of epistemic theory.
For thetic theory, such claims would be destructive. In this sense, the criteria of
logic are not universally valid. In other words, if the difference between rationality
and non- or irrationality were to depend on the adherence to formal schemes or their
violation, it would be undeniable that the relevant projects of humanity are not
rational.22
The kinds of criteria subsumed under (b) are related to economic thinking. I
use this term with little enthusiasm. A reasonable economic theory would, of course,
have to be concerned with more important and more comprehensive ideas than
formal systems involving quantified concepts of utility and preference. As it stands,
however, this is currently the main domain of economists.
Insofar as the rationality of argumentation concerns practical matters, which
are, as the thinking goes, not regulated by norms anyway (again, logic is dominant
here), the general economic answer is as follows: Whatever results in greater utility, when compared with possible alternatives, is considered rational. Of course, this
assumes that all practically relevant states of affairs are comparable in terms of their
quantifiable (and measurable) utility. However, it goes without saying that this does
not always work and that, if it does, it is a restricted view on things. As is well
known, in Western industrialized countries, this kind of thinking has seeped even
into the shallow waters of everyday beliefs. Yet that does not make it universally
true; it simply indicates that our general consciousness has become dull and
impoverished.
The Indian economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has made some remarks
on the nonuniversality of such a myopic economism that we should take to heart.23
He points out reasonable motives for actions other than utility maximization. In the
context of the present considerations, it should be noted that the unconditional
transfer of this conception of rationality into the domain of argumentation is counterintuitive. If the practice of argumentation matters, in particular, where the justification of new orientations is concerned, that is, whenever we forge ahead into the
unknown, then the economic angle is clearly inappropriate. It leads to a calculation
of probabilities, which suffers on the whole from the fact that it cannot determine

22

This argument, that is, that the dynamics of theory cannot be represented in logical chains of
reason, was one of Paul Feyerabends strongest weapons in his struggle with orthodox philosophers of science. Cf. Feyerabend (1975).
23
Cf. Sen (1977). By the way, Sen is the example of an economist who offers something more
significant in his discipline than abstract, unrealistic models supported by prejudices and anthropological speculation; cf. his book Sen (1999).

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9 Reflexivity

conclusively what is significant and what is not. An overview of the relevant

parameters is possible only for the old parts of theory, not for thetic elements.
When calculating the probable utility yielded in the pursuit of a thesis, it may
turn out that the very things which are missing are, in fact, crucial. Moreover, to
mention it once more, it is possible that important things cannot be quantified at all,
or only in a way that is metaphorical and arbitrary (How much more important is
security than freedom?). Nevertheless, there are people who regard the identification of rationality with economic thought as so self-evident that they believe it is
impossible to even ask reasonably why humans should be rational.24 To put it
plainly: Faced with such a conception of rationality, we have every right to ask why
it should be the overriding principle determining thought and action. Any answer
that turns out to be self-referential (we should be rational because that is the most
rational of all of possible alternatives) only betrays its own narrow-mindedness. It is
quite true that the criteria for rationality should be stable in terms of their self-reference. However, this is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for a concept.
The third group, subsumed under (c), forms the background for discursive situations in which decent, civilized people discuss issues that affect them all and in
which all should have a say. Clearly, a core of democratic and human rights thinking
is realized in such rules for a dialogue (which is then considered rational). Every
person should at any moment be able to express his or her opinion; all opinions
deserve attention; anyone who says something will have to justify it on request, etc.
It is true that these rules define dialogue games as elements of a general theory of
argumentation; however, their suitability is rather limited. For although the underlying principle of mutual acknowledgement is universally valid, this universal validity
does not simply carry over into any given standardizations of dialogue.25 In tense
24

Particularly surprising in this context is a statement by Nicholas Rescher in Rescher (1999). It

reads: By definition, the rational human being is someone who uses intelligence to maximize the
likelihood [] that things will develop such that they further his real interests (249). What these
real interests are supposed to be is not problematizedpresumably factual interests, as long as
they can be kept consistent. When faced with the subsequent question as to why someone should
be rational (in this sense), Rescher deems it appropriate to give the following answer: Because that
would be the only rational thing to do. Then, he addresses the objection that his answer is an
instance of circular reasoning by calling it not a vicious, but rather a virtuous circle (258), which
is reinforced by insistent references to the inevitable self-referentiality of rationality. Yet even if
these references are legitimatethis is not a vicious, even less a virtuous circle. Instead, it is a
petty definition of rational, which is applied subsequently in order to justify a request to behave
in a certain way. This connection, however, improves neither the definition nor the request. The
only consequence is that the topic of circular argumentation has been mystified even further.
25
The authors of such systems of rules seem to miss the point that they articulate their demands
almost inevitably in the context of their own discursive experiences. Hence, the case of rules and
normative universal quantifications is a peculiar one. Cf. Kleins witty commentary on Alexys
general rule about the commitment to justification [Klein (1980), 49, note 40]. The problem can be
mitigated by distinguishing different types of dialogue and then defining each by specific systems
of rules. Thus, Walton and Krabbe (cf. Walton and Krabbe (1995)), for instance, distinguish different
types of dialogue, such as examination, consultation, persuasion, etc., and then construct special
rules for, e.g. permissive and rigorous persuasion dialogues (PPD and RPD, cf. ibid 133162).
These rules regulate, for example, how to deal with the burdens of proof and the nature of commitments

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381

situations, or in the face of people who are very exhausting due to their idiosyncrasies, etc., it may be the right decision to throw out such standards and pursue other
avenues to properly determine the research theses to be realized. Following an
approved leader can be quite right and reasonable (just like it can be quite wrong
and disastrous). The exclusion of emotions, another candidate for a general system
of dialogue rules, can drain the lifeblood of thetic speechdialogue speakers commitment to or participation in the states of affairs at issue. I have already mentioned
this on several occasions.
I mentioned two criticisms; I will now turn to the second, the lack of openness
of systems, which is meant to capture rationality in a formal manner. In Chap. 4.1,
I have explained the basics of this point in the formulation, Reason needs to keep
a door ajar. In the present chapter, I have tried to ensure such an open door by presenting argumentation as a stratified or self-reflected practice. (There still remains
something to be said about the danger posed by such an open door; more on this in
Chap. 10.) Any argumentation theory that formulates the general criteria of rationality like the three discussed here has, figuratively speaking, closed this door. The
consequence, again put quite generally, is that the dynamics of orientation and orientation systems are thwarted and that their subjective character is ignored.
I would like to briefly demonstrate this by means of the almost classical book
by three professors at the University of Oslo (Fllesdal, Walle, and Elster) entitled
Argumentationsteori, sprk och vetenskapsfilosofi.26 This work is by far the most
advanced in this genre; it ranks high above the guides and handbooks on developing
skills in argumentation that are otherwise available in this field. It is written enviably
well, based on thorough research into the many different areas from which its
problems and examples are taken, and is thus packed with valuable information and
much food for thought.
Yet how is the rationality of argumentation understood in this book? In a
nutshell, the authors regard those convictions as rational which have been formed
by using logic, scientific knowledge, and a process of weighing alternatives. What I
have addressed above as the third type of criteria of rationality, that is, concerning
social relations, is not considered relevant here. The authors see the rational formation of beliefs in such a manner that any potential dialogue partners have no part in
it. They focus on the individual person who attempts (cf. Part I. What causes our
beliefs?) to form her beliefs in spite of many irrelevant influences or to resist the
resulting uncontrolled growth of nonsensical beliefs. In short, it is a question of
examining the accuracy of our opinions or beliefs.27
from prior assertions. Whether this is more than a systematization of possibilities (as usual, they
only think of logical inferential schemes), which sheds light on some qualities of argumentative
speech, can probably only be determined once we start basing our discussions of serious problems
on these rules. I am neither aware whether this has been attempted nor of any possible results.
26
The book has been masterfully translated and edited by Matthias Kaiser and George Meggle
under the German title Rationale Argumentation (cf. Fllesdal et al. (1988)). That title is the reason
for discussing it in this section on rational argumentation. (Translators note: To date, there is no
English translation.)
27
Fllesdal et al. (1988), 31. (Trans. T.P.)

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9 Reflexivity

On this note, then, the authors begin with explanations of the justification from
above, which is another term for the axiomatic method. As Aristotle knew, this
method is perfect, but rarely applicable. Consequently, the justification from
below28 is recommended. Far from reworking the so-called inductive method of
empiricism, this is a version of Poppers falsificationism, presented here in the
guise of the hypotheticaldeductive method. Put simply, the point of this method
is to form general hypotheses and to test them under the available conditions. The
instrument for doing so is, of course, logic. The point is to avoid contradictions.
There are no remarks on the constitution of data or the constitution of the conditions used for testing hypotheses. After all, the problem of constitution cannot be
solved rationally. Yet how, according to these authors, does one arrive at hypotheses?
Since there is no logical scheme29 for doing so, they consider what creative processes
might have led one or another researcher to arrive at their hypotheses (Kekuls
benzene ring, which is often mentioned in this context, comes up once more at
this point). There is no mention of a structure in which existing orientations have
gaps and theses are presented, as well as subsequently argued for, in order to bridge
those gaps. This is not surprising since all these authors consider in the context of
argumentation, are deductive inferences. The latter, however, can never justify a
thesisunless it was already clear that and why it is valid. Given that this deficiency
is all too common, however, we should not hold it against the authors. Still, what is
quite annoying is their treatment of the dynamics of theory. They write about the
Popper-Kuhn controversy,30 distance themselves from Kuhn, who is dismissed as
an irrationalist, and enlist Lakatos as a guarantor of the idea that even a scientific
revolution represents a growth in knowledge.31 How this is to be accomplished with
the rational instruments is left unclear.32 In other words, the fact that the hypothetical
deductive method cannot come to terms with frame structures or the perspectival
differences of theories (which are a decisive factor for the revolutionary dynamics
of knowledge) is not exposed in the three Norwegians study.
In addition, they claim that the hypotheticaldeductive method is not only applicable in natural sciences, but also in humanities, social sciences, and ethics.33 In all
of their examples from history and literary studies, however, the facts and details are
just given without any problems of constitution and the only question that is
deemed decisive concerns the appropriateness of the hypothesis; the latter is simply
determined by which hypothesis best fits the data. (Naturally, it is the one that does
not generate any contradictions. Yet what to do if this criterion of relevance34 is
satisfied by several hypotheses remains unaddressed and undiscussed.) Then there is
28

Fllesdal et al. (1988), 53. (Trans. T.P.)

Fllesdal et al. (1988), 70 ff. (Trans. T.P.)
30
Fllesdal et al. (1988), 79 ff. (Trans. T.P.)
31
Fllesdal et al. (1988), 82. (Trans. T.P.)
32
Feyerabend objected to Lakatos that the matter cannot be considered rational as long as there
is no general criterion which demands that a degenerating research program has to be abandoned.
Cf. Feyerabend (1970), 214 ff. This argument has not been disproved to this day.
33
Fllesdal et al. (1988), 102 ff.
34
Fllesdal et al. (1988), 105.
29

9.5 Rational Argumentation

383

a chapter on hermeneutics as a discipline which also posits and tests hypotheses.

Yet such a reduction is quite lamentable since Gadamers solution of the problem of
frame divergencesno matter how unsatisfactory it may beby way of a fusion
of horizons35 has become relatively well known. Even dialectics is mentionedin
the context of a statement that there are, besides logical contradictions, also oppositions and conflicts in reality and that the two categories should not be conflated
(which is alleged to be the case in Hegel and Marx).
Finally, ethical and practical beliefs are discussed. The message here is that their
rational formation consists in thinking in consequentialist terms, focusing on alternatives, and selecting the one with the highest probability for accomplishing what is
desirable or valuable. The fact that values must be arranged in a hierarchy for this
purpose is duly noted,36 just like the fact that values of probability are not simply
given, but must be posited (the task at hand is the generation of agreement).37
What is completely ignored, however, is that this could or should involve argumentationindeed, that this is where the actual locus of argumentation is situated and
that everything else is calculation, not argumentation.
In summary, the rational argumentation presented in this book does not allow
us to work out those problems for which we should use argumentation if we want to
avoid arbitrariness.
To conclude this section, I would like to briefly address once more the second of
the aforementioned problemsthe lack of openness. Systems of argumentative
rationality that posit criteria and norms create a theoretical meta-level above the
practice of argumentation; this level is solid, as it were, and closes argumentation.
Thus, a regular relationship between theory and practice is formed. Anything that
does not occur in the theory is also irrelevant in the practice, and anything that is
identified as true/false by the theory is assessed accordingly in the practice.
Faced with a situation in which there are several such systems of argumentative
rationality (e.g. Lumers system, Fllesdals system, the Amsterdam system,
Goviers system, etc.), we would stand before each other unable to do anything but
choose one of the systems. An argumentative discussion about these systems would
be argumentation on the meta-level. There would be no theory for such a discussion,
or rather, every participant would try to grasp it in her own system. The very expectation that the practice of argumentation will (at least occasionally) enable mutual
understanding cannot be captured by any theory; in other words, for this purpose,
the systems would have to specifically reserve an upper level.
Such confusion does not occur if we take argumentation to be stratified and
regard the upper level as a scaled-up version of the lower to which it is, and remains,
intrinsically tied. In that case, argumentative reason is open, can be substantiated on
a case-by-case basis, and only occasionally needs to absorb something from these
substantiations into the abstract concept.

35

Gadamer (1975), Part two, II, (B), (iv).

Fllesdal et al. (1988), 313.
37
Fllesdal et al. (1988), 315.
36

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9.6

9 Reflexivity

Natural, Scientific, and Philosophical Argumentation

The practice of argumentation aims at validity. It makes use of the existing epistemic
theory by constructing thetic theory from and about it, which drives research at the
limits of orientation. Hence, the role of the theoretical basis or of the employed
epistemic theory is eminently important in this regard. After all, it is from the
theoretical basis that we take the criteria of validity for concrete cases of argumentation, that is, theoretical building blocks such as concepts, propositions, and, above all,
if-then statements for making transitions. Theoretical bases may vary significantly
with respect to their existence and character. If the basis is uncertain, if it comprises
only opinions or rather idiosyncratic doxastic theory, then the argument is hardly
better than an ordinary exchange and confrontation of opinions. With an increasing
solidity of the basis, however, increasingly more binding arguments become possible.
Consequently, it becomes possible to justify theses to increasingly more demanding
forums. With regard to the solidity of the theoretical basis, its suitability for a common
basis of argumentation, we can casually distinguish three levels of argumentation for
which I propose the terms natural, scientific, and philosophical argumentation
and which I would like to characterize briefly.
(A) Natural Argumentation
I use the term natural argumentation for the form that argumentation mostly takes
in daily life. Arguments take place all the timein some circles more than in others.
Overall, we might even go so far as to speak, as I did in the Introduction, of a culture of discussion. Even though this is not always realized, it does have an influence on the intellectual climate. It is relatively obvious that, should doubt and
dissent occur, we do not simply command and coordinate, but attempt to generate
agreement. This is done through the medium of argumentative discourse.
This medium, as it arises spontaneously in social reality, is a heterogeneous
affair. There is a wide range of different options, both in terms of goals and of ways
to achieve them, that are not always reconcilable. Someone who wants to be in the
right may easily come across someone who wants to feel accepted. Thus, potential
expectations with regard to certain results may often be disappointed in natural
argumentation. It is common that people just talk at each other without a clear sense
of the structures that are relevant for validity. The result is a confusing mess made
up of self-disclosures, mental and emotional confrontations, the search for recognition,
as well as attempts at justification and motivation. Objections are easily mistaken
for personal attacks. The truth or validity of theses are not the only things that are
pursued, for so are approval, admiration, consensus, harmony, or, in the negative
case, rejection, reprimand, or appropriation. In natural argumentation, there is
almost always a lack of reliable criteria of validity based on some epistemic theory.
These are partly gathered ad hoc and partly just claimed and then backed up by
posturing, verbal pomp, and invocations of authority. Ultimately, there are only faint
signs that the practice of argumentation has been lifted out of the domain of regular
communicative activities where feelings of superiority and inferiority, differences
of social class, differences concerning commitment, as well as professional skills

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385

and judgment play a role and alternate in being the dominant factor. Any awareness
of a detached determination and examination of validity claims or even of a possibly
achievable transsubjective validity of theses is barely noticeable.
I am well aware that these descriptions of the spontaneously emerging practice of
argumentation make it seem like a hopeless mess. Yet that is only one side of natural
argumentationthe negative side. There is, however, also something positive about
natural argumentation. It can be seen in ordinary peoples self-determination and
self-assertion. They do not simply accept what other people tell them to think or do;
they accept and do only what they understand themselves. If this is a source of discomfort for a theorist, it might be a sign of elitist pride. Nevertheless, in the absence
of an advanced awareness of structures of argumentation that goes beyond basic
notions such as opinion and counter-opinion and consensus and dissent, it will be
difficult to proceed in a factual manner.38
Yet if it is possible to introduce a serious question about the justifiability and
validity of a thesis into such natural argumentation, this trend may be reversed.
Personal and social hierarchies may become irrelevant; subjective concerns may be
pushed into the background. A quaestio may take center stage and remain there for
a while. Then, the question about a relevant theoretical basis becomes more pressing, thetic constructions emerge more clearly, etc. If this is done in a patient and
reasonable manner, the potential of natural argumentation can be magnified and
lead to scientific argumentation.
(B) Scientific Argumentation
At this level, there is no longer any question about where the quaestio belongsin
which particular field or subject area and as part of which scientific (sub-)disciplines
and these fields all feature criteria of validity. This, then, is the place for making claims
and for validating them with justifications or invalidating them with objections.
Scientific argumentation is the medium by which the sciences proceed. Actually,
this is a statement that is currently not yet self-evident because, according to our
common preconception, the sciences investigate, calculate, and infer. A vague,
unreliable medium such as argumentation, one might think, can therefore only play
a marginal role in this undertaking. This preconception depends, on the one hand,
on a restricted concept of argument and, on the other hand, on a largely unpragmatic
concept of science that still neglects how research is tied to practices. I believe that
this will change in the future. Word slowly gets around that substantial arguments
play an eminent role in the sciences.39
38
The episode with the couple who bicker over flower pots in the kitchen sink (cf. Chap. 2.2) could
be regarded as a case of natural argumentationa case, however, which illustrates the positive
aspect of this stage less than its negative aspects. On the other hand, we have the dialogue between
C and T by which Willard illustrates his understanding of argument (cf. Willard (1989), 93).
Willards approach is liberal, generous, and witty, but at the same time, it is so arbitrary that there
is no conceptual basis for a theory of argument to be found.
39
Cf., for example, Henige (2006), who shows with recourse to many examples that, in order to
secure the sources, that is, the beginnings of historical research, it is necessary to argue on the
basis of substantial assessments.

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9 Reflexivity

If any given claim is part of a sciences body of knowledge, then it is possible to

infer it from that knowledge in a way that is formally compelling. If it is a research
thesis, however, this is not possible. In that case, argumentation may still help
clarify to what degree the thesis could be justified by dispelling potential open
objections.
During the phases that Kuhn calls normal science, it is even possible to discuss
research theses along established criteria of validity. The theses that turn out to be
valid can be realized in experiments and, if they stand the test, they can be integrated
into the disciplines body of knowledge. Things become more interesting during the
revolutionary phase, when such an integration no longer succeeds. Some of the
criteria of validity break away, researchers begin to express their personal opinions,
and the conditions of natural argumentation are partly back in place. Yet as long as
the primary frame, that is, the basic concepts and principles (the hard core of the
research project), is still established and not overburdened with theories that cannot
be properly realized, the level of scientific argumentation remains functional.
If this functionality is lost and if the basic conceptual framework dissolves, then
scientific standards dwindle away and we have truly descended to the level of natural
argumentationa level that is no longer dominated by impartiality and good will
now, but by a sometimes considerable degree of pretension and strategy.40 The only
remaining reasonable possibility requires scaling up once more. This means that
previously established criteria of validity are now put up for consideration, analysis,
and discussion. In that case, we have reached the third stage, philosophical
argumentation.
(C) Philosophical Argumentation
At the level of philosophical argumentation, everything is up for consideration.
There are criteria of validity, but these are not sacrosanct. Their merely thetic character is obvious. Nevertheless, we often encounter good arguments at this level, too,
which is due to the fact that it is impossible to call everything into question at the
same time. This insight is itself a result of philosophical argumentation: For a doubt
about anything, including even the validity of a criterion of validity (e.g. the reliability of unperturbed simple perceptions), to be possible, something else must be
stable and, as such, provide a certain footing. This was Wittgensteins argument
against Descartes in his notes On Certainty.41 Nevertheless, philosophical argumentation is dominated by an atmosphere of anarchic freedom, in which, as Robert
Spaemann once said, any monstrosity can be said.42 Typically, the theses that are
worked out in philosophical argumentation are concerned with possible criteria of
validity, that is, with the question whether any established or targeted criteria of

40

In that case, it actually becomes possible at times to observe the accuracy of Imre Lakatos
statement about Kuhns description of revolutionary science, namely that it is mob psychology.
Cf. Lakatos (1970), 178.
41
Cf. Wittgenstein (1974).
42
Cf. Spaemann (2001). (Trans. T.P.)

9.6

Natural, Scientific, and Philosophical Argumentation

387

validity are valid; even though, as I said, it is imperative to already have some criteria
of validity for a discussion to be possible in the first place.43
Theses in philosophical argumentation shake up the sediments of the basis of
validity, that is, practical knowledge and things taken for granted in everyday life
(metaphysics), and thus bring out what is thetic, contingent, and unstable in it.
These uncertainties or rather, the attempts at making us aware of them have a very
special quality. The philosopher is wondering about these things we have taken for
granted and calls them into question. Their thetic character is fragilitythe merely
thetic, posited, provisional status of human life, which is kept on the track (of
reason) in a makeshift manner.
Besides the anarchic freedom of the ivory tower (with its constant attempts to
give reason a new name),44 philosophical argumentation is irresponsible in an
even more basic sense because there is no practice which could be regarded as real43

The concept of philosophical argumentation developed here matches the practice of argumentation in philosophy as a subject whose doubts and attempts at clarification truly stop at nothing.
If representatives of this subject think about philosophical argumentation, however, they tend to
look for special forms that are particularly characteristic of philosophy. Two forms, for example,
that are often identified as typical argumentative patterns of philosophy are self-application and the
regressus ad infinitum. Yet this has only a certain factual justification, rather than a systematic one,
because such patterns are obviously also the subject of philosophical analysis and may therefore
change in their meaning and/or significance. To my mind, the best currently available treatment
and elucidation of patterns of argumentation that are possibly specific to philosophy is a book by
Holm Tetens (Tetens (2004)). It includes strong statements, which we should take to heart, to the
effect that logic does not have much to offer for an understanding of philosophical arguments
(10, 76). Rather than presenting formal excesses in order to present and elucidate such patterns,
Tetens provides understandable sequences of propositions. The books most impressive aspect,
however, is this: Tetens does not merely toy around with examples. He attempts to analyze real
problems by means of argumentation theory. Yet while much about it is admirable, the book is not
entirely satisfactory in the end and this is largely due to the fact that Tetens still analyzes these
argumentative patterns in the frame of logical inference. In fact, the case of normative propositions, which cannot be true, already calls into question what it means for an argument to be
conclusive (142). In general, it does not become sufficiently clear that the essential parts of argumentative transitions (Tetens only mentions syllogisms or inferences) need to generate
substantial insights and that the quality of the argument depends on to what extent this is successful. Instructive in this regard is Tetens analysis of the argument from analogy (171 ff.). He clearly
understands that analogies are not conclusive, even though they are used frequently in philosophy.
Then, he constructs an argumentative pattern which, by assuming that two parts of reality have
the same structure, makes it possible to move from a statement about the first part to a statement
about the second (177). So far so good. It is not clear, however, that the very sameness of structures
is the risky part of the matter. The structure has only been established for one part of reality; in the
other one, it is the analogy which illuminates the similarity of the structure. Yet the analogy is only
good, that is, the transition to the conclusion is only justified, to the extent that this illumination can
succeed. Cf. Mengel (1995a).
44
Cf. Michael Endes The Neverending Story (Ende (2009)). In this fairy tale, the threat to human
imagination has been modeled as the disease of the Childlike Empress, a disease that can be
cured by finding a new name. The name that is ultimately found in the fairy tale is not worth
mentioning, but the way the problem is put is wise. At least, since the so-called critique of reason,
it has become obvious that what current intellectuals discuss under the name of reason is often but
a projection of our own narrow-mindedness.

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9 Reflexivity

izing its theses, if indeed one or the other should ever pass as valid. There is no
specific philosophical praxis.45 The life of humanity as a whole realizes the results
of philosophical argumentation. Thus, humanity pays the price or reaps the benefits
from the fact that, for example, a theistically revealed religion has been replaced in
Europe by a humanitarian civil religion.
For obvious reasons, the practice of argumentation, to which reflections leading to
the generation of argumentation theory are directed, cannot simply be natural argumentation in everyday life. The important differences between validity and recognition, arguing and advertising, criticizing and mere bashing are developed to such
a small degree in that practice that they cannot be addressed and theorized as ready
and stable structures of practice. This is generally different in scientific argumentation, at least up until now. The currently observable softening, that is, the arrival of
corporate consultants and advertisers in the sciences, is due, amongst other things,
to the fact that it has been difficult to maintain an awareness of the significance and
form of scientific argumentation under the onslaught of sociologists of science and
cultural constructivists. In any case, the practice of argumentation in the sciences,
understood as a scaled-up and stylized version of the everyday practice of argumentation, is enormously important for theory generation, precisely because it involves
an awareness of the need for valid criteria. And since these must not be sacrosanct,
philosophical argumentation is still on board.
Where, then, do we find this practice of argumentation that argumentation
theory could refer to? For most people who are concerned with its theorization and
who do not simply work through the existing body of theory, it could look like this:
the practice can be found in our preconception of logic and rhetoric, in our
experiences as scientists in discussionsenriched by those practices that are
observable in TV round-tablesand probably even in the practice of questioning
the criteria of validity. Anyone who thinks more specifically about it, however, will
be unable to use this completely disparate field as a practical basis, at least not
without making provisions, but will put it in a certain frame and idealize it, all the
while isolating those respects that are considered particularly important. In doing
so, people are different. This, then, is the provenance of the different approaches to
argumentation theory.

45

In Germany, the term philosophical practice is used for a type of counseling offered by
graduates of academic philosophy to clients who pay a fee in order to present rather non-specific
problems. If all goes well, counseling can lead to these problems being analyzed in various
new frames, preferably conceptual and/or ethical and lifeworld-related ones. This may help the
client to clarify her awareness of the problem or her awareness in general. In ancient Greece,
where the overall social situation was similar to ours (disappearance of a traditionally defined
solidarity; the spread of individualism, egotism, and of the belief that might is right), such a
philosophical practice would have been called sophistry. Socrates and Plato explicitly disapproved of such a thing; the subsequent history of philosophy has come to more nuanced
judgments. The main challenge will probably be how to introduce clients, who usually expect
a tangible benefit from such counseling, to the realization that the principle of subjectivity is
only of limited use.

9.7 Normal and Radical Study of Argumentation

9.7

389

Normal and Radical Study of Argumentation

A theory of argumentation is, like any theory, formed in research activities. Research
has an argumentative side; I have attempted to explain this in Chap. 2. It uses the
existing epistemic basis and forms positions with respect to detected gaps and limits
in orientation that repair and bridge epistemic defects with the help of thetic structures. These structures are examined argumentatively and, insofar as they do not
give rise to new relevant objections, they are realized. The new practice that results
from this realization is subject to further reasons or objections.
The theorization of argumentation goes back to Aristotle. One of the original
motives was the desire to figure out what it was that made the rhetorical tricks of
sophistry so defective. As I stated in the Introduction, this led to the development of
logic, topics, rhetoric, as well as the concepts of theory, knowledge, and persuasion.
To this day, these tools enable us to capture many of the occurrences in the practice
of argumentation. As long as argumentation theory is only concerned with the confirmation of available epistemic theory and its formal implications, or, on the other
hand, with obtaining the addressees assent, these tools are still viable.
When it comes to the discussion of new theory, however, that is, the discussion
of regular theses, the traditional argumentation theory will miss what is essential. At
that point, it is time for the study of argumentation (theory).
When the reception of the books by Toulmin and Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca
started the new wave of argumentation theory half a century ago, and especially,
when the Informal Logic movement began in the early 1980s in North America,
dominant voices initially suggested that the previous body of theory on argumentation, in particular logic, was simply superfluous to a large extent and that the parts
which were still useful would have to be rebuilt and altered. Toulmin had envisioned
an entirely new logic that was supposed to begin, as it were, all over againnot
with scientific deductions, but with the analysis of real arguments in court hearings.46 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas basic message was quite similar.47
What happened next was that, indeed, manifold research for properly theorizing
the practice of argumentation set in. But with regard to logic, that is, the old theoretical frame, views soon became rigid again: the old frame was retained, if a little
expanded and enriched. The strongest indicator of this is that the transition, preferably invariant with regard to contents, from premises to a conclusion as the basic
concept of argument was regarded as natural. It is true that much has been explored
and tried in this context. Certain basic contours, however, do not ever seem to be put
up for consideration. I have tried to show how these contours refer back to the
Aristotelian foundation. Contemporary argumentation theory has become a discipline which was formed around the hard core of this P-P-C structure and now begins
to walk the well-trodden paths of normal science.

46
47

Cf. Toulmin (1958).

Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958; English edition: 1969).

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9 Reflexivity

Is this not a good thing? What we see is the emergence of a serious academic
discipline, which develops the structures typical for such disciplines (conferences,
specialist literature, journals) and may be expected to produce a continuous output
of new results that enlarge the body of knowledge. To be sure, in the context of the
politics and sociology of science, there is nothing wrong with this. Systematically
speaking, however, it is unfortunate because the relevant conceptual framework is
not reflexive. In this framework, the practice of argumentation has become objectified like any given object of research, and it has been turned into the object of theorizing. This is not appropriate; after all, as I pointed out in Chap. 9.1, the practice of
argumentation has a different status.
This practice as the highest authority over statements of validity and invalidity
cannot be objectified definitively. Hence, the results of research activities do not
become epistemic theory, but remain thetic theory. Whatever has been devised
and articulated for the theorization of argumentation can only be secured by
argumentation. If any thesis of argumentation theory (e.g. Perelmans concept of
analogy, the view of the argumentum ad baculum as a prudential argument, the use
of speech acts in pragmadialectics, Lumers systematization of ethical reasoning,
etc.) is discussed from the vantage point of a different approach, then only the
practice of argumentation generated in the process can assess the possible validity
of such a thesis.
To emphasize this even more: The validity of results that could possibly come
out of a discussion between different approaches in argumentation theory does not
depend on any previously fixed criteria. Although candidates for such criteria were
introduced to this discussion, it is not clear which ones would tip the scales in an
argumentative dialogue. It is not impossible, in fact, that new substantiations or new
criteria are found.
At this point, I would like to establish a distinction between normal and radical
research which is related to Kuhns distinction between normal and revolutionary
science, but hopefully it designates more accurately what matters here. Normal
research makes use of the conceptualtheoretical approach in order to extend
(and possibly even modify) epistemic theory in such a manner that the discovered
limit of orientation becomes passable. Radical research puts the approach itself up
for consideration. Radical research takes contact with the object to such an extreme
extent that no part of theory is retained any longer. It is possible that one ends up
being without any theoretical orientation, simply acting in a realm which has ceased
to be a clearly delineated object.
Applied to the practice of argumentation, this means the following: We simply
try to show, demonstrate, discuss, or conjure up how a thesis, which provides
some insight and promises guidance, could prove to be valid. We abandon any
inferences from existing knowledge and simply try to somehow complete the thesis. We look at other peoples arguments and pay attention to what we do ourselves.
By examining the validity of the theses under discussion, we also examine the
validity or suitability of our argumentation theory. Radical research therefore has
two sides. It is directed forward, to the object in questionin this case, arguments
about a certain quaestio the radical researcher has to engage withand it is directed

9.7 Normal and Radical Study of Argumentation

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backward, to its own theoretical apparatus, in order to gouge to what extent the latter
proves to be suitable.
Certainly, it is not quite clear at this point where we should direct our attention.
This is where the other argumentation researcher is needed: To gather aspects on
what else to considerregardless of what is already stipulated by previous research
activities.
In summary, due to the unique stratification of the subject matter of argumentation, which tends to scale up internally to a theoretical meta-level, argumentation
theory actually exists only as the study of argumentation. And, again due to this
stratification, such a study is radical research. As such a radical study of argumentation, it is also equivalent with the method of philosophical argumentation and can
expect to realize the new (or very old) form of reason, namely argumentative reason.
This argumentative reason is reflexive. It carries with it, on the level of reflection,
questions about its own possibilities and limitations. Therefore, argumentative reason is simultaneously its own instance of control and criticism.

Chapter 10

Transsubjectivity

10.1

What Is Reason in Argumentation?

Arguing is a complex verbal practice that can be theoretically permeated to some

degree by the apparatus proposed in this book. The relevant features brought out by
this permeation are the differences between epistemic and thetic theories; the three
basic operations; the potential dialogue moves; the differences between aspect,
framing, and primary as well as successive framing; the dialogical structure; the
concept of a forum; and the concept of argumentative validity. Paying attention to
these features can improve the practice and make it more transparent. But merely
improving the practice by paying attention to these features may leave the impression
that argumentation is little more than a technique for cooperatively elaborating
theses which have been checked for possible defects. Yet a practice of argumentation
construed in this way can still be questioned about its deeper or broader purpose as
well as about any special significance that it might have for human reality.
Moreover, even the apparatus for theorizing argumentation developed here may
only be one possible apparatus to which there are many alternatives. The task of
argumentation as sucha task that is immense because argumentation is considered
the ultimate authority with regard to the formation of new orientationsdemands a
more distinct, more thorough determination. We can begin by saying that arguing must
be reasonable, and that if it is not reasonable, it is nothing but mere technique and
sophistry. The epithet reasonable assigns to it the grand function of self-governance,
which we take to be a typical human capacity. The philosophical tradition termed this
capacity logos, ratio, and intellectus. With Classical German Philosophy, the
term reason became entrenched.
In this final chapter, I would like to suggest that we construe reasonable argumentation as argumentation guided by the principle of transsubjectivity. This
principle of transsubjectivity is the keystone of the concept of argument. By no
means does reasonable argumentation in the sense intended here add yet another
special quality to the previously described practice of argumentation; rather the
point is a particular emphasis, a certain framing that highlights the universality of
H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_10,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

393

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the forum. Readers of the previous chapters will probably not be very surprised by
the following final statement: Thetic reason, which, in the guise of argumentative
speech, is the most beautiful fruit of Enlightenment philosophy, has a transcendent core. It expresses a strong, quasi-religious belief in humanitys spiritual and
ethical potential.
Spelling out this belief as the core of reason casts a new light on the difference
between enlightened and religious thinking. The rift between the two is less stark
than has commonly been assumed; in fact, they share a fundamental commonality.
This commonality could be expanded into a common argumentative basis if, on the
one hand, secular modernity recognized its own self-transcending substance, and on
the other hand, the established religions accepted the pluralism in which they exist
with each other as a matter of fact and regarded each respective conception of the
absolute as a finite document of their founders enthusiasm (i.e. their encounter with
the divine). We know well that, to date, such a prospect is not realistic. Yet this is due
more to global political constellations than to theoretical problems. (Ecumenical dialogues are usually easier among believers than among the theological elites of
religious communities. As regards the dialogue between religious and secular
culture, there is an increased pressure on religions to abstain from any participation
in state power. This, too, is less about religion than about power politics.)
Talk of reasonable argumentation is not very popular at present; it even sounds a
bit stale. What is much more common, as well as more modern and fresh sounding,
is the term rational argumentation. In Chap. 9, I already called this concept one
dimensional, a qualification used to characterize the internal architecture of this
species of argumentation (in contrast to the four dimensions I presented). Now, I would
like to briefly examine once again what we gain by observing those forms usually
regarded as specific to what is rational in argumentation.
Rational argumentation is often regarded as a heightening of natural argumentation
a heightening, in terms of impartiality and accuracy, in which emotionality is
assumed to play no role. Usually, this is followed by the establishment of norms
which ensure the precise definition of the terms used, the truth or acceptability of
the premises, and the reliability of inferential schemes. If done skillfully, rational
argumentation thus construed becomes the form in which argumentation occurs, or
should occur, in the sciences. (Unfortunately, the reality of argumentation in actual
scientific practice frequently lags behind this ideal.) The most obvious and salient
feature of this form is its stable theoretical basis which guarantees the soundness of
the inferences in each step of the argument. This basis consists of inferences
endorsed by logic, probability theory, and rational decision theory. These are all
formal theories, some of which are formalized to the extent that their reference to
reality becomes almost arbitrary. Based on this apparatus, we can justify or examine
theses in three major respects:
(a) Whether they follow logically from premises.
(b) How probable they are, given a certain probability of the premises.
(c) In the case of norms, we can assess actions directed by instrumental rationality:
Whether a projected action, given that certain means have already been assessed,
is ideal for accomplishing a particular goal.

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Apparently, such possibilities of justification and examination cover only a small

part of all the questionable or controversial theses that arise in response to quaestiones.
Whenever we are truly concerned with new orientations, that is, with moving past
the limits of our current orientation, it is, of course, impossible to logically infer theses
from existing knowledge. For a precise statement of probability to be possible, we
would have to be aware of the probabilities in this domain beyond the limits of that
orientation. In other words, there would already have to be a series of experiments
from which such probabilities could be extrapolated. However, that is only possible
in special cases.1 In all other cases, we have to estimate probabilities. Such estimates
are justified by analogy and thus rest on a fragile basis. Ultimately, the only result of
such a justification, even with respect to the validity of a thesis, is a particular probability. As I have already demonstrated (cf. Chap. 7.6), such a result is pragmatically
indistinct. With respect to the normative domain, instrumental rationality is, of
course, a very common and highly relevant relation, but it assumes that ends and
goals have already been established or justified. In order to determine these, however,
neither logic nor probability theory or rational decision theory are sufficient.
To summarize: Rational argumentation in the sense studied here has a fairly
narrow scope. If the rationality of argumentation is merely of this limited sort,
not much is gained for the ordinary practice of argumentation. Most significantly,
for the important and interesting cases, it is almost of no help at all. As displayed in
detail in previous chapters, I have two reasons for this claim. The first arises from
the procedural character of knowledge and orientations, the second from the fact of
subjectivity.
Concerning the first reason, we must remind ourselves once again that a valid
thesis does not constitute knowledge; it rather is a potential guide for research. Due
to this lack of knowledge, it is quite unlikely that we will be able to precisely define
the concepts used in the thesis. After all, as long as we do not know the answers, it
1

A prominent example in this regard are claims about the probability of a meltdown in a nuclear
reactor. Until 1986, the year of the Chernobyl accident, it was alleged that such a thing occurs only
once in 10,000 years. Instead of believing after Chernobyl that we are now safe for 10,000 years,
we should examine the justification for that thesis more closely. If we do, we will realize that it is
based on the extrapolation of disruptions that occurred in the relevant processes. These extrapolations, then, presuppose knowing which processes are relevant for a meltdown. Yet both the processes that led to the accident in Harrisburg in 1979 and the process that led to the Chernobyl
accident involved new combinations of situational characteristics that were not even predictable
as mere possibilities and thus could not factor into calculations of probability. The fundamental
lesson is that the statements of probability are deficient unless the respective web of conditions is
completely transparent. But this is not possible in the case of such large-scale technologies
(cf. Perrow 1984). Therefore, a sense of security, expressed by a low probability for an accident,
veils and obscures our pragmatic circumstances: actually, what we display here is trustbut no
longer in the rational potential of humanity. The latter is most definitely overburdened here,
because it cannot achieve the necessary total control over all situational possibilities. If we really
acted strictly rationally, then we would declare the following: Such a technology asks too much of
us humans; hence, we better leave it alone. The fact that we do not abandon it expresses a trust
in the higher potential of reasonthat humanity is able to cope with the results of applying such
technologies, no matter how horrible these results may be. This is a trust that deserves to be called
religious. More on this below in Sect. 10.4 of this chapter.

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goes without saying that we cannot precisely formulate the questions. Yet if we do
not have precise, stable conceptsif these are still tentative, blurred, and fluid
then logic and probability theory are quite unfit as schemes for the construction of
justifications; all they can produce is empty accuracy.
The second reason is even more important. Rational argumentation in the sense
discussed here has nothing to do with subjectivity. The dialogue partners subjectivity
is ignored or explicitly abandoned. The clearest expression of this are verdicts of
emotionality. The impulse to disregard subjectivity is quite understandable. It aims
at universal results. An outcome that has been influenced by subjectivity is not readily accessible to a person with a different subjectivity. Nevertheless, as previously
mentioned, such disregard unduly restricts the possibilities for argumentation. In
their research, especially in normative domains, people are subjective. If left
unheeded, this subjectivity can cause trouble behind the scenes and thus impede
argumentation significantly or turn it into a mess. Prescribing rationality may rein
this in; yet whenever we effectively argue along the lines of strict rationality only,
we risk not doing justice to the matter at hand.
A first big step toward a realistic account of argumentation is to recognize subjectivity and incorporate it into argumentation. But if we stop there, and subjectivity now
has the last word, then argumentation turns into sophistry. Ancient Greece supplies a
good example in this regard. The sophists came onto the scene and taught not only
much theoretical knowledge but, most of all, the self-determined, self-interested
proper use of this knowledge. Of all things the measure is Man, Protagoras declared.2
That is a great thesis. It spoke to an incipient subjectivism and was a suitable new
orientation for a wide range of technical and political actions. Epistemic theory had
heretofore regarded the gods and cosmic forces as the measure of all things and as
guarantors of their cohesion. Now, in light of the practical experience of living with
this new self-determination, it was relegated to the status of a more or less time-honored theory, one which would soon lose almost all of its orientation value.
Yet if subjective self-determination prevails unchecked and is not tied to any
higher objectives, then the decisive factor becomes the speakers success in verbally
influencing the Other. That is why the sophists taught rhetoric and argumentation.
In particular, they taught more or less clever tricks and means of obtaining an audiences assent. Rhetoric is a theoretical toolbox that is ideally suited to introducing
subjectivity into argumentation while also allowing the rhetorician to be successful
in doing so. As Plato has Polos object to Socrates: Have the orators not great power
in a polis?3 And if the politicians appointed by drawing lots or by election were great
orators, such as Pericles, then they had tremendous possibilities for enforcing their
personal preferences.
Plato and Aristotle were quite aware of the threat that such unleashed subjectivity
posed for the life of the polis. They tried, on the one hand, to present and analyze
the maneuvers of sophistical rhetoric and, on the other hand, to show how the human
subject is embedded in the larger cosmic context in a way that constituted a significant
2
3

Freeman (1977), 125: Protagoras, Fragment 1.

Cf. Plato (1964), Gorgias, 466b.

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increase in rationalitywhen compared with traditional religiositybut still involved

a degree of transcendence. Their primary aim was to explain that even though the
religious tradition had lost its binding force, subjective opinion and feeling
could not be the final authority. In response to this challenge of subjectivism, Plato
developed his theory of Ideas and Aristotle developed his logic. Both these great and
complex conceptions have exerted their influence over the millennia.
Today, the theory of Ideas is no longer regarded as having any theoretical value
(which may be due to the fact that hardly anyone understands it anymore). Logic
has fared much better. Indeed, its longevity is quite justifiedat least in part. If a
speaker is required to use arguments that exhibit valid logical forms, then certain
deceptions that are crude in light of our present understanding are no longer possible
in an argument. It is no longer possible, for example, to demonstrate to an opponent
that he is literally the son of a doga sophistical argument exposed by Plato,4 which
was later analyzed and refuted by Aristotle.5 (The opponent concedes on request
that the dog accompanying him is his, that this dog has already had puppies, and that
it is therefore a father, which means that the dog is both his and a father. Then the
poor fellow is forced to admit that, therefore, the dog is his father. Consequently, as
the son of the dog father, he is the son of a dog.) To be sure, not much is gained from
this for our present problems and pursuits. We moderns have to try to address the
fact of subjectivity differently and more extensively.
Why is that necessary? I have already mentioned one reason on several occasions
in this book. The simple acting out of subjectivity is pleasant and enriching as long
as there are no serious deficiencies in orientation. Yet if there are such deficiencies
and if these lead to conflicts, then we end up in a power struggle with all its uncertainties. There is no doubt that this is an argument which carries much weight with
the powerless and the peacemaker, while it carries little with those in power. Some
people might be inclined to call it a weak argument. There is, however, another
reason that is more important and powerful and it depends on the fact that the principle of subjectivity feeds on existential meaning.
As we saw in Chap. 3, the level of existential meaning in an orientation system
articulates the manner in which oriented or orientation-seeking, acting, and living
human beings entrust themselves to the world. Now, if orientations are structured in
such a way that everything depends on the principle of subjectivitya way in which
research activities therefore lead to greater action possibilities for subjects and particularly for oneselfthen basic trust becomes more and more obsolete. At least,
that is the illusion that may ensue. Consider the following examples: If we are able
to irrigate a field, we no longer need to trust that it will rain on time. If the river that
carries the water for irrigation has been dammed, we no longer need to trust that it
will always carry enough water; we must, however, trust that enough water will
arrive in the long run. If that does not work properly and, if, for example, the river
dries up, but we are able to produce the water from wastewater or seawater, does
that mean that such trust is obsolete, too? No, in that case, we must trust that the
4
5

Cf. Plato (1964), Euthydemus, 287c and 298de.

Cf. Aristotle (1965), On Sophistical Refutations, 179179 a2, b7.

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necessary resources are available and that the technology used is functional. It
seems that this thought can be continued and then summarized as follows: trust is
never obsolete.
I might imagine this, but I also recognize that the situation in our human reality
is a bit different. The increasing powers at our disposalafter all, we talk of the
technical mastery of nature and the worldpush trust out of our consciousness.
Who would take offense at that? Is it not human, or all too human? Trust is something
childlike: something a weak, powerless being has to conjure up because it cannot
be responsible for itself. Anyone who is strong and powerful no longer has any need
for trust and replaces it with control.
This condition is often called self-confidence.6 Yet this term is actually misleading,
as is strikingly evident at this point, because it denotes a condition which is rather
devoid of trust. Anyone who is largely in control of the world believes, naturally,
that she is also in control of herself. But far from being obviously true, this is, on the
contrary, a rather vague and mysterious matter. The ego does not control itself as an
object the same way that it controls water power and the effects of leverage. Against
the background of this problem, it is worthwhile to inquire again into the precise
character of trust. I will carry out this inquiry in Sect. 10.4. For now, I will say only
this much: By trust, I mean a human attitude grafted onto general circumstances
and relying on these circumstances basic compliancean attitude which fills life
with existential meaning.
Living and acting under the principle of subjectivity aims at and is suitable for
increasingly controlling the conditions of living and acting. Control makes trust
superfluousmore and more with each increase in control. More precisely, it creates
this illusion. The safety achieved thereby is not perfect and the uncertainties that
human beings face, especially given the most sophisticated control mechanisms, are
enormous. This enormity is particularly due to the fact that, in ordinary life, basic
trust is hardly ever activated.
We have ceased, as it were, to learn trust as a skill. At the bottom of this development lies the discrepancy between trust and subjective self-determination. Selfdetermination is increasing, while, at the same time, the need for trust seems to be
decreasing. Actually, trust has never really disappeared, but this is not reflected in
our consciousness. Self-determination without trust is barren and empty. (Trust
without self-determination is naive and blind, that much must also be said. Therefore,
self-determination ought to be accomplished by argumentation.) This is the idea
behind my formulation that mere subjective self-determination feeds on existential
meaning. The much-heralded barrenness, loneliness, and inner void as a tendency
occurring in the wake of the continuing enforcement of the principle of subjectivity
can therefore be explained in the manner described above.
This, then, is the thought process behind answering the question of what it means
for argumentation to be reasonable: The well-known project of rational argument
6

Translators note: The German text links these two paragraphs by continuing its analysis of
different uses of the term trustSelbstvertrauen literally means self-trustwhile in English
self-confidence is the more common term.

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does not sufficiently capture the actual practice of argumentation because it has no
place for subjectivity. Now, one might consider it possible to become cognizant of
this subjectivity in the form of normative theses and to argue about them subsequently. As long as this concerns only the selection of means for subordinate ends
and goals, there will be no problem. Things are different, however, if ends and goals
are also supposed to be generated as new valid conclusions. Are we now heading
into ethical argumentation,7 and does this mean that we have rendered subjectivity
manageable? Hardly so, since we also require norms as a theoretical basis for ethical argumentation. If these are in dispute, then ethical argumentation has no beginnings. Yet they will be disputed as soon as subjectivity appears. The latter becomes
manifest in the fact that the (ultimate) ends and goals inherent in ways of seeing are
regarded as belonging to the subject and his or her identity, and thus not as suitable
topics for discussion. Partly they are not even recognized at all, and must therefore
be articulated and elaborated specifically as theses by modifying the frames.
As long as there is a religious bond, people have a frame that limits the proliferation
of their subjectivity. It is true indeed that, over the course of history, these limits
have often shown little effectiveness. Religious rulers have led draconian regimes,
invaded other countries in expansive war campaigns, etc. The argumentative justifications for such actions, however, were often defective. After all, that is precisely
why, for example, Las Casas and Vitorias arguments were superior to the conquistadors and their arguments. As we know, churches, especially the Catholic church,
have justified all kinds of outrageous crimes with arguments. That does not mean,
however, that these justifications were also valid.8 This is a broad field. At any
rate, I do not think that it is possible to justify real crimes with Christian doctrine,
that is, to prove real crimes to be valid theses with substantial arguments based on
the theoretical basis of Christianity. That all kinds of evils were committed in spite
of the faultiness of their justifications is a different problem.
It is frequently the case that people do not act in accordance with results that
could be gained from a serious argument about the maxims guiding their proposed
actions. Argumentation has no motivating or will-forming powerat most, it can
lead to insights. Whether a person truly has an insight into an orientation that is
potentially understandable, however, cannot be guaranteed. And whether he or she
renders such an insight into actions is completely open. Yet this does not discredit
the practice of argumentation as such; rather it shows that the expectations toward
this practice are wrong. The practice of argumentationeven concerning normative
thesesshould not be regarded as a medium for the formation of the will, but as
a means of assessing validity. It is here that we determine what is right and wrong
(or what is undecidable for the time being). The rightness of wanting something is
achievable as a valid thesis by argumentation onlythe coercion to act accordingly,
or any actual compliance with such coercion, is not.

Cf. Schneider (1996).

Cf., for example, the absurd and capricious arguments of the prosecution in Jan Hus trial at the
Council of Constance, as reported in Friedenthal (1977), 263290.
8

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Since the dawn of Enlightenment, the religious bond has waned among dominant
elites. Appeals to divine commandments or the divine will no longer count as arguments. Today, at least in secular culture, we criticize the conquest of the New World,
the burning of witches, and even the execution of the French king with human rights
arguments. These stem from an epistemic basis that was still thetic in the age of
Enlightenment, but is now part of legal and ethical knowledge. The Enlightenment,
then, substituted the religious bond with a bond to reason.
What is reason? All answers to this question must be treated with caution. In
Classical German Philosophy, which introduced this term, reason referred to a
typical human potential that was distinct from understanding. For Kant, understanding
is the faculty of rules, while reason is the faculty of principles. There are principles
for the theoretical and principles for the practical domain. In both domains, these
principles organize the results of employing our understanding such that the right
insights and maxims of actions can be determined and joined together into a unified
system. Hence, a person employs her understanding when, in pursuing an end, he or
she selects suitable means for doing so. In the process, she recognizes the regular
connection between means and ends and, by using (theoretical) reason, understands
this regular relationship as part of the necessities of tangible nature, which follow
set patterns and can be represented in a uniform system of our knowledge of nature.
Similarly, by using (practical) reason, she recognizes her purposeful actions as
parts of the moral necessities that she has to realize as a citizen of the spiritual
world. In Kants thought, reason was still stylized as Christian faith. This was not an
ecclesiastical faith or a faith based on sacred texts, but still a kind of Lutheranenlightened Christianity containing a belief in transcendent contents unobtainable
by knowledge.9
For Hegel, reason was the faculty of the absolute, that is, the human faculty of
becoming aware of ones participation in the absolute spirit. Reason thus construed
arrives at a kind of knowledge, and this knowledge is articulated as philosophy.
Given a sufficiently high degree of reflection, this philosophy can even reach those
transcendent spheres which Kant carefully tried to exclude. For Kant, criticism and
the critical understanding ensure that only what can be tied back to experience
counts as knowledge. A philosophical thinking informed by Hegel would have to be
able to overcome the dichotomy between knowledge and belief, which is still firmly
established in Kants philosophy. In a theoretical design, this is achieved by regarding
the spirit as active from the outset in the formation of experiential knowledge
an activation that is equivalent with our quest for understanding the world and
ourselvesinsofar as there is a continuous process of synthesizing oppositions in
pursuit of the growth of knowledge.
Anyone who is not content with discussing these thoughts externally, that is, as
an episode in the history of thought, but wants to consider seriously who could be
right here and for what reasons, would of course have to see to it that concepts are
outlined much more precisely by investigating their potential meanings. One thing,
9

Cf. Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, B xxx: Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make
room for faith.

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401

however, has already become apparent: The faculty of reason in Hegels thinking is supposed to exceed mere understanding; it is supposed to transcend the
understanding, construed as the comprehension of regularities, and even reach into
transcendent spheres.
I would like to end these general preliminary remarks at this point. This book is
not concerned with mapping higher human faculties, but with a theorization of
the practice of argumentation. How do we explain the latter in such a way that
subjectivity and the transitory character of orientation formation are included in it,
but without the whole theory being fixated on caprice or power play?
In order to answer this question, I will now propose a conception of argumentative
reason as arguing under the principle of transsubjectivity. To my knowledge,
the term transsubjectivity was first used by Paul Lorenzen.10 Lorenzens motives
were similar to mine in the present context, but it seems to me that the idea has even
been developed a bit further here. Transsubjectivity is not the same as intersubjectivity.
While intersubjectivity denotes either the complete suppression of subjectivity (as
in the Vienna Circles intersubjective verification of scientific data) or a recognition
of the merely factual subjectivity of the Other (as in symbolic interactionism and in
Wittgensteins embedding of linguistic meaning in life forms), transsubjectivity
refers to a heightening of subjectivity aimed at the potential for being compatible
with the subjectivity of the Other. It is the middle ground between simple acceptance and complete suppression. The principle of transsubjectivity states that,
beginning with my subjectivity, I put my actual ego up for consideration as well as
heighten and transcend it by seeking to participate in a general human potential,
which is only attainable by recognizing the subjectivity of the Other.
Transsubjectivity, then, is a new name for an old thing, namely the process of
putting ones subjectivity up for consideration. What does it mean to do so? Whose
consideration are we talking about? And why? The present glorification of subjectivity immediately gives rise to such questions. Transsubjectivity as the normative
principle, Put your subjectivity up for consideration, seems to be in stark and
direct contrast to our life in the free and powerful countries of the Western hemisphere. As such, it would stand no chance of being noticed. Yet this principle is not
an externally imposed norm. It rather reminds us of what we already do anyway. We
experience and suffer the fact that subjectivity is being worked off all the time. In
social situations, everyone, even the most power-hungry dogmatist, has to come to
terms with his or her surroundings to some extent. And occurrences such as illness
or old age will presumably soften even the most hardened individuals. This is the
fabric of human lifea fabric that is not permanent but unravels in the course of the
world. Nevertheless, not the inner subjective view, only the desire to retain the ego
captured in each respective moment is an illusion.
Subjectivity never rests securely; it is constantly renegotiated by the world. The
principle of transsubjectivity contains a request to integrate this fact into ones
actions as a (meta-)orientation. Why? Because it endows our actions with existential
10

Cf. Lorenzen (1969), 82.

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meaning. And how should it be realized? No, not by leading a carefully subdued
life, but first of all by taking the practice of argumentation seriously. If we construe
the practice of argumentation as a quest for theses that can be shown to be valid on
the basis of substantial argumentstheses which can subsequently guide new
actions in accordance with an altered self-conceptthen it is precisely this practice
which puts our subjectivity up for consideration. This is not a consideration in light
of the detached blindness of world affairs, but a consideration in light of who we are
and will become as human beings. It is no longer the I but this we which is the
agent of research conducted by forming theses and representing them argumentatively. The practice of argumentation combines trust (represented by the justification that constructs new orientations beyond the limits of old orientations) with
control (represented by the criticism that tests this justification). In that sense, argumentation is reasonable. Reasonable argumentation is not a kind of argumentation
that has been intensified by special measures and norms; rather it is argumentation
of the ordinary kind which, however, features an awareness of its conditions, possibilities, and limitations. It is the construction of substantial arguments as described in
this bookalbeit viewed and executed in light of the principle of transsubjectivity.
Does not this approach seem too much innocent? Is it even still possible, in the
wake of the critique of reason, to take reasonable argumentation seriously? In one
of the most influential philosophical texts of the 20th century, Horkheimer and Adorno
wrote: It is because they did not hush up the impossibility of deriving from reason
a fundamental argument against murder, but proclaimed it from the rooftops, that
Sade and Nietzsche are still vilified, above all by progressive thinkers.11 This is
the thinking of people who have been so thoroughly disappointed by the human
potential for reason that they find grim comfort in the idea of having, if nothing else,
at least no more illusions. Apparently, the underlying thought is a variation of the
theodicy argument. God, to whom we had entrusted our happiness, has disappointed
us terribly. We therefore renounce the bond with him; we stop believing in him. This
is the way of the enlightened person: She forms a new bond, the last onea bond
with her own reason. This works for a while. Events such as the Lisbon earthquake
or the tsunami in Aceh are no longer able to throw us off track. They do not demonstrate that God has abandoned us; only that nature has not yet been fully mastered.
But geologists are working on it, and, in the meantime, we express our solidarity (or
bad conscience) in the form of substantial donations.
This is quite different, however, when faced with world wars and genocides,
persecution, and torture. Someone who is affected strongly enough by such events
will presumably be unable to ward off the impression that the new bond with human
reason has proven to be a mere illusion. Who could seriously disagree with someone
who has been affected like that? What words could ease such horrors?
Nevertheless, this critique of reason is erratic. Why should it not be possible to
regard, for instance, the categorical imperative or any other expression of moral
thinking aimed at generalization and recognitionthat is, even the principle
of transsubjectivity explained hereas a fundamental argument against murder?
11

Horkheimer and Adorno (2002), 93.

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The Dynamics of Thetic Theory

403

Is it because it does not logically follow from premises that are absolutely certain?
Since it is impossible, then, to justify our humanity in a compelling way, is it equally
impossible to justify it at all? As a matter of fact, it is not reason which turns out to
be illusory in sadism and fascism, but a kind of rationality radicalized by certitude.
A closer look at the context of the idea in the Dialectic of Enlightenment reveals that
the corresponding passage highlights the notion that greed and power are far more
effective than reason. Actually, then, this is not so much about the right as about the
might of reason.
To be sure, it is quite true that the power of reason is a strange thing. In the
Chinese book of wisdom by Lao Tsu, we can find the idea that soft water wears
away the rigid stone.12 Yet this is a force we never see, because our experience is too
short. When the stone has finally been washed out of the way, those who are now
able to proceed no longer know anything about the stone and the obstacle it once
was. However, one theoretical problem still remains. It could be formulated like
this: is human reason purely cognitive? Or does it also extend to the level of existential meaning and emotionality, where it becomes manifest as confidence and trust? I
will return to this question in Sect. 10.4.

10.2

The Dynamics of Thetic Theory

In this section, I will try to show that argumentation, if taken seriously, unfolds
dynamics in which subjectivity, insofar as it is expressed in theses and arguments,
is revealed, unlocked, and represented asindeed required to bechangeable.
Argumentation is taken seriously if it is enlisted to justify and criticize theses that are
supposed to illuminate and exceed the subjects limits of orientation. If subjectivity
consists in circling in more or less stable, closed loops amidst acquired epistemic
orientations (as I have described in Chap. 3), then this subjectivity tends to be
immediately endangered whenever research is conducted. After all, there could be
emerging states of affairs that are in conflict with previous orientations. It is true
that, normally, the orientation system is not free of gaps or contradictions. But it
may reach a tipping point. If any given theses are not simply accepted and realized,
if their validity is examined argumentatively, then the subject risks being coerced
into more or less far-reaching alterations or adjustments of her orientation system
in that case, she can no longer simply remain who she is.
The practice of argumentation ensures that justifications are requested and tested.
At least in their beginnings, justifications mobilize some theory that is at the proponents disposal as epistemic theory. Now, if the opponent attacks or even refutes
it, this creates a theoretical problem for the proponent. After all, that epistemic
theory belonged to his own orientation system; he had assumed it in his own actions
without experiencing any disturbances. Praxis seemed to prove the theory right.
Now, however, there is a theoretical inadequacy. What can be done?
12

Lao Tsu (2009), Chapter 78.

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Transsubjectivity

If the challenged theory is knowledge, then the problem concerns both opponent
and proponent. If a refuting fact is brought forward against knowledge, then it must
either be neutralized as an anomaly (i.e. the fact cannot be positioned within a
taxonomy and does not do damage to relevant propositions) or the respective
piece of theory is relegated to the status of thetic theory. In that case, what is required
is a research project concerned with this refutation in order to find out what the
situation is, that is, what parts of epistemic theory are affected and how the damage
should be rectified.
If the challenged epistemic theory is doxa, the case is, on the one hand, similar:
Epistemic theory becomes thetic again. On the other hand, it is no longer true that
both dialogue partners are affected; rather, this situation only concerns the proponent
who has the following option now: He has to concede that this piece of previously
corroborated orientation is not universally available. Adhering to such a theory in
the face of objections means holding on to ones subjectivity, even though it has
revealed its particularity. Methodologically speaking, this is the dogmatization of
doxastic theory. Some people might think that doing so is a common reaction at this
point. But is that really so? Objections to doxa are not sacrosanct. Usually, they are
derived from other doxa. In those cases, the constellation may be heterogeneous and
would have to be specifically modified for a contradiction to arise in the first place.
These, finally, are also effects of the dynamics of thetic theory: Frame differences
become recognizable; differences between primary and successive framings are
revealed, generalized by respective frame modifications, and, if possible, they are
reconciled.
Still, dogmatization is always a possibility, but it creates discord. Where dogma
can be avoided, the normal dynamics of thetic theory come into play: The subject
calls the conditions of her orientations into question, distances herself from them,
and drops or revises them. A degree of certainty in understanding is lost; the subject
has to reorientate herself in smaller or larger parts of her orientation system. This is
the negative side of the dynamics of thetic theory (the so-called negative dialectics).
On the positive side, the positions of the parties involved are activated to form new
theses for bridging the resulting gaps in orientation, which may then be introduced
into the discussion.
In this respect, argumentation has two directions: upwards and downwards. In an
upward direction, theses are constructed, supported with justifications, and fashioned, if possible, into candidates for new orientations. This is the productive,
upward-directed activity of the position, or rather, of the person driving the research
project. In a downward direction, theses and steps of justification are tested and
criticized; nonsensical, ebullient, or merely speculative thetic theory is eliminated;
finally, the relevant assumptions are questioned, challenged, and, if possible, refuted.
The dynamics of thetic theory are based on the process that theses are justified
and objections considered. If constructed theses are backed up by reasons, a chain
or web of reasons is created. This is the upward movement of argumentation. It
proceeds as long as the chain or web of reasons can somehow be tied back to knowledge or, in extreme cases, even to praxis. If that is no longer possible, then the chain
or web is up in the air, as it were. This might surprise the proponent. If objections

10.2

The Dynamics of Thetic Theory

405

are taken into account, they are either sustained or refuted. If an objection is
sustained, then it leads to the aforementioned downward movement: The thetic
structure is dismantled (at least at this point).
The two instances of critical examination are knowledge and the perspective of
the Other. It is very common that the opponent has acquired different parts of
knowledge than the proponent and thus complains that these parts are not considered
in the structure. This means that he stresses the authority of knowledge. It is also
very common that the opponent apprehends and appropriates states of affairs in a
different frame. These are therefore partially different states of affairs involving
different practices. Complaining about the difference emerging here means stressing
the perspective of the Other.
In order to explain the dynamics of thetic theory with a view toward our field
of examples, let us take another look at the dialogue between Hppe and Merkel
which was analyzed in Chap. 8. In Round 3, Merkel had presented the thesis that
our moral obligations toward the early embryo are of a different kind and less stringent than those toward a living infant. In his justification, he had introduced the
example of the burning laboratory. This example appeals to moral intuitions and is
apparently supposed to form a connection to practices of treating embryos and
infants. The normative structures of these practices, however, are hardly developed
for extreme cases such as the one presented by Merkel. We would have to imaginatively fabricate a case in which the house is burning and all that remains is
enough time to either rescue the dishes with the embryos or the infant. Merkel
claims that, given this scenario, we would all choose the infant. That may be true.
However, Hppe disputes that this choice discloses a relevant moral intuition. He
presents the counter-assertion that the only thing demonstrated by such a choice is
the influence of emotional conditioning. This counter-assertion is justified with several
counterexamples (who is more likely to be saved under what circumstances and
what does that say about moral obligations?).
Thus, we have arrived at the constellation of which I spoke. An assumption is
attacked with a refuting objection. In the discussion, Merkel makes no attempt to
weaken the objection or to render it irrelevant by introducing a successor thesis. He
simply reasserts the imagined preference for the infant. On the verbal level of the
dialogue, this is a case of dogmatization. Still, for a serious assessment of the situation,
I would have to investigate further whether Merkel continues to treat the contested
assertion as devoid of open objections. After all, in any assessment of what is happening in argumentation, we have to keep in mind that a dialogue is carried out as a
real conversational event. A conversation between living people consists of interpersonal processes in which argumentative operations and moves are executed.
With respect to a conversation like the one between Hppe and Merkel, we must
also consider that the participants are public figures who are both respected and
vilified for their positions, that, moreover, this has been the case for a long time, and
that the constellation of these men is therefore rigid, and consequently, both keep a
lid on any thetic dynamics that might be able to resolve the conflict. According to
custom, the point of such a conversation is for everyone to represent and defend
their positionnot to transform and construct it further. In fact, there is nobody who

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Transsubjectivity

would do this under the pressure of public attention. Rather, such a transformation
requires time and calm deliberation. Hence, such calm deliberations are the originary
locus of argumentative dialogues.13 In a conversation such as the one between
Hppe and Merkel, which takes place under the watchful eye of the public or the
media, it is the rule that one tries to remove any objections in a way that is hopefully
plausible or at least clever. The fact that Merkel does not do this could mean that he
did not come up with any idea for refuting the objection. It is possible that he did not
even notice itbut that is unlikely in the case of a skilled speaker such as Merkel.
Similarly, it is unlikely that Merkels thinking is simply located in a different frame.
He would have clarified this in a response to the objection. Now, if the genre of
conversation does not really allow for the explicit withdrawal of a thesis, then the
simple refusal to address an objectioninstead of verbally or even rhetorically
rejecting, or obscuring itis a rather strong indication that the objection has in fact
addressed the issue successfully.
I would guess that it is against this background that Merkel takes up Hppes
objection once more, one year later, in his book Forschungsprojekt Embryo.14 He
presents an expanded version of the argument involving the burning laboratory
and now feels quite confident about it. Upon closer examination, however, it
becomes apparent that this expansion renders the argument circular. Now it is
assumed that the infant has broader protective rights than the embryo. Let us
remember, however, that it was precisely this assumption which had been called
into question in the dialogue. In fact, Merkel had constructed the example of the
burning laboratory in order to support it. Yet if it is true, as Hppe has demonstrated, that the example can be interpreted in many ways, then Merkel cannot
simply impose his interpretation involving the broader protective right. If he does
so anyway, he requires as an established assumption the very thesis that is in
question. Hence, the argument is circular.
The following can generally be summarized with respect to argumentative
dialogues: The dynamics of thetic theory ensure that theses are upgraded to positions,
that positions are unfolded and examined, that this process of unfolding is open and
takes place at a continuously renewed distance from oneself, that any rigidities are
revealed and, if possible, dissolved, and that all this allows the subjects involved
(i.e. people or groups) to make progress in understanding the world and themselves.
In one sentence: The dynamics of thetic theory ensure that the practice of argumentation is reasonable.

13

Cf. Mengel (1995b). There are attempts to specify conditions for such deliberations or for the
cooperative search for truth. Cf., for example, the ideal speech situation in Habermas (1973),
where freedom from domination is considered as a condition. This is not a bad idea, except it is
not a universal criterion. Moreover, the stylization of this freedom from domination by ensuring
equality, when selecting speech acts, is artificial.
14
Cf. Merkel (2002), 152154. A slightly annoying feature of this publication is that Hppes
objection is referenced without any information about its origin, so that interested readers cannot
(easily) find out about the context, the course of the overall argument, and the exact meaning of
Hppes specific argument.

10.3 The Recognition of the Other

10.3

407

The Recognition of the Other

As previously mentioned, thetic dynamics can be blocked. If I am sure of my position,

or proud, stubborn, or opinionated, I can easily impede these dynamics. I do not
acknowledge any dialogue principles; I do not justify anything; I do not take any
objections into account; instead, I pile claim upon claim, which is something people
accept because I am smart, knowledgeable, and responsiblein short, trustworthy.
It is not a justification but my personality that is supposed to ensure trust in my
theses. At this point, we encounter the problem of appeals to authority.
This problem cannot simply be solved by pointing out that the greatness of a
person of authority, no matter how established and agreed upon it may be, cannot
function as a justification. If it is clear that the pragmatic function of a justification
lies in creating trust in the thesis, then this function can indeed also be fulfilled by
the person of authority. What this still lacks, however, is the recognition of the Other
as a person with independent thoughts, who could understand the matter herself.
Without trust, there is no progress into the unknown. To be sure, the unknown
cannot completely be illuminated by knowledge; otherwise, it would not be
unknown. Ultimately, trust is always something childlike; yet if it actually replaces
an insight that is available, then it is naive. Only if the person of authority claims to
have an insight that is not, or not yet, available to the interlocutorbut could be
available if she trusted the person of authoritythen trust in the person of authority
may precede trust in her own insights and thus pave the way for understanding. In
such cases, an appeal to authority may function as an argument. The main application of well-understood appeals to authority, then, is the teaching-learning situation
involving the roles of teacher and student. The teacher ought to be trustedthis is
part of the concept of a teacher. The difference between a teacher and a person
merely making an assertion is that the former recognizes the Other in her pursuit of
understanding and her (limited) ability to understand. Is that not something we
desire in every serious dispute? True, but this is a specific dialogue situation. After
all, teaching is supposed to provide access to knowledge, not an understanding of
the validity of a thesis.15
This side-glance at situations involving appeals to authority was intended to
prepare us for the general theme of recognition. After all, the dynamics of thetic
theory develop only in a dialogue which features the mutual recognition of dialogue
partners. Hence, recognition is a suitable criterion for the ideal dialogue situation
or deliberation. (If freedom from domination, cf. footnote 12, means the same
as recognition, then it is quite all right.)

15

This is true, in particular for esoteric knowledge, in which case it is not clear to the impartial,
interested layperson that this is, in fact, knowledge because any possible practices are initially only
accessible from the outside. Thus, Rudolf Steiner, for example, constantly claims that on the path
of spiritual instruction, paved by him, we we can find insights that are just as evident as those of
natural sciences. To be sure, some anthroposophical practices (in agriculture, medicine, pedagogy)
deserve to be taken seriously.

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Transsubjectivity

The recognition of the Other is the basic principle of ethicsthe foundation of

social interactions among human beings. I would like to make some basic remarks
about recognition at this point. It is well known that there are systems of morals in
which the Other is recognized only in a very specific functional frame. A slave, a
maid, a servant, and a laborerthese are all recognized in the sense of being cared
for and looked after, so that they are able to fulfill the functions that are expected of
them. But is that enough? The issue of recognition, then, raises the following
question: Recognition in what frame? First, I will cast some light on this issue in
general, and then I will discuss the specific case of recognition as a dialogue partner.
Recognition is the major theme of social and moral philosophy. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel presented the struggle for recognition as a necessary phase
in the development of self-consciousness, and this account resolves some of the
theoretical problems in a way that is quite satisfactory.16
Recognition is a quality within the IThou dyad. Systematically speaking, it
leads us to the following question: In what frame are you recognized by me or in
what frame am I recognized by you, respectively? The aforementioned possibilities
(framed as a slave, a servant, etc.) are partial stages of recognition. At a sufficient
level of human rights thinking, finally, a demand for recognition as equals will
come into play. I should perceive you the same way that I perceive myself. This
equality in which I frame you does not refer to any personal qualities, desires, interests,
pursuits, demands, abilities, etc. There is no doubt that we are different in those
respects. Equality means that the Other is the same as a human being.
This is obviously an abstraction which disregards differences like the ones just
mentioned. What turns this abstraction into a mystery, however, is that we do not
know exactly what a human being is. As is well known, Kant had declared the
question What is a human being? to be the fundamental question of philosophy,
encompassing the other big questions: What can I know? What ought I to do?
For what may I hope? There is the rather common answer that humans are equal
insofar as they have equal rights, or even equal rights and equal duties. Kamlah
wrote in his anthropology that human beings are equal to each other in their needs.17
That is a slightly different way of substantiating this abstraction. But who could be
right here and for which reasons?
It is not possible to first theoretically determine the content of the abstraction a
human being, only then to raise the claim that we humans should recognize each
other in this relationship. Rather, the content of the abstraction has to result from
reflections about interactions in the dyad. Thus, we first clarify in what frame
to recognize the respective Other or in what frame we ourselves feel the need to be
recognized. And then, we use the determinations found (and discussed) in this
process to fill in the concept of a human being. In this sense, the answer to the question
of what a human being is might be phrased as follows: It is the being which determines itself in mutual recognition.
16

Cf. Hegel (1977), Phenomenology of the Spirit, Chapter IV A: Independence and Dependence of
Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage.
17
Kamlah (1973).

10.3 The Recognition of the Other

409

Now, is there a need to justify the demand for recognition itself? Or shall we say
(using the so-called transcendental-pragmatic argument): Anyone who asks for a
justification already satisfies the demand and even expects her interlocutor to do the
same? It is possible that this argument communicates an insight to someone.
Nevertheless, it is not compelling.18 After all, the question can be raised externally and,
when faced with an answer, one may proclaim ones inability to identify with it. Let us
therefore keep the question open a bit longer and look for other possible answers.
Why should we recognize each other? In the political philosophy of
Enlightenment, there are two famous conceptions of social contract, one by
Hobbes,19 the other by Rousseau.20 The social contract is a construction intended to
answer the question of why human beings live in a social organization and thus
accept certain restrictions of their original freedom of action in the first place. The
social contract is therefore the (fictional) locus where mutual recognition begins
deliberately and for understandable reasons. These two conceptions are almost
fascinatingly different, both with respect to the conception of human beings in the
(fictional) state of nature before the contract and, accordingly, with respect to the
reasons and incentives for them to enter into the contract.
Hobbes draws the infamous picture of man being a wolf to man in the state of
nature. We are aware of our own covetousness which extends to the Others property
and life. Hence, we are afraid of each other and have to arm ourselves; still, we are
forever threatened and insecure. This is the reason for entering into the social
contract. It entails subjecting oneself to the social group called the Leviathan,
which is represented by a ruler. The ruler is invested with a monopoly on violence
and issues norms for a peaceful and prosperous coexistence. The subjection is total,
that is, there is no more space for specific self-interests as a condition for ones
subjection which would be revoked in case the self-interests are neglected.21 The
subjection of everyone is the first step of a life in freedom. The main point is to
guarantee peace and the monopoly on violence. This ensures that we do not turn on
each other violently. We no longer want to do thisthat is precisely the content of
the contract. So if we examine this construction with respect to the question of why
the demand for recognition is heeded, we arrive at the conclusion that we recognize
each other because we fear each other. We know that we are a danger to each others
life and limb; consequently, we mutually refrain from this possibility.22
18

For a discussion of this argument, cf. again Wohlrapp (1998a), Part II, especially 254 ff.
Cf. Hobbes (1968).
20
Cf. Rousseau (1998).
21
There seems to be an exception to this principle: If the state is unable to protect the life and limb
of its citizens (any longer), they should be allowed to defend themselves (cf. Hobbes (1968),
Leviathan, Part II, Chapter 21). Sometimes this is interpreted as a right to resist. This interpretation,
however, is inadequate, for the contract has to be considered void in such a case. Hence, the citizen
does not resist the legitimate authority, but an imposed one.
22
Hffe (1999) calls this a transcendental exchange and claims to find in it a justification for the
human right to physical integrity. This has a certain plausibility only as a very abstract idea (we are, after
all, neither all able nor willing to threaten each other) and may in other respects be employed as a good
reason for the death penalty in cases of murderwhich, to my mind, is a defect of this proposal.
19

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Transsubjectivity

For Rousseau, human beings in the state of nature live in a community and this
community works well, at least by and large. It puts peoples needs and abilities
center stage. The members of the community may cooperate as well as help and
enrich each other; they form a unit that is strategic as much as it is emotional.
Nevertheless, there are also dangers and conflicts. These result from the fact that the
development of needs does not take place in a uniform and coordinated fashion.
Hence, people enter the social contract in order to regulate their normative relationships in such a manner that they can exist in free agreement. The form that this free
agreement takes is the law or, in other words, the legal code. Its norms are designed
in such a manner that every individual recognizes her own will in the law. This does
not necessarily require everyones participation in the creation of the law, but it does
mean that a very specific kind of assent is needed: There is a recognizable will
underlying the law, which represents a deeper, purified layer of ones own will. This
concept of a general will (volont gnrale) is extremely interesting as a theoretical construct. It was a guiding principle during the French Revolution. Today, most
people no longer understand it and associate it with totalitarian excesses. To be sure,
that is a possible way of interpreting it. This interpretation corresponds to an age
that celebrates the individual and isolated the subjects will to prevail. From such a
subjects perspective, the idea of a general will, located in a stratum of ones own
formation of the will, where it is possible to feel connected with and understand
everyone, is nothing but an imposition veiled in ideology. But this interpretation is,
as I said, particularly plausible in light of an egoistic subjectivism.
As to the question of recognition, the answer in Rousseaus conception is as follows:
We human beings recognize each other because we mutually respect each others
freedom, which we regard as a higher good that must not be surrendered to a ruler,
even if the ruler bestows peace upon us in return. Such a peace would be a heteronomous gift, ultimately an externality. In Rousseaus social contract, we ourselves can
keep the peace by drawing up laws that we want to comply with voluntarily.23
Rousseaus way of justifying recognition is more demanding than Hobbes,
which was conceived against the background of absolute monarchy. Rousseaus
idea is aimed at the republic, which he knew to some extent (from Geneva) and
whose realization was attempted in France at the end of the 18th century. This
attempt to revolutionize the power structures of the monarchy was renewed again
and again in France for almost 100 years (until 1871). It had a profound impact on the
political organization of the remaining countries in Europe. Actually, it still remains
to be completed, even though it has given momentum to the state in todays world.
The elements of Rousseaus idea allow for a systematic justification of the
demand for recognition: I can come to realize that I would not be possible all on my
own. I am born as a living being endowed with the potential for self-awareness.24
23

Kants idea of the categorical imperative is a descendant of Rousseaus idea of the general will.
Cf. Cassirer (1965).
24
The idea that the self emerges from a process of mutual ascription and role-taking has been developed with admirable clarity by George Herbert Mead in his philosophy of symbolic interactionism,
cf. Mead (1934), Part III.

10.3 The Recognition of the Other

411

This potential, however, can only develop and become actualized because I live in
relationships with others (parents, relatives) who perceive me and recognize me in
terms of this potential for autonomy. They, the others, see and experience me and
share with me in whatever frame they see and experience me. These frame
attributions are (hopefully) such that I learn to recognize and understand myself in
them. After spending some time and growing within this social protodyadthat is,
within a relationship of recognition that is still one-sidedI will (hopefully) have
found myself to the point that I can now internalize the external perspective. This
means that the others can perceive and experience me and also that I am able to do
so myself. On the one hand, this results in the ego-like dyad (IMe). On the other
hand, the social dyad (IThou) gains a symmetrical structure. I continue to exist for
you. But since I also exist for myself now, you can also exist for me. I have internalized your perspective on me and have therefore gained a distance to myself that
enables me to be in a relation with myself. Realizing the genesis of my self-relation,
I understand that you occur in it as a necessary condition. You have lent me yourself,
and I have learned to use it as mine. Furthermore, you continue to support and
confirm the ego part in the IMe relation. Therefore, to the extent that I regard
myself as real, I also draw on you.
Hence the demand to recognize the Other means, essentially, to complete ones
own self-knowledge.
In terms of the practice of argumentation, the question in what frame to recognize
the Other is answered in the following way: The dialogue partner is a resource of
aspects that are not at my disposal. The Other has a different biography and a different
perspective on issues, both on the questionable and the known ones. She has acquired
different parts of knowledge and conducts research on different states of affairs as
well as different research on the same states of affairs. She can see my projects and
theses from the outside. In that regard, the recognition of the Other is not an imposed
norm; rather it is in line with my very own interests and desires. I cannot adopt the
Others way of seeing; she is an addition that I cannot do without.
In an argumentative dialogue, the recognition of the Other first becomes manifest
in the simple fact that I try to provide justifications for my theses which make the
construction comprehensible to the Other. It also becomes manifest in the practice
of taking the Others objections into account, that is, in sustaining or in integrating
or refuting them.
Not complying with a demand for justification or ignoring an objection means
denying the recognition that is part of the practice of argumentation. This is such a
fundamental mistake that committing it is tantamount to abandoning argumentation
altogether. Speech in that vein is no longer thetic; it is a mere expression of opinion, a
command, and a threat. In the tradition of fallacies, the conditional threat is listed as
an error of argumentation. The status of this so-called argumentum ad baculumthat
is, the act of threatening instead of justifyingis clearly recognizable with the considerations presented here. In fact, it is not an error in argument after all, for it does not
even constitute a move in an argumentative dialogue. Anyone who threatens, that is,
anyone who holds out the prospect of harming another person, does not engage in
argumentation. Today, this is often misunderstood by presenting this argumentum ad

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Transsubjectivity

baculum as a prudential argument.25 According to that suggestion, we would have to

regard a situation involving a threat where someone demands, at gunpoint, your
money or your life, as an implicit syllogism of the following form:
P1: You want to stay alive.
P2: If you do not hand over the money, you will not stay alive.
C: Therefore, you should hand over the money.
This looks just like a formal argument. As it exhibits a neat structure called
modus tollens, logicians might even be inclined to regard it as a good argument. But
it has a fundamental defect. It lacks recognition. If I approach the addressee like
this, I no longer regard her as a resource of different and further aspects that would
be suitable and necessary for examining and criticizing my thesis. Instead, all I demand
is its practical realization in an action; put differently, I attempt to effect such an
action in a way that is quasi-causal. In fact, the if-then statement about a connection between the demand for money and the killing is not really a theoretical if-then
statement. It rather is a prophecy whose realization is announced by the prophet
himself. The correctness of the statement depends on the will of the person making
the threat or on the continuity of this will and the power to enforce it. It does not
depend on any regularly occurring states of affairs. After all, the addressee does
not encounter this statement in the context of a consultation (consider: if you do not
hand over the money, you will be killed), but she is threatened with the possibility
that it could become true. Yet the difference between counsel and threat is that
between the existence or the lack of recognition.
In summary, it can be said that the demand for recognition is an ingredient in
reasonable argumentation. As it were, the demand has three levels. First, it is a foundational moral principle which must be observed in all human interactions, including
dialogues. As such, the demand is categorical. Second, it is a hypothetical norm which
we must follow if we want to pursue, in a way directed by instrumental rationality,
our interest in and desire for orientations that are as reliable as possible for our
research projects. And third, it is an expression of profound self-knowledge as I can
realize that I always already belong to the Other.

10.4

The Transcendent Core of Secular Reason

As previously explained, the pragmatic function of argumentative speech is to generate

trust in theses for transcending the limits of our orientations. In the final section of
the last chapter, I have two more concerns. On the one hand, I would like to clarify

25

Cf. Wohlrapp (1991), where I criticize Woods (1987) and others for ignoring the pragmatic
difference between a threat and an advice. Woods has later delivered another treatment of the ad
baculum (Woods 1998), where he insists in the prudential character of the figure. He even cites my
paper, but without any attempt at refuting the criticism.

10.4

The Transcendent Core of Secular Reason

413

that this trust is a real belief in the strong, religious sense. On the other hand, I would
like to consider the consequences for our self-understanding.
What is the meaning of belief? To begin with, if I say, I believe that the train
is half an hour late, it means almost the same as I assume, suspect, and can imagine that. However, if I resort to such a belief in justifying that I will, contrary to
our agreement, not be at the station at the regular arrival time, then it obviously
means more. In that case, it means that I have reliable evidence, that is, arguments
from epistemic theory (e.g. experiences with the arrival time of a certain train,
knowledge about a particular construction site along the tracks which has been
mentioned as causing delays before, knowledge that this site still exists, etc.), for
constructing a regular thesis (in this case by way of generalization). If I take my
construction to be valid because I have not heard otherwisenobody has raised any
objectionsthen I might even dare to realize the thesis by going to the station a bit
later. (In addition, this might also depend on who is arriving by the train. After all,
some people are said to have no sympathy for such research.)
In any case, a belief in theses on the basis of arguments is stronger than a general
belief, which is synonymous with mere opinion. Pragmatically speaking, belief
changes its mode if what is believed is realized as a practical orientation. This kind
of belief, based on arguments, then, is situated between general belief and religious
belief. It is my thesis that, properly understood, belief is placed on a continuum at
the end of which one finds religion.
What is religious belief? Anyone carefully thinking about this issue has to come
up with ways to avoid or undermine the dogmas resulting from millennia of religious
practices, conflicts, and struggles. To my mind, the first step in doing so is to suggest
an extension of serious pragmatic thinking (in the sense of the reflexive pragmatism
developed in Chap. 1) into the realm of religion.26 This would mean that the focus
should be on human practices and on the ways in which they are or ought to be guided
by the religious message. Today, however, conceptions of the religious message and
its interpretations usually emphasize cognitivist aspects.
In other words, the message is understood and passed on as if it was primarily
about taking certain texts or propositions to be true. There is exactly one God. God
created the world. The world shows signs of intelligent design. God loves human
beings. God has a son who was born by a human woman, etc. As long as we debate
such propositions, for example, as long as we come up with and discuss proofs of
Gods existence or as long as the Christian son of God is taken by Muslims to be a
heretic invention, we are still far away from the substance of religion.
The issue seems to be that we cannot know any of these things and therefore
(have to) believe in them. But what does it really mean that we believe in them?
Do we take them to be true? And, in turn, what would this mean here? Do we pretend
that they are true? What would be the conception of truth underlying such a pretense?
Moreover, what can I, as a religious person, tell someone who does not want to
believe? Can I offer justifications, that is, thetic constructions open for objections?
In that case, religious propositions would have to be regarded as genuine theses in
26

Cf. my pragmatic definition of religion in Wohlrapp (2010).

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10

Transsubjectivity

the sense of the concept of thetic theory developed here. Taking them to be true
would mean taking them as orientations for life and action. Kant offered several
justifications for taking such propositions to be true. (Natural sciences assume a
belief in God inasmuch they assume the constancy, continuity, and systemic pattern
of the world; moral philosophy assumes a belief in God because it is a necessary
condition for the existence of any system of ethics.) Strictly speaking, then, these
are not justifications for Gods existence, but for why we ought to believe in him.
Kant calls this a rational belief, which is a belief in a transcendent God on
reasonable grounds.
A religion thus understood is concerned with the God of the philosophers.27
But any truly religious person knows that religion is something else. What is it?
In order to make headway at this point, I think we should refrain from taking
cognitive contents and problems as starting points. We should not begin with a
human being who, based on a thoroughly developed technical, economic, and
intellectual competence for acting, wonders why she should believe in religious
propositions or what it is even supposed to mean to believe in them or to take them
to be true. Certainly, there are answers for such a person and basically they are all
equally goodeven the one that belief is healthy, like eating fruit.28 Let us assume
that this person accepts such an answer. Then, we arrive at what is really important, namely praxis. Certain exercises (prayer, meditation, observance of certain
moral norms) are recommended to such a person in order to make her accustomed
to religious practice. It is at least not impossible that such accustomization would
lead to the substance of religion.
This substance is the encompassing trust that the world is good and right.
Human beings are almost forced to trust in such a way; they hardly have a choice.
At the same time, though, they have the ability to become aware of that trust and
express it verbally; most often, this takes the form of an already established religion
(new religions usually improve, reform, or restore the already existing ones). Of
course, there are also many religious people who do not identify with a particular
message. Such people may, for example, inhabit a peculiar, deep optimism paired
with devotion.
I would like to probe this question about the substance of religion a bit further
by presenting some thoughts about the genesis of religious belief. Subsequently,
I would like to address the significance of belief for the practice of argumentation.

27

The topic of the God of the Philosophers (and scholars), in counterdistinction to the God of
Abraham, God of Isaac, and God of Jacob, comes from Blaise Pascal, who carried with him a note
about his epiphany, sewn into his robe, which includes these formulations. The note has been
published as Pascals Memorial in Pascal (1962), 333. Wilhelm Weischedel chose the formula
The God of the Philosophers, as the title for his informative, extended essay on theories from the
philosophy of religion. Cf. Weischedel (1971).
28
In the United States, there has been a new sociomedical discipline called medicine and religion
for several decades now, which publishes studies documenting significant correlations between
active religious practice and an improvement in the test subjects health. Cf., for example, Koenig
and Cohen (2003).

10.4

The Transcendent Core of Secular Reason

415

Psychologists report that a newborn child trusts from the outset. Erikson called
this phenomenon basic trust.29 The development of this trust depends on the
situation at birth and during the first months of lifein particular, of course, on
the mothers attitude. At this point, things can go wrong that are very difficult to
adjust in later life. Yet if the child grows up in a loving environment characterized
by recognition, then the development of trust is not an issue. The mother or the
parents introduce the child into the world in such a manner that the childs trust
is formed and strengthened. They are, one might say, her religious instructors.
Hence, the world unfolds for the child as right and good. To be sure, it harbors
perils, dangers, and terrors. In general, however, all is well with it. The formation
and consolidation of this basic trust could be considered the natural religiosity in
human ontogeny. If the child grows into a religious community, then this natural religiosity is heightened and cultivated to a veritable religious consciousness. This, then,
would be the emergence of religion in human ontogeny.
In terms of phylogeny, the matter is much more complex. Cultural anthropologists
and religious scholars agree that there is not a single indigenous culture without a
religion. In part, this depends, of course, on the underlying concept of religion,
which cannot be the concept of high religion. The archaic human being equipped
with little technical theory is fully and thoroughly dependent on natural forces in her
actions. She has little control over whether they succeed or fail; everything is more
or less an occurrence. Natural forces, however, are not objectified. They are not a
counterpart, but rather intertwined with ones own physical and mental powers. Hence,
in a primary objectification, they must be divine. An incipient consciousness of
fire, storm, coldness, spring, and predatorsin short, of everything not at ones
own disposal, everything that is beyond human controlframes these energies
quite rightly and quite naturally as something that is superhuman. In other words, the
frame of religiosity arises in tandem with consciousness itself.30 Heraclitus (around
500 BC) could still say that the Gods are everywhere31at a time when the Greeks
had already left the archaic state of nature far behind.
Whenever in phylogeny, then, humans gradually develop a relation to themselves
or to nature as a counterpart, as something they no longer simply belong to like their
ancestorsthe world where these humans reside is divine as a matter of course.
Hence, all their actions gain a cultish quality. They hunt, till the fields, and standardize social activities surrounding birth, initiation, marriage, healing from illness,
death, etc., according to the Gods wishes. They feel they do not have a choice in
this regard. If done differently, their actions would surely fail. How do they know
this? Because they constantly experience it. At the dawn of humanity, religious reality
is not otherworldly at all, but identical with the world of experience.

29

Cf. Erikson (1950), Chapter 7.1. Erikson assumed connections between this basic trust and
organized religiosity, too.
30
Cf. Eliade (1969).
31
Heraclitus, while warming himself at a fire, reportedly told a stranger, Enter! Here, too, are
gods! Cf. Aristotle (1972), i.5 645a17.

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Enlightened individuals need not feel superior in this regard. Anyone unwilling
to resort to such nonsensical propositions as The divine does not really exist may
tell themselves the following: What exactly was going on in those days,32 I do not
know. However, I can direct my thoughts in two directions.
For one thing, in the case of archaic people, the natural world is not isolated from
human feeling and faith. Explanations (which we call mythical today) have a
different function for them than in technicalscientific thinking. Primarily, explanations make sure that whatever happens can be regarded as right. If a failed harvest is
explained as the result of transgressing a rule in an agrarian cult, the lack of food is
indeed a terrible fact, but it happens in an orderly world. In other words, given a
slight theoretical permeation of the natural worldthat is, slight in terms provided
by the technical sciencesit is always possible to give explanations for such
phenomena, even for discrepancies that might arise along with these explanations
(e.g. if the gods have been appeased and yet the next crop is still destroyed by severe
weather). Such explanations are not necessarily phantasms or the excuses of deceitful priests; they may even be completely valid epistemic theory.
However, archaic people had a very different relationship with the land and the
elements, as well as with flora and fauna, than modern individuals. Their emotional
and mental energies and potencies were structured quite differently. Hence, they
might have been capable of kinds of interference (shamanistic healings, voodoo
death, etc.) that are inconceivable for us emotionally stunted technical giants today.
So much for the situation of archaic people. Advances in technical knowledge,
thereby a stabilized object relation with nature, and a more clearly developed selfrelation lead to the emergence of domains that humans experience as they become
available to themselves. Thus, profanity enters human life. In such a profane life, an
acting human being attributes any practical success to himself or herself. Failures
are not accepted as occurrences, but lead to research and the proliferation of technical knowledge. Ordinary actions lose their ritualistic quality. Ends and means are
chosen autonomously. This leads to the formation of practices and systems of practices in which the crucial parameters are the possibility for further actions and a
utility of resources. Ends are subordinated to higher ends, and only ultimate ends
still aim at Gods favor. What is beyond human control is no longer generally experienced, but increasingly kept alive in memories and tales only, with the maintenance of rituals being delegated to a priestly caste. Many and variously powerful
spirits and forces are united. Natural religion becomes high religion; encounters
with the uncontrollable are now confined to moments of special attention during
celebrations, especially at the seams and borders of life. The normative power of
religion is seen more and more heteronomous.

32

To date, ethnologists document cases that elude any satisfying explanations; cf., for instance,
Rsing (1990). For instances that are a bit closer to our cultural context, Thomas Manns reports
about the occult seances in which he participated in 1922 are exemplary. Manns tone in these
reports is one of disgust, but it is devoid of the slightest doubt about the reality of the witnessed
materializations. Cf. Mann (1993).

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The Transcendent Core of Secular Reason

417

The dawn of Enlightenment breaks. Normative religious codes and their justifications are criticized and rejected. People realize that the divine is a projection of
their fears or of their desire for security. In knowledge creation, the development of
technology and social organization, autonomy is now the ideal. The salvation of
the world or the good life becomes synonymous with the goal of cooperative, autonomous human activity. Consequently, secularization replaces the promise of salvation with a belief in progress: research that is no longer subject to unnecessary
restrictions will enable the human potential to develop technically, socially, and
morally in such a manner that the beautiful and good world will ultimately be within
reach.33
In the 18th- and 19th-century Europe, this belief in progress was regarded as a
doctrine capable of replacing religion. Depending on their preferences, people banked
on technical (natural scientists and engineers) or social progress (republicans and
socialists). The 20th century, however, brought disillusionment. The most advanced
technology was now used to build the most terrible weapons and the most benevolent social ideals were discredited by totalitarian forms of government. If today, at
the beginning of the 21st century, the belief in progress is invoked once more, this
time with respect to genetic engineering, then this is probably nothing but a rationalization of business interests and a numbing of the perceived lack of meaning in
life. Discussions about the idea that human life could truly be improved by means
of genetic engineering indicate a deep skepticism, at least in the European countries.
To be sure, there are optimists, but it is difficult to dispel the impression that their
optimism is merely a false front. Even economic developments are supposed to give
rise to an optimism about progress. At this point, it is barely possible to dismiss the
impression that such an optimism is deceiving. The capitalist market economy in a
democratic state is the future model for the entire globe, in spite of the apparent fact
that democracy, in the way it is now regarded as functioning properly, depends on a
functioning economy. Capitalist economies, however, are dependent on expansion.
If there is no room for further expansion because of the commodification of the
entire globe (and if the natural forces released in the process still allow for the existence of human life), then humanity will think of something else or alternative ideas
(which, after all, exist at the moment, but cannot be enforced yet) will prevail. Such
considerations, or similar ones, will presumably be on the agenda at that point.
Against this background, there has been an astonishing revival of religion over
the last decades. The churches as social institutions and the Christian thinkers speak
out in favor of respect for Gods creation. Their main interlocutors, however, do
not believe in creation (even if they talk a lot about it, especially if they are politicians). Of course, there are good reasons for such skepticism. An enlightened
humanity cannot simply return to an earlier state. The religious frame has ceased to
33

Paradigm cases of this belief are the corresponding formulations in Diderots justification for the
project of the Encyclopdie. He writes that the collection and systematization of knowledge is
necessary so that our descendants, by becoming more learned, may become more virtuous and
happier. Robespierre even called the Encyclopdie the introductory chapter to the revolution; cf.
Mittelstra (1980b).

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provide a theoretical basis for decisions in technical and economic research and
praxis. A natural preserve, for instance, cannot be justified with respect for Gods
creation, but with tangible interests such as human recreation and the conservation
of flora and fauna (which are saved for later use). A deliberate return to religion in
the original sense, then, seems impossible for the hedonists and stakeholders of
Western civilizationeven if Earth should one day become once more the inhospitable
and dangerous place it used to be for the early humans. After all, the latter did not
simply experience fear and longing, but they belonged intimately to the events from
which they expected happiness and dread. Their trust was a trust in events that were
at work in themselves. This unity, however, can probably never be achieved again.
Still, everyone has not been touched by enlightenment. At least half of humanity
still lives quite traditionally. There are all kinds of religiosity. In particular, there is
Islam, a monotheistic religion that is younger than Christianity, which positions
itself in relation to Christianity in a way that is similar to Christian attitudes toward
Judaism until the 20th century: By regarding itself as a renewal which again produces the actual truths. It seems that Islam is much less likely than Christianity to
be converted into a component of the private pursuit of happiness in a secular environment. This is partly due to its semantic content (God is abstract) and also to the
fact that it is currently still the religion of the less-developed and poorer parts of
humanity. As may be the case, the protection and vindication of Gods honor, as
well as the pious persons honor reflected in it, might demand actions that conflict
considerably with our legal norms (human rights, criminal law) in the West. Yet a
person who knows that she is Gods subject and has to defend Gods honor will only
be able to communicate externally with a person who knows that God does not
exist.34
To conclude, the constellations that emerge with respect to religion in the modern
world and especially in the globalized future are full of tensions. Any attempt to
instigate a dialogue between the religions or a global minimal consensus of common values35 will presumably not make a lot of headway if it is not embedded in an
understanding of how to justly distribute wealth and power. That the latter is a political problem is indeed true. Yet any expectations that a living religion such as Islam,
whose concerns with regard to human life are enormously political, could be really
divorced from politics may prove to be premature. (In Islam, the statement, My
kingdom is not of this world, is meaningless.) Ultimately, then, we can only hope
that the question which one is stronger, the Muslim trust in God or the selfconfidence of the secular West, does not have to be decided, let alone fought out.
We have now arrived at the previously announced significance of the topic of
religion for the practice of argumentation. After all, the only one thing we can offer
in relation to these differences and disputesboth with the religious part of humanity
as well as with each other concerning the suitability of currently pursued giant projects
such as genetic engineeringis, as long as we remain reasonable, argumentation.
34

In this sentence, the use of knowledge is not terminological, but rhetorical. These people have
(doxastic) beliefs which they consider to be irrefutable.
35
Cf. Kng and Schmidt (1998).

10.4

The Transcendent Core of Secular Reason

419

Arguing can only proceed if a sufficient theoretical basis, which can function as a
common argumentative basis, is available or can be sought or provided by way of
frame modification. Yet, is it even possible to have a dialogue between religious and
secular culture, which moves beyond superficialities?
This, finally, was the purpose of addressing reason and belief. After all, finding
common ground between the two is not a hopeless cause. If we consider the idea of
reason closely enoughif we consider that our technical powers could already lead
to the destruction of humanity and of an Earth habitable for humans (according to
our current understanding)then we can come to realize that our reason, which we
regard as the highest power and indeed have to regard as such, has a transcendent
core. This core consists of the trust that we will do things in the right way: We will
not destroy humanity, but solve our problems; we will continue to do research and
increasingly come to an understanding of who we really are. Nevertheless, in order
to conceive of the rightness or truth of our self-determined human life, we require
an external standpoint that only will be available to us, if at all, in some remote
future. Hence, this assumption is the secular version of the religious belief that we
humans will eventually be one with God.
In fact, anyone who argues earnestly and to the point, in recognition of the Other
and with an awareness that this is the line of action by which humans assure
themselves of the rightness of their major research theses, constantly makes a kind
of reasonable statement of belief: I believe in humanity. This is the message underlying any instance of earnestly addressing an argument, improving a justification, or
considering an objection.
This trust in humanity, mobilized in the practice of argumentation, is not even
undermined by the fact that our arguments are often beset by objections and that
there are several states of argumentation for the same quaestiones, that is, that we
face a pluralism with respect to the ultimate validity of our research theses. As long
as we are aware that the various states of argumentation regarding some problem are
open to revision, everything is fine. Only if we view them as closed, pluralism turns
into lazy relativism. In that case, different parts of humanity simply live their lives
and all they can do is hope that they would not get in each others way. The situation
in which there are several states of argumentation regarding a thesis, all of which are
kept open for the prospect of completing the discussion, is a situation which,
taken together, constitutes the truth of a particular age. This truth is absolute, that
is, there is nothing above or beyond it. It is precisely what we are forced to rely on
in living and acting; its suitability as an orientation must therefore prove itself,
which is a story about the future shape of human life that only time can tell.
We cannot keep ourselves from realizing the theses we take to be valid. In the
process, we experience their truth or falsity in our own bodies and lives. This is the
conditio humana: We are always already engaged, like the Parisian revolutionaries,
in stirring up past circumstances, in killing our previous kings. Like Columbus, we
set out with the best, argumentatively supported belief that we are on a passage to
India, all the while being on a way to the New World.

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Index

A
Adler, Jonathan, 252, 421
Adorno, Theodor W., 107, 370, 402, 421, 426
Ailly, Pierre de, 77, 78, 80
Al Farghani (Alfraganus), 79
Al Mamun, 79
Albert, Hans, 172, 173, 370, 421
Alexy, Robert, lviii, 120, 299, 380, 421
Andreski, Stanislav, 42, 421
Anscombe, G. Elizabeth, 435
Anscombre, J.-C., liii, 421
Anselm of Canterbury, 275
Apel, Karl-Otto, xl, xli, 160, 172, 300, 301,
372, 421
Apothloz, Denis, liii
Aristoteles, 423, 427, 434
Aristotle, vii, xixxxxii, xxxvxxxviii,
xliv, xlvii, 2, 3, 9, 19, 49, 52, 77,
88, 94, 95, 103, 107, 108, 135, 146,
147, 149, 150, 155157, 160, 180,
235, 291, 316, 361, 369, 382, 389,
396, 397, 415, 421
Aspel, Patrick, 306, 429
Athena, 271
Austin, John L., 272, 421
Autiero, Antonio, 105, 421
Avery, Oswald T., 138

B
Bach, Johann S., 285
Bacon, Francis, 67, 421
Bailin, Sharon, xlvi, 421
Bakhtin, Michail M., 86
Balboa, Vasco Nunez, 84

Balme, D.L., 421

Bandler, Richard, 176, 421
Bardot, Brigitte, 31
Barley, Nigel, 101, 421
Barth, Elsa, xxxix, li, 279, 421
Bateson, Gregory, 176
Battersby, Mark, viii, xlvi, 421
Bayer, Klaus, 24, 422
Bayes, Thomas, xxix, 294
Beck, Ulrich, 91, 422
Becker, Gary S., 97, 422
Becker, Werner, 125, 422
Beecher Stowe, Harriet, 9
Behaim, Martin, 77, 78, 89
Benjamin, Walter, 114, 249, 422
Benoit, Pamela, 145, 422
Benoit, William, 145, 422, 432, 434, 436
Berger, Friedemann, 84, 90, 367, 422
Berger, Hugo, 423
Berger, Peter L., 103, 422
Bernstein, Richard, 4, 6, 7, 422
Biro, John, xlvi, 433
Blair, Anthony, viii, xlv, xlvi, 86, 252, 422,
424, 426, 429431, 434436
Blumenberg, Hans, 19, 55, 422
Boas, Franz, 305, 422
Bochenski, Josef Maria, 30, 422
Boghossian, Paul A., 308, 422
Bhler, Dietrich, 301, 421, 422
Bhm, Gnther, 76, 422
Bohr, Niels, 273
Bonjour, Laurence, 43, 422
Bourdieu, Pierre, 103, 176, 422
Boyle, Robert, 69, 138, 139, 287
Bredekamp, Horst, 430

H.R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation,

Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8,
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

437

438
Brentano, Franz, 370, 422
Brockriede, Wayne, 250, 423
Bucher, Corina, 76, 79, 422
Bchner, Georg, 114, 430
Bhler, Karl, 18, 272, 422

C
Cabot, John, 84
Caesar, Julius, 220, 222
Cage, John, 285
Callicles, 106
Cantor, Georg, 364
Carnap, Rudolf, 3, 14, 171, 422
Cassirer, Ernst, 118, 410, 422
Chammah, Albert M., 125, 431
Chargaff, Erwin, 157
Charles I., King of England, 229
Charpa, Ulrich, 27, 58, 170, 422
Christensen, Ralph, viii, lviii, 423
Christmann, U., 136, 425
Cicero, Marcus Tullius, xxviii, xxxvi
Ciompi, Luc, 112, 423
Cochrane, J.L., 424
Cohen, Harvey C., 414, 427
Cohen, Jonathan, 110, 423
Cole, P., 425
Coln, Cristbal, lxii, 24, 28, 71, 7581,
84, 89, 90, 101, 105, 117, 137,
202205, 241, 243, 248, 273, 282,
287, 367, 422, 429
Coln, Fernando, 89, 202
Condorcet, Antoine Marquis de, 71, 72, 423
Constantine, 76
Cooke, H.P., 421
Copi, Irving, 155, 423
Cowans, J., 433
Cress, D.A., 423

D
Dahrendorf, Ralph, 370, 421
Dalla Chiara, M.L., 424
Danton, George, 159, 213, 224
Darwin, Charles, 277
Dascal, Marcelo, 429, 432
Davidson, Donald, 304, 305, 423
Dawkins, Richard, 101, 423
Delius, H., 428
Dennett, Daniel, 100, 423
Deppermann, Arnulf, liii, 187, 194, 238,
423, 433
Descartes, Ren, 96, 146, 148, 272, 273, 276,
300, 386, 423
Detel, Wolfgang, 83, 423

Index
Dewey, John, xlvi, 4, 5, 423
Dias, Bartolomeu, 90, 243
Diderot, Denis, 417
Dingler, Hugo, lvii, 9, 15, 4042, 58, 82,
364, 423
Diogenes Laertius, xxx, 423
Ducrot, Oswald, liii, 421
Dring, Ingemar, xxv, 423

E
Eccles, W., 27, 431
Eemeren, Frans van, xxxvi, xlii, xliii, liv, lv,
lvii, 120, 155, 162, 232, 423, 426, 429,
431, 435, 436
Ehninger, Douglas, 250, 423
Einstein, Albert, xvii, 38, 273
Eisenstein, Sergej M., 192
Eliade, Mircea, 415, 423
Elias, Norbert, 69, 423
Elster, Jon, 381383, 424
Empedocles, 306, 307
Ende, Michael, 387, 423
Eratosthenes, 33, 79, 423
Erikson, Erik H.,
113, 415, 424
Escher, Maurits C., 180
Euclid, xxvii, 424
Euthydemus, 397
Ezra, 78, 79

F
Fahrenbach, Herbert, 425
Fehr, Ernst, 125, 424
Felix Krull, 97
Fenner, W., 427
Fetscher, Iring, xxxi, 424
Feyerabend, Paul, 7, 37, 68, 176, 193, 379,
382, 424
Fichte, Johann G., 369, 370
Finetti, Bruno de, 294, 424
Finocchiaro, Maurice, viii, xliv, 157, 208, 252,
374, 424
Fisch, R., 64, 176, 178, 434
Fischer, Thomas, 252, 424
Flaissier, Sabine, 139, 193, 205, 210, 430
Fleck, Ludwig, 176, 201, 424
Fogelin, Robert, xlv, 208, 424
Fllesdal, Dagfinn, 381383, 424
Forster, E.S., 2, 421
Fra Angelico, 180
Frankfurt, Harry, 100, 424
Franklin, Benjamin, 249, 424
Freeman, James B., 252

439

Index
Freemann, Kathleen, 396, 424
Freese, J.H., 421
Frege, Gottlob, xlii, 85, 141, 364, 424
Freud, Sigmund, 96
Friedenthal, Richard, 399, 424
Fries, Jakob F., 171, 172
Fritze, Lothar, 205, 424
Furet, Franois, 217, 424
Furley, D.J., 421

G
Gadamer, Ernst, xlvi, 383, 424
Ghde, Ulrich, 31, 111, 424
Galilei, Galileo, 374
Gastaldi, Giacomo, 84
Gatzemeier, Matthias, 432
Geertz, Clifford, 305, 424
Gehlen, Arnold, 103, 176, 424
Gethmann, Carl Friedrich, lii, 67, 425, 430
Gettier, Edmund, 4548, 425
Goebbels, Joseph, xxxi, 424
Goethe, Johann W., 180, 422
Goffman, Erwing, 176, 425, 434
Gogh, Theo van, 309
Goodenough, Ursula, 157
Goodfield, June, 69, 433
Goodwin, Jean, viii, xix, 425
Gorgias, v, 106, 109, 276, 277, 288, 396
Gosepath, Stephan, 101, 106, 112, 173, 425,
426, 431
Govier, Trudy, viii, xlv, 252258, 260, 263,
265, 320, 383, 425
Graumann, Siegrid, 425, 427, 431, 435
Greenstreet, W.J., 431
Gregor, M., 427
Grewendorf, Gnther, 279, 425
Grice, H.P., liv, lv, 425
Grinder, John, 176, 421
Groeben, Norbert, 136, 425
Gronke, Horst, 129, 425
Grootendorst, Rob, xxxvi, xlii, xliii, liv, lv,
lvii, 155, 162, 232, 423, 435
Gross, Stephen, 8, 18, 425
Grundler, Elke, 428
Gruyter, W. de, 421, 424, 426, 429,
432, 435
Guillotin, Joseph I., 140
Guyer, P., 427

H
Habermas, Jrgen, xvi, xxxii, xlxlii, xlviii, lviii,
8, 131, 139, 175, 235, 250, 298300, 318,
319, 370, 371, 406, 421, 425

Hacking, Ian, 7, 58, 300, 425

Hager, Fritz-Peter, 434
Hahn, Alois, 434
Hamblin, C.L., xxxii, xxxviii, xxxix, xliv, xlix,
li, 86, 155, 425
Hample, Dale, 145, 422
Hansen, Hans V., xlix, l, 252, 425
Harman, Gilbert, 118, 425
Hartung, Martin, 423, 433
Hastedt, Heiner, 432
Heath, T.L., 424
Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm, xli, 98,
100, 105, 115, 116, 122, 143, 190,
271, 290, 370, 383, 400, 401, 408,
425, 429, 433
Heidegger, Martin, xlii, 67, 68, 175, 425
Heine, Peter, 207, 425
Heisenberg, Werner, 38, 273, 426
Helas, P., 430
Hempel, Gustav, 3
Henige, David, 385, 426
Heraclitus, 301, 415
Herbig, Jost, 156, 157, 426
Hernando, King of Spain, 76
Herzog, Roman, 337, 338
Hetherington, Stephen C., 45, 426
Heydenreich, Titus, 422
Hilbert, David, 27, 28
Hintikka, Jaakko, 86
Hirsch, Richard, xviii, 318, 426
Hitchcock, David, viii, xlv, 156, 376, 426
Hobbes, Thomas, xxvii, 409, 410, 426
Hoerster, Norbert, 354, 426
Hoff, Johannes, 335, 426
Hffe, Otfried, 409, 426
Hofmannsthal, Hugo von, 115
Holzinger, Katharina, xvi, 426
Holzkamp, Klaus, 15, 426
Homer, 54
Honneth, Axel, 434
Hoppmann, Michael J., vii, 426
Horkheimer, Max, 107, 402, 426
Houtlosser, P., liv, 423
Hubbard, Ruth, 157
Hppe, Hubert, 118, 316, 319, 324360,
405, 406
Hurley, Susan, 432
Hus, Jan, 399, 424
Husserl, Edmund, 370
Hwang Woo Suk, 340, 344

I
Inhetveen, Rdiger, 58, 426, 433
Ivanyi, Z., 427

440
J
Jackson, Sally, liv, 423
Jacobs, Scott, liv, 423
James, Henry, 426
James, William, 4, 5, 34, 43, 426, 432
Jane, Lionel C., 78, 80, 81, 101, 117, 149, 204,
205, 242, 253, 260, 426
Janich, Peter, 9, 12, 15, 58, 365, 426, 430
Janik, Allan, xxxiv, xxxv, 433
Jaquette, Dale, 426
Jardine, Lisa, 421
Jaspers, Karl, 113, 426
Jeffrey, R.C., 422
Jelden, Eva, 365, 426, 435
Jin, Rongdong, 252
John Paul II (pope), 273
Johnson, Ralph, viii, xliii, xlv, xlvi, 235, 252,
422, 424, 426, 430, 431, 434436

K
Kahane, Howard, xlv, 426
Kaiser, Matthias, 381
Kambartel, Friedrich, lviii, 5, 28, 113, 129,
426, 427
Kamlah, Wilhelm, xl, xlii, 13, 15, 26, 31, 106,
187, 298, 408, 427
Kant, Immanuel, xlii, lvii, 9, 19, 100, 105,
114, 118, 135, 146, 155, 182, 186, 187,
224, 274, 281, 306, 362, 364, 369, 370,
400, 408, 410, 414, 422, 427
Kapp, Ernst, xx, 427
Karl, R., 430, 431
Kauffeld, Fred, viii
Kekul, August F., 282
Kenyon, Tim, xlvi, 427
Kersting, Wolfgang, 118, 427
Kertsz, Andrs, 427
Kettner, Matthias, 421
Kienpointner, Manfred, xvi, xxxvi, xlvii, liv,
61, 62, 148, 250, 251, 304, 427
Kindt, Wolfgang, liii, 427
Kirchgssner, Gebhard, 97, 427
Kitcher, Philip, 44, 58, 427
Klaus, H., 428
Klein, Josef, 146, 427
Klein, Peter, 435, 436
Klein, Wolfgang, 48, 49, 279, 291, 380, 427
Klumpp, James, 436
Knaeale, Martha, 30, 427
Kneale, William, 30, 427
Knigge, Adolf Freiherr von, 31, 427
Knorr-Cetina, Karin, 57, 427
Kock, Christian, vii, 427
Koenig, Harold G., 414, 427

Index
Kohlberg, Lawrence, 136
Khler, Hartmut, 433
Kollek, Regine, 161, 427
Kolumbus, Christoph, 422, 434
Knig, Josef, 428
Kopperschmidt, Josef, xlvii, xlviii, lviii, 131,
175, 250, 298, 318, 319, 427, 428
Korff, Wilhelm, 421
Ktter, Rudolf, 433
Krabbe, Eric C., xxxix, li, liv, 279, 380,
421, 434
Kripke, Saul A., 7
Kruiger, Tjark, xlii, xliii, 423
Kuhn, Thomas S., v, xvii, lvii, 44, 56, 57, 148,
192, 306, 307, 382, 386, 390, 428
Kng, Hans, 418, 428
Knne, Wolfgang, xvii, 428

L
Lakatos, Imre, 37, 58, 82, 83, 382, 386,
424, 428
Lao Tsu, 403, 428
Larmor, J., 431
Las Casas, Bartolom de, 78, 84, 149, 150,
399, 428
Latour, Bruno, 57, 428
Lavoisier, Antoine, 56, 139
Leddy, Thomas, l, 428
Leibniz, Gottfried W., 115, 430
Lenz, Jakob, 114
Lerch, Kent, 435
Lever, Evelyne, 214, 217, 428
Lvinas, Emmanuel, 101, 428
Locke, John, 156, 369, 428
Lorenz, Kuno, xxxviii, xlii, 15, 115, 141, 428
Lorenzen, Paul, xxxii, xxxviii, xl, xlii, lvii,
lviii, 9, 13, 15, 26, 31, 33, 58, 106, 113,
187, 298, 401, 427, 428
Louis XVI., Ludwig XVI., Louis Capet, lxii,
25, 136, 138, 140, 193, 206, 209211,
213215, 218, 226228, 367, 428, 434
Luckmann, Thomas, 103, 422
Lueken, Geert-Lueke, lv, lix, 31, 68, 110, 129,
192, 245, 309, 428, 433
Lhdorf, Claudia, viii
Luhmann, Niklas, 175
Lumer, Christoph, xxxiii, xlvi, 85, 86, 131,
170, 250, 318, 320, 383, 390, 428, 429
Lyotard, Jean Franois, xli, 175, 238, 429

M
MacCrimmon, Kenneth R., 424
Machiavelli, Niccol, 32, 35, 429

441

Index
Macpherson, C.B., 426
Madariaga, Salvador de, 76, 80, 137, 202,
282, 429
Magritte, Ren, 197
Mailhe, Jean-Baptiste, 212, 214217, 219222
Mann, Thomas, 416, 429
Marat, Jean Paul, 224
Marco Polo, 77, 78, 84
Marinos of Tyre, 78
Mrquez, Gabriel Garcia, 63, 429
Martens, Ekkehard, 432
Marx, Karl, xli, 9, 383
Maturana, Humberto, 102, 182, 429
Mauss, Ingeborg, 118, 429
McDowell, John, 6, 362, 429
McLean, George, 306, 429
McPeck, John, xlvi, 429
Mead, Georg H., 46, 99, 410, 429
Meggle, Georg, lv, 337, 381, 429, 435
Mengel, Peter, viii, lix, 146, 148, 151, 261,
387, 406, 429
Merkel, Reinhard, 118, 161, 316, 319, 320,
324360, 405, 406, 429
Merton, Robert, 35, 300, 429
Metzler, J.B., 422
Michelet, Jules, 117, 220, 226, 287, 429
Milgram, Stanley, 119, 429
Miller, Konrad, 79, 429
Miller, Max, 136, 429
Minerva, 271
Mittelstra, Jrgen, 15, 19, 20, 34, 50, 67, 310,
417, 425, 428430, 433, 435
Monty Python, xiii
Moore, Georg Edward, 6, 430
Morgan, J.L., 425
Morgenstern, Christian, lxii, 430
Morisson, Charles F.G., 206, 207, 212,
217222, 226
Morris, Charles W., 429
Muhammad Ali, 97, 431
Musgrave, Alan, 424, 428

N
Nagel, Thomas, 108, 186, 430
Neurath, Otto, 35, 171, 430
Newell, S., 434
Newton, Isaac, 300
Nidditch, P.H., 428
Niehues-Prbsting, Heinrich, xxiii, xlvi,
xlvii, 430
Niemann, Hans-Joachim, 173, 430
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 9, 96, 402, 430
Norris, Christopher, 309, 430

Notturno, M.A., 431

Nunn, George E., 75, 78, 79, 81, 84, 430

O
Oberlin, Johann Friedrich, 114
Odysseus, 54
Oesterreich, Peter L., xlvi, xlvii, 430
Olbrechts-Tyteca, Lucie, xxxii, xxxvxxxviii,
xlvixlviii, lviii, 94, 110, 151, 274,
296, 297, 389, 427, 430
Olschki, Leonardo, 20, 430
Oppenheim, Paul, 3
Ozouf, Mona, 217, 424

P
Pascal, Blaise, 414, 430
Paschen, Harm, 251, 430, 435
Paul (and Saul), 112
Peirce, Charles Sanders, lvii, 47, 47, 155,
273, 278, 299, 300, 430
Perelman, Chaim, xxxii, xxxvxxxviii,
xliv, xlvixlix, lviii, 94, 110,
151, 250, 274, 296, 297, 389,
390, 430
Perez de Luna, 282
Pericles, 396
Pernoud, Georges, 139, 193, 205, 210, 430
Perrow, Charles, 395, 430
Perry, R.B., 426
Peter, Karl H., 79, 430
Peterson (Protestant), xxxiii, 291293
Piaget, Jean, 136
Pilot, Harald, 370, 421
Pinto, Robert C., xlvi, xlviii, xlix, 252, 425,
430, 431
Plato, v, xxxxvi, xxxi, 19, 4446, 96, 106,
109, 154, 276278, 288, 291, 369, 388,
396, 397, 431
Poincar, Henri, 148, 431
Polos, 288, 396
Popper, Karl R., v, xxix, xl, liv, lvii, 3, 7, 14,
27, 35, 38, 56, 81, 98, 171, 172, 176,
239, 273, 282, 370, 382, 421, 431
Posidonius, 79
Priestley, Joseph, 72, 249
Prittwitz, Volker, xvi, 431, 432
Protagoras, 396
Provis, Chris, xvi, 431
Psarros, Nikos, 53, 431
Ptolemy, Claudius, 77, 78, 80, 89
Pusztai, Arpad, 284
Putnam, Hilary, 7, 8, 18, 47, 421, 425, 431

442
Q
Quine, William van Orman, 26, 53, 111,
320, 431
Quintilian, Marcus Fabius, xxviii, xxxvi

R
Rackham, H., 421
Radziewsky, Katharina von, viii
Rapoport, Anatol, 125, 431
Raters, M.L., 421
Rawls, John, 110, 118, 247, 431
Reemtsma, Jan-Philipp, 97, 431
Rees, R., 435
Rehbein, Jochen, liii
Reichenbach, Hans, 56, 239, 431
Replanski, Naomi, 115, 431
Rescher, Nicholas, 41, 43, 157, 247, 380,
431, 433
Rhodes, J., 434
Richelieu, Armand J de, 368
Riedel, Manfred, 435
Riedel, Ulrike, 206, 431
Rieke, Richard, xxxiv, xxxv, 433
Rilke, Rainer Maria, 315
Ritola, Juho, 426
Robespierre, Maximilien, 69, 137, 140, 159,
209, 212, 220, 221, 224229, 417, 428
Robinson, Richard, li, 431
Rohbeck, J., 424
Roland, Jean Marie de, 213
Rorty, Richard, 8, 9, 432
Rsing, Ina, 416, 432
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 25, 117, 118, 194,
220222, 285, 369, 370, 409, 410,
427, 432
Rowland, Robert, 145, 432
Russell, Bertrand, xlii, 6, 43, 44, 85, 141, 257,
364, 432
Ryle, Gilbert, 19, 432

S
Saint-Just, Louis A.L de, 69, 72, 140, 212,
220228
Salmon, Marilee H., 166169, 432
Salmon, Wesley C., 146, 151, 432
Sandbothe, Mike, 7, 432
Sander, Thorsten, lv, 432
Sandkhler, Hans J., 429
Sanford, David, li, 432
Santangel, Luis de, 203
Saretzki, Thomas, xvi, 432
Sartre, Jean P., 370
Sawyer, Tom, 195, 198, 208, 247

Index
Schelling, Friedrich W., xli, 370
Scherer, Andreas, 422, 425, 428, 433, 435
Schiller, Friedrich, 275
Schlechta, Karl, 430
Schlick, Moritz, 171
Schmidt-Faber, Werner, 251, 432
Schmidt, Helmut, 428
Schmidt, Klaus, 125, 424
Schmidt, Ursula, lix, 245, 432
Schmitten, Jrgen in der, 335, 426
Schmcker, Reinold, 337, 432
Schndelbach, Herbert, lii, 432
Schneider, Hans Julius, lv, 186, 399, 432
Schreier, M., 136, 425
Schulte, Joachim, 435
Scriven, Michael, xlv, 251, 432
Searle, John, liv, lv, 272, 432
Sellars, Wilfried, 362, 432
Semmelweis, Ignaz, 363, 432
Sen, Amartya, 125, 379, 432
Sennett, Richard, 178, 433
Seplveda, Juan G. de, 149151, 433
Sze, Raymond de, 214, 217
Sheehan, T., 425
Shute, Stephen, 432
Siegel, Harvey, xlvi, 433
Silverthorne, Michael, 421
Skirbekk, Gunnar, 300, 421, 433
Snoeck-Henkemans, Francisca, xxxvi, xlii,
xliii, liii, liv, lvii, 120, 423, 429
Snow, C.P., 363, 433
Sobota, Katarina, 94, 95, 435
Socrates, v, xxii, xxv, 154, 288, 370,
388, 396
Spaemann, Robert, 100, 386, 433
Spinoza, Baruch, xxvii
Spranz-Fogasy, Thomas, lii, liii, 433
Stahl, Ernst, 69, 137, 306
Stalnaker, Robert C., 31, 433
Stegmaier, Werner, 19, 433
Stegmller, Wolfgang, 3, 365, 433
Steiner, Rudolf, 407
Steinmann, Horst, 422, 433, 435
Steinvorth, Ulrich, 50, 101, 170, 337, 433
Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin, 5, 6, 143, 146,
427, 429, 433
Strker, Elisabeth, 365, 433

T
Talavera, Hernando de, 25, 75, 202, 203
Tetens, Holm, 15, 58, 83, 84, 387, 433, 435
Thales, 367
Theaetetus, xxvi, 44, 45
Thiel, Christian, 3, 364, 433

443

Index
Thomas Aquinas, 369
Thomson, Judith, 161, 433
Tindale, Christopher, viii, xlviii, 86, 433
Tolksdorf, Stefan, 435
Toscanelli, Paolo, 77, 80, 248
Toulmin, Stephen, xxxiixxxv, xxxviii, xli,
xlii, xliv, lii, lviii, 69, 128, 130, 133,
145, 146, 170, 175, 193, 250, 256,
291293, 316, 319, 389, 433435
Trakl, Georg, 315
Tredennick, H., 421
Trenn, T.J., 424
Twain, Mark, 195

V
Valry, Paul, 363, 433
Venzke, Andreas, 29, 75, 79, 80, 89, 241,
242, 434
Vespucci, Amerigo, 84
Vico, Giambattista, 9
Vignaud, Henry, 75, 434
Vitoria, Francisco de, 150, 399
Vogt, Rdiger, 428
Vlzing, Paul, xliii, 434

W
Wald, George, 157
Waldenfels, Bernhard, 101, 434
Waldseemller, Martin, 84
Walle, Lars, 381383, 424
Walton, Douglas, xxxix, xlix, li, liv, 86, 121,
155, 252, 287, 380, 434, 436
Walzer, Michael, 72, 211, 215, 216, 218222,
225227, 434
Wassermann, Jakob, 282, 434
Watson, James, 156, 157, 434
Watzlawick, Paul, 64, 176, 178, 434
Weakland, P.B., 64, 176, 178, 434
Weil, Eric, xxiii, 434
Weimer, Wolfgang, lii, 434
Weinstein, Mark, viii, xlvi, 434
Weischedel, Wilhelm, 414, 434
Wellmann, Carl, 252, 253, 434

Wellmer, Albrecht, 47, 299, 312, 434

Wenzel, Josef W., 235, 434
Whitehead, Alfred N., 257
Whitehead, Evelyn W., 257
Whorf, Benjamin Lee, xvii
Wiesenthal, Simon, 76, 434
Wigger, Lothar, 430, 435
Willard, Charles Arthur, 145, 385, 434, 435
Willaschek, M., 421
Willems, Herbert, 103, 176, 434
Williamson, Timothy, 36, 433
Winnacker, Ernst Ludwig, 161, 435
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, xvii, xlii, lvii, 25, 26,
33, 67, 68, 84, 101, 141, 176, 187, 191,
272, 370, 386, 401, 435
Wohlrapp, Harald, viii, xxxiii, li, 11, 12, 42,
94, 95, 107, 129, 132, 133, 159, 160,
173, 175, 180, 206, 251, 252, 254, 281,
313, 337, 372, 409, 412, 413, 426, 427,
429, w435
Wood, A.W., 427
Woods, John, xlix, li, 94, 155, 412,
435, 436
Woolgar, Steve, 57, 428
Wreen, Michael, l, 94, 436
Wright, Crispin, 47, 299, 436
Wright, Georg Henrik von, 16, 434, 435
Wunderlich, Dieter, lii, 250, 436

X
Xenophanes, 271

Y
Ysabel, Queen of Spain, 76, 202

Z
agar, Igor, liii
Zarefsky, David, 145, 175, 436
Zeitz, Colleen M., 166169, 432
Zelany, Milan, 424
Zenker, Frank, xliii, 252, 436
Zeno of Elea, xxiii