Did Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?

Author(s): Ted Joyce

Source: The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter, 2004), pp. 1-28
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
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Did Legalized Abortion

Lower Crime?

Ted Joyce
ABSTRACT
In this paper I compare changes in homicide and arrest rates among cohorts born before and after the legalization of abortion to changes in
crime in the same years among similar cohorts who were unexposed to legalized abortion. I find little consistent evidence that the legalization of
abortion in selected states around 1970, and then in the remaining states
following Roe v. Wade, had an effect on recent crime rates. I conclude
that the dramatic association as reported in a recent study is most
likely the result of unmeasured period effects such as changes in crack
cocaine use.

I. Introduction
In a recentandcontroversialarticle,DonohueandLevitt(2001) presentevidencethatthe legalizationof abortionin 1973 explainsoverhalf of therecent
declinein crimeacrossthe UnitedStates.A 50 percentincreasein the meanabortion
ratiois associatedwithan 11 percentdecreasein violentcrime,an 8 percentdecrease
in propertycrime and a 12 percentdecreasein murder.These effects are generally
andpolice manlargerandmorepreciselyestimatedthanthe effects of incarceration
the
of
conclude
that
full
on
crime
Roe
v. Wadewill
Moreover,
they
impact
power.
not be felt for another20 years. To quote, "Ourresults suggest that all else equal,
Ted Joyce is a professorof economicsat BaruchCollege and a researcherwith the NationalBureau
of EconomicResearch.Thisworkwas supportedby a grantfrom the OpenSocietyInstitute.John
DonohueIII and StevenLevittgraciouslysharedtheirdata and programs,which greatlyfacilitatedthe
author'sanalysis. Theyalso providedhelpfulcommentson earlier drafts.The authoralso thanksGreg
Colmanfor researchassistanceand RobertKaestner,Michael Grossman,SandersKorenman,Philip
Cook,Phillip Levine,JohnLott,and numerousseminarparticipantsfor helpfulcomments.He states
that the views and errors in this manuscriptare his and not those of the OpenSocietyInstitute,Baruch
College, or the NationalBureauof EconomicResearch.Thedata used in this article can be obtained
beginningAugust2004 throughJuly 2007from Dr. TedJoyce, NationalBureauof EconomicResearch, 365 FifthAvenue,5th Floor, New York,NY 10016-4309.
[SubmittedMay 2002; acceptedJuly 2002]
ISSN 022-166X ? 2004 by the Boardof Regentsof the Universityof WisconsinSystem
THE JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES * XXXIX * 1

The Journalof HumanResources

legalized abortionwill accountfor persistentdeclines of 1 percenta year in crime
over the next two decades"(p. 415). Given the social costs associatedwith crime
and the controversy surroundingabortion, a causal link between abortionand
crime has profoundimplicationsfor social policy.
The purposeof this paperis to analyzethe associationbetweenlegal abortionand
crime.The primarydifferencebetweenmy analysisof abortionand crime and that
of Donohue and Levitt is the identificationstrategy.Donohue and Levitt regress
crimeratesbetween 1985 and 1996 on abortionratioslagged 15 to 25 yearsadjusted
for state and year fixed effects. However,the study periodcoincides with the rise
anddecline of the crackcocaineepidemic,which many observerslink to the spread
of guns and the unprecedentedincreasein youth violence (Cook and Laub 1998;
Blumstein1995; Blumstein,Rivara,and Rosenfeld2000). Moreover,datafrompolice surveys,emergencyrooms,andfromurinesamplesof arresteesin majormetropolitanareassuggeststhatthe timing of the arrival,diffusion,and decline in crack
use variedsignificantlyby city (GolubandJohnson1997; Cork 1999; Groggerand
Willis 2000). Thus,even in models with stateandyear fixedeffects, the relationship
betweenabortionandcrimemay be biasedby differencesin within-stategrowthin
cocainemarketsover time, a classic problemof omittedvariables.A crudesolution
is to include controlsfor state-specificlinearor quadratictrends.However,this is
not possible in the contextof DonohueandLevitt's model, becausethe trendterms
remove all variationin the abortionratio.
I take a differentapproachto the identificationof an abortion-crimenexus. I use
the early legalizationof abortionin selected states priorto Roe v. Wadeand then
nationallegalizationafterRoe in the remainingstates to identify exogenous shifts
in unintendedchildbearing.Specifically,I estimatea reduced-formequationin which
changes in arrestand homicide rates among cohorts before and after exposureto
legalizedabortionarecomparedto changesamongcohortsthatareunexposed.1This
is similar to Donohue and Levitt's fixed effect specification,since identification
comes fromchangesin crimeand abortionacrossstates.However,I show thatthese
estimatesare sensitiveto the yearsthatareanalyzed,whichI interpretas an omitted
variableproblemrelatedto unobserved,state-specificperiod effects. I then use a
estimatorbased on a within-statecomparisongroupto net
difference-in-difference
factorsthatvaryby stateand
out changesin crime associatedwith hard-to-measure
year, such as the spreadof crackcocaine and its spillovereffects. In these analyses
I find no effect of abortionlegalizationon crime regardlessof the years analyzed.
The difference-in-difference
strategyhas two other advantagesin an analysisof
abortionand crime.First,DonohueandLevittuse the ratioof abortionsto birthsas
an inverse proxy for unwantedbirths.However,abortionis endogenousto sexual
activity,contraceptionandchildbearing.A rise in abortionmay have relativelylittle
effect on unwantedchildbearing.It is noteworthy,that the abortionraterose from
16.3 abortionsper 1,000 women ages 15 to 44 in 1973 to 29.3 in 1980, an increase
of 79 percent.Overthe sameperiod,however,the numberof birthsper 1,000women
1. See Levine et al. (1999), Gruber,Levine, and Staiger(1999), Angristand Evans (1999) for a similar
approachappliedto fertility,child well-being,and teen pregnancy,respectively.A recentmanuscriptby
Lott and Whitley (2001) also focuses on a comparisonof cohorts exposedand unexposedto legalized
abortion.They reporta positive but relativelysmall associationbetween legalized abortionand murder
rates.

Joyce
ages 15 to 44 was essentiallyunchanged,from 69.2 to 68.4. By contrast,there is
substantialevidencethatthe earlylegalizationof abortionin selectedstatesinduced
a significantdecline in fertilitybetween 1971 and 1973 (Sklar and Berkov 1974;
Joyce and Mocan 1990; Levine et al. 1999; Angristand Evans 1999). This change
in fertilityis a moreplausiblesourceof exogenousvariationwith which to identify
a decline in unwantedbirthsthan within-statechanges in reportedlegal abortions
between 1973 and 1985.
The other advantageof the difference-in-difference
approachis that it obviates
the need to measureillegal or unreportedabortionin the years before legalization.
DonohueandLevittuse no dataon abortionpriorto 1973. Theiranalysisof arrests
by single year of age, for instance,pertainsto birthcohortsbornbetween 1961 and
1981 where approximately60 percentof the state/age/cohortcells are assignedan
have concludedthatmost legal aborabortionratioof zero.However,demographers
tions in the early 1970s replacedillegal abortions(Tietze 1973; Sklarand Berkov
of abortionwere randomamong states,theirestimates
1974). If the underreporting
would be biased downward.As I show below, however,the measurementerroris
negativelycorrelatedwith the true abortionrate in 1972 and thus the directionof
the bias is unknown.

II. Conceptual and Empirical Issues

A. Abortionand UnintendedChildbearing
As outlinedby Donohueand Levitt,thereare severalways in which legal abortion
can affectcrime.Cohortsize is one. Fewerbirthsmeanfewercriminalsin subsequent
years.Second,legal abortionmay also affect crimeratesthrougha relativedecrease
in fertilityratesamongpoor,young,andminoritywomen.Since childrenfromdisadvantagedbackgroundsaremorelikely to commitcrimesas teens or adults,the result
of a selective reductionin childbearingis a drop in crime rates approximately15
to 25 years later. Third,even if the decline in fertilityrates caused by legalized
abortionweredistributedequallyamongall women,a fall in unintendedchildbearing
could bring abouta fall in crime if those born from unintendedpregnancieswere
more likely to commitcrime thanindividualsfrom pregnanciesthatwere intended.
DonohueandLevitt'sidentificationstrategyis to correlatecrimeratesandarrests
to lagged abortionratios adjustedfor state and year fixed effects. Abortionratios
serve as an inverseproxy for unwantedchildbearing.In their analysisof arrestsof
youths 15 to 24 yearsof age, theyregressarrestsby singleyearof age on the abortion
ratioin the year before a cohortwas born.Thus, arrestsof 18-year-oldsin 1988 in
statej are correlatedwith the abortionratio in statej in 1969 (t-18-1).
B. Period and CohortEffects
Thebiggestchallengeto identifyinga cohorteffect associatedwithlegalizedabortion
is the potentialconfoundingfrom strongperiod effects such as the spreadof crack
risein youthhomicidebetween 1985and 1993.
cocaine.Therewas anunprecedented
The rise amongblacksgreatlyexceededthatof whites and almostall the growthin

The Journalof HumanResources

homicideinvolvedhandguns(Blumstein1995; 2000; Cook and Laub 1998). Criminologistshave largelyattributedthe growthin youthhomicideto the violentdevelopmentof crackcocainemarketsin poorurbancenters(Blumstein,Rivara,andRosenfeld 2000). The lack of consistentdata on the extent of cocaine use or the spread
of illegal handguns,however,has limitedempiricalwork.
Despite the lack of data, several sources suggest that the introductionof crack
occurredin the mid-to-late1980s (Cork 1999; Groggerand Willis 2000; Caulkins
2001). Groggerand Willis (2000) surveyedpolice departmentsin 27 metropolitan
areas as to the year in which crack was first noted and comparedresponsesfrom
the surveywith changesin indicationsof druguse from emergencyroomincidents
as collected by the Drug Abuse WarningNetwork(DAWN). Arrivaldates tended
to be earliestin East and West Coastcities and laterfor cites in the Midwest.Cork
(1999) used dataon drug arrestsand gun homicides to associatechangesin crack
marketactivityand youth murderrates.He also foundthat clustersof drugarrests
began first in the West and Northeastbefore moving inland.
The peakin crackuse andits declinefollowed a similarpattern.Analysesof urine
amongarresteesfromthe Drug Use Forecasting(DUF) programsuggestthatcrack
use beganto fall around1989 in New York,Philadelphia,andLos Angelesbut later
andmoreslowly in Cleveland,Chicago,andIndianapolis(GolubandJohnson1997).
For example, the proportionof arresteesthat tested positive for crack/cocainein
1989 exceeded70 percentin New YorkandPhiladelphia,60 percentin Washington
D.C. and 56 percentin Los Angeles. In Cleveland,Chicago,Dallas, Denver,Houston, Indianapolis,KansasCity, San Antonio,and St. Louis,the prevalenceof crack/
cocaine among arresteesrangedfrom approximately20 to 55 percentin 1989 and
in severalcities actuallyrose in the early 1990s.
Severalpoints from this discussionare relevant.First,dataon crackuse by state
and year are too incompleteto applyempirically.Second,what is knownsuggests
thatcrackmarketsdevelopedin differentcities at differenttimes and thusrepresent
a state-yearperiodeffect thatis not capturedby nationaltrends.Third,the dataalso
suggestthatNew YorkCity andLos Angeles were earlysites of crackmarkets.Not
only are these the largestcities in the two largeststates,but abortionbecamelegal
in both statesroughlythreeyearsbeforeRoe. Thus, Donohueand Levitt'sevidence
that crime fell earlierand faster in the early legalizing states may be spurious,a
resultof the differentialtiming in the evolutionof crackmarkets.
The potentialconfoundingfrom time-varyingperiodeffects is illustratedby the
time-seriesof age- andrace-specifichomiciderates.Figurela shows homiciderates
for white teens (ages 15 to 19) andyoungadults(ages 20 to 24) in repealandnonrepeal statesfrom 1985to 1997;Figurelb presentsthe correspondingseriesforblacks.
Repealstatesarethosethatlegalizedabortionbetween 1969 and 1970:Alaska,California,Hawaii,New York,andWashington.I also includeWashingtonD.C. among
the earlylegalizers.2Abortionbecamelegal in the nonrepealstatesin 1973 with the
SupremeCourtdecision in Roe v. Wade.
2. WashingtonD.C. has not been treatedas an "earlylegalizer"in previousanalyses.However,the 1969
As a result,writes
decisionin UnitedStatesv. Vuitchrenderedthe District'sabortionlaw unconstitutional.
abortionfacilitiessoonrankedamongthe busiestin the country,with20,000patients
Lader,"Washington's
in 1971" (Lader 1974, p. 115). Data on abortionin 1971 from the Centerfor Disease Control(1972)
supportLader'sobservation.The residentabortionratio(abortionsper 1,000 live births)in D.C. in 1971

Joyce 5
Two points are noteworthy.First, homicide rates rise earlierin repeal than in
nonrepealstatesconsistentwiththe earlierarrivalof crackin New YorkandCalifornia. Second,the curvilineartrendin homicideratesis similaramongteens andyoung
adultswithin repeal and nonrepealstates and is inconsistentwith a strongcohort
affectassociatedwith legalizedabortion.Most teens in 1985 werebornbefore 1970
andthus were unexposedto legalizedabortionin utero.By 1990, however,teens in
repealstateshad been bornafter 1970 and were thus exposed.Put differently,teens
in repeal states in 1990 representthe first cohort of "morewanted"births.Thus,
evidenceof a cohorteffect associatedwith thepre-Roelegalizationof abortionwould
be a relativedecreasein teen homicideratesin repealstatesbeginningaround1988,
followed five yearslaterby a similardecline amongyoung adults.Thereis no evidence of such a patternamongeitherblacksor whites.In fact, the coincidentmovement in homiciderates by teens and young adultsis more consistentwith strong
periodeffects. In orderto isolate a cohorteffect associatedwith the legalizationof
abortion,researchersmust adjustfor these dramatictrendsin crime within-states.
C. Mismeasurementand Endogeneityof Abortion
Anotherdrawbackto DonohueandLevitt's empiricalstrategyis themismeasurement
of abortionandits endogeneityin the yearsafterlegalization.Demographersestimate
thatapproximatelytwo-thirdsof all legal abortionsreplacedillegal ones in the first
year afterlegalization.Estimatesare based on the change in birthsbetween 1970
and 1971 comparedto the numberof reportedabortionsin 1971 (Sklarand Berkov
1974; Tietze 1973). As noted above, Donohueand Levitt have no dataon abortion
for cohortsbornbefore 1974 and thus assume a zero abortionratio for more than
half theirobservations.A facile argumentis to assumethatanyerroris likely random
and estimatesare biased downward.But this assumptionis decisively contradicted
by the data. As a simple example,Kansashad an abortionratio of 414 per 1,000
live birthsin 1973. DonohueandLevitt assumethe abortionratioin Kansasis zero
in 1972. However,datacollectedby the Centersfor Disease Control(CDC)(Centers
for Disease Control 1974) indicatethat Kansashad an observedabortionratio of
369 per 1,000 live birthsin 1972! Going further,I estimatedthe residentabortion
ratein 1972 usingpublishedCDC dataandthe algorithmused by AGI for assigning
abortionsby state of residencein 1973. The correlationbetweenresidentabortion
rates or ratios in 1972 and 1973 is 0.95. In other words, states with the greatest
abortionratios in 1973 had the greatestabortionratios in 1972. By assumingthe
abortionratiowas zero in the 45 nonrepealstatesand Washington,D.C., Donohue
and Levittbuild in an errorthatis negativelycorrelatedwith the trueabortionrate.
As a result,the directionof the bias is unknown.3
was 793, morethandoublethatof New Yorkor California.Thus,I includeWashington,D.C. in all analyses
as a repealstate.However,my resultsare not sensitiveto its inclusionas a repealstate.
3. To illustrate,Let A72be the observedabortionratio in 1972, a72the actualabortionratio and u72 the
error.Thus
A72 = a72 + U72

Recall thatA72= 0 in theiranalysis;thus,a72> 0 and u72 < 0 and the true abortionratioand the error
are negativelycorrelated;moreover,given the strongpositivecorrelationbetweenthe observedabortion
ratiosin 1972 and 1973 noted above,the correlationbetweena72and u72 is undoubtedlyrobust.Now let

The Journalof HumanResources

The otherdifficultywith the abortionratioas a measureof unwantedchildbearing
is that abortionis endogenousto sexual activity,contraceptionand fertility.Some
pregnanciesthatwere abortedin the mid-to late 1970smay not havebeenconceived
hadabortionremainedillegal. Thisweakensthe linkbetweenabortionandunwanted
childbearing.In addition,Donohue and Levitt use the abortionratio (abortions/
births)and referto it as the abortionrate (abortions/women).This exacerbatesthe
endogeneityproblemand makesthe abortionratioa less clear proxy for unwanted
births.The growthin AFDC and Medicaidin the 1970s, for instance,changedthe
priceof a birthfor manypoorwomen.Thus,the abortionratiomay varyfor reasons
unrelatedto unwantedchildbearing.
D. Selected replicationof Donohue and Levitt'sfindings
To illustratesome of the difficultieswith Donohueand Levitt's identificationstrategy, I havereplicatedtheirkey findingsandpresentedthemin Table 1. Theirprimary
evidence of an associationbetweenabortionandcrime comes from two sets of regressions.In the first, rates of violent crime, propertycrime, and murderby state
andyearareregressedon whatthe authorsterm,theeffectiveabortionrate.Thelatter
is an averageof stateabortionratiosfrom 1970 to 1985weightedby theproportionof
arrestees"exposed"to legalizedabortion.4In the secondset of regressions,the logarithmof arrestsfor violent andpropertycrimeby single year of age is regressedon
the state abortionratiothe year beforethe cohortwas born.Arrestspertainto teens
and young adults 15 to 24 years of age between 1985 and 1996, which correspond
to birth cohortsfrom 1961 to 1981. Donohue and Levitt assume that the abortion
ratio is zero for cohortsbornbefore 1974.
Row 1 of Table 1 replicatesthe key index crimeregressionsfrom Donohueand
Levitt (2001, Table 4). Only the coefficienton the effective abortionrateis shown.
As Donohueand Levitt note, an increaseof one standarddeviationin the effective
abortionratio,an increaseof approximately100 abortionsper 1,000 live births,lowers crime between 9 and 13 percent.As Donohue and Levitt demonstrate,these
estimatesarequiterobustto changesin the set of includedvariables.5However,the
estimates are very sensitive to the period analyzed,as shown in Rows 2 and 3.
Specifically,if the same specificationas in Row 1 is estimatedfor the years 1985 to
C be the crimerate and following Maddala(1992) write the simplerelationshipbetweencrime and the
observedabortionratioas used by Donohueand Levitt as follows:
(2) C = A + e

p<

to show that
Substitute(a + u) for A in Equation2. It is straightforward
=
+
+
b
2oa, + oua)
P(oaa oau)/(aa
plim
where aij is the relevantcovariance.Because a,,.and 6,, are bothpositive ando,auis negative,the effect
of the systematicerroron the plim of b is unknownin this simplecontext.
4. In 45 statesplus the Districtof Columbiathey assumethe abortionratiowas zero between 1961 and
1972. For the otherfive states they estimateabortionsfor 1970-72 by backcastinglinearlyfrom 1973
totals and then assumea zero abortionratiofrom 1961 to 1969.
5. The importantexceptionis when they includea state-specifictrendterm (Donohueand Levitt 2001,
Table5).

Joyce
Table 1
The Relationship between Abortion and Crime: Regressions of Total Index Crime
Rates and Log Arrests by Single Year of Age for 15- to 24-Year-Olds
Panel A: Index Crime Rates on Effective
Abortion Ratio

Row/period
1. 1985-97
2. 1985-90
3. 1991-97

Violent Crime

Property Crime

Murder

-0.129
(0.024)
0.017
(0.045)
-0.209
(0.035)

-0.091
(0.018)
-0.033
(0.018)
-0.186
(0.034)

-0.121
(0.047)
0.276
(0.066)
-0.338
(0.053)

Panel B: Log Arrests on Lagged Abortion Ratio

Violent Crime
Arrest

Property Crime
Arrest

Murder
Arrest

6. 1991-96

-0.015
(0.003)
0.020
(0.006)
-0.011

-0.040
(0.004)
-0.028
(0.006)
-0.041

-0.028
(0.006)
0.041
(0.013)
-0.013

7. Birth cohorts
1974-81

-0.009
(0.008)

4. 1985-96
5. 1985-90

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.007)

0.011
(0.008)

0.009
(0.022)

Figures(standarderrors)arethe coefficientson theeffectiveabortionratio(PanelA) or the laggedabortion

ratio(PanelB). Rows 1 and4 replicatethe regressionsfromTables4 and7 in DonohueandLevitt(2001).
Rows 2, 3, 5, and 6 estimatethe same specificationsbut for the designatedsubperiods.Row 7 limitsthe
regressionsof log arreststo cohortsfor which abortiondataare available.This sampleincludesarrestsof
individuals15 to 22 years of age and years 1989 to 1996. Following Donohueand Levitt, the abortion
ratiohas been multipliedby 100 in all regressions.

The Journal of Human Resources

45 > 40-

?35

TTeen Repeal

'~ 30?* 25-

YoungAdults Repeal

1 2015

Young Adults Nonrepeal

105-

Teen Nonrepeal

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

Year

Figure la
White Homicide Rates for Teens (15-19) and Young Adults (20-24) by Repeal*
and Nonrepeal States, 1985-97
1990, the coefficient on the effective abortion ratio becomes positive and statistically
insignificant in the case of violent crime, negative but greatly reduced in the case
of property crime (p < .10), and positive, very large, and statistically significant in
the case of murder. When I estimate the model for the years 1991 to 1997, the results
are largely reversed. For each crime, the coefficient on the effective abortion ratio
is negative and statistically significant. Indeed, the change in the effective abortion
ratio between 1991 and 1997 multiplied by its coefficient in the murder regression
explains the entire fall in homicide between 1991 and 1997.6
Estimates in Panel B are from the same exercise as in Panel A but applied to agespecific arrests. In these regressions, the natural logarithm of arrests for 15- to 24year-olds by single year of age are regressed on the abortion ratio in the year before
each cohort was born. The unit of observation is the cohort/state/age cell. Estimates
in Row 4 again replicate the results in Donohue and Levitt (2001, Table 7); estimates
in Rows 5 and 6 are for the designated subperiods. The pattern observed with the
index crimes in Panel A is repeated in Panel B: abortion is inversely related to arrests
(p < .01) over the full period, but the association reverses sign for violent crime
and murder arrests between 1985 and 1990, and is consistently negative when estimated for years 1991 and 1996.
The lack of temporal homogeneity in the abortion-crime association points to
problems of omitted variables.7 As shown in Figure 1, murder rates among teens
6. The murderratefell from9.8 to 6.8 per 100,000 between1991 and 1997, a declineof 31 percent.The
effective abortionratefor murderrose from 33 to 142 per 1,000 live birthsover the same period.Thus,
the predictedchange in the log murderrate based on the regressionresult for murderin Row 3 is
-0.00338*(142 - 33) = -0.368 or 36.8 percent.
7. Donohueand Levitt (2003) arguethat tests of abortionand total crime are weak between 1985 and
1990becausea relativelysmallproportionof all criminalswereexposedto legalizedabortionbefore 1990.

Joyce
300Teen Repeal

>250200

Young Adults Repeal

.~ 1500

100 -

^^[

YoungAdult Nonrepeal

50
TeenNonrepeal
85

86

87

88

89

90
91
Year

92

93

94

95

96

97

Figure lb
Black Homicide Rates for Teens (15-19) and Young Adults (20-24) by Repeal
and Nonrepeal States, 1985-97
*RepealStates:AK, CA, DC, HI, NY, WA
Source:FBI's SupplementalHomicideReports

and young adults rise rapidly between 1985 and 1992 and then fall precipitously.
Lagged abortion ratios are also rising during this time. Year fixed effects remove
national trends in both abortion and crime, but they do not eliminate confounding
from state-specific shocks associated with say, the diffusion of crack cocaine. One
solution is to include controls for state-specific linear or quadratic trends but such
terms remove all variation in the abortion ratio.8
The other notable result in Table 1 is the lack of any association between abortion
and arrests when the analysis is limited to cohorts for which data on abortion exist
(Table 1, Row 7). These regressions associate arrestsbetween 1989 and 1996 to abortion between 1974 and 1981. This is a period of rapid growth in reported legal abortion
and there is substantial variation both within and between states. Moreover, the
As evidence,they pointto theirrelativelylow effective abortionratioover this period.However,the low
figureresultsfrom their inappropriateassumptionthat there were no abortionspriorto 1973 in the 45
nonrepealstates.Earlysurveillanceby the CDCfoundthattherewere 175,508reportedabortionsin 1970,
480,259 in 1971, and586,760 in 1972in theUnitedStates(Centersfor DiseaseControl1971, 1972, 1973).
Moreover,the residentabortionratioin the repealstates:Alaska,California,WashingtonD.C., Hawaii,
New York,andWashington,was 340 in 1971 and370 in 1972 (Author'scalculationsbasedon datafrom
CDC (1972, Table4) and CDC (1974, Table5). Accordingto CDC data,the abortionratiofor the entire
US peakedin 1981 at 358 (Kooninet al. 1997). In other words, cohortsborn in repeal statesbetween
1971 and 1973 were exposedto a level of abortionthatexceededthe maximumaverageexposurefor the
entirecountryat any time since abortionbecamelegal.
8. The adjustedR-squaredin a regressionof the effective abortionratioon statedummies,yeardummies,
and state-specificlineartrendsis over 0.99, which explainsthe sensitivityof Donohueand Levitt'sestimatesto the inclusionof state-specificlineartrendterms(DonohueandLevitt2001, Table5). Moreover,
quadratictrendsare more appropriategiven the curvilineartrajectoryof crime rates, but theirestimates
become nonsensicalwhen such termsare included.

10

The Journal of Human Resources

matching of arrest rates by single year of age to the abortion ratio in the year the
cohort was "in utero" is a more direct means of linking the exposure to the outcome
than is the analysis of the total crime rate regressed on an "effective abortion ratio,"
a highly aggregated measure of exposure. The absence of a correlation between abortion and arrestsin this subsample suggests that Donohue and Levitt's decision to code
the abortion ratio as zero prior to legalization may be driving their results. Alternatively, the endogeneity of abortionmay explain the lack of an association with arrests.
States in which the cost of abortion is lower may have greater sexual activity, lower
use of contraception and higher abortion rates than states in which the cost and stigma
associated with abortion are greater. If true, then variation in abortion may be only
weakly associated with differences in unintended childbearing.9
In the empirical analysis that follows, I attempt to address each of the identification
issues just discussed. The advantage of the difference-in-differences strategy is that
by staying close to the "experiment" made available by the legalization of abortion,
I associate changes in crime with plausibly exogenous changes in unintended fertility. At the same time, I avoid problems with poorly measured abortion. What I lose
is any dose-response effect associated with variation in unwanted childbearing. However, in some analyses I estimate models separately for states with abortion rates
above and below the median abortion rate in 1973. If abortion rates were essentially
zero in 1972 in the nonrepeal states, as Donohue and Levitt assume, then the effects
should be more negative for the states with greater post-Roe abortion rates.

III. Empirical Specification and Results

A. Comparison by Year of Birth in Repeal and Nonrepeal States
Abortion laws in Alaska, California, Hawaii, New York, Washington, and the District
of Columbia, what I have referred to as the "repeal states," changed dramatically
between late 1969 and 1970. The result was de jure or de facto legalization in repeal
states almost three years prior to national legalization in 1973. Thus, there are two
major policy changes that I use to identify effects of abortion on crime: early legalization among cohorts from repeal states and national legalization following Roe. I limit
the analysis to 15- to 24-years-olds because the Uniform Crime Reports record arrests
by single year of age for this group only. These are the same data used by Donohue and
Levitt. In addition, I analyze homicide offenses as recorded on the FBI's Supplemental
Homicide Reports (SHR) [Fox 2000]. These are also available by single year of age.10
I further limit this sample to cohorts born between 1967 and 1979.1"
9. Joyce (2001) shows thatthe residentabortionratein repealstatesis almostdoublethat of nonrepeal
statesbetween 1975 and 1985, but that the fertilityrateis the same in both groupsof states.The higher
pregnancyrate but similarfertilityrate in repeal statesis consistentwith greatersexual activityand/or
less contraceptioninduced,in part,by the protectionagainstunwantedchildbearingaffordedby the relatively greateraccessibilityof abortionservices.
10. The biggest drawbackto the SHR is theirreportingdeficiencies.Informationon the age andrace of
the offenderwhen missing is imputedbased on the known distributionby age/race/sex of victimsand
offendersby stateandyear (Maltz1999). Nevertheless,SupplementalHomicideReportsare widelyused
to trackcrime by age and race (Maltz 1999; Cook and Laub 1998; Fox and Zawitz2000). Moreover,I
use them in conjunctionwith murderarrestrates. Thus, a consistentrelationshipbetween abortionand
crimeacrossthese two measuresof homicideprovidesan importantcheck of these data.
11. Cohortis equal to year minusage.

Joyce
I structurethe difference-in-difference
(DD) analysisin two ways. In the first,I
comparechanges in crime by birthcohortsbefore and after exposureto legalized
abortion.This is closest to whatDonohueand Levittdo, but they use a continuous
measureof abortionto proxy unwantedchildbearing.The identifyingvariationis
based on cross-statechangesin crime amongcohortsof the same age. In the other
set of DDs, changesin crimeamongcohortsbefore and afterexposureto legalized
abortionin utero are comparedto changes among older cohortswho are close in
age, but who were unexposedto legalizedabortion.The identifyingvariationcomes
from within-statechanges in crime.
In the cross-stateDDs exposureis based on state/year-of-birthinteractions.Specifically,I definebirthyears 1967-69 as the pre-exposureyearsand 1971-73 as the
post-exposureyear in repealstates.I subtractchangesin crime amongcohortsborn
between 1967-69 and 1971-73 in nonrepealstates from changes observedfor the
same cohortsin repeal states.The identifyingassumptionis thatchangesin crime
among cohortsin nonrepealstates are a good counterfactualfor changes in repeal
states.A potentialproblemwith this strategyis thathardto measureperiodeffects,
suchas the spreadof crack,mayaffectcrimein repealandnonrepealstatesat different times andwith differentintensity.If so, then nonrepealstatesdo not providean
adequatecounterfactual(see Figures la and lb). To improvethe counterfactual,I
estimatemodels limitedto a subsetof statesin which therewas evidenceof crack/
cocaineuse in theirmajorcities between 1984 and 1989 as reportedby Groggerand
Willis (2000). TheseincludeColorado,Florida,Georgia,Illinois,Indiana,Louisiana,
Maryland,Massachusetts,Michigan,Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, andVirginia.I referto these as the comparisonstates.Thepurposeis to pair
repealstatesto a subsetof nonrepealstatesthatmayhave experiencedsimilarperiod
effects. The relevantregressionis as follows:
(1)

LnCajy = Po + f,(Repealj * Y70y) +

+
+

2(Repealj * Y7173y)
3(Repealy* Y7476y) + -4(Repealy * Y7779y)

Uaj +

Vay +

ajy

where LnCajyis the naturallogarithmof arrestsor homicides for age group,a, in

state,j, and year of birth,y. This is the same dependentvariableused by Donohue
and Levitt (2001). Repeal is a dummyvariablethat is one for repeal states; Y70,
Y7173, Y7476, and Y7779 are dummyvariablesfor cohortsbornin the designated
years. The omittedcategoryincludesthe birthyears 1967-69. Equation1 also includes fixed effects for age-state (Uaj) and age-year (Vay)interactions. Thus P2, the

coefficient on the interactionof Repeal and Y7173, measures the proportionate

change in crime between the 1971-73 and 1967-69 birthcohortsin repeal states
relativeto nonrepealstates.'2The coefficienton the otherinteractionterm,P3, mea12. Significantcourtdecisions in the fall of 1969 affectedabortionlaws in Californiaand Washington,
DC. Legalizationoccurredin Alaska in July of 1970, Hawaiiin Marchof 1970, New York in July of
1970 and Washingtonin Novemberof 1970. Given that the full impactof these reformson unintended
childbearingwould not be evident until 1971, I treatRepeal*1970 as a separateinteractionin orderto
compareperiodsclearlypre andpost the changein the legalization(see SklarandBerkov 1974;Gruber,
Levine and Staiger1999). Including1970 in the prelawperioddoes not affect my results.

11

12

The Journalof HumanResources

suresthe effect of nationallegalization.If abortionlowers crime,thenRoe v. Wade
shouldbring about a relativeimprovementin crime rates among nonrepealstates.
As a result,P3shouldapproachzero dependingon the speed of adjustment;and [4
shouldunambiguouslyequalzero as adjustmentto nationallegalizationis completed
(Gruber,Levine, and Staiger1999).
Results from the estimateof Equation1 are shown in Table 2. I display only
the coefficientson the interactionterms[2, P3and P4in Equation1. Thereare two
specificationsfor each measureof crime. The first includesall states and contrasts
The secondlimitsthe
changesin crimebetweenrepealrelativeto nonrepealstates.13
sampleto repealand 15 comparisonstates.
I have also includedestimatesof the reduced-formregressionusing the natural
log of state fertilityratesas the dependentvariable(Columns1 and 2). These estimates are almost identicalto those of Levine et al. (1999).14They show thatearly
legalizationin the repealstateswas associatedwith approximatelya 6 percentrelative decline in fertilityratesregardlessof whetherI use all 51 states(Column1) or
only repealand comparisonstates (Column2). NationallegalizationfollowingRoe
v. Wadehad no additionalimpacton fertilityrates in repeal states.
Estimatesin the firstrow of Table 2 indicatethat arrestsand homicidesfell for
cohortsbornbetween 1971 and 1973 relativeto those bornbetween 1967 and 1969
in repeal relative to nonrepealstates. These estimates are largely consistentwith
resultsobtainedby Donohueand Levitt (2001). Violent crime arrests,for instance,
declined5.0 percentmorein repealrelativeto nonrepealstatesover this period(Column3). This decline is similarin magnitudeto the effect obtainedby Donohueand
Levittwith a continuousmeasureof abortion.l5
However,two otherpatternsemerge
from these results that are less supportiveof the Donohue and Levitt hypothesis.
First,estimatesbasedon the subsampleof repealandcomparisonstatesarerelatively
small in magnitudeand statisticallyinsignificant.The coefficienton violent crime
arrests,for instance, is -0.026, half as large as when all states are included.A
of the comparisonstatesis thatthey all have largeurban
distinguishingcharacteristic
centerswith a sizeableAfrican-American
population.As such,the comparisonstates
a
more
credible
counterfactual
for changesin crimeamongthe repeal
may provide
states, which are dominatedby Californiaand New York. The other inconsistent
13. The unit of observationis the cohort/state/agecell. There are potentially4,896 observationsgiven
10 age groups,51 states andvariousyears.Threehundredand forty-oneobservationson arrestsand 157
on homicideare missing becausesome statesdid not reportarrestsor homicidesin selectedyears.There
are3 cells with zerosfor violentarrests,666 for murderarrestsand739 forhomicides.Themodelincludes
dummyvariablesfor all age and stateinteractionsas well as age and year of birthinteractions,as representedby the last two termsof Equation1. The specificationis identicalto thatof Donohueand Levitt
(2001) with the importantdifferencethat I have includedcategoricalvariablesto measuredifferential
exposureto legalizedabortioninsteadof the actualabortionratio.
14. Unlike Levine et al. (1999), I includeWashington,D.C. as a repealstate.
15. Donohueand Levitt multiplythe coefficienton abortionby 350, which is the differencein abortion
ratiosbetweenstatesin the top thirdversus bottomthirdof abortionratios.Using the resultsin Row 4,
Column1 of Table 1, this yields an effect of -5.3 percent(-0.015 * 350). The precisionof theirestimates
andmine differbecauseI allow for a more generalcovariancestructureamongstatesfollowingBetrand,
Duflo,andMullainathan(2002).Thisis implementedin Stataby clusteringon state.WhenI redoDonohue
and Levitt's regressionsof log arrestsand allow for a more generalcovariancestructure,the standard
errorsdouble.This is not surprisingsince 60 percentof their observationsassumean abortionratio of
zero, which probablyinducessubstantialserial autocorrelation.

Table 2

Reduced-Form Estimates of Fertility Rates and Log Arrests and Murders among 15- to 24-Year
and Nonrepeal States 1985-96

Ln FertilityRate
Women 15-44

Repeal 71-73
Repeal 74-76
Repeal 77-79
Only repealand
comparison
states?
R-squared
N

(1)

(2)

-0.065*
(0.011)
-0.015
(0.021)
0.004
(0.033)
No

-0.063*
(0.014)
-0.002
(0.025)
0.010
(0.037)
Yes

0.963
969

0.974
399

Ln Violent Crime
Arrests
(3)

(4)

Ln Property
CrimeArrests
(5)

-0.050
-0.026
-0.066+
(0.066) (0.070) (0.032)
-0.021
0.027 -0.069
(0.103) (0.116) (0.063)
-0.066
0.022 -0.089
(0.123) (0.145) (0.089)
No
Yes
No
0.983
4,552

0.979
1,890

0.982
4,555

Ln
A

(6)

(7)

-0.030
(0.039)
-0.014
(0.082)
-0.010
(0.126)
Yes

-0.108
(0.061)
-0.167*
(0.063)
-0.409*
(0.135)
No

0.976
1,890

0.929
3,889

Exceptfor Columns1 and 2, coefficients(standarderrorsbelow) are relativechangesin arrestsand homicidesin repea

birthcohorts(1971-73, 1974-76, and 1977-79) relativeto the 1967-69 birthcohorts.Columns1 and 2 show the reduc
each outcomethereare two specifications:Columns1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 use all states;Columns2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 use only
list of comparisonstates).All specificationsfor arrestsandhomicidesincludefixedeffects for interactionsof age and state
1 in the text). Standarderrorshave been adjustedfor intra-classcorrelationwithinstateby clusteringon state with Stata
cells in the full sampleof arrestand homicides:10 age groups,51 statesand a variednumberof age/year cells since th
1967 and 1979. Cells are lost due to nonreportingby states and zero crimes (see Footnote 13 in text). All regressions
+p < .05; *p < .01

14

The Journalof HumanResources

patternis that estimatesof P2 and 33in Equation1 exceed those of P1in absolute
value for murderarrestsand murders.As Gruber,Levine, and Staiger(1999) have
argued,one wouldexpecta relativedecreasein adverseoutcomesin nonrepealstates
following nationallegalization,which shoulddrive 52 and [3 to zero. Instead,I find
thatcohortsbornbetween1977 and 1979in repealstatesexperiencerelativedeclines
in murdersand murderarrestsof between 28 to 41 percent,much largerthan the
declinesexperiencedamongthe 1971-73 birthcohorts.Importantly,
thereis no relative decreasein fertilityfor cohortsbornbetween 1977 and 1979, whichundermines
a link between abortionand crime.16
Lastly,I divide the samplebetween 1985-90 and 1991-96 andreestimateEquation 1 separatelyfor the two subperiods.The resultsfor all statesare shownin Table
3. The patternis similarto what occurredwhen I split the samplein Table 1. If I
restrictthe sampleto those arrestedbetween 1985 and 1990, I find thatexposureto
legalized abortionin the repeal states is positively relatedto arrestsand murders.
By contrast,analysesof arrestsand murdersfrom 1991 to 1996 revealthe opposite.
Moreover,the coefficientsin each subperiodare large in absolutevalue and they
are unexpectedlylargerfor cohorts born after 1973 relativeto those born before
1973.
The temporalinconsistencycalls into questionthe DD strategybased on changes
in similarcohorts across states. Changesin crime in nonrepealstates will be an
inappropriatecounterfactual,if crack marketsdevelopedearlierand had a greater
impacton state crime ratesin repealrelativeto nonrepealstates. I turn,therefore,
to my alternativestrategyof using a within-statecomparisongroup to adjustfor
hardto measureperiodeffects. I focus firston the 1985-90 period,which provides
a broadcomparisonof aggregatedcrime and arrestratesof teen and young adults.
Donohue and Levitt have criticizedmy use of this period, since I fail to use data
fromthe 1990s.However,1985-90 is a usefulperiodbecauseI can createa plausible
within-statecomparisongroupthatwas clearlyaffectedby the upsurgein crime,but
thatwas unexposedto legalizedabortion.Second,I can analyzethe sameexperiment
by race given the availabilityof populationdata by state, year, and race for fiveyear age groups.This addsan importantdimensionto the test since the legalization
of abortionhad a much largereffect on black relativeto white fertility (Levineet
al. 1999;Angristand Evans 1999). I thenturnto a test of abortionand crimeusing
arrestand homicide rates in 1990s. I have to narrowthe age groups analyzedin
orderto isolatethose exposedandunexposedto nationallegalizationfollowingRoe.
However,I use some of the most crime-proneage groupsandthe narrowage bands
have the advantageof minimizingdifferencesin age-crimeprofilesbetweenthe exposed and comparisongroups.
16. Thereis virtuallyno differencein fertilityrates between repeal and nonrepealstates for the years
1977-79 despitethe fact thatthe abortionrateis 76 percentgreaterin repealstates(see Figure1 in Joyce
2001). For abortionto lower crime, therefore,it must be arguedthat abortionimprovedthe timing of
births,whichin turnhad an enormouseffect on the well-beingof the effectedcohorts.Indeed,the effects
of better-timedbirthson homicidehave to be an orderof magnitudegreaterthanthe effects associated
with an actualdecreasein fertilityfor this story to hold. This seems implausiblein light of the recent
literatureon the effects of delayedchildbearingamongteens (Geronimousand Korenman1992; Hotz,
McElroy,and Sanders1999).

Table 3
Split-Sample Reduced-form Estimates of Log Arrests and Murders among 15- to 24-Year-Olds b
and Nonrepeal States: 1985-90 and 1991-96
Ln Violent Crime
Arrests

Repeal 71-73
Repeal 74-76

Ln Murder Arr

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1985-90
0.054
(0.061)
0.194
(0.118)

1991-96
-0.045
(0.054)
-0.012
(0.076)
-0.054
(0.101)
0.987
2,635

1985-90
0.009
(0.027)
0.055
(0.060)

1991-96
-0.097+
(0.044)
-0.139
(0.081)
-0.183
(0.123)
0.987
2,636

1985-90
0.106
(0.059)
0.162
(0.208)

Repeal 77-79
R-squared
N

Ln Property Crime
Arrests

na
0.990
1,917

na
0.995
1,919

See note to Table2.

"na,"not applicablesince 15-year-oldsbornin 1977 would be arrestedafter 1990.

na
0.929
1,901

199
-0.
(0
-0.
(0
-0.
(0
0
2,

16

The Journal of Human Resources

14-

~~~~~12-Teen-~RepealYoung

Adult Repeal

10 8
X

TeenComparison

YoungAdultComparison

4
20
85

86

87

88

89

90

91
Year

92

93

94

95

96

Figure 2a
Violent Crime Arrest Rates for Teens and Young Adults by Repeal and Comparison States*
B. Comparisons by Year of Crime within Repeal and Nonrepeal States
In this analysis I compare the change in arrests and homicide rates among teens
between 1985 and 1990 to the change among young adults. Teens and young adults
in 1985 were born prior to 1971 and thus unexposed to legalized abortion in utero.
By 1990, almost all teens had have been born after 1970 but few of the young adults.
Thus, teens in repeal states go from unexposed to exposed between 1985 and 1990
and young adults remain essentially unexposed. A limitation of using a within-state
comparison group is that the age-crime profile of teens and young adults may differ.
Thus, I allow for a third set of differences (DDD) in which I subtract the DD in
nonrepeal states from the DD in repeal states. Since few teens in the nonrepeal states
were exposed to legalized abortion during this period, the DD in nonrepeal states
measures age effects under the assumption of common period and cohort effects.
Figures 2 and 3 present time-series of arrests and homicide rates stratified by
repeal and comparison states. A key observation is that the level and pattern of crime
among teens and young adults is more similar within states than across. This provides
visual support for the use of a within-state DD. To test for a cohort effect more
formally, I estimate the following regression.
(2) LnCRajt= Po + plTeena + 2(Teena*Repealj)
3(Repealj* Y8788,) + P4(Teena*Y8788,)
+ [5(Repealj * Y8990t) + P6(Teena*Y8990,)
+

+ 37(Teen*Repeal*Y8990) + Xj,t + Uj + V, + eajt

where LnCRajtis the natural logarithm of the arrest or homicide rate for age group
a (teen or young adult), in state j, and year t. Repeal is a dummy variable that is

Joyce
40-

Teens

Repeal

350.
30

Comparison

825
!

15

YoungAdults

Compaison
Comparison

10
5
^

85

86

0
0"

[r
87

88

89

90
91
Year

92

93

i .
94

!
95

96

Figure 2b
Property Crime Arrest Rates for Teens and Young Adults by Repeal and Comparison States*
Comparisonstatesinclude:CO,FL,GA,IL,IN,LA,MD,
*Repealstatesinclude:AK,CA,DC,HI,NY,WA;
MA,MI,MO,NJ,OH,PA,TX,VA

50-

45 -/45

Teen Repeal

40-

35?

YoungAdult Repeal

30
Y25
20

85

YoungAdultComparison

_.

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

Year

Figure 3a
Murder Arrest Rates for Teens and Young Adults by Repeal and Comparison
States*

96

17

18

The Journal of Human Resources

70^

60 -

~~~~~~~~~~60

Repeal
"^~~Teen

^^^

50
40 - YoungAdult Repeal
$

30

YoungAdult Comparison

20
Teen Comparison
100

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

Year

Figure 3b
Murder Rates for Teens and Young Adults by Repeal and Comparison States*

*Repealstatesinclude:AK,CA,DC,HI,NY,WA;
Comparisonstatesinclude:CO,FL,GA,IL,IN,LA,MD,
MA,MI,MO,NJ,OH,PA,TX,VA

one for repeal states; Y8788 and Y8990 are dummy variables for the designated years
and Teen is an indicator of those 15 to 19 years of age as compared to young adults
ages 20 to 24. The omitted category includes the years 1985-86. State and year
effects are represented by Uj and Vt, and Xjt is the matrix of control variables used
by Donohue and Levitt (2001) in their regressions of index crime rates. The DDD
estimate is 17, which measures the proportionate change in arrest or homicide rates
before and after exposure to legalized abortion (years 1985-86 versus 1989-90)
among teens relative to young adults in repeal relative to nonrepeal states. If abortion
lowers crime, then P7 should be negative.17
Results are displayed in Table 4. The first three columns show estimates for arrest
rates; the next three columns present estimates for homicide rates for all perpetrators,
then separately for whites and blacks. The sample in Panel A includes all available
states whereas Panel B is limited to repeal and comparison states only. The figures
in Row 1 represent the difference-in-difference of arrest and homicide rates (in logs)
between teens and young adults for the years 1989-90 and 1985-86 in repeal states.18
Thus, the natural logarithm of violent crime arrest rates rose 0.02 or 2.0 percent
17. ThereareseveraldifferencesbetweenEquations1 and2 thatmeritnote.In Equation2 I analyzearrest
and homiciderates,insteadof levels; I also aggregatearrestsand homicidesby age for teens (ages 15 to
19) andyoung adults(ages 20 to 24). Aggregationalso lessens the loss of cells due to zero homicidesin
a semi-logarithmicspecification.In addition,the regressionsareby year of arrestor homicideandnot by
Finally,the analysisis
year of birthexplicitly. This makesthe structureof the DDD more transparent.
limitedto the years 1985-90.
18. The DD estimatesare obtainedfrom the regressions.Using the notationfrom Equation2, the DD
estimatefor repealstates is P6+ V7.

Table 4
Changes in Log Arrest and Homicide Rates for Teens (15-19) Relative to Young Adults (20-24)
by Exposure to Legalized Abortion, 1985-90
ArrestRate for
Violent
Changesin Arrestsand Homicide(90-89)-(86-85): Teens
newly exposed,young adultsunexposed
1. DD, teens-adults,repealstates
2. DD, teens-adults,nonrepealstates
3. DDD (Row 1-Row 2)
R-squared
N

4. DD, teens-adults,repealstates
5. DD, teens-adults,comparisonstates
6. DDD (Row 4-Row 5)
R-squared
N

Property

Murder

Panel A: A
0.020
(0.031)
-0.010
(0.036)
0.030
(0.047)
0.934
594

-0.127*
(0.011)
-0.098*
(0.022)
-0.029
(0.025)
0.917
594

0.379*
(0.050)
0.210*
(0.044)
0.169+
(0.066)
0.867
576

0.019
(0.032)
-0.043
(0.052)
0.063
(0.060)
0.948
242

Panel B: Repeal and Co

-0.126*
0.380*
(0.053)
(0.011)
-0.127*
0.243*
(0.035)
(0.056)
0.137
0.000
(0.076)
(0.036)
0.919
0.938
241
242

Difference-in-difference-in-difference
(DDD) estimatesshow relativechangesin arrestandhomicideratesbetweenthose
in repealand nonrepealstates [Equation2 in the text]. Thereare 612 possible state/age/yearcells in the full sample(51
cells are due to a nonreporting
by statesand/or zero crimes.Standarderrorsare in parentheses.Modelsincludecontrolsf
generosity,concealedgunlaws, andbeertax as in DonohueandLevitt(2001). All modelsincludestateandyearfixedeffects
or race-specificpopulation,15 to 24 years of age. + p < .05; * p < .01.

20

The Journalof HumanResources

more among teens relativeto young adultsin repeal states between 1989-90 and
1985-86. In nonrepealstatesviolent crimearrestratesfell 1.0 percentmore among
teens relativeto young adults(Row 2). The DDD estimatesin Row 3 indicatethat
violent crime arrestratesincreased3.0 percentmore among teens in repeal states
relativeto teens in nonrepealstates adjustedfor within-statetrendsin arrests.
The last threecolumnscontrasttotalhomicideratesandthenseparatelyfor whites
and blacks. When limited to repeal and comparisonstates only (Panel B), we see
that white teen homicideratesrose 56 percentmore than homiciderates of young
adultsin repeal states and 44 percentmore than in comparisonstates. The correspondingchanges among blacks are 43 and 42 percentrespectively.Clearly,age
andperiodeffects are huge duringthis period.Not only is therea dramaticrelative
increasein teen homiciderates, but it occurs in both repeal and nonrepealstates.
As a result,the DDD estimatesprovideno evidencethatexposureto legalizedabortion amongteens in repealstateshad any dampeningeffect on the rise in homicide.
The lack of an effect on blackhomicideratesis particularlynoteworthy,since legalized abortionhad a greaterimpacton black relativeto white fertility.
C. Within-stateComparisonsin Nonrepeal states:
The Effect of Roe v. Wadeon Crime
The next set of analyses takes advantageof the second "naturalexperiment,"the
nationallegalizationof abortionfollowing Roe v Wade. I drop repeal states and
comparechangesin crimepre- andpost-Roein the 45 nonrepealstatesonly. I limit
the analysisto older teens and young adultsfor two reasons.First,I need a withinstate comparisongroupthat is close in age to the exposed groupbut born before
Roe; at the same time, however,I need age groupsthatcommitcrimesin the 1990s
in orderto test the associationbetweenlegalizedabortionandcrimeduringa period
of decliningcriminality.The relevantregressionis as follows:
(3)

LnCRajt= Po + [1Exposed + P2(Post_Roe * Exposed) + Uj + V, +Sajt

Let LnCRajt
be the naturallogarithmof the arrestor homicide rate for age group,
a, in state,j, and year, t; Exposedis a dummyvariablethat is one for age groups
that were exposed to legalized abortion in utero following Roe; the variable,
Post_Roe*Exposed,is an interactiontermfor the years afterRoe amongage groups
exposedto legalized abortionin utero.The next two termsare state and year fixed
effects, respectively.The coefficienton the interactionterm,[2, providesan estimate
of the DD: the changein crimeamongthe exposedrelativeto the comparisongroup
before and afterexposureto legalized abortion.
I estimatetwo versionsof Equation3. In eachI use only fouryearsof dataon arrests
andhomicides;thereare720 possiblestate/year/agecells.19In the first,I consider18and 19-year-oldsas the exposedgroupand 21- and 22-year-oldsas the comparison
group.Figures4a and4b illustratethe experiment.The years 1990 and 1991 arethe
pre-Roeperiodandthe years1993 to 1994 arethe post-Roeor exposureperiod.Eighteen and 19- year-oldsin 1990 and 1991 werebornprimarilybetween1971 and 1973
andthuslargelyunexposedto legalizedabortionduringpregnancyin the45 nonrepeal
19. Thereare 720 cells given 4 years X 4 age groupsX 45 states.

Joyce
3530-

Before

19
....

Proper18
30-

After
& 18.

25202
uz

X~

i 15-

Property21 & 22
Violent 18 & 19

10-

Violent 21 & 22
,

85

86

87

88

89

90
91
Year

92

93

94

95

96

Figure 4a
Violent and Property Crime Arrest Rates for 18- and 19-year-olds vs. 21- and
22-year-olds Before and After Roe in Nonrepeal States
states. By 1993-94 the 18- and 19-year-olds had been born after Roe and thus had
been exposed to legalized abortion. Twenty-one and 22-year-olds during this period
were born primarily before Roe and thus unexposed to legalized abortion.20
If the legalization of abortion following Roe lowered crime, then I would expect
to see a drop in arrest and homicide rates among the 18- and 19-year-olds relative
to 21- and 22-year-olds from the before to after period. Figures 4a and 4, however,
provide no evidence of a cohort effect. Rates of violent crime arrests are practically
identical for the two age groups. What is particularly impressive is the similarity in
the violent crime arrest rates prior to 1990, which supports the use of 21- and 22year-olds as a plausible comparison group. The plot for murder and murder arrest
rates point to significant period effects as all series begin to rise steeply around 1988
and peak between 1993 and 1994.
The second set of analyses compares changes in arrest and homicide rates among
different groups of young adults. In this exercise 20- and 21-year-olds are the exposed group and 23- and 24-year-olds the comparison group. Figure 5 presents a
20. Severalotherdecisions about the design of the analysismerit note. First, I comparepairs of agegroupsin orderto lessen the problemof smallcell size. Second,thereis not a directone-to-onematching
betweenage at arrestand year of birth.A 19-year-oldarrestedin Januaryof 1991, for example,could
have beenbornin Januaryof 1971 if he were 19 yearsand 12 monthswhen arrested.Similarlya 19-yearold arrestedin Decemberof 1991 could have been bornin Decemberof 1972 if he hadjust turned19.
In otherwords,thereis roughlya two-yearwindow to the birthyear, which may contaminateexposure
to the law. Forinstance,the 19-year-oldarrestedin 1993 couldhavebeenborneitherin 1973, andperhaps
unexposedto legalizedabortionduringpregnancy,or in 1974andthusexposed.I tryto minimizetheimpact
of suchcontamination
by choosingyearsandage groupssuchthatthepre-Roeyearsincludeprimarilybirth
years 1971-73 with the greatestconcentrationin 1972. The same is true of the post-lawperiod.

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The Journal of Human Resources

50
45

- MurderArrests 18 & 19
- MurderArrests21 & 22
--A- MurderRate 18 & 19

40

0
0
0

35-

/11111-

3- MurderRate 21 & 22

30
0
C)

-0

25
20
15
10
5

After

Before
,

n
u

85

86

87

88

89

91
90
Year

92

93

94

95

96

Figure 4b
Murder Arrest and Murder Offending Rates for 18- and 19-year-olds vs. 21- and
22-year-olds Before and After Roe in Nonrepeal States

25

Before

Property20 & 21
,&

20

&
b

x.. x

S 15-

--"'

After

x x.

x"
Property23 & 24

< 10
Violent 20 & 21
5

~=t_rp?6"=A

Violent 23 & 24

I'll
I
v

85

85

86

86

87

87

88

88

89

89

90

90

91

91

92

92

93

93

9496

94

95

96

Year

Figure 5a
Violent and Property Crime Arrest Rates for 20- and 21-year-olds vs. 23 and 24year-olds Before and After Roe in Nonrepeal States

Joyce
45

40 3530

Before
MurderArrests20 & 21
- MurderArrests23 & 24
~ MurderRate 20 & 21
-^Murder Rate 23 & 24

After

/
/

25-

1510 5
0

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

Year

Figure 5b
Murder Arrest and Murder Offending Rates for 20- and 21-year-olds vs. 23-and
24-year-olds Before and After Roe in Nonrepeal States
visual comparison. Because the exposure group includes individuals 20 and 21 years
of age, instead of 18 and 19 as in Figure 3, the pre-Roe period is now 1992-93 and
the post-Roe or exposure period is 1995 and 1996. Again, with the exception of
property crime, the pre-Roe levels and trends in arrest and homicide rates are similar.
Moreover, there is little to suggest that arrests or homicide rates fell differentially
for 20- and 21-year-olds relative to 23- and 24-year-olds before and after exposure
to legalized abortion.
The regression estimates of P2 in Equation 3 are displayed in Table 5. Given
Figures 4 and 5, it is not surprising that I find that exposure to legalized abortion
following Roe v. Wade has no effect on arrest or homicide rates of the two exposed
groups. Consider arrestrates for violent crime in Panel A. The estimated coefficient,
0.064, indicates that violent crime arrests rose 6.4 percent more among teens 18 to
19 years of age relative to 21- and 22-year-olds. The remaining DDs indicate that
Roe had a statistically insignificant and qualitatively unimportant impact on arrest
and homicide rates.
Finally, a criticism of the difference-in-differences strategy is that it fails to exploit
the variation in abortion, and by proxy unwanted childbearing, across states and over
time. To address this point, I reestimate Equation 3 separately for states with abortion
rates above and below the median abortion rate in 1973. Recall that Donohue and
Levitt assume that the abortion ratio is zero in all 45 nonrepeal states in 1972. As
noted above this assumption is extreme. Nevertheless, the absolute change in resident
abortion rates between 1972 and 1973 in nonrepeal states is correlated with the level
of the abortion rate in 1973.21The weighted mean abortion rate in 1973 for states
21. The unweightedcorrelationis 0.72 and the correlationweightedby populationof women 15 to 44
years of age is 0.28.

23

Table 5
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Log Arrest and Homicide Rates among Selected Age Grou
to Legalized Abortion Before and After Roe: Nonrepeal States 1990-96
Arrest Rate for
Violent
(1)

Property
(2)

Changes (1994-93) minus (1991-90):

18 and 19 exposed, 21 and 22 comparison group
R-squared
N

0.064*
(0.022)
0.908
656

Panel A: 18 and 19 year-o

0.051+
(0.017)
0.909
656

Changes (1996-95) minus (1993-92):

20 and 21 exposed, 23 and 24 comparison group
R-squared
N

0.062*
(0.018)
0.875
660

Panel B: 20 and 21 year-ol

0.095*
(0.018)
0.853
660

In each panel,the youngerage groupswent fromunexposedto exposedto legalizedabortionduringpregnancy.In PanelA

90 were bornbetween 1971 and 1973 and unexposedto legalizedabortion.These same aged teens in 1994-93 were bor
exposed.By contrast,21-22 year-oldsin 1994-93 were bornprimarilybetween 1971 and 1973 andthus were neverexp
entireperiod.The comparisonsin PanelB are structuredsimilarly.Thereare 720 possible state/age/yearcells (45 states x
due to nonreportingby statesand/or zero crimes.Models includecontrolsfor age, year and state. Standarderrors(in pa
within state.Regressionsare weightedby the statepopulation.+p < .05; *p < .01.

Joyce
below the medianis 6.6 abortionsper 1,000 women 15 to 44 as comparedto 16.0
effect of abortionon crime,
in statesabovethe median.If thereis a "dose-response"
then the effect of Roe v. Wadeon arrestand homicide rates should be greaterin
absolutevalue for the stateswith greaterabortionratesin the year immediatelyfollowingRoe. I findno evidenceof suchan effect. Estimatesfromthe separateestimation of Equation3 for high and low abortionstates differ inconsequentiallyfrom
the pooled resultsin Table 5 (resultsnot shown but availableupon request).
The significanceof the findingsin Table 5 is that the DDs pertainto years in
which arrestand homiciderates were falling or beginningto fall. Moreover,they
pertainonly to nonrepealstates and providea test that is unaffectedby the heavily
weightedinfluenceof New York and California.Third,the narrowerage difference
betweenthe exposed and unexposedenhancesthe credibilityof the counterfactual
as evidencedby the similarityin the level andtrendin the arrestand homiciderates
well beforelegalization.Fourth,they providecompellingevidencethatthe negative
associationbetweenabortionand crimebetween 1991 and 1997 is spurious(Tables
1 and 3), the result of inadequatecontrolsfor hard to measureperiod effects that
vary by state.

IV. Conclusion
DonohueandLevitt(2001) presentan intriguingassociationbetween
the growthin abortionand the decreasein crimein the 1990s. The evidence I have
presentedquestionsthe magnitudeof the associationand its causal interpretation.
The primarydifferencebetweenDonohueandLevitt's approachand mine is one of
identification.We all agree that the impactof crack and its spillovereffects had a
dramaticinfluenceon crime and that its impactvariedby state, year and age. The
problem,therefore,is how to identify a cohort effect, such as the legalizationof
abortion,amidststrongage andperiodeffects. WhatI have triedto show is thatthe
comparisonof changesin crime across states,the essence of the state fixed effects
methodology,is flawedbecausethe periodeffects vary by stateand year. Thus,my
preferredidentificationstrategyuses a within-statecomparisongroupto difference
out changesin crimerelatedto the unmeasuredperiodeffects. The weaknessof this
strategyis that my comparisongroups differ in age from the groups exposed to
legalizedabortion.Since age-crimeprofilesmay differ,the comparisongroupsmay
not providethe appropriatecounterfactual.To minimizethis problemI firstused a
difference-in-differences-in-differences
(DDD)estimatebasedon a DD withinrepeal
statesto eliminateperiodeffects anda secondDD in nonrepealstatesto net out agecrimedifferences.However,given the increasingexposureto legalizedabortionover
time, I could not repeatthis strategyduringthe years of falling crime in the 1990s.
I overcamethis by focusing only on nationallegalizationfollowing Roe and by
limiting the analysis to groups closer in age but still with differentexposuresto
legalizedabortion.WhatI foundcompellingwas thatthe age-crimeprofilesfor these
cohortsin the years leadingup to Roe were remarkablysimilar(see Figures4 and
5), which suggeststhatthe older cohortsprovideda crediblecounterfactual.
In closing, however,it would be useful to pull back fromissues of measurement
andidentificationandask moregenerallywhy a cohorteffect associatedwith legal-

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The Journal of Human Resources

ized abortion was not more evident in the data. I have two explanations. First, the
actual number of unintended births averted, although significant, was an order of
magnitude less than the number of reported legal abortions in the early 1970s. Many
analysts, including Donohue and Levitt treat reported abortions as an appropriate
counterfactual for unintended childbearing. I have questioned this strategy because
the availability of legal abortion may figure into decisions regarding sex and contraception, which weakens the link between abortion and fertility. Second, analysts, I
being one, have tended to overestimate the selection effects associated with abortion.
A careful examination of studies of pregnancy resolution reveals that women who
abort are at lower risk of having children with criminal propensities than women of
similar age, race and marital status who instead carried to term. For instance, in an
early study of teens in Ventura County, California between 1972 and 1974, researchers demonstrated that pregnant teens with better grades, more completed schooling,
and not on public assistance were much more likely to abort than their poorer, less
academically oriented counterparts (Leibowitz, Eisen, and Chow 1986). Studies
based on data from the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS) and the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) make the same point (Michael 2000;
Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders 1999). Indeed, Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders (1999)
found that teens who abort are similar along observed characteristics to teens that
were never pregnant, both of whom differ significantly from pregnant teens that
spontaneously abort or carry to term. Nor is favorable selection limited to teens.
Unmarried women that abort have more completed schooling and higher AFQT
scores than their counterparts that carry the pregnancy to term (Powell-Griner and
Trent 1987; Currie, Nixon, and Cole 1995). In sum, legalized abortion has improved
the lives of many women by allowing them to avoid an unwanted birth. I found
little evidence to suggest, however, that the legalization of abortion had an appreciable effect on the criminality of subsequent cohorts.

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